The end of the Cold War ushered in an era of seeming paradox – while American pre-

eminence in material capabilities has been undisputable, US global influence has been
increasingly challenged. Discuss with reference to actors and events that constrained the US
ability to get its way in international affairs.

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2018.
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Zed Books, London.
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<https://www.economist.com/node/21528664>.
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Governance", in , Procedia Economics and Finance, vol. 19, pp. 37-50, viewed 29 April 2018.
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Security, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 147-172.
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viewed 1 May 2018, <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-
defence/article/2133064/china-step-aid-syria-war-winds-down>.
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refashioning of US exceptionalism", in , International Politics, vol. 53, no. 2, pp. 220-
238.
17. Zhang, X 2017, "Chinese Capitalism and the Maritime Silk Road: A World-Systems
Perspective", Geopolitics, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 310-331
18. Martin, L 2013, "Turkey and the USA in a Bipolarizing Middle East", Journal of Balkan
and Near Eastern Studies, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 175-188.
19. Sorenson, D 2016, Syria in Ruins, Praeger, Santa Barbara.
20. Meltzer, A 2013, "End of the “American Century”, Economic and Political Studies, vol.
1, no. 1, pp. 79-88.
21. Layne, C 2012, "This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana",
International Studies Quarterly, vol. 56, no. 1, pp. 203-213.
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an Era of U.S. Decline", International Security, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 41-72.
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Immediate end of the Cold War

- Before discussing factors that limited US influence, important to recognise the
“unipolar moment”:
o Krauthammer, C 1990, The Unipolar Moment, Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no.1,
p.23.
- US material, economic and institutional influence was undisputable and unchallenged
- De Keersmaeker  unilateralism in the NSS
- New World Order Phase  US could be interpreted as a hegemon willing to use its
material capabilities to shape global discourse and provide ideational direction to the
international system:
o George Bush: Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of
the Union 1990, viewed 28 April 2018,
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19253>.
o De Keersmaeker, G. (2017). Polarity, Balance of Power and International
Relations Theory. Palgrave Macmillan. Cham, pp.187-207.
o New National Security Strategy at the end of Cold War: ‘continued
international stability’, ‘continuing leadership role of the US’, ‘multipolarity’
o Consensus around a lasting American dominance became the implicit premise
of American public debate
o Hegemonic stability theory holds that an open international economic system
requires a single hegemonic power to undertake military/economic tasks i.e.
stabilising key regions – Layne, 2012
o Hegemonic discourse – lends credence to the need to spread one’s own
political model and provide order in the international system
- Although there were challenges to the unbridled influence of the US  these
were largely overcome due to America’s hegemony and assertive multilateralism
- Assertive multilateralism:
o The direction and agenda of international affairs was set by the US  its allies
followed
o Samir Amin  triad imperialism  collaboration in economic affairs
- First Gulf War, 2nd Gulf War, Yugoslav Wars, NATO enlargement
- Afghanistan invasion and Iraq War  VERY VERY BIG:
o Demonstrated the ultimate extent of US exceptionalism
o Designation of the Axis of Evil showed the normative capabilities of the US
o Gordy, K & Lee, J 2009, "Rogue Specters: Cuba and North Korea at the
Limits of US Hegemony", Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 34, no. 3,
pp. 229-248.
- US considered itself the ‘powerful force for peace, prosperity and democracy’ hard
and soft power assets:
o GW Bush admin (2002 NSS)
 o Stress on military force
- Latent stresses on American influence:
o Early Russian resistance to the US in terms of Iraq War
o C’za Rice - Admitted the possibility of great power military competitors who
required containment (Russia and China)
o Suggested the possibility of pre-emptive strikes against competitors
Factors that have limited America’s geopolitical influence
- More recently, the unipolar moment has come to an end
Geopolitical camp of Russia and China  sovereignty
- Superpower status not necessarily in material capabilities but in discursiveness
- Sovereignty hawks that limit the US’ disguised unilateralism:
o Russian  state-centric principles, empirical/legal norms
o Non-intervention, sovereignty, territorial integrity
- More importantly  provide ideational and diplomatic support to non-liberal states:
o Anti-hegemonic rhetoric
o Libya as the last straw
o Under unipolarity, any form of balancing is revisionist as opposed to
balancing being the status quo under multipolarity (Schweller and Pu, 2011)
o Current international system is entering a deconcentration /delegitimation
phase:
o Delegitimation involves two components: a delegitimating rhetoric (the
discourse of resistance) and cost-imposing strategies that fall short of full-
fledged balancing behavior (the practice of resistance).
o China has found subtle ways to resist US unipolarity without actually
challenging the dominant ideology of Pax Americana
- Revisionist powers in one sense, but also seeking to uphold the principles of
sovereign equality that should ideally be the basis of modern diplomatic interaction
- Contemporary foreign diplomacy of the Chinese state gives credence to the
arguments that the state might serve as an emancipatory agent which upholds
sovereign equality, territorial integrity, anti-hegemony and global harmony
- Bloc politics has assumed new guises in the trend towards multipolarity:
o Independent choice of political systems and mode of development (Serafettin,
2015)
o Rubinovitz (2018) China and Russia’s vetoes against punishing Syrian
government through tougher sanction, criticism of UN-led intervention in
Libya, peaceful denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula:
 Putin, in the first major remarks from a Russian leader since a coalition
of Western countries began air strikes in Libya, said that Muammar
Gaddafi’s government fell short of democracy but added that did not
justify military intervention. “The resolution is defective and flawed,”
Putin told workers at a Russian ballistic missile factory. “It allows
everything. It resembles medieval calls for crusades.” Putin said that
interference in other countries’ internal affairs has become a trend in
U.S. foreign policy and that the events in Libya indicated that Russia
should strengthen its own defense capabilities. - Putin likens U.N.
Libya resolution to crusade calls 2018, viewed 20 April 2018,
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-russia/putin-likens-u-n-
libya-resolution-to-crusade-calls-idUSTRE72K2J220110321>.
 o Reflects a shared fear that permitting intervention might be used against them
in the future
o Believes that action in the name of humanitarian concerns should not be used
to undermine the legal norms of the international system
 Should be decided in the UNSC (through due process) vis-à-vis Libya
o Fears of security vacuums  prioritisation of international stability (criticism
of Libya, rejection of Syria)

