Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Journal of Philosophy, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Philosophy.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 132.239.1.231 on Thu, 21 Jan 2016 21:33:25 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BEAUTY AND AESTHETIC VALUE 617
This content downloaded from 132.239.1.231 on Thu, 21 Jan 2016 21:33:25 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
618 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
This content downloaded from 132.239.1.231 on Thu, 21 Jan 2016 21:33:25 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BEAUTY AND AESTHETIC VALUE 619
worth as propaganda or anything else, but its worth (or its suc-
cess) as art. To call something "good music" must be to judge
it by essentially musical criteria; for when we say it is good music
we are saying that it is good qua music, good music-wise, or in
the manner of music. Thus there must be a manner in which music
is good, considered simply as music, if there is such a thing as good
music.
And surely judgments of artistic goodness are aesthetic judg-
ments. I don't quite know how this proposition is to be supported,
when challenged-except that I do not see how any other form
of statement could have a better claim to be an aesthetic judgment
than the sort of statement that judges a work of art as a work
of art. To say that music is good music is certainly not to make
any other kind of judgment, moral, political, financial, medical,
or whatever.
As regards the other disputed point, about the proper task of
aesthetics, Hofstadter apparently thinks the subject has been per-
verted from its true tradition. Perhaps so-though I think it is a
little odd to imply that Aristotle was not writing aesthetics in his
Poetics, which he sums up in his last sentence in a way that plainly
acknowledges the importance of judgments of artistic goodness
and the need to examine their meaning and grounds.' But since
Hofstadter concedes that there is work available for aesthetics in
my sense (metacriticism), though he does not regard it very highly,
the question at issue (apart from the appropriation or misappro-
priation of labels) is whether there is another job to be done by
aesthetics in his sense.
If it be granted that there are judgments of artistic goodness,
whether or not they are genuinely aesthetic judgments, the next
question is what sort of judgment they are; and I say that they are
judgments of aesthetic value. Here again I collide with Hof-
stadter 's position. It seems to me that to call a sequence of
sounds "good music" is to attribute to it a comparatively high
degree of a special sort of value, which might be called "musical
value. " And I take the general term 'aesthetic value ' to be
related to the specific term 'musical value' in this logical fashion:
anything that has musical value has aesthetic value. Musical
value, poetic value, dramatic value, painting value, sculptural
1 " So much for tragic and epic poetry, their characteristics, . . . and
the causes of their being well [done, made] or not" (in terms of their special
artistic function, which is to produce their "proper pleasure," oikeia hedone).
Butcher translates: " the causes that make a poem good or bad "; Fyfe:
"the causes of success and failure '; G. F. Else: "the causes of artistic ex-
cellelnce and the opposite. "
This content downloaded from 132.239.1.231 on Thu, 21 Jan 2016 21:33:25 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
620 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
This content downloaded from 132.239.1.231 on Thu, 21 Jan 2016 21:33:25 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
622 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
I believe that this revelation theory is both too abstract and too
general.
The theory is too abstract in this way: what all beautiful works
of art reveal is, in the end, the same thing, namely spiritual validity.
But it will not be enough to say this unless we then go on to
explain the difference between works of art. What is it that King
Lear reveals and Macbeth does not? How does one work become
greater, or more beautiful, than another-by being more powerful,
more rightful, more revelatory, or revelatory of different things?
And, finally, are there not many forms of life revealed in works
of literature-in different plays and poems, even in the same play,
and not only through the characters and events, but in the very
meter and diction and structure? Some forms of life are less
valid, presumably, than others, even among the great works:
Dante's, Homer's, Lucretius's. What distinctions can the theory
provide?
The theory is also too general. I don't see how every work
of art can be a revelation. I will grant that a tragic drama makes
a direct allusion to the human condition, but can the same be said
for a string quartet? It is always possible to achieve generality
of revelatory content by ascending to higher levels of abstraction:
the string quartet exhibits order, and so reveals the order of the
universe, etc. But if 'spiritual validity' has a more concrete and
substantial meaning, then it does not seem extendable to every
beautiful work of art. Of course it may be said that the string
quartet does not contain references to reality, but is itself, as a
whole, a reference-or a kind of symbol. But this view raises
difficult problems.
For how does it come about that the work of art reflects "ex-
istential validity" -how do we know that beauty is "truth regard-
ing validity of (spiritual) being " (615 n) ? A work cannot become
a symbol without some symbol-making or symbol-forming process.
It will not do, I think, to try to sink the epistemological or semiotic
question into the phenomenological one, with the help of an am-
biguous word like 'show'. The fullest phenomenological descrip-
tion of the aesthetic experience will give us only what is in the
experience; it will not justify our attributing to the work a ref-
erence beyond itself to human life (which is implied in 'showing'),
and still less will it justify our deriving from the work a truth
about human life (which may be implied in 'revealing'). Taken
in its fullest and richest sense, Hofstadter's account of spiritual
life working itself out in valid form is a fine description of what
we may hear in music or see in painting, but it remains meta-
phorical. Music has a life of its own, it moves and grows, it finds
This content downloaded from 132.239.1.231 on Thu, 21 Jan 2016 21:33:25 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BEAUTY AND AESTIETIC VALUE 623
III. BEAUTY
This content downloaded from 132.239.1.231 on Thu, 21 Jan 2016 21:33:25 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
624 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
This content downloaded from 132.239.1.231 on Thu, 21 Jan 2016 21:33:25 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BEAUTY AND AESTHETIC VALUE 625
This content downloaded from 132.239.1.231 on Thu, 21 Jan 2016 21:33:25 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
626 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
This content downloaded from 132.239.1.231 on Thu, 21 Jan 2016 21:33:25 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BEAUTY AND AESTHETIC VALUE 627
But I am afraid that this is not enough to let me escape from the
trouble into which I am plunged by Hofstadter's attack-and by
his charge that I confuse "the stuff of the work and the work
itself ' (609). When I try to give examples of excellent (or, if
Hofstadter prefers, highly successful) works of art that are never-
theless not properly called "beautiful," his answreris that, though
the "stuff" (or subject) may not be beautiful, the work itself
nevertheless is. At the risk of some unorthodoxy, I would like to
say whv I do not wholly accept this criticism. There are three
types of case to consider.
First, consider nonrepresentational works of visual or auditory
art. In these, we cannot confuse the subject with the work itself,
since there is no subject. Yet I would say, for example, that
Beethoven's Great Fugue (Op. 133) should not be called "beauti-
ful, though it is a tremendous piece of music, a great and excellent
work. Parts of it have beauty, but as a whole it glories in its
power, its dramatic intensity, its drive and pent-up energy. As
to visual art, let me invoke the support of Henry Moore, in a
passage quoted by Harold Osborne:
For me a work must first have vitality of its own. I do not mean a reflection
of the vitality of life, of movement, physical action, frisking, dancing figures
and so on, but that a work can have in it a pent-up energy, an intense life of
its own, independent of the object it may represent. When a work has this
powerful vitality we do not connect the word Beauty with it. Beauty, in the
later Greek or Renaissance sense, is not the aim of my sculpture.4
This content downloaded from 132.239.1.231 on Thu, 21 Jan 2016 21:33:25 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
628 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
6 I use the term 'depict' in the slightly technical sense (distinguished from
that of 'portray') assigned to it in Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy
of Criticism (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1958), ch. 6.
This content downloaded from 132.239.1.231 on Thu, 21 Jan 2016 21:33:25 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions