CO, SELYNN

Article 3. Section 22. Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder.

Salvador v. Mapa – G.R. No. 135080 [2008]

FACTS: On October 8, 1992 then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans. By Memorandum Order No. 61 dated November 9,
1992, the functions of the

Committee were subsequently expanded to include all non-performing loans which shall embrace behest and non-
behest loans.

Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for investigation, including the loan transactions between
Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (MEA), now Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc. (PEMI) and the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP). The Committee determined that they bore the characteristics of behest loans, as defined under
Memorandum Order No. 61 because the stockholders and officers of PEMI were known cronies of then President
Ferdinand Marcos; the loan was under-collateralized; and PEMI was undercapitalized at the time the loan was
granted.

Ombudsman handed down the assailed Resolution, dismissing the complaint filed by the PCGG against the
respondents for violation of RA 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Ombudsman conceded that
there was ground to proceed with the conduct of preliminary investigation. Nonetheless, it dismissed the complaint
holding that the offenses charged had already prescribed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post facto laws.

HELD: An ex post facto law has been defined as one (a) which makes an action done before the passing of the law
and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it
greater than it was when committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the
law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendant. This Court added two (2) more to the list, namely: (e) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and
remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; or (f) that
which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.

The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws.
Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or
those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. The subject administrative and
memorandum orders clearly do not come within the shadow of this definition. Administrative Order No. 13 creates
the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, and provides for its composition and functions. It
does not mete out penalty for the act of granting behest loans. Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame
of reference for determining behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum
Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws. There is, therefore, no basis for the Ombudsman to rule
that the subject administrative and memorandum orders are ex post facto.