Geopolitical bloc  economic influence

- American economic institutions now failing against the rise of China  limiting
American soft power capacity
- Previously, World Bank and IMF were the only developmental institutions and only
economic framework:
o US basically used it as a tool of policy and used the neoliberal policies to gain
traction in the markets of the global south (Babb, S. and Kentikelenis, A.
(2018). ‘International Financial institutions as Agents of Neoliberalism’. In: D.
Cahill, M. Cooper, M. Konings and D. Primrose, ed., The SAGE Handbook of
Neoliberalism. SAGE Publications Ltd.)
o Privatisation of Bolivian water supply
o Samir Amin  the centralisation of capital accumulation in the US since the
1980’s
- China offers a developmental/economic alternative
o OBOR, BRI, Investment Bank, Trade/aid etc.
o BRICS nations and emerging markets becoming the centres of economic
transactions
o China now has massive investment and traction in the economies of the Global
South (Latin America and Africa) through generous aid programs etc.
 Brazil’s Dilma Rousseff the latest to develop an interest in the way
China ‘does things’ in regard to its political, economic, and social
development (Leahy 2011).  Chodor, 2015
o Crypto-currency being developed in conjunction with Russia Aitken, R
2017, Russian-Chinese Cryptocurrency Alliance Launch Delayed Over
China's ICO Hitch, in , Forbes.com, viewed 27 April 2018,
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogeraitken/2017/09/06/russian-chinese-
cryptocurrency-alliance-launch-delayed-over-chinas-ico-
hitch/#2d3bc24964b5>.
- America also controls massively smaller share of the world market than ever before
o Declining economic growth
 Fiscal crisis in the US
 Downgrading of US treasury bonds
 National debt
o Most of its activity is financial, rather than productive manufacturing
o China is largest economy on a PPP basis
o Largest holder of USD, largest debtor and largest creditor
o RMB soon to become the reserve currency of the world
o If USD loses reserve currency role, US hegemony will become unaffordable:
 Can no longer borrow or print money to finance military dominance
(Layne, 2012)
Rise of regional powers that challenge US allies

- Assertive multipolarity requires both hard and soft power influences through regional
allies
o Rubinovitz 2015 US strategy of offshore balancing requires military and
economic allies who have ‘similar values’ to the US
- However, American allies losing ground in their regional struggles
- China already dominant in East Asia
- In Latin America:
o US Southern Command  securitisation of Latin America through the War on
Drugs/crackdown on so called narco-terrorism
o US also propped numerous unpopular neoliberal governments in the region
(Ecuador – Gutierrez, Bolivia – de Lozada)
o Pink Tide has increasingly challenged US hegemony  elections of legitimate
socialist governments in much of Latin America (Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil,
Nicaragua, Chile, Argentina + Cuba)
o Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America-Peoples' Trade Agreement
 first step in consolidating a regional bloc opposed to America and
neoliberalism  Cuba and Venezuela challenging US hegemony through
offering a developmental alternatice
o Chodor, T 2015, Neoliberal hegemony and the Pink Tide in Latin America,
Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire.
- More prominently, Iran is becoming the largest and most dominant regional player in
the Middle East against the power of the Gulf States:
o Hezbollah and the Assad government defeating the Saudi and Gulf-backed
proxies
o Syrian alliance is critical for Iran’s deterrent strategy against US and Israel
o Retain geographical link to Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas/PIJ/PFLP in
Gaza via Syria
o Alawite (Shia) dominated governments in both Syria and Iraq are beneficial
o Iranian backed Houthis are dominant in the Yemeni provisional government
resisting Saudi-led coalition airstrikes
o Withdrawal of US forces from Iraq allowed Iran to spread influence in the
Shia dominated governments of Nouri al-Maliki and then Haider al-Abadi, as
well providing material support to Shi’ite militias against Sunni insurgents
o Russia wants to maintain oil pipelines between Iran, Syria and itself, as well as
use the Syrian coast as a depot for Russian naval vessels
o China wants energy supplies including oil from Iran and Syria
- INTERSECTION OF AMERICAS RIVALS AND CONSTRAINING OF US
NATIONAL INTEREST

Amin, S 2006, Beyond US Hegemony: Assessing the Prospects for a Multipolar World, Zed
Books, London.

Samir Amin – Beyond US Hegemony: Assessing the Prospects for a Multipolar World

China

- Asia overcoming legacy of underdevelopment, imperialism and exploitation within

the confines of the capitalist system
 o Supposed conclusion of this trend is a renewed global capitalist system, albeit
without the continued exploitation of Asia
o Multipolar world organised around USA, EU, China, Russia, India seen as the
inevitable result:
o Differ from the multipolar imperialism of pre-WW2 and triad imperialism of
Japan, US, Europe
- However, this line of argument does not recognise the hostility of the US to China nor
the EU/Japan’s deference to the US
- Principal question is whether China is evolving towards a stable capitalist or a
transition towards socialism:
o Currently is engaged in a passive adaptation to the demands of global
integration – one of ‘market socialism’
o The capitalist road of Deng Xiaoping Thought has based its appeal in its
ability to achieve economic growth with widely distributed material benefits

The Global South

- 1960s and 1970s marked by significant solidarity between the countries of the Global
South:
o Decolonisation and mutual support for anti-colonial struggles
o Refusal to join pro-NATO military alliances, repudiation of IMF and World
Bank
- Renewal of solidarity might give rise to a new multipolarity
- Bandung Project (1955):
o Completion of decolonisation, political independence of the South, refusal to
join in the encirclement of the socialist bloc
- Development of the Non-Aligned Movement:
o Development ideology – de-linking but still participation within world
capitalist system to develop productive forces, industrialise and overcome the
limitations of colonialism
- New basis for solidarity in the South through the unilateral adjustment and neoliberal
globalisation of the peripheries:
o Genuine multipolarity can emerge from a united front of democratic popular
regimes

Reform of the UN

- Genuine multipolarity means commitment to national sovereignty and international

law
- Contrary to popular opinion, veto backed bipolarity of Cold War gave peripheral
countries some movement/manoeuvring:
o Core imperialist countries were forced to respect sovereignty and development
of peoples of the South for fear of tipping balance of power
- Important principle should not be multipolarity but polycentrism:
o Genuine respect for diversity and recognition of uneven development of
capitalism
o Resulting desire to alleviate these structural inequalities, even within
framework of capitalism
- However, neoliberal era – sovereignty of US national interests should be placed above
all principles:
 o Washington’s imperialism sees the defence of US national interests as above
any international law/body
- Monopoly of the North reinforced by WTO and international business law
(consolidating intellectual property law, property rights etc.):
o Marginalisation of the South from technology, productive capital, markets etc.
o Sharpens the global polarisation of wealth
- Major condition for a serious multipolarity is disarmament – disarmament of the
powerful states:
o Removal of network of US and NATO military bases, end of sales of weapons
to comprador Gulf states that fuel civil wars

Zhang, X 2017, "Chinese Capitalism and the Maritime Silk Road: A World-Systems
Perspective", Geopolitics, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 310-331

Chinese Capitalism and the Maritime Silk Road – A World Systems Perspective

- Material and political growth of China has set up fear of hegemonic competition
between the US and China
- One Belt One Road initiative is the overarching paradigm for China’s economic
policy and foreign policy
- Realist camp treats China’s ascent as a traditional hegemonic transition:
o Rising power becomes discontent with subaltern status and challenges the
incumbent hegemon (the US)
- Liberal camp argues that China wants to launch a departure from the democratic
capitalist world-order:
o Challenge US superiority in this system
- However these structural explanations do not account for the nature of China’s
changing external stance – namely the economic initiatives such as OBOR or the
Maritime Silk Road Initiative
- Need to situate an analysis of Chinese rise within historical development of capitalism
and East Asia:
o Encounter with imperial powers in the 19th century led to impoverishment and
exploitation of China (Opium wars, Boxer rebellion)
o Post-Mao – modernisation through a liberal strategy, economic integration
(ascension to WTO in 2001)
- Since 2000s – China has taken increasingly active role in trade/investment:
o Official aid to developing countries overtaken World Bank loans to these
countries
o BRICs Development Bank, China Development Bank
o Chinese leadership role in world and regional economy alongside the
institutionalisation of their economic development initiatives
- Chinese integration into world economy came with a tacit acknowledgment of the
US-led liberal order:
o 1990’s - China took over export-oriented, labour intensive industries that had
been dominated by the East Asian tigers in the 1980’s
o Mutual interdependence between liberal states and China
o China depended on the consumer markets of advanced capitalist economies
and US relied on China purchasing treasury bonds/financial products with the
trade surpluses to stabilise the economy
 - China is subsequently “climbing the ranks” of the international order – from a semi-
peripheral nation towards advanced capitalist state:
o Capital saturation, declining capital returns, excess capacity/overaccumulation
and financialisation
o However state still retains dominance and stranglehold over the economy –
nationalisation, shareholdings, strict management of capital and capitalists
- When surplus capital cannot find an outlet – engages in a “spatial fix” and outward
expansion:
o OBOR represents this “going out” policy in a quantitatively more ambitious
setting
o Connect Asia, Europe and Africa

Martin, L 2013, "Turkey and the USA in a Bipolarizing Middle East", Journal of Balkan and
Near Eastern Studies, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 175-188.

Turkey and the USA in a Bipolarising Middle East

- Middle East is moving from multipolarity to a bipolar region divided between Iran
(Syria, Hezbollah, Iraqi Shiite government, Houthis – with support from Russia and
China) and the US/Western proxies (Turkey, Gulf states, Israel, Jordan, Syrian rebels,
Yemeni insurgents)
o Crisis in Syria has become a proxy war
- Between 1990 and 2010 – rough multipolarity in the Middle East:
o US, Turkey, Iran, Israel, Syria, pre-invasion Iraq jockeyed for influence and
power
o Turkey played a balancing role in the region through trade networks,
diplomatic mediates and cultural linkages with Arab world (soft-power
paradigm)
- Bipolarisation began in 2011 – growth of Iranian power and influence:
o Arab Spring offered Iran an attempt to spread Shia dissent against Sunni
majority regimes (i.e. Bahrain)
o Withdrawal of US forces from Iraq allowed Iran to spread influence in the
Shia dominated governments of Nour al-Maliki and then Haider al-Abadi, as
well providing material support to Shi’ite militias against Sunni insurgents
o Iranian progress in the development of nuclear capabilities
 Iran believes that it is a deterrent against US/Israeli first strike threats
as well as Israeli nuclear power
- Syrian alliance is critical for Iran’s deterrent strategy against US and Israel:
o Retain geographical link to Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas/PIJ/PFLP in
Gaza via Syria
o Alawite (Shia) dominated governments in both Syria and Iraq are beneficial
- Bipolarisation of Middle East has global geopolitical implications:
o Russia and China have inserted themselves on the side of the Syrian
government while America/Europe have inserted themselves on the side of the
insurgents
 Russia wants to maintain oil pipelines between Iran, Syria and itself, as
well as use the Syrian coast as a depot for Russian naval vessels
 China wants energy supplies including oil from Iran and Syria
- Bipolarisation threatens US national interests:
 o US concern over Iranian ability to impact world energy markets against their
favour by raising the price of Oil
o Ability to promote Shia uprisings in Sunni Gulf States as well as support for
Houthis could create a huge Iranian led Shia bloc opposed to the US

Patman, R & Southgate, L 2016, "Globalization, the Obama administration and the
refashioning of US exceptionalism", in , International Politics, vol. 53, no. 2, pp. 220-238.

Globalisation, the Obama administration and the refashioning of US exceptionalism

- New US exceptionalism puts less emphasis on unilateral military force, and instead a
willingness to work within international institutions/law
- Theorists assume that globalisation has eliminated the sanctity of the state as the focus
of security concerns and IR
- American exceptionalism:
o US is a unique representation of peace and freedom that inspires others
o US has to transgress prevailing norms to provide this same peace and security
to others in line with American values
o Justification of military conquests through ideas of manifest destiny, Calvinist
morality/religious principles
- Has shaped foreign policy continually:
o First used to excuse US isolationism until 1941
o Since achieving superpower status, US has embarked on quest to improve the
world and lead an open international community
- Exceptionalism in early post-Cold War (1990-1993):
o New World Order phase
o Victory in the Gulf War
o Affirmation of a ‘new world order’ based in liberal democracy, free markets,
US power and UN authority
o Metamorphosed into the ‘assertive multilateralism’ of the Clinton
administration
- 1993-2001:
o Inclusive form of US exceptionalism was not sustained – post-Cold War was
not the order that both Bush I and Clinton envisaged
o Failure of intervention in Somalia – US scepticism of US involvement in
multilateral intervention and greater focus on intervention only for the sake of
US national interest
- 9/11 and Bush Era:
o The era of neo-cons in the US administration and unashamed unilateralism
o Rejected the idea of nation building, embraced the traditional view that
security was determined by military means
o War on terror – defence against the attack on the exceptional core values of
the US:
 Defending freedom against the terrorists
 Black/white, good/evil conception of conflict
o Exclusive US exceptionalism manifested in invasion of Iraq but also
challenged by the significant resistance of the native population
- Obama era exceptionalism recognised that the world had ceased to be unipolar
- Exceptionalism focused on soft-power assets:
 o Tilt towards multilateralism, desire to lighten US military involvement in the
world, negotiation with potential adversaries such as DPRK/Cuba/Iran
- However also evident in invasion of Libya:
o Mobilisation of the international community on multilateral terms

Sorenson, D 2016, Syria in Ruins, Praeger, Santa Barbara.

Syria in Ruins – The International Response

Turkey

- Turkey joined NATO in post-WWII while Syria undertook an independent Arab

nationalism allied with the USSR
- Beginning of civil war:
o Turkey denounced Assad and demanded no-fly zone over Syria like in Libya
- Has joined with other Sunni states to fund jihadi groups such as Jaysh al-Islam and
Jabhat al-Nusra:
o Opened up porous border to allow recruits to join the group in Syria
o Turkish border became transit point for foreign fighters
- Joined the anti-ISIS coalition while also bombing PKK/YPG targets in Rojava

USA

- Cold War policy of containing Soviet influence:

o 2 CIA led coups in Syria throughout 50’s
- Syrian Ba’athism oriented itself with the USSR
o Syrians also fought 2 wars with the Israelis and maintained tense relations
- Still joined the US coalition in the invasion of Iraq (first Gulf War)
- US support for ‘moderate elements’ in the anti-Assad coalition (i.e. the early FSA and
the SDF)
o No real moderate forces, just different degrees of Jihadis and Salafists
o John Kerry claimed 90% of anti-Assad fighters were moderates
- Jabhat al-Nusra, Jaysh al-Islam and other allied groups incorporated much of the US
trained FSA forces:
o Also raided FSA equipment including anti-tank weapons

Iran

- Iran has represented Shi’ite culture

- Since the revolution, Hafez al-Assad developed close ties to Iran during the
crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood (Sunni organisation):
o Iran also saw Syria as an important bridge against Saddam
o Also used Syrian territory to send material support to Hezbollah
- Thus mobilised in support of Syrian state against largely Sunni insurgency in 2011:
o Revolutionary Guard sent in to train Syrian forces followed by the insertion of
Hezbollah fighters
- Wanted to prevent the emergence of a pro-Saudi Salafi government in the wake of
Assad – which would join an anti-Iran axis

Russia
 - Historical ties viz. the USSR and trade ties
- Putin wanted to prevent another Libya or Iraq as well as the lack of a pro-Russian
regime in the Middle East that would prevent access to the vital trade routes of the
Mediterranean
- Use Syria as a buffer against Jihad and a way to exert its power over the West

Gulf States

- Support for Sunni extremists

- Topple the secular, Shia oriented Assad government to form an anti-Iranian axis

Meltzer, A 2013, "End of the “American Century”, Economic and Political Studies, vol. 1,
no. 1, pp. 79-88.

End of the American Century

- End of WWII – US proposed military and economic strategies to avoid war, contain
the USSR and regulate the global economy
- That period is ending – international institutions that sustained this US-led world are
no longer accepted
- US is still military strong but unable to translate power into influence
- Economic institutions:
o US led the development of the Bretton Woods Institutions, GATT, WTO – to
the extent that the IMF and World Bank are considered policy tools of the US
o Doha round of negotiations stalled – US turned from international free trade to
bilateral agreements
o The free trade institutions that the US have spearheaded have received
significant opposition through the anti-globalisation movement, Occupy,
Zapatistas, Labour movement etc.

Layne, C 2012, "This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana",
International Studies Quarterly, vol. 56, no. 1, pp. 203-213.

This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana

- Pre-GFC – consensus that unipolarity and American hegemony would be enduring

features of international politics
o Policymakers and academics
o Hillary Clinton – ‘new American moment’ (2010) and lasting American
leadership
- GFC has had two-fold impact on this prevailing mythology:
o Shift of global wealth and power from West to East (namely to China)
o Raised doubts about robustness of economic and financial primacy of the US
- Unipolar movement is over and ‘Pax Americana’ since the end of WWII is winding
down
- Post CW debate about Unipolarity:
o US was ‘sole remaining superpower’ – preserving this hegemonic role has
been overriding grand strategy objective of every post-CW president
o Layne and Waltz argued that unipolarity was a transitional phase into
multipolarity:
  Have generally been vindicated despite being a minority
 US hegemony would spur the emergence of new great powers that
acted as counterweights to US hegemony
o Unipolar optimists (Wohlforth, Zakaria, Fukuyama) theorise that US will
avoid the historical failure of hegemons:
 Military and economic gap between US and rivals is insurmountable
 US hegemony is benevolent (normative and ideological statement) –
no reason why other states would like to counterbalance the US
 Other states have incentives to align with US power due to economic
and security benefits (triad imperialism)
 Immense soft power assets compared to previous hegemons – massive
cultural and ideological presence in the world
- End of the unipolar moment has vindicated the declinists and unipolar pessimists:
o Great Recession is not itself the cause of decline but has accelerated the causal
forces driving these trends
o Driver of declining power is the emergence of new powers:
 Relative decline of the US relative to China
 Centralisation of finance capital in the states of triad HOWEVER
China increasingly becoming centre of finance (Belt and Road, Silk
Road, largest holder of USD and US debt)
 Fiscal crisis in the US
 Most transactions in the world soon to be undertaken in RMB rather
than USD – USD no longer has reserve currency status
o Unipolarity’s demise marks end of era of Pax Americana:
 US used post-war unipolarity (USSR had been decimated) to construct
the post-war international order
 Once again used post-CW unipolarity to reassert Pax Americana by
extending geopolitical and ideological ambitions
o Whilst US remains militarily pre-eminent, rise of China and fiscal constraints
means US military dominance will eventually be challenged
- External factors: rise of new great powers:
o American decline is part of a broader trend – shift of economic power away
from the Euro-Atlantic core:
 Rejected by Samir Amin’s thesis of generalisation and centralisation of
capital in the imperialist triad
 BRICS nations, ‘emerging markets’
o China took a low profile between 1978 and the GFC and integrated itself
within the American-led world order
 Has finally become wealthy enough to militarily and economically
challenge US supremacy
 Formation of new economic institutions that signal the demise of Pax
Americana and Bretton Woods/imperialist triads
 China is now dominant manufacturing nation, largest economy on PPP
terms
 Will rise to challenge the imperialist order vis-à-vis critical theory
article
- Domestic factors: economic decline:
o Mounting US economic and fiscal problems
 Downgrading of US treasury bonds
 Spiralling national debt
 o Questions as to whether USD will continue as the world economy’s reserve
currency:
 China largest holder of USD and largest US debtor
 RMB could replace USD as the reserve currency of the world economy
o Arnold Wolfers – modern great powers must be both security and welfare
states:
 Must ensure domestic prosperity as well as military capabilities
 US has done this by borrowing heavily to finance weapons and
economic programs – assumption that US is stable and able to pay its
debts
o Increasing inability of the US to do this – bailouts, quantitative easing,
mounting costs of Medicare/Social security due to aging population
 US is running unsustainable budget deficits – borrowed to finance Iraq
and Afghan wars
 Over 100% debt-to-GDP ratio
 Declining confidence in the US and USD
o If USD loses reserve currency role, US hegemony will become unaffordable:
 Can no longer borrow or print money to finance military dominance
- End of the Pax Americana:
o Hegemonic stability theory holds that an open international economic system
requires a single hegemonic power to undertake military/economic tasks i.e.
stabilising key regions
 Should ideally supply liquidity to the global economy and provide a
reserve currency
o China seems insulated from economic crisis – is the largest creditor of the US
and RMB will ultimately replace the USD as the reserve currency:
 Drive global economic growth
- Prominent scholars (Zakarian, Ikenberry, Wohlforth) argue that US can cushion itself
against a loss of hegemony by ‘locking in’ Pax Americana’s institutions so they
outlive unipolarity:
o Will arguably fail

Schweller, R & Pu, X 2011, "After Unipolarity: China's Visions of International Order in an
Era of U.S. Decline", International Security, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 41-72.

After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of US Decline

- Rest of the world is catching up to US hyperpower
- Traditional proposition that multipolar systems arise from ‘hard’ balancing:
o Return to multipolarity will instead join the US as poles within existing
international system
- Current international system is entering a deconcentration /delegitimation phase:
o Delegitimation involves two components: a delegitimating rhetoric (the
discourse of resistance) and cost-imposing strategies that fall short of full-
fledged balancing behavior (the practice of resistance).
- Under unipolarity, any form of balancing is revisionist as opposed to balancing being
the status quo under multipolarity
o Balancing under unipolar system must be preceded by delegitimation of
existing polarity
o Subaltern states should act in resistance :
  Denying access to bases
 Launching terrorist acts against the US
 Diplomatic friction
 Voting against the US in the UN
 Economic protectionism
 Proliferating WMDs
- Chinese resistance:
o Modernisation has set China on track to be the wealthiest great power in the
world and the peer competitor with the US
o China has found subtle ways to resist US unipolarity without actually
challenging the dominant ideology of Pax Americana
o China both accommodates and contests US hegemony:
 Worked within current international system to expand economy,
increase its status etc. whilst not directly challenging US hegemony
De Keersmaeker, G. (2017). Polarity, Balance of Power and International Relations Theory.
Palgrave Macmillan. Cham, pp.187-207.

American Hegemony, Empire and Unipolarity

- New National Security Strategy at the end of Cold War:

o ‘continued international stability’, ‘continuing leadership role of the US’,
‘multipolarity’
o New World Order speech, multilateral invasion of Iraq
o Cooperation for a more secure and peaceful world
- However Krauthammer’s article ‘The Unipolar Moment’ criticises the Bush
administration’s NSS:
o Recognises the existence of unipolarity and claims that US unipolarity should
be prolonged for as long as possible
o Both Bush and Krauthammer recognise the end of bipolarity but have different
interpretations of what it means
- In reality, both approaches were referring to lateralism rather than polarity:
o Krauthammer was criticising the Bush administration’s creation of a broad
coalition against Iraq and seeking legitimation by the UNSC
o Wanted to defend unilateralist policy  USA should use unipolarity and
unilateralism to spread liberal democratic institutions
o Krauthammer – the alternative to unipolarity is chaos
- Both saw US as the natural leader of the world community
- By the time of the Clinton admin:
o Economic growth, total collapse of USSR
o Consensus around a lasting American dominance became the implicit premise
of American public debate
o Hegemonic discourse – lends credence to the need to spread one’s own
political model and provide order in the international system
o Questions over whether American dominance was based in hard power or soft
power assets
o Only people outside the hegemonic discourse were those who predicted the
emergence of a China/US bipolarity (declinists)
- 1998 NSS:
o ‘World’s most powerful force for peace, prosperity…democracy’
 o Hegemon who has the duty of leadership based in material preponderance and
uniqueness of the American model
o However, warning of a resurgent Russia was used a justification for NATO
enlargement in 1996 and 1997
- GW Bush admin (2002 NSS):
o Stress on military force
o Admitted the possibility of great power military competitors who required
containment (Russia and China)
o Suggested the possibility of pre-emptive strikes against competitors
o Con. Rice  Theory of multipolarity threatens to divert us from meeting the
great tasks before us...Power in the service of freedom is to be welcomed
 Multipolarity described as a foreign policy choice
- US interpretation of multipolarity is peculiar:
o Acknowledging the rise of great powers, as long as they accept an implicit
understanding of US dominance
o Also require ‘similar values’  willing to cooperate with the US in pursuit of
similar national security goals
o The world is not described in conflicting poles, but in terms of common
(liberal-democratic) interests
- 2008 was the turning point in American hegemonic discourse:
o Failure of Iraq/withdrawal of troops
o Continuing problems in Afghanistan
o Rise of China (Beijing Olympics) and resurgent Russia (war with Georgia in
2008)
- National Intelligence Council (2008):
o Predicted multipolarity by 2025  still odd interpretation of American
multipolarity
o ‘First among equals’
o 2012 – undeniable multipolarity with China becoming largest economy
- 2009 – Obama:
o Multipolarity is simply treated as a matter of fact
o HR Clinton  ‘multipartner world’
o Biden  ‘multipolar world in which like-minded nations make common
cause’  great power co-operation and lack of tolerance for spheres of
influence etc.
- US still preponderant power but willing to accept negotiation and shifting balances

Beinart, P 2018, Trump Is Preparing for a New Cold War, The Atlantic, viewed 18 April
2018, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/trump-is-preparing-for-a-
new-cold-war/554384/>.

Trump is Preparing for a New Cold War

- Trump admin is preparing for a new Cold War:

o NSS  ‘respond to growing political, economic and military
competitions…China and Russia’
o Mattis – Great power competition is now primary focus of US national
security
- Competition is made to sound like an inevitability rather than a choice
- CCP has ended term limits to allow Xi to continue as President
 o China seen in Asia as magnanimous for its trade and aid, as well its poverty
alleviation at home
- Trump has little respect for liberal-democratic norms that ensure America’s soft
power assets:
o Moral authority and diplomatic capacity

Serafettin, Y. (2015). China's Foreign Policy and Critical Theory of International Relations.
Journal of Chinese Political Science, 21(1), pp.75-88.

China’s Foreign Policy and Critical Theory of International Relations

- CTIR sees the state as the ultimate unit for human progress and liberation
- China as a systemic parallel and challenge to the sustainability of the unipolar
moment
- Relative decline of the US in its ability to give meaning to material, ideational and
ethical history
- Contemporary foreign diplomacy of the Chinese state gives credence to the arguments
that the state might serve as an emancipatory agent which upholds sovereign equality,
territorial integrity, anti-hegemony and global harmony
- China’s five principles of peaceful coexistence:
o State can function as an emancipatory, anti-hegemonic actor
o International realm can be liberated without abolishing, subjugating or
weakening the national realm
- China’s material and ideational emergence indicates a potential transformation of the
post-war global order and the role of the state
o Chinese foreign policy as the dominant progenitor of this change
- Historical materialism and class theory are inseparable from CTIR:
o Revolutionary members of the international realm are politically conscious of
oppressor/oppressed dynamic (anti-imperialism)
o Strive for a better alternative to reconstruct or replace existing international
order (realist, revisionist power)
- With collapse of bipolar global system, Chinese foreign policy took pragmatist rather
than ideological turn:
o Multipolar power configuration as the central principle
o National sovereignty, tolerance of socio-political difference and strict non-
interference
- China sees itself as correcting the historical wrongs of the colonial/neo-colonial
capitalist world system:
o Hu Yaobong – ‘forces threatening peaceful coexistence are imperialism,
hegemonism and colonialism’
- Bloc politics has assumed new guises in the trend towards multipolarity:
o Independent choice of political systems and mode of development
- Rather than overthrowing IS, China focuses on reform/reordering the system on
principles of peaceful coexistence, sovereignty etc.
o Emancipatory politics influenced by its basis in masses and revolutionary
intelligentsia
- China’s criticism towards existing international system is not anti-hegemonic:
o No open war against hegemon
o However, use of delegitimation rhetoric through parallel social/development
initiatives (OBOR, BRICS, Investment Bank)
 - Reconstructing great-power relationship into multiple poles

US Department of State (2018). Briefing on Syria. [online] Available at:

https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/01/277545.htm [Accessed 18 Mar. 2018].

US Department of State Briefing on Syria

- Regime change strategy  ‘political transition…Syrian opposition’, ‘we don’t think

he should be there at the end of the game’, ‘departure of this regime’
- Countering influence of Russia and Iran (regional and global powers)  ‘Iran’s
malign activities in and through Syria…present an enduring challenge to US interest’,
‘limiting Iran’s influence’

Global Times (2018). US' strong sense of insecurity beyond comprehension: FM. [online]
Available at: http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1089716.shtml [Accessed 22 Mar. 2018].

US’ strong sense of insecurity beyond comprehension: FM

- China’s non-aggressive, multipolar rhetoric

- Chinese seen as an existential threat by the US  “frankly, the US is under attack”
(Director of National Intelligence)
- US afraid of a multipolar world system
- China not defining themselves as revisionist power  “jointly uphold world peace
and security” (Foreign Ministry spokesperson)

Rubinovitz, Z. The Rise of the Others: Can the U.S. Stay on Top? In: Kleiman, A. ed.,
(2018). Great Powers and Geopolitics: International Affairs in a Rebalancing World. Springer
International Publishing. Basel, pp.31-58.

The Rise of the Others: Can the U.S. Stay on Top?

- US is now a declining power  relative to China

o Declining economy
- At the end of Cold War  US held power that gave it unprecedented advantage over
all other powers and a position of primacy
- Theoretical questions  would it be wise for the US to struggle to maintain primacy
- Sources of threat to US primacy:
o China  assumed bipolarity
o BRICS  multipolarity
- Narrow focus on Chinese threat to American unipolarity leaves little space to assess
other emerging powers with the possible of becoming poles (BRICS and EU are
rarely considered rivals)
- US is declining considerably economically
o Comparative share in the global economy is dropping
o China is the largest holder of USD, America’s largest creditor and debtor
o However US still maintains hard power assets
- Scholars contend China is playing the American game
- Fingar  lowered consumption in the West since GFC challenges Chinese strategy:
o Can no longer disrupt the US-led system that they have used to develop
 - China has been a sovereignty hawk  opposing liberal internationalism/humanitarian
intervention  challenging balance of power
- Authoritarian capitalism (socialism with Chinese characteristics) has increasingly
become an ideological export  liberal paradigm challenged
- However US will remain dominant military power:
o China has challenged the balance of power in East Asia and become dominant
land power but does not have global infrastructure that NATO and US has
o US also has strongholds in East Asia  Japan, Singapore, Philippines,
Indonesia
o China cannot jeopardise global balance of power as long as Europe, Gulf,
India, Japan, Russia remain independent
- Wealthy China is not a status quo power  aggressive state determined to achieve
regional hegemony
o Replace the myth of China’s ‘peaceful rise’
- Defense burdens of China’s neighbours is not rising and bilateral trade is rising:
o China is succeeding in dividing and playing off regional rivals and US is not
fulfilling its role as regional hegemon
- American edge in military power still safe
- China has the ability to dominate markets in the Global South  largest trading
partner with many African and Latin American countries (alternative model of
development)
- Diplomatic Arena has been considerably shifted:
o China and Russia have become co-leaders of a conservative Westphalian camp
 strict non-interference and respect for sovereignty
o China and Russia’s vetoes against punishing Syrian government through
tougher sanction, criticism of UN-led intervention in Libya, peaceful
denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula:
 Putin, in the first major remarks from a Russian leader since a coalition
of Western countries began air strikes in Libya, said that Muammar
Gaddafi’s government fell short of democracy but added that did not
justify military intervention. “The resolution is defective and flawed,”
Putin told workers at a Russian ballistic missile factory. “It allows
everything. It resembles medieval calls for crusades.” Putin said that
interference in other countries’ internal affairs has become a trend in
U.S. foreign policy and that the events in Libya indicated that Russia
should strengthen its own defense capabilities. - Putin likens U.N.
Libya resolution to crusade calls 2018, viewed 20 April 2018,
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-russia/putin-likens-u-n-
libya-resolution-to-crusade-calls-idUSTRE72K2J220110321>.
o Reflects a shared fear that permitting intervention might be used against them
in the future
o Countries are willing to trade American patronage for Chinese patronage:
 Beijing as a new and rival pole
 Hope of financial aid and diplomatic backing

Headley, J 2017, Post-communist Russia and the West: From Crisis to Crisis?, in Fish, M,
Gill, G & Petrovic, M (eds.), A quarter century of post-communism assessed, Springer
International Publishing AG, Cham, pp. 271-291.

Post-Communist Russia and the West: From Crisis to Crisis

- 1994 – first crisis between Russian Fed and the West occurred over NATO’s threat to
bomb the Bosnian Serbs:
o 1999  tense standoff between Russian and NATO troops over Kosovo war
- 2003  RF opposed war in Iraq
- 2004  tensions emerged over the elections of American backed Victor Yushchenko
in Ukraine
- 2008  condemnation of Russian war with Georgia
- 2012  continuing disagreements over Syria
- 2013  deep tension over Crimean referendum, crisis, invasion etc.
- Key features of Russian foreign policy:
o Assertion of Russian national interests distinct from the West
o Insistence on Russia’s status as a great power
o Maintenance of Russia’s role in international institutions
o Resistance to Western unilateralism and hegemony
o US considers all of these elements antagonistic
- Bosnian Serb Crisis:
o Helped Russian policymakers to consolidate key elements of Russian foreign
policy
o Insistence that NATO had no right to threaten force without a UNSC
resolution:
 Despite a lack of evidence of culpability in civilian attacks, NATO
threatened airstrikes against Bosnian Serbs
o Demonstrated that Russia should be involved as an equal partner in regional
and international affaris
o Russian interests can diverge from those of Western powers
- Russian policy to Syria:
o 2013 chemical attack  call by the West for armed intervention against the
government of Bashar al-Assad
o Russia brokered deal between Syrian government and OPCW to destroy its
chemical weapon stocks and sign up to Chemical Weapons Convention
o Russian policy informed by broad principles:
 Peaceful resolution to the conflict
 No preconditions to negotiations (such as resignation of Assad)
 Outside powers should neither threaten force nor use to it to resolve the
conflict
 War was a civil war with no right or wrong side (despite support for
Assad)
 Decisions must involve Russia and international institutions (such as
the UNSC)
o Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs – “any unilateral forceful action
bypassing the UNSC will become a direct violation of international law”
(2013)
 Insistence on international law, observation of principles of non-
intervention, scepticism of humanitarian intervention
- Norms and interests of Russian Foreign Policy:
o Non-intervention, sovereignty, territorial integrity  general state-centric
norms
o Believes that action in the name of humanitarian concerns should be used to
undermine the legal norms of the international system
 Should be decided in the UNSC (through due process) vis-à-vis Libya
 o Fears of security vacuums  prioritisation of international stability (criticism
of Libya, rejection of Syria)
o Opposition to regime change
o Russia believes that it is better off with traditional state-centric principles:
 Pursue their national interests under the defence that they are
sovereignly justified in doing so
o Russia does not frame its behaviour in the common good  frames it in
empirical norms, due process etc.
o Western refusal to acknowledge Russia as sovereign equal has created
resentment
 Frustration over Western moral and epistemic authority  rejection of
various forms of Western exceptionalism
 Accuse US of continual moral double standards over questions of
human rights, democracy etc.
o Pursuit of multipolarity, opposition to NATO enlargement, resistance to
interventionism and unilateralism, sovereignty
- Russia is a revisionist power that challenges the dominant order:
o Part of growing trend to multipolarity
o BRICS etc.

Gordy, K & Lee, J 2009, "Rogue Specters: Cuba and North Korea at the Limits of US
Hegemony", in , Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 229-248.

Chodor, T 2015, Neoliberal hegemony and the Pink Tide in Latin America, Palgrave
Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire.