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EASTERN BROADCASTING CORP (DYRE) V. DANS JR.

[137 SCRA 628; L-59329; 19 JUL 1985]

Facts: A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was “summarily closed” on
grounds of national security. The radio station was allegedly used to incite people to sedition.
Petitioner, DYRE contends that they were denied due process. There was no hearing to
establish factual evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the closure of the radio station
violates freedom of expression. Before the court could even promulgate a decision upon the
Issue raised, Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene Espina, filed a motion to withdraw the
petition. The rights of the station were sold to a new owner, Manuel Pastrana; who is no
longer interested in pursuing the case. Despite the case becoming moot and academic,
(because there are no longer interested parties, thus the dismissal of the case) the Supreme
Court still finds that there is need to pass a “RESOLUTION” for the guidance of inferior courts
and administrative tribunals in matters as this case.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE.

(2) Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right of Freedom of
Expression.

Held: The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void. The
absence of a hearing is a violation of Constitutional Rights. The primary requirements in
administrative proceedings are laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relation (69 Phil.635). The Ang Tibay Doctrine should be followed before any broadcast station
may be closed. The Ang Tibay Doctrine provides the following requirements:

(1) The right to hearing, includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence
presented.

(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented

(3) The decision must have something to support itself.

(4) Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to support conclusion)

(5) Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing

(6) The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law and facts and not
simply accept subordinate’s views

(7) Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know the various
issued involved and reasons for decisions rendered.

The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of Due Process, it
gives an unavoidable standard that government actions must conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty and property is valid.

The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional right of freedom of
speech and expression. The court stresses that all forms of media, whether print or broadcast
are entitled to this constitutional right. Although the government still has the right to be
protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for
the limitation of freedom of expression is the “clear and present danger” rule. If in the
circumstances that the media is used in such nature as to create this danger that will bring in
such evils, then the law has the right to prevent it. However, Radio and television may not be
used to organize a rebellion or signal a start of widespread uprising. The freedom to comment
on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. The people
continues to have the right to be informed on public affairs and broadcast media continues to
have the pervasive influence to the people being the most accessible form of media.
Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the the special protection given to all forms of media by
the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.

CHAVEZ VS PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT

Facts: Francisco Chavez, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative
duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving national interest, demands
that the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) be required to make public
any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s task of recovering the
Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten
wealth involves an issue of ³paramount public interest´ since it has a “debilitating effect on the
country’s economy” that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino
people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the transactions or deals being
contrived and effected by the government.

Issue: W/N the Supreme Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of
any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses, regarding their ill-gotten wealth.

Ruling: YES. It is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government
representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they
have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such
information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily
to intra-agency or inter-agency communications during the stage when common assertions
are still in the process of being formulated or are in the “exploratory” stage. There is a need, of
course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, such as on
matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other
classified information.

There is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public
concern and imbued with public interest. Ill-gotten wealth, by its very nature, assumes a public
character. Based on Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, and 14, “ill-gotten wealth” refers to assets and
properties purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by former President Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives and close associates through or as a result of their improper or
illegal use of government funds or properties; or their having taken undue advantage of their
public office; or their use of powers, influences or relationships, resulting in their unjust
enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines. Clearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from the
government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. As such,
upon reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to the
satisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as may be adjudged by competent courts.
Another declared overriding consideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is
that it may be used for national economic recovery.

Agreements entered into by the PCGG with the Marcoses declared null and void for being
contrary to law and the Constitution. PCGG directed to disclose to the public the terms of any
proposed compromise settlement, as well as the final agreement, relating to such alleged ill-
gotten wealth.

Javier vs COMELEC

Facts: Evelio Javier and Arturo Pacificador were candidates in Antique for the Batasang
Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. Javier appeared to enjoy more popular support but the
latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On
the eve of the elections, some of Javier’s followers were ambushed and killed, allegedly by
Pacificador’s men.

Javier, after the elections, went to the COMELEC to question the canvass of the election
returns. He charged that the elections were marred by “massive terrorism, intimidation,
duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat
and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador.” The
Second Division of the COMELEC, of which one of Pacificador’s former law partners was a
Member, directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass
but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. Subsequently,
the same Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the
winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari
before the Supreme Court, the proclamation by the canvassers was set aside as premature,
having been made before the lapse of the five-day period of appeal, which Javier had
seasonably made. The Second Division finally promulgated the decision dismissing the
complaints of Javier and proclaiming Pacificador as the elected assemblyman of Antique.

Javier then appealed to the Supreme Court, with a prayer to annul the decision proclaiming
Pacificador as the winner. In 1986, while the case was pending, Javier was gunned down in
broad daylight. The EDSA Revolution subsequently toppled the Marcos regime, which brought
about the abolition of the Batasang Pambansa.

Issue: W/N Javier’s petition should be dismissed for being moot and academic in the light of
supervening events.

