People v.

Tomio should the evidence warrant, file the appropriate criminal and

administrative cases against them. As regards Mitamura efforts must be

Facts: exerted by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, in coordination

Tatsumi Nagao, a Japanese national, came to Manila. Maida with the National Bureau of Investigation, to have him investigated and

Tomio alias Sato Toshio and Mitamura gave Nagao a pack of cigarettes prosecuted, should the evidence warrant.

that the policemen who searched him said contained marijuana and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ABDILA SILONGAN, ET. AL.

proceeded to bring him to jail. The accused acted as interpreters in jail (G.R. No. 137182, April 24, 2003)

and told Nagao that the penalty for illegal possession of marijuana is 6 “Penalties Modified”

to 12 years imprisonment but the policemen are willing to accept

$100,000 in lieu of this. Nagao agreed and accused told him that they FACTS:

have advanced the money to the police, Nagao was then brought back to On March 16, 1996, businessman Alexander Saldaña went

his hotel where he was not allowed to leave. He called up his friend to to Sultan Kudarat with with Americo Rejuso Jr., Ervin Tormis, and Victor

ask for help and called up his dad as well who agreed to send 3M yen. Cinco to meet a certain Macapagal Silongan alias Commander Lambada.

While retrieving money from the bank, the police, whose help was asked The four victims were taken to the mountain hideout in

for by the Japanese embassy, brought the accused to the police district Maguindanao. The kidnappers demanded P15 million pesos from

for investigation and were charged with kidnapping and serious illegal Alexander’s wife for his release, it was later reduced to twelve million

detention. pesos after negotiations. The release was made in effect of the exchange

The accused claims that they were guarding Nagao, they for a relative of the kidnappers who was caught delivering a ransom note

claim that he could have left them anytime as they did not physically to Alexander's family. Only eight of the accused were brought to trial,

restrain him. namely, Abdila, Macapagal, and Teddy, all surnamed Silongan, Akmad

Awal, Rolly Lamalan, Sacaria Alon, Jumbrah Manap, and Ramon

Issue: Pasawilan.

1. WON kidnapping for ransom was committed After trial, the RTC rendered judgment and named the

2. WON court had jurisdiction seven (7) accused Abdila, and Macapagal, all surnamed Silongan, Akmad

Awal, Rolly Lamalan, Sacaria Alon, Jumbrah Manap, and Ramon

Ratio: Pasawilan as guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was charged with

1. The accused got Nagao’s passport and his money was taken by the Kidnapping for Ransom and sentenced Death Penalty. Teddy Silongan

police, he can not speak Tagalog or English and had no friends or was acquitted.

relatives in the Philippines. Even if he could have left, where ISSUE:

would he go without his money and passport? Plus the fact that WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THEIR VERDICT OF

Nagao thought he was on a temporary leash by the police, which IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY TO THE ACCUSED WITH

would mean at least 6 years imprisonment plus the threat of INDEMNIFICATION DAMAGES AND MORAL DAMAGES.

scandal, that would cause him ignominy as he is a Buddhist priest. RULING:

Even though he was not physically restrained, he was NO. Considering that it has been proven beyond reasonable

psychologically restrained. doubt that the abduction of Alexander Saldaña, Americo Rejuso, Jr., Ervin

Accused claims that the money they were asking is for is the Tormis, and Victor Cinco were for the purpose of extorting ransom, the

payment of hotel expenses and to pay them back for the alleged trial court correctly imposed the death penalty.

payment to the police to release Nagao. The court did not believe As already stated, the trial court ordered the appellants to

this as the evidence points to an elaborate plan to kidnap Nagao pay, jointly and severally, Alexander Saldaña and Americo Rejuso, Jr.,

and ask for ransom money. Even assuming that they merely asked indemnification damages of P50,000 each and moral damages of

for a loan, they still deprived Nagao of liberty to compel him to P100,000 and P50,000, respectively.

pay the loan. The court affirmed the award of P100,000 to Alexander and

2. Yes. The crime was committed in various places. Moreover, in the P50,000 to Americo as moral damages. The amount of moral anxiety

proceedings of the lower court, the accused never questioned the suffered by the two victims is in no wise the same. Undoubtedly,

jurisdiction of the court. Alexander's family had undergone greater distress in the uncertainty of

seeing Alexander again.

The court also directs the Philippine National Police to conduct a Three Justices of the Court maintain their position that R.A.

thorough investigation into the involvement of the five policemen and No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty;
nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is
constitutional, and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the
case at bar.
Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor
G.R. No. 121519 October 30, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE TY and CARMEN TY, accused-appellants.
KAPUNAN, J.:p
Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty were charged with the crime of kidnapping
and failure to return a minor in an information filed by 2nd Assistant
City Prosecutor of Kalookan City Rosauro J. Silverio, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about the month of April 1989, in Kalookan. City,
Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being then the owners, proprietors, managers
and administrators of Sir John Clinic and as such said accused had the
custody of Arabella Sombong, a minor, conspiring together and mutually
helping one another and with deliberate intent to deprive the parents of
the child of her custody, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fail to restore the custody of said Arabella Sombong to her
parents by giving said custody of subject minor to another person
without the knowledge and consent of her parents.
Contrary to Law. 1
Both accused were arrested, and then arraigned on October 27, 1992
when they pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
After trial, on May 31, 1995, a decision was rendered by the Regional
Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 123, the decretal portion of which
disposes as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both accused Spouses Vicente Ty and
Carmen Ty guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping a
minor and failure to return the same as defined and penalized by Article
270 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences them to suffer
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. The accused are hereby ordered to
pay the private complainant the sum of P100,000.00 by way of moral
damages caused by anxiety, by her being emotionally drained coupled
by the fact that up to this date she could not determine the whereabouts
of her child Arabella Sombong.
SO ORDERED. 2
The accused now interpose this appeal alleging the ensuing assignment
of errors, viz:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANTS
"DELIBERATELY FAILED TO RESTORE THE CHILD TO HER MOTHER,"
AND CONVICTING THEM UNDER ART. 270 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE, AND SENTENCING THEM TO "RECLUSION PERPETUA";
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CRIME
COMMITTED, IF ANY, IS THAT DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ART.
277 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE;
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RECOMMENDING EXECUTIVE
CLEMENCY PURSUANT TO PRECEDENT IN "PEOPLE vs. GUTIERREZ,"
197 SCRA 569; and
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING "COMPLAINANT THE SUM OF
P100,000.00 BY WAY OF MORAL, DAMAGES." 3
The relevant antecedents surrounding the case are as follows:
On November 18, 1987, complainant Johanna Sombong brought her sick
daughter Arabella, then only seven (7) months old, for treatment to the
Sir John Medical and Maternity Clinic located at No. 121 First Avenue,
Grace Park, Kalookan City which was owned and operated by the
accused-appellants. Arabella was diagnosed to be suffering bronchitis
and diarrhea, thus complainant was advised to confine the child at the
clinic for speedy recovery. About three (3) days later, Arabella was well
and was ready to be discharged but complainant was not around to take
her home. A week later, complainant came back but did not have enough
money to pay the hospital bill in the amount of P300.00. Complainant
likewise confided to accused-appellant Dr. Carmen Ty that no one would
take care of the child at home as she was working. She then inquired
about the rate of the nursery and upon being told that the same was On October 13, 1992, complainant filed a petition for habeas corpus with

P50.00 per day, she decided to leave her child to the care of the clinic the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, this time against the alleged

nursery. Consequently, Arabella was transferred from the ward to the guardians of her daughter, namely, Marietta Neri Alviar and Lilibeth

nursery. 4 Neri. On January 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision granting

the petition and ordering the guardians to immediately deliver the

Thereafter, hospital bills started to mount and accumulate. It was at this person of Cristina Grace Neri to the complainant, the court having found

time that accused-appellant Dr. Ty suggested to the complainant that she Cristina to be the complainant's child. On appeal to the Court of Appeals,

hire a "yaya" for P400.00 instead of the daily nursery fee of P50.00. however, said decision was reversed on the ground that the guardians

Complainant agreed, hence, a "yaya" was hired. Arabella was then again were not unlawfully withholding from the complainant the rightful

transferred from the nursery to the extension of the clinic which served custody of Cristina after finding that Cristina and complainant's

as residence for the hospital staff. 5 daughter are not one and the same person. On January 31, 1996, this

Court inSombong v. Court of Appeals 9 affirmed the Court of Appeals'

From then on, nothing was heard of the complainant. She neither visited decision.

her child nor called to inquire about her whereabouts. Her estranged

husband came to the clinic once but did not get the child. Efforts to get In this appeal, accused-appellants would want us to take a second look

in touch with the complainant were unsuccessful as she left no address and resolve the issue of whether or not they are guilty of kidnapping and

or telephone number where she can be reached. This development failure to return a minor. Accused-appellants of course contend that they

prompted Dr. Ty to notify the barangay captain of the child's are not guilty and the Solicitor General agrees. In its Manifestation and

abandonment. 6 Eventually, the hospital staff took turns in taking care Motion in lieu of Appellee's Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General

of Arabella. 7 recommends their acquittal.

Sometime in 1989, two (2) years after Arabella was abandoned by We agree.

complainant, Dr. Fe Mallonga, a dentist at the clinic, suggested during a

hospital staff conference that Arabella be entrusted to a guardian who As we have mentioned above, this Court in Sombong v. Court of

could give the child the love and affection, personal attention and caring Appeals 10 affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the

she badly needed as she was thin and sickly. The suggestion was trial court's ruling that complainant has rightful custody over the child,

favorably considered, hence, Dr. Mallonga gave the child to her aunt, Cristina Grace Neri, the latter not being identical with complainant's

Lilibeth Neri. 8 daughter, Arabella. The Court discoursed, thusly:

In 1992, complainant came back to claim the daughter she abandoned Petitioner does not have the right of custody over the minor Cristina

some five (5) years back. because, by the evidence disclosed before, the court a quo, Cristina has

not been shown to be petitioner's daughter, Arabella. The evidence

When her pleas allegedly went unanswered, she filed a petition adduced before the trial court does not warrant the conclusion that

for habeas corpus against accused-appellants with the Regional Trial Arabella is the same person as Cristina.

