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The Balance between Legislative and Executive Power: A Study in Comparative Constitutional
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Author(s): Karl Loewenstein
Source: The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Jun., 1938), pp. 566-608
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THE BALANCE BE'WEEN LEGISLATIVE AND
EXECUTIVE POWER: A STUDY IN COM.
PARATIVE CONS'T'lIUTIONAL LAW*
KARL LOEWENSTEINt
I N REVOLUTIONARY therealpolitical
periods,
ly obscuredby the persistent
issuesarefrequent-
applicationof an obsoletescientific
terminology whichdenotesattitudesand patternsof behaviorno
longerin conformity withactualconditions.Particularlyinpoliticalthe-
orytheuse of traditional termsmaybe misleading and confusing.The
postulateof a balanceor equilibrium betweenlegislativeand executive
powers,revealsits ancestryfromthe customary divisionof
tri-partite
stateactivitiesintothelegislative,
executive,andjudicialfunctions tradi-
tionallyassociatedwithMontesquieu.Anyrealistic discussion,
therefore,
ofwhathasbecome,intheserecentyears,thecrucialissueofgovernment
andconstitutional lawneedsclarification
ofterms.In itsoriginalmeaning
thedoctrine oftheseparation ofpowerssignifies anddetermines, by con-
trastandjuxtaposition, thecomponent partsofstatepowerundertheas-
sumption of a staticsystemwhich,in thespiritof theage whenit was
formulated, organizestheactivitiesofthestateby wayofa divisionbe-
* Thisarticleis in substance
theenlarged
andannotated ofanaddress
version presented
by theauthorat theSecondInternational of Comparative
Congress Law at theHagueon
August5, I937; it coversdevelopmentsto May i, 1938.
t ProfessorofPoliticalScience,Amherst College.
IThe mostup-to-date bibliography on contemporary politicalorganization in general
andontheproblems concerning therelationshipbetween andexecutive
legislative inparticular
is to be foundin tomex oftheEncyclopedie Fransaise, l'Etat modeme(1935)(citedhere-
after, E.F.; thefigure quotedindicatesthe"fascicule," notthepage,according tothedivision
ofthevolume;thenameaddedis thatoftheindividual author;literatureis contained in the
appendix Io. B-i ff.);seeIO64.-4 (Gordon).Compare Barthelemy, Le roledupouvoir ex6cutif
dansles republiques modemes(I907); Dendias,Le renforcement des pouvoirsdu chefde
l'6tatdanslesdemocraties parlementaries(I932); Dendias,Le chefde l'etatrepublicain et le
rajustement de l'ex6cutif (au seuilde la dictature)(1937);Gordon, Les nouvelles constitu-
tionseurop6ennes et le roledu chefde l'6tat(1932); Mirkine-Guetzevich, Les nouvelles ten-
dancesdu droitconstitutionnel (2d ed. I936); Barthelemy-Duez, Traitedu droitconstitu-
tionnel(I933), 252 ff.,6o4ff.;Esmein-Nezard, Elements du droitconstituoionnel fran;aiset
compare457 if.(7thed. 1921); Finer,Theoryand PracticeofModernGovernment 949ff.
(I932).
Muchvaluablematerialis scattered
also in Friedrich,
Constitutional
Government and
Politics(1937);see,however,
thereservations
madeby Loewenstein,
3I Am.Pol. Sc. Rev.
953 if. (1937).
566
LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER 567
tweenor distribution amongdifferent humanagencieswithinthe same

nationalunitofpoliticaladministration. Moreas politicalideologythan
as a standardofactual politicalorganizationthedoctrine thatthepolitical
powersofthestateshouldbe,bynecessity, distinguished and separatedin
accordance withtheobjectivesofstateactivities has serveditspurposein
the twilightperiodbetweenthe absolutemonarchy and thefullydevel-
oped constitutional state.
The presentpoliticalsituation, however,is characterized mostdecided-
lyby thefactthatall states,whether constitutional,authoritarian or dic-
tatorial,demonstrate theexistenceand necessity ofa politicaldynmamism
whichamountsin practiceto a moreor lesscompletemerger ofthelegis-
lative and executivefunctions.In consequencethereof, traditional
the
substantive or qualitativedistinction betweenthelaw-making function,
thatis thedrafting, and
enacting sanctioning of the law, and the execu-
tive,thatis theactual applicationof thelaw by wayof administration,
has beensuperseded, to a largeextent,by the quantitativepoliticalas-
cendancy of the executive. The government integratesthe will of the
stateas reflectedbothby legislation and administration. Thus todayex-
ecutiveactivitiesno longerconfine theirscopeexclusively to theapplica-
tionof thestatutesand to generaladministration, but have growninto
thegeneralpoliticalfunctions ofthegovernment forwhichenactment and
applicationof the law are onlyincidentalinstrumentalities of political
poweras such. In thissense,thetraditional staticsofstateactivityhave
becomesubmerged, in our time,in what one may call appropriately
thoughunscientifically politicalleadership.It is evidentthatto Montes-
quieu'stheory governmental decisionsandactionstranscending thefunc-
tionaldivision,forwhichthe Frenchdoctrinecoinedthe term"actesde
gouvernement," wouldbe irrelevant.2
2
By the termof "actesde gouvernement," a notionmoreor less unknownin thiscountry,is
meant the totalityof political acts of the governmentnot subjected to controlof courts or
otheragenciesofthestate. In reactionto the extremerationalizationofpoliticalpowerduring
the nineteenthcenturyin recentyearsthe rangeofdiscretionary actionofthe governmenthas
been constantlyenlarged. Continentalconstitutionaljurisprudenceand practiceallowsforan
increasinglybroad sphereofmerelypoliticaldecisionofthe government.In theUnitedStates,
wherethe tendencyprevailsof establishinga maximumof judicial controlover the adminis-
trativeactivities,the "political questions" may come relativelyclose to the European termof
"actede gotvernement"; see Tiaco v. Forbes,228 U.S. 549 (I913); Ex parteCooper, I43 U.S. 472
(1891). It is scarcelysurprisingthat the National Socialist doctrinecapitalized, although
ratherlate, on such a convenientnotionas a dogmaticgroundworkforthe irresponsibility of
the leadershipprinciple;see Ipsen, Politikund Justiz(I937).
For a generaldiscussionofthe"actesde gauvernement" see Duez, Les actes de gouvernement
(I935); Gros,Survivancede la raisond'etat 1106.14 (Corneille)(I932). The problemwas well
realizedby Locke in his Essay on Civil Government, ch. XI-XIII in the emphasisplaced on
568 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
I. A REALISTIC RE-EXAMINATION OF
MONTESQUIEU'S DOCTRINE
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES
The doctrineof the separationand its attendantpostulateof the mu-

tual checksof powers,already knownunderthe qualificationof "mixed
government"to the ancients,3became an ideal patternof political or-
ganizationin theeighteenthcentury,morepreciselyin theperiodbetween
the GloriousRevolutionin England of i688 and the FrenchRevolution
of I 789. Elaborated by JohnLocke4forthe ex postfactojustificationfor
the Whig compromisebetweenthe parliamentand the prerogativeof the
Crown which,by that time,had been reducedfromroyal absolutismto
constitutionalfunctionalism, the doctrinewas cast into its definiteshape
by Montesquieu.5 Incidentally,as a memberof the aristocracyde robe,
the presidentof the courtof Bordeaux was deeply interestedin the de-
fense of traditionalrightsof the judiciary branch against the Crown.
It is herebeside the point to emphasizethat Montesquieueitherdeliber-
ately idealized or unintentionally misinterpretedcontemporaryBritish
the discretionarypower of the "Prerogative."While Montesquieu's arrangementwhich
attributesto the executivethe functionof "d'executerles resolutions publiques"(Esprit des
lois, book XI, chapter6) impliesthe strictdependenceof the government on previouscom-
mandsofthelegislature.
3 Aristotle,Polybius,Thomas Aquinas; Harringtonand Bolingbrokein England. See de
la Bigne de Villeneuve,La findu principede la separationdes pouvoirs9 if. (I934) The once
much discussedclassificationof states or governments, today a ratherstale topic,is, in the
last analysis,theteleologicalversionofthejustification of"mixed"government as correspond-
ing best to humannature.
4 On Locke's contributionto the doctrinesee de la Bigne de Villeneuveop. cit. supra
note 3, at i6 ff.
s The literatureon Montesquieuis immense.Althoughno efforts have beensparedby con-
stitutionallawyersto stretchhis loose terminology to the utmost,the real approachcan be
found not throughlegal but only throughsociologicalinterpretation. In addition to de la
Bignede Villeneuve,op. cit.,supranote3, see thefollowing selectionofreferences:Duguit,La
separationdes pouvoirset l'assembleenationalede I 789 (i893); Barthelemyand Duez, op. cit.,
supra note i, Esmein-Nezard,op. cit. supra note i, 493 if. (8th ed. I927); Girons,Essai sur
la separationdes pouvoirsdans l'ordrepolitique,administrative et judiciaire(I88I); Levin,
The PoliticalDoctrinesofMontesquieu'sEspritdes lois (1936) (withelaboratebibliography as
to the classicalbackground);Carrede Malberg,Contributions a la theoriegeneralede l'6tat,
p. 2 if.(I926); Eisenmann,L'Esprit deslois et la separationdes pouvoirs,in: MElangesCarrede
Malberg,p. I65 ff.(I933); Haikal, Le Presidentdu Conseilet l'volution du regimeparlemen-
taire en France 3 ff.(I937); Loewenstein,Volk und Parlamentnach der Staatstheorieder
franz6sischen Nationalsammlungvon 1789 (I922), passim; Zweig, Die Lehre vom pouvoir
constituant,62 if. (1909); i Finer, Theory and Practice of Modem Government153 ff.
(1932); E.F. 1063.7(H. Puget).
LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER j69
institutions6in that in Englandof the eighteenth centurythe cabinet
systemwithits implications ofpoliticalpartiesand ministerial responsi-
bilitywas alreadyclearly in the making. It should be borne in mind,
however, thattheominousterm,separationofpowers,is nowherefound
expressisverbisin Montesquieu'sfamousChapter 6 of Book XI of
L'Espritdeslois; on thecontrary, it is stressedthatthepowersmustcol-
laborate:"Le pouvoirarretele pouvoir."What is evenmoreimportant
is thefactthatthedoctrine, whether itshistoricalderivationwas trueor
false,served hereafteras a ramrod againstroyal absolutism both in Eu-
ropeandbeyondtheseas. Thusa historical misunderstanding becamethe
foundation oftheconstitutions on theNorthAmericancontinent.7 Here
thedogmahas retaineditsspell to our own day. Some ofthe most impor-
tantpartsof theso-calledNew Deal of thepresentadministration have
beeninvalidatedrecently by arguments whichseemto be drawndirectly
fromMontesquieu'srigidpostulateof a strictconfinement of theexecu-
tiveandlegislative functions to theirproperspheres.8Undertheinfluence
of traditionalistconceptions whichare so surprisingly frequentin this
country,9theUnitedStatesstands todayout as theonlystatein whicha
clearbalancebetweenlegislativeand executivepowershas been main-
tainedconstitutionally.This dogmatictenacity, upheldevenin theface
offundamental and
changesin economicstructure socialthought, is per-
hapsone oftheexplanations whythiscountry, otherwise unusuallyfor-
tunatein its pragmaticconstitutionalism, experiences today whatsome
considerto be a majorconstitutional crisis.Thus thepostulateof func-
tionaldualism,implying theequilibrium betweenthepowers,is on trial
eveninthecountry whichexemplifies thedoctrine kath'exochen.
6 See Dedieu,
Montesquieuetla tradition anglaiseenFrance(190o9);Carcassonne,
politique
Montesquieu et le de
probleme la constitution
frangaiseau I7i*mesi&cle(1928); Klimovsky,
Die englische
Gewaltenteilungslehrebiszu Montesquieu(I927). Compare alsoMontesquieu's
ownobservations inBookX ch.6 oftheEspritdeslois.
7 On theinfluenceofMontesquieu on theAmerican constitutions(stateand federal)see
Nos.XLVII and XLVIII ("theoraclewhich
i Finer,op.cit.supranote5,at i62 if.;Federalist,
is alwaysconsulted andcitedon thissubject").Wright, A Sourcebook ofAmerican Political
Theory,282 ff.,343ff.(1929); Erlick,La separationdespouvoirsetla constitutionf6deralede
I787 (1936). Knust, Montesquieu und die der
Verfassungen Vereinigten Staatenvon Amerika
(I922).
Corporationv. UnitedStates,295 U.S. 495, 529 (I935);
8 A.L.A.SchechterPoultry Panama
RefiningCorporationv. Ryan, 295 U.S. 388, 414 (i935).
9For morerecentcriticism of theseparationand thechecksand balancesdoctrine see:
Fairlie,The Separation ofPowers,21 Mich. L. Rev. I (I923); Powell, Separation ofPowers,
ofPowers,28 Pol. Sc. Q. 34 ff.(I9I3).
27 Pol. Sc. Q. 193 ff.(1912); Powell,Separation
570 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGOLAW REVIEW
FAILURE OF PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE THEORY IN EUROPE
On theotherhand,attempts in Europeto operatea statein termsof

ofpowerswereshortlived,
thestrictseparation as evidencedbytheFrench
constitutionof I79I.10 By somesortofinherentnecessitythe techniqueof
government, bentuponachieving theunityofthewillofthestate,led to
the systemof mutualinteraction of and reciprocal interdependence be-
tweenthelegislative andtheexecutive whichis generally spokenofas the
parliamentary system.The cabinetorcouncilofministers, whiledepend-
enton thelegislativeassembly, formstheunifying linkbetweenthetwo
powersand createsthereby theunityofpoliticalpower.In fact,parlia-
mentarism is theoppositeoftheseparation ofpowersin thatit aimssuc-
at
cessfully converting the functional dualism intostatemonismby es-
tablishinga clearpreponderance ofthecabinetorexecutive overthepar-
liamentor legislative.Wheredevelopment and rationalization of party
lifehasledto theparliamentary as in
system, England-a priceless giftof
theAnglo-Saxon politicalgeniustoorganized society-thedoctrine ofthe
separationofpowerswas necessarily jettisoned, and fusion of executive
and legislative,or at least mutualinterdependence of parliamentand
government ensued.Such an evolutiondid not prevent,however,the
dogmaof separationobstinately beingheldsacrosanct"' although, by a
subtletransformation ofitscontent, it servednolongerforthefunctional
purposesofgovernmental technique, but fortheteleological aimsof the
ruleoflaw ("Rechtsstaat").
A peculiarversionof the balancebetweenlegislativeand executive
OOn the Frenchconstitutionof 1791 see L.
Duguit, op. cit. supra note 5; Loewenstein,
op.cit.supranote5,passim.In reality,
theconstitutionoftheConstituante wasbuilt,inspite
oftheroyalveto,ontheinherent assumption ofthesupremacy ofthelegislative; seeRedslob,
Die Verfassungstheorie
derfranz6sischenNationalsammlung von1789 (19I2). Aulard,His-
toirepolitiquede la frangaise553ff.(1926); Esmein-N&zard,
op. cit.supra note i, at p. 471 if.
" See Finer,op.cit.supranote at
5, x67ff.Theefforts oftheclassicalschoolofFrench con-
stitutional theorists
tosquarethecirclebetweenthedogmaoftheseparation ofpowers andthe
conflicting oftheparliamentary
reality systemarethecoreofthefamous controversy between
Esmein,op. cit.supranotex,at 505ff.on theonehand(followed by Duguit)and Carrede
Malbergop.cit.supra note5,at 74ff.ontheotherwhois boldenoughto declarethemainte-
nanceofMontesquieu's doctrine
meresophistry.See also Eisenmann, op. cit.,supranote5
(whocontends thatMontesquieu didnotseparategovernment andparliament strictlyspeak-
ing,butassigned to eachpoweronlyjuridical,
notpoliticalindependence). Similar laborious
effortsare madeevenin England;see,e.g.,Wade and Phillips,Constitutional Law, 38 ff.
(I93I). On thesolutionto be foundin distinguishingbetween "power"and "function" see
Arthur, "Separation despouvoirs"et"separation
desfonctions,"Revuedudroitpublic217 if.
(I900oo).Thistheory, whichpermitsthemaintenance ofthedogmawhiledeviating fromthe
premises in practice,has beenextremely forreconciling
helpful delegationoffunctions with
nominal separationofpowers.
LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER 57I
powergrewout of theevolutionof constitutional monarchy of the Cen-