Ruling: NO. Several lives have been lost in connection with this case, including that of
petitioner Javier’s himself. Pacificador is now in hiding. The purity of suffrage has been defiled
and the popular will scorned through a confabulation of those in authority. The Supreme Court
cannot keep silent in the face of these terrible facts. Were it not for the supervening events
that have legally rendered it moot and academic, this petition would have been granted and
the contested decision of the COMELEC set aside as being violative of the Constitution.
Issue: How was Javier denied due process?

Ruling: Commissioner Opinion, one of the Second Division Commissioners, ignored due
process of law when he did not inhibit himself from the proceedings on the ground that he
was formerly Pacificador’s law partner. For refusing to do so, he divested the Second Division
of the necessary vote for the questioned decision, assuming it could act, and rendered the
proceeding null and void.

People v Basay G.R. No. 86941

Facts: The spouses Zosimo and Beatrice Toting, together with one of their daughters, Bombie,
were hacked inside their home. In order to conceal the crime, the perpetrators also burned
the said house. Because of the fire, the spouses’ other daughter, Manolita, was burned to
death, while one of their sons, Manolo, suffered second and third degree burns. Bombie
survived the hacking and the burning and was found alive around forty meters away from the
dead bodies of her family members almost two days after the crime was committed. Upon
being found, Bombie allegedly related to the authorities that Jaime Ramirez and Teodoro
Basay killed their parents and burned their house. She died a day later while confined in the
hospital.

After Bombie told the authorities who the perpetrators were, they went to Jaime’s house, and
Jaime, upon seeing the police, tried to run. He was then turned over to the Pamplona police
station and brought to the chamber of Judge Teopisto Calumpang, accompanied by Elpedio
Catacutan, a barrister and a COMELEC registrar of the place, who acted as Jaime’s counsel. An
affidavit, referred to as Jaime’s extrajudicial confession, was produced before the Judge,
previously typed by a police investigating officer. The Judge then made the court interpreter
translate the allegations of the sworn statement into the local dialect for Jaime, who did not
understand English. Afterwards, Jaime and Catacutan signed the document in the presence of
the Judge. After Teodoro was also apprehended by the police, he and Jaime allegedly executed
a Joint Waiver wherein it was stated that for their safety and security, they voluntarily decided
to be detained and that they killed the spouses and thereafter burned the spouses’ house
which resulted in the death of one and hospitalization of two Toting children.

During the trial, Jaime testified that he did not read the document that he signed before Judge
Calumpang because he did not know how to read. He also did not understand when it was
read to him because it was in English. He also stated that Catacutan was not his lawyer and
that he did not know him, but only saw him for the first time in the Pamplona Municipal Hall
while the latter was going upstairs.

The trial court disregarded the joint waiver insofar as it tended to incriminate the accused and
because when they signed the same, they were not represented by counsel, in violation of
their rights as provided in Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. There being no other
evidence against Teodoro, the court acquitted him. However, it admitted in evidence Jaime’s
extrajudicial confession, considered as part of the res gestae the statement given by Bombie
identifying Jaime and Teodoro as the perpetrators of the crime, and considered as flight-which
is indicative of guilt-Jaime’s running away when he saw the law enforcers. It further ruled that
Jaime signed the extrajudicial confession voluntarily and in the presence of counsel so it is
therefore admissible against him.

Jaime neither filed a notice of appeal, nor orally manifested his intention to appeal. However,
the lower court transmitted the records of the case to the Supreme Court because in view of
the penalty imposed-life imprisonment-the lower court raticionated that such decision is
subject for automatic review by the Supreme Court. Although erroneous, the Supreme Court
nonetheless accepted the appeal in the interest of justice.

Issue: W/N the trial court erred in finding Jaime guilty on the basis of the alleged extrajudicial
confession, the statement of Bombie Toting, and his presumed guilt because of his alleged
flight.

Ruling: YES. The confession, which is indisputably an uncounselled confession or admission, is


inadmissible as evidence.

A close scrutiny of the questioned extrajudicial confession reveals all possible violations of
Jaime’s right to remain silent, to counsel, and to be informed of such rights, and of the
safeguards prescribed by the Supreme Court for the holding of custodial investigations. These
violations are:

(a) The interrogation was conducted and the confession was written in English, a language
that Jaime, a farmer in a remote barangay of Pamplona, cannot speak and does not
understand; he only finished Grade II. There is no evidence to show that the
interrogator, who was not even presented as a witness and remains unidentified,
translated the questions and the answers into a dialect known and fairly understood by
Jaime.
(b) Jaime was not told that he could retain a counsel of choice and that if he cannot afford
to do so, he could be provided with one.
(c) He did not sign any waiver of his right to remain silent and to counsel.
(d) He was not assisted by any counsel during the investigation. Instead, a certain Elpedio
Catacutan, who claimed to have appeared for him as a “friend-counsel,” was present
only at the time that Jaime was brought to the office of Judge Catacutan for the
preparation of the jurat.
(e) Assuming that Catacutan may have been summoned to act as Jaime’s counsel, he was,
nevertheless, not present during the custodial interrogation which, by the way, was
conducted a week before he was made to appear before Judge Calumpang. Catacutan’s
presence before the Judge did not change the situation. As the Supreme Court stated in
People v. Burgos, the securing of the counsel to help the accused when the latter
subscribed under oath to his statement at the Fiscal’s Office was too late and had no
palliative effect; it did not cure the absence of counsel at the time of the custodial
investigation when the extrajudicial statement was being taken.
(f) Furthermore, Catacutan is not a lawyer; according to the trial court, he is a barrister. In
fact, he candidly admitted that he is not a lawyer but that he obtained a law degree
from Siliman University in 1959. Unfortunately, however, he failed in three Bar
Examinations.
(g) There is no showing that the so-called extrajudicial confession, which is in English, was
correctly explained and translated to Jaime by Judge Calumpang. Although the latter
claimed in his testimony on direct examination that he translated the same in the local
dialect to Jaime before the latter affixed his signature thereto, Catacutan categorically
declared that it was the interpreter, one Pedro Rodriguez, who translated it to Jaime.
(h) Finally, the kind of “advice” proffered by the unidentified interrogator belongs to that
stereotyped class-a long question by the investigator informing Jaime of his right
followed by a mono syllabic answer-which the Supreme Court has condemned for being
unsatisfactory. The investigator gave his advice perfunctorily or in a pro-forma manner,
obviously to pay mere lip service to the prescribed norms. This stereotyped advice has
assumed the nature of a “legal form” or model. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and artificially
stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on
the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving
up of a right is missing.

As for Bombie’s alleged statement given to the authorities identifying Jaime and Teodoro as
the perpetrators of the heinous crime, it should also not have been admitted. In the first place,
the trial court itself ruled that Bombie was not a competent witness. The Supreme Court
agrees with such a conclusion, not necessarily because she was only 6 years old, but because
her condition at the time she supposedly gave her statement made it impossible for her to
have communicated effectively. She was taken from the crime scene two days after the
commission of the crime, and died the day after. The doctor who first attended to her when
she arrived at the hospital was not presented as a witness. On the other hand, the doctor who
attended to her before she died testified that when he last saw Bombie alive, she could not
talk. It was this inability to talk which led the trial court to express its doubts on the veracity of
the child’s statement. Although persons of tender age are prone to tell the truth, however, the
Court must be cautious in appreciating said testimony where the person had a serious wound
and had not eaten for one day and one night. There is no evidence to show that Bombie told
the doctor as to who were the perpetrators of the crime; neither did she tell her own brother,
Zosimo Jr. that it was Jaime and Teodoro who killed their parents and her brother and sister
and burned their house. The Court cannot understand why the law enforcer who talked to her
did not ask her questions concerning the commission of the crime by the accused. Neither did
they take her statement from her on her way to the hospital or at the hospital. Had her
statement been made to the doctor or to the barangay captain or to any reputable member of
the community where the incident happened, the Court will have put weight and consider her
statement as a dying declaration. Persons in authority are prone to fabricate or misrepresent
the facts to serve their own purpose. The Court therefore has to be cautious when these peace
officers testify in Court. In the second place, as a result of the foregoing, the trial court
completely disregarded Bombie’s so-called statement as against Teodoro. The Supreme Court
sees neither rhyme nor reason for the trial court’s admission of the same as against Jaime.
Finally, while it may be true that Jaime ran away when he first saw the armed law officers, he
did so merely out of fear of them. This act should not be considered as the flight which is
indicative of guilt. Jaime had not left his house or barangay since the day the crime was
committed. If he were indeed one of the perpetrators and had the intention to flee in order to
avoid arrest, he should have vanished sooner and should not have remained in his house.
Besides, if his running away could be construed as flight, it could only be considered as
circumstantial evidence. Such evidence would still be insufficient for a conviction.

Hence, Jaime’s guilt was not established with moral certainty. He should be acquitted.

PEOPLE VS. BOLANOS [211 SCRA 262; G.R. NO. 101808; 3 JUL 1992]

Facts: Ramon Bolanos was tried for the murder of Oscar Pagdalian. He was convicted by the
lower court based on the testimonies of the apprehending policemen, who stated that when
they boarded Bolanos and his companion, Claudio Magtibay, on the police vehicle, Bolanos
allegedly admitted that he killed Pagdalian because he was abusive. The penalty of reclusion
perpetua was imposed upon him. A manifestation was filed by the Solicitor General’s Office,
with the position that the lower court erred in admitting as evidence the extrajudicial
confession of Bolanos while on board the police patrol jeep, for it was done in violation of
Bolanos constitutional right to be informed, to remain silent, and to have a counsel of his
choice, while under police custody.

Issue: W/N Bolanos’ confession is admissible.