Court of Quezon City. Said petition was however denied due course and

was summarily dismissed without prejudice on the ground of lack of xxx xxx xxx

jurisdiction, the alleged detention having been perpetrated in Kalookan

City. In the instant case, the testimonial and circumstantial proof establishes

the individual and separate existence of petitioner's child, Arabella, from

Thereafter, the instant criminal case was filed against accused- that of private respondents' foster child, Cristina.

appellants.

We note, among others, that Dr. Trono, who is petitioner's own witness,

Complainant likewise filed an administrative case for dishonorable testified in court that, together with Arabella, there were several babies

conduct against accused-appellant Dr. Carmen Ty before the Board of left in the clinic and so she could not be certain whether it was Arabella

Medicine of the Professional Regulation Commission. This case was or some other baby that was given to private respondents. Petitioner's

subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. own evidence shows that, after the confinement of Arabella in the clinic

in 1987, she saw her daughter again only in 1989 when she visited the
clinic. This corroborates the testimony of petitioner's own witness, Dra. The foregoing notwithstanding, even if we were to consider Cristina

Ty, that Arabella was physically confined in the clinic from November, Grace Neri and Arabella Sombong as one and the same person, still, the

1987 to April, 1989. This testimony tallies with her assertion in her instant criminal case against the accused-appellants must fall.

counter-affidavit to the effect that Arabella was in the custody of the

hospital until April, 1989. All this, when juxtaposed with the unwavering Before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to return a minor under
declaration of private respondents that they obtained custody of Cristina Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code can be had, two elements must

in April, 1988 and had her baptized at the Good Samaritan Church on concur, namely: (a) the offender has been entrusted with the custody of
April 30, 1988, leads to the conclusion that Cristina is not Arabella. the minor, and (b) the offender deliberately fails to restore said minor to

his parents or guardians. The essential element herein is that the

Significantly, Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros, herself a mother and offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor but what is actually

the ponente of the herein assailed decision, set the case for hearing on punishable is not the kidnapping of the minor, as the title of the article

August 30, 1993 primarily for the purpose of observing petitioner's seems to indicate, but rather the deliberate failure or refusal of the

demeanor towards the minor Cristina. She made the following personal custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or

but relevant manifestation: guardians. 11 Said failure or refusal, however, must not only be

deliberate but must also be persistent as to oblige the parents or the

The undersigned ponente as a mother herself of four children, wanted to guardians of the child to seek the aid of the courts in order to obtain

see how petitioner as an alleged mother of a missing child supposedly in custody. 12 The key word therefore of this element is deliberate and

the person of Cristina Neri would react on seeing again her long lost Black's Law Dictionary defines deliberate as:

child. The petitioner appeared in the scheduled hearing of this case late,

and she walked inside the courtroom looking for a seat without even Deliberate, adj. Well advised; carefully considered; not sudden or rash;

stopping at her alleged daughter's seat; without even casting a glance on circumspect; slow in determining. Willful rather than merely

said child, and without even that tearful embrace which characterizes intentional. Formed, arrived at, or determined upon as a result of careful

the reunion of a loving mother with her missing dear child. Throughout thought and weighing of considerations, as a deliberate judgment or

the proceedings, the undersignedponente noticed no signs of plan. Carried on coolly and steadily, especially according to a

endearment and affection expected of a mother who had been deprived preconceived design; given to weighing facts and arguments with a view

of the embrace of her little child for many years. The conclusion or to a choice or decision; careful in considering the consequences of a step;

finding of undersigned ponente as a mother, herself, that petitioner- slow in action; unhurried; characterized by reflection; dispassionate; not

appellee is not the mother of Cristina Neri has been given support by rash. People v. Thomas, 25 Cal. 2d 880, 156 P.2d 7, 17, 18.

aforestated observation. . .

By the use of this word, in describing a crime, the idea is conveyed that

xxx xxx xxx the perpetrator weighs the motives for the act and its consequences, the

nature of the crime, or other things connected with his intentions, with

Since we hold that petitioner has not been established by evidence to be a view to a decision thereon; that he carefully considers all these, and

entitled to the custody of the minor Cristina on account of mistaken that the act is not suddenly committed. It implies that the perpetrator

identity, it cannot be said that private respondents are unlawfully must be capable of the exercise of such mental powers as are called into

withholding from petitioner the rightful custody over Cristina. At this use by deliberation and the consideration and weighing of motives and

juncture, we need not inquire into the validity of the mode by which consequences. 13

private respondents acquired custodial rights over the minor, Cristina.

Similarly, the word deliberate is defined in Corpus Juris Secundum as:

xxx xxx xxx

DELIBERATE.

Under the facts and ruling in Sombong, as well as the evidence adduced

in this case accused-appellants must perforce be acquitted of the crime As a Verb

charged, there being no reason to hold them liable for failing to return

one Cristina Grace Neri, a child not conclusively shown and established The word is derived from two Latin words
to be complainant's daughter, Arabella. which mean literally "concerning" and "to

weigh;" it implies the possession of a mind

 capable of conceiving a purpose to act, and the already working abroad, she personally went to the guardians'

exercise of such mental powers as are called residence and informed them that herein complainant wanted her

into use by the consideration and weighing of daughter back. Dr. Ty testified as follows:

the motives and the consequences of the act;

and has been defined as meaning to consider, Q: Now, since you said a while ago that when you placed the child under
reflect, take counsel, or to weigh the the (sic) guardianship, you are (sic) aware that the natural mother will

arguments for and against a proposed course get back the child, why did you not return the minor to the natural
of action; to consider and examine the reasons mother?

for and against, consider maturely, ponder,

reflect upon, or weigh in the mind; to reflect, A: During that time mam, the resident physician who will (sic)
with a view to make a choice; to weigh the discharged the baby was not present because she was abroad.
motives for an act and its consequences, with

a view to a decision thereon. Q: But then madam witness, are you aware where the child was and to

whom it was given?

As an Adjective

The word, used adjectively, implies action after thought and reflection,
and relates to the end proposed; indicates a purpose formed in a mind
capable of conceiving a purpose; and is based upon an intention
accompanied by such circumstances as evidence a mind fully conscious
A: The exact address was not given to me, mam, before the resident
physician left for abroad so, I asked the PAO to give me one month to
have (sic) a long distance call to this doctor and asked her for the
whereabout(s) of the child.

of its own purpose and design. It has been defined as meaning carefully Q: And where you granted the thirty-day period by the Officer of the
considered; circumspect; entered upon after deliberation and with fixed PAO?
purpose, formed after careful consideration, and fully or carefully

considering the nature or consequences of an act or measure; maturely A: Yes, mam.

reflected; not sudden or rash, carefully considering the probable

consequences of a step; premeditated; slow in determining; weighing Q: What happened if any during that thirty-day period?
facts and arguments with a view to a choice of decision; well-advised.

A: I was able to talk to Fe Mallonga in Bahrain and she told me the exact
Under some circumstances, it has been held synonymous with, or address of the guardian, mam.
equivalent to, "intentional," "premeditated," and "willful."

Q: Were (sic) you informed (of) the exact address of the guardian, did
Under other circumstances, however, it has been compared with, or you informed (sic) the PAO?
distinguished from, "premeditated," "sudden," and "willful." 14

A: Yes, mam.
Essentially, the word deliberate as used in the article must imply

something more than mere negligence; it must be premeditated, ATTY. WARD:

obstinate, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously

wrong.
Q: Then, what happened next, madam witness?

In the case at bar, it is evident that there was no deliberate refusal or

A: I was the one who went to the address to be sure that the child was
failure on the part of the accused-appellants to restore the custody of the
really there, mam.
complainant's child to her. When the accused-appellants learned that

complainant wanted her daughter back after five (5) long years of
Q: And did you see the child?
apparent wanton neglect, they tried their best to help herein

complainant find the child as the latter was no longer under the clinic's
A: Yes, mam.
care. Accused-appellant Dr. Ty did not have the address of Arabella's

guardians but as soon as she obtained it from Dr. Fe Mallonga who was
Q: What did you do with the child?
A: I just tell (sic) the child, "Ay ang laki mo na pala," I just told the child ATTY. WARD:

like that and I've (sic) talked also to the guardian during that time, mam.

Q: And what happened when you get (sic) the assistance of the NBI?

Q: And what did you tell the guardian?

A: They were the ones who asked the guardian to surrender the child,

A: I told the guardian that the rightful mother was claiming for the child mam.

and that we should talked (sic) with each other at the PAO for the

decision, mam. Q: You stated a while ago that there was no written agreement between

you or your hospital and the guardian of the minor, is that correct?

Q: Did the guardian bring the child to the PAO's Office (sic)?

A: Yes, mam.

A: No mam, she did not appear.

Q: For what reason if you know, why (did) the guardian did (sic) not

Q: Why? follow you or obey you when you want (sic) to get back the child?

A: They told me first that they are (sic) going to contact a lawyer but for A: I don't know of any reason, mam. 17

(sic) several days, she did not respond anymore, mam.

The efforts taken by the accused-appellants to help the complainant in

When the guardians refused to return the child, accused- finding the child clearly negate the finding that there was a deliberate

appellant Dr. Ty sought the assistance of the National Bureau of refusal or failure on their part to restore the child to her mother.

Investigation (NBI) which conducted a conference among the parties but Evidence is simply wanting in this regard.

since a case was yet to be filed, the custody of the minor remained with

the guardians. This fact is evident from the following testimony, thus: It is worthy to note that accused-appellants' conduct from the moment

the child was left in the clinic's care up to the time the child was given up

Q: You testified on cross-examination that you located the whereabouts for guardianship was motivated by nothing more than an earnest desire

of the child sometime later, what steps did you take up (sic) after you to help the child and a high regard for her welfare and well-being.

found the child?