tralEuropeantype,e.g.,in Francebetweeni8i5 and I848, in Germany
beforeandafterI870, andin theAustro-Hungarian monarchy.12 Herethe
Crown,in exercising the royalprerogative, was able to counterbalance
theparliament as therepresentation ofthepopularwillby thedeviceof
the discretionary appointment of the ministers who wereresponsible to
theCrownandnottotheparliament.In thesecountries existedwhatmay
be called,withduereservations, thesuccessful establishmentofan equilib-
riumbetweenthe executiveand the legislativepowersbecause,forthe
sakeofavoidinga deadlock,pregnant withrevolution, somesortofcom-
promisealwayshad to be found.Bismarck's reaction againstthePrussian
dietin theearlysixties,however, showsthatthisprecarious balancewhen
seriouslydisturbed, resultedinvariablyin theunchallengeable ascendancy
oftheexecutive.13
Wherepoliticaldynamicsdevelopeda parliamentary monarchy as in
Englandtoward the end of the eighteenthcenturyand, more decidedly,
afterI832, or in Belgiumafteri83I,14or in FranceundertheJulymon-
archy,15theCrownwas moreor lessreducedto thefunction ofstabilizer
or moderator ofpartypolitics;'6 by necessitythe center ofgravityshifted
, On the constitutional monarchy see Jellinek,Allgemeine Staatslehre696 if. (3d ed.
1922); Friedrich,op. cit. supra note i, at I50 if. On the German Imperial constitution of
I871 see Mattern,Principles of the Constitutional Jurisprudenceof the GermanNational
Republic,55 ff.(I928); Meyerand Anschutz, Lehrbuch des deutschenStaatsrecht 270 ff.,
329ff.(7thed., I918); Kaufmann, ZurLehredesmonarchischen Princips(i906); Rehm,Das
politischeWesenderdeutschen Monarchie, in: FestgabefiirOttoMayer,59 ff.(I916). The
classicaltreatiseon thesubjectis by Constant, Coursde politiqueconstitutionnelle (I86I)
(oneofmanyeditions).
'3 Seenretrospectively, ofthePrussian
thefailure dietinthefamous withBismarck
conflict
was
overthearmyappropriations perhaps the decisiveeventinmodem German history; ifthe
parliament had succeededin asserting itselfagainstthe executive,Germany wouldhave
reachedtheparliamentary system andthehistory ofEuropeandtheworldmight havetakena
differentturn. Compare i Bismarck, Gedenken und Erinnerungen,316 if., 326 if. (I915);
Weber,Parlament imneugeordneten
undRegierung in: Gesammelte
Deutschland, politische
SchriftenI30 if.(I92I).
'4 On Belgiumsee Redslob, Le regimeparlementaireo100ff.(1924); Pirenne,Histoirede la
de l'Europe,
I830 dansl'Ivolutionconstitutionnelle
Belgique(I932); Mirkine-Guetz6vitch,
Revue de 'histoiremodeme 241 ff.(I931); E.F., IO68.10-12(Pirenne).
ISSee Barthelemy-Duez, op. cit. supranotei, at 175ff.;J. Barth?lemy, L'Introduction
du regi'une
parlementaire en France sous LouisXVIII et CharlesX (I933).
16The theoretical foundation oftheideais dueto Constant, op. cit.supra note12. On the
positionoftheCrownin Englandsee Ogg,EnglishGovernment andPolitics,at 82 ff.(I930).
Z. Marriott,The Mechanismof theModern State 25 ff.(I927); Wade and Phillips,op. cit.
supranote Ii, at 6i ff.,I49 ff.On thepositionofmonarchy todayseeLoewenstein, Monarchy
GainsLost Groundin Europe,ix Soc. Science202 (1936).
to the parliamentand the cabinet. The real issues of politicshad to be

decided firstbetweenparliamentand cabinet,lateron betweenthepeople
and the governmentwhen the electorateat the polls became the final
arbiter.I7
From the position of the Crown in the parliamentarymonarchythe
presidentas the head of the state in republicandemocraciesderivedhis
ratherrestrictedfunctionsas evidencedby France afteri875.18 On the
other hand, the traditionalinfluenceof the Crown in the constitutional
monarchymade itselffeltin the effortsto assign wider and more inde-
pendent powers to the head of the state under the Weimar republic,19
an experimentwhichwas bound to failbecause presidentialgovernment,
even in its limitedsense,is, in the last analysis,incompatiblewithparlia-
mentarycabinet government.20
I7Fromamongthemyriads ofbookson theparliamentarysystemmaybe quotedhere:
Redslob,Die parlamentarische editionof I924 citednote14 supra;
(I918) (French
Regierung
Hashach,Die parlamentarische (1919);Barthelemy,
Kabinettsregierung La crisede la demo-
cratiecontemporaine(1931); Barthelemy-Duez, op. cit.supra note i, I58 ff.;Esmein-Nezard,
op. cit. supra note i, vol. I, 154 if.; 4 Duguit, Traite du droitconstitutionnel 105 ff. (I924),
Finer,op. cit. supra,note5, vol.II, 949ff.on "monism"and "dualism"in theinterpreta-
tionoftheparliamentary system see Gouet,De l'unitedu cabinetparlementaire 8 ff.(1930);
Friedrich,op. cit. supra note i, at 342 ff.,36I ff.;Melot, L'evolution du regimeparlemen-
taire(1936) (containing contributions fromvariousauthorson thedifferent countries under
parliamentary government); Le regime
Burdeau, danslesconstitutions
parlementaire d'apres-
guerreEuropeennes Les nouvellestendancesdu droitcon-
(I932); Mirkine-Guetzevitch,
stitutionnel(2d ed. I936); Capitant, in: MelangesCarr6de Mal-
Regimesparlementaires,
berg, 3 if. (1933); Mirkine-Guetzevitch,
Le regimeparlementairedans les constitutions
europ6ennes in:Annuaire
d'apresguerre, del'Institut
international
dudroitpublicI936,39if.
(1937); E.F. io68.i (Barthelemy,Histoiredu regimeparlementaire);io68.2-4 (Barthelemy,
France); 1068.5-I4 (othercountriesby variousauthors).
18Ontheposition
ofthepresident
inrepublican
statessee Barthelemy-Duez,
op.cit.supra
note i, at 45 ff.,606 ff.;Finer,op. cit.supranote 5, at I Io if.;Samelli,II capo dellostato nelle
costituzione dellerepubliche deldopoguerra (i935); compare alsotheliterature quotedsupra
note i.
E.F. 1068.3 (Barth6lemy);1064.1 (Gordon).
19Ontheposition
ofthepresident
undertheWeimar seeAnschiitz,
republic Die Verfassung
des deutschenReichs,241 ff.(4th ed. I933); Finer,op.cit.supranote 5, Vol. II, Io96 ff.;Hene-
man,The Growth of ExecutivePowerin Germany (I934); Kraus,The Crisisof German
Democracy(1932).
20
Thisimportant aspectwhichexplains at leastpartlythefailure
ofconstitutional
govern-
mentin Germany needsmoreclarification thanit canbe givenhere;compare theremarks of
op. cit.,supranotei, at 35I; see also Herrfahrdt,
Friedrich, Die Kabinettsbildungnachder
Weimarer Verfassung unterdemEinfluss derpolitischenPraxis(1927).Foranexcellent study
oftherelationsbetween cabinetandReichstag
president, seeRenchin,Le chefde l'6tatet la
constitutiondu cabinetau droitpublic allemand (I937), particularlyio9 if.; Wolgast,Zum
deutschenParlamentarismus(1929). The politicaltension
betweenpresident
and cabinet
resulted in theestablishment
ultimately oftheso-called"cabinetofcombat"-Kampfregier-
ofparliamentary
ung"-a perversion governmentunprecedentedinmodemgovernment short
ofdictatorship.
Thuswe notethat-withtheexception oftheUnitedStates-the doc-

trine of the between
balance,throughseparation, executiveand legisla-
tivepowersnowherecouldbe converted intoa lastingsuccess. The dog-
maticpostulate had become a myth,and,at that,oneofthemostinfluen-
tial of all timesin constitutional
theory.
MAINTENANCE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE FIELD

OF THE JUDICIARY FUNCTION
For all intentsand purposes,however, it becameaxiomaticforconsti-
tutionalgovernment that,in thethreefold divisionofpowers,thejudici-
arywas functionally divorcedfromtheothertwo,evenwhereappoint-
mentby theexecutiveseemedindispensable.21 Bothtechnically and psy-
chologically thedeviceforachievingindependence was lifetenureofmag-
istrates,anothergiftof the Anglo-Saxon politicalgeniusto themodern
state. Here again the UnitedStatesmaintainsa distinctposition.Not
onlywas thejudiciaryfunction keptindependent fromtheotherpowers,
butit becameintegrated intothesystemofchecksand balancesthrough
judicialreview of legislativeacts,whether theyare sponsoredby thead-
ministration or emanatefromtheinitiative of Congress.This additional
check,althoughnot explicitly envisagedby theframers of theconstitu-
tion22andsubsequently assailed as an interference
unjustified ofthecourts
withtheconductofgovernment, seems,inthelightofMontesquieu's doc-
trine,onlylogicalin establishing an "all-round"systemof checksand
balances. It is noteworthy, however,and by no meansaccidentalthat
judicial reviewcould implantitselfpermanently only in the country
wheretheseparation ofpowerswas institutionalized whileimitationselse-
21
See,e.g.,forEnglandWadeandPhillips, op.cit.supranotei , at 38 if.Undertheconsti-
tutionalmonarchy of the CentralEuropeanpattern, magistratesthoughappointedby the
government wereirremovable exceptbydueprocess(through regular disciplinary and
courts),
therefore theindependence ofthejudiciary wasas muchguaranteed as in Englandand con-
siderably moreso thanundertheelectivesystemin thiscountry.
= See Hamiltonin theFederalist Nos. 78-82;Marburyv. Madison,i Cranch(U.S.) I37
(I803). In viewoftheconflicting evidencepresentedintheNationalConvention theauthoris
inclined to assumethatjudicialreview,at leastforfederal
statutes,wasnotenvisaged delege
ferenda although theideaas suchwasbynomeansaliento American constitutionallawyersof
the period. See Hamiltonand Adair,The Power to Govern,I43 and notes 97, 98 (I937): "It
is clearenoughthattheConvention meantto adopt'judicialreview,'butit doesnotfollow
thattheirjudicialreviewis thejudicialreviewoftoday."Perhapsa clearerinsight intothe
maybe gainedby referring
statuscontroversiae to the veryanalogoussituationunderthe
Weimarconstitution of i919 wherejudicialreviewalthoughconsidered was leftundecided.
Whenjudicialreviewwasadoptedlateroninpractice(to a verylimited thejustifica-
extent),
tionwas evolvedbyconstitutional theoryon similarpremisesas in thiscountry,namelyby
the idea of the supremacyof the constitutioninherentin the writtendocument.
wherefailedto gaina lastingfoothold,23 evenwhereconditions wereas

auspiciousas, forexample,in Switzerland.24 In no countryoperatedon
thebasisofa genuine parliamentary systemwas judicialreviewworkable
as shownbyrepublican Germany25 orby Czechoslovakia whereat present
it has completely disappeared.26
Whileindependence of the judiciarybecamethe veryrockbedand
touchstone of constitutional government, dictatorshipsweredrivenper-
forceto destroyalso thislast elementof the separationof powers.In
totalitarianItaly,Germany, and also,to a lesserextent,in someofthe
authoritarian states,judicialindependence hasbeensuperseded bypoliti-
cal coordination accomplished usuallyby purgesof thebenchand by a
selectiveprocessof appointment on thebasis ofpoliticalconformity to
party tenetsor thetotalitarian demands of the regime.27
23 For abundant
literature
on judicialreviewin thevariouscountries
see E.F. 10 B-24;
1062.I6 (Puget); 1063.3-7 (Lambert). Further:Haines, AmericanDoctrineof JudicialSu-
premacy, Appendix II 573if.(2d ed. 1932), Haines,SomePhasesoftheTheory
andPractice of
judicialreview ofLegislation
in Foreign 24Am.Pol. Sci.Rev.583(I924).
Countries,
See also Beard,The SupremeCourtand theConstitution, 51 ff.(192); Haines,op. cit.
supra, at I26 if.
ForFranceseeBarthelemy andDuez,op.cit.supranotei, at 203 ff.;EsmeinandN6zard,
op.cit.supranotei, at 538ff.;Blondel,
Le contr6le de la constitutionnalitt
jurisdictionnel des
lois (1927).
ForGermany seeAnschiitz,
op.cit.supranoteI9, at 370off.;
2 Anschiitz-Thoma,
Handbuch
des deutschen
Staatsrechts
546if.;Mattern, op.cit.supranote12, at 590of.; Friedrich,
43
Pol. Sci. Q. I88 if.(1928); Friederich,op. cit.supranote i, at I67 if.
ForAustria seeEisenmann, La justiceconstitutionnelle
dela HauteCourConstitutionnelle
de l'Autriche (I928).
ForCzechoslovakia seeFlanderka, Le contr6le
dela constitutionnalitt
desloisenTschecho-
slovaquie(I926).
4 On
judicialreview inSwitzerland seeFleiner,Schweizerisches
Bundesstaatsrecht,44I ff.
(1923);Rappard,Le contr6le de la constitutionnalit6
desloisf&deralesparle jugeauxEtats
Uniset en Suisse(I934). Judicial review offederalcourtsexistsinSwitzerland onlyforcan-
tonallegislation; see Rappard,The Government of Switzerland50o,90o(937). A popular
initiativeforextending judicialreview to federal
statutes,introducedin I935,is as yetunde-
cided.
25 See forGermany:Weimarconstitution,articleI9; Anschuitz,
op. cit. supra note 19, at
159if.;forCanadaseeHeneman,
Dominion ofProvincial
Disallowance inCanada,
Legislation
31 Pol. Sci. Rev. 92 ff.(I937); 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 6i8 if. (I937); E.F. 1064.6 (Lambert).
26Sander,Das tschechoslovakische in derJahren1929-1935, in: 23 Jahr-
Verfassungsrecht
buch des 6ffentlichen
Recht, 263 (1936).
27 No details
can be givenhere.Note,however,thattheproblem ofciviljusticein dicta-
torialcountrieshasthusfarbeenlittleinvestigated.
ForGermany compare Loewenstein,Law
in theThirdReich,45 Yale L. J.779,805(1936),andibid.,notes94 to 96; Loewenstein,Dic-
tatorship andtheGerman 4 Univ.Chi.L. Rev.565(I937); Cot,La conception
Constitution,
hitleriennedu droit(1938).ForItalyseeSteiner,
The FascistConception ofLaw,36 Col.L.
Rev. 1267 ff.(1936).
THE TECHNICAL ASPECT OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE

SEPARATION OF POWERS
Furthermore,fromthe viewpointof governmentaltechnique proper,

cogentreasonsno longercan be foundfora rigiddistributionof executive
and legislativefunctionsof the state amongdifferent agencies. Obviously
practical considerationsnecessitatea divisionof labor since no singlein-
dividual or no single body of individuals is able to cope simultaneously
with the manifoldactivities of modernstate administration.Basically,
however,it is not intelligiblewhy the agencywhichdeliberatesand sanc-
tionsthe law shouldnot also take care ofits execution,that is the applica-
tion of the generalrule to the individual situation. It was no less an au-
thoritythan Rousseau obsessed by his idea of the generalwill as the ulti-
mate sourceof political action, who contendedthat legislationcould pro-
vide forall contingenciesand that, therefore, executionof the legislative
willshouldbe merelya subordinatefunction.28In themeantime,however,
the relationbetweenthe two functionshas been reversed. Administrative
action has become more importantthan legislative sanction. All state
activities tend to be mere instrumentalities of political leadership. The
main functionof the governmentis no longerthat of executingthe law
as the generalwill, but, on the contrary,that of guidingthe generalwill
and of exercisingleadership,qualities forwhichlegislativeor administra-
tive functionsare only means toward an end. Legislation has become a
functionof political leadership. As a rule,also in democraciesthe govern-
menthas the initiativeof and responsibilityforand, forexample in Eng-
land, the virtual monopoly of legislative action. The legislative assem-
blies as such may criticizeand even reject the government'sproposals,
but, as a rule, they are confinedto being principleconfirmingagencies
withoutambitionor potentialityof political leadership. Thus, the appli-
cation of the statuteto the individualsituationis moreor less an incident
oflegislativepower,or,legislationis merelyinstrumentalto the fulfillment
of the objectives of generalpolicy prescribedor dictated by the govern-
ment. Paradoxicallyone may even contendthat the agencywhichenacts
the law is best suited forcarryingit out. By theirverynature executive
and legislativeactions are only differentstages of the same political proc-
ess and the same political will. On the otherhand, technicallyas well as
morallythe postulateremainsunaffectedthat the judicial functionshould
be whollydivorcedfromboth the otherfunctionssince decidingof issues
and controversieson the basis of the law requiresevidentlya different
technique. Moreover,the judicial functionguaranteesjustice against the
28
Du Contratsocial, book III, ch. i.
holderof everyotherpowerand function, namely,thestate. But even

ifMontesquieu, in theenvironment oftheprimarily administrativestate
underabsolutism, in vindicating
was justified separatespheresofaction
forboththemakingand executing ofthelaw,hisbasicassertion is mate-
riallydisprovedby theexperience in all modemstateswherethegovern-
mentincreasingly assumesresponsibility and initiativeofthelegislative
function whichthelegislativebodiesarepolitically unableor technically
unfitto perform,as shownby thevastvolumeofdelegatedlegislation or
even executivelegislation,withoutexplicitdelegation, on the basis of
originalor usurpedordinance makingpowersof thegovernment.29 The
borderlinebetweenlegislationand administration, once a fundamental
maximoftheconstitutional state,has becomemoreand morevague. It
canscarcelybe denied,that,fromtheviewpoint oftechnicalachievement
thecombination
and perfection, oflegislative and executiveor adminis-
trativeobjectivesservesthepurposesofefficiency inmodernadministra-
tionbetterthanthesplitting up of an essentiallyuniform processinto
twoseparatedepartments. Thisconclusion mayappearas heresyto the
orthodox constitutionallawyer,butnonetheless itcorrespondstothereal-
itiesofmodemstateempiricism.
THE REAL IMPLICATION OF MONTESQUIEU'S DOCTRINE: SEPARATION OF
POWERS GUARANTEES POLITICAL LIBERTY
Suchcriticalobservations,drawnfromtheactualpoliticalsituation, do
notin theleastaffectthelastingand,in fact,immortal coreofthedoc-
trineofthegreatFrenchpoliticalrealist.Stripped ofitsmerely technical
which,as it has beenindicated,
implications, areno longerconvincing or
evencorrect,theethicalcontentremains unimpaired. In itsoriginalcon-
ceptionandpurposeitwasthemasterly politicaldevicewhichdismantled
royalabsolutismfortheultimate sakeofpoliticalliberalismalthough this
resultmayhavebeenbeyondMontesquieu's pragmatic intentions.The-
ory and practiceof contemporary dictatorialgovernment, whichis so
muchakinto theabsolutism oftheeighteenth century, amply justifyan
emphatic restatement of the irrefutable
arguments in favorof liberty
fromarbitraryoppression whichappearstodayno lessin theguiseofthe
29Thisis,ofcourse,
oneofthetopicsinwhichmodern constitutionallawis mostinterested.
Seep. 598infra,onthepleinspouvoirsanddelegated ForEnglandseeLordHewart
legislation.
ofBury,The NewDespotism TheParliamentary
(1929); Willis, PowersofEnglishGovern-
mentDepartments (X935);Robson,JusticeandAdministrativeLaw (1928); Allen,Lawinthe
Making304ff.(2d ed.,i930). Reporton Ministers Powers,Cmd.4060-1I932;Loewenstein,
Verfassungslebenin Grossbritannien 20 Jahrbuch
1924-1932, des offentlichenRechts297ff.
(1932); Jacoby,DelegationofPowers and JudicialReview, 36 Col. L. Rev. 871 ff.,882 ff.
(I936).
raisond'etatthanit did underCharlestheFirstor Louis theFourteenth.

