[Presumption that the accused remained drug-use free]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 191061

Appellee,

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - NACHURA,

PERALTA,

ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

ROSELLE SANTIAGO y PABALINAS,

Appellant. Promulgated:

February 9, 2011

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

The public prosecutor of Makati charged the accused Roselle Santiago y Pabalinas
alias Tisay (Roselle) with violation of Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) 9165[1] before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City in Criminal Case 05-792. Roselle was also
charged with violation of Section 15 of the same law in Criminal Case 05-1101.[2]

Initially, Roselle pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case 05-1101 (violation of Section 15) but
she later changed her plea to guilty[3] and was so found by the court. The latter, however,
deferred her sentencing until the termination of the case for violation of Section 5.

The parties stipulated at the pre-trial (1) that PO3 Leo Gabang investigated the case; (2)
that, although the latter prepared the investigation report, he had no personal knowledge
of what happened; (3) that the police made a request, through P/Supt. Marietto Mendoza,
for laboratory examination; (4) that P/Insp. Richard Allan Mangalip, a forensic chemist of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, examined the submitted specimen,
not knowing from whom the same was taken; (5) that the PNP Crime Laboratory Office
issued Physical Science Report D-090-05S; and (6) that the forensic chemist was
qualified. With these stipulations, the prosecution dispensed with Mangalips testimony.[4]
PO1 Voltaire Esguerra (Esguerra) testified that on April 4, 2005, they received information
that Roselle was selling illegal drugs at her house at Pipit
Extension, Barangay Rizal, Makati City. Esguerra conducted a test buy and received from
her one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet that presumably contained shabu. When he
returned to his office, Esguerra marked the sachet with @ Tisay then sent it to the
laboratory for testing.[5] Before receiving the results of the test buy, an asset told the police
that Roselle was going to leave her house, prompting Esguerras team to conduct a buy-bust
operation.

Esguerra met Roselle again and told her that it was he who bought shabu from her earlier
that day. She thus let him enter the front yard of her house where he told her that he
wanted to buy another pack for P300.00. Roselle took his marked money and entered the
house. While waiting and looking in, Esguerra spotted two women[6] inside using shabuwith
the asset by their side, apparently waiting for his turn. Subsequently, Roselle returned with
one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet presumably containing shabu. Upon receipt of
the sachet, Esguerra signaled his team. They arrested Roselle and appraised her of her
rights. Esguerra immediately marked the sachet with RPS.

After returning to the station, he turned over Roselle and the seized sachet to the
investigator. When the contents of the first and second sachets (with @ Tisay and RPS
markings) were examined, these were confirmed to be Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu). A confirmatory test also found Roselle positive for the use of shabu.

For her defense, Roselle denies that she sold shabu to Esguerra. She claims that the case
was a product of a mistaken identity, as she was not known as Tisay in the area
but Roselle. She narrated how she was forcibly taken from her house and into custody.

In its decision dated June 11, 2008, the RTC found Roselle guilty of violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. 9165, and sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P500,000.00. The RTC also sentenced her to undergo rehabilitation for not less than six
months at a government drug rehabilitation center subject to the provisions of R.A. 9165
for her violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165.

Roselle appealed from both judgments to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC
03451 but the latter court affirmed the two convictions. She looks for her acquittal from
this Court.

The Issues Presented to the Court

The issues presented to the Court are (1) whether or not the police conducted a valid arrest
in Roselles case; and (2) whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTCs finding that
the prosecution evidence established her guilt of the offense charged beyond reasonable
doubt.

The Courts Ruling

One. Roselle claims that the police did not make a valid arrest in her case since they
arrested her without proper warrant and did not apprise her of the rights of a person taken
into custody as the Constitution and R.A. 7438 provide.[7] But Roselle raised this issue only
during appeal, not before she was arraigned. For this reason, she should be deemed to have
waived any question as to the legality of her arrest.[8]

Two. Although the prosecution established through Esguerra the acts constituting the
crime[9] charged in the drug-pushing case (Section 5), it failed to provide proper identity of
the allegedly prohibited substance that the police seized from Roselle.

Esguerra testified that he seized a heat-sealed sachet of white substance from Roselle and
marked the sachet with RPS right in her presence. He claimed that he then immediately
submitted the specimen to the police crime laboratory for examination. But the request for
laboratory exam reveals that it was not Esguerra who delivered the specimen to the crime
laboratory.[10] It appears that Esguerra gave it to a certain SPO3 Puno who in turn
forwarded it to a certain PO2 Santos. No testimony covers the movement of the specimen
among these other persons. Consequently, the prosecution was unable to establish the
chain of custody of the seized item and its preservation from possible tampering.

Since the seized substance was heat-sealed in plastic sachet and properly marked by the
officer who seized the same, it would have also been sufficient, despite intervening changes
in its custody and possession, if the prosecution had presented the forensic chemist to attest
to the fact a) that the sachet of substance was handed to him for examination in the same
condition that Esguerra last held it: still heat-sealed, marked, and not tampered with; b)
that he (the chemist) opened the sachet and examined its content; c) that he afterwards
resealed the sachet and what is left of its content and placed his own marking on the cover;
and d) that the specimen remained in the same condition when it is being presented in
court. In this way, the court would have been assured of the integrity of the specimen as
presented before it. If the finding of the chemist is challenged, there may be opportunity for
the court to require a retest so long as sufficient remnants of the same are left.

What is more, the prosecution failed to account for the whereabouts of the seized specimen
after the crime laboratory conducted its tests. This omission is fatal since the chain of
custody should be established from the time the seized drugs were confiscated and
eventually marked until the same is presented during trial.[11]
Taking into account the above reasons, the Court finds it difficult to sustain the conviction
of Roselle for violation of Section 5. The presumption of her innocence of the charge must
prevail.

As for the other offense, her violation of Section 15 (Use of Illegal Drugs), it is curious that
the CA still entertained her appeal from it despite the fact that she pleaded guilty to the
charge and did not ask the trial court to allow her to change her plea. At any rate, since she
had been under detention at the Correctional Institute for Women since 2005 and
presumably deprived of the use of illegal substance during her entire stay there, she should
be deemed to have served the mandatory rehabilitation period that the RTC imposed on
her.

WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt
of the alleged violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, the Court REVERSES the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC 03451 dated October 30, 2009 and ACQUITS the
accused Roselle Santiago y Pabalinas of the charge against her for that crime.

The Court DIRECTS the warden of the Correctional Institute for Women to release the
accused from custody immediately upon receipt of this decision unless she is validly
detained for some other reason.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD

[1] Also known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

[2]
Criminal Cases 05-792 and 05-1101 were tried jointly with Criminal Case 05-793
entitled People v. Marilou Sapico y Pili and Betsyrose Cabase y Saguirre for violation of
Section 12 of R.A. 9165 and Criminal Cases 05-1102 to 05-1103 entitled People v. Marilou
Sapico y Pili and People v. Betsyrose Cabase y Saguirre, respectively for violation of Section
15 of the same law.
[3] Records, Vol. I, pp. 54-57.
[4] Pre-trial Order dated June 28, 2005, id. at 43-46.
[5] See Request for Laboratory Experiment, id. at 223.
[6] Later identified as Marilou Sapico and Betsyrose Cabase.
[7]
An Act Defining Certain Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial
Investigation as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and Investigating Officers, and
providing Penalties for violations thereof.
[8] Rebellion v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175700, July 5, 2010.
[9]
(1) The identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. See People v. Pagaduan, G.R. No.
179029, August 12, 2010.
[10] Request for Laboratory Examination, records, Vol. I, p. 226.
[11] People v. Cervantes, G.R. No. 181494, March 17, 2009, 581 SCRA 762, 777.

January 11, 2016

G.R. No. 174673

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
FE ROA GIMENEZ AND IGNACIO B. GIMENEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Rules of procedure are not ends in themselves. The object of these rules is to assist and facilitate
a trial court's function to be able to receive all the evidence of the parties, and evaluate their
admissibility and probative value in the context of the issues presented by the parties' pleadings
in order to arrive at a conclusion as to the facts that transpired. Having been able to establish the
facts, the trial court will then be able to apply the law and determine whether a complainant is
deserving of the reliefs prayed for in the pleading.

Dismissal on the basis of a very strict interpretation of procedural rules without a clear
demonstration of the injury to a substantive right of the defendant weighed against 19 years of
litigation actively participated in by both parties should not be encouraged.

There is likewise serious reversible error, even grave abuse of discretion, when the
Sandiganbayan dismisses a case on demurrer to evidence without a full statement of its
evaluation of the evidence presented and offered and the interpretation of the relevant law. After
all, dismissal on the basis of demurrer to evidence is similar to a judgment. It is a final order
ruling on the merits of a case.

This is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated May
25, 20062 and September 13, 2006.3 The Sandiganbayan deemed petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (Republic) to have waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence4 and granted the
Motion to Dismiss of respondents Spouses Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez (Gimenez
Spouses) based on demurrer to evidence.5
The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), instituted a
Complaint6 for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the
Gimenez Spouses before the Sandiganbayan.7 "The Complaint seeks to recover . . . ill-gotten
wealth . . . acquired by [the Gimenez Spouses] as dummies, agents[,] or nominees of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos[.]"8

During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the positions held,
business interests, income, and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez Spouses.9 The Republic
presented the testimonies of Atty. Tereso Javier, Head of the Sequestered Assets Department of
PCGG, and of Danilo R.V. Daniel, Director of the Research and Development Department of
PCGG.10 Witnesses testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned or controlled by the
Gimenez Spouses.11

On February 27, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied a motion to recall Danilo R.V. Daniel’s
testimony.12 The Republic then manifested that it was "no longer presenting further
evidence."13 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 days or until March 29, 2006
"to file its formal offer of evidence."14

On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved "for an extension of thirty (30) days or until April 28,
2006, within which to file [its] formal offer of evidence."15 This Motion was granted by the
Sandiganbayan in a Resolution of the same date.16

On April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an additional 15 days or until May 13, 2006 within
which to file its Formal Offer of Evidence.17 This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a
Resolution dated May 8, 2006.18 Following this, no additional Motion for extension was filed by
the Republic.

In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan noted that the Republic
failed to file its Formal Offer of Evidence notwithstanding repeated extensions and the lapse of
75 days from the date it terminated its presentation of evidence.19 Thus, it declared that the
Republic waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence.20

The first assailed Resolution provides:

It appearing that the plaintiff has long terminated the presentation of its evidence on February 27,
2006, and it appearing further that it failed or otherwise neglected to file its written formal offer
of evidence for an unreasonable period of time consisting of 75 days (i.e., 30 days original period
plus two extension periods totaling 45 days), the filing of said written formal offer of evidence is
hereby deemed WAIVED.

WHEREFORE, the reception of the defendants’ evidence shall proceed on June 22 and 23, 2006,
both at 8:30 o’clock [sic] in the morning as previously scheduled.21

Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence dated May 30, 2006.22 He
argued that the Republic showed no right to relief as there was no evidence to support its cause
of action.23 Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss dated June 13, 2006 on the ground of
failure to prosecute.24 Through her own Motion to Dismiss, she joined Ignacio Gimenez’s
demurrer to evidence.25

Two days after Fe Roa Gimenez’s filing of the Motion to Dismiss or on June 15, 2006, the
Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the first assailed Resolution] and to Admit
Attached Formal Offer of Evidence.26 The pertinent portions of the Republic’s offer of
documentary exhibits attached to the Motion are summarized as follows:
Exhibits A to G and series consist of the Income Tax Returns, Certificate of Income Tax
Withheld On Compensation, Statement of Tax Withheld At Source, Schedule of Interest Income,
Royalties and Withholding Tax, Statement of Assets, Liabilities & Net Worth of Ignacio B.
Gimenez from 1980-1986 proving his legitimate income during said period. Exhibits H -J and
series refer to the Deeds of Sale and Transfer Certificates of Title proving that spouses
Gimenezes acquired several real properties.

Exhibits K and series (K-1-K-4) pertain to Checking Statements Summary issued by the
Bankers Trust Company (BTC) proving that Fe Roa Gimenez maintained a current account
under Account Number 34-714-415 with BTC. Exhibits L and series (L1-L-114) are several
BTC checks, proving that from June 1982 to April 1984, Fe Roa Gimenez issued several checks
against her BTC Current Account No. 34-714-415 payable to some individuals and entities such
as Erlinda Oledan, Vilma Bautista, The Waldorf Towers, Cartier, Gliceria Tantoco, Bulgari,
Hammer Galleries and Renato Balestra, involving substantial amount of money in US
Dollars. Exhibits M and series (M1-M-25) are several The Chase Manhattan Bank (TCMB)
checks drawn against the account of Fe Roa Gimenez under Account Number 021000021,
proving that she issued several checks drawn against her TCMB account, payable to individuals
and entities such as Gliceria Tantoco, Vilma Bautista and The Waldorf Towers, involving
substantial sums in US Dollars. Exhibit N is the Philippine National Bank (PNB), New York
Branch Office Charge Ticket No. FT 56880 dated December 9, 1982 in the amount of
US$30,000.00 for Fe Roa Gimenez proving that she received said enormous amount from the
PNB, New York Branch Office, with clearance from the Central Bank, which amount was
charged against PNB Manila. Exhibit N-1 is the PNB New York Branch Advice to Payee No.
FT 56535 dated November 12, 1982 in the amount of US$10,990.00 for Fe Roa Gimenez
proving her receipt of such amount as remitted from California Overseas Bank, Los
Angeles. Exhibits O and series (O1-O-8) refer to several Advices made by Bankers Trust AG
Zurich-Geneve Bank in Switzerland to respondent Fe Roa Gimenez proving that she maintained
a current account with said bank under Account Number 107094.50 and that from July 30, 1984
to August 30, 1984, she placed a substantial amount on time deposit in several banks, namely,
Hypobank, Luzemburg, Luxemburg, Societe Generale, Paris and Bank of Nova Scotia, London.

Exhibit P is the Certification dated March 19, 2002 issued by Director Florino O. Ibanez of the
Office of the President proving that Fe Roa Gimenez, from January 1, 1966 to April 1, 1986,
worked with the Office of the President under different positions, the last of which as
Presidential Staff Director with a salary of P87,072.00 per annum.

Exhibit Q and series (Q-1-Q-18) is the Affirmation of Ralph Shapiro filed with the United
States Court of Appeals in the case entitled, "The Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E.
Marcos, et al." which discussed certain acts of Fe Roa Gimenez and Vilma Bautista, among
others, in relation to the funds of the Marcoses.

Exhibits R and S and series (R-1, R-9; S-1-S-10) refer to the Certificate of Filing of Amended
Articles of Incorporation of GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., the Amended Articles of
Incorporation of GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., the Treasurer’s Affidavit executed by Ignacio
Gimenez and the Director’s Certificate executed by Roberto B. Olanday, Ignacio Gimenez and
Roberto Coyuto, Jr. proving Ignacio Gimenez and Roberto Olanday’s interests in GEl
Guaranteed Education, Inc.

Exhibits T and series (T-1-T-8) are the Advices made by the Bankers Trust AG Zurich-Geneve
Bank in Switzerland to Ignacio Gimenez proving that he maintained a current account with said
bank under Account Number 101045.50 and that from March to June, 1984, he placed a
substantial amount on time deposit in several banks, namely, Credit Lyonnais, Brussels, Societe
Generale, Paris, Credit Commercial De France, Paris and Bank of Nova Scotia, London.

Exhibits U and V and series (U-1-U-5; V1-V-18) consist of the Affidavit dated April 25, 1986
and the Declaration dated June 23, 1987 including the attachments, of Oscar Carino, Vice-
President and Manager of the PNB New York Branch, narrating in detail how the funds of the
PNB New York Branch were disbursed outside regular banking business upon the instructions of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos using Fe Roa Gimenez and others as
conduit.

Exhibits W and series (W-1-W-4) are the Debit memos from the PNB to Fe Roa Gimenez
while Exhibits X and X-1 are the Acknowledgments of said respondent, proving that she
received substantial amounts of money which were coursed through the PNB to be used by the
Marcos spouses for state visits and foreign trips.

Exhibit Y and series (Y-1-Y-2) is the Letter dated August 25, 1986 of Juan C. Gatmaitan,
Assistant Chief Legal Counsel of PNB to Charles G. LaBella, Assistant United States Attorney
regarding the ongoing investigation of irregular transactions at the PNB, New York Branch
proving that PNB cooperated with the United States government in connection with the
investigation on the irregular transactions of Oscar Carino at PNB New York Branch.

Exhibit Z is the service record of Fe Roa Gimenez issued by Florino O. Ibanez of the Office of
the President which proves that she worked with the Office of the President from 1966-1986
holding different positions, the last of which was Presidential Staff Director.1âwphi1

Exhibits AA and series (AA-1 –AA-2) are the several Traders Royal Bank checks drawn
against Account No. 74-702836-9 under the account name of Fe Roa Gimenez which prove that
she issued said checks payable to individuals and entities involving substantial amount of money.

Exhibits BB and CC and series (BB-1–BB-17; CC-1-CC-3) are the several Transfer of Funds
Advice from Traders Royal Bank Statements of Account of Fe Roa Gimenez, proving that she
maintained a current account under Account No. 74-7028369 at Traders Royal Bank.

Exhibits HH and series (HH-1-HH-3) are the Certification dated October 3, 2002 of Lamberto
R. Barbin, Officer-in-Charge, Malacanang Records Office, that the Statement of Assets and
Liabilities of spouses Marcoses for the years 1965 up to 1986 are not among the records on file
in said Office except 1965, 1967 and 1969; the Statement of Assets and Liabilities as of
December 31, 1969 and December 31, 1967 of former President Ferdinand Marcos; and the
Sworn Statement of Financial Condition, Assets, Income and Liabilities as of December 31,
1965 of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These documentary exhibits prove the assets and
liabilities of former President Marcos for the years 1965,1967 and 1969.

Exhibit II and series is [sic] the Statement of Assets and Liabilities as of December 31,1969
submitted by Fe Roa Gimenez which prove that her assets on that period amounted only to
P39,500.00.

Exhibit KK is the Table of Contents of Civil Case No. [0]007 before the Sandiganbayan entitled
"Republic of the Philippines vs. Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez, et. al.", including its
Annexes which prove the assets and liabilities of spouses Gimenezes.

Exhibits KK-1 up to KK-12 are several transfer certificates of title and tax declarations in the
names of spouses Gimenezes, proving their acquisition of several real properties.
Exhibits KK-15, KK-18, KK-20 up to KK-27, KK-30, KK-32 up to KK-38 and KK-40 are
the General Information Sheet, Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation, and
Amended Articles of Incorporation of various corporations. These prove the corporations in
which Ignacio B. Gimenez has substantial interests.

Exhibits KK-41 up to KK-44 are the Writs and Letters of Sequestration issued by the PCGG
which prove that the shares of stocks of Ignacio Gimenez in Ignacio B. Gimenez, Securities, Inc.
and the real properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 137638, 132807, 126693
and 126694 located in San Fabian, Pangasinan, were sequestered by the PCGG.

Exhibit KK-45 is the Memorandum dated August 1, 1988 of Atty. Ralph S. Lee and Alexander
M. Berces, Team Supervisor and Investiogator, [sic] respectively, of IRD, PCGG, proving that
the PCGG conducted an investigation on New City Builders, Inc., Transnational Construction
Corporation, and OTO Construction and Development Corporation in relation to Ignacio B.
Gimenez and Roberto O. Olanday.

Exhibits KK-48, KK-49 and KK-50 are certain Lis Pendens from the PCGG addressed to the
concerned Register of Deeds informing that the real properties mentioned therein had been
sequestered and are the subject of Civil Case No. [0]007 before the Sandiganbayan.

Exhibits KK-51, KK-51-A, KK-52 and KK-52-A are the Letter and Writ of Sequestration
issued by the PCGG on Allied Banking Corporation and Guaranteed Education Inc. pursuant to
its mandate to go after ill-gotten wealth.

Exhibits NN, OO, PP, QQ and QQ-1 refer to the Memorandum To All Commercial Banks
dated March 14, 1986 issued by then Central Bank Governor Jose B. Fernandez and the Letter
dated March 13, 1986 of Mary Concepcion Bautista, PCGG Commissioner addressed to then
Central Bank Governor Fernandez requesting that names be added to the earlier request of
PCGG Chairman Jovito Salonga to instruct all commercial banks not to allow any withdrawal or
transfer of funds from the market placements under the names of said persons, to include spouses
Gimenezes, without authority from PCGG.

Exhibits KK and series, NN, OO, PP, QQ and QQ-1 which prove the various real properties,
business interests and bank accounts owned by spouses Gimenezes were part of the testimony of
Atty. Tereso Javier.

Exhibit RR and series (RR-1-RR-23) are the Affidavit dated July 24, 1987 of Dominador
Pangilinan, Acting President and President of Trader’s Royal Bank, and the attached
Recapitulation, Status of Banker’s Acceptances, Status of Funds and Savings Account Ledger
wherein he mentioned that Malacanang maintained trust accounts at Trader’s Royal Bank, the
balance of which is approximately 150-175 million Pesos, and that he was informed by Mr.
Rivera that the funds were given to him (Rivera) by Fe Roa Gimenez for deposit to said
accounts.

Exhibits SS and series (SS-1-SS-29) are the Affidavit dated July 23, 1987 of Apolinario K.
Medina, Executive Vice President of Traders Royal Bank and attachments, which include
Recapitulation, Status of Funds, and Messages from Traders Royal Bank Manila to various
foreign banks. In his Affidavit, Medina divulged certain numbered confidential trust accounts
maintained by Malacanang with the Trader’s Royal Bank. He further stated that the deposits
were so substantial that he suspected that they had been made by President Marcos or his family.

Exhibit TT and series (TT-1-TT-3) is [sic] the Memorandum dated July 19, 2005 of Danilo
R.V. Daniel, then Director of the Research and Development Department of PCGG regarding the
investigation conducted on the ill-gotten wealth of spouses Gimenezes, the subject matter of
Civil Case No. [0]007. He revealed that during the investigation on the ill-gotten wealth of
spouses Gimenezes, it was found out that from 1977 to 1982, several withdrawals, in the total
amount of P75,090,306.42 were made from Trust Account No. 128 (A/C 76-128) in favor of I.B.
Gimenez, I.B. Gimenez Securities and Fe Roa Gimenez.

Exhibits RR, SS, TT and their series prove that spouses Gimenez maintained bank accounts of
substantial amounts and gained control of various corporations.1âwphi1 These are also being
offered as part of the testimony of Danilo R.V. Daniel.27 (Emphasis in the original, citations
omitted)

In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied the
Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration and granted the Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to
Dismiss.28 According to the Sandiganbayan:

While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that the higher ends of
substantial justice militate against dismissal of cases purely on technical grounds, the
circumstances of this case show that the ends of justice will not be served if this Court allows the
wanton disregard of the Rules of Court and of the Court’s orders. Rules of procedure are
designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases. . . .

The reasons invoked by the plaintiff to justify its failure to timely file the formal offer of
evidence fail to persuade this Court. The missing exhibits mentioned by the plaintiff’s counsel
appear to be the same missing documents since 2004, or almost two (2) years ago. The plaintiff
had more than ample time to locate them for its purpose. . . . Since they remain missing after
lapse of the period indicated by the Court, there is no reason why the search for these documents
should delay the filing of the formal offer of evidence.

[Petitioner’s] counsel . . . admits that faced with other pressing matters, he lost track of the time.
We cannot just turn a blind eye on the negligence of the parties and in their failure to observe the
orders of this Court. The carelessness of [petitioner’s] counsel in keeping track of the deadlines
is an unacceptable reason for the Court to set aside its Order and relax the observance of the
period set for filing the formal offer of evidence.29 (Citation omitted)

The Sandiganbayan also found that the Republic failed to prosecute its case for an unreasonable
length of time and to comply with the court’s rules.30 The court also noted that the documentary
evidence presented by the Republic consisted mostly of certified true copies.31 However, the
persons who certified the documents as copies of the original were not presented.32 Hence, the
evidence lacked probative value.33 The dispositive portion of the assailed Resolution reads:

ACCORDINGLY, there being no valid and cogent justification shown by the plaintiff for the
Court to Grant its Motion for Reconsideration and admit its Formal Offer of Evidence, the
plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence
is DENIED. The Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence filed by the defendant Ignacio B.
Gimenez and adopted by defendant Fe Roa Gimenez is GRANTED. The case is
then DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.34 (Emphasis in the original)

The Republic filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 3, 2006 before this
court.35
The Gimenez Spouses were required to comment on the Petition.36 This court noted the separate
Comments37 filed by the Gimenez Spouses.38 The Republic responded to the Comments through
a Consolidated Reply39 dated June 22, 2007.

In the Resolution40 dated August 29, 2007, this court required the parties to submit their
memoranda.41

On February 18, 2008, this court resolved to require the parties to "move in the premises[.]"42

On March 2, 2012, the Republic filed a Motion for Leave to Re-open Proceedings, to File and
Admit Attached Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari.43 In this Supplement, the Republic
argued that the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006 was void for failing to state
the facts and the law on which it was based.44This Motion was granted, and the Gimenez
Spouses were required to file their Comment on the Supplement to the Petition.45 Thereafter, the
Republic filed its Reply.46

Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Rejoinder47 dated December 19, 2012 which was expunged by this court
in a Resolution48dated January 23, 2013. Ignacio Gimenez’s Motion for Leave to File and Admit
Attached Rejoinder49 was denied.50

The Republic raised the following issues:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in dismissing the case in the light of the
allegations in the Complaint which were substantiated by overwhelming evidence presented vis-
a-vis the material admissions of spouses Gimenezes as their answer failed to specifically deny
that they were dummies of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and that they acquired illegal
wealth grossly disproportionate to their lawful income in a manner prohibited under the
Constitution and Anti-Graft Statutes.

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in denying petitioner’s Motion to Admit Formal
Offer of Evidence on the basis of mere technicalities, depriving petitioner of its right to due
process.

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in making a sweeping pronouncement that
petitioner’s evidence do not bear any probative value.51

The issues for consideration of this court are:

First, whether a Petition for Review on Certiorari was the proper remedy to assail the
Sandiganbayan Resolutions; and

Second, whether the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that petitioner Republic of the Philippines
waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence and in granting respondents Ignacio Gimenez
and Fe Roa Gimenez’s Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence.

We grant the Petition.

Respondent Ignacio Gimenez pictures petitioner as being confused as to the proper mode of
review of the Sandiganbayan Resolutions. According to him, petitioner claims that the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion.52 Hence, petitioner should have filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and not a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.53 Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any error, and petitioner has to show
that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction.54

Observance of the proper procedure before courts, especially before the Sandiganbayan, cannot
be stressed enough. Due process is enshrined in the Constitution, specifically the Bill of
Rights.55 "Due process [in criminal cases] guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence
until the contrary is proved[.]"56 "Mere suspicion of guilt should not sway judgment."57

To determine whether a petition for review is the proper remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan
Resolutions, we review the nature of actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution,
and damages.

Actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and damages for ill-gotten wealth are
also called civil forfeiture proceedings.

Republic Act No. 137958 provides for the procedure by which forfeiture proceedings may be
instituted against public officers or employees who "[have] acquired during his [or her]
incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his [or her] salary as
such public officer or employee and to his [or her] other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property, [which] property shall be presumed prima facie to have been
unlawfully acquired."59

This court has already settled the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over civil forfeiture cases:

. . . violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even
though the proceeding is civil in nature, since the forfeiture of the illegally acquired property
amounts to a penalty.60

In Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,61 this court re-affirmed the doctrine that forfeiture
proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379 are civil in nature.62 Civil forfeiture proceedings were
also differentiated from plunder cases:

. . . a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different from a
plunder case. . . . In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission
of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. . . . On the other hand,
all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379 is the
disproportion of respondent’s properties to his legitimate income, it being unnecessary to prove
how he acquired said properties. As correctly formulated by the Solicitor General, the forfeitable
nature of the properties under the provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a determination
of a specific overt act committed by the respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of
the illegal wealth.63(Citation omitted)

To stress, the quantum of evidence required for forfeiture proceedings under Republic Act No.
1379 is the same with other civil cases — preponderance of evidence.64

When a criminal case based on demurrer to evidence is dismissed, the dismissal is equivalent to
an acquittal.65

As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an acquittal; any further
prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.66

Hence, the Republic may only assail an acquittal through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court:
Accordingly, a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting an accused’s demurrer
to evidence may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, based on the
narrow ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.67 (Citation omitted)

In this case, a civil forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, petitioner correctly filed a Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of the Rule provides the
mode of appeal from judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan:

SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.— A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth.

II

Petitioner argues that substantial justice requires doing away with the procedural
technicalities.68 Loss of vital documentary proof warranted extensions to file the Formal Offer of
Evidence.69 Honest efforts to locate several missing documents resulted in petitioner’s inability
to file the pleading within the period granted by the Sandiganbayan.70

Respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner cannot fault the Sandiganbayan for its
incompetence during trial.71 Even if the evidence were formally offered within the prescribed
period, PCGG’s evidence still had no probative value.72 It is solely petitioner’s fault "that the
persons who certified to the photocopies of the originals were not presented to testify[.]"73 It is
also misleading to argue that the pieces of documentary evidence presented are public
documents.74 "The documents are not public in the sense that these are official issuances of the
Philippine government."75 "The bulk consists mainly of notarized, private documents that have
simply been certified true and faithful."76

According to respondent Fe Roa Gimenez, petitioner tries to excuse its non-filing of the Formal
Offer of Evidence within the prescribed period by raising its efforts to locate the 66 missing
documents.77 However, the issue of the missing documents was laid to rest during the hearing on
November 16, 2004.78 The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until March 2005 to produce the
documents; otherwise, these would be excluded.79 The testimonies of the witnesses related to the
missing documents would also be expunged from the case records.80

Moreover, respondent Fe Roa Gimenez claims that "[t]he Sandiganbayan did not err when it
ruled that the great bulk of the documentary evidence offered by the PCGG have no probative
value."81 Aside from the 66 missing documents it failed to present, almost all of petitioner’s
pieces of documentary evidence were mere photocopies.82The few that were certified true copies
were not testified on by the persons who certified these documents.83

Our Rules of Court lays down the procedure for the formal offer of evidence. Testimonial
evidence is offered "at the time [a] witness is called to testify."84 Documentary and object
evidence, on the other hand, are offered "after the presentation of a party’s testimonial
evidence."85 Offer of documentary or object evidence is generally done orally unless permission
is given by the trial court for a written offer of evidence.86

More importantly, the Rules specifically provides that evidence must be formally offered to be
considered by the court. Evidence not offered is excluded in the determination of the
case.87 "Failure to make a formal offer within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a
waiver to submit it."88

Rule 132, Section 34 provides:

SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.— The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

The rule on formal offer of evidence is intertwined with the constitutional guarantee of due
process. Parties must be given the opportunity to review the evidence submitted against them and
take the necessary actions to secure their case.89 Hence, any document or object that was marked
for identification is not evidence unless it was "formally offered and the opposing counsel [was]
given an opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identify
it."90

This court explained further the reason for the rule:

The Rules of Court provides that "the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered." A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings
of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial.
Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent
is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the
evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will
not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.91 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

To consider a party’s evidence which was not formally offered during trial would deprive the
other party of due process. Evidence not formally offered has no probative value and must be
excluded by the court.92

Petitioner’s failure to file its written Formal Offer of Evidence of the numerous documentary
evidence presented within the prescribed period is a non-issue. In its first assailed Resolution
dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan declared that petitioner waived the filing of its Formal
Offer of Evidence when it failed to file the pleading on May 13, 2006, the deadline based on the
extended period granted by the court. Petitioner was granted several extensions of time by the
Sandiganbayan totalling 75 days from the date petitioner terminated its presentation of evidence.
Notably, this 75-day period included the original 30-day period. Subsequently, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence, and the Formal
Offer of Evidence.

In resolving petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of
Evidence, the Sandiganbayan found the carelessness of petitioner’s counsel unacceptable.
According to the Sandiganbayan, it could not countenance the non-observance of the court’s
orders.

This court has long acknowledged the policy of the government to recover the assets and
properties illegally acquired or misappropriated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
wife Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies,
agents or nominees.93 Hence, this court has adopted a liberal approach regarding technical rules
of procedure in cases involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth:

In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside
technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This
Court prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial
justice to the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of
form, should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two decades have passed since the
government initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive
resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition,
accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the
ownership of these funds and other assets be finally determined and resolved with dispatch, free
from all the delaying technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks.94 (Emphasis supplied,
citation omitted)

To be clear, petitioner was able to file its Formal Offer of Evidence, albeit, belatedly. Petitioner
hurdled 19 years of trial before the Sandiganbayan to present its evidence as shown in its
extensive Formal Offer of Evidence. As petitioner argues:

Undeniable from the records of the case is that petitioner was vigorous in prosecuting the case.
The most tedious and crucial stage of the litigation and presentation of evidence has been
accomplished. Petitioner completed its presentation of evidence proving the ill-gotten nature and
character of the funds and assets sought to be recovered in the present case. It presented vital
testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of voluminous record proving the gross
disparity of the subject funds to spouses Gimenezes’ combined declared income which must be
reconveyed to the Republic for being acquired in blatant violation of the Constitution and the
Anti-Graft statutes.95

This court is not unmindful of the difficulty in gathering voluminous documentary evidence in
cases of forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth acquired throughout the years. It is never easy to prosecute
corruption and take back what rightfully belongs to the government and the people of the
Republic.

This is not the first time that this court relaxed the rule on formal offer of evidence.

Tan v. Lim96 arose from two civil Complaints: one for injunction and another for legal
redemption, which were heard jointly before the trial court.97 The defendant did not file a Formal
Offer of Evidence in the injunction case98 and merely adopted the evidence offered in the legal
redemption case.99 The trial court held that the defendant’s failure to file his Formal Offer of
Evidence in the injunction case rendered the plaintiff’s evidence therein as
uncontroverted.100 The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision and was affirmed by this
court.101 This court ruled that while the trial court’s reasoning in its Decision was technically
sound, a liberal interpretation was more appropriate and in line with substantial justice:

It may be true that Section 34, Rule 132 of the rules directs the court to consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered and that under Section 35, documentary evidence is offered
after presentation of testimonial evidence. However, a liberal interpretation of these Rules would
have convinced the trial court that a separate formal offer of evidence in Civil Case No. 6518
was superfluous because not only was an offer of evidence made in Civil Case No. 6521 that was
being jointly heard by the trial court, counsel for Jose Renato Lim had already declared he was
adopting these evidences for Civil Case No. 6518. The trial court itself stated that it would freely
utilize in one case evidence adduced in the other only to later abandon this posture. Jose Renato
Lim testified in Civil Case No. 6518. The trial court should have at least considered his
testimony since at the time it was made, the rules provided that testimonial evidence is deemed
offered at the time the witness is called to testify. Rules of procedure should not be applied in a
very rigid, technical case as they are devised chiefly to secure and not defeat substantial justice.
....

The logic of the Court of Appeals is highly persuasive. Indeed, apparently, the trial court was
being overly technical about the nonsubmission of Jose Renato Lim’s formal offer of evidence.
This posture not only goes against Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure decreeing a
liberal construction of the rules to promote a just, speedy and inexpensive litigation but ignores
the consistent rulings of the Court against utilizing the rules to defeat the ends of substantial
justice. Despite the intervening years, the language of the Court in Manila Railroad Co. vs.
Attorney-General, still remains relevant:

"x x x. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and
delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing
itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best
adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. It is the means by which the
powers of the court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one
and takes on that of the other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and
unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism."102 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Furthermore, "subsequent and substantial compliance . . . may call for the relaxation of the rules
of procedure."103

Weighing the amount of time spent in litigating the case against the number of delays petitioner
incurred in submitting its Formal Offer of Evidence and the state’s policy on recovering ill-
gotten wealth, this court is of the belief that it is but only just that the Rules be relaxed and
petitioner be allowed to submit its written Formal Offer of Evidence. The Sandiganbayan’s
Resolutions should be reversed.

III

According to petitioner, the Sandiganbayan erred when it granted the demurrer to evidence filed
by respondents and dismissed the case despite a "prima facie foundation [based on the pleadings
and documents on record] that spouses Gimenezes amassed enormous wealth grossly
disproportionate to their lawful income or declared lawful assets."104

Similarly, the Complaint alleged specific acts committed by respondent Ignacio Gimenez:

[T]aking undue advantage of his relationship, influence, and connection, by himself and/or in
unlawful concert and active collaboration with former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda
R. Marcos for the purpose of mutually enriching themselves and preventing the disclosure and
recovery of assets illegally obtained: (a) acted as the dummy, nominee or agent of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos in several corporations such as, the Allied
Banking Corporation, Acoje Mining Corporation, Baguio Gold Mining, Multi National
Resources, Philippine Oversees, Inc. and Pioneer Natural Resources; (b) unlawfully obtained,
through corporations organized by them such as the New City Builders, Inc. (NCBI), multi-
million peso contracts with the government buildings, such as the University of Life Sports
Complex and Dining Hall as well as projects of the National Manpower Corporation, Human
Settlements, GSIS, and Maharlika Livelihood, to the gross and manifest disadvantage of the
Government and the Filipino people; and (c) in furtherance of the above stated illegal purposes,
organized several establishments engaged in food, mining and other businesses such as the
Transnational Construction Corporation, Total Systems Technology, Inc., Pyro Control
Technology Corporation, Asian Alliance, Inc., A & T Development Corporation, RBO Agro
Forestry Farm Development Corporation, Bathala Coal Mining Corporation, Coal Basis Mining
Corporation, Titan Coal Mining Corporation, GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., and I.B. Gimenez
Securities, Inc.105

Despite the specific allegations in the Complaint, petitioner contends that respondents merely
gave general denials to the allegations in the Complaint.106 "[N]o specific denial [was] made on
the material allegations [in] the [C]omplaint."107

Respondents, on the other hand, assert that the Sandiganbayan was correct in granting the
Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence.

Respondent Ignacio Gimenez claims that petitioner cannot be excused from filing its Formal
Offer of Evidence considering the numerous extensions given by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner
had all the resources and time to gather, collate, and secure the necessary evidence to build its
case.108 Petitioner’s presentation of evidence took 19 years to complete, and yet it failed to
submit the necessary documents and pleading.109

Similarly, respondent Fe Roa Gimenez argues that petitioner was negligent in failing to comply
with the Sandiganbayan’s orders considering the inordinate amount of time given to petitioner to
present evidence, which resulted in only five witnesses in 19 years.110

To determine the propriety of granting respondents’ Motion to Dismiss based on Demurrer to

Evidence, we review the nature of demurrer.

Rule 33, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.— After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present
evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

In Oropesa v. Oropesa111 where this court affirmed the dismissal of the case on demurrer to
evidence due to petitioner’s non-submission of the Formal Offer of Evidence,112 demurrer to
evidence was defined as:

. . . "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue." We have also held that a demurrer to evidence "authorizes a judgment on the
merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he would
ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief
sought."113 (Citations omitted)

This court has laid down the guidelines in resolving a demurrer to evidence:

A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown
no right to relief. Where the plaintiff’s evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as
may reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer
to evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting
every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and
reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material
elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim.
It should be sustained where the plaintiff’s evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.114
Furthermore, this court already clarified what the trial court determines when acting on a motion
to dismiss based on demurrer to evidence:

What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to evidence is whether the
plaintiff is entitled to the relief based on the facts and the law. The evidence contemplated by the
rule on demurrer is that which pertains to the merits of the case, excluding technical aspects such
as capacity to sue. . . .115 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

Petitioner, in its Supplement to the Petition, argued that the testimonial evidence it had presented
and offered during trial warranted consideration and analysis.116 The Sandiganbayan erroneously
excluded these testimonies in determining whether to grant the motion to dismiss or not, hence:

. . . even assuming that the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s formal offer of evidence,
petitioner still had testimonial evidence in its favor which should [have] been considered. It
behoved then upon the Sandiganbayan to discuss or include in its discussion, at the very least, an
analysis of petitioner’s testimonial evidence.117

With our ruling reversing the Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions on petitioner’s Formal Offer of
Evidence, what should be determined now by the Sandiganbayan is whether petitioner’s
evidence is sufficient to entitle it to the relief it seeks after the Sandiganbayan rested its case.
Petitioner is required to establish preponderance of evidence.

In the second assailed Resolution, the Sandiganbayan granted respondents’ Motion to Dismiss
based on the lack of Formal Offer of Evidence of petitioner. At the same time, it observed that
the pieces of documentary evidence presented by petitioner were mostly certified true copies of
the original. In passing upon the probative value of petitioner’s evidence, the Sandiganbayan
held:

On another note, the evidence presented by the plaintiff consisted mainly of certified true copies
of the original. These certified copies of documentary evidence presented by the plaintiff were
not testified on by the person who certified them to be photocopies of the original. Hence, these
evidence do not appear to have significant substantial probative value.118

Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for making "a general and sweeping statement that the
evidence presented by petitioner lacked probative value for the reason that they are mainly
certified true copies which had not been testified on by the person who certified [them]."119 Thus,
its right to due process was violated when the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner’s documentary
evidence in the same Resolution which dismissed the case.120

Petitioner argues that: a) respondents unqualifiedly admitted the identity and authenticity of the
documentary evidence presented by petitioner;121 and b) the documents it presented were public
documents, and there was no need for the identification and authentication of the original
documentary exhibits.122 Petitioner relies on the Sandiganbayan Order123 dated August 6, 2002.
The Order reads:

Considering the manifestation of Atty. Reno Gonzales, counsel for plaintiff/PCGG, that
the defendant Fe Roa Gimenez, through counsel, is willing to stipulate that the documents to be
presented and identified by the witness are in her custody as Records Officer of the PCGG, the
parties agreed to dispense with the testimony of Ma. Lourdes Magno.

WHEREFORE, and as prayed for, the continuation of the presentation of plaintiff’s evidence is
set on October 9 and 10, 2002, both at 8:30 o’clock [sic] in the morning.

SO ORDERED.124 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner claims that the following exhibits were acquired in relation to the PCGG’s functions
prescribed under Executive Order No. 1, Section 3(b),125 and form part of the official records of
the PCGG:126 "Certifications as to the various positions held in Government by Fe Roa-Gimenez,
her salaries and compensation during her stint as a public officer, the BIR Income Tax Returns
and Statement of Assets and Liabilities showing the declared income of spouses Gimenezes; the
Articles of Incorporation of various corporations showing spouses Gimenezes’ interests on
various corporations; and several transactions involving huge amounts of money which prove
that they acted as conduit in the disbursement of government funds."127

On the other hand, respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner’s documents are not
"official issuances of the Philippine government."128 They are mostly notarized private
documents.129 Petitioner’s evidence has no probative value; hence, a dismissal on demurrer to
evidence is only proper.130 Respondent Fe Roa Gimenez claims that the Sandiganbayan did not
err in holding that the majority of petitioner’s documentary evidence has no probative value,
considering that most of these documents are only photocopies.131

The evidence presented by petitioner before the Sandiganbayan deserves better treatment.

For instance, the nature and classification of the documents should have been ruled upon. Save
for certain cases, the original document must be presented during trial when the subject of the
inquiry is the contents of the document.132 This is the Best Evidence Rule provided under Rule
130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.— When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office.

In case of unavailability of the original document, secondary evidence may be presented133 as

provided for under Sections 5 to 7 of the same Rule:

SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable.— When the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence
and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy,
or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the
order stated.

SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. — If the document is in
the custody or under the control of adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If
after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document,
secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss. (5a)
SEC. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record.— When the original of
a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may
be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

In Citibank, N.A. v. Sabeniano,134 citing Estrada v. Hon. Desierto,135 this court clarified the
applicability of the Best Evidence Rule:

As the afore-quoted provision states, the best evidence rule applies only when the subject of the
inquiry is the contents of the document. The scope of the rule is more extensively explained thus
—

But even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence rule applies only when the
content of such document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such
document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible (5
Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-66; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78). Any other substitutionary evidence is
likewise admissible without need for accounting for the original.

Thus, when a document is presented to prove its existence or condition it is offered not as
documentary, but as real, evidence. Parol evidence of the fact of execution of the documents is
allowed (Hernaez, et al. vs. McGrath, etc., et al., 91 Phil[.] 565). x x x

In Estrada v. Desierto, this Court had occasion to rule that —

It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only [a] copy of the Angara Diary as
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not,
however, violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that:

"Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court’s discretion, whenever in the
case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other
useful purpose will be served by requiring production.

"x x x x x x x x x

"In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been abandoned, for certain
documents in which ordinarily no real dispute arised [sic]. This measure is a sensible and
progressive one and deserves universal adoption (post, sec. 1233). Its essential feature is that a
copy may be used unconditionally, if the opponent has been given an opportunity to inspect it."

This Court did not violate the best evidence rule when it considered and weighed in evidence the
photocopies and microfilm copies of the PNs, MCs, and letters submitted by the petitioners to
establish the existence of respondent’s loans. The terms or contents of these documents were
never the point of contention in the Petition at bar. It was respondent’s position that the PNs in
the first set (with the exception of PN No. 34534) never existed, while the PNs in the second set
(again, excluding PN No. 34534) were merely executed to cover simulated loan transactions. As
for the MCs representing the proceeds of the loans, the respondent either denied receipt of
certain MCs or admitted receipt of the other MCs but for another purpose. Respondent further
admitted the letters she wrote personally or through her representatives to Mr. Tan of petitioner
Citibank acknowledging the loans, except that she claimed that these letters were just meant to
keep up the ruse of the simulated loans. Thus, respondent questioned the documents as to their
existence or execution, or when the former is admitted, as to the purpose for which the
documents were executed, matters which are, undoubtedly, external to the documents, and which
had nothing to do with the contents thereof.
Alternatively, even if it is granted that the best evidence rule should apply to the evidence
presented by petitioners regarding the existence of respondent’s loans, it should be borne in mind
that the rule admits of the following exceptions under Rule 130, Section 5 of the revised Rules of
Court[.]136 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

Furthermore, for purposes of presenting these as evidence before courts, documents are classified
as either public or private. Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 19. Classes of Documents.— For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents
are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.

All other writings are private.

The same Rule provides for the effect of public documents as evidence and the manner of proof
for public documents:

SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence.— Documents consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact
which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.

SEC. 24. Proof of official record.— The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a)
of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state.— Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court
having a seal, under the seal of such court.

....

SEC. 27. Public record of a private document.— An authorized public record of a private
document may be proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal
custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody.

....
SEC. 30. Proof of notarial documents.— Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and
certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate
of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document
involved. (Emphasis supplied)

Emphasizing the importance of the correct classification of documents, this court pronounced:

The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be
presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign
character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or
a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record
of a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further
authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is
any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a
notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or
set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities
prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or
the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court.137 (Emphasis supplied)

The distinction as to the kind of public document under Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of
Court is material with regard to the fact the evidence proves. In Philippine Trust Company v.
Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,138 this court ruled that:

. . . not all types of public documents are deemed prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated:

....

"Public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer" include those specified as
public documents under Section 19(a), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the acknowledgement,
affirmation or oath, or jurat portion of public documents under Section 19(c). Hence, under
Section 23, notarized documents are merely proof of the fact which gave rise to their
execution (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories . . . is proof that Philtrust had been served
with Written Interrogatories), and of the date of the latter (e.g., the notarized Answer to
Interrogatories is proof that the same was executed on October 12, 1992, the date stated
thereon), but is not prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Additionally, under Section
30 of the same Rule, the acknowledgement in notarized documents is prima facie evidence of the
execution of the instrument or document involved (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories
is prima facie proof that petitioner executed the same).

The reason for the distinction lies with the respective official duties attending the execution of
the different kinds of public instruments. Official duties are disputably presumed to have been
regularly performed. As regards affidavits, including Answers to Interrogatories which are
required to be sworn to by the person making them, the only portion thereof executed by the
person authorized to take oaths is the jurat. The presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed therefore applies only to the latter portion, wherein the notary public merely attests
that the affidavit was subscribed and sworn to before him or her, on the date mentioned thereon.
Thus, even though affidavits are notarized documents, we have ruled that affidavits, being self-
serving, must be received with caution.139 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In Salas v. Sta. Mesa Market Corporation,140 this court discussed the difference between mere
copies of audited financial statements submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and certified true copies of audited financial
statements obtained or secured from the BIR or the SEC which are public documents under Rule
132, Section 19(c) of the Revised Rules of Evidence:

The documents in question were supposedly copies of the audited financial statements of
SMMC. Financial statements (which include the balance sheet, income statement and statement
of cash flow) show the fiscal condition of a particular entity within a specified period. The
financial statements prepared by external auditors who are certified public accountants (like
those presented by petitioner) are audited financial statements. Financial statements, whether
audited or not, are, as [a] general rule, private documents. However, once financial statements
are filed with a government office pursuant to a provision of law, they become public documents.

Whether a document is public or private is relevant in determining its admissibility as evidence.

Public documents are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution
and genuineness. On the other hand, private documents are inadmissible in evidence unless they
are properly authenticated. Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

....

Petitioner and respondents agree that the documents presented as evidence were mere copies of
the audited financial statements submitted to the BIR and SEC. Neither party claimed that copies
presented were certified true copies of audited financial statements obtained or secured from the
BIR or the SEC which under Section 19(c), Rule 132 would have been public documents. Thus,
the statements presented were private documents. Consequently, authentication was a
precondition to their admissibility in evidence.

During authentication in court, a witness positively testifies that a document presented as

evidence is genuine and has been duly executed or that the document is neither spurious nor
counterfeit nor executed by mistake or under duress. In this case, petitioner merely presented a
memorandum attesting to the increase in the corporation’s monthly market revenue, prepared by
a member of his management team. While there is no fixed criterion as to what constitutes
competent evidence to establish the authenticity of a private document, the best proof available
must be presented. The best proof available, in this instance, would have been the testimony of a
representative of SMMC’s external auditor who prepared the audited financial statements.
Inasmuch as there was none, the audited financial statements were never
authenticated.141 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Indeed, in Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc,142 this court held that mere collection of documents by
the PCGG does not make such documents public documents per se under Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court:

The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigations
does not make them per se public records referred to in the quoted rule.

Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Maria Lourdes Magno, who testified that these
public and private documents had been gathered by and taken into the custody of the PCGG in
the course of the Commission’s investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses.
However, given the purposes for which these documents were submitted, Magno was not a
credible witness who could testify as to their contents. To reiterate, "[i]f the writings have
subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by those witnesses." Witnesses can testify
only to those facts which are of their personal knowledge; that is, those derived from their own
perception. Thus, Magno could only testify as to how she obtained custody of these documents,
but not as to the contents of the documents themselves.
Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits or Memoranda
submitted to the court. Basic is the rule that, while affidavits may be considered as public
documents if they are acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified as
hearsay evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are not generally prepared by the affiant,
but by another one who uses his or her own language in writing the affiant’s statements, parts of
which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the
adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason,
affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on
the witness stand to testify thereon.143(Citations omitted)

Notably, the Sandiganbayan’s evaluation of the evidence presented by petitioner was cursory. Its
main reason for granting the Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence was that there was no
evidence to consider due to petitioner’s failure to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. It brushed off
the totality of evidence on which petitioner built its case.

Even assuming that no documentary evidence was properly offered, this court finds it clear from
the second assailed Resolution that the Sandiganbayan did not even consider other evidence
presented by petitioner during the 19 years of trial. The Sandiganbayan erred in ignoring
petitioner’s testimonial evidence without any basis or justification. Numerous exhibits were
offered as part of the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses.

Petitioner presented both testimonial and documentary evidence that tended to establish a
presumption that respondents acquired ill-gotten wealth during respondent Fe Roa Gimenez’s
incumbency as public officer and which total amount or value was manifestly out of proportion
to her and her husband’s salaries and to their other lawful income or properties.

Petitioner presented five (5) witnesses, two (2) of which were Atty. Tereso Javier and Director
Danilo R.V. Daniel, both from the PCGG:

Petitioner presented as witnesses Atty. Tereso Javier, then Head of the Sequestered Assets
Department of PCGG, and Danilo R.V. Daniel, then Director of the Research and Development
Department of PCGG, who testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned and/ or under
the control of spouses Gimenezes.144

Several exhibits excluded by the Sandiganbayan were offered as part of petitioner’s testimonial
evidence:

1) Exhibit "KK"145 was offered "for the purpose of proving the assets or properties of the spouses
Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."146

2) Exhibits "KK-1" to "KK-12"147 inclusive of sub-markings, were offered "for the purpose of
proving the real properties acquired by the spouses Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez,
and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."148

3) Exhibits "KK-15," "KK-18," "KK-20," "KK-27," "KK-30," "KK-32" to "KK-38" and "KK-
40"149 were offered "for the purpose of proving the corporations in which Ignacio B. Gimenez
has interest, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."150

4) Exhibit "KK-45"151 was offered "for the purpose of proving that the PCGG conducted an
investigation of New City Builders, Inc., Transnational Construction Corporation, and OTO
Construction and Development Corporation in relation to Ignacio B. Gimenez and Roberto O.
Olanday, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."152
5) Exhibits "KK-48" to "KK-50"153 were offered "for the purpose of proving that the PCGG
formally filed notices of lis pendens with the Registers of Deeds of Taytay, Rizal, Lucena City,
Quezon and San Fabian, Pangasinan over the properties mentioned in said notices in connection
with Civil Case No. [0]007 pending with the Sandiganbayan, and as part of the testimony of
Tereso Javier."154

6) Exhibits "KK-51" to "KK-52"155 and their sub-markings were offered "for the purpose of
proving that the PCGG sequestered the shares of stock in Allied Banking Corporation and
Guaranteed Education, Inc. as stated in the said writ/letter of sequestration, and as part of the
testimony of Tereso Javier."156

7) Exhibits "NN" to "QQ"157 and their sub-markings were offered "for the purpose of proving
that the PCGG formally requested the Central Bank to freeze the bank accounts of the spouses
Igancio [sic] B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez and that the Central Bank, acting on said request,
issued a memorandum to all commercial banks relative thereto. They are also being offered as
part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."158

8) Exhibits "RR" to "RR-23"159 were offered "for the purpose of proving that Dominador
Pangilinan, former Acting President and President of Traders Royal Bank, executed an affidavit
on July 24, 1987 wherein he mentioned Malacanang trust accounts maintained with the Traders
Royal Bank the balance of which was very high, approximately 150-175 million pesos, as
indicated in the monthly statements attached to his affidavit. They are also being offered as part
of the testimony of Danilo R.V. Daniel."160

9) Exhibits "SS" to "SS-29"161 were offered "for the purpose of proving that Apolinario K.
Medina, Executive Vice President of Traders Royal Bank, executed an Affidavit on July 23,
1987 wherein he mentioned about certain numbered (confidential) trust accounts maintained
with the Traders Royal Bank, the deposits to which ‘were so substantial in amount that (he)
suspected that they had been made by President Marcos or his family. They are also being
offered as part of the testimony of Danilo R.V. Daniel."162

10) Exhibits "TT" to "TT-3"163 were offered "for the purpose of proving that Director Danilo
R.V. Daniel of the Research and Development Department of the PCGG conducted an
investigation on the ill-gotten wealth of the spouses Ignacio and Fe Roa Gimenez and found that
from 1977 to 1982, the total sum of P75,090,306.42 was withdrawn from the account No. 128
(A/C 76-128) in favor of I.B Gimenez, I.B. Gimenez Securities and Fe Roa Gimenez. They are
also being offered as part of the testimony of Director Danilo R.V. Daniel."164

The court cannot arbitrarily disregard evidence especially when resolving a demurrer to evidence
which tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence.

The difference between the admissibility of evidence and the determination of its probative
weight is canonical.165

Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence)
is to [be] considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the
question of whether or not it proves an issue. Thus, a letter may be offered in evidence and
admitted as such but its evidentiary weight depends upon the observance of the rules on
evidence. Accordingly, the author of the letter should be presented as witness to provide the
other party to the litigation the opportunity to question him on the contents of the letter. Being
mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its contents suspect. As
earlier stated, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value.166 (Citations
omitted)

The Sandiganbayan should have considered Atienza v. Board of Medicine, et al.167 where this
court held that it is better to admit and consider evidence for determination of its probative value
than to outright reject it based on very rigid and technical grounds.168

Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, in
connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or
admissibility, we have held that:

[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but
admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their
rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant
or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or
incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring
them.169(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

A liberal application of the Rules is in line with the state’s policy to recover ill-gotten wealth. In
case of doubt, courts should proceed with caution in granting a motion to dismiss based on
demurrer to evidence. An order granting demurrer to evidence is a judgment on the
merits.170 This is because while a demurrer "is an aid or instrument for the expeditious
termination of an action,"171 it specifically "pertains to the merits of the case."172

In Cabreza, Jr., et al. v. Cabreza,173 this court defined a judgment rendered on the merits:

A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it determines the rights and
liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory
objections"; or when the judgment is rendered "after a determination of which party is right, as
distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical
point."174 (Citations omitted)

To reiterate, "[d]emurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the
defendant having to submit evidence on his [or her] part, as he [or she] would ordinarily have to
do, if plaintiff’s evidence shows that he [or she] is not entitled to the relief sought."175 The order
of dismissal must be clearly supported by facts and law since an order granting demurrer is a
judgment on the merits:

As it is settled that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on the
merits, it is imperative that it be a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the
facts and the law on which it is based.176(Citation omitted)

To erroneously grant a dismissal simply based on the delay to formally offer documentary
evidence essentially deprives one party of due process.

IV

Respondents did not fail to specifically deny material averments in the Complaint.

Under Rule 8, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the "defendant must specify each material
allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth
the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial."177 There are three modes
of specific denial provided for under the Rules:
1) by specifying each material allegation of the fact in the complaint, the truth of which the
defendant does not admit, and whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters
which he will rely upon to support his denial; (2) by specifying so much of an averment in the
complaint as is true and material and denying only the remainder; (3) by stating that the
defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a
material averment in the complaint, which has the effect of a denial.178

In paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the PCGG, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
averred that:

14. Defendant Fe Roa Gimenez, by herself and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, taking undue advantage of her position, influence
and connection and with grave abuse of power and authority, in order to prevent disclosure and
recovery of assets illegally obtained:

(a) actively participated in the unlawful transfer of millions of dollars of government funds into
several accounts in her name in foreign countries;

(b) disbursed such funds from her various personal accounts for Defendants’ own use[,] benefit
and enrichment;

(c) acted as conduit of the Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos in purchasing
the New York properties, particularly, the Crown Building, Herald Center, 40 Wall Street, 200
Wall Street, Lindenmere Estate and expensive works of arts;179

In their Answer, respondents claimed that;

9. Defendants Spouses Gimenez and Fe Roa specifically deny the allegations contained in
paragraphs 14(a), 14(b) and 14(c), the truth being that defendant Fe Roa never took advantage of
her position or alleged connection and influence to allegedly prevent disclosure and recovery of
alleged illegally obtained assets, in the manner alleged in said paragraphs.180

Similarly, the PCGG made material allegations in paragraph 16 of the Complaint:

16. Defendant Ignacio B. Gimenez, taking undue advantage of his relationship, influence, and
connection, by himself and/or in unlawful concert and active collaboration with Defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, for the purpose of mutually enriching themselves
and preventing the disclosure and recovery of assets illegally obtained, among others:

(a) acted as the dummy, nominee or agent of Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos, in several corporations such as, the Allied Banking Corporation, Acoje Mining
Corporation, Baguio Gold Mining, Multi National Resources, Philippine Overseas, Inc. and
Pioneer Natural Resources;

(b) unlawfully obtained, through corporations organized by them such as the the [sic] New City
Builders, Inc. (NCBI), multimillion peso contracts with the government for the construction of
government buildings, such as the University of Life Sports Complex and Dining Hall as well as
projects of the National Manpower Corporation, Human Settlements, GSIS, and Maharlika
Livelihood, to the gross and manifest disadvantage to Plaintiff and the Filipino people.

(c) in furtherance of the above stated illegal purposes, organized several establishments engaged
in food, mining and other businesses such as the Transnational Construction Corporation, Total
Systems Technology, Inc., Pyro Control Technology Corporation, Asian Alliance, Inc., A & T
Development Corporation, RBO Agro Forestry Farm Development Corporation, Bathala Coal
Mining Corporation, Coal Basis Mining Corporation, Titan Coal Mining Corporation, GEI
Guaranteed Education, Inc., and I.B. Gimenez Securities, Inc.181

To which respondents specifically denied through the following paragraph:

11. Defendants Spouses Gimenez and Fe Roa specifically deny the allegations contained in
paragraphs 16, 16(a), 16(b) and 16(c) that defendant Gimenez allegedly took advantage of his
alleged relationship, influence and connection, and that by himself or in alleged unlawful concert
with defendants Marcos and Imelda, for the alleged purpose of enriching themselves and
preventing the discovery of alleged illegally obtained assets: (1) allegedly acted as dummy,
nominee or agent of defendants Marcos and Imelda; (2) allegedly obtained multi-million peso
projects unlawfully; and (3) allegedly organized several establishments, the truth being: (1) that
defendant Gimenez never acted as dummy, nominee or agent of defendants Marcos and Imelda;
(2) that defendant Gimen[e]z never once obtained any contract unlawfully; and (3) that
defendant Gimenez is a legitimate businessman and organized business establishments legally
and as he saw fit, all in accordance with his own plans and for his own purposes.182

In Aquintey v. Spouses Tibong,183 this court held that using "specifically" in a general denial does
not automatically convert that general denial to a specific one.184 The denial in the answer must
be so definite as to what is admitted and what is denied:

A denial is not made specific simply because it is so qualified by the defendant. A general denial
does not become specific by the use of the word "specifically." When matters of whether the
defendant alleges having no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief are plainly and
necessarily within the defendant’s knowledge, an alleged "ignorance or lack of information" will
not be considered as a specific denial. Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules also provides that material
averments in the complaint other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages shall be
deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Thus, the answer should be so definite and
certain in its allegations that the pleader’s adversary should not be left in doubt as to what is
admitted, what is denied, and what is covered by denials of knowledge as sufficient to form a
belief.185 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

However, the allegations in the pleadings "must be contextualized and interpreted in relation to
the rest of the statements in the pleading."186 The denials in respondents’ Answer comply with
the modes provided for under the Rules. We have held that the purpose of requiring specific
denials from the defendant is to make the defendant disclose the "matters alleged in the
complaint which he [or she] succinctly intends to disprove at the trial, together with the matter
which he [or she] relied upon to support the denial."187 The denials proffered by respondents
sufficiently disclosed the matters they wished to disprove and those they would rely upon in
making their denials.

To summarize, the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to

evidence. It erred in making a sweeping declaration on the probative value of the documentary
evidence offered by petitioner and in excluding other evidence offered during trial without full
evaluation based on reasons grounded in law and/or jurisprudence.

The third part of Rule 33, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "[i]f the motion [to
dismiss] is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed [the movant] shall be deemed
to have waived the right to present evidence." As this court held:
[I]f a demurrer to evidence is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed, the movant
shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. The movant who presents a
demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence retains the right to present their own evidence, if the trial
court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court
disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to
present their own evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render
judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged
litigations.188 (Citations omitted)

This procedure, however, does not apply.

In this case, we principally nullify the assailed Resolutions that denied the admission of the
Formal Offer of Evidence. It only follows that the Order granting demurrer should be denied.
This is not the situation contemplated in Rule 33, Section 1.189 Respondents were not able to
even comment on the Formal Offer of Evidence. Due process now requires that we remand the
case to the Sandiganbayan. Respondents may, at their option and through proper motion, submit
their Comment. The Sandiganbayan should then rule on the admissibility of the documentary and
object evidence covered by the Formal Offer submitted by petitioner. Respondents then may
avail themselves of any remedy thereafter allowed by the Rules.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated May 25, 2006 and
September 13, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division in Civil Case No. 0007
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the. Sandiganbayan for further
proceedings with due and deliberate dispatch in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes
*
Designated as additional member per Raftle dated August 19, 2009.
1
Rollo, pp. 30–120.
2
Id. at 122. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0007 and entitled Republic v. Fe Roa
Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez. The Resolution was approved by Associate Justices Gregory
S. Ong (Chair), Jose R. Hernandez, and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada of the Fourth Division.
3
Id. at 124–133. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez and
concurred in by Associate Justices Gregory S. Ong (Chair) and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada.
4
Id. at 122, Resolution dated May 25, 2006.
5
Id. at 133, Resolution dated September 13, 2006.
6
Id. at 134–161.
7
Id. at 1721, Republic’s Memorandum.
8
Id. at 1722.
9
Id. at 1725–1726.
10
Id. at 1726.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 1727.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 122, Resolution dated May 25, 2006.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 124, Resolution dated September 13, 2006.
23
Id. at 126.
24
Id. at 124–125.
25
Id. at 1767, Republic’s Memorandum.
26
Id. at 188–191.
27
Id. at 1789–1800, Republic’s Memorandum.
28
Id. at 1767.
29
Id. at 129–130, Resolution dated September 13, 2006.
30
Id. at 131–132, citing RULES OF COURT, Rule 17, sec. 3, which provides:

SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.— If for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to
appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute
his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the
court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own
motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same
or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits,
unless otherwise declared by the court.
31
Id. at 132.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 133.
35
Id. at 834 and 919, Petition.
36
Id. at 1634, Supreme Court Resolution dated December 11, 2006, 1636, Fe Roa Gimenez’s
Comment/Opposition to Petition for Review, and 1655, Supreme Court Resolution dated March
14, 2007.
37
Id. at 1635–1641, Fe Roa Gimenez’s Comment/Opposition to Petition for Review, and 1657–
1662, Ignacio B. Gimenez’s Comment.
38
Id. at 1655, Supreme Court Resolution dated March 14, 2007, and 1671, Supreme Court
Resolution dated June 18, 2007.
39
Id. at 1676–1686.
40
Id. at 1687a–1687b.
41
Id. at 1687a.
42
Id. at 1808, Supreme Court Resolution dated February 18, 2008.
43
Id. at 1895–1898.
44
Id. at 1902, Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari.
45
Id. at 1912, Supreme Court Resolution dated June 20, 2012.
46
Id. at 1974–1991.
47
Id. at 1994–2000.
48
Id. at 2015–2016.
49
Id. at 2004–2005.
50
Id. at 2015, Supreme Court Resolution dated January 23, 2013.
51
Id. at 1769, Republic’s Memorandum.
52
Id. at 1702, Ignacio B. Gimenez’s Memorandum.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 1702–1703.
55
See CONST., art. III, secs. 1 and 14, which provide:

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

....

SECTION 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and
his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
56
Perez v. Estrada, 412 Phil. 686, 705 (2001) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc]. See Marcos v.
Sandiganbayan (1st Division), 357 Phil. 762, 783 (1998) [Per J. Purisima, En Banc].
57
People v. Bagus, 342 Phil. 836, 853 (1997) [Per J. Francisco, Third Division].
58
Rep. Act No. 1379 (1955) is entitled An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State any
Property Found to have been Unlawfully Acquired by any Public Officer or Employee and
Providing for the Proceedings therefor.
59
Rep. Act No. 1379 (1955), sec. 2.
60
Maj. Gen. Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, 499 Phil. 589, 614 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En
Banc]. See Pres. Decree No. 1486 (1978), sec. 4, which created the Sandiganbayan and vested
jurisdiction of civil forfeiture cases under Rep. Act No. 1379. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 90529, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 667, 674–676 [Per J. Regalado, En Banc], this
court traced the legislative history of the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over civil forfeiture
proceedings.
61
618 Phil. 346 (2009) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
62
Id. at 362–363.
63
Id.
64
See Exec. Order No. 14-A (1986), sec. 1, entitled Amending Executive Order No. 14.
65
See Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (3rd Division), G.R. Nos. 195011–19, September 30, 2013,
706 SCRA 451 [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division] and People v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 681
Phil. 90, 109 (2012) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
66
People v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 681 Phil. 90, 109 (2012) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
67
Id. at 110.
68
Rollo, p. 1782, Republic’s Memorandum.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 1706, Ignacio B. Gimenez’s Memorandum.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 1702.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 1712, Fe Roa Gimenez’s Memorandum.
78
Id. at 1714. The Order is not referenced to in the records.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 1717.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, sec. 35 provides:

SEC. 35. When to make offer.— As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made
at the time the witness is called to testify.

Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a party’s testimonial
evidence. Such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in writing.
85
RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, sec. 35.
86
RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, sec. 35.
87
See RULES OF COURT, Rule 128, sec. 3, which provides:

SEC. 3. Admissibility of evidence.— Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and
is not excluded by the law or these rules.
88
Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Spouses Parocha, 550 Phil. 571, 575 (2007) [Per J. Velasco, Jr.,
Second Division]. See Constantino v. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 68, 75 (1996) [Per J. Bellosillo,
First Division].
89
See Heirs of Emilio Santioque v. Heirs of Emilio Calma, 536 Phil. 524, 543 (2006) [Per J.
Callejo, Sr., First Division], citing Pigao v. Rabanillo, 522 Phil. 506, 517–518 (2006) [Per J.
Corona, Second Division].
90
Villaluz v. Ligon, 505 Phil. 572, 588 (2005) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Second Division].
91
Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Spouses Parocha, 550 Phil. 571, 578–579 (2007) [Per J. Velasco, Jr.,
Second Division]. See People v. Logmao, 414 Phil. 378, 385 (2001) [Per J. Bellosillo, Jr., Second
Division].
92
See Spouses Ong v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 338, 350–352 (1999) [Per J. Panganiban, Third
Division]. See also Westmont Investment Corporation v. Francia, Jr., et al., 678 Phil. 180, 194
(2011) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division]. We recall, however, that admissibility of evidence is a
different concept from probative value under evidentiary rules. See Atienza v. Board of Medicine,
et al., 657 Phil. 536, 543 (2011) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division], citing PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 38, 59 (1998) [Per J. Romero, Third
Division].
93
Marcos, Jr. v. Republic, G.R. No. 189434, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 280, 308–309 [Per J.
Sereno (now C.J.), Second Division]. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 461 Phil. 598, 610 (2003) [Per
J. Corona, En Banc]. See Exec. Order No. 1 (1986), entitled Creating the Presidential
Commission on Good Government, Proclamation No. 3 (1986), entitled Declaring a National
Policy to Implement Reforms Mandated by the People Protecting their Basic Rights, Adopting a
Provisional Constitution, and Providing for an Orderly Transition to a Government under a New
Constitution, art. II, sec. 1(d), Exec. Order No. 14 (1986), entitled Defining the Jurisdiction over
Cases Involving the Ill-gotten Wealth of Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda R.
Marcos, Members of their Immediate Family, Close Relatives, Subordinates, Close and/or
Business Associates, Dummies, Agents and Nominees.
94
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 453 Phil. 1059, 1087–1088 (2003) [Per J. Corona, En Banc]. In
this case, this court set aside the Sandiganbayan Resolution that denied petitioner’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. (Id. at 1077 and 1150).
95
Rollo, p. 1781, Republic’s Memorandum.
96
357 Phil. 452 (1998) [Per J. Martinez, Second Division].
97
Id. at 456–457.
98
Id. at 461.
99
Id. at 477.
100
Id. at 474.
101
Id. at 474–475 and 481–482.
102
Id. at 478–480. This court applied 1964 RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, sec. 35, which
provides:
SEC. 35. Offer of Evidence.— The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
103
Security Bank Corporation v. Indiana Aerospace University, 500 Phil. 51, 60 (2005) [Per J.
Carpio, First Division].
104
Rollo, p. 1772, Republic’s Memorandum.
105
Id. at 1776–1777.
106
Id. at 1778.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 1701, Ignacio B. Gimenez’s Memorandum.
109
Id. at 1701–1702.
110
Id. at 1711–1713, Fe Roa Gimenez’s Memorandum.
111
G.R. No. 184528, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 174 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].
112
Id. at 185.
113
Id.
114
Spouses Condes v. Court of Appeals, 555 Phil. 311, 324 (2007) [Per J. Nachura, Third
Division], citing Heirs of Emilio Santioque v. Heirs of Emilio Calma, 536 Phil. 524, 540–541
(2006) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., First Division].
115
Casent Realty Development Corporation v. Philbanking Corporation, 559 Phil. 793, 801–802
(2007) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].
116
Rollo, p. 1906, Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 132, Resolution dated September 13, 2006.
119
Id. at 1784, Republic’s Memorandum.
120
Id. at 1785.
121
Id. at 1786.
122
Id. at 1788.
123
Id. at 1632.
124
Id.
125
Exec. Order No. 1 (1986), sec. 3 provides:

Sec. 3. The Commission shall have the power and authority:

....

(b) To sequester or place or cause to be placed under its control or possession any building or
office wherein any ill-gotten wealth or properties may be found, and any records pertaining
thereto, in order to prevent their destruction, concealment or disappearance which would
frustrate or hamper the investigation or otherwise prevent the Commission from accomplishing
its task.
126
Rollo, 1786–1787, Republic’s Memorandum.
127
Id. at 1725–1726.
128
Id. at 1702, Ignacio B. Gimenez’s Memorandum.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 1706.
131
Id. at 1717, Fe Roa Gimenez’s Memorandum.
132
See Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc, et al., 681 Phil. 380, 402–403 (2012) [Per J. Sereno (now
C.J.), Second Division], Heirs of Margarita Prodon v. Heirs of Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina
Clave, G.R. No. 170604, September 2, 2013, 704 SCRA 465, 478 [Per J. Bersamin, First
Division], and Bognot v. RRI Lending Corporation, G.R. No. 180144, September 24, 2014, 736
SCRA 357, 377 [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
133
See Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr., G.R. No. 191696, April 10, 2013, 695 SCRA 599, 611 [Per J.
Mendoza, Third Division].
134
535 Phil. 384 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division].
135
408 Phil. 194, 230 (2001) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
136
535 Phil. 384, 457–459 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division].
137
Patula v. People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 135, 156 [Per J. Bersamin,
First Division].
138
650 Phil. 54 (2010) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].
139
Id. at 68–70.
140
554 Phil. 343 (2007) [Per J. Corona, First Division].
141
Id. at 348–350.
142
Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc, et al., 681 Phil. 380 (2012) [Per J. Sereno (now C.J.), Second
Division].
143
Id. at 404–405.
144
Rollo, p. 1726, Republic’s Memorandum.
145
Id. at 1757. Exhibit "KK" refers to the "Table of Contents of SB CC No. [0]007 entitled RP
vs. Ignacio/Fe Roa Dimnez [sic], et al., including its Annexes[.]" (Id.)
146
Id. at 1757.
147
Id. at 1023–1024, Formal Offer of Evidence. Exhibit "KK-1" refers to the "Certified true copy
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 137638 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan registered under the name of Ignacio B. Gimenez, married to Fe Roa Gimenez,
covering a parcel of land with an area of 1,106 square meters, [located in] Barrio Nibaleo, San
Fabian, Pangasinan." Exhibit "KK-2" refers to a "Certified true copy of Tax Declaration No.
0634 under the name of Ignacio B. Gimenez married to Fe Roa Gimenez of the property covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 137638." Exhibit "KK-3" refers to the "Certified true copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 520192 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal
registered under the name of Ignacio B. Gimenez . . . married to Fe Roa Gimenez, covering a
parcel of land with an area of 888 square meters [located in] Barrio Dolores, Taytay, Rizal."
Exhibit "KK-4" refers to the "Certified true copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 138076 of
the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan registered under the name of Ignacio B.
Gimenez . . . married to Fe Roa Gimenez, covering a parcel of land with an area of 1,106 square
meters [located in] Barrio Nibaleo, San Fabian, Pangasinan." Exhibit "KK-5" refers to the
"Certified true copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12869 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Quezon registered under the name of Spouses Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa
Gimenez, covering a parcel of land with an area of 194,426 square meters [located in] Barrio
Real (New Kiloloron), Real (formerly Infanta), Quezon." Exhibit "KK-5-A" refers to the
"Bracketed portion at the dorsal page of Exhibit ‘KK-5’ which is the certification of the Deputy
Register of Deeds stating that Exhibit ‘KK-5’ is a true copy of TCT No. T-12869, Book No. T-
60, Page No. 169, registered in the name of Sps. Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez[.]"
Exhibit "KK-6" refers to the "Certified true copy of Tax Declaration No. 30-003-0131-A under
the name of Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez of the property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-12869." Exhibit "KK-7" refers to the "Certified true copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-12142 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Quezon registered
under the name of Ignacio Bautista Gimenez, married to Fe Roa Gimenez, covering a parcel of
land with an area of 18.6738 hectares [located in] Barrio Capalong, Infanta, Quezon." Exhibit
"KK-7-A" refers to the "Bracketed portion at the dorsal page of Exhibit ‘KK-7’, which is the
certification of the Deputy Register of Deeds, stating that said Exhibit ‘KK-7’ is a true copy of
TCT No. T-12142, Book No. T-57, Page No. 42[.]" Exhibit "KK-8" refers to the "Certified true
copy of Tax Declaration No. 30-003-0301-A under the name of Ignacio Bautista Gimenez[.]"
Exhibit "KK-9" refers to the "Certified true copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12870 of
the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Quezon registered under the name of Spouses Ignacio
B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez, covering a parcel of land with an area of 152,682 square
meters, [located in] Barrio Kiloloron, Real (formerly Infanta), Quezon." Exhibit "KK-9-A" refers
to the "Bracketed portion at the dorsal page of Exhibit ‘KK-9’ which is the certification of the
Deputy Register of Deeds stating [that] said Exhibit ‘KK-9’ is a true copy of TCT No. T-12870,
Book No. T-60, Page No. 170[.]" Exhibit "KK-10" refers to the "Certified true copy of Tax
Declaration No. 30-005-0348-A under the name of Sps. Ignacio Jimenez and Fe Roa Jimenez of
the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12870." Exhibit "KK-11" refers to the
"Certified true copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-13178 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Quezon registered under the name of Ignacio Bautista Gimenez married to Fe Roa
Gimenez, covering a parcel of land with an area of 16.1641 hectares, situated in the Sitio of
Capalong, Infanta, Quezon." Exhibit "KK-11-A" refers to the "Bracketed portion at the dorsal
page of Exhibit ‘KK-11’ which is the certification of the Deputy Register of Deeds stating that
Exhibit ‘KK-11’ is a true copy of TCT No. T-13178, Book No. T-62, Page No. 78[.]" Exhibit
"KK-12" refers to the "Certified true copy of Tax Declaration No. 30-003-0302-A under the
name of Ignacio Bautista Gimenez of the property located at Barrio Capalong, Real, Quezon
with an area of 16.1541 hectares."
148
Id. at 1758–1759, Republic’s Memorandum.
149
Id. at 1025–1026, Formal Offer of Evidence. Exhibit "KK-15" refers to the "Certified true
copy of the General Information Sheet of Allied Banking Corporation for the year 2002
consisting of seven (7) pages." Exhibit "KK-18" refers to the "Certified true copy of the General
Information Sheet of Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation for year 2002 consisting of seven
(7) pages." Exhibit "KK-27" refers to the "Certified true copy of the Certificate of Filing of
Amended Articles of Incorporation of I.B. Gimenez Securities, Inc. (Formerly Ignacio B.
Jimenez Securities, Inc., amending Article VII thereof) issued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission on November 26, 1997, with the attached Amended Articles of Incorporation,
consisting of nine (9) pages." Exhibit "KK-30" refers to the "Certified true copy of the General
Information Sheet of Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company for the year 2001 consisting of
seven (7) pages." Exhibit "KK-32" refers to the "Certified true copy of the Certificate of Filing of
Amended Articles of Incorporation of Manila Stock Exchange (amending Article IV by
shortening the term of its existence, thereby dissolving the corporation) issued by the Securities
and Exchange Commission on December 9, 1999, with the attached Amended Articles of
Incorporation consisting of eleven (11) pages." Exhibit "KK-33" refers to the "Certified true
copy of the General Information Sheet of Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation for the
year 1982 consisting of five (5) pages." Exhibit "KK-34" refers to the "Certified true copy of the
Certificate of filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation of Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Corporation[.]" Exhibit "KK-35" refers to the "Certified true copy of the General Information
Sheet of Oriental Petroleum and Minerals Corporation for the year 2002 consisting of eight (8)
pages." Exhibit "KK-36" refers to the "Certified true copy of the Certificate of Filing of
Amended Articles of Incorporation of Oriental Petroleum and Minerals Corporation[.]" Exhibit
"KK-37" refers to the "Certified true copy of the General Information Sheet of Philippine
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation for the year 2003[.]" Exhibit "KK-38" refers to the
"Certified true copy of the Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation of
Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (amending Article II, Paragraph 5 of the
Secondary Purposes of the Amended Articles of Incorporation thereof) issued by the Securities
and Exchange Commission on June 9, 1972, with the attached Amended Articles of
Incorporation, consisting of ten (10) pages." Exhibit "KK-40" refers to the "Certified true copy
of the Cover Sheet of Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation of Prudential
Guarantee and Assurance Incorporated consisting of twelve (12) pages, including the attached
Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation dated October 24, 2000 and the
Amended Articles of Incorporation.
150
Id. at 1760, Republic’s Memorandum.
151
Id. at 1027, Formal Offer of Evidence. Exhibit "KK-45" refers to the "Certified true copy of
the Memorandum dated August 1, 1988 of Atty. Ralph S. Lee, Team Supervisor, IRD, and
Alexander M. Berces, Investigator, for Atty. Roberto S. Federis, Director, IRD, thru Atty.
Romeo A. Damosos, Acting Asst. Director, IRD, all of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, consisting of seven (7) pages, regarding the investigation of New City Builders,
Inc., Transnational Construction Corporation, and OTO Construction and Development
Corporation in relation to Ignacio B. Gimenez and Roberto O. Olanday."
152
Id. at 1761, Republic’s Memorandum.
153
Id. at 1028, Formal Offer of Evidence. Exhibit "KK-48" refers to the "Photocopy of Notice of
Lis Pendens dated March 22, 1989 from the Presidential Commission on Good Government . . .
informing the [Register of Deeds of Taytay, Rizal] that the property covered by TCT No. 520192
. . . is deemed sequestered[.]" Exhibit "KK-49" refers to the "Photocopy of Notice of Lis Pendens
dated March 22, 1989 from the Presidential Commission on Good Government . . . informing the
[Register of Deeds of Lucena City, Quezon] that the following properties [have been]
sequestered[:] TCT No. 128969[,] TCT No. 12142[,] TCT No. 12870[,] and TCT No. 13178[.]"
Exhibit "KK-50" refers to the "Photocopy of Notice of Lis Pendens dated March 22, 1989 from
the Presidential Commission on Good Government . . . informing the [Register of Deeds of San
Fabian, Pangasinan] that the following properties are deemed sequestered and the subject of
Civil Case No. [0]007 . . . : TCT No. 138076 (property located at Nibalew, San Fabian,
Pangasinan), Beach House located in San Fabian, Pangasinan, and House with Property Index
No. 013-31-018 located at Nibalew West, San Fabian, Pangasinan."
154
Id. at 1762, Republic’s Memorandum.
155
Id. at 1028–1029, Formal Offer of Evidence. Exhibit "KK-51" refers to the "Certified true
copy of a letter of sequestration dated June 19, 1986 of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government . . . addressed to Mr. Lucio C. Tan, Chairman of Allied Banking Corporation
regarding [the] sequestration of shares of stock in the . . . bank in the names of Lucio C. Tan, Iris
Holdings & Dev. Corp., Mariano Tanenglian, Virgo Holdings & Dev. Corp., Ignacio B.
Gimenez, and Jewel Holdings, Inc., consisting of two (2) pages." Exhibit "KK-51-A" refers to
the "Bracketed portion of Exhibit ‘51’ with the name of Ignacio B. Gimenez with 44,089
common shares . . . listed." Exhibit "KK-52" refers to the "Certified true copy of Writ of
Sequestration . . . regarding the sequestration of the shares of stock of Roberto O. Olanday,
Ignacio B. Gimenez, Aracely Olanday, Oscar Agcaoili and Grid Investments, Inc." Exhibit "KK-
52-A" refers to the "Bracketed portion on Exhibit "52" of the name of Ignacio B. Gimenez."
156
Id. at 1763, Republic’s Memorandum.
157
Id. at 1029, Formal Offer of Evidence. Exhibit "NN" refers to the "Certified xerox copy of a
Memorandum To All Commercial Banks dated March 14, 1986 issued by [the] Governor of the
Central Bank of the Philippines, regarding the letter dated March 13, 1986 of Mary Concepcion
Bautista, Commissioner of [PCGG]." Exhibit "OO" refers to the "Certified xerox copy of a letter
dated March 13, 1986 of Mary Concepcion Bautista, [PCGG Commissioner], regarding [the]
names to be added to the [list of persons not allowed to make] any withdrawal or transfer of
funds from the deposit accounts, trust accounts, and/or money market placements under the
names of said persons without written authority from the PCGG[.]" Exhibit "PP" refers to the
same exhibit as ‘OO’; Exhibit "PP-1" refers to the "Bracketed portion on Exhibit ‘PP’ of the
names of Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Jimenez [sic] appearing as No. 14 in the list of names."
Exhibit "QQ" is the "Same as Exhibit ‘NN’." Exhibit "QQ-1" refers to the "Bracketed portion on
Exhibit ‘QQ’ of the names of Ignacio Jimenez [sic] and Fe Jimenez [sic] appearing as No. 14 in
the list of names."
158
Id. at 1763, Republic’s Memorandum.
159
Id. at 1029–1030, Formal Offer of Evidence. Exhibit "RR" refers to the "Photocopy of
Affidavit dated July 24, 1987 of Dominador Pangilinan, Former Acting President and President
of Traders Royal Bank, consisting of twenty-two (22) pages[.]" Exhibits "RR-1" to "RR-3" refer
to pages 2–4 of Pangilinan’s Affidavit. Exhibit "RR-4" refers to Annex A of Pangilinan’s
Affidavit. Exhibits "RR-5" to "RR-7" refer to the "Status of Bankers Acceptances dated July 30,
1978 [regarding] A/C # 20, consisting of three (3) pages, attached to [Pangilinan’s affidavit.]"
Exhibit "RR-8" refers to the "Recapitulation as of February 28, 1982 attached to [Pangilinan’s
affidavit.]" Exhibits "RR-9" to "RR-20" refer to the "Status of Funds of A/C # 128 as of June 4,
1979, consisting of twelve (12) pages, attached to [Pangilinan’s affidavit.]" Exhibit "RR-21"
refers to "Annex ‘B’ of [Pangilinan’s affidavit], which is the Savings Account Ledger of
Account No. 50100060-6 at Traders Royal Bank." Exhibit "RR-22" refers to paragraph 1 of
Pangilinan’s affidavit. Exhibit "RR-23" refers to the "First sentences of paragraph 4 of
[Pangilinan’s affidavit], which reads: ‘In about 1977 or 1978, Mr. Rivera told me that funds were
being given to him by Ms. Fe Gimenez for deposit into trust accounts maintained with TRB.’"
160
Id. at 1764, Republic’s Memorandum.
161
Id. at 1030–1032, Formal Offer of Evidence. Exhibit "SS" refers to the "Photocopy of the
Affidavit dated July 23, 1987 of Apolinario K. Medina, Executive Vice-President of Traders
Royal Bank, consisting of twenty-nine (29) pages including the annexes." Exhibits "SS-1" to
"SS-3" refer to pages 2–4 of Medina’s affidavit. Exhibit "SS-4" refers to Annex "A" of Medina’s
affidavit. Exhibits "SS-6" to "SS-8" refer to the "Status of Bankers Acceptances dated July 30,
1978 re A/C # 20[.]" Exhibit "SS-9" refers to the "Recapitulation as of February 28, 1982
attached to [Medina’s affidavit.]" Exhibits "SS-10" to "SS-21" refer to the "Status of Funds re
A/C # 128 as of June 4, 1979[.]" Exhibit "SS-22" refers to Annex "B" of Medina’s Affidavit
which pertains to the message of Traders Royal Bank to California Overseas Bank, Los Angeles
dated September 28, 1981. Exhibit "SS-23" refers to Annex "C" of Medina’s affidavit which
pertains to the message of Traders Royal Bank Manila to Chemical Bank, New York dated
September 28, 1981. Exhibit "SS-24" refers to Annex "D" of Medina’s affidavit which pertains
to the message of Traders Royal Bank Manila to Bankers Trust Co., New York dated September
28, 1981. Exhibit "SS-25" refers to Annex "E" of Medina’s affidavit which pertains to the
message of Traders Royal Bank Manila to Irving Trust Company New York dated September 28,
1981. Exhibit "SS-26" refers to Annex "F" of Medina’s affidavit which pertains to the message
of Traders Royal Bank Manila to California Overseas Bank, Los Angeles dated September 28,
1981. Exhibit "SS-27" refers to Annex "G" of Medina’s affidavit which pertains to the message
of Traders Royal Bank Manila to California Overseas Bank Los Angeles dated September 28,
1981. Exhibit "SS-28" refers to Annex "H" of Medina’s affidavit which pertains to the message
of Traders Royal Bank to Irving Trust Company, New York dated February 16, 1982. Exhibit
"SS-29" refers to the attachment to Medina’s affidavit which pertains to the message of Traders
Royal Bank Manila to Irving Trust Company, New York dated January 12, 1982.
162
Id. at 1766, Republic’s Memorandum.
163
Id. at 1032, Formal Offer of Evidence. Exhibit "TT" refers to the "Memorandum dated July
19, 2005 for Atty. Plutarco B. Bawagan, Jr. from Director Danilo R.V. Daniel, Research &
Development Department of the [PCGG] regarding the investigation conducted on the ill-gotten
wealth of spouses Ignacio and Fe Roa Gimenez[.]" Exhibits "TT-1" to "TT-3" refer to pages 2–4
of Mr. Daniel’s Memorandum.
164
Id. at 1766, Republic’s Memorandum.
165
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 38, 59 (1998) [Per
J. Romero, Third Division]. See Heirs of Lourdes Sabanpan v. Comorposa, 456 Phil. 161, 172
(2003) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; RULES OF COURT, Rule 128, sec. 3 provides:

SEC. 3. Admissibility of evidence.— Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and
is not excluded by the law or these rules.
166
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 38, 59–60 (1998)
[Per J. Romero, Third Division].
167
657 Phil. 536 (2011) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].
168
Id. at 542.
169
Id.
170
See Nepomuceno, et al. v. Commission on Elections, et al., 211 Phil. 623, 628 (1983) [Per J.
Escolin, En Banc], Oropesa v. Oropesa, G.R. No. 184528, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 174, 185
[Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division], and Casent Realty Development Corporation v.
Philbanking Corporation, 559 Phil. 793, 801–802 (2007) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].
171
Nepomuceno, et al. v. Commission on Elections, et al., 211 Phil. 623, 628 (1983) [Per J.
Escolin, En Banc].
172
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 341 Phil. 432, 440
(1997) [Per J. Francisco, Third Division].
173
679 Phil. 30 (2012) [Per J. Sereno (now C.J.), Second Division].
174
Id. at 41–42. In Lu Ym v. Nabua, 492 Phil. 397, 404 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division],
"an interlocutory order . . . neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case[;] it [still] leaves
something to be done [on the part of] the court before the case is finally decided on the merits."
175
Uy v. Chua, 616 Phil. 768, 783–784 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
176
Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88709, February 11, 1992, 206
SCRA 127, 133 [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
177
RULES OF COURT, Rule 8, sec. 10 provides:

SEC. 10. Specific denial.— A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of
which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters
upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an
averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the
remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth of a material averment made to the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have
the effect of a denial.
178
Philippine Bank of Communications v. Spouses Go, 658 Phil. 43, 57 (2011) [Per J. Mendoza,
Second Division].
179
Rollo, p. 147, Complaint.
180
Id. at 168, Answer.
181
Id. at 149–151, Complaint.
182
Id. at 168–169, Answer.
183
540 Phil. 422 (2006) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., First Division].
184
Id. at 441.
185
Id.
186
Philippine Bank of Communications v. Spouses Go, 658 Phil. 43, 58 (2011) [Per J. Mendoza,
Second Division].
187
Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 464 Phil. 331, 339 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr.,
Second Division].
188
Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v. Velarde, 482 Phil. 193, 206–207 (2004) [Per J. Austria-
Martinez, Second Division]. See Quebral v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 387, 405–406 (1996)
[Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
189
RULES OF COURT, Rule 33, sec. 1 provides:

SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.— After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present
evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

G.R. No. 163996 June 9, 2005

JUAN G. RIVERA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the decision
dated May 3, 2004 of the Sandiganbayan,1 which convicted petitioner of twelve counts of the
crime of falsification by a public officer under Article 171 and one count of the crime of
malversation of public funds under Article 217 (4), both of the Revised Penal Code and its
resolution dated June 10, 2004,2 denying reconsideration thereof and disallowing him to present
evidence.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Juan G. Rivera and Eric O. Garcia, municipal mayor and disbursement officer,
respectively, of Guinobatan, Albay, were charged before the Sandiganbayan with twelve counts
of falsification of public documents and one count of malversation of public funds involving the
amount of P1,936,798.64 given to the Municipality of Guinobatan as calamity fund for the
victims of the Mayon volcanic eruption. Garcia died on August 25, 2001 and was accordingly
dropped from the amended information.

Upon arraignment,3 petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to all thirteen cases. A pre-trial was
conducted and thereafter trial ensued. On various dates, the prosecution presented its witnesses
and offered documentary exhibits. Then, it rested its case.

The defense was scheduled to present evidence on September 29, 2003; however, during the
hearing, petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Benjamin C. Belarmino, Jr., informed the court that
they have not yet received the resolution on the prosecution’s Formal Offer of Exhibits, further
manifesting that upon receipt of the resolution, they will ask for leave of court to file demurrer to
evidence.
Thereupon, the court directed Atty. Belarmino to file a demurrer to evidence even without leave
of court but the latter manifested that he would still discuss the matter with his collaborating
counsel.

However, in the order issued by the Sandiganbayan on September 29, 2003, it was stated that
petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he would be filing a demurrer to evidence without
leave of court within ten (10) days.4

On October 20, 2003, petitioner filed his Demurrer to Evidence5 without leave of court to which
the prosecution filed its Opposition on October 27, 2003.

Pursuant to Section 23, Rule 119 of The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
Sandiganbayan considered the right of petitioner to present evidence waived and deemed the
case submitted for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. On May 3, 2004,
the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed decision finding petitioner guilty as charged, the
dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE:

A. In Criminal Cases No. 26686 to 26697, the Court finds the accused Juan G.
Rivera GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for TWELVE (12) COUNTS of the crime of
Falsification by Public Officer defined under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of, after applying the indeterminate
sentence law, TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of prisión
correccional as minimum, up to TEN (10) YEARS of prisión mayor, as maximum, for each
count;

Fine of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) for each count, or a total of TWENTY FOUR
THOUSAND PESOS (P24,000.00) for all twelve counts; and

All the accessory penalties provided for by law.

B. In Criminal Case No. 26698, the Court finds the accused Juan G. Rivera GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds defined under Article 217(4) of
the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of, after
applying

i) the indeterminate sentence law, TWELVE (12) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS, and ELEVEN
(11) DAYS of reclusion temporal as minimum, up to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion
temporal as maximum,

ii) the penalty of perpetual special disqualification,

iii) a fine of SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY FOUR THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY
FIVE PESOS (P794,445.00).

By way of restitution, the accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the government in the same
amount of SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY FOUR THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY
FIVE PESOS (P794,445.00); and

All the accessory penalties provided for by law.

SO ORDERED.6
On May 17, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the decision and further moved that he
be allowed to present evidence.7 The same, however, was denied in a resolution dated June 10,
2004, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court is constrained to DENY the omnibus motion for
reconsideration.

SO ORDERED.8

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.9

The sole issue for resolution is whether or not the assailed decision and resolution of the
Sandiganbayan should be set aside to allow petitioner to present evidence despite the demurrer to
evidence filed.

Petitioner prays that in the interest of justice he be allowed to present evidence in view of the
severity of the penalty imposed on him which is imprisonment of about 140 years. He asserts
that he was unaware of the consequences of the action taken by his former counsel when he
manifested that they were opting to file a demurrer to evidence. He also claims that the
Sandiganbayan made no searching inquiry to determine whether he fully understood the legal
ramifications of filing a demurrer to evidence without leave of court. He submits that by its
filing, he was totally unaware and did not comprehend that he was in effect waiving his
constitutional right to present evidence and be heard.

The petition is meritorious.

We recognize the importance of procedural rules in insuring the effective enforcement of

substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice.10 However, the rules
of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid technical sense, as they are used only to help
secure, not override substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made,
their aim would be defeated.11 That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the
higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence.12

The adjudication of cases involving the transcendental matter of life and liberty of a person,
requires our utmost consideration.13 The Constitution ordains that due process must be observed
in cases involving a possible deprivation of life, liberty, or property.14

In the case at bar, the extreme penalty of more than a double-life sentence was imposed. No less
than his liberty is at stake here.15 Consequently, this case deserves to be deliberated upon,
moreso because after the initial assessment by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner’s only and last
resort is with this Court.

A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect
that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or
not, to make out a case or sustain the issue".16 The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of
the whole evidence to sustain a verdict.17 In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised
in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient
proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.18

The transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing held on September 29, 2003 is
reproduced herein, to wit:

CHAIRMAN:
Call the cases.

INTERPRETER:

Criminal Cases Nos. 26686-97 and 26698 entitled, People versus Juan Rivera, for trial.

PROSECUTOR:

Respectfully appearing for the People, your Honor.

COUNSEL:

Same appearance for the accused, your Honor.

CHAIRMAN:

Ready? It’s your turn now to present evidence (referring to defense counsel).

COUNSEL:

Your Honor please, last week, we received a telegram from this Court, wherein we were notified
that the prosecution’s Formal Offer of Exhibits has been resolved. But we have not received the
final Resolution, your Honor.

CHAIRMAN:

Will that be a justification for asking for a postponement? Don’t you think of preparing for
today’s hearing?

COUNSEL:

I don’t intend, your Honor, to request for postponement, however, we have thought that upon
receipt of said Resolution, we will be asking for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence.

CHAIRMAN:

You file your demurrer to evidence, just file it without leave of court.

COUNSEL:

I will have to discuss this matter yet with my collaborating counsel, your Honor.

CHAIRMAN:

You do that, since you are the lead counsel.

Where is the accused?

COUNSEL:

He is in court, your Honor.

CHAIRMAN:

Okay, just tell us if you are not ready, but do not say you are still going to confer with the
accused.

If you will tell us you are not ready yet, so that you will have time to intelligently prepare for it,
by all means, we will agree to that.
COUNSEL:

Thank you, your Honor.

CHAIRMAN:

ORDER.

When these cases were called for hearing this morning, counsel for the accused manifested that
he will be filing a demurrer to evidence even without leave of court.

WHEREFORE, as prayed for, the defense is hereby granted a period of ten (10) days within
which to file the said demurrer, furnishing the prosecution a copy thereof, who asked for the
same period to file its comment/opposition thereto. Thereafter, this incident shall be deemed
submitted for resolution of this Court.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

It appears from the aforequoted TSN of the hearing on September 29, 2003, that counsel for
accused, Atty. Belarmino, asked for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence but was curtly
ordered to file the same even without leave of court. When Atty. Belarmino inquired about the
resolution on the prosecution’s Formal Offer of Exhibits, the Sandiganbayan thought that it was
only an excuse to request for postponement, and that he was not prepared for the hearing.

The order dated September 29, 2003,19 inaccurately stated that Atty. Belarmino manifested that
he will be filing a demurrer to evidence even without leave of court when the records show no
such manifestation was made. On the contrary, the records show that Atty. Belarmino asked for
leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence and for time to discuss the same with his co-counsel
but was instead ordered by the court to file the same without leave of court within ten days.

In addition, we note that Atty. Belarmino did not cite any ground when he moved for leave of
court to file demurrer to evidence; neither did the Sandiganbayan make any inquiry thereon
before issuing the September 29, 2003 order, directing the petitioner to file a demurrer to
evidence even without leave of court. This is contrary to the provisions of Section 23, Rule 119
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which specifically instructs that "the motion for
leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds."

Also, the records show that petitioner was not consulted nor did his counsel confer with him and
ask whether he understood the significance of filing a demurrer to evidence. In fact, Atty.
Belarmino was not given the opportunity to discuss with petitioner the consequences of filing a
demurrer to evidence without leave of court.

In People v. Bodoso,20 the accused was charged with raping his fourteen-year old daughter. After
the prosecution rested its case, the counsel de oficio of accused manifested that the defense was
not intending to present any evidence and was resting its case. There was no clear showing that
accused agreed to the waiver and intended to relinquish his right to be heard as manifested by his
counsel. We held thus, to wit:

Henceforth, to protect the constitutional right to due process of every accused in a capital
offense and to avoid any confusion about the proper steps to be taken when a trial court comes
face to face with an accused or his counsel who wants to waive his client’s right to present
evidence and be heard, it shall be the unequivocal duty of the trial court to observe, as a
prerequisite to the validity of such waiver, a procedure akin to a "searching inquiry" as specified
in People v. Aranzado when an accused pleads guilty, particularly –
1. The trial court shall hear both the prosecution and the accused with their respective counsel on
the desire or manifestation of the accused to waive the right to present evidence and be heard.

2. The trial court shall ensure the attendance of the prosecution and especially the accused with
their respective counsel in the hearing which must be recorded. Their presence must be duly
entered in the minutes of the proceedings.

3. During the hearing, it shall be the task of the trial court to –

a. ask the defense counsel a series of question to determine whether he had conferred with and
completely explained to the accused that he had the right to present evidence and be heard as
well as its meaning and consequences, together with the significance and outcome of the waiver
of such right. If the lawyer for the accused has not done so, the trial court shall give the latter
enough time to fulfill this professional obligation.

b. inquire from the defense counsel with conformity of the accused whether he wants to present
evidence or submit a memorandum elucidating on the contradictions and insufficiency of the
prosecution evidence, if any, or in default theory, file a demurrer to evidence with prior leave of
court, if he so believes that the prosecution evidence is so weak that it need not even be rebutted.
If there is a desire to do so, the trial court shall give the defense enough time to this purpose.

c. elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic
status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to
give a free and informed waiver.

d. all questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter,
hence, the record must state the language used for this purpose as well as reflect the
corresponding translation thereof in English.

In passing, trial courts may also abide by the foregoing procedure even when the waiver of the
right to be present and be heard is made in criminal cases involving non-capital offenses. After
all, in whatever action or forum the accused is situated, the waiver that he makes if it is to be
binding and effective must still be exhibited in the case records to have been validly undertaken,
that is, it was done voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences. As a matter of good court practice, the trial
court would have to rely upon the most convenient, if not primary, evidence of the validity of the
waiver which would amount to the same thing as showing its adherence to the step-by-step
process outlined above.21 (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, in People v. Flores,22 counsel for accused manifested that Flores was waiving his right
to present evidence and requested for time to file a demurrer to evidence. The records were
bereft of any indications that accused voluntarily waived his right to present evidence and with
full comprehension. In that case, we ruled thus:

The lower court, in view of the severity of the imposable penalty, ought to have inquired into the
voluntariness and full knowledge of the consequences of accused-appellants’ waiver. Though the
Rules require no such inquiry to be undertaken by the court for the validity of such waiver or any
judgment made as result of the waiver, prudence, however, requires the Court to ascertain the
same to avoid any grave miscarriage of justice. Although accused-appellants’ waiver amazed the
lower court, nevertheless, the record is devoid of any facts which would indicate that the lower
court took steps to assure itself of accused-appellants’ voluntariness and full knowledge of the
consequences of their waiver.
Besides, counsels’ waiver should have put the court on guard. Any lawyer worth his salt ought to
know that the filing of a demurrer to evidence with leave of court as was done below, has the
beneficial effect of reserving the movant’s right to present evidence if the demurrer is denied by
the court. Thus, a counsel who files a demurrer with leave of court, but at the same time
expressly waives his right to present evidence should put a judge on guard that said counsel may
not entirely comprehend the consequences of the waiver. The trial court should have exercised
prudence by warning counsel about the prejudicial effects of their waiver, that with such a
waiver, the case would be deemed submitted for decision, and their leave to file motion for
demurrer to evidence will have no effect.23

Finally, the evidence on record of the instant case do not clearly show where and to whom the
allegedly malversed money were given after it was encashed. What is clear is that the calamity
fund was released to Almeda O. Lim, the Municipal Treasurer of Guinobatan, Albay to which
Official Receipt No. 8749242H was issued. Thereafter, checks bearing her signature and that of
Rivera’s were personally encashed by her while she was allegedly accompanied by Garcia.
Witnesses who owned the forged receipts testified that they handed the blank receipts to Garcia
and not to petitioner. Then, after receipt of the cash, the disbursement vouchers and other forms
required to liquidate the amount were allegedly prepared by Almeda O. Lim and thereafter,
transmitted to Rivera for approval, and finally to the provincial Government. It has not been
satisfactorily established whether petitioner has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has
consented to the taking by another person, of such funds.

Due to the precipitate filing by the defense of the demurrer to evidence, the Sandiganbayan
determined petitioner’s guilt based only on the prosecution’s evidence. To our mind, the
presentation of evidence by the defense would resolve any doubt as to petitioner’s complicity
and avoid possible miscarriage of justice. Clearly, when "transcendental matters" like life, liberty
or State security are involved, suspension of the rules is likely to be welcomed more
generously.24 The Rules on procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. When they are rigid and strict in application, resulting in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote justice, the Court is empowered to suspend the rules.25

In the interest of substantial justice, we are therefore constrained to remand the case to the
Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated May 3, 2004 and the resolution
dated June 10, 2004 of the Sandiganbayan are hereby SET ASIDE. Let the records of Criminal
Case Nos. 26686-98 be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 49-70; penned by Associate Justice Norberto Y. Geraldez, with Associate Justices
Gregory S. Ong and Efren N. Dela Cruz concurring.
2
Id. at 72-76.
3
Records, Vol. I, p. 259.
4
Rollo, p. 113.
5
Id. at 114-125.
6
Id. at 68-69.
7
Id. at 126-138.
8
Id. at 76.
9
Id. at 8-48.
10
Seven Brothers Shipping Corp. v. Oriental Assurance Corp., 439 Phil. 663, 674 (2002).
11
Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 140576-99, 13 December 2004.
12
Malonzo v. Zamora, 370 Phil. 240, 257 (1999).
13
People v. Flores, 336 Phil. 58, 64 (1997).
14
People v. Beriber, G.R. No. 151198, 8 June 2004, 431 SCRA 332, 340.
15
De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 326 Phil. 182, 189 (1996).
16
Gutib v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 293, 300 (1999).
17
Ong v. People, G.R. No. 140904, 9 October 2000, 342 SCRA 372, 383, citing Gutib v.
CA, supra.
18
Choa v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175, 183 (2002), citing Ong v. People, supra; and Gutib v. CA, supra.
19
Rollo, p. 113.
20
446 Phil. 838 (2003).
21
Id. at 855-857.
22
Supra, note 13.
23
Id. at 64.
24
Supra, note 15.
25
Supra, note 13 at 62.

G.R. No. 191015 August 6, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE C. GO, AIDA C. DELA ROSA, and FELECITAS D. NECOMEDES,** Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The power of courts to grant demurrer in criminal cases should be exercised with great caution,
because not only the rights of the accused - but those of the offended party and the public interest
as well - are involved. Once granted, the accused is acquitted and the offended party may be left
with no recourse. Thus, in the resolution of demurrers, judges must act with utmost
circumspection and must engage in intelligent deliberation and reflection, drawing on their
experience, the law and jurisprudence, and delicately evaluating the evidence on hand.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the September 30, 2009 Decision2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101823, entitled "People of the Philippines,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Concepcion Alarcon-Vergara et al., Respondents," as well as its January
22, 2010 Resolution3 denying reconsideration of the assailed judgment.

Factual Antecedents

The following facts appear from the account of the CA:

On October 14, 1998, the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued
Resolution No. 1427 ordering the closure of the Orient Commercial Banking Corporation
(OCBC) and placing such bank under the receivership of the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC). PDIC, as the statutory receiver of OCBC, effectively took charge of
OCBC’s assets and liabilities in accordance withits mandate under Section 30 of Republic Act
7653.

xxxx

While all the aforementioned events were transpiring, PDIC began collecting on OCBC’s past
due loans receivable by sending demand letters to its borrowers for the immediate settlement
oftheir outstanding loans. Allegedly among these borrowers of OCBC are Timmy’s, Inc. and
Asia Textile Mills, Inc. which appeared to have obtained a loanof [P]10 Million each. A
representative of Timmy’s, Inc. denied being granted any loan by OCBC and insisted that the
signatures on the loan documents were falsified. A representative of Asia Textile Mills, Inc.
denied having applied, much less being granted, a loan by OCBC.

The PDIC conducted an investigation and allegedly came out with a finding that the loans
purportedly in the names of Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. were released in the form
of manager’schecks in the name of Philippine Recycler’s and Zeta International, Inc. These
manager’s checks were then allegedly deposited to the savings account of the private respondent
Jose C. Go with OCBC and, thereafter, were automatically transferred to his current account in
order to fund personal checks issued by him earlier.
On September 24, 1999, PDIC filed a complaint4 for two (2) counts of Estafa thru Falsification
of CommercialDocuments in the Office of the City Prosecutor of the City of Manila against the
private respondents in relation to the purported loans of Timmy’s, Inc.and Asia Textile Mills,
Inc. On November 22, 2000, after finding probable cause, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
the City of Manila filed Informations5 against the private respondents which were docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 in the RTC in Manila.

Upon being subjected to arraignment by the RTC in Manila, the private respondents pleaded not
guilty to the criminal cases filed against them. A pretrial was conducted. Thereafter, trial of the
cases ensued and the prosecution presented its evidence. After the presentation of all of the
prosecution’s evidence, the private respondents filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to
Evidence and a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition. The presiding judge granted the private
respondents’ Motion for Voluntary Inhibition and ordered the case to be re-raffled to another
branch. The case was subsequently re-raffled to the branch of the respondent RTC judge.6

In an Order dated December 19, 2006, the respondent RTC judge granted the private
respondents’ Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence. On January 17, 2007, the private
respondents filed their Demurrer to Evidence7praying for the dismissal of the criminal cases
instituted against them due to the failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

On July 2, 2007, an Order8 was promulgated by the respondent RTC judge finding the private
respondents’ Demurrer to Evidence to be meritorious, dismissing the Criminal Case Nos. 00-
187318 and 00-187319 and acquitting all of the accused in these cases. On July20, 2007, the
private prosecutor in Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 moved for a reconsideration
of the July 2, 2007 Order but the same was denied by the respondent RTC judge in an
Order9 dated October 19, 2007.10

Surprisingly, and considering thathundreds of millions of Orient Commercial Banking

Corporation (OCBC) depositors’ money appear to have been lost – which must have contributed
to the bank’s being placed under receivership, no motion for reconsideration of the July 2, 2007
Order granting respondents’ demurrer to evidence was filed by the handling public prosecutor,
Manila Prosecutor Marlo B. Campanilla (Campanilla). Only complainant Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation (PDIC) filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and the same lacked
Campanilla’s approval and/or conformé; the copy of the Motion for Reconsideration filed with
the RTC11 does not bear Campanilla’s approval/conformé; instead,it indicates thathe was merely
furnished with a copy of the motion by registered mail.12 Thus, while the prosecution’s copy of
PDIC’sMotion for Reconsideration13 bore Campanilla’s subsequent approval and conformity,
that which was actually filed by PDIC with the RTC on July 30, 2007 did not contain the public
prosecutor’s written approval and/or conformity.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On January 4, 2008, the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
anoriginal Petition for Certiorari14 with the CA assailing the July 2, 2007 Order of the trial court.
Itclaimed that the Order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lackor excess of
jurisdiction; that it was issued with partiality; that the prosecution was deprived of its day in
court; and that the trial court disregarded the evidence presented, which undoubtedly showed that
respondents committed the crime of estafa through falsification ofcommercial documents.

On September 30, 2009, the CA issued the assailed Decision with the following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the petition filed in this case is hereby
DENIED and the assailed Orders of the respondent RTC judge are AFFIRMED and deemed
final and executory.

SO ORDERED.15

Notably, in dismissing the Petition, the appellate court held that the assailed July 2, 2007 Order
of the trial court became final since the prosecution failed to move for the reconsideration
thereof, and thus double jeopardy attached. The CA declared thus –

More important than the fact that double jeopardy already attaches is the fact that the July 2,
2007 Order of the trial court has already attained finality. This Order was received by the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Manila on July 3, 2007 and by the Private Prosecutor on July 5, 2007.
While the Private Prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order, the Public
Prosecutor did not seek for the reconsideration thereof. It is the Public Prosecutor who has the
authority to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the said order and the Solicitor General who can
file a petition for certiorari with respect to the criminal aspect of the cases. The failure of the
Public Prosecutor to file a Motion for Reconsideration on or before July 18, 2007 and the failure
of the Solicitor General to file a Petition for Certiorarion or before September 1, 2007 made the
order of the trial court final.

As pointed out by the respondents, the Supreme Court ruled categorically on this matter in the
case of Mobilia Products, Inc. vs. Umezawa (452 SCRA 736), as follows:

"In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private
complainant or the offended party is limited to the civil liabilityarising therefrom. Hence, if a
criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the
order of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the
criminal aspect thereof is concerned and may be made only by the public prosecutor; or in the
case of an appeal, by the State only, through the OSG. The private complainant or offended party
may not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal aspect ofthe case.
However, the offended party or private complainant may file a motion for reconsideration of
such dismissal or acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is
concerned. In so doing, the private complainant or offended party need not secure the conformity
of the public prosecutor. If the court denies his motion for reconsideration, the private
complainant or offended party may appeal or file a petition for certiorarior mandamus, if grave
abuse amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown and the aggrieved party has no right
of appeal or given an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."16

In addition, the CA ruled that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion in granting the demurrer, or that it was denied its day in court; that on
the contrary, the prosecution was afforded every opportunity to present its evidence, yet it failed
to prove that respondents committed the crime charged.

The CA further held that the prosecution failed to present a witness who could testify, based on
personal knowledge, that the loan documents were falsified by the respondents; that the
prosecution should not have relied on "letters and unverified ledgers," and it "should have trailed
the money from the beginning to the end;"17 that while the documentary evidenceshowed that the
signatures in the loan documents were falsified, it has not been shown who falsified them. It
added that since only two of the alleged 13 manager’s checks were being questioned, there arose
reasonable doubt as to whether estafa was committed, as to these two checks; instead, there is an
"inescapable possibility that an honest mistake was made in the preparation of the two
questioned manager’s checks since these checks were made out to the names of different payees
and not in the names of the alleged applicants of the loans."18 The appellate court added –

x x x Finally, the petitioner failed to present evidence on where the money went after they were
deposited to the checking account of the private respondent Jose C. Go. There is only a vague
reference that the money was used to fund the personal checks earlier issued by x x x Go. The
petitioner should have gone further and identified who were the recipients of these personal
checks and if these personal checks were negotiated and honored. With all the resources of the
public prosecutor’s office, the petitioner should have done a better job of prosecuting the cases
filed against the private respondents. It isa shame that all the efforts of the government will go
for naught due to the negligence of the public prosecutors in tying up the chain of evidence in a
criminal case.19

As a final point, the CA held that if errors were made inthe appreciation of evidence, these are
mere errors of judgment – and not errors of jurisdiction – which may no longer be reviewed lest
respondents be placed in double jeopardy.

The OSG moved for reconsideration, but in the assailed January 22, 2010 Resolution, the CA
stood its ground. Hence, the instant Petition was instituted.

Issues

In the Petition, it is alleged that –

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED

THAT –

(a) NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT RTC

JUDGE IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE;

(b) THE ORDER OF ACQUITTAL HAS ALREADY ATTAINED FINALITY WHEN IT WAS
NOT CHALLENGED IN A TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE MANNER; AND

(c) THE LOWER COURT MERELY COMMITTED ERRORS OF JUDGMENT AND NOT OF
JURISDICTION.20

Petitioner’s Arguments

Petitioner argues that the public prosecutor actually filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
assailed July 2,2007 Order of the trial court granting respondents’ demurrer – that is, by
"joining"the private prosecutor PDIC in the latter’s July 20, 2007 Motion for Reconsideration.
Nonetheless,it admitted that while it joined PDIC in the latter’s July 20, 2007 Motion for
Reconsideration, it had only until July 18, 2007 within which to seek reconsideration since it
received the order on July 3, 2007, while the private prosecutor received a copy of the Order
only on July 5, 2007; it pleads thatthe two-day delay in filing the motion should not prejudice the
interests of the State and the People.

Petitioner assumes further that, since it was belated in its filing of the required Motion for
Reconsideration, it may have been tardy as well in the filing of the Petition for Certiorariwith the
CA, or CA-G.R. SP No. 101823. Still, it begs the Court to excuse its mistake in the nameof
public interest and substantial justice, and in order to maintain stability in the banking industry
given that the case involved embezzlement of large sums ofdepositors’ money in OCBC.
Petitioner goes on to argue that the CAerred in affirming the trial court’s finding that demurrer
was proper. It claims that it was able to prove the offense charged, and it has shown that
respondents were responsible therefor.

In its Reply,21 petitioner claims thatthe July 2, 2007 Order of the trial court granting respondents’
demurrer was null and void to begin with, and thus it could not have attained finality. It adds
thatcontrary to respondents’ submission, the private prosecutor’s Motion for Reconsideration
contained the public prosecutor’s written conformity, and that while it may be saidthat the public
prosecutor’s motion was two days late, still the trial court took cognizance thereof and passed
upon its merits; by so doing, the trial court thus validatedthe public prosecutor’s action of
adopting the private prosecutor’sMotion for Reconsideration as his own. This being the case, it
should therefore besaid that the prosecution’s resultant Petition for Certiorariwith the CA on
January 4, 2008 was timely filed within the required 60-day period, counted from November 5,
2007,or the date the public prosecutor received the trial court’s October 19, 2007 Order denying
the Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioner submits further that a Petition for Certiorariwas the only available remedy against the
assailed Orders of the trial court, since the granting of a demurrer in criminal cases is tantamount
to an acquittal and is thus immediately final and executory. It adds that the denial of its right to
due process is apparent since the trial court’s grant of respondents’ demurrer was purely
capricious and done with evident partiality, despite the prosecution having adduced proof beyond
reasonable doubt that they committed estafa through falsification of commercial documents.
Petitioner thus prays that the assailed CA dispositions be reversed and that Criminal Case Nos.
00-187318 and 00-187319 be reinstated for further proceedings.

Respondents’ Arguments

Praying that the Petition be denied, respondents Jose C. Go (Go), Aida C. Dela Rosa (Dela
Rosa), and Felecitas D. Necomedes (Nicomedes) – the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318
and 00-187319 – argue in their Comment22 that the trial court’s grant of their demurrer to
evidence amounts to an acquittal; any subsequent prosecution for the same offense would thus
violate their constitutional right against double jeopardy. They add thatsince the public
prosecutor failed to timely move for the reconsideration of the trial court’s July 2, 2007 Order, it
could not have validly filed an original Petition for Certiorariwith the CA. Nor can it be said that
the prosecution and the private prosecutor jointly filed the latter’s July 20, 2007 Motion for
Reconsideration with the trial court because the public prosecutor’s copy of PDIC’smotion was
merely sent through registered mail. Therefore if it were true that the public prosecutor gave his
approval or conformity to the motion, he did so only afterreceiving his copy of the motion
through the mail, and not at the time the private prosecutor actually filed its Motion for
Reconsideration with the trial court.

Next, respondents submit that petitioner was not deprived of its day in court; the grant of their
demurrer to evidence is based on a fair and judicious determination of the facts and evidence
bythe trial court, leading it to conclude that the prosecution failed to meet the quantum of proof
required to sustain a finding of guilt on the part of respondents. They argue thatthere is no
evidence to show that OCBC released loan proceeds to the alleged borrowers, Timmy’s, Inc. and
Asia Textile Mills, Inc., and that these loan proceeds were then deposited in the account of
respondent Go. Since no loans were granted to the two borrowers, then there is nothing for Go to
misappropriate. With respect to the two manager’s checks issued to Philippine Recycler’s Inc.
and Zeta International, respondents contend that these may not beconsidered to be the loan
proceeds pertaining to Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc.’s loan application because
these checks were not in the name of the alleged borrowers Timmy’s, Inc.and Asia Textile Mills,
Inc. as payees. Besides, these two checks were never negotiated with OCBC, either for
encashmentor deposit, since they did not bear the respective indorsements or signatures and
account numbers of the payees; thus, they could not be considered to havebeen negotiated nor
deposited with Go’s account with OCBC.

Next, respondents argue that the cash deposit slip used to deposit the alleged loan proceeds in
Go’s OCBC account is questionable, since under banking procedure, a cash deposit slip may not
be used to deposit checks. Moreover, it has not been shown who prepared the said cash deposit
slip. Respondents further question the validity and authenticity of the other documentary
evidence presented, such as the Subsidiary Ledger, Cash Proof,23 Schedule of Returned Checks
and Other Cash Items (RTCOCI), etc.

Finally, respondents claim that not all the elementsof the crime of estafa under Article 315, par.
1(b) of the Revised Penal Code have been established; specifically, it has not been shown that
Goreceived the alleged loan proceeds, and that a demand was made upon him for the return
thereof.

Our Ruling

The Court grants the Petition.

Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents against the respondents are based on the theory that in 1997, fictitious loans in favor
of two entities – Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. – were approved, after which two
manager’s checks representing the supposed proceeds of these fictitious loans were issued but
made payable to two different entities – Philippine Recycler’sInc. and ZetaInternational –
without any documents issued by the supposed borrowers Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills,
Inc. assigning the supposedloan proceeds tothe two payees. Thereafter, these two manager’s
checks – together with several others totaling ₱120,819,475.0024 – were encashed, and then
deposited in the OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0 of Go. Then, several automatic
transfer deposits were made from Go’s savings account to his OCBC Current Account No. 008-
00-000015-0 which were then used to fund Go’s previously dishonored personal checks.

The testimonial and documentary evidenceof the prosecution indicate that OCBC, a commercial
bank, was ordered closed by the BSP sometime in October 1998. PDIC was designated as OCBC
receiver, and it took over the bank’s affairs, assets and liabilities, records, and collected the
bank’s receivables.

During efforts to collect OCBC’s pastdue loan receivables, PDIC as receiver sent demand letters
to the bank’s debtor-borrowers on record, including Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc.
which appeared to have obtained unsecured loans of ₱10 million each, and which apparently
remained unpaid. In response to the demand letters, Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc.
denied having obtained loans from OCBC. Timmy’s, Inc., through its designated representative,
claimed that while it is true that it applied for an OCBC loan, it no longer pursued the application
after it was granted a loan by another bank. When the OCBC loan documents were presented to
Timmy’s, Inc.’s officers, it was discovered that the signatures therein of the corporate officers
were forgeries. In their defense and to clarify matters, Timmy’s, Inc.’s corporate officers
executed affidavits and furnished official documents such as their passports and the corporation’s
Articles of Incorporation containing their respectivesignatures to show PDIC that their purported
signatures in the OCBC loan documents were forgeries. After its investigation into the matter,
PDIC came to the conclusion that the signatures on the Timmy’s, Inc. loan documents were
indeed falsified.25

On the other hand, in a written reply26 to PDIC’s demand letter, Asia Textile Mills, Inc.
vehemently denied thatit applied for a loan with OCBC. On this basis, PDIC concluded that the
AsiaTextile Mills, Inc.loan was likewise bogus. Moreover, PDIC discovered other bogus loans in
OCBC.

Through the falsified loan documents, the OCBC Loan Committee – composed of Go, who was
likewise OCBCPresident, respondent Dela Rosa (OCBC Senior Vice President, or SVP, and
Chief Operating Officer, or COO), Arnulfo Aurellano and Richard Hsu – approved a ₱10 million
unsecured loan purportedly in favor of Timmy’s, Inc. After deducting finance charges, advance
interest and taxes, DelaRosa certified a net loan proceeds amounting to ₱9,985,075.00 covered
by Manager’s Check No. 000000334727 dated February 5, 1997.28 The face of the check bears
the notation "Loan proceeds of CL-484," the alpha numeric code ("CL-484")of which refers to
the purported loan of Timmy’s, Inc.29 However, the payee thereof was not the purported
borrower, Timmy’s, Inc., but a certain "Zeta International". Likewise, on even date, Manager’s
Check No. 000000334030 for ₱9,985,075.00 was issued, and on its face is indicated "Loan
proceeds of CL-477", which alpha numeric code ("CL-477") refers to the purported loan of
AsiaTextile Mills, Inc.31 Manager’s Check No. 0000003340 was made payable not to Asia
Textile Mills, Inc., but to "Phil. Recyclers Inc."

On the same day that the subject manager’s checks were issued, or on February 5, 1997, it
appears that the two checks – together with other manager’s checks totaling ₱120,819,475.00–
were encashed; on the face ofthe checks, the word "PAID" was stamped, and at the dorsal
portion thereof there were machine validations showing thatManager’s Check No. 0000003347
was presented at 6:16 p.m., while Manager’s Check No. 0000003340 was presented at 6:18
p.m.32

After presentment and encashment, the amount of ₱120,819,475.00 – which among others
included the ₱9,985,075.00 proceeds of the purported Timmy’s, Inc. loan and the ₱9,985,075.00
proceeds of the supposed Asia Textile Mills, Inc. loan – was deposited in Go’s OCBC Savings
Account No. 00810-00108-0 at OCBC Recto Branch, apparently on instructions of respondent
Dela Rosa.33 The deposit is covered by OCBC Cash Deposit Slip34 dated February 5, 1997, with
the corresponding machine validation thereon indicating that the deposit was made at 6:19
p.m.35 The funds were credited to Go’s savings account.36

It appears that previously, or on February 4, 1997, seven OCBC checks issued by Go from his
personal OCBC Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0 totaling ₱145,488,274.48 were
dishonored for insufficiency of funds.37 After Manager’s Check Nos. 0000003340 and
0000003347, along with several other manager’s checks, were encashed and the proceeds thereof
deposited in Go’s OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0 withautomatic transferfeature to
his OCBC Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0, funds were automatically transferred from the
said savings account to the current account, which atthe time contained only a total amountof
₱26,332,303.69. Go’sOCBC Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0 was credited with
₱120,819,475.00, and thereafter the account registered a balance of ₱147,151,778.69. The seven
previously dishonored personal checks were thenpresented for clearing, and were subsequently
cleared that sameday, or on February 5, 1997.38 Apparently, they were partly funded by the
₱120,819,475.00manager’s check deposits – which include Manager’s Check Nos. 0000003340
and 0000003347.
During the examination and inquiry into OCBC’s operations, oron January 28, 1998, Go issued
and sent a letter39 to the BSP, through Maria Dolores Yuviengco, Director of the Departmentof
Commercial Banks, specifically requesting that the BSP refrain from sending any
communication to Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc., among others. He manifested that
he was "willing to assume the viability and full payment"of the accounts under investigation and
examination, including the Timmy’s, Inc. and AsiaTextile Mills, Inc. accounts.

Demurrer to the evidence40 is "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that
the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to
make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiencyof the whole
evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in
a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to
sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. x x x Sufficient evidence for purposes of
frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in character, weight or amount as will legally
justify the judicial or official action demanded according to the circumstances. To be considered
sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the
precise degree of participation therein by the accused."41 Thus, when the accused files a
demurrer, the court must evaluate whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient enough to
warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.42

"The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court,
and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such
discretion."43 As to effect, "the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and
cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. The order is
reviewable only by certiorariif it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack or
excess of jurisdiction."44 When grave abuse of discretion is present, an order granting a demurrer
becomes null and void.

As a general rule, an order granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal.
There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof would not violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. For instance, this Court ruled that when there is a
finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing a
criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence,its judgment is considered void, as
this Court ruled in People v. Laguio, Jr.:

By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts
granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of
certiorariunder Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in
jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an
original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not
violated.

In the instant case, having affirmed the CA finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court when it granted the accused’s demurrer to evidence, we deem its consequent order of
acquittal void.45

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as "that capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which
is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. ‘The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility.’ The party questioning the acquittal of an accused
should be able toclearly establish that the trial court blatantly abused its discretion such that it
was deprived of its authority to dispense justice."46

In the exercise of the Court’s "superintending control over inferior courts, we are to be guided by
all the circumstances of each particular case ‘as the ends of justice may require.’ So it is that the
writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial
justice."47

Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, the Court declaresthat the CA grossly erred in
affirming the trial court’s July 2, 2007 Order granting the respondent’s demurrer, which Order
was patently null and void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion and manifest
irregularity, thus causing substantial injury to the banking industry and public
interest.1avvphi1 The Court finds that the prosecution has presented competent evidence to
sustain the indictment for the crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and
that respondents appear to be the perpetrators thereof. In evaluating the evidence, the trial court
effectively failed and/or refused to weigh the prosecution’s evidence against the respondents,
which it was duty-bound to do as a trier of facts; considering that the case involved hundreds of
millions of pesos of OCBC depositors’ money – not to mention that the banking industry is
impressed with public interest, the trial court should have conducted itself with circumspection
and engaged in intelligent reflection in resolving the issues.

The elements of estafa through abuse ofconfidence under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code48 are: "(a) that money,goods or other personal property is received by the offender in
trust oron commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation orconversion of such
money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) there is demand
by the offended party to the offender."49

Obviously, a bank takes its depositors’ money as a loan, under an obligation to return the same;
thus, the term "demand deposit."

The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code
on simpleloan. Article 1980 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "x x x savingsx x x
deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions
concerning simple loan." There is a debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its
depositor. The bank is the debtor and the depositor is the creditor. The depositor lends the bank
money and the bank agrees to pay the depositor on demand. x x x50

Moreover, the banking laws impose high standards on banks in view of the fiduciary nature of
banking."This fiduciary relationship means that the bank’s obligation to observe ‘high standards
ofintegrity and performance’ is deemed written into every deposit agreement between a bank and
its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to assume a degree of diligence
higher than that of a good father of a family."51

In Soriano v. People,52 it was held that the President of a bank is a fiduciary with respect to the
bank’s funds, and he holds the same in trust or for administration for the bank’s benefit. From
this, it may beinferred that when such bank president makes it appear through falsification that
an individual or entity applied for a loan when in fact such individual or entity did not, and the
bank president obtains the loan proceeds and converts the same, estafa is committed.
Next, regarding misappropriation, the evidence tends to extablish that Manager’s Check
Nos.0000003340 and 0000003347 were encashed, using the bank’s funds which clearly
belonged to OCBC’s depositors, and then deposited in Go’s OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-
00108-0 at OCBC Recto Branch – although he was not the named payee therein. Next, the
money was automatically transferred to Go’s OCBC Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0 and
used to fund his seven previously-issued personal checks totaling ₱145,488,274.48, which
checks were dishonored the day before. Simply put, the evidence strongly indicates that Go
converted OCBC funds to his own personal use and benefit. "The words ‘convert’ and
‘misappropriate’ connote an act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s
own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for
one’s own use includes not only conversion to one’s personal advantage, but also every attempt
to dispose of the property of another without right. x x x In proving the element of conversion or
misappropriation, a legal presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to
deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of
their whereabouts.Thus, the merepresumption of misappropriation or conversion is enough to
conclude thata probable cause exists for the indictment x x x."53

As to the third element of estafa, there is no question that as a consequence of the

misappropriation of OCBC’s funds, the bank and its depositors have been prejudiced; the bank
has been placed under receivership, and the depositors’ money is no longer under their
unimpeded disposal.

Finally, on the matter of demand, while it has not been shown that the bank demanded the return
of the funds, it has nevertheless been held that "[d]emand is not an element of the felony or a
condition precedent tothe filing of a criminal complaint for estafa. Indeed, the accusedmay be
convicted ofthe felony under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code if the
prosecution proved misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the money or property
subject of the Information. In a prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary where there is
evidence of misappropriation or conversion."54 Thus, strictly speaking, demand is not an element
of the offense of estafa through abuse of confidence; even a verbal query satisfies the
requirement.55 Indeed, in several past rulings of the Court, demand was not even included as
anelement of the crime of estafa through abuse of confidence, orunder paragraph 1(b).56

On the other hand, the elements of the crime of falsification of commercial document under Art.
17257 are: "(1) that the offender is a private individual; (2) that the offender committed any of the
acts of falsification; and (3) that the act of falsification is committed ina commercial
document."58 As to estafa through falsification of public, official or commercial documents, it
has been held that –

The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of committing

Estafa, because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of
Falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an
element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial document. In other words,
the crime of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or
commercial document todefraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission
of Estafa, not by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of the public,
official or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit the estafa.59

Simulating OCBC loan documents – such as loan applications, credit approval memorandums,
and the resultant promissory notes and other credit documents – by causing it to appear that
persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate, and
by counterfeiting or imitating their handwriting or signatures constitute falsification of
commercial and public documents.

As to the respondents’ respective participation in the commission of the crime, suffice it to state
that as the beneficiary of the proceeds, Go is presumed to be the author of the falsification. The
fact that previously, his personal checks totaling ₱145,488,274.48 were dishonored, and the day
after, the amount of ₱120,819,475.00 was immediately credited to his account, which included
funds from the encashment of Manager’s Check Nos. 0000003340 and 0000003347 or the loan
proceeds of the supposed Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. accounts, bolsters this view.
"[W]henever someone has in his possession falsified documents [which he used to] his
advantage and benefit, the presumption that he authored it arises."60

x x x This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely
connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity
of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had
complicity in the forgery.

In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged

document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger.

Certainly, the channeling of the subjectpayments via false remittances to his savings account, his
subsequent withdrawals of said amount as well as his unexplained flight at the height of the
bank’s inquiry into the matter more than sufficiently establish x x x involvement in the
falsification.61

Likewise, Dela Rosa’s involvement inthe scheme has been satisfactorily shown. As OCBC SVP
and COO and member of the OCBC Loan Committee, she approved the purported Timmy’s,
Inc.loan, and she certified and signed the February 2, 1997 OCBC Disclosure Statement and
other documents.62 She likewise gave specific instructions to deposit the proceeds of Manager’s
Check Nos. 0000003340 and 0000003347, among others, in Go’s OCBC Savings Account No.
00810-00108-0 at OCBC Recto Branch.63 Finally, she was a signatory to the two checks.64

On the other hand, respondent Nicomedes as OCBC Senior Manager for Corporate Accounts –
Account Management Group, among others prepared the Credit Approval Memorandum and
recommended the approval of the loans.65

In granting the demurrer, the trial court – in its assailed July 2, 2007 Order – concluded that
based on the evidence adduced, the respondents could not have falsified the loan documents
pertaining toTimmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. since the individuals who assert that their
handwriting and signatures were forged were not presented incourt to testify on such claim; that
the prosecution witnesses – Honorio E. Franco, Jr. (Franco) of PDIC, the designated Assisting
Deputy Liquidator of OCBC, and Virginia Rowella Famirin (Famirin), Cashier of OCBC Recto
Branch – were not present when the loan documents were executed and signed, and thus have no
personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the alleged falsification; and as high-
ranking officers of OCBC, respondents could not be expected to have prepared the
saiddocuments. The evidence, however, suggests otherwise; it shows that respondents had a
direct hand in the falsification and creation of fictitious loans. The loan documents were even
signed by them. By disregarding what is evident in the record, the trial court committed
substantial wrong that frustrates the ends of justice and adversely affects the public interest. The
trial court’s act was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion
when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and personal hostility. x x x66

On the charge of estafa, the trial court declared that since the payees of Manager’s Check Nos.
0000003340 and 0000003347 were not Asia Textile Mills, Inc. and Timmy’s, Inc., respectively,
but other entities– Phil. Recyclers Inc. and Zeta International, and there are no documents drawn
by the borrowers assigning the loan proceeds to these two entities, then it cannot besaid that
there were loan proceeds released to these borrowers. The trial court added that it is doubtful that
the two manager’s checks were presented and negotiated for deposit in Go’s savings account,
since theydo not contain the required indorsements of the borrowers, the signatures of the tellers
and individuals/payees who received the checks and the proceeds thereof, and the respective
account numbers of the respondents; and the checks were presented beyond banking hours. The
trial court likewise held that the fact that a cash deposit slip – and not a check deposit slip – was
used to allegedly deposit the checks raised doubts as to the truth of the allegation that the
manager’s checks were deposited and credited to Go’s savings account.

The CA echoed the trial court’s observations, adding that the evidence consisted of mere "letters
and unverifiedledgers" which were thus insufficient; that there was an "inescapable possibility
that an honest mistake was made" in the preparation and issuance of Manager’s CheckNos.
0000003340 and 0000003347, since these two checks are claimed to be just a few of several
checks – numbering thirteen in all – the rest of which werenever questioned by the receiver
PDIC. The appellate court added that the prosecution should have presented further evidence as
to where the money went after being deposited inGo’s savings and current accounts, identifying
thus the recipients of Go’spersonal checks.

What the trial and appellate courts disregarded, however, is that the OCBC funds ended up in the
personal bank accountsof respondent Go, and were used to fund his personal checks, even as he
was not entitled thereto. These, if not rebutted, are indicative ofestafa, as may be seen from the
afore-cited Sorianocase.

The bank money (amounting to ₱8million) which came to the possession of petitioner was
money held in trust or administration by him for the bank, in his fiduciary capacity as the
President of said bank. It is not accurate to say that petitioner became the owner of the ₱8 million
because it was the proceeds of a loan. That would have been correct if the bank knowingly
extended the loan to petitioner himself. But that is not the case here. According to the
information for estafa, the loan was supposed to be for another person, a certain "Enrico Carlos";
petitioner, through falsification, made it appear that said "Enrico Carlos" applied for the loan
when infact he ("Enrico Carlos") did not. Through such fraudulent device, petitioner obtained the
loan proceeds and converted the same. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that
petitioner became the legal owner of the ₱8 million. Thus, petitioner remained the bank’s
fiduciary with respect to that money, which makes it capable of misappropriation or conversion
in his hands.67

Thus, it is irrelevant that the proceeds of the supposed loans were made payable to entities other
than the alleged borrowers.1âwphi1 Besides, the manager’s checks themselves indicate that they
were the proceeds of the purported Timmy’s, Inc.’s and Asia Textile Mills, Inc.’s loans, through
the alpha numeric codes specifically assigned to them that are printed on the face of the checks;
the connection between the checks and the purported loans is thus established. In the same vein,
the CA’s supposition that there is an "inescapable possibility that an honest mistake was made
inthe preparation of the two questioned manager’s checks" is absurd; even so, the bottom line is
that they were encashed using bank funds, and the proceeds thereof were deposited in Go’s bank
savings and current accounts and used to fund his personal checks.

Furthermore, as correctly pointed outby petitioner, it issuperfluous to require that the recipients
of Go’s personal checks be identified. For purposes of proving the crime, it has been shown that
Goconverted bank funds to his own personal use when they were deposited in his accounts and
his personal checks were cleared and the funds were debited from his account.1âwphi1 This
suffices. Likewise, the Court agrees that the prosecution’s reliance on the supposed loan
documents, subsidiary ledgers, deposit slip, cash proof, RTCOCI and other documents was
proper. They are both public and private documents which may be received in evidence; notably,
petitioner’s documentary evidence was admitted in full by the trial court.68 With respect to
evidence consisting of private documents, the presumption remains that "therecording of private
transactions has been fair and regular, and that the ordinary course of business has been
followed."69

Go’s January 28, 1998 letter to the BSP stating that he was "willing to assume the viabilityand
full payment" of the accounts under examination – which included the Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia
Textile Mills, Inc. accounts, among others – is an offer of compromise, and thus an implied
admission of guilt under Rule 130, Section 27 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.70

In addition, appellant’s act of pleading for his sister-in-law’s forgiveness may be considered as
analogous to an attempt to compromise, which in turn can be received as an implied admission
ofguilt under Section 27, Rule 130 x x x.71

As a result of the Court’s declaration of nullity of the assailed Orders of the trial court, any
dissection of the truly questionable actions of Prosecutor Campanilla – which should merit
appropriate disciplinary action for they reveal a patent ignorance of procedure, if not indolence
or a deliberate intention to bungle his own case – becomes unnecessary. It is conceded that the
lack of Campanilla’s approval and/or conforméto PDIC’s Motion for Reconsideration should
have rendered the trial court’s assailed Ordersfinal and executory were it not for the fact that they
were inherently null and void; Campanilla’s irresponsible actions almost cost the People its day
in court and their right to exact justice and retribution, not to mention that they could have
caused immeasurable damage to the banking industry. Just the same, "[a] void judgment or order
has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is
non-existent. Such judgment or order may be resisted in any action or proceeding whenever it is
involved. It is not even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or final
order; it may simply be ignored."72 More appropriately, the following must be cited:

x x x Clearly, the assailed Order of Judge Santiago was issued in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. A void order is no order at all. It cannot confer any right or be
the source of any relief. This Court is not merely a court of law; it is likewise a court of justice.

To rule otherwise would leave the private respondent without any recourse to rectify the public
injustice brought about by the trial court's Order, leaving her with only the standing to file
administrative charges for ignorance of the law against the judge and the prosecutor. A party
cannot be left without recourse to address a substantive issue in law.73

Finally, it must be borne in mind that "[t]he granting of a demurrer to evidence should x x x be
exercised with caution, taking into consideration not only the rights of the accused, but also the
right of the private offended party to be vindicated of the wrongdoing done against him, for if it
is granted, the accused is acquitted and the private complainant is generally left with no more
remedy. In such instances, although the decision of the court may be wrong, the accused can
invoke his right against double jeopardy. Thus, judges are reminded to be more diligent and
circumspect in the performance of their duties as members of the Bench xx x."74

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The September 30, 2009 Decision and January 22,
2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The July 2, 2007 and
October 19, 2007 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49 in Criminal Case
Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 are declared null and void, and the said cases are ordered
REINSTATED for the continuation of proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Per Raffle dated August 4, 2014.

** Also spelled as "Felicitas D. Nicomedes" in some parts of the records.

1
Rollo, pp. 10-83.
2
Id. at 85-93; penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and concurred in by Associate
Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Romeo F. Barza.
3
Id. at 94-95.
4
Id. at 96-105.
5
Id. at 106-109.
6
Presiding Judge Concepcion Alarcon-Vergara of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
49.
7
Rollo, pp. 215-246.
8
Id. at 339-350. The decretal portion of the Order reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and finding the Demurrer to Evidence meritorious, the
same is hereby granted. The Informations against accused Jose C. Go, Aida C. De la Rosa and
Felicitas D. Nicomedes are hereby DISMISSED and all said accused are ACQUITTED of the
charge.

SO ORDERED.
9
Id. at 405-406.
10
Id. at 86-88.
11
Records, Vol. II, pp. 501-555.
12
Id. at 554.
13
Rollo, pp. 351-404.
14
Id. at 407-479.
15
Id. at 92.
16
Id. at 91-92.
17
Id. at 89.
18
Id. at 90.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 25.
21
Id. at 583-607.
22
Id. at 533-564.
23
Exhibit "W," Folder of Exhibits.
24
₱120,819,000.00, in other portions of the record.
25
Rollo, pp. 97-99, 155-156; Annex "C" of the Petition, Complaint-Affidavit dated September
13, 1999 of Honorio E. Franco, Jr. of PDIC, and designated Assisting Deputy Liquidator of
OCBC, filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila; Exhibit "BB," Affidavit of
Arthur Leong dated September 6, 1999 denying that Timmy’s, Inc. obtained a loan from OCBC;
Exhibit "HH," Letter of Timmy’s, Inc. to PDIC denying that it obtained a loan from OCBC;
Exhibit "KK," Certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration of the travel record of Artimson
Leong, dated July 27, 2005, showing that Artimson Leong, purported signatory to Timmy’s,
Inc.’s OCBC loan documents dated February 5, 1997, was out of the country at the time he
allegedly signed said loan documents; Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), Arthur Leong,
September 13, 2005.
26
Id. at 118; Exhibit "A," Letter of Asian Textile Mills, Inc. dated February 2, 1999 signed by
Carmen G. So, Vice President for Finance.
27
Id. at 136; Exhibit "R."
28
Exhibit "AA," OCBC Disclosure Statement dated February 2, 1997, Folder of Exhibits.
29
Rollo, p. 99; Annex "C’ of the Petition, Complaint-Affidavit dated September 13, 1999 of
Honorio E. Franco, Jr. of PDIC, and designated Assisting Deputy Liquidator of OCBC, filed
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
30
Id. at 129; Exhibit "K."
31
Id. at 103, 122, 123; Annex "C" of the Petition, Complaint-Affidavit dated September 13, 1999
of Honorio E. Franco, Jr. of PDIC, and designated Assisting Deputy Liquidator of OCBC, filed
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila; Exhibit "C," OCBC Promissory Notedated
February 5, 1997 purportedly executed by Asian Textile Mills, Inc.; Exhibit "D," OCBC
Disclosure Statement dated February 5, 1997, Folder of Exhibits.
32
TSN, Honorio E. Franco, Jr., October 8, 2002, pp. 6-20; TSN, Virginia Rowella Famirin, June
29, 2005, pp. 6-11.
33
Id.; Exhibit "T," Folder of Exhibits.
34
Rollo, p. 137; Exhibit "S," id.
35
Id.; Exhibits "S-9" and "S-10," id.

TSN, Honorio E. Franco, Jr., October 8, 2002, p. 20;Exhibit "T," Subsidiary Ledger of Go’s
36

OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0, id.

37
TSN, Honorio E. Franco, Jr., October 29, 2002, pp. 3-7; TSN, Virginia Rowella Famirin
(Cashier of OCBC Recto Branch), June 28, 2005, pp. 15-25, 32; Exhibit "X," OCBC Recto
Branch Schedule of Returned Checks and Other Cash Items (RTCOCI) dated February 4, 1997,
id.
38
Id.; Exhibits "T," "U," "V," and "W;" id; Honorio E. Franco, Jr., October 8, 2002 and October
29, 2005, pp. 22-33 and 4-15, respectively; TSN, Virginia Rowella Famirin, June 28, 2005, pp.
59-68.
39
Exhibit "DD," Folder of Exhibits.
40
Under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the
action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the
prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused
with or without leave of court.

If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce
evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the
accused waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of
the evidence for the prosecution.

The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds and
shall be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case.
The prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from its
receipt.

If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to
evidence within a similar period from its receipt.

The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer
itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certioraribefore judgment.
41
Gutib v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 293, 300, 305 (1999).
42
See Bautista v. Cuneta-Pangilinan, G.R. No. 189754, October 24, 2012, 684 SCRA 521, 538.
43
Te v. Court of Appeals, 400 Phil. 127, 139 (2000).
44
People v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), G.R. No. 174504, March 21, 2011, 645 SCRA 726,
731.
45
Mupas v. People, G.R. No. 189365, October 12, 2011, 659 SCRA 56, 67.
46
Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan, G.R. Nos. 172777 & 172792, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 590,
602.
47
Gutib v. Court of Appeals, supra note 41 at 307.

Art. 315. Swindling(estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
48

mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by: x x x x

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely: x x x x

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender intrust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; orby denying having
received such money, goods, or other property.
49
Magtira v. People, G.R. No. 170964, March 7, 2012, 667 SCRA 607, 618-619.
50
Central Bank of the Philippines v. Citytrust Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 141835, February
4, 2009, 578 SCRA 27, 32, citing The Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 457 Phil. 688, 705 (2003).
51
The Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, id. at 706.
52
G.R. No. 162336, February 1, 2010, 611 SCRA 191, 210-211.
53
Burgundy Realty Corporation v. Reyes, G.R. No. 181021, December 10, 2012, 687 SCRA
524, 533, 535.
54
Lee v. People, 495 Phil. 239, 250 (2005); see also Ceniza-Manantan v. People, 558 Phil. 104,
118 (2007); Cosme, Jr. v. People, 538 Phil. 52, 70 (2006).
55
Asejo v. People, 555 Phil. 106, 114 (2007), citing Tubb v. People and Court of Appeals, 101
Phil. 114, 119 (1957).
56
Real v. People, 567 Phil. 14, 21-22; Ceniza-Manantan v. People, supra note 54; Lee v. People,
supra note 54.
57
The Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. – The
penalty of prision mayorand a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public
officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a
document by committing any of the following acts:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not
in fact so participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in anact or proceeding statementsother than those
in fact made by them;

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

5. Altering true dates;

6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;

7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document

when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from,
that of the genuine original; or

8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or
official book.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who shall commit any of the
offenses enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of this article, with respect to any record or
document of such character that its falsification may affect the civil status of persons.

Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. — The penalty of
prision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos
shall be imposed upon:

1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next
preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of
commercial document; and

2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall
in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding
article. Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to
the damage of another or who, with the intent tocause such damage, shall use any ofthe false
documents embraced in the next preceding article, or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of this
article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree.
58
Domingo v. People, G.R. No. 186101, October 12, 2009, 603 SCRA 488, 502.
59
Ambito v. People, G.R. No. 127327, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 69, 100-101, citing Reyes,
The Revised Penal Code, Book II, 2001 ed., p. 226.
60
Chua v. People, G.R. No. 183132, February 8, 2012, 665 SCRA 468, 476.
61
Id. at 476-477, citing Serrano v. Court of Appeals, 452 Phil. 801, 819-820 (2003).
62
Exhibits "D," "Y," "AA," Folder of Exhibits.
63
TSN, Virginia Rowella Famirin, June 29, 2005, pp. 6-11.
64
TSN, Virginia Rowella Famirin, June 28, 2005, pp. 19-23.
65
Exhibit "Y," Folder of Exhibits.
66
Litton Mills, Inc. v. Galleon Trader, Inc., 246 Phil. 503, 509 (1988).
67
Soriano v. People, supra note 52 at 210-211.
68
Records, Vol. II, pp. 657-658, Order of the court dated May 29, 2006.
69
New Sampaguita Builders Construction, Inc. (NSBCI) v. Philippine National Bank, 579 Phil.
483, 513 (2004).
70
Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. – In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an
admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.

In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed
by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence
as an implied admission of guilt.
71
People v. Español, 598 Phil. 793, 807 (2009).
72
and Bank of the Philippines v. Orilla, G.R. No. 194168, February 13, 2013, 690 SCRA 610,
618-619.
73
Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz, 385 Phil. 208, 223 (2000).
74
Bautista v. Cuneta-Pangilinan, supra note 42 at 542.

G.R. No. 174673

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
FE ROA GIMENEZ AND IGNACIO B. GIMENEZ, Respondents.

DECISION
LEONEN, J.:

Rules of procedure are not ends in themselves. The object of these rules is to assist and facilitate
a trial court's function to be able to receive all the evidence of the parties, and evaluate their
admissibility and probative value in the context of the issues presented by the parties' pleadings
in order to arrive at a conclusion as to the facts that transpired. Having been able to establish the
facts, the trial court will then be able to apply the law and determine whether a complainant is
deserving of the reliefs prayed for in the pleading.

Dismissal on the basis of a very strict interpretation of procedural rules without a clear
demonstration of the injury to a substantive right of the defendant weighed against 19 years of
litigation actively participated in by both parties should not be encouraged.

There is likewise serious reversible error, even grave abuse of discretion, when the
Sandiganbayan dismisses a case on demurrer to evidence without a full statement of its
evaluation of the evidence presented and offered and the interpretation of the relevant law. After
all, dismissal on the basis of demurrer to evidence is similar to a judgment. It is a final order
ruling on the merits of a case.

This is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated May
25, 20062 and September 13, 2006.3 The Sandiganbayan deemed petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (Republic) to have waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence4 and granted the
Motion to Dismiss of respondents Spouses Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez (Gimenez
Spouses) based on demurrer to evidence.5

The Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), instituted a
Complaint6 for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the
Gimenez Spouses before the Sandiganbayan.7 "The Complaint seeks to recover . . . ill-gotten
wealth . . . acquired by [the Gimenez Spouses] as dummies, agents[,] or nominees of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos[.]"8

During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the positions held,
business interests, income, and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez Spouses.9 The Republic
presented the testimonies of Atty. Tereso Javier, Head of the Sequestered Assets Department of
PCGG, and of Danilo R.V. Daniel, Director of the Research and Development Department of
PCGG.10 Witnesses testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned or controlled by the
Gimenez Spouses.11

On February 27, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied a motion to recall Danilo R.V. Daniel’s
testimony.12 The Republic then manifested that it was "no longer presenting further
evidence."13 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 days or until March 29, 2006
"to file its formal offer of evidence."14

On March 29, 2006, the Republic moved "for an extension of thirty (30) days or until April 28,
2006, within which to file [its] formal offer of evidence."15 This Motion was granted by the
Sandiganbayan in a Resolution of the same date.16

On April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an additional 15 days or until May 13, 2006 within
which to file its Formal Offer of Evidence.17 This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a
Resolution dated May 8, 2006.18 Following this, no additional Motion for extension was filed by
the Republic.
In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan noted that the Republic
failed to file its Formal Offer of Evidence notwithstanding repeated extensions and the lapse of
75 days from the date it terminated its presentation of evidence.19 Thus, it declared that the
Republic waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence.20

The first assailed Resolution provides:

It appearing that the plaintiff has long terminated the presentation of its evidence on February 27,
2006, and it appearing further that it failed or otherwise neglected to file its written formal offer
of evidence for an unreasonable period of time consisting of 75 days (i.e., 30 days original period
plus two extension periods totaling 45 days), the filing of said written formal offer of evidence is
hereby deemed WAIVED.

WHEREFORE, the reception of the defendants’ evidence shall proceed on June 22 and 23, 2006,
both at 8:30 o’clock [sic] in the morning as previously scheduled.21

Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence dated May 30, 2006.22 He
argued that the Republic showed no right to relief as there was no evidence to support its cause
of action.23 Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss dated June 13, 2006 on the ground of
failure to prosecute.24 Through her own Motion to Dismiss, she joined Ignacio Gimenez’s
demurrer to evidence.25

Two days after Fe Roa Gimenez’s filing of the Motion to Dismiss or on June 15, 2006, the
Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the first assailed Resolution] and to Admit
Attached Formal Offer of Evidence.26 The pertinent portions of the Republic’s offer of
documentary exhibits attached to the Motion are summarized as follows:

Exhibits A to G and series consist of the Income Tax Returns, Certificate of Income Tax
Withheld On Compensation, Statement of Tax Withheld At Source, Schedule of Interest Income,
Royalties and Withholding Tax, Statement of Assets, Liabilities & Net Worth of Ignacio B.
Gimenez from 1980-1986 proving his legitimate income during said period. Exhibits H -J and
series refer to the Deeds of Sale and Transfer Certificates of Title proving that spouses
Gimenezes acquired several real properties.

Exhibits K and series (K-1-K-4) pertain to Checking Statements Summary issued by the Bankers
Trust Company (BTC) proving that Fe Roa Gimenez maintained a current account under
Account Number 34-714-415 with BTC. Exhibits L and series (L1-L-114) are several BTC
checks, proving that from June 1982 to April 1984, Fe Roa Gimenez issued several checks
against her BTC Current Account No. 34-714-415 payable to some individuals and entities such
as Erlinda Oledan, Vilma Bautista, The Waldorf Towers, Cartier, Gliceria Tantoco, Bulgari,
Hammer Galleries and Renato Balestra, involving substantial amount of money in US
Dollars. Exhibits M and series (M1-M-25) are several The Chase Manhattan Bank (TCMB)
checks drawn against the account of Fe Roa Gimenez under Account Number 021000021,
proving that she issued several checks drawn against her TCMB account, payable to individuals
and entities such as Gliceria Tantoco, Vilma Bautista and The Waldorf Towers, involving
substantial sums in US Dollars. Exhibit N is the Philippine National Bank (PNB), New York
Branch Office Charge Ticket No. FT 56880 dated December 9, 1982 in the amount of
US$30,000.00 for Fe Roa Gimenez proving that she received said enormous amount from the
PNB, New York Branch Office, with clearance from the Central Bank, which amount was
charged against PNB Manila. Exhibit N-1 is the PNB New York Branch Advice to Payee No. FT
56535 dated November 12, 1982 in the amount of US$10,990.00 for Fe Roa Gimenez proving
her receipt of such amount as remitted from California Overseas Bank, Los Angeles. Exhibits O
and series (O1-O-8) refer to several Advices made by Bankers Trust AG Zurich-Geneve Bank in
Switzerland to respondent Fe Roa Gimenez proving that she maintained a current account with
said bank under Account Number 107094.50 and that from July 30, 1984 to August 30, 1984,
she placed a substantial amount on time deposit in several banks, namely, Hypobank,
Luzemburg, Luxemburg, Societe Generale, Paris and Bank of Nova Scotia, London.

Exhibit P is the Certification dated March 19, 2002 issued by Director Florino O. Ibanez of the
Office of the President proving that Fe Roa Gimenez, from January 1, 1966 to April 1, 1986,
worked with the Office of the President under different positions, the last of which as
Presidential Staff Director with a salary of P87,072.00 per annum.

Exhibit Q and series (Q-1-Q-18) is the Affirmation of Ralph Shapiro filed with the United States
Court of Appeals in the case entitled, "The Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos,
et al." which discussed certain acts of Fe Roa Gimenez and Vilma Bautista, among others, in
relation to the funds of the Marcoses.

Exhibits R and S and series (R-1, R-9; S-1-S-10) refer to the Certificate of Filing of Amended
Articles of Incorporation of GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., the Amended Articles of
Incorporation of GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., the Treasurer’s Affidavit executed by Ignacio
Gimenez and the Director’s Certificate executed by Roberto B. Olanday, Ignacio Gimenez and
Roberto Coyuto, Jr. proving Ignacio Gimenez and Roberto Olanday’s interests in GEl
Guaranteed Education, Inc.

Exhibits T and series (T-1-T-8) are the Advices made by the Bankers Trust AG Zurich-Geneve
Bank in Switzerland to Ignacio Gimenez proving that he maintained a current account with said
bank under Account Number 101045.50 and that from March to June, 1984, he placed a
substantial amount on time deposit in several banks, namely, Credit Lyonnais, Brussels, Societe
Generale, Paris, Credit Commercial De France, Paris and Bank of Nova Scotia, London.

Exhibits U and V and series (U-1-U-5; V1-V-18) consist of the Affidavit dated April 25, 1986
and the Declaration dated June 23, 1987 including the attachments, of Oscar Carino, Vice-
President and Manager of the PNB New York Branch, narrating in detail how the funds of the
PNB New York Branch were disbursed outside regular banking business upon the instructions of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda Marcos using Fe Roa Gimenez and others as
conduit.

Exhibits W and series (W-1-W-4) are the Debit memos from the PNB to Fe Roa Gimenez
while Exhibits X and X-1 are the Acknowledgments of said respondent, proving that she
received substantial amounts of money which were coursed through the PNB to be used by the
Marcos spouses for state visits and foreign trips.

Exhibit Y and series (Y-1-Y-2) is the Letter dated August 25, 1986 of Juan C. Gatmaitan,
Assistant Chief Legal Counsel of PNB to Charles G. LaBella, Assistant United States Attorney
regarding the ongoing investigation of irregular transactions at the PNB, New York Branch
proving that PNB cooperated with the United States government in connection with the
investigation on the irregular transactions of Oscar Carino at PNB New York Branch.

Exhibit Z is the service record of Fe Roa Gimenez issued by Florino O. Ibanez of the Office of
the President which proves that she worked with the Office of the President from 1966-1986
holding different positions, the last of which was Presidential Staff Director.1âwphi1
Exhibits AA and series (AA-1 –AA-2) are the several Traders Royal Bank checks drawn against
Account No. 74-702836-9 under the account name of Fe Roa Gimenez which prove that she
issued said checks payable to individuals and entities involving substantial amount of money.

Exhibits BB and CC and series (BB-1–BB-17; CC-1-CC-3) are the several Transfer of Funds
Advice from Traders Royal Bank Statements of Account of Fe Roa Gimenez, proving that she
maintained a current account under Account No. 74-7028369 at Traders Royal Bank.

Exhibits HH and series (HH-1-HH-3) are the Certification dated October 3, 2002 of Lamberto R.
Barbin, Officer-in-Charge, Malacanang Records Office, that the Statement of Assets and
Liabilities of spouses Marcoses for the years 1965 up to 1986 are not among the records on file
in said Office except 1965, 1967 and 1969; the Statement of Assets and Liabilities as of
December 31, 1969 and December 31, 1967 of former President Ferdinand Marcos; and the
Sworn Statement of Financial Condition, Assets, Income and Liabilities as of December 31,
1965 of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These documentary exhibits prove the assets and
liabilities of former President Marcos for the years 1965,1967 and 1969.

Exhibit II and series is [sic] the Statement of Assets and Liabilities as of December 31,1969
submitted by Fe Roa Gimenez which prove that her assets on that period amounted only to
P39,500.00.

Exhibit KK is the Table of Contents of Civil Case No. [0]007 before the Sandiganbayan entitled
"Republic of the Philippines vs. Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez, et. al.", including its
Annexes which prove the assets and liabilities of spouses Gimenezes.

Exhibits KK-1 up to KK-12 are several transfer certificates of title and tax declarations in the
names of spouses Gimenezes, proving their acquisition of several real properties.

Exhibits KK-15, KK-18, KK-20 up to KK-27, KK-30, KK-32 up to KK-38 and KK-40 are the
General Information Sheet, Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation, and
Amended Articles of Incorporation of various corporations. These prove the corporations in
which Ignacio B. Gimenez has substantial interests.

Exhibits KK-41 up to KK-44 are the Writs and Letters of Sequestration issued by the PCGG
which prove that the shares of stocks of Ignacio Gimenez in Ignacio B. Gimenez, Securities, Inc.
and the real properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 137638, 132807, 126693
and 126694 located in San Fabian, Pangasinan, were sequestered by the PCGG.

Exhibit KK-45 is the Memorandum dated August 1, 1988 of Atty. Ralph S. Lee and Alexander
M. Berces, Team Supervisor and Investiogator, [sic] respectively, of IRD, PCGG, proving that
the PCGG conducted an investigation on New City Builders, Inc., Transnational Construction
Corporation, and OTO Construction and Development Corporation in relation to Ignacio B.
Gimenez and Roberto O. Olanday.

Exhibits KK-48, KK-49 and KK-50 are certain Lis Pendens from the PCGG addressed to the
concerned Register of Deeds informing that the real properties mentioned therein had been
sequestered and are the subject of Civil Case No. [0]007 before the Sandiganbayan.

Exhibits KK-51, KK-51-A, KK-52 and KK-52-A are the Letter and Writ of Sequestration issued
by the PCGG on Allied Banking Corporation and Guaranteed Education Inc. pursuant to its
mandate to go after ill-gotten wealth.

Exhibits NN, OO, PP, QQ and QQ-1 refer to the Memorandum To All Commercial Banks dated
March 14, 1986 issued by then Central Bank Governor Jose B. Fernandez and the Letter dated
March 13, 1986 of Mary Concepcion Bautista, PCGG Commissioner addressed to then Central
Bank Governor Fernandez requesting that names be added to the earlier request of PCGG
Chairman Jovito Salonga to instruct all commercial banks not to allow any withdrawal or
transfer of funds from the market placements under the names of said persons, to include spouses
Gimenezes, without authority from PCGG.

Exhibits KK and series, NN, OO, PP, QQ and QQ-1 which prove the various real properties,
business interests and bank accounts owned by spouses Gimenezes were part of the testimony of
Atty. Tereso Javier.

Exhibit RR and series (RR-1-RR-23) are the Affidavit dated July 24, 1987 of Dominador
Pangilinan, Acting President and President of Trader’s Royal Bank, and the attached
Recapitulation, Status of Banker’s Acceptances, Status of Funds and Savings Account Ledger
wherein he mentioned that Malacanang maintained trust accounts at Trader’s Royal Bank, the
balance of which is approximately 150-175 million Pesos, and that he was informed by Mr.
Rivera that the funds were given to him (Rivera) by Fe Roa Gimenez for deposit to said
accounts.

Exhibits SS and series (SS-1-SS-29) are the Affidavit dated July 23, 1987 of Apolinario K.
Medina, Executive Vice President of Traders Royal Bank and attachments, which include
Recapitulation, Status of Funds, and Messages from Traders Royal Bank Manila to various
foreign banks. In his Affidavit, Medina divulged certain numbered confidential trust accounts
maintained by Malacanang with the Trader’s Royal Bank. He further stated that the deposits
were so substantial that he suspected that they had been made by President Marcos or his family.

Exhibit TT and series (TT-1-TT-3) is [sic] the Memorandum dated July 19, 2005 of Danilo R.V.
Daniel, then Director of the Research and Development Department of PCGG regarding the
investigation conducted on the ill-gotten wealth of spouses Gimenezes, the subject matter of
Civil Case No. [0]007. He revealed that during the investigation on the ill-gotten wealth of
spouses Gimenezes, it was found out that from 1977 to 1982, several withdrawals, in the total
amount of P75,090,306.42 were made from Trust Account No. 128 (A/C 76-128) in favor of I.B.
Gimenez, I.B. Gimenez Securities and Fe Roa Gimenez.

Exhibits RR, SS, TT and their series prove that spouses Gimenez maintained bank accounts of
substantial amounts and gained control of various corporations.1âwphi1 These are also being
offered as part of the testimony of Danilo R.V. Daniel.27 (Emphasis in the original, citations
omitted)

In the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied the
Republic’s Motion for Reconsideration and granted the Gimenez Spouses’ Motion to
Dismiss.28 According to the Sandiganbayan:

While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that the higher ends of
substantial justice militate against dismissal of cases purely on technical grounds, the
circumstances of this case show that the ends of justice will not be served if this Court allows the
wanton disregard of the Rules of Court and of the Court’s orders. Rules of procedure are
designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases. . . .