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is

A: I explained to the guardian that the verbal agreement between the hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellants

supposed to be guardianship was only a plain guardianship and not as VICENTE TY and CARMEN TY are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime

an adoption, sir. charged and are ordered to be released immediately unless they are

being detained for other lawful causes. Costs de oficio.

Q: You said you went to the NBI after you found the child, why did you

go to the NBI?

G.R. No. 181440 April 13, 2011

A: Because the guardian are (sic) not willing to surrender the child to the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

PAO's Office (sic), that is why I asked their help, sir. 16 vs.

AIDA MARQUEZ, Accused-Appellant.

... DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Q: Now, when you informed the present custodian that the natural

mother is now claiming the child, why were you not able to get the For review is the August 29, 2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in

minor? CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00467, which affirmed with modification the

Regional Trial Court’s (RTC) January 21, 2004 Decision2 in Criminal

A: I was not able to get the minor so I asked the help of the NBI to have Case No. 99-106, wherein accused-appellant Aida Marquez (Marquez),

the child surrender (sic), mam. also known as Aida Pulido, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor as defined and Marquez telling her that she will file a case against Marquez if Justine is

penalized under Article 270 of the Revised not returned to her.

Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 18;3 was sentenced to serve Merano afterwards went to see then Mayor Alfredo Lim to

the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and was ordered to pay the offended ask for his help. Merano said that Mayor Lim referred her to Inspector

party Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and Twenty Eleazar of San Pedro, Laguna, who assigned two police officers to

Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages. accompany her to Marquez’s house.

On December 28, 1998, Marquez was charged with Kidnapping under When Merano did not find Justine in Marquez’s house, she

Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. went back to Inspector Eleazar who told her to come back the following

18, before the RTC, Branch 140 of Makati City. The Information reads in day to confront Marquez whom he will call. Merano came back the next

part as follows: day as instructed but Marquez did not show up.

That on or about the 6th day of September, 1998, in the City of Makati, On November 17, 1998, Merano gave her sworn statement

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this to the police and filed a complaint against Marquez. On

Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being entrusted with the February 11, 1999, Marquez allegedly called Merano up again to tell her

custody of a minor, JUSTINE BERNADETTE to pick up her daughter at Modesto Castillo’s (Castillo) house in Tiaong,

C. MERANO, a three (3) month old baby girl, did then and there willfully, Quezon. The following day, Merano, accompanied by Senior Police

unlawfully and feloniously deliberately fail to restore the latter to her Officer (SPO) 2 Diosdado Fernandez and SPO4 Rapal, went to the house

parent, CAROLINA CUNANAN y MERANO (sic).5 of Castillo in Quezon. Merano claimed that

Marquez pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in her arraignment on Castillo told her that Marquez sold Justine to him and his wife and that

October 10, 2002.6 Trial on the merits followed the termination of the they gave Marquez Sixty Thousand Pesos

pre-trial conference. (P60,000.00) supposedly for Merano who was asking for money. Castillo

According to the complainant, Carolina Cunanan Merano even gave Merano a photocopy of the handwritten "Kasunduan" dated

(Merano), she met Marquez at the beauty parlor where she was working May 17, 1998, wherein Merano purportedly gave Justine to the Castillo

as a beautician. Merano confessed to easily trusting Marquez because spouses.12

aside from her observation that Marquez was close to her employers, The Castillos asked Merano not to take Justine as they had

Marquez was also nice to her and her co-employees, and was always grown to love her but Merano refused. However, she was still not able to

giving them food and tip. take Justine home with her because the police advised her to go through

On September 6, 1998, after a trip to a beach in Laguna, the proper process as the Castillos might fight for their right to retain

Marquez allegedly borrowed Merano’s then three-month custody of Justine. Merano then learned from Castillo that in an effort to

old daughter Justine Bernadette C. Merano (Justine) to buy her some legalize the adoption of Justine, the Castillos turned over custody of

clothes, milk and food. Merano said she agreed because it was not Justine to the Reception and Study

unusual for Marquez to bring Justine some things whenever she came to Center for Children of the Department of Social Welfare and

the parlor. Development.

When Marquez failed to return Justine in the afternoon as To defend herself, Marquez proffered her own version of

promised, Merano went to her employers’ house to ask them for what had happened during her testimony.15 Marquez said that she had

Marquez’s address. However, Merano said that her employers just only formally met Merano on September 6, 1998 although she had

assured her that Justine will be returned to her soon. known of her for some time already because Merano worked as a

Merano averred that she searched for her daughter but her beautician at the beauty parlor of Marquez’s financier in her real estate

efforts were unsuccessful until she received a call from business.

Marquez on November 11, 1998. During that call, Marquez allegedly told Marquez alleged that on that day, Merano offered Justine to

Merano that she will return Justine to Merano the following day and that her for adoption. Marquez told Merano that she was not interested but

she was not able to do so because her own son was sick and was confined she could refer her to her friend Modesto Castillo (Castillo). That very

at the hospital. Marquez also allegedly asked Merano for Fifty Thousand same night, while Marquez was taking care of her son who was then

Pesos (P50,000.00) for the expenses that she incurred while Justine was confined at the Makati Medical Center, Merano allegedly proceeded to

with her.9 When the supposed return of Justine did not happen, Merano Marquez’s house in Laguna and left Justine with Marquez’s maid. The

claimed that she went to Marquez’s house, using the sketch that she got following day, while Marquez was at the hospital again, Castillo,

from her employers’ driver, but Marquez was not home. accompanied by his mother, went to Marquez’s house to pick up Justine.

Upon talking to Marquez’s maid, Merano learned that Since Marquez was out, she instructed her maid not to give Justine to

Justine was there for only a couple of days. Merano left a note for Castillo for fear of possible problems. However, she still found
Justine gone upon her return home that evening. Marquez allegedly DOUBT.21

learned of the encounter between the Castillos and Merano when a San On August 29, 2007, the Court of Appeals found Marquez’s appeal to be

Pedro police officer called Marquez to tell her that Merano, accompanied unmeritorious and affirmed the RTC’s decision with modifications on

by two police the damages awarded, to wit:

officers, went to Castillo’s house to get Justine. This was confirmed by WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision,

Castillo who also called Marquez and told her dated January 21 2004, of the Regional

that Merano offered Justine to him for adoption. Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140, is AFFIRMED with the

SPO2 Fernandez, one of the police officers who MODIFICATIONS that nominal damages of

accompanied Merano to Castillo’s house in February 1999, was P20,000.00 is hereby awarded in addition to the P50,000.00 moral

presented by the defense to prove that he was a witness to the execution damages, while the award for exemplary damages is accordingly deleted

of a document wherein Merano gave up her right to Justine to the Castillo for lack of basis.

spouses. Fernandez said that on February 12, 1999, he and SPO4 Rapal The Court of Appeals, in affirming Marquez’s conviction,

accompanied Merano to the house of Castillo where Justine was relied on the satisfaction of the elements of the crime as charged. It said

allegedly being kept. When they arrived at that the conflicting versions of the parties’ testimonies did not even

Castillo’s house, where they found baby Justine, Merano and Castillo matter as the fact remained that

talked and after sometime, they arrived at an agreement regarding Marquez had, at the very least, constructive custody over Justine and she

Justine’s adoption. SPO2 Fernandez averred that he, Castillo, Merano failed to return her when demanded to do so.

and SPO4 Rapal left Castillo’s house to go to a lawyer near Castillo’s The accused Marquez is now before us, still praying for a

house. After the agreement was put into writing, they all signed the reversal of her conviction on the same arguments she submitted to the

document, entitled "Kasunduan sa Pagtalikod sa Karapatan at Pagpapa- Court of Appeals.

ampon sa Isang Anak,"with Castillo and Merano as parties to the After a painstaking scrutiny of the entire records of this

agreement, and SPO2 Fernandez and SPO4 Rapal as witnesses. SPO2 case, this Court finds no reason to reverse the courts below.

Fernandez claimed that he was surprised that Merano gave up Justine Marquez argues that her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt

for adoption when they supposedly went there to get Justine back. because the elements constituting the crime

On January 21, 2004, the RTC found Marquez guilty beyond of serious illegal detention or kidnapping are not present in this case.

reasonable doubt of the crime charged as follows: The crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention falls under Article

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused AIDA 267 of the Revised Penal Code, viz:

MARQUEZ a.k.a. AIDA PULIDO, GUILTY Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner

RETURN A MINOR under Article 270 of the deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua

Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act. No. 18 and is hereby to death:

sentenced to suffer the penalty of 1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

RECLUSION PERPETUA. 2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

For the Civil aspect, accused is ordered to pay private complainant FIFTY 3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the

THOUSAND PESOS (PHP50,000.00) for moral damage and TWENTY person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been

THOUSAND PESOS (PHP20,000.00) for exemplary damage. made.

Costs against the accused. The RTC recounted in detail the factual 4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the

antecedents of the case and made a comprehensive synopsis of the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.

testimonies of all the witnesses presented. In finding for the prosecution, Marquez further contends that it is illogical for her to

the RTC held that the testimony of the complainant mother, Merano, was voluntarily divulge to Merano the whereabouts of Justine, even

enough to convict the accused Marquez because it was credible and was recommending the assistance of police officers, if she were indeed guilty

corroborated by documentary evidence.20 of kidnapping.

On intermediate appellate review, the Court of Appeals was Accused is mistaken, if not misled, in her understanding and

faced with the lone assignment of error as follows: appreciation of the crime she was charged with and eventually convicted

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED- of.