Separationof powersis boundup withpoliticalliberty.It disappears
wherelibertyhas vanished.30 The foremost objectiveofanygovernment
whichdeservesthisnoblenameis thatof preserving and guaranteeing
politicalliberty. Says Montesquieu:"La libertepolitique dans un
citoyenestcettetranquillited'espritquiprovientde l'opinionque chacun
a de sa surete;et pourqu'on ait cetteliberte,il fautque le gouvemement
soiltelqu'un citoyenne puissepas craindre un autrecitoyen."'3In terms
ofmoderninterpretation politicallibertysignifiesandembodiestheruleof
law.32 Psychologicaland historicalexperienceprove to the hiltthe truthof
Montesquieu'smaximthatanyhumanbeingendowedwithpowerabuses
his powerto the detrimentof thosesubjectedto his domination.33 The
famouspassage should be quoted in full: "C'est une experienceetemelle
que touthommequi a du pouvoirestporteenabuser.I1 va jusqu'a ce qu'il
trouvedeslimites.Pourqu'onnepuisseabuserdupouvoiril fautqueparla
deschosesle pouvoirarretele pouvoir."34
disposition The technicalpresup-
positionofthedoctrineoftheseparation ofpowersmaybe historically un-
foundedand empirically disproved; its ethical namely,the
implications,
ultimatepurposeofprotectingpoliticallibertyagainsttheencroachments
of unlimitedpower,has been conducive,in thelast analysis,forsupple-
mentingthepostulateof thedivisionof powersamongdifferent human
agenciesby thedemandofmutualchecksand balancesamongthemfor
controllingpower. Onlycontrolled poweris justified power. Perhapsat
30See, e.g., Barthelemy,Precis du droit public 280 ff.(I937); E.F. 1063.7 (H. Puget);
1030.7 (R. Carr6 de Malberg). The opposite view prevailsof course in dictatorialconstitu-
tional law; see, e.g., Koehler, Grundlehrendes deutschenVerwaltungsrechts(x935). Koell-
reutter,Grundrissder allgemeinenStaatslehre87 ff.(1933). In Soviet-Russiaand in Turkey
the principleof the separationof powershas been explicitlyabandoned (priorto the consti-
tution).
3t Espritdes lois, book XI, ch. 6.
3 See the classic definitionby Dicey, Introductionto the Study of the Constitution,r79
ff.(8th ed. 9155). See, however,forincisivestricturesof Dicey's theoryJennings,Law and the
Constitution(I933). For definitionof the "Rechsstaa4"see Jellinek,op. cit.supra note 12, at
246 if.; McIlwain, Governmentby Law, 14 ForeignAffairsI85 if. (1936). On the disappear-
ance of the rule of law under National Socialism see Loewenstein,Law in the Third Reich,
45 Yale L. J., 779, 802 if. (1936).
33 For an illuminatingcase historyofthemaximthatpowercorruptspowersee Loewenstein,
The Dictatorshipof Napoleon the First,35 So. Atl. Q. 298 ff.(1936); Loewenstein,Opposition
and Public Opinion under the Dictatorshipof Napoleon the First, 4 Soc. Research 46I ff.
(1937); Loewenstein,Die DiktaturNapoleons des Ersten,14 Zeitschrift Recht
fiir6offentliches
457 if. (1936).
34 This passage is foundin chapter4 ofbook XI, thusprecedingthefamousdiscussionof the
Britishconstitutionin chapter6.
no timeinmodemhistoryhavethepsychological ofMontes-
ingredients
quieu'sdoctrinebeenmoreimperative.
II. HISTORICAL RETROSPECT ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN

LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER
CLARIFICATION OF THE TERM "EXECUTIVE"
Next in thisdogmaticapproachto thethesisofthebalancebetween
executiveandlegislativepoweritis necessary to determine moreprecisely
whatis meantby theterm"executive"as opposedto theterm"legisla-
tive." Whenusingthetermexecutive we mean,forthesakeofbrevity,
notthetitularheadofthestatebutthegovernment as a politicalagency
whichassumesresponsibility in thelegalsensebeforethecountry and in
the transcendental sensebeforehistory.Even in totalitarian dictator-
ships,as in Italy and in Greece,or in camouflaged dictatorships, as in
Austriaand Portugal,a titularhead,whether underthenameofkingor
ofpresident ofthestate,maysurviveas figurehead, although deprived of
actual powers. In democratic republics and monarchies of the parlia-
mentary type,too,thepresident ofthestateor thepersonaloccupantof
the thronehas surrendered his powers,moreor less completely, to the
cabinetorthegovernment. It shouldbe remembered here,however, that
in parliamentary monarchies suchas Belgium,theNetherlands or in the
Scandinavian countries35whichare equallysubjectto thevicissitudes of
partylife,theholderoftheroyaloffice has
recently acquired more mo-
mentumwithinthedynamicsof thestatethancouldbe expectedwhen
the historicalmissionof parliamentarism, namelythe neutralization of
theroyalprerogative, has beenaccomplished.36 Onlyunderpresidential
government properis thepresident as theheadoftheexecutive identical
withtheholderofrealpower,as intheUnitedStateswherethe"cabinet"
or the heads of the departments are his personaltrusteeswho are not
amenableto responsibility beforeCongress.37 Similarlyin Germany of
the Weimarconstitution, the presidentgainedpowerfarbeyondthe
originaltermsofhis office becauseofthecalamitousdelusioncontained
in the constitutionalschemeto the effect thatthe Reichs-Chancellor's
positioncouldbe made contingent bothon the confidence of thepopu-
3sOnSweden
seeTingsten,
L'volutionduparlementarisme in:Annales
Su6dois, del'Institut
du droitcompare3 ff.(1934); Braunias,Das parlamentarische Wahlrecht475 fif.(1932); Red-
slob,Le regime parlementaire I36 if. (1924).
36 On recent
developmentssee Loewenstein,MonarchyGains Lost Groundin Europe, I
Soc. Sci. 202 if. (1936).
37On the Amercan"cabinet" systemsee Finer,op. cit.supranote at
5, xo44if.; Friedrich,
op. cit.supra note i, at 35; Learned,The President'sCabinet (19I2).
larlyelectedpresident and thepopularlyelectedReichstag.This funda-

mentalmisconstruction playedautomatically intothehandsofthepresi-
dentwhenpoliticalextremism had succeededin narrowing the parlia-
mentarybasis of the coalitioncabinets.The situationcould not but
lead into legal no-man'sland38and ultimatelyto dictatorship when
von Hindenburg, afterthe dismissalof Dr. Brtiningin I933 triedto
substitutepresidential government outrightforparliamentary support
of the cabinet.In democratic states,positionand actual powersof the
presidentevidentlydepend largelyon the methodof appointment,
whetherby thepeopleor by the parliamentary bodies,as witnessedby
France,Czechoslovakia and Austria. The positionof the presidentis
stronger whenhe is notelectedby theparliament.39 The SwissBundesrat
is an exceptionwhichconfirms the rule.40Yet actual powerdepends
verymuchon thepersonality of thepresidentirrespective of themode
of appointment, as shownby Massarykand Benes in Czechoslovakia41
wherethe National Assemblyelects the president,and by Svinhuv-
fundin Finland42 wherespecialelectorselectedby thepeople,together
withthedeputies,formtheelectoralcollege.
It willbe shownlaterthatrecentconstitutional developments in vari-
ous statesindicatea changein attitudetowardoffice and function ofthe
statepresident.43 Estonia,for example, which in her first
post-war con-
stitution at
had no presidency all, by the reform of 1934 established the
officeof thepopularlyelectedpresident whototallyeclipsedthe govern-
mentproper.44 A similardevelopment appearsin thenewIrishconstitu-
tionof I937 withlargelyincreasedpowersof a popularlyelectedstate
38The problem was notclearlyrealizeduntilit was too late. See Anschiitz, op.cit.supra
note19, at 312, 318 ff.(withliterature);Anschiitz-Thoma,op. cit. supra note23, at 487if.;
Heneman, op.cit.supra noteI9, at 119 ff.;Renchin,op. cit.supra note20, passim.
39Finland (constitutionof 1919) and Spain (constitutionof 1931) have a combinationof
parliamentary andpopularelectionbyaddingto themembers ofparliament speciallyelected
both
electors, together forming theelectoral
college.
40 On thelegalandpolitical oftheSwissBundesrat
position see Fleiner,op.cit.supranote
24,at 182 if.; op.
Rappard, cit.supra(Government of note
Switzerland) 24,at 76if.;E F. xo68
I4-I6 (d'Ernst).
Foradditional referencesseenote107infra.
4 On the presidentin Csechoslovakiasee Sander,op. cit.supra note26, at 278 ff.
42On thepresident andconstitutional developmentsinFinlandseeErich,Die Verfassungs-
entwicklungin Finland bis Ende 193I, 20 Jahrbuchdesoffentlichen Rechts323 (I932); Gra-
ham,Finland,in Buell, New Governmentsin Europe(I934), pp. 261 if.; Loewenstein,Mili-
tant Democracyand FundamentalRights,31 Pol. Sci. Rev. 638 (1937).
43Fordetailsseep. 588infra.
44See p. 588 infra.
58o THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOLAWREVIEW
Ontheotherhand,ampleexperience
president.4s sincethewarhasdem-
onstratedbeyond doubtthatthepopularelection in-
ofthepresident,
tended totheinstability
as a counter-weight ofparliamentary
party gov-
ernment,gravely thefunctioning
endangers oftheparliamentary
system
as evidencedin republican
GermanyandSpain.Theplebiscitarychar-
acterofhisoffice,whenbasedonpopular mayeasilyopenthe
election,
waytoan authoritarianordictatorial
regime.
THE FOUR PERIODS
thehistorical
Seenretrospectively, developmentofconstitutional
gov-
ernmentinsofar
as therelation
betweenthelegislative
andtheexecutive
isconcerned, divided
seemsclearly intofourperiods.
oftheparliament.-When
Ascendancy royalabsolutism
succumbedto
as in EnglandafterI688, in FranceafterI789,thenat-
risingliberalism,
uralrecipientofliberal
aspirationswastheparliament. Rousseau's
seduc-
tivedoctrineoftheomnipotency ofthelegislativeas wellas thepent-up
resentment againstabsolutismwere responsible factthatthedemo-
forthe
craticideology behindmodern constitutionalismclaimedtheultimate
powerofpolitical decisionfortherepresentatives,sincetheyalonewere
believeddogmatically to reflect
what has been calledthewillofthepeo-
ple.46During the nineteenth the
century, attempt to democratizethe
representative hasobscured,
institutions toa largeextent, therealissues
ofpolitical
leadershipas involvedinthedistributionand location
ofpoliti-
calpower.Bytransfer ofpsychological the
emphasis parliamentcenter
as
ofpoliticalgravityacquired rightsandpowers offullsovereignty which
themonarchy andtheclassesaffiliated
withtheCrown wereforcedtosur-
render.Thelong-drawn processtooka different
tempo indifferent
coun-
triesas evidenced byFrancewhere progressionandretrogression alter-
natedalmostcyclically, whileintheso-calledconstitutionalmonarchies
oftheCentralEuropeantypethefinalascendancy ofparliament was
45ArticlesI2 to 14 of the constitutionof I937. On the Irishpresidencysee Keith, I9 Jour.
of Comp. Leg. 268 (x937). There is a good deal of disagreementabout the possibilitiesof a
strongpresidencyin Eire accordingto the new constitution.See Bromage,Constitutional
developmentsin the Saorstat Eireann and the Constitutionof Eire, II Internalaffairs,31
Pol. Sci. Rev. o1050,
I058 (1937). The electionof Mr. Hyde to the presidencyin April,I938,
seemsto indicatethatat least Mr. DeValera considersthefunctionsofthepresidentas merely
formal.But the constitutional documentmay lenditselfin timeto a moreliteralinterpreta-
tion,even againstMr. DeValera.
46On the supremacyofthe legislature(amountingto the dictatorshipofan assembly)dur-
ing the FrenchRevolutionsee Mirkine-Guetzevitch,Le gouvernement parlementaire sous la
Convention,in Cahiers de la Revolution Frangaise 47 ff. (I937); Mirkine-Guetzevitch,
Parlementarisme sous la ConventionNationale,Revue du Droit Public 67I ff.(I935).
delayed until after the war. Thus an irresistiblepolitical evolution,

which had begun with the French revolutionbore in many countriesits
finalfruitsas late as in the post-warconstitutions.47A particularposition
was held only by England where,followingthe curbingof the powersof
the Crownby aristocraticand plutocraticforces,the periodof parliamen-
tary sovereigntylasted not longerthan a generation(between I832 and
i867).48 But in spite of variations,the evolutionof constitutionalgovern-
mentfromthe beginningof the nineteenthcenturyto the post-warconsti-
tutionsrevealsa uniformtrendtowardthe predominanceof the legislative
as the legal exponentof the popular will over the governmentwhosemain
functionwas that of executingthe will of the people. While a graphic
representation of the battle frontbetweenexecutiveand legislativeduring
the nineteenthcenturywould reveal considerablesinuosityaccordingto
national conditions,it is safe to say that nowherea technicalformulawas
found which guaranteed a lasting balance between executive and legis-
lative powers. Periods of temporarystabilizationof the political equilib-
riumin favorof the executivewere followedinvariablyby a new driveof
the democraticimpulsesin the guise of parliamentaryprocesses. The ul-
timatevictoryof the legislativewas concomitantwith the finalestablish-
mentof parliamentaryascendancy.
Resurgenceof executivepoweras emergency deviceduringthewar.-The
incisivesurgicaloperationadministeredto the body politic of Europe by
the worldwar, forcedthe issue into the open. For technicalreasons,the
emergencysituationduringthe war caused a sudden resurgence,in every
country,of almost unrestrictedthoughnot entirelyuncontrolledpowers
of the executiveforthe sake of the conductof the war49or forthe mainte-
nance of neutrality.50soUnder the pressureof the "union sacree" the legis-
lative, in states at war, abdicated moreor less voluntarilyin favorof the
government bent upon winningthe war. Constitutionalgovernmentwas
everywheresuspended. What seemed,at first,only as a passing episode,
47See Burdeau, op. cit. supra note I7, at 79 ff.;Mirkine-Guetzevitch, Les nouvellesten-
dances du droitconstitutionnelII7 ff.(2d ed. I936).
48Loewenstein, ZurSoziologiederparlamentarischen Reprisentation in Englandnachder
grossen Reform: Das Zeitalter der Parlamentssouveranitat (I832-I867), 51 Zeitschriftfiir
Sozialwissenschaftund Sozialpolitik613 (I924).
49See forFrance,Renouvin, The Formsof War Government in France(I927); Jeze,
L'executifen tempsde guerre(les pleinspouvoirs)(I917). For comparative materialsee
au coursde la guerremondiale(1933).
Onisor,Les dcrets-loiset le droitdes circonstances
ForUnitedStatessee Berdahl, WarPowersoftheExecutive intheUnitedStates(I920).
s?Forexample inSwitzerland seeResolutionoftheFederalCouncilofAugust3, 1914(A.S.
347); Jacoby, op. cit. supra note 29, at 896; Tingsten,Les pleins pouvoirs,58 ff.(1934);
Gouet, La question constitutionnelledes pr6tendusdlcrets-loisx83 ff.(I932).
582 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOLAWREVIEW
proved,in thelightofcontemporary events,infactto be a sortofa dress