The reasons invoked by the plaintiff to justify its failure to timely file the formal offer of
evidence fail to persuade this Court. The missing exhibits mentioned by the plaintiff’s counsel
appear to be the same missing documents since 2004, or almost two (2) years ago. The plaintiff
had more than ample time to locate them for its purpose. . . . Since they remain missing after
lapse of the period indicated by the Court, there is no reason why the search for these documents
should delay the filing of the formal offer of evidence.

[Petitioner’s] counsel . . . admits that faced with other pressing matters, he lost track of the time.
We cannot just turn a blind eye on the negligence of the parties and in their failure to observe the
orders of this Court. The carelessness of [petitioner’s] counsel in keeping track of the deadlines
is an unacceptable reason for the Court to set aside its Order and relax the observance of the
period set for filing the formal offer of evidence.29 (Citation omitted)

The Sandiganbayan also found that the Republic failed to prosecute its case for an unreasonable
length of time and to comply with the court’s rules.30 The court also noted that the documentary
evidence presented by the Republic consisted mostly of certified true copies.31 However, the
persons who certified the documents as copies of the original were not presented.32 Hence, the
evidence lacked probative value.33 The dispositive portion of the assailed Resolution reads:

ACCORDINGLY, there being no valid and cogent justification shown by the plaintiff for the
Court to Grant its Motion for Reconsideration and admit its Formal Offer of Evidence, the
plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence
is DENIED. The Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence filed by the defendant Ignacio B.
Gimenez and adopted by defendant Fe Roa Gimenez is GRANTED. The case is
then DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.34 (Emphasis in the original)

The Republic filed its Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 3, 2006 before this
court.35

The Gimenez Spouses were required to comment on the Petition.36 This court noted the separate
Comments37 filed by the Gimenez Spouses.38 The Republic responded to the Comments through
a Consolidated Reply39 dated June 22, 2007.

In the Resolution40 dated August 29, 2007, this court required the parties to submit their
memoranda.41

On February 18, 2008, this court resolved to require the parties to "move in the premises[.]"42

On March 2, 2012, the Republic filed a Motion for Leave to Re-open Proceedings, to File and
Admit Attached Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari.43 In this Supplement, the Republic
argued that the second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006 was void for failing to state
the facts and the law on which it was based.44This Motion was granted, and the Gimenez
Spouses were required to file their Comment on the Supplement to the Petition.45 Thereafter, the
Republic filed its Reply.46

Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Rejoinder47 dated December 19, 2012 which was expunged by this court
in a Resolution48dated January 23, 2013. Ignacio Gimenez’s Motion for Leave to File and Admit
Attached Rejoinder49 was denied.50

The Republic raised the following issues:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in dismissing the case in the light of the
allegations in the Complaint which were substantiated by overwhelming evidence presented vis-
a-vis the material admissions of spouses Gimenezes as their answer failed to specifically deny
that they were dummies of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and that they acquired illegal
wealth grossly disproportionate to their lawful income in a manner prohibited under the
Constitution and Anti-Graft Statutes.

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in denying petitioner’s Motion to Admit Formal
Offer of Evidence on the basis of mere technicalities, depriving petitioner of its right to due
process.

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in making a sweeping pronouncement that
petitioner’s evidence do not bear any probative value.51

The issues for consideration of this court are:

First, whether a Petition for Review on Certiorari was the proper remedy to assail the
Sandiganbayan Resolutions; and

Second, whether the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that petitioner Republic of the Philippines
waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence and in granting respondents Ignacio Gimenez
and Fe Roa Gimenez’s Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence.

We grant the Petition.

Respondent Ignacio Gimenez pictures petitioner as being confused as to the proper mode of
review of the Sandiganbayan Resolutions. According to him, petitioner claims that the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion.52 Hence, petitioner should have filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and not a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.53 Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any error, and petitioner has to show
that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of
jurisdiction.54

Observance of the proper procedure before courts, especially before the Sandiganbayan, cannot
be stressed enough. Due process is enshrined in the Constitution, specifically the Bill of
Rights.55 "Due process [in criminal cases] guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence
until the contrary is proved[.]"56 "Mere suspicion of guilt should not sway judgment."57

To determine whether a petition for review is the proper remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan
Resolutions, we review the nature of actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution,
and damages.

Actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and damages for ill-gotten wealth are
also called civil forfeiture proceedings.

Republic Act No. 137958 provides for the procedure by which forfeiture proceedings may be
instituted against public officers or employees who "[have] acquired during his [or her]
incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his [or her] salary as
such public officer or employee and to his [or her] other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property, [which] property shall be presumed prima facie to have been
unlawfully acquired."59

This court has already settled the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over civil forfeiture cases:

. . . violations of R.A. No. 1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even
though the proceeding is civil in nature, since the forfeiture of the illegally acquired property
amounts to a penalty.60
In Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,61 this court re-affirmed the doctrine that forfeiture
proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379 are civil in nature.62 Civil forfeiture proceedings were
also differentiated from plunder cases:

. . . a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different from a
plunder case. . . . In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission
of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. . . . On the other hand,
all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379 is the
disproportion of respondent’s properties to his legitimate income, it being unnecessary to prove
how he acquired said properties. As correctly formulated by the Solicitor General, the forfeitable
nature of the properties under the provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a determination
of a specific overt act committed by the respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of
the illegal wealth.63(Citation omitted)

To stress, the quantum of evidence required for forfeiture proceedings under Republic Act No.
1379 is the same with other civil cases — preponderance of evidence.64

When a criminal case based on demurrer to evidence is dismissed, the dismissal is equivalent to
an acquittal.65

As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an acquittal; any further
prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.66

Hence, the Republic may only assail an acquittal through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court:

Accordingly, a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting an accused’s demurrer

to evidence may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, based on the
narrow ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.67 (Citation omitted)

In this case, a civil forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, petitioner correctly filed a Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of the Rule provides the
mode of appeal from judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan:

SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.— A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth.

II

Petitioner argues that substantial justice requires doing away with the procedural
technicalities.68 Loss of vital documentary proof warranted extensions to file the Formal Offer of
Evidence.69 Honest efforts to locate several missing documents resulted in petitioner’s inability
to file the pleading within the period granted by the Sandiganbayan.70

Respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner cannot fault the Sandiganbayan for its
incompetence during trial.71 Even if the evidence were formally offered within the prescribed
period, PCGG’s evidence still had no probative value.72 It is solely petitioner’s fault "that the
persons who certified to the photocopies of the originals were not presented to testify[.]"73 It is
also misleading to argue that the pieces of documentary evidence presented are public
documents.74 "The documents are not public in the sense that these are official issuances of the
Philippine government."75 "The bulk consists mainly of notarized, private documents that have
simply been certified true and faithful."76

According to respondent Fe Roa Gimenez, petitioner tries to excuse its non-filing of the Formal
Offer of Evidence within the prescribed period by raising its efforts to locate the 66 missing
documents.77 However, the issue of the missing documents was laid to rest during the hearing on
November 16, 2004.78 The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until March 2005 to produce the
documents; otherwise, these would be excluded.79 The testimonies of the witnesses related to the
missing documents would also be expunged from the case records.80

Moreover, respondent Fe Roa Gimenez claims that "[t]he Sandiganbayan did not err when it
ruled that the great bulk of the documentary evidence offered by the PCGG have no probative
value."81 Aside from the 66 missing documents it failed to present, almost all of petitioner’s
pieces of documentary evidence were mere photocopies.82The few that were certified true copies
were not testified on by the persons who certified these documents.83

Our Rules of Court lays down the procedure for the formal offer of evidence. Testimonial
evidence is offered "at the time [a] witness is called to testify."84 Documentary and object
evidence, on the other hand, are offered "after the presentation of a party’s testimonial
evidence."85 Offer of documentary or object evidence is generally done orally unless permission
is given by the trial court for a written offer of evidence.86

More importantly, the Rules specifically provides that evidence must be formally offered to be
considered by the court. Evidence not offered is excluded in the determination of the
case.87 "Failure to make a formal offer within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a
waiver to submit it."88

Rule 132, Section 34 provides:

SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.— The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

The rule on formal offer of evidence is intertwined with the constitutional guarantee of due
process. Parties must be given the opportunity to review the evidence submitted against them and
take the necessary actions to secure their case.89 Hence, any document or object that was marked
for identification is not evidence unless it was "formally offered and the opposing counsel [was]
given an opportunity to object to it or cross-examine the witness called upon to prove or identify
it."90

This court explained further the reason for the rule:

The Rules of Court provides that "the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered." A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings
of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial.
Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent
is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the
evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will
not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.91 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

To consider a party’s evidence which was not formally offered during trial would deprive the
other party of due process. Evidence not formally offered has no probative value and must be
excluded by the court.92
Petitioner’s failure to file its written Formal Offer of Evidence of the numerous documentary
evidence presented within the prescribed period is a non-issue. In its first assailed Resolution
dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan declared that petitioner waived the filing of its Formal
Offer of Evidence when it failed to file the pleading on May 13, 2006, the deadline based on the
extended period granted by the court. Petitioner was granted several extensions of time by the
Sandiganbayan totalling 75 days from the date petitioner terminated its presentation of evidence.
Notably, this 75-day period included the original 30-day period. Subsequently, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence, and the Formal
Offer of Evidence.

In resolving petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of
Evidence, the Sandiganbayan found the carelessness of petitioner’s counsel unacceptable.
According to the Sandiganbayan, it could not countenance the non-observance of the court’s
orders.

This court has long acknowledged the policy of the government to recover the assets and
properties illegally acquired or misappropriated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
wife Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies,
agents or nominees.93 Hence, this court has adopted a liberal approach regarding technical rules
of procedure in cases involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth:

In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside
technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This
Court prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial
justice to the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of
form, should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two decades have passed since the
government initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive
resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition,
accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the
ownership of these funds and other assets be finally determined and resolved with dispatch, free
from all the delaying technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks.94 (Emphasis supplied,
citation omitted)

To be clear, petitioner was able to file its Formal Offer of Evidence, albeit, belatedly. Petitioner
hurdled 19 years of trial before the Sandiganbayan to present its evidence as shown in its
extensive Formal Offer of Evidence. As petitioner argues:

Undeniable from the records of the case is that petitioner was vigorous in prosecuting the case.
The most tedious and crucial stage of the litigation and presentation of evidence has been
accomplished. Petitioner completed its presentation of evidence proving the ill-gotten nature and
character of the funds and assets sought to be recovered in the present case. It presented vital
testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of voluminous record proving the gross
disparity of the subject funds to spouses Gimenezes’ combined declared income which must be
reconveyed to the Republic for being acquired in blatant violation of the Constitution and the
Anti-Graft statutes.95

This court is not unmindful of the difficulty in gathering voluminous documentary evidence in
cases of forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth acquired throughout the years. It is never easy to prosecute
corruption and take back what rightfully belongs to the government and the people of the
Republic.

This is not the first time that this court relaxed the rule on formal offer of evidence.
Tan v. Lim96 arose from two civil Complaints: one for injunction and another for legal
redemption, which were heard jointly before the trial court.97 The defendant did not file a Formal
Offer of Evidence in the injunction case98 and merely adopted the evidence offered in the legal
redemption case.99 The trial court held that the defendant’s failure to file his Formal Offer of
Evidence in the injunction case rendered the plaintiff’s evidence therein as
uncontroverted.100 The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision and was affirmed by this
court.101 This court ruled that while the trial court’s reasoning in its Decision was technically
sound, a liberal interpretation was more appropriate and in line with substantial justice:

It may be true that Section 34, Rule 132 of the rules directs the court to consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered and that under Section 35, documentary evidence is offered
after presentation of testimonial evidence. However, a liberal interpretation of these Rules would
have convinced the trial court that a separate formal offer of evidence in Civil Case No. 6518
was superfluous because not only was an offer of evidence made in Civil Case No. 6521 that was
being jointly heard by the trial court, counsel for Jose Renato Lim had already declared he was
adopting these evidences for Civil Case No. 6518. The trial court itself stated that it would freely
utilize in one case evidence adduced in the other only to later abandon this posture. Jose Renato
Lim testified in Civil Case No. 6518. The trial court should have at least considered his
testimony since at the time it was made, the rules provided that testimonial evidence is deemed
offered at the time the witness is called to testify. Rules of procedure should not be applied in a
very rigid, technical case as they are devised chiefly to secure and not defeat substantial justice.

....

The logic of the Court of Appeals is highly persuasive. Indeed, apparently, the trial court was
being overly technical about the nonsubmission of Jose Renato Lim’s formal offer of evidence.
This posture not only goes against Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure decreeing a
liberal construction of the rules to promote a just, speedy and inexpensive litigation but ignores
the consistent rulings of the Court against utilizing the rules to defeat the ends of substantial
justice. Despite the intervening years, the language of the Court in Manila Railroad Co. vs.
Attorney-General, still remains relevant:

"x x x. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and
delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing
itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best
adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. It is the means by which the
powers of the court are made effective in just judgments. When it loses the character of the one
and takes on that of the other the administration of justice becomes incomplete and
unsatisfactory and lays itself open to grave criticism."102 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Furthermore, "subsequent and substantial compliance . . . may call for the relaxation of the rules
of procedure."103

Weighing the amount of time spent in litigating the case against the number of delays petitioner
incurred in submitting its Formal Offer of Evidence and the state’s policy on recovering ill-
gotten wealth, this court is of the belief that it is but only just that the Rules be relaxed and
petitioner be allowed to submit its written Formal Offer of Evidence. The Sandiganbayan’s
Resolutions should be reversed.

III
According to petitioner, the Sandiganbayan erred when it granted the demurrer to evidence filed
by respondents and dismissed the case despite a "prima facie foundation [based on the pleadings
and documents on record] that spouses Gimenezes amassed enormous wealth grossly
disproportionate to their lawful income or declared lawful assets."104

Similarly, the Complaint alleged specific acts committed by respondent Ignacio Gimenez:

[T]aking undue advantage of his relationship, influence, and connection, by himself and/or in
unlawful concert and active collaboration with former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda
R. Marcos for the purpose of mutually enriching themselves and preventing the disclosure and
recovery of assets illegally obtained: (a) acted as the dummy, nominee or agent of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos in several corporations such as, the Allied
Banking Corporation, Acoje Mining Corporation, Baguio Gold Mining, Multi National
Resources, Philippine Oversees, Inc. and Pioneer Natural Resources; (b) unlawfully obtained,
through corporations organized by them such as the New City Builders, Inc. (NCBI), multi-
million peso contracts with the government buildings, such as the University of Life Sports
Complex and Dining Hall as well as projects of the National Manpower Corporation, Human
Settlements, GSIS, and Maharlika Livelihood, to the gross and manifest disadvantage of the
Government and the Filipino people; and (c) in furtherance of the above stated illegal purposes,
organized several establishments engaged in food, mining and other businesses such as the
Transnational Construction Corporation, Total Systems Technology, Inc., Pyro Control
Technology Corporation, Asian Alliance, Inc., A & T Development Corporation, RBO Agro
Forestry Farm Development Corporation, Bathala Coal Mining Corporation, Coal Basis Mining
Corporation, Titan Coal Mining Corporation, GEI Guaranteed Education, Inc., and I.B. Gimenez
Securities, Inc.105

Despite the specific allegations in the Complaint, petitioner contends that respondents merely
gave general denials to the allegations in the Complaint.106 "[N]o specific denial [was] made on
the material allegations [in] the [C]omplaint."107

Respondents, on the other hand, assert that the Sandiganbayan was correct in granting the
Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence.

Respondent Ignacio Gimenez claims that petitioner cannot be excused from filing its Formal
Offer of Evidence considering the numerous extensions given by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner
had all the resources and time to gather, collate, and secure the necessary evidence to build its
case.108 Petitioner’s presentation of evidence took 19 years to complete, and yet it failed to
submit the necessary documents and pleading.109

Similarly, respondent Fe Roa Gimenez argues that petitioner was negligent in failing to comply
with the Sandiganbayan’s orders considering the inordinate amount of time given to petitioner to
present evidence, which resulted in only five witnesses in 19 years.110

To determine the propriety of granting respondents’ Motion to Dismiss based on Demurrer to

Evidence, we review the nature of demurrer.

Rule 33, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.— After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present
evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
In Oropesa v. Oropesa111 where this court affirmed the dismissal of the case on demurrer to
evidence due to petitioner’s non-submission of the Formal Offer of Evidence,112 demurrer to
evidence was defined as:

. . . "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue." We have also held that a demurrer to evidence "authorizes a judgment on the
merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he would
ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief
sought."113 (Citations omitted)

This court has laid down the guidelines in resolving a demurrer to evidence:

A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown
no right to relief. Where the plaintiff’s evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as
may reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer
to evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting
every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and
reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material
elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim.
It should be sustained where the plaintiff’s evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.114

Furthermore, this court already clarified what the trial court determines when acting on a motion
to dismiss based on demurrer to evidence:

What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to evidence is whether the
plaintiff is entitled to the relief based on the facts and the law. The evidence contemplated by the
rule on demurrer is that which pertains to the merits of the case, excluding technical aspects such
as capacity to sue. . . .115 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

Petitioner, in its Supplement to the Petition, argued that the testimonial evidence it had presented
and offered during trial warranted consideration and analysis.116 The Sandiganbayan erroneously
excluded these testimonies in determining whether to grant the motion to dismiss or not, hence:

. . . even assuming that the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s formal offer of evidence,
petitioner still had testimonial evidence in its favor which should [have] been considered. It
behoved then upon the Sandiganbayan to discuss or include in its discussion, at the very least, an
analysis of petitioner’s testimonial evidence.117

With our ruling reversing the Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions on petitioner’s Formal Offer of
Evidence, what should be determined now by the Sandiganbayan is whether petitioner’s
evidence is sufficient to entitle it to the relief it seeks after the Sandiganbayan rested its case.
Petitioner is required to establish preponderance of evidence.

In the second assailed Resolution, the Sandiganbayan granted respondents’ Motion to Dismiss
based on the lack of Formal Offer of Evidence of petitioner. At the same time, it observed that
the pieces of documentary evidence presented by petitioner were mostly certified true copies of
the original. In passing upon the probative value of petitioner’s evidence, the Sandiganbayan
held:

On another note, the evidence presented by the plaintiff consisted mainly of certified true copies
of the original. These certified copies of documentary evidence presented by the plaintiff were
not testified on by the person who certified them to be photocopies of the original. Hence, these
evidence do not appear to have significant substantial probative value.118

Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for making "a general and sweeping statement that the
evidence presented by petitioner lacked probative value for the reason that they are mainly
certified true copies which had not been testified on by the person who certified [them]."119 Thus,
its right to due process was violated when the Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner’s documentary
evidence in the same Resolution which dismissed the case.120

Petitioner argues that: a) respondents unqualifiedly admitted the identity and authenticity of the
documentary evidence presented by petitioner;121 and b) the documents it presented were public
documents, and there was no need for the identification and authentication of the original
documentary exhibits.122 Petitioner relies on the Sandiganbayan Order123 dated August 6, 2002.
The Order reads:

Considering the manifestation of Atty. Reno Gonzales, counsel for plaintiff/PCGG, that
the defendant Fe Roa Gimenez, through counsel, is willing to stipulate that the documents to be
presented and identified by the witness are in her custody as Records Officer of the PCGG, the
parties agreed to dispense with the testimony of Ma. Lourdes Magno.

WHEREFORE, and as prayed for, the continuation of the presentation of plaintiff’s evidence is
set on October 9 and 10, 2002, both at 8:30 o’clock [sic] in the morning.

SO ORDERED.124 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner claims that the following exhibits were acquired in relation to the PCGG’s functions
prescribed under Executive Order No. 1, Section 3(b),125 and form part of the official records of
the PCGG:126 "Certifications as to the various positions held in Government by Fe Roa-Gimenez,
her salaries and compensation during her stint as a public officer, the BIR Income Tax Returns
and Statement of Assets and Liabilities showing the declared income of spouses Gimenezes; the
Articles of Incorporation of various corporations showing spouses Gimenezes’ interests on
various corporations; and several transactions involving huge amounts of money which prove
that they acted as conduit in the disbursement of government funds."127

On the other hand, respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner’s documents are not
"official issuances of the Philippine government."128 They are mostly notarized private
documents.129 Petitioner’s evidence has no probative value; hence, a dismissal on demurrer to
evidence is only proper.130 Respondent Fe Roa Gimenez claims that the Sandiganbayan did not
err in holding that the majority of petitioner’s documentary evidence has no probative value,
considering that most of these documents are only photocopies.131

The evidence presented by petitioner before the Sandiganbayan deserves better treatment.

For instance, the nature and classification of the documents should have been ruled upon. Save
for certain cases, the original document must be presented during trial when the subject of the
inquiry is the contents of the document.132 This is the Best Evidence Rule provided under Rule
130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.— When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad
faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office.

In case of unavailability of the original document, secondary evidence may be presented133 as

provided for under Sections 5 to 7 of the same Rule:

SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable.— When the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence
and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy,
or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the
order stated.

SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. — If the document is in
the custody or under the control of adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If
after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document,
secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss. (5a)

SEC. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record.— When the original of
a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may
be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

In Citibank, N.A. v. Sabeniano,134 citing Estrada v. Hon. Desierto,135 this court clarified the
applicability of the Best Evidence Rule:

As the afore-quoted provision states, the best evidence rule applies only when the subject of the
inquiry is the contents of the document. The scope of the rule is more extensively explained thus
—

But even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence rule applies only when the
content of such document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such
document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible (5
Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-66; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78). Any other substitutionary evidence is
likewise admissible without need for accounting for the original.

Thus, when a document is presented to prove its existence or condition it is offered not as
documentary, but as real, evidence. Parol evidence of the fact of execution of the documents is
allowed (Hernaez, et al. vs. McGrath, etc., et al., 91 Phil[.] 565). x x x

In Estrada v. Desierto, this Court had occasion to rule that —

It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only [a] copy of the Angara Diary as
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing so, the Court, did not,
however, violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that:
"Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court’s discretion, whenever in the
case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other
useful purpose will be served by requiring production.

"x x x x x x x x x

"In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been abandoned, for certain
documents in which ordinarily no real dispute arised [sic]. This measure is a sensible and
progressive one and deserves universal adoption (post, sec. 1233). Its essential feature is that a
copy may be used unconditionally, if the opponent has been given an opportunity to inspect it."

This Court did not violate the best evidence rule when it considered and weighed in evidence the
photocopies and microfilm copies of the PNs, MCs, and letters submitted by the petitioners to
establish the existence of respondent’s loans. The terms or contents of these documents were
never the point of contention in the Petition at bar. It was respondent’s position that the PNs in
the first set (with the exception of PN No. 34534) never existed, while the PNs in the second set
(again, excluding PN No. 34534) were merely executed to cover simulated loan transactions. As
for the MCs representing the proceeds of the loans, the respondent either denied receipt of
certain MCs or admitted receipt of the other MCs but for another purpose. Respondent further
admitted the letters she wrote personally or through her representatives to Mr. Tan of petitioner
Citibank acknowledging the loans, except that she claimed that these letters were just meant to
keep up the ruse of the simulated loans. Thus, respondent questioned the documents as to their
existence or execution, or when the former is admitted, as to the purpose for which the
documents were executed, matters which are, undoubtedly, external to the documents, and which
had nothing to do with the contents thereof.

Alternatively, even if it is granted that the best evidence rule should apply to the evidence
presented by petitioners regarding the existence of respondent’s loans, it should be borne in mind
that the rule admits of the following exceptions under Rule 130, Section 5 of the revised Rules of
Court[.]136 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

Furthermore, for purposes of presenting these as evidence before courts, documents are classified
as either public or private. Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 19. Classes of Documents.— For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents
are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.

All other writings are private.

The same Rule provides for the effect of public documents as evidence and the manner of proof
for public documents:

SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence.— Documents consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact
which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.

SEC. 24. Proof of official record.— The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a)
of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state.— Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be
under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court
having a seal, under the seal of such court.

....

SEC. 27. Public record of a private document.— An authorized public record of a private
document may be proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal
custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody.

....

SEC. 30. Proof of notarial documents.— Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and
certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate
of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document
involved. (Emphasis supplied)

Emphasizing the importance of the correct classification of documents, this court pronounced:

The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be
presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign
character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or
a competent public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record
of a private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further
authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is
any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a
notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or
set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities
prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or
the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court.137 (Emphasis supplied)

The distinction as to the kind of public document under Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of
Court is material with regard to the fact the evidence proves. In Philippine Trust Company v.
Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,138 this court ruled that:

. . . not all types of public documents are deemed prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated:

....
"Public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer" include those specified as
public documents under Section 19(a), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the acknowledgement,
affirmation or oath, or jurat portion of public documents under Section 19(c). Hence, under
Section 23, notarized documents are merely proof of the fact which gave rise to their
execution (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories . . . is proof that Philtrust had been served
with Written Interrogatories), and of the date of the latter (e.g., the notarized Answer to
Interrogatories is proof that the same was executed on October 12, 1992, the date stated
thereon), but is not prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Additionally, under Section
30 of the same Rule, the acknowledgement in notarized documents is prima facie evidence of the
execution of the instrument or document involved (e.g., the notarized Answer to Interrogatories
is prima facie proof that petitioner executed the same).

The reason for the distinction lies with the respective official duties attending the execution of
the different kinds of public instruments. Official duties are disputably presumed to have been
regularly performed. As regards affidavits, including Answers to Interrogatories which are
required to be sworn to by the person making them, the only portion thereof executed by the
person authorized to take oaths is the jurat. The presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed therefore applies only to the latter portion, wherein the notary public merely attests
that the affidavit was subscribed and sworn to before him or her, on the date mentioned thereon.
Thus, even though affidavits are notarized documents, we have ruled that affidavits, being self-
serving, must be received with caution.139 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In Salas v. Sta. Mesa Market Corporation,140 this court discussed the difference between mere
copies of audited financial statements submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and certified true copies of audited financial
statements obtained or secured from the BIR or the SEC which are public documents under Rule
132, Section 19(c) of the Revised Rules of Evidence:

The documents in question were supposedly copies of the audited financial statements of
SMMC. Financial statements (which include the balance sheet, income statement and statement
of cash flow) show the fiscal condition of a particular entity within a specified period. The
financial statements prepared by external auditors who are certified public accountants (like
those presented by petitioner) are audited financial statements. Financial statements, whether
audited or not, are, as [a] general rule, private documents. However, once financial statements
are filed with a government office pursuant to a provision of law, they become public documents.

Whether a document is public or private is relevant in determining its admissibility as evidence.

Public documents are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution
and genuineness. On the other hand, private documents are inadmissible in evidence unless they
are properly authenticated. Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

....

Petitioner and respondents agree that the documents presented as evidence were mere copies of
the audited financial statements submitted to the BIR and SEC. Neither party claimed that copies
presented were certified true copies of audited financial statements obtained or secured from the
BIR or the SEC which under Section 19(c), Rule 132 would have been public documents. Thus,
the statements presented were private documents. Consequently, authentication was a
precondition to their admissibility in evidence.

During authentication in court, a witness positively testifies that a document presented as

evidence is genuine and has been duly executed or that the document is neither spurious nor
counterfeit nor executed by mistake or under duress. In this case, petitioner merely presented a
memorandum attesting to the increase in the corporation’s monthly market revenue, prepared by
a member of his management team. While there is no fixed criterion as to what constitutes
competent evidence to establish the authenticity of a private document, the best proof available
must be presented. The best proof available, in this instance, would have been the testimony of a
representative of SMMC’s external auditor who prepared the audited financial statements.
Inasmuch as there was none, the audited financial statements were never
authenticated.141 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Indeed, in Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc,142 this court held that mere collection of documents by
the PCGG does not make such documents public documents per se under Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court:

The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigations
does not make them per se public records referred to in the quoted rule.

Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Maria Lourdes Magno, who testified that these
public and private documents had been gathered by and taken into the custody of the PCGG in
the course of the Commission’s investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses.
However, given the purposes for which these documents were submitted, Magno was not a
credible witness who could testify as to their contents. To reiterate, "[i]f the writings have
subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by those witnesses." Witnesses can testify
only to those facts which are of their personal knowledge; that is, those derived from their own
perception. Thus, Magno could only testify as to how she obtained custody of these documents,
but not as to the contents of the documents themselves.

Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits or Memoranda
submitted to the court. Basic is the rule that, while affidavits may be considered as public
documents if they are acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified as
hearsay evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are not generally prepared by the affiant,
but by another one who uses his or her own language in writing the affiant’s statements, parts of
which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the
adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason,
affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on
the witness stand to testify thereon.143(Citations omitted)

Notably, the Sandiganbayan’s evaluation of the evidence presented by petitioner was cursory. Its
main reason for granting the Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence was that there was no
evidence to consider due to petitioner’s failure to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. It brushed off
the totality of evidence on which petitioner built its case.

Even assuming that no documentary evidence was properly offered, this court finds it clear from
the second assailed Resolution that the Sandiganbayan did not even consider other evidence
presented by petitioner during the 19 years of trial. The Sandiganbayan erred in ignoring
petitioner’s testimonial evidence without any basis or justification. Numerous exhibits were
offered as part of the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses.

Petitioner presented both testimonial and documentary evidence that tended to establish a
presumption that respondents acquired ill-gotten wealth during respondent Fe Roa Gimenez’s
incumbency as public officer and which total amount or value was manifestly out of proportion
to her and her husband’s salaries and to their other lawful income or properties.
Petitioner presented five (5) witnesses, two (2) of which were Atty. Tereso Javier and Director
Danilo R.V. Daniel, both from the PCGG:

Petitioner presented as witnesses Atty. Tereso Javier, then Head of the Sequestered Assets
Department of PCGG, and Danilo R.V. Daniel, then Director of the Research and Development
Department of PCGG, who testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned and/ or under
the control of spouses Gimenezes.144

Several exhibits excluded by the Sandiganbayan were offered as part of petitioner’s testimonial
evidence:

1) Exhibit "KK"145 was offered "for the purpose of proving the assets or properties of the spouses
Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."146

2) Exhibits "KK-1" to "KK-12"147 inclusive of sub-markings, were offered "for the purpose of
proving the real properties acquired by the spouses Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez,
and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."148

3) Exhibits "KK-15," "KK-18," "KK-20," "KK-27," "KK-30," "KK-32" to "KK-38" and "KK-
40"149 were offered "for the purpose of proving the corporations in which Ignacio B. Gimenez
has interest, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."150

4) Exhibit "KK-45"151 was offered "for the purpose of proving that the PCGG conducted an
investigation of New City Builders, Inc., Transnational Construction Corporation, and OTO
Construction and Development Corporation in relation to Ignacio B. Gimenez and Roberto O.
Olanday, and as part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."152

5) Exhibits "KK-48" to "KK-50"153 were offered "for the purpose of proving that the PCGG
formally filed notices of lis pendens with the Registers of Deeds of Taytay, Rizal, Lucena City,
Quezon and San Fabian, Pangasinan over the properties mentioned in said notices in connection
with Civil Case No. [0]007 pending with the Sandiganbayan, and as part of the testimony of
Tereso Javier."154

6) Exhibits "KK-51" to "KK-52"155 and their sub-markings were offered "for the purpose of
proving that the PCGG sequestered the shares of stock in Allied Banking Corporation and
Guaranteed Education, Inc. as stated in the said writ/letter of sequestration, and as part of the
testimony of Tereso Javier."156

7) Exhibits "NN" to "QQ"157 and their sub-markings were offered "for the purpose of proving
that the PCGG formally requested the Central Bank to freeze the bank accounts of the spouses
Igancio [sic] B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez and that the Central Bank, acting on said request,
issued a memorandum to all commercial banks relative thereto. They are also being offered as
part of the testimony of Tereso Javier."158

8) Exhibits "RR" to "RR-23"159 were offered "for the purpose of proving that Dominador
Pangilinan, former Acting President and President of Traders Royal Bank, executed an affidavit
on July 24, 1987 wherein he mentioned Malacanang trust accounts maintained with the Traders
Royal Bank the balance of which was very high, approximately 150-175 million pesos, as
indicated in the monthly statements attached to his affidavit. They are also being offered as part
of the testimony of Danilo R.V. Daniel."160

9) Exhibits "SS" to "SS-29"161 were offered "for the purpose of proving that Apolinario K.
Medina, Executive Vice President of Traders Royal Bank, executed an Affidavit on July 23,
1987 wherein he mentioned about certain numbered (confidential) trust accounts maintained
with the Traders Royal Bank, the deposits to which ‘were so substantial in amount that (he)
suspected that they had been made by President Marcos or his family. They are also being
offered as part of the testimony of Danilo R.V. Daniel."162

10) Exhibits "TT" to "TT-3"163 were offered "for the purpose of proving that Director Danilo
R.V. Daniel of the Research and Development Department of the PCGG conducted an
investigation on the ill-gotten wealth of the spouses Ignacio and Fe Roa Gimenez and found that
from 1977 to 1982, the total sum of P75,090,306.42 was withdrawn from the account No. 128
(A/C 76-128) in favor of I.B Gimenez, I.B. Gimenez Securities and Fe Roa Gimenez. They are
also being offered as part of the testimony of Director Danilo R.V. Daniel."164

The court cannot arbitrarily disregard evidence especially when resolving a demurrer to evidence
which tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence.

The difference between the admissibility of evidence and the determination of its probative
weight is canonical.165

Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence)
is to [be] considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the
question of whether or not it proves an issue. Thus, a letter may be offered in evidence and
admitted as such but its evidentiary weight depends upon the observance of the rules on
evidence. Accordingly, the author of the letter should be presented as witness to provide the
other party to the litigation the opportunity to question him on the contents of the letter. Being
mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its contents suspect. As
earlier stated, hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value.166 (Citations
omitted)

The Sandiganbayan should have considered Atienza v. Board of Medicine, et al.167 where this
court held that it is better to admit and consider evidence for determination of its probative value
than to outright reject it based on very rigid and technical grounds.168

Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, in
connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or
admissibility, we have held that:

[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but
admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their
rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant
or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or
incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring
them.169(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

A liberal application of the Rules is in line with the state’s policy to recover ill-gotten wealth. In
case of doubt, courts should proceed with caution in granting a motion to dismiss based on
demurrer to evidence. An order granting demurrer to evidence is a judgment on the
merits.170 This is because while a demurrer "is an aid or instrument for the expeditious
termination of an action,"171 it specifically "pertains to the merits of the case."172

In Cabreza, Jr., et al. v. Cabreza,173 this court defined a judgment rendered on the merits:

A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it determines the rights and
liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory
objections"; or when the judgment is rendered "after a determination of which party is right, as
distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical
point."174 (Citations omitted)

To reiterate, "[d]emurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the
defendant having to submit evidence on his [or her] part, as he [or she] would ordinarily have to
do, if plaintiff’s evidence shows that he [or she] is not entitled to the relief sought."175 The order
of dismissal must be clearly supported by facts and law since an order granting demurrer is a
judgment on the merits:

As it is settled that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on the
merits, it is imperative that it be a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the
facts and the law on which it is based.176(Citation omitted)

To erroneously grant a dismissal simply based on the delay to formally offer documentary
evidence essentially deprives one party of due process.

IV

Respondents did not fail to specifically deny material averments in the Complaint.

Under Rule 8, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the "defendant must specify each material
allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth
the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial."177 There are three modes
of specific denial provided for under the Rules:

1) by specifying each material allegation of the fact in the complaint, the truth of which the
defendant does not admit, and whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters
which he will rely upon to support his denial; (2) by specifying so much of an averment in the
complaint as is true and material and denying only the remainder; (3) by stating that the
defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a
material averment in the complaint, which has the effect of a denial.178

In paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the PCGG, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
averred that:

14. Defendant Fe Roa Gimenez, by herself and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, taking undue advantage of her position, influence
and connection and with grave abuse of power and authority, in order to prevent disclosure and
recovery of assets illegally obtained:

(a) actively participated in the unlawful transfer of millions of dollars of government funds into
several accounts in her name in foreign countries;

(b) disbursed such funds from her various personal accounts for Defendants’ own use[,] benefit
and enrichment;

(c) acted as conduit of the Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos in purchasing
the New York properties, particularly, the Crown Building, Herald Center, 40 Wall Street, 200
Wall Street, Lindenmere Estate and expensive works of arts;179

In their Answer, respondents claimed that;

9. Defendants Spouses Gimenez and Fe Roa specifically deny the allegations contained in
paragraphs 14(a), 14(b) and 14(c), the truth being that defendant Fe Roa never took advantage of
her position or alleged connection and influence to allegedly prevent disclosure and recovery of
alleged illegally obtained assets, in the manner alleged in said paragraphs.180

Similarly, the PCGG made material allegations in paragraph 16 of the Complaint:

16. Defendant Ignacio B. Gimenez, taking undue advantage of his relationship, influence, and
connection, by himself and/or in unlawful concert and active collaboration with Defendants
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, for the purpose of mutually enriching themselves
and preventing the disclosure and recovery of assets illegally obtained, among others:

(a) acted as the dummy, nominee or agent of Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos, in several corporations such as, the Allied Banking Corporation, Acoje Mining
Corporation, Baguio Gold Mining, Multi National Resources, Philippine Overseas, Inc. and
Pioneer Natural Resources;

(b) unlawfully obtained, through corporations organized by them such as the the [sic] New City
Builders, Inc. (NCBI), multimillion peso contracts with the government for the construction of
government buildings, such as the University of Life Sports Complex and Dining Hall as well as
projects of the National Manpower Corporation, Human Settlements, GSIS, and Maharlika
Livelihood, to the gross and manifest disadvantage to Plaintiff and the Filipino people.

(c) in furtherance of the above stated illegal purposes, organized several establishments engaged
in food, mining and other businesses such as the Transnational Construction Corporation, Total
Systems Technology, Inc., Pyro Control Technology Corporation, Asian Alliance, Inc., A & T
Development Corporation, RBO Agro Forestry Farm Development Corporation, Bathala Coal
Mining Corporation, Coal Basis Mining Corporation, Titan Coal Mining Corporation, GEI
Guaranteed Education, Inc., and I.B. Gimenez Securities, Inc.181

To which respondents specifically denied through the following paragraph:

11. Defendants Spouses Gimenez and Fe Roa specifically deny the allegations contained in
paragraphs 16, 16(a), 16(b) and 16(c) that defendant Gimenez allegedly took advantage of his
alleged relationship, influence and connection, and that by himself or in alleged unlawful concert
with defendants Marcos and Imelda, for the alleged purpose of enriching themselves and
preventing the discovery of alleged illegally obtained assets: (1) allegedly acted as dummy,
nominee or agent of defendants Marcos and Imelda; (2) allegedly obtained multi-million peso
projects unlawfully; and (3) allegedly organized several establishments, the truth being: (1) that
defendant Gimenez never acted as dummy, nominee or agent of defendants Marcos and Imelda;
(2) that defendant Gimen[e]z never once obtained any contract unlawfully; and (3) that
defendant Gimenez is a legitimate businessman and organized business establishments legally
and as he saw fit, all in accordance with his own plans and for his own purposes.182

In Aquintey v. Spouses Tibong,183 this court held that using "specifically" in a general denial does
not automatically convert that general denial to a specific one.184 The denial in the answer must
be so definite as to what is admitted and what is denied:

A denial is not made specific simply because it is so qualified by the defendant. A general denial
does not become specific by the use of the word "specifically." When matters of whether the
defendant alleges having no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief are plainly and
necessarily within the defendant’s knowledge, an alleged "ignorance or lack of information" will
not be considered as a specific denial. Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules also provides that material
averments in the complaint other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages shall be
deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Thus, the answer should be so definite and
certain in its allegations that the pleader’s adversary should not be left in doubt as to what is
admitted, what is denied, and what is covered by denials of knowledge as sufficient to form a
belief.185 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

However, the allegations in the pleadings "must be contextualized and interpreted in relation to
the rest of the statements in the pleading."186 The denials in respondents’ Answer comply with
the modes provided for under the Rules. We have held that the purpose of requiring specific
denials from the defendant is to make the defendant disclose the "matters alleged in the
complaint which he [or she] succinctly intends to disprove at the trial, together with the matter
which he [or she] relied upon to support the denial."187 The denials proffered by respondents
sufficiently disclosed the matters they wished to disprove and those they would rely upon in
making their denials.

To summarize, the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to

evidence. It erred in making a sweeping declaration on the probative value of the documentary
evidence offered by petitioner and in excluding other evidence offered during trial without full
evaluation based on reasons grounded in law and/or jurisprudence.

The third part of Rule 33, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "[i]f the motion [to
dismiss] is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed [the movant] shall be deemed
to have waived the right to present evidence." As this court held:

[I]f a demurrer to evidence is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed, the movant
shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. The movant who presents a
demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence retains the right to present their own evidence, if the trial
court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court
disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to
present their own evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render
judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged
litigations.188 (Citations omitted)

This procedure, however, does not apply.

In this case, we principally nullify the assailed Resolutions that denied the admission of the
Formal Offer of Evidence. It only follows that the Order granting demurrer should be denied.
This is not the situation contemplated in Rule 33, Section 1.189 Respondents were not able to
even comment on the Formal Offer of Evidence. Due process now requires that we remand the
case to the Sandiganbayan. Respondents may, at their option and through proper motion, submit
their Comment. The Sandiganbayan should then rule on the admissibility of the documentary and
object evidence covered by the Formal Offer submitted by petitioner. Respondents then may
avail themselves of any remedy thereafter allowed by the Rules.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated May 25, 2006 and
September 13, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division in Civil Case No. 0007
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the. Sandiganbayan for further
proceedings with due and deliberate dispatch in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes
*
Designated as additional member per Raftle dated August 19, 2009.
1
Rollo, pp. 30–120.
2
Id. at 122. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0007 and entitled Republic v. Fe Roa
Gimenez and Ignacio B. Gimenez. The Resolution was approved by Associate Justices Gregory
S. Ong (Chair), Jose R. Hernandez, and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada of the Fourth Division.
3
Id. at 124–133. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez and
concurred in by Associate Justices Gregory S. Ong (Chair) and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada.
4
Id. at 122, Resolution dated May 25, 2006.
5
Id. at 133, Resolution dated September 13, 2006.
6
Id. at 134–161.
7
Id. at 1721, Republic’s Memorandum.
8
Id. at 1722.
9
Id. at 1725–1726.
10
Id. at 1726.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 1727.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 122, Resolution dated May 25, 2006.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 124, Resolution dated September 13, 2006.
23
Id. at 126.
24
Id. at 124–125.
25
Id. at 1767, Republic’s Memorandum.
26
Id. at 188–191.
27
Id. at 1789–1800, Republic’s Memorandum.
28
Id. at 1767.
29
Id. at 129–130, Resolution dated September 13, 2006.
30
Id. at 131–132, citing RULES OF COURT, Rule 17, sec. 3, which provides:

SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.— If for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to
appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute
his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the
court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own
motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same
or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits,
unless otherwise declared by the court.
31
Id. at 132.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 133.
35
Id. at 834 and 919, Petition.
36
Id. at 1634, Supreme Court Resolution dated December 11, 2006, 1636, Fe Roa Gimenez’s
Comment/Opposition to Petition for Review, and 1655, Supreme Court Resolution dated March
14, 2007.
37
Id. at 1635–1641, Fe Roa Gimenez’s Comment/Opposition to Petition for Review, and 1657–
1662, Ignacio B. Gimenez’s Comment.
38
Id. at 1655, Supreme Court Resolution dated March 14, 2007, and 1671, Supreme Court
Resolution dated June 18, 2007.
39
Id. at 1676–1686.
40
Id. at 1687a–1687b.
41
Id. at 1687a.
42
Id. at 1808, Supreme Court Resolution dated February 18, 2008.
43
Id. at 1895–1898.
44
Id. at 1902, Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari.
45
Id. at 1912, Supreme Court Resolution dated June 20, 2012.
46
Id. at 1974–1991.
47
Id. at 1994–2000.
48
Id. at 2015–2016.
49
Id. at 2004–2005.
50
Id. at 2015, Supreme Court Resolution dated January 23, 2013.
51
Id. at 1769, Republic’s Memorandum.
52
Id. at 1702, Ignacio B. Gimenez’s Memorandum.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 1702–1703.
55
See CONST., art. III, secs. 1 and 14, which provide:

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

....

SECTION 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and
his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
56
Perez v. Estrada, 412 Phil. 686, 705 (2001) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc]. See Marcos v.
Sandiganbayan (1st Division), 357 Phil. 762, 783 (1998) [Per J. Purisima, En Banc].
57
People v. Bagus, 342 Phil. 836, 853 (1997) [Per J. Francisco, Third Division].
58
Rep. Act No. 1379 (1955) is entitled An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State any
Property Found to have been Unlawfully Acquired by any Public Officer or Employee and
Providing for the Proceedings therefor.
59
Rep. Act No. 1379 (1955), sec. 2.
60
Maj. Gen. Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, 499 Phil. 589, 614 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En
Banc]. See Pres. Decree No. 1486 (1978), sec. 4, which created the Sandiganbayan and vested
jurisdiction of civil forfeiture cases under Rep. Act No. 1379. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 90529, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 667, 674–676 [Per J. Regalado, En Banc], this
court traced the legislative history of the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over civil forfeiture
proceedings.
61
618 Phil. 346 (2009) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
62
Id. at 362–363.
63
Id.
64
See Exec. Order No. 14-A (1986), sec. 1, entitled Amending Executive Order No. 14.
65
See Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (3rd Division), G.R. Nos. 195011–19, September 30, 2013,
706 SCRA 451 [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division] and People v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 681
Phil. 90, 109 (2012) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
66
People v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 681 Phil. 90, 109 (2012) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
67
Id. at 110.
68
Rollo, p. 1782, Republic’s Memorandum.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 1706, Ignacio B. Gimenez’s Memorandum.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 1702.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 1712, Fe Roa Gimenez’s Memorandum.
78
Id. at 1714. The Order is not referenced to in the records.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 1717.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, sec. 35 provides:

SEC. 35. When to make offer.— As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made
at the time the witness is called to testify.

Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a party’s testimonial
evidence. Such offer shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in writing.
85
RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, sec. 35.
86
RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, sec. 35.
87
See RULES OF COURT, Rule 128, sec. 3, which provides:

SEC. 3. Admissibility of evidence.— Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and
is not excluded by the law or these rules.
88
Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Spouses Parocha, 550 Phil. 571, 575 (2007) [Per J. Velasco, Jr.,
Second Division]. See Constantino v. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 68, 75 (1996) [Per J. Bellosillo,
First Division].
89
See Heirs of Emilio Santioque v. Heirs of Emilio Calma, 536 Phil. 524, 543 (2006) [Per J.
Callejo, Sr., First Division], citing Pigao v. Rabanillo, 522 Phil. 506, 517–518 (2006) [Per J.
Corona, Second Division].
90
Villaluz v. Ligon, 505 Phil. 572, 588 (2005) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Second Division].
91
Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Spouses Parocha, 550 Phil. 571, 578–579 (2007) [Per J. Velasco, Jr.,
Second Division]. See People v. Logmao, 414 Phil. 378, 385 (2001) [Per J. Bellosillo, Jr., Second
Division].
92
See Spouses Ong v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 338, 350–352 (1999) [Per J. Panganiban, Third
Division]. See also Westmont Investment Corporation v. Francia, Jr., et al., 678 Phil. 180, 194
(2011) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division]. We recall, however, that admissibility of evidence is a
different concept from probative value under evidentiary rules. See Atienza v. Board of Medicine,
et al., 657 Phil. 536, 543 (2011) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division], citing PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 38, 59 (1998) [Per J. Romero, Third
Division].
93
Marcos, Jr. v. Republic, G.R. No. 189434, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 280, 308–309 [Per J.
Sereno (now C.J.), Second Division]. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 461 Phil. 598, 610 (2003) [Per
J. Corona, En Banc]. See Exec. Order No. 1 (1986), entitled Creating the Presidential
Commission on Good Government, Proclamation No. 3 (1986), entitled Declaring a National
Policy to Implement Reforms Mandated by the People Protecting their Basic Rights, Adopting a
Provisional Constitution, and Providing for an Orderly Transition to a Government under a New
Constitution, art. II, sec. 1(d), Exec. Order No. 14 (1986), entitled Defining the Jurisdiction over
Cases Involving the Ill-gotten Wealth of Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda R.
Marcos, Members of their Immediate Family, Close Relatives, Subordinates, Close and/or
Business Associates, Dummies, Agents and Nominees.
94
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 453 Phil. 1059, 1087–1088 (2003) [Per J. Corona, En Banc]. In
this case, this court set aside the Sandiganbayan Resolution that denied petitioner’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. (Id. at 1077 and 1150).
95
Rollo, p. 1781, Republic’s Memorandum.
96
357 Phil. 452 (1998) [Per J. Martinez, Second Division].
97
Id. at 456–457.
98
Id. at 461.
99
Id. at 477.
100
Id. at 474.
101
Id. at 474–475 and 481–482.
102
Id. at 478–480. This court applied 1964 RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, sec. 35, which
provides:

SEC. 35. Offer of Evidence.— The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
103
Security Bank Corporation v. Indiana Aerospace University, 500 Phil. 51, 60 (2005) [Per J.
Carpio, First Division].
104
Rollo, p. 1772, Republic’s Memorandum.
105
Id. at 1776–1777.
106
Id. at 1778.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 1701, Ignacio B. Gimenez’s Memorandum.
109
Id. at 1701–1702.
110
Id. at 1711–1713, Fe Roa Gimenez’s Memorandum.
111
G.R. No. 184528, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 174 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].
112
Id. at 185.
113
Id.
114
Spouses Condes v. Court of Appeals, 555 Phil. 311, 324 (2007) [Per J. Nachura, Third
Division], citing Heirs of Emilio Santioque v. Heirs of Emilio Calma, 536 Phil. 524, 540–541
(2006) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., First Division].
115
Casent Realty Development Corporation v. Philbanking Corporation, 559 Phil. 793, 801–802
(2007) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].
116
Rollo, p. 1906, Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 132, Resolution dated September 13, 2006.
119
Id. at 1784, Republic’s Memorandum.
120
Id. at 1785.
121
Id. at 1786.
122
Id. at 1788.
123
Id. at 1632.
124
Id.
125
Exec. Order No. 1 (1986), sec. 3 provides:

Sec. 3. The Commission shall have the power and authority:

....

(b) To sequester or place or cause to be placed under its control or possession any building or
office wherein any ill-gotten wealth or properties may be found, and any records pertaining
thereto, in order to prevent their destruction, concealment or disappearance which would
frustrate or hamper the investigation or otherwise prevent the Commission from accomplishing
its task.
126
Rollo, 1786–1787, Republic’s Memorandum.
127
Id. at 1725–1726.
128
Id. at 1702, Ignacio B. Gimenez’s Memorandum.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 1706.
131
Id. at 1717, Fe Roa Gimenez’s Memorandum.
132
See Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc, et al., 681 Phil. 380, 402–403 (2012) [Per J. Sereno (now
C.J.), Second Division], Heirs of Margarita Prodon v. Heirs of Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina
Clave, G.R. No. 170604, September 2, 2013, 704 SCRA 465, 478 [Per J. Bersamin, First
Division], and Bognot v. RRI Lending Corporation, G.R. No. 180144, September 24, 2014, 736
SCRA 357, 377 [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
133
See Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr., G.R. No. 191696, April 10, 2013, 695 SCRA 599, 611 [Per J.
Mendoza, Third Division].
134
535 Phil. 384 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division].
135
408 Phil. 194, 230 (2001) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
136
535 Phil. 384, 457–459 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division].
137
Patula v. People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 135, 156 [Per J. Bersamin,
First Division].
138
650 Phil. 54 (2010) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].
139
Id. at 68–70.
140
554 Phil. 343 (2007) [Per J. Corona, First Division].
141
Id. at 348–350.
142
Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc, et al., 681 Phil. 380 (2012) [Per J. Sereno (now C.J.), Second
Division].
143
Id. at 404–405.
144
Rollo, p. 1726, Republic’s Memorandum.
145
Id. at 1757. Exhibit "KK" refers to the "Table of Contents of SB CC No. [0]007 entitled RP
vs. Ignacio/Fe Roa Dimnez [sic], et al., including its Annexes[.]" (Id.)
146
Id. at 1757.
147
Id. at 1023–1024, Formal Offer of Evidence. Exhibit "KK-1" refers to the "Certified true copy
of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 137638 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan registered under the name of Ignacio B. Gimenez, married to Fe Roa Gimenez,
covering a parcel of land with an area of 1,106 square meters, [located in] Barrio Nibaleo, San
Fabian, Pangasinan." Exhibit "KK-2" refers to a "Certified true copy of Tax Declaration No.
0634 under the name of Ignacio B. Gimenez married to Fe Roa Gimenez of the property covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 137638." Exhibit "KK-3" refers to the "Certified true copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 520192 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal
registered under the name of Ignacio B. Gimenez . . . married to Fe Roa Gimenez, covering a
parcel of land with an area of 888 square meters [located in] Barrio Dolores, Taytay, Rizal."
Exhibit "KK-4" refers to the "Certified true copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 138076 of
the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan registered under the name of Ignacio B.
Gimenez . . . married to Fe Roa Gimenez, covering a parcel of land with an area of 1,106 square
meters [located in] Barrio Nibaleo, San Fabian, Pangasinan." Exhibit "KK-5" refers to the
"Certified true copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12869 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Quezon registered under the name of Spouses Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa
Gimenez, covering a parcel of land with an area of 194,426 square meters [located in] Barrio
Real (New Kiloloron), Real (formerly Infanta), Quezon." Exhibit "KK-5-A" refers to the
"Bracketed portion at the dorsal page of Exhibit ‘KK-5’ which is the certification of the Deputy
Register of Deeds stating that Exhibit ‘KK-5’ is a true copy of TCT No. T-12869, Book No. T-
60, Page No. 169, registered in the name of Sps. Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez[.]"
Exhibit "KK-6" refers to the "Certified true copy of Tax Declaration No. 30-003-0131-A under
the name of Ignacio B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez of the property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-12869." Exhibit "KK-7" refers to the "Certified true copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-12142 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Quezon registered
under the name of Ignacio Bautista Gimenez, married to Fe Roa Gimenez, covering a parcel of
land with an area of 18.6738 hectares [located in] Barrio Capalong, Infanta, Quezon." Exhibit
"KK-7-A" refers to the "Bracketed portion at the dorsal page of Exhibit ‘KK-7’, which is the
certification of the Deputy Register of Deeds, stating that said Exhibit ‘KK-7’ is a true copy of
TCT No. T-12142, Book No. T-57, Page No. 42[.]" Exhibit "KK-8" refers to the "Certified true
copy of Tax Declaration No. 30-003-0301-A under the name of Ignacio Bautista Gimenez[.]"
Exhibit "KK-9" refers to the "Certified true copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12870 of
the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Quezon registered under the name of Spouses Ignacio
B. Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez, covering a parcel of land with an area of 152,682 square
meters, [located in] Barrio Kiloloron, Real (formerly Infanta), Quezon." Exhibit "KK-9-A" refers
to the "Bracketed portion at the dorsal page of Exhibit ‘KK-9’ which is the certification of the
Deputy Register of Deeds stating [that] said Exhibit ‘KK-9’ is a true copy of TCT No. T-12870,
Book No. T-60, Page No. 170[.]" Exhibit "KK-10" refers to the "Certified true copy of Tax
Declaration No. 30-005-0348-A under the name of Sps. Ignacio Jimenez and Fe Roa Jimenez of
the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12870." Exhibit "KK-11" refers to the
"Certified true copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-13178 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Quezon registered under the name of Ignacio Bautista Gimenez married to Fe Roa
Gimenez, covering a parcel of land with an area of 16.1641 hectares, situated in the Sitio of
Capalong, Infanta, Quezon." Exhibit "KK-11-A" refers to the "Bracketed portion at the dorsal
page of Exhibit ‘KK-11’ which is the certification of the Deputy Register of Deeds stating that
Exhibit ‘KK-11’ is a true copy of TCT No. T-13178, Book No. T-62, Page No. 78[.]" Exhibit
"KK-12" refers to the "Certified true copy of Tax Declaration No. 30-003-0302-A under the
name of Ignacio Bautista Gimenez of the property located at Barrio Capalong, Real, Quezon
with an area of 16.1541 hectares."
148
Id. at 1758–1759, Republic’s Memorandum.
149
Id. at 1025–1026, Formal Offer of Evidence. Exhibit "KK-15" refers to the "Certified true
copy of the General Information Sheet of Allied Banking Corporation for the year 2002
consisting of seven (7) pages." Exhibit "KK-18" refers to the "Certified true copy of the General
Information Sheet of Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation for year 2002 consisting of seven
(7) pages." Exhibit "KK-27" refers to the "Certified true copy of the Certificate of Filing of
Amended Articles of Incorporation of I.B. Gimenez Securities, Inc. (Formerly Ignacio B.
Jimenez Securities, Inc., amending Article VII thereof) issued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission on November 26, 1997, with the attached Amended Articles of Incorporation,
consisting of nine (9) pages." Exhibit "KK-30" refers to the "Certified true copy of the General
Information Sheet of Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company for the year 2001 consisting of
seven (7) pages." Exhibit "KK-32" refers to the "Certified true copy of the Certificate of Filing of
Amended Articles of Incorporation of Manila Stock Exchange (amending Article IV by
shortening the term of its existence, thereby dissolving the corporation) issued by the Securities
and Exchange Commission on December 9, 1999, with the attached Amended Articles of
Incorporation consisting of eleven (11) pages." Exhibit "KK-33" refers to the "Certified true
copy of the General Information Sheet of Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation for the
year 1982 consisting of five (5) pages." Exhibit "KK-34" refers to the "Certified true copy of the
Certificate of filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation of Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Corporation[.]" Exhibit "KK-35" refers to the "Certified true copy of the General Information
Sheet of Oriental Petroleum and Minerals Corporation for the year 2002 consisting of eight (8)
pages." Exhibit "KK-36" refers to the "Certified true copy of the Certificate of Filing of
Amended Articles of Incorporation of Oriental Petroleum and Minerals Corporation[.]" Exhibit
"KK-37" refers to the "Certified true copy of the General Information Sheet of Philippine
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation for the year 2003[.]" Exhibit "KK-38" refers to the
"Certified true copy of the Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation of
Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (amending Article II, Paragraph 5 of the
Secondary Purposes of the Amended Articles of Incorporation thereof) issued by the Securities
and Exchange Commission on June 9, 1972, with the attached Amended Articles of
Incorporation, consisting of ten (10) pages." Exhibit "KK-40" refers to the "Certified true copy
of the Cover Sheet of Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation of Prudential
Guarantee and Assurance Incorporated consisting of twelve (12) pages, including the attached
Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation dated October 24, 2000 and the
Amended Articles of Incorporation.
150
Id. at 1760, Republic’s Memorandum.
151
Id. at 1027, Formal Offer of Evidence. Exhibit "KK-45" refers to the "Certified true copy of
the Memorandum dated August 1, 1988 of Atty. Ralph S. Lee, Team Supervisor, IRD, and
Alexander M. Berces, Investigator, for Atty. Roberto S. Federis, Director, IRD, thru Atty.
Romeo A. Damosos, Acting Asst. Director, IRD, all of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, consisting of seven (7) pages, regarding the investigation of New City Builders,
Inc., Transnational Construction Corporation, and OTO Construction and Development
Corporation in relation to Ignacio B. Gimenez and Roberto O. Olanday."
152
Id. at 1761, Republic’s Memorandum.
153
Id. at 1028, Formal Offer of Evidence. Exhibit "KK-48" refers to the "Photocopy of Notice of
Lis Pendens dated March 22, 1989 from the Presidential Commission on Good Government . . .
informing the [Register of Deeds of Taytay, Rizal] that the property covered by TCT No. 520192
. . . is deemed sequestered[.]" Exhibit "KK-49" refers to the "Photocopy of Notice of Lis Pendens
dated March 22, 1989 from the Presidential Commission on Good Government . . . informing the
[Register of Deeds of Lucena City, Quezon] that the following properties [have been]
sequestered[:] TCT No. 128969[,] TCT No. 12142[,] TCT No. 12870[,] and TCT No. 13178[.]"
Exhibit "KK-50" refers to the "Photocopy of Notice of Lis Pendens dated March 22, 1989 from
the Presidential Commission on Good Government . . . informing the [Register of Deeds of San
Fabian, Pangasinan] that the following properties are deemed sequestered and the subject of
Civil Case No. [0]007 . . . : TCT No. 138076 (property located at Nibalew, San Fabian,
Pangasinan), Beach House located in San Fabian, Pangasinan, and House with Property Index
No. 013-31-018 located at Nibalew West, San Fabian, Pangasinan."
154
Id. at 1762, Republic’s Memorandum.
155
Id. at 1028–1029, Formal Offer of Evidence. Exhibit "KK-51" refers to the "Certified true
copy of a letter of sequestration dated June 19, 1986 of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government . . . addressed to Mr. Lucio C. Tan, Chairman of Allied Banking Corporation
regarding [the] sequestration of shares of stock in the . . . bank in the names of Lucio C. Tan, Iris
Holdings & Dev. Corp., Mariano Tanenglian, Virgo Holdings & Dev. Corp., Ignacio B.
Gimenez, and Jewel Holdings, Inc., consisting of two (2) pages." Exhibit "KK-51-A" refers to
the "Bracketed portion of Exhibit ‘51’ with the name of Ignacio B. Gimenez with 44,089
common shares . . . listed." Exhibit "KK-52" refers to the "Certified true copy of Writ of
Sequestration . . . regarding the sequestration of the shares of stock of Roberto O. Olanday,
Ignacio B. Gimenez, Aracely Olanday, Oscar Agcaoili and Grid Investments, Inc." Exhibit "KK-
52-A" refers to the "Bracketed portion on Exhibit "52" of the name of Ignacio B. Gimenez."
156
Id. at 1763, Republic’s Memorandum.
157
Id. at 1029, Formal Offer of Evidence. Exhibit "NN" refers to the "Certified xerox copy of a
Memorandum To All Commercial Banks dated March 14, 1986 issued by [the] Governor of the
Central Bank of the Philippines, regarding the letter dated March 13, 1986 of Mary Concepcion
Bautista, Commissioner of [PCGG]." Exhibit "OO" refers to the "Certified xerox copy of a letter
dated March 13, 1986 of Mary Concepcion Bautista, [PCGG Commissioner], regarding [the]
names to be added to the [list of persons not allowed to make] any withdrawal or transfer of
funds from the deposit accounts, trust accounts, and/or money market placements under the
names of said persons without written authority from the PCGG[.]" Exhibit "PP" refers to the
same exhibit as ‘OO’; Exhibit "PP-1" refers to the "Bracketed portion on Exhibit ‘PP’ of the
names of Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Jimenez [sic] appearing as No. 14 in the list of names."
Exhibit "QQ" is the "Same as Exhibit ‘NN’." Exhibit "QQ-1" refers to the "Bracketed portion on
Exhibit ‘QQ’ of the names of Ignacio Jimenez [sic] and Fe Jimenez [sic] appearing as No. 14 in
the list of names."
158
Id. at 1763, Republic’s Memorandum.
159
Id. at 1029–1030, Formal Offer of Evidence. Exhibit "RR" refers to the "Photocopy of
Affidavit dated July 24, 1987 of Dominador Pangilinan, Former Acting President and President
of Traders Royal Bank, consisting of twenty-two (22) pages[.]" Exhibits "RR-1" to "RR-3" refer
to pages 2–4 of Pangilinan’s Affidavit. Exhibit "RR-4" refers to Annex A of Pangilinan’s
Affidavit. Exhibits "RR-5" to "RR-7" refer to the "Status of Bankers Acceptances dated July 30,
1978 [regarding] A/C # 20, consisting of three (3) pages, attached to [Pangilinan’s affidavit.]"
Exhibit "RR-8" refers to the "Recapitulation as of February 28, 1982 attached to [Pangilinan’s
affidavit.]" Exhibits "RR-9" to "RR-20" refer to the "Status of Funds of A/C # 128 as of June 4,
1979, consisting of twelve (12) pages, attached to [Pangilinan’s affidavit.]" Exhibit "RR-21"
refers to "Annex ‘B’ of [Pangilinan’s affidavit], which is the Savings Account Ledger of
Account No. 50100060-6 at Traders Royal Bank." Exhibit "RR-22" refers to paragraph 1 of
Pangilinan’s affidavit. Exhibit "RR-23" refers to the "First sentences of paragraph 4 of
[Pangilinan’s affidavit], which reads: ‘In about 1977 or 1978, Mr. Rivera told me that funds were
being given to him by Ms. Fe Gimenez for deposit into trust accounts maintained with TRB.’"
160
Id. at 1764, Republic’s Memorandum.
161
Id. at 1030–1032, Formal Offer of Evidence. Exhibit "SS" refers to the "Photocopy of the
Affidavit dated July 23, 1987 of Apolinario K. Medina, Executive Vice-President of Traders
Royal Bank, consisting of twenty-nine (29) pages including the annexes." Exhibits "SS-1" to
"SS-3" refer to pages 2–4 of Medina’s affidavit. Exhibit "SS-4" refers to Annex "A" of Medina’s
affidavit. Exhibits "SS-6" to "SS-8" refer to the "Status of Bankers Acceptances dated July 30,
1978 re A/C # 20[.]" Exhibit "SS-9" refers to the "Recapitulation as of February 28, 1982
attached to [Medina’s affidavit.]" Exhibits "SS-10" to "SS-21" refer to the "Status of Funds re
A/C # 128 as of June 4, 1979[.]" Exhibit "SS-22" refers to Annex "B" of Medina’s Affidavit
which pertains to the message of Traders Royal Bank to California Overseas Bank, Los Angeles
dated September 28, 1981. Exhibit "SS-23" refers to Annex "C" of Medina’s affidavit which
pertains to the message of Traders Royal Bank Manila to Chemical Bank, New York dated
September 28, 1981. Exhibit "SS-24" refers to Annex "D" of Medina’s affidavit which pertains
to the message of Traders Royal Bank Manila to Bankers Trust Co., New York dated September
28, 1981. Exhibit "SS-25" refers to Annex "E" of Medina’s affidavit which pertains to the
message of Traders Royal Bank Manila to Irving Trust Company New York dated September 28,
1981. Exhibit "SS-26" refers to Annex "F" of Medina’s affidavit which pertains to the message
of Traders Royal Bank Manila to California Overseas Bank, Los Angeles dated September 28,
1981. Exhibit "SS-27" refers to Annex "G" of Medina’s affidavit which pertains to the message
of Traders Royal Bank Manila to California Overseas Bank Los Angeles dated September 28,
1981. Exhibit "SS-28" refers to Annex "H" of Medina’s affidavit which pertains to the message
of Traders Royal Bank to Irving Trust Company, New York dated February 16, 1982. Exhibit
"SS-29" refers to the attachment to Medina’s affidavit which pertains to the message of Traders
Royal Bank Manila to Irving Trust Company, New York dated January 12, 1982.
162
Id. at 1766, Republic’s Memorandum.
163
Id. at 1032, Formal Offer of Evidence. Exhibit "TT" refers to the "Memorandum dated July
19, 2005 for Atty. Plutarco B. Bawagan, Jr. from Director Danilo R.V. Daniel, Research &
Development Department of the [PCGG] regarding the investigation conducted on the ill-gotten
wealth of spouses Ignacio and Fe Roa Gimenez[.]" Exhibits "TT-1" to "TT-3" refer to pages 2–4
of Mr. Daniel’s Memorandum.
164
Id. at 1766, Republic’s Memorandum.
165
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 38, 59 (1998) [Per
J. Romero, Third Division]. See Heirs of Lourdes Sabanpan v. Comorposa, 456 Phil. 161, 172
(2003) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; RULES OF COURT, Rule 128, sec. 3 provides:

SEC. 3. Admissibility of evidence.— Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and
is not excluded by the law or these rules.
166
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 38, 59–60 (1998)
[Per J. Romero, Third Division].
167
657 Phil. 536 (2011) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].
168
Id. at 542.
169
Id.
170
See Nepomuceno, et al. v. Commission on Elections, et al., 211 Phil. 623, 628 (1983) [Per J.
Escolin, En Banc], Oropesa v. Oropesa, G.R. No. 184528, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 174, 185
[Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division], and Casent Realty Development Corporation v.
Philbanking Corporation, 559 Phil. 793, 801–802 (2007) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].
171
Nepomuceno, et al. v. Commission on Elections, et al., 211 Phil. 623, 628 (1983) [Per J.
Escolin, En Banc].
172
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 341 Phil. 432, 440
(1997) [Per J. Francisco, Third Division].
173
679 Phil. 30 (2012) [Per J. Sereno (now C.J.), Second Division].
174
Id. at 41–42. In Lu Ym v. Nabua, 492 Phil. 397, 404 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division],
"an interlocutory order . . . neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case[;] it [still] leaves
something to be done [on the part of] the court before the case is finally decided on the merits."
175
Uy v. Chua, 616 Phil. 768, 783–784 (2009) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
176
Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88709, February 11, 1992, 206
SCRA 127, 133 [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
177
RULES OF COURT, Rule 8, sec. 10 provides:

SEC. 10. Specific denial.— A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of
which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters
upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an
averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the
remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth of a material averment made to the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have
the effect of a denial.
178
Philippine Bank of Communications v. Spouses Go, 658 Phil. 43, 57 (2011) [Per J. Mendoza,
Second Division].
179
Rollo, p. 147, Complaint.
180
Id. at 168, Answer.
181
Id. at 149–151, Complaint.
182
Id. at 168–169, Answer.
183
540 Phil. 422 (2006) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., First Division].
184
Id. at 441.
185
Id.
186
Philippine Bank of Communications v. Spouses Go, 658 Phil. 43, 58 (2011) [Per J. Mendoza,
Second Division].
187
Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 464 Phil. 331, 339 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr.,
Second Division].
188
Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v. Velarde, 482 Phil. 193, 206–207 (2004) [Per J. Austria-
Martinez, Second Division]. See Quebral v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 387, 405–406 (1996)
[Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
189
RULES OF COURT, Rule 33, sec. 1 provides:

SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.— After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law
the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present
evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

G.R. Nos.195011-19 September 30, 2013

GREGORIO SINGIAN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (3RD DIVISION), THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONON GOOD GOVERNMENT, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The grant or denial of a Demurrer to Evidence is left to the sound discretion of the court, and its
ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion.
This Petition for Certiorari Ad Cautelam1seeks to set aside the August 5, 2010 Resolution2 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 26297-26305,denying petitioner Gregorio Singian, Jr.'s
Demurrer to Evidence3 and the November 18, 2010 Resolution4denying reconsideration thereof.
Antecedents

The criminal cases involved in the present Petition have been the subject of a previous
disposition of the Court, specifically Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan.5 In said case, the Court made
the following recital of facts:

Atty. Orlando L. Salvador was Presidential Commission On Good Government Consultant on

detail with the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans (Committee). He was also the
coordinator of the Technical Working Group composed of officers and employees of government
financing institutions to examine and study the reports and recommendations of the Asset
Privatization Trust relating to loan accounts in all government financing institutions. Among the
accounts acted upon by the Committee were the loans granted to Integrated Shoe, Inc. (ISI) by
the Philippine National Bank (PNB).

It would appear that on 18 January 1972, ISI applied for a five-year confirmed irrevocable
deferred letter of credit amounting to US$2,500,000.00 (₱16,287,500.00) to finance its purchase
of a complete line of machinery and equipment. The letter of credit was recommended to the
PNB Board of Directors by then Senior Vice[-]President, Mr. Constantino Bautista.

On 27 January 1972, the PNB approved the loan, subject to certain stipulations. The said letter of
credit was to be secured by the following collaterals: a) a second mortgage on a 10,367-square
meter lot under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 218999 with improvements, machinery and
equipment; b) machinery and equipment to be imported under the subject letter of credit; and c)
assignment of US$0.50 per pair of shoes of ISI’s export sales. It was further subjected to the
following pertinent conditions: a) that the letter of credit be subject to joint and several
signatures of Mr. Francisco J. Teodoro, Mrs. Leticia T. Teodoro, Marfina T. Singian, Tomas
Teodoro, and Gregorio Singian, Jr.; b) that ISI, which has a paid-up capital amounting to
₱1,098,750.00 as of January1972, shall increase its authorized capital to ₱5,000,000.00, and in
the event that cash receipts do not come up to the projections, or as may be required by the bank,
ISI will further increase its capitalization and the present stockholders will subscribe to their
present holdings; and c) that ISI shall submit other collaterals incase the appraised value of the
new machinery and equipment be insufficient.

ISI was further extended the following subsequent loan accommodations:

1. ₱1,500,000.00 on 10 February 1972 for the purchase of raw materials;

2. ₱1,000,000.00 on 18 January 1973 as export advance;

3. ₱1,500,000.00 on 21 March 1973 as export advance;

4. ₱600,000.00 on 06 March 1974 as credit line;

5. ₱2,500,000.00 renewed on 15 December 1976;

6. ₱5,000,000.00 on 19 November 1978 as export advance;

7. ₱1,500,000.00 on 04 August 1980 as export advance; and

8. ₱7,000,000.00 on 15 December 1980 also as an export advance.

The Committee found that the loans extended to ISI bore characteristics of behest loans
specifically for not having been secured with sufficient collaterals and obtained with undue
haste.
As a result, Atty. Orlando Salvador filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a sworn complaint
dated 20 March 1996, for violation of Section 3, paragraphs (e) and (g), of Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, against the following: Panfilo Domingo, former PNB President, Constantino
Bautista, former PNB Senior Vice-President, Domingo Ingco, former member of the PNB Board
of Directors, John Does, former members of the PNB Board of Directors, Francisco Teodoro,
President of ISI, Leticia Teodoro, Vice-President of ISI, Marfina Singian, Incorporator of ISI,
Tomas Teodoro, General Manager of ISI, and Gregorio Singian, Jr., Executive Vice-President of
ISI. The complaint, docketed as OMB-0-96-0967, was assigned to Graft Investigation Officer I
Atty. Edgar R. Navales (Investigator Navales) of the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation
Bureau (EPIB) for investigation.

xxxx

Hence, the corresponding eighteen (18) Informations against petitioner and his co-accused for
violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Rep. Act No. 3019,docketed as Criminal Cases No. 26297 to
No. 26314, were filed before the Sandiganbayan and were raffled to the Third Division thereof.
The eighteen (18)Informations correspond to the nine (9) loan accommodations granted to ISI,
each loan being the subject of two informations alleging violations of both paragraphs of Section
3 of Rep. Act No. 3019.6

Thus, herein petitioner was charged with nine counts of violation of Section 3(e),7 and another
nine counts of violation of Section 3(g),8 of Republic Act No.3019 (RA 3019), or the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 26297-26314, the cases involved the
purported granting of behest loans by the government’s Philippine National Bank (PNB) to
Integrated Shoes, Inc. (ISI), in various amounts and on different dates as above-enumerated.

The Informations9 covering Section 3(e) charged that Panfilo Domingo(Domingo), then PNB
Director/President/Vice-President (Europe); Domingo C. Ingco (Ingco), then PNB Director; and
Constantino Bautista (Bautista), then PNB Senior Executive Vice-President, while in the
performance of their official functions and taking advantage of their official positions, conspired
with private individuals, specifically officers of ISI, including petitioner, who was ISI’s
Executive Vice-President, in willfully, unlawfully and criminally causing undue injury to the
government and giving unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to ISI by
accommodating and granting several loans and advances to the latter, despite knowing that it
lacked sufficient capitalization, or failed to give adequate collateral or raise its working capital to
secure the government’s interest in case it failed to pay said loans, as in fact it failed to pay these
loans.

On the other hand, the Informations10 covering Section 3(g) charged the above individuals,
including petitioner, with conspiring, confederating, and willfully, unlawfully and criminally
entering into the above-mentioned loan transactions which are grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government, for lack of sufficient capitalization or adequate collateral,
and for failure of ISI to raise its working capital to secure the government’s interest in case it
failed to pay said loans, which indeed ISI failed to pay.

On January 27, 2004, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty on all counts. All the other accused
were arraigned as well, except for Bautista, who passed away prior to his scheduled arraignment.

On April 29, 2005, the Sandiganbayan dismissed Criminal Case Nos.26306-26314.11 On October
6, 2007, the accused Ingco passed away; as a result, the cases against him were dismissed as
well. Accused Domingo likewise passed away on June 26, 2008 resulting in an October 29, 2008
Resolution wherein the Sandiganbayan dropped the cases against him.
Trial with respect to the remaining cases ensued. For its testimonial evidence, the prosecution
called to the stand nine witnesses:

1. Director Danilo R.V. Daniel, then Coordinator of the Technical Working Group on Behest
Loans (TWG) and Director of the Research Division of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), who testified on the investigation conducted by the TWG of the ISI
account and on various documents relative thereto, including the Fourteenth (14th) Report of
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans12 (Ad Hoc Committee) dated
July15, 1993 which he drafted, and which characterized the ISI account as a behest loan;13

2. Atty. Reginald Bacolor from the Legal Department, Privatization Management Office of the
Asset Privatization Trust (APT), who testified on the deeds, documents and titles covering the
foreclosed properties offered as collaterals in the ISI account and thereafter sold by the
government through the APT;14

3. Atty. Edwin Flor V. Barroga, then Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Binangonan, Rizal, who
testified on the property offered as collateral by ISI, which was the subject of a prior
encumbrance to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS);15

4. Atty. Cinderella Benitez, Securities Counsel II of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), who testified on ISI’s SEC documents, specifically its capitalization and financial status.
She identified certified copies of ISI’s Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws, Amended Articles of
Incorporation, Certificates of Increase of Capital Stock, etc.;16

5. Atty. Mary Ann B. Morales, SEC Securities Counsel III from its Registration and Monitoring
Department, who likewise testified on ISI’s SEC documents. She identified ISI’s General
Information Sheets, Schedule of Stockholders, Subscribed and Paid-Up Capital, Certificate of
Corporate Filing/Information, etc. She testified, among others, that as of 1973, ISI’s subscribed
capital stock was only ₱1.6 million, while its paid-up capital was merely₱1,298,750.00;17

6. Cesar Luis Pargas, of the Privatization Management Office, APT, custodian of ISI’s loan
documents, who testified on and brought with him the loan documents, deeds, titles, notes, etc.
covering the ISI account;18

7. Claro Bernardino, Senior Manager of PNB’s Human Resource Group, who brought the
personnel records/certificates of employment of the accused Domingo and Ingco;19

8. Ramonchito Bustamante, Manager of the Loans and Implementing Services Division of PNB,
expert witness on banking policy and PNB’s loan policies, as well as ISI’s loan data; and20

9. Stephen Tanchuling, Chief Administrative Officer of the Records Division of the Research
Department of the PCGG, custodian of documents turned over to PCGG by the Ad Hoc
Committee. He testified that his function was to authenticate documents in his custody, which
consisted of records transmitted to the Ad Hoc Committee by different government agencies. He
identified as well the Executive Summary21 of the ISI account; the Fourteenth (14th) Report of
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans dated July 15, 1993; the
Executive Summary of the Ad Hoc Committee Findings; and other relevant documents.22

For its documentary evidence, the prosecution presented the following, among others:

1) Photocopy of the Fourteenth (14th) Report of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on

Behest Loans23 which listed ISI as among the corporations with loans obtained from the
government or government banks (in this case, PNB)which were found to possess the
characteristics of a behest loan;
2) Photocopy of an Executive Summary of Findings of the Ad Hoc Committee,24 detailing the
particulars of the ISI account;

3) Photocopy of the certified true copy of the January 10, 1972 Memorandum25 from Bautista to
the PNB Board of Directors, detailing Bautista’s findings and recommendations regarding ISI’s
application for a $2.5 million(₱16,287,500.00) letter of credit for the purpose of purchasing
machinery and equipment for a new shoe factory then being built in Bataan.

4) Certified photocopy of a Deed of Undertaking and Conformity to Bank Conditions26 (Deed of

Undertaking) dated March 24, 1972 executed by ISI in favor of PNB;

5) Certified photocopy of a Deed of Assignment27 dated March 24, 1972,assigning $0.50 per pair
of shoes of all export sales of ISI in favor of PNB;

6) Certified photocopy of Chattel Mortgage with Power of Attorney28 executed by ISI in favor of
PNB;

7) Certified true copy of Certificate of Filing of Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock29 issued
by the SEC dated February 6, 1974, showing that ISI increased its authorized capital stock from
₱3 million to ₱7 million; and

8) Certified true copy of the By-Laws of Integrated Pacific, Inc. (ISI’s predecessor
corporation).30

After the presentation of its testimonial and documentary evidence, the prosecution rested its
case and filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits.31 The respondent court admitted in toto the State’s
documentary exhibits.

Petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence

On February 17, 2010, petitioner, with prior leave, filed a Demurrer to Evidence32 anchored on
the following grounds: (1) lack of proof of conspiracy with any PNB official; (2) the contracts
with PNB contained provisions that are beneficial, and not manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous, to the government; (3)the loans could not be characterized as behest loans
because they were secured by sufficient collaterals and ISI increased its capitalization; and (4)
assuming the loans are behest loans, petitioner could not be held liable for lack of any
participation.33

In particular, petitioner claimed that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence of conspiracy to
defraud the government because his co-accused from PNB had no power to approve the alleged
behest loans; that if a theory of conspiracy were to be pursued, then all the members of the
PNB’s Board of Directors at the time the loans and credit accommodations to ISI were approved,
and not only Domingo and Ingco, should have been impleaded as they were the ones who
directed PNB’s affairs; that the prosecution failed to show that he exercised any kind of
influence over PNB’s Board of Directors in order to ensure the grant of the loans and
accommodations applied for; and for failure to present evidence that the accused colluded with
each other in entering into the loan agreements and accommodations.

Petitioner contended further that the contracts and agreements entered into by and between PNB
and ISI were standard contracts used by PNB in its dealings with its clients; that the terms
thereof were couched in words and fashioned in a manner that favored the bank; that the
agreements guaranteed repayment of the loan and the putting up of sufficient collateral, and
provided for interest and penalties in the event of breach, and thus were not grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
Next, petitioner argued that the subject loans were not undercollateralized; that ISI was not
undercapitalized as the corresponding increase in its authorized capital stock and paid-up capital
was timely made; and that the loans could not have been characterized as behest loans
considering the following stipulations: a) the assets intended for acquisition through the letter of
credit would serve as the collateral therefor; b) the officers and majority stockholders of ISI were
made jointly and severally liable for its obligations; c) ISI may not declare dividends while the
loans are subsisting; d) PNB is given the right to designate its Comptroller in ISI; and e) even if
it is assumed for the sake of argument that the subject loans were undercollateralized, this fact –
standing alone – does not make for a behest loan, as the presence of at least two (2) criteria out
of the eight enumerated in Presidential Memorandum Order No. 61 dated November 9, 1992is
required to characterize the loans as behest loans.

Assuming that the loan agreements are behest loans, petitioner claimed that he may not be held
liable because his indictment was based solely on the Deed of Undertaking which was altered
such that his name was stricken out and instead the name "Gregorio T. Teodoro" was inserted;
that the accountee-mortgagor-assignor under said deed was ISI; that the obligations were
assumed by ISI; that ISI had already fully complied with all its obligations under the deed; and
that he was not a member of ISI’s Board of Directors, which alone was tasked – as ISI’s
governing body – with the observance of the obligations set forth under the deed; nor may he
seek to compel action thereon at a stockholders’ meeting, as he is not a shareholder of ISI either.

Finally, petitioner claimed that the Ad Hoc Committee documents – specifically the Executive
Summary and Fourteenth (14th) Report of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans – are inadmissible for not being photocopies of the originals, but mere copies of
photocopies in the custody of the PCGG; and that they were prepared and issued by individuals
who have no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances which transpired during the
proceedings adverted to.

Petitioner thus prayed that as against him, Criminal Case Nos. 26297-26305 be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.

Prosecution’s Opposition

In its Opposition,34 the prosecution insisted that conspiracy may be inferred from the following
pattern of events:

a. The frequency of the loans or closeness of the dates at which they were granted;

b. The quantity of the loans granted;

c. The failure of PNB to verify and to take any action on ISI’s failure to put up additional
capitalization and additional collaterals; and d. The eventual absence of any action by PNB to
collect full payment from ISI.35

The prosecution noted that without ISI putting up additional capitalization or collateral, PNB
kept granting loans to it, such that in 1973, its in debtedness already rose to ₱16,360,000.00
while its capital stock stood at only ₱7 million; that petitioner is intimately connected with the
incorporators and officers of ISI – Leticia Teodoro is his mother-in-law, while Francisco
Teodoro is his father-in-law; and Marfina Teodoro-Singian is his wife; that as of 1983, ISI’s debt
to PNB amounted to ₱71,847,217.00, as a result of the undercapitalized and undercollateralized
loans extended to it; and that as signatory to the Deed of Undertaking, petitioner assumed the
obligations of a surety.
Finally, the prosecution noted that petitioner’s arguments in his Demurrer to Evidence constitute
matters of defense which should be passed upon only after trial on the merits.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

On August 5, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed Resolution, which decreed as
follows:

WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, this Court DENIES the Demurrer to Evidence
filed by accused Gregorio Singian, Jr. as the evidence for the prosecution sufficiently established
the essential elements of the offense charged and overcame the presumption of innocence in
favor of said accused.

SO ORDERED.36

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration37 having been denied on November 18, 2010 by the
respondent court, he filed the present Petition for Certiorari.

Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSEOF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OFJURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED THE
ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS XX X CONSIDERING THAT:

I.

THE FIRST ELEMENT OF SECTION 3(G) OF R.A. 3019 IS NOT PRESENTBECAUSE THE
EXISTENCE OF CONSPIRACY IS NEGATED BY THEFACT THAT THE PUBLIC
OFFICERS WHO WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR GRANTING THE LOANS IN QUESTION
WERE NEVER CHARGED, ACCUSED OR INCLUDED IN THE INFORMATIONS
SUBJECT OFTHESE CASES.

II.

EVEN IF IT IS PRESUMED, PURELY IN GRATIA ARGUMENT IS, THAT ACONSPIRACY

ATTENDED THE GRANT OF THE QUESTIONED LOANSTO ISI, THERE IS,
NEVERTHELESS, NO OVERT ACT ATTRIBUTABLETO THE PETITIONER THAT EVEN
REMOTELY JUSTIFIES HISINCLUSION IN THE PROSECUTION’S CONSPIRACY
DRAGNET.

III.

THE PROSECUTION’S EXHIBITS "C" (ALSO MARKED AS EXHIBIT"RR") AND "QQ"

WHICH THE PROSECUTION FOISTED TO MAKE ITAPPEAR THAT THE CREDIT
ACCOMMODATIONS SUBJECT OF THECRIMINAL CASES BELOW ARE BEHEST
LOANS, DO NOT HAVE ANYPROBATIVE VALUE AND ARE COMPLETELY
INADMISSIBLEBECAUSE THEY ARE UNDISPUTABLY AND BLATANTLYHEARSAY.38

Petitioner’s Arguments

Essentially, petitioner reiterates all his arguments in his Demurrer to Evidence and Motion for
Reconsideration of the respondent court’s denial thereof. He emphasizes, however, that he had
nothing to do with the application and grant of the questioned loans, since he was never a
member of ISI’s Board of Directors which, under the law and ISI by-laws, had the sole power
and authority to approve and obtain loans and give collaterals to secure the same; nor is he a
stockholder of ISI. Nor has it been shown from the testimonial and documentary evidence that as
Executive Vice-President, he participated in ISI’s loan and credit transactions, or that he actively
participated in the commission of the crimes of which he is charged. Without such proof,
petitioner believes that he may not be charged with conspiracy.

Petitioner adds that no evidence was presented as well to show that he had any participation in
PNB’s failure to verify and take action against ISI to compel it to put up additional capital and
collaterals, or that he was responsible for PNB’s failure to collect or secure full payment of the
ISI credit.

Finally, petitioner justifies his resort to certiorari on the argument that the collective acts of the
prosecution and the respondent court constitute a denial of his constitutional right to due process,
which gives ground for the availment of the extraordinary remedy.39

Respondents’ Arguments

In its Comment,40 the prosecution asserts that the respondent court did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in denying the Demurrer to Evidence arguing that in petitioner’s case, all the
elements under Section 3(g) exist to hold petitioner liable. It adds that petitioner was part of the
conspiracy to defraud the government, as evidenced by his participation and signature in the
Deed of Undertaking, the terms of which ISI violated and PNB failed to enforce.

On the other hand, the PCGG in its Comment41 adopts the arguments of the prosecution and
asserts that the respondent court arrived at its conclusion after careful examination of the record
and the evidence, which justify a finding sustaining petitioner’s indictment. It adds that all the
elements of the crime under Section 3(g) have been proved, which thus justifies a denial of
petitioner’s Demurrer to Evidence.

Our Ruling

The Court dismisses the Petition.

Demurrer to evidence

"A demurrer to the evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that
the evidence which his adversary produced is in sufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to
make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole
evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in
a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to
sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt."42

"Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in character,
weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded according to the
circumstances. To be considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the
commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused."43

Elements of Section 3(g), RA 3019

For one to be successfully prosecuted under Section 3(g) of RA 3019, the following elements
must be proven: "1) the accused is a public officer; 2) the public officer entered into a contract or
transaction on behalf of the government; and 3) the contract or transaction was grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government."44However, private persons may likewise be
charged with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 if they conspired with the public officer.
Thus, "if there is an allegation of conspiracy, a private person may be held liable together with
the public officer, in consonance with the avowed policy of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act which is ‘to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which may
constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.’"45

The Sandiganbayan found competent

or sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment or to support a verdict of
guilt for violation of Section 3(g), RA 3019

The Sandiganbayan found that the prosecution presented sufficient or competent evidence to
establish the three material elements of Section 3(g) of RA3019. First, although petitioner is a
private person, he was shown to have connived with his co-accused. Second, ISI and PNB
entered into several loan transactions and credit accommodations. Finally, the loan transactions
proved disadvantageous to the government.

There is no grave abuse of discretion on

the part of the Sandiganbayan in
denying petitioner’s Demurrer to
Evidence

At the outset, we emphasize that "the resolution of a demurrer to evidence should be left to the
exercise of sound judicial discretion. A lower court’s order of denial shall not be disturbed, that
is, the appellate courts will not review the prosecution’s evidence and precipitately decide
whether such evidence has established the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, unless
accused has established that such judicial discretion has been gravely abused, there by amounting
to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. Mere allegations of such abuse will not suffice."46

"Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of
the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility."47

In this case, petitioner miserably failed to present an iota of evidence to show that the
Sandiganbayan abused, much more, gravely abused, its discretion in denying petitioner’s
Demurrer to Evidence. We agree with the PCGG’s observation that the Sandiganbayan arrived at
its conclusion after a careful and deliberate examination and assessment of all the evidence
submitted. A closer scrutiny of the assailed Resolutions would indeed show that the
Sandiganbayan meticulously discussed both testimonial and documentary evidence presented by
the prosecution.48It was only after a careful analysis of the facts and evidence presented did the
respondent court lay down its findings and conclusions.49

Based on the evidence presented, the Sandiganbayan was convinced that all three elements of
Section 3(g), RA 3019 were satisfactorily established. It found that PNB and ISI entered into
several contracts or loan transactions. The Sandiganbayan also assessed that petitioner conspired
with his co-accused in defrauding the government considering "(1) the frequency of the loans or
closeness of the dates at which they were granted; (2) the quantity of the loans granted; (3) the
failure of the bank to verify and to take any action on the failure of ISI to put up additional
capitalization and additional collaterals; and (4) the eventual absence of any action by the Bank
to collect full payment from ISI."50 The Sandiganbayan ratiocinated that –
x x x the loans subject of this case refer to not just one but several loans. The first two loans were
granted in a span of two months x x x The first loan was in the amount of ₱16,287,500.00 when
the capital stock of ISI amounted to only₱1,000,000.00. This was followed by two additional
loans in January and March 1973 x x x then another loan x x x in the following year x x x. Two
years later x x x ISI obtained another loan x x x which was succeeded by an additional loan x x
x. Still, ISI was granted two more loans x x x.

xxxx

However, all loans subject of this case were granted despite failure of ISI to raise its working
capital, and to put up additional collateral. The Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of
Incorporation and the Amended Articles of Incorporation likewise show that ISI last increased its
authorized capital stock to₱7,000,000.00 on April 27, 1973, when the indebtedness of the
corporation was already ₱16,360,000.00. Indeed, it would appear that inaction on the part of the
PNB to notify ISI to further increase its capital and the corresponding inaction on the part of ISI
to comply with its undertaking indicate conspiracy between the accused.

Accused-movant further negates his liability by asserting that his name does not appear in the
Deed of Undertaking, and neither has he signed the same. A cursory examination of the Deed,
however, reveals otherwise. It also bears stressing at this point that as he has never denied his
position as Executive Vice-President of ISI, he would undeniably have participation in its
transactions, especially where loan accommodations of the corporation are concerned.51

The Sandiganbayan also found that the loan transactions were grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government. Based on the documentary evidence presented by the
prosecution, it noted that ISI was undercapitalized while the loans were undercollateralized. It
also noted that the government was only able to foreclose properties amounting to ₱3 million
whereas ISI’s indebtedness stood at more than ₱71 million.

Based on the foregoing, we find no showing that "the conclusions made by the Sandiganbayan
on the sufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution at the time the prosecution rested its case,
were manifestly mistaken."52 The Sandiganbayan did not exercise its judgment in a whimsical or
capricious manner.1âwphi1 As we aptly held:

Given the sufficiency of the testimonial and documentary evidence against petitioner, it would,
therefore, be premature at this stage of the proceedings to conclude that the prosecution’s
evidence failed to establish petitioner’s participation in the alleged conspiracy to commit the
crime. Likewise, the Court cannot, at this point, make a categorical pronouncement that the guilt
of the petitioner has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. As there is competent and
sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for the crime charged, it behooves petitioner to
adduce evidence on his behalf to controvert the asseverations of the prosecution. Withal,
respondent court did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found that there was a prima facie
case against petitioner warranting his having to go forward with his defensive evidence.

The determination of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence presented by the

prosecution as to establish a prima facie case against an accused is left to the exercise of sound
judicial discretion. Unless there is a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss or a demurrer to
evidence may not be disturbed.53

Similarly, we have also ruled that:

When there is no showing of such grave abuse, certiorari is not the proper remedy. Rather, the
appropriate recourse from an order denying a demurrer to evidence is for the court to proceed
with the trial, after which the accused may file an appeal from the judgment of the lower court
rendered after such trial. In the present case, we are not prepared to rule that the Sandiganbayan
has gravely abused its discretion when it denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence. Public
respondent found that the prosecution’s evidence satisfactorily established the elements of the
crime charged. Correspondingly, there is nothing in the records of this case nor in the pleadings
of petitioner that would show otherwise.54

At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that the issues raised herein are almost the same as those
raised by petitioner before the Court when he questioned the Sandiganbayan’s denial of his
Motion for Re-determination of Existence of Probable Cause.55 In resolving petitioner’s
contention that he should not be made liable for ISI’s failure to put up additional capitalization
and collaterals because he is not a member of the Board of Directors, the Court declared that:

True, the power to increase capitalization and to offer or give collateral to secure indebtedness
are lodged with the corporation’s Board of Directors. However, this does not mean that the
officers of the corporation other than the Board of Directors cannot be made criminally liable for
their criminal acts if it can be proven that they participated therein. In the instant case, there is
evidence that petitioners participated in the loan transactions when he signed the undertaking. x x
x56

Anent the issue regarding the sufficiency of ISI’s collateral, we also declared the same to be "a
matter of defense which should be best ventilated in a full-blown trial."57 Moreover, we declared
that –

Fifth. It is petitioner's view that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence that he took part in any
conspiracy relative to the grant of the loan transactions. Suffice it to state that the alleged
absence of any conspiracy among the accused is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense,
the truth of which can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.58

In fine, we hold that "the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in
nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits,"
and "the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as admissibility of
testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper."59 Petitioner's claims and
defenses in his Demurrer to Evidence can best be tackled during trial. In the presentation of his
defense, he shall have the opportunity to explain or show why he should not be made liable. For
example, if there is any truth to the allegation in his Demurrer of Evidence that the Deed of
Undertaking was altered, or that the signature therein affixed is not his own, such that there arise
serious doubts as to his participation in the execution of said document, this can be resolved only
upon proof presented during trial. Petitioner must present evidence regarding such claim, the
truth of which he can demonstrate during trial. Since this Court is not a trier of facts, there is no
way that this issue can be resolved by this Court at this stage of he proceedings.

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the respondent court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner's Demurrer to Evidence; it was done in the proper exercise of its
jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD* JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Per Raffle dated September 30.2013.

1
Rollo. pp. 3-48.
2
Id. at 50-67; penned by Associate Justice Alex L. Quiroz and concurred in by Associate
Justices Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr. and Samuel R. Martires.
3
Id. at 74-105.
4
Id at 68-72
5
514 Phil. 536 (2005).
6
Id. at 539-543.
7
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative
or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
8
g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit
thereby.
9
Rollo, pp. 134-136, 140-142, 146-148, 152-154, 158-160, 164-166, 170-172, 176-178, 182-
184.
10
Id. at 131-133, 137-139, 143-145, 149-151, 155-157, 161-163, 167-169, 173-175, 179-181.
11
Covering Section 3(e) of REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019.
12
Rollo , pp. 304-309.
13
Id. at 58-59.
14
Id. at 60.
15
Id. at 61.
16
Id. at 56-57.
17
Id. at 58.
18
Id. at 55.
19
Id. at 57-58.
20
Id. at 59-60.
21
Id. at 295-303.
22
Id. at 62.
23
Id. at 305-309.
24
Id. at 295-303.
25
Id. at 258-268.
26
Id. at 286-291.
27
Id. at 292-293.
28
See Formal Offer of Exhibits, id. at 197-219, at 200.
29
Id. at 294.
30
Id. at 272-285.
31
Id. at 197-219.
32
Id. at 74-105.
33
Id. at 74-76.
34
Id. at 525-539.
35
Id. at 531.
36
Id. at 67. Emphases in the original.
37
Id. at 109-130.
38
Id. at 22-23.
39
Citing Toledo, Jr. v. People, 174 Phil. 582 (1978).
40
Rollo, pp. 461-497.
41
Id. at 549-568.
42
Soriquez v. Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division), 510 Phil. 709, 706.
43
Gutib v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 293, 300, 305 (1999).
44
Nava v. Palattao, 531 Phil. 345, 372 (2006).
45
Go v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 404, 405-406.
46
Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, 393 Phil. 143, 154 (2000).
47
Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 5 at 545-546.
48
Rollo, pp. 55-62.
49
Id. at 62-67.
50
Id. at 63.
51
Id. at 63-65.
52
Resoso v. Sandiganbayan, 377 Phil. 249, 257 (1999).
53
Soriquez v. Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division), supra note 42 at 718-719.
54
Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 46 at 154-155.
55
See Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 5 at 544-545.
56
Id. at 551.
57
Id. at 550.
58
Id. at 551-552.
59
Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas, 499 Phil. 36, 49-50 (2005); see also Lee v. KBC Bank
N.V., G.R. 164673, January 15, 2010, 610 SCRA 117, 129.