APPELLANT OF KIDNAPPING AND A reading of the charge in the information shows that the

FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR WHEN THE LATTER’S GUILT WAS NOT act imputed to Marquez was not the illegal detention of a person, but

PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE

involves her deliberate failure to restore a minor baby girl to her parent Marquez merely facilitated Justine’s adoption, then there was no more

after being entrusted with said baby’s custody. need for Merano to contact Marquez and vice-versa, since

Contrary to Marquez’s assertions, therefore, she was charged with Merano, as Marquez claimed, had direct access to Castillo. The evidence

violation of Article 270, and not Article 267, of the shows, however, that Merano desperately searched for a way to

Revised Penal Code. communicate with Marquez. As testified to by both Merano and

The Revised Penal Code considers it a crime when a person who has Marquez, Marquez frequented the beauty parlor where Merano worked

been entrusted with the custody of a minor later on deliberately fails to in, and yet, curiously, Marquez was nowhere to be found after September

return said minor to his parent or guardian. This may be found in Article 6, 1998. It took Marquez more than two months before communicating

270, which reads: Art. 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. — with Merano again, after she supposedly facilitated the adoption of

The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person Justine. If Marquez were indeed surprised to learn about the charges

who, being entrusted with the custody of a minor person, shall against her, she would have made every effort to clear her name when

deliberately fail to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. she found out that there was a standing warrant for her arrest. She

This crime has two essential elements: would have immediately contacted either Merano or Castillo to confront

1. The offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and them on why she was being implicated in their arrangement. Finally,

2. The offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents even if it were true that Merano subsequently agreed to have Castillo

or guardians.26 adopt Justine, as evidenced by the "Kasunduan sa Pagtalikod sa

This Court, in elucidating on the elements of Article 270, stated that Karapatan at Pagpapa-ampon sa Isang Anak," this would still not affect

while one of the essential elements of this crime is that the offender was Marquez’s liability as the crime of kidnapping and failure to return the

entrusted with the custody of the minor, what is actually being punished minor had been fully consummated upon her deliberate failure to return

is not the kidnapping but the deliberate failure of that person to restore Justine to Merano.

the minor to his parents or guardians.27 As the penalty for such an Marquez avers that the prosecution’s "evidence has fallen

offense is so severe, the Court further explained what "deliberate" as short of the quantum of proof required for conviction" and that it has

used in Article 270 means: "failed to establish [her] guilt with moral certainty."29 Marquez argues

Indeed, the word deliberate as used in Article 270 of the Revised Penal that her testimony was not only straightforward and consistent but also

Code must imply something more than mere negligence - it must be corroborated by a duly respected police officer. She insists that Merano’s

premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and testimony should not be believed as the only reason Merano filed this

maliciously wrong.28 charge was because she failed to get the money she demanded from

(Emphasis ours.) Marquez.

It is clear from the records of the case that Marquez was entrusted with This Court is constrained to once again reiterate the time-

the custody of Justine. Whether this is due to Merano’s version of honored maxim that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of

Marquez borrowing Justine for the day, or due to Marquez’s version that witnesses is entitled to the highest respect In People v. Bondoc, a case

Merano left Justine at her house, it is undeniable that in both versions, also involving the accused’s failure to return a minor, we explained the

Marquez agreed to the arrangement, i.e., to temporarily take custody of rationale of this maxim: We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings

Justine. It does not matter, for the first element to be present, how long of the trial court. The issue involved in this appeal is one of

said custody lasted as it cannot be denied that Marquez was the one credibility, and this Court has invariably ruled that the matter of

entrusted with the custody of the minor Justine. Thus, the first element assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is best performed by the

of the crime is satisfied. trial courts because they, unlike appellate courts, can weigh the

As to the second element, neither party disputes that on testimony of witnesses in the light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude

September 6, 1998, the custody of Justine was transferred or entrusted of the witnesses at the trial, except when circumstances of weight or

to Marquez. Whether this lasted for months or only for a couple of days, influence were ignored or disregarded by them which does not obtain in

the fact remains that Marquez had, at one point in time, physical and the present case.

actual custody of Justine. Marquez’s deliberate failure to return Justine, Unless there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked,

a minor at that time, when demanded to do so by the latter’s mother, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight that

shows that the second element is likewise undoubtedly present in this would have affected the result of the case, this Court will not disturb

case. factual findings of the lower court. Having had the opportunity of

Marquez’s insistence on Merano’s alleged desire and intention to have observing the demeanor and behavior of witnesses while testifying, the

Justine adopted cannot exonerate her because it has no bearing on her trial court more than this Court is in a better position to gauge their

deliberate failure to return Justine to Merano. If it were true that credibility and properly appreciate the relative weight of the often
conflicting evidence for both parties. When the issue is one of credibility, have discussed above, the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a

the trial court's findings are given great weight on appeal.33 (Emphases minor had been fully consummated way before the execution of the

ours.) agreement in February 1999, the validity of which is not in issue before

The RTC, in finding Merano credible, stated: us now. Moreover, even if Merano had indeed given up Justine to Castillo

Between the two conflicting allegations, the Court, after taking into on February 12, 1999, Merano’s consent to have Justine adopted in 1999

account all the testimonies and evidences presented by the prosecution has no impact on her demand to regain custody of Justine in 1998.1 a vv

and the defense, finds for the prosecution. The lone testimony of the p h i1

complainant inspired credibility and was corroborated by the In People v. Bernardo, we held that the crime of kidnapping and failure

documents, to wit, she is the mother of the child and she searched for to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code is clearly

her child when accused failed to return her baby, filed this complaint analogous to illegal and arbitrary detention or arrest, thereby justifying

when she failed to get her child and she was able to recover the child the award of moral damages.

from the DSWD at its Reception and Study Center for Children (RSCC) as The award of nominal damages is also allowed under

evidenced by the Discharge Slip after accused informed her that the child Article 2221 of the New Civil Code which states that:

was with Modesto Castillo. If indeed the complainant had given up or

have sold her baby, she would not have exhausted all efforts possible to Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order

find her baby. Further, the child would not have been in RSCC but it that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the

would have been with Modesto Castillo as per the document allegedly defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of

executed by Complainant. The testimony of the complainant was indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

straightforward and devoid of any substantial It took Merano almost a year to legally recover her baby. Justine was only

Inconsistencies. three months old when this whole debacle began. She was already nine

The RTC found Marquez’s defense of denial to be weak. It months old when Merano saw her again. She spent her first birthday at

also outlined the inconsistencies in Marquez’s testimonies which further the Reception and Study Center for Children of the Department of Social

destroyed her credibility. The manner of appreciating the defense of Welfare and Development.37 Evidently, Merano’s right as

denial was discussed by this Court in this wise: a parent which was violated and invaded must be vindicated and

As to the defense of denial, the same is inherently weak. recognized, thereby justifying the award of nominal damages.

Denial is a self-serving negative evidence, which cannot WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 29,

be given greater weight than that of the declaration of a credible witness 2007 in CA-G.R. CR. HC No. 00467 finding

who testifies on affirmative matters. Like alibi, denial is an inherently Aida Marquez GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of

weak defense, which cannot prevail over the positive and credible KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO RETURN A

testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Denial cannot prevail over the MINOR under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby

positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses who were not shown to AFFIRMED. No Costs.

have any ill motive to testify against petitioner.

Abandonment of One’s Victim

Merano’s credibility has been established by the trial court,

to which the Court of Appeals agreed. This Court finds no reason to LAMERA v. CA, 198 SCRA 186 SECTION 21, Same offenses

depart from these findings, especially since it was the trial court which FACTS: An owner type jeepney, driven by petitioner, hit a tricycle

had the opportunity to evaluate and assess the credibility of the resulting to the damage of the tricycle, and physical injuries to the

witnesses presented before it. Both courts found Merano’s testimony to passengers of the said tricycle. Two informations were filed against

be straightforward and consistent. Thus, Marquez’s denial and petitioner. First is reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property

inconsistent statements cannot prevail over Merano’s positive and and physical injuries under Article 365 of the Revised penal Code and

credible testimony. second, abandonment of ones victim under Article 247 of the Revised

Anent Marquez’s claim that SPO2 Fernandez’s testimony corroborated Penal Code. The second information was filed because the petitioner,

hers, a perusal of the transcript of SPO2 instead of giving assistance to the victims, fled and left them. He invoked

Fernandez’s testimony will reveal that its focus was mainly on how the his right against double jeopardy saying that his conviction of reckless

agreement on Justine’s adoption came to be. imprudence resulting to damage to property and multiple physical

The fact that SPO2 Fernandez may have corroborated injuries is a bar for the prosecution to charge him with the crime of

Marquez’s defense of adoption by testifying that he witnessed how abandonment of ones victim. The lower court and the Court of Appeals

Merano gave up her child for adoption to Castillo is irrelevant. As we ruled against the petitioner, hence this appeal. ISSUE: Could there be a
valid charge for alleged abandonment under Article 275, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides as basis for prosecution. "2. Anyone
who shall fail to help another whom he has accidentally wounded or
injured" when, he was previously charged with "reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries" under
Article 365 (sic) of the Revised Penal Code?
RULING: There is no double jeopardy, because these two offenses are
repeatedly, "Agustin, putang ina mo. Agustin,
mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin
kita." Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the
motorcade left the premises. Meanwhile,
Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of Reyes
and the other demonstrators, stayed inside the
house. Reyes was then charged with grave
threats and grave oral defamation.

not identical. Reckless imprudence is a crime falling under the chapter

Issue:
on criminal negligence, while abandonment of ones victim is a crime
WON Accused is guilty of GRAVE
falling under the chapter on crimes against security. The former is
THREATS (YES)
committed by means of culpa, while the latter is committed by means of
WON Accused is guilty of ORAL
dolo. Failure to help ones victim is not an offense by itself nor an element
DEFAMATION (NO)
of reckless imprudence. It merely Increases the penalty by one degree.