rehearsalforthefinalanddefinitive restorationofexecutive predominance
ofourowntime. On thepatternofwargovernment, mosttypesofpres-
entcrisisgovernments havebeenmodeled.
Post-warpredominance oftheparliament.-When the templeof Janus
was closed,ofthebelligerent nationsEngland,France,and Belgium,and
mostoftheneutralstatesreturned to thepre-war effortsofstabilizing the
equilibriumbetweenparliament and government. The defeatednations,
however,and particularly the newlycreatedstates,in violentreaction
againsttheoppression oftheirformer rulers-thusrepeating theprocess
whichoccurred afterthebreakdown ofabsolutism in France-resorted to
a patternof government in whichtechniqueand spiritof party-driven
parliamentary supremacytriumphed. Fulfillment of ultra-democratic
aspirationshaunting post-war Europecouldnotbutlead,forthetimebe-
ing,to unprecedented predominance ofthelegislative overtheexecutive.
The post-warconsttutionsof Reichand Landerin Germany, Austria,
Poland,Czechoslovakia, FinlandandtheBalticstates,andevenofYugo-
slavia wereoperated,fora shortwhile,on theprinciple of unmitigated
parliamentarysovereignty.51 Afteronehundred andfifty yearsRousseau
had defeatedMontesquieu.Someoftherecurring featureswhichreflect,
in termsof constitutional arrangements, the rationalization of the su-
premacyofparliament, maybe summarized here.5 Usuallythegovern-
mentor cabinetwas dependent uponor evennominated by theparlia-
ment. Pertinent illustrationsare Austria,Prussiaand Estonia.Political
partiesalthoughnotformally recognized by theconstitution, becamethe
actualsourceofpoliticalpower.53 Whenefforts weremadeto ensurethe
ofthegovernment,
stability thesolution wasnotfoundincreating a strong
majority party,butbymechanical devicessuchas thequorum fora vote
of non-confidence,as in Czechoslovakia"4 and in Spain.55ssProportional
as
representation, the literaland possiblymathematical realization ofthe
"willof thepeople,"undermined theformation of largeblocsof public
opinion56whichalonemakeforthestability ofgovernments. In addition,
51 G. Burdeau,
op. cit.supranote17,at 141 if.,167 if.,203 ff.
52See Mirkine-Guetz6vitch, op. cit.supra note 47; E.F. I070.1-3; Barthelemy, La crisede
la d6mocratiecomtemporaine (1931); Gordon,op. cit.supra note i.
UsPelloux, Les parties politiques dans les constitutionsd'apr6sguerre, Revue du droit
public 238ff. (I934); Vesseyt,De la necessitedes partis organisesen regimeparlementaire
(1933).
4 Constitutionof I920, articles75 to 77. ssConstitutionof 193I, article64.
56See Finer,op. cit. supra note S, at 914 ff.;E.F. 1066.2 (M. Carrier);Friedrich,op. cit.
supra note I, at 269 if. (withextensiveliteratureon p. 544); Hermens,Demokratieund Wahl-
sometimes a systemofpermanent parliamentary committees duplicated

thevicesoftheparliament invariousrespects, as in Czechoslovakia.57 In
general,thepost-warconstitutions are animatedby deep distrustof the
executivewhosepowerswerecutdownin favorofa "pure"expression of
thewillofthepeopleerroneously believedto be reflected bestinmultiple
parties.
Recentrecrudescence ofstrong executive powers.-Thereasonswhyparlia-
mentarydemocracy of the post-warpatternbrokedownin almostall
countries whereit was triedout,aretoowellknownto be repeatedhere.58
They may be summarized by the statementthatthe rationalization of
politicalpower as embodied in the paper of constitutional documents
failedtoprovidefortheessentialqualityofall government, namelypoliti-
cal leadership.It is a truismthatpoliticalleadership cannotbe produced
by constitutional arrangements, but it is equallytruethatit can be pre-
ventedfromgettingintostrideby a clumsystructure of constitutional
law. Evidentlyparliamentary government is workableonlywhereuna-
nimityaboutthefundamentals ofnationalvaluesis unbroken.In theab-
senceofsuchunanimity, thestrainof howto harmonize conflictingcon-
ceptions on thetherapeutics to be administered to the ailingbodypolitic
resultedin most states in destructionof the policy-forming process
throughparliament,59 and, in consequencethereof, in economicdisinte-
grationand evenchaos. Moreand morethelegislativebodytornby in-
ternaldissensions, becameincapableofexpeditious actionoranyactionat
all. Consequently, thependulumswungback violentlyto the otherex-
treme.Henceemerged whatmaybe calledleadership superimposed upon
thewillofthepeopleinsteadofleadership generated by thewillofthepeo-
ple. In some states,the changein governmental techniquewas accom-
plishedby stages of a more gradual evolution from parliamentarism to
monopolization ofpoliticalpowerby theexecutive, as in Italyor in Aus-
tria;in othercountries socialpressureled to revolutionary overthrow of
theconstitution by scantily veiled or opencoup d'etat as in Poland, Ger-
recht(1933); Hermens,Proportional
Representation of GermanDe-
and the Breakdown
mocracy,3 Social Research41 (1936); Humpbregs,4 Social Research225 (1937); 2 Braunias,
Representationin Germany,2
op. cit. supra note35, at 19I ff., 221 ff.;Aris, Proportional
Politica 433 ff.(1937).
s7 Czechoslovakianconstitutionof 1920, Art. 54; see E.F. 1070.1I-3 (B. Mirkine-Guetz6-
vitch); Spanish constitutionof 1933, Arts.6I, 62, 8o.
58Theclassicstatement La crisede la d6mocratie
is byBarthelemy, (I93 );
contemporaine
see also E.F. io80.I (L. Febvre); 1080.2-3 (d'Ormesson).
s9Loewenstein, Europe,29 Pol. Sci.Rev.
in Contemporary
versusDemocracy
Autocracy
571 if., 755 ff. (I935).
manyor Greece.As the result,in mostof thenewlyestablished demo-

craticandparliamentary states,authoritarian oroutright dictatorialgov-
ernments cameintolife.But regardless ofexternalforms, concentration
insteadofseparation ofpowersin thehandsoftheleaderor theleading
groupis characteristic forall of them.The executivewhatevernameit
bearshas completely eclipsedthelegislative in thetotalitarian statesof
and
Russia,Italy,Germany Turkey, as it does in the of
group authori-
tarianrepublics likeAustria,Portugal,Poland,Latvia,and Lithuaniaor
in the groupof the authoritarian monarchies of Yugoslavia,Bulgaria,
Greece,and, to a lesserextent, also in and
Hungary Rumania.
But evenamongthetraditional democracies whereliberal-democratic
spirit and institutions remained unimpaired, at leastformally, in these
recentyears since the beginning of the economiccrisis,a tranformation
of the relationship betweenlegislativeand executivehas travelledfast
and far. The crisis,irreverent to politicaldogma,struckat authoritarian
and democratic states alike. Legislativedecisions ofparliaments, lagging
behindevents,wereincapableofdealingwiththecrisis.Alsoindemocra-
cies a basic changein the traditional conceptsof politicaltechniqueis
In
clearlyunderway. England,France,Czechoslovakia, inBelgium,Fin-
land and the IrishFreestate,evenin Switzerland, the executive, by a
constitutionalprocess of everincreasing momentum has come to overplay
thelegislativeto suchan extentthatthe classicaldoctrineof thepre-
established harmony betweenthestatepowershas fallenin abeyance.
III. SUMMARYOF THE PRESENT RELATIONS BETWEEN

EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE POWERS
Although it is ratherhazardousto establishclear-cut
typesbecauseof
thegreatvarietyofforms in thevariousstates,an attemptwillbe made
to systematizethepresentpatterns ofrelationshipbetweenexecutiveand
legislative.
TOTALITARIAN DICTATORSHIPS
The firstcategoryembracesthosestatesin whicha moreor lesscom-
pletefusionofpowershas takenplaceto thebenefit ofeithera singleper-
son,or a singlegroupofpersonsor a singleparty.No exampleexiststo-
dayoftheconstitutional ofan assembly
dictatorship forwhichin France
theConvention of I792, theSenatein i814, or thelegislative
assemblies
of I848 and I87i are the historicalillustrations.60
6oFor the dictatorshipof an assemblycomparethe National Conventionof 1792. See also
note 46 supra; i Deslandres,Histoireconstitutionnelle de la France de 1789 a 1870 207 if.
(1932); also v. 2, 323 if.(legislative Assemblyof 1848) and 726 ff.(ConstituentAssembly
of I871).
The totalitarian dictatorships ofRussia,Italy,Germany, Turkey6'are

qualifiedby thefactthatconcentration ofpowershas beenofficially sub-
stitutedforseparationof powers.One man alone,or conjointly witha
groupof popularlyirresponsible advisors,wieldsthe totalityof powers
withoutany constitutional limitationswhatever.62 The absoluteruler
represents thewillof thestateand monopolizes politicalpowerin all its
manifestations. The willof thepeopleis institutionalized in theorgani-
zationof the singleor official partywhichthedictatoras leaderof the
party controlssupremely. Stripped ofitspseudo-constitutional trappings
whichno dictatorship to
seemswilling forego, the totalitarianstateis the
technologicalrationalization of absolutismor despotismfamiliarto stu-
dentsof history.Invariably,however,thisunequivocalsituationis ob-
fuscatedby the adroituse of legalisticindoctrination whichpreserves
nominally institutionsand eventerminology ofdemocracy.Variationsin
thearrangement ofthisauxiliarymachinery ofgovernment indicaterath-
ermoredifferent of
shadesofpoliticalfinesse theabsolute rulers thansub-
stantialdeviationsfromthestandardpatternof fullconcentration of all
statefunctions in thepersonoftheleaderand hisobsequiousgroup.For
thecomplete merger ofexecutiveandlegislative powersitmakeslittledif-
ferencethat,in Germany, theReichstagis admittedly ornamental63 while
to chamber and Senate in Italy has been leftat least theformal right of
participationin thelegislative process.64 In bothinstancesthelegislative
bodies,in factappointed by thedictators on theonepartyticket,aresub-
servienttoolsof the dictator and utterlyincapableofexpressing thewillof
6i The boundlessmass of foreignliteratureon dictatorshipis almost exclusivelydescrip-
tiveof all phases and aspectswhilescientifictreatisesofconstitutionallaw, likewiseabundant

withinthe bordersof dictatorialcountries,are moreor less conspicuousby theirabsence in
foreigncountries.Instead ofgivingspecificquotationsherethereaderis referred to the elabo-
rate bibliographicaldata contained in the E.F. For Italy see E.F. 1084.1-4 (L. Febvre);
Io084.5-15 (H. Lagardelle). For Germanysee E.F. 1068.1-25 (H. Jourdan,H. Brunschwig).
For Russia see 1082.I-II (G. Meguet). For Turkeysee 1090.1I-4 (E. Thomas).
62 For Germanysee Loewenstein,Dictatorship and the German Constitution,4 Univ.
Chi. L. Rev. 537, 554 ff.(I937); Ermath, The New Germany48 if. (1936); Bonnard, Le
droit et l'tat dans la doctrinenational socialiste (1936); Stoffel,La dictaturedu fascisme
allemand (1936). The officialGermandoctrineof the relationbetweenexecutiveand legis-
lative poweris presentedby Hamel, Gleichgewicht zwischengesetzgebenderund vollziehender
Gewalt, in Deutsche Landesreferatezum i . Internationalen Congress fur Rechtsver-
gleichurgim Haag I937, 438 (I937). For Italy see Finer,Mussolini'sItaly 248 (1935); Steiner,
Governmentin Fascist Italy (1938).
63Loewenstein,op. cit.supra note 62, at 558 ff.
64 Finer,
op. cit.supra note 62, at 255 ff.;Schneider,The Fascist Governmentof Italy 5I if.
if.
(1936); Rosenstock-Franck,L'conomie corporativefascisteen doctrineet en fact 242
(I934); Steiner op. cit.supra note 62, at 69.
thepeopleor ofchecking thearbitrariness

ofthesupreme leader. More-
over,Italypresents in thegovernment controlledFascistGrandCouncil
a legalizedinstitutionofmixedlegislative
andexecutive oradministrative
functions.65At anyrate,theessentialfeature indictatorshipsis thecom-
pleteabsenceofanylegitimate methodofcontrol oftheleaderbypublic
opinionfromwhichtheleadinggroupis leftexempt.In Russia,wherethe
newconstitution payslip serviceto therationaldivi-
of I937 studiously
sionofpowers,thereis no evidencethattheostentatious institutionaliza-
tionofdemocratic in theconstitution
instrumentalities is morethanthe
tributeoftraditional despotismtoWestern ideologyforpoliticalpurposes
at homeand abroad.
AUTHORITARIAN STATES
Technically although perhapsnotquiteideologically

in closeneighbor-
hoodtototalitarian aretheso-calledauthoritarian66
dictatorships statesof
thecorporate pattern,67namely,Austriauntilitsabsorption,
andPortugal.
In Austriaweobservethecustomary turnfrompost-war predominance of
theparliament firstto thestrengthening
oftheexecutive(president and
government) by theconstitutionalreformof 192968and finally,afterthe
self-incapacitationofthechamberin 1933,to thecoupd'etatofDollfuss,
legalized,as legalitygoes,by thepseudo-corporate constitutionof 193469
whichfollowssomecluesoffered by thePapal EncyclicalQuadragesimo
Anno of I93 .70 A vastlycomplicatedmachineryof councilsthemembers
6sOn thefascistGrandCouncilsee Finer,op. cit.supranote62, at 276ff.;Schneider,
op. cit.
supra note 62, at 47 ff.;Macedonio,II Gran Consigliodel Fascismo (i934).
66On the verydogmaticdifferentiation between"totalitarian"and "authoritarian"states
see Ziegler,Autoritarer oder totalerStaat (1932).
67 For a criticalattitudeto
corporativism in generalsee Speyer,Corporativisme ou parle-
mentarisme reforme (I935); Pre,Le bilandu corporativisme (I936); Bourgin,L'etat corporatif
en Italie (I935); Mirkine-Guetzevitch, Le n6o-absolutismecorporatif,in Annee politique
frangaiseet etrangere251 if. (I934); Loewenstein,Occupational Representationand the
Idea ofan EconomicCouncil,I2 Social Sci. 426 if.(I937); Finer,op. cit.supranote62,at 492 ff.
A morepositiveendorsement of corporativism is givenby Manoilescu,Le siecledes corpora-
tions (I936); Bonnard,Syndicalisme,corporatismeet Pl'tat corporatif(I937).
68 For a
genuinelyscientificdiscussionof Austrianconstitutionallaw since the war see
Voegelin,Der autoritireStaat (1936). See also Burdeau,op. Cit. supra note I7, at I48 ff.;
E.F. 1088.I-2 (L. Febvre).
69 On the Austrianconstitution of 1934 see Merkel,Die standisch-autoritare Verfassung
Oesterreichs(I935); E. Voegelin,op. cit. supra note 68, at I50 ff.(extensivebibliographyon
286 if.); Nawiasky,Staatstypender Gegenwart175if. (I935); Raschhofer,Oesterreichs neue
Verfassung,14 Zeitschrift furauslaindisches 6ffentliches
Recht 846if. (I934).
E.F. I088.4-5 (L. Febvre).
70On the Encyclical"Quadragesima Anno" see Kerschagl,Die QuadragesimoAnnound der
neue Staat (I935); Nawiasky,op. cit.supranote 69,at i66 if.
ofwhichwere,withoutexception, directly appointedby the