Ruling: NO. Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep
on the way to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted,
Bolanos should have been informed of his constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of
the 1987 Constitution. Considering the clear requirements of the Constitution with respect to
the manner by which confession can be admissible in evidence, and the glaring fact that the
alleged confession obtained while on board the police vehicle was the only reason for the
conviction, besides Bolanos’ conviction was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, the
Supreme Court has no recourse but to reverse the subject judgment under review. Bolanos is
acquitted.

People vs. Ramos, 39 SCRA 236

Facts: Malcon Olevere was stopped and frisked by police officers when they saw him acting
suspiciously during one evening, and found in his possession dried marijuana leaves. Olevere
was then placed under arrest. During investigation, Olevere declared that he bought the
recovered marijuana leaves from Rogelio Ramos, alias “Balanchoy.” The following day, a police
team was accompanied by Olevere to the residence of Ramos, and Ramos was arrested and
immediately brought to the Drugs Enforcement Section Western Police Department
Headquarters for investigation. During the custodial investigation, Olevere executed a written
sworn statement implicating Ramos as the source of the marijuana leaves. Ramos, after having
been duly apprised of his constitutional rights, verbally admitted before the police officers the
commission of the offense charged. He likewise admitted that he sold the marijuana leaves to
Olevere for P10.00. He pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Documentary evidence, as well
as the policemen who took down Olevere’s sworn statement and arrested Ramos, and a
forensic chemist who affirmed that the leaves confiscated from Olevere are positive for
marijuana were presented. Olevere was not. After the trial, the Court of First Instance of
Manila found Ramos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in view of the
verbal admission Ramos himself gave and the evidence offered and admitted in court. The
case was raised to the Supreme Court on automatic review.

Issue: W/N the confession of Ramos to the police officers of the commission of the offense
charged is admissible as evidence against him.

Ruling: NO. Ramos only finished Grade VI, which means that he is not adequately educated to
understand fairly and fully the significance of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel.
As mandated, it is not enough that the police investigator merely informs him of his
constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, and then taking his statements down, the
interrogating officer must have patience in explaining these rights to him. The records do not
reveal that these requirements have been fully complied with, nor was there any showing that
Ramos has been represented by counsel during custodial investigation. In consonance with
Section 20 of the Bill of Rights which states that “any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence,” the Supreme Court holds that Ramos verbal
admissions during custodial investigation may not be taken in evidence against him.

Issue: W/N the constitutional right of Ramos to meet the witness against him face to face and
to cross-examine him has been violated by the non-presentation of Olevere in court.

Ruling: YES. The lower court erred in admitting as evidence the written sworn affidavit of
Olevere, who executed the written sworn statement declaring that Ramos sold to him the
marijuana leaves for P10.00. This piece of evidence is a mere scrap of paper because Olevere
was not produced in court for cross-examination. An affidavit being taken ex- parte is often
incomplete and inaccurate. Such kind of evidence is considered hearsay. For the court to admit
the sworn statement of Olevere without giving the adverse party the right to cross-examine
him would easily facilitate the fabrication of evidence and the perpetration of fraud. The
inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based, not only on the lack of opportunity on the part
of the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, but also on the commonly known fact that,
generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiant’s statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood by
the one writing them.

Since Olevere was not presented as a witness, the testimonies offered by the witnesses for the
prosecution are regarded as hearsay, insofar as they impute to Ramos the commission of the
offense charged.

Chavez vs. Court of Appeals

Facts: Roger Chavez, along with eight others, were accused of stealing a Thunderbird car.
Upon arraignment, all of the accused except those three who have not been identified nor
apprehended, pleaded not guilty. The trial began with the prosecution spontaneously calling
Roger Chavez to the witness stand as an ordinary witness, without previously informing
Chavez’ counsel, Atty. Carbon. Atty. Carbon vehemently objected, to no avail. The Judge called
Chavez to the witness stand, stating that it is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act
as witness on the witness stand including the accused, and that the defense counsel could not
object to have the accused called on the witness stand. There, Chavez was subjected to direct
examination. After Chavez’ examination, the court gathered enough information to free all the
accused except him, who was found to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified theft. Chavez appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the appeal on
procedural grounds. Chavez appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue: W/N Chavez’ right against self-incrimination was violated when he was compelled to
testify against himself in open court.

Ruling: YES. Chavez was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his
constitutional right to remain silent. When the Judge of the trial court emphatically stated that
Chavez’ counsel cannot object to Chavez being called to the witness stand, Chavez had to take
the stand. He was thus peremptorily asked to create evidence against himself. The Judge’s
statement that Chavez’ counsel could not object to have the latter called on the witness stand
wielded authority. By those words, Chavez was enveloped by a coercive force; they deprived
him of his will to resist; they foreclosed choice; the realities of human nature tell us that as he
took his oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, no genuine consent
underlay submission to take the witness stand. Constitutionally sound consent was absent.
The decision convicting him was clearly of the view that the case for the People was built
primarily around the admissions of Chavez himself. The trial court described Chavez as the
“star witness for the prosecution.”

Issue: W/N Chavez waived his right against self-incrimination when he answered the questions
and did not invoke the said right upon taking the witness stand.

Ruling: NO. It cannot be said that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the
stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he
claimed the right upon being called to testify. If he answered the questions in spite of his fear
of being accused of perjury or being put under contempt, this circumstance cannot be counted
against him. His testimony is not of his own choice. To him it was a case of compelled
submission. He was a cowed participant in proceedings before a judge who possessed the
power to put him under contempt had he chosen to remain silent. Nor could he escape
testifying. The court made it abundantly clear that his testimony atleast on direct examination
would be taken right then and there on the first day of the trial. It matters not, after all efforts
to stave off his taking the stand became fruitless, no objections to questions propounded to
him were made. Here involved is not a mere question of self-incrimination. It is a defendant’s
constitutional immunity from being called to testify against himself. And the objection made at
the beginning is a continuing one. There is therefore no waiver of the privilege, because a
waiver, to be effective, must be certain and unequivocal, and intelligently, understandably,
and willingly made; such waiver following only where liberty of choice has been fully accorded.
The defense of waiver, therefore, cannot stand. If, by his own admission, the defendant
proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For the privilege against self-
incrimination is a rampart that gives protection-even to the guilty. Chavez ordered discharged
from custody, unless he is held, kept in custody, or detained for any cause or reason other
than the said judgment.
BELTRAN VS. SAMSON [53 PHIL 570; G.R. NO. 32025; 23 SEPT 1929]

Facts: Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his
handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that
such order would be a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because
such examination would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should
have gotten in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence
against himself.

Issue: Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose
of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents
supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of
the constitutional provision under examination.

Held: The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain
absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his
handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is something
more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical
act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar
writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he
is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more
serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in
one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a
similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled
to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish
evidence against himself. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to
obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go
unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it
should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his
handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without
resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal
right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may
succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the
raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent
persons.

People vs Austria

Facts: Tomas Azuela was found stabbed to death, with his skull fractured, on a sugarcane field
in Negros Occidental. It was later on learned that he was carrying the payroll and P771.40
intended as wages for the laborers of Hacienda Austria, where he worked as an overseer, and
the payroll and the money were missing.

In connection with his death, four suspects were picked up by the police. One was Pablo
Austria, the last person who was seen with Tomas. The others were implicated based on the
sworn statement of Pablo-Eduardo, Pablo’s son; Jaime de la Torre; and Leopoldo Abanilla. A
complaint of robbery with homicide was then filed against them. All of them pleaded not
guilty to the charge.

The prosecution witnesses stated that Tomas was last seen alive with Pablo. A blood stained
hoe was found in Jaime’s home. Upon examination, the blood from the crime scene and the
blood from the hoe were found to be from the same blood group. Eduardo was only
implicated based on his father’s sworn statement.

Both Jaime and Pablo claim that they were manhandled by the police. On cross-examination,
the interrogating officer admitted that he did not apprise both of their rights to remain silent
and to counsel as he was merely conducting an informal interview. The trial court convicted
Jaime, Pablo, and Eduardo. During the pendency of the appeal, Pablo died of undetermined
cause while Jaime died of hypertension in the New Bilibid Prisons Hospital.

Issue: W/N Eduardo’s guilt had been established beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling: NO. Conviction should be made on the basis of a strong, clear, and compelling
evidence. Of course, this is not to say that conviction cannot be had simply because the
evidence is circumstantial. However, in this case, the evidence of the prosecution against
Eduardo Austria is merely circumstantial. They do not prove an unbroken link of events that
could give rise to a reasonable and fair conclusion that Eduardo committed the imputed
offense. The only evidence against him is that he was seen at about 1:00 in the afternoon of 9
August 1975 along the road to Hacienda Austria. This evidence, even if tied up with the
testimony of Illuminada that Eduardo harbored ill-feelings against Tomas because the former
was dismissed from the hacienda by the latter does not establish or support an inference,
much less a conclusion, that he participated in the commission of the offense charged.
Eduardo’s conviction on an inference based on another inference cannot be maintained. To
overcome the presumption of innocence, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REY SUNGA, et al.

Facts: Upon the discovery of the mutilated body of a high-school girl at a coffee plantation, an
Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for Rape with Homicide against
several suspects including Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang, Inocencio Pascua, Jr., and Lito Octac as
principals, and Locil Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos as accomplice.

Rey Sunga et al. filed with the RTC a petition for bail underscoring the weakness of the
prosecution‘s evidence, there being no direct evidence against them. In the same proceeding,
a motion was granted to discharge Locil to become a state witness while deferring the
resolution of the bail petition.

Through the testimony of Locil, the RTC reached to a decision convicting Sunga and Lansang as
principals of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced each to suffer the penalty of
death, and Pascua as principal in the crime of Rape.

Issue: Whether the guilt of Sunga et al. has been proven beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged
Held: The testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or
implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as proof to
a moral certainty that the latter committed or participated in the commission of the crime.
The testimony must be substantially corroborated in its material points by unimpeachable
testimony and strong circumstances and must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness
becomes manifest.

As an exception to the general rule on the requirement of corroboration of the testimony of


an accomplice or co-conspirator-turned state witness, her testimony may, even if
uncorroborated, be sufficient as when it is shown to be sincere in itself because it is given
unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner and full of details which, by their nature, could
not have been the result of deliberate afterthought.

The Court is not in fact prepared to accord Locil credibly as a witness. Who can trust one who,
in her early teens, gets pregnant, flees home and stays in a boarding house albeit she has no
visible means of income to pay therefor, and carries an alias name to evade being traced by
her mother and aunt?

Evidence to be believed should not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but
should also be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind
can approve as probable under the circumstances.

The observations pertaining to both the weak, incomprehensible voice with which Locil gave
her testimony, the improbability with which she was precisely made by appellants to be a
witness to their crime, and the failure of her description of Pascua‘s eyes to match the latter‘s
actual physical feature cannot but engender serious doubts as to the reliability of her
testimony against all appellants. The Court thus finds her uncorroborated account to have
failed the jurisprudentially established touchstone for its credibility and sufficiency, that of
straightforwardness and deliberateness, as evidence to warrant appellants‘ conviction.

De la Camara vs. Enage

Facts: Ricardo de la Camara, the Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, was
arrested and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan for his alleged participation in the killing
of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other laborers of the Tirador Logging Company. He,
along with his co-accused Nambinalot Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, was accused of multiple
frustrated murder and multiple murder. De la Camara filed an application for bail, premised on
the assertion that there was no evidence to link him with the crime. The judge, Hon. Manuel
Enage, fixed the amount of his bail at P1,195,200.00-P840,000.00 for the information charging
multiple murder and P355,200.00for the offense of multiple frustrated murder. The Secretary
of Justice, upon being informed of this order, sent a telegram to the Judge stating that the
bond “is excessive” and suggesting that a P40,000.00 bond, either in cash or property, would
be reasonable. However, the Judge remained adamant.

De la Camara appealed by way of certiorari to the Supreme Court, assailing the


constitutionality of the amount of the bail fixed as repugnant to the constitutional mandate
prohibiting excessive bail. However, de la Camara escaped from prison during the pendency of
the appeal, thus rendering the case moot and academic.

Issue: Was the amount for bail fixed by the judge excessive, and should the amount therefore
be reduced?

Ruling: YES. No attempt at rationalization can give the color of validity to the challenged order.
The order fixing the amount of bail at P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple
murder, there being fourteen victims, and the sum of P355,200.00 for the information
charging multiple frustrated murder, there being twelve victims, is clearly violative of the
constitutional provision against excessive bail. Under the circumstances, there being only two
offenses charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the
information for murder andP25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor
should it be ignored that the Department of Justice did recommend the total sum of
P40,000.00 for the two offenses.

Issue: Has the case against De la Camara been rendered moot and academic by his escape
from prison?

Ruling: YES. De la Camara’s escape cannot be condoned. That is why he is not entitled to the
relief prayed for. However, in the guidance of lower court judges, it is deemed advisable for
the Supreme Court to set forth anew the controlling and authoritative doctrines that should be
observed in fixing the amount of the bail sought in order that full respect be accorded to such
a constitutional right. The fact that this case is moot and academic should not preclude the
Supreme Court from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity
on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the Constitution that
excessive bail shall not be required.

What should be observed in fixing the amount of bail?

1. Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offenses when
the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right flows from the presumption of innocence in
favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter
he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Thereby a regime of liberty is honored in the observance and not in the breach. It is not
beyond the realm of probability, however, that a person charged with a crime,
especially so where his defense is weak, would just simply make himself scarce and thus
frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is intended as a guarantee that such an intent
would be thwarted. It is a mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable
certainty, insure the attendance of the accused for the subsequent trial. Nor is there
anything unreasonable in denying this right to one charged with a capital offense when
evidence of guilt is strong, as the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the
proceeding against him with a death sentence, an ever-present threat, temptation to
flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted.
2. Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring
a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is understandable why. If
there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless.
3. Guidelines in the fixing of the amount of bail, according to Villaseñor v. Abano:
(1) Ability of the accused to give bail;(2) Nature of the offense;(3) Penalty for the offense
charged;(4) Character and reputation of the accused;(5) Health of the accused;(6)
Character and strength of the evidence;(7) Probability of the accused appearing in
trial;(8) Forfeiture of other bonds;(9) Whether the accused was a fugitive from justice
when arrested; and(10) If the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other
cases.

PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [211 SCRA 241; G.R. NO. 101724; 3 JUL 1992]

Facts: Two letter complaints were filed with the Tanod bayan by Teofilo Gelacio on October
28,1986 and December 9, 1986, a political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza, wife of
Congressman Democrito Plaza of Agusan del Sur, shortly after private respondent had
replaced Mrs. Plaza as OIC/provincial Governor of Agusan del Sur on March 1986 The
complaint questioned the issuance to Governor Paredes, when he was still the provincial
attorney in 1976 of a free patent title for a lot in the Rosario public land subdivision in San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur. He misrepresented to a Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands that
the lands subject herein are disposable lands, thereby inducing said inspector to recommend
approval of his application for free patent. On August 10, 1989 an information for violation of
RA 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was then filed in the Sandiganbayan after an ex
parte preliminary investigation. A motion to quash the information was filed by the private
respondent contending among others that he is charged for an offence which has prescribed.
Said motion was granted. The crime was committed on January 21, 1976, period of
prescription was 10 years, therefore it has prescribed in 1986. Now the motion to quash was
being assailed.

Issue: Whether or Not the motion to quash validly granted.

Held: Yes. RA 3019, being a special law the computation of the period for the prescription of
the crime is governed by Sec. 29 of Act No. 3326, which begins to run from the day of the
commission of the crime and not the discovery of it. Additionally, BP 195 which was approved
on March 16, 1982, amending Sec. 11 of RA 3019 by increasing ten to fifteen years of the
period for the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of RA 3019 may not be given
retroactive application to the crime which was committed by Paredes, as it is prejudicial to the
accused. To apply BP 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law1 for it would alter his
situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had already been
extinguished under the law existing when it was committed.

GUANZON VS. DE VILLA [181 SCRA 623; G.R. 80508; 30 JAN 1990]

Facts: Pursuant to the “Areal Target Zonings” or “Saturation Drives” conducted by the military
and police in Metro Manila, 41 residents and taxpayers from Metro Manila filed a petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction, maintaining that they have a common or general
interest in the preservation of the rule of law, protection of their human rights, and the reign
of peace and order in their communities. According to them, the said saturation drives were
conducted in critical areas pinpointed by the military and police as places where the
subversives are hiding. The arrests range from 7 to 1,500; and the petitioners claim that they
follow a common pattern of human rights abuses, such as:

1. Having no specific target in mind, in the dead of the night or early morning hours, police
and military units without any search warrant or warrant of arrest cordon an area of
more than one residence and sometimes whole barangay or areas of barangay in Metro
Manila. Most of them are in civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification
cards.
2. The raiders rudely rouse residents from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows
of their homes, shouting, kicking their doors open (destroying some in the process), and
then ordering the residents within to come out of their respective residences.
3. The residents at the point of high-powered guns are herded like cows, the men are
ordered to strip down to their briefs and examined for tattoo marks and other imagined
marks.
4. While the examination of the bodies of the men are being conducted by the raiders,
some of the members of the raiding team force their way into each and every house
within the cordoned off area and then proceed to conduct a search of the said houses
without civilian witnesses from the neighborhood.
5. In many instances, many residents have complained that the raiders ransack their
homes, tossing about the residents’ belongings without total regard for their value. In
several instances, walls are destroyed, ceilings are damaged in the raiders’ illegal effort
to ³fish´ for incriminating evidence.
6. Some victims of these illegal operations have complained with increasing frequency that
their money and valuables have disappeared after the said operations.
7. All men and some women who respond to these illegal and unwelcome intrusions are
arrested on the spot and hauled off to waiting vehicles that take them to detention
centers where they are interrogated and “verified.” These arrests are all conducted
without any warrants of arrest duly issued by a judge, nor under the conditions that will
authorize warrantless arrest. Some hooded men are used to finger point suspected
subversives.
8. In some instances, arrested persons are released after the expiration of the period
wherein they can be legally detained without any charge at all. In other instances, some
arrested persons are released without charge after a few days of arbitrary detention.
9. The raiders almost always brandish their weapons and point them at the residents
during these illegal operations.
10.Many have also reported incidents of “on-the-spot beatings,” maulings and
maltreatment.
11.Those who are detained for further “verification” by the raiders are subjected to mental
and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical information.

Issue: W/N the saturation drives conducted by the authorities should be enjoined by the
courts.

Ruling: NO. The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually
committed. However, the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the essential
and legitimate ones. There is nothing wrong in police making their presence visibly felt in
troubled areas. Police cannot respond to riots or violent demonstrations if they do not
move in sufficient numbers. A show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of
people are protected and not violated. A blanket prohibition such as that sought by the
petitioners would limit all police actions to one on one confrontations where search
warrants and warrants of arrests against specific individuals are easily procured. Anarchy
may reign if the military and police decide to sit down in their offices because all concerted
drives where a show of force is present are totally prohibited.

The remedy, moreover, is not an original action for prohibition brought through a
taxpayers’ suit. Where not one victim complains and not one violator is properly charged,
the problem is not initially for the Supreme Court. It is basically one for the executive
departments and for trial courts. Well meaning citizens with only second-hand knowledge
of the events cannot keep on indiscriminately tossing problems of the executive, the
military, and the police to the Supreme Court as if we are the repository of all remedies for
all evils. The rules of constitutional litigation have been evolved for an orderly procedure in
the vindication of rights. They should be followed. If our police makers sustain the
contention of the military and the police that occasional saturation drives are essential to
maintain the stability of government and to insure peace and order, clear policy guidelines
on the behavior of soldiers and policemen must not only be evolved, they should also be
enforced. A method of pinpointing human rights abuses and identifying violators is
necessary. Thus, the problem is appropriate for the Commission of Human Rights. A high
level conference should bring together the heads of the Department of Justice, Department
of National Defense, and the operating heads of affected agencies and institutions to
devise procedures for the prevention of abuses.

Under the circumstances of this taxpayers’ suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman
whom we can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts ascertained through an
orderly procedure, no permanent relief can be given at this time. Further investigation of
the petitioners’ charges and a hard look by administration officials at the policy
implications of the prayed for blanket prohibition are also warranted.

In the meantime and in the face of a prima facie showing that some abuses were probably
committed and could be committed during future police actions, the Court has to
temporarily restrain the alleged banging on walls, the kicking in of doors, the herding of
half-naked men to assembly areas for examination of tattoo marks, the violation of
residences even if these are humble shanties of squatters, and the other alleged acts which
are shocking to the conscience.

Petition remanded to the Regional Trial Courts of Manila, Malabon, and Pasay City, so that
the petitioners may present evidence supporting their allegations and where specific erring
parties may be pinpointed and prosecuted.

Ople vs. Torres

Facts: Administrative Order No. 308, entitled “Adoption of a National Computerized


Identification Reference System” was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on 12 December
1996. Senator Blas F. Ople submitted a petition to the Court, assailing the Order on two
constitutional grounds: (1) It is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate; and (2) It
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy.

Issue: W/N AO 308 violates the citizens’ right to privacy.

Ruling: YES. The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence,
it is the burden of the Government to show that AO 308 is justified by some compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn. AO 308is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need
to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with
basic services and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the
need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by
persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough
to warrant the issuance of AO 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness,
the over breadth of AO 308 which if implemented will put our people’s right to privacy in clear
and present danger.

AO 308, furthermore, falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered
about our people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of
proper safeguards in this regard of AO 308 may interfere with the individual’s liberty of abode
and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable
unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-
incrimination; it may pave the way for “fishing expeditions” by government authorities and
evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and
misuse of the PRN, biometrics, and computer technology are accentuated when we consider
that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the
correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to
prevent.

Issue: W/N the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the national
ID and the use of biometrics technology.

Ruling: NO. The use of biometrics and computer technology in AO 308 does not assure the
individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy. As technology advances, the level of
reasonably expected privacy decreases. The measure of protection granted by the reasonable
expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes more widely accepted. The security of
the computer data file depends not only on the physical inaccessibility of the file but also on
the advances in hardware and software computer technology. AO 308 is so widely drawn that
a minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used,
cannot be inferred from its provisions.

The ability of a sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-to-grave dossier


on an individual and transmit it over a national network is one of the most graphic threats of
the computer revolution. The computer is capable of producing a comprehensive dossier on
individuals out of information given at different times and for varied purposes. It can continue
adding to the stored data and keeping the information up to date. Retrieval of stored data is
simple. When information of a privileged character finds its way into the computer, it can be
extracted together with other data on the subject. Once extracted, the information is putty in
the hands of any person. The end of privacy begins.

AO 308 declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

EBRALINAG v. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF CEBU

Facts: The petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the
public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and
recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flag ceremony
compulsory in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8
(Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions) dated
July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag
ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.

Jehovah's Witnesses admitted that they taught their children not to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of
worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give to anyone or
anything except God". They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. They
think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends
constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and
spirit which the Constitution protect against official control.

Issue:
Whether or not school children who are members or a religious sect may be expelled from
school for disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8

Held:
No. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the
amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator

The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is
the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public
interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public
safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified. (Teehankee)

The petitioners further contend that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag
ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their
countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag
ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for
the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not
engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
The Court is not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the flag,
singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which
admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will shake up our part of the
globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with
reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes" . What
the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public
schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of
government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture but also
receive training for a vocation of profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect
for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and
moral and spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricular.
Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation
that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of
the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be
conducive to love of country or respect for dully constituted authorities.

Also, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are
enrolled violates their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to "protect and
promote the right of all citizens to quality education . . . and to make such education accessible
to all (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).

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