SC:
Grave Threats
 After a careful consideration of the original
information, we find that all the elements
of the crime of grave threats as defined in
Reyes v. People Article 282 1 of the Revised Penal Code
and penalized by its paragraph 2 were
Facts: alleged therein namely: (1) that the
Accused was a former civilian offender threatened another person with
employee of the Navy Exchange who was the infliction upon his person of a wrong;
terminated on May 1961. On June, he led a (2) that such wrong amounted to a crime;
group of 20-30 people in a demonstration in and (3) that the threat was not subject to a
front of the US Naval Station, carrying placards condition.
bearing statements such as, "Agustin, mamatay The threats were made "with the
ka;" "To, alla boss con Nolan;" "Frank do not be deliberate purpose of creating in the mind
a common funk;" "Agustin, mamamatay ka of the person threatened the belief that the
rin"; "Agustin, Nolan for you;" "Agustin alla bos threat would be carried into effect."
con Nolan;" "Agustin, dillega, el dia di quida rin Indeed, Hallare became so apprehensive of
bo chiquiting;" and others. Col. Monzon went to his safety that he sought the protection of
the place and talked to Rosauro Reyes and one Col. Monzon, who had to escort him home,
Luis Buenaventura upon learning that the wherein he stayed while the
demonstration was not directed against the demonstration was going on. It cannot be
naval station but against Agustin Hallare and a denied that the threats were made
certain Frank Nolan for their having allegedly deliberately and not merely in a
caused the dismissal of Rosauro Reyes from temporary fit of anger, motivated as they
the Navy Exchange, Col. Monzon suggested to were by the dismissal of petitioner one
them to demonstrate in front of Hallare's month before the incident. We, therefore,
residence hold that the appellate court was correct in
The three jeeps carrying the upholding petitioner's conviction for the
demonstrators parked in front of Hallare's offense of grave threats.
residence after having gone by it twice Rosauro  The charge of oral defamation stemmed
Reyes got off his jeep and posted himself at the from the utterance of the words, "Agustin,
gate, and with his right hand inside his pocket putang ina mo". This is a common enough
and his left holding the gate-door, he shouted expression in the dialect that is often
 employed, not really to slander but rather
to express anger or displeasure. It is
seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by
the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the
virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it
should be viewed as part of the threats
voiced by appellant against Agustin
Hallare, evidently to make the same more
emphatic.
SECOND DIVISION
RONNIE CALUAG,
Petitioner,
For review on certiorari are the
Decision[1] dated December 9, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28707 and
its Resolution[2] dated February 15, 2006,
denying reconsideration. The appellate court
had affirmed the Decision[3] dated August 3,
2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las
Pias City, Branch 198, in Criminal Case No. 04-
0183-84, which affirmed the
Decision[4] dated January 28, 2004 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Las Pias
City, Branch 79, in Criminal Cases Nos. 47358
and 47381 finding petitioner Ronnie Caluag
and Jesus Sentillas guilty of slight physical
injuries and Ronnie Caluag guilty of grave
threats.
The factual antecedents of this case
are as follows:
On May 18 and 23, 2000, two separate
Informations[5] docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 47381 and 47358, respectively, were filed
against Caluag and Sentillas. The Information
in Criminal Case No. 47381 charged Caluag and
Sentillas with slight physical injuries
committed as follows:
That on or about
the 19th day of March, 2000,
in the City of Las Pias,
Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and
confederating together, and
both of them mutually
helping and aiding one
another did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault,
and employ personal violence
upon the person of NESTOR
G.R. No. 171511
PURCEL DENIDO, by then
and there mauling him,
thereby inflicting upon him
physical injuries which
required medical attendance
for less than nine (9) days and
incapacitated him from
performing his customary
labor for the same period of
time. CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
The Information in Criminal Case No. 47358
charged Caluag with grave threats committed
Joint
as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of March
2000, in the City of Las Pias, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, moved by personal
resentment which he entertained against
one JULIA LAVIAL DENIDO, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
threaten said JULIA LAVIAL DENIDO with the
infliction on her person of a harm amounting to
a crime, by then and there poking his gun at her
forehead and uttering the following words in
tagalog, to wit:
Saan ka pupunta gusto mo ito?
thereby causing said complainant to be
threatened. CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
Upon arraignment, Caluag and
Sentillas pleaded not guilty.Thereafter, joint
trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the two
private complainants, the spouses Nestor and
Julia Denido, as witnesses. Their version of the
facts are as follows:
In the afternoon of March 19, 2000,
around 4 oclock[8] in the afternoon, Nestor
learned that two of his guests from an earlier
drinking spree were mauled. At that time,
Caluag and Sentillas were drinking at the store
owned by the son of Sentillas. When Nestor
inquired from several people including his own
son Raymond what happened, Caluag butted in
and replied, Bakit kasama ka ba roon?, and
immediately boxed him without
warning. Nestor retaliated but he was
overpowered by Caluag and Sentillas. Julia saw
Caluag and Sentillas box her husband.Although
she tried to pacify them, they did not listen to
her. To avoid his assailants, Nestor ran to his
house. Julia followed him. At around 6:00 p.m.,
Nestor told his wife to report the boxing
incident to the barangay authorities.[9]
Later, at around 7:30 in the evening,
when Julia and her son Rotsen were on their
way to their barangay hall, she encountered
Caluag, who blocked her way at the alley near
her house. Caluag confronted Julia with a gun,
poked it at her forehead, and said Saan ka
pupunta, gusto mo ito?[10] Despite this fearful
encounter, she was still able to proceed to the
barangay hall where she reported the gun-
poking incident to the barangay authorities.[11]
For its part, the defense presented the
accused Caluag and Sentillas; and the barbecue
vendor Pablo Barrameda, Jr. as
witnesses.According to them, in the afternoon
of March 19, 2000 at around 6 oclock in the
evening, Caluag was on his way home with his
three-year old son when Nestor, drunk and
unruly, blocked his way and asked him, Pare,
galit ka ba sa akin? He answered in the
negative but Nestor persisted in his
questioning and would not allow him to pass
through.Annoyed, he told Nestor, Hindi
nga! Ang kulit kulit mo! Nestor then boxed him
on his face which caused him to fall
down. Caluag first assured himself of the safety
of his son and then punched Nestor back. As
people around pacified them, he was led to the
store owned by the son of Sentillas.Nestor
pursued him and punched him again. As
he retaliated, some bystanders separated
them. Nestor then shouted, Putang ina mo,
Pare!Gago ka! Gago ka! Marami ka ng taong
niloko! Thereafter, an unidentified man from the
crowd armed with a knife went towards
Nestor but Sentillas timely interceded and
pacified the man.Sentillas never boxed Nestor.
Caluag also denied poking a gun at Julia.[12]
In a Joint Decision dated January 28,
2004, the MeTC found Caluag and Sentillas
guilty of slight physical injuries, and Caluag
guilty of grave threats.
The MeTC relied on Nestors
testimony. It noted that Nestor did not deny
that he was drunk at the time of the incident
while Caluag admitted that he got annoyed by
Nestors attitude. The MeTC concluded that
Caluag and Sentillas lost control of their
tempers due to Nestors unruly behavior. On
the other hand, the MeTC noted that Julia did
not waste time reporting the gun-poking
incident to the barangay.While she had
intended to report the mauling of her husband,
as he instructed her, what she reported instead
was what happened to her.With such
straightforward and seemingly natural course
of events, the MeTC was convinced that the
negative assertions of Caluag and Sentillas
cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of
Nestor and Julia.
The decretal portion of the joint
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing
premises considered, the Court finds and
declares accused RONNIE CALUAG AND JESUS
S[E]NTILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of Slight Physical Injuries
under Criminal Case No. 47381, and sentences
them to pay [a] fine of P200.00 each.The two
(2) accused are also censured to be more
complaisant and well-bred in dealing with
people.
The Court also finds accused RONNIE
CALUAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Grave Threats under Article 282,
par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, under
Criminal Case No. 47358, and sentences him to
suffer two (2) months imprisonment [and to]
pay [a] fine of P200.00.
Criminal Case No. 47382, as earlier
explained, is ordered dismissed being merely a
duplication of Criminal Case No. 47358.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Caluag and Sentillas appealed to the
RTC which affirmed in toto the joint decision of
the MeTC.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the RTC on December
9, 2005. The appellate court noted that the
MeTC gave credence to the testimonies of
Nestor and Julia because they were in accord
with the natural course of things. Likewise,
petitioners negative assertions cannot prevail
over the positive testimonies of Nestor and
Julia. The appellate court disregarded the
purported inconsistencies in the testimonies of
Nestor and Julia since these refer to collateral
matters and not to the essential details of the
incident.
Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to
this Court on the ground that the Court of
Appeals:
I.
MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED CERTAIN
RELEVANT FACTS NOT DISPUTED BY THE
PARTIES AND WHICH, IF PROPERLY
CONSIDERED WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT
CONCLUSION;
II.
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE
[MeTC] WHICH MADE INFERENCES OR
CONCLUSIONS IN ITS JOINT DECISION THAT
ARE MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ABSURD OR
IMPOSSIBLE AND WHICH ARE GROUNDED
ENTIRELY ON SPECULATIONS, SURMISES OR
CONJECTURES OR ARE BASED ON A
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS;
III.
ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONER
HEREIN IS GUILTY OF THE OFFENSES
CHARGED BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT.[14]
Simply, the issue
is: Was there sufficient evidence to sustain
petitioners conviction of slight physical
injuries and of grave threats?
Petitioner contends that he was able
to present Barrameda, an independent and
impartial witness, who supported his version
of events and debunked those of Nestor and
Julia. Contrary to the findings of the lower
courts that petitioner offered mere denials,
Barramedas testimony is actually a positive
statement that should have been given full
credit.Petitioner also argues that although the
lower courts acknowledged that Nestor was
drunk and troublesome at the time of the
incident, they chose to believe his testimony
rather than petitioners. Petitioner adds that
there is no basis for the lower courts to
conclude that he lost his temper because of
Nestors unruly behavior. Petitioner maintains
that just because Julia immediately reported
the gun-poking incident to the barangay, this
did not necessarily mean that it actually
happened. Petitioner also argues that
assuming that he did poke a gun at Julia, the
crime committed was other light threats as
defined under Article 285, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code.[15]
For the respondent, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the MeTC
did not err in giving credence to the
testimonies of Nestor and Julia.The MeTC
found that the positive assertions of Nestor
and Julia, their straightforward manner of
testifying, and the seemingly natural course of
events, constituted the more plausible and
credible version. The MeTC also noted that
Julia did not waste time reporting the gun-
poking incident to the barangay authorities
immediately after it happened. The OSG also
agrees with the MeTC that petitioner lost his
temper, given the unruly behavior of Nestor.
We find the petition with insufficient
merit and accordingly sustain petitioners
conviction.
At the outset, it must be stressed that
petitioner raises questions of fact. Certainly,
such matters mainly require a calibration of
the evidence or a determination of the
credibility of the witnesses presented by the
parties and the existence and relevancy of
specific surrounding circumstances, their
relation to each other and to the whole, and the
probabilities of the situation.[16]
The well-entrenched rule is that only
errors of law and not of fact are reviewable by
this Court in petitions for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 under which this petition is
filed. It is not the Courts function under Rule 45
to review, examine and evaluate or weigh once
again the probative value of the evidence
presented.[17]
Moreover, findings of fact of the trial
court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
are binding upon this Court. It is not the
function of this Court to weigh anew the
evidence already passed upon by the Court of
Appeals for these are deemed final and
conclusive and may no longer be reviewed on
appeal.[18]
A departure from the general rule,
however, may be warranted where the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to the findings and conclusions of the
trial court, or when the same is unsupported by
the evidence on record. Nevertheless, we find
that there is no ground to apply the exception
in the instant case because the findings and
conclusions of the Court of Appeals are in full
accord with those of the MeTC and the
RTC. This Court will not assess and evaluate all
over again the evidence, both testimonial and
documentary, adduced by the parties to the
appeal particularly where, as in this case, the
findings of the MeTC, the RTC and the Court of
Appeals completely coincide.[19]
Even if the Court relaxes the
abovecited general rule and resolves the
petition on the merits, we still find no
reversible error in the appellate courts ruling.
As the lower courts and the Court of
Appeals correctly stated, the testimonies of
Nestor and Julia were more in accord with the
natural course of things. There could be no
doubt that Caluag and Sentillas lost control of
their temper as Caluag himself admitted that
he got annoyed by Nestors unruly
behavior. Likewise, the gun-poking incident
also happened since Julia did not waste time in
reporting it to the barangay
authorities. Instead of reporting the mauling of
her husband, she reported what happened to
her in her hurry, excitement and confusion.
Indeed, the positive declarations of Nestor and
Julia that petitioner committed the acts
complained of undermined his negative
assertions. The fact that Barrameda testified in
petitioners behalf cannot be given more weight
than the straightforward and credible
statements of Nestor and Julia. Indeed, we find
they had no reason to concoct stories to pin
down petitioner on any criminal act, hence
their testimonies deserve full faith and credit.
The MeTC, the RTC and the Court of
Appeals uniformly found petitioner guilty of
grave threats under Article 282, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to
suffer two months of imprisonment and to pay
a fine of P200. We find no reason to reverse the
findings and conclusions of the MeTC and RTC,
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Under the Revised Penal Code, there
are three kinds of threats: grave threats
(Article 282), light threats (Article 283) and
other light threats (Article 285). These
provisions state:
Art. 282. Grave threats. Any person who shall
threaten another with the infliction upon the
person, honor or property of the latter or of his
family of any wrong amounting to a crime, shall
suffer:
1. The penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed by law for the crime he threatened
to commit, if the offender shall have made the
threat demanding money or imposing any
other condition, even though not unlawful, and
said offender shall have attained his purpose. If
the offender shall not have attained his
purpose, the penalty lower by two degrees
shall be imposed.
If the threat be made in writing or
through a middleman, the penalty shall be
imposed in its maximum period.
2. The penalty of arresto
mayor and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos, if the
threat shall not have been
made subject to a condition.
Art. 283. Light threats. Any
threat to commit a wrong not
constituting a crime, made in
the manner expressed in
subdivision 1 of the next
preceding article, shall be
punished by arresto mayor.
Art. 285. Other light threats. The penalty of
arresto menor in its minimum period or a
fine not exceeding 200 pesos shall be
imposed upon:
1. Any person who, without being included in
the provisions of the next preceding article,
shall threaten another with a weapon or draw
such weapon in a quarrel, unless it be in lawful
self-defense.
2. Any person who, in the heat of anger, shall
orally threaten another with some harm not
constituting a crime, and who by subsequent
acts show that he did not persist in the idea
involved in his threat, provided that the
circumstances of the offense shall not bring it
within the provisions of Article 282 of this WHEREFORE, the petition
Code.3. Any person who shall orally threaten to
is DENIED for utter lack of merit.The Decision
do another any harm not constituting a felony.
In grave threats, the wrong dated December 9, 2005 and the Resolution
threatened amounts to a crime which may or dated February 15, 2006 of the Court of
may not be accompanied by a condition. Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28707
In light threats, the wrong threatened does
not amount to a crime but is always are AFFIRMED.
accompanied by a condition. In other light
threats, the wrong threatened does not Costs against petitioner.
amount to a crime and there is no condition.
The records show that at
around 7:30 in the evening, Julia Denido left
her house to go to the barangay hall to report
the mauling of her husband which she
witnessed earlier at around 4:00 oclock in the
afternoon. On her way there, petitioner
confronted her and pointed a gun to her
forehead, while at the same time saying Saan
ka pupunta, gusto mo ito?[20] Considering what
Grave Coercion
transpired earlier between petitioner and
Julias husband, petitioners act of pointing a
gun at Julias forehead clearly enounces a threat
TIMONER VS. PEOPLE ET. AL. - NOVEMBER
to kill or to inflict serious physical injury on her
person.Actions speak louder than
words.Taken in the context of the surrounding
25, 1983 (G.R. NO. L-62050)
circumstances, the uttered words do not go
against the threat to kill or to inflict serious FACTS: Jose Timoner, the petitioner, was
injury evinced by petitioners accompanying convicted by the Municipal Court of Daet with
act.
the crime of Grave Coercion, as penalized
under Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code,
Given the surrounding circumstances, because of the complaint by Pascual Dayaon,
the offense committed falls under Article 282, Lourdes Rabustillos and others. Timoner, then
par. 2 (grave threats) since: (1) killing or Mayor of Daet, together with two uniformed
shooting someone amounts to a crime, and (2) policemen, Samuel Morena and Ernesto
the threat to kill was not subject to a condition.
Quibral, and six laborers, was acting on the
recommendation of Dra. Allegre, the Municipal
Article 285, par. 1 (other light threats) Health Officer, to close among other structures
is inapplicable although it specifically states, that were along the sidewalk, the barbershop
shall threaten another with a weapon or draw of Dayaon and store of Rabustillos. Timoner
such weapon in a quarrel, since it presupposes filed a complaint in the CFI of Camarines Norte
that the threat to commit a wrong will not
against Rebustillos and others for judicial
constitute a crime. That the threat to commit a
abatement of their stalls, alleged that the stalls
wrong will constitute or not constitute a crime
constituted public nuisances as well as per se.
is the distinguishing factor between grave
The petitioner appealed to the Court of
threats on one hand, and light and other light
Appeals, which was the Intermediate Appellate
threats on the other.
Court then, however, the CA affirmed in full the
judgment of the trial court. Petitioner claimed
that their actions was done in abatement of a
public nuisance and, therefore, under lawful
authority.
ISSUES: Whether or not Timoner committed
Grave Coercion. Whether or not the structures
among the sidewalk are constituted as public
nuisances, and nuisances per se. Whether or
not Timoner was within his authority to close
the structures.
HELD: The petitioner was acquitted of the
crime charged. He did not commit Grave
Coercon as the elements of Grave Coercion
required that he acted not under the authority
of the law. As the then Mayor of the City,
Timoner had the authority to act on behalf of
the recommendation and his constituents’
right to public order and safety, and that such
stalls along the sidewalk affected the
community and general public, as it is in a
public place, and was annoying to all who come
within its sphere. The Supreme Court did
contend that the barbershop did constitute a
public nuisance, as defined under Article 694
and 695 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Furthermore, it had been recommended for
closure by the Municipal Health Officer
G.R. No. 90423 September 6, 1991
FRANCIS LEE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND PELAGIA PANLINO DE
CHIN, respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set
aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
June 29, 1989 which reversed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 129 at Caloocan
City, Metro Manila, and reinstated as well as
affirmed in toto the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 2,
same city. The RTC decision found the
petitioner guilty of the crime of light coercion,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
judgment appealed from is hereby modified.
The accused Francis Lee is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of light
coercion, as penalized under paragraph 2 of
Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code and he is
hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of
TWENTY (20) DAYS of ARRESTO MENOR and
to pay one-third (1/3) of the costs. (p. 40,
Rollo)
On the other hand, the MTC decision convicted
the petitioner of the offense of grave coercion,
the pertinent portion of the same is hereby
quoted as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
finds the accused Francis Lee, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Grave
Coercion, as charged, defined and penalized
under Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, and
is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment
of THREE (3) MONTHS, of arresto mayor,
medium, and to pay a fine of P250.00, with cost.
The accused is further ordered to indemnify
the offended party, Pelagia Paulino de Chin, by
way of civil liability the sum of P5,000.00 as
moral damages and the sum of P2,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
... (p. 33, Rollo)
The facts as stated by the respondent Court of
Appeals are undisputed, thus:
At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of June
20, 1984, the complainant Maria Pelagia
Paulino de Chin, 23 years old, was fetched from
her house at 112 BLISS Site, 8th Avenue,
Caloocan City by Atanacio Lumba, a bank
employee, upon the instruction of the
petitioner Branch Manager Francis Lee of
Pacific Banking Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as bank). Upon arriving at the office
of Pacific Banking Corporation located at
Caloocan City, petitioner Francis Lee did not
attend to her immediately. After an hour later,
the petitioner confronted the complainant
about a forged Midland National Bank Cashier
Check No. 3526794, which the latter allegedly
deposited in the account of Honorio Carpio.
During the said confrontation, the petitioner
Francis Lee was shouting at her with piercing
looks and threatened to file charges against her
unless and until she returned all the money
equivalent of the subject cashier check.
Accordingly, the complainant was caused to
sign a prepared withdrawal slip, and later, an
affidavit prepared by the bank's lawyer, where
she was made to admit that she had swindled
the bank and had return the money equivalent
of the spurious check. During her stay at the
said bank, the complainant, who was five (5)
months in the family way, was watched by the
bank's employees and security guards. It was
about six o'clock in the afternoon of the same
day when the complainant was able to leave
the bank premises.
Upon the other hand, the petitioner, 37 years
old, presented his version, basically a denial of
the charges, to wit: he was the Branch Bank
Manager of Pacific Banking Corporation. After
having been informed that Midland National
Bank Cashier Check No. 3526794 was
dishonored for being spurious, he examined
the relevant bank records and discovered that
complainant Maria Pelagia Paulino de Chin was
instrumental in inducing their bank to accept
the subject dollar check and was also the one
who withdrew the proceeds thereof, by
utilizing a withdrawal slip purportedly signed
by Honorio Carpio. Petitioner, thru Atanacio
Lumba, invited the complainant to his office.
Responding to his invitation, the complainant
arrived at the bank before noon of June 20,
1984, but was not attended to immediately as
the petitioner had to attend to other bank
clients. The complainant was merely informed
about the subject fake dollar check that was
deposited with said bank upon her assurance
that it was genuine. The complainant was not
compelled into signing the withdrawal slip, but
she acted freely and voluntarily in executing
her affidavit and in returning the money
equivalent of the subject check. There was
nothing unusual during her lengthy stay in the
bank. (pp. 44-45, Rollo)
The sole issue posed in this petition is whether
or not the acts of petitioner in simply "shouting
at the complainant with piercing looks" and
"threats to file charges against her" are
sufficient to convict him of the crime of grave
coercion (p. 6, Rollo).
Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 286. Grave coercions. — The penalty
of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500
pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,
without authority of law, shall, by means of
violence, prevent another from doing
something not prohibited by law, or compel
him to do something against his will, whether
it be right or wrong.
If the coercion be committed for the purpose of
compelling another to perform any religious
act or to prevent him from so doing, the penalty
next higher in degree shall be imposed.
Considering that the present case does not
involve violence but intimidation, the
provisions of Article 1335 of the New Civil
Code on intimidation are relevant. It states:
Art. 1335. ...
There is intimidation when one of the
contracting parties is compelled by a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an
imminent and grave evil upon his person or
property, or upon the person or property of his
spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his
consent.
To determine the degree of the intimidation,
the age, sex and condition of the person shall
be borne in mind.
A threat to enforce once's claim through
competent authority, if the claim is just or legal,
does not vitiate consent.
As a general rule, the findings of facts of the
Court of Appeals command utmost respect.
However, such findings are disregarded if
there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which
has been overlooked or the significance of
which has been misinterpreted that, if
considered, would affect the result of the case
(see San Sebastian College v. Court of Appeals,
et al., G.R. No. 84401, May 15, 1991).
While the appellate court emphasized the
pregnancy and feminine gender of the
complainant, it overlooked other significant
personal circumstances which are material in
determining the presence of coercion in this
case.
The records show that complainant is a highly
educated person who is familiar with banking
procedures. She is a graduate of Business
Administration major in Banking and Finance
from NCBA. She also finished one semester of
MA in graduate school. In 1983, complainant
worked with the Insular Bank of Asia and
America as a bank teller (TSN, November 20,
1984, pp. 5-7; Records, pp. 96-98).
Likewise, it appears that complainant actively
participated in the deposit and withdrawal of
the proceeds of the controversial check. We
find that she told Honorio Carpio (Carpio, for
short), a relative and payee of the check; to
open a savings account with the Pacific
Banking Corporation (Bank, for short) and
accompanied him; that subsequently, she
presented a Midland National Bank Cashier's
check payable to Carpio in the sum of
$5,200.00 to Mr. Lamberto R. Cruz (Cruz, for
short), PRO Manager, Foreign Department;
that she claimed that she was requested by her
uncle to deposit the check for collection; that
she was a bank depositor and she "knew
somebody downstairs"; that she assured Cruz
that the check would be honored between
banks (TSN, April 15, 1985, pp. 89-92; Records,
180-183); that on June 11, 1984, the bank, after
the usual clearing period, sent out a notice to
Carpio that the proceeds of the check were
already credited to his account but the same
was returned to the bank because the address
was false or not true; that the total amount of
the check in pesos was P92,557.44; that the
total deposit of Carpio was P92,607.44, his
initial deposit of P50.00 being added to the
amount of the check; that on the same day,
complainant personally inquired from the
bank whether the proceeds of the check have
already been credited to Carpio's account
(TSN, June 11, 1985, p. 163, records, p. 163);
that upon an affirmative answer, the bank
records show that on that day, the complainant
withdrew the sum of P12,607.00 thru a
withdrawal slip purportedly signed by Carpio;
that in the interim, Carpio allegedly left abroad
(Annex C, p. 17, Records); that on June 13,
1984, she withdrew the sum of P80,000.44
from Carpio's account by means of a
withdrawal slip allegedly signed by Carpio and
then, she closed his account; that out of the said
amount, she redeposited the sum of
P50,000.00 to her own savings account and
received in cash the remaining balance of
P30,000.44; and on June 15 and 18, 1984,
complainant withdrew the amounts of
P2,000.00 and P18,000.00, respectively from
her savings account (Exh. "3", Records, p. 15, in
relation to TSN, October 8, 1985, pp. 194-195,
Records, pp. 286-287).
In the light of the foregoing circumstances,
petitioner's demand that the private
respondent return the proceeds of the check
accompanied by a threat to file criminal
charges was not improper. There is nothing
unlawful on the threat to sue. In the case
of Berg v. National City Bank of New York (102
Phil. 309, 316), We ruled that:
... It is a practice followed not only by banks but
even by individuals to demand payment of
their accounts with the threat that upon failure
to do so an action would be instituted in court.
Such a threat is proper within the realm of the
law as a means to enforce collection. Such a
threat cannot constitute duress even if the
claim proves to be unfounded so long as the
creditor believes that it was his right to do so.
The Solicitor General argues that the
complainant was intimidated and compelled
into disclosing her time deposit, signing the
typewritten withdrawal slip and the affidavit
by the petitioner's threat to detain her at the
bank.
At this point, there is a need to make a
distinction between a case where a person
gives his consent reluctantly and against his
good sense and judgment and where he gives
no consent at all, as where he acts against his
will under a pressure he cannot resist. Thus,
in Vales v. Villa (35 Phil. 769, 789), We ruled:
... It is clear that one acts as voluntarily and
independently in the eye of the law when he
acts reluctantly and with hesitation as when he
acts spontaneously and joyously. Legally
speaking he acts as voluntarily and freely when
he acts wholly against his better sense and you coupled with the statement that you could
judgment as when he acts in conformity with not leave?
them. Between the two acts there is no
difference in law. But when his sense, A Yes, sir.
judgment, and his will rebel and he refuses
absolutely to act as requested, but is Q When Mr. Lee was requiring you to sign the
nevertheless overcome by force or withdrawal slip did it not occur to you to leave
intimidation to such an extent that he becomes the bank?
a mere automaton and acts mechanically only,
a new element enters, namely, a disappearance
of the personality of the actor. He ceases to Atty. Pangilinan:
exist as an independent entity with faculties
and judgment, and in his place is substituted The question has already been answered she
another — the one exercising the force or said she cannot leave because she is being
making use of the intimidation. While his hand threatened.
signs, the will which moves it is another's.
While a contract is made, it has, in reality and Atty. Dizon:
in law, only one party to it; and, there being
only one party, the one using the force or the That was during the time when she first met
intimidation, it is unenforceable for lack of a Mr. Lee.
second party.
Court:
From these considerations it is clear that every
case of alleged intimidation must be examined Witness may answer.
to determine within which class it falls. If it is
within the first class it is not duress in law, if it
A When I was about to sign the withdrawal slip
falls in the second, it is.
I inquired from him If I signed it I can leave
already but he insisted that I should not leave,
The circumstances of this case reveal that the Sir.
complainant, despite her protestations, indeed
voluntarily, albeit reluctantly, consented to do
Q When he told you that did it not occur to you
all the aforesaid acts.
to stand up and go out of the bank?
Bearing in mind her involvement in the deposit
A No, Sir.
and encashment of the check, the complainant
admitted to being nervous upon being
informed that the check was spurious (TSN, Q Why?
November 20, 1984, p. 15; Record, p. 106)
A He was insisting that I return the amount I
We find that complainant's lengthy stay at the have withdrawn especially on June 18 when I
bank was not due to the petitioner's threat. It withdrew P18,000.00, Sir.
was rather due to her desire to prove her
innocence. Her testimony on this point is a COURT:
revelation:
The question is why did you not leave and
Atty. Dizon: (counsel for petitioner) disregarded him?

You are always talking of signing the A Because I cannot just leave him that way, Your
withdrawal slip by force, is it not that earlier Honor.
you admitted that no actual force was
employed upon you in connection with the Atty. Dizon:
signing of this document and the force that you
are claiming was the alleged shouting against
Why? What was the reason that you cannot
leave him?
A Because he is insisting that the responsibility
of one person be my responsibility and at that
time I was feeling nervous and he did not tell me
to stand up and leave, Sir. (ibid, pp. 18-20,
Records, pp. 109-111)
In her insistence to clear up her name, it is not
farfetched for Us to think that the complainant
voluntarily but grudgingly returned the money
to show good faith. Thus, it was she who
informed the petitioner about the existence of
the RCBC Time Deposit Certificate (Exh. "A",
pp. 4-5, Records). The allegation that she did so
because of petitioner's threats came from the
complainant herself. She has not been able to
present any other witness to buttress her
claim.
Further, We find that contrary to
complainant's allegations in her affidavit (ibid,
p. 5) it was not the petitioner who suggested
the encashment of the RCBC Time Deposit
Certificate but her sister; and that again, it was
not the petitioner who agreed to the sister's
suggestion but Cruz, the PRO Manager, Foreign
Department of the bank (TSN, January 8, 1985,
pp. 40-41, Records, pp. 131-132).
Moreover, while complainant claimed that her
freedom of movement was restrained, she,
however, was able to move about freely
unguarded from the office of the petitioner
situated at the ground floor to the office of Cruz
at the mezzanine floor where her sister found
her (ibid, pp. 39- 40, Records, pp. 130-131).
Undoubtedly, during that time, there were
many bank clients who transacted business
with the bank (TSN, November 20, 1984, p. 21;
Records, p. 112). The bank security guards
then were at their posts. Complainant herself
admitted that they manifested no overt acts to
prevent her from leaving despite the alleged
loud threats of the petitioner (ibid, pp. 20- 21,
Records, pp. 111-112) which could be heard
considering that the door to petitioner's office
was kept open (TSN, October 8, 1985, p. 184,
Records, p. 276). Given such atmosphere, the
complainant still did not leave the bank.
The respondent court cited the prepared
typewritten withdrawal slip and the non-
presentation of the complainant's passbook as
indicators of her involuntary acts.
We disagree. The petitioner testified that the
general rule was that the bank requires the
presentation of the passbook whenever
withdrawals are made. However, there was an
exception to this rule, i.e. when the depositor is
a regular customer in depositing or
withdrawing money in the bank (TSN, October
8, 1985, pp. 189-190, Records, pp. 281-282).
The prosecution failed to submit evidence to
rebut his contentions. Besides, the trial court's
conclusion that the withdrawal slip was
typewritten was without basis considering
that the complainant merely averred that the
withdrawal slip was already prepared when
she signed it (Exh. "A", Records, p. 4).
We also take exception to the following ruling
of the appellate court:
It must be noted that the position of a bank
manager is one of prestige and dignity and
when the said bank was cheated or swindled it
certainly reflects on the capability and
efficiency of the manager and one can just
imagine the kind of mental attitude and feeling
of anger the latter would have towards the
alleged swindler. Shouting, raising of voice and
dagger looks are common characteristics of an
angry man and that was what accused Lee
exhibited to a fragile weaker sex and pregnant
offended party. It would be natural to get angry
with someone who had victimized you.
Naturalness, however is not always righteous.
It is like taking the law into your hands and that
was what the accused Lee did. (CA Decision, pp.
11-12, Rollo, pp. 52-53)
This pronouncement creates an impression
that the petitioner had made a personal case
out of the situation. However, the evidence
does not support this view. We find that at the
time the check was deposited and encashed,
the petitioner was then on leave (TSN, June 11,
1985, p. 156; Records, p. 248). Under this
circumstance, it is not fair to consider the
bank's mistake in accepting and paying the
check as the petitioner's mistake which could
militate against his efficiency. The petitioner
attributed the mistake in the payment of the
forged check to the usual risks in banking
business. He stated:
Atty. Pangilinan, Private prosecutor
(authorized by the Fiscal to prosecute the case
in the latter's stead)
Q So you no longer consider him (Carpio) as
entitled in (sic) the proceeds of the chek (sic)
and therefore at that point of (sic) time you will
now concede that the payment made by you to
him was a big mistake?
A When we were asking for the respondent and
we were locating Honorio Carpio and we
cannot locate him, I consider that a mistake,
Sir.
Q It was a big mistake as a matter of fact?
A When it comes to the falling of the business
considering the big amount I would say big
mistake but only a mistake, it was a usual risk in
banking business, Sir.
Q But of course Mr. Lee, being a mistake that
mistake will harm and tense your personality
as a Bank Manager?
A It is up to our Manager to decide but when it
comes to other transactions I am handling Three
Million plus and considering that check I don't
think with all modesty it will affect me, Sir.
Q But you are called upon to try to recover any
money which was in your judgment was
unlawfully taken from you by anybody
A When it comes to procedure I don't think it
was unlawfully taken, as a matter of fact it was
our bank who credited this account, Sir.
Q So it is your bounded (sic) duty to recover
money which was paid to someonelse (sic)
which payment is not due to him, am I correct?
A It is the duty of our lawyer to recover it, Sir.
Q Is it not a fact that your lawyer is only your
agent?
Atty. Dizon:
I think we are going too far, it has nothing to do
with the particular incident subject matter of
the criminal offense.
Court:
I see the point of the defense but the witness is
very intelligent, I can see the point of counsel,
because in order not to effect his integrity he
resorted to this, for example in case of a bank
employee who stole P500.00 and the other one
is P200.00, it could have the same mistake
which is supposed to be admonished by
removal. You answer.
A Yes that is the same case whether it is small
or big but when it comes to the Manager the
Head Office is very understanding when it
comes to bogus checks and of course my work
is a supervisory. Sir. (ibid, pp. 170-171;
Records, pp. 263-264)
The most telling proof of the absence of
intimidation was the fact that the complainant
refused to sign the promissory note in spite of
the alleged threats of the petitioner (TSN,
January 8, 1985, p. 48; Records, p. 139).
American authorities have declared that "(t)he
force which is claimed to have compelled
criminal conduct against the will of the actor
must be immediate and continuous and
threaten grave danger to his person during all
of the time the act is being committed. That is, it
must be a dangerous force threatened 'in
praesenti.' It must be a force threatening great
bodily harm that remains constant in
controlling the will of the unwilling participant
while the act is being performed and from which
he cannot then withdraw in safety." (State v.
Hood, 165 NE 2d, 28, 31-32, Emphasis ours).
The complainant proferred excuses for her
action. For one, she claimed that her sister's
presence helped her recover her composure
(TSN, November 20, 1984, p. 29, Records, p.
120).
We are not persuaded. If indeed she had
recovered her composure because of her
sister's presence, she could have just left the
premises in a huff without encashing the RCBC
Time Deposit Certificate or if they
(complainant and sister) were already at the
RCBC, they could have desisted from encashing
the check and then could have left for home
notwithstanding the alleged presence of Mr.
Lumba who was no longer in his own bank but
among the RCBC clients or she could have
refused to sign the affidavit which was handed
to her first before the promissory note. Yet, she
did neither of these logical possibilities.
Secondly, she averred that she refused to sign
the promissory note because she was able to
read its contents unlike the affidavit and she
realized that she would have a great
responsibility to return the amount taken by
Carpio (ibid, pp. 27-28, Records, pp. 118-119).
Such an excuse is flimsy and weak. It is strange
that complainant's sister, who was with her,
failed to corroborate her statement that she
was denied the opportunity to read the
affidavit. Her bare assertion simply confirms
the voluntariness of her actions. All her
disputed acts were geared towards proving
her good faith. Complainant was willing to
return the sum of P48,000.00 she took since it
was only up to this amount where her
involvement lies. However, as soon as she
realized that she would have the enormous
task of reimbursing the bank the balance of the
proceeds of the forged check allegedly taken by
Carpio, she refused to cooperate any further.
Notwithstanding the alleged threats of
petitioner, she did not budge. Thus, We find it
as a logical consequence that she merely asked
for the receipt of the P18,000.00 she deposited
rather than the cancellation of her earlier
withdrawal. On this point, complainant
claimed that after her refusal to sign the
document, she no longer insisted on the return
of the money because she felt that it was the
only way she could leave the bank premises
(TSN, November 20, 1984, p. 31, Records, p.
120). This pretense, however, was belied by
her subsequent actuations. We find that she
and her sister left the bank unescorted to eat
their snack; that they were required by the
petitioner to come back; and that they decided
not to eat but instead went home (TSN,
November 20, 1984, pp. 31-32, Records, pp.
122-123 and January 8, 1965, pp. 49-50,
Records, pp. 140-141). With such behavior, We
are at a loss to understand how coercion could
attach in this case. Obviously, the complainant
has not been cowed into submission.
Against this backdrop, We hold that coercion
did not exist in this case. Consequently, the
petitioner should be acquitted.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is
hereby REVERSED and a new one hereby
entered ACQUITTING the accused of the crime
of grave coercion.
Unjust Vexation
G.R. No. L-40577 August 23, 1934
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PROCOPIO REYES, POLICARPIO NACANA,
FLORENTINO CLEMENTE, HERMOGENES
MALLARI, MARCELINO MALLARI, CASTOR
ALIPIO, and RUFINO MATIAS, defendants-
appellants.
Hilarion U. Jarencio for appellants.
Acting Solicitor-General Peña for appellee.
HULL, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Art. 287, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code was
used to punish the defendants for unjust
vexation for the act of disturbing or
interrupting a ceremony of a religious
character
FACTS:
While the pabasa was going on the evening of
April 10, 1933, between 11 and 12 o'clock, the
defendants Procopio Reyes, Policarpio Nacana,
Florentino Clemente, Hermogenes Mallari,
Marcelino Mallari, Castor Alipio, and Rufino
Matias arrived at the place, carrying bolos and
crowbars, and started to construct a barbed
wire fence in front of the chapel. Alfonso
Castillo, who was chairman of the committee in
charge of the pabasa, tried to persuade them to
refrain from carrying out their plan, by
reminding them of the fact that it was Holy
Week and that it was highly improper to
construct a fence at that time of the evening. A
verbal altercation ensued.
When the people attending the pabasa in the
chapel and those who were eating in the yard
thereof noticed what was happening, they
became excited and left the place hurriedly and
in such confusion that dishes and saucers were
broken and benches toppled over.
The pabasa was discontinued and it was not
resumed until after an investigation conducted
by the chief of police on the following morning,
which investigation led to the filing of the
complaint appearing on pages 1 and 2 of the
record.
Many years ago the Clemente family by
informal donation gave the land on which the
old chapel was erected. When it was destroyed,
the present chapel was erected, and there is
now a dispute as to whether the new chapel is
not now impinging on the land that belongs to
the Clemente family. The appellants are
partisans of he Clemente family.

ISSUE:
Whether the defendants are guilty of unjust
vexation

HELD:
YES
It is urged upon us that the act of building a
fence was innocent and was simply to protect
private property rights. The fact that this
argument is a pretense only is clearly shown by
the circumstances under which the fence was
constructed, namely, late at night and in such a
way as to vex and annoy the parties who had
gathered to celebrate the pabasa and is further
shown by the fact that many of the appellants
saw fit to introduce as their defense a false
alibi.
Appellants are therefore acquitted of a
violation of article 133 of the Revised Penal
Code but found guilty of a violation of article
287 of the Revised Penal Code.