or indirectly
government,is thecorporate settingforfactualgovernment dictatorship.
A similarversionof Catholicauthoritarianconceptshas been introduced
in Portugalby the constitutionof i 933.71 The government,acting nomi-
bythe
cannotbe overthrown
nallyundera popularly"elected"president,
corporatechamberfrom which all real have
powers been trans-
carefully
ferredtothegovernment.
AUTHORITARIAN STATES WITH NOMINAL PRESERVATION OF
PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS
A slightly differentpatternofgovernmental ascendancy overthelegis-
lativeis offeredbysuchstateswhereparliamentary institutions
arenomi-
nally stillin existenceand the multiplepartysystem has not yetbeen
whollysuperseded by thegovernment controlledsinglepartymechanism.
We may qualifythistypeof authoritarian government as neo-presiden-
tial because, in additionto the government, personof thepresident
the
playsan important roleinshapinginternalpolicies.The headofthestate
has risenabove thepositionof a merelyceremonialfigureor, at its best,of
a stabilizerof temporaryfluctuations. Supported by the army, he pre-
vails on the governmentno less than the monarchicalrulerof a by-gone
age, and throughthe governmenthe controlspublic opinionand the par-
liamentarymachinery. For the sake of illustrationwe may referto Po-
land.72Here the transformationof an impotent parliamentarisminto
camouflageddictatorshipof the executivewas accomplishedin two stages
of constitutionalreform(in I926 and I935) wherebythe methodsofopen
coup d'etatas well as of constitutionallydisguisedcoercionwere success-
fullyapplied. The undisputedascendancyof the state presidentand his
cabinet was finallyaccomplishedby ingeniousmanipulationsof constitu-
tional processes. Party cadres and parliamentarybodies, movingin nar-
row channelsprescribedby governmentcontrol,are no longerefficient in-
71On thePortuguese
dictatorship bothas
considered
whichis generally and
benevolent
beneficial,see Speyer,op. cit. supra note 67, at 65 ff.and passim; Pre, op. cit. supra note 67,
at 103 ff.;Descamps, Le Portugal,La vie sociale actuelle (I935); Pereia dos Santos, Un etat
corporatif,le Portugal (I935); Anderssen,Die portugiesischeDiktatur,26 Archivdes offent-
lichenRechts IOI (I934); Cota, Economic Planningin CorporativePortugal(I938); Lamson,
enPortugal(1938).
Le corporativisme
72 On the presentconstitutionalsituationin Poland see Deryug,Le problamede l'equilibre
entrele pouvoirlgislatif et le pouvoir ex6cutifet la nouvelleconstitutionPolonaise, in La
de la Po-
Themis Polonaise, serie III, vol. to, 89 if.; Delmas, L'6volutionconstitutionnelle
logne depuis I919 (1936); Cybichowsky,Der Entwurfder neuen polnischen Verfassung,
25 Archiv des offentlichen Rechts 316 (I934); Cybichowsky,Die Entwicklungdes pol-
nischenStaatsrechtsin den JahrenI921-1934, 22 Jahrbuchdes offentlichen Rechts 527 if.
(I935); E.F. 1074.4 (Mirkine-Guetz6vitch); 1088.12, I3 (Jouve).
588 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAG LAW REVIEW
struments fortheexerciseofindependent legislativepowers.Bothselec-

tionofparliamentary personneland,in addition,rigidcontrolofitsactiv-
itiesguaranteecompleteconformity to theinstructionsofthegovernment.
At thepresentmoment, the
however, political situation showsratherdi-
vergenttrends.UnderPilsudski'ssuccessorefforts are noticeableto con-
vertthemultiplepartysystemintothe convenient singlepartypattern
ofthetotalitarian to
state,destined,perhaps, anticipatetherevivalof a
realoppositionwhichseemstoindicatethatthenationis tiredofthetute-
lageofthemilitary clique. The finaloutcomeofthistug-of-war is,forthe
timebeing,stillin suspense.On thewhole,the climatein Centraland
EasternEuropeis morefavorableto theone-party regimethanto a relax-
ationofthestronggripthegovernment holdson thecountry.
By similardevelopment, presidentialgovernment was substituted for
thegenuineparliamentary patternin the Balticstates. In Estonia,73 the
constitutional reformof I934 establishedpresidential government.Al-
thoughthenewconstitution permitted parliamentto continueand even
to withdraw its confidencefromtheactinggovernment, thepresident, by
therightof dissolutionand by controlling thegovernment, is theactual
centerofpoliticalpower. It shouldbe noted,however,that,by referen-
dumin I936, thepeopledecidedfortherestoration ofparliamentary gov-
ernment, and a newconstitution on moregenuinely democratic and par-
liamentarylines,is now in force.Thus Estonia exemplifies the tran-
sitionalcharacterof the presidentialregimereadyto disappearwhen
economicand politicalappeasement forwhichit was installed,havesuffi-
cientlyprogressed.On the otherhand,Latvia and Lithuania74 are at
73 On presidentialgovernmentin Estonia see A. de Chanbon, La r6publiqued'Estonie
(1936); Loewenstein,op. cit. supra note 42, at 639 if.; Roucek, Constitutionalchangesin Es-
tonia, 30 Pol. Sci. Rev. 556 if. (I936); St. v. Csekey, Die Verfassungsentwicklung Estlands
I929-I934, 22 Jahrbuchdes 6ffentlichen Rechts 411 if. (I935); Tatarin-Tamheyden,Auto-
cratischeRegierungenin Lettland und Esthland und deren volkischePolitik, 26 Archivdes
6offentlichenRechts 257 if. (I935); E.F. I070.4 (Mirkine-Guetz6vitch).The text of the new
constitutionof September3, I937, is reprintedin Informationsconstitutionnelles et parle-
mentariesof NovemberI5, 1937,no. I5, 288 if. (I937).
On constitutionalevolutionin the Baltic States in generalsee: Graham,Stabilityin the
Baltic States, in Buell, New Governmentsin Europe 279 ff.(Estonia), 286 ff.(Latvia), 290 ff.
(Lithuania) (1934); Montfort,Le droit constitutionneldes nouveaux etats de la Baltique
orientale,in i Annales de l'Institut du droit public compare de l'Universitede Paris 41 ff.
(1934). The best information on the postwarsituationin the Baltic States is foundin Tibal,
Les problemespolitiques contemporainesde l'Europe orientale,CentreEuropeen de la Dota-
tion Carnegie (I929).
74On Latvia see Tartarin-Tarnheyden, op. cit.supranote 73,at 257if.;E.F. 1070.5 (Mirkine-
Guetzevitch). The projectof a new presidentialconstitution(submittedin 1934) whichlegal-
presentunderan extra-constitutional systemof authoritarian regimein

whichthe presidentand the government, as his aids, have completely
absorbedthefunctions oftheformer legislativebodies. In I936, in both
countriessome kind of representation withoutpartyparticipation, on
corporatelinesin Latvia and on the basis of administrative bodiesin
Lithuania,werecreated.To thesameclass,althoughpreviously existing
parliamentary institutionshave not been discontinued, belongsto date
thekingdomof Yugoslavia.75The constitution of I93I, "legalizing"the
coupd'etatofKingAlexander in I929, showsthecolorofroyalabsolutism
or "regime personnel" familiarin theBalkan;no secretvoteexistsforthe
Parliamentwhich,electedon theone-party ticket,is littlemorethana
recording machineof the government, carryingout the wishesof the
Crown.Oncemore,similarly as in Poland,widespread dissatisfactionofa
profoundly democratic nationindicatesthatthe Regencyinstalledafter
King Alexander'sassassination,may be compelledto restorethe lost
democraticinstitutions at least in part. A similarpredominance of the
Royalexecutive is securedinRumaniawherethekingcontrols thecabinet
and thecabinetcontrolstheparliament, by virtueoftheso-called"40%-
law" whichassignsautomatically 50o%of all parliamentary seats to the
partywhichobtains40% of the totalvote at the elections.75^ The coup
d'etatof I938 abolishedtheparliament togetherwith the politicalparties
and establisheda royaldictatorship withoutany pseudo-parliamentary
trappings.Of the twootherroyaldictatorships on the Balkan, Greece,
aftertheKing'scoupd'etatinAugust,I936, isoperatedas dictatorship out-
rightin whichall politicalpartieshavebeenoutlawedand parliamentary
institutions arein abeyance.Bulgaria,on theotherhand,havingtriedto
exist,after King'scoupd'etatin May, I934, forseveralyearsundera
the
systemof royaldictatorship, withoutpartiesand parliamentary organi-
zation,at presentevidentlyseeksthe way back to moreconstitutional
processes ofgovernment.
ruleofthepresident,
izestheexisting has notyetbeenputin force;see also law ofMay 12,
I936. Informations
constitutionnelles 1936,no. 3, 44.
et parlementaires,
On the presentsituationin Lithuaniasee E.F. 1070.5(Mirkine-Guetzevitch);Annual
RegisterI936 205-206. (Epstein ed. 1937).
La dictature
ofYugoslaviaof x93I see Pribitchevitch,
7SOn theconstitution du roi Alex-
La constitution
andre(1933);Loutzitch, du Royaumede Yagoslaviedu 9 septembre I931
(I933). E.F. o1090.4(Pernot).
the"Acerbo"-system
7Sa On seeSteiner,op. cit.supra note62, at 73. Ontheelectoral
tech-
niquesin Yugoslaviasee Cemerlic,
Les systmes6lectoraux en Yugoslavie(I937). On the
Rumanian electorallaw see Braunias,op. cit. supra note 35, at 457 if.; Ascente,Essai sur le
en Roumanie(1937).
representatif
r6gime
CONSlrll 'i ONAL STATES OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TYPE:

THE UNITED STATES
Withinthecategoryof theconstitutionalstate,a specificpatternofthe
relationshipbetweenlegislativeand executiveis presentedby the state
advisedlyorganizedunderthe separationof powers. The governmentof
the United States76is commonlyconsideredas the outstanding,and, if
we disregarddistortionsof the patternin Latin America,as the only ex-
istingexampleforthe timebeing. Separationofpowersis deemedto pre-
vail because the presidentas the head of the executiveis virtuallyirre-
movable duringhis term(exceptby impeachment)and because the cabi-
net, appointedby him and responsibleto him alone, is beyondinfluence
and controlof Congress. Consequently,incompatibilityexists between
the officesof memberof Congressand of memberof the administration.
Secondly,the presidentand the ministersor heads of the departments
appointedby him,are barred,at least theoretically, fromexercisinglegal
influenceover Congress. In addition,since the courts are independent
of both the executive and legislativeagencies, the scheme of Montes-
quieu seemsto have materializedin the constitutionalframeof the great-
est republicof moderntimes. Actually,however,as is generallyknown,
the practiceof the Americandemocracyis widelydifferent fromthiscon-
ceptual model. The connectinglink between executiveand legislativeis
the partyin power,that is the partywhich,underthe two-partysystem,
has been victoriousat the last presidentialelections.The presidentis the
recognizedif not the officialleader of his party throughwhich,as a rule,
he is in a positionto imposehis politicalintentionsupon both assemblies
as a whole and in particularupon the permanentcommitteeswhichguide
the legislativeassembliesas such. At timesthis equilibriumis disturbed
by a change in the compositionof the majorityin the powerfulSenate
whenthe periodicalrenewalof one-thirdof its membersupsets the politi-
cal equilibrium,or even when the interveningelectionsdestroythe as-
cendancy of the presidentialparty over the House of Representatives.
In spite of frequentdelays and temporarydeadlocksthisarrangement of
76 'he followingdiscussionof the constitutionalsituationin the United States as well as
otherreferences to this countrycovers,of course,familiarground. The importanceforthe
line of thoughtpursuedin this articlelies in the attemptto incorporateAmericanconstitu-
tional developmentsinto the universaltrendof strengthening the powersof the executive
as againstthelegislative,a trendwhichin thiscountryis emphasizedas wellas complicatedby
the parallelevolutionofincreasingfederalpowersas againstthe states. It seemsthat also in
termsof constitutional law a "splendidisolation" or "aloofness"fromuniversalfeaturesof
theconstitutional stateis no longerfeasible.Thereinlies,in the author'sopinion,theintrinsic
importanceof the "New Deal." For foreignviewpointson the "experimentRoosevelt" see
E.F. 1070.9-12 (Cestre) (and literatureE.F. io B-27).
LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER 59I
powershas workedsurprisingly wellthrough generations becauseusually

a compromise betweenconflicting political interests would be agreedon
which,to be sure,mayfallintoconflict but whichnevertheless are ani-
matedbycommonloyaltytowardthefundamentals ofthecommon politi-
cal society.
It is on thisbackground of traditional equilibrum that the constitu-
tionaltendencies of the UnitedStatessince I933 shouldbe soberlyex-
amined. That thepresident was forcedto assumeleadershipoverCon-
gressafterhiselectionin I933 was due to theinadequatehandlingofthe
economicdepression by theoutgoingadministration. No constitutional
anomalieswereinvolvedwhenCongressconsented to enlarging theexecu-
tivepowersforthesakeofdealingexpeditiously and elasticallywiththe
depression.The constitutional crisisaroundtheNew Deal has notbeen
caused,as in mostpoliticaldeadlocksin Europe,by inherent deficiencies
oftheconstitutional structure itself.It is truethatthepresentadminis-
tration,whenattempting to cope withthecrisisin termsofstateinter-
ventionin theeconomicprocessforthesakeofa moreequitabledistribu-
tionofrisks,founditselfcaughtby thetraditional non-collectivist inter-
pretation of the constitution the
through Supreme Court. It would cer-
tainlybe an unwarranted reversalofcauseand effect to assumethatthe
faultyconstruction oftheconstitution is responsible forthedeadlock.In
thelightof currentdevelopments in Europeit is incontestable thatthe
constitution itself,bywayofan elastic-wronglycalled"liberal"-inter-
pretation, would have offeredall essentialpresuppositions forcomplying
withthetwofundamental postulates of constitutional government, that
is enoughleewayforefficient leadership bythepresident on theonehand,
and themechanism foreffective controloverthe administration by the
peopleand theirrepresentatives on theotherhand.
Seen fromtheangleof universalconstitutional trendsfromwhichno
country be it everso wellbalanced mayescape, the events sinceI933 have
emphasizedthe plebiscitary effects of the presidential electionby the
peoplewhich,forsimilarly impelling reasons, in several European states
recently has been substitutedfor election of the head of the state by the
parliament.77 Sincethepoliticalweightofpopularelectioncoincidedwith
the imponderables of a strongpersonality in the presidential officethe
balanceofpowersas envisagedby theconstitution was at onceconverted
intogenuineleadershipofPresidentRoosevelt.Hence theunmistakable
ascendancy oftheexecutive overthelegislative as itwasvisibleduringthe
77E.g., Austria(reformof I929); Estonia and Latvia (reformsof I934); Poland (constitu-
tion of I935); Irish Free State (constitutionof I937).
President'sfirstterm. This incalculablehumanelement,and not the

mechanism of abstractconstitutional
provisionshelpsto explainthat
from I933 to 1937 congressionalgovernmenthas become eclipsed by
presidentialgovernment. Leadershiphereas everywhere is a productof
personality and not of structuralarrangements of the constitutional
charter.
Anotherpoint,however, seemsmoreimportant forthe scopeof this
study.It mustbe remembered thatthesetbackadministered tothesocial
reconstruction programcommonly knownas theNew Deal duringthe
first
termofthePresident, wasbynomeansa consequence ofa structural
maladjustment oftherelationship betweenexecutive andlegislative from
whichalmostall of the constitutional crisesin Europesprang.On the
contrary,thelargemajority oftheDemocratic partyin Congress has en-
abledthePresident topursuehispoliticalintentions notunliketheleader-
shipof a Britishcabinetsupportedby an unassailablemajorityin the
House of Commons.The administrative programwas temporarily de-
layedowingto theparticular composition oftheSupremeCourtwhichas
such was whollyaccidental.In viewof the popularadherenceto the
President'spersonality and programas evidencedby the vote forhis
secondtermin November1936,it was at leastnotagainstthespiritof
the constitution thatthe administration shouldtryto remove,by the
courtreform an
proposal, obstacle which was lessstructural thanpersonal.
Onemaydisagreeaboutthewisdomorpracticability ofthemeansadopt-
ed forthisend. The twoparallelsofthethreatoftheBritishcabinetto
breakthe obstruction of the Lords to popularlydesiredconstitutional
reforms,in I832 and 1911, maybe adducedas pertinent illustrationsfor
theapplication oflawfulpressure againstequallylawfulresistance.It is
onlyat thisjuncturetherealissueofthebalancebetweenexecutive and
powerso familiar
legislative inEuropebecomesacutealsointhiscountry.
Congress,supported bya considerable sectionofpublicopinionotherwise
favorable to the administration, re-asserted
its constitutional independ-
encefromtheexecutive whenthePresident announced hiscourtreform
plan in February,I937. The plan-perhapstoo tenaciously upheldby
the President-failed. Although, viewedfrom a wider vista,the court
reform by itself
appearsonly as a minor episodein thefar-reaching social
reconstructionwhichis underwayalso in theUnitedStates,theparlia-
mentary opposition againsttheplanevenwithin thePresident's ownparty
in Congressshowsclearlythattheuniversaltrendofstrengthening the
executive the
as against legislative hasbeen,forthetimebeing,frustrated
orat leastdelayedin theUnitedStates.78Thusthesecondbasicprinciple

of constitutional government was reaffirmed, that of effective popular
controlovertheleadershipvestedconstitutionally in the President.Al-
thoughpoliticallythe Presidenthas succeededin converting the court
minority intoa majoritypresumably favorableto his program, the im-
portantfactremains,thatCongresswhenunwilling to be convinced can-
notbe coercedby theexecutive, noteventhrough thepowerful medium
ofpartyandpartypatronage.78a
Anotheraspect,however, on whichmuchlightcouldbe gainedby re-
to
ferring Europeandevelopments is the relationship betweenCongress
and theelectorate.The realizationofthewillof thepeopleas expressed
bytheoverwhelming majorityforthePresident at thepreceding elections
ofNovember1936has been sidetracked or evenfrustrated by Congress.
Owingto theabsenceofdissolution in thiscountrytheHouse of Repre-
sentativesrisesto actualascendancyovertheelectorate, which,between
elections,can exerciseonly extra-constitutional pressure itsrepresenta-
on
tives. Suchinfluence, is on thewhole,less effective thandirectpressure
by organizedlobbying. Here the original structure of the separationof
powersclearlycomesthrough the texture ofpartydynamicswhichother-
wisemitigate possibleshocksofdisagreement betweenthepowers.In any
country operated on the basis of genuineparliamentarism theelectorate
wouldhavebeencalleduponto decidetheissuebetweenCongressand the
President whojustlymayhavefeltthathe movedwithinthelimitsofhis
plebiscitarymandate.
Summarizing thepresentsituationon thebackground ofgeneraltrends
it may safelybe said thatin the UnitedStatespresidential leadership,
more factual than definable in terms of constitutionallaw, has not resulted
in thepredominance oftheexecutiveoverthelegislative as
branch every-
whereelse in Europe. Underthepresentconstitution, thereis no trace
of dictatorialor quasi-dictatorial powersof thepresidentas it has been
demagogically asserted.The executive inthiscountry is byfarlesspower-
fulthantheBritishcabinetor anyotherdemocratic executivein Europe,
withthepossibleexception ofFrance. Moreover, it shouldbe notedthat
thenon-existence oftheparliamentary systemgivesto theconstitutional
78The incidentof the appointmentof Mr. JusticeBlack has no immediatebearingupon
the problemsdiscussedin the textbecause the Presidentacted entirelywithinthe rangeof his
constitutionaldiscretion-performing an "actede gouvernement" (see p. 567 supra,and note 2)-
in submittinghis choice to the Senate.
78&Note the fate of the Reorganizationbill earlyin I938. See Binkley,The Powersof the
President(I937).
practicein this countrya less democraticappearance than in some other

democracieswherethe rillof the people as reflectedby the generalelec-
tionsreactsimmediatelyupon both executiveand legislativewithoutbe-
ing dilutedby the parliamentas in the United States. The moreor less
accidentalconfiguration whichis responsibleforcheckingboth the execu-
tive and thelegislativeby thethirdpower,the judiciary,unorthodoxas it
appears underthe doctrineof the separationof powers,is not likelyto be
perpetuatedand may not re-occurfora long timeto come.
CONSITlJIONAL STATES OF THE PARLIAMENTARY TYPE
The essentialfeatureof governmentin states operatedunderthe par-

liamentarysystem79 properis the dose collaborationand integrationof
the legislativeand the executivein formingthe will of the state. The ex-
ecutiveparticipatesin and even dominatesthe processof law-makingby
the rightsof legislativeinitiativeand especiallyof appropriation,which
amount frequentlyto actual monopolyof legislative control. On the
other hand, the parliamentbears upon the governmentby the various
methodsof political controldeveloped underthe parliamentarysystem.
The doctrinethat the cabinetis nothingmorethan a committee,agentor
delegate of the legislativeas expoundedon the basis of Britishpremises
by Bagehot8?belongsas much to the past as the supremacyof the parlia-
ment over the cabinet itself.8'With the exceptionof France, nothingof
the classical conceptof parliamentarysovereigntyhas outlivedwar and
crisis.
GreatBritain.-Most indicativeof the changedsituationis the trans-
formationwhichparliamentarygovernmenthas undergonein England.82
The focal point of Britishparliamentarismconsistsin determiningthe
79For literaturesee note I 7 supra.
80Bagehot, The EnglishConstitution (first
published intheFortnightly
Reviewin I865),
no. I.; on Bagehotsee Marriott,op. cit.supra note I6, at 480 if.
81 See
Loewenstein,op. cit.supra note 48.
82The leadingauthority
todayon Englishgovernment
is Jennings,CabinetGovernment
(X936).See alsoLow,The Governance
ofEngland(3rded. I9I0); WadeandPhillips,
op.cit.
supra note II, at 33 ff.,148 ff.;Anson,Law and Customof the Constitution(I935); 2 Finer,
op.cit.supranote5, at 949ff.;Ogg,EnglishGovernment andPolitics59 ff.,143ff.,448 ff.
(I930). Spencer,Government and PoliticsAbroad 15 ff.(I936); Lowell, The Government of
England (I912); Redslob,op. cit. supra note 14, at I2 ff.;Loewenstein,Verfassungsleben in
Grossbritannien, 20 Jahrbuchdes offentlichen Rechts I95 ff., 267 ff.,280 ff.(I932). Simon,
Quelquesreflexions surle regimeparlementaireen GrandeBretagne, Revuedu droitpub-
lic x72 ff. (I935); Sirieuaen,
Le regimeparlementaireanglaiscontemporain(1935); Savel-
kouls,Das englische Kabinettsystem (x934)(an amusingattemptto discover
theNational
Socialist"leadership-principle"in theEnglishconstitution).
E.F. 1068.6-i0(SmeIlie).
majoritypartythroughthedeviceof thegeneralelection,heldat inter-

vals fixedby statute,or irregularly bywayofministerial dissolution.Be-
tweeatheelections, however, theleadersofthevictorious majority party,
organizedas thecabinetunderthegenuirle leadershipofthePrimeMin-
ister,exercisefactually almostunlimited powersnotonlyovertheopposi-
tion,butalsooverthegovernment partythrough partydisciplineand the
threatof dissolution.This practiceof whatamountsto "'constitutional
dictatorship" was madepossiblein Englandby avoidingthedangersand
vicesof themultiplepartyformation,83 by stubbornly maintaining the
crudeand theoretically unfairsystemofmajorityelectionin theindivid-
ual constituencies, and mostofall, by theawarenessofthestrongvalues
oftradition amonggovernors andgoverned.Atrareoccasions,butscarce-
ly ever in fundamentals, the cabinetis compelledto recedeclassically
beforewhatis calleda "revoltof backbenchers" indicating,beyondthe
professional criticismoftheopposition, a serioustrendin publicopinion
averseto theparticular measure.84 By an altogethersingularcoincidence
of the spiritof traditional stabilityand of the techniqueof adjustment
GreatBritainhas succeededin establishing the undisputedand at all
timesworkableleadership oftheexecutivewhilethedemocratic processes
as suchwereleftunaffected. The solutionoftheabdicationcrisisin I936
is,in a way,a modeldemonstration ofcabinetleadership overbothpublic
opinion and parliament. No unbiased observer,however,couldbe mis-
taken,thatparliamentarism ofthistypeis theuniqueachievement ofone
countryaloneand as a generalpatternnot to be imitatedby or applied
to othercountries lessexperienced and lessgivento moderation and com-
promisethantheBritish.
In thisconnection attentionshouldbe calledto theIrishconstitution
ofI937 which evidently triesto squarethecirclebetweenpresidential and
parliamentary government oftheBritishtype. Responsibility ofthegov-
ernment towardtheparliament is coupledwithincreasedandindependent
powersofthepopularlyelectedpresident.It remainsto be seenwhether
this interesting experiment forreconciling genuineparliamentarism to
genuineleadership of the executive willyield better than
results similar
efforts in Germanybeforei933,85or whetherthe constitution cut to fit
thepersonof Mr. De Valerawillbe too largeforany one of his succes-
sors.
in Grossbritannien(I925).
83Loewenstein,Minderheitsregierung
bill(I934)
to Disaffection
are theIncitement
84 Recentillustrations and theHoare-Laval
incident(I935); see Jennings,op. cit. supra note 82, at 365-66; see also Loewenstein,op. cit.
supra note 82, at 277 if.
85See p. 572 supra,and notes i9 and 20.
France.-According to competent observers theparliamentary system

in itsgenuineor authentic formhas neverexistedin FranceoftheThird
Republicbecauseof thedesuetudeofpresidential or ministerialdissolu-
tion,by which the electorate may become the arbiter ofconflicts
between
government and parliament.86 To date,republican Franceis evidently
theonlycountry inwhichparliamentary supremacy as theheirofclassical
Jacobintraditions and conceptions was able to maintainitself.87 Its per-
manentandglaring as a form
deficiencies ofpoliticalgovernment-which,
incidentally,do littleto impairtheefficiency as a systemofadministra-
tion,-are too well known tobe discussed here at length.Conspicuous fea-
turesareinstability ofcabinets88-the shiftingofcabinetpersonnel has,on
theotherhand,itsdefinite advantages,-andthecomplete lackofcontrol
andpoweroftheelectorate between generalelections.Bothare caused,in
thelastanalysis, bytheabsenceofeffective partyorganization anddisci-
plineinsideand outsideofparliament. Hencetheincessant repetitionof
crisesundertheFrenchparliamentarism, resulting in lossofprestige and
strengthin theinternational and thenationalfield.In brief, thepolitical
apparatuscontrolled bytheparliamentary oligarchy has failedto giveto
Francewhatthisrevolutionary erademandsmost,namelypoliticallead-
ership.It is undeniable, however, thatforthissituationFrenchnational
temperament and historical traditionaremoreresponsible thana faulty
construction of the constitutional mechanism which,whenappliedto
othercountries, didyieldsatisfactory resultsas in Czechoslovakia.89 One
remembers that in France strongpresidents failedas MacMahon in
86R. Redslob,
op. cit.supranote14,at 156 if.,256 ff.
87Foran authoritative
statement
oftheclassicalFrench
doctrine thesupremacy
concerning
ofparliamentsee Carr6de Malberg,
La loi,expr6ssionde la volont6generale20 if., 75 if.
(I931).
On parliamentarygovernmentin France see Barth61lemy-Duez, op. cit. supra note i, at
68o ff.,712 if.; Capitant,La reformedu parlementarisme (I934); Gordon, Les nouvelles
constitutions Europ6ennes et le r61ledu chefde l'6tat(1932); i Esmein-N&zard, op. cit.supra
note I, at 258 ff.;vol. ri, at 274 ff.;Haikal, op. cit. supra in note 5, at 40 if.; Siegfried, Tab-
leau des partis en France (I930), Redslob, op. cit. supra note I4, at i56 if.; Finer,op. cit.
suzpra note 5, at 1048 ff.; Valeur, in Buell, Democratic Governmentsin Europe 26I ff.
(1935); Spencer,op. cit. supra note 82, at I77 if.; Braunias, Staatskriseund Staatsreform
in Frankreich, 23 Jahrbuch des offentlichen Rechts72 ff. (I936). E.F. 1030.5 (Carrede
Malberg); 1068.2(Barthelemy);1069.I (Gordon).
88See Haikal, op. cit.supra note 5, at 302 ff.;Marion,Les ministeres du second cartelen
I932 (1933); Aubert,Le moulinparlementaire(I933); Tardieu, Sur la pente (I935); Finer,
op. cit.supra note 5, at 1054if.; Valeur,op. cit.supra note 87, at 315 if.; Lindsay,Ministerial
Instabilityin France,46 Pol. Sci. Q. 46 ff.(I931).
89See Sander,op. cit.supra note23, at 268 ff.;Burdeau,op. cit.supra note 17, at io8 if.;
Beuve-Mery, Les nouvellestendancesdu droitpublictschechoslovaque, in Annalesde
l'Institut
droitpubliccompare
del'Universite
de Paris99ff.(1936).E.F. 1078.8,9 (Miseaux).
I87790 and Millerand in I9249' and that only Poincare's personality

achieved in I926 what Doumergue was unable to performin 1934.92
Doumergue's attemptsto strengthenthe executivepowerby restoringto
the presidentand the cabinet the rightof dissolutionindependentfrom
theassentof the Senate, and by monopolizingfinancialpowersof expendi-
ture in the hands of the governmentwould have been, if successful,
France's contributionto the universaltrendtoward greatergovernment
powers.
Moreover,it is significantthat also the experimentundertakenby the
FrontCommun93 thusfarhas not succeededin revitalizingthe Frenchpar-
liamentarysystem. Real politicalleadershipwas to be establishedby the
orthodoxmethod of creatinga strongerbasis forparliamentarygovern-
mentby a lastingcoalitionof both voters and partieswithinand outside
ofparliament. The mirageof a workingtwo-partysystem-the Common
Front as a liberal-socialistcombinationagainst a more conservativebloc
of the right-was at least outlined on the political horizon. But, seen
froma less ephemeralaspect, more importantis the fact that, in June,
1937, and in April,1938,M. Leon Blum's cabinetwas forcedto retreatbe-
fore a Senate reluctantto concede to a socialist leader pleins pouvoirs
whichwerereadilygrantedto M. Chautemps. The incidentsindicatethat
the powerof the parliamentaryoligarchyentrenchedin the Senate is far
frombeing subdued and that even the unbrokenmajorityof the Front
Communwas unable to continue the cumbersomeparliamentarytech-
nique of statute-making by the fullbody of the assemblies. Refugehas to
be taken, as before,in the emergencymeasureof pleins pouvoirsin order
to carryout the legislationfordealing with the crisis. The technicalde-
vice of conferringthe needed powers to the governmentby way of an
Enabling Act may spell also in France the doom to the classical type of
90On thefirst sincei875seeReclus,Le seize
oftheFrenchChamber
(andlast)dissolution
mai (I93I).
91On Millerand'sconflictwiththe chambersee Finer,op. cit. supra note 5, at 1140 if.
Doumergue,"see Haikal, op. cit. supra note 5, at 243 f.;

92 On the "experiment
Barthelemy,La constitution
Doumergue,Revuepolitiqueet parlementaire
I934,p. 245 ff.;
B. Mirkine-Guetzevitch,
Constitutional
reform 98 if.(I935);
in France,6 PoliticalQuarterly
Valeur,op. cit.,supra note 87, at 532 ff.;Braunias,op. cit.supra note 87, at o105ff.
On constitutional Valeurde la libert6
inFranceseeJoseph-Barthelemy,
reform et adapta-
tion & la republiquer78 ff.(1935); Haikal, op. cit. supra note 5, at 448 if.; Blum, La reforme
gouvernementale (I936); Tardieu,La reformede l'6tat (I933); Tardieu,L'heure de la decision
(I934); Bardoux,La Francede demain(I936); Ordinaire, La revisionde la constitution
(i934); Romain,Le plan du 9 juillet (I935); Melot, op. cit. supra note I7, at 226.
30 Am.Pol. Sci. Rev. 857
93Sharp,The PopularFrontin France:Preludeor Interlude,
ff.(1936); Haikal, op. cit. supra note 5, at 266 ff.
parliamentary
government, or,to be morehesitantin conclusions,
it may
inauguratea fundamental transformationof the relationshipbetween
executive
andlegislative
in statesoperatedbyparliamentarism.
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM AND THE TECHNIQUE OF
THE "PLEINS POUVOIRS"
The presentsituationin almostall countries faithful
to theprinciples
ofparliamentary government is characterizedby thefactthatno longer
is stabilization
ofthegovernment by thesupport ofstrongparliamentary
coalitionssought.The partiesbehindthegovernment wouldbe strong
enoughto carryout thepolidesofthecabinetagainstanypossiblecom-
binationoftheopposition.Nonetheless thestrong parliamentary major-
itvcommits thatactofself-abdicationoflegislativefunctionscalledpleins
pouvoirs94 or EnablingActby whichthegovernment assumesthepleni-
tudeoflegislative powersinsteadofand in theplace oftheparliament.
Moreover,suchdelegationof legislativeauthority is grantednot fora
specificpurposeand withinthelimitsof specified but it is
instructions,
conferred ingeneral,without anylimitations otherthanpurelyformal and
foranyobjectivewhatever unspecified at thetimeofgranting.Suchpow-
ers are by no meansa substitute forconstitutional emergency powers
customarily
(Notverordnungsrecht),95 accepted in timesof waror when par-
liamentis physically prevented fromassembling.At first forceduponre-
calcitrantparliaments as a stop-gapor makeshift of pragmaticnature
thedeviceoftheEnablingActseemsto emerge fromthecrisisas thenew
technicalbasis forexecutiveleadership which,whilepreserving theulti-
matepoliticalresponsibility of the freelyelectedrepresentatives of the
94On the pleinspouvoirsor EnablingActs whichformthe legal basis forthe dtcrets-lois
a
vastliterature
existsinalmostallcountries underparliamentary government. Oneofthebest
monographs is byTingsten,Les pleinspouvoirs (I934) (withextensive onp. 345ff.).
literature
Compareinaddition, Gouet,La questionconstitutionnelle despr6tendus d&crets-lois
(1932);
Haikal,op.cit.supranote5,at 68ff.,
422 if.;Bonnard, Lesd&rets-loisduministerePoincare en
I926, Revuedu droitpublic248 ff.(I927); Barthelemy-Duez, op. cit.supra note5,at I95 if.,
779 ff.(bibliographyon p 250, 781); Mirkine-Guetz6vitch,
op. cit. supra note I7, at 78 if.;
Jeze,L'ex&utif en tempsde guerre(1917); Carrede Malberg,op. cit.supra note 87, at 79 ff.;
Eisenmann, Die Theorievonderdelegation in derfranzosischen
legislative Rechtslehre,i
Zeitschriftfuroffentliches
Recht334ff.(I935). Foran excellent
studyofa morelimited sec-
tionoftheproblem see Jacoby,
Delegation ofPowersandJudicial Review,36 Col. L. Rev.
87I ff.(I936). Theeventual ofordinances
unconstitutionality onthebasisofthedelegation of
legislativepowers,becauseoflack ofpowersto delegate,or becauseofexcessiveapplicationof
delegatedpowers,is, of course,onlyone aspect amongmanyothersof the wholecomplexof
delegation.
95On emergencypowersprovidedforthe constitutionsee Friedrich,op. cit. supra note i,
at 208 ff.(withliteratureon p. 534); Barth6lemy-Duez,
op. cit.supra note 5, at 240 ff.;Gouet,
op. cit.supranote94, at I63 if.
people,confidesto thegovernmentofthedaywide-range legislative

pow-
ers,in additionto thefreedomofexecutiveaction. Whatappearednot
longago as a temporary expedientforextraordinarysituationsbecomes
moreandmorea regularinstitution ofdemocratic,thoughno longerpar-
liamentarygovernment, as shownbyrecentexperienceinalmostall demo-
craticcountries.Pleinspouvoirsare notgrantedto governments witha
precariousparliamentarystanding,but, on the contrary,only to cabinets
whichotherwisewould be strongenough to carryout theirprogramby
ordinaryparliamentarymethods. But the necessityof swiftand efficient
action commendsthe practiceof governmentby decree forsituationsin
whichthe time-consuming and cumbroustechniqueof parliamentarydis-
cussion and deliberationis deemed unsuited. Moreover, the success of
statutoryinterventionin economiclifefrequentlydepends on its secrecy
in preparationor impositionby surpriseand long-drawnparliamentary
debates may frustrateits objectives and provoke the resistanceof selfish
interestsusing theirparliamentaryexponentsforblockingand delaying
themeasure. Apparentlyforstate interventionism the appropriatemeth-
od is that of the Enabling Act.
It is beyond doubt that the Enabling Acts or pleins pouvoirshave no
theoreticaljustificationand legal basis in the variousdemocraticconstitu-
tions96whichare stilldominatedby the obsolete conceptionof a clear-cut
96In Francethecourtshave no powerof judicial reviewofstatuteswhichare consideredas
the supremetype of legislatureacts; constitutionalobjectionsto the Enabling Acts proper
thus are reservedto parliamentary debates and the "doctrine"of constitutionallawyers(see
Jacoby,op. cit.supranote 94, at 88o); but sincethe "d6cret-loi"is formallya "reglement"of
the President,the Conseil d'Etat took jurisdictionover the individualordinancesby way of
"recourspar excesdes pouvoirs";thechangein attitudewas inauguratedby the celebratedcase
of Compagniesde l'Est, du Midi, du Nord, du Paris-Lyon-Mediterrane, de l'Orleans et de
l'Ouest,December6, I907 (Recueil913 if.). Thus thedecret-loifactuallycame underthescope
of judicial reviewforadministrativeacts althoughthe basic problemof constitutionality of
the delegationproperis stillimmunefromthe courts. On the whole,the Frenchdoctrinestill
maintainsthetheoryofnon-delegability althoughit is nowgenerallyadmittedthatemergency
situationshave constantlyoverriddenthe classical divisionofpowersas establishedby a writ-
ten constitutionlaid down as earlyas in I894 by Esmein. Plains pouvoirstherefore have be-
come accepted as customarylaw (Jacoby,874 ff.); see, e.g.,Barth61lemy-Duez, op. cit. supra
note 5, at 779 ff.;Tingsten,op. cit. supra note 94, at 17 ff.;Gouet, op. cit. supra note 94, at
I99 ff. On the otherhand Carre de Malberg (E.F. I030.7) justifiesthe pleinspouvoirson the
basis of the unconditionedsupremacyof the legislativepowerwhichimpliesfreedomof dele-
gation.
For Czechoslovakiasee Jacoby,op. cit. supra note 94, at 893 ff.;Sander, Verfassungsur-
kunde und Verfassungszustand in der Tschechoslovakischen Republik 135 ff.(I935); Beuve-
Mery,op. cit. supra note 89, at 113 ff. For the Weimarconstitutionin Germanysee Jacoby,
op. cit. supra note 94, at 885 ff.;Tingsten,op. cit.supra note 94, at 287 ff.;Anschiitz-Thoma,
op. cit. supra note 23, at 3I0 ff.(Schoenborn).
For Belgiumsee Speyer,op. cit.supra in note 67, at 38 ff.;Tingsten,op. cit.supra note 94,
6oo THE N'IVERSITY OF CHICAGOLAW REVIEW
divisionbetweenexecutiveand legislativefunctions.At thetimewhen

mostoftheconstitutions originated,emergency powersofthegovernment
withoutrecurrence to parliamentary wereconsidered
collaboration either
as a residueofor relapseintotheabsolutist of
spirit monarchy and such
deviceswereaverseto Western concepts ofconstitutionalism. Within the
hierarchy oflegislative acts,theordinance-making powerofthegovern-
mentforthepurposeofexecuting thelawswas strictly subordinated to
theregularparliamentary statute.Butinno country didabstractobjec-
tionsof constitutional lawyersand parliamentary fundamentalists pre-
vailoverthedirenecessity ofcarrying onthegovernment, intimeofacute
tension,by unorthodox methods.The courts,eveniftheyhad thepower
ofchallenging theconstitutionality ofdecreesas a substitute forregular
statutes,dodged the issue by legal interpretationand extensionof the
ordinance-making powers of the or
government, theyacquiescedto the
practice.97It wouldhavebeenclearlywithintheprovince ofthelegisla-
tivebodiesthemselves to refutethepracticeofthedecret-loi. Thuseven
thoroughly democratic states which are beyondthereproach ofauthori-
tarianleaningssuchas France,Belgium, orCzechoslovakia, haveassented
to thetechnique ofEnablingActsas a recurrent feature ofgovernmental
predominance, or arein search forworkable formulas forthisnewdevelop-
ment.
In France98 thepracticeofgovernment decreesby pleinspouvoirs, in-
atI42 if.; Jacoby,op. cit.supranote94, at 875 noteI5; Annuaire
de l'Institut
International
de droitpublicI935, 473 if. (1936) (Rolin).
ForSwitzerland
seeGiacometti,
Verfassungsrecht undVerfassungspraxis inderSchweizer-
ischenEidgenossenschaft,
Festgabe(Fleiner)45 ff.,74 ff.(I937); Fleiner,
Verfassungsrecht
und Gesetzesdelegation3I if. (I928). See p. 603 infra.
97Thisis thegeneral forexample in
experience France;seeHaikal,op.cit.suprainnote5,
p. 420 ff.,433; Barth6lemy-Duez,op. cit. supra note5, at 78i, Jacoby, op. cit. supra note
94,passim.As to thelegalcharacter ofd6crets-lois: (a) Theyhavetherankandvalidity of
formal lawsthatis theymayaffect ormodify evenprevious statutory enactments; (b) Until
ratification
bytheparliament ("habilitation")theyareconsidered as ordinances("riglements")
and as suchtheyaresubjectto thejudicialreviewofadministrative actsby theCouncilof
State;(c) After repealbytheparliament theyaredeprived ofvalidity onlyexnunc;(d) After
ratificationbytheparliament theyareformal statutesthatis theymaybe modified onlyby
formal parliamentaryactandtheyarebeyond judicialreview;
consequently, actions instituted
beforeratificationaredismissed.
98 The
pleinspouvoirsweregrantedin thefollowing
instances(see also Haikal, op. cit.supra
note5, at 422 if.): March22, 1924 (grantedtoPoincare fora financial
emergency,thepowers
becamepractically overruledbytheelection inMayinwhichPoincare's cabinetwasbeaten.)
August3, 1924 (granted, untilDecember 31, I926, to Poincare,fordealingwitha financial
crisis);February 28, I935 (grantedto Doumergue's cabinetof"NationalUnion,"untilJune
30, I934 andrenewed on July6, I934 forpoliticalandfinancial reasons).In May andJune
I935,
thechamber refusedtograntsimilarpowers tothecabinets ofFlandinandBuisson.On
weregranted,untilJanuaryi, 1936, to M. Laval "en
June9, 1935 "pouvoirsexceptionnels"
augurated,to a limitedextent,duringthewar,was utilizedagainforreal

emergency situationsand forstrictly limitedpurposes,in I924 and I926.
Followingtheseprecedents, the cabinetsof Doumergue,in I934, and of
M. Laval, in I935, appliedthepowerson an unprecedented scaleevenfor
administrative andjudicialreforms notat all connected withtheeconomic
objectivesforwhichtheyhad beengrantedoriginally.In bothI937 and
I938 the powersaccordedto the cabinetsof M. Chautempsand M.
Daladierwereofthewidestpossiblerangeand oncemoreinvolveda com-
pleteself-abdicationoftheChambers.99
In Czechoslovakia0?? althoughthe government has neverexperienced
lack ofparliamentary majorities, of
thepractice government decreesbe-
gan in I933. Intendedforlimitedperiods,thepowerswereregularly re-
newedbeforeexpiration.Executivelegislationhas continuedeversince
althoughby no meansdid theNationalAssemblysurrender theordinary
law-making function altogether.
The situation similarin Belgium,anothercountry
is oftraditionalpar-
liamentary structure.?x0Continuously sinceI932, thegovernment, backed
by the three greatparties of the Catholics, Liberalsand has
Socialists,
used the specialpowersconferred by generalEnabling Acts mainlyfor
economictasksin general,butalso forspecific purposessuchas theenact-
mentof a comprehensive piece of legislation. The ordinarylegislative
functions oftheparliament were,however, not discontinued.Again,the
government exerciseslegislativefunctions concurrently withthe parlia-
ment. Even Luxembourg, in I935, resorted to thisnewdeviceofgovern-
mentordinances in theplace ofordinary parliamentary statutes.'02
dela monnaie,"
la devaluation
vued'#viter "pourlutter la speculation
contre le
etpourdefendre
La de Revue
franc."See alsoGignoux, politique dtcrets-lois, et
politique Octo-
parlementaire,
ber io, I935.
99Law ofJune2I, 1937,granted to M. Chautemps, aftertherequestofM. Blumhadbeen
refusedby the Senate; law ofApril14, I938, grantedto M. Daladier.
Ioo Examplesof suchsweeping
delegations are: laws of June9, I933
in Czechoslovakia
(Slg. no. 95); of November II, I933 (no. 20o6); of June 2I, I934 (no. 109); of June 26, I935
de droitpublic459ff.(I937); Jacoby,
de l'InstitutInternational
(no. I31); seealso Annuaire
op.cit.supranote94,at 893if.,Beuve-Mery, op.cit.supranote89,at III if.
101Examples in Belgium are: Laws of July i6, 1926; of December 30, I932; of May I7,
Powers
I933; of July30, I934; of December 7, I934; of March I5, I935; of March 30, I936.
wereusuallygranted forsixmonthsandrenewedbefore Thus,withtheexception
expiration.
sinceI932.
daysin I935, Belgiumhas beenunderspecialpowersuninterruptedly
of fifteen
See also Tingsten,op. cit. supra note 94, at 134 ff.;Jacoby,op. cit. supra note 94, at 875,
Melot,op.cit.supranoter7,I34 if.;Dor andMoreau,Les tendances actuellesdu droitpublic
Revue
et du droitprive, de l'Institut
Beige du droitcompare Io8 if.(I936); Annuairede l'In-
stitutInternationalde droitpublic I935, 473 ff.;1936, II8 if.
102Luxembourg,law of May 5, I935; see Informations constitutionnelles et parlementaires,
no. 2/I936, 37.
602 THE UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGOLAWREVIEW
In Englandpleinspouvoirs inthefullmeaning ofthetermareunknown

althoughEnabling Acts for are
purposes widelyresorted
specific to.103
In all countries underobservation theEnablingActhas thecommon
featureof conferring uponthegovernment, by wayof a sweepingdele-
gation, to do all that is to
necessary cope witha particularsituation
whichis usuallyreferred tointhemostgeneralterms.Frequently though
notinvariably suchdecreesare promulgated undertheauthority of the
nominalheadofthestate(CrownorPresident); actuallythey aredrafted
by thecabinetitselfwithor withoutcollaboration of ad hocsummoned
expertsoutsideof the ministerial bureaucracy.Decreesenactedunder
suchdelegation mayderogateand supersede evenfull-fledgedparliamen-
tarystatutes.As to theirscope,thepleinspouvoirs sometimes tryto set
limitsby referring to specificemergency situations or,less frequently,to
a particular purpose of economic nature.In practice,however, manyof
thedecreesissuedpresent onlya veryremote relationto thepurposestat-
ed intheact.104Occasionally theparliaments seekto excludespecificmat-
tersfromtherangeoftheEnablingActbyimposing somematerial limita-
tionsuponthegovernment.s05 The onlyrestriction thusfarregularly im-
posed uponthe government refersto the timelimitforthe exerciseof
extraordinary powersby thegovernment; thenecessity ofrenewing the
powersevidentlyimpliesa methodof controlby the parliament.The
timelimitvariesfroma coupleofmonthsto a fullyear. Extensions have
beengrantedso regularly thattheEnablingActshavebecomea perma-
nentfeatureofthelegislative process.
"13 Delegationforlimitedand specialpurposesis consideredas a necessaryincidentofgov-
ernmentalpowers. See Tingsten,op. cit.supra note 94, I75 if.; Jacoby,op. cit.supra note 94,
at 881 if.;Allen,op. cit.supranote29,at 304 ff.;Loewenstein,op.cit.supranote29,at 297if.The
practiceofmoregeneraldelegationwas adoptedin connectionwiththeeconomiccrisisin 1931
by McDonald's second national government;see on these instancesLoewenstein,op. cit.,
supranote 29,at 303 ff.,and Jacoby,883 note3I. Legal objectionsare raisedif thepowersso
delegatedare excessive,such as placingordinancesissued on the basis of the EnablingActs
beyondcontrolofthecourtsbystatutorydeclarationscontainedin theact, orwhenordinances
are interfering withregularstatutoryenactmentsproper,or whenthe ordersare dealingwith
"mattersof principle"reservedforparliament. See also note 29 supra.
104The FrenchJournalOfficiel of October3I, I935 publishedno fewerthan 367 decreesof
the mostheterogeneous kindmanyofwhichwerein no relationat all to thepurposeindicated
in the EnablingAct itself. In Belgium,withinthe last halfof the year I934 58 arreteswere
issued. In Czechoslovakia,to the end of I936 the figureof ordinancesexceeds400.
o05
For example,in CzechoslovakiatheEnablingActofJune9, I933 (Slg. no. 95) forbadein-
terferencewiththe currencyand levyingof taxes by decree. When in June I937 the French
Senate triedto restrictthe pleinspouvoirsdemandedby the cabinetof M. Blum,the govern-
mentresignedratherthan accept materiallimitations.The cabinetof M. Chautemps,how-
ever,receivedthe powersunconditionally.
Controloftheparliament is providedforby theprovisionrecurrent in

all similaracts thatall decreesissuedunderthespecialpowersare to be
laid beforeparliamentwhichmayor may not repealthem. Sincemost
ofthedecreesareofa morethantransitory nature,ithasprovedto be im-
practical to insert the clause that decrees unlessratifiedby parliament
lose theirvalidityautomatically.Parliament mayrefuse, however,their
ratification, or it maydemandtheirabolition.If ratified thedecreebe-
comesan ordinary statute,ifnotratified it mayat leastcontinueas hav-
ingtheforceofan ordinance.Experience showsthattherightofdemand-
ingrepealis rarelyusedo?6 becausethesituationregulatedby thedecree
couldnotbe changedextuncwithout gravelyaffecting actionsundertaken,
in themeantime, byprivateindividuals ingoodfaithinthevalidityofthe
decree. Sincetheparliament usuallyis notpreparedto assumeresponsi-
bilityforoutright repealwhileat thesametimeunwilling to convert,
by
formalratification, thedecree-laws intoregularstatutes,as a rulenothing
at all is done. Thus thepositionofparliament towardthegovernmental
legislation is similarto theacquiescentattitudeoftheBritishparliament
towardministerial legislation which,in recenttimes,has grownto para-
mountimportance fortheadministration of GreatBritain.Virtually the
parliament possessespoliticalcontrolovertheexecutivelegislation, actu-
allyit wiselyrefrains fromusingit. Duringtheexerciseofsuchdelegated
powersparliament may evenbe adjournedand thegovernment decrees
thusbecomethe exclusivesourceof legislation.Sometimesconcurrent
powersofthegovernment do notexcludeordinary legislationby thepar-
liamentwhich,however, is confined to less urgentand less controversial
matters.
THE EXECUTIVE IN SWITZERLAND
In thisconnection
thepresentconstitutionalsituationin Switzerland'07
deservesspecialconsideration.Since i874, that well-balancedcountry
o16The decrets-lois,issued by the cabinet of Doumergueduring1934, were ratified,by a
close majority,as late as in February1935,whenhis successor,M. Flandin,insistedon a defi-
nite assumptionof responsibility by the chamber;see Haikal, op. cit., supra note 5, 433. On
theotherhand,theparliament,althoughthe decreesissuedby Poincar6in 1926 weredulysub-
mitted,delayed ratificationad calendasGraecas; see Barth&lemy-Duez, op. cit. supra note i,
at 781.
107 On recentconstitutional developmentsin Switzerlandsee Giacometti,Verfassungsrecht
und Verfassungspraxis, in Festgabe (Fleiner) 45 if. (1937); Spencer,op. cit. supra note 82, at
413 if.; Buell, Democratic Governments in Europe 557 ff.(I935); Tingsten,op. cit.supra note
94, at 58 if.; Battelli, Les institutionsde la democratiedirecteen droit Suisse et compare
moderne(I933); Ruck, SchweizerischesStaatsrecht(I933); Secretan,L'initiative populaire
cantonaleet la legislationde crise (I934).
See E.F. 1068.I4-I6 (d'Ernst).
604 THE tNIVERSITY OF CHICAGOLAW REVIEW
undera liberal-democratic formof government whichis neitherparlia-

mentarynorpresidential, has enjoyedan unparalleled equilibrium be-
tweenexecutiveand legislativepower,strengthened by the integration
ofdirectpopularactionintothelaw-making process.The FederalCoun-
cil (Bundesrat)is notresponsible to theFederalParliament(Bundesver-
sammnlung). On the basis of thissemi-representative systemtheposition
ofthegovernment was neither weakenedby thefactthatit is electedby
theparliament, norwas its prestigeaffected whenthepeoplerejecteda
government proposalby referendum. A government ofrealexpertsand
notofpartypoliticians, holdingtheiroffice bycustomary re-election over
longperiods,it is perhapsthemoststableexisting today. It usedto give
effective executiveleadershipwithoutbeingable to forceits willupon
parliament andpeopleiftheyweredisinclined to followthelead.
Yet Switzerland, in theseyearsofeconomic and politicaltension, also
paid the tributeto the universal tendency of increased governmental
powers.Thisaimcouldbe reachedonlybystretching almostbeyondrec-
ognitionthe liberalconstitution whichthe government deemedinsuffi-
cientforcopingwiththecrisis.The practiceadoptedin recentyearsin-
volvesbothcurtailment of legislativepowersof the parliament and of
popularparticipation in thelegislativeandconstituent processeswhichis
so conspicuous a featureof Swissconstitutional life. First,the Federal
Parliament conferredupontheFederalCouncil,bywayofsweeping dele-
gation,therightto issueordinances havingthevalidityofordinary statu-
toryenactments.Enablingclausesof thiskind,particularly whencon-
tainedin a so-called"urgentresolution of theFederalCouncil"108 were
frequently vagueandconfined merely tosetting up a generalframe within
whichthe FederalCouncilcouldmovewithmoreor less discretion. In
theexercise ofsuchdelegations theFederalCouncildidnotshyevenfrom
violationsof the constitutional provisionsproper'09whichotherwise
couldbe modified by
only popular referendum. Onlyinrareinstances the
FederalAssembly hasreserved foritselftherightofrepealing suchgovern-
mentalmeasures.In addition, theFederalCouncilextended thepowerof
issuingpoliceordinances grantedby the constitutionT"farbeyondthe
o08Article89, alinea 2.
ro9Giacometti,op. cit.supra note
I07, at 62 if. Even the Resolutionofthe Federal Council
of September27, I936 concerningmeasureswhichdecreedthe devaluationof the Swiss franc
had no legal justificationin an enablingclause of a previousact as it was contendedby the
Federal Council (see Id. at 69). Be it notedthatin France,Belgiumand Czechoslovakiade-
valuationwas introducedby parliamentarystatute. The last devaluationofApril,1938,was
imposedby decree.
I? Article I02, no. 8-io.
scope of the originalprovision.IIIn such cases, however,the govern-

mentseeksnotinfrequently legalizationthroughsubsequentratification
by theparliament.As regardsthepopularparticipation inlegislation,the
urgency clause of the constitutionwas so
applied readily in recent years
that this institution, intendedby the constitution to be a real emer-
gencyvalveforenactments whichcannotbe postponedlestacutedanger
forthe statewouldarise,becamean almostregularfeatureof ordinary
legislationin Switzerland.Underthe conditionsof real urgency,the
FederalCouncil,conjointly withtheFederalParliament, maytake care
of a pressingsituationby way of the "urgentresolution of the Federal
Council"("dringlicher Bundesratsbeschluss")withoutwaitingforthe re-
sultofa popularreferendum whichotherwise mustbe heldat therequest
of30,000voters."2Thispracticewhichcompetent observers havecorrect-
ly characterized as "parliamentary dictatorship" or rathermoreas out-
rightauthoritarian, has made deep inroadsin theconstitution based on
theprinciples ofpopularinitiativeand referendum"3 becauseurgency, in
itselfan unequivocalterm,has beendetermined usuallyonlyon grounds
of the generalnecessityof a measureand not whetherthe enactment
couldpossiblynotbe postponeduntilthepeoplehad decided. Further-
more,suchurgentresolutions of theFederalCouncilhave cut eveninto
theconstituent powersof thepeople"4by excluding popularratification
of constitutional amendment prescribedby the constitution. The real
reasonfortheflagrant misuseoftheurgency clauseis thatparliament and
government evidentlymistrustthe soundnessof the peopleand public
opinion. Consequently, a tensionbetweenvotersand government has
arisenwhichis apt to undermine thesenseoflegalityand theconfidence
in constitutional processes.
Thereis littledoubtamongSwissconstitutional lawyersthattheactual
ascendancyofthegovernment overparliament and peopleis unconstitu-
tionalbecauseit amountsto theobliteration and actualabolitionof the
separation ofpowerson whichtheSwissconstitution is grounded."5 Once
morethedoctrine, conceived,in past times,as thefoundation ofliberal-
ism,has becomea mythin the lightof the authoritarian tendencies of
today which did not halt even beforethe cradle of Europeandemocracy.
"I Giacometti,op. cit.supra note 107, at 72 if.
112See
Fleiner,op. cit. supra in note 24, at 404; Giacometti,op. cit. supra note 107, at 46
ff.Sulzer,Der allgemeinverbindlicheBundesbeschlussnach Artikel89 BV.
"3 Giacometti,op. cit.supra note 107, at 46.
"4 Id. at 58 ff.
i (1928).
und Gesetzesdelegation3 f.
"s5Id. at 74 ff.Verordnungsrecht
6o6 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
In Switzerland supremacy of the executive was won by clearly extra-

constitutional methods.It seemsunlikelythata returnto thepre-crisis
normalcy is possiblein thenearfuture.The legitimate waybackto legal-
itV,ifnotto a fullrestoration ofliberalism as impliedin theseparationof
powers,is thedirectreform of the constitution whichis boundto come
sincepublicopinionis moreand moreresentful of thehigh-handed meth-
ods of a government justlysuspectedof authoritarian leanings.Such a
reformshouldbringthe constitution in line withthe actuallyexisting
supremacy ofthe executiveby conferring upontheFederalCouncillegiti-
matepowersformoreexpeditious actionin emergency situations
together
withthe establishment of constitutionalreviewoffederalacts. It is sig-
nificant,however,thattheSwisspeopleare slowerthanothernationsin
realizingtheneedsof constitutional reform becauseof thedeeplyrooted
liberaltraditions of themiddleclasses. This is clearlyevidencedby the
resultsof two recentpopularinitiativesforconstitutional reformwhich
bothhave failedto reachtheirobjectives."6
TRIUMPH OF MONTESQUIETJ: THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL

CONTROL FOR THE SAKE OF LIBERTY
In concluding thisskeletonsurveyoftherelationsbetweenthelegisla-
tiveand theexecutivepoweras theyexisttoday,a forecast, on thebasis
of alreadyvisibletrends,of possiblefuturedevelopments may be per-
mitted.Constitutional historyevidentlymovesin risingand descending
curves.The eighteenth century ideologueswhobelievedin thefeasibility
oftransforming themetaphysical conceptof"thewillof thepeople"into
practicalinstitutionsand workable formulas,have been bitterlydis-
proved.The intrinsicchangesof the technological age did not fail to
affectdeeplythemethodsandprocessesofgovernment. Duringthetwen-
ty yearssince the worldwar state interventionism
has progressedby rapid
strides.In the fieldof government as in privatelife,libertyhad to be
sacrificed
forefficiency. For thisreason,in dictatorialstatespredomi-
nanceoftheexecutiveis perhapsconsidered lessas tyranny or despotism
thanas thenecessaryoffset ofthedecayofindividualself-determination
which,in thisrevolutionary age, has beenmade responsible forpolitical
chaosand economicdisturbances.Even in statesstillloyalto constitu-
116The initiativefora total revisionof the
sponsoredin 1934 by the "renewal
constitution,
movement." a group of disguised fascists,young conservatives,Catholics and disgruntled
shopkeepers.was rejectedby a vast majorityof the votersand thecantonsin 1935. Likewise
the Socialist "crisisinitiative"whichintendedto equip the Federal Council withfar-reaching
extraordinary powersfordealingwitheconomiclegislation,was rejectedin 1935 by a majority
of votersand cantons.
tionalprocessesthemergerbetweengovernmental and legislativepowers

reflectsthe increasingdifficulties of a capitalisticsocietywhichevery-
whereis travelling faston theroadtowardplannedeconomy.It is doubt-
ful whether,underthe systemof privatecapitalism,planningcan be
achievedby voluntary cooperation ofprivateinterests, as foreshadowed,
perhaps, to some extent by thedevelopment of various Boards and admin-
istrativeagenciesof economicself-government in England and else-
where,II7or onlyby compulsion appliedby the government whichulti-
mately cannot butlead to statecapitalism.At any rate,the classicaltask
of theparliament, namely,law-making and
by deliberation sanction, has
beenoverriden by theneedof swiftdecisionwhichonlya smallbodyof
menis suitedto perform.The tenaciously upheldpostulateof a separa-
tionoflegislativeand executive(or administrative) actionis unrealistic,
obsoleteand maybecomeat timesevendangerous.Hence theunavoid-
able concentration of politicalaction,whether legislativeor administra-
in
tive, thehandsofthegovernment.
The crucialissue,therefore, in constitutionalstatesis theintegration
of theincreasedpowersof thegovernment to decideand to act intothe
generalsystemof politicalcontrolby thepeople. For thisfunction the
parliament, as thefreelyelectedorganof thesovereignnation,is by all
meansmoreindispensable thanever. No betteror equallyappropriate
methodof supervision has beendevised. In otherwords:therealprob-
lemis howgovernmental leadershipthrough actioncan be subordinated
tothepoliticalcontrol byparliament. Politicalcontrol inthissensemeans
both appointment and revocationof the government by constitutional
processesand, in addition,the continuous scrutiny of governmental ac-
tionby therepresentatives ofthepeople. Hereemergesthefundamental
tenorofMontesquieu's doctrine.The technical appliancesoftheconstitu-
tionmustservethereconciliation ofleadership withfreedom, lestleader-
ship would destroy freedom. Veryrarely the "will of the people"can be
expressedin a facileformulaor in termsof concreteproposals.But the
people can preventthe government fromeffacing theirwill. Political
leadership means: "I am theirleader,therefore, I follow them.""'8The
constitution is the rationalizedsystemof controlsoverthe government
by thepeopleforthesake ofliberty.Ourownexperience clearlyvindi-
117 On this developmentwhich has parallels in Belgium and in Switzerland,see Robson,
Public Enterprise(1937). See also Bretha de la Gressaye,La representation et

professionnelle
corporative,Revue philosophiquede droit59 if. (I934); Bonnard,op. cit. supra note 67.
118This happy phrase,coined by Carlyle,is borrowedfromJennings,
op. cit.supra note 82,
at 364.
catestheimmortal wisdomofMontesquieu's thesisthatleadership when

uncontrolled, abusesits powersand degenerates intodespotismstyled
now-a-days dictatorshipor totalitarianism.Divisionof powerswithits
attendantchecksand balances,anothertermforcontrol, implies,in the
lastanalysis,thepreservation ofpoliticallibertyevenwhenthetechnical
arguments forsuchdivisionoffunctions areno longervalid.
Thustheimmediate objectivesofthefuturetechnique ofgovernment
in constitutionalstatesare twofold.On theone hand,rationalmethods
mustbe discovered and guarantees mustbe devisedbywhichtheconsti-
tutionalmachinery bringsreal leadersas experts,and not onlyexpert
politicians anddemagogues to thetop. Thisis theproblem ofrationalized
controlofmassemotionalism, involving,temporarily perhaps,somerevi-
sionsof traditionally reveredstandardsof equalitarianconcepts."9In
thesecondplace,whilethegovernment thusentrusted withpowerdoes
whatgovernments have to do, namelyto govern,a rationalized method
hastobe foundofhowgovernmental leadershipshouldbe madeamenable
to politicalcontrolof thepeopleor theirrepresentatives. This implies
evidentlya revisionof the technicalfunctions of representative assem-
blies.120Relievedof theirburdenof actual participation in theconduct
of thebusinessofthegovernment theparliaments can becometrueand
efficientagenciesofpoliticalcontrol.It maybe hopedthatfromthisnew
divisionof functions and powersa newbalanceof politicalforceswill
emergemorein conformity withrealitiesthanthepresentmythof the
balancebetweenlegislative andexecutive power.Suchan arrangement of
weightsand counter-weights shouldserve for the tasks of directed
economy inthetechnologicalage,and,at thesametime,itwouldbe better
adjustedto the ultimateend of all and everypoliticalorganization:
Politicalfreedom.
I9g Loewenstein,op. cit.supra note 27, at 656 if. For the elaborateefforts,
in all European
democracies,to check emotionalpropagandaentertainedby politicalpartiesforsubversive
purposessee the extensivestudyof Loewenstein,LegislativeControlof Political Extremism
in European Democracies,38 Col. L. Rev. 591 if. (r938).
120 For
attemptsdirectedtowardthis end see, e.g., Czechoslovakia,laws of May 30, 1933
(Slg. no. 88, 89), Annuairede l'Institutde droitpublic 1934 748 if. (1935); Belgium: Regu-
lation of the procedureof the Chamberof Deputies of December5, I935 (Informations con-
stitutionnelles et parlementaires[no. I of Februaryi5, I936, 4 if.]).

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The Balance between Legislative and Executive Power: A Study in Comparative Constitutional

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tweenor distribution amongdifferent humanagencieswithinthe same

The doctrineof the separationand its attendantpostulateof the mu-

FAILURE OF PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE THEORY IN EUROPE

On theotherhand,attempts in Europeto operatea statein termsof

powergrewout of theevolutionof constitutional monarchy of the Cen-

to the parliamentand the cabinet. The real issues of politicshad to be

Thuswe notethat-withtheexception oftheUnitedStates-the doc-

MAINTENANCE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE FIELD

wherefailedto gaina lastingfoothold,23 evenwhereconditions wereas

THE TECHNICAL ASPECT OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE

Furthermore,fromthe viewpointof governmentaltechnique proper,

holderof everyotherpowerand function, namely,thestate. But even

raisond'etatthanit did underCharlestheFirstor Louis theFourteenth.

II. HISTORICAL RETROSPECT ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN

larlyelectedpresident and thepopularlyelectedReichstag.This funda-

delayed until after the war. Thus an irresistiblepolitical evolution,

proved,in thelightofcontemporary events,infactto be a sortofa dress

sometimes a systemofpermanent parliamentary committees duplicated

manyor Greece.As the result,in mostof thenewlyestablished demo-

III. SUMMARYOF THE PRESENT RELATIONS BETWEEN

The totalitarian dictatorships ofRussia,Italy,Germany, Turkey6'are

tiveof all phases and aspectswhilescientifictreatisesofconstitutionallaw, likewiseabundant

thepeopleor ofchecking thearbitrariness

Technically although perhapsnotquiteideologically

ofwhichwere,withoutexception, directly appointedby the

struments fortheexerciseofindependent legislativepowers.Bothselec-

presentunderan extra-constitutional systemof authoritarian regimein

CONSlrll 'i ONAL STATES OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TYPE:

powershas workedsurprisingly wellthrough generations becauseusually

President'sfirstterm. This incalculablehumanelement,and not the

orat leastdelayedin theUnitedStates.78Thusthesecondbasicprinciple

practicein this countrya less democraticappearance than in some other

The essentialfeatureof governmentin states operatedunderthe par-

majoritypartythroughthedeviceof thegeneralelection,heldat inter-

France.-According to competent observers theparliamentary system

I87790 and Millerand in I9249' and that only Poincare's personality

Doumergue,"see Haikal, op. cit. supra note 5, at 243 f.;

people,confidesto thegovernmentofthedaywide-range legislative

divisionbetweenexecutiveand legislativefunctions.At thetimewhen

augurated,to a limitedextent,duringthewar,was utilizedagainforreal

In Englandpleinspouvoirs inthefullmeaning ofthetermareunknown

Controloftheparliament is providedforby theprovisionrecurrent in

undera liberal-democratic formof government whichis neitherparlia-

scope of the originalprovision.IIIn such cases, however,the govern-

In Switzerland supremacy of the executive was won by clearly extra-

TRIUMPH OF MONTESQUIETJ: THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL

tionalprocessesthemergerbetweengovernmental and legislativepowers

Public Enterprise(1937). See also Bretha de la Gressaye,La representation et

catestheimmortal wisdomofMontesquieu's thesisthatleadership when

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