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J.

DEL CASTILLO
CASE DIGESTS

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements


For Remedial Law 1

Submitted to:
Atty. Christian “Kit” Villasis

15 September 2017
TABLE OF CONTENTS

REMEDIAL LAW ...................................................................................................1


POLITICAL LAW...............................................................................................392
CIVIL LAW..........................................................................................................482
LABOR LAW .......................................................................................................692
CRIMINAL LAW ................................................................................................915
COMMERCIAL LAW ......................................................................................1123
TAXATION LAW..............................................................................................1152
LEGAL ETHICS................................................................................................1186
REMEDIAL LAW

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. YANG CHI HAO
G.R. NO. 165332, October 2, 2009

DOCTRINE:Only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment, may be entertained in a


petition for certiorari; that certiorari will not lie where an appeal may be taken or is lost
through petitioner’s own doing; and that questions of fact are not decided by this Court.

FACTS:
Yang Chi Hao, private respondent herein, filed a Petition for Naturalization before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila which was opposed by the Republic of the Philippines
through the Office of the SolGen. The OSG cross-examined the private respondent and
his witnesses, but did not present any of its own evidence. The trial court issued a
decision denying the Petition for Naturalization which prompted the private respondent to
file a Motion for Reconsideration which was granted by the trial court.
Thereafter the OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the court.
Instead of filing an ordinary appeal before the Court of Appeals, the OSG filed a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, claiming that by reversing its original
decision, the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
The appellate court dismissed the petition declaring that the present recourse is an
incorrect, improper, or a wrong legal remedy for the simple reason that the order in
question is a final order which disposed of the case. Hence, the proper recourse
therefrom is an ordinary appeal to be filed within fifteen (15) days from the time the OSG
received notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration.
The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of
Appeals. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction when it granted the petition for naturalization of the private
respondent.

HELD:
No.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.
In this case, the OSG simply argues that the trial court erred in granting the petition for
naturalization because it failed to consider material evidence that would warrant the
denial of said petition. If, indeed, there was error, this is simply an error of judgment in
appreciation of facts and the law. Besides, the trial court has the discretion to reverse
itself upon the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Indeed, Section 3, Rule 37 of the
Rules of Court is explicit in that a trial court may amend its judgment or order if it finds that

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the judgment or final order is contrary to the evidence or law. If a mistake was committed
by the trial court, it was in the exercise of its jurisdiction. Thus, the error is one of
judgment, not of jurisdiction; consequently, petitioner's remedy is appeal, not certiorari.
Also, also mandated by Sections 11 and 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (1939), or
the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Notably, in Keswani v. Republic, we
declared that the remedy from a decision by the trial court admitting an individual as a
Filipino citizen is through an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, a decision granting a petition for naturalization becomes executory only
two years after its promulgation. On this matter, Section 1 of Republic Act No. 530 (1950)
provides:
Section 1. The provisions of existing laws notwithstanding, no petition for
Philippine citizenship shall be heard by the courts until after six months from the
publication of the application required by law, nor shall any decision granting the
application become executory until after two years from its promulgation and after
the court, on proper hearing, with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his
representative, is satisfied, and so finds, that during the intervening time the
applicant has (1) not left the Philippines, (2) has dedicated himself continuously to
a lawful calling or profession, (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation
of Government promulgated rules, (4) or committed any act prejudicial to the
interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.
As such, petitioner is not without a remedy to assail the grant of citizenship. In
addition, it may also move to have the naturalization certificate cancelled in the proper
proceedings, if it can be shown that the certificate was obtained fraudulently.

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ARNEL SAGANA vs. RICHARD A. FRANCISCO
G.R. No. 161952 October 2, 2009

DOCTRINE: Jurisprudence has long established that for substituted service of summons
to be valid, the following must be demonstrated: (a) that personal service of summons
within a reasonable time was impossible; (b) that efforts were exerted to locate the party;
and (c) that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion
residing at the party’s residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party’s
office or regular place of business. It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving
these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officer’s return.

FACTS:
Arnel Sagana filed a Complaint for Damages alleging that Richard A. Francisco shot
him with a gun hitting him on the right thigh.
The process server Manuel S. Panlasigui attempted to serve summons at
respondent's address at No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City but was
unsuccessful. In his Server's Return, he stated that he tried to personally serve the
summons to respondent at his given address, however, the occupant of that house, who
refused to give his identity, told him that respondent is unknown at said address.
Panlasigui also declared that diligent efforts were exerted to serve the summons but
these proved to be futile.Subsequently, the trial court attempted to serve summons to
respondent's office through registered mail. However, despite three notices, respondent
failed to pick up the summons.
The trial court dismissed the case on account of petitioner's lack of interest to
prosecute. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration stating that after the Server's
Return was filed, he exerted efforts to locate the respondent, and it was confirmed that
respondent indeed lived at No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City and the same
was granted conditioned upon the service of summons on the respondent within 10 days
from receipt of the Order.
Thus, Process Server Jarvis Iconar again tried to serve the summons at the
address of the respondent but no avail. According to Iconar's handwritten notation on the
summons, he was informed by Michael Francisco, respondent's brother, that respondent
no longer lived at said address. However, he left a copy of the summons to Michael
Francisco.
This prompted the petitioner to file a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default
alleging that despite service of summons, respondent still failed to file an Answer. The
trial court issued an Order finding that the summons was validly served to respondent
through his brother, Michael. It thus declared respondent in default and allowed petitioner
to present his evidence ex parte. Nonetheless, copies of all pleadings and court
documents were furnished to respondent at No. 36 Sampaguita St.
Michael Francisco, through his counsel, filed a Manifestation and Motion denying
that he received the summons or that he was authorized to receive summons on behalf of
his brother, respondent Richard Francisco. He alleged that the substituted service did not
comply with Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, since summons was not served at
defendant's residence or left with any person who was authorized to receive it on behalf of
the defendant. Michael Francisco also prayed that his name be stricken off the records as

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having received a copy of the summons. The trial court issued an Order denying Michael
Francisco's Manifestation and Motion for lack of merit.
Having failed to file an answer or any responsive pleading, Francisco was declared
in default and Sagana was allowed to present evidence ex parte. RTC ruled in favor of
Sagana.
Francisco appealed to the CA and prayed that the RTC erred in assuming
jurisdiction over the person, despite the irregularity of the substituted service of summons
by the court Process Server and in awarding of damages to Sagana. CA favored
Francisco hence Sagana filed this petition for review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not summons were properly served to Francisco

HELD:
Yes.
Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court, the rules of procedure then
in force at the time summons was served, provided:
Section 8.Substituted service. - If the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section [personal service on
defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place
of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
Jurisprudence has long established that for substituted service of summons to be
valid, the following must be demonstrated: (a) that personal service of summons within a
reasonable time was impossible; (b) that efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c)
that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion residing at
the party's residence or upon a competent person in charge of the party's office or regular
place of business. It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these
circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officer's return.
In this case, personal service of summons was twice attempted by the trial court,
although unsuccessfully. In the first attempt, the resident of the house refused to receive
the summons; worse, he would not even give his name. In the second attempt,
respondent's own brother refused to sign for receipt of the summons, and then later
claimed that he never received a copy, despite his participation in the proceedings. The
trial court also thrice attempted to contact the respondent through his place of work, but to
no avail. These diligent efforts to locate the respondent were noted in the first sheriff's
return, the process server's notation, as well as the records of the case.
Clearly, personal service of summons was made impossible by the acts of the
respondent in refusing to reveal his whereabouts, and by the act of his brother in claiming
that respondent no longer lived at No. 36 Sampaguita St., yet failing to disclose his
brother's location. We also note that it was the trial court which directed that the second
service of summons be made within seven days; thus, the reasonable time was
prescribed by the trial court itself.
Undeniably, no Sheriff's Return was prepared by process server Jarvis Iconar; the
only record of the second service of summons was Mr. Iconar's handwritten notation in

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the summons itself. However, the information required by law and prevailing
jurisprudence, that is, that personal service was impossible because of the claim that
respondent no longer lived at the stated address, that efforts were exerted to locate the
respondent through the multiple attempts to serve summons, and that summons was
served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion, were already in the records of the
trial court.
Moreover, we find the claim that respondent moved out of their residence in March
1993 without informing his brother or parents his whereabouts, despite regular calls and
letters, simply incredulous. What makes this version of events even more implausible is
respondent's admission that he received a copy of the trial court's Decision of 20
September 1999 that was sent to No. 36 Sampaguita Street. Respondent even filed a
Notice of Appeal coincidentally indicating that his address was No. 36 Sampaguita St.,
Baesa, Quezon City. He also received a copy of the appellate court's order for preliminary
conference that was sent to said address. These were never denied by respondent,
despite being given every opportunity to do so.

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METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO., vs. LAMB CONSTRUCTION
CONSORTIUM CORPORATION, represented by Victor T. Nubla and Edgardo C.
Santos
G.R. No. 170906 | November 27, 2009

DOCTRINE: A petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is ex parte,


non-adversarial, and summary in nature because the only issue involved is the
purchaser's right to possession. In fact, Section 7 of Act 3135 (1924) expressly provides
that it is the ministerial duty of the cadastral court to issue a writ of possession in favor of
the purchaser even during the redemption period, unless the case falls under the
exceptions provided by law and jurisprudence. As a rule, mere inadequacy or surplus in
the purchase price does not affect the purchaser's entitlement to a writ of possession. In
case there is a surplus, the mortgagor is entitled to receive the same from the purchaser.
The failure or refusal of the mortgagee-purchaser to return the surplus does not affect the
validity of the sale but gives the mortgagor a cause of action against the
mortgagee-purchaser.

FACTS:
Lamb Construction Consortium Corporation obtained a P5.5 million loan from
petitioner Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., subject to 18% interest per annum. To secure
the loan, respondent executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of petitioner involving six
parcels of land. Respondent, however, failed to pay the loan upon maturity hence
petitioner filed a petition for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the said properties. During the
auction sale, petitioner emerged as the highest bidder with the bid amount of
P6,669,765.75 and was accordingly issued a Certificate of Sale.
During the period of redemption, petitioner filed a verified petition for issuance of a
writ of possession. Petitioner alleged that notwithstanding its demands, respondent
refused and failed to turn over actual possession of the foreclosed properties. While the
petition was pending with the trial court, respondent redeemed the one of the parcels of
land mortgaged.
RTC rendered a Decision denying petitioner's application for the issuance of a writ of
possession because it failed to deposit the surplus proceeds from the foreclosure sale.
On appeal, CA ruled that petitioner is entitled to a writ of possession, the issuance of
which is ministerial upon the court. At the same time, it ruled that petitioner is also obliged
to return the excess of the bid price over the outstanding obligation, since the application
of the proceeds from the sale of the mortgaged property to the mortgagor's obligation is
an act of payment, not payment by dation. It then found imperative that an assessment of
the total outstanding debt be made in order to resolve whether there was any surplus
proceeds which must be returned to respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court can rule upon the surplus or excess of the purchase price
upon issuing a writ of possession

HELD:
No

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In Sulit v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 441 (1997), we withheld the issuance of a writ
of possession because the mortgagee failed to deliver the surplus from the proceeds of
the foreclosure sale which is equivalent to approximately 40% of the total mortgage debt.
Sulit was considered as an exception to the general rule that it is ministerial upon the
court to issue a writ of possession even during the period of redemption. We explained
that equitable considerations prevailing in said case demand that a writ of possession
should not issue.
In the subsequent case of Saguan v. Philippine Bank of Communications, 538 SCRA
390 (2007) however, we clarified that the exception made in Sulit does not apply when the
period to redeem has already expired or when ownership over the property has already
been consolidated in favor of the mortgagee-purchaser. In other words, even if the
mortgagee-purchaser fails to return the surplus, a writ of possession must still be issued.
In the instant case, the period to redeem has already lapsed. Thus, following the ruling in
Saguan, the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the petitioner is in order.
The failure of the mortgagee to deliver the surplus proceeds does not affect the
validity of the foreclosure sale. It gives rise to a cause of action for the mortgagee to file an
action to collect the surplus proceeds. Relatedly, we held in Sulit that if the mortgagee is
retaining more of the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to, this fact alone will not
affect the validity of the sale but simply gives the mortgagor a cause of action to recover
such surplus.
In the instant case, the cadastral court is without jurisdiction to order petitioner to
deliver to respondent the surplus or excess of the purchase price. The only issue in a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is the purchaser's entitlement to
possession. No documentary or testimonial evidence is even required for the issuance of
the writ as long as the verified petition states the facts sufficient to entitle the purchaser to
the relief requested. As held in Saguan, when the mortgagee-purchaser fails to return the
surplus, the remedy of a mortgagor "lies in a separate civil action for collection of a sum of
money", thus:
However, petitioners' remedy lies in a separate civil action for collection of a
sum of money. We have previously held that where the mortgagee retains more of
the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to, this fact alone will not affect the
validity of the sale but simply gives the mortgagor a cause of action to recover such
surplus. In the same case, both parties can establish their respective rights and
obligations to one another, after a proper liquidation of the expenses of the
foreclosure sale, and other interests and claims chargeable to the purchase price
of the foreclosed property. The court can then determine the proper application of
compensation with respect to respondent's claim on petitioners' remaining
unsecured obligations. In this regard, respondent is not precluded from itself filing
a case to collect on petitioners' remaining debt.
An action to collect the surplus proceeds is improper where there is a pending
action for the nullification of the foreclosure proceedings.

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JOVEN YUKI, JR., vs. WELLINGTON CO
G.R. No. 178527 | November 27, 2009

DOCTRINE:It is an elementary rule that the jurisdiction of the court in ejectment cases is
determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint and cannot be made to depend
upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant; Principle
holds even if the facts proved during trial do not support the cause of action alleged in the
complaint.

FACTS:
Mr. Joseph Chua was the registered owner of a parcel of land, together with a
commercial building erected thereon. In 1981, he leased a portion of the building to
petitioner Joven Yuki, Jr., who put up a business therein under the name and style
"Supersale Auto Supply." The contract of lease between Mr. Chua and petitioner had a
term of five years but was not reduced into writing. Thereafter, the lease was renewed
through a series of verbal and written agreements, the last of which was a written
Contract of Lease covering the period of January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2003 at a
monthly rental of P7,000.00.
In November 2003, Mr. Chua informed petitioner that he sold the property to
respondent Wellington Co and instructed petitioner to henceforth pay the rent to the new
owner. After the expiration of the lease contract, petitioner refused to vacate and
surrender the leased premises. Thus, respondent filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer
before the MeTC of Manila.
Petitioner denied having been served with copies of the alleged notice of sale and
notice to vacate. By way of affirmative defenses, he claimed that the complaint should be
dismissed for being premature as there was no allegation therein of prior referral to the
barangay. Petitioner also asserted that since he was not notified by the former owner of
the sale, he was deprived of his preemptive rights. Moreover, respondent has no cause of
action against him because respondent is not the true owner of the property but merely
acts as a representative of persons whom respondent refused to disclose. Further,
petitioner argued that there was an implied renewal of lease considering that a) he did not
receive a notice to vacate, b) the two months deposit and one month advance payment
he gave to Mr. Chua were never returned to him, and c) respondent accepted his
payments for the months of January and February 2004.
Petitioner also asserted that his property rights would be violated if he is evicted
because he has been operating his business in the premises for more than 20 years and
has established goodwill in the area. He thus proposed that he be compensated the
amount of not less than P1 million or be allowed to dispose of his stocks within a
reasonable period of time, before he vacates the premises.
On September 21, 2004, the MeTC-Branch 15 rendered a Decision in favor of the
respondent. In reversing the ruling of the MeTC, the RTC found no proof on record that
petitioner actually received the notice to vacate, thereby making the Complaint fatally
defective. The RTC likewise opined that the resolution of the case hinges on the
existence of implied new lease, a question which is incapable of pecuniary estimation
and, therefore, beyond the MeTC's jurisdiction. Before the CA, the decision of the RTC
was set aside and reinstated the decision of the MeTC.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not the existence of an implied new lease, a matter which is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and, therefore, beyond the MeTC's jurisdiction.

HELD:
No.
The allegation of existence of implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will not divest
the MeTC of jurisdiction over the ejectment case. It is an elementary rule that the
jurisdiction of the court in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the
complaint and cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or
pleadings filed by the defendant. This principle holds even if the facts proved during trial
do not support the cause of action alleged in the complaint. In connection with this, it is
well to note that in unlawful detainer cases the elements to be proved and resolved are
the facts of lease and expiration or violation of its terms.
Here, no interpretative exercise is needed to conclude that respondent has
complied with such requirement. In respondent's Complaint, he specifically alleged that
(1) the former owner, Mr. Chua, and petitioner entered into a contract of lease; (2)
subsequently, respondent purchased the leased premises from Mr. Chua and became
the owner thereof; (3) thereafter, the lease contract between Mr. Chua and petitioner
expired; and (4) petitioner refused to vacate the premises despite the expiration and
non-renewal of the lease.
Besides, we do not agree with the RTC that the MeTC does not have jurisdiction to
resolve the issue of existence of implied new lease in the unlawful detainer case. Tacita
reconduccion refers to the right of the lessee to continue enjoying the material or de facto
possession of the thing leased within a period of time fixed by law. During its existence,
the lessee can prevent the lessor from evicting him from the disputed premises. On the
other hand, it is too well-settled to require a citation that the question to be resolved in
unlawful detainer cases is, who is entitled to de facto possession. Therefore, since tacita
reconduccion is determinative of who between the parties is entitled to de facto
possession, the MeTC has jurisdiction to resolve and pass upon the issue of implied new
lease in unlawful detainer case. In Mid-Pasig Land Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, we ruled that the MeTC is clothed with exclusive original jurisdiction over an
unlawful detainer case even if the same would entail compelling the plaintiff therein to
recognize an implied lease agreement.

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POWER SITES AND SIGNS, INC., vs. UNITED NEON
(a Division of Ever Corporation)
G.R. No. 163406 | November 24, 2009

DOCTRINE: Before a court grants injunctive relief, the following must be demonstrated:
that complainant is entitled to the relief sought, the actual or threatened violation of
complainant's rights, the probability of irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of pecuniary
compensation as relief. Otherwise, there is no basis for the issuance of a writ of
injunction.

FACTS:
The petitioner sent a letter-complaint to the Muntinlupa City Engineer and Building
Official requesting to revoke United Neon’s building permit and to issue a Cease and
Desist Order against it. The City Building Official referred the complaint to United Neon to
comment. However, before a resolution could be made by the City Building Official,
Power Sites filed a Petition for Injunction with Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Damages against United Neon before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City.
After the filing of the parties' respective memoranda, which took the place of
testimonial evidence, the RTC granted petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction.
United Neon then filed a Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Court of
Appeals. In brief, United Neon claimed that the grant of preliminary injunction was
unwarranted, particularly because Power Sites only prayed for a prohibitory injunction in
its original petition, but the Order went as far as to grant a mandatory injunction in favor of
Power Sites. United Neon prayed that the Court of Appeals invalidate the RTC's Order
and Writ, issue a temporary restraining order enjoining the RTC from further proceeding.
After the parties' exchange of pleadings, the Court of Appeals invalidated the Order of the
RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly invalidated the order of the RTC which granted the
preliminary injunction in favor of Power Sites

HELD:
Yes
A preliminary injunction may be granted only where the plaintiff appears to be clearly
entitled to the relief sought and has substantial interest in the right sought to be defended.
While the existence of the right need not be conclusively established, it must be clear. The
standard is even higher in the case of a preliminary mandatory injunction, which should
only be granted -

x x x in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where


considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant's favor;
where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right against his protest

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and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; and where the effect of the
mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing
relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant,
than to establish a new relation x x x.
The evidence presented before us in support of a preliminary injunction is weak
and inconclusive, and the alleged right sought to be protected by petitioner is vehemently
disputed. We note that both parties allege that: (1) they began construction of their
respective billboards first; (2) the billboard of the other party blocks the other's exclusive
line of sight; (3) they are entitled to protection under the provisions of the National Building
Code and OAAP Code of Ethics/Guidelines.[30] However, we are not in a position to
resolve these factual matters, which should be resolved by the trial court. The question of
which party began construction first and which party is entitled to the exclusive line of
sight is inextricably linked to whether or not petitioner has the right that deserves
protection through a preliminary injunction. Indeed, the trial court would be in the best
position to determine which billboard was constructed first, their actual location, and
whether or not an existing billboard was obstructed by another.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Jose Feliciano Loy, Jr., Raymundo Hipolito III, and Edgardo Ridao,
Petitioners, vs. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-Philippine
Transport and General Workers Organization (SMCEU-PTGWO), as represented by
its President Ma. Pilar B. Aquino and SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION CREDIT
COOPERATIVE, INC., as represented by its President Daniel Borbon, Respondents
G.R. No. 164886 | November 24, 2009

DOCTRINE: Summary judgments are sanctioned by the Rules of Court as a device to


simplify and expedite the resolution of cases when, as shown by pleadings, affidavits,
depositions or admissions on the records, there are no genuine issues which would entail
an expensive, lengthy and protracted trial. However, if there is a genuine issue of material
fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, resort to summary judgment would not
be proper. Stated otherwise, if there exists an issue of fact, the motion for summary
judgment should be denied.

FACTS:
Petitioners acted as counsel for the Union in the negotiation of the CBA between the
management of three corporations – SMC, Magnolia Corporation and San Miguel Foods,
Incorporated and the Union. They filed a complaint with Application for Preliminary
Attachment for the collection of unpaid attorney’s fees for the legal services they rendered
for SMCEU-PTGWPO.
On the other hand, the respondents filed a Motion to Discharge Writ of Attachment
and Dismiss Complaint. They alleged that the Board Resolution passed was neither valid
nor ratified by the Unions general membership. They also alleged that no demand to pay
attorney’s fees was made to the Union and that petitioners had already been paid for their
services.
The RTC denied the Motion to Discharge Writ of Attachment and Dismiss
Complaint. In its Order, the RTC ordered the garnishees - San Miguel Corporation,
Magnolia Corporation, San Miguel Foods, Inc., and United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB) - to deliver the garnished funds to the Clerk of Court, RTC-Manila. Meanwhile,
San Miguel Corporation Credit Cooperative, Inc. (Credit Cooperative) moved to intervene
in the case claiming that the garnished funds included cooperative dues, the seed capital
of which appears to have come from the union funds. In its Answer in Intervention, the
Credit Cooperative prayed for the lifting of the garnishment of its funds, arguing that said
funds do not belong to or are owned by the Union but actually came from the individual
share capital of its members.
Meanwhile, a Compromise Agreement was entered into by petitioners and
Hipolito, Jr., the latter acting in his capacity as President of the Union and obligating the
Union to pay petitioners' claim for attorney's fees in the reduced amount of P1.5 million.
This Compromise Agreement, although initially approved by the RTC, was later on
invalidated and set aside by the trial court on the ground of irregularities surrounding its
execution. The case was then set for pre-trial conference. Meanwhile, in a local union
election of officers held were Ma. Pilar B. Aquino (Aquino) and Marcial A. Frisnedi
(Frisnedi) were elected as the President and Vice-President, respectively. As newly
elected officers of the Union, they filed a Motion for Substitution/Intervention, which was

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 13
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
granted in an Order of the RTC. The RTC also allowed the Union, under its new set of
officers, to amend its answer to the complaint.
The RTC ordered the garnished funds of the Union in the amount of P3 million to
be deposited with the Philippine National Bank. The trial court denied the Union's motion
to resume pre-trial and instead.
However, petitioners filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. They averred that the
case was ripe for Summary Judgment because there was a judicial admission that legal
services were indeed rendered which resulted to the benefits enjoyed by the workers in
the 1992-1995 CBA.
The Union opposed the motion arguing that it only admitted the allegation in the
complaint insofar as the benefits enjoyed by the workers in the 1992-1995 CBA are
concerned but not the legal services allegedly rendered by petitioners. Further, it alleged
that the amount claimed as attorney's fees was unconscionable. The trial court rendered
its Decision granting the motion for summary judgment. It held that the case was ripe for
summary judgment in view of the Union's admission, through Hipolito, Jr., of its monetary
obligation to petitioners in the amount of P3 million for the legal services they rendered.
The Union appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed Decision
nullifying the RTC's Decision and remanding the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case is ripe for summary judgment considering the fact that the
amount for services rendered is not yet determined

HELD:
The determination of the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees would require
presentation of evidence and a full-blown trial. The Rules of Court allows the rendition of a
summary judgment if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions on
file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. There
can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in issue or where material
allegations of the pleadings are in dispute.
In fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the
basis of quantum meruit, the elements to be considered are generally (1) the importance
of the subject matter in controversy, (2) the extent of services rendered and (3) the
professional standing of the lawyer. A determination of these factors would indispensably
require nothing less than a full-blown trial where the party can adduce evidence to
establish the right to lawful attorney\'s fees and for the other party to oppose or refute the
same.
The Union considers the attorney's fees in the amount of P3 million as
unreasonable, unconscionable and without basis. In fixing said amount of attorney's fees,
the RTC ratiocinated that the issue of the reasonableness of the amount claimed as
attorney's fees had been heard by the IBP in the disbarment case.
The question of unconscionableness of P3,000,000,00 Attorney's fees of Atty.
Hipolito has been heard and tried by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Hence, all
defenses and claims of defendant Union now through the new president Aquino shall be

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 14
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
dismissed under Section 7, Rule 9, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure necessitating a
Summary judgment, attaching therewith the various transcripts of stenographic notes of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. That there is [sic] no more triable issues otherwise
what was heard by the IBP on unconscionable attorney's fees would be heard again. That
if the defendant Union in 1990 prior to the instant case paid a single lone-lawyer of the
Union of 5% broken down as follows: 4% (2.3 Million as Attorney's fees) and 1%
(670,799.52 as seed capital of the Union's cooperative) as shown in the Court's T.S.N.
dated October 4, 1994; the defendant Union can not now claim the P3 Million Attorney's
fees for three (3) lawyers with a higher and subsequent 1993 CBA benefits as
unconscionable.
We find that the RTC erroneously ruled on this matter. First, it does not appear
from the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Jaime M. Vibar, the IBP
Commissioner who tried the disbarment case, that a pronouncement was made as to how
much Hipolito III (petitioner herein) should receive as attorney's fees. The IBP merely
sustained Hipolito III's entitlement to compensation for acting as union counsel in
collaboration with Loy, Jr. and Ridao (co-petitioners herein) in concluding the 1992-1995
CBA, but refused to fix an amount as the matter was already being heard in court.
Second, the testimony of Abuerne was unsubstantiated by evidence, thereby making her
an incompetent witness to testify on such matters. The records of the Credit Cooperative
were not presented to substantiate Abuerne's statements. The lawyer who was allegedly
paid P2.3 million attorney's fees in 1990 was not also presented to testify. No proof was
proffered to show that Hipolito III was entitled to or actually received the amount. Hence,
the RTC arbitrarily fixed petitioners' attorney's fees at P3 million despite insufficient
factual basis.
When material allegations are disputed, it cannot be asserted that there is no real
issue necessitating a formal trial. We deem it necessary, therefore, that further inquiry
should be made in order for petitioners to prove the extent of the services they rendered,
the time they consumed in the negotiations and such other matters necessary for the
determination of the reasonable value of their services.
Mindful that the instant case has been pending for more than a decade, we
painstakingly reviewed the records. Unfortunately, we find them inadequate and
insufficient to determine the reasonableness of the amount claimed or to fix, for that
matter, a reasonable amount of attorney's fees in order to finally resolve the present
controversy. Thus, in order to adequately afford both parties ample opportunity to present
their evidence in support of their respective claims, a remand is inevitable, but only for the
purpose of determining the reasonable amount of attorney's fees on quantum meruit
basis.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 15
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LYNN PAZ T. DELA CRUZ et al. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN et al.
G.R. No. 161929, December 8, 2009

DOCTRINE: Under the principle of the law of the case, when a question is passed upon by
an appellate court and the case is subsequently remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings, the question becomes settled upon a subsequent appeal. Whatever is
once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same
parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to
be the facts of the case before the court.

FACTS:
The instant criminal complaint arose from the construction and/or renovation project
involving several multi-purpose halls located in various barangays in the City of Tarlac.
Upon post audit, the Provincial Auditor of the Commission on Audit issued two Notice of
Disallowances on the ground that what were actually constructed and/or renovated were
barangay chapels in violation of Section 29(2), Article VI of the Constitution and Section
335 of the Local Government Code prohibiting public expenditure for religious purposes.
On February 6, 1998, private complainants Jesus B. David and Ana Alamo Aguas
filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman in connection with the approval and
implementation of the aforesaid projects against several local government officials of the
City of Tarlac for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
On December 8, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution which
granted the prosecutions motion and ordered the preventive suspension of the accused
for a period of 90 days. It ruled that the validity of the information has been previously
settled in its April 24, 2003 Resolution. Thus, under Section 13 of RA No. 3019, the
preventive suspension of the accused becomes mandatory. Petitioners thereafter filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied.

ISSUE:
 Whether the subject criminal case was prematurely instituted considering the pendency
of petitioners appeals before the COA En Banc.
 Whether the Ombudsman may still reconsider his Resolution dated July 13, 1999,
dismissing the complaint, after the same has already become final and executory.
 Whether the subject information is fatally defective.
 Whether, on the basis of the admitted or undisputed facts, there is probable cause to
prosecute petitioners and their co-accused for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019

HELD:
The preventive suspension of the accused under Section 13 of RA No. 3019 is
mandatory upon a finding that the information is valid.
Section 13 of RA No. 3019 provides:
Section 13.Suspension and loss of benefits - Any public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 16
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if
he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he
failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have
been filed against him.
Pursuant to this provision, it becomes mandatory for the court to immediately issue the
suspension order upon a proper determination of the validity of the information. The court
possesses no discretion to determine whether a preventive suspension is necessary to forestall
the possibility that the accused may use his office to intimidate witnesses, or frustrate his
prosecution, or continue committing malfeasance. The presumption is that unless the accused is
suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both.
The validity of the subject information has been raised and resolved in G.R. No. 158308.
Under the principle of the law of the case, this issue can no longer be re-litigated.
The issues and arguments in the instant petition were already included in the issues and
arguments raised and resolved in G.R. No. 158308. The Court EnBancs June 17, 2003
Resolution should, thus, have put to rest the issue of the validity of the subject information. Yet,
petitioners would have us now revisit the same issue in the instant petition. This cannot be done.
Under the principle of the law of the case, when a question is passed upon by an appellate court
and the case is subsequently remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, the question
becomes settled upon a subsequent appeal. Whatever is once irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the
law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such
decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. Thus, considering
that the validity of the information has long been settled in G.R. No. 158308, the Sandiganbayan
properly granted the motion to suspend the accused pendente lite.
In conclusion, we note with deep disapproval the failure of petitioners to properly apprise
this Court of the proceedings previously taken in G.R. No. 158308. Petitioners did not act
forthrightly when they omitted in their statement of facts that they had earlier challenged the
validity of the subject information before the Sandiganbayan and this Court, which issue they
now seek to resuscitate in the instant petition. That the accused should be allowed to arduously
and zealously defend his life, liberty and property is not in question. But this is so only within the
permissible limits of the framework of our criminal laws and rules of procedure. Indubitably, the
accused should not give ground for delay in the administration of criminal justice, much less,
hide from this Court the patent unworthiness of his cause.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDGARDO ESTRADA

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 17
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
G.R. No. 178318, January 15, 2010

DOCTRINE:A witness who testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and


frank manner and remained consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness.
Moreover, the testimony of a rape victim, especially one who is young and immature,
deserves full credit considering that no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow
an examination of her private parts and thereafter allow herself to be perverted in a public
trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and
punished.

FACTS:
On November 19, 1997, two similarly-worded Informations were filed against
appellant Edgardo Estrada charging him with two counts of Rape.Appellant was
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
Sometime in July 1997, she was sleeping side by side with her uncle, herein
appellant, when the latter suddenly placed his knees between her thighs and proceeded
to remove her clothes. Appellant who was already naked went on top of her and inserted
his penis in her vagina. AAA tried to resist but appellant pinned her hands above her
head. After having carnal knowledge of AAA, appellant told her not to report to anyone
what had transpired or she would be killed.
After the rape incident, AAA stayed at her grandfather’s house which was likewise
located in the same barangay where her grandmother’s house was situated. She thought
that she would be safe there. However, she was grievously mistaken. One evening, also
in the month of July 1997, appellant arrived thereat and again raped AAA. While the latter
was sleeping, appellant poked a knife at her and ordered her to remove her clothes. AAA
was cowed into submission and appellant succeeded in sexually assaulting her for the
second time.
On August 16, 2002, the trial court rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty of
qualified rape on two counts and sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty of
death.On January 31, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming with
modifications the Decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals opined that mere
allegation in the Information that the appellant was the victims uncle would not suffice to
satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of relationship. It must be categorically stated
that appellant is a relative within the 3rd civil degree by consanguinity or affinity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of the rape victim can convict the accused in crime

HELD:
Yes. Applying the guiding principles that a) an accusation for rape is easy to make,
difficult to prove and even more difficult to disprove; b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime,
the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution; and c) the evidence of
the prosecution must stand on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense, we affirm the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding herein
appellant guilty of two counts of simple rape.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 18
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
deserve great weight and respect. A witness who testified in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner and remained consistent on cross-examination is a credible
witness. Moreover, the testimony of a rape victim, especially one who is young and immature,
deserves full credit considering that no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and thereafter allow herself to be perverted in a public trial if she
was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished. More so
when, as in this case, the rape victim accuses a close relative of having ravished her. Indeed, if
the victim, who was only twelve years old when she was raped, had the guile to accuse her own
uncle of rape and send him to jail it was only because she was motivated by an honest desire to
have the crime against her punished.
In the instant case, it was clearly established by the prosecution that on two occasions in
July 1997, the victim was sexually abused by appellant through force and intimidation, against
her will and without her consent. The qualifying circumstance of minority of the victim was
likewise proven by the presentation of the latter’s Birth Certificate.
However, as regards the allegation in the Information that appellant is an uncle of the
victim, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the same did not sufficiently satisfy the
requirements of Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., it must be succinctly stated that
appellant is a relative within the 3rd civil degree by consanguinity or affinity. It is immaterial that
appellant admitted that the victim is his niece.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 19
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HILARIO ESCOTON
G.R. No. 183577, February 1, 2010

DOCTRINE: In rape cases, the credibility of the victim is always the single most important
issue. In passing upon this matter, the highest degree of respect must be accorded to the
findings of the trial court. We stress that in rape cases the accused may be convicted
based solely on the testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible,
natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.

FACTS:
AAA was born on October 29, 1990, as shown by her Certificate of Live Birth and
Baptismal Certificate. The appellant is the uncle of AAA, being the brother of her mother.
On May 12, 2001, at around 7 oclock in the evening, AAA and her brother were asleep in
the house of their maternal grandmother with whom they were residing. The appellant
woke up AAA and told her to follow him to his house which was about 500 meters away.
AAAs brother also woke up and accompanied her. Their grandmother did not give them
permission to leave, but they still proceeded towards their destination.
Upon arrival, the appellant undressed himself and removed the lower garments of
AAA. He made her lie down on the bamboo floor then inserted his penis into her vagina
despite her pleas to discontinue his hideous act. AAA felt pain as the appellant had sex
with her. The appellant raped AAA for five times during the night while her brother lay
silently beside her.
On June 28, 2004, the trial court rendered its Decision.The Court found accused
HILARION ESCOTON, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MULTIPLE
RAPE

ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of the rape victim can convict the accused in the crime
charged

HELD:
Yes. We stress that in rape cases the accused may be convicted based solely on the
testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. In this regard, the trial court is in
the best position to assess the credibility of the victim, having personally heard her and observed
her deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. In the absence of any showing that the
trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some factor or circumstances of weight that
would affect the result of the case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, the trial courts assessment
of credibility deserves the appellate courts highest respect.
The testimony of rape victims are given full weight and credence, considering that no
young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public
trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to seek justice for the wrong done to her. It is
highly improbable that a girl of tender years who is not yet exposed to the ways of the world,
would impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is false. Considering that
the victim in this case underwent a harrowing experience and exposed herself to the rigors of

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 20
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
public trial, it is unlikely that she would concoct false accusations against the appellant, who is
her uncle. Her spontaneous revelation of the assault on her and her unrelenting determination to
have the appellant arrested and prosecuted of rape lend credence to her claim that she was
indeed raped.
An accused can still be convicted of rape on the sole basis of the testimony of the victim.
Here, even if we disregard the medico-legal report, the result would still be the same the
prosecution, through the testimony of AAA, has successfully proved the case of rape against the
appellant.
Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving negative
evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration of a
credible witness. Between the positive assertions of the victim and the negative averments of the
appellant, the former indisputably deserve more credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary
weight.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 21
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ARMANDO VIDAR @ Ricky, NORBERTO BUTALON, SONNYMARBELLA @ Spike
and JOHN DOES and PETER DOES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 177361, February 1, 2010

DOCTRINE: A witness who testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and


frank manner and remained consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness.
Moreover, the testimony of a rape victim, especially one who is young and immature,
deserves full credit considering that no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow
an examination of her private parts and thereafter allow herself to be perverted in a public
trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and
punished.

FACTS:
On November 19, 1997, two similarly-worded Informations were filed against
appellant Edgardo Estrada charging him with two counts of Rape.Appellant was
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
Sometime in July 1997, she was sleeping side by side with her uncle, herein
appellant, when the latter suddenly placed his knees between her thighs and proceeded
to remove her clothes. Appellant who was already naked went on top of her and inserted
his penis in her vagina. AAA tried to resist but appellant pinned her hands above her
head. After having carnal knowledge of AAA, appellant told her not to report to anyone
what had transpired or she would be killed.
After the rape incident, AAA stayed at her grandfather’s house which was likewise
located in the same barangay where her grandmother’s house was situated. She thought
that she would be safe there. However, she was grievously mistaken. One evening, also
in the month of July 1997, appellant arrived thereat and again raped AAA. While the latter
was sleeping, appellant poked a knife at her and ordered her to remove her clothes. AAA
was cowed into submission and appellant succeeded in sexually assaulting her for the
second time.
On August 16, 2002, the trial court rendered its Decision finding appellant guilty of
qualified rape on two counts and sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty of
death.On January 31, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming with
modifications the Decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals opined that mere
allegation in the Information that the appellant was the victims uncle would not suffice to
satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of relationship. It must be categorically stated
that appellant is a relative within the 3rd civil degree by consanguinity or affinity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of the rape victim can convict the accused in crime.

HELD:
Yes. Applying the guiding principles that a) an accusation for rape is easy to make,
difficult to prove and even more difficult to disprove; b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime,
the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution; and c) the evidence of
the prosecution must stand on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 22
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
the evidence for the defense, we affirm the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding herein
appellant guilty of two counts of simple rape.
Factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
deserve great weight and respect. A witness who testified in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner and remained consistent on cross-examination is a credible
witness. Moreover, the testimony of a rape victim, especially one who is young and immature,
deserves full credit considering that no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and thereafter allow herself to be perverted in a public trial if she
was not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished. More so
when, as in this case, the rape victim accuses a close relative of having ravished her. Indeed, if
the victim, who was only twelve years old when she was raped, had the guile to accuse her own
uncle of rape and send him to jail it was only because she was motivated by an honest desire to
have the crime against her punished.
In the instant case, it was clearly established by the prosecution that on two occasions in
July 1997, the victim was sexually abused by appellant through force and intimidation, against
her will and without her consent. The qualifying circumstance of minority of the victim was
likewise proven by the presentation of the latter’s Birth Certificate.
However, as regards the allegation in the Information that appellant is an uncle of the
victim, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the same did not sufficiently satisfy the
requirements of Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., it must be succinctly stated that
appellant is a relative within the 3rd civil degree by consanguinity or affinity. It is immaterial that
appellant admitted that the victim is his niece.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 23
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HILARIO P. SORIANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BANGKO SENTRAL
NG PILIPINAS (BSP), PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC),
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ANTONIO C. BUAN, and STATE PROSECUTOR ALBERTO R.
FONACIER
G.R. No. 162336, February 1, 2010

DOCTRINE: A special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial
of a motion to quash an information.

FACTS:
Soriano was charged for estafa through falsification of commercial documents for
allegedly securing a loan of 48 million in the name of two (2) persons when in fact these
individuals did not make any loan in the bank, nor did the bank's officers approved or had
any information about the said loan. The state prosecutor conducted a Preliminary
Investigation on the basis of letters sent by the officers of Special Investigation of BSP
together with 5 affidavits and filed two (2) separate information against Soriano for estafa
through falsification of commercial documents and violation of DORSI law.
Soriano moved for the quashal of the two (2) informations based on the ground:
1. that the court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged, for the letter
transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ constituted the complaint and was defective for
failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Sec. 3(a), Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court, such as statment of address of the petitioner and oath of
subscription and the signatories were not authorized persons to file the complaint;
and
2. that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, for the commission of estafa
uner par. 1(b) of Art. 315 of the RPC is inherently incompatible with the violation of
DORSI law (Sec. 83 or RA 337 as amended by PD 1795), and therefore a person
cannot be charged of both offenses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy in an order
denying a Motion to Quash

HELD:
No. the Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper
remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The proper procedure in such a
case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the
special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the merits, an adverse
decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. Thus, petitioners
should not have forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they
should have gone to trial and reiterated the special defenses contained in their motion to quash.
There are no special or exceptional circumstances in the present case that would justify
immediate resort to a filing of a petition for certiorari.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 24
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NIEVA ALBERTO y DE NIEVA
G.R. No. 179717, February 5, 2010

DOCTRINE: It is well-settled that the trial courts determination on the issue of credibility of
witnesses and its consequent findings of facts must be given great weight and respect on
appeal, unless certain facts or substance have been overlooked, which, if considered,
might affect the result of the case. This is so because of the judicial experience that trial
courts are in a better position to decide the question of credibility, having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial.

FACTS:
On January 23, 2003, an informant went to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the
Makati Police Station to inform PO1 Alex Inopia that appellant Nieva Alberto y De Nieva
was selling shabu. An entrapment team was thus immediately formed to be conducted in
Makati City.
Upon their arrival thereat, the informant approached the appellant and introduced
the poseur-buyer, PO1 Inopia. The appellant asked PO1 Inopia how much shabu he
needed and the latter handed over the P500.00 buy-bust money. The appellant then
gave a small plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance. Thereafter, PO1
Inopia lighted his cigarette, which was the pre-arranged signal for the consummation of
the illegal sale. PO1 Santos responded and together with PO1 Inopia arrested the
appellant and retrieved from her the buy-bust money. The sachet containing the white
crystalline substance was marked with the initials NDA and sent to the crime laboratory
for examination. The examination showed that the contents of the plastic sachet weighed
0.25 gram and are positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous
drug.
The trial court found that all the elements for the illegal sale of shabu were
satisfactorily established by the prosecution. The identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration were proven. Likewise, the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor were established. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial
court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of the lone witness is credible enough to convict the
accused

HELD:
Yes. It is well-settled that the trial courts determination on the issue of credibility of
witnesses and its consequent findings of facts must be given great weight and respect on
appeal, unless certain facts or substance have been overlooked, which, if considered, might
affect the result of the case. This is so because of the judicial experience that trial courts are in a
better position to decide the question of credibility, having heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 25
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Our re-examination of the testimony of PO1 Inopia follows the trial courts
conclusion that his testimony was given in a straightforward and simple manner. Besides,
appellant is questioning the testimony of PO1 Inopia only on matters pertaining to minor
details of the incident that do not, in any way, affect her conviction. The inconsistencies
ascribed to PO1 Inopia involve minor details, too trivial to adversely affect his credibility as
prosecution witness, and do not negate his positive identification of the appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime. On the other hand, the testimony of PO1 Inopia on the
circumstances that occurred on the date of the entrapment operation against the
appellant from the moment he received a confidential tip from his informer until the time
the buy-bust team apprehended the appellant deserves to be given weight and
significance as it emanated from the mouth of a policeman who enjoys the presumption of
regularity in the performance of his duty. Police officers are presumed to have acted
regularly in the performance of their official functions in the absence of clear and
convincing proof to the contrary or proof that they were moved by ill will.
The argument of the appellant that the prosecutions account of the buy-bust
operation is unworthy of belief since no corroborative testimony was presented, fails to
impress. There is no law requiring that in drug cases the testimony of a single witness has
to be corroborated to be believed. Corroborative evidence is vital only when there are
reasons to suspect that the witness twisted the truth, or that his or her observation was
inaccurate. Evidence is assessed in terms of quality, not quantity. It is to be weighed, not
counted. Thus, it is not uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the
testimony of a lone witness.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPOUSES WILLIAM GENATO and REBECCA GENATO vs. RITA VIOLA
G.R. No. 169706, February 5, 2010

DOCTRINE:It is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that are
controlling. The inclusion of the names of all the parties in the title of a complaint is a
formal requirement under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. However, the rules of
pleadings require courts to pierce the form and go into the substance. The non-inclusion
of one or some of the names of all the complainants in the title of a complaint, is not fatal
to the case, provided there is a statement in the body of the complaint indicating that such
complainant/s was/were made party to such action.
A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no
longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it was made by the court that rendered it or by
highest court of the land.

FACTS:
In October 1991, a complaint titled "VILLA REBECCA HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC. versus MR. WILLIAM GENATO and spouse REBECCA GENATO"
was filed with the HLURB. The said complaint was verified by 34 individuals, including the
respondent herein, who referred to themselves as the "Complainants" who "caused the
preparation of the foregoing Complaint". The complaint stated that on various dates,
complainants executed Contracts to Sell and/or Lease Purchase Agreements with the
Sps. Genato pertaining to housing units in Villa Rebecca Homes Subdivision. Sometime
thereafter the HLURB issued a cease and desist order (CDO) enjoining the collection of
amortization payments. This CDO was subsequently lifted. Thereafter, complainants
went to the Sps. Genato with the intention of resuming their amortization payments. The
latter however refused to accept their payments and instead demanded for a lump sum
payment of all the accrued amortizations which fell due during the effectivity of the CDO.
On March 8, 1995, the Housing Arbiter rendered a Decision ordering complainants
to resume payment of their monthly amortization from date hereof pursuant to the
agreement.
On May 26, 2000, Arbiter Marino Bernardo M. Torres issued the Writ of Execution.
In connection therewith, the sheriff seized Rita Viola's two delivery trucks and 315 sacks
of rice. Respondent Viola then filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Execution, with Prayers
for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, Clarification and Computation of Correct
Amount of Money Judgment and Allowance of Appeal.
On December 15, 2000, Arbiter Torres issued an Order denying respondent
Viola's motion to quash the writ of execution and directed her to pay the Sps. Genato the
amount of ₱739,133.31.
Petitioners contend that the CA erred in ruling that the lack of jurisdiction of the
court over an action cannot be waived. They submit that "jurisdiction of the court over an
action" is different from "jurisdiction over the person". They say that the latter was what
the HLURB was referring to because it stated that Rita Viola was never impleaded. They
contend that jurisdiction over the person can be conferred by consent expressly or
impliedly given, as in the case of Rita Viola.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 27
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
On the other hand, respondent contends that the HLURB did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person since she was not a party to the case; hence, the HLURB
decision is a nullity as against her and therefore never acquired finality. With a void
judgment, the resultant execution was likewise void.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the HLURB has not
acquired jurisdiction over the person over the person of the respondent Rita Viola.

HELD:
Yes, the Court of Appeals has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent.
It is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that are
controlling. The inclusion of the names of all the parties in the title of a complaint is a
formal requirement under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. However, the rules of
pleadings require courts to pierce the form and go into the substance. The non-inclusion
of one or some of the names of all the complainants in the title of a complaint, is not fatal
to the case, provided there is a statement in the body of the complaint indicating that such
complainant/s was/were made party to such action. This is specially true before the
HLURB where the proceedings are summary in nature without regard to legal
technicalities obtaining in the courts of law and where the pertinent concern is to promote
public interest and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action, application or other proceedings.
Respondent Viola, although her name did not appear in the title as a party, was
one of the persons who caused the preparation of the complaint and who verified the
same. The allegations in the body of the complaint indicate that she is one of the
complainants. She categorically considered, and held out, herself as one of the
complainants from the time of the filing of the complaint and up to the time the decision in
the HLURB case became final and executory. To repeat, the averments in the body of the
complaint, not the title, are controlling. Hence, having been set forth in the body of the
complaint as a complainant, Viola was a party to the case.
For clarity, the complaint should have been amended to reflect in the title the
individual complainants. There being a "defect in the designation of the parties", its
correction could be summarily made at any stage of the action provided no prejudice is
caused thereby to the adverse party. In the present case, the specification of the
individual complainants in the title of the case would not constitute a change in the identity
of the parties. Only their names were omitted in the title but they were already parties to
the case, most importantly, they were heard through their counsel whom they themselves
chose to prepare the complaint and represent them in the case before the HLURB. No
unfairness or surprise to the complainants, including Viola, or to the Sps. Genato would
result by allowing the amendment, the purpose of which is merely to conform to
procedural rules or to correct a technical error.
The error or defect is merely formal and not substantial and an amendment to cure
such defect is expressly authorized by Sec. 4, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 28
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Moreover, it was only when the final and executory judgment of the HLURB was
already being executed against Viola that she, for the first time, reversed her position; and
claimed that she was not a party to the case and that the HLURB did not acquire
jurisdiction over her. Viola is estopped from taking such inconsistent positions. Where a
party, by his or her deed or conduct, has induced another to act in a particular manner,
estoppel effectively bars the former from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude or
course of conduct that causes loss or injury to the latter. The doctrine of estoppel is based
upon the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice, and its purpose is to
forbid one to speak against his own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of
one to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon. After petitioners had
reasonably relied on the representations of Viola that she was a complainant and entered
into the proceedings before the HLURB, she cannot now be permitted to impugn her
representations to the injury of the petitioners.
Final and executory judgment may no longer be modified
The April 27, 1999 HLURB Resolution, reinstating the December 18, 1996
Decision, has long been final and executory. Nothing is more settled in the law than that a
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no
longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it was made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land. The only recognized exceptions to the general rule are the
correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice
to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of
the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. None of the exceptions is
present in this case. The HLURB decision cannot be considered a void judgment, as it
was rendered by a tribunal with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint and,
as discussed above, with jurisdiction over the parties. Hence, the same can no longer be
modified.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 29
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ATTY. MANGONTAWAR M. GUBAT vs. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
G.R. No. 167415, February 26, 2010

DOCTRINE: For a full-blown trial to be dispensed with, the party who moves for summary
judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of genuine issues of fact,
or that the issue posed is patently insubstantial as to constitute a genuine issue. A client
has an undoubted right to settle a suit without the intervention of his lawyer, for he is
generally conceded to have the exclusive control over the subject-matter of the litigation
and may, at any time before judgment, if acting in good faith, compromise, settle, and
adjust his cause of action out of court without his attorney’s intervention, knowledge, or
consent, even though he has agreed with his attorney not to do so. The terms of the
compromise subscribed to by the client should not be such that will amount to an entire
deprivation of his lawyer’s fees, especially when the contract is on a contingent fee
basis—a lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice or imposition of
fraud on the part of his client as the client is against abuse on the part of his counsel.

FACTS:
In August 1990, plaintiffs Ala Mambuay, Norma Maba, and Acur Macarampat
separately filed civil suits for damages against the NPC before the Regional Trial Court of
Lanao del Sur in Marawi City. Petitioner was the one who signed the complaints on behalf
of himself and Atty. Mandangan.
During the course of the proceedings, the three complaints were consolidated
because the plaintiffs’ causes of action are similar. They all arose from NPC’s refusal to
pay the amounts demanded by the plaintiffs for the cost of the improvements on their
respective lands which were destroyed when the NPC constructed the Marawi-Malabang
Transmission Line.
On the day of the initial hearing on the merits, NPC and its counsel failed to
appear. Consequently, respondent was declared in default. Despite the plea of NPC for
the lifting of the default order, the RTC of Marawi City, Branch 8, rendered its Decision on
April 24, 1991.
NPC appealed to the CA which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 33000. During
the pendency of the appeal, Atty. Gubat filed an Entry and Notice of Charging Lien to
impose his attorney’s lien of ₱30,000.00 and appearance fees of ₱2,000.00 on each of
the three civil cases he handled, totalling ₱96,000.00.
On August 19, 1992, NPC moved to dismiss its appeal alleging that the parties had
arrived at a settlement. Attached to the motion were acknowledgment receipts dated April
2, 1992 signed by plaintiffs Acur Macarampat, Ala Mambuay, and Norma Maba, who
received ₱90,060.00, ₱90,000.00, and ₱90,050.00 respectively, in full satisfaction of their
claims against the NPC. The motion stated that copies were furnished to Atty.
Mandangan and herein petitioner, although it was only Atty. Mandangan’s signature
which appeared therein.
After the cases were remanded to the RTC, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on his attorney’s fees. He claimed that the plaintiffs and the NPC
deliberately did not inform him about the execution of the compromise agreement, and
that said parties connived with each other in entering into the compromise agreement in
order to unjustly deprive him of his attorney’s fees.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Petitioner thus prayed that a partial summary judgment be rendered on his
attorney’s fess and that NPC be ordered to pay him directly his lawful attorney’s fees of
₱32,000.00 in each of the above cases, for a total of ₱96,000.00.
NPC opposed the motion for partial summary of judgment. It alleged that a client
may compromise a suit without the intervention of the lawyer and that petitioner’s claim
for attorney’s fees should be made against the plaintiffs. NPC likewise claimed that it
settled the case in good faith and that plaintiffs were paid in full satisfaction of their claims
which included attorney’s fees.
On March 15, 2000, the trial court issued an Order granting petitioner’s motion for
summary judgment. It found that the parties to the compromise agreement connived to
petitioner’s prejudice which amounts to a violation of the provisions of the Civil Code on
Human Relations.
NPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the motion was denied by the trial court
in its June 27, 2000 Order. Thus, NPC filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60722, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the court a
quo for granting petitioner’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. It prayed that the
subject order be set aside insofar as NPC is concerned.
Petitioner alleged that NPC’s remedy should have been an ordinary appeal and
not a petition for certiorari because the compromise agreement had settled the civil suits.
Thus, when the trial court granted the motion for partial summary judgment on his fees, it
was a final disposition of the entire case. He also argued that the issue of bad faith is
factual which cannot be a subject of a certiorari petition. He also insisted that NPC’s
petition was defective for lack of a board resolution authorizing Special Attorney Comie
Doromal (Atty. Doromal) of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to sign on NPC’s
behalf.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s result to summary judgment is proper.

HELD:
No, the petitioner’s resort to summary judgment is not proper; he is not entitled to
an immediate relief as a matter of law, for the existence of bad faith is a genuine issue of
fact to be tried.
A summary judgment is allowed only if, after hearing, the court finds that except as
to the amount of damages, the pleadings, affidavits, depositions and admissions show no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. The purpose of a summary judgment is to avoid drawn out litigations and
useless delays because the facts appear undisputed to the mind of the court. Such
judgment is generally based on the facts proven summarily by affidavits, depositions,
pleadings, or admissions of the parties. For a full-blown trial to be dispensed with, the
party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the
absence of genuine issues of fact, or that the issue posed is patently insubstantial as to
constitute a genuine issue. "Genuine issue" means an issue of fact which calls for the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Petitioner pleaded for a summary judgment on his fees on the claim that the parties
intentionally did not inform him of the settlement. He alleged that he never received a
copy of NPC’s Motion to Withdraw Appeal before the CA and that instead, it was another
lawyer who was furnished and who acknowledged receipt of the motion. When he
confronted his clients, he was allegedly told that the NPC deceived them into believing
that what they received was only a partial payment exclusive of the attorney’s fees. NPC
contested these averments. It claimed good faith in the execution of the compromise
agreement. It stressed that the attorney’s fees were already deemed included in the
monetary consideration given to the plaintiffs for the compromise.
The above averments clearly pose factual issues which make the rendition of
summary judgment not proper. Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong. It is synonymous with fraud, in that it involves a
design to mislead or deceive another. The trial court should have exercised prudence by
requiring the presentation of evidence in a formal trial to determine the veracity of the
parties’ respective assertions. Whether NPC and the plaintiffs connived and acted in bad
faith is a question of fact and is evidentiary. Bad faith has to be established by the
claimant with clear and convincing evidence, and this necessitates an examination of the
evidence of all the parties. As certain facts pleaded were being contested by the opposing
parties, such would not warrant a rendition of summary judgment.
A client may enter into a compromise agreement without the intervention of the
lawyer, but the terms of the agreement should not deprive the counsel of his
compensation for the professional services he had rendered. If so, the compromise shall
be subjected to said fees. If the client and the adverse party who assented to the
compromise are found to have intentionally deprived the lawyer of his fees, the terms of
the compromise, insofar as they prejudice the lawyer, will be set aside, making both
parties accountable to pay the lawyer’s fees. But in all cases, it is the client who is bound
to pay his lawyer for his legal representation.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It is a consensual
contract, binding upon the signatories/privies, and it has the effect of res judicata. This
cannot however affect third persons who are not parties to the agreement.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, a client has an undoubted right to settle a suit
without the intervention of his lawyer, for he is generally conceded to have the exclusive
control over the subject-matter of the litigation and may, at any time before judgment, if
acting in good faith, compromise, settle, and adjust his cause of action out of court without
his attorney’s intervention, knowledge, or consent, even though he has agreed with his
attorney not to do so. Hence, a claim for attorney’s fees does not void the compromise
agreement and is no obstacle to a court approval.
However, counsel is not without remedy. As the validity of a compromise
agreement cannot be prejudiced, so should not be the payment of a lawyer’s adequate
and reasonable compensation for his services should the suit end by reason of the
settlement. The terms of the compromise subscribed to by the client should not be such
that will amount to an entire deprivation of his lawyer’s fees, especially when the contract
is on a contingent fee basis. In this sense, the compromise settlement cannot bind the
lawyer as a third party. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice
or imposition of fraud on the part of his client as the client is against abuse on the part of

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
his counsel. The duty of the court is not only to ensure that a lawyer acts in a proper and
lawful manner, but also to see to it that a lawyer is paid his just fees.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
THE PARENTS-TEACHERS ASSOCIATION (PTA) OF ST. MATHEW CHRISTIAN
ACADEMY, GREGORIO INALVEZ, JR., ROWENA LAYUG, MALOU MALVAR,
MARILOU BARAQUIO, GARY SINLAO, LUZVIMINDA OCAMPO,MARIFE
FERNANDEZ, FERNANDO VICTORIO, ERNESTO AGANON and RIZALINO
MANGLICMOT, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, GREGORIO INALVEZ,
JR., Petitioners,
vs.
THE METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST CO., Respondent.
G.R. No. 176518, March 2, 2010

DOCTRINE:As a rule, it is ministerial upon the court to issue a writ of possession after the
foreclosure sale and during the period of redemption; Exception is where it appears that
there is a third party in possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of
the debtor/mortgagor. The ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession under
Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is not strictly speaking a “judicial process” as contemplated in
Article 433 of the Civil Code. Even if the application for the writ of possession was
denominated as a “petition,” it was in substance merely a motion; no verification and
certification on non-forum shopping need be attached to the motion. The nature of the ex
parte petition for issuance of possessory writ under Act.No. 3135 to be a nonlitigious
proceeding and summary in nature.

FACTS:
Sometime in 2001, the spouses Denivin and Josefina Ilagan (spouses Ilagan)
applied for and were granted a loan by the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (MBTC) in the
amount of P4.79M secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over 8 parcels of land covered by
different Transfer Certificates of Title. Upon default, an extrajudicial foreclosure was
conducted with MBTC being the highest bidder and for which a Certificate of Sale was
issued in its favor. During the period of redemption, MBTC filed an Ex-Parte Petition for
Issuance of a Writ of Possession, before a trial court, by posting the required bond which
was subsequently approved. In due course, St. Mathew Christian Academy of Tarlac, Inc.
(SMCATI), allegedly a third party occupying the parcels of land, filed a Petition for
Injunction with Prayer for Restraining Order against MBTC and the Provincial Sheriff.
Eventually, the trial court issued a Joint Decision granting MBTC the writ of
possession, on the ground that SMCATI is not a third party against whom a writ of
possession cannot be issued, thusly: (1) the lease to SMCATI by the spouses Ilagans, as
lessor, was for a period of one year from the execution of the lease contract in 1998 –
therefore, the lease should have expired in 1999; (2) the lease was not registered and
annotated at the back of the title, and therefore, not binding on third persons; and (3) the
spouses Ilagans are the owners or practically the owners of SMCATI – even if it has a
separate personality, nevertheless, “piercing the veil of corporate entity” is resorted to for
the spouses Ilagan should not be allowed to commit fraud under the separate
entity/personality of SMCATI.
Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration of the said Decision, the
Parents-Teachers Association, teachers and students of SMCATI (Petitioners), filed a
Motion for Leave to file Petition in Intervention, which was granted by the trial court.
However, in a subsequent Order, the trial court reversed its earlier Order by ruling that

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 34
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
petitioners’ intervention would have no bearing on the issuance and implementation of
the writ of possession.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are third parties against whom the writ of possession
cannot be issued?

HELD:
No. Ordinarily, a purchaser of property in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is
entitled to possession of the property. Thus, whenever the purchaser prays for a writ of
possession, the trial court has to issue it as a matter of course. However, the obligation of
the trial court to issue a writ of possession ceases to be ministerial once it appears that
there is a third party in possession of the property claiming a right adverse to that of the
debtor/mortgagor. Where such third party exists, the trial court should conduct a hearing
to determine the nature of his adverse possession.
In this case, however, petitioners cannot be considered as third parties because
they are not claiming a right adverse to the judgment debtor, spouses Ilagan.
Petitioner-teachers and students did not claim ownership of the properties, but merely
averred actual “physical possession of the subject school premises”. Petitioner-teachers’
possession of the said premises was based on the employment contracts they have with
SMCATI. As regards the petitioner-students, the school-student relationship is
contractual in nature. As such, it would be specious to conclude that the teachers and
students hold the subject premises independent of or adverse to SMCATI. In fact, their
interest over the school premises is necessarily inferior to that of the school. Besides,
their contracts are with the school and do not attach to the school premises. Moreover,
the foreclosure of the current school premises does not prevent the SMCATU from
continuing its operations elsewhere. As such, petitioners cannot be deemed “third
parties” as contemplated in Act No. 3135, as amended.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 35
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPOUSES NORMAN K. CERTEZA, JR. and MA. ROSANILA V. CERTEZA, AND
AMADA P. VILLAMAYOR and HERMINIO VILLAMAYOR, JR., vs. PHILIPPINE
SAVINGS BANK
G.R. No. 190078, March 5, 2010

DOCTRINE: A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 as amended, no longer prescribes the requirements of


at least two bidders for a valid auction sale.—The use of the word “bids” (in plural form)
does not make it a mandatory requirement to have more than one bidder for an auction
sale to be valid. A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, as amended, no longer prescribes the requirement
of at least two bidders for a valid auction sale. We further held that “Except for errors or
omissions in the notice of sale which are calculated to deter or mislead bidders, to
depreciate the value of the property, or to prevent it from bringing a fair price, simple
mistakes or omissions are not considered fatal to the validity of the notice and the sale
made pursuant thereto.”

FACTS:
Petitioners obtained a ₱1,255,000.00 loan from respondent Philippine Savings
Bank (PS Bank), secured by two parcels of land, with all the buildings and improvements
existing thereon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. N-208706 and N-208770.
Petitioners failed to pay their outstanding obligation despite demands hence PS
Bank instituted on May 8, 2002, an action for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the Real Estate
Mortgage pursuant to Act No. 3135, as amended.
During the auction sale conducted on February 18, 2003, PS Bank emerged as the
sole and highest bidder. A corresponding Certificate of Sale dated February 20, 2003 was
issued in favor of PS Bank, which was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City on March 25, 2003.
During the period of redemption, on December 1, 2003, PS Bank filed an Ex-parte
Petition for Writ of Possession with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, which
was granted in an Order dated September 21, 2004, after the period of redemption for the
foreclosed property had already expired.
On January 20, 2005, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to Intervene
and to Stay Issuance or Implementation of Writ of Possession, attaching therein their
Petition-in-Intervention pursuant to Sec. 8 of Act No. 3135. They sought the nullification of
the extrajudicial foreclosure sale for allegedly having been conducted in contravention of
the procedural requirements prescribed in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 (Re: Procedure in
Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgages) and in violation of herein petitioners’
right to due process.
PS Bank opposed the motion citing Manalo v. Court of Appeals where we held that
"(T)he issuance of an order granting the writ of possession is in essence a rendition of
judgment within the purview of Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court." PS Bank also
argued that with the issuance of the trial court’s Order on September 21, 2004, the Motion
for Leave to Intervene can no longer be entertained.
The petitioners filed their Reply arguing that the filing of their petition before the
court where possession was requested was pursuant to Sec. 8 of Act No. 3135.
On March 3, 2005, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 217, issued an Order denying
the motion for intervention and to stay the implementation of the writ.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 36
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the motion was denied in the
Order dated May 9, 2005.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there may be only one bidder
in a foreclosure sale.

HELD:
No, the Court of Appeals did not commit an error in ruling that there may only be one
bidder in a foreclosure sale.
The requirement for at least two participating bidders provided in the original
version of paragraph 5 of A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 is not found in Act No. 3135. Hence, in the
Resolution of the Supreme Court en banc dated January 30, 2001, we made the following
pronouncements:
It is contended that this requirement is now found in Act No. 3135 and that it is
impractical and burdensome, considering that not all auction sales are commercially
attractive to prospective bidders.
The observation is well taken. Neither Act No. 3135 nor the previous circulars
issued by the Court governing extrajudicial foreclosures provide for a similar requirement.
The two-bidder rule is provided under P.D. No. 1594 and its implementing rules with
respect to contracts for government infrastructure projects because of the public interest
involved. Although there is a public interest in the regularity of extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgages, the private interest is predominant. The reason, therefore, for the requirement
that there must be at least two bidders is not as exigent as in the case of contracts for
government infrastructure projects.
On the other hand, the new requirement will necessitate republication of the notice
of auction sale in case only one bidder appears at the scheduled auction sale. This is not
only costly but, more importantly, it would render naught the binding effect of the
publication of the originally scheduled sale. x x x
Thus, as amended by the January 30, 2001 Resolution, paragraph 5 of A.M. No.
99-10-05-0 now reads:
5. The name/s of the bidder/s shall be reported by the sheriff or the notary public who
conducted the sale to the Clerk of Court before the issuance of the certificate of sale.
Hence, the CA correctly ruled that it is no longer required to have at least two
bidders in an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage.
Subsequently, on August 7, 2001, we further resolved other matters relating to
A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, specifically on: (1) period of redemption of properties with respect to
the change introduced by Republic Act No. 8791 (The General Banking Law of 2000) to
Act No. 3135; (2) ceiling on sheriff’s fees; and (3) payment of filing fees prescribed in the
Rules of Court in addition to sheriff’s fees.29
Pursuant to A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, as amended by the Resolutions of January 30,
2001 and August 7, 2001, the then Court Administrator (now Associate Justice of this
Court) Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., issued Circular No. 7-200230dated January 22, 2002
which became effective on April 22, 2002.31 Section 5(a) of the said circular states:
Sec. 5. Conduct of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale –

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
a. The bidding shall be made through sealed bids which must be submitted to the
Sheriff who shall conduct the sale between the hours of 9 a.m. and 4 p.m. of the date of
the auction (Act 3135, Sec. 4). The property mortgaged shall be awarded to the party
submitting the highest bid and in case of a tie, an open bidding shall be conducted
between the highest bidders. Payment of the winning bid shall be made either in cash or
in managers check, in Philippine currency, within five (5) days from notice.
The use of the word "bids" (in plural form) does not make it a mandatory
requirement to have more than one bidder for an auction sale to be valid. A.M. No.
99-10-05-0, as amended, no longer prescribes the requirement of at least two bidders for
a valid auction sale. We further held that "Except for errors or omissions in the notice of
sale which are calculated to deter or mislead bidders, to depreciate the value of the
property, or to prevent it from bringing a fair price, simple mistakes or omissions are not
considered fatal to the validity of the notice and the sale made pursuant thereto".
In view of the foregoing, the extra-judicial foreclosure sale conducted in this case is
regular and valid. Consequently, the subsequent issuance of the writ of possession is
likewise regular and valid.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 38
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ASSOCIATED ANGLO-AMERICAN TOBACCO CORPORATION AND FLORANTE DY
VS HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. CRISPIN C. LARON
G.R. No. 167237, April 23, 2010

DOCTRINE: The appeal of a final order substantially amending only some matters in a
previously rendered Decision is also an appeal of the other intimately interwoven matters
passed upon in the original decision.

FACTS:
Spouses Paul Pelaez Jr and Rocelli Pelaez were employees of Associated
Ango-American Tobacco Corporation. When Paul defaulted in remitting sales proceeds,
the Corporation instituted the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage executed by the
former. As a result, spouses Pelaez filed a Complaint against the corporation to stop the
extrajudicial sale.
`In the Regional Trial Court, the court decided in favor of the Spouses Pelaez.
However, upon motion of the spouses Pelaez, the Regional Trial Court amended its
previous decision and changed the overage and moral and exemplary damages amounts
to be paid by the corporation. The corporation filed a notice of appeal. Meanwhile, the
spouses Pelaez filed a Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Partial Execution. The Regional
Trial Court, granted the motion of spouses Pelaez. The corporation then filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The same was dismissed. Thus, a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the corporation with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the changes made by the court with its decision constitutes an
amendment or supplemental pleading.

HELD:
The modification is an amendment. The appeal of a final order substantially
amending only some matters in a previously rendered Decision is also an appeal of the
other intimately interwoven matters passed upon in the original decision. The decision of
the Regional Trial Court is not severable since the disposition of some inter-related issues
in the original Regional Trial Court Decision were materially amended by the latest order,
thus, these two issuances must be taken in conjunction with each other.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 39
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
TRINIDAD GO VS VICENTE VELEZ CHAVES
G.R. No. 182341, April 23, 2010

DOCTRINE: A deviation from the rigid application of the procedural rules may thus be
allowed, as the petitioners should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of
their case, rather than lose their property on mere technicalities.

FACTS:
Vicente Chaves filed a complaint against spouses Trinidad and Gonzalo Go for the
removal of the clouds on his certificate of title. Chaves prayed that the SPA and mortgage
to the spouses Go be invalidated. Subsequently, two parties intervened in the case
namely Alice, wife of Vicente Chaves, and Mega Integrated Agro-Livestock Farms Inc.
which claimed that it purchased Vicente a portion of the property in dispute.
The Regional Trial Court decided in favor of Vicente Chaves. Thereafter, spouses Go
appealed to the Court of Appeals. A Motion to Dismiss was filed by Mega and Alice,
alleging that spouses Go failed to furnish them a copy of the brief. The Court of Appeals
granted the motion of Mega and Alice and dismissed the appeal of the spouses Go.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court erred in dismissing the appeal due to the failure to
append a copy of the assailed judgment and late furnishing of copies of the brief to Mega
and Alice

HELD:
Yes. Despite deficiencies in the petitioner’s appellant brief, it is found to be sufficient
in form and substance as to apprise the appellate court of the essential facts and nature of
the case as well as the issues raised and the laws necessary for the disposition of the
same. The failure of the counsel of spouses Go to serve a copy of the appellant’s brief to
two of the adverse parties was a mere oversight constituting excusable neglect. A
deviation from the rigid application of the procedural rules may thus be allowed, as the
petitioners should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of their case,
rather than lose their property on mere technicalities. Every litigant must be afforded the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case, free from the
unacceptable plea of technicalities. Hence, the dismissal of appeals purely on technical
grounds is frowned upon.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 40
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
REGIONAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, VS COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 165155, April 13, 2010

DOCTRINE: Rules of procedure are tools to facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of
proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving substantial
justice. So long as their purpose is sufficiently met and no violation of due process and fair
play takes place, the rules should be liberally construed, especially in agrarian cases.

FACTS:
Respondents are co-owners of several parcels of land. Petitioners on the other hand
are in actual possession of the said land as tillers thereof. Thereafter, an ejectment case
was filed by respondents with the Department for Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board for
non-payment of rentals.
The Regional Adjudicator decided in favor of the respondents and extinguished the
tenancy leasehold relationship. The petitioners filed two notices of appeal. In answer, the
respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal on the basis that the Notice of Appeal
was not filed beyond the reglementary period, it did not state ground relied upon for the
appeal, and that contained the forged signature of the deceased defendants. The motion
was granted. Thereafter, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court found merit in respondent’s petition. A Motion for
Reconsideration was filed by the petitioner which was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appeals should be considered as “mere scraps of paper” for
failure to state the grounds relied upon for an appeal.

HELD: No. The defects found in the two notices of appeal are not of such nature that
would cause a denial of the right to appeal. Moreover, the defects are not only excusable
but also inconsequential. Rules of procedure are tools to facilitate a fair and orderly
conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving
substantial justice. So long as their purpose is sufficiently met and no violation of due
process and fair play takes place, the rules should be liberally construed, especially in
agrarian cases. When the heirs of the real parties in interest signed the Notice of Appeal,
they did not intend, and could not have intended, to visit fraud upon the proceedings; any
intention to mislead is simple negated by their ready admission and participation in the
proceedings as heirs.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 41
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ANGELITA DE GUZMAN V EMILIO A. GONZALEZ III
G.R. No. 158104, March 26, 2010

DOCTRINE: The transmittal of the funds is considered a clear case of restitution and is a
mere mitigating circumstance. It does not obliterate the criminal liability of the accused for
the malversation of public funds.

FACTS:
Angelita De Guzman was indicted for malversation of public funds before the
Regional Trial Court. She requested for a reinvestigation alleging she was not able to
participate during the preliminary investigation as she was out of the country. The
reinvestigation was granted. After reinvestigation, the case was recommended for
dismissal for insufficiency of evidence to establish a probable cause. However the
dismissal of the Prosecutor was recommended for disapproval by Graft Investigation
Officer II Agbada. As an effect, a demand was sent to De Guzman for the transmittal of
the amount due to the Municipality of Claveria. De Guzman complied. Meanwhile, the
Deputy Ombudsman favored the disapproval of the recommendation for dismissal. De
Guzman filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution of the case should be continued despite the findings
of the reinvestigating prosecutor that there was no sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause.

HELD:
Yes. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspect. The
Deputy Ombudsman was merely exercising his power and thus it is discretionary upon
him whether or not he would rely on the findings of fact of the Prosecutor. Moreover, the
transmittal of the funds is considered a clear case of restitution and is a mere mitigating
circumstance. It does not obliterate the criminal liability of the accused for the
malversation of public funds.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 42
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
TEOFILO EVANGELISTA vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. 163267, 5 May 2010

DOCTRINE: Once an information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case as to its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests on the discretion of the court.
The court is not dutifully bound by such finding of the investigating prosecutor.

FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 1 of PD 1866 for allegedly possessing
firearms without the corresponding permit or license from competent authority. He posted
bail and moved that the proceedings be suspended and that a preliminary investigation
be held. The RTC granted his motion and, accordingly, the State Prosecutor conducted
the preliminary investigation.
On its resolution, the State Prosecutor found no probable cause to indict him and
recommended the reversal of the resolution finding probable cause and the dismissal of
the complaint. However, the trial court denied its motion to withdraw the information ruling
that since it was already filed in Court, the matter should be left to its discretion.
Thereafter, trial ensued wherein the petitioner was found guilty for the violation of Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions both in the Regional Trial Court and Court of
Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in disregarding the results of the
preliminary investigation.

HELD:
No. There is nothing procedurally improper on the part of the trial court in disregarding
the result of the preliminary investigation it itself ordered. Judicial action on the motion
rests in the sound exercise of judicial discretion. In denying the motion, the trial court just
followed the jurisprudential rule laid down in Crespo v. Judge Mogul that once a
complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or
the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests on the sound discretion of the court. The
court is not dutifully bound by such finding of the investigating prosecutor. In Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc v. Judge How we held:

It bears stressing that the court is however not bound to adopt the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice since the court is mandated to independently evaluate or assess
the merits of the case, and may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of
the Secretary of Justice. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice
would be an abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine prima
facie case.

Consequently, petitioner has no valid basis to insist on the trial court to respect the result
of the preliminary investigation it ordered to be conducted.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 43
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
In fine, we find no reason not to uphold petitioner’s conviction. The records substantiate
the RTC and CA’s finding that petitioner possessed, albeit constructively, the subject
firearms and ammunition when he arrived in the Philippines on January 30, 1996.
Moreover, no significant facts and circumstances were shown to have been overlooked or
disregarded which if considered would have altered the outcome of the case.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 44
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH AMPER y REPASO
G.R. 172708, 5 May 2010

DOCTRINE: We have consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing the
legality of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue, or to move for the quashal of the
information against him on this ground, which should be made before arraignment.

FACTS:
An Information was filed against appellant for allegedly taking several pieces of
jewelry and having carnal knowledge with his minor victim. After trial, he was found guilty
of the crime of Robbery with Rape under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 7659, by the Regional Trial Court. He questioned the legality of his
arrest on appeal, however, the same was denied by the Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant may validly question the legality of his arrest before the
Court of Appeals.

HELD:
No. We have consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing the
legality of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue, or to move for the quashal of the
information against him on this ground, which should be made before arraignment. In this
case, appellant only raised for the first time the alleged irregularity of his arrest in his
appeal before the CA. This is not allowed considering that he was already properly
arraigned and even actively participated in the proceedings. He is, therefore, deemed to
have waived such alleged defect when he submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 45
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
FELISA R. FERRER vs. DOMINGO CARGANILLO, SERGIO CARGANILLO,
SOLEDAD AGUSTIN and MARCELINA SOLIS
G.R. 170956, 12 May 2010

DOCTRINE: Section 5 of Rule 45 provides that the failure of the petitioner to comply,
among others, with the contents of the petition for review on certiorari shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal thereof, and, Section 4 of the same rule mandates, among
others, that the petition should state the full name of the appealing party as the petitioner.

This petition concerns four cases, involving the petitioner, jointly heard by the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) and subsequently further appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Since the discussion of this digest focuses on the procedural rule applied, only the third
case will be tackled.

FACTS:
In DARAB Case 7864, the first case against respondent Marcelina, Felisa
represented that the tenant of the landholding, Pedro Solis, died in June 1997 and was
survived by his wife, Marcelina. She further alleged that Marcelina took over the
cultivation of the 14,000-square meter landholding without her knowledge and consent. In
addition, during the lifetime of Pedro, the latter failed to pay lease rentals for three
consecutive years from 1995 to 1997. Hence, the case for ejectment against Marcelina.
In her Answer, Marcelina specifically denied Felisa’s allegation of arrears in lease
rentals from 1995 to 1997.
After submission of their respective position papers, the PARAD promulgated a
Decision dismissing both cases for lack of merit and evidence. DARAB also dismissed the
appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the Decision of the PARAD in toto. On Petition for
Review under Rule 43 to the CA, the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the DARAB with
respect to the issue of non-payment of lease rentals. On which basis, the CA dismissed
the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal made by the Court of Appeals was proper.

HELD:
Yes. DARAB Case 7864 should be dismissed for failure of Felisa to properly indicate
the appealing party.

With respect to the first case against Marcelina, we resolve to dismiss the appeal of
Felisa. Section 5 of Rule 45 provides that the failure of the petitioner to comply, among
others, with the contents of the petition for review on certiorari shall be sufficient ground
for the dismissal thereof. Section 4 of the same rule mandates, among others, that the
petition should state the full name of the appealing party as the petitioner. In this case,
Felisa indicated in the caption as well as in the parties portion of the petition that she is the
landowner. Even in the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, Felisa
attested that she is the petitioner in the instant case. However, it appears in the PARAD

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 46
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
records that the owners of the subject 14,000-square meter agricultural land are Rosa R.
Pajarito (Pajarito), Elvira A. Madolora (Madolora) and Anastacia F. Lagado
(Lagado). Felisa is only the representative of the said landowners with respect to the first
case against Marcelina. Thus, for failure of Felisa to indicate the appealing party with
respect to the said case, the appeal must perforce be dismissed. However, such failure
does not affect the appeal on the other three cases as Felisa is the owner/co-owner of the
landholdings subject of said three cases.

Procedural lapse aside, DARAB Case No. 7864 should still be dismissed for failure of
Felisa to establish her principals’ claim.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 47
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JOSE DELOS REYES vs. JOSEPHINE ANNE B. RAMNANI
G.R. No. 169135, 18 June 2010

DOCTRINE: While, as a general rule, all written motions should be set for hearing under
Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, excepted from this rule are non-litigious motions
or motions which may be acted upon by the court without prejudicing the rights of the
adverse party.

FACTS:
On October 11, 1977, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of respondent.
Thereafter, a writ of execution was issued by the same court. On June 6, 1978, then
Branch Sheriff Pedro T. Alarcon conducted a public bidding and auction sale over the
subject property during which respondent was the highest bidder. Consequently, a
certificate of sale was executed in her favor on even date.
On November 17, 1978, a writ of possession was issued by the trial court. On March
8, 1990, the certificate of sale was annotated at the back of TCT No. 480537. Thereafter,
the taxes due on the sale of the subject property were paid on September 26, 2001.
On February 17, 2004, respondent filed a motion for the issuance of an order
directing the sheriff to execute the final certificate of sale in her favor. Petitioner opposed
on the grounds that the subject motion was not accompanied by a notice of hearing and
that the trial court’s October 11, 1977 Decision can no longer be executed as it is barred
by prescription.
The trial court ruled that the prescription for the issuance of a writ of execution is not
applicable in this case. Less than a year from the October 11, 1977 Decision, respondent
exercised her right to enforce the same through the levy and sale of the subject property
on June 6, 1978. Although the certificate of sale was annotated on the title only on March
8, 1990, petitioner did not exercise his right to redeem the subject property within one
year from said registration. Thus, what remains to be done is the issuance of the final
certificate of sale which was, however, not promptly accomplished at that time due to the
demise of the trial court’s sheriff. The issuance of the final certificate of sale is a ministerial
duty of the sheriff in order to complete the already enforced judgment.
In affirming the ruling of the trial court, the CA noted that the subject motion is a
non-litigious motion, hence, the three-day notice rule does not apply. Further, it agreed
with the trial court that the issuance of the final certificate of sale is not barred by
prescription, laches or estoppel because the October 11, 1977 Decision was already
executed through the levy and sale of the subject property on June 6, 1978. Respondent
is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate of sale as a matter of right because
petitioner failed to redeem the subject property.
Petitioner contends that the motion dated February 16, 2004 filed by respondent to
compel the sheriff to execute the final certificate of sale is fatally defective because it does
not contain a notice of hearing. He further claims that the subject motion seeks to enforce
the trial court’s October 11, 1977 Decision which can no longer be done because 27
years have elapsed from the finality of said Decision.
Meanwhile, respondent contends that the subject motion is a non-litigious motion and
that petitioner was not denied due process because he was given an opportunity to be
heard by the trial court. She also points out that said motion is not barred by prescription,

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 48
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
laches, and estoppel considering that the levy and sale of the subject property was
conducted on 6 June 1978 and the petitioner failed to redeem the same.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the fatally defective motion.

HELD:
No. As to petitioner’s claim that the subject motion is defective for lack of a notice of
hearing, the CA correctly ruled that the subject motion is a non-litigious motion. While, as
a general rule, all written motions should be set for hearing under Section 4,11 Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court, excepted from this rule are non-litigious motions or motions which may
be acted upon by the court without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. As already
discussed, respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate of sale as a matter
of right and petitioner is powerless to oppose the same. Hence, the subject motion falls
under the class of non-litigious motions. At any rate, the trial court gave petitioner an
opportunity to oppose the subject motion as in fact he filed a Comment/ Opposition14 on
March 1, 2004 before the trial court. Petitioner cannot, therefore, validly claim that he was
denied his day in court.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENE BARON y TANGAROCAN
G.R. No. 185209, 28 June 2010

DOCTRINE: A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be


sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results to a fair
and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
perpetrator.

FACTS:
An Information was filed before RTC Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, charging the
appellant and two others with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
committed against Juanito Berallo. Only the appellant was arrested while the two others
remain at-large to date.
On his defense, appellant denied any participation in the crime. He claimed that he
was just a passenger in the tricycle when two others announced a hold-up, dragged the
driver to the sugarcane fields, and killed him. According to him, he was also threatened by
the perpetrators should he report the incident to the police which is why he was not able to
escape or at least request for assistance from the people around him even after having
the chance to do so.
The Regional Trial Court found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable of the crime
charged. On appeal, the appellant alleged that the trial court failed to appreciate in his
favor the exempting circumstance of irresistible force and/or uncontrollable fear of an
equal or greater injury. However, the same was disregarded by the CA holding that all
requisites for said circumstances were lacking.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

HELD:
No. In this case, the prosecution successfully adduced proof beyond reasonable
doubt that the real intention of the appellant and his companions was to rob the victim.
The appellant and his companions boarded the tricycle of the victim pretending to be
passengers. Midway to their destination, one of the accused declared a hold-up and at
gun point, tied the hands of the victim and brought him towards the sugarcane field where
he was stabbed to death. The victim was divested of his wallet containing ₱1,250.00, a
wrist watch and ring. Emerging from the sugarcane plantation, they boarded the tricycle
of the victim, detached the sidecar and dumped the same in a canal beside the Martesan
Bridge with the fatigue jacket of one of the accused. They proceeded
to Barangay Oringao, Kabankalan and hid the motorcycle in the house of Villatima’s aunt,
Natividad.

Concededly, there is no direct evidence proving that the appellant conspired and
participated in committing the crime. However, his complicity may be proved by
circumstantial evidence, which consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances
from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
common experience. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
have been established; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to warrant a
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an
unbroken chain that results to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to
the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.

In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution leads to the
inescapable conclusion that the appellant and his co-accused conspired to commit
robbery with homicide.
xxx

From [this] series of proven circumstantial evidence, the inescapable and natural
conclusion is the three accused were in conspiracy with one another to kill the victim and
cart away the motorcycle as the combination of these numerous circumstantial evidence
[is] enough to produce the strong moral certainty from an unbiased and [unprejudiced]
mind to safely conclude that no other persons but the three accused conspired to
perpetrate the crime as clearly the series of events indubitably [shows] that there was
unity of purpose, concurrence of will, and that they all acted in concert towards the same
end, the accused being together with a group when they rode the tricycle of the victim; all
of them were together at the scene of the crime, they all rode in the same stolen
motorcycle going to Barangay Oringao, Kabankalan City; all of them were together in
hiding the stolen motorcycle in the house of Natividad Camparicio; and they were
together as a group going to Cadiz City from Kabankalan City passing [through] and
stopping [at] various cities and municipalities.

The concerted manner in which the appellant and his companions perpetrated the
crime showed beyond reasonable doubt the presence of conspiracy. When a homicide
takes place by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be
guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether they actually
participated in the killing, unless there is proof that there was an endeavor to prevent the
killing. There was no evidence adduced in this case that the appellant attempted to
prevent the killing. Thus, regardless of the acts individually performed by the appellant
and his co-accused, and applying the basic principle in conspiracy that the "act of one is
the act of all," the appellant is guilty as a co-conspirator. As a result, the criminal liabilities
of the appellant and his co-accused are one and the same.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
VICTORIAS MILLING CO., INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and INTERNATIONAL
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
G.R. No. 168062, 29 June 2010

DOCTRINE: The Rule on Summary Procedure, by way of exception, permits only a


motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter but it does
not mention the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person.

The purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and


inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical rules.

FACTS:
On March 4, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages
against respondent before the MCTC. Summons was served to Danilo Maglasang, IPI's
Human Relations Department Manager.
IPI filed its Answer with express reservation that said Answer should not be construed
as a waiver of the lack of jurisdiction of the MCTC over the person of IPI, for non-service
of summons on the proper person. It then filed an Omnibus Motion for Hearing of
Affirmative Defenses raised in the Answer and moved for the suspension of proceedings.
MCTC issued an Order denying the suspension of the proceedings of the case
sought by IPI and set the case for preliminary conference in accordance with the Rule on
Summary Procedure. Thus, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals to question the jurisdiction of the MCTC over its person.
In the meantime, in the MCTC, IPI moved for the deferment of the preliminary
conference while VMC moved for the termination of the same. The said preliminary
conference was terminated and the parties were directed to submit the affidavits of their
witnesses and other evidence together with their position papers. The parties
subsequently submitted the required position papers with the MCTC.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
filed by the respondent was granted by the Court of Appeals. It enjoined MCTC from
proceeding with the case and disturbing the possession of the petitioner over the leased
premises during the pendency of this petition until further orders from this Court.
VMC no longer filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA's Resolution, on the
ground that the questioned CA Resolution is patently null and void and due to the urgency
of VMC's predicament. It instead immediately filed the present petition for certiorari. It
contends that the petition for certiorari filed by IPI assailing the MCTC's interlocutory
order in an ejectment case is clearly and specifically prohibited under Section 13 of Rule
70 of the Rules of Court as well as the Rule on Summary Procedure. The rules being clear
and unambiguous, it submits that the said petition should have been dismissed outright
by the CA. It also alleged, among others, that IPI does not have a clear and unmistakable
right to the property subject of the case as to be entitled to an injunctive writ. It
emphasizes that the grant of the injunctive writ by the CA will serve no other purpose but
to cause undue and unnecessary delay to what should be the speedy and summary
disposition of the ejectment suit which is repugnant to public policy.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 52
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
On the other hand, IPI contends that the Rule on Summary Procedure was not
intended to undermine the rules of jurisdiction and rules on service of summons. It insists
that in the present case, as in Go v. Court of Appeals, there is a procedural void which
justified the CA's act of providing an equitable remedy, of not immediately dismissing the
petition for certiorari before it and of issuing the injunctive writ.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals had gravely abused its discretion in ordering the
issuance of an injunctive writ on the basis of a clearly prohibited pleading.

HELD:
Yes. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, on forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases,
provides:

Sec. 13. Prohibited pleadings and motions.-The following petitions, motions, or


pleadings shall not be allowed:
1. Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, or failure to comply with section 12;
2. Motion for a bill of particulars;
3. Motion for a new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of
trial;
4. Petition for relief from judgment;
5. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;
6. Memoranda;
7. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order
issued by the court;
8. Motion to declare the defendant in default;
9. Dilatory motions for postponement;
10. Reply;
11. Third-party complaints; and
12. Interventions. (Emphasis supplied)

Although it is alleged that there may be a technical error in connection with the
service of summons, there is no showing of any substantive injustice that would be
caused to IPI so as to call for the disregard of the clear and categorical prohibition of filing
petitions for certiorari. It must be pointed out that the Rule on Summary Procedure, by
way of exception, permits only a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter but it does not mention the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person. It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one thing
implies the exclusion of all others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. From this it can
be gleaned that allegations on the matter of lack of jurisdiction over the person by reason
of improper service of summons, by itself, without a convincing showing of any resulting
substantive injustice, cannot be used to hinder or stop the proceedings before the MCTC
in the ejectment suit. With more reason, such ground should not be used to justify the
violation of an express prohibition in the rules prohibiting the petition for certiorari.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 53
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
IPI's arguments attempting to show how the Rule on Summary Procedure or lack of
rules on certain matters would lead to injustice are hypothetical and need not be
addressed in the present case. Of primary importance here is that IPI, the real defendant
in the ejectment case, filed its Answer and participated in the proceedings before the
MCTC.

The purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and


inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical rules.In the present case,
weighing the consequences of continuing with the proceedings in the MCTC as against
the consequences of allowing a petition for certiorari, it is more in accord with justice, the
purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure, the policy of speedy and inexpensive
determination of cases, and the proper administration of justice, to obey the provisions in
the Rule on Summary Procedure prohibiting petitions for certiorari.

The present situation, where IPI had filed the prohibited petition for certiorari; the CA's
taking cognizance thereof; and the subsequent issuance of the writ of injunction enjoining
the ejectment suit from taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner,
and the ensuing delay is the antithesis of and is precisely the very circumstance which the
Rule on Summary Procedure seeks to prevent.

The petition for certiorari questioning the MCTC’s interlocutory order is not needed
here. The rules provide respondent IPI with adequate relief. At the proper time, IPI has the
right to appeal to the RTC, and in the meantime no injustice will be caused to it by waiting
for the MCTC to completely finish resolving the ejectment suit. The proceedings before
the MCTC being summary in nature, the time and expense involved therein are minimal.
IPI has already raised the matter of improper service of summons in its Answer. The
MCTC's error/s, if any, on any of the matters raised by respondent IPI can be threshed out
during appeal after the MCTC has finally resolved the ejectment case under summary
procedure.

As accurately pointed out by petitioner, Go v. Court of Appeals does not support the
case of respondent IPI. The factual milieu and circumstances of the said case do not fit
with the present case. They are in fact the exact opposite of those in the present case
before the court hearing the original ejectment case. Not only was there an absence of
any "indefinite suspension" of the ejectment suit before the MCTC but likewise there was
no "procedural void" that would otherwise cause delay in the summary and expeditious
resolution thereof that transpired to warrant applicability of Go v. Court of Appeals. It is
worth pointing out that in Go v. Court of Appeals12 the Supreme Court categorically
upheld that "the purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious
and inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical rules. Pursuant to this
objective, the Rule prohibits petitions for certiorari, like a number of other pleadings, in
order to prevent unnecessary delays and to expedite the disposition of cases."
Considering that the petition for certiorari filed before the CA is categorically
prohibited, the CA should not have entertained the same but should have dismissed it
outright.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 54
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ANGELES CITY vs. ANGELES ELECTRIC CORPORATION and REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT BRANCH 57, ANGELES CITY
G.R. No. 166134, 29 June 2010

DOCTRINE: Requisites to warrant the issuance of a writ of the preliminary injunction.

As a rule, the issuance of preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion of the
court taking cognizance of the case and will not be interfered with, except where there is
grave abuse of discretion committed by the court.

FACTS:
AEC was granted a legislative franchise under Republic Act 4079 to construct,
maintain and operate an electric light, heat, and power system for the purpose of
generating and distributing electric light, heat and power for sale in Angeles City,
Pampanga.
On September 11, 1974, Presidential Decree 551 reduced the franchise tax of
electric franchise holders. It provided that the franchise tax payable by all grantees of
franchises to generate, distribute and sell electric current for light, heat and power shall be
two percent (2%) of their gross receipts and such franchise tax shall be payable to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative.
On January 1, 1992, the Local Government Code of 1991 was passed into law,
conferring upon provinces and cities the power, among others, to impose tax on
businesses enjoying franchise. In accordance with the LGC, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Angeles City enacted Tax Ordinance No. 33, S-93, otherwise known as
the Revised Revenue Code of Angeles City (RRCAC).
As a result, a petition seeking the reduction of the tax rates and a review of the
provisions of the RRCAC was filed with the Sangguniang Panlungsod by Metro Angeles
Chamber of Commerce and Industry Inc. (MACCI) of which AEC is a member. There
being no action taken by the Sangguniang Panlungsod on the matter, MACCI elevated
the petition to the Department of Finance, which referred the same to the Bureau of Local
Government Finance (BLGF). In the petition, MACCI alleged that the RRCAC is
oppressive, excessive, unjust and confiscatory; that it was published only once,
simultaneously on January 22, 1994; and that no public hearings were conducted prior to
its enactment. Acting on the petition, the BLGF issued a First Indorsement to the City
Treasurer of Angeles City, instructing the latter to make representations with
the Sangguniang Panlungsod for the appropriate amendment of the RRCAC in order to
ensure compliance with the provisions of the LGC, and to make a report on the action
taken within five days.
Thereafter, starting July 1995, AEC has been paying the local franchise tax to the
Office of the City Treasurer on a quarterly basis, in addition to the national franchise tax it
pays every quarter to the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The City Treasurer issued a Notice
of Assessment to AEC for payment of business tax, license fee and other charges for the
period 1993 to 2004 in the total amount of ₱94,861,194.10. AEC protested the
assessment claiming that, among others, pursuant to RA 4079, it is exempt from paying
local business tax and the assessment and collection of taxes under the RRCAC cannot

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
be made retroactive to 1993 or prior to its effectivity. However, it was denied by the City
Treasurer for lack of merit.
Aggrieved, AEC appealed the denial of its protest to the RTC of Angeles City via a
Petition for Declaratory Relief.
However, the City Treasurer levied on the real properties of AEC. This prompted AEC
to file with the RTC, where the petition for declaratory relief was pending, an Urgent
Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction to enjoin Angeles City and its City Treasurer from levying, annotating the levy,
seizing, confiscating, garnishing, selling and disposing at public auction the properties of
AEC.
After due notice and hearing, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order,
followed by an Order granting the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Angeles
City and its City Treasurer moved for its dissolution but the same was denied.
Petitioner’s main argument is that the collection of taxes cannot be enjoined by the
RTC, citing Valley Trading Co., Inc. v. Court of First Instance of Isabela, Branch II,
wherein the lower court’s denial of a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the collection of a local tax was upheld. Petitioner further reasons that
since the levy and auction of the properties of a delinquent taxpayer are proper and lawful
acts specifically allowed by the LGC, these cannot be the subject of an injunctive writ.
Petitioner likewise insists that AEC must first pay the tax before it can protest the
assessment. Finally, petitioner contends that the tax exemption claimed by AEC has no
legal basis because RA 4079 has been expressly repealed by the LGC.
On the other hand, AEC asserts that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction because it was issued after due
notice and hearing, and was necessary to prevent the petition from becoming moot. In
addition, AEC claims that the issuance of the writ of injunction was proper since the tax
assessment issued by the City Treasurer is not yet final, having been seasonably
appealed pursuant to Section 195 of the LGC. AEC likewise points out that following the
case of Pantoja v. David, proceedings to invalidate a warrant of distraint and levy to
restrain the collection of taxes do not violate the prohibition against injunction to restrain
the collection of taxes because the proceedings are directed at the right of the City
Treasurer to collect the tax by distraint or levy. As to its tax liability, AEC maintains that it
is exempt from paying local business tax. In any case, AEC counters that the issue of
whether it is liable to pay the assessed local business tax is a factual issue that should be
determined by the RTC and not by the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining Angeles City and its City Treasurer from levying, selling, and
disposing the properties of AEC.

HELD:
No.The LGC does not specifically prohibit an injunction enjoining the collection of
taxes.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 56
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
A principle deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is that taxes being the lifeblood of
the government should be collected promptly, without unnecessary hindrance or delay. In
line with this principle, the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 expressly provides
that no court shall have the authority to grant an injunction to restrain the collection of any
national internal revenue tax, fee or charge imposed by the code. An exception to this rule
obtains only when in the opinion of the Court of Tax Appeals the collection thereof may
jeopardize the interest of the government and/or the taxpayer.
The situation, however, is different in the case of the collection of local taxes as there
is no express provision in the LGC prohibiting courts from issuing an injunction to restrain
local governments from collecting taxes. Thus, in the case of Valley Trading Co., Inc. v.
Court of First Instance of Isabela, Branch II, cited by the petitioner, we ruled that:

Unlike the National Internal Revenue Code, the Local Tax Code does not contain any
specific provision prohibiting courts from enjoining the collection of local taxes. Such
statutory lapse or intent, however it may be viewed, may have allowed preliminary
injunction where local taxes are involved but cannot negate the procedural rules and
requirements under Rule 58.

In light of the foregoing, petitioner’s reliance on the above-cited case to support its
view that the collection of taxes cannot be enjoined is misplaced. The lower court’s denial
of the motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the collection of
the local tax was upheld in that case, not because courts are prohibited from granting
such injunction, but because the circumstances required for the issuance of writ of
injunction were not present.
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that although there is no express prohibition in
the LGC, injunctions enjoining the collection of local taxes are frowned upon. Courts
therefore should exercise extreme caution in issuing such injunctions.

No grave abuse of discretion was committed by the RTC

Section 3, Rule 58, of the Rules of Court lays down the requirements for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, viz:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained
of, or in the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant;
or
(c) That a party, court, or agency or a person is doing, threatening, or attempting to do,
or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the
rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and
tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

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Two requisites must exist to warrant the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
namely: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2)
an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

In issuing the injunction, the RTC ratiocinated that:

It is very evident on record that petitioner resorted and filed an urgent motion for
issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to stop the
scheduled auction sale only when a warrant of levy was issued and published in the
newspaper setting the auction sale of petitioner’s property by the City Treasurer,
merely few weeks after the petition for declaratory relief has been filed, because if the
respondent will not be restrained, it will render this petition moot and academic. To the
mind of the Court, since there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
available to the petitioner in the ordinary course of law except this application for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to stop the auction
sale and/or to enjoin and/or restrain respondents from levying, annotating the levy,
seizing, confiscating, garnishing, selling and disposing at public auction the properties
of petitioner, or otherwise exercising other administrative remedies against the
petitioner and its properties, this alone justifies the move of the petitioner in seeking
the injunctive reliefs sought for.

Petitioner in its petition is questioning the assessment or the ruling of the City
Treasurer on the business tax and fees, and not the local ordinance concerned. This
being the case, the Court opines that notice is not required to the Solicitor General since
what is involved is just a violation of a private right involving the right of ownership and
possession of petitioner’s properties. Petitioner, therefore, need not comply with Section
4, Rule 63 requiring such notice to the Office of the Solicitor General.
The Court is fully aware of the Supreme Court pronouncement that injunction is not
proper to restrain the collection of taxes. The issue here as of the moment is the
restraining of the respondent from pursuing its auction sale of the petitioner’s properties.
The right of ownership and possession of the petitioner over the properties subject of the
auction sale is at stake.
Respondents assert that not one of the witnesses presented by the petitioner have
proven what kind of right has been violated by the respondent, but merely mentioned of
an injury which is only a scenario based on speculation because of petitioner’s claim that
electric power may be disrupted.
Engr. Abordo’s testimony reveals and even his Affidavit Exhibit "S" showed that if the
auction sale will push thru, petitioner will not only lose control and operation of its facility,
but its employees will also be denied access to equipments vital to petitioner’s operations,
and since only the petitioner has the capability to operate Petersville sub station, there will
be a massive power failure or blackout which will adversely affect business and economy,
if not lives and properties in Angeles City and surrounding communities.
Petitioner, thru its witnesses, in the hearing of the temporary restraining order,
presented sufficient and convincing evidence proving irreparable damages and injury
which were already elaborated in the temporary restraining order although the same may
be realized only if the auction sale will proceed. And unless prevented, restrained, and

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
enjoined, grave and irreparable damage will be suffered not only by the petitioner but all
its electric consumers in Angeles, Clark, Dau and Bacolor, Pampanga.
The purpose of injunction is to prevent injury and damage from being incurred,
otherwise, it will render any judgment in this case ineffectual.
"As an extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain the
status quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until
the merits of the case can be heard" (Cagayan de Oro City Landless Res. Assn. Inc. vs.
CA, 254 SCRA 220)
It appearing that the two essential requisites of an injunction have been satisfied, as
there exists a right on the part of the petitioner to be protected, its right[s] of ownership
and possession of the properties subject of the auction sale, and that the acts (conducting
an auction sale) against which the injunction is to be directed, are violative of the said
rights of the petitioner, the Court has no other recourse but to grant the prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction considering that if the respondent will not be
restrained from doing the acts complained of, it will preempt the Court from properly
adjudicating on the merits the various issues between the parties, and will render moot
and academic the proceedings before this court.
As a rule, the issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion of
the court taking cognizance of the case and will not be interfered with, except where there
is grave abuse of discretion committed by the court. 36For grave abuse of discretion to
prosper as a ground for certiorari, it must be demonstrated that the lower court or tribunal
has exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a
unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. In other
words, mere abuse of discretion is not enough.
Guided by the foregoing, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
in issuing the writ of injunction. Petitioner, who has the burden to prove grave abuse of
discretion, failed to show that the RTC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in granting the
injunction. Neither was petitioner able to prove that the injunction was issued without any
factual or legal justification. In assailing the injunction, petitioner primarily relied on the
prohibition on the issuance of a writ of injunction to restrain the collection of taxes. But as
we have already said, there is no such prohibition in the case of local taxes. Records also
show that before issuing the injunction, the RTC conducted a hearing where both parties
were given the opportunity to present their arguments. During the hearing, AEC was able
to show that it had a clear and unmistakable legal right over the properties to be levied
and that it would sustain serious damage if these properties, which are vital to its
operations, would be sold at public auction. As we see it then, the writ of injunction was
properly issued.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ASIAN CONSTRUCTION and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. CATHAY
PACIFIC STEEL CORPORATION, (CAPASCO)
G.R. No. 167942, 29 June 2010

DOCTRINE: As a rule, only questions of law may be appealed to the court by petition for
review.

FACTS:
On several occasions, petitioner purchased from respondent various reinforcing
steel bars worth ₱2,650,916.40 covered by a total of twelve invoices. Partial payments
were made by the petitioner, however, the remaining balance of ₱214,704.91 was not
paid despite the repeated demands of the respondent. As a result, the latter filed a
complaint for a sum of money and damages with the RTC Antipolo.
In its answer, petitioner denied that it authorized the purchases/purchase orders from
the respondent; it alleged that no demand for payment was made or received by
petitioner, it had no knowledge as to the truth of the invoices, statement of accounts and
letters as they were never received by petitioner, it had not received the reinforcing steel
bars, the amount billed by respondent was bloated and no deduction was made for the
corresponding payments made by petitioner and that it had not agreed to pay interest and
attorney's fees.
After the pre-trial conference was terminated, trial of the case on the merits was set.
The trial court ordered the petitioner to pay respondent its obligation including attorney’s
fees and costs of suit.
Petitioner then appealed the case to the CA which found that based on the invoices
there is a specific amount of interest agreed upon, which is 24% per annum. It also found
that the outstanding balance of petitioner is ₱241,704.91 which must earn interest from
May 12, 1998, which is the date of extra-judicial demand.
Petitioner argues, among others, that the photocopies of the delivery receipts were
not admissible in evidence and that the witness Chua was incompetent to establish the
admissibility of secondary evidence.
On the other hand, respondent submits that it has duly proven its claim by a
preponderance of evidence. The originals of the invoices were presented during the
hearing and the loss of the delivery receipts was properly established by respondent,
hence the admission of the secondary evidence was proper.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in admitting the photocopies of the delivery
receipts and the testimony of Mr. David Chua as admissible in evidence.

HELD:
No. As a rule, only questions of law may be appealed to the Court by petition for
review. The Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction is limited to errors of law. Moreover
factual findings of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the CA, are generally
binding on this Court.

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In the present case, the orders by, deliveries to, and pick-ups by, petitioner of reinforcing
steel bars having a total value of ₱2,650,916.40 were evidenced by the testimony of Chua
and the invoices. Notably the invoices contained a statement to the effect that the
reinforcing steel bars were received in good order and condition.

The total payment in the amount of ₱2,409,211.49 made by petitioner was also supported
by evidence. Some payments made were in fact admitted in the Answer of petitioner.

With regard to the testimony of Chua, the fact that he is the head of Marketing and
Finance proves that he is competent to testify on the sale of the reinforcing steel bars to
petitioner and its unpaid balance. The notations addressed to him on the purchase orders
and his signature on the demand letters further support the finding that he has personal
knowledge of the transactions he testified on. Mere allegations of his incompetence to
testify on such matters, are not proof and these cannot prevail over evidence to the
contrary.

As for the delivery receipts, there is sufficient uncontroverted evidence showing loss of
the originals despite the diligence exerted to find the same. Copies of the same are thus
admissible.

The factual findings of the trial court and the CA were based on a preponderance of
evidence which were not refuted with contrary evidence by petitioner. We thus find no
reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court and the CA.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ASUNCION URIETA VDA. DE AGUILAR, represented by ORLANDO U. AGUILAR vs.
SPOUSES EDERLINA B. ALFARO and RAUL ALFARO
G.R. No. 164402, 5 July 2010

DOCTRINE: As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in petitions for review on
certiorari.

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages before the
RTC San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. She alleged that Ignacio, her husband, was issued
an original certificate of title over a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Buenavista, Sablayan,
Occidental Mindoro. Prior thereto, Ignacio allowed petitioner’s sister, Anastacia Urieta,
mother of respondent Ederlina, to construct a house on the southern portion of said land
and to stay therein temporarily.

When Ignacio died, his heirs decided to partition the subject property. Thus, petitioner
asked the respondents, who took possession of the premises after the death of
Anastacia, to vacate the lot. However, they did not heed her demand.

As a result, petitioner filed a case for accion publiciana praying that respondents be
ordered to vacate subject property, and to pay moral, temperate, and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney’s fees and the costs of suit.

In their Answer, respondents asserted that Ignacio and herein petitioner sold to their
mother Anastacia the southern portion of the lot as shown by the Kasulatan sa
Bilihan which bears the signatures of petitioner and Ignacio. Since then, they and their
mother have been in possession thereof.

The Regional Trial Court ordered the respondents to vacate subject premises and denied
their counterclaim for reconveyance on the grounds of prescription and laches.

On appeal, CA reversed the Decision of RTC. It upheld the validity of the Kasulatan sa
Bilihan since it is a notarized document and disputably presumed to be authentic and duly
executed.

Petitioner contends that the CA grievously erred in upholding the validity and
genuineness of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan. She executed a sworn statement declaring that
she and her husband never sold any portion of the lot and that their signatures appearing
on said deed were forged. She also points to several circumstances which cast doubt on
the authenticity and due execution of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan, but which the CA
inexplicably ignored. Furthermore, petitioner maintains that her title is indefeasible. And
while there are exceptions to the rule on indefeasibility of title, she emphasizes that
respondents never disputed her title.

In their comment, respondents assert that in petitions filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, only questions of law can be raised. Factual issues are prohibited. From the

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
arguments advanced by the petitioner, however, it is clear that she is asking this Court to
examine and weigh again the evidence on record.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the factual issues raised in the petition may be examined by this
Court.

HELD:
Yes. This case falls under the exceptions where the Supreme Court may review
factual issues.

As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in petitions for review on certiorari. It is
settled that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the court is not a trier
of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented
by the contending parties during the trial of the case. This rule, however, is subject to a
number of exceptions, one of which is when the findings of the appellate court are
contrary to those of the trial court, like in the present case.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
AMELIA B. HEBRON vs. FRANCO L. LOYOLA,
G.R. No. 168960, July 5, 2010

DOCTRINE: “Burden of Proof. - Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence
on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of
evidence required by law.”
“The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the
inheritance in equal shares."
“Laches is the failure of or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to
do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to
assert a right within reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
thereto has either abandoned it or declined to assert it. “

FACTS:
This case originated from a suit for partition and damages concerning the two parcels
of land denominated as Lot Nos. 730 and 879 of the Carmona cadastre.
The administration of the said lots was entrusted to Encarnacion Loyola-Bautista. All
the heirs of Januario and Remigia received their shares in the fruits of the subject
properties during Encarnacion's administration thereof. With the latter's death on 1969,
administration of the subject properties was assumed by her daughter, Amelia
Bautista-Hebron, who, after some time, started withholding the shares of Candida and the
heirs of Conrado.
By the time partition of the said properties was formally demanded on November 4,
1990, Candida was the only one still living among the children of Januario and Remigia.
The rest were survived and represented by their respective descendants and children
For petitioner's failure to heed their formal demand, respondents filed with the RTC of
Imus, Cavite. While manifesting her conformity to the partition demanded by her co-heirs,
petitioner claimed in her amended answer that Candida and the heirs of Conrado have
already relinquished their shares in consideration of the financial support extended them
by her mother, Encarnacion.
Trial on the merits then ensued. While conceding their receipt of financial assistance
from Encarnacion, Candida and the heirs of Conrado maintained that adequate
recompense had been effectively made when they worked without pay at the former's rice
mill and household or, in the case of Carmelita Aguinaldo-Manabo, when she
subsequently surrendered her earnings as a public school teacher to her said aunt.
The RTC ruled in favor of partition, ordering the partition of the disputed lands among
the 7 heirs, disregarding the calim of defendant that Candida and the heirs of Conrado
have waived their share. On appeal, the CA upheld the ruling of the RTC, and denied the
motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the trial court was correct in ruling that the defendant failed to prove
base on preponderance of evidence the waiver of Candida and the heirs of Conrado
(2) Whether or not the CA was correct in saying that the spouse cannot relinquish the
hereditary shares of their children

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
(3) Whether or not Candida and the heirs of Conrado are barred by estoppel in asserting
their claims

HELD:
(1) YES. Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 1.Burden of Proof. - Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the
amount of evidence required by law. (Emphasis supplied)
From the above provision, it is clear that the defendant, not only the plaintiff, also has a
burden of proof. The plaintiffs have the duty to establish their claims. And, it is the
defendants who have the duty to establish their defenses.
Petitioner has admitted in her answer that respondents are heirs of Remigia and
Januario; and that the two subject properties were left behind by Remigia and
Januario. "An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof." Hence, we find no error
committed by the CA when it affirmed the ruling of the trial court that the burden was on
petitioner to establish her affirmative defense of waiver or sale of the shares of Candida
and the heirs of Conrado.
(2) YES. Children of the deceased, like Candida and her siblings, are compulsory heirs
who are entitled to a share in the properties of the deceased. Art. 980 of the Civil Code
states: "The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares." The heirs of Conrado are also heirs of Remigia
and Januario, being the children of a child of Remigia and Januario; and as such are
entitled to their shares in the estate of Remigia and Januario.
The minor children of Conrado inherited by representation in the properties of their
grandparents Remigia and Januario. These children, not their mother Victorina, were the
co-owners of the inherited properties. Victorina had no authority or had acted beyond her
powers in conveying, if she did indeed convey, to the petitioner’s mother the undivided
share of her minor children in the property involved in this case. "The powers given to her
by the laws as the natural guardian covers only matters of administration and cannot
include the power of disposition. She should have first secured the permission of the court
before she alienated that portion of the property in question belonging to her minor
children."
(3) No.Laches is the failure of or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier,
or to assert a right within reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
thereto has either abandoned it or declined to assert it.
In the present case, the book of accounts, showing the record of receipts of some heirs of
their shares, has repeated entries in Amelia's handwriting that Candida and the heirs of
Conrado are no longer entitled to shares in the fruits of the properties in litigation because
they have sold or given their share in the said properties to Encarnacion. These entries
only prove that Amelia no longer recognized the entitlement of Candida and the heirs of
Conrado to their respective shares. It is relevant to note however that the entries in the
book of accounts started only on July 17, 1986. Hence, there is definite proof of
non-recognition by petitioner of Candida and the heirs of Conrado's entitlement to shares
in the subject properties starting only on July 17, 1986. Before this time, during the

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
administration of the properties by Encarnacion Loyola-Bautista and some undetermined
number of years after her death, Candida and the heirs of Conrado were proven to have
been receiving their shares in the fruits of the subject properties.
On record is the written demand letter for partition of the litigated properties signed by
Candida and the heirs of Conrado dated November 4, 1990. The complaint for partition
was subsequently filed on February 23, 1993.
From July 17, 1986, to November 4, 1990 only 4 years have elapsed. Even from July 17,
1986 to February 23, 1993 just six years have passed. Considering that the parties are
closely related to each other and considering also that the parties are many different
heirs, some of whom reside outside the Philippines, the passage of six years before the
respondents asked for partition through the court is not unreasonable. We find
respondents not guilty of laches.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SALVADOR V. REBELLION vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 175700, July 5, 2010
DOCTRINE: “It has been consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing
any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the
information against him on this ground before arraignment.”

FACTS:
In the afternoon of July 27, 2000, PO3 George Garcia (PO3 Garcia) and PO3 Romeo
Sotomayor, Jr. (PO3 Sotomayor), together with Michael Fermin and Joseph Apologista,
all members of the Mayor’s Action Command (MAC) of Mandaluyong City, were on
routine patrol along M. Cruz St., Barangay Mauway, when they chanced upon two
individuals chanting and in the act of exchanging something. The police officers
introduced themselves and then inquired from petitioner what he was holding. Petitioner
took out from his possession three strips of aluminum foil which PO3 Garcia confiscated.
PO3 Sotomayor also found on petitioner a plastic sachet which contained white
crystalline substance which looked like tawas. Suspecting that the substance was
"shabu", he confiscated the plastic sachet. Petitioner and his companion, who was later
identified as Clarito Yanson (Clarito), were brought to the MAC station at the Criminal
Investigation Division (CID) for investigation. After laboratory examination, the contents of
the plastic sachet weighing 0.03 gram were found positive for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. The test on the three strips of aluminum foil
also yielded positive for traces of shabu.
On the basis thereof, petitioner was correspondingly charged with illegal possession
of dangerous drugs. Clarito, on the other hand, was further investigated by the City
Prosecutor’s Office.
The RTC and the CA found the accused guilty of the crime charged. On appeal,
accused-petitioner questioned the validity of their warrantless arrest.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not accused-petitioner may question the validity of the warrantless arrest
for the first time on appeal
(2) Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid

HELD:
(1) No. Petitioner’s claim that his warrantless arrest is illegal lacks merit. We note that
nowhere in the records did we find any objection interposed by petitioner to the
irregularity of his arrest prior to his arraignment. It has been consistently ruled that an
accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this
issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before
arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the
court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters
his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. In this case, petitioner was duly
arraigned, entered a negative plea and actively participated during the trial. Thus, he is
deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an
accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity of the
conviction of the accused.
(2) Yes. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private
individual under Sec 5(a) Rule 113
Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful – A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing or is attempting to commit an offense;
xxx
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and he shall
be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7, Rule 112.
Our own review discloses sufficient evidence that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was
effected under Section 5(a), or the arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto. The MAC team
witnessed petitioner handing a piece of plastic sachet to Clarito. Arousing their suspicion
that the sachet contains shabu, team members PO3 Garcia and PO3 Sotomayor alighted
from their motorcycles and approached them. Clarito was not able to completely get hold
of the plastic sachet because of their arrival. At the first opportunity, the team members
introduced themselves. Upon inquiry by PO3 Garcia what petitioner was holding, the
latter presented three strips of aluminum foil which the former confiscated. At a distance,
PO3 Sotomayor saw petitioner in possession of the plastic sachet which contains white
crystalline substance. There and then, petitioner and Clarito were apprehended and
brought to the CID for investigation. After laboratory examination, the white crystalline
substance placed inside the plastic sachet was found positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
Under these circumstances, we entertain no doubt that petitioner was arrested
in flagrante delicto as he was then committing a crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, within the view of the arresting team. Thus, his case comes under the exception to
the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest. Consequently, the results of the
attendant search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove his guilt of the offense
charged.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HERMINIO T. DISINI vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 175730, July 5, 2010
DOCTRINE:“The simultaneous availment of judicial remedies from different fora for
exactly the same ultimate relief and involving the same issue constitutes forum-shopping.
It is a prohibited malpractice, condemned for trifling with the courts and their processes.”
“an objection based on lack of jurisdiction over the person is waived when the defendant
files a motion or pleading which seeks affirmative relief other than the dismissal of the
case.”

FACTS:
On July 23, 1987, the Republic through the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a
civil complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages against
petitioner Herminio T. Disini (Disini), spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos (Marcos
spouses) and Rodolfo B. Jacob (Jacob). The same was docketed as Civil Case No. 0013
and assigned to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan (respondent court). Summons
for Disini was issued on July 29, 1987. Per Sheriff’s Return dated September 4, 1987, the
summons was unserved on the ground that petitioner did not live at the given address,
which was No. 92 Kennedy St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. The occupants of
said address were the Roman family.
Between 1987 up until 2002, multiple attempts to serve summons to Disini were all in
vain, as his whereabouts could not be ascertained. Finally, service of summons by
publication was resorted to and by August 27, 2002, petitioner was declared in default for
failure to file his responsive pleading within 60 days from the publication of the summons.
On February 17, 2003, with the motion to drop Sison as party-defendant still pending, the
Republic asked the Sandiganbayan to hold in abeyance the pre-trial until the said motion
had been resolved.
The records of the Sandiganbayan became silent from the year 2003 to 2006, then
petitioner Disini’s wife and children filed a petition in a Swiss Federal Court to remove a
previously issued freeze order on their Swiss accounts. On August 18, 2006, the Swiss
Federal Court rendered a partial decision ordering the counsel for the Republic of the
Philippines to submit a forfeiture order from a Philippine court with regard to the assets of
Liliana and Herminio Disini not later than December 30, 2006; otherwise, the Swiss
Federal Court would revoke the freeze order on the Disini Swiss accounts.
This deadline spurred the Republic (through the PCGG) to file an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion with the Sandiganbayan on November 30, 2006. The Republic
prayed for the resolution of its Urgent Motion to Resolve (its motion to drop Rafael Sison
as party-defendant). Should the resolution of this pending motion be favorable to the
Republic, it likewise prayed for the setting of the ex parte presentation of evidence at an
early date.
On December 7, 2006, petitioner Disini filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default and for
Leave to File and Admit Attached Answer, together with an Answer to Amended
Complaint with Compulsory Counterclaims. He maintained that he was unaware of the
civil case pending against him because he never received summons or other processes
from the court, nor any pleadings from the parties of the case. His only fault, he averred,
was that he was ignorant of the proceedings in the case because of the absence of a
proper notice. Petitioner asked the respondent court to look at his meritorious defenses.

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He then invoked the liberality of the courts in lifting default orders to give both parties
every opportunity to defend their cases, and pointed out that the proceedings, being in
their pre-trial stage, would not be delayed by petitioner’s participation therein.
On December 18, 2006, the Sandiganbayan resolved to deny petitioner’s Motion to Lift
Default Order.
Given the validity of the service of summons, the respondent court held that
petitioner’s failure to file a responsive pleading within the allotted period resulted in his
default. The respondent court refused to lift the order of default on the ground that there
was no fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that would justify such an
action.
Petitioner then filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and an
Extremely Urgent Manifestation and Motion on December 19, 2006. Aside from asking for
reconsideration, petitioner also prayed that the republic’s ex parte presentation of
evidence be held in abeyance until the resolution of his motion for reconsideration.
On August 7, 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution denying petitioner’s
Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan court gravely abused its discretion in declaring the
defendant in default and not lifting its default order against petitioner Disini
(2) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan court gravely abused its discretion when it allowed
the Republic to present its evidence ex-parte while petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration [of the stay of the default order] had not yet been resolved.

HELD:
(1) No. In his Petition, petitioner originally sought the nullification of the proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan on the theory of lack of jurisdiction over his person, premised
on the alleged impropriety in the service of summons.
However, petitioner subsequently filed several motions with the Sandiganbayan which
sought various affirmative reliefs from that court, sans any qualification of the nature of its
appearance and without reserving or reiterating its previous objection on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the person.
In regard to the Motion for Leave to Take Deposition (which is the last pleading on
record), it is important to note that there are two instances when the defendant can take
depositions under Section 1 of Rule 23: (1) after the court has acquired jurisdiction over
the defendant or the property subject of the action; and (2) after an answer has been
served. Both instances presuppose that the court has already acquired jurisdiction over
the defendant. By seeking the relief contained in this provision, petitioner is deemed to
have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Thus,
petitioner may be held to have waived his objections regarding the lack of jurisdiction over
his person by seeking affirmative relief through the said provision.
While petitioner bewailed the mode of service of summons on him and questioned
the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over his person, he has rendered his own arguments
moot by his voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Jurisprudence holds that an objection based on lack of jurisdiction over the person is

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waived when the defendant files a motion or pleading which seeks affirmative relief other
than the dismissal of the case.
(2) Yes. There is forum shopping when one party repetitively avails of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on
the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely, by some
other court.
In filing a Second Motion to Lift the Order of Default with the Sandiganbayan while the
instant Petition is pending with this Court, petitioner has unfairly doubled his chances of
securing the lifting of the default order. "This misdeed amounts to a wagering on the result
of [petitioner’s] twin devious strategies, and shows not only [his] lack of faith in this Court
in its evenhanded administration of law but also [his] expression of disrespect if not
ridicule for our judicial process and orderly procedure."
Because of the forum-shopping committed by petitioner, the Court cannot grant the relief
he prayed for.

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MUNICIPALITY OF TIWI vs. ANTONIO B. BETITO
G.R. No. 171873, July 9, 2010

DOCTRINE: “A judgment on the pleadings is proper when the answer admits all the
material averments of the complaint. But where several issues are properly tendered by
the answer, a trial on the merits must be resorted to in order to afford each party his day in
court.”

FACTS:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi passed Resolution No. 15-92 authorizing Mayor
Corral to hire a lawyer to represent Tiwi and its barangays in the recovery of their rightful
share in disputed realty taxes. Thereafter, Mayor Corral sought the services of
respondent Atty. Antonio B. Betito (respondent) and Atty. Alberto Lawenko (Atty.
Lawenko).
As a result, on January 25, 1993, Mayor Corral, representing Tiwi, and respondent
together with Atty. Lawenko entered into a Contract of Legal Services (subject contract).
The subject contract provided, among others, that respondent and Atty. Lawenko would
receive a 10% contingent fee on whatever amount of realty taxes that would be recovered
by Tiwi through their efforts.
The present controversy arose when respondent sought to enforce the Contract of
Legal Services after rendering legal services which allegedly benefited Tiwi. In his
Complaint for sum of money against Tiwi, respondent claims that he handled numerous
cases which resulted to the recovery of Tiwi’s share in the realty taxes. As a result of
these efforts, Tiwi was able to collect the amount of ₱110,985,181.83 and another
₱35,594,480.00 from the NPC as well as other amounts which will be proven during the
trial. Under the Contract of Legal Services, respondent is entitled to 10% of whatever
amount that would be collected from the NPC.
However, despite repeated demands for the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi to pass an
appropriate ordinance for the payment of his attorney’s fees, the former refused to pass
the ordinance and to pay what is justly owed him. Respondent prayed that Tiwi be
ordered to pay ₱11,000,000.00 in attorney’s fees and 10% of the other amounts to be
determined during trial plus interest and damages; that the Sangguniang Bayan be
ordered to pass the necessary appropriation ordinance; that the municipal treasurer
surrender all the receipts of payments made by the NPC to Tiwi from January 1993 to
December 1996 for the examination of the court; and that Tiwi pay ₱500,000.00 as
attorney’s fees.
In their Answer, petitioners admitted that the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi passed
Resolution No. 15-92 but denied that said resolution authorized then Mayor Corral to
enter into the subject contract. In particular, Mayor Corral exceeded her authority when
she bound Tiwi to a gargantuan amount equivalent to 10% of the amount of realty taxes
recovered from NPC. Further, the legal services under the subject contract should have
been limited to the execution of the decision in National Power Corporation v. Province of
Albay as per Resolution No. 15-92. For these reasons, the subject contract is void,
unenforceable, unconscionable and unreasonable. Petitioners further claim that they are
not aware of the cases which respondent allegedly handled on behalf of Tiwi since these
cases involved officials of the previous administration; that some of these cases were

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
actually handled by the Office of the Solicitor General; and that these were personal
cases of said officials. In addition, the Contract of Legal Services was not ratified by
the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi in order to become effective. Petitioners also raise the
defense that the realty taxes were recovered by virtue of the opinion rendered by then
Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio T. Carpio and not through the efforts of
respondent.
As to the amount of ₱110,985,181.83 in realty taxes, the same was received by Albay
and not Tiwi while the amount of ₱35,594,480.00 is part of the share of Tiwi in the
utilization of the national wealth. Furthermore, in a Commission on Audit (COA)
Memorandum dated January 15, 1996, the COA ruled that the authority to pass upon the
reasonableness of the attorney’s fees claimed by respondent lies with the Sangguniang
Bayan of Tiwi. Pursuant to this memorandum, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi passed
Resolution No. 27-98 which declared the subject contract invalid. Petitioners also allege
that the contract is grossly disadvantageous to Tiwi and that respondent is guilty of laches
because he lodged the present complaint long after the death of Mayor Corral; and that
the amount collected from NPC has already been spent by Tiwi.
On November 7, 2000, respondent filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings
and/or partial summary judgment.
On March 3, 2001, the trial court rendered a partial judgment on the pleadings in favor
of respondent ordering the defendant Municipality of Tiwi to pay the plaintiff the sum of
₱14,657,966.18 plus interest at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint until payment
is fully delivered to the plaintiff; and, for this purpose, the defendant Sangguniang
Bayan of Tiwi, represented by the co-defendants officials, shall adopt and approve the
necessary appropriation ordinance. Trial to receive evidence on the remaining amounts
due and payable to the plaintiff pursuant to the contract of legal services shall hereafter
continue, with notice to all the parties.
The trial court held that petitioners’ answer to the complaint failed to tender an issue,
thus, partial judgment on the pleadings is proper. It noted that petitioners did not
specifically deny under oath the actionable documents in this case, particularly, the
Contract of Legal Services and Resolution No. 15-92. Consequently, the genuineness
and due execution of these documents are deemed admitted pursuant to Section 8, Rule
8 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the authority of Mayor Corral to enter into the subject
contract was deemed established.
It added that the authority given to Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer was not only for the
purpose of executing the decision in National Power Corporation v. Province of Albay but
extended to representing the interest of Tiwi in other cases as well. Further, the said
resolution did not impose as a condition precedent the ratification of the subject contract
by the Sangguniang Bayan in order to render it effective. Lastly, the trial court ruled that
the answer admitted, through a negative pregnant, that Tiwi was paid the amounts of
₱110,985,181.83 and ₱35,594,480.00, hence, respondent is entitled to 10% thereof as
attorney’s fees under the terms of the subject contract.
The CA affirmed the Decision of the trial court:

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the application of the rule of judgment on the pleadings and/or
summary judgment is proper

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(2) Whether or not the purported "contract of legal services" exceeded the authority of the
late Mayor Corral and should have been ratified by the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi in
order to be enforceable.
(3) Whether or not the authority given includes the authority to represent the Bayan of Tiwi
in all matters

HELD:
(1) No. Judgment on the pleadings is improper when the answer to the complaint tenders
several issues.
A motion for judgment on the pleadings admits the truth of all the material and relevant
allegations of the opposing party and the judgment must rest on those allegations taken
together with such other allegations as are admitted in the pleadings. It is proper when an
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the
adverse party’s pleading. However, when it appears that not all the material allegations of
the complaint were admitted in the answer for some of them were either denied or
disputed, and the defendant has set up certain special defenses which, if proven, would
have the effect of nullifying plaintiff’s main cause of action, judgment on the pleadings
cannot be rendered.
In the instant case, a review of the records reveals that respondent (as plaintiff) and
petitioners (as defendants) set-up multiple levels of claims and defenses, respectively,
with some failing to tender an issue while others requiring the presentation of evidence for
resolution. The generalized conclusion of both the trial and appellate courts that
petitioners’ answer admits all the material averments of the complaint is, thus, without
basis.
(2) Yes. Mayor Corral was authorized to enter into the Contract of Legal Services
Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC provides:
SECTION 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and
Compensation. — x x x
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the
general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this
Code, the municipal mayor shall: x x x
(1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services,
and activities of the municipal government, and in this connection, shall: x x x
(vi) Upon authorization by the sangguniang bayan, represent the municipality in all
its business transactions and sign on its behalf all bonds, contracts, and
obligations, and such other documents made pursuant to law or ordinance; x x x
Pursuant to this provision, the municipal mayor is required to secure the prior
authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan before entering into a contract on behalf of the
municipality. In the instant case, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi unanimously passed
Resolution No. 15-92 authorizing Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer of her choice to represent
the interest of Tiwi in the execution of this Court’s Decision in National Power Corporation
v. Province of Albay
The authority necessarily carried with it the power to negotiate, execute and sign on
behalf of Tiwi the Contract of Legal Services. That the authorization did not set the terms
and conditions of the compensation signifies that the council empowered Mayor Corral to
reach a mutually agreeable arrangement with the lawyer of her choice subject, of course,

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to the general limitation that the contract’s stipulations should not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy, and, considering that this is a
contract of legal services, to the added restriction that the agreed attorney’s fees must not
be unreasonable and unconscionable. On its face, and there is no allegation to the
contrary, this prior authorization appears to have been given by the council in good faith
to the end of expeditiously safeguarding the rights of Tiwi. Under the particular
circumstances of this case, there is, thus, nothing objectionable to this manner of prior
authorization.
The Court is thus satisfied that it was in fact the Council's intention, which it expressed in
clear language, to confer on the Mayor ample discretion to execute a "negotiated
contract" with any interested party, without regard to any official acts of the Council prior
to Resolution No. 21.
Prescinding therefrom, petitioners’ next contention that the subject contract should first
be ratified in order to become enforceable as against Tiwi must necessarily fail. As
correctly held by the CA, the law speaks of prior authorization and not ratification with
respect to the power of the local chief executive to enter into a contract on behalf of the
local government unit. This authority, as discussed above, was granted by
the Sangguniang Bayanto Mayor Corral as per Resolution No. 15-92.
(3) No. The scope of the legal services contemplated in Resolution No. 15-92 was limited
to the execution of the decision in National Power Corporation v. Province of Albay.
The wording of Resolution No. 15-92 is clear. Its title and whereas clauses, previously
quoted above, indicate that the hiring of a lawyer was for the sole purpose of executing
the judgment in National Power Corporation v. Province of Albay, that is, to allow Tiwi to
recover its rightful share in the unpaid realty taxes of NPC.
We cannot accept respondent’s strained reading of Resolution No. 15-92 in that the
phrase "to represent the interest of the Municipality of Tiwi and its Barangays" is taken to
mean such other matters not related to the execution of the decision in National Power
Corporation v. Province of Albay. It could not have been the intention of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Tiwi to authorize the hiring of a lawyer to perform general legal services
because this duty devolves upon the municipal legal officer. The council sought the
services of a lawyer because the dispute was between the municipality (Tiwi) and
province (Albay) so much so that it f ell under the exception provided in Section
481(b)(3)(i) of the LGC which permits a local government unit to employ the services of a
special legal officer. Thus, the provisions of paragraph 4 of the Contract of Legal Services
to the contrary notwithstanding, the basis of respondent’s compensation should be limited
to the services he rendered which reasonably contributed to the recovery of Tiwi’s share
in the subject realty taxes.

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LAZARO PASCO and LAURO PASCO vs. HEIRS OF FILOMENA DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. 165554, July 26, 2010

DOCTRINE:“Having refused to abide by a compromise agreement, the aggrieved party


may either enforce it or regard it as rescinded and insist upon the original demand”

FACTS:
The present petition began with a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages filed on
December 13, 2000 by respondents, the heirs of Filomena de Guzman (Filomena),
represented by Cresencia de Guzman-Principe (Cresencia), against petitioners Lauro
Pasco (Lauro) and Lazaro Pasco (Lazaro). The case was filed before the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Bocaue, Bulacan.
During the pre-trial of the case on February 15, 2002, the parties verbally agreed to settle
the case. On February 21, 2002, the parties jointly filed a Compromise Agreement that
was signed by the parties and their respective counsel. Said Compromise Agreement,
was approved by the MTC in an Order dated April 4, 2002.
On May 2, 2002, petitioners filed a verified Motion to Set Aside Decision alleging that the
Agreement was written in a language not understood by them, and the terms and
conditions thereof were not fully explained to them. Petitioners further questioned the
MTC’s jurisdiction. In an Order dated June 28, 2002, the MTC denied the motion; it also
granted Cresencia’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of execution. The writ of execution
was subsequently issued on July 3, 2002. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration and to
Quash Writ/Order of Execution dated August 1, 2002 was denied by the MTC.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The RTC dismissed the petition and held that (1) the MTC had jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (2) Cresencia was authorized to institute the action and enter into a
Compromise Agreement on behalf of her co-heirs; and (3) the MTC’s approval of the
Compromise Agreement was not done in a capricious, whimsical, or arbitrary manner;
thus, petitioners’ resort to certiorari under Rule 65 was improper. Petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration was denied, hence they sought recourse before the CA.
The CA dismissed petitioners’ appeal.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the MTC has jurisdiction over the case
(2) Whether or not the petitioner’s Certiorari petition under Rule 65 was proper
(3) Whether or not the SPA validly authorized Cresencia to enter into a compromise
agreement

HELD:
(1) Yes. The MTC had jurisdiction over the case.
It is beyond dispute that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or Batas Pambansa
(BP) Blg. 129 as amended by Republic Act No. 7691 fixes the MTC’s jurisdiction over
cases where "the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
costs." Thus, respondents’ initiatory complaint, covering the principal amount of
₱140,000.00, falls squarely within the MTC’s jurisdiction.
(2) Yes. Petitioners properly resorted to the special civil action of certiorari.
On the first question, the CA held that the proper remedy from the MTC’s Order approving
the Compromise Agreement was a Petition for Relief from Judgment under Rule 38 and
not a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. We recall that petitioners filed a verified Motion
to Set Aside Decision on May 2, 2002, which was denied by the MTC on June 28, 2002.
This Order of denial was properly the subject of a petition for certiorari, pursuant to Rule
41, Section 1, of the Rules of Court:
Section 1. Subject of Appeal – An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final
order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxx
(e) an order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or
compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground
vitiating consent.
xxxx

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
From the express language of Rule 41, therefore, the MTC’s denial of petitioners’ Motion
to Set Aside Decision could not have been appealed. Indeed, a decision based on a
compromise agreement is immediately final and executory and cannot be the subject of
appeal, for when parties enter into a compromise agreement and request a court to
render a decision on the basis of their agreement, it is presumed that such action
constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal said decision. While there may have been other
remedies available to assail the decision, petitioners were well within their rights to
institute a special civil action under Rule 65.
(3) Yes. Cresencia was authorized to enter into the Compromise Agreement.
As regards the third issue, petitioners maintain that the SPA was fatally defective
because Cresencia was not specifically authorized to enter into a compromise
agreement. Here, we fully concur with the findings of the CA that:
x x x It is undisputed that Cresencia’s co-heirs executed a Special Power of Attorney,
dated 6 April 1999, designating the former as their attorney-in-fact and empowering her to
file cases for collection of all the accounts due to Filomena or her estate. Consequently,
Cresencia entered into the subject Compromise Agreement in order to collect the
overdue loan obtained by Pasco from Filomena. In so doing, Cresencia was merely
performing her duty as attorney-in-fact of her co-heirs pursuant to the Special Power of
Attorney given to her.
Moreover, we note that petitioners never assailed the validity of the SPA
during the pre-trial stage prior to entering the Compromise Agreement. This matter was
never even raised as a ground in petitioners’ Motion to Set Aside the compromise, or in
the initial Petition before the RTC. It was only months later, in December 2002, that
petitioners – rather self-servingly - claimed that the SPA was insufficient.

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UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS vs. DANES B. SANCHEZ
G.R. No. 165569, July 29, 2010

DOCTRINE: “exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is


competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of.”
“essential test required to sustain dismissal on this ground, we have explained that "[t]he
test of the sufficiency of the facts found in a petition, to constitute a cause of action, is
whether admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the
same in accordance with the prayer of the petition."

FACTS:
This case began with a Complaint for Damages filed by respondent Danes B. Sanchez
(respondent) against the University of Santo Tomas (UST) and its Board of Directors, the
Dean and the Assistant Dean of the UST College of Nursing, and the University Registrar
for their alleged unjustified refusal to release the respondent’s Transcript of Records
(ToR). The case was raffled to Branch 5 of the RTC of Dinalupihan, Bataan, and docketed
as Civil Case No. DH-788-02.
In his Complaint, respondent alleged that he graduated from UST on April 2, 2002 with a
Bachelor’s Degree of Science in Nursing. He was included in the list of candidates for
graduation and attended graduation ceremonies. On April 18, 2002, respondent sought to
secure a copy of his ToR with the UST Registrar’s Office, paid the required fees, but was
only given a Certificate of Graduation by the Registrar. Despite repeated attempts by the
respondent to secure a copy of his ToR, and submission of his class cards as proof of his
enrolment, UST refused to release his records, making it impossible for him to take the
nursing board examinations, and depriving him of the opportunity to make a living.
The respondent prayed that the RTC order UST to release his ToR and hold UST liable
for actual, moral, and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and the costs of suit.
Instead of filing an Answer, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss where they claimed that
they refused to release respondent’s ToR because he was not a registered student, since
he had not been enrolled in the university for the last three semesters. They claimed that
the respondent’s graduation, attendance in classes, and taking/passing of examinations
were immaterial because he ceased to be a student when he failed to enroll during the
second semester of school year 2000-2001. They also sought the dismissal of the case
on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, as paragraph 10 of the
complaint admitted that:
10. On several occasions, [respondent] went to see the [petitioners] to get his ToR,
but all of these were futile for he was not even entertained at the Office of the
Dean. Worst, he was treated like a criminal forcing him to admit the fact that he did
not enroll for the last three (3) semesters of his schooling. [Petitioner] Dean tried to
persuade the [respondent] to give the original copies of the Class Cards which he
has in his possession. These are the only [bits of] evidence on hand to prove that
he was in fact officially enrolled. [Respondent] did not give the said class cards and
instead gave photo copies to the [Petitioner] Dean. The Office of the Dean of
Nursing of [petitioner] UST became very strict in receiving documents from the
[respondent]. [They have] to be scrutinized first before the same are received.
Receiving, as [respondent] believes, is merely a ministerial function [of] the

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[petitioners] and the documents presented for receiving need not be scrutinized
especially so when x x x they are not illegal. Copies of the class cards are hereto
attached as "F" hereof.
After the parties filed their responsive pleadings, petitioners filed a Supplement to their
Motion to Dismiss, alleging that respondent sought administrative recourse before the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED) through a letter-complaint dated January 21,
2003. Thus, petitioners claimed that the CHED had primary jurisdiction to resolve matters
pertaining to school controversies, and the filing of the instant case was premature.
The RTC denied the Motion to Dismis on the ground that the issues involved required an
examination of the evidence, which should be threshed out during trial. Petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration was denied in an Order dated August 1, 2003, so petitioners
sought recourse before the CA.
The CA affirmed the denial of petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss, and directed the RTC to
proceed with trial.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies should be
applied
(2) Whether or not respondent violated the rule against forum-shopping
(3) Whether or not the complaint failed to state a cause of action

HELD:
(1) No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in this case.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where a remedy
before an administrative agency is provided, the administrative agency concerned must
be given the opportunity to decide a matter within its jurisdiction before an action is
brought before the courts. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a ground for
dismissal of the action.
In this case, the doctrine does not apply because petitioners failed to demonstrate that
recourse to the CHED is mandatory – or even possible – in an action such as that brought
by the respondent, which is essentially one for mandamus and damages. The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of numerous exceptions, one of which is
where the issues are purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court, as in the
present case. Petitioners’ liability – if any – for damages will have to be decided by the
courts, since any judgment inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the
Civil Code. As such, exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with. As we
held in Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology:
x x x exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is
competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter
complained of. Administrative agencies are not courts; x x x neither [are they] part
of the judicial system, [or] deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does
not have the power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have
commenced her case before the Commission.
In addition, the rule on primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency
exercises quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions. Thus, an essential requisite for this
doctrine to apply is the actual existence of quasi-judicial power. However, petitioners

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
have not shown that the CHED possesses any such power to "investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions."
Indeed, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 772221 otherwise known as the Higher Education
Act of 1994, certainly does not contain any express grant to the CHED of judicial or
quasi-judicial power.
(2) No. Respondent is not guilty of forum shopping
Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party
seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, or when he
institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the
gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
Here, there can be no forum shopping precisely because the CHED is without
quasi-judicial power, and cannot make any disposition of the case – whether favorable or
otherwise.
(3) No. The Complaint states a cause of action
Under Rule 16, Section 1(g) of the Rules of Court, a motion to dismiss may be made on
the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action. To clarify the
essential test required to sustain dismissal on this ground, we have explained that "[t]he
test of the sufficiency of the facts found in a petition, to constitute a cause of action, is
whether admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the
same in accordance with the prayer of the petition." Stated otherwise, a complaint is said
to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be
correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for.
The Complaint makes the following essential allegations:
 that petitioners unjustifiably refused to release respondent’s ToR despite his
having obtained a degree from UST;
 that petitioners’ claim that respondent was not officially enrolled is untrue;
 that as a result of petitioners’ unlawful actions, respondent has not been able to
take the nursing board exams since 2002;
 that petitioners’ actions violated Articles 19-21 of the Civil Code;
 that petitioners should be ordered to release respondent’s ToR and held liable for
₱400,000.00 as moral damages, ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages, ₱50,000.00
as attorney’s fees and costs of suit, and ₱15,000.00 as actual damages.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SONIC STEEL INDUSTRIES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. No. 165976 , July 29, 2010

DOCTRINE:Certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only if there is no appeal or any plain,


speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

FACTS:
Petitioner Sonic Steel Industries Inc. (Sonic) is engaged in the manufacture and sale of
galvanized steel sheets or G.I. sheets. In March 2003 petitioner loaded 371 crates of
G.I. sheets valued at ₱19,979,460.00 on board respondent Premier Shipping Lines, Inc.’s
(Premier’s) vessel, the M/V Premship XIV, for shipment to its clients in Davao City. Prior
to departure of the vessel, respondent Premier procured an insurance policy from
respondent Oriental Assurance Corporation (Oriental) to cover the goods of petitioner
shipped on board the vessel. While on transit, the Master of the vessel ordered an
inspection on the ship. In the course of the inspection, it was discovered that the cargo
was flooded with seawater.
Despite petitioner Sonic’s demand for indemnification for the total loss of its insured
cargo, respondents Seaboard and Oriental refused to settle its claim. Hence, Sonic filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
Petitioner’s original complaint against respondents was filed within 60 days of the loss of
its goods, in compliance with a stipulation in the bill of lading issued by respondent
Premier that "(s)uits based on claims arising from shortage, damage, or non delivery of
shipment shall be instituted within [60] days of the date of accrual of the right of action."
As respondents did not pay petitioner’s claim even long after 90 days from the date of
accrual of the right of action, petitioner moved before the RTC to have its Amended
Complaint admitted, to incorporate Sections 243 and 244 of the Insurance Code, which
provide for the proper interest to be awarded in cases where there is unreasonable
refusal to pay valid claims.
After respondent Seaboard’s Comment and/or Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for
Leave of Court to File Amended Complaint and Motion to Admit Amended Complaint, and
petitioner’s Reply thereto were filed, the RTC denied the admission of petitioner’s
Amended Complaint. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but the same was denied.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which denied the petition as well
as the subsequent motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the CA was correct in denying petitioner’s petitions.

HELD:
YES.Certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only if there is no appeal or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For a writ of certiorari to issue, a
petitioner must not only prove that the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction but must also show
that he has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. On
September 29, 2004, petitioner received the assailed September 17, 2004 Resolution
denying reconsideration of the dismissal of its petition with the CA. It could have filed an

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, but it did not. Instead it allowed
almost two months to pass and then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Certiorari
is not a substitute for a lost appeal. The Rules preclude recourse to the special civil action
of certiorari if appeal, by way of a petition for review, is available as the remedies of
appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
At any rate, we find no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the CA. Petitioner admittedly committed lapses. The CA’s ruling
on such lapses was within the contemplation of the law. "For certiorari to prosper, the
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility". In the present case, petitioner failed to
sufficiently show that the CA ruled in a capricious and whimsical manner amounting to an
arbitrary exercise of power.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
NOLI ALFONSO and ERLINDA FUNDIALAN vs. SPOUSES HENRY and LIWANAG
ANDRES
G.R. No. 166236, July 29, 2010

DOCTRINE:Technical rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to
benefit the deserving.

FACTS:
The present case stemmed from a complaint for accion publiciana with damages filed
by respondent spouses Henry and Liwanag Andres against Noli Alfonso and spouses
Reynaldo and Erlinda Fundialan before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 77, San
Mateo, Rizal.
On July 8, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. Petitioners,
thus, appealed to the CA.
On November 5, 2003, petitioners' previous counsel was notified by the CA to file
appellants' brief within 45 days from receipt of the notice. The original 45-day period
expired on December 21, 2003. But before then, on December 8, 2003, petitioners'
former counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw Appearance. Petitioners consented to the
withdrawal.
On December 19, 2003, petitioners themselves moved for an extension of 30 days or
until January 21, 2004 within which to file their appellants' brief. Then on March 3, 2004,
petitioners themselves again moved for a fresh period of 45 days from March 3, 2004 or
until April 18, 2004 within which to file their appellants' brief.
On March 17, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution:5 a) noting the withdrawal of
appearance of petitioners' former counsel; b) requiring petitioners to cause the Entry of
Appearance of their new counsel; and c) granting petitioners' motions for extension of
time to file their brief for a period totaling 75 days, commencing from December 21, 2003
or until March 5, 2004.
Petitioners themselves received a copy of this Resolution only on April 6, 2004. By
that time, the extension to file appellants' brief had already long expired.
On April 14, 2004, the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), having been approached by
petitioners, entered its appearance as new counsel for petitioners. However, on August
10, 2004, the CA issued the assailed Resolution dismissing petitioners' appeal.
On September 6, 2004, the PAO filed their Motion for Reconsideration which
requested for a fresh period of 45 days from September 7, 2004 or until October 22, 2004
within which to file appellants' brief. On October 21, 2004, the brief8 was filed by the PAO.
On November 26, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution9which denied petitioners' motion
for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the declaration of default and the subsequent denial of petitioner’s
motions for reconsideration where proper.

HELD:
YES. The declaration of default and denials of the motions for reconsiderations are
proper.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.-An appeal may be dismissed by the
Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following
grounds:
xxxx
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his
brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;
Petitioners plead for the suspension of the rules and cite a number of cases where the
Court excused the late filing of a notice of appeal as well as the late filing of the appellant's
brief. They further cite Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals where the
late filing of the appellant's brief was excused because the Court found the case
impressed with public interest.
The cases cited by petitioners are not in point. In the present civil case which involves the
failure to file the appellants' brief on time, there is no showing of any public interest
involved. Neither is there a showing that an injustice will result due to the application of
technical rules.
Poverty cannot be used as an excuse to justify petitioners' complacency in allowing
months to pass by before exerting the required effort to find a replacement lawyer.
Poverty is not a justification for delaying a case. Both parties have a right to a speedy
resolution of their case. Not only petitioners, but also the respondents, have a right to
have the case finally settled without delay.

Furthermore, the failure to file a brief on time was due primarily to petitioners' unwise
choices and not really due to poverty. Petitioners were able to get a lawyer to represent
them despite their poverty. They were able to get two other lawyers after they consented
to the withdrawal of their first lawyer. But they hired their subsequent lawyers too late.
It must be pointed out that petitioners had a choice of whether to continue the services of
their original lawyer or consent to let him go. They could also have requested the said
lawyer to file the required appellants' brief before consenting to his withdrawal from the
case. But they did neither of these. Then, not having done so, they delayed in engaging
their replacement lawyer. Their poor choices and lack of sufficient diligence, not poverty,
are the main culprits for the situation they now find themselves in. It would not be fair to
pass on the bad consequences of their choices to respondents. Petitioners' low regard for
the rules or nonchalance toward procedural requirements, which they camouflage with
the cloak of poverty, has in fact contributed much to the delay, and hence frustration of
justice, in the present case.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HEIRS OF FRANCISCA MEDRANO vs ESTANISLAO DE VERA
G.R. No. 165770 , August 9, 2010

DOCTRINE:In cases where the subject property is transferred by the defendant during
the pendency of the litigation, the interest of the transferee pendente lite cannot be
considered independent of the interest of his transferors. If the transferee files an answer
while the transferor is declared in default, the case should be tried on the basis of the
transferee’s answer and with the participation of the transferee.

FACTS:
This case concerns a 463-square meter parcel of land5 covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 41860 in the name of Flaviana De Gracia (Flaviana). In 1980, Flaviana
died intestate, leaving her half-sisters Hilaria Martin-Paguyo (Hilaria) and Elena
Martin-Alvarado (Elena) as her compulsory heirs.
In September 1982, Hilaria and Elena, by virtue of a private document denominated
"Tapno Maamoan ti Sangalobongan," waived all their hereditary rights to Flaviana’s land
in favor of Francisca Medrano (Medrano). It stated that the waiver was done in favor of
Medrano in consideration of the expenses that she incurred for Flaviana’s medication,
hospitalization, wake and burial. In the same year, Medrano built her concrete bungalow
on the land in question without any objection from Hilaria and Elena or from their children.
When Hilaria and Elena died, some of their children affirmed the contents of the private
document executed by their deceased mothers. To that end, they executed separate
Deeds of Confirmation of Private Document and Renunciation of Rights in favor of
Medrano. They likewise affirmed in said documents that Medrano had been occupying
and possessing the subject property as owner since September 1982.
Due to the refusal of the other children to sign a similar renunciation, Medrano filed a
Complaint on April 27, 2001 for quieting of title, reconveyance, reformation of instrument,
and/or partition with damages against Pelagia M. Paguyo-Diaz (Pelagia), Faustina
Paguyo-Asumio (Faustina), Jesus Paguyo (Jesus), Veneranda Paguyo-Abrenica, Emilio
a.k.a. Antonio Alvarado, Francisca Alvarado-Diaz (Francisca) and Estrellita
Alvarado-Cordero (Estrellita). Medrano then caused the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens on TCT No. 4186011 on May 3, 2001.
On April 2, 2002, respondent Estanislao D. De Vera (De Vera) filed an Answer with
Counterclaim. De Vera presented himself as the real party-in-interest on the ground that
some of the named defendants (Faustina, Pelagia, Francisca, Elena Kongco-Alvarado,
Jesus, and Estrellita) had executed a Deed of Renunciation of Rights in his favor on
March 23, 2002. He maintained that the "Tapno Maamoan ti Sangalobongan" that was
executed by the defendants’ predecessors in favor of Medrano was null and void for want
of consideration. Thus, while some children affirmed the renunciation of their deceased
mothers’ rights in the lot in favor of Medrano, the other children renounced their hereditary
rights in favor of De Vera.
Medrano filed a Motion to Expunge Answer with Counterclaim of Estanislao D. De Vera
and to Declare Defendants in Default. She argued that respondent De Vera had no
personality to answer the complaint since he was not authorized by the named
defendants to answer in their behalf.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
In an Order,19 dated July 30, 2002, the trial court disagreed with Medrano’s argument
and admitted De Vera’s Answer with Counterclaim. The trial court opined that De Vera did
not need a special power of attorney from the defendants because he did not answer the
complaint in their behalf. De Vera made a voluntary appearance in the case as the
transferee of the defendants’ rights to the subject property. The trial court further
explained that when the presence of other parties is required for granting complete relief,
the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants. While it was unsure whether De
Vera was an indispensable party to the case, the trial court opined that at the very least he
was a necessary party for granting complete relief. It thus held that the admission of De
Vera’s Answer with Counterclaim is proper in order to avoid multiplicity of suits. In the
same Order, the court declared the named defendants in default for not answering the
complaint despite valid service of summons. Thus, it appears that the court a quo treated
the named defendants and De Vera as distinct and separate parties.
Medrano’s response to the aforesaid order was two-fold. With regard to the order
declaring the named defendants in default, Medrano filed on February 13, 2003 a Motion
to Set Reception of Evidence Before the Branch Clerk of Court. She argued that she
could present evidence ex parte against the defaulting defendants on the ground that she
presented alternative causes of action against them in her complaint. Her cause of action
on the basis of acquisitive prescription can be raised solely against the defaulting original
defendants. She thus prayed to be allowed to present evidence ex parte with respect to
her claim of acquisitive prescription against the defaulting defendants. As for the order
admitting De Vera’s Answer with Counterclaim, Medrano filed on February 21, 2003 a
Motion for Reconsideration of Order dated July 30, 2002. She asked the court to order De
Vera to file a pleading-in-intervention so that he could be properly named as a defendant
in the case. De Vera did not comply with the court’s order despite service upon his lawyer,
Atty. Simplicio M. Sevilleja, on April 2, 2003.
The CA reversed the RTC’s ruling. De Vera then filed a Petition for Certiorari to the CA

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the trial court was correct in refusing to allow De Vera to participate in
the case and requiring him to file a motion to intervene.
(2) Whether or not the petition for certiorari was proper

HELD:
(1) No. the trial court was wrong.
The trial court gravely abused its discretion in refusing to allow De Vera to participate in
the case and requiring him to file a motion to intervene.
The trial court misjudged De Vera’s interest in Civil Case No. U-7316. It held that De
Vera’s right to participate in the case was independent of the named defendants.
Because of its ruling that De Vera had an "independent interest," the trial court considered
his interest as separate from Medrano’s claims against the named defendants, and
allowed the latter to be tried separately. Thus, it admitted De Vera’s Answer with
Counterclaim but declared the named defendants in default and allowed the ex parte
presentation of evidence by Medrano against the named defendants.
The trial court’s approach is seriously flawed because De Vera’s interest is not
independent of or severable from the interest of the named defendants. De Vera is a

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
transferee pendente lite of the named defendants (by virtue of the Deed of Renunciation
of Rights that was executed in his favor during the pendency of Civil Case No. U-7316).
His rights were derived from the named defendants and, as transferee pendente lite, he
would be bound by any judgment against his transferors under the rules of res judicata.
Thus, De Vera’s interest cannot be considered and tried separately from the interest of
the named defendants.
It was therefore wrong for the trial court to have tried Medrano’s case against the named
defendants (by allowing Medrano to present evidence ex parte against them) after it had
already admitted De Vera’s answer. What the trial court should have done is to treat De
Vera (as transferee pendente lite) as having been joined as a party-defendant, and to try
the case on the basis of the answer De Vera had filed and with De Vera’s participation. As
transferee pendente lite, De Vera may be allowed to join the original defendants under
Rule 3, Section 19:
SEC. 19. Transfer of interest. – In case of any transfer of interest, the action may
be continued by or against the original party, unless the court upon motion directs
the person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or
joined with the original party. (Emphasis supplied)
The above provision gives the trial court discretion to allow or disallow the substitution or
joinder by the transferee. Discretion is permitted because, in general, the transferee’s
interest is deemed by law as adequately represented and protected by the participation of
his transferors in the case. There may be no need for the transferee pendente lite to be
substituted or joined in the case because, in legal contemplation, he is not really denied
protection as his interest is one and the same as his transferors, who are already parties
to the case.
We note that under Rule 3, Section 19, the substitution or joinder of the transferee is
"upon motion", and De Vera did not file any motion for substitution or joinder. However,
this technical flaw may be disregarded for the fact remains that the court had already
admitted his answer and such answer was on record when the ex parte presentation of
evidence was allowed by the court. Because De Vera’s answer had already been
admitted, the court should not have allowed the ex parte presentation of evidence.

(2) Yes. Certiorari petition before the CA was proper


Ordinary appeal was not an adequate remedy under the circumstances of the case. An
appeal seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by a court, which has jurisdiction
over the person and the subject matter of the dispute. In the instant case, the trial court
maintained that it had no jurisdiction over De Vera because it did not consider him a party
to the case. Its stance is that De Vera, as a non-party to the case, could not participate
therein, much less assail any of the orders, resolutions, or judgments of the trial court. An
appeal would have been an illusory remedy in this situation because his notice of appeal
would have certainly been denied on the ground that he is not a party to the case.
On the other hand, certiorari is an extraordinary remedy for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction. It is proper if the court acted without or in grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in law. Given the circumstance that the final decision in Civil Case No. U-7316
prejudices De Vera’s rights despite the fact that he was not recognized as a party thereto
and was not allowed to assail any portion thereof, De Vera’s remedy was to annul the trial

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
court proceedings on the ground that it was conducted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. With such annulment, the trial court should hear the case
anew with De Vera fully participating therein.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and NESTOR DELA CRUZ vs. ELOISA ESPEJO, ELENITA
ESPEJO, EMERITA ESPEJO, OPHIRRO ESPEJO, OTHNIEL ESPEJO,
ORLANDO ESPEJO, OSMUNDO ESPEJO, ODELEJO ESPEJO and NEMI FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 168387, August 25, 2010

DOCTRINE: The Best Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, the best evidence is the original document itself and no other evidence (such as a
reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The original is
preferred because it reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the document.

FACTS:
The respondents mortgaged both parcels of land to Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI)
to secure certain loans. Upon their failure to pay the loans, the mortgaged properties were
foreclosed and sold to RBBI. RBBI eventually consolidated title to the properties and transfer
certificates of title (TCTs) were issued in the name of RBBI. TCT No. T-62096 dated January 14,
1985 was issued for the Murong property. Subsequently, TCT No. T-62836 dated June 4, 1985
was issued for the Lantap property.
On February 26, 1985, respondents Espejos bought back one of their lots from
RBBI. Hovever, Deed of Sale did not mention the barangay where the property was located but
mentioned the title of the property (TCT No. T-62096), which title corresponds to the Murong
property. Meanwhile, RBBI, executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in
favor of the tenants of the Murong property. On February 10, 1997, respondents filed a
Complaint before the RARAD for the cancellation of petitioners CLOAs, the deposit of leasehold
rentals by petitioners in favor of respondents, and the execution of a deed of voluntary land
transfer by RBBI in favor of respondent. The OIC-RARAD agreed to the position of the
respondents but the decision of the OIC-RARAD was reveresed by DARAB. On appeal to the
CA agreed with the respondents. Using the Best Evidence Rule embodied in Rule 130, Section
3, the CA held that the Deed of Sale is the best evidence as to its contents, particularly the
description of the land which was the object of the sale. Since the Deed of Sale expressed that
its subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 the Murong property then that is the property
that the respondents repurchased.

ISSUE:
WON CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to determine the subject of the contracts

HELD:
YES. the appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. The Best
Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, the best
evidence is the original document itself and no other evidence (such as a reproduction,
photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The original is preferred because it
reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the document.
In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule because
there is no dispute regarding the contents of the documents. It is admitted by the parties that the
respondents Deed of Sale referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while the petitioners
Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer referred to TCT No. T-62836 as its subject, which is further
described as located in Barangay Murong.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SATURNINO VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 181829, September 1, 2010

DOCTRINE: Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides: The court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence
is offered must be specified.

FACTS:
The accused was charged with three counts of qualified rape. When arraigned on
November 14, 2002, appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges.During pre-trial, the parties
stipulated that the appellant is the father of AAA. It was likewise agreed that AAA was below 12
years of age when the rape incidents happened. AAAs birth and medical certificates were
likewise marked as Exhibits A and C, respectively. After the presentation of AAAs testimony, the
prosecution rested its case. The trial court lent credence to the testimony of AAA and convicting
the accused with 3 counts of qualified rape. On appeal, appellant argued that the prosecution
failed to formally offer in evidence AAAs birth certificate. Thus appellant claimed that assuming
he was indeed guilty of the crimes charged, he should only be held liable for simple rape and not
qualified rape because the minority of the victim was not duly established. However, the CA
likewise affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
WON the accused is guilty of three counts of qualified rape.

HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court agreed with the appellant that both the medical certificate and
AAAs birth certificate, although marked as exhibits during the pre-trial, should not have been
considered by the trial court and the CA because they were not formally offered in
evidence. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides: The court shall consider
no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered
must be specified.

In this case, we note that after the marking of the exhibits during pre-trial, the prosecution did not
formally offer the said medical certificate or birth certificate in evidence. In fact, the prosecution
rested its case after presenting the testimony of AAA without formally offering any documentary
exhibit at all.

In Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Parocha is instructive, thus:

The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Failure to make a formal offer within a
considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to submit it. Consequently, as in this case,
any evidence that has not been offered shall be excluded and rejected. . . The Rules of Court
[provide] that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. A formal
offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment
only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the
trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the
evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to review
documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court. . . Thus, the trial court is bound to
consider only the testimonial evidence presented and exclude the documents not
offered. Documents which may have been identified and marked as exhibits during
pre-trial or trial but which were not formally offered in evidence cannot in any manner be
treated as evidence. Neither can such unrecognized proof be assigned any evidentiary
weight and value. It must be stressed that there is a significant distinction between
identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer. The former is done in the course of
the pre-trial, and trial is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit; while the
latter is done only when the party rests its case. The mere fact that a particular document is
identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the
evidence. It must be emphasized that any evidence which a party desires to submit for the
consideration of the court must formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and
rejected.

In view of the foregoing, we find that the prosecution did not present any satisfactory evidence to
prove AAAs minority. In view of the foregoing, we find appellant guilty only of three counts of
simple rape the penalty for which is reclusion perpetua for each count.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
DELFIN LAMSIS, MAYNARD MONDIGUING, JOSE VALDEZ, JR. and Heirs of AGUSTIN
KITMA, represented by EUGENE KITMA vs. MARGARITA SEMON DONG-E
G.R. No. 173021, October 20, 2010

DOCTRINE: As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time
of the proceedings. This is because jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or vested by the
agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law, which prevails at the time of the filing of
the complaint.An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence. In the seminal case
of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, the Court ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a party from
raising the courts lack of jurisdiction. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned or declined to assert it. Wisely, some cases have cautioned against
applying Tijam, except for the most exceptional cases where the factual milieu is similar
to Tijam.

FACTS:
This case involves a conflict of ownership and possession over an untitled parcel of land,
denominated as Lot No. 1, with an area of 80,736 square meters. The property is located along
Km. 5 Asin Road, Baguio City and is part of a larger parcel of land with an area of 186,090
square meters. While petitioners are the actual occupants of Lot No. 1, respondent is claiming
ownership thereof and is seeking to recover its possession from petitioners. After summarizing
the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court found that it preponderates in favor of
respondents long-time possession of and claim of ownership over the subject property which
was affirmed by the CA. However, the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in
the petition before the SC by the petitioner. Petitioner argued that NCIP has primary jurisdiction
over ancestral lands, hence, the courts should not interfere when the dispute demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal. In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. It
was never raised before the trial court or the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case in light of the effectivity of RA 8371
or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 at the time that the complaint was instituted.

HELD:
YES. As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time of
the proceedings. This is because jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or vested by the
agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law, which prevails at the time of the filing of
the complaint.An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence. In the seminal case
of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, the Court ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a party from
raising the courts lack of jurisdiction. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 92
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned or declined to assert it. Wisely, some cases have cautioned against
applying Tijam, except for the most exceptional cases where the factual milieu is similar
to Tijam.In Tijam, the surety could have raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction in the trial court but
failed to do so. Instead, the surety participated in the proceedings and filed pleadings, other than
a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. When the case reached the appellate court, the surety
again participated in the case and filed their pleadings therein. It was only after receiving the
appellate courts adverse decision that the surety awoke from its slumber and filed a motion to
dismiss, in lieu of a motion for reconsideration. The CA certified the matter to this Court, which
then ruled that the surety was already barred by laches from raising the jurisdiction issue.In case
at bar, the application of the Tijam doctrine is called for because the presence of laches cannot
be ignored. If the surety in Tijam was barred by laches for raising the issue of jurisdiction for the
first time in the CA, what more for petitioners in the instant case who raised the issue for the first
time in their petition before this Court.At the time that the complaint was first filed in 1998, the
IPRA was already in effect but the petitioners never raised the same as a ground for dismissal;
instead they filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the value of the property did not meet
the jurisdictional value for the RTC.They obviously neglected to take the IPRA into
consideration.When the amended complaint was filed in 1998, the petitioners no longer raised
the issue of the trial courts lack of jurisdiction. Instead, they proceeded to trial, all the time aware
of the existence of the IPRA as evidenced by the cross-examination conducted by petitioners
lawyer on the CSTFAL Chairman Guillermo Fianza. In the cross-examination, it was revealed
that the petitioners were aware that the DENR, through the CSTFAL, had lost its jurisdiction over
ancestral land claims by virtue of the enactment of the IPRA. They assailed the validity of the
CSTFAL resolution favoring respondent on the ground that the CSTFAL had been
rendered functus officio under the IPRA. Inexplicably, petitioners still did not question the trial
courts jurisdiction.When petitioners recoursed to the appellate court, they only raised as errors
the trial courts appreciation of the evidence and the conclusions that it derived therefrom. In their
brief, they once again assailed the CSTFALs resolution as having been rendered functus
officio by the enactment of IPRA. But nowhere did petitioners assail the trial courts ruling for
having been rendered without jurisdiction It is only before this Court, eight years after the filing of
the complaint, after the trial court had already conducted a full-blown trial and rendered a
decision on the merits, after the appellate court had made a thorough review of the records, and
after petitioners have twice encountered adverse decisions from the trial and the appellate
courts that petitioners now want to expunge all the efforts that have gone into the litigation and
resolution of their case and start all over again. This practice cannot be allowed.Thus, even
assuming arguendo that petitioners theory about the effect of IPRA is correct (a matter which
need not be decided here), they are already barred by laches from raising their jurisdictional
objection under the circumstances.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 93
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ENRIQUE MIGUEL LACSON vs. MJ LACSON DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
G.R. No. 168840, December 8, 2010

DOCTRINE: Denial of due process means the total lack of opportunity to be heard or to have
ones day in court. There is no denial of due process where a party has been given an
opportunity to be heard and to present his case.

FACTS:
Respondent MJ Lacson Development Company, Inc. is a corporation engaged in the
business of sugar production. It owns and operates Hacienda San Benito in Moises Padilla,
Negros Occidental. On January 20, 2003, it filed before RTC a Complaint for Injunction with
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, Accounting and Damages against petitioner Enrique Miguel
Lacson. However, the parties were thereafter able to arrive at an Amicable Settlement. They
submitted the above-quoted Amicable Settlement on April 15, 2003 for the trial courts approval
and same was eventually approved through a Judgment by Compromise dated April 23,
2003.Just less than a month after said approval, however, petitioner filed on May 13, 2003 a
Motion for Partial Modification of the Judgment by Compromise. In said motion, petitioner
alleged that prior to the submission of the Amicable Settlement for approval, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) installed a group of farmer-beneficiaries who were not workers or
laborers of Hacienda San Benito. Said group allegedly cut the standing crops in
the hacienda and such act, petitioner claimed, could not be stopped by him because at that
time, he has no power to do so because of the TRO issued by the court. Because of this,
petitioner believed that there was a need to partially modify the conditions of the Amicable
Settlement by proportionately reducing the amount covered by the promissory note which he
would execute in favor of respondent pursuant to paragraph 1 of the above-quoted Amicable
Settlement.In an Order dated June 30, 2003, the trial court granted respondents Motion for
Execution, in effect denying petitioners Motion for Partial Modification of the Judgment by
Compromise. On appeal, Petitioner claims that during the hearing of his Motion for Partial
Modification of the Judgment by Compromise, he moved in open court that he be allowed to
present evidence in support of said motion. Unfortunately, the trial court failed to rule on the
same. Because of this, petitioner argues that he was denied due process. However, the CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
WON petitioner was denied due process.

HELD:
NO. We cannot subscribe to petitioners claim that he was denied due process. Denial of
due process means the total lack of opportunity to be heard or to have ones day in court. There
is no denial of due process where a party has been given an opportunity to be heard and to
present his case. Here, petitioner alleges that the trial court conducted a hearing on his Motion
for Partial Modification of the Judgment by Compromise. Clearly, he was given the opportunity
to be heard thereon. The failure of the lower court to rule on his oral motion to present evidence
during said hearing is not denial of due process. The fact is that the trial court heard his motion
for partial modification and his failure to present further evidence to support the same cannot be
equated with lack of due process. Besides, respondent, in its Memorandum advances a

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 94
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
plausible explanation for the trial courts failure to rule on petitioners oral motion to allow him to
present evidence, that is, petitioner was ordered by the trial court to reduce into writing his oral
motion but he did not do so. Petitioner did not dispute this allegation in his Memorandum despite
his having the opportunity to do so, since as shown by the records, respondent served upon
petitioner a copy of its memorandum way ahead of petitioners filing before this Court of his own
memorandum.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
BARANGAY DASMARIÑAS thru BARANGAY CAPTAIN MA. ENCARNACION R.
LEGASPIvs. CREATIVE PLAY CORNER SCHOOL, DR. AMADO J. PIAMONTE,
REGINA PIAMONTE TAMBUNTING, CELINE CONCEPCION LEBRON and CECILE
CUNA COLINA
G.R. No. 169942, January 24, 2011

DOCTRINE:Utter disregard of the rules of procedure cannot justly be rationalized by


harking on the policy of liberal construction.

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a Complaint for Falsification and Use of Falsified Documents against
the respondents alleging that latter falsified and used the Barangay Clearance and
Official Receipt purportedly issued in the name of CPC by the Office of the Barangay.
Respondents on the other hand, denied having falsified the subject documents. The
Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case because of failure to establish
probable cause. Petitioner thus brought the case before the Department of Justice (DOJ)
through a Petition for Review. The DOJ, though, after finding that no error which would
justify the reversal of the assailed resolution was committed by Prosecutor Ochoa and
that the petition was filed late, dismissed the Petition for Review.

But before petitioner was able to file its petition, it first sought for an extension of time
of 15 days, which the Court of Appeals granted. Subsequently, petitioner asked for
another extension of five days for the same reason given in its first motion for extension.
But this time the Court of Appeals denied the second motion for having been filed beyond
the period allowed by the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner argued on the policy of liberal construction embodied in Section 6, Rule


1 of the Rules of Court which provides that the rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action. Petitioner believes that if only the CA examined the records
of the case, it would find that the substantial merits of the case are enough to override
technical deficiencies.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the technical rules should be relaxed and not be strictly followed in the
interest of substantial justice.

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court gave emphasize in Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
which provides:
“….. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket fee
before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an
additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No
further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case
to exceed fifteen (15) days.”

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Considering that the CA has already sufficiently explained how it was able to arrive
at the conclusion that there is no compelling reason for such second extension, the Court
deem it unnecessary to repeat the same especially since the Court are in total agreement
with the ratiocination of the Court of Appeals.

As to petitioner’s invocation of liberal application of the rules, the Court cannot heed
the same. "It is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that the rules of
procedure should not be strictly followed in the interest of substantial justice. However, it
does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will. It bears emphasizing that
procedural rules should not be belittled or dismissed simply because their
non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantial rights. Like all
rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons."

The Court has examined the records of this case, however, and the Court is
convinced that the present case is not attended by such an imperative that justifies
relaxation of the rules. Moreover, as pointed out by respondents, petitioner had not only
once transgressed procedural rules. This Court has previously held that "technical rules
may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving."
Petitioner’s low regard of procedural rules only shows that it is undeserving of their
relaxation.

Besides, even if the Court of Appels ignores the petition’s belated filing, the same
would have been dismissed for being an improper remedy. It has been held that "the
remedy of a party desiring to elevate to the appellate court an adverse resolution of the
Secretary of Justice is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. A Rule 43 petition for review
is a wrong mode of appeal."

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 97
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
DIONISIO LOPEZ y ABERASTURIvs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
SALVADOR G. ESCALANTE, JR.
G.R. No. 172203, February 14, 2011

DOCTRINE:Freedom of expression enjoys an exalted place in the hierarchy of


constitutional rights. Free expression however, "is not absolute for it may be so regulated
that [its exercise shall neither] be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal
rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society." Libel stands as an
exception to the enjoyment of that most guarded constitutional right.

The Supreme Court is precluded from making further evaluation of the factual
antecedents of the case. However, the Court cannot lose sight of the fact that both lower
courts have greatly misapprehended the facts in arriving at their unanimous conclusion.

FACTS:
Private complainant, Mayor Escalante of Cadiz City, filed a complaint for libel against
the petitioner for putting up a billboard with the phrase “Cadiz Forever” and a blank phase
following the word “Never.” The accused affixed the nickname of the herein private
complainant "BADING" and the name of the City of "SAGAY" before the word "NEVER.”
According to a witness, petitioner has an ax to grind against the mayor. Another witness
also found the message unpleasant because Mayor Escalante is an honorable and
dignified resident of Cadiz City. According to her, the message is an insult not only to the
person of the mayor but also to the people of Cadiz City.

Petitioner admitted having placed all the billboards because he is aware of all the
things happening around Cadiz City. He mentioned "BADING" because he was not in
conformity with the many things the mayor had done in Cadiz City. He further maintained
that his personal belief and expression was that he will never love Bading and Sagay.

The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment convicting petitioner


of libel. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the resolution of the lower court. Hence,
this petition.

Petitioner avers that there is nothing in said printed matter tending to defame and
induce suspicion on the character, integrity and reputation of private respondent.

The OSG, that "there is nothing in the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER" and "BADING AND
SAGAY NEVER" which ascribe to private respondent any crime, vice or defect, or any
act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which will either dishonor, discredit, or
put him into contempt."

Respondent, on the other hand, argued that the words printed on the billboards
somehow bordered on the incomprehensible and the ludicrous yet they were so
deliberately crafted solely to induce suspicion and cast aspersion against private
respondent’s honor and reputation.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Supreme Court is precluded from making further evaluation
of the factual antecedents of a case brought before them

2. Whether or not the printed phrase "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY
NEVER" is libelous

HELD:
1. No. At the outset, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The factual findings of the lower courts are
final and conclusive and are not reviewable by the Supreme Court, unless the case falls
under the following exceptions:

a. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises


and conjectures;
b. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
c. Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
d. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
e. When the findings of fact are conflicting;
f. When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
g. When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
h. When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based;
i. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and,
j. When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record

As a general rule, the Supreme Court is precluded from making further evaluation
of the factual antecedents of the case. However, the Court cannot lose sight of the fact
that both lower courts have greatly misapprehended the facts in arriving at their
unanimous conclusion. Hence, the Court is constrained to apply one of the exceptions
specifically “When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.”

2. For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: a) it must be


defamatory; b) it must be malicious; c) it must be given publicity and d) the victim must be
identifiable.Absent one of these elements precludes the commission of the crime of libel.

Although all the elements must concur, the defamatory nature of the subject printed
phrase must be proved first because this is so vital in a prosecution for libel. Were the
words imputed not defamatory in character, a libel charge will not prosper. Malice is
necessarily rendered immaterial. To determine "whether a statement is defamatory, the
words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural
and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them,
unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense."

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Tested under these established standards, the Court cannot subscribe to the
appellate court’s finding that the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY
NEVER" tends to induce suspicion on private respondent’s character, integrity and
reputation as mayor of Cadiz City. There are no derogatory imputations of a crime, vice or
defect or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending, directly or
indirectly, to cause his dishonor. In its ordinary sense, the word did not cast aspersion
upon private respondent’s integrity and reputation much less convey the idea that he was
guilty of any offense. Simply worded as it was with nary a notion of corruption and
dishonesty in government service, it is the Supreme Court’s considered view to
appropriately consider it as mere epithet or personal reaction on private respondent’s
performance of official duty and not purposely designed to malign and besmirch his
reputation and dignity more so to deprive him of public confidence.

In addition, as observed by the OSG, at the time the billboards were erected and
during the incumbency of private respondent as mayor of Cadiz City, these witnesses
were either employed in the Cadiz City Hall or active in the project of the city government.
These witnesss would naturally testify in his favor.

As ruled in the case of MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da’ Wah Council of the
Phils., Inc. "Personal hurt or embarrassment or offense, even if real, is not automatically
equivalent to defamation," "words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or
slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or
vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute bases for an action for defamation
in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the language is
offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself."

In criminal prosecutions, fundamental is the requirement that the elemental acts


constituting the offense be established with moral certainty as this is the critical and only
requisite to a finding of guilt." In this case, contrary to the conclusion of the trial court as
affirmed by the appellate court, the prosecution failed to prove that the controversial
phrase "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" imputes derogatory remarks
on private respondent’s character, reputation and integrity.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
AURORA B. GO vs. ELMER SUNBANUN, GEORGIE S. TAN, DORIS SUNBANUN
and RICHARD SUNBANUN
G.R. No. 168240, February 9, 2011

DOCTRINE: When a procedural rule is amended for the benefit of litigants for the
furtherance of the administration of justice, it shall be retroactively applied to likewise
favor actions then pending, as equity delights equality

FACTS:
Respondents filed a suit for damages against Aurora, her husband Yiu Wai Sang, and
Yiu-Go Employment Agency for breach of warranty in the fire insurance policies that the
respondents made involving the property rented out by petitioner.
The RTC rendered judgment finding only Aurora liable and ordering her to pay moral
damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs.
Aurora filed her Motion for Reconsideration on the last day to file her appeal. The court in
its April 27, 2004 Order denied said motion.
Atty. Ycong received the notice of denial with a day left to file her appeal. Explaining that
Aurora has been busy campaigning for the local elections as she was running for the
position of town mayor in Calubian, Leyte and that he and his client have yet to discuss
the pros and cons of appealing the case, Atty. Ycong sought for the relaxation of the
procedural rules by filing an extension of 15 days to file Aurora’s notice of appeal. The
RTC denied the notice of appeal thereafter filed.
For non-compliance with the formal requirements of a petition, the Court of Appeals (CA)
dismissed the certiorari petition filed by petitioner. The CA dismissed the petition for being
procedurally flawed, viz: the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping is signed
by only one petitioner without a Special Power of Attorney/Secretary’s Certificate
authorizing her to represent the two (2) other petitioners; the Affidavit of Service shows
that respondents were personally served copies of the petition but lacks explanation why
service of the petition with this Court was not done personally; counsel for petitioners
failed to indicate his PTR and IBP numbers; certified true copies of the assailed decision
dated January 26, 2004 attached to the petition is a mere photocopy of a certified true
copy; the copies of pleadings and other relevant documents referred to in the petition
which would support the allegations therein are not attached.

ISSUE:
May the formal deficiencies in the petition before the CA be relaxed in the interest
ofijustice?

HELD:
The signatures/authorizations of Sang and Yiu-Go Employment Agency in the
verification and certification on non-forum shopping are not necessary. The signatures
may be dispensed with as these parties are not involved in the petition.
Non-submission of certified true copy of the January 26, 2004 Decision and copies of the
Complaint and Answer is not fatal. Not all pleadings and parts of case records are
required to be attached, but only those which are material and pertinent that they may
provide the basis for a determination of a prima facie case for abuse of discretion.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 101
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Failure to indicate PTR and IBP Official Receipt Numbers are not fatal. The failure of
petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Ycong, to indicate in the petition before the CA his PTR
and IBP numbers for the year 2004 was obviously an oversight.
However, whenever practicable, personal service and personal filing of pleadings are
always the preferred modes of service. Should one deviate from the general rule, it is
mandatory for him/her to submit a written explanation why the pleading was not
personally filed/served. Otherwise, the court has the discretion to consider the paper as
not filed. Therefore, there was no grave abuse on the part of the CA in exercising its
discretion to dismiss Aurora’s petition.
Nevertheless, in spite of petitioner’s error, the ‘fresh period rule’ amendment as held in
Neypes v. Court of Appeals will be applied to her benefit.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 102
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third division) and
MANUEL G. BARCENAS
G.R. No. 174504 , March 21, 2011

DOCTRINE: The dismissal order arising from the grant of a demurrer to evidence
amounts to an acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in
double jeopardy. The order is reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

FACTS:
Respondents were charged for having violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019
before the Sandiganbayan. That the accused being high ranking officials did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into contracts/transactions for the
construction of the Mabalacat-Clark Spur Road and the Clark Perimeter Road, without
the benefit of public bidding and at the price higher by 60 to 167% than the typical
roadway construction cost, thus, depriving the government of the opportunity of obtaining
the most advantageous construction cost. During the trial, the prosecution presented its
lone witness, Atty. Pagunuran, legal counsel of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Consequently, instead of presenting their evidence, the respondents filed their
respective motions for leave to file their demurrer to evidence and alleged that the
witness had no personal knowledge of the transaction and thus it’s a hearsay and that the
prosecution failed to prove that there was an overpricing and (iii) that the ruling of the
Court of Appeals in an administrative case (C.A. G.R. SP No. 62084), which upheld the
validity of the direct negotiated contracts, even in the absence of a public bidding, was
already the law of the case. The demurrer to evidence was however denied. It opined that the
prosecution’s evidence substantiated the elements of the crime and that the respondents must
present controverting evidence. The respondents then filed a MR and was granted and
the case was dismissed. The SB based its ruling on the ground that that there being want
of substantial evidence to support an administrative charge, there could be no sufficient
evidence to warrant a conclusion that there is probable cause for a violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Thus this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an appeal can be made.

HELD:
Procedurally, the petitioner resorted to a wrong remedy. Section 1 of Rule 122 allows
"any party" to appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the right of the accused
against double jeopardy will be violated. It is axiomatic that an appeal in criminal cases
throws the whole case wide open for review by an appellate court. As a consequence, an
appeal by the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal necessarily places the accused in
double jeopardy. The rule barring an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is, however, not
absolute. The following are the recognized exceptions thereto: (i)when the prosecution is
denied due process of law; and (ii) when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’
demurrer to evidence. Where appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper. In the dismissal

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 103
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
of a criminal case upon demurrer to evidence, appeal is not available as such an appeal
will put the accused in double jeopardy. Certiorari, however, is allowed.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 104
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ASIA UNITED BANK, CHRISTINE T. CHAN, and FLORANTE C. DEL MUNDO vs.
GOODLAND COMPANY, INC.
G.R. No. 191388, March 9, 2011

DOCTRINE: There can be no determination of the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure


and the propriety of injunction in the Injunction Case without necessarily ruling on the
validity of the REM, which is already the subject of the Annulment Case. The identity of
the causes of action in the two cases entails that the validity of the mortgage will be ruled
upon in both, and creates a possibility that the two rulings will conflict with each other.
This is precisely what is sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping.

FACTS:
Goodland Company, Inc. (Goodland) executed Third Party Real Estate Mortgage
over two parcels of land in favor of Asia United Bank. The mortgage secured the
obligation amounting to P250,000,000.00 of Radio Radiomarine Network, Inc.
(RMNI). Goodland then filed a complaint before the RTC for the annulment of the REM on
the ground that the same was falsified and done in contravention of parties’ verbal
agreement.While the annulment case was pending, RMNI defaulted in payment of its
obligation to AUB. AUB filed its application for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate
Mortgage under Act No. 3135. The mortgaged properties were sold in public auction to
AUB as the highest bidder. Certificate of Sale was issued and was registered with the
Registry of Deeds.Goodland filed another complaint against AUB and its officers. This
complaint sought to annul the foreclosure of sale and to enjoin the consolidation of title.
AUB filed a motion to dismiss with opposition to a TRO in the injunction case. They
brought to the court’s attention Goodland’s forum shopping given pendency of the
annulment case. They argued that the two cases both rely on the alleged falsification of
the real estate mortgage as basis for the reliefs sought.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Goodland committed forum shopping

HELD:
Yes. The cause of action in the earlier Annulment Case is the alleged nullity of the
REM (due to its allegedly falsified or spurious nature) which is allegedly violative of
Goodland’s right to the mortgaged property. It serves as the basis for the prayer for the
nullification of the REM. The Injunction Case involves the same cause of action,
inasmuch as it also invokes the nullity of the REM as the basis for the prayer for the
nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and for injunction against consolidation of title.
While the main relief sought in the Annulment Case (nullification of the REM) is ostensibly
different from the main relief sought in the Injunction Case (nullification of the extrajudicial
foreclosure and injunction against consolidation of title), the cause of action which serves
as the basis for the said reliefs remains the same — the alleged nullity of the REM. Thus,
what is involved here is the third way of committing forum shopping, i.e., filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers. As previously held
by the Court, there is still forum shopping even if the reliefs prayed for in the two cases are
different, so long as both cases raise substantially the same issues

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 105
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORPORATION VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
G.R. No. 181371 March 02, 2011

DOCTRINE: When an appeal is withdrawn, the assailed decision becomes final and
executory.

FACTS:
On April 13, 2005, petitioner filed with respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(CIR) a request for the issuance of a tax credit certificate in the amount of P32,170,409,
representing the 20% sales discounts allegedly granted to senior citizens fortheyear
2002.

On April 14, 2005, petitioner filed with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) a Petition for
Review.On July 23, 2007, the First Division of the CTA rendered a Decision denying
petitioner's claim for insufficiency of evidence.Aggrieved, petitioner moved for
reconsideration but the First Division of the CTA denied the same in a Resolution dated
September 12, 2007.On October 3, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time
to File Petition for Review on Certiorari with the CTA En Banc. On October 19, 2007,
petitioner filed with the CTA En Banc a Petition for Review, docketed as CTA En Banc
Case No. 316. On December 4, 2007, the CTA En Banc resolved to deny due course, and
accordingly, dismissed the Petition for Review.This prompted petitioner to file before us a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the
Resolutions dated December 4, 2007 and January 17, 2008 of the CTA En Banc.In
response, comments were filed by the respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General.
However, instead of filing a reply to the comments, petitioner filed a Motion to Withdraw,
praying that the case be dismissed without prejudice. According to petitioner, the amount
of tax credit being claimed for 2002 would just be included in its future claims for issuance
of a tax credit certificate since the said amount was carried over to its 2003 Income Tax
Return.

The OSG does not oppose the Motion to Withdraw. However, citing Section 2, Rule 17 of
the Rules of Court, the OSG argues that the withdrawal of the instant case is no longer a
matter of right on the part of petitioner, but is discretionary upon the Court. The OSG also
calls attention to the failure of Mr. Jacinto J. Conception, the person who signed the
Verification and Certification of Non-forum Shopping, to exhibit before the notary public a
valid Identification Card. The OSG insists that such failure renders the instant Petition
defective. Thus, it should be dismissed with prejudice.

ISSUE:
Whether the dismissal should be with prejudice against petitioner.

HELD:
YES. Section 1, Rule 13 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court provides that "[a]
case shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum that the Court or its Rules require." In the instant case,

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 106
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
records show that on August 19, 2009, we resolved to require petitioner to file a reply.
Instead of complying, petitioner opted to file a motion to withdraw. Clearly, by requiring
petitioner to file its Reply, the Court has not yet deemed the case submitted for decision or
resolution. Thus, we resolve to grant petitioner's Motion to Withdraw.

However, we agree with the OSG that the dismissal of the instant case should be with
prejudice. By withdrawing the appeal, petitioner is deemed to have accepted the decision
of the CTA. And since the CTA had already denied petitioner's request for the issuance of
a tax credit certificate in the amount of P32,170,409 for insufficiency of evidence, it may
no longer be included in petitioner's future claims. Petitioner cannot be allowed to
circumvent the denial of its request for a tax credit by abandoning its appeal and filing a
new claim. To reiterate, "an appellant who withdraws his appeal x x x must face the
consequence of his withdrawal, such as the decision of the court a quo becoming final
and executory."

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 107
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. PIO ROQUE S. COQUIA, Jr.
G.R. No. 167518, March 23, 2011

DOCTRINE: Clearly, then, this Court may not pass upon the same issues which had
been finally adjudicated since a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked
by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the Supreme
Court. This principle of immutability of final judgment renders it unalterable as nothing
further can be done except to execute it.

FACTS:
Respondent Coquia filed a complaintfor illegal suspension, illegal dismissal and other
monetary claims against petitioner BPI and some of its corporate officers. On July 29,
1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decisionfinding respondent Coquia’s dismissal illegal.
The NLRC, in its Decision dated April 19, 2000, reversed the assailed decision and
declared that there exist sufficient bases for the dismissal.
From the said NLRC Resolution, petitioner BPI and respondent Coquia filed their
separate petitions before the CA. The CA, however, resolved the petitions differently. In
CA-G.R. SP No. 84230, the CA, through its Special Sixteenth Division, rendered a
Decision dated December 14, 2004 which denied respondent Coquia’s petition and
sustained the NLRC’s deletion of the award of backwages and moral and exemplary
damages. The CA likewise sustained the award of separation pay as reinstatement was
no longer possible due to strained relation between petitioner BPI and respondent
Coquia.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled on the issue
of payment of separation pay in favor of respondent considering that another division of
the CA first acquired jurisdiction over the said subject matter.

HELD:
The issues regarding the validity of respondent Coquia’s dismissal and the
correctness of the award of separation pay have been barred by the principle of res
judicata by virtue of a final and executory judgment rendered in CA G.R. SP No. 83883
involving the same parties, issues and cause of action.
As mentioned, the judgment rendered in CA-G.R. SP No. 83883 has already become
final and executory. It was rendered based on the merits by a court which has jurisdiction
thereon. The parties involved in that case and in the present petition are the same as well
as the subject matter and cause of action, which revolves around the validity of
respondent Coquia’s termination from employment and the propriety of the award of
separation pay in his favor.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 108
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
STEFAN TITO MIOZA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. CESAR TOMAS LOPEZ, in his official capacity as Mayor and Chair, Loon
Cockpit Arena Bidding and Awards Committee, its Members namely: HERMINIGILDO
M. CALIFORNIA, NOEL CASTROJO, JESSE SEVILLA, FORTUNATO GARAY,
PERFECTO MANTE, ROGELIO GANADOS, P/INSP. JASEN MAGARAN,
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF LOON, BOHOL, represented by its Presiding Officer, Vice
Mayor RAUL BARBARONA, and MARCELO EPE,Respondents.
G.R. No. 170914 April 13, 2011

DOCTRINE: There can be no legal duel in court when the one who demands satisfaction from
the alleged offender is not even the offended party.

FACTS:
The Sangguniang Bayan issued a resolution declaring the cockpit owned and operated by
petitioner in Bgy. Lintuan as unlicensed and that the only licensed cockpit is the one in Cogon
Norte. The resolution likewise stated that the cockpit in Bgy. Lintuan has no benches, toilets, or
eateries and that the place is prone to vehicular accidents for lack of parking space. As a result,
Mayor Lopez revoked petitioners temporary license to operate.
Municipal Ordinance No. 03-001 Series of 2003 was approved to regulate cockfighting in the
municipality. Pursuant thereto, the Sangguniang Bayan a resolution which opened for public
bidding a 25-year franchise of the cockpit operation in Loon.Four qualified parties submitted their
cash bids among them is petitioner’s uncle who submitted the bid for and on his behalf.
During the conduct of the public bidding, Marcelo was declared the winner and a franchise for
the cockpit operation in Loon was granted in his favor by way of Municipal Ordinance No.
03-007, Series of 2003.
Petitioner then filed a Complaintwith the RTC against Mayor Lopez, the members of
the Sangguniang Bayan, the members of the Loon Cockpit Bidding and Awards Committee,
and the franchise awardee, Marcelo, for Annulment of both the bidding process and Municipal
Ordinance No. 03-007, Series of 2003 and for Damages.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has the standing to challenge the bidding proceedings and the issuance
of Ordinance No. 03-007, Series of 2003.

HELD:
Under this definition, petitioner, not being one of the bidders clearly has no personality to
contest the alleged rigged bidding as well as to pray for the annulment of Ordinance No. 03-007,
Series of 2003 which granted the franchise to Marcelo. The fact that he owns the cockpit in Bgy.
Lintuan does not clothe him with legal standing to have the bidding proceedings annulled and
Marcelo stripped off of the cockpit franchise. Even assuming that the bidding proceeding was
rigged thereby disqualifying Marcelo as a bidder, the highest bidder would still be Jose, and not
the petitioner who was not even a participant. Contrary to petitioners claim that Jose was his
representative, records show that Jose acted in his personal capacity when he applied to be one
of the bidders of the cockpit franchise.[31] Never was it shown that he was bidding on behalf of
someone else, particularly petitioner. Petitioners agreement with his family and Jose, i.e., that

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 109
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
the latter would bid on behalf of the petitioner, does not bind the respondents. Thus, had Jose
been the highest bidder, the franchise would have been awarded in his name and not in favor of
petitioner. Jose would be the one accountable to the Sangguniang Bayan with regard to
fulfillment of the obligations of said franchise.
All told, this Court finds no reason to disturb the judgment of the CA affirming the RTCs dismissal
of petitioners action. Suffice it to state that on the sole basis of the allegations of the complaint,
the court may dismiss the case for lack of cause of action.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 110
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND (HDMF) vs. SPOUSES FIDEL and FLORINDA R.
SEE and SHERIFF MANUEL L. ARIMADO
G.R. No. 170292,June 22, 2011

DOCTRINE: A party that loses its right to appeal by its own negligence cannot seek refuge in
the remedy of a writ of certiorari.

FACTS:
Respondent-spouses Fidel and Florinda See (respondent-spouses) were the highest
bidders in the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of a propertythat was mortgaged to petitioner Home
Development Mutual Fund or Pag-ibig Fund (Pag-ibig). They paid the bid price in cash to
respondent Sheriff Manuel L. Arimado (Sheriff Arimado). In turn, respondent-spouses received
a Certificate of Sale wherein Sheriff Arimado acknowledged receipt of the purchase
price. Despite the expiration of the redemption period, Pag-ibig refused to surrender its
certificate of title to the respondent-spouses because it had yet to receive the
respondent-spouses payment from Sheriff Arimado who failed to remit the same despite
repeated demands. It turned out that Sheriff Arimado withdrew from the clerk of court the money
paid by respondent-spouses, on the pretense that he was going to deliver the same to
Pag-ibig. The money never reached Pag-ibig and was spent by Sheriff Arimado for his personal
use.
Considering Pag-ibigs refusal to recognize their payment, respondent-spouses filed a
complaint for specific performance with damages against Pag-ibig and Sheriff Arimado. The
complaint alleged that the law on foreclosure authorized Sheriff Arimado to receive, on behalf of
Pag-ibig, the respondent-spouses payment. Pag-ibig admitted the factual allegations of the
complaint but maintained that respondent-spouses had no cause of action against it. Pag-ibig
insisted that it has no duty to deliver the certificate of title to respondent-spouses unless Pag-ibig
actually receives the bid price. When the case was called for pre-trial conference, the parties
submitted their Compromise Agreement for the courts approval.

ISSUE:
Whether certiorari was the proper remedy.

HELD:
No. Certiorari is a limited form of review and is a remedy of last recourse. It is proper only
when appeal is not available to the aggrieved party. In the case at bar, the decision of the trial
court was appealable under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court because it completely disposed of
respondent-spouses case against Pag-ibig. Pag-ibig does not explain why it did not resort to an
appeal and allowed the trial courts decision to attain finality. In fact, the decision of the trial court
was already at the stage of execution when Pag-ibig belatedly resorted to a Rule 65 Petition
for Certiorari. Clearly, Pag-ibig lost its right to appeal and tried to remedy the situation by
resorting to certiorari. It is settled, however, that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal,
especially if the party’s own negligence or error in the choice of remedy occasioned such loss or
lapse.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that a Rule 65 certiorari could still be resorted to,
Pag-ibigs petition would still have to be dismissed for having been filed beyond the reglementary
period of 60 days from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. Pag-ibig admitted

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 111
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
receiving the trial courts Order denying its Motion for Reconsideration on March 22, 2002; it thus
had until May 21, 2002 to file its petition for certiorari. However, Pag-ibig filed its petition only on
May 24, 2002, which was the 63rd day from its receipt of the trial courts order and obviously
beyond the reglementary 60-day period.
Pag-ibig stated that its petition for certiorari was filed within sixty (60) days from receipt of
the copy of the writ of execution by petitioner [Pag-ibig] on 07 May 2002, which writ sought to
enforce the Decision assailed in the petition. This submission is beside the point. Rule 65,
Section 4 is very clear that the reglementary 60-day period is counted from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution being assailed, or from notice of the denial of the motion [for
reconsideration], and not from receipt of the writ of execution which seeks to enforce the
assailed judgment, order or resolution. The date of Pag-ibigs receipt of the copy of the writ of
execution is therefore immaterial for purposes of computing the timeliness of the filing of the
petition for certiorari.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 112
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MA. LIGAYA B. SANTOS vs. LITTON MILLS INCORPORATED
G.R. No. 170646, June 22, 2011

DOCTRINE:Technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate, the cause of
justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable aim, the just resolution of cases
on their merits, however, cannot be sacrificed merely in order to achieve that objective. Rules of
procedure are tools designed not to thwart but to facilitate the attainment of justice; thus, their
strict and rigid application may, for good and deserving reasons, have to give way to, and be
subordinated by, the need to aptly dispense substantial justice in the normal course.

FACTS:
Atty. Mario, personnel manager of respondent Litton Mills, directed petitioner to explain
in writing why no disciplinary action should be imposed on her after having been caught
engaging in an unauthorized arrangement with a waste buyer. Allegedly, petitioner has been
demanding money from a certain Leonardo A. Concepcion (Concepcion) every time he
purchases scrap and sludge oil from the company and threatening to withhold the release of the
purchased materials by delaying the release of official delivery receipt and gate pass if he would
not oblige. In her letter-reply, petitioner denied the accusation and explained that herjob is
merely clerical in nature and that she has no authority to hold the release of purchased waste
items. Atty. Mario notified petitioner that an administrative investigation and requested her to
appear and present her defenses on the charges. During the hearing, petitioner, represented by
three officers of the union of which she was a member, submitted a Motion for Reinvestigation
(which she also filed in the criminal case for extortion). Petitioner received a Letter of
Termination from respondents for obtaining or accepting money as a result of an unauthorized
arrangement with a waste buyer, an act considered as affecting company interests.
The Labor Arbiter found that her dismissal is valid. The NLRC affirmed the findings of the
Labor Arbiter. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorariwith the CA. In a Resolution, the CA
dismissed the petition for failure of the petitioner to indicate in the petition the actual addresses of
the parties and to state in the Verification and Certification of non-forum shopping that there
were no other pending cases between the parties at the time of filing. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration explaining that her petition substantially complied with the provisions of Section
3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court because it indicated that the parties may be served with notices
and processes of the Court through their respective counsels whose addresses were
specifically mentioned therein. She also insisted that although the Verification and Certification
attached to the petition was an abbreviated version, the same still substantially complied with the
Rules.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the rules can give a liberal construction upon faithful compliance of
petitioner.

HELD:
Yes. Under Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, petitions for certiorari shall contain,
among others, the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents. The
petitioner should also submit together with the petition a sworn certification that (a) he has not
theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, he must state the status of the same;
and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall promptly inform the court within five days therefrom. The Rule explicitly
provides that failure to comply with these requirements shall be sufficient ground to dismiss the
petition.
To us, the mention of the parties respective counsels addresses constitutes substantial
compliance with the requirements of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court which provides in
part that [t]he petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and
respondents. Our observation further finds support in Section 2, Rule 13 which pertinently
provides that [i]f any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his
counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the Court.
Moreover, in her motion for reconsideration, petitioner explained that she was of the
honest belief that the mention of the counsel’s address was sufficient compliance with the
rules. At any rate, she fully complied with the same when she indicated in her Motion for
Reconsideration the actual addresses of the parties. Hence, we are at a loss why the CA still
proceeded to deny petitioners petition for certiorari and worse, even declared that: Instead of
[rectifying] the deficiencies of the petition, the petitioner chose to avoid compliance, arguing
more than revising the mistakes explicitly pointed out. It is settled that subsequent and
substantial compliance may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. The Court has time
and again relaxed the rigid application of the rules to offer full opportunity for parties to ventilate
their causes and defenses in order to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice.

Because there was substantial and subsequent compliance in this case, we resolve to
apply the liberal construction of the rules if only to secure the greater interest of justice. Thus, the
CA should have given due course to the petition.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 114
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ANICETO CALUBAQUIB et.al., vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 170658, June 22, 2011

DOCTRINE:Due process rights are violated by a motu proprio rendition of a summary


judgment.

FACTS:
President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclamation No. 80 which declared a
39.3996-hectare landholding located at Barangay Caggay, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a military
reservation site. The proclamation expressly stated that it was being issued subject to private
rights, if any there be. Respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for recovery of
possessionagainst petitioners alleging that sometime in 1992, petitioners unlawfully entered the
military reservation through strategy and stealth and took possession of a five-hectare portion
(subject property) thereof. Petitioners denied the allegation that they entered the subject
property through stealth and strategy. They maintained that they and their
predecessor-in-interest, Antonio Calubaquib (Antonio), have been in open and continuous
possession of the subject property since the early 1900s. When Antonio died in 1918, his six
children acknowledged inheriting the subject property from him in a private document
entitled Convenio. In 1926, Antonios children applied for a homestead patent but the same was
not acted upon by the Bureau of Lands. Petitioners cite as their basis a proviso in Proclamation
No. 80, which exempts from the military reservation site private rights, if any there be. Without
any trial, the trial court rendered a Decision dismissing petitioners claim of possession of the
subject property in the concept of owner. The trial court held that while Proclamation No. 80
recognized and respected the existence of private rights on the military reservation, petitioners
position could not be sustained, as there was no right of [petitioners] to speak of that was
recognized by the government. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the rendering of a summary judgment is proper in this case.

HELD:
No. Summary judgments are proper when, upon motion of the plaintiff or the
defendant, the court finds that the answer filed by the defendant does not tender a genuine
issue as to any material fact and that one party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.A
summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [the]
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The test of the propriety of rendering
summary judgments is the existence of a genuine issue of fact, as distinguished from a sham,
fictitious, contrived or false claim. The filing of a motion and the conduct of a hearing on the
motion are therefore important because these enable the court to determine if the parties
pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in support of, or against, the motion are sufficient to overcome
the opposing papers and adequately justify the finding that, as a matter of law, the claim is
clearly meritorious or there is no defense to the action.

In the case at bar, the trial court proceeded to render summary judgment with neither of
the parties filing a motion therefor. Under these circumstances, it was improper for the trial court
to have persisted in rendering summary judgment. Considering that the remedy of summary

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
judgment is in derogation of a party's right to a plenary trial of his case, the trial court cannot
railroad the parties rights over their objections.By proceeding to rule against petitioners without
any trial, the trial and appellate courts made a conclusion which was based merely on an
assumption that petitioners defense of acquisitive prescription was a sham, and that the ultimate
facts pleaded in their Answer (e.g., open and continuous possession of the property since the
early 1900s) cannot be proven at all.This assumption is as baseless as it is premature and
unfair. No reason was given why the said defense and ultimate facts cannot be proven during
trial. The lower courts merely assumed that petitioners would not be able to prove their defense
and factual allegations, without first giving them an opportunity to do so.

It is clear that the guidelines and safeguards for the rendition of a summary judgment
were all ignored by the trial court. The sad result was a judgment based on nothing else but an
unwarranted assumption and a violation of petitioners due process right to a trial where they can
present their evidence and prove their defense.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LEONARDO S. UMALE vs. ASB REALTY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 181126, June 15, 2011

DOCTRINE:Being placed under corporate rehabilitation and having a receiver appointed to


carry out the rehabilitation plan do not ipso facto deprive a corporation and its corporate officers
of the power to recover its unlawfully detained property.

FACTS:
Amethyst Pearl executed a Deed of Assignment in Liquidation of the subject premises in
favor of ASB Realty in consideration of the full redemption of Amethyst Pearls outstanding
capital stock from ASB Realty. Thus, ASB Realty became the owner of the subject premises.
ASB Realty commenced an action in the Metropolitan Trial Court for unlawful detainer of the
subject premises against petitioner Leonardo S. Umale (Umale). ASB Realty alleged that it
entered into a lease contractwith Umale. Their agreement was for Umale to conduct a
pay-parking business on the property and pay a monthly rental to ASB Realty.Upon the
contracts expiration, Umale continued occupying the premises and paying rentals albeit at an
increased monthly rental.
ASB Realty served on Umale a Notice of Termination of Lease and Demand to Vacate
and Pay. Umale failed to comply with ASB Realtys demands and continued in possession of the
subject premises, even constructing commercial establishments thereon.
Umale admitted occupying the property since 1999 by virtue of a verbal lease contract
but vehemently denied that ASB Realty was his lessor. He was adamant that his lessor was the
original owner, Amethyst Pearl. Umale further claimed that when his oral lease contract with
Amethyst Pearl ended, they both agreed on an oral contract to sell. Umale also challenged ASB
Realtys personality to recover the subject premises considering that ASB Realty had been
placed under receivership by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and a
rehabilitation receiver had been duly appointed.

ISSUE:
Whether the corporate officer of ASB Realty (duly authorized by the Board of Directors)
file suit to recover an unlawfully detained corporate property despite the fact that the corporation
had already been placed under rehabilitation.

HELD:
Yes. The Court resolves the issue in favor of ASB Realty and its officers.

Corporations, such as ASB Realty, are juridical entities that exist by operation of law. As
a creature of law, the powers and attributes of a corporation are those set out, expressly or
impliedly, in the law. Among the general powers granted by law to a corporation is the power to
sue in its own name. This power is granted to a duly-organized corporation,
unless specifically revoked by another law. Corporate rehabilitation is defined as the restoration
of the debtor to a position of successful operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continuance
of operation is economically feasible and its creditors can recover by way of the present value of
payments projected in the plan more if the corporation continues as a going concern than if it is
immediately liquidated. The intention of the law is to effect a feasible and viable rehabilitation
by preserving a floundering business as a going concern, because the assets of a business are

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
often more valuable when so maintained than they would be when liquidated. This concept of
preserving the corporations business as a going concern while it is undergoing rehabilitation is
called debtor-in-possession or debtor-in-place. This means that the debtor corporation (the
corporation undergoing rehabilitation), through its Board of Directors and corporate officers,
remains in control of its business and properties, subject only to the monitoring of the
appointed rehabilitation receiver. While the Court rules that ASB Realty and its corporate officers
retain their power to sue to recover its property and the back rentals from Umale, the necessity
of keeping the receiver apprised of the proceedings and its results is not lost upon this
Court. Tasked to closely monitor the assets of ASB Realty, the rehabilitation receiver has to be
notified of the developments in the case, so that these assets would be managed in accordance
with the approved rehabilitation plan.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JOHN ANTHONY ESPIRITU vs. MANUEL N. TANKIANSEE AND JUANITA U. TAN
G.R. No. 164153, June 13, 2011

DOCTRINE: There is forum shopping when two or more actions or proceedings, founded on
the same cause, are instituted by a party on the supposition that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition.

FACTS:
John Anthony B. Espiritu, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of Westmont Investment
Corporation, Sta. Lucia Realty and Development Corporation, Golden Era Holdings, Inc., and
Exchange Equity Corporation (Espiritu Group) and Tony Tan Caktiong and William Tan Untiong
(Tan Group) filed a Petition for Issuance of Shares of Stock and/or Return of Management and
Controlwith the Regional Trial Court of Manila against United Overseas Bank Limited, United
Overseas Bank Philippines, Manta Ray Holdings, Inc., Wee Cho Chaw, Wee Ee Cheong,
Samuel Poon Hon Thang, Ong Sea Eng, Chua Ten Hui, Wang Lian Khee and Marianne
Malate-Guerrero (UOBP Group). Manuel N. Tankiansee and Juanita U. Tan, joined by Farmix
Fertilizer Corp., and Pearlbank Securities, Inc. (intervenors), filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-In-Intervention. Following suit, the Espiritu and Tan
Groups attempted to resort to discovery procedure. On January 31, 2003, they filed a Notice to
Take Depositions. Upon Oral Examination of Manuel Tankiansee and Juanita U. Tan.While this
case was pending resolution before the appellate court or on February 2, 2004, the trial court
rendered a Decision in the main case (i.e., Civil Case No. 02-103160). From this judgment,
petitioners, except petitioner Westmont Investment Corporation, filed a notice of appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are guilty of forum shopping.

HELD:
Yes. As stated earlier, while this case was pending review before the Court of Appeals,
the trial court rendered a Decision in the main case (i.e., Civil Case No. 02-103160). From this
judgment, petitioners, except petitioner Westmont Investment Corporation, filed a notice of
appeal. With these developments, the instant petition should be denied because (1) petitioners
appeal before the appellate court is the appropriate and adequate remedy, and (2) the certiorari
petition, subject matter of this case, constitutes forum shopping. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, clearly provides that a petition for certiorari is available only when there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A petition
for certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. The existence and
the availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action
for certiorari. In the same vein, petitioner’s certiorari petition, questioning the three interlocutory
orders which denied their resort to discovery procedure, has been superseded by the filing of
their subsequent appeal before the Court of Appeals. We find that petitioners appeal from the
February 2, 2004 Decision of the trial court in the main case is the appropriate and adequate
remedy in this case as it challenges the aforesaid interlocutory orders and the decision in the
main case.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPOUSES MANUEL AND FLORENTINA DEL ROSARIO vs. GERRY ROXAS
FOUNDATION, INC.
G.R. No. 170575,June 8, 2011

DOCTRINE:The allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for are the determinants of
the nature of the action and of which court has jurisdiction over the action.

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against the respondent before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Roxas City. The complaints contain that the plaintiffs
are the true, absolute and registered owners of a parcel of land.Sometime in 1991, without the
consent and authority of the plaintiffs, defendant took full control and possession of the subject
property, developed the same and use it for commercial purposes.Plaintiffs have allowed the
defendant for several years to make use of the land without any contractual or legal
basis. Hence, defendant’s possession of the subject property is only by tolerance.But plaintiffs’
patience has come to its limits. Hence, sometime in the last quarter of 2002, plaintiffs made
several demands upon said defendant to settle and/or pay rentals for the use of the
property.Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letters, defendant failed and refused, as it
continues to fail and refuse to pay reasonable monthly rentals for the use and occupancy of the
land, and to vacate the subject premises. Consequently, defendant is unlawfully withholding
possession of the subject property from the plaintiffs, who are the owners thereof.After the
MTCC issued an Order setting the case for preliminary conference, respondent filed on a Motion
to Resolve its Defenses on Forum Shopping and Lack of Cause of Action.

ISSUE:
Whether or not in determining if there is a case for unlawful detainer, a court should limit itself in
interpreting a single phrase/allegation in the complaint.

HELD:
Yes. The Court ruled that taken in its entirety, the allegations in the complaint
establish a cause of forcible entry, not unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, one is deprived of
physical possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth. Where the defendants possession of the property is illegal ab initio, the summary action
for forcible entry (detentacion) is the remedy to recover possession.
In their Complaint, petitioners maintained that the respondent took possession and
control of the subject property without any contractual or legal basis. Assuming that these
allegations are true, it hence follows that respondents possession was illegal from the very
beginning. Therefore, the foundation of petitioners’ complaint is one for forcible entry that is the
forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without right. Thus, and
as correctly found by the CA, there can be no tolerance as petitioners alleged that respondent’s
possession was illegal at the inception.
Corollarily, since the deprivation of physical possession, as alleged inpetitioners
Complaint and as earlier discussed, was attended by strategy and force, this Court finds that the
proper remedy for the petitioners was to file a Complaint for Forcible Entry and not the instant
suit for unlawful detainer.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 120
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LUCIA RODRIGUEZ ANDPRUDENCIA RODRIGUEZ vs. TERESITA V. SALVADOR
G.R. No. 171972,June 8, 2011

DOCTRINE: Agricultural tenancy is not presumed but must be proven by the person alleging it.

FACTS:
Teresita V. Salvador filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against petitioners Lucia
(Lucia) and Prudencia Rodriguez, mother and daughter, respectively before the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Dalaguete, Cebu. Respondent alleged that she is the absolute owner of a parcel
of land and that petitioners acquired possession of the subject land by mere tolerance of her
predecessors-in-interest. Salvador alleged that despite several verbal and written demands
made by her, petitioners refused to vacate the subject land.In their Answer, petitioners
interposed the defense of agricultural tenancy. Lucia claimed that she and her deceased
husband, Serapio, entered the subject land with the consent and permission of respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest, siblings Cristino and Sana Salvador, under the agreement that Lucia
and Serapio would devote the property to agricultural production and share the produce with
the Salvador siblings. Since there is a tenancy relationship between the parties, petitioners
argued that it is the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which has
jurisdiction over the case and not the MTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners-defendants are tenants of the subject land based on
factual and legal basis and supported by substantial evidence.

HELD:
No. Agricultural tenancy exists when all the following requisites are present: 1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4)
the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between
landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee.
In this case, to prove that an agricultural tenancy relationship exists between the parties,
petitioners submitted as evidence the affidavits of petitioner Lucia and their neighbors. The
statements in the affidavits presented by the petitioners are not sufficient to prove the existence
of an agricultural tenancy. As correctly found by the CA, the element of consent is
lacking. Except for the self-serving affidavit of Lucia, no other evidence was submitted to show
that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest consented to a tenancy relationship with
petitioners. Self-serving statements, however, will not suffice to prove consent of the landowner;
independent evidence is necessary.Aside from consent, petitioners also failed to prove sharing
of harvest. The affidavits of petitioners’ neighbors declaring that respondent and her
predecessors-in-interest received their share in the harvest are not sufficient. Petitioners should
have presented receipts or any other evidence to show that there was sharing of harvest and
that there was an agreed system of sharing between them and the landowners.As we have
often said, mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land will not ipso facto make the tiller
an agricultural tenant. It is incumbent upon a person who claims to be an agricultural tenant to
prove by substantial evidence all the requisites of agricultural tenancy.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
OEB M. ALIVIADO et.al.vs. PROCTER & GAMBLE PHILS., INC., and PROMM-GEM INC.
G.R. No. 160506, June 6, 2011

DOCTRINE: The doctrine of finality of judgment provides that once a judgment has become
final and executory, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the
modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land,
as what remains to be done is the purely ministerial enforcement or execution of the judgment.

FACTS:
The Supreme Court rendered a Decisionholding: (a) that Promm-Gem, Inc.
(Promm-Gem) is a legitimate independent contractor; (b) that Sales and Promotions Services
(SAPS) is a labor-only contractor consequently its employees are considered employees of
Procter & Gamble Phils., Inc. (P&G); (c) that Promm-Gem is guilty of illegal dismissal; (d) that
SAPS/P&G is likewise guilty of illegal dismissal; (e) that petitioners are entitled to reinstatement;
and (f) that the dismissed employees of SAPS/P&G are entitled to moral damages and
attorney’s fees there being bad faith in their dismissal. P&G filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
an Opposition (to petitioners' motion for partial reconsideration), and Supplemental Opposition.
On the other hand, petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration and Comment/
Opposition (to P&G's motion for reconsideration). Before any of the parties received the notice of
Entry of Judgment, P&G filed on August 9, 2010 a Motion for Leave to File Motion to Refer the
Case to the Supreme Court En Banc with Second Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for
Clarification and a Motion to Refer the Case to the Supreme Court En Banc with Second Motion
for Reconsideration and Motion for Clarification. On October 4, 2010, P&G filed a Motion for
Leave to Admit the Attached Supplement to the Motion to Refer the Case to the Supreme Court
En Banc with Second Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Clarification as well as
a Supplement to the Motion to Refer the Case to the Supreme Court En Banc with Second
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Clarification. Thereafter, or on November 8, 2010,
P&G filed a Manifestation and Motionpraying that its Motion for Leave to File Motion to Refer the
Case to the Supreme Court En Banc with Second Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for
Clarification, Motion to Refer the Case to the Supreme Court En Banc with Second Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for Clarification, Motion for Leave to Admit the Attached
Supplement to the Motion to Refer the Case to the Supreme Court En Banc with Second Motion
for Reconsideration and Motion for Clarification as well as its Supplement to the Motion to Refer
the Case to the Supreme Court En Banc with Second Motion for Reconsideration and Motion
for Clarification, be resolved as they were filed before it received notice of the entry of judgment.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Entry of Judgment was properly issued.
2. Whether or not the P&G can file a second motion for reconsideration.

HELD:
1. Yes. The Court stressed that the issuance of the Entry of Judgment on July 27, 2010
was proper because it was made after receipt by P&G of a copy of the Resolution denying its
motion for reconsideration. Section 1, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court provides that:

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SECTION 1. Finality of decisions and resolutions. - A decision or resolution of the
Court may be deemed final after the lapse of fifteen days from receipt by the
parties of a copy of the same subject to the following:

(a) the date of receipt indicated in the registry return card signed by the party or,
in case he or she is represented by counsel, by such counsel or his or her
representative, shall be the reckoning date for counting the fifteen-day period;
and

(b) if the Judgment Division is unable to retrieve the registry return card within
thirty (30) days from mailing, it shall immediately inquire from the receiving post
office on (i) the date when the addressee received the mailed decision or
resolution, and (ii) who received the same, with the information provided by
authorized personnel of the said post office serving as the basis for the
computation of the fifteen-day period.

It is immaterial that the Entry of Judgment was made without the Court having first resolved
P&Gs second motion for reconsideration. This is because the issuance of the entry of judgment
is reckoned from the time the parties received a copy of the resolution denying the first motion
for reconsideration. The filing by P&G of several pleadings after receipt of the resolution denying
its first motion for reconsideration does not in any way bar the finality or entry of
judgment. Besides, to reckon the finality of a judgment from receipt of the denial of
the second motion for reconsideration would be absurd. First, the Rules of Court and the
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court prohibit the filing of a second motion for
reconsideration. Second, some crafty litigants may resor

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
FELIXBERTO ABELLANA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
SPS. SAAPIA B. ALONTO AND DIAGA ALONTO
G.R. No. 174654

DOCTRINE: It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal


shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of
the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case,
the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist.

FACTS:
Abellana extended a loan to Sps. Alonto, secured by a deed of real estate mortgage.
Subsequently, Abellana prepared a deed of absolute sale conveying said lots to him,
which Sps. Alonto signed in Manila but was notarized by Abellana in Cebu without the
Alonto’s appearing before the notary. Thereafter, Abellana caused the transfer of the
titles to his name and sold the lots to third persons.

Sometime later, an information was filed against Abellana for Estafa and falsification
of Public Document.

The RTC ruled that Abellana is only guilty of falsification of a public document by
private individuals and not of estafa through falsification of public document. RTC noted
that Abellana did not intend to defraud the Alonto’s; that after the latter failed to pay their
obligation, Abellana prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale which the Alonto’s actually signed,
but the DOA was notarized without the Alonto’s personally appearing before the notary
public.

On appeal to the CA, the CA held that Abellana who was charged with and arraigned
for estafa through falsification of public document (Article 171 (1)) could not be convicted
of falsification of public document by a private individual. (Article 171 (2)) The CA opined
that the conviction of Abellana for an offense not alleged in the Information or one not
necessarily included in the offense charged violated his constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Nevertheless, the CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC with respect to the civil liabilities.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abellana could still be held civilly liable despite his acquittal by the
trial court and the CA.

HELD:
No. Abellana could not be held civilly liable.

For civil liability to arise, one must by his own act or omission, done intentionally, or
negligently, causes damage to another.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
For Abellana to be civilly liable to the Alonto’s, it must be proven that the acts he
committed had caused damage to the spouses. Based on the records of the case, the
acts allegedly committed by Abellana did not cause any damage to the Alonto’s.

First, the Alonto’s actually signed the DOA. Second, the non appearance of the
Alonto’s before the notary public for the notarization does not necessarily nullify or render
void ab initio the parties’ transaction. Since the defective notarization does not invalidate
the DOA, the transfer of said properties from the Alonto’s to Abellna remains valid. Hence,
Abellana caused the cancellation of Sps. Alonto’s title and the issuance of new ones
under his name, and thereafter sold the same to third persons.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 125
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ATIKO TRANS, INC and CHENG LIE NAVIGATION CO., vs. PRUDENTIAL
GUARANTEE AND ASSURANCE, INC.
G.R. No. 167545, August 17, 2011

DOCTRINE(S): Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be acquired not only by
proper service of summons but also by defendant’s voluntary appearance without
expressly objecting to the court’s jurisdiction.

The filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional
time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default
with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of
the court.

The issue of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant must be seasonably raised.

Defendant cannot be declared in default unless such declaration is preceded by a


valid service of summons.

FACTS:
Fourty (40) coils of electrolytic tinplates were loaded on board a ship in Taiwan for
shipment to Manila. The shipment was covered by a bill of lading issued by Cheng Lie
Navigation (a Taiwanese corporation) with Oriental Tin Can as the notify party. The
cargoes were insured against all risk by Prudential Guarantee.

Upon the arrival of the shipment in Manila, it was found out that one of the tinplates
was damaged. Oriental then filed a claim against Prudential which it paid.

Prudential then filed a complaint for sum of money against Cheng Lie and Atiko
(authorized agent of Cheng Lie) before the MeTC of Makati. Later on, Prudential filed a
motion to declare defendant in default alleging that a copy of the summons was served
upon Atiko’s cashier Cristina Figueroa and despite receipt thereof, Atiko failed to file any
responsive pleadings. MeTC ordered Atiko in default and subsequently rendered
judgment in favor of Prudential.

Atiko filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC of Makati.

In its Memorandum, Atiko and Cheng Lie argued that the MeTC never acquired
jurisdiction over its person. RTC dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the
MeTC. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not MeTC acquired jurisdiction over Cheng Lie and Atiko?

HELD:
MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over Atiko.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 126
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
It is true that Atiko is a domestic corporation, and service of summons may be made
only upon the persons enumerated in Sec. 11 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. However,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be acquired not only by proper service of
summons but also by defendant’s voluntary appearance without expressly objecting to
the court’s jurisdiction.

When Atiko filed its Notice of Appeal, Memorandum of Appeal, Motion for
Reconsideration, and Petition for Review, it never questioned the jurisdiction of the MeTC
over its person. The filing of these pleadings seeking affirmative relief amounted to
voluntary appearance and, hence, rendered the alleged lack of jurisdiction moot.

Moreover, Atiko’s contention is a mere afterthought. It was only in their Memorandum


with the SC where they claimed, for the first time, that Atiko was not properly served with
summons. It has been held in a litany of cases that the issue of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant must be seasonably raised. Failing to do so, a party who invoked
the jurisdiction of a court to secure an affirmative relief cannot be allowed to disavow such
jurisdiction after unsuccessfully trying to obtain relief.

MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over Cheng Lie.

In the present case, no summons was served upon Cheng Lie in any manner
prescribed by the Rules of Court (Sec.12, Rule 14). It should be recalled that Atiko was
not properly served with summons. The MeTC acquired jurisdiction over Atiko thru its
voluntary appearance. Thus, since there being no proper service of summons to Atiko to
speak of, it follows that the MeTc never acquired jurisdiction over the person of Cheng
Lie. Cheng Lie’s filing of numerous pleadings cannot be considered as voluntary
appearance, since it never sought affirmative relief other than the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person.

Thus, Cheng Lie cannot be served in default since such declaration must be
preceded by a valid service of summons.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 127
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
EUGENIO BASBAS ET AL., vs. BEATA SAYSON and ROBERTO SAYSON
G.R. No. 172660, August 24, 2011

DOCTRINE: What distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary judgment


is the presence of issues in the Answer to the complaint. When the answer fails to tender
any issue a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. On the other hand, when the
Answer specifically denies the averments of the complaint or asserts affirmative
defenses, a summary judgment is proper provide that the issue raised is not genuine.

FACTS:
In 1976, Sps. Sayson filed a Petition for Registration of an agricultural land located in
Leyte. Said application was opposed by the State and Eugenio Basbas Sr.. The CFI
rendered a decision adjudicating to Sps. Sayson said agricultural land and approving its
registration. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. The CA decision
became final and executory, accordingly a writ of possession was issued but was never
implemented.

In 1986, an OCT was issued to the Sps. Sayson pursuant to the CFI Decision. In
1989, an Alias Writ of Possession was issued but could not be implemented because of
the refusal of Basbas, claiming that the land they occupied is not the same land subject of
the CFI decision. A relocation survey was conducted by the order of the RTC of Ormoc
city.

In 1989, the RTC ordered Basbas to vacate the subject property. However the 1989
order was not implemented within the 5 year period from the time it became final. Hence
Sayson filed a complaint for revival of judgment. In the answer of Basbas, he admitted the
following: (1) the land registration case was decided in favor of the Sps. Sayson; (2) the
said decision became final and executor; (3) OCT was issued in the name of the Sps.
Sayson; (4) there was a relocation order. Furthermore, Basbas contended that the Order
sought to be revived is not the judgment contemplated under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court, hence the action for revival of judgment is improper Also they averred that they
cannot be made parties to be complaint of revival of judgment as they were not parties to
the land registration case (the petitioners here are heirs succeeding the original parties in
this case). Thus order sought to be revived is not binding upon them. Sayson
subsequently filed an omnibus motion for judgment on the pleadings and/or summary
judgment.

RTC ruled in favor of Sayson. On appeal, the CA denied the appeal. However it noted
that Basbas’ answer admitted almost all of the allegations in Sayson’s complaint. Hence
the RTC committed no reversible error when it granted Sayson’s motion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC was correct in granting the Omnibus Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment?

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 128
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
Judgment on the Pleadings is not proper; Summary Judgment is proper.

What distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary judgment is the


presence of issues in the Answer to the Complaint. When the Answer fails to tender any
issue, that is, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said
material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by admitting the truthfulness thereof
and/or omitting to deal with them at all, a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. On the
other hand, when the Answer specifically denies the material averments of the complaint
or asserts affirmative defenses, or in other words raises an issue, a summary judgment is
proper provided that the issue raised is not genuine.

Judgment on the pleadings is not proper because petitioners’ Answer tendered


issues.

In this case, we note that while petitioners’ Answer to respondents’ Complaint


practically admitted all the material allegations therein, it nevertheless asserts the
affirmative defenses that the action for revival of judgment is not the proper action and
that petitioners are not the proper parties. As issues obviously arise from these affirmative
defenses, a judgment on the pleadings is clearly improper in this case.
However, before we consider this case appropriate for the rendition of summary
judgment, an examination of the issues raised, that is, whether they are genuine issues or
not, should first be made.
The issues raised are not genuine issues; hence rendition of summary judgment is
proper.
To resolve the issues of whether a revival of judgment is the proper action and
whether respondents are the proper parties thereto, the RTC merely needed to examine
the following: 1) the RTC Order dated September 13, 1989, to determine whether same is
a judgment or final order contemplated under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court;
and, 2) the pleadings of the parties and pertinent portions of the records showing, among
others, who among the respondents were oppositors to the land registration case, the
heirs of such oppositors and the present occupants of the property.
Plainly, these issues could be readily resolved based on the facts established by
the pleadings. A full-blown trial on these issues will only entail waste of time and
resources as they are clearly not genuine issues requiring presentation of evidence.
Petitioners aver that the RTC should not have granted respondents’ Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment because of the controverted stipulations
and the issues enumerated in the Pre-trial Order, which, according to them, require the
presentation of evidence. These stipulations and issues, however, when examined,
basically boil down to questions relating to the propriety of the action resorted to by
respondents, which is revival of judgment, and to the proper parties thereto – the same
questions which we have earlier declared as not constituting genuine issues.

In sum, this Court holds that the instant case is proper for the rendition of a
summary judgment, hence, the CA committed no error in affirming the Order of the RTC
granting respondents’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 129
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
RADITO AURELIO y REYES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R.No. 174980, August 31, 2011

DOCTRINE: Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses that refer to trivial and


insignificant details do not destroy their credibility; Testimonies of witnesses need only to
corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the principal
occurrence.

FACTS:
Chief Police Inspector Bien Calag instructed SPO2 Julius Bacero to verify a report of
rampant selling of Shabu in Brgy. Harapin and bukas, Mandaluyong City. Bacero and
PO1 Ronald Jacuba proceeded to the area to conduct surveillance. An informant directed
them to the house where the sale of shabu was being conducted. Thereafter, upon return
of the police officers, Calag formed a buy-bust team then proceeded to the house of
Aurelio. After Aurelio handed the shabu to Bacero, Jacuba arrived and together with
Bacero arrested Aurelio.
Aurelio denied the allegations and argued he was staying at a friend’s house
watching TV. He only went out to buy cigarettes but suddenly was apprehended by the
police officers.
Petitioner asserts that the credibility of the prosecution witness is adversely affected
by several inconsistencies in their testimonies. These inaccuracies consist of the
following: (a) the information regarding petitioner’s illegal sale of shabu was not entered in
the police blotter; (b) the participation of Bacero in the test-buy with the petitioner is not
clear, because if it is true that the test-buy yielded positive result, then, Bacero should
have arrested petitioner, (c) Bacero vacillated in his declaration that he has personal
knowledge regarding petitioner illegal activities (d) the testimonies of Bacero and Jacuba
regarding the surveillance on the petitioner contradict each other; (e) length of time
Bacero waited for the petitioner to return with the shabu is incredulous and cannot be
ascertained if it was three minutes or three seconds; (f) testimonies of said officers on the
buy bust money was recovered also oppose each other.
The RTC convicted Aurelio. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the RTC erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses due to several inconsistencies.

HELD:
After a thorough review of the inconsistencies mentioned by the petitioner, the Court
found that they do not relate to the elements of the offenses committed. They tend to
focus on minor and insignificant matters. These inconsistencies do not detract from the
fact that the prosecution’s key witness who conducted the entrapment, identified the
petitioner as the same person who sold the shabu to him and from whose possession
another plastic sachet was recovered.
Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses that refer to trivial and insignificant
details do not destroy their credibility. Moreover, minor inconsistencies serve to
strengthen rather than diminish the prosecution’s case as they tend to erase any

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 130
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed thereby negating any misgiving that
the same were perjured.

Testimonies of witnesses need only to corroborate each other on important and


relevant details concerning the principal occurrence.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 131
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
AGAPITO ROM et al. vs. ROXAS & COMPANY, INC
G.R. No. 169331, September 5, 2011

DOCTRINE: Findings of fact of qusi-judicial bodies which have acquired expertise to


specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even with finality.

FACTS:
Respondent filed an application with the DAR seeking for the exemption of a parcel of
land located in Nasugbu, Batangas from the coverage of CARP. Respondent asserted
that that the CARL covers only agricultural land. Respondent claimed that prior to the
effectivity of the CARL the lands subject of the application were already re-classified as
part of the residential cluster by a zoning ordinance which was approved by the HLURB.

DAR denied the application because the application was not accompanied by proof of
disturbance compensation as required by its rules. To comply with the requirement,
respondent offered payment of disturbance compensation and attempted to obtain the
required waivers from petitioners, who are the farmer-beneficiaries of the subject parcels
of land. However, the parties failed to reach an agreement as regards the amount, hence,
respondent filed a petition to fix disturbance compensation before the PARAD of
Batangas.

PARAD granted the application. Petitioner’s filed an MR arguing that the certifications
(dated 1997 and 1998) on which the application was based was superseded by a
Sanguniang Bayan Resolution in 1993. Further they argued that the application for
exemption is already barred by laches or estoppel considering the CLOAs have been
issued to petitioners in 1991 and that since then they have been occupying the subject
parcels of land in the concept of an owner. MR denied by the PARAD.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA arguing that the DAR has no
jurisdiction of the application since the application submitted by respondent lacks the
necessary proof of payment of disturbance compensation and they further argued that
such payment was a condition sine qua non before DAR could take cognizance of the
application by respondent. The CA denied the petition for being the improper remedy. CA
held that petitioner’s should have filed a Petition for Review under rule 43 of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the parcel of land subject of the application may be exempted from the
coverage of CARL.

HELD:
The documents submitted by respondent to support its application for exemption
clearly show that the parcels of land, specifically identified, were already re-classified as
residential prior to the effectivity of the CARL.”Well settled is the rule that findings of fact
of xxx quasi-judicial bodies (like the DAR) which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only great respect

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 132
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
but even finality. They are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave
abuse of discretion or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in
utter disregard of the evidence of on record.”

The Court finds that respondent has substantially complied with the requirement of
submitting the proof of payment of disturbance compensation. Records show that upon
being required by PARAD to submit proof of payment of disturbance compensation,
respondent exerted efforts to comply with the said requirement but failed to agree on the
price.

Further, Sec. 61 of R.A. 6657 clearly mandates that judicial review of DAR orders or
decisions are governed by the Rules of Court. Thus, petitioners resorted to a wrong mode
of appeal. Petitioner’s should have assailed before the CA the orders of the DAR through
a petition for Review under Rule 43.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 133
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ELENA JANE DUARTE vs. MIGUEL SAMUEL A.E. DURAN
G.R. No. 173038, September 14, 2011

DOCTRINE: Fresh period rule; Litigants must be given a fresh period of 15 days within
which to appeal counted from the receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration under Rules 40, 41, 42, 42 and 45 of the Rules of Court; ruling
retroactively applies even to cases pending prior to the promulgation of Neypes, there
being no vested rights in the rules of procedure.

A contract of sale is perfected the moment the parties agree upon the object of the
sale, the price, and the terms of payment; Once perfected, the parties are bound by it
whether the contract is verbal or in writing because no form is required,.

FACTS:
Respondent offered to sell a laptop for the sum of 15k to petitioner thru the help of a
common friend Josephine Dy. Since petitioner was undecided, respondent left the laptop
with petitioner for two days. Later on, petitioner informed respondent that she was willing
to buy the laptop on installment. Petitioner proposed that she will pay 5k as initial payment
and promised to pay 3k and 7k later on, to which respondent agreed.

Subsequently, petitioner gave her second installment to Josephine, who signed the
handwritten receipt allegedly made by petitioner as proof of payment. But when Dy
returned to get the remaining balance, petitioner only offered to pay 2k claiming that the
laptop was only worth 10k. Due to the refusal of petitioner to pay the remaining balance,
respondent sent petitioner a demand letter.

Petitioner denied writing the receipt and receiving the demand letter. Petitioner
claimed that there was no contract of sale. Petitioner claimed that Josephine offered to
sell respondent’s laptop but because petitioner was not interested in buying it, Josephine
asked if petitioner could instead lend respondent money with the laptop as collateral.
Petitioner gave the money under the agreement that the amounts she lent to respondent
would be considered as partial payments for the laptop in case she decides to buy it. Later
on, petitioner informed respondent that she has finally decided not to buy the laptop.
Respondent, however, refused to pay and insisted that petitioner purchase the laptop
instead.

MTCC ruled in favor of respondent. It found that the receipt and the testimonies of
respondent and Dy were sufficient to prove that there was a contract of sale. On appeal,
the RTC reversed the decision of the MTCC, and held that the receipt shows no proof of
conformity or acknowledgement on the part of the petitioner. On petition for review with
the CA, the appellate court reversed the decision of the RTC and reinstated the decision
of the MTCC. It held that the RTC erred in not giving weight and credence to the demand
letter. The CA pointed out that petitioner failed to overturn the presumption that the
demand letter sent by respondent by registered mail was received by her, neither was she
able to deny the genuineness and due execution of the receipt.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Petitioner contends that the filing of the Petition for Review with the CA was
beyond the reglementary period. Records show that respondent received a copy of the
RTC decision on March 25, 2004, filed a MR on April 12, 2004 since April 9 and 10 were
holidays and April 11, 2004 was a Sunday, and received a copy of the RTC Order denying
his MR on May 27, 2004. Thus, he only had one day left from May 27, 2004 to file a
Petition for Review with the CA. Petitioner likewise denies the existence of a contract of
sale, insisting that the laptop was not sold to her but was given as a security for
respondent’s debt.

Respondent argues that his Petition for review was timely filed with the CA because
he has 15 days from receipt of the RTC Order within to file the Petition for Review with the
CA. Further, respondent argued that the receipt is an actionable document, and thus,
petitioner’s failure to deny under oath its genuineness and due execution constitutes
execution thereof. In addition, petitioner’s denial of the receipt of the demand letter cannot
overcome the presumption that the said letter was received in the regular course of mail.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent’s Petition for Review with the CA was timely filed;
Whether or not there was a perfected contract of sale?

HELD:
Petition for Review was timely filed.

To standardize the appeal periods and afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their
cases, the SC ruled in Neypes vs CA that litigants must be given a fresh period of 15 days
within which to appeal, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial
or motion for reconsideration. Such pronouncement retroactively applies even to cases
pending prior to the promulgation of Neypes, there being no vested rights in the rules of
procedure.

Since the instant case was pending in the CA at the time Neypes was promulgated,
respondent is entitled to a fresh period of 15 days counted from the date respondent
received the RTC Order denying his MR within which to file his Petition for Review.

There was a contract of sale. The absence of a written contract of sale does not mean
otherwise.

A contract of sale is perfected the moment the parties agree upon the object of the
sale, the price and the terms of payment. Once perfected, the parties are bound by it
whether the contract is verbal or in writing because no form is required. The absence of a
written contract is not fatal to respondent’s case. Respondent only needed to show by a
preponderance of evidence that there was an oral contract of sale, which he did by
submitting evidence his own affidavit,, the affidavit of his witness Josephine and the
demand letter.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 135
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
FERDINAND A. CRUZ vs. JUDGE HENRICK F. GINGOYON and
JUDGE JESUS B. MUPAS
G.R. No. 170404, September 28, 2011

DOCTRINE: A pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements


submitted to the court or the judge in which the proceedings are pending is equivalent to
“misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
proceedings before the same” within the meaning of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and
therefore, constitutes direct contempt.

FACTS:
The case stemmed from a civil complaint filed by petitioner against Benjamin Mina in
the RTC of Pasay City for abatement of nuisance. Petitioner sought redress from the
court to declare as a nuisance the “basketball goal” which was permanently attached to
the 2nd floor of Mina’s residence but protrudes to the alley which serves as the public’s
only right of way. Mina was declared in default hence petitioner presented his evidence
ex-parte.
After trial, Judge Gingoyon in his decision declared the basketball goal as a public
nuisance but dismissed the case on the ground that petitioner lacked locus standi. Judge
Gingoyon ruled that the action for abatement of nuisance should be commenced by the
city or municipal mayor and not by a private individual like the petitioner and further
narrated a detailed description of what has been happening in the alley subject of the civil
case.
Petitioner then filed an MR and accused Judge Gingoyon to be communicating with
Mina off-record as it pictured a detailed description of the alley in its decision. Petitioner
argued that it’s impossible for Judge Gingoyon to picture such detailed description when it
is only petitioner who presented its evidence ex parte while the defendant Mina was
declared in default.
Judge Gingoyon issued an Order finding petitioner guilty of direct contempt of court
ordered the arrest of petitioner. Petitioner on his part filed an ex parte motion to post bond
and quast warrant of arrest. Petitioner then filed with the SC a Petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent court properly adjudged petitioner in direct contempt of court

HELD:
A pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the
court or judge wherein proceedings are pending has been held to be equivalent to
misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
proceedings before the same within the meaning of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
therefore, constitutes direct contempt.

The MR filed by petitioner contained a serious allegation that Judge Gingoyon has
been communicating with the defendant off the record, which is considered as a grave
offense. This allegation is unsubstantiated and totally bereft of factual basis. In fact, when

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
asked to adduce proof of the allegation, petitioner was not able to give any, but repeatedly
argued that is is his “fair observation or conclusion.”

The act of petitioner in openly accusing Judge Gingoyon of communicating with Mina
off the record, without factual basis, brings the court into disrepute and exposes Judge
Gingoyon to severe reprimand and even removal from office.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Ho Wai Pang vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011

DOCTRINE:Infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation or the


so-called Miranda Rights render inadmissible only the extra-judicial confession or
admission made during such investigation. The admissibility of other evidence, provided
they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected
even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.

FACTS:
On September 6, 1991, at around 11:30 in the evening, United Arab Emirates Airlines
Flight No. 068 from Hongkong arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA).
Among the passengers were 13 Hongkong nationals who came to the Philippines as
tourists. At the arrival area, the group leader Wong Kwok Wah (Sonny Wong) presented a
Baggage Declaration Form to Customs Examiner Gilda L. Cinco (Cinco), who was then
manning Lane 8 of the Express Lane. Cinco examined the baggages of each of the 13
passengers as their turn came up. From the first travelling bag, she saw few personal
belongings such as used clothing, shoes and chocolate boxes which she pressed.
When the second bag was examined, she noticed chocolate boxes which were almost of
the same size as those in the first bag. Becoming suspicious, she took out four of the
chocolate boxes and opened one of them. Instead of chocolates what she saw inside
was white crystalline substance contained in a white transparent plastic. Cinco thus,
immediately called the attention of her immediate superiors Duty Collector Alalo and
Customs Appraiser Nora Sancho who advised her to call the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) and the police. Thereupon, she guided the tourists to the Intensive Counting
Unit (ICU) while bringing with her the four chocolate boxes earlier discovered.
At the ICU, all in all, 18 chocolate boxes were recovered from the baggages of the six
accused. NARCOM Agent Neowillie de Castro, after conducting the Mandelline Re-Agent
test, found that the white crystalline substance is positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.
On September 7, 1991, the 13 tourists were brought to the NBI for further
questioning. The forensic chemist’s findings revealed that the representative samples
were positive for methampethamine hydrochloride and its total weight was 31.126
kilograms.
On September 19, 1991, six informations were filed. The reinvestigation conducted
gave way to a finding of conspiracy among the accused. Thus, a single Amended
Information under Criminal Case No. 91-1592 was filed and all the other Informations
were withdrawn.On April 6, 1995, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision finding all
the accused guilty of violating Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
On June 16, 2006, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal and affirmed the decision
of RTC. While conceding that petitioner’s constitutional right to counsel during custodial
investigation was indeed violated, it nevertheless went on to hold that there were other
evidence sufficient to warrant his conviction.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 138
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ISSUE:
Whether or not infraction of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation
render inadmissible evidence other than extra-judicial confession or admission made
during such investigation.

HELD:
NO. The Court categorically ruled that the infractions of the so called Miranda rights
render inadmissible only the extra-judicial confession or admission made during
custodial investigation. The admissibility of other evidence provided they are relevant to
the issue and not otherwise excluded by law or rules, are not affected even if obtained or
taken in the course of custodial investigation.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 139
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PABLO POLSOTIN, JR. ARWIN RAYALA, GERONIMO LIMPANTE, RAUL DOMDOM
and OSCAR ANDRIN vs. DE GUIA ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 172624, December 5, 2011

DOCTRINE:A worker cannot be deprived of his job, a property right, without satisfying the
requirement of due process. As enshrined in our bill of rights, no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

FACTS:
Petitioners Polsotin, Rayala, Limpante, Domdom and Andrin (petitioners) were bus drivers
and conductors of respondent De Guia Enterprises, Inc. (respondent). Alleging that they were
dismissed without cause and due process, petitioners filed on July 17, 2001 a complaint for
illegal dismissal and payment of backwages and damages against respondent before the
NLRC.

During the hearings set before the Labor Arbiter, respondent failed to appear despite due
notice.It likewise failed to timely submit its position paper. Thus, on the last hearing held on
January 14, 2002, the case was submitted for decision.

On February 8, 2002, respondent filed its position paper without furnishing petitioners a
copy of the same. On December 27, 2002, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decisiondismissing
petitioners complaint for lack of merit. It held that petitioners were validly terminated from
employment for violation of company rules and regulations as well as for gross and habitual
neglect of duties as supported by petitioners employment records submitted by
respondent. The Labor Arbiter added that the procedural requirements for dismissing petitioners
were likewise satisfied.
Petitioners appeal before the NLRC was dismissed purely on technical grounds as it did
not contain the required certification of non-forum shopping and proof of service upon the
respondent. Immediately, petitioners rectified these lapses by filing their motion for
reconsideration indicating therein that there was no intention on their part to commit forum
shopping and that the registry receipt showing proof of service upon respondent was attached to
their Memorandum of Appeal filed with the NLRC. With respect to their petition for certiorari with
the CA, petitioners failed to affix their individual signatures on top of their typewritten names in
the verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the petition. On this basis and
on the conclusion that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
petitioners appeal on technical grounds, the CA denied due course to the petition and dismissed
the same.

Note, however, that in both instances, petitioners were not represented by a


lawyer. They had no counsel on record and had been filing and signing all pleadings only
through their representative, petitioner Rayala.

ISSUE:
Whether or not in spite of technicalities, the petitioner’s appeal should have been
given due course.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
YES. The Court has often set aside the strict application of procedural technicalities to
serve the broader interest of substantial justice. It bears stressing that the dismissal of an
employees appeal on purely technical ground is inconsistent with the constitutional mandate on
protection to labor. Aware that petitioners are not represented by counsel, the CA could have
been more prudent by giving petitioners time to engage the services of a lawyer or at least by
reminding them of the importance of retaining one. It is worthy to mention at this point that the
right to counsel, being intertwined with the right to due process, is guaranteed by the
Constitution to any person whether the proceeding is administrative, civil or criminal. Indeed,
labor tribunals are mandated to use all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedily, objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure. However, in every
proceeding before it, the fundamental and essential requirements of due process should not to
be ignored but must at all times be respected. Besides, petitioners case concerns their job,
considered as a property right, of which they could not be deprived of without due process

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 141
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MARIALY O. SY, et al., vs. FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CO., INC.
G.R. No. 182915, December 20, 2011

DOCTRINE:Although as a rule, modes of service of summons are strictly followed in


order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, such
procedural modes, however, are liberally construed in quasi-judicial proceedings,
substantial compliance with the same being considered adequate. Moreover, jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired not only by service of summons
but also by voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority. Appearance by
a legal advocate is such voluntary submission to a court’s jurisdiction. It may be made not
only by actual physical appearance but likewise by the submission of pleadings in
compliance with the order of the court or tribunal.

FACTS:
Fairland is a domestic corporation engaged in garments business, while Susan de
Leon (Susan) is the owner/proprietress of Weesan Garments (Weesan).On the other hand, the
complaining workers (the workers) are sewers, trimmers, helpers, a guard and a secretary who
were hired by Weesan.

On December 23, 2002, workers Marialy O. Sy, Vivencia Penullar, Aurora Aguinaldo,
Gina Aniano, Gemma dela Pea and Efremia Matias filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC
a Complaint for underpayment and/or non-payment of wages, overtime pay, premium pay for
holidays, 13th month pay and other monetary benefits against Susan/Weesan. In January 2003,
the rest of the aforementioned workers also filed similar complaints. Eventually all the cases
were consolidated as they involved the same causes of action.

On February 5, 2003, Weesan filed before the Department of Labor and


Employment-National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) a report on its temporary closure for a
period of not less than six months. As the workers were not anymore allowed to work on that
same day, they filed on February 18, 2003 an Amended Complaint, and on March 13, 2003,
another pleading entitled Amended Complaints and Position Paper for Complainants, to include
the charge of illegal dismissal and impleaded Fairland and its manager, Debbie Manduabas
(Debbie), as additional respondents.

A Notice of Hearing was thereafter sent to Weesan requesting it to appear before Labor
Arbiter Ramon Valentin C. Reyes (Labor Arbiter Reyes) on April 3, 2003, at 10:00 a.m. On said
date and time, Atty. Antonio A. Geronimo (Atty. Geronimo) appeared as counsel for Weesan
and requested for an extension of time to file his clients position paper. On the next hearing on
April 28, 2003, Atty. Geronimo also entered his appearance for Fairland and again requested for
an extension of time to file position paper.

On May 16, 2003, Atty. Geronimo filed two separate position papers one for
Fairland[15] and another for Susan/Weesan. The Position Paper for Fairland was verified by
Debbie while the one for Susan/Weesan was verified by Susan. To these pleadings, the workers
filed a Reply.[17]Atty. Geronimo then filed a Consolidated Reply verified both by Susan and
Debbie.On November 25, 2003, the workers submitted their Rejoinder.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. Said
decision was set aside by the NLRC. Thus, Fairland, for the second time now through Atty.
Melina O. Tecson filed MR assailing jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and NLRC, claiming that it
was never summoned to appear, but denied by the NLRC. Hence, a Petition for Certiorari was
filed but CAs first division denied the same. Since a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition was granted,
the case now was transferred to CAs Special Ninth Division that granted the MR.

On May 9, 2008, the CA now reversed the First Division’s ruling. It held that the labor
tribunals did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Fairland. Aggrieved, the workers filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorati docketed as G.R. No. 182915.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the labor tribunal validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant.

HELD:
YES. Jurisdiction over the person of Fairland and Debbie was acquired through their
voluntary appearance.Appearance by a legal advocate is such voluntary submission to a
court’s jurisdiction. It may be made not only by actual physical appearance but likewise by
the submission of pleadings in compliance with the order of the court or tribunal.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MAKILITO B. MAHINAY vs. HON. IRENEO LEE GAKO JR, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 5, Cebu City and JOCELYN B. SORENSEN
G.R. No. 165338, November 28, 2011

DOCTRINE: Verification of pleading is not an empty ritual bereft of any legal importance. It is
intended to secure an assurance that the allegations contained in the pleading are true and
correct; are not speculative or merely imagined; and have been made in good faith. A pleading
may be verified by stating that the pleaders have read the allegations in their petition and that the
same are true and correct based either on their personal knowledge or authentic records, or
based both on their personal knowledge and authentic records. While the rule gives the
pleaders several ways of verifying their pleading, the use of the phrase personal
knowledge or authentic records is not without any legal signification and the pleaders are not at
liberty to choose any of these phrases fancifully.

FACTS:
Constantina H. Sanchez, Josefina H. Lopez and Susan Honoridez are the registered
owners parcel of land known as Lot 5 located in Cebu City. On July 25, 1994, Mahinay filed a
complaint for specific performance against the owners and one Felimon Suarez to compel them
to convey Lot 5 to him. In traversing Mahinays allegations, the owners asserted that they did not
violate Mahinays preferential right to buy as the transaction between them and Suarez was
actually an equitable mortgage, and not a sale. The RTC rendered a Decision debunking the
owners theory of equitable mortgage. It held that the notarized documents Mahinay presented,
particularly the Deed of Absolute Sale, outweigh the owners evidence consisting of private
documents which was affirmed by the CA. Sorensen thus filed with the CA a petition
for certiorari. In a Resolution promulgated on April 24, 2007, however, the CA outrightly
dismissed Sorensens petition for her failure to state that the allegations in her petition are true
and correct not only based on her personal knowledge but also based on authentic records.

ISSUE:
WON the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Sorensens petition for certiorari.

HELD:
NO.The rule requiring certain pleadings to be verified is embodied in Section 4, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court. It reads:SEC. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required bylaw
or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.A pleading is
verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are
true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.A pleading required to
be verified which contains a verification based on information and belief, or upon knowledge,
information and belief, or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Verification of pleading is not an empty ritual bereft of any legal importance. It is intended
to secure an assurance that the allegations contained in the pleading are true and correct; are
not speculative or merely imagined; and have been made in good faith. A pleading may be
verified by stating that the pleaders have read the allegations in their petition and that the same
are true and correct based either on their personal knowledge or authentic records, or based
both on their personal knowledge and authentic records. While the rule gives the pleaders
several ways of verifying their pleading, the use of the phrase personal knowledge or authentic

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
records is not without any legal signification and the pleaders are not at liberty to choose any of
these phrases fancifully. Hun Hyung Park v. Eung Won Choi teaches us when to properly
use authentic records in verifying a pleading:[A]uthentic records as a basis for verification bear
significance in petitions wherein the greater portions of the allegations are based on the records
of the proceedings in the court of origin and/or the court a quo, and not solely on the personal
knowledge of the petitioner. To illustrate, petitioner himself could not have affirmed, based on his
personal knowledge, the truthfulness of the statement in his petition before the CA that at the
pre-trial conference respondent admitted having received the letter of demand, because he
(petitioner) was not present during the conference. Hence, petitioner needed to rely on the
records to confirm its veracity.
In her CA petition, Sorensen questioned the September 1, 2006 and September 18,
2006 Orders of Judge Gako which respectively granted Mahinays Reiteratory Motion and
denied her Motion for Reconsideration. In addition to said Orders and Motions, and to support
the allegations in her petition, Sorensen also attached copies of the August 12, 2005 Decision of
this Court in G.R. No. 153762 and other material portions of the records of Civil Case No.
CEB-16335. Quite obviously, Sorensen had no participation in the preparation and execution of
these documents although they constitute the main bulk of her evidence. Hence, it was
necessary for Sorensen to state in the verification that the allegations in her petition are true and
correct not only based on her personal knowledge but also based on the information she
gathered from authentic records. The CA is, therefore, correct in its observation that Sorensens
verification is insufficient.
Nonetheless, the Rules and jurisprudence on the matter have it that the court may allow
such deficiency to be remedied. In Altres v. Empleo, this Court pronounced for the guidance of
the bench and the bar that non-compliance x x x or a defect [in the verification] does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or
correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance
with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the needs of justice may be served
thereby.Pitted against this test, we sustain the CA for not taking a liberal stance in resolving
Sorensens petition for certiorari as the dismissal thereof did not impair or affect her substantive
rights.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs. MANUEL P. BESITAN
G.R. No. 178901, November 23, 2011

DOCTRINE:In compensation proceedings, the test of proof is probability, not absolute


certainty; hence a claimant only needs to show reasonable work connection and not
direct causal relation.

FACTS:
Petitioner GSIS is a social insurance institution created under Commonwealth Act (CA) No.
186, charged with the management and administration of the trust fund of the Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC) for government officials and employees.

Respondent Besitan was employed by the Central Bank of the Philippines (now Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas) on January 21, 1976 as a Bank Examiner. Subsequently, he was promoted
as Bank Officer II and eventually as Bank Officer III. His duties and responsibilities are as follows:

1. Heads a team of examiners in the conduct of regular/special examination of


rural banks;
2. Submits report of examination/memoranda to MB and other reports related
to examination;
3. Confers with Head/Top Management of rural banks under examination;
4. Monitors, verifies, and analyzes various periodic and special reports required
of rural banks to ascertain, among others, compliance with pertinent laws and
regulations, and prepares reports corresponding thereto;
5. Evaluates, processes, and prepares memoranda/reports on various
requests such as the establishment of branches/banking offices and
investments in allied undertakings/subsidiaries/affiliates, both locally and
abroad; as well as prepares appropriate recommendations on
requests/complaints received from the public, etc.;
6. Performs related duties as may be assigned.

In October 2005, Besitan was diagnosed with End Stage Renal Disease secondary to
Chronic Glomerulonephritis and thus, had to undergo a kidney transplant at the National Kidney
and Transplant Institute (NKTI), for which he incurred medical expenses amounting
to P817,455.40.

Believing that his working condition increased his risk of contracting the disease, Besitan
filed with the GSIS a claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 626,
as amended. The GSIS, however, denied the claim in a letter dated May 2, 2006. Besitan
sought reconsideration in a letter dated June 6, 2006; but the GSIS denied the same in a letter
dated June 20, 2006. The Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed the appealed
decision ratiocinating that there is no substantial evidence to prove that the illness was directly
caused by the employees duties. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the ECC. The CA
ruled that Besitan is entitled to compensation benefits under PD No. 626, as amended, because
his ailment was aggravated by the nature of his work. GSIS filed a Motion for Reconsideration

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 146
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
which was denied by the CA in a resolution dated July 17, 2017. Hence, this petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45of the Rules of Court was filed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Besitan is entitled to compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626, as
amended.

HELD:
YES. Under the increased risk theory, there must be a reasonable proof that the employees
working condition increased his risk of contracting the disease, or that there is a connection
between his work and the cause of the disease. Only a reasonable proof of work-connection, not
direct causal relation, however, is required to establish compensability of a non-occupational
disease. Probability, and not certainty, is the yardstick in compensation proceedings; thus, any
doubt should be interpreted in favor of the employees for whom social legislations, like PD No.
626, were enacted.

Moreover, direct and clear evidence, is not necessary to prove a claim. Strict rules of
evidence do not apply as PD No. 626 only requires substantial evidence or such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 147
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPS. RICARDO HIPOLITO, JR. and LIZA HIPOLITO
G.R. No. 174143, November 28, 2011

DOCTRINE:Findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great


respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of
said administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction.

FACTS:
Petitioner-spouses Ricardo Hipolito, Jr. and Liza Hipolito (petitioners) allege that on June
15, 1989, Edeltrudis Hipolito y Mariano (Edeltrudis)entered into an agreementwith Francisco
Villena(now deceased) to rent a portion of the property located at 2176 Nakar Street, San
Andres Bukid, Manila and to construct an apartment-style building adjacent to the existing
house thereon. The contract was for a period of 20 years. Pursuant to the agreement, Edeltrudis
built a three-storey apartment building without securing a building permit. Petitioners inherited
the apartment building upon the death of Edeltrudis.

In 2002 or 13 years after the execution of the agreement, petitioners and the heirs of
Francisco Villena, all residing in the property, were informed that respondent Atty. Carlos D.
Cinco (Atty. Cinco) acquired the subject property through a deed of sale sometime in 1976.

On June 17, 2002, herein respondents Atty. Cinco, Teresita Cinco and Dr. Carlota Balde
Cinco (respondents) filed with the OBO a verified requestfor structural inspection of an old
structure located at 2176 Nakar Street, San Andres Bukid, Manila.

Acting on the request, Building Inspector Engineer Leonardo B. Rico (Engr. Rico)
conducted an initial inspection. In his memorandum Engr. Rico reported that two old and
dilapidated buildings made of wooden materials were found in the premises and recommended
that the matter be referred to the Committee on Buildings (Committee) for further appropriate
action and disposition.

With prior notices to the parties and the tenants, three hearings were subsequently held
from August 12, 2002 to September 20, 2002 for purposes of resolving the focal issue of the
structural stability, architectural presentability, electrical and fire safety aspect to determine
[whether] or not the subject buildings are still safe for continued occupancy.On September 20,
2002, Victoria Villena, wife and heir of Francisco Villena and owner of one of the two buildings,
filed a counter manifestation questioning respondents personality to file the petition for
condemnation, and refuting the technical evaluation reports of Engr. Rico and respondents
commissioned engineer. Whereupon, the Committee was constrained to schedule an ocular
inspection of the subject buildings on October 7, 2002. The Office of the Building Official
declared the buildings dangerous and ruinous and recommended their demolition. Said
Resolution was based on Ocular Inspection revealing that the subject structures incurred an
extensive degree of deterioration by 60%-80%. A demolition order was issued and the
petitioners and tenants were furnished a copy hereof. Despite successive and consistent
dismissal of appeals to the Secretary of the DPWH, to the Office of the President and to the
Court of Appeals, the petitioners remained undaunted. Unwilling to concede, petitioners now

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 148
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
come before this Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the Resolution of the Administrative
Authorities sustaining the recommendations of the Office of the Building of Manila.

HELD:
NO. The CA did not err in affirming the Resolution of the Administrative Authorities
sustaining the recommendations of the Office of the Building of Manila. Findings of fact by
administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts
by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over
matters falling under their jurisdiction. Such findings must be respected as long as they are
supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or even
preponderant.It is not the task of the appellate court to once again weigh the evidence submitted
before and passed upon by the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment regarding
sufficiency of evidence. Similarly, this Court will not disturb these factual findings absent
compelling reasons to do so. This Court, in numerous occasions, has cited exceptions to the
general rule that it is not a trier of facts. None of the said exceptions is present in this case.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SAMUEL JULIAN, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, ROBERTO DELA CRUZ
vs.DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE CITY SHERIFF
G.R. No. 174193, December 7, 2011

DOCTRINE: The requirement of an appeal fee is not a mere technicality of law or


procedure and should not be disregarded without the most compelling of reasons.

FACTS:
This case was stemmed when Thelma, mother of herein petitioner Samuel Julian,
obtained a housing loan from respondent DBP, and executed a Real Estate Mortage in
favor of the respondent. Subsequently, Thelma died, so the property was sold to the
respondent through public auction since there was failure to pay the loan. The actual
occupants of the property, petitioners’ sibling, offered DBP to buy the subject property.
However, since they failed to pay resulting to rescission, DBP filed Unlawful Detainer
case for their refusal to vacate the premises. Petitioner then filed for Cancellation of
Respondent’s Title to the property. However, RTC dismissed the case for the failure of the
parties to comply with court’s order. Then petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court of
Appeals, but failed to pay the docket and other lawful fees.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for non-payment of the required docket
and other lawful fees. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in strictly applying the rules on the
payment of docket fees.

HELD:
Yes. Payment of full docket fees within the prescribed period for taking an appeal is
mandatory.

It is well-established that "the right to appeal is a statutory privilege and must be


exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law." "Thus,
one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must strictly comply with the requirements of
the rules, and failure to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal."

The applicable rule for appeals from judgments issued by the RTC in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction is Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, Section 4 of which provides:

Section 4.Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. - Within the period for
taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and
other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court
together with the original record or the record on appeal.

The Rules also provide that failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other
lawful fees is a ground for dismissal of the appeal.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The Court has consistently ruled in a number of cases that the payment of the full
amount of docket fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional.It
is a condition sine qua non for the appeal to be perfected and only then can a court
acquire jurisdiction over the case.The requirement of an appeal fee is not a mere
technicality of law or procedure and should not be undermined except for the most
persuasive of reasons. Non-observance would be tantamount to no appeal being filed
thereby rendering the challenged decision, resolution or order final and executory.

Admittedly, this rule is not without recognized qualifications. The Court has
declared that in appealed cases, failure to pay the appellate court docket fee within the
prescribed period warrants only discretionary as opposed to automatic dismissal of the
appeal and that the court shall exercise its power to dismiss in accordance with the tenets
of justice and fair play and with great deal of circumspection considering all attendant
circumstances.

Clearly, the case applies to a situation where payment of the docket fees was
made albeit incomplete. In the instant case, no payment was made by petitioner at all.
The Court sees no justifiable reason to allow this Court to relax the strict application of the
Rules.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Spouses William Guidangen and Mary Guidangen vs.
Devota B. Wooden
G.R. No. 174445, February 15, 2012

DOCTRINE: It is settled that a mere assumption cannot be made the basis of a


decision in a case or in granting relief. A judgment must always be based on the court's
factual findings.

FACTS:
Devota Wooden (respondent) filed a complaint with the RTC of Lagawe, Ifugao to
compel the petitioners William and Mary Guidangen to execute a registrable document
of a conveyance of a two-storey house located at the Philippine National Police (PNP)
barracks in Lagawe, Ifugao. Respondent alleged that sometime in 1994 to 1995, she and
her husband, Nestor Wooden, a member of the PNP, bought the said house from the
petitioners for the sum of P60,000.00 as evidenced by a private document. This private
document, however, was allegedly taken by petitioner Mary Guidangen (Mary) along with
some other documents when she processed the claims and benefits due from the PNP of
Nestor who died in 1997.

In their Answer,petitioners denied having sold the old house to Nestor and
respondent or having executed a private document relative to its sale. They alleged that
they built the old house and lived there until 1988 after which they transferred to their new
house. In 1983, their nephew Nestor, who was still single then, lived with them in the old
house as well as in their new house until 1995 after the couple got married. They also
entrusted to the couple the collection of rents from tenants. In support of their claim of
ownership, petitioners presented the tax declaration and clearance for payment of taxes
of the old house in their name.

In reply, respondent maintained that petitioners sold the old house to her and
Nestor. She denied that Nestor lived with petitioners or that she and her husband asked
petitioners to allow them to stay in the old house. She also denied having sought
permission from the petitioners to collect the rentals from tenants for minor repair works.

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Instead, they pointed out that what they undertook in the old house were not minor repairs
but a major renovation. To further bolster her claim that the old house was already sold to
them, respondent averred that Mary even prepared Nestor’s Statement of Assets,
Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for the year 1996 while the latter was hospitalized. The
old house was declared therein as part of Nestor’s assets, thereby proving that the same
already belongs to the Wooden spouses.

Respondent presented as witnesses the former tenants in the ground floor of the
old house, PO3 Oscar Mamaclay and Policeman Jay Telan, who testified that they paid
their rentals to the respondent. Telan recounted that he initially paid rentals to Mary but
was later advised by her to make the payments to respondent because she has already
sold the house to the Wooden spouses.

On the other hand, Mary testified that she and her husband constructed the old
house in the latter part of 1981. They occupied the same in 1982 until 1988, after which
they left and moved to their newly-built house. The old house was leased to tenants and in
the latter part of 1995, they allowed the Wooden spouses to occupy the second floor
thereof for free.

The RTC ruled that respondent was not able to prove the sale of the old house with
preponderant evidence which would justify the court to compel petitioners to execute the
documents of sale/ conveyance. It dismissed the complaint.

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC through its decision and held that respondent
"was able to present other cogently strong proofs in amplification of her evidence which
were entirely ignored by the court a quo to the effect that the subject house was sold by
appellees to them."

Petitioners moved for reconsiderationbut their motion was denied by the CA for
lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the findings by the Honorable Court of Appeals are manifestly
mistaken, without evidentiary basis and contradictory to the findings of the Trial Court?

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:

Yes. "It is a matter of judicial policy to accord the trial court’s findings of facts with the
highest respect and not to disturb the same on appeal unless there are strong and
impelling reasons to do so. The reason for this is that trial courts have more opportunity
and facilities to examine factual matters than appellate courts. They are in a better
position to assess the credibility of witnesses, not only by the nature of their testimonies,
but also by their demeanor on the stand. (Borillo v. Court of Appeals)" No clear specific
contrary evidence was cited by the CA to justify the reversal of the trial court’s findings.
Thus, in this case, between the factual findings of the trial court and those of the CA,
those of the trial court must prevail over those of the latter.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Pacific Ace Finance LTD. vs. Eiji* Yanagisawa
G.R. No. 175303, April 11, 2012

DOCTRINE: When a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case, its authority continues, subject only to the appellate authority, until the
matter is finally and completely disposed of, and that no court of co-ordinate authority is at
liberty to interfere with its action.

FACTS:
Eiji, a Japanese national, married Evelyn who is a Filipina. During their marriage,
Evelyn purchased a townhouse under her name. After sometime, Eiji filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of bigamy. During its pendency, filed
a Motion for Issuance of Restraining Order against Evelyn and an Application of Writ of
Preliminary Injuction. He asked that Evelyn be enjoined from disposing or encumbering
all of the properties registered in her name. Evelyn voluntary agreed which led the court to
issue an order. The order indicated that the properties registered in the name of the
defendant would not be disposed of, alienated or encumbered in any manner during the
pendency of the petition. This was annotated on the title of the subject townhouse.

The Makati RTC had dissolved Eiji and Evelyn’s marriage, and had ordered the
liquidation of their registered properties, including the Paranaque townhouse unit, with its
proceeds to be divided between the parties.

Evelyn obtained a loan from Pacific Ace Finance Ltd. (PAFIN). To secure
theloan, she executed a real estate mortgaged in favor of PAFIN over the subject town
house. At the time of this mortgage, the appeal in the nullity of marriage case was pending
before the CA.

Eiji filed a complaint for the annulment of real estate mortgage against Evelyn
and PAFIN before the RTC of Paranaque. The Paranaque RTC dismissed and
explained that Eiji, as a foreign national, cannot possibly own the mortgaged property
without ownership, or any other law or contract binding the defendants to him; Eiji has no
cause of action that may be asserted against them.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Eiji appealed to the CA. The appellate court determined that the Paranaque
RTC’s decision was improper because it violated the doctrine of non-interference. The
CA annulled and set aside the Paranaque RTC’s decision to dismiss Eiji’s complaint. It
also annulled the real estate mortgage executed by Evelyn in favor of PAFIN.

Evelyn and PAFIN filed separate motions for reconsideration which were both
denied for lack of merit.

PAFIN filed this petition for review. Petitioner seeks a reversal of the CA decision,
which allegedly affirmed the Makati RTC ruling that Eiji is a co-owner of the mortgaged
property. PAFIN insists that the CA sustained a violation of the constitution with its
declaration that an alien can have an interest in real property located in the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Paranaque RTC can rule on the same issue that was already
ruled upon by the Makati RTC and is pending appeal in the CA?

HELD:

No, the RTC of Paranaque violated the doctrine of non-interference. The issue
of ownership and liquidation of properties acquired during the cohabitation of Eiji and
Evelyn has been submitted for the resolution of the Makati RTC, and is pending appeal
before the CA. The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference dictates that the
assumption by the Makati RTC over the issue operates as an “insurmountable barrier” to
the subsequent assumption by the Paranaque RTC. By insisting on ruling on the same
issue, the Paranaque RTC effectively interfered with the Makati RTC’s resolution of the
issue and created the possibility of conflicting decisions.

Cojuangco v. Villegas states: “The various branches of the [regional trial courts] of
a province or city, having as they have the same or equal authority and exercising as they
do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot and are not permitted to
interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary
rule would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of
justice.” The matter is further explained thus:

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It has been held that "even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is, also, axiomatic that the
court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts."

In addition, it is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction


acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, its authority continues, subject only
to the appellate authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of, and that
no court of co-ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. This doctrine is
applicable to civil cases, to criminal prosecutions, and to courts-martial. The principle is
essential to the proper and orderly administration of the laws; and while its observance
might be required on the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it does not rest upon
such considerations exclusively, but is enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive, and
dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of the process.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JOVINA DABON VDA. DE MENDEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES
MINEO and TRINIDAD B. DABON,
G.R NO. 174937, June 13, 2012

DOCTRINE: While the court has the power to relax procedure rules for persuasive and
weighty reasons, this does not mean that [they] are too belittled or dismissed simply
because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party’s substantive rights. Just like
any other rule (procedural rules) are required to be followed except for the most
persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed.

FACTS:
On June 19, 1995 petitioner Jovina Dabon Vda. De Mendez filed a Complaint for
Nullity of Deed of Sale, Transfer Certificate of Title, Tax Declaration and other relevant
documents, and Reconveyance of property with damages, docketed as Civil Case No.
MAN-2445, against respondent Sps. Mineo and Trinidad Dabon before the RTC of
Mandaue City, Branch 56. Petitioner, in her complaint, alleged that she is the registered
owner of a paraphernal property situated in Barangay Ibabao, Mandaue City, containing
an area of 174 square meters, covered by TCT No. 9408, that she never sold the subject
property to respondent-spouses, and that her signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated July 15, 1982 was forged. Petitioner further claimed that sometime in 1982, due to
financial difficulties and illness of her youngest son, she mortgaged her property to
Banco Cebuano to secure a Php 20,000.00 loan. When her property was about to be
foreclosed by the bank, she borrowed from her first cousin, respondent Mineo. After
paying the bank, Gloria Singson, Mineo’s sister went to petitioner’s house and asked her
to sign some papers, including a receipt containing the loan. Later, refused to accept the
same demanding instead Php 50,000.00. Respondent-spouses filed their Answer,
contending that there was a valid sales as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute sale
signed by petitioner on July 15, 1982 before Notary Public Bienvenido N. Mabanto, Jr.
They narrated that after petitioner signed the Deed of Absolute Sale, they paid the
amount of Php 20,000.00 to the bank in order to prevent the foreclose of the subject
property, and that since then, they have been paying the taxes for the said property. Trial
on the merits ensued on July 31, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision in favour of
respondent-spouses. It ruled that petitioner’s cause of action had prescribed since an
action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust
prescribed in 10 years and the court found that the Deed of Absolute Sale was duly
executed. On the Appeal, the CA agreed with the RTC that there was no forgery, but it
also ruled that petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of authenticity and due
execution of the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petitioner has failed the correct remedy of Petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Supreme Court in assailing the Decision
dated September 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals.
2. Whether petitioner’s signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 15, 1982
was forged.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
1. Petitioner, in filing a petition for certiorari under rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
availed of the wrong remedy. Under the Rules of Court, the proper remedy of a party
aggrieved by a judgment, final order, or resolution of the CA is to file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review in certiorari under rule 45 within15 days from notice of
the judgment, final order or resolution appealed from records show that petitioner filed
her petition 33 days after receipt of the Resolution dated September 12, 2006. Whether
we treat the petition as an appeal or as a special civil action for certiorari the petition
must be dismissed as the core issue of whether petitioner’s signature in the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated July 15, 1982 was forged, is a question of fact not allowed in both
instances.
2. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of hand-writing of
experts. More credence was also given by the RTC and the CA to the testimony of the
notary public who personally saw petitioner sign the Deed of Absolute Sale. No doubt,
direct evidence such as the testimony of the notary public, outweighs the testimony of
the expert witness, which, at best, is considered indirect or circumstantial evidence.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MICHAEL BIGLETE Y CAMACHO
G.R. NO. 182920, June 18, 2012

DOCTRINE: Direct evidence is not the only matrix by which the guilt of the accused may
be determined. Resort to circumstantial evidence may be made in the absence of direct
evidence.

FACTS:
On August 27, 2001, around 8:00 pm, Arnel Alcos was driving his passenger
jeepney plying the San Pablo City-Sto. Angel route. Seated beside him was his wofe,
Susan Alcos. While they were already cruising along Schetelig Avenue in San Pablo
City, Susan heard a gunshot. Seconds after, a red motorcycle overtook their jeep. The
driver of the motorcycle was holding a gun.
After a while, Susan noticed her husband slumped in his seat with his head resting
on the steering wheel. The passenger jeepney they were riding turned turtle. Later, she
discovered that Arnel was hit in his head which caused his death. Victor Andaya who
was, at that time, in a waiting shed approximately 20 meters away from where the
incident happened saw it.
Some 500 meters from Schetelig Avenue, Julius Panganiban who was at his house
preparing dinner when he heard a loud noise. When he went out to investigate, he saw a
motorcycle crashed into his gate and a revolver lying near it. However, the motorcycle
driver was nowhere to be found. Julius reported the matter to the police authorities and
at the same time surrendered possession of the motorcycle and revolver.
At about 2:00 pm of August 28, 2001, appellant went to the police station and
reported to SPO2 Joselito Mendoza Calabia that on August 27, 2001, his motorcycle
was stolen by three men who mauled him. He escaped from them by climbing a high
concrete fence at Tirones Compund at Barangay III-C. Appellant admitted that he owned
the subject motorcycle. However, he claimed that on August 27, 2001 at around 7:00
pm, while he was traversing Balagtas Blvd., somebody hit him at the back with a piece of
wood. When he fell down from the motorcycle, somebody got it from him. Appellant then
ran towards a vacant lot. Thereafter, he sought his cousin, Rodelo Biglete, Jr. and
proceeded to the police station and reported the incident.
The RTC rendered its judgment finding appellant guilty as charged. The appellate
court affirmed the factual findings of the trial court.

ISSUE:
With the categorical denial by the appellant, the principal issue therefore is factual,
that is: whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to convict
accused/appellant for murder.

HELD:
It was held that the crime committed is murder. The lack of direct evidence does not
ipso facto bar the finding of guilt against the appellant. As long as the prosecution
establishes the appellant’s participation through credible and sufficient circumstantial
evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant committed the
imputed crime, the latter should be convicted. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
instruct us when circumstantial evidence is deemed sufficient for conviction, viz:
1) ,when there is more than one circumstance;
2) when the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.

The combination of the following events leads to no other conclusion that the
appellant/accused was the author of the crime, thus:
1) Arnel Alcos was shot while he was driving a jeepney;
2) right after the shooting, accused/appellant was seen by Susan Alcos and Victor
Andaya as the only one holding a gun on board the motorcycle which overtook the
jeepney driven by Arnel Alcos; and
3) accused was the owner of the motorcycle.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
EDGARDO NAVIA, RUBEN DIO and ANDREW BUISING vs. VIRGINIA PARDICO, for
and in behalf and in representation of BENHUR V. PADRICO
G.R. NO. 184467, June 19, 2012

DOCTRINE: For the protective writ of amparo to issue in enforced disappearance cases,
allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must
also be shown by the required quantum of proof that their disappearance was carried out
by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, (the government) or a political
organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge (the same or) give information on the
fate or whereabouts of (said missing) persons.

FACTS:
Versions of Petitioners:
On March 31, 2008, at around 8:30 pm, petitioners Ruben Dio (Dio) and Andrew
Buising (Buising), who both work as security guards at the Asian Land Security, invited
Enrique Lapore (Bong) and Benhur Pardico (Ben) to their office because they received a
report from a certain Mrs. Emphasis, a resident of Grand Royale Subdivision, that she
saw Bong and Ben removing a lamp from a post in said subdivision.
At the security office, Dio and Buising interviewed Bong and Ben. The suspects
admitted that they took the lamp but clarified that they were only transferring it to a post
nearer the house of Lolita (Bong’s mother). According to Egdardo Navia (Navia),
Supervisor of the security guards, considering that the complainant was not interested in
the investigation, he ordered the release of Bong and Ben. Bong signed a statement to
the effect that the guards released him without inflicting any harm or injury to him. His
mother, Lolita, also signed the logbook below an entry which states that she will never
again harbor or entertain Ben in her house. Thereafter, Lolita and Bong left the security
office. Ben was left behind as Navia was still talking to him. Ben also affixed his signature
on the logbook to affirm the statements entered by the guards that he was released
unharmed and without any injury.
Upon Navia’s instructions, Dio and Buising went back to the house of Lolita to make
her sign the logbook as witness that they indeed released Ben from their custody.
Subsequently petitioners received an invitation from the Malolos City Police Station
requesting them to appear thereat on April 17, 2008 relative to the complaint of Virginia
Pardico (Virginia) about her missing husband, Ben. Petitioners informed her that they
released Ben and that they have no information as to his whereabouts.

Version of the Respondent:


According to the respondents, Bong and Ben were not merely invited. They were
unlawfully arrested, shoved into the Asian Land vehicle and brought to the security office
for investigation. Upon seeing Ben at the security office, Navia lividly grumbled “Ikaw
naman?,” and slapped him while he was still seated. Ben begged for mercy, but his pleas
were met with a flurry of punches coming from NAvia hitting him in different parts of his
body. Navia then took hold of his gun, looked at Bong and said, “Wala kang nakita at
wala kang nadinig, papatayin ko na si Ben.”
Later on Lolita was instructed to sign an entry in the guard’s logbook where she
undertook not to allow Ben to stay in her house anymore, that as proof that they released

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
her son Bong unharmed but Ben had to stay as the latter’s case will be forwarded to the
barangay. When Bong had to leave, Ben pleaded not to leave him. However, since they
were afraid of Navia, they left Ben behind. Moments after Lolita and Bong reached their
house, Buising arrived and asked Lolita to sign the logbook again without reading what
she signed.
The following morning, Virginia went to the Asian Land Security Office to visit her
husband, Ben, but only to be told that petitioners had already released him together with
Bong the night before. Since she could not find her husband, Virginia reported the matter
to the police. Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia
filed a petition for writ of amparo before the RTC of Malolos City. A writ of amparo was
accordingly issued on the petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether Ben’s disappearance as alleged in Virginia’s petition and prove during the
summary proceedings conducted before the court a quo, falls within the ambit of AM No.
07-9-12-SC and relevant laws.

HELD:
It does not. Section 1 of AM No, 07-9-12 provides: Section 1. Petition. The petition
for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis ours) While Section 1
provides AM No. 07-9-12-SC’s coverage, said rule does not, however, define extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. The courts in probing enforced disappearance
cases, courts should read AM No. 07-9-12-Sc in relation to RA No. 9851, as Section 3(g)
thereof defines enforced or involuntary disappearance, quoted as follows: (g) “Enforced
or involuntary disappearance of persons” means the arrest, detention, or abduction of
persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political
organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom, or to give
information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing
from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Under Section 1 of AM No.
07-9-12-SC, a writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the
person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private
individual or entity. Still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an
indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale
Subdivision in Barangay Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a
private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has been presented that
would link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental operation. To
fall within the ambit of AM No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance
must be attended by some governmental involvement.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
EMILIA LIM vs. MINDANAO WINES AND LIQUOR GALLERIA, Single Proprietorship
Business Outfit Owned by Evelyn S. Valdevieso
G.R. NO. 175851, July 4, 2012

DOCTRINE: Acquittal from a crime does not necessarily mean absolution from civil
liability.

FACTS:
Respondent Mindanao Wines and Liquor Galleria (Mindanao Wines) delivered
several cases of liquors to H and E Commercial owned by Emilia Lim, for which the latter
issued four Philippine National Bank (PNB) postdated checks worth Php 25,000.00 each.
When two of these checks, particularly PNB Check Nos. 951453 and 951454 dated
October 10, 1996 and October 20, 1996, respectively, bounced for the reasons
ACCOUNT CLOSED and DRAWN AGAINST INSUFFICIENT FUNDS. Mindanao Wines,
thru its proprietress Evelyn Valdevieso, demanded from H and E Commercial the
payment of the value through two separate letters both dated November 8, 1996. When
the demands went unheeded, Mindanao Wines filed before Branch 2 of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Davao City Criminal Case Nos. 68-309-B-98 and
68-310-B-98 against Emilia for violations of BP 22. After the prosecution rested its case,
Emilia filed a Demurrer to Evidence claiming insufficiency of evidence. In its December
10, 1999 order, MTCC granted the demurrer to evidence. It ruled that while Emilia did
issue the check to value, the prosecution nevertheless miserably failed to prove one
essential element that consummates the crime of BP 22, i. e. the fact of dishonor of the
two subject checks. It noted that other than the checks, no bank representatives testified
about presentment and dishonor. Hence, the MTCC acquitted Emilia of the criminal
charges. However, the MTCC still found her civilly liable because when she redeemed
one of the checks during the pendency of the criminal case, the MTCC considered the
same as an acknowledgement on her part of her obligation with Mindanao Wines. On
appeal with the RTC, the RTC clarified that the MTCC dismissed the criminal case based
on reasonable doubt and not on insufficiency of evidence. And while the prosecution
failed to prove criminal liability beyond reasonable doubt, Emilia’s indebtedness was
nonetheless proven by preponderance of evidence, the quantum of evidence required to
prove the same. Thus, it dismissed the appeal. Undettered, Emilia filed with the CA a
Petition for Review still insisting that the MTCC’s dismissal was based on insufficiency of
evidence and that the same pertains to both the criminal and civil aspect of BP 22. In its
June 30, 2006 Decision, the CA ruled that the dismissal of the criminal cases against
Emilia was expressly based on reasonable doubt, hence she is not free from civil liability
because the same is not extinguished by acquittal based on said ground. The CA further
declared that even granting that her acquittal was for insufficiency of evidence, the same
is still akin to a dismissal based on reasonable doubt. Hence, this petition for review on
certoriari. Emilia prays for the reversal and setting side of the said rulings of the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether the dismissal of Emilia’s BP 22 cases likewise includes the dismissal of
their civil aspect.

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HELD:
Emilia’s allegations that she was denied due process and that Mindanao Wines is
not the real party in interest do not merit our attention as these were never raised for
resolution before the courts below. These new issues are mere afterthoughts. They were
raised only for the first time in this petition for review on certoriari. Notwithstanding her
acquittal, Emilia is civilly liable. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
the extinction of the civil liability where xxx the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as
only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases. Moreover, it is well to
remember that a check may be evidence of indebtedness. A check, the entries of which
are in writing, could prove a loan transaction. While Emilia is acquitted of violation of BP
22, she would nevertheless pay the debt she owes.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K OCHOA namely: RUBY B. OCHOA MICAELA B.
OCHOA and JOMAR B. OCHOA vs. G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION
G.R NO. 170071, July 16, 2012
G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs. HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K OCHOA
NAMELY: RUBY B. OCHOA MICAELA B. OCHOA and JOMAR B. OCHOA
G.R NO. 170125

DOCTRINE: It must be remembered that this requirement of authentication only pertains


to private documents and does not apply to public documents proof of their due
execution or genuineness.

FACTS:
These petitions stemmed from a complaint for damages filed by the heirs against G
& S with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 164 on account of Jose
Marcial’s death while on board a taxi cab owned and operated by G & S. The RTC
adjudged G & S guilty of breach of contract of carriage and ordered it to pay the heirs the
following amounts: 1. Php 50,000.00 as civil indemnity; 2. Php 6,537,244.96 for loss of
earning capacity of the deceased; 3. Php 100,000.00 as attorney’s fees and; 4. Cost of
litigation The RTC also ordered G & S to pay the heirs the following: 1. Php 300,000.00
as moral damages; 2. Php 50,000.00 as exemplary damages On appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTC Decision but with the modifications that the awards of loss of income in
the amount of Php 6,537,244.96 be deleted and that moral damages reduced to Php
200,000, the deletion ordered on the ground that the income certificate issued by Jose
Marcial’s employer, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), is
self-serving, unreliable and biased, and that the same was not supported by competent
evidence such as income tax returns or receipt. With respect to moral damages, the CA
found the same excessive disproportionate to the award of Php 50,000.00 exemplary
damages. Thus, the same was reduced to Php 200,000.00. The parties’ respect appeals
from the CA Decision became the subject of this Court’s (SC) March 9, 2011 Decision
which denied G & S petition and partly granted that of the heirs. The Court affirmed the
assailed CA Decision with the modification that for loss of earning capacity of the
deceased, as well as moral damages on the reduced amount of Php 100,000.00 Hence,
this G & S Motion for Reconsideration. G & S argued that the USAID Certification used
as basis in computing the award for loss of income is inadmissible in evidence because it
was not properly authenticated and identified in Court by the signatory thereof; that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees and, hence, was able to overcome the presumption of fault imputed to it; and,
that while settled in the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts, even if it did not
particularly state under which exception to such rule its case falls. The heirs filed their
comment thereto.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the USAID Certification is a public or private document.
2. Whether G & S exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employees.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
3. Whether there is a compelling reason to re-examine the factual findings of the
lower courts.
HELD:
1. Before a private document offered as authentic be received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must first be proved. It must be remembered that this
requirement of authentication only pertains to private documents, these being admissible
without further proof of their rule, namely: said documents have been executed in the
proper registry and are presumed to be valid and genuine until the contrary is shown by
clear and convincing proof; and, second, because public documents are authenticated
by the official signature and seals which they bear and of which seals, court may take
judicial notice. Hence, in a case, the court held that in the presentation of public
documents as evidence, due execution and authenticity thereof are already presumed. If
therefore becomes necessary to first as certain whether the subject USAID Certification
is a private document before this Court can rule upon the corrections of its admission
and consequent use as basis for the award of loss of income in these case. Section 19,
Rule 132 of the Rule of Court clarifies documents as either public or private, viz: Section
19: Classes of Documents – for the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private. Public documents are: a. The written official acts
or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and
public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country; x x x x x x In view of
these, it is clear that the USAID Certification is a public document pursuant to paragraph
(a), section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the authenticity and due
execution of said Certification are already presumed. Moreover, as a public document
issued in the performance of a duty by public officer, the subject USAID Certification is
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The USAID Certification could very well
be used as basis for the award of loss of income to the heirs.

2. G & S insisted that it exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family
when it hired and continued to employ Bibiano Padilla Jr. (the driver of the ill-fated Avis
taxicab). The reasons advanced by G & S in support of this argument are mere rehash if
not a repetition of those raised in its petition which have already been considered and
passed upon in their March 9, 2011 Decision, hence, do not require reconsideration. The
conclusion therefore that G & S failed to overcome the presumption that the common
carrier is at fault or is negligent when a passenger dies or is injured stands. (Emphasis
supplied).

3. As we have consistently held, “this court is not a trier of facts. It is not a function of
this court to analyze or weigh evidence. When we give due course to such situations, it is
solely by way exception, such exception apply only in the presence of extremely
meritorious cases.” Hence, we note that although G & S enumerated in its consolidated
Memorandum the exceptions to the rule that a petition for review on certiorari should
only raise questions of law, it nevertheless did not point out under what exception its
case falls. And, upon review of the records of the case, we are convinced that it does not
fall under any way. Hence, we cannot proceed to resolve said issues and disturb the
findings and conclusions of the CA with respect thereto x x x (Emphasis supplied). The
Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LILYLIM vs. KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO.
G.R. No. 175256 & 179160 / August 23, 2012

DOCTRINE: Is it forum shopping for a private complainant to pursue a civil complaint for
specific performance and damages, while appealing the judgment on the civil aspect of a
criminal case for estafa?

FACTS:
Lim file a civil case for specific performance and damages during the pendency of
her appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case she filed against Charlie Co. She
claims that the cause of action for the damages is based on the crime of estafa, as Co
Violated Lim’s right to be protected against forum shopping. He represented to Lim that
she can withdraw 37,200 bags of cement using the authorities she bought from him.
This is a fraudulent representation because Co knew, at the time that they entered into
the contract, that he could not deliver what he promised.
On the other hand, Lim’s cause of action for the case of specific performance is based
on contract. Co violated Lim’s rights as a buyer in a contract of sale. Co received
payment for the 37,200 bags of cement but did not deliver the goods that were the
subject of the sale.

ISSUE:
Did Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific performance and
damages during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case for
estafa?

HELD:
Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those arising from other sources of
obligations are authorized by law to proceed independently of each other, the resolution
of the present issue hinges on whether the two cases herein involve different
kinds of civil obligations such that they can proceed
independently of each other. The answer is in the affirmative.
A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil
liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued independently
of the criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may be based on “an
obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony,” as provided in
Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort53). It may also be
based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated
independently from the criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code
(“in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries”).
The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions
that constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the
criminal action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the
criminal offense. If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or
subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
final outcome of the criminal action.55 The civil liability based on delict is extinguished
when the court hearing the criminal action declares that “the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist.
Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities,
jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities
simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis
pendentia, or res judicata.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
V.C PONCE COMPANY INC., petitioner vs. Municipality of Parañaque and
Sampaguita Hills Homeowners Association, INC., respondents
G.R. No. 178731 / November 12, 2012

DOCTRINE: "It is a settled rule that relief will not be granted to a party when the loss or
the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or to a mistaken mode of
procedure.”

FACTS:
Respondent Municipality (now City) of Parañaque (municipality) filed a complaint7
against petitioner VCP for the expropriation of its property, which is located in the
municipality’s Barrio San Dionisio and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
116554. The municipality intended to develop the property for its landless residents, in
line with the Presidential Commission on Urban Poor’s classification of the site as an
area of priority development. Respondent Sampaguita Hills Homeowners Association,
Inc. (SHHAI), consisting of the property’s actual occupants, who are also the intended
beneficiaries of the action, intervened in the case.
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque, Branch 274, sustained the municipality’s
right to expropriate the said property and to a writ of possession. The parties did not file
any objection to the above Order and proceeded to submit the names of their respective
nominees for commissioner. The trial court appointed three commissioners to assist in
ascertaining the just compensation.
commissioners Bienvenido Reyes and Jose Marleo Del Rosario informed the trial court
that VCP did not participate in the meetings despite notification and that, due to time
constraints, the commissioners denied VCP’s request for an additional four months to
submit its independent valuation of the property. The commissioners also informed the
court that Cenon Astudillo, VCP’s choice for commissioner, did not contribute to the
commission’s work due to his frequent absences.
Judge Fortunito L. Madrona (Judge Madrona) rendered his Decision rejecting the report.
The trial court explained that just compensation, as Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court provides,27 must reflect the value and character of the property sought to be
expropriated, at the time it was taken or at the time the complaint for expropriation was
filed, whichever came first. Applying this rule to the facts of the case, the reckoning
period should have been the time of filing of the complaint in 1987 because it took place
before the taking of the property in 2002. The report violated this rule by using data
from 1996 onwards.
The trial court then made an independent finding based on the evidence already on
hand. It determined that there exists, on record, a certification from the Office of the
City Assessor, that the property’s market value for the years 1985 to 1993 (which
includes the year the complaint was filed) was P1,366,400.00. This value roughly
translates to P75 per square meter, for a total of P1,372,350.00.
VCP moved for a reconsideration, which the trial court denied in its Order dated August
15, 2005.
VCP received its copy of the said Order on August 24, 2005.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
On October 21, 2005 or 58 days since VCP received the Order denying its Motion for
Reconsideration, it filed with the CA a Motion for Extension of Time (MOTEX) to File
Petition for Certiorari, which the CA granted.
VCP filed its Petition for Certiorari on November 7, 2005. It justified its resort to the
extraordinary remedy on the ground that “there is no appeal or plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the course of law that is available to the petitioner.” It assailed the
trial court’s rejection of the appraisal report as a grave abuse of discretion. VCP
maintained that the appraisal, which is based on the property’s value at the time of its
taking in 2002, is correct. Assuming arguendo that the commissioners committed an
error, the trial court should have recommitted the valuation to a new set of
commissioners, instead of substituting its own judgment. VCP insisted that the trial
court’s own valuation of P75.00 per square meter is unrealistic and is unsupported by the
evidence. Lastly, VCP argued that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
when it failed to impose legal interests on the just compensation from the time of taking
until VCP is fully paid. It prayed for the annulment of the trial court’s Decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the
proper remedy to be applied in the case.

HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative.
VCP attempts to extricate itself from the effects of its negligence by alleging that an
appeal would not have been speedy and adequate for its purpose. The Court,
however, finds no merit in its contention.
A court with appellate jurisdiction can review both the facts and the law, including
questions of jurisdiction. It can set aside an erroneous decision and even nullify the
same, if warranted. Appeal is a speedy remedy, as an adverse party can file its appeal
from a final decision or order immediately after receiving it. A party, who is alleging that
an appeal will not promptly relieve it of the injurious effects of the judgment, should
establish facts to show how the appeal is not speedy or adequate. VCP’s empty
protestations, therefore, fail to impress. There is no reason, and VCP cannot explain,
why an appeal would not be speedy and adequate to address its assigned errors. VCP
cannot complain of delay because it was guilty of delay itself, and it even waited until the
58th day of its receipt of the CA Decision before taking action. Clearly, petitioner
resorted to certiorari as a substitute for its lost appeal. The CA did not err in dismissing
the same.
In sum, VCP’s continued negligence, and its resort to the wrong remedy, placed all
perceived errors in the decisions below beyond the CA’s and this Court’s grasp.
Period for filing a Motion for Reconsideration not extendible; failure to file Motion
for Reconsideration on time renders the Decision final.
VCP received the CA Decision on April 10, 2007. Based on Rule 52 of the Rules of
Court and Rule 7 of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (IRCA), VCP had 15
days from its receipt of the Decision, or until April 25, 2007, to file a motion for
reconsideration, an appeal, or a motion for new trial. Failure to file the necessary

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
pleading within the reglementary period would render the CA Decision final and
executory.
Instead of filing a Motion for Reconsideration on April 25, 2007, VCP filed a MOTEX on
the ground that its lawyer had withdrawn from the case and it was still in the process of
retaining a new counsel. The CA was correct in denying petitioner’s MOTEX because
the period to file a Motion for Reconsideration is not extendible. The Court has
pronounced strict adherence to the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v.
Judge Japson that “no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional
Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals).” Since the
period to file a Motion for Reconsideration is not extendible, VCP’s MOTEX did not toll
the reglementary period. Thus, there being no Motion for Reconsideration as of April 25,
2007, the Decision of the CA dated March 23, 2007 became final and executory by
operation of law.64 The CA was correct in denying the Motion for Reconsideration that
VCP had belatedly filed on May 25, 2007 as its lateness had rendered it moot.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
RUBEN MAGTOTO vs. CA, and Leonila dela Cruz
GR No. 175792 / November 21, 2012

DOCTRINE: Petitioners’ failure to timely file their Answer was unreasonable and
unjustified. The trial court properly declared them in default. We thus sustain the
appellate court’s ruling dismissing petitioners’ appeal for lack of merit.

FACTS:
Leonila filed before the RTC a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages and
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the spouses Magtoto. Alleging that on
January 11, 1999, she sold her three parcels of land situated in Mabalacat, Pampanga to
petitioner Ruben C. Magtoto (Ruben) for P11,952,750.00.As payment therefor, Ruben
issued several postdated checks.After the parties executed the corresponding Deed of
Absolute Sale,Leonila delivered the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) of the properties
to spouses Magtoto. From then on, the spouses Magtoto exercised acts of dominion
over the said properties, enjoyed the use thereof, and transferred their titles in the name
of Ruben.
Meanwhile, most of the checks that Ruben issued were dishonored. Out of the total
purchase price of P11,952,750.00, the spouses Magtoto were only able to pay the
amount of P2,455,000.00. Despite Leonila’s repeated demands, the balance of
P9,497,750.00 remained unpaid. Hence, the Complaint.
The spouses Magtoto were served with summons requiring them to file an Answer within
15 days from notice.The said spouses, however, thrice moved for extensions of time
within which to file the same.In an Orderdated July 25, 2003, the RTC granted the
spouses Magtoto a final extension until August 2, 2003 within which to file their Answer.
On August 4, 2003 or two days after the last day for filing the Answer, the spouses
Magtoto instead filed a Motion to Dismiss.In an Orderdated September 11, 2003, the
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.
On January 23, 2004, Leonila filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default and to
Render Judgment Based on the Complaint. Citing Section 4, Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court, Leonila argued that after the denial of their Motion to Dismiss, spouses Magtoto
should have filed their Answer within the reglementary period. However, despite the
lapse of more than three months from receipt of notice of denial of their Motion to
Dismiss, the spouses Magtoto still failed to file their Answer. Leonila also cautioned the
spouses Magtoto that their counsel’s withdrawal of appearance does not justify their
failure to file an Answer.
The motion to declare petitioners in default was heard by the RTC on March 18, 2004.
During said hearing, Ruben was present. The court a quo noted that despite the spouses
Magtoto’s counsel’s withdrawal of appearance as early as September 25, 2003, they
have not yet engaged the services of another counsel.The RTC thus deemed the motion
submitted for resolution.Eventually, the RTC declared the spouses Magtoto in default on
March 23, 2004.Leonila’s presentation of evidence ex parte and formal offer of evidence
followed.
On June 25, 2004 or almost three months after they were declared in default, the
spouses Magtoto, through their new counsel, filed an Omnibus Motion to Lift Order of

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Default and to Admit Attached Answer,and their Answer.The RTC, however, denied the
said motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were correctly declared in default?

HELD:
YES.
The RTC correctly declared the spouses Magtoto in default. The records show that after
receipt of the summons, the spouses Magtoto thrice requested for extensions of time to
file their Answer. The RTC granted these requests. For their final request for extension,
the RTC gave the spouses Magtoto until August 2, 2003 within which to file their Answer.
But still, no Answer was filed. Instead, on August 4, 2003, or two days after the deadline
for filing their Answer, the spouses Magtoto filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint.
Despite its belated filing, the RTC acted on the motion and resolved the same, albeit not
in favor of the said spouses. Thereafter, Atty. Canlas, petitioners’ former counsel, filed a
motion to withdraw his appearance since he could no longer effectively defend spouses
Magtoto because he had lost communication with them.
After the denial of their Motion to Dismiss on September 11, 2003, petitioners should
have filed their Answer within the balance of the period prescribed in Rule 11. Instead,
they filed their Answer on June 25, 2004 or nine months after the denial of their Motion to
Dismiss or three months after they were declared in default. This delay is unreasonable
as well as unjustified.
In an attempt to pass the blame on the RTC for their failure to timely file an Answer, the
spouses Magtoto aver that it took them a while to secure the services of a new counsel
because they were waiting for the RTC to rule on Atty. Canlas’s motion for withdrawal of
appearance and for its advice for them to retain a new counsel. The belated filing of the
Answer is solely attributable to the spouses Magtoto. They miserably failed to be vigilant
in protecting and defending their cause. The RTC thus properly declared them in default.
At the outset, it must be pointed out that petitioners’ resort to a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is inappropriate. Petitioners’ remedy from the
adverse Decision of the CA lies in Rule 45 which is a Petition for Review on Certiorari. As
such, this petition should have been dismissed outright for being a wrong mode of
appeal. Even if the petition is to be treated as filed under Rule 45, the same must still be
denied for late filing and there being no reversible error on the part of the CA. Records
show that petitioners received a copy of the CA Resolution denying their Motion for
Reconsideration on October 30, 2006.They therefore had 15 days or until November 14,
2006 within which to file their Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court.
However, they filed their Petition for Certiorari on December 29, 2006,after the period to
file a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 had expired. Hence, this Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 was resorted to as a substitute for a lost appeal which is not
allowed.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ANTONIO PERLA vs. MIRASOL BARING and RANDY PERLA
G.R. No. 172471 / November 12, 2012

DOCTRINE: An order for support must be issued only if paternity or filiation is


established by clear and convincing evidence.

FACTS:
Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and her then minor son, Randy (collectively
respondents), filed before the RTC a Complaint for support against Antonio.
They alleged in said Complaint that Mirasol and Antonio lived together as common-law
spouses for two years. As a result of said cohabitation, Randy was born on November
11, 1983. However, when Antonio landed a job as seaman, he abandoned them and
failed to give any support to his son. Respondents thus prayed that Antonio be ordered
to support Randy.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, Antonio, who is now married and has a family of his
own, denied having fathered Randy. Although he admitted to having known Mirasol, he
averred that she never became his common-law wife nor was she treated as such. And
since Mirasol had been intimidating and pestering him as early as 1992 with various suits
by insisting that Randy is his son, Antonio sought moral and exemplary damages by way
of counterclaim from respondents.
The RTC ruled that Mirasol and Randy are entitled to the relief sought since Antonio
himself admitted that he had sex with Mirasol. It also noted that when the 15-year old
Randy testified, he categorically declared Antonio as his father. The RTC opined that
Mirasol would not have gone through the trouble of exposing herself to humiliation,
shame and ridicule of public trial if her allegations were untrue. Antonio’s counterclaim
was denied due to the absence of bad faith or ill-motive on the part of Mirasol and
Randy.
The CA upheld Randy’s illegitimate filiation based on the certified true copies of his birth
certificate and of his baptismal certificate identifying Antonio as his father. According to
the appellate court, while these documents do not bear the signature of Antonio, they are
proofs that Antonio is the known, imputed and identified father of Randy. The CA also
affirmed the trial court’s findings on the credibility of the witnesses and its appreciation of
facts, as there was nothing to suggest that the RTC erred in such respects. It
highlighted Antonio’s vacillation in his testimony regarding the number of times he had
sex with Mirasol and concluded that the same is a clear badge of his lack of candor - a
good reason to disregard his denials.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the order for Support was proper?

HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative.
Since respondents’ complaint for support is anchored on Randy’s alleged illegitimate
filiation to Antonio, the lower courts should have first made a determination of the same.
Respondents’ Complaint for support is based on Randy’s alleged illegitimate filiation to
Antonio. Hence, for Randy to be entitled for support, his filiation must be established

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
with sufficient certainty. A review of the Decision of the RTC would show that it is bereft
of any discussion regarding Randy’s filiation. Although the appellate court, for its part,
cited the applicable provision on illegitimate filiation, it merely declared the certified true
copies of Randy’s birth certificate and baptismal certificate both identifying Antonio as
the father as good proofs of his filiation with Randy and nothing more. This is despite
the fact that the said documents do not bear Antonio’s signature. “Time and again, this
Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and
filiation. An order for support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an
irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or
filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.
Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy identifying Antonio as the
father. However, said certificate has no probative value to establish Randy’s filiation to
Antonio since the latter had not signed the same. It is settled that “[a] certificate of live
birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity
when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said
certificate.” We also cannot lend credence to Mirasol’s claim that Antonio supplied
certain information through Erlinda. Aside from Antonio’s denial in having any
participation in the preparation of the document as well as the absence of his signature
thereon, respondents did not present Erlinda to confirm that Antonio indeed supplied
certain entries in Randy’s birth certificate. Besides, the several unexplained
discrepancies in Antonio’s personal circumstances as reflected in the subject birth
certificate are manifestations of Antonio’s non-participation in its preparation. Most
important, it was Mirasol who signed as informant thereon which she confirmed on the
witness stand.
Anent Randy’s baptismal certificate, we cannot agree with the CA that the same is a
good proof of Antonio’s paternity of Randy. Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of
participation of the supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate renders
this document incompetent to prove paternity. And “while a baptismal certificate may be
considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the
child’s paternity. Thus, baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as
proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to
prove the same.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 176
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
VALERIANA VILLONDO vs. CARMEN QUIJANO, ADRIANO ALCANTARA, and
MARCELINO EBENA
G.R. No. 173606, December 3, 2012

DOCTRINE:In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer, the purpose
of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession; and in case of
controverted right, it requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other
of them sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the
question of ownership. It is obviously just the person who has first acquired possession
[who] should remain in possession pending this decision.

FACTS:
Plaintiff Valeriana Villondo (Valeriana) claimed that respondent Carmen Quijano
(Carmen) and her farm laborers, respondents Adriano Alcantara and Marcelino Ebena,
intruded into her land with the help of three policemen and other barangay officials. They
destroyed the plants therein, harvested the root crops, corn, and banana, built a hut,
fenced off the area, and posted a "NO TRESPASSING" sign, thus preventing Valeriana
and her family from entering the premises where they have always resided and depriving
them of their harvest alleging that they were the owners of the said land. Valeriana based
her and her family’s right of possession on Certificate of Stewardship No. 146099 in the
name of Daniel T. Villondo, which she claimed to have been awarded to her
now-deceased husband whose actual name is Daniel P. Villondo. On the other hand,
Carmen based her right of possession through her tax declarations. With this,
respondents questioned Valeriana’s legal personality to sue, contending that "Daniel T.
Villondo,"13 the named tiller in the Certificate of Stewardship No. 146099, is the real
party-in-interest and thus should be the plaintiff in the suit and not Valeriana. They
claimed that "Daniel T. Villondo" is actually Valeriana’s son Romualdo Villondo
(Romualdo), a construction worker who had never even cultivated the subject land.
Hence, the court a quo should have dismissed the complaint since it does not state a
cause of action.

ISSUE:
Whether Valeriana is a real party-in-interest in the forcible entry case she filed.

HELD:
Yes. ‘Interest’ within the meaning of the rules means material interest, an interest
in issue and to be affected by the decree as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest. A real party-in-interest is one who has a
legal right. x x x The action must be brought by the person who, by substantive law,
possesses the right sought to be enforced. x x x
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court specifies who may be the plaintiff in an action for
forcible entry, viz:
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - x x x a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any
land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 177
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or
assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one
(1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in
the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under
them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and
costs. (Emphasis supplied.)
Sans the presence of the awardee of the Certificate of Stewardship, the provision clearly
allows Valeriana to institute the action for the recovery of the physical possession of the
property against the alleged usurper. She has a right or interest to protect as she was the
one dispossessed and thus, she can file the action for forcible entry. Any judgment
rendered by the courts below in the forcible entry action will bind and definitely affect her
claim to possess the subject property. The fact that Valeriana is not the holder of the
Certificate of Stewardship is not in issue in a forcible entry case. This matter already
delves into the character of her possession. We emphasize that in ejectment suits, it does
not even matter if the party’s title to the property is questionable.
The court highlighted the principle behind ejectment proceedings:
Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property the party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the
unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior
possession.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 178
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LETICIA DIONA, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, MARCELINA DIONA vs.
ROMEO A. BALANGUE, SONNY A. BALANGUE, REYNALDO A. BALANGUE, and
ESTEBAN A. BALANGUE, JR.
G.R. No. 173559, January 7, 2013

DOCTRINE: The great of a relief neither sought by the party in whose favor it was given
not supported by the evidence presented violates the opposing party’s right to due
process nor may be declared void ab initio in a proper proceeding.

FACTS:
Respondents obtained a loan from petitioner payable in six months and secured
by a Real Estate Mortgage over their 202-square meter property located in Marulas,
Valenzuela and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. V-12296. When the
debt became due, respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand. Thus, petitioner
filed with the RTC a Complaint praying that he be paid. The court granted the relief
sought by the petitioner. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, alleging
that respondents did not interpose a timely appeal despite receipt by their former counsel
of the RTC’s Decision. Before it could be resolved, however, respondents filed a Motion
to Set Aside Judgment claiming that not all of them were duly served with summons.
According to the other respondents, they had no knowledge of the case because their
co-respondent Sonny did not inform them about it. They prayed that the RTC’s Decision
be set aside and a new trial be conducted. But RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of
Execution to implement its October 17, 2000 Decision. Respondents then filed a Motion
to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale, claiming that the parties
did not agree in writing on any rate of interest and that petitioner merely sought for a 12%
per annum interest in her Complaint. Surprisingly, the RTC awarded 5% monthly interest
(or 60% per annum). Resultantly, their indebtedness inclusive of the exorbitant interest
from March 2, 1991 to May 22, 2001 ballooned from ₱124,400.00 to ₱652,000.00.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion and
serious error of law when it granted respondents’ petition for annulment of judgment as a
substitute or alternative remedy of a lost appeal.

HELD:
No. The court ruled that it be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. Annulment of judgment under Rule 47; an
exception to the final judgment rule; grounds therefor.
A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy
granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has
failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute
for a remedy which was lost due to the party’s own neglect in promptly availing of the
same. "The underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments
goes against the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation must end and terminate sometime

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 179
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of justice that once a
judgment has become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest."
While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction,
jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a
judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court declared that a final and executory
judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be
shown for having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.
We agree with respondents that the award of 5% monthly interest violated their right to
due process and, hence, the same may be set aside in a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of
what is being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining
the evidence presented in support thereof. Due process considerations require that
judgments must conform to and be supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in
court. In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston,36 this Court expounded that:
Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which
exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the
opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The
fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of a complaint must provide the
measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 180
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MARY LOUISE R. ANDERSON vs. ENRIQUE HO
G.R. No. 172590 , January 7, 2013

DOCTRINE: The rules on forum shopping, which were precisely designed to promote
and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such
absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective, which is simply
to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum shopping. The subsequent filing of the
certification duly signed by the petitioner himself should thus be deemed substantial
compliance, pro hac vice.

FACTS:
Anderson filed a Complaint for Ejectment against respondent Enrique Ho (Ho)
before the (MeTC) of Quezon City. She alleged that through her mere tolerance, Ho is in
possession of her parcel of land. As she was already in need of the said property,
Anderson served upon Ho a Demand Letter to Vacate but Ho refused. Because of this,
Anderson prayed that the MeTC order Ho to vacate the propety and pay her damages.
Ho denied that his occupation of the property is through Anderson’s mere tolerance. He
claimed that he managed her affairs in the Philippines and administered her properties.
When Anderson sought his assistance in ejecting her relatives from the and in
demolishing the Church built thereon, he was able to secure a judgment from the court in
favor of Anderson.
For all these, Anderson did not pay Ho a single centavo and instead executed a written
document which states that as partial payment for Ho’s services, Anderson is authorizing
him “to make use of the property as his residence free of charge provided he vacates [it]
if there is a buyer for the lot” and “that the balance of Ho’s compensation shall consist of
10% of the proceeds of the sale of any or all of her properties
In view of this, Ho averred that he possesses the property not through mere tolerance
but as part of his compensation for services rendered to Anderson. Hence, he is entitled
to the continued possession thereof until such time that the property is sold and he is
paid.
MeTC dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. It gave much weight to the written
document executed by Anderson wherein she gave her consent for Ho to occupy the
property provided that the latter shall vacate the same if there is already a buyer for the
lot. There being no allegation that the said property already has a buyer, she could not
eject Ho therefrom.
The RTC is inclined to consider the dismissal of the complaint. The CA, on the other
hand, resolves to dismiss. Although after many extensions granted for the filing of the
petition for review by anderson’s counsel because anderson was in the USA, when the
petition was already filed, the certification against forum shopping attached thereto was
signed by him on Anderson’s behalf without any accompanying authority to do so. Thus,
dismissal of the complaint. Hence, petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Anderson’s prayer of relaxation of the rules on certification against
forum shopping should be granted and therefore giving her sufficient cause of action for
ejectment and damages against Ho.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 181
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
No. No justifiable reason exists in this case as to relax the rule on certification
against forum shopping.

The certificate of non-forum shopping has, time and again, been declared as basic,
necessary and mandatory for procedural orderliness. Non-compliance therewith or a
defect therein is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction
thereof.

Thus, SC denied petition. Ejectment case against Ho shall not prosper for lack of cause
of action and for failure of the Petitioner to abide by the rules as to the certification
against forum shopping, compliance of which is necessary and mandatory for procedural
orderliness.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 182
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SALVACION VILLANUEVA, TEOFILO TREDEZ, DONALD BUNDAC, DANNY
CABIGUEN, GREGORIO DELGADO, and BILLY BUNGAR vs. PALAWAN COUNCIL
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (PSCD)
G.R. No. 178347 February 25, 2013

DOCTRINE: The writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that the Court issues only
under closely defined grounds and procedures that litigants and their lawyers must
scrupulously observe.

FACTS:
The controversy in the instant case arose when PCSD issued an SEP Clearance to
Patricia Louise Mining and Development Corporation (PLMDC) for its proposed
small-scale nickel mining project to be conducted in a controlled use area in Barangay
Calategas in the Municipality of Narra, Province of Palawan.

The petitioners, who are farmers and residents of Barangay Calategas, sought the recall
of the said clearance in their letter to PCSD Chairman, Abraham Kahlil Mitra. The PCSD,
through its Executive Director, Romeo B. Dorado, denied their request for lack of basis.

On August 7, 2006, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus against
PCSD and PLMDC with the RTC of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City. They prayed for
the nullification of the said SEP Clearance for violating various provisions of RA 7611
and PCSD Resolution No. 05-250. They alleged that these provisions prohibit
small-scale nickel mining for profit in the proposed site, which, they maintain, is not even
a controlled use zone, but actually a core zone.

PLMDC and PCSD sought the dismissal of the Petition on various grounds, including the
impropriety of the remedy of certiorari. PCSD argued that it did not perform a
quasi-judicial function.

ISSUE:
Whether or notRTC has certiorari jurisdiction over PCSD because the latter is a
quasi-judicial body functioning only within the RTC’s territorial jurisdiction

HELD:
NO. The following requisites must concur for a Petition for Certiorari to prosper,
namely:
(a) The writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions;
(b) Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 183
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
(c) There is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.

In the case at bar, the parties submit that the public respondent PCSD is exercising a
quasi-judicial function in its issuance of the SEP clearance based on the procedure it
follows under its own AO 6 or Guidelines in the Implementation of SEP Clearance
System. This procedure includes reviewing the sufficiency and accuracy of the
documents submitted by the project proponent and conducting public hearings or
consultations with the affected community.

The Court disagrees with the parties’ reasoning and holds that PCSD did not perform a
quasi-judicial function that is reviewable by petition for certiorari. There must be an
enabling statute or legislative act conferring quasi-judicial power upon the administrative
body. RA 7611, which created the PCSD, does not confer quasi-judicial powers on the
said body.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 184
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
EFREN ALMUETE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 179611 : March 12, 2013

DOCTRINE: Section 6,1 Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure allows
promulgation of judgment in absentia and gives the accused a period of fifteen (15) days
from notice to him or his counsel within which to appeal; otherwise, the decision
becomes final.

FACTS:
Efren D. Almuete (petitioner), Johnny Ila (Ila) and Joel Lloren (Lloren) were charged
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, with violation of
Section 687 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, otherwise known as the "Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines," as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2672. On the scheduled date of promulgation of
judgment, petitioners counsel informed the trial court that petitioner and Lloren were ill
while Ila was not notified of the scheduled promulgation. The RTC, however, found their
absence inexcusable and proceeded to promulgate its Decision as scheduled and
finding accused guilty. The petitioner and co-accused filed a Petition for Certiorari on
Court of Appeals which granted the petition in favor of Almuete. The People of the
Philippines elevate the case to Supreme Court which reinstated RTC’s decision.
Aggrieved, the accused moved for reconsideration and repromulgation but was denied.
CA also denied their reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it acquitted petitioner
Almuete in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

HELD:
YES. Petitioners right to appeal has prescribed. As to whether petitioner may still
appeal the RTCs September 8, 1998 Decision, we rule in the negative.

In People v. Court of Appeals, this Court reversed petitioners acquittal by the CA as it


was made with grave abuse of discretion. This Court explained that an acquittal via a
Petition for Certiorari is not allowed because "the authority to review perceived errors of
the trial court in the exercise of its judgment and discretion x x x are correctible only by
appeal by writ of error." Thus, in filing a Petition for Certiorari instead of an appeal,
petitioner availed of the wrong remedy.

The CA reviewed the trial courts assessment of the evidence on record, its findings of
facts, and its conclusions based on the said findings. The CA forthwith concluded that
the said evidence was utterly insufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction,
and acquitted respondent Almuete of the crime charged.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 185
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The appellate court acted with grave abuse of its discretion when it ventured beyond the
sphere of its authority and arrogated unto itself, in the certiorari proceedings, the
authority to review perceived errors of the trial court in the exercise of its judgment and
discretion, which are correctible only by appeal by writ of error. Consequently, the
decision of the CA acquitting respondent Almuete of the crime charged is a nullity. If a
court is authorized by statute to entertain jurisdiction in a particular case only, and
undertakes to exercise the jurisdiction conferred in a case to which the statute has no
application, the judgment rendered is void. The lack of statutory authority to make a
particular judgment is akin to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In this case, the CA is
authorized to entertain and resolve only errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.

A void judgment has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In
contemplation of law, it is non-existent. It cannot impair or create rights; nor can any right
be based on it. Thus, respondent Almuete cannot base his claim of double jeopardy on
the appellate courts decision

Clearly, petitioners right to appeal the RTCs September 8, 1998 Decision has long
prescribed. Consequently, the said Decision is no longer open to an appeal.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 186
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HEIRS OF LAZARO GALLARDO v. PORFERIO SOLIMAN
G.R. NO.178952 : April 10, 2013

DOCTRINE: The signature of only one of the petitioners in the certification against forum
shopping substantially complied with rules because all the petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense

FACTS:
Petitioners are heirs of Lazaro Gallardo (Lazaro). Lazaro and Prosperidad are the
registered owners of a 4.3699-hectare parcel of land in Balingcanaway, Tarlac, Tarlac,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 976035 (the land). The land was
placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer pursuant to Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 27, and respondent Porferio Soliman (Porferio) was instituted as a qualified
farmer tenant-transferee thereof. On June 2, 1995, petitioners filed a Complaint for
collection of land amortizations, dispossession, ejectment, and cancellation of Deed of
Transfer and Emancipation Patent against respondent Porferio before the Office of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), Diwa ng Tarlak, Tarlac City. The case
was docketed as DARAB Case No. 898-T 95.

PARAD directed Porferio, Vivian and Antonio to pay petitioners a total of about 478.24
cavans of palay, P25,000.00 moral and exemplary damages, P15,000.00 attorney's
fees, and costs. DARAB also upheld the ruling with modifications. The Court of Appeals
dismissing petitioners' Petition for Review on the ground that the verification and
certification against forum shopping was signed by only four of the six petitioners.
Petitioners Mario Lazaro P. Gallardo and Lazaro P. Gallardo, Jr. did not sign, and no
special power of attorney to sign in their favor accompanied the Petition. The CA held
that the certification against forum shopping must be executed and signed by all of the
petitioners, or else it is insufficient.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the signing of the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping by only 4 of the 6 petitioners is insufficient to meet the requirements of the rule

HELD:
YES. The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed
by all the plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient.
However, the Court has also stressed that the rules on forum shopping were designed to
promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and thus should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate
objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the
contents of the certification. This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the
provisions regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its
mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 187
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
requirements completely disregarded. Thus, under justifiable circumstances, the Court
has relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that
although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.

In HLC Construction and Development Corporation v. Emily Homes Subdivision


Homeowners Association, it was held that the signature of only one of the petitioners in
the certification against forum shopping substantially complied with rules because all the
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense.
The same leniency was applied by the Court in Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile, because the
lone petitioner who executed the certification of non-forum shopping was a relative and
co-owner of the other petitioners with whom he shares a common interest.

Furthermore, we have consistently held that verification of a pleading is a formal, not a


jurisdictional, requirement intended to secure the assurance that the matters alleged in a
pleading are true and correct. Thus, the court may simply order the correction of
unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules. It is
deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the
truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification; and when
matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 188
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
BOARDWALK BUSINESS VENTURES, INC. v. ELVIRA A. VILLAREAL
G.R. No. 181182 : April 10, 2013

DOCTRINE: The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due
process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law

FACTS:
The case stemmed on Boardwalk filing a Complaint for Replevin against Villareal.
MeTC rendered decision favoring Boardwalk. RTC granted the appeal filed by Villareal.
Boardwalk filed Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. It filed with RTC Manila a
Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review and paid the docket and other
legal fees thereto. Boardwalk also filed its Notice of Appeal with RTC. Court of Appeals
dismissed outright the petition holding that Boardwalk erred in filing its Motion for
Extension and payment of fees with the RTC. It should have done so with the CA as
required by the Rules.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Boardwalk properly filed its appeal

HELD:
NO. Petitioner's case is not unique, and there is no compelling reason to accord it
the privilege it now seeks. The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a
component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in
the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law." This being so, x x x an
appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.
Deviations from the Rules cannot be tolerated. The rationale for this strict attitude is not
difficult to appreciate as the Rules are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of
appealed cases. In an age where courts are bedeviled by clogged dockets, the Rules
need to be followed by appellants with greater fidelity. Their observance cannot be left to
the whims and caprices of appellants. Petitioner must comply with the following
requirements laid down in Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. However, records show that
petitioner failed to comply with the foregoing rules.

Concededly, this Court in several cases exercised leniency and relaxed the Rules.
However, in this case, petitioner committed multiple violations of the Rules which should
sufficiently militate against its plea for leniency. As will be shown below, petitioner failed
to perfect its appeal by not filing the Petition within the reglementary period and paying
the docket and other lawful fees before the proper court. These requirements are
mandatory and jurisdictional

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 189
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
DARMA MASLAG v. AND ELIZABETH MONZON, WILLIAM GESTON, REGISTRY OF
DEEDS OF BENGUET
G.R. No. 174908, June 17, 2013

DOCTRINE: It is incumbent upon x x x appellants to utilize the correct mode of appeal of


the decisions of trial courts to the appellate courts. In the mistaken choice of their
remedy, they can blame no one but themselves

FACTS:
In 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for reconveyance of real property with
declaration of nullity of original certificate of title (OCT) against respondents Elizabeth
Monzon (Monzon), William Geston and the Registry of Deeds of La Trinidad, Benguet.
The Complaint was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet.
After trial, the MTC found respondent Monzon guilty of fraud in obtaining an OCT.
Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet which
reversed the ruling of MTC. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. Respondents moved to
dismiss petitioner’s ordinary appeal for being the improper remedy. They asserted that
the proper mode of appeal is a Petition for Review under Rule 42 because the RTC
rendered it in its appellate jurisdiction. Court of Appeals dismissed the case for improper
remedy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the appeal filed by
the Petitoner

HELD:
YES. Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides for the dismissal of an
improper appeal:

SECTION 2.Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. – An appeal under


Rule 41 taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only
questions of law shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not being reviewable by said
court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from the
appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed.

An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the
appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.

There are two modes of appealing an RTC decision or resolution on issues of fact and
law. The first mode is an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 in cases where the RTC
exercised its original jurisdiction. It is done by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. The
second mode is a petition for review under Rule 42 in cases where the RTC exercised its

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 190
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
appellate jurisdiction over MTC decisions. It is done by filing a Petition for Review with
the CA. Simply put, the distinction between these two modes of appeal lies in the type of
jurisdiction exercised by the RTC in the Order or Decision being appealed.

The MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case;
hence, there is no other way the RTC could have taken cognizance of the case and
review the court a quo’s Judgment except in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. It
cannot be overemphasized that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by
law and it is "not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or
coveniently set aside." Neither would the active participation of the parties nor estoppel
operate to confer original and exclusive jurisdiction where the court or tribunal only
wields appellate jurisdiction over the case. Thus, the CA is correct in holding that the
proper mode of appeal should have been a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court, and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.

Was it rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, or in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction? In short, we look at what type of jurisdiction was actually
exercised by the RTC. We do not look into what type of jurisdiction the RTC should have
exercised. This is but logical. Inquiring into what the RTC should have done in disposing
of the case is a question which already involves the merits of the appeal, but we
obviously cannot go into that where the mode of appeal was improper to begin with.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 191
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
TERESA C. AGUILAR, CESAR D. RAAGAS, VILLAMOR VILLEGAS, and THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF MAKATIvs. MICHAEL J. O'PALLICK
G.R. No. 182280, July 29, 2013

Doctrine: "The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or
proceeding in which he was not made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due
process of law."

Facts:
O’Pallick (respondent) was the assignee of Poblete and Villanueva in a Contract to Sell for the
purchase of the Makati Prime Citadel Condominium in Makati (unit) between the latter and
Primetown Property Group, Inc. (PPGI). After respondent paid the full purchase price of the unit,
PPGI issued a deed of sale in his favor but said deed of sale was not registered or annotated in
the title. Meanwhile, Aguilar (petitioner) was able to obtain a final and executory decision in her
favor against PPGI before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), and, as a
result, several properties of PPGI including the unit were levied. A Notice of sale was posted by
the sheriff which was also published. But before the scheduled auction sale, respondent filed
and affidavit of third party claim. When the auction sale was completed, petitioner was declared
the highest bidder and was issued a certificate of sale. Respondent filed a case for quieting of
title and to set aside the levy on execution of the subject unit, to annul the certificate of sale
issued in favor of Aguilar, as well as to recover the unit.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is bound by the decision of the HLURB and the subsequent
auction sale.

HELD:
No, respondent is not bound by the decision of the HLURB.
"The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding
in which he was not made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due process of
law." Thus, we agree with the CA’s pronouncement that since respondent was not impleaded in
the HLURB case, he could not be bound by the decision rendered therein. Because he was not
impleaded in said case; he was not given the opportunity to present his case therein. But, more
than the fact that O’Pallick was not impleaded in the HLURB case, he had the right to vindicate
his claim in a separate action, as in this case. As a prior purchaser of the very same
condominium unit, he had the right to be heard on his claim.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 192
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
CAROLINA B. JOSE vs. PURITA SUAREZ
G.R. No. 176111, July 17, 2013

Doctrine: When a trial court is confronted to rule on "a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw
an Information", it is its "bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this
assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the motion."

Facts:
Jose (petitioner) filed two complaints against Suarez (respondent) for estafa. In a joint resolution,
the city prosecutor found probable cause to indict respondent for estafa and, as a result, the
corresponding information was filed against her. Respondent filed a petition for review before
the Department of Justice (DOJ) to which the latter resolved to reverse the findings of the city
prosecutor finding that there was in fact, no probable cause to indict respondent for estafa.
Pursuant to the DOJ’s directive, the city prosecutor moved for the withdrawal of the information
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC, however, denied the motion and ruled in this
wise:
“Acting on the Motion to Resolve "Motion to Withdraw Information" dated July 13, 2005, and
finding it to be unmeritorious, the Court resolves to deny the motion.
SO ORDERED.”
A motion for reconsideration was filed by respondent but the same was likewise denied.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to
withdraw the information without making an independent evaluation of the merits of the case as
to whether there was probable cause or not.

HELD:
Yes, there was grave abuse of discretion.
When a trial court is confronted to rule on "a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an
Information", it is its "bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this
assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the motion." The RTC simply
declared that it was denying the motion for being "unmeritorious," without further elaborating on
the bases of its conclusion. Moreover, there is nary any reference made to the findings of the
DOJ. Likewise, in itsdenial of respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC merely stated
that the 5% interest is a matter of defense. There was never any discussion as to how it reached
such conclusion, or how the DOJ findings impacted on its ruling. And instead of confronting the
reasons stated in the motion for the withdrawal of the Information, the RTC digressed and
focused solely on what constitutes estafa involving bouncing checks.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 193
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HEIRS OF NUMERIANO MIRANDA, SR., namely: CIRILA (deceased), CORNELIO,
NUMERIANO, JR., ERLINDA, LOLITA, RUFINA, DANILO, ALEJANDRO, FELIMON,
TERESITA, ELIZABETH and ANALIZA, all surnamed MIRANDA, Petitioners, vs. PABLO
R. MIRANDA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 179638, July 8, 2013

Doctrines:While filing a pleading by private courier is not prohibited by the Rules, "the date of
delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of
filing thereof in court;" instead, "the date of actual receipt by the court is deemed the date of filing
of that pleading."
An action for revival of a judgment cannot modify, alter, or reverse the original judgment, which
is already final and executory.

Facts:
In a case filed by the Heirs of Numeriano Miranda Sr. (petitioners) against the heirs of Pedro
Miranda, among whom Pablo Miranda (respondent) was a part of, the Regional Trial Court
ruled, among others, that some of the petitioners were to vacate the premises of a certain
property and pay the respondent monthly rentals. Petitioners did not file an appeal and the same
became final and executory. More than 5 years later, respondent filed an Ex-parte motion
praying that the RTC issue a Break-Open and Demolition Order" in order to compel the
petitioners to vacate his property but since more than five years have elapsed from the time the
Writ of Execution should have been enforced, the RTC denied the Motion. This prompted
respondent to file with the RTC a Petition for Revival of Judgment. On June 20, 2006 the RTC
rendered its decision granting the Petition. On July 13, 2006, the petitioners filed a notice of
appeal via LBC.

Issues:
Whether or not the appeal was filed out of time.
Whether or not an appeal on the Petition for revival of Judgment can modify, alter or reverse
the original judgment.

HELD:
Yes, the appeal was filed out of time.
It is basic and elementary that a Notice of Appeal should be filed "within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from." Under Section 3, In this case, however, the
counsel for petitioners filed the Notice of Appeal via a private courier, a mode of filing not
provided in the Rules. Though not prohibited by the Rules, we cannot consider the filing of
petitioners’ Notice of Appeal via LBC timely filed. It is established jurisprudence that "the date of
delivery of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of
filing thereof in court;" instead, "the date of actual receipt by the court x x x is deemed the date of
filing of that pleading."Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, pleadings may be filed in court either
personally or by registered mail. In the first case, the date of filing is the date of receipt. In the
second case, the date of mailing is the date of receipt.
No, a petition for revival of judgement cannot modify, alter or reverse the original judgment.
An action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action.It is different and distinct from
the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced. As such, a party aggrieved by a decision

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 194
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
of a court in an action for revival of judgment may appeal the decision, but only insofar as the
merits of the action for revival is concerned. The original judgment, which is already final and
executory, may no longer be reversed, altered, or modified.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 195
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEMARIE JALBONIAN alias "Budo"
G.R. No. 180281, July 01, 2013

Doctrine: "Well-settled is the rule that the testimony of a lone prosecution witness, as long as it
is credible and positive, can prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt."

Facts:
Jalbonian (Accused) was charged of the crime of murder for causing the death of Fortunato
Quintanilla through stabbing with a bladed weapon. Accused was apprehended only after more
than 5 years of hiding and was subsequently arraigned and entered the plea of not guilty. During
the trial, the lone witness of the prosecution was Barangay Chairman Oscar Valenciano
(Valenciano) who testified that at around noon of the day of the crime, he saw accused position
himself behind the deceased and subsequently proceeded to stab the latter at the back.
According to his testimony, Valenciano was merely about three arms-length away from the
accused when he saw the incident. Further, immediately after the stabbing incident, Valenciano
ordered Julio Gaston, who was a member of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit
(CAFGU), to chase the accused but the latter eluded arrest. The Regional Trial Court (RTC)
convicted the accused for the crime of murder. The accused appealed the decision assailing the
credibility of Valenciano and contending that the RTC erred in relying on the latter’s testimony
which was incredible and insufficient to prove his guilt.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in convicting the accused by relying only on the testimony of
Valenciano.

HELD:
No, the RTC did no err in convicting the accused based on Valenciano’s testimony alone.
We are convinced that it was appellant who killed the victim. Valenciano clearly narrated the
details of the stabbing incident and positively identified appellant as the assailant. In a simple,
spontaneous, and straightforward manner. The witness pointed to the person who stood up[,]
and when asked[,] identified himself as Joemarie Jalbonian y Mellendez. Also, the fact that
Valenciano was just a few meters away from the victim and that the crime was committed in
broad daylight bolster Valenciano’s identification of appellant as the assailant.
Likewise untenable is appellant’s contention that Valenciano’s testimony cannot be relied upon
since it was not corroborated by other witnesses to the crime. Finding of guilt based on the
testimony of a lone witness is not uncommon. "For although the number of witnesses may be
considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, preponderance is not necessarily with the
greatest number and conviction can still be had on the basis of the credible and positive
testimony of a single witness. Corroborative evidence is deemed necessary ‘only when there
are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his observation
had been inaccurate.’"

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 196
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR. and MA. ROSARIO M. SABITSANA vs.
JUANITO F. MUERTEGUI, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact DOMINGO A.
MUERTEGUI, JR.
G.R. No. 181359, August 5, 2013

Doctrines:An action for quieting of title may be instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the
assessed value of the real property in dispute.
Act 3344 is the law that is applicable over unregistered sale of real estate not Art. 1544 of the
Civil Code.

Facts:
On September 2, 1981, Alberto Garcia (Garcia) executed an unnotarized Deed of Sale in favor
of Juanito Muertegui (respondent) over an unregistered parcel of land. The respondent’s father
and brother took actual possession over the lot and started planting coconut and ipil-ipil trees.
They also paid real property taxes over the said parcel of land. On October 17, 1991, Garcia
sold the same parcel of land to the family lawyer of the Muertegui, Atty. Clemencio Sabastina
(petitioiners) through a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale. The sale was also registered with the
register of deeds and a new title was issued in favor of petitioner. When the father of respondent
passed away, his heirs applied for registration and coverage under the Public Land Act.
Petitioner opposed the application for registration through a letter addressed to the DENR
claiming that he was the true owner of the lot. He further asked that the application be held in
abeyance until the issue of ownership is resolved. Respondents then filed a case for quieting of
title with preliminary injunction against petitioner and his wife before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC).

Issues:
Whether or not it was the RTC who had jurisdiction over the case considering that the
assessed value of the land was merely P 1,230.00.
Whether or not the applicable law in this case is Article 1544 of the Civil Code which gives the
petitioners the better right to the lot.

HELD:
Yes, it is the RTC who has jurisdiction over the case.
On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may be
instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. Under
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom
may be brought in the appropriate RTC. It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title
was prompted by petitioners’ letter-opposition to respondent’s application for registration. Thus,
in order to preventa cloud from being cast upon his application for a title, respondent filed the
case to obtain a declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory relief,
which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules.
No, the applicable law is not Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
What applies in this case is Act No. 3344,as amended, which provides for the system of
recording of transactions over unregistered real estate. Act No. 3344 expressly declares that
any registration made shall be without prejudice to a third party with a better right. The sale to
respondent Juanito was executed on September 2, 1981 via an unnotarized deed of sale, while

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 197
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
the sale to petitioners was made via a notarized document only on October 17, 1991, or ten
years thereafter. Thus, Juanito who was the first buyer has a better right to the lot, while the
subsequent sale to petitioners is null and void, because when it was made, the seller Garcia was
no longer the owner of the lot. Nemo dat quod non habet.
The fact that the sale to Juanito was not notarized does not alter anything, since the sale
between him and Garcia remains valid nonetheless. Notarization, or the requirement of a public
document under the Civil Code,is only for convenience, and not for validity or enforceability.And
because it remained valid as between Juanito and Garcia, the latter no longer had the right to
sell the lot to petitioners, for his ownership thereof had ceased.
Nor can petitioners’ registration of their purchase have any effect on Juanito’s rights. The mere
registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was no
longer the owner of the land, having previously sold the same to another even if the earlier sale
was unrecorded. Neither could it validate the purchase thereof by petitioners, which is null and
void. Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Our land registration
laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 198
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. MARY SHEILA ARCOBILLAS
G.R. No. 179648, August 7, 2013

Doctrines:The filing of a Motion for Reconsideration is not a mere technicality of procedure. It is


a jurisdictional and mandatory requirement which must be strictly complied with.
Gross neglect of duty "denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to
perform a duty." It "refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be
affected.

Facts:
Mary Sheila Arcobillas (respondent), a bank teller, inadvertently misposted the amount of US$
5,517.00 to the account of Avelina Nomad-Spoor instead of the amount of P5, 517.00 thereby
causing damage to her employer Philippine National Bank (petitioner) the amount of P214,
641.23. After investigation, respondent was administratively charged with neglect of duty and
was subsequently found by respondent’s Administrative Adjudication Panel guilty of gross
neglect of duty resulting in her forced resignation with benefits. Respondent filed a case of illegal
dismissal before the Labor Arbiter (LA) who found that there was no sufficient evidence to hold
respondent of gross and habitual negligence of duty. Petitioner appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) who subsequently affirmed the decision of the LA. Without filing
a motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
(CA).

Issues:
Whether or not the CA can give due course to the petition for certiorari even without the filing
of the motion for reconsideration before the lower tribunal/quasi-judicial body.
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross and habitual negligence of duty.

HELD:
No, the CA cannot give due course to the petition for certiorari without the filing of the
motion for reconsideration before the lower tribunal/quasi-judicial body.
PNB’s failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration with the NLRC before filing its Petition for
Certiorari before the CA is a fatal infirmity. it is a well-established rule that "a [M]otion for
[R]econsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the
special civil action for certiorari x x x. The rationale for the rule is that the law intends to afford the
NLRC an opportunity to rectify such errors or mistakes it may have committed before resort to
courts of justice can be had. Of course, the rule is not absolute and jurisprudence has laid down
exceptions when the filing of a [P]etition for [C]ertiorari is proper notwithstanding the failure to file
a [M]otion for [R]econsideration,"such as "(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the
court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have
been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a
[M]otion for [R]econsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 199
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order
of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relied by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding was
ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and, (i) where the issue raised is
one purely of law or where public interest is involved." Here, PNB did not at all allege to which of
the above-mentioned exceptions this case falls. Neither did it present any plausible justification
for dispensing with the requirement of a prior Motion for Reconsideration before the NLRC. It
bears to stress that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration is not a mere technicality of
procedure. It is a jurisdictional and mandatory requirement which must be strictly complied with.
No, respondent is not guilty of gross and habitual neglect of duty.
To warrant removal from service, the negligence should be gross and habitual.Although it was
her second time to commit misposting (i.e., the first misposting was in 1995 while the second
misposting was committed in 1998), Arcobillas’s act cannot be considered as gross as to
warrant her termination from employment. Gross neglect of duty "denotes a flagrant and
culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform a duty." It "refers to negligence
characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there
is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected."As aptly held by the labor tribunals,
the misposting was not deliberately done as to constitute as gross negligence. Rather, it was a
case of simple neglect brought about by carelessness which, as satisfactorily explained by
Arcobillas, was the effect of her heavy workload that day and the headache she was
experiencing.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 200
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
VIRGINIA M. VENZON vs. RURAL BANK OF BUENAVISTA (AGUSAN DEL NORTE), INC.,
represented by LOURDESITA E. PARAJES
G.R. No. 178031, August 28, 2013

Doctrine:

Facts:
Virginia Venzon (petitioner) obtained a loan from Rural Bank of Buenavista (respondent)
which was secured by a real estate mortgage. According to petitioner, when she offered to pay
the balance of the loan, respondent shoved her out of the premises of the bank resulting in the
former’s failure to pay the balance of the loan. Subsequently, respondent foreclosed the
mortgage and the property was sold to the latter as the highest bidder. 18 years after the
foreclosure sale, petitioner filed a petition to nullify the foreclosure proceedings on the ground
that the same is void for lack of notice and publication of the sale. The Regional Trial Court
(RTC) ruled against petitioner stating among others that under the Rural Bank Act as amended,
the foreclosure of mortgages covering loans granted by rural banks and executions of
judgments thereon involving real properties levied upon by a sheriff shall be exempt from
publication where the total amount of the loan, including interests due and unpaid, does not
exceed ₱10,000.00. Since petitioner’s outstanding obligation amounted to just over ₱6,000.00
publication was not necessary. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) who dismissed the
same stating that the petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s petition for certiorari is the proper remedy given the factual
circumstance.

HELD:
No, the petition for certiorari is an improper remedy.
The Court finds no error in the CA’s treatment of the Petition for Certiorari. The trial court’s July
13, 2006 Resolution dismissing the case was indeed to be treated as a final order, disposing of
the issue of publication and notice of the foreclosure sale – which is the very core of petitioner’s
cause of action in Civil Case No. 5535 – and declaring the same to be unnecessary pursuant to
the Rural Banks Act, as petitioner’s outstanding obligation did not exceed ₱10,000.00, and thus
leaving petitioner without basis to maintain her case. This constitutes a dismissal with the
character of finality. As such, petitioner should have availed of the remedy under Rule 41, and
not Rule 65.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPOUSES CARMELITO AND ANTONIA ALDOVER vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS,
SUSANA AHORRO, et al.
G.R. No. 167174, September 23, 2013

Doctrine:A Petition for Certiorari is not the proper remedy to review the intrinsic correctness of
the public respondent’s ruling. It is settled that as long as a court or quasi-judicial body acts
within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction will amount to
nothing more than errors of judgment which are not reviewable in a special civil action
of certiorari.

Facts:
The Reyeses were the registered owners of a parcel of land. On August 12, 1999, the
Reyeses obtained a loan from Antonia Aldover (petitioners) secured by a real estate
mortgage on the parcel of land. The Reyeses failed to pay their loan and the petitioners
caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the lot where the latter emerged as the winning
bidder. Subsequently, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner. Thereafter,
petitioners filed a verified petition for the issuance of a Writ of Possession before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 71. Despite the Reyeses’ opposition to the petition,
RTC Branch 71 issued the Writ of Possession and ordered its sheriff to place the
petitioner in possession of the land. The sheriff, however, failed to do the same as there
were several persons who occupy portions of the land claiming to be the owners
thereof (private respondents). Private respondents filed a Complaint for Declaration of
Documents and Title, Reconveyance and Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction against the petitioners stating, among others, in said
complaint that the respondents have been residing in the subject land since the 1960’s by virtue
of a lease with the Reyeses. They further allege that their possession became in the concept of
an owner when the Reyeses sold parts of the land to them. Finally they claim that the mortgage
was fictitious since during the time of the execution of the same, the Reyeses were no longer the
owners of the property; hence, the mortgage and the foreclosure were void. RTC Branch 268
denied the prayer for TRO. This was followed by an Order granting respondents’ Motion to
Admit and admitting respondents’ Amended Complaint where they withdrew their ancillary
prayer for injunctive relief. Meanwhile, RTC Branch 71 granted petitioners’ Motion for Special
Order of Demolition. The respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Injunction with
prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against the petitioners before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ultimately resolved
the petition in favor of the respondents. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied; thus, they filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court (SC).

Issue:
Whether or not a petition for certiorari may lie against the CA for issuing a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction considering that petitioner was the buyer of the subject land in a foreclosure sale and
therefore has the right to possess the same.

HELD:
No.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
A Petition for Certiorari is not the proper remedy to review the intrinsic correctness of the public
respondent’s ruling. It is settled that as long as a court or quasi-judicial body acts within its
jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction will amount to nothing
more than errors of judgment which are not reviewable in a special civil action of certiorari. Thus,
whether the CA committed errors in proceedings, misappreciated the facts, or misapplied the
law is beyond our power of review in this Petition for Certiorari for it cannot be used for any
purpose except to limit the action of the respondent court within the bounds of its jurisdiction.
It should also be noted that to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the following
must be present (1) that they have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a
right in esse; (2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (3) there is an urgent
need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicants; and, (4) there is no other ordinary,
speedy, and adequate remedy to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.
In the instant case even though petitioners were indeed the purchasers of the subject land in the
foreclosure sale, Sec.33 of Rule 39 provides thus:
“xxx Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be
substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the
property as of the time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the
purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the
property adversely to the judgment obligor.”
Considering the foregoing and the fact that respondents properly alleged that they were the
owners of the subject property, the CA cannot be said to have acted apriciously, whimsically,
arbitrarily or despotically in issuing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
GREGORIO SINGIAN, JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (3RD DIVISION), THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONON GOOD GOVERNMENT
G.R. Nos.195011-19, September 30, 2013

Doctrine:The grant or denial of a Demurrer to Evidence is left to the sound discretion of the
court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such
discretion.

Facts:
Gregorio Singian, Jr. (Petitioner), the Executive Vice-President of Integrated Shoe, Inc. (ISI),
is one of the many accused in a case for violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 (The Anti-graft and
Corrupt Practices Act) due to the purported granting of behest loans by the government’s
Philippine National Bank (PNB) to ISI. During the trial for the case of petitioner, the prosecution
called to the stand 9 witnesses as well as presented 8 documentary evidence. After the
prosecution rested its case, petitioner, with prior leave, filed a Demurrer to Evidence anchored
on the following grounds: 1) lack of proof of conspiracy with any PNB official; (2) the contracts
with PNB contained provisions that are beneficial, and not manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous, to the government; (3)the loans could not be characterized as behest loans
because they were secured by sufficient collaterals and ISI increased its capitalization; and (4)
assuming the loans are behest loans, petitioner could not be held liable for lack of any
participation. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence. Petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration having been denied, the latter filed a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court (SC).

Issue:
Whether or not the SC can disturb the decision of a lower court with regard to a demurrer to
evidence through a petition for certiorari.

HELD;
No, the SC cannot disturb the decision of a lower court with regard to a demurrer to
evidence through a petition for certiorari.
"A demurrer to the evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that
the evidence which his adversary produced is in sufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to
make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the
whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence
raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient
evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt."
"Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in character,
weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded according to the
circumstances. To be considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the
commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused."
"The resolution of a demurrer to evidence should be left to the exercise of sound judicial
discretion. A lower court’s order of denial shall not be disturbed, that is, the appellate courts will
not review the prosecution’s evidence and precipitately decide whether such evidence has
established the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, unless accused has

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
established that such judicial discretion has been gravely abused, there by amounting to a lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Mere allegations of such abuse will not suffice."
In this case, petitioner miserably failed to present an iota of evidence to show that the
Sandiganbayan abused, much more, gravely abused, its discretion in denying petitioner’s
Demurrer to Evidence. We agree with the PCGG’s observation that the Sandiganbayan arrived
at its conclusion after a careful and deliberate examination and assessment of all the evidence
submitted. A closer scrutiny of the assailed Resolutions would indeed show that the
Sandiganbayan meticulously discussed both testimonial and documentary evidence presented
by the prosecution.It was only after a careful analysis of the facts and evidence presented did
the respondent court lay down its find

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MANOLITO DE LEON and LOURDES E. DE LEON vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS
G.R. No. 184565, November 20, 2013

DOCTRINE:The party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.

In civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, who is required to establish his
case by a preponderance of evidence. Once the plaintiff has established his case, the
burden of evidence shifts to the defendant, who, in turn, has the burden to establish his
defense.

FACTS:
Petitioner-spouses Manolito and Lourdes de Leon executed a Promissory Note
binding themselves to pay Nissan Gallery Ortigas the amount of P458,784.00 in 36
monthly installments of P12,744.00, with a late payment charge of five percent (5%) per
month. To secure the obligation under the Promissory Note, they constituted a Chattel
Mortgage over a 1995 Nissan Sentra 1300. On the same day, Nissan Gallery Ortigas,
with notice to petitioner-spouses, executed a Deed of Assignment of its rights and
interests under the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage in favor of Citytrust Banking
Corporation. Citytrust was then merged with and absorbed by respondent Bank of the
Philippine Islands.
When petitioner-spouses failed to pay their monthly amortizations, BPI, thru counsel,
sent them a demand letter. Afterwhich, BPI filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Manila a Complaint for Replevin and Damage against petitioner-spouses.
Petitioner-spouses, in their Answer, averred that the case should be dismissed for
failure of respondent BPI to prosecute the case pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 17 of the
Rules of Court because the mortgaged vehicle was stolen while the insurance policy was
still in force. They averred that BPI should have collected the insurance proceeds and
applied the same to the remaining obligation.
Petitioner-spouses offered as evidence the Alarm Sheet issued by the PNP, the
Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Reynaldo Llanos and the testimonies of Ultu and
petitioner Manolito.
MeTC ruled in favor of BPI and declared petitioner-spouses liable to pay their
remaining obligation for failure to notify Citytrust or BPI of the alleged theft of the
mortgaged vehicle and to submit proof thereof. RTC reversed the MeTC Decision. CA
reversed and set aside the RTC Order and reinstated the MeTC Decision.

ISSUE:
Who has the burden of proving that the mortgaged vehicle was stolen and that
Citytrust received notice and proof of loss of the mortgaged vehicle.

HELD:
The party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Section 1, Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court defines "burden of proof" as "the duty of a party to present evidence on the
facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence
required by law." In civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, who is required

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Once the plaintiff has established
his case, the burden of evidence shifts to the defendant, who, in turn, has the burden to
establish his defense.
In this case, BPI had to prove that petitioner-spouses failed to pay their obligations
under the Promissory Note. Petitioner-spouses, on the other hand, had to prove their
defense that the obligation was extinguished by the loss of the mortgaged vehicle, which
was insured.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
DIGITAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. JESSIE E. CANTOS
G.R. No. 180200, November 25, 2013

DOCTRINE:DIsmissal of the indirect contempt charge against respondent amounts to


an acquittal, which effectively bars a second prosecution.

FACTS:
By virtue of Republic Act (RA) No. 7678, DIGITEL was granted a legislative franchise
to install, operate and maintain telecommunications systems throughout the Philippines.
Upon seeking the renewal of its Mayor's Permit to operate and provide
telecommunications service in Balayan, Batangas, petitioner was informed by Mayor
Benjamin E. Martinez, Jr. that its business operation would be restrained should it fail to
pay the assessed real property taxes. When petitioner failed to pay, the Chief of the
Permit and License Division of Balayan, Batangas issued a Cease and Desist Order
enjoining petitioner from further operating its business.
Petitioner thus promptly filed a case for Annulment of the Cease and Desist Order
before the RTC of Balayan, Batangas. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3514.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and declared that the issuance of the Cease and Desist
Order was without legal basis. It held that the enjoinment of petitioner's business
operation is not one of the remedies available to enforce collection of real property taxes
under existing laws. The RTC also ruled that petitioner is only liable to pay real property
taxes on properties not used in connection with the operation of its franchise.
The ruling became final and executory as shown in an Entry of Judgment dated
February 2, 2000.
In June 2002, respondent, in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer of the Province of
Batangas, issued seven Warrants of Levy certifying that several real properties of
petitioner situated in the Municipalities of Ibaan, San Juan, Sto. Tomas, Cuenca,
Nasugbu, Balayan, and Lemery, all in the Province of Batangas, are delinquent in the
payment of real property taxes. Hence, the properties would be advertised and sold at
public auction. Petitioner wrote respondent to request the lifting of the Warrants of Levy
and to refrain from proceeding with the public sale of its property located in Balayan,
Batangas. It invoked the final Decision in Civil Case No. 3514 decreeing petitioner's
exemption from the payment of real property tax which it claimed to be binding upon
respondent. But since the warrants remained uplifted, petitioner filed with the RTC a
Petition for Indirect Contempt and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).
RTC issued an Order denying petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. It held that the issuance of the writ prayed for had already become
moot and academic since the public auction sale sought to be enjoined was already
consummated. RTC rendered its Decision 25 dated July 7, 2003 dismissing petitioner's
Petition for Indirect Contempt and Prohibition against respondent (Civil Case No. 4051).
The RTC ruled that since respondent was not a party in Civil Case No. 3514, he had no
duty to render obedience to the Decision therein.
CA noted that the dismissal of the case for indirect contempt by the RTC amounted
to an acquittal from which an appeal is not allowed.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Cantos is guilty of indirect contempt?

HELD:
No. Contempt is not a criminal offense. However, a charge for contempt of court
partakes of the nature of a criminal action. Rules that govern criminal prosecutions
strictly apply to a prosecution for contempt. In fact, Section 11 of Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court provides that the appeal in indirect contempt proceedings may be taken as in
criminal cases. This Court has held that an alleged contemner should be accorded the
same rights as that of an accused. Thus, the dismissal of the indirect contempt charge
against respondent amounts to an acquittal, which effectively bars a second prosecution.
Respondent is not guilty of indirect contempt. "Contempt of court is defined as a
disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It
signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's order, but such
conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into
disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. It is a defiance
of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court which tends to bring the authority and
administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice party-litigants or
their witnesses during litigation."
In this case, the acts of respondent in issuing the Warrants of Levy and in effecting
the public auction sale of petitioner's real properties, were neither intended to undermine
the authority of the court nor resulted to disobedience to the lawful orders of Branch IX.
He merely performed a ministerial function which he is bound to perform.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
FRANCISCO LIM vs. EQUITABLE PCI BANK, now known as the BANCO DE ORO
UNIBANK, INC.
G.R. No. 183918, January 15, 2014

DOCTRINE: The basic rule is that he who alleges must prove his case.

FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco Lim authorizes his brother, Franco Lim to mortgage his share in
the property by executing an Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney. On 1989, Banco De
Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank released a loan in the amount of P8.5 million by virtue
of the said Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney, which was entered in the Register of
Deeds of San Juan, Metro Manila. On 1992, the loan was fully paid by Franco.
On 1996, petitioner, Franco, and their mother Victoria Yao Lim obtained from
respondent Equitable PCI Bank a loan in the amount of P30 million in favor of Sun Paper
Products, Inc. To secure the loan, petitioner and Franco executed in favor of respondent
a Real Estate Mortgage over the same property. However, when the loan was not paid,
respondent foreclosed the mortgaged property. On this 2 nd loan, petitioner alleged that
he did not authorize Franco to mortgage the subject property to respondent and that his
signatures in the Real Estate Mortgage and the Surety Agreement were forged.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. It ruled that petitioner was able to prove by
preponderance of evidence that he did not participate in the execution of the mortgage
contract giving rise to the presumption that his signature was forged. CA reversed the
RTC Decision. It ruled that petitioner's mere allegation that his signature in the mortgage
contract was forged is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity of the
notarized document.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was able to prove that his signature was forged.

HELD:
No. Petitioner failed to prove that his signature was forged.
Allegations of forgery, like all other allegations, must be proved by clear, positive,
and convincing evidence by the party alleging it. It should not be presumed but must be
established by comparing the alleged forged signature with the genuine signatures.
Although handwriting experts are often offered as witnesses, they are not indispensable
because judges must exercise independent judgment in determining the authenticity or
genuineness of the signatures in question.
In this case, the alleged forged signature was not compared with the genuine
signatures of petitioner as no sample signatures were submitted. What petitioner
submitted was another mortgage contract executed in favor of Planters Development
Bank, which he claims was also forged by his brother. But except for this, no other
evidence was submitted by petitioner to prove his allegation of forgery. His allegation
that he was in the US at the time of the execution of the mortgage contract is also not
sufficient proof that his signature was forged.
Moreover, petitioner's subsequent actions belie his allegation of forgery. Before the
expiration of the redemption period, petitioner sent respondent a letter signifying his

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
intention to reacquire the said property. He even visited the bank to discuss the matter.
Clearly, his acts contradict his claim of forgery, which appears to be an afterthought and
a last-ditch effort to recover the said property.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MANLAR RICE MILL, INC. vs. LOURDES L. DEYTO, doing business under the trade
name "J.D. Grains Center" and JENNELITA DEYTO ANG, a.k.a. "JANET ANG," G.R. No.
191189 January 29, 2014

DOCTRINE:In civil cases, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence, which
connotes "that evidence that is of greater weight or is more convincing than that which is in
opposition to it. It does not mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the testimony of one side is
more believable than that of the other side, and that the probability of truth is on one side than on
the other."

FACTS:
Petitioner Manlar Rice Mill, Inc. is engaged in the business of rice milling and selling of
grains. Respondent Lourdes L. Deyto does business under the trade name "JD Grains Center"
and is engaged in the business of milling and selling of grains. Respondent Jennelita Deyto Ang
or Janet Ang is Deyto’s daughter and, prior to her alleged absconding, operated her own rice
trading business through her own store, "Janet Commercial Store". Ang entered into a rice
supply contract with Manlar, with the former purchasing rice from the latter amounting to
₱3,843,220.00. The transaction was covered by nine postdated checks issued by Ang from her
personal bank/checking account with Chinabank. Upon presentment, all of the checks were
dishonored. Manlar made oral and written demands upon both Deyto and Ang, which went
unheeded. It appears that during the time demand was being made upon Deyto, she informed
Manlar, through its Sales Manager Pablo Pua, that Ang could not be located. Manlar filed a
Complaint for sum of money against Deyto and Ang before the RTC.The Court ruled in favor of
Manlar prompting Deyto’s appeal to CA which reversed the decision and ruled in favor of Deyto.
Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:
w/n Deyto is solidarily liable with Ang who was alleged to be the only person who transacted
with Manlar.

HELD:
No. It is a basic rule in evidence that he who alleges must prove his case or claim by the
degree of evidence required. In civil cases, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of
evidence, which connotes "that evidence that is of greater weight or is more convincing than that
which is in opposition to it. It does not mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the testimony of
one side is more believable than that of the other side, and that the probability of truth is on one
side than on the other." The evidence does not support Manlar’s view that both Deyto and Ang
contracted with Manlar for the delivery of rice on credit. The preponderance of evidence
indicates that it was Ang alone who entered into the rice supply agreement with Manlar.
Evidence showed that Deyto was an old lady who owned properties in Isabela and Manila. She
is a reputable businessperson in Isabel and that Ang originally worked for JD Grains Center, but
was removed in 1997 for failure to remit collections. Ang and Deyto were no longer on good
terms as a result of Ang’s activities. Deyto took custody of one of Ang’s children, who was
previously recovered from a kidnapping perpetrated by no less than Ang’s best friend. Ang
appeared to have abandoned her own family and could no longer be located. What this Court
sees is an attempt to implicate Deyto in a transaction between Manlar and Ang so that the

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
former may recover its losses, since it could no longer recover them from Ang as a result of her
absconding. This conclusion is consistent with what the totality of the evidence show. However,
as a general rule, a contract affects only the parties to it, and cannot be enforced by or against a
person who is not a party thereto. "It is a basic principle in law that contracts can bind only the
parties who had entered into it; it cannot favor or prejudice a third person." Under Article 1311 of
the Civil Code, contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs. Thus,
Manlar may sue Ang, but not Deyto, who the Court finds to be not a party to the rice supply
contract.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPOUSES VICENTE AFULUGENCIA and LETICIA AFULUGENCIA vs.
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. and EMMANUEL L. ORTEGA, Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff, Province of Bulacan
G.R. No. 185145 February 5, 2014

DOCTRINE:Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules of Court provides that "a party not served with
written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open
court, or to give a deposition pending appeal." The provision seeks to prevent fishing expeditions
and needless delays. Its goal is to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial.

FACTS:
Petitioners, spouses Vicente and Leticia Afulugencia, filed a Complaint for nullification of
mortgage, foreclosure, auction sale, certificate of sale and other documents, with damages,
against respondents Metrobank and Emmanuel L. Ortega. After the filing of the parties’
pleadings and with the conclusion of pre-trial, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of
Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum7 to require Metrobank’s officers8 to appear and
testify as the petitioners’ initial witnesses during the August 31, 2006 hearing for the presentation
of their evidence-in-chief, and to bring the documents relative to their loan with Metrobank, as
well as those covering the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of petitioners’ 200-square meter
land in Meycauayan, Bulacan. The trial court issued an Order denying petitioners’ Motion for
Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum. The court stated that as pointed out by
the defendant bank in its opposition, the motion under consideration is a mere scrap of paper by
reason of its failure to comply with the requirements for a valid notice of hearing as specified in
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court. Moreover, the defendant bank and
its officers are adverse parties who cannot be summoned to testify unless written interrogatories
are first served upon them, as provided in Sections 1 and 6, Rule 25 of the Revised Rules of
Court. The Court of Appeals likewise dismissed petitioners’ appeal.

ISSUES:
(1) w/n the notice and hearing (secs. 4 and 5, rule 15, rules of court) are required for a mere
motion for subpoena of respondent bank’s officers when such requirements apply only to
deposition under sec. 6, rule 25, rules of court
(2) w/n the bank officers can be summoned without the written interrogatories.

HELD:
(1)Yes. Metrobank was notified of the Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad
Testificandum; in fact, it filed a timely Opposition thereto. The technical defect of lack of notice of
hearing was thus cured by the filing of the Opposition.

(2) No. Contrary to petitioners’ submission, the case of Adorio cannot apply squarely to this
case. In Adorio, the request for subpoena duces tecum was sought against bank officials who
were not parties to the criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The situation is
different here, as officers of the adverse party Metrobank are being compelled to testify as the
calling party’s main witnesses; likewise, they are tasked to bring with them documents which
shall comprise the petitioners’ principal evidence. This is not without significant consequences
that affect the interests of the adverse party, as will be shown below.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 214
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not
allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter. This is embodied in
Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules, which provides – Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written
interrogatories. Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a
failure of justice, a party not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the
adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal.
One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is
there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. Besides, since the calling party is
deemed bound by the adverse party’s testimony, compelling the adverse party to take the
witness stand may result in the calling party damaging its own case. Another reason for the rule
is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court may limit the inquiry to what is relevant,
and thus prevent the calling party from straying or harassing the adverse party when it takes the
latter to the stand.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 215
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LUCENA D. DEMAALA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 173523 February 19, 2014

DOCTRINE:Where a party was afforded the opportunity to participate in the proceedings, yet he
failed to do so, he cannot be allowed later on to claim that he was deprived of his day in court.

FACTS:
Petitioner Lucena D. Demaala is the Municipal Mayor of Narra, Palawan, and is the
accused for several violations of RA 3019 which cases are pending before the Sandiganbayan.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed before the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Suspend the
Accused Pursuant to Section 13, RA 3019 arguing that under Section 13 of RA
3019, petitioner’s suspension from office was mandatory. Petitioner opposed the motion but
Sandiganbayan still ordered the preventive suspension. Petitioner thereafter filed her Motion for
Reconsideration and set the date of hearing. The Ombudsman (Prosecution) also filed a Motion
to Reset the Scheduled Trial and was set for hearing. However, three days before the hearing
for the latter motion, Ombudsman sought to reset the scheduled hearing for the continuation of
the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence to a later date. Thereafter even before the
hearing, Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:
w/n petitioner was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution
denying the Motion for Reconsideration without conducting a hearing thereon.

HELD:
No. Petitioner’s cause of action lies in the argument that her Motion for Reconsideration,
which was earlier set for a hearing was reset to another schedule. Nonetheless, before the said
date could arrive, Sandiganbayan issued the assailedResolution denying her Motion for
Reconsideration, thus depriving her of the opportunity to be heard. This premise, however, is
grossly erroneous. A reading and understanding of the Sandiganbayan’s Order on the motion
indicates that what it referred to were the two hearing dates covering the continuation of the trial
proper – the ongoing presentation of the prosecution’s evidence – and not the single hearing
date for the determination of petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner’s failure to attend
the scheduled hearing of her own Motion for Reconsideration is fatal to her cause.
Consequently, there was nothing procedurally irregular in the issuance of the assailed May 23,
2006 Resolution by the Sandiganbayan. The contention that petitioner was deprived of her day
in court is plainly specious; it simply does not follow. Where a party was afforded the opportunity
to participate in the proceedings, yet he failed to do so, he cannot be allowed later on to claim
that he was deprived of his day in court. It should be said that petitioner was accorded ample
opportunity to be heard through her pleadings.
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process – it is
enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective
sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be
based. "To be heard" does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court - one
may also be heard through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings
is accorded, there is no denial of due process.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 216
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PIDLTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by its Vice-President for
Administration, M/GEN. NEMESIO M. SIGAYA vs. PHILTRANCO WORKERS
UNION-ASSOCIATION OF GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (PWU-AGLO),
represented by JOSE JESSIE OLIVAR
G.R. No. 180962 February 26, 2014

DOCTRINE:While a government office may prohibit altogether the filing of a motion for
reconsideration with respect to its decisions or orders, the fact remains that certiorari inherently
requires the filing of a motion for reconsideration, which is the tangible representation of the
opportunity given to the office to correct itself.

FACTS:
Petitioner Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc., a local land transportation company engaged
in the business of carrying passengers and freight, retrenched 21 of its employees.
Consequently, the company union, herein private respondent Philtranco Workers
Union-Association of Genuine Labor Organizations (PWU-AGLU), filed a Notice of Strike with
DOLE, claiming that petitioner engaged in unfair labor practices. Parties were not able to settle.
So the case reached the DOLE Secretary who ordered reinstatement. Petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration while respondents filed a Partial Appeal. The Secretary of Labor held that
the complainant’s and the respondent’s respective pleadings need not be acted upon for lack of
legal basis. Petitioner then filed before the CA an original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
and sought injunctive relief. The CA held that, in assailing the Decision of the DOLE voluntary
arbitrator, petitioner erred in filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules, when it
should have filed a petition for review under Rule 43 thereof, which properly covers decisions of
voluntary labor arbitrators. For this reason, the petition is dismissible pursuant to Supreme Court
Circular No. 2-90. The CA added that since the assailed Decision was not timely appealed
within the reglementary 15-day period under Rule 43, the same became final and executory.
Another Motion for Reconsideratio was filed but CA likewise dismissed it.

ISSUE:
w/nthe petitioner availed of the correct remedy in filing a petition for certiorari under rule 65
instead of under rule 43 of the rules of court.

HELD:
Yes. It has long been settled that the remedy of an aggrieved party in a decision or
resolution of the Secretary of Labor is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition
for any further or subsequent remedy, and then seasonably file a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65. There is no distinction: when the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a
labor case in an industry indispensable to national interest, "he exercises great breadth of
discretion" in finding a solution to the parties’ dispute. "The authority of the Secretary of Labor to
assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all questions and
controversies arising therefrom. The power is plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him
to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute."
The very nature of certiorari – which is an extraordinary remedy resorted to only in the absence
of plain, available, speedy and adequate remedies in the course of law – requires that the office

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
issuing the decision or order be given the opportunity to correct itself. Quite evidently, this
opportunity for rectification does not arise if no motion for reconsideration has been filed. The
only way by which a labor case may reach the Supreme Court is through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion. Such petition may be filed within a reasonable time from receipt of the resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision." Clearly, before a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be availed of, the filing of a motion for
reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to afford an opportunity for the correction of the error
or mistake complained of.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 218
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ONE NETWORK RURAL BANK, INC. vs. DANILO G. BARIC
G.R. No. 193684 March 5, 2014

DOCTRINE: It is well-settled that a party who has not appealed from a decision cannot seek
any relief other than what is provided in the judgment appealed from. An appellee who has
himself not appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than the
ones granted in the decision of the court.

FACTS:
Jaime Palado was the registered owner of real property with a building containing
commercial spaces for lease, located in Barangay Piapi, Davao City. Respondent Danilo G.
Baric was a lessee therein, operating a barber shop on one of the commercial spaces. Palado in
December 2000, demanded the return of the leased property through a written notice. Baric took
the matter to the office of the Barangay Lupon. However, on the scheduled dates of conciliation,
Baric failed to attend, which prompted the Barangay Chairman to issue a Certificate to Bar
Action. In the meantime, it appears that the building was demolished. Baric filed a case for
forcible entry with prayer for injunctive relief against Palado and herein petitioner One Network
Rural Bank, Inc. Baric filed an Amended Complaint and alleged that he had been occupying the
leased space since 1994; that in 2000, he renovated the leased space with Palado’s consent
and knowledge. After the sale a new title was issued in the bank’s name. It then constructed a
new building on the lot. MTC and RTC both ruled in favor of Palado and the bank. Upon appeal,
CA reversed the decision holding that Palado was guilty of forcible entry. While Palado’s notice
to vacate required Baric to vacate the premises within 40 days, the latter was granted, under the
lease contract the right to at least four months advance notice. In addition, Network Bank’s
purchase of the property was subject to all liens and encumbrances found thereon, and the
bank merely stepped into the shoes of the former owner. Since the restoration of the possession
was already impracticable, nominal damages were awarded. Hence, the petition.

ISSUES:
(1) w/n Baric can be reinstated to the premises
(2) w/n the bank may be held liable for nominal damages

HELD:
(1) No. With regard to Baric's argument that he should be reinstated to the premises and
awarded damages, this may not be allowed. He did not question the CA ruling in an appropriate
Petition before this Court. "It is well-settled that a party who has not appealed from a decision
cannot seek any relief other than what is provided in the judgment appealed from. An appellee
who has himself not appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other
than the ones granted in the decision of the court below."

(2) No.Nominal damages are not for indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or
recognition of a right violated or invaded. Network Bank did not violate any of Baric's rights; it
was merely a purchaser or transferee of the property.Surely, it is not prohibited from acquiring
the property even while the forcible entry case was pending, because as the registered owner of
the subject property, Palado may transfer his title at any time and the lease merely follows the
property as a lien or encumbrance. Any invasion or violation of Baric's rights as lessee was

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 219
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
committed solely by Palado, and Network Bank may not be implicated or found guilty unless it
actually took part in the commission of illegal acts, which does not appear to be so from the
evidence on record. On the contrary, it appears that Barie was ousted through Palado's acts
even before Network Bank acquired the subject property or came into the picture. Thus, it was
error to hold the bank liable for nominal damages.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 220
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SHERWIN BIS y AVELLANEDA
G.R. No. 191360 March 10, 2014

DOCTRINE: In prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance itself constitutes the
corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved
unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will or proof that the evidence has been tampered
with and in such case, the burden of proof rests on the appellant.

FACTS:
Both the RTC and CA found that accused Sherwin Bis feloniously distributed and sold 3
heat sealed transparent plastic sachets containing methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise
known as shabu to PO2 Manuel Espejo who was a poseur-buyer. The latter used marked
money, a piece of One thousand peso bill.

ISSUE:
w/n the chain of custody was properly established

HELD:
Yes. In the present case, the totality of the prosecution’s evidence shows the integrity of the
drugs seized to be intact. The identity of the drugs was proven and the chain of its custody and
possession has been duly accounted for and not broken. This can be gleaned from the
testimonies of Espejo and Arce who narrated that from the moment the items were seized from
appellant, the same were brought to the police station where Espejo marked them with his
initials, properly inventoried, and, together with the laboratory request, were immediately
delivered by Espejo himself to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination to determine the
presence of dangerous drugs. Police Inspector Melanie Joy Ordoño conducted an examination
on the specimens submitted with the corresponding markings and concluded that the three heat
sealed transparent plastic sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
dangerous drug.
Incidentally, this conclusion is bolstered by the defense’s admission of the existence and due
execution of the request for laboratory examination, the Chemistry Report and the specimens
submitted. Moreover, Espejo, when confronted during trial, identified the three plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance as the very same items confiscated from the appellant.
Under the situation, this Court finds no circumstance whatsoever that would hint any doubt as to
the identity, integrity and evidentiary value of the items subject matter of this case. "Besides, the
integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill
will or proof that the evidence has been tampered with" and in such case, the burden of proof
rests on the appellant. Here, appellant miserably failed to discharge this burden.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 221
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPOUSES FERNANDO and MA. ELENA SANTOS vs. LOLITA ALCAZAR,
represented by her Attorney-in-Fact DELFIN CHUA
G.R. No. 183034. March 12, 2014

DOCTRINE: While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy prevails over a
mere photocopy, there is no harm if in a case, both the original and a photocopy thereof
are authenticated, identified and formally offered in evidence by the party proponent.

FACTS:
Lolita Alcazar, proprietor of Legazpi Color Center (LCC), instituted through her
attorney-in-fact Delfin Chua a Complaintfor sum of money against the petitioners,
spouses Fernando and Ma. Elena Santos, to collect the value of paint and construction
materials obtained by the latter from LCC amounting to P1,456,000.00, which remained
unpaid despite written demand. Pre-trial was conducted. On November 8, 2005,
respondent presented her evidence and testified in court as the lone witness. On
November 21, 2005, she made a formal offer of her evidence and rested her case. On
January 17, 2006, petitioners filed a Demurrer toEvidence,which respondent opposed.
Petitioners argued that the Acknowledgment — respondent’s Exhibit “A” which was
presented in court — was not an original copy and thus inadmissible; petitioners’ receipt
of the written demand was not proved; the alleged deliveries of paint and construction
materials were not covered by delivery receipts; and respondent’s testimony was merely
hearsay and uncorroborated. The trial court issued an Orderdenying petitioners’
demurrer for lack of merit. Petitioners moved to reconsider the trial court’s order but was
denied. Petitioner’s motion to reset the hearing was likewise denied. Petitioners went up
to the CA on certiorari.

ISSUE:
WON the photocopy presented and offered in evidence is inadmissible and could
not be the basis for arriving at a finding of liability on their part, pursuant to the best
evidence rule.

HELD:
No. Respondent’s failure to present the original copy of the Acknowledgment
during the taking of her testimony for the second time, and the presentation of a mere
photocopy thereof at said hearing, does not materially affect the outcome of the case. It
was a mere procedural inadvertence that could have been cured and did not affect
petitioners’ cause in any manner. As conceded by them and as held by the CA, the
original exists and was made part of the records of the case when respondent’s evidence
was first taken. Though respondent now claims that she had lost the original, the CA
proclaimed that the document resides in the record. This would explain then why
respondent cannot find it in her possession; it is with the court as an exhibit. Besides, it
evidently appears that there is no question raised on the authenticity and contents of the
photocopy that was presented and identified in court; petitioners merely insist that the
photocopy is inadmissible as a result of respondent’s failure to present the original,
which they nevertheless admit to exist and is found and included in the record of the
case. While it is a basic rule of evidence that the original copy prevails over a mere

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 222
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
photocopy,there is no harm if in a case, both the original and a photocopy thereof are
authenticated, identified and formally offered in evidence by the party proponent. More to
the point is the fact that petitioners failed to deny specifically under oath the genuineness
and due execution of the Acknowledgment in their Answer. The effect of this is that the
genuineness and due execution of the Acknowledgment is deemed admitted. “By the
admission of the genuineness and due execution [of such document] is meant that the
party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another
for him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly
as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered;
and that any formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or
revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. Hence, such defenses as that the
signature is a forgery x x x; or that it was unauthorized x x x; or that the party charged
signed the instrument in some other capacity than that alleged in the pleading setting it
out x x x; or that it was never delivered x x x, are cut off by the admission of its
genuineness and due execution.”

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 223
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPOUSES EDMUNDO DELA CRUZ and AMELIA CONCIO-DELA CRUZ vs.
SPOUSES RUFINO R. CAPCO and MARTYC. CAPCO
G.R. No. 176055. March 17, 2014.

DOCTRINE: To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or


deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a
statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which the
statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature.

FACTS:
On October 6, 2003, the spouses Dela Cruz filed a Complaintfor Unlawful
Detainer against the spouses Capco before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Pateros. They alleged that Teodora T. Concio (Teodora), mother of petitioner Amelia
Concio-Dela Cruz (Amelia), acquired ownership over a piece of land by virtue of a
Decision rendered by the RTC of Pasig in Land Registration Case. The said property
was eventually registered in her name. Teodora, out of neighborliness and blood
relationship, tolerated the spouses Capco’s occupation thereof. Subsequently, the
subject property was conveyed to the spouses Dela Cruz. Intending to construct a house
thereon and utilize the space for their balut and salted eggs business, the spouses Dela
Cruz thus demanded that the spouses Capco vacate the property. As the spouses
Capco refused, the matter was brought before the Barangay Lupon for conciliation
wherein several meetings were held but to no avail.The MeTC rejected the spouses
Capco’s claimed right to possess the subject property. It concluded that since the
spouses Capco’s possession of the subject property was by mere tolerance of the
spouses Dela Cruz, the latter have the better right to possess and thus may recover the
same upon demand. The spouses Capco appealed to the RTC but the latter did not find
merit in the spouses Capco’s appeal. Undeterred, the spouses Capco filed a Petition for
Review with the CA. The CA found in favor of the spouses Capco. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
WON the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the Spouses Dela Cruz’ complaint even
when there was a failure of the Complaint to allege when and how the spouses Capco
came into possession of the property.

HELD:
Yes. A complaint, to sufficiently make out a case for unlawful detainer and fall
under the jurisdiction of the MeTC, must allege that: 1. initially, possession of property by
the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; 2. eventually, such
possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the
latter’s right of possession; 3. thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and 4. within one year from
the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint
for ejectment. Here, the Complaint alleged that the spouses Dela Cruz’
predecessor-in-interest, Teodora, is the registered owner of the property per TCT No.
31873 and that she tolerated the spouses Capco’s occupation of the lot. The spouses
Dela Cruz subsequently acquired the property through conveyance and they extended

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
the same tolerance to the spouses Capco. The spouses Dela Cruz demanded for the
spouses Capco to vacate the property but to no avail; hence, they sent the latter a formal
demand letter which, per the attached copy to the Complaint, is dated September 1,
2003.The Complaint was filed on October 6, 2003 or within one year from the time the
formal demand to vacate was made. Clearly, the Complaint sufficiently established a
case for unlawful detainer as to vest the MeTC jurisdiction over it.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 225
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
VILMA MACEDONIO vs. CATALINA RAMO, YOLANDA S. MARQUEZ, SPOUSES
ROEL and OPHELIA PEDRO, SPOUSES JOEFFRY and ELIZA BALANAG, and BPI
FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC.
G.R. No. 193516. March 24, 2014.

DOCTRINE: Dismissing the action without allowing the parties to present evidence and
after ordering them to compromise is tantamount to deprivation of due process, and the
“dismissal of an action for failure to submit a compromise agreement, which is not even
required by any rule, is definitely a harsh action.

FACTS:
Civil Case No. 5703-R
On January 6, 2004, Vilma Macedonio (petitioner) filed a civil case for rescission of
contract under Article 1191 of the Civil Code,with damages, against respondent Catalina
Ramo (Ramo). The complaintalleged that on October 29, 2003, petitioner and Ramo
entered into an agreement for the purchase by petitioner of a 240-square meter portion
of Ramo’s 637-square meter unregistered lot located at Brgy. Sto. Rosario Valley,
Baguio City (the subject property); that Ramo assured petitioner that the subject property
was free from liens and encumbrances; that of the agreed P1,700,000.00 sale price,
petitioner paid P850,000.00 as earnest money; that a “Deed of Sale with Mortgage to
Secure Payment of Price” (October 29, 2003 deed of sale) was executed between the
parties, and Ramo handed to petitioner a copy of the tax declaration covering the
property, which indicated that it was subject to several liens and encumbrances, namely
a) levy made in relation to a case before Branch 60 of the Baguio RTC and b) mortgage
to ARGEM, a lending institution; that Ramo assured petitioner that she would clear the
property of liens and encumbrances before petitioner pays the balance of the price on
January 3, 2004 as stipulated in the October 29, 2003 deed of sale; that petitioner failed
to clear the property of the ARGEM mortgage. The parties were unable to submit a
compromise agreement. The trial court dismissed Civil Case No. 5703-R for failure to
prosecute. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, who was given until the end of
this month of August, 2006 in order to substantiate her Motion for Reconsideration. The
September 4, 2006 hearing did not push through, as petitioner’s counsel filed a motion to
reset. On February 11, 2008, petitioner filed a Motionpraying that the trial court issue an
order directing theparties to comply with their oral agreement for Ramo to return
petitioner’s money — or the P850,000.00 advance she made. Ramo opposed the
motion. In October 2009, petitioner’s new counsel filed a Notice of Appearance with
Manifestation and Motioninforming the court of Ramo’s June 29, 2009 letter and offer,
petitioner’s refusal of the offer, and praying that the case be set for pretrial since all
efforts to settle the issues between the parties failed. On February 2, 2010, an Entry of
Judgmentwas issued by the trial court, certifying that the October 23, 2006 Order
—which declared that Civil Case No. 5703-R was already terminated — became final
and executory on November 17, 2006. On December 2, 2009, petitioner filed a written
Protestwith the office of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR Cordillera
Administrative Region, seeking an investigation into Ramo’s acquisition of the subject
property, and claiming that Ramo’s sales patent was issued despite her having

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
committed multiple violations of the law. It appears that to this date, no action has been
taken on
the protest.

Civil Case No. 7150-R


On April 21, 2010, petitioner filed another civil case against respondents for specific
performance, annulment of documents and titles, with damages. Ramo filed her answer
with motion to dismiss the case, claiming that in filing the case, petitioner violated the
rule against forum shopping since there had already been a prior terminated case (Civil
Case No. 5703-R) and a pending Protest with the DENR. To this, petitioner filed her
comment and opposition, arguing that since Civil Case No. 5703-R was not decided on
the merits and no trial was conducted, Civil Case No. 7150-R is not barred. The trial
court dismissed Civil Case No. 7150-R with prejudice and held that held that petitioner
filed multiple cases based on the same cause of action, although with different prayers
for relief. Petitioner moved to reconsider, but in an August 16, 2010 Order, the trial court
stood its ground. Thus, petitioner instituted this direct recourse. In a July 29, 2013
Resolution,the Court resolved to give due course to the Petition.

ISSUE:
WON Civil Case No. 5703-R bars the filing of the second case — or Civil Case
No. 7150-R.

HELD:
No. It is understandable why the trial court in Civil Case No. 5703-R should not have
precipitately dismissed the case: petitioner sought a refund of her payments but
evidently, Ramo was not willing to pay her. Indeed, even as Ramo made a judicial
admission of her liability to petitioner — that is, in open court on June 22, 2009 — and an
extrajudicial admission thereafter — via her June 29, 2009 letter which she and her
counsel signed — she refuses to pay petitioner what she owes. For the same reasons,
the Court finds that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 7150-R was unwarranted. It is true
that while it was incumbent for petitioner to have informed the trial court of Civil Case No.
5703-R and the pending DENR Protest, this Court is inclined to forego petitioner’s failure
to abide by the requirements of the 1997 Rules regarding certifications against forum
shopping, in favor of deciding the case on the basis of merit, seeing, as the Court does,
that a rigid interpretation of the 1997 Rules would result in substantial injustice to
petitioner. The circumstances require that substance must prevail over form, keeping in
mind, as the Court has held countless times, that procedural rules are mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice; their application should be relaxed when
they hinder instead of promote substantial justice. Public policy dictates that court cases
should as much as possible be resolved on the merits and not on technicalities. Besides,
“the Rules of Civil Procedure on forum shopping are not always applied with inflexibility.”
The Court took into consideration the evidence and Ramo’s admissions that while she
refuses to honor her obligations under the sale or at least return petitioner’s money, she
went on to subdivide and transfer or sell the property to other individuals, which is
absolutely unfair if not perverse. Apparently, this injustice has been lost on the trial court,

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
having decided the way it did by disregarding the basic facts and adhering to
technicalities.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
VENUS B. CASTILLO, LEAH J. EVANGELISTA, DITAS M. DOLENDO, DAWN
KAREN S. SY and PRUDENTIAL PLANS, INC. EMPLOYEES UNION-FEDERATION
OF FREE WORKERS (PPEU-FFW) vs. PRUDENTIALIFE PLANS, INC., and/or JOSE
ALBERTO T. ALBA, ATTY. CEFERINO A. PATIÑO, JR., and ROSEMARIE DE
LEMOS
G.R. No. 196142. March 26, 2014.

DOCTRINE: It is an established rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (SC) in
cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals (CA) via Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is generally limited to reviewing errors of law; There are, however,
recognized exceptions to this rule such as when there is a divergence between the
findings of facts of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and that of the
Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Individual petitioners were regular employees of respondent Prudentialife Plans, Inc.
Prudential Plans Employees Union-FFW (PPEU-FFW), on the other hand, is a local
chapter of the Federation of Free Workers and is the authorized bargaining agent of
Prudentialife’s rank-and-file employees. The individual petitioners are members of
PPEU-FFW. Under Section 4, Article X of the parties’ CBA, Prudentialife employees
were granted an optical benefit allowance of P2,500.00 to subsidize prescription
eyeglasses for those who have developed vision problems in the course of employment.
Suspecting fraud, Prudentialife began an investigation into the matter, and it sent
individual written Notices to Explainto petitioners and other employees who availed of
the benefit. The notices revealed its initial findings — that the given address and
telephone number of Alavera Optical were fictitious; that the official receipts and
prescriptions issued by Alavera Optical appear to have been forged; that the eyeglasses
were grossly overpriced; and that Prudentialife was being required to pay for the
eyeglasses even though they have not been released as yet. Prudentialife concluded
that petitioners and other employees knowingly availed of the optical benefit allowance
to obtain a refund of the maximum P2,500.00 benefit even though they did not have
vision problems, or that their eyeglasses were worth less than P2,500.00. On April 10,
2006, Prudentialife issued individual Notices of Termination to petitioners and other
employees. Petitioners and the other availing employees submitted their respective
written explanations. On May 5, 2006, petitioners filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal,
money claims and damages against respondents. The Labor Arbiter held that there was
ground to dismiss petitioners, finding that there was a concerted and premeditated
scheme to defraud Prudentialife. Respondents filed an appeal with the NLRC. In a
December 8, 2008 Decision, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.
Respondents went up to the CA via an original Petition for Certiorari, insisting that there
was just cause to dismiss the petitioners for serious misconduct. The CA reversed the
decision of the NLRC. Petitioners moved to reconsider, but was denied. Thus, the instant
Petition. Petitioners urge a judicious review of the case given the conflicting decisions of
the labor tribunals and the appellate court. They add that it was improper for the CA to
adjudge them guilty of wrongdoing based on the written admissions of their
co-employees and not on evidence pointing to their wrongdoing, and it is unfair for the

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
CA to sweepingly rule that the acts of some employees were attributable to all who
availed of the optical benefit allowance.

ISSUE:
WON Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally limited to
reviewing errors of law.

HELD:
Yes. When there is a divergence between the findings of facts of the labor tribunals
and the CA, there is a need to refer to the record. “It is an established rule that the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. This
Court is not a trier of facts. In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of
the CA are conclusive and binding and consequently, it is not our function to analyze or
weigh evidence all over again. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule
such as when there is a divergence between the findings of facts of the NLRC and that of
the CA.”

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANUEL APLAT y SUBLINO
and JACKSON DANGLAY y BOTIL, accused, MANUEL APLAT y SUBLINO,
accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 191727. March 31, 2014

DOCTRINE: It is perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a


crime to give varying details as there may be some details which one witness may notice
while the other may not observe or remember.

FACTS:
In an Informationdated April 19, 2006, appellant and Danglay were charged with
Violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. That on or about the 12th day of April 2006,
in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver one (1) brick of dried
marijuana leaves with fruiting tops wrapped in a newspaper weighing 950 grams, more
or less, for [P]1,500.00 to PO3 PHILIP R. FINES, a bona fide member of the Drug
Enforcement Unit of the Baguio City Police Office, who acted as poseur-buyer, knowing
fully well that said drug is a dangerous drug and that the sale and delivery of such drug is
prohibited without authority of law to do so, in violation of the aforementioned provision of
law. Appellant and Danglay pleaded not guilty to the charge upon their separate
arraignment. RTC found appellant and Danglay guilty as charged. Aggrieved, appellant
and Danglay separately appealed to the CAwherein they questioned the chain of
custody of the subject drugs and the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against
them. Like the RTC, the CA gave credence to the police officers’ narration of the incident
as prosecution witnesses. Undeterred, appellant interposed the present appeal.

ISSUE:
WON the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are
sufficient to diminish their credibility.

HELD:
No. Appellant further challenges the legality of the buy-bust operation by adverting to
the alleged inconsistency between the testimony of PO3 Fines, who claims that he did
not notice who was carrying the plastic bag containing the alleged dangerous drug or
where it came from, and that of SPO4 Sison, who stated that it was Danglay who was
carrying the bag. He also invites the Court’s attention to the conflicting testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses as to the color of the bag. While PO3 Fines mentioned a red
colored bag, SPO4 Sison and PO3 Sagmayao stated that Danglay was carrying a blue
colored sando bag.The Court, however, finds that the CA correctly agreed with the
appellee that the perceived inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses are insufficient to diminish their credibility. Indeed, the inconsistencies alluded
to by the appellant refer merely to minor details and collateral matters that do not in any
way affect the material points of the crime charged. As held in People v.
Castro,“[i]nconsistencies on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the
substance of their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimonies.” “It is

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime to give
varying details as there may be some details which one witness may notice while the
other may not observe or remember.”

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROY SAN GASPAR
G.R. No. 180496. April 2, 2014.

DOCTRINE: It has been held that in the absence of any ill motives on the part of
the witnesses, their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.

FACTS:
On June 2, 2000, appellant was charged with the crime of Parricide under Article 246
of the RPC in an Information, that on or about 11:30 o’clock in the evening of April 25,
1999, at Purok Ma-oy, Barangay Bambad, Municipality of Isulan, Province of Sultan
Kudarat, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, armed with a [.12] Gauge Homemade Shotgun, with intent to kill, did then and
there, [willfully], [unlawfully] and feloniously, attack, assault and shot IMELDA E. SAN
GASPAR, his legitimate wife, thereby inflicting gunshot wound upon the latter, which
directly caused her death. Upon being arraigned on July 12, 2000, appellant, with the
assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.After pre-trial was
terminated, trial on the merits ensued. The RTC in its Decisionon January 29, 2003
convicted appellant of the crime of Parricide. The RTC relied on the testimonies of the
witnesses for the prosecution particularly, Joramel and Cherme. Having witnessed the
shooting incident, both of them positively identified appellant as the person who shot
their mother, Imelda. To the RTC, such positive identification, without any showing of ill
motive on the part of the eyewitnesses, was enough to establish the guilt of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt.On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification theDecision of
the RTC. Not satisfied, appellant now appeals to this Court asserting that the lower
courts erred in not giving exculpatory weight to the defense he interposed.

ISSUE:
WON the testimonies of Joramel and Cherme were impelled by any ill motive to
testify against appellant.

HELD:
No. Joramel and Cherme positively and categorically identified appellant as the one
who shot and killed Imelda. Their testimonies corroborated each other on material
details. Moreover, there is no showing that Joramel and Cherme were impelled by any ill
motive to testify against appellant. It has been held that in the absence of any ill motives
on the part of the witnesses, their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.On the
other hand, appellant only offered his bare denial of the offense. However, “[t]he Court
had consistently stressed that denial, like alibi, is a weak defense that becomes even
weaker in the face of positive identification of the accused by prosecution witnesses.”The
Court, therefore, finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. “It is a
well-settled rule that factual findings of the trial court involving the credibility of witnesses
are accorded respect since trial courts have first-hand account on the witnesses’ manner
of testifying and demeanor during trial. The Court shall not supplant its own interpretation
of the testimonies for that of the trial judge since he is in the best position to determine
the issue of credibility.”Furthermore, “in the absence of misapprehension of facts or
grave abuse of discretion on the court a quo, and especially when the findings of the

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
judge have been adopted and affirmed by the CA, the factual findings of the trial court
shall not be disturbed.”

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO ABAIGAR,
accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 199442. April 7, 2014.

DOCTRINE: It is settled that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the
province and expertise of the trial court.

FACTS:
An Informationwas filed charging appellant Francisco Abaigar with the crime of
murder, the accusatory portion of which reads, that on or about the 11th day of July
2001, at about 9:00 o’clock in the evening, at Barangay Rosalim, Municipality of San
Jorge, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without
any justifiable cause, with intent to kill, and by means of treachery and evident
premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of JOSEPH
GABUYA by shooting him with the use of a homemade shotgun locally known as
“Bardog,” which the accused had conveniently provided himself for the purpose, hitting
the victim’s left side of the face and behind the head, thereby inflicting upon him serious
and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death. During his
arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.The trial court rendered
itsJudgmentfinding appellant guilty as charged. Aggrieved, appellant appealed before
the Court of Appeals. In a Decision, the appellate court affirmed in full the Judgment of
the trial court. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
WON Relecita has ill motive to testify against appellant.

HELD:
No. Appellant basically argues that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in
lending credence to the testimony of eyewitness Relecita. Appellant claims that Relecita
could have forewarned the victim of his presence if indeed Relecita saw him in the
vicinity; and that it was improbable that Relecita could see him considering the poor
lighting condition of the place. The Court is not persuaded. It is settled that the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is within the province and expertise of the trial
court. In this case, we find no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the trial court.
The court below categorically found that Relecita had no ill motive to testify against
appellant; she “has no reason to impute on him the heinous crime of murder had she not
witnessed the actual killing of the victim.”Similarly, the appellate court found Relecita to
have “positively identified the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.”Also, the failure
of Relecita to warn the victim of the appellant’s impending attack should not be taken
against her. Neither should it be taken as a blemish to her credibility.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HEIRS OF FRANCISCO BIHAG, namely: ALEJANDRA BIHAG, NICOMEDES B.
BIHAG, VERONICA B. ACOSTA, SUSANA B. MIÑOZA, PAULINO B. BIHAG,
DANILO B. BIHAG, TIMOTEO B. BIHAG JR., EDILBERTO B. BIHAG, JOSEPHINE B.
MIÑOZA, and MA. FE B. ARDITA,petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF NICASIO BATHAN,
namely: PRIMITIVA B. BATHAN and DUMININA B. GAMALIER, respondents.
G.R. No. 181949. April 23, 2014.

DOCTRINE: The Supreme Court, in order to standardize the appeal periods provided in
the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, declared that an
aggrieved party has a fresh period of 15 days counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration, within which to file the
notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Also, it is a settled rule that a decision
or order becomes final and executory if the aggrieved party fails to appeal or move for a
reconsideration within 15 days from his receipt of the court’s decision or order disposing
of the action or proceeding.

FACTS:
On April 23, 1992, petitioners heirs of Francisco Bihag (Francisco), filed with the
RTC of Mandaue City a Complaintfor Quieting of Title, Damages, and Writ of Injunction
and TRO against respondents spouses Bathan and their daughter, Duminina Bathan
Gamalier. Petitioners alleged that sometime in the 1960’s, respondent Primitiva
approached her brother, Francisco, to borrow money.But since he did not have money at
that time, she instead asked him to mortgage his unregistered land in Casili, Mandaue
City, to the Rural Bank of Mandaue City so that she could get a loan.She promised that
she would pay the obligation to the bank and that she would return to him the
documents, which were submitted to the bank in support of the loan
application.Francisco agreed on the condition that respondent Primitiva would pay the
real property tax of the subject land while it was mortgaged. When Francisco died on
December 13, 1976, petitioners found out that the mortgage had long been
cancelled.They confronted respondents to return the documents but to no
avail.Petitioners later discovered that respondents took possession of the land and were
hauling materials and limestones from it to the prejudice of petitioners. The RTC issued a
Decisionin favor of respondents. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration but the RTC
denied the same. Unfazed, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal on October 2, 2006.On
January 5, 2007, the RTC issued an Orderdenying the Notice of Appeal. Thereafter,
respondents filed a Motion for the Issuanceof a Writ of Execution,which petitioners did
not oppose. The RTC issued an Ordergranting the Motion and issued a Writ of
Execution. The petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunctionunder Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. On October 26, 2007, the CA issued a Resolutiondismissing the Petition for being
insufficient in form and substance. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsiderationattaching a copy of the RTC’s August 24, 2007 Order andexplaining that
no motion for reconsideration was filed since they never received a copy of the RTC’s
January 5, 2007 Order, denying their Notice of Appeal.

ISSUE:

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WON the Notice of Appeal by the petitioners was erroneously denied by the RTC.
HELD:
Yes. In Neypes, the Supreme Court, in order to standardize the appeal periods
provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases,
declared that an aggrieved party has a fresh period of 15 days counted from receipt of
the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration, within which to
file the notice of appeal in the RTC.In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we agree with
petitioners that their Notice of Appeal was timely filed as they had a fresh 15-day period
from the time they received the Order denying their Motion for Reconsideration within
which to file their Notice of Appeal. But while we agree with petitioners that their Notice of
Appeal was erroneously denied by the RTC, we are nevertheless constrained to deny
the instant Petition as the January 5, 2007 Order, denying petitioners’ Notice of Appeal,
has attained finality. It is a settled rule that a decision or order becomes final and
executory if the aggrieved party fails to appeal or move for a reconsideration within 15
days from his receipt of the court’s decision or order disposing of the action or
proceeding.Once it becomes final and executory, the decision or order may no longer be
amended or modified, no even by an appellate court.In this case, petitioners, through
their counsel, received a copy of the assailed January 5, 2007 Order, under Registry
Receipt No. E-0280, on January 22, 2007, as evidenced by the Certification of the
assistant postmaster. As such, petitioners should have filed their motion for
reconsideration within 15 days, or on or before February 6, 2007, but they did not.
Instead, they filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals on October 10,
2007. At this time, the RTC’s January 5, 2007 Order denying the Notice to Appeal had
long become final and executory. Petitioners’ mere denial of the receipt of the assailed
Order cannot prevail over the Certification issued by the assistant postmaster as we
have consistently declared that “[t]he best evidence to prove that notice was sent would
be a certification from the postmaster, who should certify not only that the notice was
issued or sent but also as to how, when and to whom the delivery and receipt was
made.”

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILFREDO SOLANO, JR. y
GECITA, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 199871. June 2, 2014.

DOCTRINE: Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than
one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

FACTS:
Appellant Wilfredo Solano, Jr. y Gecita was charged with the crime of rape with
homicide in an Information that reads as follows, that on or about the 22nd day of April,
2007 at around 9:00 o’clock in the morning, at Sitio Okdo, Barangay Palanas,
Municipality of Pilar, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force, threat
and intimidation, and by employing personal violence upon “AAA,”a 12-year old girl, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have sexual intercourse with her
against her will and without her consent, and after the sexual assault said accused
strangled “AAA,” resulting in the immediate death of said victim, to the damage and
prejudice of her legal heirs. The crime is aggravated by the minority of the victim being
twelve years old (12) at the time of the incident. When arraigned on June 6, 2007,
appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City rendered its
Decisionfinding appellant guilty as charged based on circumstantial evidence. Appellant
appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision, the appellate court affirmed in full the
trial court’s Decision. Hence, this appeal.Appellant claims that the pieces of
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution are insufficient to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. He insists that it was highly improbable for prosecution
witness Edwin Jr. to have seen him chasing “AAA” from a distance of 50 to 60 meters or
even identify him as the perpetrator of the crime. Appellant also assails the testimony of
Nestor that he saw appellant dragging the victim’s body towards the swamp considering
the lack of explanation why he was in the vicinity or how he reached the place.

ISSUE:
WON the pieces of circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution are
insufficient.

HELD:
No. “Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.”In this case, it is beyond doubt that all the circumstances taken
together point to the singular conclusion that appellant, to the exclusion of all others,
committed the crime. As found by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court, the
victim was last seen in the presence of the appellant. Edwin Jr. saw appellant chasing
the victim. Nestor also saw appellant dragging the motionless body of “AAA.” The body
of the victim was eventually found buried in the mud near the place where she was last

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
seen with the appellant. Appellant admitted holding a grudge against the family of “AAA”
because he believes that a relative of “AAA” had raped his [appellant’s] sister. The
autopsy report showed that “AAA” was raped and strangled. Likewise, appellant could
not ascribe any ill motive on the part of prosecution witnesses Edwin Jr., Edwin Sr. and
Nestor whom he even considered as friends.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JOSELITO MA. P. JACINTO (formerly President of F. Jacinto Group, Inc.),
petitioner, vs. EDGARDOGUMARU, JR., respondent.
G.R. No. 191906. June 2, 2014.

DOCTRINE: When a judgment has been satisfied, it passes beyond review,”and “there
are no more proceedings to speak of inasmuch as these were terminated by the
satisfaction of the judgment.”

FACTS:
On December 6, 2004, a Decisionwas rendered in favor of respondent Eduardo
Gumaru, Jr. and against petitioner Joselito Ma. P. Jacinto and F. Jacinto Group, Inc.
Petitioner and F. Jacinto Group, Inc. filed an appeal with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). However, the appeal was not perfected for failure to post the
proper cash or surety bond; this was the finding of the NLRC in its Resolution dated
September 30, 2005.Thus, the December 6, 2004 Decision became final and executory.
Entry of judgment was issued by the NLRC on November 23, 2005.On February 6, 2006,
a Writ of Executionwas issued in the labor case. A Second Alias Writ of Execution was
issued and returned when the first one expired. Petitioner filed an Extremely Urgent
Motion to Lift and Annul Levy on Executionpraying, among others, that the scheduled
June 27, 2008 auction sale be restrained, and that the execution process covered by the
Second Alias Writ of Execution be invalidated but was denied. Petitioner went up to the
CA on certiorari but was denied.

ISSUE:
WON the petitioner may execute a special power of attorney designating his counsel
of record to sign the Petition on his behalf.

HELD:
Yes. It is true, as petitioner asserts, that if for reasonable or justifiable reasons he is
unable to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping in his CA Petition,
he may execute a special power of attorney designating his counsel of record to sign the
Petition on his behalf. However, while the Court takes the petitioner’s side with regard to
the procedural issue dealing with verification and the certification against forum
shopping, it nonetheless appears that the Petition has been overtaken by events. In a
May 24, 2011 Manifestation,respondent informed this Court that the judgment award has
been satisfied in full. The petitioner does not dispute this claim, in which case, the labor
case is now deemed ended. “It is axiomatic that after a judgment has been fully satisfied,
the case is deemed terminated once and for all.”And “when a judgment has been
satisfied, it passes beyond review, satisfaction being the last act and the end of the
proceedings, and payment or satisfaction of the obligation thereby established produces
permanent and irrevocable discharge; hence, a judgment debtor who acquiesces to and
voluntarily complies with the judgment is estopped from taking an appeal therefrom.”
With the above development in the case, the instant Petition is rendered moot and
academic. The satisfaction of the judgment in full has placed the case beyond the
Court’s review. “Indeed, there are no more proceedings to speak of inasmuch as these
were terminated by the satisfaction of the judgment.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MA. CONSOLACION M. NAHAS, doing business under the name and style —
PERSONNEL EMPLOYMENT AND TECHNICAL RECRUITMENT AGENCY,
petitioner, vs. JUANITA L. OLARTE, respondent.
G.R. No. 169247. June 2, 2014.

DOCTRINE: Settled is the rule that the findings of the Labor Arbiter, when affirmed by
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Court of Appeals (CA), are
binding on the Supreme Court (SC), unless patently erroneous.

FACTS:
Olarte was deployed as a domestic helper to Hail, Saudi Arabia for a contract term of
two years. Per her employment contract,she was to serve her employer, Fahad
Abdulaziz Mohammed Al-Mijary (Fahad) for a basic monthly salary of US$200.00.
Fajad’s information sheet, on the other hand, provides that there are two adults and
three children living in his household and that no disabled or sick person is to be put
under Olarte’s care. Upon arriving in Fahad’s home, Olarte was surprised that there were
four children with one suffering from serious disability. This notwithstanding, Olarte
served Fahad’s family diligently. However, her salaries were not paid. In the succeeding
months, Olarte started feeling intense pain in her legs. She was later diagnosed to be
suffering from ostro-arthritis. Because of her condition, Olarte requested Fahad to just
allow her go home to the Philippines. But her pleas fell on deaf ears. At that point, Fahad
was already frequently maltreating her since she could no longer accomplish all the
household chores due to her illness. Olarte finally saw an opportunity to escape from the
abusive hands of her employer. Several months later, Olarte filed a Complaintfor illegal
dismissal, damages, attorney’s fees and refund of placement fees against her foreign
employer Fahad and Nahas/PETRA/Royal Dream. The Labor Arbiter ruled that
PETRA/Royal Dream/Nahas failed to discharge the burden of proving that Olarte’s
termination and repatriation were for just cause; and also rejected their claim against
liability after giving weight to the fact that Nahas admitted to have interviewed Olarte but
failed to substantiate the claim that the latter withdrew her application. Nahas appealed
to the NLRC. The NLRC, however, was not persuaded and affirmed the decision of the
LA. Nahas filed a Motion for Reconsiderationwhich was denied. Hence, the recourse to
the CA via a Petition for Certiorari, which was also denied.The Motion for
Reconsiderationthereto having been denied in the CA Resolutiondated July 8, 2005,
Nahas now comes to this Court via the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
WON the issue of Nahas’ act for and in behalf of PETRA and/or Royal Dream in
deploying Olarte abroad is a question of fact.

HELD:
Yes. It must be stressed, at the outset, that the resolution of the issue of whether
Nahas acted for and in behalf of PETRA and/or Royal Dream in deploying Olarte abroad
is a question of fact. “Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts and this
doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases. Questions of fact are for the labor
tribunals to resolve. Only errors of law are generally reviewed in petitions for review on

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
certiorari criticizing decisions of the CA.”Also “settled is the rule that the findings of the
Labor Arbiter, when affirmed by the NLRC and the CA, are binding on the Supreme
Court, unless patently erroneous.”In this case, the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA
are one in their factual conclusion that Nahas, acting for and in behalf of PETRA and
Royal Dream, interviewed Olarte, caused her to sign an employment contract, and
facilitated and made possible her deployment abroad. The Court is, therefore, not
dutybound to inquire into the accuracy of this factual finding, particularly in this case
where there is no showing that it was arbitrary and bereft of any rational basis.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JOSE ESPINELI a.k.a. DANILO ESPINELI vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 179535. June 9, 2014.

DOCTRINE: Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence
would be sufficient to convict the offender “if i) there is more than one circumstance; ii)
the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and iii) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.”

FACTS:
On June 24, 1997, an Informationcharging petitioner with the crime of murder was
filed before the RTC,the accusatory portion of which reads as follows, that on or about
the 15th day of December, 1996 in the Municipality of Imus, Province of Cavite,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, together with one (1) Sotero Paredes and three (3) other unidentified persons,
whose real names, identities and whereabouts are still unknown, said Sotero Paredes
having been earlier charged with the same offense, and is now undergoing trial before
Branch 90, of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, then armed with firearms, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and shoot one Alberto Berbon y
Downie with the use of said firearms, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot
wounds on his head and different parts of his body which caused his instantaneous
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Alberto Berbon y Downie.
Petitioner was arrested and when arraigned with the assistance of counsel, entered a
plea of not guilty. The trial court adjudged petitioner guilty of murder. Petitioner
seasonably appealed his conviction before this Court. Pursuant, however, to the Court’s
pronouncement in People v. Mateo,the case was ordered transferred to the CA for
appropriate action and disposition through a Resolutiondated March 22, 2006. The CA
affirmed with modification the findings of the trial court. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsiderationwhich the CA denied in its Resolutiondated September 14,
2007. Hence, this Petition. Petitioner anchors his quest for the reversal of his conviction
on the alleged erroneous admission in evidence of the Sinumpaang Salaysayof Reyes
for being hearsay and inadmissible. He avers that the said sworn statement should not
have been given probative value because its contents were neither confirmed nor
authenticated by the affiant. Thus, all circumstances emanating from or included in the
sworn statement must be totally brushed aside as lacking any evidentiary and probative
value.

ISSUE:
WON the circumstantial evidence failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

HELD:
No. Truly, “direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis from
which a court may draw its finding of guilt.”The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is
that evidence “which indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the
fact-finder draws from the evidence established.”Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules
of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to convict the offender “if i) there is
more than one circumstance; ii) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven;
and iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.”All the circumstances must be consistent with one another, consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld provided that the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads
to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others as the guilty person.In this case, the circumstances found by the CA as forming
an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that petitioner, to the
exclusion of all others, is the guilty person.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
GIPA vs. SOUTHERN LUZON INSTITUTE, represented by RUBEN ASUNCION
G.R. No.177425 June 18, 2014
DOCTRINE:A court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the
prescribed docket fees does not apply where the party does not deliberately intend to
defraud the court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the
rules by paying additional docket fees when required by the court.
The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the
perfection of an appeal. In both original and appellate cases, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees.
A party’s failure to pay the appellate docket fee within the reglementary period
confers only a discretionary and not a mandatory power to dismiss the proposed appeal.
Such discretionary power should be used in the exercise of the court’s sound judgment
in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play with great deal of circumspection,
considering all attendant circumstances and must be exercised wisely and prudently,
never capriciously, with a view to substantial justice.
Those who seek exemption from the application of the rule have the burden of
proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious reason warranting such departure.
FACTS:
Southern Luzon Institute (SLI), an educational institution in Bulan, Sorsogon, filed
a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership and Possession with Damages against
petitioners Alonzo Gipa, Imelda Marollano, Juanito Ludovice, Demar Bitangcor, Virgilio
Gojit, Felipe Montalban and four others namely, Arturo Rogacion, Virgilio Gracela,
Rosemarie Alvarez and Rosita Montalban. SLI alleged that it is the absolute owner of a
parcel of land occupied by the petitioners and refused to vacate the same despite
demand. They asserted that they did not heed SLI’s demand to vacate as they believed
that they have the right to stay on the said property. They relied on their occupation
thereof and that of their predecessors-in-interest which, according to them, dates back to
as early as 1950. Finding SLI to have proven its ownership of the property, the RTC
rendered a decision in its favor.
Petitioners filed a Notice of Appealwhich was granted by the RTC. The CA,
however, dismissed the appeal since it was not shown that the appellate court docket
fees and other lawful fees were paid.Petitioners promptly filed a Motion for
Reconsiderationto which they attached a Certificationfrom the RTC that they paid the
appeal fee in the amount of ₱3,000. In view of this, the CA granted the said motion and
consequently reinstated the appeal. Subsequently, however, the CA further required
petitioners to remit within ten days from notice the amount of ₱30.00 for legal research
fund, which apparently was not included in the ₱3,000.00 appeal fee previously paid by
them. Despite the lapse of nine months from their counsel’s receipt of the said resolution,
petitioners failed to comply with the CA’s directive. Hence, the said court dismissed the
appeal.
The CA contends that:

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 245
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Jurisprudence is replete that the nonpayment of the docket and
other lawful fees within the reglementary period as provided under Section
4 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court is a ground for the dismissal of
an appeal, as provided for under Section 1(c)[,] Rule 50 of the same Rule.
We quote:

SECTION 1.Grounds for dismissal of appeal. – An appeal may be


dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the
appellee, on the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
c. Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as
provided in Section 4 of Rule 41; x x x

Petitioners and their co-defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration invoking the
principle of liberality in the application of technical rules considering that they have paid
the substantial amount of ₱3,000.00 for docket and other legal fees and fell short only by
the meager amount of ₱30.00. As compliance, they attached to the said motion a postal
money order in the sum of ₱30.00 payable to the Clerk of Court of the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA gravely erred in dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioners for
failure to remit the amount needed
HELD:
No. The CA properly dismissed the case.
Payment of the full amount of appellate court docket and lawful fees is mandatory
and jurisdictional; Relaxation of the rule on payment of appeal fee is unwarranted in this
case.
Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4.Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. – Within the period for taking
an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or
final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful
fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together
with the original record or the record on appeal.
In Gonzales v. Pe (G.R. No. 167398, August 8, 2011), the Court’s explanation
anent the requirement of full payment of docket and other lawful fees under the
above-quoted provision was iterated, viz:

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
In Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo, as with other subsequent cases of the
same ruling, the Court explained that the procedural requirement under Section 4
of Rule 41 is not merely directory, as the payment of the docket and other legal
fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It bears
stressing that an appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege. An ordinary
appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must be made within 15
days from notice. And within this period, the full amount of the appellate court
docket and other lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered
the judgment or final order appealed from. The requirement of paying the full
amount of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period is not a mere
technicality of law or procedure. The payment of docket fees within the prescribed
period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the
appeal is not perfected. The appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action and the Decision sought to be appealed from
becomes final and executory. Further, under Section 1 (c), Rule 50, an appeal
may be dismissed by the CA, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the
ground of the non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41. The payment of the
full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an
appeal. In both original and appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction over
the case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees.
Here, petitioners concede that payment of the full amount of docket fees within
the prescribed period is not a mere technicality of law or procedure but a jurisdictional
requirement. Nevertheless, they want this Court to relax the application of the rule on the
payment of the appeal fee in the name of substantial justice and equity.
The Court is not persuaded.
The liberality which petitioners pray for has already been granted to them by the
CA at the outset. It may be recalled that while petitioners paid a substantial part of the
docket fees, they still failed to pay the full amount thereof since their payment was short
of ₱30.00. Based on the premise that the questioned Decision of the RTC has already
become final and executory due to non-perfection, the CA could have dismissed the
appeal outright. But owing to the fact that only the meager amount of ₱30.00 was lacking
and considering that the CA may opt not to proceed with the case until the docket fees
are paid, it still required petitioners, even if it was already beyond the reglementary
period, to complete their payment of the appeal fee within 10 days from notice. Clearly,
the CA acted conformably with the pronouncement made in Camposagrado, a case cited
by petitioners, that "[a] party’s failure to pay the appellate docket fee within the
reglementary period confers only a discretionary and not a mandatory power to dismiss
the proposed appeal. Such discretionary power should be used in the exercise of the
court’s sound judgment in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play with great
deal of circumspection, considering all attendant circumstances and must be exercised
wisely and prudently, never capriciously, with a view to substantial justice."

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 247
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The CA’s leniency over petitioners’ cause did not end there. Although they were
given only 10 days to remit the ₱30.00 deficiency, the said court allowed an even longer
period of nine months to lapse, apparently in the hope that petitioners’ compliance would
be on its way. But as no payment was remitted, it was constrained to finally dismiss the
appeal for non-perfection. Surprisingly, petitioners were again heard of when they filed a
Motion for Reconsideration to which they attached a postal money order of ₱30.00.
Nevertheless, they did not offer any plausible explanation either as to why they, at the
start, failed to pay the correct docket fees or why they failed to comply with the CA’s
directive for them to remit the ₱30.00-deficiency. Instead, they focused on begging the
CA for leniency, arguing that the meager amount of the deficiency involved justifies
relaxation of the rules. What is worse is that even if the CA already took note of the lack
of such explanation in its Resolution denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration,
petitioners, up to now, have not attempted to tender one in this Petition and instead
continue to capitalize on substantial justice, fair play and equity to secure a reversal of
the dismissal of their appeal. The Court cannot, therefore, help but conclude that there is
really no plausible reason behind the said omission.
Suffice it to say that "[c]oncomitant to the liberal interpretation of the rules of
procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately
explain his failure to abide by the rules." Those who seek exemption from the application
of the rule have the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious reason
warranting such departure. Petitioners’ failure to advance any explanation as to why they
failed to pay the correct docket fees or to complete payment of the same within the
period allowed by the CA is thus fatal to their cause. Hence, a departure from the rule on
the payment of the appeal fee is unwarranted. Neither do the cases cited by petitioners
help because they are not in point. Unlike in this case, the CA in Camposagrado no
longer required the petitioners therein to complete the payment of the appeal fee by
remitting the ₱5.00 deficiency but just dismissed the appeal outright. Moreover, a
justifiable reason for the insufficient payment was tendered by petitioners in the said
case, i.e., that they relied on the assessment made by the collection officer of the court
and honestly believed that the amount collected from them was that which is mandated
by the Rules. The same thing goes true with Gutierrez. In fact, the pronouncement made
in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, as cited in Gutierrez, even militates against
petitioners. It was reiterated therein that the rule that "a court acquires jurisdiction over
any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fees does not apply where the
party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees, and
manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional docket fees when
required by the court." As may be recalled, petitioners in this case did not immediately
remit the deficient amount of ₱30.00 when required by the CA and only did so after the
lapse of more than nine months when their appeal was already dismissed.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JOSE vs. NOVIDA
G.R. No.177374 July 2, 2014
DOCTRINE: A review under Rule 45 is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. Moreover, a petition for review under Rule 45 covers questions of law only.
"The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the CA via Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. This
Court is not a trier off acts. In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of
the CA are conclusive and binding and consequently, it is not our function to analyze or
weigh evidence all over again."
FACTS:
Respondents Ernesto M. Novida, Rodolfo Palaylay, Jr., Alex M. Belarmino, Rodrigo
Libed, Leonardo L. Libed, Bernardo B. Belarmino, Benjamin G. Acosta, Modesto A.
Orlanda, Warlito B. Mejia, Mamerto B. Belarmino and Marcelo O. Delfin, together with
Cristina M. Esteban, were each granted – as farmer-beneficiaries – Emancipation
Patents (EPs) and Certificates of Title(covering one hectare each) over a parcel of land
in Pangasinan which was placed within the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.
Petitioners Mariano, Camilo, Victoria, Tiburcia and Fermina, as well as Josefina
and Anecita – all surnamed Jose – filed with the Office of Department of Agrarian Reform
a Petition for Reinvestigation and Cancellation of Anomalously Prepared and Generated
Emancipation Patents against the respondents, claiming that they are the bona fide and
actual tenant-tillers of the subject property; that they were issued Certificates of Land
Transfer (CLTs) to the same; that they are actually in possession of the same; and that
the EPs issued to respondents were anomalous. The Office of the DAR Region I ruled in
favor of the petitioners.
Respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession, accounting, liquidation
and damages with injunctive relief against petitioners before the Regional Office of the
DARAB Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The DARAB held in favor of the respondents.
Meanwhile, the DAR Secretary issued an order affirming the order of the DAR
Region I Director in the petition for reinvestigation and cancellation of EPs filed by
petitioners against the respondents. However, on respondents’ motion for
reconsideration, the DAR Secretary issued another order stating that the DARAB has no
jurisdiction over the case.
Meanwhile, failing to obtain a reconsideration of the DARAB Urdaneta’s decision,
they appealed to DARAB Quezon City. The appeal was premised on the arguments that
the DARAB Urdaneta erred in taking cognizance of the case, which is under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform as the subject property was
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP); and that there is
another case between the parties – for cancellation of anomalously prepared/generated
Emancipation Patents – pending in the Office of the DAR Secretary. DARAB Quezon
City affirmed the DARAB Urdaneta decision. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,but the DARAB Quezon City denied the same. Petitioners went up to

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
the CA via Petition for Reviewinsisting that the DAR Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction
over the case. The CA affirmed the DARAB decision. Their motion for reconsideration
was denied.
Respondents point out that a review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is discretionary and will be granted only when there are special and important
reasons therefor; that such special and important circumstances that should warrant
review do not obtain in petitioners’ case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Petition for Review under Rule 45 is the proper remedy to assail a
decision of a quasi-judicial body
HELD:
No. As correctly pointed out by the respondents, a review of the instant petition
under Rule 45 is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted
only when there are special and important reasons therefor. Moreover, a petition for
review under Rule 45 covers questions of law only. “The jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in cases brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. This Court is not a trier off acts.
In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and
binding and consequently, it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over
again."
This Court finds that no special and important reasons exist to warrant a thorough
review of the assailed CA Decision. Quite the contrary, the Court is satisfied with and
can simply rely on the findings of the DARAB Urdaneta, DARAB Quezon City, and the
CA - as well as the very admissions of the petitioners themselves - to the effect that
respondents fulfilled all the requirements under the agrarian laws in order to become
entitled to their EPs; that F elicisimo voluntarily surrendered and abandoned the subject
property in favor of his creditors, who took over the land and tilled the same until 1987;
that Felicisimo migrated to the U.S.A. and became a naturalized American citizen; that in
1991, respondents were illegally dispossessed of their landholdings through force and
intimidation by the petitioners after Felicisimo returned from abroad; and that as between
petitioners and respondents, the latter are legally entitled to the subject property. These
identical findings are not only entitled to great respect, but even finality. For petitioners to
question these identical findings is to raise a question of fact.
It must be said as well that "factual findings of administrative bodies charged with
their specific field of expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts, and in the
absence of substantial showing that such findings were made from an erroneous
estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of stability
of the governmental structure, should not be disturbed."

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PLDT vs. OCAMPO
G.R. No. 163999 July 9, 2014
DOCTRINE: The 60-day limitation (Rule 65) may be relaxed only for the most
persuasive reasons and only in meritorious cases, which must be sufficiently shown by
the party invoking liberality.
FACTS:
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), through its Quality Control
Investigation Division (QCID), conducted an investigation on the alleged illegal
International Simple Resale (ISR) activities in Makati City. ISR is a method of routing and
completing an international long distance call using lines, cables, antennas, and/or
airwave or frequency that directly connect to the local or domestic exchange facilities of
the country of destination of the call. Likened to a jumper, the unauthorized routing of
international long distance calls by-passes petitioner’s International Gateway Facilities
(IGF) with the use of ISR access numbers, making international long distance calls
appear as local calls, and thereby, depriving petitioner of substantial revenues.
After confirming that some PLDT subscribers wereindeed operating ISR businesses
in Makati City, under the business names INFILNET and Emergency Monitoring
System(EMS), petitioner requested the assistance of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to apprehend the said subscribers. The Manila RTC issued two
search warrantsdirected at the officeof EMS, both located in Makati City.On the same
day, NBI agents conducted simultaneous raids during which electronic gadgets,
documents,assorted office supplies, several pieces of computer equipment, and some
personal belongings of the employees of INFILNET and EMS were seized.
An Information for the crime of simple theft was filed before the RTC of Makati City
against respondents Millard R. Ocampo, Cipriano Rey R. Hipolito, Eric F. Merjilla, and
Jose R. Carandang.Respondents posted bail the following day. Respondets filed before
the Makati RTC a Motion to Suppress or Exclude or Return Inadmissible Evidence
Unlawfully Obtained,assailing the validity of the Search Warrants on the ground that the
searches conducted were not in accordance with the established constitutional rules and
statutory guidelines. Makati RTC denied the Motion ruling that it is the issuing court, in
this case, the Manila RTC, which has the jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the Search
Warrants. Respondents moved for reconsideration but the same was
unavailing,prompting them to file with the CA a Petition for Certiorari. The CA rendered a
Decisiondismissing the Petition.
Respondents applied for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum against certain
persons allegedly in possession of documents relating to PAMTEL, a foreign
telecommunicationscompany with tie-ups to INFILNET and EMS.Finding the documents
irrelevant and immaterial to the resolution of the case, the RTC denied the application for
subpoena duces tecum. Respondents sought reconsideration but the RTC denied the
same in its Orderdated October 10, 2002. Respondents were notified of the denial of
their Motion for Reconsideration on October 18, 2002.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Respondents elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorariassailing the
Orders of the RTC Makati.The CA rendered a Decisionfinding grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the RTC in issuing the assailed Orders.In reversing the denial of the
Motion toSuppress, the CA explained thatcontrary to the findings of the RTC, there was
no intention on the part of respondents to delay the resolution of the Motion.
Petitioner assails the propriety of the CA’s reversal of the Orders of the RTC, positing
that in filing the Petition for Certiorari, respondents failed to observe procedural rules.
First, no motion for reconsideration of the RTC Makati order dated November 29, 2002,
denying respondents’ Motion to Suppress, was filed prior to the filing of the Petition for
Certiorari.Second, more than60-days had lapsed from the time respondents were
notified of the denialof their Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated July 11, 2002,
which denied their application for subpoenaduces tecum. Respondents, on the other
hand, insist that their failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated
November 29, 2002 is not fatal as the rule is subject to exceptions.In this case,
respondents no longer filed a motion for reconsideration as they already moved inopen
court for a reconsideration of the denial of their Motion to Suppress butthe RTC flatly
denied the same.As to the alleged non-compliance with the 60-day period, respondents
brush aside the issue arguing that technical rules cannot prevent the CA fromgiving due
course to a Petition for Certiorari, which it considers to be meritorious.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 60-day period required for filing of a special civil action should be
complied with
HELD:
Yes. The Petition for Certiorari should have been filed within 60 days from notice
of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Order.
Section 4,Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that a special civil action for
certiorari should be instituted within 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or
resolution, or from the notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
judgment, order, or resolution being assailed. The 60-day period, however, is
inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay, which would violate the constitutional
rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their cases. Thus, strict compliance of this rule
is mandatory and imperative. But like all rules, the 60-day limitation may be relaxed "for
the most persuasive of reasons," which must be sufficiently shown by the party invoking
liberality.”
In this case, respondents were notified of the denial of their Motion for
Reconsideration on October 18, 2002.Accordingly, they had until December 17, 2002
within which to file a Petition for Certiorariwith the CA. Records, however, show that it
was only on January 20, 2003 that respondents filed their Petition for Certiorari. Instead
of admitting that more than 60 days had lapsed, respondents kept silent about it in their
Petition for Certiorari. When petitioner brought up the issue,respondents’ replywas
unresponsive. Infact, they did not even confirm or deny the alleged lapse of the 60-day
period. They have not offered any plausible justification for their non-compliance. In fact,

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
their adamant refusal to admit the obvious truth as well as their deliberate attempt to hide
this procedural lapse cannot be ignored. Leniency is given only to those deserving of it.
In this case, respondents are not entitled to any because they intentionally omitted to
indicate in their Petition for Certiorarithe date they were notified of the Order dated
October 10, 2002 in order to mislead the CA. Besides, relaxing the rule would not only be
unfair and unjust but would also be prejudicial to petitioner, who had every right to
believe that the order had attained finality and may no longer be altered, modified, or
reversed. As we have said, the 60-day limitation may be relaxed only for the most
persuasive reasons and only in meritorious cases, which must be sufficiently shown by
the party invoking liberality.Such is not the situation in this case.In the absence of a
motion for reconsideration, the Petition for Certiorari should have been
dismissed.Jurisprudence consistently holds that the filing of a motion for reconsideration
is a prerequisite to the institution of a petition for certiorari.Although this rule is subject to
certain exceptions, none of which is present in this case.Respondents admit that they
failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 29, 2002 prior to
filing the Petition for Certiorari. As an excuse, they alleged that their counselverbally
moved for a reconsideration of the denial of their Motion to Suppress, which the RTC
flatly denied in open court. Such allegation, however, as aptly pointed out by petitioner,is
not supported by the evidence as the Order dated November 29, 2002 made no mention
of such fact.It is also unlikely for respondents’ counsel to have moved for a
reconsideration of the said Order considering that, as stated in the Order, he appeared
only after the hearings were over.Besides, the lower court should first be informed of its
supposed error and be allowed to correct or rectify the same through a re-examination of
the legal and factual aspects of the case, which could only be done by filing a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed order.This respondents failed todo. Thus, in the absence
of a motion for reconsideration, the CA erred in giving due course to the Petition and in
reversing the Order dated November 29, 2002.In closing, we must emphasize thatwhile
litigation isnot a game of technicalities, this does not mean that procedural rules may be
ignored at will or that their non-observance may be dismissed simply because it may
prejudice a party’s substantial rights.Mere invocations of substantial justice and liberality
are not enough for the court tosuspend procedural rules.Again, except only for the most
compelling or persuasive reasons, procedural rules must be followed to facilitate the
orderly administration of justice.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
CANDELARIA and BASIT vs. HON. MARIA AMIFAITH S. FIDER-REYES
G.R. No. 173861 July 14, 2014
DOCTRINE: A Petition for Certiorari is dismissible for failure to allege that there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law as to
justify resort to certiorari.
The writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of
the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void. Moreover, it is designed to correct
errors of jurisdiction and not errors in judgment.
FACTS:
During an alleged buy-bust operation conducted Jay Candelaria and Eric Basit
werefor delivering, with the intention to sell, five cases of counterfeit FundadorBrandy.
They were charged with violation of Section 155 in relation to Section 170 of Republic
Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the IntellectualProperty Code of the
Philippines.petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress/Exclude Evidence based on
inadmissibility of evidence. They contended that the evidence the prosecution intended
to present were obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. This is considering that at the time the alleged counterfeit
productswere seized, they were neither committing nor attempting to commit a crime in
the presence of the arresting officers as to justify the conduct of search and seizure
following their unlawful arrest.
RTC issued an order denying the Motion to Suppress/Exclude Evidence. Observing
that the motion was anchored on petitioners’ alleged illegal arrest, it held that any
objection to an arrest must be made before an accused enters his plea on arraignment.
Having failed to move for the quashal of the information before the arraignment, an
accused is estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. Petitioners filed a Motion
for Reconsiderationwhich the RTC denied.
Thus they filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Courtto nullify
and set aside two Orders of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy in the
given case
HELD:
No. It is to be stressed that in every special civil action under Rule 65, a party
seeking the writ whether for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, must be able to show
that his or her resort to such extraordinary remedy is justified by the absence of an
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. “[H]e
must allege in his petition and establish facts to show that any other existing remedy is
not speedy or adequate x x x.” As held in Visca v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources:

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
x x x [I]t is incumbent upon an applicant for a writ of certiorari to allege with
certainty in his verified petition facts showing that “there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,” because this is
an indispensable ingredient of a valid petition for certiorari. “Being a special civil
action, petitioner-appellant must allege and prove that he has no other speedy
and adequate remedy.” “Where the existence of a remedy by appeal or some
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy precludes the granting of the writ, the
petitioner must allege facts showing that any existing remedy is impossible or
unavailing, or that excuse petitioner for not having availed himself of such
remedy. A petition for certiorari which does not comply with the requirements of
the rules may be dismissed.17cralawlawlibrary

Pursuant to the foregoing, the instant Petition for Certiorari is dismissible for failure
to allege that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law as to justify resort to certiorari.
Assuming the assailed October 12, 2005 Order (The Order denying the Motion to
Suppress/Exclude Evidence) to be erroneous, the mistake is an
error in judgment which is beyond the
ambit of certiorari.
In Triplex Enterprises, Inc. v. PNB-Republic Bank,the Court held that:

The writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases wherein the


act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void. Moreover, it is designed
to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors in judgment. The rationale of this
rule is that, when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so
engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is
committed. Otherwise, every mistake made by a court will deprive it of its
jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment will be a void judgment.

When the court has jurisdiction over the case and person of the defendant, any
mistake in the application of the law and the appreciation of evidence committed
by a court may be corrected only by appeal. The determination made by the trial
court regarding the admissibility of evidence is but an exercise of its jurisdiction
and whatever fault it may have perpetrated in making such a determination is an
error in judgment, not of jurisdiction. Hence, settled is the rule that rulings of the
trial court on procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence during the
course of a trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of a
separate appeal or review on certiorari. They must be assigned as errors and
reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court
on the merits of the case.19cralawlawlibrary

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 255
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Here, it is undisputed that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case and the person of
the petitioners. As such, any perceived error in its interpretation of the law and its
assessment of evidence is correctible by appeal, not certiorari, as the same would only
be considered an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. In particular, the RTC’s denial
of the Motion to Suppress/Exclude Evidence based on its assessment that the evidence
sought to be suppressed/excluded is admissible, was done in the proper exercise of its
jurisdiction. Assuming that the RTC’s determination is erroneous, the mistake is clearly
not an error of jurisdiction but of judgment which is not correctible by certiorari.
No grave abuse of discretion.
Even assuming that petitioners’ resort of certiorari is proper, the Petition must still be
dismissed for their failure to show that the RTC acted in grave abuse of discretion as to
amount to lack of jurisdiction. “Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an
excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.

In this case, petitioners miserably failed to show how the RTC supposedly abused its
discretion. In fact, we note that the main issue raised by petitioners in their Petition is
when is the proper time to file a motion to suppress/exclude evidence.They even
conceded that this is a pure question of law.
In any case, our perusal of the records shows that the RTC did not abuse, much
more, gravely abuse its discretion. The RTC thoroughly considered the pleadings
submitted by the parties, to wit: Motion to Suppress/Exclude Evidence; Opposition (to
the Motion to Suppress Evidence); Reply; Rejoinder; and Sur-Rejoinder; as well as the
Joint affidavit submitted by the arresting officers. Only after a careful analysis of the
submissions of the parties did the RTC render its judgment.
Petitioners violated the principle
of hierarchy of courts.
It also did not escape our attention that from the RTC, petitioners made a direct
recourse to this Court. This is against the well-settled principle dictating that a petition
for certiorari assailing the interlocutory orders of the RTC should be filed with the Court
of Appeals and not directly with the Supreme Court. It was held in Rayos v. City of
Manilathat:
Indeed, this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts
exercise concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction. However, such concurrence in
jurisdiction does not give petitioners unbridled freedom of choice of court forum.
In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, citing People v. Cuaresma, the Court held:

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive.
It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals.
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to
parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the
court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of
courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves
as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
(“inferior”) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against
the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted
to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
over-crowding of the Court’s docket.

Clearly, a direct invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction may only be allowed if
there are special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition
which, however, are not obtaining in this case.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SILVERIO, SR. vs. SILVERIO, JR.
G.R. No. 186589, July 18, 2014
DOCTRINE: The pendency of a special civil action for certiorari instituted in relation to a
pending case does not stay the proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.
A hearing is required in order to resolve a charge of indirect contempt; the
respondent to the charge may not be convicted on the basis of written pleadings alone.
FACTS:
The RTC Makati issued an Omnibus Order on the case, “In re: Intestate Estate of the
Late Beatriz S. Silverio, Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr., Petitioner, versus Ricardo S. Silverio,
Jr., Heir-Administrator Designate, Edmundo S. Silverio, Heir-Movant, and Ligaya S.
Silverio, represented by her Legal Guardian Nestor Dela Merced II, Heir-Intervenor,”
Petitioner Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (Ricardo Sr.) is the surviving spouse of the
decedent Beatriz S. Silverio, with whom he has children: herein respondent Ricardo Jr.
(Ricardo Jr.); Edmundo; Ligaya; and Nelia Silverio-Dee (Nelia). Lorna Cillan-Silverio
(Lorna) is Ricardo Sr.’s second wife. The subject matter of case is the decedent’s
intestate estate (the estate), which includes, among others, shares of stock in Pilipinas
Development Corporation (PDC) and a residential house in Urdaneta Village (house at
Urdaneta Village).
Nelia filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA with an application for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction questioning the trial court’s Omnibus Order, particularly Ricardo
Jr.’s appointment as the new administrator.The CA granted Nelia’s petition.
Ricardo Jr. filed with this Court an “Appeal under Rule 45 and/or Certiorari under
Sec. 1, Rule 65” with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction, seeking among others a reversal of the CA’s Resolution
and the issuance of injunctive relief. Respondent contended therein that the CA acted
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order and in granting injunctive relief against
him.
He wrote and sent two letters, one each to petitioners. Ricardo Jr. demanded in
the first letter that Ricardo Sr. cease and desist from 1) exercising the rights of a
stockholder in PDC; 2) managing PDC’s affairs and business; and 3) transacting with
third persons for and in behalf of PDC and to turn over all of its books and records. In
the second letter, Ricardo Jr. demanded that Lorna immediately vacate the house at
Urdaneta Village.

Petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Indirect Contemptseeking that herein
respondent Ricardo Jr. be declared in indirect contempt of court and punished
accordingly. They alleged that respondent’s demand letters violate and defy the
CA’sResolutions which enjoined respondent’s appointment as administrator pursuant to
the Omnibus Order. The CA issued the assailed Decision, which held thus –

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
After a careful evaluation of the evidentiary records, this Court finds it
inappropriate to make a ruling on whether or not the Respondent has committed
certain acts violative of Revised Rule 71 of the Rules.Accordingly, in the light of
the foregoing development, this Court is compelled to restrain itself from resolving
the issuesin the instant petition.
Petitioners filed a Petiton for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court praying
that the assailed Decision be set aside and that the Court declare respondent guilty of
indirect contempt.
Ricardo Jr. submits that the mere act of writing and sending the letters to
petitioners does not make him liable for indirect contempt of court, as they do not deal
directly or indirectly with any of the enjoined acts enumerated in the Omnibus Order.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the CA is correct in suspending the application for a Petition for
Certiorari of the petitioner pending the appeal of the respondent
Whether or not the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the indirect contempt
proceedings filed before the appellate court
HELD:
No. The pendency of a special civil action for certiorari instituted in relation to a
pending case does not stay the proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. Rule 65, Section 7 of the 1997
Rules makes this clear:
The court in which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the
proceedings, and it may also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings. The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case
unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been
issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case.
The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days from
the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal, absent a temporary
restraining order or a preliminary injunction, or upon its expiration. Failure of the public
respondent to proceed with the principal case may be a ground for an administrative
charge.
Petitioners are thus correct in arguing that the pendency of Ricardo, Jr.’s appeal
with the CA did not interrupt the course of Nelia’s Petition for Certiorari with the CA, in
the absence of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction issued in
the former case. This is because "an original action for certiorari is an independent
action and is neither a continuation nor a part of the trial resulting in the judgment
complained of." The CA therefore committed error in dismissing petitioners' indirect

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 259
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
contempt petition, on the ground of pendency of the respondent’s appeal. It need not
wait for this Court to resolve the same before the petitioners' contempt charge may be
heard.
No. The Supreme Court cannot, at this point, grant petitioners' plea to resolve the
merits of their petition for indirect contempt; it is the CA that should properly try the same.
Aside from the fact that the CA is the court against which the alleged contempt was
committed, a hearing is required in resolving a charge for indirect contempt. The
respondent in an indirect contempt charge may not be convicted on the basis of written
pleadings alone.
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, specifically outline the procedural
requisites before the accused may be punished for indirect contempt. First, there must
be an order requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be cited for
contempt. Second, the respondent must be given the opportunity to comment on the
charge against him. Third, there must be a hearing and the court must investigate the
charge and consider respondent's answer. Finally, only if found guilty will respondent be
punished accordingly. The law requires that there be a charge in writing, duly filed in
court, and an opportunity given to the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel.
What is most essential is that the alleged contemner be granted an opportunity to meet
the charges against him and to be heard in his defenses. This is due process, which
must be observed at all times.
In contempt proceedings, the prescribed procedure must be followed. To be sure,
since an indirect contempt charge partakes the nature of a criminal charge, conviction
cannot be had merely on the basis of written pleadings. A respondent in a contempt
charge must be served with a copy of the motion/petition. Unlike in civil actions, the
Court does not issue summons on the respondent. While the respondent is not required
to file a formal answer similar to that in ordinary civil actions, the court must set the
contempt charge for hearing on a fixed date and time on which the respondent must
make his appearance to answer the charge.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DOLE vs. NAMBOKU PEAK,
INC.
G.R. No.169745, July 18, 2014

DOCTRINE: A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by


the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
FACTS:
Namboku is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of providing manpower
services to variousclients, mainly airline companies. The Philippine Aircraft Loaders and
Cargo Employees AssociationSolidarity of Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment
and Reforms (PALCEA-SUPER) filed a Petitionfor direct certification election before the
Med-Arbiter seeking to represent the rank-and-file employees of Namboku assigned at
the Cargo and Loading Station of the Philippine Airlines (PAL) in Ninoy Aquino
International Airport; and that Namboku is an unorganized establishment. Namboku
opposed the Petitionon the ground of inappropriateness. It claimed that the members of
the PALCEA-SUPER are project employees. Hence, they cannot represent its regular
rank-and-file employees. The Med-Arbiter issued an Orderholding that the members of
PALCEA-SUPER are regular employees of Namboku.
Namboku appealedthe Med-Arbiter’s Order to the Secretary of the Labor,
maintaining that the members of PALCEA-SUPER are mere project employees. In the
meantime, Namboku received a summons setting the pre-election conference and
stating that the Order granting the conduct of a certification election in an unorganized
establishment is not appealable.
Namboku filed a Manifestation and Motion,as well as a Supplemental Motion and
Manifestation,seeking to suspend the conduct of certification election pending resolution
of its appeal. It contended that Section 17,Rule VIII of Department Order No. 40-03
prohibiting the filing of an appeal from an order granting the conduct of a certification
election in an unorganized establishment is unconstitutional because it runs counter to
Article 259of the Labor Code. The Secretary of Labor denied the appeal and affirmed the
Med-Arbiter’s Order. In rejecting Namboku’s contention that Section 17, Rule VIII of
Department Order No. 40-03 is unconstitutional, the Secretary of Labor ratiocinated that
unless said Department Order is declared by a competent court as unconstitutional, her
office would treat the same as valid.
Namboku filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari. Namboku imputed grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the Secretary ofLabor in (i) not resolving the issue of
appropriateness and (ii) rejecting its appeal based on an invalid provision of Department
Order 40-03. The CA issued its Decisiongranting Namboku’s Petition and reversing the
resolution of the Secretary of Labor.
The Secretary of Labor filed a Motion for Reconsideration.This prompted
Namboku to file a Motion to Expungeon the ground that the Secretary of Labor is a mere
nominalparty who has no legal standing to participate or prosecute the case. It argued

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
that the Secretary of Labor should have refrained from filing the said Motion for
Reconsideration and should havemaintained the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
The CA issued a Resolutiondenying the Secretary of Labor’s Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground, among others, that she is merely a nominal party to the
case and has no personal interest therein.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor has legal standing to file a Motion for
Reconsideration against reversal of its order by the CA
HELD:
No. The Secretary of Labor isnot the real party-in-interest vested with personality to
file the present petitions. A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to bebenefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.As thus
defined, the real parties-in-interest in these cases would have been PALCEA-SUPER
and PJWU-SUPER. The Sec. of Labor was impleaded in the Petitions for Certiorari filed
before the CA as a nominal party because one of the issues involved therein was
whether she committed an error of jurisdiction. But that does not make her a real
party-in-interest or vests her withauthority to appeal the Decisions of the CA in case it
reverses her ruling. Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only real
parties-in-interest who participated in the litigation of the case before the CA canavail of
an appeal by certiorari.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPOUSES MANZANILLA and VELASCO vs. WATERFIELDS INDUSTRIES CORP.
G.R. No.177484, July 18, 2014
DOCTRINE: Under the doctrine of estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the
person relying thereon.
Rule 129, SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, verbal or written, made
by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.
FACTS:
The spouses Manzanilla are the owners of a parcel of land in Barangay San Miguel,
Sto. Tomas, Batangas. They leased a 6,000-square meter portion of the
above-mentioned property to Waterfields, as represented by its President Aliza R. Ma.
Beginning April 1997, however, Waterfields failed to pay the monthly rental.
Hence, Ma sent the spouses Manzanilla a letter dated July 7, 1997 which reads as
follows:

Spouses Mr. & Mrs. Alejandro Manzanilla


Sto. Tomas, Batangas
I promise to pay the following rentals in arrears:
10 April 97 8,000.00
10 May 97 18,000.00
10 June 97 18,000.00
10 July 97 18,000.00
check replacement 8,000.00
P70,000.00

by way of check payment dated July 15, 1997.

In addition to the aforementioned, I will give a check for the amount of P18,000,
representing advance rental for the month of August 1997.

From hereon, notwithstanding the terms of the lease contract, I shall pay rentals
(eve) on or before the 10th day of each month, (30-day) representing advance
rental.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The deposit stipulated in our lease contract shall be used exclusively for the
payment of unpaid utilities, if any, and other incidental expenses only and applied
at the termination of the lease.

The lease contract dated 5/24/94 shall be amended according to the above
provision.

(Signed) ALIZA MA President


Waterfields Industries Corporation
7/9/97
Quezon City
The spouses Manzanilla filed before the MTC a Complaint for Ejectment against
Waterfields. On the other hand, Waterfields claimed that it did not fail or refuse to pay the
monthly rentals but was just utilizing the rental deposit. It argued that the spouses
Manzanilla have no cause of action against it. Waterfields also asserted that the
precipitate filing of the Complaint against it is tainted with bad faith and intended to cause
it grave injustice considering that it already spent an enormous amount in developing the
property.
The MTC found Ma’s letter to have amended the Contract of Lease. In particular,
Section 4 of the Contract of Lease which provides that the rental deposit shall answer for
any unpaid rentals, damages, penalties and unpaid utility charges was superseded by
the portion in Ma’s July 9, 1997 letter which states that “the deposit stipulated in our
lease contract shall be used exclusively for the payment of unpaid utilities, if any,
and other incidental expenses only and applied at the termination of the lease”.
Hence, the MTC found no merit in Waterfield’s claim that it did not fail or refuse to pay
the monthly rentals as it was applying the rental deposit to its payment of the same.
Consequently, the MTC declared that Waterfields violated the lease agreement due to
non-payment of rentals.
Before the RTC, Waterfields questioned the MTC’s ruling that Ma’s letter of July 9,
1997 effectively amended the Contract of Lease. It argued that the said letter is
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds since the same was merely in the handwriting
of Ma, unsubscribed by both parties, and unacknowledged before a notary public.
Hence, the rental deposit should have been applied as payment for monthly rentals
pursuant to the original Contract of Lease.
The RTC, however, was unimpressed. It noted in its Decision dated July 14, 2000
that in its Answer, Waterfields admitted paragraph 5 of the Complaint which states that
the Contract of Lease was amended on June 6, 1994 and July 9, 1997.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The CA reversed the RTC’s decision. The spouses Manzanilla contend that there
can be no issue as to the due execution, effectivity and enforceability of Ma’s July 9,
1997 letter since aside from the fact that Waterfields itself admitted in its Answer that the
Contract of Lease was amended on July 9, 1997, the MTC and the RTC had uniformly
ruled that the said letter operates as an amendment to the original contract. Hence, this
Petition for Certiorari.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the CA is correct in reversing the RTC’s decision

HELD:
No.
Waterfields cannot now contradict its
judicial admission that the Contract of
Lease was amended on July 9, 1997;
the doctrine of estoppel likewise bars it
from falsifying Ma’s July 9, 1997 letter
in this litigation.

Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, verbal or written, made by a


party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof.
The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

“A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b) during trial, either
by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of the
judicial proceeding.”

Here, paragraph 5 of the Complaint alleges

5. That, subsequently, the said Contract of Lease was amended on 06 June


1994 and on 09 July 1997 x x x.

Whereas, paragraph 2 of Waterfields’ Answer reads:

2. Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the Complaint are admitted.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Clearly, Waterfields admitted in its Answer the truth of the material allegation that the
Contract of Lease was amended on July 9, 1997. “It is well- settled that judicial
admissions cannot be contradicted by the admitter who is the party itself and binds the
person who makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made thru palpable
mistake (as in this case), no amount of rationalization can offset it.”

Moreover, “[u]nder the doctrine of estoppel, an admission or representation is


rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as
against the person relying thereon. A party may not go back on his own acts and
representations to the prejudice of the other party who relied upon them. In the law of
evidence, whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally
and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing [to be] true, and to act upon
such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission,
be permitted to falsify it.”

In view of these, any effort on the part of Waterfields to impugn the July 9, 1997 letter
is futile.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LAS MARIAS GRILL AND RESTAURANT vs. BUCAD
G.R. No. 196249, July 21, 2014
DOCTRINE: In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of the CA are
conclusive and binding and consequently, it is not our function to analyze or weigh
evidence all over again.
Factual findingsof administrative bodies charged with their specific field of
expertise, are affordedgreat weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial
showing that suchfindings were madefrom an erroneous estimation of the evidence
presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of stability of the governmental
structure, should not be disturbed
FACTS:
Complaints for Illegal Dismissal and Money Claims filed by respondents,
Ferdinand M. Bucad, Charleston A. Reynante, Bernadine B. Roaquin, Marlon A. Ompoy,
Ruben N. Laroza, Evageline B. Bumacod, Wilma Caingles, Brian Ogario, Evelyn
A.Bastan, Anaclito A. Bastan, Ma. Gina Benitez, Herminio Agsaoay, Norberto
Ballasteros, Demetrio L. Berdin, Jr., Joel Ducusin, Jovy R. Balata, and Maribel Roaquin,
against petitioners Las Marias Grill and Restaurant and Café Teria Bar and Restaurant,
single proprietorships owned by petitionersRose Hana Angeles and Zenaida Angeles,
respectively. They bewailed thatthey were underpaid workers.
Petitioners offered not a tinge of explanation as they failed to submit their Position
Paper.Ensuingly, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision ruling that petitioners are guilty
of illegal dismissal. Aggrieved, petitioners seasonably appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission ("NLRC") flatly denying the charges against them. They were
surprised to discover that their former counsel did not file any pleading in their behalf to
refute respondents’ accusations.
The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. The CA affirmed the NLRC
decision. The petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. They would have this
Court resolve issues which require a reevaluation of the evidence; issues of fact relating
to the dismissal of their employeesand the computation of monetary claims, which have
been passed upon by the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court can review findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
and of the NLRC
HELD:
No. What must be realized, however, is that this Court is not a trier of facts. "The
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the CA viaRule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. This
Court is not a trier offacts. In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of the
CA are conclusive and binding and consequently, it is not our function to analyze or
weigh evidence all over again."26 This principle applies with greater force in labor cases,

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
where this Court has consistently held that findings of fact of the NLRC are accorded
great respect and even finality,especially if they coincide withthose of the LaborArbiter
and are supported by substantial evidence.
"Judicial review by this Court does not extend to a reevaluation of the sufficiency
ofthe evidence uponwhich the proper labor tribunal has based its determination."Factual
issues are beyond the scope of this Court’s authority to review on certiorari.
Moreover, "factual findingsof administrative bodies charged with their specific field
of expertise, are affordedgreat weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial
showing that suchfindings were madefrom an erroneous estimation of the evidence
presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of stability of the governmental
structure, should not be disturbed."

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPOUSES MAURICIO M. TABINO and LEONILA DELA CRUZ-TABINO vs.LAZARO
M. TABINO
G.R. No. 196219, July 30, 2014

DOCTRINE: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies and Forum-Shopping

FACTS:
Proclamation No. 518 was issued, establishing the military reservation known as
Fort Bonifacio situated in the then municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Pateros and
Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City. Proc. 518 allowed a maximum area of 300
square meters for disposition to any bona fide occupants/residents of different
Barangays. Petitioner Mauricio M. Tabino (Mauricio) – a technical sergeant in the military
– and his brother, respondent Lazaro M. Tabino – a colonel in the military – occupied a
353-square meter lot in Pembo, Makati City. Mauricio established residence within the
lot, while respondent continued to reside in Novaliches, Quezon City. The lot was later
subdivided into two portions, denominated as Lots 2 and 3, Block 255, Zone 12, Group
10, Sampaguita Extension, Pembo, Makati City.
On May 11, 2004, respondent filed an ejectment case against Mauricio and the latter’s
wife, Leonila dela Cruz with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati. The ejectment case is
based on the theory that respondent is the true and sole owner of the 353-square meter
lot; Petitioners countered in their Answer that respondent had no right to eject them, that
the parties’ true agreement was that petitioners would act as caretakers of respondent’s
Lot 3, and for this, respondent would pay petitioners a monthly salary of
₱800.00. Petitioners and respondent both filed Protests with the DENR relative to Lots 2
and 3. The DENR held that respondent (plaintiff) is not qualified to acquire Lot 2 under
Proc. 518 since he was already awarded a home lot in Fort Bonifacio. The ejectment
case in MeTC favored the Petitioners. It ruled that the Plaintiff’s contention that
defendants’ stay on the premises is by mere tolerance is devoid of merit.
Well-established is the rule that findings of administrative agencies are accorded not
only respect but also finality when the decision or order is not tainted with unfairness or
arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. RTC affirmed the lower
court’s decision. However, CA, reversed the decision.

ISSUE/S:
1) CAN THE COURT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND ADJUDICATE ON
REVIEW THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY
WITHOUT HAVING ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES FIRST EXHAUSTED?

2) HAS RESPONDENT VIOLATEDTHE RULE AGAINST FORUM- SHOPPING IN


FILING EJECTMENT CASE AGAINST PETITIONERS DURING THE
PENDENCY OF THE MISCELLANEOUS SALES APPLICATION CASES
BEFORE THE DENR WHICH ADMINISTRATIVE BODY, IN EXERCISE OF ITS
QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION, HAS FIRST ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER
THE SAME PARTIES, SAME SUBJECT MATTER AND SAME ISSUES OF
FACT AND LAW?

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
Respondent is correct in arguing that petitioners may not raise the issues of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and forum-shopping, after having voluntarily
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the MeTC and the RTC trying the ejectment
case. Besides, these issues are being raised for the first time at this stage of the
proceedings. Moreover, petitioners in the instant Petition pray for the reinstatement of
the MeTC Decision. As such, they cannot be allowed to simultaneously attack and adopt
the proceedings or actions taken by the lower courts.
On this point, it is worth stressing that the courts generally accord great respect, if not
finality, to factual findings of administrative agencies because of their special knowledge
and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction. Echoing the explanation of the
private respondent DENR, citing the case of Ortua vs. Encarnacion, the findings of facts
of the Director of Land (now the Regional Director) is conclusive in the absence of any
showing that such decision was rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition or
mistake, other than error of judgment in estimating the value or effect of evidence,
regardless of whether or not it is consistent with the preponderance of evidence, so long
as there is some evidence upon which the findings in question could be made.
We agree with the respondents and dismiss the petition for petitioners’ failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a
cornerstone of Our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities
within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine
is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of
controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed.
Another important reason for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers,
which enjoins the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming
primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The
theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve questions
addressed to their particular expertise and that errors committed by subordinates in their
resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. Strict
enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of
avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded dockets.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MEYR ENTERPRISES CORPORATION vs. ROLANDO CORDERO
G.R. No. 197336, September 3, 2014

DOCTRINE:A question of fact cannot be raised in petitions for review on certiorari; in


such appeals by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law
shall be raised.

FACTS:
On August 22, 2002, Meyr Enterprises Corporation (plaintiff-appellant,) filed a
Complaint7 for Damages and Attorney’s Fees before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City against Rolando Cordero (defendant-appellee). Meyr claims to be the registered
owner of a 4,887-square meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-1198. He alleged
that sometime in July 2002, defendant constructed a dike in front of his land. The flow of
the waves of the sea causing damages to his land. The trees in the land were allegedly
in danger of being uprooted and the sand of disappearing further. Plaintiff-appellant
prays actual damages, moral damages, and exemplary damages. Cordero averred that
the construction of the dike began December 2001 through the authority of the Local
Government of Guinsiliban, Camiguin pursuant to a resolutionof the Sangguniang
Bayan. He added that plaintiff-appellant has no personality to sue as the area in
controversy is a foreshore land, owned by the State and under no circumstances will
plaintiff suffer any damage or injury there from. RTC dismissed the complaint of the
plaintiff based on defendant-appellee’s affirmative defenses. Plaintiff’s file an MR but
was also denied. In CA, it concluded that Meyr is not assailing the dismissal of its
complaint but only the award of moral damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation cost by the
trial court, which it based on malicious prosecution, but it affirmed the decision of the
RTC.

ISSUE/S:
1) WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT
GROSSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER FILED SUBJECT
COMPLAINT WITH THE INTENTION TO VEX, HUMILIATE AND ANNOY
RESPONDENT WHICH AMOUNTED TO MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

HELD:
The Court denies the Petition. The resolution of the case hinges on the question of
whether petitioner is guilty of malice and bad faith in instituting Civil Case, if it is not so,
then there is no ground to hold it liable for malicious prosecution. The existence of bad
faith is a question of fact and is evidentiary. It requires that the reviewing court look into
the evidence to find if indeed there is proof that is substantial enough to show such bad
faith. However, this Court is not a trier of facts, it is not duty-bound to analyze again and
weigh the evidence introduced in and considered by the tribunals below. When supported
by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding on the
parties and are not reviewable by this Court. This being the case, the instant Petition must
fail because a question of fact cannot properly be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari. An appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall raise only

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
questions of law.Of course this is subject to exceptions. However, these exceptions do
not obtain in the instant case. It will suffice for this Court to rely on the judgment of the trial
and appellate court prevailing jurisprudence uniformly holds that findings of facts of the
trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. LUIS SAMAR and MAGDALENA SAMAR
G.R. No. 197329, September 8, 2014

DOCTRINE:Determination of just compensation under Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil


Procedure.

FACTS:
Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) filed Civil Case No. IR-2243 with the
RTC, seeking to expropriate respondent spouses Luis and Magdalena Samar’s
1,020-square meter lot which NPC needed for the construction of a transmission line.
The RTC directed the issuance of a Writ of Condemnation in favor of NPC. Accordingly,
NPC entered the subject lot and constructed its transmission line denominated as Tower
No. 83. However, the trial court issued another Order5 dismissing Civil Case No. IR-2243
without prejudice for failure to prosecute, to wit - After almost three (3) years since the
said order was issued, the Committee has not met nor deliberated on said matter and the
parties in this case have not exerted efforts in pursuing their claims despite so long a
time. Case is dismissed without prejudice.
Respondents filed with the same trial court a Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
IR-2678, for compensation and damages against NPC relative to the subject lot which
NPC took over but for which it failed to pay just compensation on account of the
dismissal of Civil Case No. IR-224. Atty. Wenifredo Pornillo, recommended a valuation
within the range of ₱1,000.00 to ₱1,500.00 per square meter. Lorenzo C. Orense,
commissioner for NPC, did not set an amount, although he stated that the lot should be
valued at the prevailing market prices of agricultural, and not residential, lands within the
area. The court representative, Esteban D. Colarina, proposed a ₱1,100.00 per square
meter valuation. RTC, ruled the value of the subject lot at ₱1,000.00 per square meter.
NPC filed an appeal to CA which was denied.

ISSUE/S:
1) WHETHER OR NOT CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
REMANDING THE COURT FOR DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF JUST
COMPENSATION FOR THE EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY INACCORDANCE
WITH SECTION 4, RULE 67 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.

HELD:
The Court grants the Petition. NPC insists that Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of
Court should have been observed in fixing the amount of just compensation for the
subject lot, that the value of the lot at the time of NPC’s taking thereof or filing of Civil
Case No. IR-2243 in 1990 should have been the basis for computing just compensation
and not the prevailing market value at the time of the filing or pendency of Civil Case No.
IR-2678 in 1995. NPC thus prays that Civil Case No. IR-2678 be remanded to the trial
court for determination of just compensation applying Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1964
Rules of Court.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, Just compensation is based on the price or value of the
property at the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the government.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
However, if the government takes possession before the institution of expropriation
proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession,
not of the filing of the complaint. The value at the time of the filing of the complaint should
be the basis for the determination of the value when the taking of the property involved
coincides with or is subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings.
The procedure for determining just compensation is set forth in Rule 67 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 5 of Rule 67 partly states that ‘upon the rendition of the
order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and
disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken.’ However, we held in Republic v.
Court of Appeals that Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing of complaint for eminent domain
with the appropriate court by the expropriator. If no such complaint is filed, the
expropriator is considered to have violated procedural requirements, and hence, waived
the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the appointment of commissioners
to ascertain just compensation. In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we
clarified that when there is no action for expropriation and the case involves only a
complaint for damages or just compensation, the provisions of the Rules of Court on
ascertainment of just compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule 67) are no longer applicable,
and a trial before commissioners is dispensable.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
EDUARDO D. MONSANTO, DECOROSO D. MONSANTO, SR., AND REV. FR.
PASCUAL D. MONSANTO, JR. vs. LEONCIO LIM AND LORENZO DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. 178911 September 17, 2014

DOCTRINE: Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed
docket fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter.

FACTS:
Flordelis B. Menzon, Regional Director of the Home Development Mutual Fund
requested the intervention of Executive Judge Sinforiano A. Monsanto of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar on the alleged anomalous auction sale
conducted by Sheriff IV Lorenzo De Guzman. According to Pag-IBIG, De Guzman
previously acceded to its request to move the date of the auction sale to January 20,
2004; however, to its surprise, the sale proceeded as originally scheduled on January
15, 2004. Pag-IBIG also claimed that the winning bid of Leoncio Lim in the amount of
P500,000.00 was grossly disadvantageous to the government considering that the
outstanding loan obligations of the mortgagor, Eduardo Monsanto, was more than the
bid amount. Executive Judge Monsanto refrained from acting on the letter considering
that Eduardo is his relative; instead he re-assigned the same to Judge Sibanah E.
Usman of Branch 28.
Pag-IBIG informed the trial court that the loan of Eduardo had been restructured and that
Eduardo had commenced paying monthly amortizations, that as a result of the
restructuring, Pag-IBIG is withdrawing its Petition for Extra-judicial Foreclosure. And that
it is no longer interested in pursuing an administrative action against De Guzman.
Leoncio opposed Pag-IBIG’s manifestation. Leoncio filed with Branch 27 a Manifestation
with Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession claiming that the reglementary
period had elapsed without Eduardo redeeming the subject property, as such, he is
already entitled to the issuance of a writ of possession. On July 15, 2005, Decoroso D.
Monsanto and Pascual moved to intervene in the case. Both claimed that they are
co-owners and actual possessors of the subject property. RTC ruled that The public
auction sale are in order. There is no showing that he has abused his authority during
the conduct of the public auction. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE/S:
WHETHER OR NOT CA ERRED IN RULING THAT NO GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 27, IN
ITS ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION AND ITS ISSUANCE DOES NOT
NEED A MOTION FOR THE CONFIRMATION OF SALE WHICH REQUIRES A
HEARING.

HELD:
The Petition is dismissed.Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment
of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Section 5, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that a civil action is
commenced by the filing of the original complaint in court. Moreover, every ordinary civil
action must be based on a cause of action.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 275
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
In this case, records show that no formal complaint or petition was filed in court. The
case was supposedly “commenced” through a letter of Pag-IBIG asking the intervention
of Executive Judge Monsanto on the alleged anomalous foreclosure sale conducted by
De Guzman. However, said letter could not in any way be considered as a
pleading. Section 1, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court defines pleadings as “written
statements of the respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the court for
appropriate judgment.” To stress, Pag-IBIG’s letter could not be considered as a formal
complaint or petition. First, the parties to the case were not identified pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 3 and Section 1,31 Rule 7. Second, the so-called claim or cause of
action was not properly mentioned or specified. Third, the letter miserably failed to
comply with the requirements of Rule 7, Rules of Court. The letter bore no caption, it
was not even assigned a docket number; the parties were not properly identified, the
allegations were not properly set forth, no particular relief is sought, in fact, only the
intervention of Executive Judge Monsanto is requested, it was not signed by a counsel,
and most of all, there is no verification or certification against forum-shopping.
We have also noted that no docket fees were paid before the trial court. Section 1, Rule
141 of the Rules of Court mandates that upon the filing of the pleading or other
application which initiates an action or proceeding, the fees prescribed therefore shall be
paid in full. It is hornbook law that courts acquire jurisdiction over a case only upon
payment of the prescribed docket fee.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 276
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HEIRS OF TELESFORO JULAO, namely, ANITA VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, SONIA J.
TOLENTINO and RODERICK JULAO vs.SPOUSES ALEJANDRO and MORENITA
DE JESUS
G.R. No. 176020 September 29, 2014

DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by
the material allegations of the complaint. Thus, it cannot be acquired through, or waived
by, any act or omission of the parties nor can it be cured by their silence, acquiescence, or
even express consent.

FACTS:
Telesforo Julao filed before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), Baguio City, two Townsite Sales Applications (TSA), TSA No. V-2132 and TSA
No.V-6667.Upon his death on June 1, 1971, his applications were transferred to his heirs.
On April 30, 1979, Solito Julao (Solito) executed a Deed of Transfer of Rights, transferring
his hereditary share in the property covered by TSA No. V-6667 to respondent spouses
Alejandro and Morenita De Jesus. In 1983, respondent spouses constructed a house on
the property they acquired from Solito. In 1986, Solito went missing. DENR issued an
Order, Rejection and Transfer of Sales Rights. Consequently, on December 21, 1998,
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-2446,covering a 641-square meter property, was
issued in favor of the heirs of Telesforo.
On March 2, 1999, petitioners, representing themselves to be the heirs of Telesforo,
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City, a Complaint or Recovery of
Possession of Real Property, against respondent spouses. Petitioners alleged that they
are the true and lawful owners of a 641-square meter parcel of land located at Naguilian
Road, Baguio City, covered by OCT No. P-2446. Respondent spouses filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of prescription, which the RTC denied for lack of merit.Thus, they
filed an Answer contending that they are the true and lawful owners and possessors of
the subject property, that they acquired the said property from petitioners' brother,
Solito; and that contrary to the claim of petitioners, TSA No. V-6667 and TSA No. V-2132
pertain to the same property.
After petitioners rested their case, respondent spouses filed a Motion for Leave of
Court to File a Demurrer to Evidence. The RTC, however, denied the Motion.
The heirs of Solito then moved to intervene and filed an Answer-ln-lntervention, arguing
that their father, Solito, is a legitimate son of Telesforo and that Solito sold his hereditary
share in the estate of his father to respondent spouses by virtue of a Deed of Transfer of
Rights. RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. On Appeal, the CA reversed
the ruling of the RTC. The CA found the Complaint dismissible on two grounds: (1) failure
on the part of petitioners to identify the property sought to be recovered; and (2) lack of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE/S:
1) WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING
THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE
COMPLAINT.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 277
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
The Petition lacks merit.
The assessed value must be alleged in the complaint to determine which court has
jurisdiction over the action.
Jurisdiction as we have said is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in
the complaint, which contains the concise statement of the ultimate facts of a plaintiffs
cause of action. SEC. 19.Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds twenty
thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts:
SEC. 33.Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes,
the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that in an action for recovery of possession, the
assessed value of the property sought to be recovered determines the court's jurisdiction.
In this case, for the RTC to exercise jurisdiction, the assessed value of the subject
property must exceed ₱20,000.00. Since petitioners failed to allege in their Complaint the
assessed value of the subject property, the CA correctly dismissed the Complaint as
petitioners failed to establish that the RTC had jurisdiction over it. In fact, since the
assessed value of the property was not alleged, it cannot be determined which trial court
had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
In an action to recover, the property must be identified
Moreover, Article 434 of the Civil Code states that "[i]n an action to recover, the property
must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the
weakness of the defendant's claim." The plaintiff, therefore, is duty-bound to clearly
identify the land sought to be recovered, in accordance with the title on which he anchors
his right of ownership.66 It bears stressing that the failure of the plaintiff to establish the
identity of the property claimed is fatal to his case.67
In this case, petitioners failed to identify the property they seek to recover as they failed to
describe the location, the area, as well as the boundaries thereof. In fact, as aptly pointed
out by the CA, no survey plan was presented by petitioners to prove that respondent
spouses actually encroached upon the 70-square meter portion of petitioners'
property.68 Failing to prove their allegation, petitioners are not entitled to the relief prayed
for in their Complaint.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 278
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in dismissing the Complaint for lack of
jurisdiction and for failing to identify the property sought to be recovered.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 279
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
GEORGE PIDLIP P. PALILEO and JOSE DE LA CRUZ vs.
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK
G.R. No. 193650, October 8, 2014

DOCTRINE: Failure to appeal within the 15-day period amounts to the acceptance of the
judgment rendered by the court.

FACTS:
The proceedings in the case would have been greatly abbreviated if the court a quo
and the CA did not overlook the fact that PDB’s Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and
for New Trial was filed one day too late. The bank received a copy of the trial court’s
June 15, 2006 Decision on July 17, 2006; thus, it had 15 days – or up to August 1, 2006
– within which to file a notice of appeal, motion for reconsideration, or a motion for new
trial, pursuant to the Rules of Court.Yet, it filed the omnibus motion for reconsideration
and new trial only on August 2, 2006.
Hence the Regional Trial Court issued a writ of execution which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 15-day period to appeal is mandatory.

HELD:
Yes, since PDB’s Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was filed
late and the 15-day period within which to appeal expired without PDB filing the requisite
notice of appeal, it follows that its right to appeal has been foreclosed; it may no longer
question the trial court’s Decision in any other manner. "Settled is the rule that a party is
barred from assailing the correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him”.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 280
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
RESIDENTS OF LOWER ATAB & TEACHERS' VILLAGE, STO.TOMAS PROPER
BARANGAY, BAGUIO CITY, represented by BEATRICE T. PULAS, CRISTINA A.
LAPP AO. MICHAEL MADIGUID, FLORENCIO MABUDYANG and FERNANDO
DOSALIN, Petitioners vs. STA. MONICA INDUSTRIAL & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No.198878 October 15, 2014

DOCTRINE: An action to quiet title in order to prosper, two indispensable requisites must
be present, namely: "(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance,
or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid
or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

FACTS:
In May 2001, petitioners – residents of Lower Atab & Teachers’ Village, Sto. Tomas
Proper Barangay, Baguio City – filed a civil case for quieting of title with damages
against respondent Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation. The Complaint
in said case essentially alleged that petitioners are successors and
transferees-in-interest of Torres, the supposed owner of an unregistered parcel of land in
Baguio City.Petitioners acknowledged that while they declared their respective lots for
tax purposes, they applied for the purchase of the same – through Townsite Sales
applications – with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The
petitioners did not have any original certificate of title moreover they are currently
applying to buy the lot from the Baguio city coursed thru the DENR.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are entitled for relief thru the remedy of action to quiet title.

HELD:
No, petitioners do not have legal or equitable title to the subject property. Evidently,
there are no certificates of title in their respective names. And by their own admission in
their pleadings, specifically in their pre-trial brief and memorandum before the trial court,
they acknowledged that they applied for the purchase of the property from the
government, through townsite sales applications coursed through the DENR.Legal title
denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial ownership."
Beneficial ownership has been defined as ownership recognized by law and
capable of being enforced in the courts at the suit of the beneficial owner.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 281
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, as represented by the COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES ANTONIO
VILLAN MANLY, and RUBY ONG MANLY, Respondents.
G.R. No. 197590 November 24, 2014

DOCTRINE:When the remedy of appeal is available, an action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, will not prosper because it is not a substitute for a lost appeal.

FACTS:
Respondent Antonio Villan Manly (Antonio) is a stockholder and the Executive
Vice-President of Standard Realty Corporation, a family-owned corporation. He is also
engaged in rental business. On April 27, 2005, petitioner Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) issued Letter of Authority authorizing its revenue officers to investigate respondent
spouses’ internal revenue tax liabilities for taxable year 2003 and prior years.
On June 6, 2005, petitioner issued a letter to respondent spouses requiring them to
submit documentary evidence to substantiate the source of their cash. The state
prosecutor issued a resolution recommending the filing of criminal charges. The
Department of Justice however reverses the decision of the prosecutor and dismisses the
case which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is a proper remedy when appeal
is available.

HELD:
No, the remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision, final order, or resolution of the CA
is to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. If the
remedy of an appeal is available, an action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, which is an original or independent action based on grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, will not prosper because it is not a substitute
for a lost appeal. However, exceptions to this rule, to wit: 1) when public welfare and the
advancement of public policy dictate; 2) when the broader interest of justice so requires;
3) when the writs issued are null and void; 4) when the questioned order amounts to an
oppressive exercise of judicial authority; 5) when, for persuasive reasons, the rules may
be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure; 6) when the judgment or order is attended by grave abuse
of discretion; or 7) in other meritorious cases, petitioner was able to convincingly show
that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the dismissal of the
criminal charges against respondent spouses despite the fact that there is probable
cause to indict them.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 282
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
DEMETRIA DE GUZMAN, ET AL. vs. FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 191710 January 14, 2015

DOCTRINE: One cannot avail of the remedy provided for under Rule 65 when an appeal
is still available.

FACTS:
In this case, petitioners question the extent of the easement of right of way granted to
them and the indemnity for the same as fixed by the Court of Appeals, petitioners assail
the judgment of the Court of Appeals by interposing on their appeal that the Appellate
Court’s decision was not in accord with the law, however their Prefatory statement states
that: “Plaintiffs-petitioners are left with no appeal, nor is there any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law after the respondent Court of Appeals
incorrectly denied their motion for reconsideration. Respondent Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction not only in reversing the final ruling
of the trial Court, but also on the award of indemnity, then in their Arguments/Discussion,
petitioners alleged that: The Court of Appeals whimsically and capriciously reversed the
final ruling of the Regional Trial Court.” Petitioners arguments provide that the petition
should have been Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. But the title of the petition is
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE:
Whether to treat the petition as under Rule 45 or under Rule 65.

HELD:
Under rule 45, since it was filed well within the reglementary period provided under
the said rule. It was held in Sanchez v. Court of Appeals that the Rules of Court should be
liberally construed in order to promote their object of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding. The rules of procedure should be
viewed as mere tools designed to aid the courts in the speedy, just and inexpensive
determination of the cases before them. Liberal construction of the rules and the
pleadings is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. Litigations should, as
much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on mere technicalities. Moreover,
The general rule is that the remedy to obtain reversal or modification of judgment on the
merits is appeal. Thus, the proper remedy for the petitioner should have been a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court since the decision sought to be
reversed is that of the CA. The existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes
a resort to certiorari, because one of the requisites for availment of the latter is precisely
that there should be no appeal. The remedy of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
was still available to the petitioner.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 283
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPOUSES JOSE O. GATUSLAO and ERMILA LEONILA LIMSIACO-GATUSLAO vs.
LEO RAY V. YANSON
G.R. No. 191540 January 21, 2015

DOCTRINE:It is settled that the issuance of a Writ of Possession may not be stayed by a
pending action for annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure itself.

FACTS:
Petitioner Ermila Leonila Limsiaco-Gatuslao is the daughter of the late Felicisimo
Limsiaco (Limsiaco) who died intestate on February 7, 1989. Limsiaco was the registered
owner of two parcels of land with improvements in the City of Bacolod. Limsiaco
mortgaged the said lots along with the house standing thereon to Philippine National
Bank (PNB). Upon Limsiaco’s failure to pay, PNB extrajudicially foreclosed on the
mortgageand caused the properties’ sale at a public auction on June 24, 1991 where it
emerged as the highest bidder. When the one-year redemption period expired without
Limsiaco’s estate redeeming the properties, PNB caused the consolidation of titles in its
name. On November 10, 2006, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by PNB conveying
the subject properties in favor of respondent. As a consequence thereof, the Registry of
Deeds of Bacolod City issued TCT Nos. T-311125and T-311126 in respondent’s name in
lieu of PNB’s titles. The petitioner thereafter contest the writ of possession being applied
by the respondent-buyer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the owner can be stopped from possessing the property by the
respondent who fails to redeem it.

HELD:
No, the purchaser, therefore, in the public auction sale of a foreclosed property is
entitled to a writ of possession PNB, therefore, as the absolute owner of the properties is
entitled to a writ of possession. And since respondent purchased the properties from
PNB, the former has necessarily stepped into the shoes of the latter. Otherwise stated,
respondent, by subrogation, has the right to pursue PNB’s claims against petitioners as
though they were his own.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 284
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
IRENE D. OFILADA vs. SPOUSES RUBEN ANDAL and MIRAFLOR ANDAL
G.R. No. 192270 January 26, 2015

DOCTRINE: The material averments in the complaint determine the jurisdiction of a


court.

FACTS:
Irene, together with her husband Carlos Ofilada (Carlos), bought from the heirs of
Teresita Liwag (Teresita) a 27,974-square meter parcel of land principally planted with
rambutan, a number of coconut trees and other fruit-bearing plants located in Barrio Puri,
Tiaong, Quezon. Wherein respondent Miraflor Andal (Miraflor), who brokered the sale of
the property, signed as ‘tenant.’ Apparently, ten days prior to the sale, Miraflor appeared
before Anastacio Lajara (Anastacio), the then Barangay Agrarian Reform Council
(BARC) Chairman of Barangay Puri, San Antonio, and executed a Pagpapatunay stating
that: Spouses Andal are not tenants of the said land. The land was eventually registered
in the name of Irene Ofilada, 8 years later Irene filed an ejectment case against the
Spouses Andals. The Andals interposed the defense that they are tenants of the land
hence the jurisdiction must be in the DARAB (Dept. of Agrarian reform adjudication
board) and not in the MTC. The MTC granted the ejectment case which was affirmed by
the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the MTC has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:
Yes, a court does not lose jurisdiction over an ejectment suit by the simple expedient
of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship
between the parties. The court continues to have the authority to hear and evaluate the
evidence, precisely to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, and, if, after hearing,
tenancy is shown to exist, it shall dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Forcible entry
and unlawful detainer cases fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, and the municipal circuit trial courts. On
the other hand, the DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and has exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving
the implementation of agrarian reform. As DAR’s adjudicating arm, it is the DARAB that
has exclusive and original jurisdiction involving all agrarian disputes.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 285
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Hon. Ramon Jesus P. Paje, In His Capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), v. Hon. Teodoro A. Casiño, Et. Al.,
G.R. No. 207257, February 3, 2015

DOCTRINE: The function of the extraordinary and equitable remedy of a Writ of


Kalikasan should not supplant other available remedies and the nature of the forums that
they provide. The Writ of Kalikasan is a highly prerogative writ that issues only when
there is a showing of actual or imminent threat and when there is such inaction on the
part of the relevant administrative bodies that will make an environmental catastrophe
inevitable. It is not a remedy that is availing when there is no actual threat or when
imminence of danger is not demonstrable. The Writ of Kalikasan thus is not an excuse
to invoke judicial remedies when there still remain administrative forums to properly
address the common concern to protect and advance ecological rights. After all, we
cannot presume that only the Supreme Court can conscientiously fulfill the ecological
duties required of the entire state.

FACTS:
In February 2006, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), and Taiwan
Cogeneration Corporation (TCC) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
expressing their intention to build a power plant in Subic Bay which would supply reliable
and affordable power to Subic Bay Industrial Park (SBIP).
On July 28, 2006, SBMA and TCC entered into another MOU, whereby TCC
undertook to build and operate a coal-fired power plant. The SBMA Ecology Center
issued SBFZ Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) No.
EC-SBFZ-ECC-69-21-500 in favor of Taiwan Cogeneration International Corporation
(TCIC), a subsidiary of TCC, for the construction, installation, and operation of
2x150-MW Circulating Fluidized Bed (CFB) Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant at Sitio
Naglatore. TCC assigned all its rights and interests under the MOU dated July 28, 2006
to Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. (RP Energy).
The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Olongapo City expressed the city government’s
objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy source and urging the proponent to
consider safer alternative sources of energy for Subic Bay through the issuance of
several resolutions.
RP Energy requested the DENR to amend its ICC to include additional components
in its proposed coal-fired power plant, which was opposed by the Sangguniang
Panglusod several times.
On July 20, 2012, respondents filed a Petition for Writ of kalikasan against RP
Energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Jesus P. Paje, in his capacity as Secretary of the
DENR. In the Petition, the Casiño Group alleged, among others, that the power plant
project would cause grave environmental damage; that it would adversely affect the
health of the residents of the municipalities of Subic, Zambales, Morong, Hermosa, and
the City of Olongapo; that the ECC was issued and the LDA entered into without the prior
approval of the concerned sanggunians as required under Sections 26 and 27 of the
Local Government Code (LGC); that the LDA was entered into without securing a prior
certification from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) as required
under Section 59 of RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA Law);

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that Section 8.3 of DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 (DAO 2003-30) which allows
amendments of ECCs is ultra vires because the DENR has no authority to decide on
requests for amendments of previously issued ECCs in the absence of a new EIS; and
that due to the nullity of Section 8.3 of DAO 2003-30, all amendments to RP Energy’s
ECC are null and void.
The CA rendered a Decision denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan and the
application for an environment protection order due to the failure of the Casiño Group to
prove that its constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology was violated or
threatened.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Casiño Group failed to substantiate its claims that the
construction and operation of the power plant will cause environmental damage.

2. Whether the ECC is invalid for lack of signature of Mr. Luis Miguel Aboitiz, as
representative of RP Energy, in the Statement of Accountability of the ECC.

3. Whether the first and second amendments to the ECC are invalid for failure to
undergo a new environmental impact assessment (EIA) because of the utilization
of inappropriate EIA documents.

4. Whether the Certificate of Non-Overlap, under Section 59 of the IPRA Law, is a


precondition to the issuance of an ECC and the lack of its prior issuance rendered
the ECC invalid.

5. Whether the Certificate of Non-Overlap, under Section 59 of the IPRA Law, is a


precondition to the consummation of the Lease and Development Agreement
(LDA) between SBMA and RP Energy and the lack of its prior issuance rendered
the LDA invalid.

6. Whether compliance with Section 27, in relation to Section 26, of the LGC (i.e.,
approval of the concerned sanggunian requirement) is necessary prior to the
implementation of the power plant project.

7. Whether the validity of the third amendment to the ECC can be resolved in this
case.

HELD:
1. YES. The appellate court correctly ruled that the Casiño Group failed to
substantiate its claims that the construction and operation of the power plant
will cause environmental damage of the magnitude contemplated under the
writ of Kalikasan. On the other hand, RP Energy presented evidence to
establish that the subject project will not cause grave environmental damage
through its Environmental Management Plan which will ensure that the project
will operate within the limits of existing environmental laws and standards

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2. No. The appellate court erred when it invalidated the ECC on the ground of
lack of signature of Mr. Aboitiz. in the ECC’s Statement of Accountability
relative to the copy of the ECC submitted by RP Energy to the appellate court.
While the signature is necessary for the validity of the ECC, the particular
circumstances of this case show that the DENR and RP Energy were not
properly apprised of the issue of lack of signature in order for them to present
controverting evidence and arguments on this point as the issue only arose
during the course of the proceedings upon clarificatory questions from the
appellate court. Consequently RP Energy cannot be faulted for submitting the
certified true copy of the ECC only after it learned that the ECC had been
invalidated on the ground of lack of signature in the Decision of the appellate
court. The certified true copy of the ECC bearing the signature Mr. Aboitiz in
the Statement of Accountability portion was issued by the DENR and remains
uncontroverted. It showed that the Statement of Accountability was signed Mr.
Aboitiz on December 24, 2008. Because the signing was done after the official
release of the ECC on December 22, 2008, the DENR did not strictly follow its
rules which require that the signing of the Statement of Accountability should
be done before the official release of the ECC. However, considering that the
issue was not adequately argued nor was evidence presented before the
appellate court on the circumstances at the time of signing, there is insufficient
basis to conclude that the procedure adopted by the DENR was tainted with
bad faith or inexcusable negligence. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that the
signature requirement was substantially complied with.

3. The Supreme Court ruled that the appellate court erred when it ruled that the
first and second amendments to the subject ECC were invalid for failure to
comply with a new EIA and for violating DAO 2003-30 and the Revised
Manual. The appellate court failed to properly consider the applicable
provisions in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual on amendments to ECCs.
Our examination of the provisions on amendments to ECCs, as well as the
EPRMP and PDR themselves, shows that the DENR reasonably exercised its
discretion in requiring an EPRMP and a PDR for the first and second
amendments, respectively. Through these documents, which the DENR
reviewed, a new EIA was conducted relative to the proposed project
modifications. Hence, absent sufficient showing of grave abuse of discretion or
patent illegality, relative to both the procedure and substance of the
amendment process, we uphold the validity of these amendments.

4. The Supreme Court ruled that the ECC is not the license or permit
contemplated under Section 59 of the IPRA Law and its implementing rules.
Hence, there is no necessity to secure the CNO under Section 59 before an
ECC may be issued and the issuance of the subject ECC without first securing
the aforesaid certification does not render it invalid.

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5. The Supreme Court ruled that a CNO should have been secured prior to the
consummation of the LDA between SBMA and RP Energy. However,
considering that this is the first time we lay down the rule of action appropriate
to the application of Section 59, we refrain from invalidating the LDA due to
equitable considerations.

6. The Supreme Court ruled that the implementation of the project is not subject
to the prior approval of the concerned sanggunians, under Section 27 of the
LGC, and the SBMA’s decision to approve the project prevails over the
apparent objections of the concerned sanggunians of the LGUs, by virtue of
the clear provisions of RA 7227. Thus, there was no infirmity when the LDA
was entered into between SBMA and RP Energy despite the lack of approval
of the concerned sanggunians.

7. The appellate court correctly ruled that the issue as to the validity of the third
amendment to the ECC cannot be resolved in this case because it was not
one of the issues set during the preliminary conference, and would, thus,
violate RP Energy’s right to due process.

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People of the Philippines vs. Jimmy Gabuya y Adlawan
G.R. No. 195245, February 16, 2015

DOCTRINE: Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a
party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of an
objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on
appeal.

FACTS:
Accused Appellant was charged with violation of Sections 5 (sale of dangerous
drugs) and 11 (possession of dangerous drugs), Article II of Republic Act No. 91653
(R.A. 9165). The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of appellant
beyond reasonable doubt for the offenses charged. It found the buy-bust operation to
be valid, the warrantless arrest and body search carried out against appellant as
justified, and the testimony of PO1 Rosales to be credible. The RTC likewise held that
the prosecution was able to establish the unbroken link in the chain of custody of the
illegal drugs in both cases. The CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision.

Insisting on his acquittal, appellant interposes this appeal where he raises as additional
issues in his Supplemental Brief17 the following: (1) the failure of the police officers to
mark the seized sachets of shabu not only at the scene of the crime but also in his
presence; and (2) the lack of information on the whereabouts of the shabu after it was
examined by the Forensic Chemist, P/Insp. Calabocal, whose testimony did not cover
the manner in which the specimens were handled after the examination.

ISSUE:
Whether or not accused can raise objection to evidence for the first time on appeal.

HELD:
The records of the case are bereft of evidence that appellant, during trial, interposed
any objection to the non-marking of the seized items in his presence and the lack of
information on the whereabouts of the shabu after it was examined by P/Insp. Calabocal.
While he questioned the chain of custody before the CA, the alleged defects appellant is
now alluding to were not among those he raised on appeal. The defects he raised
before the CA were limited to the alleged lack of physical inventory, non-taking of
photographs of the seized items, and the supposed failure of the police officers to mark
the sachets of shabu at the crime scene. But even then, it was already too late in the
day for appellant to have raised the same at that point since he should have done so
early on before the RTC. It bears stressing that the Court has already brushed aside an
accused’s belated contention that the illegal drugs confiscated from his person is
inadmissible for failure of the arresting officers to comply with Section 21 of R.A. 9165.
This is considering that “[w]hatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers
from literally complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because [appellant] did not
question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Objection to evidence
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the
evidence offered, he must so state in the form of an objection. Without such objection,

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he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.” Besides and as already
mentioned, the CA has already concluded that the identity of the seized drugs was
established by the prosecution and its integrity preserved.

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People of the Philippines vs. Allan Roxas Diaz
G.R. No. 197818, February 25, 2015

DOCTRINE:Objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal. When a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so
state in the form of objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for the
first time on appeal.

FACTS:
Accused Appellant was charged with violation of Sections 5 (sale of dangerous
drugs) Article II of Republic Act No. 91653 (R.A. 9165). The RTC rendered a Decision
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The CA affirmed
the RTC’s Decision.
In this appeal, Appellant assails the trial court's assessment of the credibility of
prosecution witness PO2 Coronel. He faults the RTC in giving more faith and credit to
PO2 Coronel's testimony regarding the buy-bust operation over his defense of denial.
Appellant banks on the prosecution's alleged failure to comply with the requirements of
law with respect to the proper marking, inventory, and taking of photograph of the seized
specimen.

ISSUE:
Whether or not accused can raise objection to evidence for the first time on appeal.

HELD:
The Supreme Court noted that appellant failed to contest the admissibility in
evidence of the seized item during trial. In fact, at no instance did he manifest or even
hint that there were lapses on the part of the police officers in handling the seized item
which affected its integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to the admissibility of
evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. When a party desires the court to
reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such
objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. In this case, appellant
raised the police operatives' alleged non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 for the first time on appeal before the CA. Thus, following established
jurisprudence, the alleged flaws do not adversely affect the prosecution's case.

In any event, it is "settled that an accused may still be found guilty, despite the failure to
faithfully observe the requirements provided under Section 21 of R.A. [No.] 9165, for as
long as the chain of custody remains unbroken." Here, it is beyond cavil that the
prosecution was able to establish the necessary links in the chain of custody of the
subject specimen from the moment it was seized from appellant up to the time it was
presented during trial as proof of the corpus delicti.

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Teofilo B. Adolfo vs. Fe T. Adolfo
G.R. No. 201427, March 18, 2015

DOCTRINE: The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings, on the


one hand, and their sham or fictitious character, on the other, are what distinguish a
proper case for summary judgment from one for a judgment on the pleadings.

FACTS:
On April 4, 2004, Teofilo (Adolfo) filed with the RTC Mandaue a petition for judicial
separation of property (Civil Case No. MAN-4821) against his wife, Fe, alleging that they
bought with conjugal funds Lot 1087-A-2-E covered by TCT No. 18368 located in
Bgy.Cabancalan, Mandaue City. Alleging that they have been separated in fact and
reunion is now an impossibility due to irreconcilable differences, Adolfo prayed for
separation of property in view of the refusal of Fe to divide the lot. In her answer, Fe
alleged that the property is not conjugal, but paraphernal property belonging to her.
She narrated that the lot was a portion of a bigger lot owned by her mother Petronilla.
On October 11, 1967, her mother executed a quitclaim deed and transferred a portion of
the mother lot to her and a new title (TCT {17216}-5415 was issued in her name. She
then sold the lot to her brother, and a new title (TCT {17833}-5515) issued in her
brother’s name. Her brother then mortgaged the property to the DBP which foreclosed
the same; DBP then sold it spouses Antonio and Lucy Garcia (TCT No. 18266). On
May 25, 1983, the Garcias sold the lot to her and another title issued in the name of “FE
M. TUDTUD, x x x married to Teofilo Adolfo, which became TCT No. 18368. Fe thus
alleged that the property exclusively belongs to her and the inclusion of Teofilo’s name in
the title does not make him a co-owner but was merely used to describe her marital
status. In accordance with Article 135 all the property brought by the wife to marriage
as well as all property brought in under Art. 148 of the Civil Code constitute
paraphernalia property.

Prior to the institution of Civil Case No. MAN-4821, or in 1996, Fe’s sister Florencia and
her husband Juanito (Gingoyons) filed Civil Case No. MAN-2683 for partition with
damages, alleging that in 1988, Fe sold a 300-square meter lot portion of the lot to the
spouses Gingoyon, but that the latter refused to subdivide it. In her answer, Fe alleged
that that early as 1983 when she bought the lot from the Garcia’s, the same became
conjugal property, and the sale was made without the signature of Teofilo, hence it was
null and void. In 2002, the RTC ruled in favour of Fe and declared it conjugal property,
hence, the Gingoyons appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed thereat as C.A. G.R.
78971.

Going back to Civil Case No. MAN-4821, Teofilo filed a Request for Admission of 1) the
genuineness of the duly marked certified true copies of the Complaint, Answer, and
Decision in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 (Exhibits “F,” “G” and “H,” respectively); 2)
respondent’s declaration in said Answer that the subject property constituted conjugal
property of the marriage; and 3) the trial court’s pronouncement in said case that the
subject property forms part of the conjugal estate. Fe failed to answer the Request for
Admission, hence, Teoflio filed a motion to render judgment on the pleadings, alleging

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that since Fe failed to answer the request for admission, the matters included in the
request are deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 26, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, he is
now entitled to judgment on the pleading based on Rule 34. Fe opposed the motion,
arguing that the decision in CA.G.R. No. 78971 had not yet become final.

The case was eventually transferred to RTC Branch 55, the court which handled Civil
Case No. MAN-2683. The latter rendered judgment granting the motion by Teofilo,
treating it as a motion for summary judgment. It ruled that judicial separation was
proper, taking judicial notice of its decision in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 that the property
is conjugal property. With Fe’s failure to provide a verified answer or denial under oath to
the request for admission of the documents, she is deemed to have admitted the
genuineness of the same. It thus ordered the division of the property, with provision for
the presumptive legitime of their child, Nilo.

Fe appealed to the CA, which was docketed as C.A.G.R. No. 01783.

The Gingoyon’s appeal to the CA, (CA G.R. No. 78971) was resolved in their favour, the
CA ruling that TCT No. 18368 is paraphernalia property as established by the records
and the evidence. It became final and executory.

C.A. GR. 0783, the appeal filed by Fe on the decision granting her husband’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings and treating it as a motion for summary judgment, was
favourably acted upon by the CA. The CA held that the trial court cannot treat Adolfo’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings as one for summary judgment. It stated that in a
proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there are no ostensible issues at all on
account of the defending party’s failure to raise an issue in his answer, while in a proper
case for summary judgment, such issues exist, although they are sham, fictitious, or not
genuine as shown by affidavits, depositions or admissions. In other words, a judgment
on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, while a summary judgment is a
judgment on the facts as summarily proved by affidavits, depositions, or admissions. It
added that Fe’s Answer appeared on its face to tender an issue; it disputed petitioner’s
claim that the subject property is their conjugal property. The next thing to be
determined is whether this issue is fictitious or sham as to justify a summary judgment.
The CA added that although respondent was bound by the resulting admission prompted
by her failure to reply to petitioner’s request for admission, her claims and documentary
exhibits clearly contradict what petitioner sought to be admitted in his request; that the
trial court disregarded the fact that the issue of whether the subject property is conjugal
was still unresolved as CA-G.R. CV No. 78971 was still pending; and that finally, the trial
court should have been guided by the principles that trial courts have but limited
authority to render summary judgments and that summary judgments should not be
rendered hastily.

Teofilo assailed the CA decision to the Supreme Court via petition for review.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not summary judgment is proper in the case, considering the failure of Fe
to answer or deny under oath the Request for Admission in Civil Case No. MAN-4821.

HELD:
The Court denies the Petition. In rendering summary judgment, the trial court relied
on respondent’s failure to reply to petitioner’s request for admission, her admission in
Civil Case No. MAN-2683, as well as its May 15, 2002 Decision declaring that the
subject property is a conjugal asset. It took judicial notice of the proceedings in said
case. While there is nothing irregular with this – as courts may “take judicial notice of a
decision or the facts prevailing in another case sitting in the same court if (1) the parties
present them in evidence, absent any opposition from the other party; or (2) the court, in
its discretion, resolves to do so” – the trial court however disregarded the fact that its
decision was then the subject of a pending appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. It should
have known that until the appeal is resolved by the appellate court, it would be premature
to render judgment on petitioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings; that it would be
presumptuous to assume that its own decision would be affirmed on appeal. One of the
issues raised in the appeal is precisely whether the subject property is conjugal, or a
paraphernal asset of the respondent. Thus, instead of resolving petitioner’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings, the trial court should have denied it or held it in abeyance. It
should have guided petitioner to this end, instead of aiding in the hasty resolution of his
case. In the first place, Civil Case No. MAN-4821 was transferred to it from Branch 56
precisely for the reason that it was the court which tried the closely related Civil Case No.
MAN-2683.

Even if respondent is deemed to have admitted the matters contained in petitioner’s


request for admission by her failure to reply thereto, the trial court should have
considered the pending appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. It cannot take judicial notice
solely of the proceedings in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, and ignore the appeal in CA-G.R.
CV No. 78971. After all, CA-G.R. CV No. 78971 is merely a continuation of Civil Case
No. MAN-2683; an appeal is deemed a continuation of the same case commenced in the
lower court.

On the part of petitioner, it must be said that he could not have validly resorted to a
motion for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. While it may appear that
under Rules 34 and 35 of the 1997 Rules, he may file a motion for judgment on the
pleadings or summary judgment as a result of the consequent admission by respondent
that the subject property is conjugal, this is not actually the case. Quite the contrary, by
invoking the proceedings and decision in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, petitioner is
precluded from obtaining judgment while the appeal in said case is pending, because the
result thereof determines whether the subject property is indeed conjugal or paraphernal.
He may not preempt the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971.

While it is true that a judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the
action,petitioner cannot, after invoking the proceedings in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 to
secure affirmative relief against respondent and thereafter failing to obtain such relief, be
allowed to repudiate or question the CA’s ruling in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971. The

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principle of estoppel bars him from denying the resultant pronouncement by the
appellate court, which became final and executory, that the subject property is
respondent’s paraphernal property. “In estoppel, a person, who by his deed or conduct
has induced another to act in a particular manner, is barred from adopting an
inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct that thereby causes loss or injury to
another. It further bars him from denying the truth of a fact which has, in the
contemplation of law, become settled by the acts and proceeding of judicial or legislative
officers or by the act of the party himself, either by conventional writing or by
representations, express or implied or in pais.”

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Rosario Baguis Tambuyat vs. Wenifreda Balcom Tambuyat
G.R. No. 202805, March 23, 2015

DOCTRINE: Where a party has the means in his power of rebutting and explaining the
evidence adduced against him, if it does not tend to the truth, the omission to do so
furnishes a strong inference against him.

FACTS:
Adriano and Wenifreda (Tambuyat), married since 1965, owned several properties,
among them a parcel of lot bought by Adriano. The deed of sale was signed by Adriano
as vendee, while Rosario (Baguis) signed as one of the witnesses. When the title to the
lot was issued (TCT No. T-145321(M), however, it was registered in the name of
“ADRIANO TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E. BAGUIS”. When Adriano died
intestate in 1998, Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation of TCT T-145321, alleging
that she was the surviving spouse of Adriano; TCT T-145321 was erroneously
registered; that Rosario is married to one Eduardo Nolasco; and the registration was a
result of the insidious machination of Rosario with the assistance of the broker. She
prayed that TCT T-145321 be cancelled and a new one issued indicating her as the
spouse married to Adriano. Opposing, Rosario denied that the property was acquired
by the spouses Adriano and Wenifreda during their marriage; that it was she who bought
it using her personal funds; she and Adriano were married on September 2, 1988 and
lived together as husband and wife, producing a son named Adrian; that the trial court
had no jurisdiction over the proceeding as it is merely a summary proceeding and a
thorough determination will have to be made if the property is conjugal or personal.

After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favour of Wenifreda. It ordered the
cancellation of TCT T-145321 and issuance of a new one indicating Wenifreda as
married to Adriano, as well as the payment of damages in her favour. It ruled that
Section 108 of PD 1529 required court authorisation for any alteration or amendment if
any mistake, error or omission was made in entering a certificate of title. It was proved
that Wenifreda is the surviving spouse of Adriano; that Rosario had a prior subsisting
marriage to Nolasco, and TCT No. T-145321 was issued with her erroneously indicated
as Adriano’s spouse. Adrian’s filiation may not be proved in a land registration case.

On appeal to the CA, the later ruled that a separate and different proceeding is not
necessary to resolve her opposition to the petition in the case as she in effect
acquiesced and freely submitted her issues to the court to prove her allegations; the
distinction between the trial court sitting as a land registration court and as a general
court had been eliminated by PD 1529; Adriano and Rosario were not co-owners of the
property as both of them had prior subsisting marriages at the time of their adulterous
relations; Adriano alone was the vendee in the deed of sale and no evidence was proved
that Rosario contributed to the purchase of the property.

Rosario elevated her case to the Supreme Court. She argues that the case is
essentially a partition of Adriano’s estate which deprives her and her son of their share;
Section 108 cannot apply to the case as there were contentious issues which need to be

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resolved by a court of general jurisdiction; based on the evidence, she acquired the
property using her own funds.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in allowing the cancellation of TCT T-143521 to
indicate Wenifreda as the surviving spouse of Adriano.

HELD:
The Court denies the Petition. Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the
erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title may be resorted to in seven
instances: (1) when registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent,
expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (2) when new interests have arisen
or been created which do not appear upon the certificate; (3) when any error, omission or
mistake was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any
duplicate certificate; (4) when the name of any person on the certificate has been
changed; (5) when the registered owner has been married, or, registered as married, the
marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be
affected; (6) when a corporation, which owned registered land and has been dissolved,
has not conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; and (7) when there is
reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title. The present case falls
under (3) and (7), where the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan committed an error in issuing
TCT T-145321 in the name of “Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis”
when, in truth and in fact, respondent Wenifreda – and not Banguis – is Adriano’s lawful
spouse.

The only issue that needed to be resolved in LRC Case No. P-443-99 is – who should be
included in the title to the subject property as Adriano’s spouse, Banguis or Wenifreda?
Was there error in placing Banguis’s name in the title as Adriano’s spouse? If Banguis is
Adriano’s spouse, then there would be no need to amend or even cancel the title. On the
other hand, if Wenifreda is Adriano’s spouse, the inclusion of Banguis would then be
erroneous, and TCT T-145321 would have to be cancelled. All that is required in
resolving this issue is to determine who between them is Adriano’s spouse; it was
unnecessary for Banguis to prove that she is the actual owner of the property. Title to the
property is different from the certificate of title to it.

Nonetheless, if Banguis felt that she had to go so far as to demonstrate that she is the
true owner of the subject property in order to convince the trial court that there is no need
to cancel TCT T-145321, then she was not precluded from presenting evidence to such
effect. Understandably, with the quality of Wenifreda’s documentary and other evidence,
Banguis may have felt obliged to prove that beyond the certificate of title, she actually
owned the property. Unfortunately for her, this Court is not convinced of her claimed
ownership; the view taken by the CA must be adopted that she and Adriano could not
have been co-owners of the subject property as she failed to present sufficient proof that
she contributed to the purchase of the subject property, while the deed of sale covering
the subject property showed that Adriano alone was the vendee. This Court is not a trier
of facts, so it must rely on the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals, which are thus

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
considered conclusive and binding. Moreover, the Court notes that while Banguis
claims that she alone paid for the property using her own funds and money borrowed
from her sister, she nonetheless acknowledges that Adriano is a co-owner thereof, thus
implying that he contributed to its acquisition. Such contradictory statements cast serious
doubts on her claim; basically, if she were the sole purchaser of the property, it would
only be logical and natural for her to require that her name be placed on the deed of sale
as the vendee, and not as mere witness – which is what actually occurred in this case.
On the other hand, if Adriano contributed to its purchase, Banguis would have required
that her name be placed on the deed as a co-vendee just the same. Her failure to explain
why – despite her claims that she is the purchaser of the property – she allowed Adriano
to be denominated as the sole vendee, renders her claim of ownership doubtful. “Where
a party has the means in his power of rebutting and explaining the evidence adduced
against him, if it does not tend to the truth, the omission to do so furnishes a strong
inference against him.” One cannot also ignore the principle that “the rules of evidence in
the main are based on experience, logic, and common sense.”

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
FAJ CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, vs. SUSAN M. SAULOG,
G.R. No. 200759. March 25, 2015

DOCTRINE
Attorneys; The mistakes of counsel bind his client.

FACTS:
After several opportunities for the presentation of its first witness, petitioner failed to
proceed with trial. Its counsel moved and asked for several postponements of
trial, which the trial court granted despite respondent’s opposition. However, petitioner’s
counsel and witness failed to appear during the successive scheduled hearings,
prompting the trial court, upon respondent’s motion, to dismiss the case for failure to
prosecute.

Appellant now questions anew the propriety of the dismissal of the complaint on
ground of failure to prosecute. Appellant argues that it should not be made to suffer the
consequences of the negligence or mistakes of its counsel.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mistake of the counsel bind his client.

HELD:
Yes, Suffice it to state that we have not seen any reason to reverse the CA’s ruling on
this matter; on the other hand, the record will disclose that petitioner was itself neglectful
of its duties relative to its case, and it continued to retain the services of its counsel which
it now conveniently claims to be negligent, even after repeatedly suffering from the latter’s
claimed lack of care. It appears that despite witnessing firsthand the caliber of its lawyer
during the initial presentation of its evidence in 2003, petitioner changed counsel only
after the trial court’s January 30, 2006 Decision on respondent’s counterclaim. The
general rule still applies that the mistakes of counsel bind his client.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ROGELIO ROQUE, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 193169. April 6, 2015.

DOCTRINE:
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; The Supreme Court (SC), not being a
trier of facts, will not disturb the factual findings of the Court of Appeals (CA), unless they
were mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or
contrary to the findings reached by the court of origin.

FACTS:
Petitioner Rogelio Roque (petitioner) was charged with the crime of frustrated
homicide. RTC ruled against the petitioner prompting him to file an appeal with the CA
which affirmed the lower court’s decision. On appeal to the Supreme Court, petitioner
grounded the appeal on CA’s appreciation of evidence with regard to the presence of
unlawful aggression.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Supreme Court may reappreciate and reexamine evidence which
are evidentiary and factual in nature.

HELD:
No, Petitioner’s assigned errors, requiring as they do a reappreciation and
reexamination of the evidence, are evidentiary and factual in nature. The Petition must
therefore be denied on this basis because “one, the petition for review thereby violates
the limitation of the issues to only legal questions, and two, the Court, not being a trier of
facts, will not disturb the factual findings of the CA, unless they were mistaken, absurd,
speculative, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings
reached by the court of origin,” which was not shown to be the case here. Besides,
findings of facts of the RTC, its calibration of the testimonial evidence, its assessment of
the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on the said findings, are
accorded high respect if not conclusive effect when affirmed by the CA, as in this case.
After all, the RTC “had the opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and detect
if they were telling the truth.” “To [thus] accord with the established doctrine of finality and
bindingness of the trial court’s findings of fact, [the Court shall] not disturb [the] findings of
fact of the RTC, particularly after their affirmance by the CA” as petitioner was not able to
sufficiently establish any extraordinary circumstance which merits a departure from the
said doctrine.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
CE CASECNAN WATER AND ENERGY COMPANY, INC. VS.PROVINCE OF NUEVA
ECIJA
G.R. No. 196278. June 17, 2015

DOCTRINE:

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is required for a court to act on any controversy.

Court of Tax Appeals; the expanded jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)
includes its exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the decisions, orders or
resolutions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in local tax cases originally decided or
resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.

A certiorari petition questioning an interlocutory order issued in a local tax case falls
under the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals.

FACTS:
On June 26, 1995; Petitioner and the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) entered
into a build-operate-transfer (BOT) contract relative to the construction and development
of the Casecnan MultiPurpose Irrigation and Power Project, a combined irrigation and
hydroelectric power generation facility using the Pantabangan Dam in Nueva Ecija.
On September 29, 2003; petitioner and NIA executed a Supplemental Agreement
amending Article II of the contract which pertains to payment of taxes.It states that NIA
must reimburse petitioner for real property taxes (RPT) provided the same was paid
upon NIA’s directive and with the concurrence of the Department of Finance.
On September 6, 2005, petitioner received from the Office of the Provincial Assessor
a Notice of Assessment of Real Property dated August 2, 2005, which indicates that for
the years 2002 to 2005, its RPT due was P248,676,349.60.
After filing for an appeal with the Nueva Ecija Board, multiple demand for payment of
RPT was sent to the petitioner which the same paid under protest.
Hence, on September 23, 2008, petitioner filed with the RTC of San Jose City,
Nueva Ecija a Complaint for injunction and damages with application for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction. RTC denied petitioners request.

Petitioner filed under Rule 65 with the CA which dismissed the same contending that
since in resolving the issue of whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the issue of the validity
of the assessment and the collection of the RPT against petitioner must also be
resolved, thus jurisdiction over the case lies within the Court of Tax Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA has a jurisdiction over an interlocutory order issued by the
RTC over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the
RTC in a local tax case.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
No, It is settled that it is the CTA which has exclusive jurisdiction over a special civil
action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
With respect to the CTA, its jurisdiction was expanded and its rank elevated to that of
acollegiate court with special jurisdiction by virtue of Republic Act No. 9282. This
expanded jurisdiction of the CTA includes its exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by
appeal the decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTC in local tax cases originally
decided or resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction. the
Court ruled that the CTA likewise has the jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari or to
determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in
issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the CTA’s exclusive appellate
jurisdiction.
No doubt, the injunction case before the RTC is a local tax case. And as earlier
discussed, a certiorari petition questioning an interlocutory order issued in a local tax
case falls under the jurisdiction of the CTA. Thus, the CA correctly dismissed the Petition
for Certiorari before it for lack of jurisdiction.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
DARAGA PRESS, INC. vs. COMMISSION ONAUDIT and DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION-AUTONOMOUSREGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO
G.R. No. 201042. June 16, 2015.

DOCTRINE:
Commission on Audit; Appeals; Decisions and resolutions of the respondent
Commission on Audit (COA) may be reviewed and nullified only on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Commission on Audit; Jurisdiction; The respondent Commission on Audit (COA), as
the duly authorized agency to adjudicate money claims against government agencies
and instrumentalities, pursuant to Section 26 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1445, has
acquired special knowledge and expertise in handling matters falling under its
specialized jurisdiction.

FACTS
On November 15, 2007, pursuant to Section 196 of Republic Act No. 9401 then
Department of Budget and Management Secretary Rolando G. Andaya, Jr. requested
the respondent COA to validate and evaluate the request of then Regional Governor of
the ARMM Nur Misuari for the release of funds to cover the region’s alleged unpaid
obligation to petitioner DPI for textbooks delivered in 1998.
In response to the request, the respondent COA issued Local Government Sector
(LGS) Office Order No. 2007-058 dated December 7, 2007, creating a team of auditors
to validate and evaluate the alleged unpaid obligation.
On April 29, 2008, Assistant Commissioner Gloria S. Cornejo of the LGS issued a
Memorandum expressing serious doubts on the validity of the obligation as the actual
receipt of the subject textbooks could not be ascertained.
On September 22, 2008, petitioner DPI filed with the respondent COA a money claim
for the payment of textbooks it allegedly delivered on July 3, 1998 to the respondent. The
Fraud Audit and Investigation Office (FAIO), Legal Services Sector (LSS) conducted
further validation ofpetitioner DPI’s money claim, which yielded the same result. The
findings of the FAIO complemented and corroborated the initial observations/findings of
the audit team created under LGS Office Order No. 2007-058 datedDecember 7, 2007.
COA denied the money claim because it found no convincing proof that the subject
textbooks were delivered.
Hence, petitioner DPI filed the instant Petition raising the issue of whether the
respondent COA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the money claim on the
sole basis of sheer doubt.

ISSUE
1. Whether or not COA committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the money
claim.
2. Whether or not the decisions and resolutions of COA may be reviewed and
nullified by other grounds except for GAD.
3. Whether or not the absence of GAD renders the COA decision final.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD
1. No, Contrary to the claim of petitioner DPI, there is sufficient reason for the
respondent COA to doubt and disregard the documentary evidence presented by
petitioner DPI as the FAIO found inconsistencies, discrepancies, and inaccuracies in the
dates and figures stated in the documents provided for investigation.
2. No, Decisions and resolutions of the respondent COA may be reviewed and
nullified only on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion exists when there is an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as
when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim,
and despotism.
3. Yes, In the absence of grave abuse of discretion, the factual findings of the
respondent COA, which are undoubtedly supported by the evidence on record, must be
accorded great respect and finality. The respondent COA, as the duly authorized agency
to adjudicate money claims against government agencies and instrumentalities,
pursuant to Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, has acquired special knowledge
and expertise in handling matters falling under its specialized jurisdiction. And as we
have often said: It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of
administrative authorities, especially one that was constitutionally created like herein
respondent COA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers, but also
of their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. It is, in fact, an
oft-repeated rule that findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect
but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or
arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.ALLAN BRITANICO and JOJO BRITANICO
G.R. No. 201836. June 22, 2015.

DOCTRINE
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; It is a settled principle that people react
differently when confronted with a startling and dangerous experience.

FACTS
Respondents in the case were charged with murder of Segundo belmonte after they
allegedly conspired to kill the latter, with the use of bladed weapons, with treachery and
evident premeditation, hacking him several times hitting him on different parts of his
body, resulting in his instantaneous death.
On December 7, 2009, the RTC rendered its Judgment finding appellants guilty as
charged. The court a quo lent credence to the eyewitness account of Rolando Toralde
(Rolando) who narrated that in the afternoon of August 23, 2003, he was on his way to
the house of his uncle, Segundo. However, when he was about to pass by the house of
Francisco, he saw the latter and his sons, Rolly, Allan, and Jojo, hack Segundo with the
use of bladed weapons. Fearingfor his life, he hid in the grassy portion for about 10
minutes. Upon seeing his uncle fall to the ground, Rolando left and immediately informed
his cousin, Alma, about the misfortune that befell her father. When placed on the witness
stand, Alma testified that it was Rolando whoinformed her about the hacking incident.
She claimed that Francisco is her uncle, being the brother of her mother, while Jojo,
Allan and Rolly are her cousins
CA affirmed in full the ruling of the trial court. Appelants question the same based on
the witness' inconsistencies and improbabilities; they claimed that the trial court erred in
lending credence to the narration of Rolando as the same was fraught with
inconsistencies and improbabilities. They contended that it was unnatural for Rolando to
simply watch for 10 minutes while his uncle was being hacked to death. They believed
that when faced with such situation, Rolando would naturally shout to distract his uncle’s
assailants or to seek help. Moreover, they insisted that Rolando should have
immediately reported the incident to the authorities, and not just to his cousin, Alma.
Further, the number of wounds sustained by the victim did not tally with the number of
blows supposedly delivered by the assailants as testified to by Rolando. Hence this
petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in lending credence to the narration of Rolando as the
same was fraught with inconsistencies and improbabilities.

HELD
No, It is a settled principle that people react differently when confronted with a
startling and dangerous experience. For example, a person who witnessed a hacking
incident may faint, act with nonchalance, or may hide out of fear for his life; on the other
hand, he may also act with bravery by coming to the aid and succor of the victim, most
especially if the latter is a relative; or he may act cautiously and seek the help of other
people. The list is not all-encompassing because people do not act similarly to a given

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 306
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
situation. Hence, we do not find it unnatural, as the appellants claim, for Rolando to hide
in the grassy area upon witnessing the hacking of his uncle, Segundo, by the appellants.
Rolando also admitted that he got scared which is also a reasonable and logical reaction
to such a startling event.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 307
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HERMIE OLARTE y TARUG, and RUBEN OLAVARIO y MAUNAO vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 197731. July 6, 2015

DOCTRINE: Suffice it to state that the errors raised by the petitioners are all
“appreciation of evidence” errors or factual errors which are not within the province of a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

FACTS:
The victim Eugene M. Villostas (Villostas) was fetched by his half-brother, Charlie
Penilla (Penilla), from a drinking session. On their way home, Villostas decided to buy
cigarettes from a nearby videoke bar at Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela City. Inside the bar,
however, three men who belonged to a group then singing and drinking suddenly
stabbed him on different parts of his body. They only stopped when bystanders started
throwing stones at them. This whole incident was witnessed by Penilla who was then
only seven to eight arms length away from the crime scene. Barangay tanods
immediately responded and brought the malefactors to the Barangay Hall where they
were later identified.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City, Branch 172, rendered its
Decision finding petitioners guilty as charged.
Petitioners questioned the credibility of prosecution witnesses. They pointed out
inconsistencies in their testimonies respecting the victim’s degree of intoxication at the
time of the incident, the kind or brand of liquor that he imbibed, and the length of time
that he had been drinking immediately prior thereto. Petitioners argued that such
inconsistencies rendered doubtful their identification as the culprits by said prosecution
witnesses. The CA, in its Decision, debunked petitioners’ arguments as it found the
inconsistencies pointed out by them as relating to mere minor details. On the other hand,
it found no cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court as regards
petitioners’ culpability.

ISSUE:
Whether the petition that requires appreciation and reexamination of trial evidence
will prosper
HELD:.
The Court had already explained in Batistis v. People that: Pursuant to Section 3,
Rule 122, and Section 9, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court, the review on appeal of a
decision in a criminal case, wherein the CA imposes a penalty other than death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, is by petition for review on certiorari. A petition
for review on certiorari raises only questions of law. The assigned errors, requiring as
they do a re-appreciation and reexamination of the trial evidence, are evidentiary and
factual in nature. The petition must therefore be denied on this basis because “one, the
petition for review thereby violates the limitation of the issues to only legal questions, and
two, the Court, not being a trier of facts, will not disturb the factual findings of the CA,
unless they were mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, or contrary to the findings reached by the court of origin,” which was not
shown to be the case here.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JOSE YULO AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES PERLA CABAYLO
DAVIS AND SCOTT DAVIS
G.R. No. 197709, August 03, 2015

DOCTRINE:The general rule is that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not
raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law,
theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to
be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly would amount to
trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process.

FACTS:
Respondents received separate demand letters from petitioner and the Trajeras
requiring them to remove a portion of the Gabayeron home and fence which they claim
encroached upon their respective properties.
Respondents filed a case for quieting of title and damages against the petitioners before
the RTC. The court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs (respondents) and
against the defendants (petitioners) confirming plaintiffs’ title to Lot No. 92.
Petitioner and the Trajeras interposed an appeal before the CA. The CA issued its
Decision affirming the RTC’s judgment, denying the appeal. Petitioner filed its Motion for
Reconsideration, which the CA denied.
Petitioner argues that respondents were not buyers in good faith as they did not cause
the survey of the properties at the time they bought the same; that had they inspected
the properties and gone beyond the titles thereto prior to the sale, they would have
discovered that the house and fence encroached upon adjacent lots.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue in their Comment that the Petition requires a
reevaluation of the evidence, which is proscribed by Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure; that in raising the issue of good faith, the petitioner questions the findings of
fact of the CA which, as far as this Court is concerned, are final; and that given the
unanimous conclusion arrived at by the trial and appellate courts, there is no reason to
review their findings of fact and law.

ISSUE:
Whether the petition which requires a reevaluation of the evidence may prosper.

HELD:
A petition to review the decision of the CA is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion. It has been repeatedly held that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought
before it from the CA is limited to reviewing errors of law; findings of fact of the appellate
court are conclusive upon this Court, as it is not its function to analyze and weigh the
evidence all over again. There are recognized exceptions to the rule, however, such as:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the CA
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record; or (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.
However, petitioner has not shown that this case falls under any of the above
exceptions. Thus, the petition was DENIED.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 310
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
TEDDY MARAVILLA vs. JOSEPH RIOS
G.R. No. 196875, August 19, 2015

DOCTRINE: Even though petitioner exercises the initiative to select what will be
attached to his Petition for Review, it is the CA that ultimately determines the sufficiency
of these attachments. In this case, the insufficiency of the supporting documents coupled
with the unjustified refusal of the petitioner to even attempt to substantially comply with
the attachment requirement justified the dismissal of his petition.

FACTS:
Respondent Joseph Rios filed a criminal case against petitioner Teddy Maravilla for
reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries. Respondent accused
petitioner of recklessly driving his jeep which caused it to collide with the motorcycle he
(respondent) was then driving; as a result, respondent was injured and incapacitated to
work for more than ninety days.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CA. As viewed, the instant petition is
defective in substance:
a. It failed to incorporate a written explanation why the preferred personal
mode of filing under Section 11, Rule 13, Revised Rules of Court, was not
availed of;chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
b. Some relevant and pertinent pleadings and documents, which are
necessary for a better understanding and resolution of the instant petition,
were not attached therein, in violation of Section 2(d), Rule 429 of the
Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
i. Copy of the information filed before the municipal trial court;
ii. Copy of the appellant's brief filed before the RTC;
iii. Copy of the appellee's brief, if any;
iv. Other pieces of evidence/documents adduced before the lower
court.

While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that the rules of procedure
should not be strictly enforced at the cost of substantial justice, this does not mean that
the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly
presentation and assessment of the issues and their just resolution. Justice eschews
anarchy.

Thus, for failure of the petitioner to comply with pertinent provisions of the Rules, the
petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration invoking liberal application of procedural laws, but
in its second assailed Resolution, the CA stood its ground.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for review under rule
42 due to the technicalities.

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HELD:
NO. We (SC) cannot agree with the petitioner's arrogant but unworthy proposition.
Instead of manifesting that he would submit the additional documentary evidence, the
petitioner remained [adamant] in his stand not to submit the additional pleadings and
other material portions of the record. He maintained that what he has submitted based
on his discretion, are all that are necessary to support his allegations in his petition. As
we have already mentioned, the accompanying documents were insufficient to support
the petition. Also, the petitioner could have easily ended his debacle by merely attaching
the supplemental documents in his Motion for Reconsideration. Instead, the petitioner
stubbornly chose to insist that this Court direct the elevation of the records of the case if
we deem that the relevant documents were not appended to the petition.

It is not disputed that it is petitioner who knows best what pleadings or material portions
of the record of the case would support the allegations in the petition. Petitioner's
discretion in choosing the documents to be attached to the petition is however not
unbridled. The CA has the duty to check the exercise of this discretion, to see to it that
the submission of supporting documents is not merely perfunctory. The practical aspect
of this duty is to enable the CA to determine at the earliest possible time the existence
of prima facie merit in the petition. Moreover, Section 3 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court
provides that if petitioner fails to comply with the submission of "documents which should
accompany the petition," it "shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof." In this
case, the insufficiency of the supporting documents combined with the unjustified refusal
of petitioner to even attempt to substantially comply with the attachment requirement
justified the dismissal of [his] petition.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by thePHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENTADMINISTRATION (POEA), petitioner, vs.
PRINCIPALIAMANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL CONSULTANTS,INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 198426. September 2, 2015

DOCTRINE:While “[w]ellentrenched is the rule that courts will not interfere in matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with
the regulation of activities coming under the special and technical training and
knowledge of such agency,” it is not entirely correct to say that an action by an
administrative agency, such as in the case at bar, cannot be questioned in an injunction
suit. It has been held that “[c]ourts cannot enjoin an agency from performing an act within
its prerogative, except when in the exercise of its authority it gravely abused or exceeded
its jurisdiction.” Indeed, administrative decisions on matters within the executive
jurisdiction can be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law,
and in such cases, injunction may be granted.

FACTS:
In the Order respondent Principalia Management andPersonnel Consultants, Inc.
(Principalia), a recruitmentagency, was found by the POEA to have collected
fromcomplainant Alejandro Ramos an excessive placement fee.

Two days later Principalia soughtto stay the implementation of the June 8, 2009
POEAOrder by filing aComplaint for Injunction with Application for Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ ofPreliminary Prohibitory and
Mandatory Injunction. Itcontended that the immediate cancellation of its license notonly
deprived it of due process but also jeopardized thedeployment of hundreds of overseas
Filipino workers. Court issued 72 hour TRO.

POEA filed with the RTC a Motion toDismiss12 based on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction,failure to exhaust administrative remedies and forumshopping. According to
it, (1) it is the DOLE Secretary andnot the RTC which has jurisdiction over cases
assailingPOEA Orders which direct the cancellation of license of arecruitment agency;
(2) assuming that the RTC hasjurisdiction, Principalia nevertheless failed to
exhaustadministrative remedies since it failed to first seekrecourse from the DOLE; and
(3) Principalia committedforum shopping when it also later appealed

RTC ruled that the case falls under the exception tothe rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies since itappears that Principalia may suffer irreparable damage
asa result of the immediate cancellation of its license. there is no forum shopping
because there is neitheridentity of parties nor identity of relief between the injunction
case and the appealbefore the DOLE. Hence, the RTC denied the said motion. Republic,
through the POEA, questioned byway of Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. the CA
stoodits ground by denying the Republic’s Motion forReconsideration. However, on May
22, 2013, Principalia, filed a Motion toDismiss (With Leave of Court)19 before the RTC. It
averredthat due to the length of time that the case has beenpending, it is no longer
interested in pursuing the same.Aside from this, Principalia believed that the

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issuesinvolved in this case have already become moot andacademic in view of the
subsequent renewal of its license.

Parties Arguments: Principalia, aside from refuting the substantialarguments of the


Republic, asserts that the presentPetition is already moot and academic. This is in view
ofthe fact that its 2007 license which was ordered cancelledby the POEA had already
long expired and in fact has beenrenewed by the POEA many times over. Principalia
thusasserts that a ruling on this Petition will no longer be of
practical value considering that the subject matter thatPrincipalia then sought to enjoin
was the immediateenforcement of the POEA Order cancelling its 2007 license.

The Republic, on the other hand, argues that therenewal of Principalia’s license does not
bar this Courtfrom ruling on the matters raised in the Petition. Evenassuming that the
Petition has indeed become moot andacademic, the case at bench falls under the
exceptions thatauthorize courts to pass upon questions that are alreadymoot. To further
convince the Court, the Republic aversthat in view of the plethora of pending similar
cases thatseek injunction from regular courts, the resolution of theinstant Petition is
necessary in settling once and for allwhich between the DOLE Secretary and the RTC
hasjurisdiction over actions assailing a POEA Order thatinvolves immediate enforcement
of penalties for seriousoffenses such as cancellation of license. The Republiclikewise
buttresses its other arguments that Principaliafailed to exhaust administrative remedies
when it directlyfiled the injunction case with the RTC and that itcommitted forum-
shopping.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC is bereft of jurisdiction to entertain the injunction case against the
Order of POEA which has original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all
pre-employment cases.

HELD:
Anent the failure of Principalia to observe the principleof exhaustion of administrative
remedies, suffice it to saythat this principle admits of exceptions,38 and
notably,Principalia raised one of these exceptions, i.e., deprivation of dueprocess, as an
issue in its suit. And since this issue is aquestion of fact which the Court can only
determine afterthe trial is had, the RTC was correct in not dismissing thecase and in
allowing the same to proceed to trial.Significantly, this likewise goes true with respect to
themain relief for injunction. As the elements for its issuance,i.e., (1) there must be a
right to be protected; and (2) theacts against which the injunction is to be directed
areviolative of said right,39 are matters that must be provedduring trial, the RTC merely
acted in its judicial spherewhen it proceeded to try the case.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented byCommander Raymond Alpuerto
of the Naval Base CamilloOsias, Port San Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan, petitioner,
vs.REV. CLAUDIO R. CORTEZ, SR., respondent.
G.R. No. 197472. September 7, 2015

DOCTRINE:“An inalienable public land cannot be appropriated and thus may not be the
proper object of possession. Hence, injunction cannot be issued in order to protect ones
alleged right of possession over the same.”

FACTS:
Respondent Rev. Claudio R. Cortez, Sr. (Rev. Cortez), amissionary by vocation
engaged in humanitarian andcharitable activities, established an orphanage and
schoolin Cagayan.He claimed that since 1962, he has been inpeaceful possession of
about 50 hectares of land located inthe western portion of Palaui Island. With the help of
Aetas and others, cleared and developed foragricultural purposes in order to support his
charitable,humanitarian and missionary works.

President Ferdinand E. Marcos issuedProclamation No. 201 reserving for military


purposes aparcel of the public domain situated in Palaui Island. More than two decades
later President Fidel V. Ramos declared Palaui Island and the surrounding
waterssituated in the Municipality of Sta. Ana, Cagayan as marine reserve.

Rev. Cortez filed a Petition forInjunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction5 against Rogelio C.Biñas (Biñas) in his capacity as
Commanding Officer of thePhilippine Naval Command.

Rev. Cortez and his men were constrained toleave the area. In view of these, Rev.
Cortez filed the saidPetition with the RTC seeking preliminary mandatoryinjunction
ordering Biñas to restore to him possession andto not disturb the same, and further, for
the saidpreliminary writ, if issued, to be made permanent. Petition was granted.
However, the samepertained to five hectares (subject area) only, not to thewhole 50
hectares claimed to have been occupied by Rev.Cortez because the last 38 years
cannot reasonably be determined or accurately identified the land area.

Even so, [Rev. Cortez] failed to present in evidence the application for patent allegedly
filed by [him] showing that he applied for patent on the entire 50 hectares of land which
he possessed or occupied for a long period of time. Under the circumstances, therefore,
the title of petitioner to the 50 hectares of land in Palaui Island remains unclear and
doubtful, and [is] seriously disputed by the government.

More significantly, at the time that Proc. No. 201 was issued on May 22, 1967, [Rev.
Cortez] has not perfected his right over the 50 hectares of land nor acquired any vested
right thereto considering that he only occupied the land as alleged by him in 1962 or
barely five (5) years before the issuance of the Presidential Proclamation. Proclamation
No. 201 had the effect of removing Palaui Island from the alienable or disposable portion

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of the public domain and therefore the island, as of the date of [the] issuance [of the
proclamation], has ceased to be disposable public land.

RTC rendered its Decisionmaking the injunction final and permanent. In so ruling,
the said court made reference to the Indigenous Peoples’ [Right] Act(IPRA).

In its brief, 16 the OSG pointed out that Rev. Cortezadmitted during trial that he filed the
Petition forinjunction on behalf of the indigenous cultural communitiesin Palaui Island
and not in his capacity as pastor ormissionary of the Church of the Living God. He
alsoclaimed that he has no interest over the land. Based onthese admissions, the OSG
argued that the Petition shouldhave been dismissed outright for not being the real
party-in-interest.

CA upheld theRTC’s issuance of a final injunction. Finally, withrespect to the RTC’s


mention of the IPRA, the CA found thesame to be a mere obiter dictum.

ISSUE: Whether Rev. Cortez is entitled to a:


(1) Preliminary mandatory injunction
(2) Final writ of mandatory injunction.

HELD:
(1) YES. The main action for injunction is distinct from theprovisional or ancillary
remedy of preliminaryinjunction.” A preliminary injunction does not determinethe merits
of a case or decide controverted facts. Since itis a mere preventive remedy, it only seeks
to preventthreatened wrong, further injury and irreparable harm orinjustice until the rights
of the parties are settled. “It isusually granted when it is made to appear that there is
asubstantial controversy between the parties and one ofthem is committing an act or
threatening the immediatecommission of an act that will cause irreparable injury
ordestroy the status quo of the controversy before a fullhearing can be had on the merits
of the case.” Apreliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an actionor proceeding
prior to judgment or final order. For its issuance,the applicant is required to show, at least
tentatively, thathe has a right which is not vitiated by any substantialchallenge or
contradiction. Simply stated, the applicantneeds only to show that he has the ostensible
right to thefinal relief prayed for in his complaint. On the otherhand, the main action for
injunction seeks a judgment thatembodies a final injunction. A final injunction is
onewhich perpetually restrains the party or person enjoinedfrom the commission or
continuance of an act, or in case ofmandatory injunctive writ, one which confirms
thepreliminary mandatory injunction. It is issued when thecourt, after trial on the merits,
is convinced that theapplicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained
ofpermanently enjoined. Otherwise stated, it is only afterthe court has come up with a
definite pronouncementrespecting an applicant’s right and of the act violative ofsuch
right, based on its appreciation of the evidencepresented, that a final injunction is issued.
To be a basis fora final and permanent injunction, the right and the actviolative thereof
must be established by the applicant withabsolute certainty.

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(2) No. “Two requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1)there must be a right
to be protected and (2) the actsagainst which the injunction is to be directed are
violativeof said right.” Thus, it is necessary that the Courtinitially determine whether
the right asserted by Rev.Cortez indeed exists. As earlier stressed, it is necessarythat
such right must have been established by him withabsolute certainty.

Here, the Court notes that while Rev. Cortez reliesheavily on his asserted right of
possession, he,nevertheless, failed to show that the subject area overwhich he has a
claim is not part of the public domain andtherefore can be the proper object of
possession.

In this case, there is no such proof showing that thesubject portion of Palaui Island has
been declared alienable and disposable when Rev. Cortez started to occupy the
same. Hence, it must be considered as still inalienablepublic domain. Being such, it
cannot be appropriated andtherefore not a proper subject of possession under Article530
of the Civil Code. Viewed in this light, Rev. Cortez’claimed right of possession has no leg
to stand on.

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that Rev. Cortezfailed to conclusively establish
his claimed right over thesubject portion of Palaui Island as would entitle him to
theissuance of a final injunction.

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INC SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC., INTERORIENT NAVIGATION COMPANY LTD. AND
REYNALDO RAMIREZv.RANULFO CAMPOREDONDO
G.R. No. 199931, September 07, 2015

DOCTRINE: It is axiomatic that this Court is not a trier of facts; it reviews only
questions of law. As such, in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may
be raised. This rule, nevertheless, admits of exceptions, as in this case where the factual
findings of the LA and the CA, on one hand, and the NLRC, on the other, are at odds.
There being contradictory findings of facts, the Court deigns it right to evaluate the
pieces of evidence adduced by the parties and draw conclusions from them.
FACTS:
Ranulfo Camporedondo was hired by INC Shipmanagement, Inc as its chief cook on
board the vessel M/V Fortunia for a period of 10 months with a monthly salary of
US$578.50 and allowance of US$80.00.
As chief cook, respondent's tasks included food preparation and meals of the ship crew,
custody, inventory, and budgeting of food supplies of the vessel. 10Allegedly, keeping in
mind his duties, respondent inquired from the captain the budget for the vessel; he also
reported to the latter the insufficiency and poor quality of some of the supplies. These
inquiries enraged the captain. As a result, he reprimanded respondent on a daily basis.
Respondent stated that on September 11, 2007, the captain gave him a return ticket to
the Philippines to take a vacation. He was purportedly promised to be transferred to
another vessel. On September 12, 2007 or about a month and a half into his contract,
respondent was given a report13 of dismissal, which he refused to accept.
On August 27, 2008, respondent filed a Complaint15 for illegal dismissal, non-payment of
overtime pay and attorney's fees against INC, Interorient and Reynaldo Elamirez,
corporate officer of INC
The LA rendered a Decision declaring that petitioners illegally dismissed respondent.
The NLRC, however, ruled against the respondent stating that it was convinced that
respondent's performance as chief cook was below the company's standard. Further, It
declared that the delay in filing the case proved the weakness of respondent's claim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case can be elevated to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for
certiorari, considering that the factual findings of the LA and the CA, on one hand, and
the NLRC, on the other, are at odds.
HELD:
It is axiomatic that this Court is not a trier of facts; it reviews only questions of law.
As such, in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be raised. This

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rule, nevertheless, admits of exceptions, as in this case where the factual findings of the
LA and the CA, on one hand, and the NLRC, on the other, are at odds. There being
contradictory findings of facts, the Court deigns it right to evaluate the pieces of evidence
adduced by the parties and draw conclusions from them.

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PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC/NORWEGIAN CREW
MANAGEMENTv.JULIA T. ALIGWAY (AS SUBSTITUTE FOR HER DECEASED
HUSBAND, DEMETRIO ALIGWAY, JR.
G.R. No. 201793, September 16, 2015

DOCTRINE:As a rule, in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law can be raised and be reviewed by this Court. However, this rule admits
of exceptions and one such exception is where the Court may make its own evaluation of
the evidence adduced by the parties because the factual findings of the tribunals or
courts a quo are in conflict with each other.
FACTS:
On November 25, 2008, the Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTC), for and in
behalf of its foreign principal, the Norwegian Crew Management (NCM), employed
Demetrio as chief cook on board the vessel Amasis. Demetrio's employment contract
was for nine months with a monthly salary of US$758.00.
Demetrio alleged that prior to his deployment, he underwent pre-employment medical
examination (PEME) and was declared fit to work. Thereafter, while aboard the vessel,
he suffered from "vomiting, anorexia, weight loss, and palpitations followed by dizziness
and a feeling of lightheadedness." As a result, on April 22, 2009, he was medically
repatriated.
Consequently, Demetrio filed a Complaint13 dated January 22, 2010 for disability
benefits, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees against the PTC, the NCM,
and their officers. He alleged that his work as chief cook, which involved food intake,
contributed to or aggravated his gastric cancer. He claimed that although the cause of
gastric cancer was unknown, there was speculation that smoked food may be promoting
factors.
The LA rendered a Decision dismissing the Complaint for lack of merit. The LA held that
the company-designated physician declared that Demetrio's illness was not
work-related; and that because of this, the burden fell on the latter to disprove the finding
of the company-designated doctor. The LA ruled that Demetrio failed to discharge this
burden because he adduced no evidence proving that his work increased the risk of
contracting stomach cancer.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Decision of the LA.It gave credence to the medical
opinion of the company-designated physician. It opined that aside from bare allegations,
Demetrio adduced no competent evidence to prove that his stomach cancer was caused
or aggravated by the working conditions on the vessel.
The CA decreed that the LA and the NLRC improperly relied on the findings of the
company-designated physician. It held that said doctor merely referred to medical
literature to explain Demetrio's condition without personally examining him; that Dr.

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Salvador did not discuss how Demetrio's work and working environment could have
caused or aggravated his illness; that the opinion of Dr. Salvador lacked accuracy and
was hypothetical, if not purely academic; and that Dr. Salvador was not Demetrio's
original attending physician.

In conclusion, the CA held that the presumption of compensability prevails and that
Demetrio is entitled to full disability benefits pursuant to the CBA.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in holding that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying Demetrio's appeal and in affirming the dismissal of the complaint for lack of
merit.
RULING:
As a rule, in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions
of law can be raised and be reviewed by this Court. However, this rule admits of
exceptions and one such exception is where the Court may make its own evaluation of
the evidence adduced by the parties because the factual findings of the tribunals or
courts a quo are in conflict with each other. In this case, the LA, as affirmed by the
NLRC, found that Demetrio was not entitled to disability benefits, among other claims,
and dismissed his complaint for lack of merit. The CA ruled otherwise. Thus, because of
the conflicting findings of fact of the LA and NLRC, on one hand, and of the CA, on the
other, this Court has to exercise its mandated authority to examine the evidence on
record.

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EDILBERTO P. ETOM, JR.v.AROMA LODGING HOUSE THROUGH EDUARDO G. LEM,
PROPRIETOR AND GENERAL MANAGER
G.R. No. 192955, November 09, 2015

DOCTRINE: As a rule, the perfection of appeal within the period required by law is mandatory
and jurisdictional. Failure to appeal within such period results in the assailed decision becoming
final and executory. As regards a motion for reconsideration of a decision of the NLRC, the
same must be filed within 10 days from the receipt of the assailed decision. It must,
nevertheless, be emphasized that the NLRC is not bound by the technical rules of procedure.
Thus, in deciding labor cases, the NLRC is allowed to liberally apply its rules.

FACTS:
This case stemmed from a complaint dated April 15, 2008 filed by petitioner against Aroma
Lodging House (respondent) for illegal dismissal and money claims. Petitioner alleged that
respondent, a business engaged in providing affordable lodging,9 employed him as roomboy in
1997 with a monthly salary of P2,500.00. He averred that his working hours were from 5:00 a.m.
to 11:00 p.m. from Monday to Saturday, including holidays. His tasks included cleaning the
lodging house and washing towels and bedsheets.
Petitioner claimed that on February 4, 2008, respondent refused to allow him to report for work.
Petitioner argued that respondent did not inform him of any violation that would warrant his
dismissal. He also claimed that he was not given an opportunity to explain and answer any
imputation against him by his employer.
On August 20, 2008, the LA rendered a Decision18 finding petitioner to have been legally
dismissed. In its April 30, 2009 Decision,23 the NLRC affirmed the ruling of the LA but deleted
the award of punitive damages.
The NLRC concurred with the LA ruling that petitioner was underpaid considering that he was
receiving only P2,500.00 as monthly salary. It decreed that petitioner was entitled to receive
salary differential amounting to P166,080.38 for three years computed from February 20, 2005
to February 20, 2008 less 10% thereof for the facilities provided by respondent.
On June 30, 2009, the NLRC denied respondent's motion for reconsideration.
Undaunted, respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari insisting that petitioner was not
entitled to salary differential, 13th month pay and holiday pay because he admitted in an affidavit
that he had been receiving wages and other benefits in accordance with law. It also
asseverated that it was exempt from Minimum Wage Law since it had no more than 10
employees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a grave error when it concluded that the
respondent’s motion for reconsideration was not filed out of time.

HELD:
As a rule, the perfection of appeal within the period required by law is mandatory and
jurisdictional. Failure to appeal within such period results in the assailed decision becoming final
and executory. As regards a motion for reconsideration of a decision of the NLRC, the same
must be filed within 10 days from the receipt of the assailed decision. It must, nevertheless, be

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
emphasized that the NLRC is not bound by the technical rules of procedure. Thus, in deciding
labor cases, the NLRC is allowed to liberally apply its rules.
In this case, petitioner alleges that the subject motion for reconsideration was filed beyond the
10-day reglementary period. However, we note the explanation made by respondent for the
seeming late filing of its motion to wit:
x x x [I]t is public knowledge that May 23, 2009 happens to be a Saturday, hence, under
established rules and relevant jurisprudence, the filing of petitioners' (herein respondent) Motion
for Reconsideration should be on May 25, 2009, the next working day after May 23, 2009. On
May 25, 2009, Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration before the public respondent,
however, through a glitch in the docket machine date and time puncher of the NLRC at that date
and hour, the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration date of filing was erroneously marked and
stamped as May 26, 2009 1:47 A.M. Petitioners only managed to take notice of the mistake in
the date and time of the docket of their Motion for Reconsideration on the following day, May 26,
2009, the real May 26, 2009. Petitioners thence quickly went to the NLRC Docket Section to
report the mistake and x x x was [sic] told by the Docket Section Personnel that they have
already corrected the erroneous date and time of petitioners' docketed Motion for
Reconsideration to the x x x correct May 25, 2009, 1:47 P.M. and have forwarded the Motion for
Reconsideration of the [petitioners to the NLRC x x x Indeed, it would be plainly absurd for a
government office docket section like that of the public respondent NLRC to be open for
business at such unholy hour of 1:47 A.M. x x x
Based on the foregoing explanation, we are convinced that respondent timely filed its motion for
reconsideration of the NLRC Decision. In fact, the NLRC took cognizance of it and decided the
motion on the merit.
In any event, we held in Opinaldo v. Ravina43 that the NLRC may liberally apply its rules and
decide a motion for reconsideration on the merits. We upheld the liberal application by the
NLRC of its technical rules to resolve the issues on the merits because "a full resolution of the
case on the merits is the more palpable explanation for the liberal application of its rules."

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 323
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
NICANOR PINLAC Y RESOLMEv.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 197458, November 11, 2015

DOCTRINE: It must be stressed that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The issue raised by petitioner as well as his arguments
pertains to factual findings which are not within the ambit of a petition for review. Our ruling in
Ortega v.People is pertinent: "The petition being a petition for review, the jurisdiction of this Court
is confined to reviewing questions of law."

FACTS:
The prosecution established that on the evening of March 9, 1997, "AAA,"3 a 14-year old
boy, went with petitioner to the Kale Beach Resort in Subic, Olongapo City for initiation rites in a
fraternity founded by the latter. After succumbing to petitioner's "persuasion" to drink alcohol and
smoke marijuana, "AAA" lost control of himself ("nawala ako sa sarili"). While in a daze, stupor,
or near total unconsciousness, petitioner isolated "AAA" from his companions and other
fraternity recruits, forcibly disrobed "AAA", and performed oral sex on him by sucking his penis
until he ejaculated. The following day or on March 10, 1997, petitioner again performed oral sex
on "AAA" after convincing him anew to ingest alcohol and to smoke marijuana.
In a Decision dated January 6, 2010, it found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
having violated Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, thus:
On the basis of the foregoing evidence presented, the Court finds and so holds that the
prosecution has presented the required evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt [of] [violation of Section 05 (b) of Article III of Republic Act 7610.
Dismissing petitioner's arguments, the CA held that the government's case was erected upon
actual, incontrovertible facts which proved beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner did in fact
commit the crime set forth under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 i.e., performing lascivious
acts upon a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse, and that the child-victim,
in this case "AAA" as clearly and specifically spelled out in the trial court's discussion, was below
18 years of age

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in its finding of facts and hence, can be the subject of a petition
for review.

HELD:
It must be stressed that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review filed
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The issue raised by petitioner as well as his arguments
pertains to factual findings which are not within the ambit of a petition for review. Our ruling in
Ortega v.People is pertinent: "The petition being a petition for review, the jurisdiction of this Court
is confined to reviewing questions of law."
In any event, we find no cogent reason to set aside the findings of the trial court which were
affirmed by the CA. After a thorough review of the records of this case, we find that the CA
Decision squares with the evidence and with the law as well as with the jurisprudential doctrines
laid down by this Court. Both the RTC of Olongapo City, Branch 72 and the CA reached the
correct conclusion that petitioner was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having violated
Section 5(b), Article in of RA 7610. We find, as did the RTC and the CA, that the State had

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
satisfactorily established the following elements constitutive of the offense charged: "(1) the
accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is
performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse; and (3) the child,
whether male or female, is below 18 years of age."17 In this case "AAA" was 14 years and eight
months old when he was subjected to sexual abuse by the herein petitioner on March 9 and 10,
1997. This Court thus finds no reversible error in the assailed Decision.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 325
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ABNER MANGUBATv.BELEN MORGA-SEVA
G.R. No. 202611, November 23, 2015

DOCTRINE:It must be stressed that the remedy of annulment of judgment is only available
under certain exceptional circumstances as this is adverse to the concept of immutability of final
judgments. Hence, it is allowed only on two grounds, i.e., extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

FACTS:
Spouses Gaudencio and Aurelia Mangubat filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with
Damages against respondent Belen Morga-Seva (Belen) and two other defendants and were
able to obtain a favorable judgment from the RTC. Since Belen and her co-defendants' appeal
to the CA and later to this Court were both unsuccessful, the RTC Decision became final and
executory.
On September 3, 1998, Gaudencio and his children as heirs (the heirs) of the deceased Aurelia
filed with the same court a Complaint for Revival of the Decision. They averred that the writ of
execution could not be implemented because Belen and her co-defendants evaded service
thereof. And since five years had already lapsed from the date of its entry, Gaudencio and the
heirs prayed for the revival of the RTC Decision.
Subsequently, Gaudencio and Belen entered into a compromise agreement to the effect that all
claims and counterclaims that the parties may have against each other are hereby waived.
Such agreement was approved by the RTC and on February 23, 2001 rendered a Decision in
accordance therewith. Upon its finality, the Writ of Execution was ordered issued by the said
court.
On June 24, 2002, Abner, on his own behalf, moved to substitute his father Gaudencio who died
on January 31, 2002. Consequently and purportedly in behalf of all the heirs, Abner, through
Atty. Vista-Gumba, filed a Motion to Declare the Amicable Settlement Null and Void. It was
alleged therein that Gaudencio acted only on his own behalf when he entered into the
compromise agreement with Belen, hence, the same is null and void for want of consent and
participation of the heirs who were indispensable parties.
On September 21, 2010, Abner filed a Petition for Annulment of Final Order with the CA. He
contended that under the Compromise Agreement, Belen was supposed to make her payment
on or before June 30, 2001. However, the same was made only on December 18, 2003 or way
beyond the period agreed upon. Thus to Abner, it was unjust for the RTC to have issued its
September 25, 2006 Order divesting the heirs of ownership of the subject property. Moreover,
Abner argued that since the February 23, 2001 RTC Decision approving the Compromise
Agreement had long become final and executory, the RTC had already lost its jurisdiction over
the case when it issued the September 25, 2006 Order.
In a Resolution dated July 13, 2011, the CA dismissed the Petition for lack of merit. The Motion
for Reconsiderationthereto was also denied in Resolution39 dated June 13, 2012.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the remedy of annulment of judgment can be availed of on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 326
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
It must be stressed that the remedy of annulment of judgment is only available under
certain exceptional circumstances as this is adverse to the concept of immutability of final
judgments. Hence, it is allowed only on two grounds, i.e., extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Abner anchors his Petition for Annulment of Final Order on lack of jurisdiction. He posits that the
RTC had lost jurisdiction over the case when its February 23, 2001 Decision became final,
hence, any issuance subsequent thereto is made without any jurisdiction.
The argument is, however, specious. "Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in
rendering the judgment or final order is either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature
of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner." Here, it is undisputed that
the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of Abner, he having asked for affirmative relief
therefrom several times. As mentioned, what Abner questions is the RTC's jurisdiction over the
case.
"In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not
merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. Lack of
jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court should not have taken
cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter is conferred by law." The
RTC's jurisdiction over petitions for revival of judgment had already been upheld by the Court.
It was held that "[a]n action for revival of judgment may be filed either 'in the same court where
said judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any
other place designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in general.'" Here, the
Complaint for revival of judgment was filed in the same court (RTC-Pili Camarines Sur, Branch
31) which rendered the August 27, 1985 Decision in Civil Case No. P-279. Undoubtedly, the
RTC has jurisdiction over the action. There is therefore no valid ground for the Petition for
Annulment of Final Order that Abner filed with the CA.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 327
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
UNITED ALLOY PHILIPPINES CORPORATIONv.UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS
BANK [UCPB] AND/OR PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION [PDIC],
JAKOB VAN DER SLUIS AND ROBERT T.CHUA
G.R. No. 179257, November 23, 2015

DOCTRINE: The dismissal of the principal action x x x [carries] with it the denial,
disallowance or revocation of all reliefs ancillary to the main remedy sought in that
action.
FACTS:
UniAlloy and UCPB entered into a Lease Purchase Agreement wherein UniAlloy
leased from UCPB several parcels of land located in Misamis Oriental. On August 27,
2001, however, UniAlloy filed the aforesaid Complaint against respondents. It claimed
that, thru misrepresentation and manipulation, respondent Jakob Van Der Sluis took foil
control of the management and operation of UniAlloy and that respondents connived
with one another to obtain fictitious loans purportedly for UniAlloy as evidenced by
Promissory Notes.
On the same day, the Executive Judge of the RTC, Cagayan de Oro City issued a
72-hour TRO directing UCPB to cease and desist from taking possession of the disputed
premises.
On September 13, 2001, the RTC, acting as Special Commercial Court, issued an Order
granting the motions to dismiss and ordering the dismissal of the case on the grounds of
improper venue, forum-shopping and for being a harassment suit. The RTC held that
venue was improperly laid considering that the Promissory Notes sought to be annulled
were issued pursuant to a Credit Agreement which, in turn, stipulates that any legal
action relating thereto shall be initiated exclusively in the proper courts of Makati City. It
also opined that UniAlloy committed forum-shopping for failing to disclose in its
certificate of non-forum-shopping the pendency of Civil Case No, 2001-156 which
involves the same parties, the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances. The cases, as ruled by the RTC, have also identical causes of action,
subject matter and issues.
On September 25, 2001, UniAlloy received copies of the RTC Orders. And on October 9,
2001, it filed with the Court of Appeals, Manila Station (CA Manila) its petition in CA-G.R.
SP No. 67079 attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court a quo in (i)
dismissing its petition on the grounds of improper venue, forum-shopping and
harassment, (ii) ordering the turnover of the property in question to UCPB after the
dismissal of the Complaint, and (iii) applying the Interim Rules of Procedure for
Intra-corporate Controversies.
Thereafter, and since this Court's Decision in G.R. No. 152238 attained finality, UniAUoy
filed with the CA Manila a Motion to Issue and Implement Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction. In the meantime, the records of CA-G.R. SP No. 67079 were forwarded to CA

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 328
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
CDO pursuant to Republic Act No. 8246.

On May 31, 2006, the CA CDO issued a Resolution denying UniAlloy's motion. It found
that UniAUoy had lost its right to remain in possession of the disputed premises because
it defaulted in the payment of lease rentals and it was duly served with a notice of
extrajudicial termination of the LPA. Said court also found that UniAUoy vacated the
leased premises and UCPB was already in actual physical possession thereof as of
August 24, 2001, or three days before UniAUoy filed its complaint with the RTC. Hence,
it could no longer avail of the remedy of preliminary injunction to regain possession of the
disputed premises.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of UniAlloy's main action carries with it the dissolution
of any ancillary relief previously granted therein.
HELD:
The contention is non sequitur.

"Provisional remedies [also known as ancillary or auxiliary remedies], are writs and
processes available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a
litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests pending rendition, and for
purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. They are provisional
because they constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the
action, and they are ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent
upon the result of the main action."43 One of the provisional remedies provided in the
Rules of Court is preliminary injunction, which may be resorted to by a litigant at any
stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order to compel a party or
a court, agency or a person to refrain from doing a particular act or acts. 44 In Bacolod
City Water District v. Hon. Labayen,45 this Court elucidated that the auxiliary remedy of
preliminary injunction persists only until it is dissolved or until the tepnination of the main
action without the court issuing a final injunction, viz.:
x x x Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do
or refrain from doing a certain act, It may be the main action or merely a provisional
remedy for and as an incident in the main action.

The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of
preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an
independent action or proceeding. As a matter of course, in an action for injunction, the
auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, may issue.
Under the law, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final
injunction which is distinct from, and should not be confused with, the provisional remedy
of preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo until the

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 329
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or until the
termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction.46cralawlawlibrary

Based on the foregoing, it is indubitably clear that the August 17, 2007 Decision of CA
CDO dismissing UniAlloy's Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus effectively superseded
the February 18, 2002 Resolution of the CA Manila granting UniAUoy's ancillary prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. It wrote finis not only to the main case
but also to the ancillary relief of preliminary injunction issued in the main case.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 330
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HEIRS OF SIMEON LATAYAN, NAMELY: LEONIDES Q. LATAYAN, ARIEL Q. LATAYAN,
AND ETHEL Q. LATAYAN-AMPIL, REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT,
LEONIDES Q. LATAYAN, Petitioners, v.PEING TAN, JOHNNY TAN, HERMTNIGILDO
CASALAN, WEBINO VILLAREAL, DIOSCOROMOLO, DAMACINO BAYAWA, EDGAR
NARITA, YOLANDA NARITA, POLICRONIA CAPIONES, ANDRES LOZANO, GREGORIO
YAGAO, EMILIANO GUMATAY, JESUS ALCONTIN, ADAM DULAUON, MARIO PEREZ,
LARRY CEMAFRANCA, FELIXBERTO BULADACO, CIPRIANOAHIT, BUENAVENTURA
B ACALSO AND SALDE ESPIA,****Respondents.
G.R. No. 201652, December 02, 2015

DOCTRINE: The jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the nature and subject matter of an action
is conferred by law. The court or tribunal must look at the material allegations in the complaint,
the issues or questions that are the subject of the controversy, and the character of the relief
prayed for in order to determine whether the nature and subject matter of the complaint is within
its jurisdiction. If the issues between the parties are intertwined with the resolution of an issue
within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court or tribunal, the dispute must be addressed and
resolved by the said court or tribunal.

FACTS:
On January 31, 2000, Simeon Latayan (Simeon), represented by his son and
attorney-in-fact, Leonides Latayan, filed an Amended Complaint8 before the PARAD Davao
City, for cancellation of the CLOAs issued to respondents, docketed as DARAB Case No.
XI-1589-DC-99. Simeon alleged that he is the registered owner of two adjoining lots covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-14201 and T-14202 comprising 23.1488 hectares. He
contended that the titles to the subject lots were unilaterally and arbitrarily cancelled without his
consent or knowledge, and without notice and placed under the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) sans payment of just compensation.
On July 10, 2000, the PARAD rendered a Decision10 in favor of Simeon. The PARAD noted that
Simeon was never notified of the coverage by CARP of his properties and that he learned of the
same only when he, filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) a petition for
exemption of his landholdings from the operation of the CARP.
Respondents filed an appeal with the DARAB.14 While the appeal was pending, Simeon died
and was substituted by his sons, Leonides and Ariel, and his daughter, Ethel, herein petitioners.
In its May 9, 2005 Decision,15 the DARAB set aside the PARAD Decision and dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction.
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the DARAB's judgment to the CA via a Petition for Review. The
CA held that the PARAB committed no reversible error when it set aside the decision of the
PARAD and dismissed the case recognizing that jurisdiction over the matters involved is rightly
vested with the DAR Secretary.

ISSUE:
Whether or notthe Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that it is the
dar secretary and not the [darab] which has jurisdiction over cases involving cancellation of
cloas[j just compensation, etc., considering that the said ruling is diametrically opposite [the]
express provisions of section 50 of republic act 6657 and the jurisprudence promulgated by [the]

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Honorable Supreme Court, which expressly conferred exclusive original jurisdiction upon the
DARAB to hear cases of this nature.

HELD:
This Petition will not prosper. The jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the nature and
subject matter of an action is conferred by law. The court or tribunal must look at the material
allegations in the complaint, the issues or questions that are the subject of the controversy, and
the character of the relief prayed for in order to determine whether the nature and subject matter
of the complaint is within its jurisdiction. If the issues between the parties are intertwined with the
resolution of an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court or tribunal, the dispute must be
addressed and resolved by the said court or tribunal.
Considering that herein petitioners' predecessor-in-interest (i.e. Simeon) sought to cancel
respondents' registered CLOAs on the grounds: (1) that no agrarian dispute was involved in this
case; (2) that the subject lots are exempt from CARP coverage, and (3) that due process of law
was not observed when the original petitioner (Simeon) was divested of the ownership of the
subject lots: it thus stands to reason that it is the DAR Secretary that has jurisdiction to resolve
the controversy pursuant to applicable law, rules, and jurisprudence.

Both illuminating and instructive are these pronouncements by this Court that bear with
particular relevance on the petition at bench -
Section 1, Rule II of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure, the rule in force at the time of the filing
of the petition, provides:
Section 1.Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. — The Board shall have
primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all
agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the [CARP] under [RA 6657], Executive Order
Nos. 228, 229 and 129-A, [RA 3844] as amended by [RA 6389], [PD 27] and other agrarian
laws and their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but
not be limited to cases involving following:
xxx

f) Those involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of [CLOAs] and Emancipation
Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration Authority;
xxx
While the DARAB may entertain petitions for cancellation of CLOAs, as in this case, its
jurisdiction is, however, confined only to agrarian disputes. As explained in the case of Heirs of
Dela Cruz v. Heirs of Cruz and reiterated in the recent case of Bagongahasa v. Spouses Cesar
Caguin, for the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction, the controversy must relate to an agrarian dispute
between the landowners and tenants in whose favor CLOAs have been issued by the DAR
Secretary.

As defined in Section 3 (d) of [RA 6657], an agrarian dispute relates to "any controversy relating
to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise, over lands
devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired under the said Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries,
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee."

To be sure, the tenurial, leasehold, or agrarian relations referred to may be established with the
concurrence of the following: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent
between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the agricultural relationship is to bring
about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or
agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee. x x x

In this case, a punctilious examination reveals that petitioner's allegations are solely hinged on
the erroneous grant by the DAR Secretary of CLOA No. 00122354 to private respondents on
the grounds that she is the lawful owner and possessor of the subject lot and that it is exempt
from the CARP coverage, hi this regard, petitioner has not alleged any tenurial arrangement
between the parties, negating the existence of any agrarian dispute and consequently, the
jurisdiction of the DARAB. Indisputably, the controversy between the parties is not agrarian in
nature and merely involves the administrative implementation of the agrarian reform program
which is cognizable by the DAR Secretary. Section 1, Rule II of the 1994 DARAB Rules of
Procedure clearly provides that "matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of
[RA 6657], and other agrarian refonn laws and pertinent rules, shall be the exclusive prerogative
of and cognizable by the DAR Secretary."

Furthermore, it bears to emphasize that under the new law, [RA 9700], x x x which took
effect on July 1, 2009, all cases involving the cancellation of CLOAs and other titles
issued under any agrarian reform program are now within the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary. Section 9 of the said law provides:
Section 9. Section 24 of [RA 6657], as amended, is further amended to read as follows:
xxx
All cases involving the cancellation of registered emancipation patents, certificates of
land ownership award, and other titles issued under any agrarian reform program are
within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Secretary of the DAR.
Consequently, the DARAB is bereft of jurisdiction to entertain the herein controversy, rendering
its decision null and void. Jurisdiction lies with the Office of the DAR Secretary to resolve the
issues of classification of landholdings for coverage (whether the subject property is a private or
government[-]owned land), and identification of qualified beneficiaries. Hence, no error can be
attributed to the CA in dismissing the case without prejudice to its re-filing x x x.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 333
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ANTONIO Z. KING, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, EDGARDO
SANTOS VS. FRANCISCO A. ROBLES, ANTONIO T. DATU, RENE A. MASILUNGAN,
RESTITUTO S. SOLOMON, RODRIGO MENDOZA, ROMEO MENDOZA REYNALDO
DATU, JOSEPH TIU, TERESITA TIU, ROGELIO GEBILAGUIN AND PRESCILLA
GEBILAGUIN
G.R. Nos. 197096-97, December 07, 2015

DOCTRINE: Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on
the part of the public officer concerned, equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse
of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
By constitutional fiat and under RA 6770,[16] the Ombudsman is given a wide latitude of
investigatory and prosecutory powers on offenses committed by public officers free from
legislative, executive or judicial intervention.[17] Because of the endowment of broad investigative
authority, the Ombudsman is empowered to determine, based on the sufficiency of the
complaint, whether there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and file the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts. In contrast, if the Ombudsman finds the complaint insufficient in form or
substance, it may also dismiss the complaint.

FACTS:
In a decision rendered by the NLRC, Azkcon Group of Companies and/or Jay Ar Lazo were
adjudged guilty of having illegally dismissed Rogelio from service and were ordered to reinstate
Rogelio to his former position, to pay him full backwages from the time his salary was withheld
up to his actual reinstatement.
As such, Arbiter Rosales issued a writ of execution commanding the execution arm of the
NLRC “to proceed to the premises of Azkcon Group of Companies and/or Jay Ar Lazo located
at J.P. Ramos St., Bo. Talipapa, Caloocan City or wherever it may be found and collect the sum
of x x x P471,200.99 representing [Rogelio’s] backwages and 13th month pay.
In compliance with such directive, personal properties found inside the compound of
Azkcon at No. 220 Lias Road, Lambakan Street, Marilao, Bulacan were levied upon.
Contending that the value of the properties taken and hauled by Rogelio through his
attorney-in-fact were worth more than the monetary award of the NLRC, petitioner King,
claiming to be the President of Azkcon Metal Industries, Inc., Azkcon Refrigeration Industries,
Inc., Azkcon Construction Development Corporation, Azk Trading and PMAFC, filed criminal
complaints for Robbery, Violation of RA 3019 and Falsification of Public Documents against
respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman. He alleged that respondents conspired in
the unlawful taking of the machineries and equipment which caused him and the aforesaid
companies undue injury.
After the consolidation of the cases and hearing the parties’ respective position, the
Ombudsman in its Joint Resolution dated August 29, 2008 dismissed all the charges against the
respondents for lack of probable cause.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 334
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ISSUE:
Whether the Ombudsman erred in its finding of lack of probable cause to hold respondents
for trial.

HELD:
The Petition is bereft of merit.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty-bound
to investigate on its own or on complaint by “any person, any act or omission of a public officer or
employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.”[15] By
constitutional fiat and under RA 6770,[16] the Ombudsman is given a wide latitude of
investigatory and prosecutory powers on offenses committed by public officers free from
legislative, executive or judicial intervention.[17] Because of the endowment of broad investigative
authority, the Ombudsman is empowered to determine, based on the sufficiency of the
complaint, whether there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and file the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts. In contrast, if the Ombudsman finds the complaint insufficient in form or
substance, it may also dismiss the complaint. Such prerogative is beyond the ambit of this Court
to review the Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed
before it[18] except when the exercise thereof is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.[19]
“Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of
the public officer concerned, equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.”[20] A
perusal of the Petition shows that petitioner failed to demonstrate the Ombudsman’s abuse,
much less grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the charges against respondents for lack of
probable cause. On the contrary, a review of the records readily reveals that the Ombudsman’s
assailed Joint Resolution is based on substantial evidence. From the well-explained Joint
Resolution, in our view, petitioner’s Affidavit/Complaint is bereft of sufficient ground to engender
a well-founded belief that the crimes imputed on respondents have been committed and that
they are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. In fine, the Ombudsman did not
abuse his discretion warranting the Court’s intervention, in dismissing the charges against
respondents.
Petitioner complained of procedural flaws in the enforcement of the writ of execution arguing in
the main mat the value of the levied and hauled properties were much more than the monetary
award of the NLRC. This we believe is not an adequate ground to reverse the action of the
Ombudsman.
Petitioner’s bone of contention in the present Petition boils down to the appreciation and
determination of factual matters. The question of whether there was indeed an over levy of
properties is one that is essentially a factual concern as it goes into the determination of the fair
market value of the properties levied upon vis-a-vis the value of the properties hauled and taken
out of the company’s premises. Obviously, petitioner invites an evaluation of the evidentiary
matters which is not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. Besides, this Court is not a trier
of facts. Matters pertaining to proofs and evidence are beyond the power of this Court to review
under a Rule 45 Petition except in the presence of some meritorious circumstances, none of
which is availing in this case.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 335
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPOUSES CLAUDIO AND CARMENCITA TRAYVILLA vs. BERNARDO SEJAS AND
JUVY PAGLINAWAN, REPRESENTED BY JESSIE PAGLINAWAN
G.R. No. 204970, February 01, 2016

DOCTRINE:the Supreme Court held that although the caption of the complaint filed by
therein respondents with the RTC was denominated as one for 'specific performance and
damages,' the relief sought was the conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately,
the execution of deeds of conveyance in their favor of the real properties enumerated in
the provisional memorandum of agreement. Under these circumstances, the case before
the RTC was actually a real action, affecting as it did title to or possession of real
property.

FACTS:
In 2005, petitioners Claudio and Carmencita Trayvilla instituted before the RTC Civil
Case No. 4633-2K5 against respondent Bernardo Sejas (Sejas). In their Complaint for
specific performance and damages, petitioners claimed among others that Sejas was the
registered owner of a 434-square meter parcel of land in Tukuran, Zamboanga del Sur
that by virtue of a private handwritten document, Sejas sold said parcel of land to them in
1982; that thereafter, they took possession of the land and constructed a house thereon;
that they resided in said house and continued to reside therein; that Sejas later
reasserted his ownership over said land and was thus guilty of fraud and deceit in so
doing; and that they caused the annotation of an adverse claim. They prayed that Sejas
be ordered to execute a final deed of sale over the property and transfer the same to
them. In an Amended Complaint, this time for specific performance, reconveyance, and
damages, petitioners impleaded respondent Juvy Paglinawan (Paglinawan) as additional
defendant, claiming that Sejas subsequently sold the subject property to her, after which
she caused the cancellation of TCT T-8,337 and the issuance of a new title - TCT
T-46,627 - in her name. Petitioners prayed that Sejas be ordered to execute a final deed
of sale in their favor and transfer the property to them; that Paglinawan's TCT T-46,627 be
canceled and the property be reconveyed to them.However, the additional docket fees for
the moral damages prayed for in the Amended Complaint were not paid. Likewise, for the
additional causes of action, no docket fees were charged and paid.

ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals ruled correctly when it dismissed the complaint by reason of
Petitioner-Appellants' alleged non-payment of the correct dockets fees due to its failure to
alleged the fair market value or the stated value of the subject property in the amended
complaint?

HELD:
The Court denies the Petition.
As correctly ruled by the CA, while petitioners' Amended Complaint was denominated as
one mainly for specific performance, they additionally prayed for reconveyance of the
property, as well as the cancellation of Paglinawan's TCT T-46,627. In other words,
petitioners' aim in filing Civil Case No. 4633-2K5 was to secure their claimed ownership
and title to the subject property, which qualifies their case as a real action. Pursuant to

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 336
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a real action is one that affects title
to or possession of real property, or an interest therein.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 337
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PETRON LPG DEALERS ASSOCIATION AND TOTAL GAZ LPG DEALERS
ASSOCIATION vs. NENA C. ANG, ALISON C. SY, NELSON C. ANG, RENATO C.
ANG, AND/OR OCCUPANTS OF NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION
G.R. No. 199371, February 03, 2016
DOCTRINE: Facts discovered during surveillance operations conducted by the
authorities on the basis of information and evidence provided by the complainants
constitute personal knowledge which could form the basis for the issuance of a search
warrant.
FACTS:
Petitioners Petron LPG Dealers Association and Total Gaz LPG Dealers Association,
together with other liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) associations, filed a
letter-complaint before the National Bureau of Investigation-Ilocos Regional Office
requesting assistance in the surveillance, investigation, apprehension and prosecution of
respondents Nena C. Ang, Alison C. Sy, Nelson C. Ang, Renato C. Ang, and National
Petroleum Corporation for alleged illegal trading of LPG products and/or underfilling,
possession and/or sale of underfilled LPG productsDe Jemil and Antonio waited at a
distance. After about one hour, the Barba Gas truck emerged from the compound. De
Jemil then followed the truck back to the Barba Gas sales office at Jose Singson street in
Vigan, where the refilled Starflame LPG cylinders were unloaded. The two then
proceeded to the test-buy phase of the operation; with an empty eleven-kilogram
Starflame LPG tank in hand, they went to Barba Gas and purchased one of the refilled
Starflame LPG cylinders unloaded from the truck. The Barba Gas employee took De
Jemil's empty cylinder and replaced it with a filled one. De Jemil paid P510.00 for the filled
cylinder and received a dated receipt7 for the purchase. Thereafter, the filled Starflame
LPG cylinder was examined, weighed, inspected, marked, and photographed.

ISSUE:
THE COURT OF APPEALS MADE A DECISION NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE
REVISED RULES OF COURT AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
HONORABLE COURT AS REGARDS THE DETERMINATION OF PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE OF WITNESSES IN SEARCH WARRANT APPLICATIONS.

HELD:
The Court grants the Petition.
The Court finds the evidence presented sufficient to prove probable cause; the
issuing court and the CA thus patently erred in quashing the search warrants. Where the

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 338
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
findings of fact of the CA are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record, the same cannot bind this Court
Thus, applying Ty in its entirety to the present case, the Court finds that there exists
probable cause for the issuance of search warrants as applied for by petitioners.
Probable cause for purposes of issuing a search warrant refers to "such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the item, article or object sought in connection with
said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.On
the other hand, probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information refers to "such
facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and that respondents are probably guilty thereof. It is such set of facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe mat the offense
charged in the Information, or any offense included therein, has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested." Thus, while Tyrefers to preliminary investigation
proceedings, and the instant case is concerned with applications for the issuance of
search warrants, both are resolved based on the same degree of proof; the
pronouncement in Ty may therefore apply to the present controversy.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 339
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
UWE MATHAEUS vs. SPOUSES ERIC AND GENEVIEVE MEDEQUISO
G.R. No. 196651, February 03, 2016

DOCTRINE: a party desiring to appeal from a decision of the RTC rendered in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the CA,
submitting together with the petition a certification on non-forum shopping.

FACTS:
In Civil Case No. 5579, the Tagbilaran Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Branch 1 issued a January 12, 2007 Decision ordering petitioner to pay respondents
spouses Eric and Genevieve Medequiso, the amount of P30,000.00 with legal interest,
attorney's fees, and costs.

Petitioner interposed an appeal, docketed as Civil Case No. 7269, before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 48. On September 30, 2008, the RTC issued a
Decision affirming the MTCC judgment.Petitioner moved to reconsider, but the RTC - in
an April 13, 2009 Order - upheld its judgment.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A PROPER VERIFICATION AND
CERTIFICATION OF THE PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 42 THAT
WARRANTS A DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS.chanRoblesvirtu

HELD:
The Court denies the Petition.

We have held that Clerks of Court are notaries public ex-officio, and may thus notarize
documents or administer oaths but only when the matter is related to the exercise of their
official functions. Clerks of court should not, in their ex-officio capacity, take part in the
execution of private documents bearing no relation at all to their official functions. Under
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party desiring to appeal
from a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a
verified petition for review with the CA, submitting together with the petition a certification
on non-forum shopping. Under Section 3 of the same Rule, the failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and
other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of
and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 340
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPOUSES ALFREDO TEAÑO* AND VERONICA TEAÑO vs. THE MUNICIPALITY OF
NAVOTAS, REPRESENTED BY MAYOR TOBIAS REYNALD M. TIANGCO, AND
MUNICIPAL TREASURER MANUEL T. ENRIQUEZ
G.R. No. 205814, February 15, 2016a
nroblesvirtu
DOCTRINE: A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in
nature that it may be availed of only when, other remedies are wanting, and only if the
judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court
lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud.

FACTS:
On December 8, 2005, petitioners filed a Complaint against the Municipality of
Navotas Petitioners claimed that they were the registered occupants of parcels of land
with improvements situated inside the National Housing Authority Industrial Development
Project (NHAIDP), C-3 Road, Northbay Boulevard South, Navotas, sometime in July
2005, they received a Final Notice to Collect Real Property Tax (Notice) from the
Municipal Treasurer's Office demanding the payment of real estate taxes on the foregoing
properties amounting to P5,702,658.74 for the years 1990 to 2005.
Petitioners argued that other than the warrant of levy on their residential house, the realty
taxes being collected against them were improper for being violative of their right to due
process, and for being unconscionable, abusive and contrary to law. the public auction
sale conducted on December 21, 2005 is valid but since it was conducted prior to the
September 21, 2007 Order.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in dismissing the case?

HELD:
The Petition lacks merit.
petitioners filed with the CA a petition captioned as "Annulment of Summary Judgment
with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order."
However, petitioners failed to allege therein with particularity the facts and law relied upon
for the annulment, such that the CA, among other reasons, denied the same. When
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration with said court, petitioners' line of arguments
was suddenly geared towards their resort to a certiorari petition which, in the first place,
was not the remedy it availed of when it filed the CA Petition. Be that as it may, petitioners
now clarify that the CA Petition is indeed a petition for annulment of judgment and that
they have just "mixed up their discussions in the Motion for Reconsideration with the CA
by arguing that certiorari was the proper remedy against the questioned RTC resolution
and order." Petitioners now pray, among others, that the RTC Resolution dated August
13,2008 and its Order dated December 9, 2008 be annulled for having been issued
without jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 341
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS OF THE PORT OF
BATANGAS, and THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS vs. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION (PSPC), WILLIE J. SARMIENTO, PSPC Vice-President for Finance
and Treasurer and ATTY. CIPRIANO U. ASILO
G.R. No. 205002

DOCTRINE:Forum shopping exists if the suits raise identical causes of action, subject
matter, and issues; thus, the mere filing of several cases based on the same incident
does not necessarily constitute forum shopping.

FACTS:
Respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC) is a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling petroleum products for distribution
in the Philippines. petitioner District Collector Juan N. Tan, the Collector of Customs of the
Port of Batangas, issued a demand letterasking respondent PSPC to pay the excise tax
and value-added tax (VAT), plus penalty Respondent PSPC, however, refused to heed
the demand and, instead, issued a letter dated February 13, 2009 questioning the factual
or legal basis of the demand.petitioner District Collector issued another letter reiterating
the demand for the payment of the said unpaid taxes. respondent PSPC appealed the
matter to petitioner Commissioner of Customs (COC) Napoleon Morales. Pending the
resolution of the said appeal, petitioner COC ordered petitioner District Collector to
observe status quo.Meanwhile, petitioner District Collector filed a Complaint-Affidavit for
Perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against respondent
Sarmiento in relation to the Verification and Certification he filed before the RTC of
Batangas City, where he declared that the Petition for Review PSPC filed with the CTA
does not involve the same issues and/or reliefs.

ISSUE:
Whether the CTA committed a reversible error when it ruled that respondents did not
commit willful and deliberate forum shopping.

HELD:
The subject matter in the CTA case is the alleged unpaid taxes of respondent PSPC
on its importation of CCG and LCCG for the years 2006 to 2008 in the total amount of
P21,419,603,310.00, which is sought to be collected by petitioners. On the other hand,
the subject matter of the Batangas injunction case is the 13 importations/shipments of
respondent PSPC for the period January to February 2010, which respondent PSPC
claims are threatened to be seized by petitioners pursuant to the Memorandum dated
February 9, 2010 issued by petitioner District Collector.
Also, the cause of action in the CTA case is based on the Letter-Decisions of petitioner
COC, finding respondent PSPC liable for excise taxes and VAT; while the cause of action
in the Batangas injunction case is the Memorandum dated February 9, 2010, ordering the
personnel of petitioner BOC in the Port of Batangas to hold the delivery of all import
shipments of respondent PSPC. Furthermore, the issues raised are not the same.
Respondent PSPC filed the CTA case to assail the Letter-Decisions of petitioner COC,
finding it liable to pay excise taxes and VAT on its importation of CCG and LCCG. Thus, in

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 342
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
the Petition for Review, the main issue involved is the validity of the Letter-Decisions;
while in the Verified Motion, the issue raised is respondent PSPC’s entitlement to a
suspension order pending the resolution of the validity of the Letter-Decisions.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 343
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNARDINO PERALTAJ MORILLO AND
MICHAEL AMBAS Y REYES, BERNARDINO PERALTA Y MORILLO
G.R. No. 208524, June 01, 2016

DOCTRINE: For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the defendant to prov|e that he was
somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must likewise demonstrate that it is
physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time." If there is the
least possibility of his presence at the locus criminis, the defense of alibi will not prosper.
And with respect to mere denial as a defense, the rule is that this plea cannot prevail over
the positive testimony of an eyewitness to the crime.

FACTS:
That on or about 23rd day of May, 2007 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating with three (3) other persons whose true names, identities
and whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another,
armed with firearms, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence against and
intimidation of persons, did then and there willfully., unlawfully, and feloniously rob Supt.
Joven Bocalbos y Canas and Norberto Olitan Jr. y Espajos, in the following manner, to
wit: while complainant Supt. Joven Bocalbos y Canas was driving his vehicle a Nissan
Urban Van with plate No. XED-744 loaded with passengers cruising along
Commonwealth Avenue, and at Dona Carmen Subdivision, Fairview, this City, the said
accused who posed themselves as passengers of the said van, at gun point announced a
holdup and thereafter rob, steal and carry away the following personal belongings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Peralta is guilty of Robbery with Homicide?
HELD:
After a careful review of the records of the case, we affirm the ruling of both the RTC
and the CA finding appellant Peralta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide.In this case, all the above-mentioned elements had been
sufficiently proven by the prosecution. The taking of Olitan's property was committed with
violence and intimidation. This taking happened after Peralta and Ambas announced a
hold-up in order to rob the passengers of the van of their valuables. Olitan had no choice
but to hand over his cellphone, silver ring, sunglasses, and cash money to Ambas who
was pointing a gun at him. And undoubtedly, homicide was also committed when
Bocalbos was shot in the head on the occasion of that robbery.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 344
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPOUSES GERARDO AND CORAZON TRINIDAD vs. FAMA REALTY, INC. AND
FELIX ASSAD
G.R. No. 203336, June 06, 2016

DOCTRINE: Where contempt is committed against quasi-judicial entities, the filing of


contempt charges in court is observed only when there is no law granting contempt
powers to these quasi-judicial entities.

FACTS:
In 1991, petitioners Gerardo and Corazon Trinidad offered to buy from respondent
Fama Realty, Inc. (FAMA) 14 lots of the latter's St. Charbel Executive Village located at
Mindanao Avenue, Tandang Sora, Quezon City, at a total price of P17,620,800.00, or
P5,000.00 to P5,100.00 per square meter. The parties, thus, executed Reservation
Agreements, pursuant to which petitioners made partial payments. Later on, a
controversy arose regarding petitioners' payments, prompting them to file with the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) an action for specific performance
against FAMA and herein respondent Felix Assad, then FAMA President and General
Manager. Respondents interposed an appeal before the HLURB Board of
Commissioners, Petitioners moved to reconsider, whereupon the HLURB Board of
Commissioners issued an April 2, 1997 Decision Respondents then filed an appeal with
the Office of the President, which in turn rendered an August 31, 1998 Decision
dismissing the same and affirming the above HLURB Board of Commissioners' April 2,
1997 Decision. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was similarly rebuffed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be dismissed for filing with the wrong court or
tribunal?

HELD:
The Court dismisses the Petition, Under the circumstances, petitioners should have
sought to cite respondents in contempt before the HLURB itself, and not this Court.
Such pronouncement applies to the HLURB as well; to restate, where contempt is
committed against quasi-judicial entities, the filing of contempt charges in court is allowed
only when these quasi-judicial entities are not by law granted contempt powers.
Executive Order No. 648, the HLURB Charter, grants the HLURB Board the power to cite
and declare any person, entity or enterprise in direct or indirect contempt "whenever any
person, entity or enterprise commits any disorderly or disrespectful conduct before the
Commission or in the presence of its members or authorized representatives actually
engaged in the exercise of their official functions or during the conduct of any hearing or
official inquiry by the said Commission, at the place or near the premises where such
hearing or proceeding is being conducted with obstruct, distract, interfere or in any other
way disturb, the performance of such functions or the conduct of such hearing or
proceeding;" or "whenever any person, enterprise or entity fails or refuses to comply with
or obey without justifiable reason, any lawful order, decision, writ or process of the
Commission.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HEIRS OF BABAI GUIAMBANGAN, namely, KALIPA B. GUIAMBANGAN, SAYA
GUIAMBANGAN DARUS, NENENG P. GUIAMBANGAN, AND EDGAR P.
GUIAMBANGAN,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF KALAMANSIG, SULTANKUDARAT, represented by its MAYOR
ROLANDO P. GARCIA, MEMBERS of its SANGGUNIANG BAYAN, and its
MUNICIPAL TREASURER
G.R. No. 204899, July 27, 2016

DOCTRINE: Neither the misjoinder nor the non-joinder of parties is a ground for the
dismissal of an action," particularly a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65; the CA should
simply order that a party be impleaded in the case.
The CA dismissed the Petition for lack of appropriate service of the Petition
for Certiorari on the respondents as required by Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997
Rules, although the record indicates that a copy thereof was served upon their counsel of
record. While this is not sanctioned by the 1997 Rules, this Court has excused it in the
past.
Finally, while only one of the heirs, verified the CA Petition for Certiorari, without
proof of authority to file the same obtained from the other heirs, this is not fatal. As heirs,
they all share a common interest; indeed, even if the other heirs were not impleaded, the
Petition may be heard, as any judgment should inure to their benefit just the same. Or,
quite simply, the CA could have ordered their inclusion, as earlier stated above.

FACTS:
Datu Eishmael Summagumbra (Eishmael), heir of the late Babai Guiambangan
(Babai) and ascendant and predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioners, Kalipa B.
Guiambangan, Saya Guiambangan Darus, Neneng P. Guiambangan, and Edgar P.
Guiambangan, instituted before the RTC Brach 19 of Isulan, Sultan Kudarat (RTC Branch
19) Civil Case No. 989 against herein respondents Municipality of Kalamansig, Sultan
Kudarat, its Mayor, Members of its Sangguniang Bayan, and its Municipal Treasurer for
recovery of possession of real property and among others in connection with a parcel of
land which Eishmael claimed was registered in Babai’s name as OCT 995-A. On March 4,
2002, a Judgment was rendered in Civil Case No. 989, which decreed, among others,
ordering the respondents to vacate portions of the subject property and surrender the
possession thereof to the plaintiff, Datu Eishmael Summagumbra. The said Judgment
became final and executory, and in a May 2, 2002 Order, the trial court directed the
issuance of a writ of execution. On June 13, 2002, Sheriff Edwin Cabug (Cabug) issued a
Sheriff’s Notice to vacate the premises. On March 26, 2007, Cabug issued a Sheriff’s
Partial Return of Service, indicating that the writ of execution was not enforced.

On August 4, 2008, fire gutted the Hall of Justice where the file of Civil Case No.
989 was kept; however, the record thereof was not reconstituted. On September 17,
2010, Cabug issued another Sheriff’s Partial Return of Service and a Notice of
Garnishment which he sent to the Manager of the Land Bank of the Philippines Lebak,
Sultan Kudarat Branch, in an apparent attempt to execute the March 4, 2002 Judgment in
Civil Case No. 989. Respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Issue an Order to the Sheriff

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 346
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Prohibiting Him from Executing an Alleged Judgment in the Above-Entitled Case, seeking
to restrain Cabug from enforcing the decision in Civil Case No. 989 on the ground that
since the record thereof was not reconstituted, then there is no judgment in said case to
be enforced Petitioners filed their Omnibus Comment18 to the motion, and to this
respondents submitted their Comments/Reply. The trial court issued an Order20 granting
respondents’ Urgent Motion. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, however was
denied by the trial court.

Petitioners filed an original Petition for Certiorari before the CA, however in a June
14, 2011 Resolution, the CA resolved to dismiss the Petition, for failing to strictly comply
with Rule 65 and other related provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly for: (a) Failure
to implead Public Respondent RTC Br. 19, Sultan Kudarat in the caption of the case; (b)
Lack of appropriate service of the petition on adverse parties Municipality of Kalamansig
represented by Mayor Rolando P. Garcia, the Sangguniang Bayan Members and the
Municipal Treasurer of the said Municipality as required by Rule 46, Section 3; (c) Being
defective in substance as the verification and certification of non-forum shopping is
signed by Saya Guiambangan without any proof that she has been duly authorized by the
other heirs of Babai Guiambangan to file the petition on their behalf. Petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in its September 10, 2012 Resolution.

Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that that the CA should not have
dismissed their Petition for Certiorari on the ground of technicality, and should have
treated their case with more leniency and liberality; that even if the other heirs did not sign
the CA Petition and are not made party to the CA case as a result, still any judgment
obtained will be to their benefit as well, considering that they share a common interest in
the action, as co-heirs to Babai and Eishmael, and as co-owners of the subject property;
that even though the signatory to the CA Petition was designated only as "Saya
Guiambangan," it refers to petitioner herein, Saya Guiambangan Darus, who actually
signed the said petition, thus, "Saya Guiambangan" and "Saya Guiambangan Darus"
refer to one and the same individual; that in any case, they attached a Special Power of
Attorney32 to the instant Petition in order to comply with the procedural requirement; and
that if the CA looked beyond the procedural aspect of the case, it would have realized the
merit in their cause.

ISSUE:
Whether the Petition for Certiorari before the CA was properly dismissed due to
mere procedural technicalities, when these defects should have been overlooked given
the circumstances and merit of their case.

HELD:
Yes. The said Petition for Certiorari should not have been dismissed.

The CA dismissed petitioners’ Certiorari Petition on three grounds: first, for failure
to implead the trial court as required by Section 5, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules, which states
as follows:

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Sec. 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. – When the petition filed
relates to the acts or omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, the petitioner shall join, as private respondent
or respondents with such public respondent or respondents, the person or persons
interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of
such private respondents to appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and
in behalf of the public respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings, and
the costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against
the private respondents only, and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial
agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as public
respondent or respondents.

Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is


pending, the public respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or comment
to the petition or any pleading therein. If the case is elevated to a higher court by
either party, the public respondents shall be included therein as nominal parties.
However, unless otherwise specifically directed by the court, they shall not appear
or participate in the proceedings therein.

This, however, is not fatal. In Abdulrahman v. The Office of the Ombudsman, this
Court held that "neither the misjoinder nor the non-joinder of parties is a ground for the
dismissal of an action," particularly a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65; the CA should
simply order that a party be impleaded in the case. The Court made the following
pronouncement in said case:

The acceptance of a petition for certiorari, and necessarily the grant of due
course thereto, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Thus, the court
may reject and dismiss a petition for certiorari (1) when there is no showing of
grave abuse of discretion by any court, agency, or branch of the government; or (2)
when there are procedural errors, such as violations of the Rules of Court or
Supreme Court circulars.

Indeed, the rules of procedure need not always be applied in a strict,


technical sense, since they were adopted to help secure and not override
substantial justice. "In clearly meritorious cases, the higher demands of substantial
justice must transcend rigid observance of procedural rules."

Thus, we have given due course to a petition because it was meritorious,


even though we recognized that the CA was correct in dismissing the petition
for certiorari in the light of the failure of petitioner to submit material documents.
We have affirmed the CA when it granted a petition for certiorari despite the
litigant’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration beforehand. We have also had
occasion to excuse the failure to comply with the rule on the statement of material
dates in the petition, since the dates were evident from the records.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Next, the CA dismissed the Petition for lack of appropriate service of the Petition
for Certiorari on the respondents as required by Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997
Rules, although the record indicates that a copy thereof was served upon their counsel of
record. While this is not sanctioned by the 1997 Rules, this Court has excused it in the
past, thus:

True it is that Rule 46, Section 3 mandates that a copy of the petition should
be served on the other party; and that proof of such service should be filed with the
petition in court. However, the rule was substantially complied with when service
was made to petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Dennis Ancheta.

Without the benefit of a proper notice of petitioner’s substitution of counsel,


respondent had no recourse but to serve the copy of its petition to whom it knew
and perceived as being petitioner’s counsel of record. In faithful compliance and
with no intention of delay, service was made on Atty. Ancheta. 41

Finally, while only one of the heirs, Saya Guiambangan Darus, verified the CA
Petition for Certiorari, without proof of authority to file the same obtained from the other
heirs, this is not fatal. As heirs, they all share a common interest; indeed, even if the other
heirs were not impleaded, the Petition may be heard, as any judgment should inure to
their benefit just the same. Or, quite simply, the CA could have ordered their inclusion, as
earlier stated above.

x x x As such co-owners, each of the heirs may properly bring an action for
ejectment, forcible entry and detainer, or any kind of action for the recovery of possession
of the subject properties. Thus, a co-owner may bring such an action, even without joining
all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the
benefit of all.

This ponente reiterated this principle in Heirs of Lazaro Gallardo v. Soliman, and
later, in Jacinto v. Gumaru, Jr. Indeed, the CA should not have forgotten the guidelines
laid down by the Court regarding verifications and certifications against forum shopping:
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule
form the jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected above
respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission of
defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:

1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or


submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on
or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.

2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not


necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its
submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs
the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good
faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect
therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission
or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of
‘substantial compliance’ or presence of ‘special circumstances or compelling
reasons.’

5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the


plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be
dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a
common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the
signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping
substantially complies with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the
party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons,
the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney
designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf. (Emphasis supplied)

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
NAGA CENTRUM, INC., REPRESENTED BY AIDA KELLY YUBUCO
vs. SPOUSES RAMON J. ORZALES AND NENITA F. ORZALES
G.R. No. 203576, September 14, 2016

DOCTRINE: A party cannot be allowed to influence and manipulate the courts' decisions
by performing acts upon the disputed property - during the pendency of the case -which
would allow it to achieve the objectives it desires
.

FACTS:
Respondents own a house and lot situated at No. 28-B Valentin Street, Sabang,
Naga City which is surrounded, by property owned by others. One of which is by the
property of the petitioner. The respondents alleged that when they acquired their property
in 1965, their access to the public highway (Valentin Street) was through Rizal Street,
which forms part of a property now owned by the petitioner. But when the squatters
inhabiting said place were evicted, the petitioner caused Rizal Street to be closed by
enclosing its property with a concrete fence. This prompted the respondents to ask for a
permanent right of way through the intervention of the court after the petitioner refused
their offer to buy the portion where the proposed right of way is sought to be established.
The petitioner, however, alleged, among others that there is an existing passageway
leading to Valentin Street along Lot 1503 of Cad-290 which is available to the
respondents and that the property of the respondents became isolated due to their own
acts. In the course of the proceedings, the trial court, through an order dated August 26,
2005, granted the respondents' petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and ordered the petitioner 'to clear the [respondents'] access from the latter's residence
towards the former Rizal Street to Valentin Street of junks and other materials or vehicles
for repair that blocks [sic] or obstructs [sic] the same during the pendency of the ocular
inspection. Thereafter, the trial court ruled, among others, granting respondents, a legal
easement if right of way.

Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA and argued that the trial court's Decision
was void as it was issued by a pairing judge even after the regular judge for the sala had
already been appointed; that even assuming that the pairing judge had jurisdiction to
render the decision, he should have held that respondents should have sought a right of
way from the seller when they bought the property; that the judge disregarded the fact
that Felisa Estela (Estela) and Aurora dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) should have also been
impleaded in the case, since respondents were using their properties for ingress and
egress as well; that for failing to implead Estela and Dela Cruz, Civil Case No. 2004-0036
should have been dismissed instead; and that it was error for the trial court to have
ordered the establishment of the easement at the boundary of petitioner, Estela, and Dela
Cruz's respective lots. However, the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that that Judge Pablo Formaran
III, then RTC Branch 22 pairing judge, had no jurisdiction to issue the December 23, 2008
Decision since a regular judge (Judge Efren Santos) for the sala had already been
appointed and in fact assumed office and that for this reason, the December 23, 2008

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Decision is null and void. That since respondents are at fault for failing to secure a right of
way from the seller when they bought the property knowing that it was surrounded by
private properties and thus had no means of ingress and egress, then petitioner should
not be obliged to provide the easement; that on account of Article 649 of the Civil Code,
which provides in part that "easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable
is due to the proprietor's own acts," respondents cannot demand an easement since they
are responsible for isolating their property from the highway. On the other hand, the
respondents, in their Comment, argued that prior to the issuance of the trial court's
Decision on December 23, 2008 in Civil Case No. 2004-0036, the authority of the pairing
judge - Judge Formaran III - to decide the case had been questioned before the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) on consulta, and on November 9, 2008, the OCA issued a
memorandum affirming Judge Formaran III's authority to decide the case based on OCA
Circular No. 90-2004 and that petitioner did not question the OCA's findings, and it was
only on February 2, 2009, or after the unfavorable December 23, 2008 Decision came
out, that it filed a motion to vacate the same on the pretense that Judge Formaran III was
not authorized to decide the case; and that petitioner's actions in this regard are a mere
afterthought which the trial court and the CA themselves did not fail to notice.
Respondents added that there is no basis for the application of Article 649 of the Civil
Code, in that the isolation of their property is not of their own doing but of petitioner's,
since it unduly closed Rizal Street, blocked the same, and built concrete structures
thereon even when Civil Case No. 2004-0036 was already pending

ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the pairing judge of branch 22 has jurisdiction to render the
assailed decision.
II. Whether the respondent has the right to demand right of way.

HELD:

I. Yes, the pairing judge has jurisdiction to render the decision. It was only after the
unfavorable December 23, 2008 Decision came out that it moved to vacate the same on
the ostensible ground that Judge Formaran III had no authority as pairing judge to decide
the case. In short, petitioner had multiple opportunities to quell its doubts; by not seizing
upon these opportunities, it confirmed that it did not have any.

... a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case
just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the
court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties is barred
from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive
as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated - obviously
for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
jurisdiction or power of the court... And in Littleton vs. Burges, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said
that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a
particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction
to escape a penalty.
Elaborating on this ruling, the Court in Crisostomo v. CA, G.R. No. L-27166, March
25, 1970, 32 SCRA 54,60, stated that:
xxxx

The petitioners, to borrow the language of Mr. Justice Bautista Angelo (People vs.
Archilla, G.R. No. L-15632, February 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 699, 700-701), cannot
adopt a posture of double-dealing without running afoul of the doctrine of estoppel.
The principle of estoppel is in the interest of a sound administration of the laws. It
should deter those who are disposed to trifle with the courts by taking inconsistent
positions contrary to the elementary principles of right dealing and good faith
(People vs. Acierto, 92 Phil. 534, 541 [1953]). For this reason, this Court closes the
door to the petitioners' challenge against the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
and will not even honor the question with a pronouncement.'

A reading of the above-quoted statements may give the impression that the doctrine
applies only to the plaintiff or the party who, by bringing the action, initially invoked but
later repudiated the jurisdiction of the court. But while the rule has been applied to estop
the plaintiff from raising the issue of jurisdiction [Tolentino v. Escalona, G.R. No.L-26886,
January 24, 1969, 26 SCRA 613; Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L- 29264,
August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 419; Crisostomo v. Reyes, G.R. No. L-27166, March 25,
1970, 32 SCRA 54; Ong Ching v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-35356, May 18, 1973, 51 SCRA
13; Capilitan v. Dela Cruz, G.R. Nos, L-29536-7, February 28, 1974, 55 SCRA 706;
Florendo v. Coloma, G.R. No. 60544, May 19, 1984, 129 SCRA 304; Solicitor General v.
Coloma, Adm. Matter No. 84-3-886-0, July 7, 1986, 142 SCRA 511; Sy v. Tuvera, G.R.
No. L-76639, July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA 103] it has likewise been applied to the defendant
[Carillo v. Allied Worker's Association of the Phils., G.R. No. L-23689, July 31, 1968, 24
SCRA 566; People v. Munar, G.R. No.L-37642, October 22, 1973, 53 SCRA 278; Solano
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41971, November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 122; Royales v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 65072, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 470] and
more specifically, to the respondent employer in a labor case x x x. The active
participation of the party against whom the action was brought, coupled with his failure to
object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is
tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution
of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body's jurisdiction.

Indeed, far from nullifying his actions, the Court lauds Judge Formaran III for his
prudence and careful handling of his affairs in general, and the instant case in particular.

II. Yes, the respondent has the right to demand right of way. To be entitled to an
easement of right of way, the following requisites should be met:

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
1. An immovable is surrounded by other immovables belonging to other persons, and
is without adequate outlet to a public highway;
2. Payment of proper indemnity by the owner of the surrounded immovable;
3. The isolation of the immovable is not due to its owner's acts; and
4. The proposed easement of right of way is established at the point least prejudicial
to the servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance of
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

The only issues raised by petitioner in this case relate to the third and fourth
requisites. It claims that respondents should be faulted for the isolation of their property,
as they failed to secure a right of way from their seller when they bought the same in
1965; that respondents should obtain their right of way from Estela and Dela Cruz
instead; and that the designated right of way granted by the trial court to respondents
already contains permanent structures, which thus requires the appointment of another;
and in this regard, petitioner is willing to negotiate with respondents as to location and
price.

However, respondents may not be blamed for the isolation they are now suffering. By its
very location, their property is isolated, and this is not their fault. Suffice it to say further
that the Court agrees with the findings of the lower courts that the closure of Rizal Street
by the petitioner caused their property to be isolated.

On the contention that respondents should seek a right of way from Estela and
Dela Cruz instead, the Court finds this to be unnecessary. As they are, Dela Cruz's
116-square meter lot and Estela's 90-square meter lot are not sizeable enough to
accommodate a road right of way for respondents; besides, their homes almost entirely
cover their lots, such that there is none left for a road. On the other hand, petitioner's land
is large enough, at 19,000 square meters; a reduction thereof by 40 square meters - 2
meters wide by 20 meters long for respondents' road right of way, would hardly be felt by
it.

All in all, the location of the easement as depicted and illustrated in the sketch
approved by the trial court (Exhibit "17") appears to be legal, reasonable, and just.

Significantly, respondents have been using Rizal Street for so long; petitioner
knew of this, and it even granted access to respondents. At the very least, respondents
have been using Rizal Street for 23 years (or from 1980 up to 2003). While petitioner may
have allowed access by the informal settlers to Rizal Street through tolerance, the same
cannot be said of respondents; they are not informal settlers on petitioner's land.

In the case at bar, TCT No. 96886, issued in the name of Joaquin Limense, does
not contain any annotation that Lot No. 12-D was given an easement of right of way over
Lot No. 12-C. However, Joaquin Limense and his successors-in-interests are fully aware
that Lot No. 12-C has been continuously used and utilized as an alley by respondents and
residents in the area for a long period of time.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Joaquin Limense's Attorney-in-Fact, Teofista L. Reyes, testified that respondents
and several other residents in the area have been using the alley to reach Beata Street
since 1932. Thus:

xxxx

In Mendoza v. Rosel, this Court held that:

Petitioners claim that inasmuch as their transfer certificates of title do


not mention any lien or encumbrance on their lots, they are purchasers in
good faith and for value, and as such have a right to demand from
respondents some payment for the use of the alley. However, the Court of
Appeals found, as a fact, that when respondents acquired the two lots
which form the alley, they knew that said lots could serve no other purpose
than as an alley. The existence of the easement of right of way was
therefore known to petitioners who must respect the same, in spite of
the fact that their transfer certificates of title do not mention any
burden or easement It is an established principle that actual notice or
knowledge is as binding as registration.

Every buyer of a registered land who takes a certificate of title for value and
in good faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrances except those noted on
said certificate. It has been held, however, that 'where the party has knowledge of
a prior existing interest that was unregistered at the time he acquired a light to the
same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of
registration as to him.

In the case at bar, Lot No. 12-C has been used as an alley ever since it was
donated by Dalmacio Lozada to his heirs. It is undisputed that prior to and after the
registration of TCT No. 96886, Lot No. 12-C has served as a right of way in favor of
respondents and the public in general. We quote from the RTC's decision:

x x x It cannot be denied that there is an alley which shows its


existence. It is admitted that this alley was established by the original owner
of Lot 12 and that in dividing his property the alley established by him
continued to be used actively and passively as such. Even when the
division of the property occurred, the non-existence of the easement was
not expressed in the corresponding titles nor was the apparent sign of the
alley made to disappear before the issuance of said titles.

The Court also finds that when plaintiff acquired the lot (12-C) which forms
the alley, he knew that said lot could serve no other purpose than as an
alley. That is why even after he acquired it in 1969 the lot continued to be
used by defendants and occupants of the other adjoining lots as an alley. x
xx

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Thus, petitioners are bound by the easement of right of way over Lot No.
12-C, even though no registration of the servitude has been made on TCT No.
96886.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioner thus acknowledged respondents' right to use Rizal Street. It should have
known from familiarity not only with its own land, but with those adjoining it, and from the
ongoing proceedings in the case, that respondents had no other way to and from Valentin
Street than through its property. For this reason, it is guilty of gross and evident malice
and bad faith when, even while Civil Case No. 2004-0036 was pending, it deliberately
blocked respondents' access to Rizal Street by constructing a building thereon, dumping
filling materials and junk on the main gate of respondents' home, and converting portions
of the road into an auto repair shop and parking space, making it difficult and
inconvenient, if not humiliating, for respondents to traverse the path to and from their
home. Under Article 19 of the Civil Code, "(e)very person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith." Under Article 26, "(e)very person shall respect the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors." Petitioner's action
betrays a perverse and deliberate intention to hurt and punish respondents for legally
demanding a right of way which it nevertheless knew was forthcoming, and which,
considering the size of its land, it may give without the least prejudice to its own rights.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 356
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
EVELYN V. RUIZ vs. BERNARDO F. DIMAILIG
G.R. No. 204280 November 09, 2016

DOCTRINE:The determination of presence or absence of good faith, and of negligence


factual matters, which are outside the scope of a petition for review on certiorari.
Nevertheless, this rule allows certain exceptions including cases where the RTC and the
CA arrived at different or conflicting factual findings

FACTS:

Bernardo F. Dimailig was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT
No. T-361747 located in Alapan, Imus, Cavite. In 19 October 1997, he entrusted the
owner's copy of the said TCT to his brother, Jovannie, who in turn gave the title to Editha
Sanggalang, a broker, for its intended sale. In January 1998, the property was
mortgaged to Evelyn V. Ruiz as evidenced by a Deed of REM without Bernardo's
knowledge and consent so Bernardo instituted this suit for annulment of the Deed of
REM. In her Answer, Evelyn contended that she met Jovannie when she inspected the
subject property and assured her that Bernardo owned the property and his title thereto
was genuine. She further claimed that Jovannie mortgaged the property to her. She also
insisted that as a mortgagee in good faith and for value, the REM cannot be annulled
and that she had the right to keep the owner's copy of TCT No. T-361747 until the loan
was fully paid to her. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint. It held that while
Bernardo was the registered owner of the subject property, Evelyn was a mortgagee in
good faith because she was unaware that the person who represented himself as
Bernardo was an impostor. Bernardo's Motion for Reconsideration was denied so he
appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the trial court’s decision.
It held that the innocent purchaser (mortgagor in this case) for value protected by law is
one who purchases a titled land by virtue of a deed executed by the registered owner
himself, not by a forged deed. Since the Deed of REM was forged, and the title to the
subject property is still in the name of the rightful owner, and the mortgagor is a different
person who only pretended to be the owner, then Evelyn cannot seek protection from the
cloak of the principle of mortgagee in good faith. Evelyn filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari is filed in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Evelyn V. Ruiz is a mortgagee in good faith.

HELD:

As a rule, the issue of whether a person is a mortgagee in good faith is not within the
ambit of a Rule 45 Petition. The determination of presence or absence of good faith, and

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 357
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
of negligence factual matters, which are outside the scope of a petition for review on
certiorari. Nevertheless, this rule allows certain exceptions including cases where the
RTC and the CA arrived at different or conflicting factual findings, as in the case at
bench. As such, the Court deems it necessary to re-examine and re-evaluate the factual
findings of the CA as they differ with those of the RTC.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 358
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
NICOLAS S. MATUDAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARILYN B.
MATUDAN
G.R. No. 203284 November 14, 2016

DOCTRINE: It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for the most compelling
and cogent reasons

FACTS:

Nicolas S. Matudan and Marilyn B. Matudan were married in Laoang, Northern


Samar on October 26, 1976. They had four children. In 1985, Marilyn left to work abroad
an she had not been seen nor heard from by her husband and children thereafter. On 20
June 2008, Nicolas filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 alleging that (1) before, during, and after his
marriage to Marilyn, the latter was psychologically incapable of fulfilling her obligations
as a wife and mother; (2) she consistently neglected and failed to provide for him and
their children with the necessary emotional and financial care, support, and sustenance,
and even so after leaving for work abroad; (3) based on expert evaluation conducted by
Clinical Psychologist Nedy L. Tayag, Marilyn's psychological incapacity is grave,
permanent, and incurable. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, opposed the Petition. The Quezon City Office of the City Prosecutor
having determined that there is no collusion between the parties, proceedings were
conducted in due course. The trial proceeded in Marilyn's absence. The following
documents were submitted in evidence: (1) Nicolas’ Judicial Affidavit which was adopted
as his testimony on direct examination; (2) Judicial Aftidavit of Maricel which was
adopted as part of her testimony on direct examination; and (3) Sworn Affidavit of Dr.
Tayag which was considered part of her testimony on direct examination. The Regional
Trial Court issued its Decision dismissing the Petition in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 on
the ground that the evidence failed to sufficiently prove Marilyn's claimed psychological
incapacity. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling so a Petition for Review on Certiorari
was filed in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Marilyn B. Matudan is psychological incapacited.

HELD:

In Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, the Court ruled that the issue of whether or not
psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 359
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Such factual
issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the
Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such
factual determination. It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial
court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for the
most compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go
beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case,
or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts, which are unavailing in the
instant case.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 360
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JESUS B. VILLAMOR vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
G.R. No. 204422 November 21, 2016

DOCTRINE: Questions of facts may not be the subject of an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. However, there
are exceptions to this rule such as when the factual findings of the CA are not supported
by the evidence on record and/or are based on misapprehension of facts.

FACTS:

In 1978, Jesus B. Villamor with Social Security System No. 03-4047063-3, was
employed by Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. (VVCCI). On 3 November 2006, he was
brought to Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital, Manila, due to dizziness associated with
numbness and weakness on his left arm and leg. After more than a week of confinement,
he was discharged from the said hospital with diagnoses of Hypertension Stage 1;
Cerebro-Vascular Disease (CVD) Acute, Non-Hemorrhagic Infarct Right Pons and Right
Basal Ganglia; Dyslipidemia (abnormal levels of lipids [cholesterol triglycerides, or both]
carried by lipoproteins in the blood). On 9 March 2007, he filed before SSS Pasig City
Branch, claims for sickness benefits under the SSS law and the EC TTD benefits under
the EC law for his CVD or stroke, Infarct Hypertension. SSS Pasig Branch granted his
claim for sickness benefits under the SSS law, but denied his claim for EC TTD benefits
on the ground that there is no causal relationship between his illness and his working
conditions. Upon further evaluation by SSS-Medical Operations Department, it denied
the claim for lack of a causal relationship between his job as clerk and illness. It also
noted that his smoking history, alcoholic beverage drinking habit, and poor compliance
with anti-hypertensive medication increased his risk of developing his illness. Both his
appeal and motion for reconsideration was denied by the Employees' Compensation
Commission which the Court of Appeals affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Petition and Supplemental Petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court contending that the CA erred in denying his claim for EC TTD filed in the Supreme
Court is valid.

HELD:

As a rule, questions of facts may not be the subject of an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. However, there
are exceptions to this rule such as when the factual findings of the CA are not supported
by the evidence on record and/or are based on misapprehension of facts. Such is the
situation in this case.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 361
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
INTERADENT ZAHNTECHNIK PHILIPPINES, INC., BERNARDINO G. BANTEGUI,
JR. AND SONIA J. GRANDEA vs. REBECCA F. SIMBILLO
G.R. No. 207315 November 23, 2016

DOCTRINE: In the exercise of its power to review decisions of the NLRC, the CA can
make its own factual determination when it finds that the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion in overlooking or disregarding the evidence which are material to the
controversy.

FACTS:

Rebecca F. Simbillo worked at Interadent Zahntechnik Philippines, Inc. (Interadent)


as a rank-and-file employee from May 2, 2004 up to March 2006. In April 2008, she was
rehired as Accounting Manager and subsequently promote to Finance and Accounting
manager on April 16, 2010. She was also elected by the Board of Director as Treasurer
on March 31, 2010. On 23 July 2010, Interadent sought a company-wide implementation
of security measures such as body frisking and bag/personal items inspection of all
employees upon ingress and egress of office, disconnection of all USB ports and
prohibition of cellular phone usage due to an alleged leakage of security information
uncovered by the external auditors. On 28 July 2010, upon the directive of Bernardino G.
Bantegui, Jr., all network and internet connections in the Accounting Department were
removed and disabled. Rebecca’s e-mail account was likewise suspended. A
Memorandum was served to her the next day requiring her to submit a written
explanation and attend an administrative hearing on August 2, 2010, regarding a
message she posted on her Facebook account referring to company concerns with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and insulting statements against a co-worker. She was
preventively suspended for seven days effective July 29, 2010 to August 6, 2010. On the
following day, Rebecca through her counsel, wrote a reply-letter arguing that she was
already constructively dismissed even prior to her receipt of the Notice to Explain when
certain security procedures were directed exclusively against her. Her suspension was
extended up to August 25, 2010. On 9 August 2010, she filed with the Labor Arbiter a
Complaint for constructive illegal dismissal, non-payment of service incentive leave pay,
13th month pay, illegal suspension, claims for moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees against Interadent, Bernardino and Sonia J. Grandea. On 24 August
2010, Interadent issued a Second Notice informing her termination from service effective
August 25, 2010 on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. She asserts that her
dismissal was without just cause or compliance with procedural due process since the
alleged loss of trust and confidence was based on self-serving allegations and mere
speculation. On the other hand, Interdadent insisted that she was terminated for a valid
and just cause and with compliance with procedural due process. The Labor Arbiter
ruled that she was not constructively dismissed, because she failed to prove her claim of

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 362
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
discrimination. Such ruling was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission.
She filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was granted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals may reverse the factual declarations of both the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that there was substantial evidence of willful and intentional
breach of trust.

HELD:

As a rule, factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies such as the NLRC are generally
accorded not only respect but also finality because of the special knowledge and
expertise gained by these agencies from handling matters under their specialized
jurisdiction. However, well-settled is the rule that for want of substantial basis, in fact or in
law, these factual findings cannot be given the stamp of finality and conclusiveness
normally accorded to it. Hence, the CA can review the factual findings or legal
conclusions of the NLRC and "is not proscribed from 'examining evidence anew to
determine whether the factual findings of the NLRC are supported by the evidence
presented and the conclusions derived therefrom accurately ascertained'." In the
exercise of its power to review decisions of the NLRC, the CA can make its own factual
determination when it finds that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in overlooking or
disregarding the evidence which are material to the controversy. In the instant case, the
Court agrees with the CA that the conclusions arrived at by the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC are manifestly erroneous because the evidence does not support their findings.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 363
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MANULIFE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. HERMENEGILDA YBAÑEZ
G.R. No. 204736 November 28, 2016

DOCTRINE:In appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
findings of fact by the CA especially where such findings of fact are affirmatory or
confirmatory of the findings of fact of the RTC are conclusive upon this Court.

FACTS:

Insurance Policy Nos. 6066517-18 and 6300532-69 was issued by Manulife


Philippines, Inc. on October 25, 2002 and July 25, 2003 to Dr. Gumersindo Solidum
Ybañez. His wife, Hermenegilda Ybañez, was revocably designated as the beneficiary in
said insurance policies. She filed a Claimant's Statement-Death Claim on December 10,
2003. The Death Certificate dated November 17, 2003 stated that the insured had
"Hepatocellular CA., Crd Stage 4, secondary to Uric Acid Nephropathy; SAM
Nephropathy recurrent malignant pleural effusion; NASCVC. Upon investigation,
Manulife concluded that the insured misrepresented or concealed material facts at the
time the subject insurance policies were applied for so it denied the death claims and
refunded the premiums that the insured paid on the insurance policies. It subsequently
instituted a Complaint for Rescission of Insurance Contracts against Hermenegilda and
the BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI Family). On 25 November 25, 2005, BPI Family filed a
Manifestation praying that either it be dropped from the case or that the case be
dismissed with respect to it, because it no longer had any interest in the subject
insurance policies as asssignee because the insured’s obligation had already been
settled or paid. Since no objection was interposed to this prayer by either Manulife or
Hermenegilda, the RTC granted this prayer in its Order of November 25, 2005. The
Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint due to insufficiency of evidence. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in affirming the
RTC Decision dismissing Manulife's Complaint for rescission of insurance contracts for
failure to prove concealment on the part of the insured.

HELD:

The present recourse essentially challenges anew the findings of fact by both the
RTC and the CA that the Complaint for rescission of the insurance policies in question
will not prosper because Manulife failed to prove concealment on the part of the insured.
This is not allowed. It is horn-book law that in appeal by certiorari to this Court under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, the findings of fact by the CA especially where
such findings of fact are affirmatory or confirmatory of the findings of fact of the RTC, as

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 364
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
in this case, are conclusive upon this Court. The reason is simple: this Court not being a
trial court, it does not embark upon the task of dissecting, analyzing, evaluating,
calibrating or weighing all over again the evidence, testimonial or documentary, that the
parties adduced during trial. Of course, there are exceptions to this rule, such as (1)
when the conclusion is grounded upon speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when
the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when there is no citation of specific evidence
on which the factual findings are based; (7) when the findings of absence of facts is
contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) when the findings of the CA are
contrary to the findings of the RTC; (9) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain
relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; (10) when the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and, (11)
when the CA's findings are contrary to the admission of both parties. We are satisfied
that none of these exceptions obtains in the Petition at bench. Thus, this Court must
defer to the findings of fact of the RTC - as affirmed or confirmed by the CA - that
Manulife's Complaint for rescission of the insurance policies in question was totally bereft
of factual and legal bases because it had utterly failed to prove that the insured had
committed the alleged misrepresentation/s or concealment/s of material facts imputed
against him.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 365
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., YVONNE S. YUCHENGCO, ATTY. EMMANUEL
G. VILLANUEVA, SONNY RUBIN, ENGR. FRANCISCO MONDELO, and MICHAEL
REQUIJO vs. EMMA CONCEPCION L. LIN
G.R. No. 207277January 16, 2017

DOCTRINE: The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the
same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the
purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists where the elements of litis pendentia
are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.
On the other hand, for litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the
following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to
the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to
res judicata in the other case.

Res judicata, in turn, has the following requisites: (1) the former judgment must be final;
(2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between
the first and second actions, (a) identity of parties, (b) identity of subject matter, and (c)
identity of cause of action.

The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from
administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern
the third and vice versa. Matters handled by the Insurance Commission are delineated
as either regulatory or adjudicatory, both of which have distinct characteristics.

FACTS:

Emma Concepcion L. Lin obtained various loans from Rizal Commercial and
Banking Corporation (RCBC) secured by six clustered warehouses located at Plaridel,
Bulacan. The five warehouses were insured with Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. against
fire for ₱56 million, while the remaining warehouse was insured for ₱2 million. On 24
February 2008, the five warehouses were gutted. Despite the Fire Clearance
Certification issued by the Bureau of Fire Protection on April 8, 2008 stating that the case
of fire was accidental, Malayan claimed that the case of fire was arson. She sought the
assistance from the Insurance Commission (IC), but Malayan still denied or refused to
pay her insurance claim so she filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with
Damages against Malayan; it’s corporate officers Yvonne Yuchengco, Atty. Emmanuel
Villanueva, Sonny Rubin, Engr. Francisco Mondelo, Michael Angelo Requijo; and the

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 366
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
RCBC on January 4, 2010. She subsequently filed before the IC an administrative case
against Malayan, represented this time by Yvonne on June 17, 2010. On 17 August
2010, Malayan filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 10-122738 based on forum
shopping. It argued that (1) the administrative case was instituted to prompt or incite IC
into ordering Malayan to pay her insurance claim and (2) the elements of forum shopping
are present in these two cases. The Regional Trial Court held that there is no forum
shopping. In the administrative case, she was seeking a relief clearly distinct from that
sought in the civil case by praying for the suspension or revocation of Malayan's license
to operate as a non-life insurance company. In contrast with the civil case, she prayed for
the collection of a sum of money with damages. A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
before the Court of Appeals was dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing the Civil Case on the
ground of willful and deliberate forum shopping despite the fact that the civil case and the
administrative case both seek the payment of the same fire insurance claim.

HELD:

We deny this Petition. We hold that the case law rulings in the Go and Almendras
cases control and govern the case at bench.

First off, it is elementary that "an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely
interlocutory and, therefore, not appealable, x x x to x x x avoid undue inconvenience to
the appealing party by having to assail orders as they are promulgated by the court,
when all such orders may be contested in a single appeal."

Secondly, petitioners herein utterly failed to prove that the RTC, in issuing the assailed
Orders, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
"It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered to have been
done in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction." "For
grave abuse of discretion to exist, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross so
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law."

In the present case, petitioners basically insist that Lin committed willful and deliberate
forum shopping which warrants the dismissal of her civil case because it is not much
different from the administrative case in terms of the parties involved, the causes of
action pleaded, and the reliefs prayed for. Petitioners also posit that another ground
warranting the dismissal of the civil case was Lin's failure to notify the RTC about the
pendency of the administrative case within five days from the filing thereof.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 367
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
These arguments will not avail. The proscription against forum shopping is found in
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 5.Certification against forum shopping. --The plaintiff or principal party shall certify
under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a
sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith; (a) that he has
not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in
any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such
other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim,
a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn
that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that
fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and
after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for
summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a
cause for administrative sanctions.

The above-stated rule covers the very essence of forum shopping itself, and the
constitutive elements thereof viz., the cognate concepts of litis pendentia and res
judicata - x x x The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the
same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the
purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists where the elements of litis pendentia
are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another.
On the other hand, for litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the
following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to
the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to
res judicata in the other case.

Res judicata, in turn, has the following requisites: "(1) the former judgment must be final;
(2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 368
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
the first and second actions, (a) identity of parties, (b) identity of subject matter, and (c)
identity of cause of action."

"The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from
administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern
the third and vice versa." In the context of the case at bar, matters handled by the IC are
delineated as either regulatory or adjudicatory, both of which have distinct
characteristics, as postulated in Almendras Mining Corporation v. Office of the Insurance
Commission:

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 369
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
FCD PAWNSHOP AND MERCHANDISING COMPANY, FORTUNATO C. DIONISIO
JR., and FRANKLIN C. DIONISIO vs. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, ATTY.
NORMAN R. GABRIEL, ATTY. ENGRACIO M. ESCASINAS, JR., and THE
REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR MAKATI CITY
G.R. No. 207914 January 18, 2017

DOCTRINE: Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not
having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous
case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and
(3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers
(splitting causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or
res judicata).

FACTS:

Felicitas Dionisio-Juguilon, Adelaida Dionisio, Fortunato C. Dionisio, Jr, and Franklin


C. Dionisio owned FCD Pawnshop and Merchandising Company which was the
registered owner of a pared of fond in Makati under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
(168302) S-3664, or TCT (168302) S-3664.In 2009, Fortunato and Franklin entrusted the
original owner's copy of TCT (168302) S-3664 to Atty. Rowena Dionisio. It was later
discovered that the said title was used as collateral by Sunyang Mining Corporation
(Sunyang) to obtain a ₱20 million loan from Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP).On
February 9, 2011, Fortunato and Franklin filed a Petition to annul the Sunyang mortgage
and claim for damages against UBP, Sunyang, the Registry of Deeds of Makati, and
several others Civil Case No. 11-116 based on the premise that TCT (168302) S-3664
was fraudulently mortgaged. The case was assigned to Branch 57 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati.Meanwhile, UBP caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject
property and bought the same at the auction sale. In the Notice of Extrajudicial Sale
published prior to the auction sale, the title to the subject property was erroneously
indicated as "Transfer Certificate of Title No. 163302 (S-3664);" but elsewhere in the
notice, the title was correctly indicated as "Transfer Certificate of Title No. 168302
(S-3664)." The publisher later circulated an Erratum admitting its mistake and it made
the corresponding correction. On account of perceived irregularities in the foreclosure
and sale proceedings, Fortunato and Franklin filed another complaint forannulment of
the extrajudicial foreclosure and certificate of sale issued with injunctive relief against
UBP, the Registry of Deeds of Makati, and several others on December 2011. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 11 -1192 and assigned to Branch 133 of the Makati
RTC. In a written opposition, UBP claimed that the filing of Civil Case No. 11-1192
violated the rule against forum shopping. The Makati Regional Trial Court Branch 33

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
issued an Order dismissing Civil Case No. 11-1192 on the ground of forum shopping. An
original Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals was filed claiming that there is
no forum shopping, because Civil Case No. 11-116 (annulment of mortgage) and Civil
Case No. 11-1192 (annulment of foreclosure and sale proceedings) involve different
subject matters. Such petition was dismissed so a Petition for Review on Certiorari was
filed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners essentially point out that in maintaining Civil Case Nos.
11-116 and 11-1192, they are not guilty of forum shopping, nor did they violate the rule
on litis pendentia.

HELD:

The Court denies the Petition.

This ponente has had the occasion to rule on a case where a party instituted two cases
against the same set of defendants - one for the annulment of a real estate mortgage,
and a second for injunction and nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and
consolidation of title, rooted in the same real estate mortgage - who moved to dismiss
the second case on the ground of forum shopping, claiming that both cases relied on a
determination of the same issue: that is, the validity of the real estate mortgage. The trial
court dismissed the second case, but the CA ordered its reinstatement. This ponente
affirmed the trial court, declaring as follows:

There is forum shopping 'when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising
substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some
other court.' The different ways by which forum shopping may be committed were
explained in Chua v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company: Forum shopping can be
committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and
with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground
for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of
action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the
ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action but with different prayers (splitting causes of action, where the ground for
dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).

Common in these types of forum shopping is the identity of the cause of action in the
different cases filed. Cause of action is defined as 'the act or omission by which a party
violates the right of another.’

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 371
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The cause of action in the earlier Annulment Case is the alleged nullity of the REM (due
to its allegedly falsified or spurious nature) which is allegedly violative of Goodland's right
to the mortgaged property. It serves as the basis for the prayer for the nullification of the
REM. The Injunction Case involves the same cause of action, inasmuch as it also
invokes the nullity of the REM as the basis for the prayer for the nullification of the
extrajudicial foreclosure and for injunction against consolidation of title. While the main
relief sought in the Annulment Case (nullification of the REM) is ostensibly different from
the main relief sought in the Injunction Case (nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure
and injunction against consolidation of title), the cause of action which serves as the
basis for the said reliefs remains the same - the alleged nullity of the REM. Thus, what is
involved here is the third way of committing forum shopping, i.e., filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers. As previously held by the
Court, there is still forum shopping even if the reliefs prayed for in the two cases are
different, so long as both cases raise substantially the same issues.

There can be no determination of the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure and the
propriety of injunction in the Injunction Case without necessarily ruling on the validity of
the REM, which is already the subject of the Annulment Case. The identity of the causes
of action in the two cases entails that the validity of the mortgage will be ruled upon in
both, and creates a possibility that the two rulings will conflict with each other. This is
precisely what is sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping.

The substantial identity of the two cases remains even if the parties should add different
grounds or legal theories for the nullity of the REM or should alter the designation or form
of the action. The well-entrenched rule is that 'a party cannot, by varying the form of
action, or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the
principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.'

The foregoing view was reiterated in a subsequent pronouncement, which happens to


form the underlying premise of the CA's disposition.

The factual milieu in the present case is the same as in the above-cited cases. The
plaintiffs in both cases first filed a case for annulment of the mortgage, followed by the
case for annulment of the foreclosure proceedings. For this reason, the underlying
principle in these previously decided cases must apply equally to the instant case. Thus,
the Court completely agrees with the CA's findings that in the event that the court in Civil
Case No. 11-116 (annulment of mortgage case) should nullify the Sunyang mortgage,
then subsequent proceedings based thereon, including the foreclosure, shall also be
nullified. Notably as well, the CA's observation in Civil Case No. 11-1192 (case for
annulment of foreclosure and sale) - that since the complaint therein repeatedly makes
reference to an "unlawful" and "fraudulent" Sunyang mortgage, then the same evidence
in Civil Case No. 11-116 will have to be utilized- is well-taken.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 372
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Petitioners maintain that Civil Case No. 11-1192 (case for annulment of foreclosure and
sale) is grounded on specific irregularities committed during the foreclosure proceedings.
However, their Complaint in said case reiterates the supposed illegality of the Sunyang
mortgage, thus presenting the court in said case with the opportunity and temptation to
resolve the issue of validity of the mortgage. There is therefore a danger that a decision
might be rendered by the court in Civil Case No. 11-1192 that contradicts the eventual
ruling in Civil Case No. 11-116, or the annulment of mortgage case.

The rules of procedure are geared toward securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding. "Procedural law has its own rationale in the
orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of
substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice,
despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes." With these principles in mind,
the Court would rather have petitioners try their cause of action in Civil Case No. 11-116,
rather than leave the trial court in danger of committing error by issuing a decision or
resolving an issue in Civil Case No. 11-1192 that should properly be rendered or
resolved by the court trying Civil Case No. 11-116.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 373
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPOUSES ROMEO PAJARES and IDA T. PAJARESvs. REMARKABLE LAUNDRY
AND DRY CLEANING, represented by ARCHEMEDES G. SOLIS
G.R. NO. 212690 20 FEBRUARY 2017

DOCTRINE: In the specific performance and rescission of contract cases, the subject
matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence jurisdiction belongs to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC). In the case for damages, however, the court that has jurisdiction
depends upon the total amount of the damages claimed.

FACTS:

Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning filed a complaint for Breach of Contract and
Damages against herein Spouses before the RTC of Cebu City.

Respondent alleged that it entered into a Remarkable Dealer Outlet Contract with
petitioners whereby the latter, acting as a dealer outlet, shall accept and receive items or
materials for laundry which are then picked up and processed by the former in its main
plant or laundry outlet. It was petitioners violated Article IV (Standard Required Quota &
Penalties) of said contract, which required them to produce at least 200 kilos of laundry
items each week. On April 30, 2012, they ceased dealer outlet operations on account of
lack of personnel. Respondent made written demands upon petitioners for the payment
of penalties imposed and provided for in the contract, but the latter failed to pay thereby
constitutes breach of contract.

RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs complaint is for the
recovery of damages for the alleged breach of contract. The complaint sought the award
of ₱200,000.00 as incidental and consequential damages; the amount of ₱30,000.00 as
legal expenses; the amount of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the amount of
₱20,000.00 as cost of the suit, or for the total amount of ₱280,000.00 as damages.
According to B.P Blg. 129, RTC has jurisdiction over claims exceeding ₱300,000.00.

On appeal, CA reversed the decision and ruled that an action for breach of contract and
damages is one incapable of pecuniary estimation. Hence cognizable by jurisdiction of
RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action for breach of contract and damages is incapable of
pecuniary estimation jurisdiction of which belongs to RTC

HELD:

No. After an analysis of the complaint filed by respondents, the court was convinced
that it is an action for damages.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 374
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Pursuant to paragraph 8, Section 19 of BP 129, as amended by Republic Act No.
7691, provides that where the amount of the demand exceeds ₱l00,000.00, exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs,
exclusive jurisdiction is lodged with the RTC. Otherwise, jurisdiction belongs to the
Municipal Trial Court.
The above jurisdictional amount had been increased to ₱200,000.00 on March 20, 1999
and further raised to ₱300,000.00 on February 22, 2004 pursuant to Section 5 of RA
7691.
Then in Administrative Circular No. 09-94this Court declared that "where the claim for
damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such
claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court." In other words,
where the complaint primarily seeks to recover damages, all claims for damages should
be considered in determining which court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case regardless of whether they arose from a single cause of action or several causes of
action.
Since the total amount of the damages claimed by the respondent in its Complaint filed
with the RTC on September 3, 2012 amounted only to ₱280,000.00, said court was
correct in refusing to take cognizance of the case.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 375
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ALEXIS C. ALMENDRAS vs.SOUTH DAVAO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC.,
(SODACO), ROLANDO SANCHEZ, LEONARDO DALWAMPO and CARIDAD C.
ALMENDRAS
G.R. No. 198209 22 MARCH 2017

DOCTRINE: Section 4 of Circular 2-90 in effect provides that an appeal taken either to
this Court or to the CA by the wrong mode or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.
This rule is now incorporated in Section 5, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the
filing of the case directly with this Court departs from the hierarchy of courts. Normally,
direct resort from the lower courts to this Court will not be entertained unless the
appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals.

FACTS:

Petitioner Almendras alleged that he owned and had occupied said parcel of land since
September 21, 1978 until he was forcibly dispossessed by respondent South Davao
Development Company, Inc. (SODACO) on April 23, 1994. Petitioner claimed that
Caridad sold the property to Rolando, a purported dummy of SODACO.

Almendras filed an Amended Complaint seeking to annul the Deed of Sale executed by
and among respondents Caridad C. Almendras, Rolando C. Sanchez and Leonardo
Dalwampo over a parcel of unregistered land located at Inawayan, Sta. Cruz, Davao del
Sur containing approximately 6.3087 hectares.

Petitioner, failed to file a sworn statement specifically denying the matters therein or
setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot either deny or admit said matters. Thus,
Rolando filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. He alleged that there being no genuine
issue as to any material fact, and the issue of ownership raised by petitioner being sham
or fictitious, except as to the issue of damages. He is entitled to a summary judgment.
Rolando prayed that the complaint be dismissed, that the validity of the DOS as well as
his ownership and possession of the subject property be upheld. Almendras opposed the
summary judgment alleging that he was not personally served a copy of the Request for
Admission hereby rendering such defective. In the assailed March 28, 2011 Order, the
RTC held that contrary to petitioner's claim, he was in fact served a copy of the Motion
for Summary Judgment via registered mail and that he received a copy thereof on March
24, 2010 while his counsel was furnished a copy thereof on March 17, 2010. The RTC
also held that there was a faithful compliance on the notice of hearing requirement. It
noted that the motion was filed on June 29, 2010 while the hearing was scheduled on
July 9, 2010. Thus, it cannot be said that there was violation of Section 5, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court.

The RTC then concluded that by petitioner's failure to respond to the Request for
Admission, he was deemed to have admitted or impliedly admitted the matters specified
therein. In particular, petitioner is deemed to have admitted the fact that the property in

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 376
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
question had been validly sold to Rolando thereby rendering the complaint without any
cause of action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a Motion for Summary Judgment is applicable?

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court find it unnecessary to discuss the determination of


applicability of summary judgment. Petitioner went straight to this Court via Rule 45
when he had the more appropriate remedy of appealing before the CA. Hence, it would
be proper to conclude that petitioner had forgone his right to open the entire case for
review on any matter concerning a question of fact.

Quoting the rule of the High Court, “As the instant Petition was filed without resorting to a
more appropriate remedy before the CA, the same should be dismissed following our
ruling above.”

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 377
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
WILLIAM ANGHIAN SIY vs. ALVIN TOMLIN
G.R. No. 205998, 24 APRIL 2017

DOCTRINE: In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is
either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be
recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof,
wrongfully detains the same.

FACTS:

Petitioner Siy filed before RTC Quezon City a complaint for Recovery of Possession with
Prayer for Replevin against herein respondent.

He alleged that he is the owner of 2007 Range Rover with plate number ZMG 272 that
he purchased from Alberto Lopez III. Thereafter, he entrusted the vehicle Ong who is a
businessman involved in the second-hand car sales, after the latter claimed that he had
a prospective buyer. Ong failed to transmit the proceeds of the purported sale. He later
found out that the vehicle was transferred to Chua. Petitioner filed before QC
Anti-Carnapping Section. Ong met with petitioner upon learning of the complaint to
arrange the transfer of the vehicle. However, Ong still failed to return. As a result the
Highway Patrol Group took custody and impounded the vehicle. Petitioner thus prayed
for a writ of replevin be issued.

The respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to quash the Writ of Replevin, dismiss the
complaint and turnover the vehicle to him. He claimed to be the lawful and registered
owner of the vehicle. Also, he alleged that the manager’s check and affidavit of Lopez
containing the sale of the vehicle are insufficient to prove the ownership. RTC denied the
motion for failure to post a counterbond. On appeal, the CA granted the petition since the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction for failure of petitioner to pay the correct docket fees
and misdeclaring the real value of the vehilcle.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Replevin is proper

HELD:

No. In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either
the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered, and
that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the
same. The person need not be the owner as long as he specify and show his right to the
possession. Considering that he was no longer the owner or rightful possessor of the
subject vehicle at the time he filed Civil Case No. Q-11-69644 in July, 2011, petitioner
may not seek a return of the same through replevin. Quite the contrary, respondent, who

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 378
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
obtained the vehicle from Chua and registered the transfer with the Land Transportation
Office, is the rightful owner thereof, and as such, he is entitled to its possession.

For this reason, the CA was correct in decreeing the dismissal of Civil Case No.
Q-11-69644, although it erred in ordering the return of the vehicle to the PNP-HPG,
which had no further right to hold the vehicle in its custody. As the registered and rightful
owner of the subject vehicle, the trial court must return the same to respondent.

Since Ong was able to sell the subject vehicle to Chua, petitioner thus ceased to be the
owner thereof. Nor is he entitled to the possession of the vehicle; together with his
ownership, petitioner lost his right of possession over the vehicle. His argument that
respondent is a buyer in bad faith, when the latter nonetheless proceeded with the
purchase and registration of the vehicle on March 7, 2011, despite having been apprised
of petitioner’s earlier November, 2010 ‘‘Failed to Return Vehicle” report filed with the
PNP-HPG, is unavailing. Petitioner had no right to file said report, as he was no longer
the owner of the vehicle at the time; indeed, his right of action is only against Ong, for
collection of the proceeds of the sale.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 379
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
RODANTE F. GUYAMIN, LUCINIA F. GUYAMIN and EILEEN G. GATARIN vs.
JACINTO FLORES and MAXIMO FLORES, represented by RAMON FLORES
G.R. No. 202189, 25 APRIL 2017

DOCTRINE: As owners, respondents' substantive rights must be protected in the first


instance; they cannot be defeated by a resort to procedural hair-splitting that gets the
parties and this Court nowhere. The Court will not pretend to engage in a useless
discussion of the virtues of adhering strictly to procedure, when to do so would promote a
clear injustice and violation of respondents' substantive rights. More so when the result
would be the same, that is, petitioners would eventually and ultimately lose their case.
As applied to the instant case, in the language of then Chief Justice Querube Makalintal,
technicalities 'should give way to the realities of the situation'.

FACTS:
Respondents alleged that they are the owners of the subject property in this case.
They filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession against petitioners who are their
relatives occupying the property for years by mere tolerance. They reminded petitioners
to vacate because they will sell the property petitioners failed to vacate. The matter failed
to be settled in the barangay prompting the issuance of Certificate to File Action.
Summons was served to herein petitioners who refused to sign and acknowledge receipt.
This fact was noted in the court process server’s Return of Summons. Respondents
moved to Declare Defendants in Default for failure to file answer, which the court granted.
RTC ordered that petitioners vacate the property. On appeal, CA confirmed the decision
of RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in finding RTC was correct in declaring
defendants in default

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that both courts correctly ruled in declaring defendants in
default.
The filing of petitioners' answer prior to respondents' motion to declare them in default,
and the latter's filing of a reply, do not erase the fact that petitioners' answer is late.
Respondents' reply filed thereafter is, like the belated answer, a mere scrap of paper, as it
proceeds from the said answer.
Further, in this case, petitioners aim to win their case not on the merit, but on pure
technicality. Respondents remain to be the registered owner of the property and the tax
declaration in their names.
As owners of the subject property who have been deprived of the use thereof for so many
years owing to petitioners' continued occupation, and after all these years of giving
unconditionally to the petitioners who are their relatives, respondents must now enjoy the
fruits of their ownership. Respondents have been more than cordial in dealing with
petitioners; they have shown only respect and reverence to the latter, even to the extent
of using less offensive language in their complaint for fear of generating more enmity than
is required. Thus, instead of using "demand", respondents chose "'remind". The parties

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 380
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
being relatives and the context and circumstances being the way they are, the choice of
words is understandable. The Court will treat respondents' act as a polite demand;
indeed, the law never required a harsh or impolite demand but only a categorical one.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 381
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARLON SORIANO-NARAG
GR. NO. 216063, June 5, 2017

DOCTRINE:It has been held time and again that tactical findings of the trial court, its
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies
and the conclusions based on these tactical findings are to be given the highest respect
because it had the better opportunity to observe the witness first hand and note their
demeanor, conduct and altitude under grueling examination.

FACTS:
On the afternoon of February 9, 2004, appellant barged into the house of his uncle,
Perfecto Narag and proceeded to Perfecto’s room. While Perfecto was attempting to
close the door of his room upon learning the shout of his wife Ederlina to close the door
of his room, appellant grabbed his neck and immediately stabbed his chest while uttering
the words, “I will kill you”. Ederlina tried to stop the appellant from stabbing her husband
but he pushed her away and stabbed her instead at the right wrist and forehead. Despite
Ederlina and perfecto’s plea to stop his stabbing frenzy, but he paid no attention to his
pleas. Villamor, the tricycle driver in their employ came in and forced appellant returned
inside the room and stabbed Perfecto at the back again.
Appellant claimed that there had been long-standing bad blood between his family
and his deceased uncle, Perfecto, and that his family feud was caused by Perfecto’s
desire to deprive appellant’s mother of her legitimate share in the common residential
compound at Linao East, Tuguegarao City. He further claimed that on February 9, 2004,
Perfecto went near a store he was standing right inside the common residential
compound, that at distance at about five meters, Perfecto yelled at him to step outside;
that when he stepped outside their store, Perfecto swung his knife at him and injured his
knee; that he ran inside the kitchen and armed himself with a chisel; that when Perfecto
tried to hurt him again, he was able to stab his trust. After the stabbing incident, he
surrendered to Barangay Council man Benigno Lucas who brought him to the police
station in Anaturan, Tuguegarao City where he was investigated; and that afterwards, he
was brought to the hospital for treatment but said hospital did not issue a medical
certificate.
After trial, the RTC found him GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER as
defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as Amended by Republic Act No. 7659
and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without the possibility of
parole. Said accused was ordered likewise to pay the heirs of Perfecto Narag civil
indemnity, actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages and to pay the costs of
suit. Aggrieved, appellant sought recourse before the CA. The CA sustained the findings
of the RTC that Marlon’s guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. It nonetheless
modified the sums awarded by the RTC in concept of actual and exemplary damages.

ISSUE:
Whose testimonies are more credible, the Prosecution’s witnesses or the accused
appellant’s witnesses?

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
According to the Supreme Court, it is almost trite to say that the factual findings of
the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of
their testimonies and the conclusions drawn from these factual findings are accorded the
highest respect by the appellate court, whose revisory power and authority is limited to
the bare and cold records of the case. This explains why this court, which is not a trial
court, is loathe to re-examine and reevaluate the evidence that had been analyzed and
dissected by the trial court, and sustained and affirmed by the appellate court. In the
case at bench, we see no reason at all to overturn, the finding of facts and the
conclusions of law made by both the trial court and the appellate court relative to the fact
that treachery or alevosia in fact attended the stabbing-to-death of Perfecto by the
appellant at the time and place alleged in the information.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) vs. SPOUSES SENANDO F. SALVADOR and
JOSEFINA R. SALVADOR
GR. No: 205428, June 07, 2017

DOCTRINE: While it is true that the determination of the amount of just compensation is
within the court’s discretion, it should not be done arbitrarily or capriciously. Rather, it
must always be based on all established rules, upon correct legal principles and
competent evidence.

FACTS:
Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land with a total land area of
229 square meters, located in Kaingin St., Barangay Parada, Valenzuela City and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-77660.
On November 9, 2011, the Republic, represented by DPWH, filed a complaint before
the RTC for the expropriation of 83 square meters of said parcel of land as well as the
improvements thereon, for the construction of the C-5 Northern link Road Project Phase
2 (Segment 9) turn the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) to Mac-Arthur Highway.
On February 10, 2012, respondents received two checks from the DPWH
representing 100% of the total value of the subject property and the cost of the onestorey
semi-concrete residential house erected on the property amounting to P 161,850.00 and
P 523,449.22, respectively.
The RTC issued the corresponding writ of procession in favor of the Republic on the
same day, respondents manifested that they were no longer intending to claim any just
compensation. On August 23, 2012, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the Republic
condemning the subject property for the propose of implementing the construction of the
C-5 Northern Link Road Project Phase 2 (Segment 9) from NLEX to McArthur Highway,
Valenzuela City.
The RTC likewise directed the Republic to pay respondents consequential damages
equivalent to the value of the capital gains tax and other taxes necessary for the transfer
of the subject property in the Republic’s name. As a consequence, the Republic filed a
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court assailing the RTS’s August 23,
202 Decision and January 10, 2013 Order of denial of the Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the RTC correctly denied the Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration
for having been filed out of time.
2. Whether the capital gains tax on the transfer of the expropriated property can be
considered as consequential damages that may be awarded to respondents.

HELD:
Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that if a pleading is files by a
registered mail, x x x the date of mailing shall be considered as the date of filing. It does
not matter when the court actually receives the mailed pleading. In this case, the records
show that the Republic filed its Motion for Partial Reconsideration before the RTC via
registered mail on September 28, 2012. Although the trial court received the Republic’s

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
motion only on October 5, 2012, it should have considered the pleading to have been
filed on September 28, 2012, the date of its mailing which is clearly within the
reglementary period of 15 days to file said motion, counted from September 13,2012, on
the date of the Republic’s receipt of the assailed Decisions.
Henceforth, the RTC exceed in denying the Republic’s Motion for Partial
Reconsideration for having been filed out of time. On the second issue, the RTC
committed a serious error when it directed the Republic to pay respondents
consequential damages equivalent to the value of the capital gains tax and other taxes
necessary for the transfer of the subject property.
As far as the government is concerned, the capital gains tax in expropriation
proceedings remains a liability of the seller, as it is a tax on the seller’s gain from the sale
of real property.
Consequential damages are only awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the
remaining property of the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in value. In this
case, no evidence was submitted to prove any impairment or decrease in value of the
subject property as a result of the expropriations.
More significantly, given that the payment of capital gains tax on the transfer of the
subject property has no effect on the increase or decrease in value of the remaining
property, it can hardly be considered as consequential damages that may be awarded to
respondents.
The herein Petition for Review on Certiorari was GRANTED. The Decision dated
August 23, 2012 and the Order dated January 10, 2013 of the RTC, Branch 270,
Valenzuela City in Civil Case No. 175-V-11, were MODIFIED, in that the award of
consequential damages was DELETED. In addition, spouses Senando F. Salvador and
Josefina R. Salvador were ORDERED to pay for the capital gains tax due in the transfer
of the expropriated property.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, etc.; EUFEMIA CAMPOS CULLAMAT, etc.;
NORKAYA S MOHAMAD, etc.
vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, etc.
G.R. No. 231658, G.R. No. 231771, G.R No. 231774, July 4, 2017

DOCTRINE: As long as the President complies with all the requirements of Section 18, Article
VII, the existence of terrorism cannot prevent him from exercising his extraordinary power of
proclaiming martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. After all, the
extraordinary powers of the President are bestowed on him by the Constitution. No act of
congress can, therefore, curtail or diminish such powers.

FACTS:
On May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President RodrigoRoa Duterte
issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
On the President’s report to congress he explained the events which took placeon May 23,
2017 in Marawi City, which impelled him to declare a state of martial law and suspend the
privilege of writ of habeas corpus, to wit:
 At 1400H members of the Maute Group and ASG, along with theirsympathizers,
commenced their attack on various facilities – governmentand privately owned – in the
City of Marawi.
 At 1600H around fifty (50) armed criminals assaulted Marawi City Jailbeing managed
by the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP).
 The Maute Group forcibly entered the jail facilities, destroyed its maingate and
assaulted on-duty personnel. BJMP personnel were disarmed,tied and /or locked inside
the cells.
 The group took cellphones, personnel-issued firearms, and vehicles (i.etwo [2]
prisoner vans and private vehicles)
 By 1630H, the supply of power into Marawi City had been interrupted andsporadic
gunfights were heard and felt everywhere. By evening, the poweroutrage had spread
citywide. (As of May 24, 2017, Marawi City’s electricsupply was still cut off, plunging the
city into total black-out).
 From 1800H to 1900H the same members of the Maute Group ambushedand burned
the Marawi Police Station. A patrol car of the Police Stationwas also taken.
 A member of the Provincial Drug Enforcement Unit was killed thetakeover of the Marawi
City Jail. The Maute Group facilitated the escapeof at least sixty-eight (68) inmates of
the City Jail.
 The BJMP directed its personnel at the Marawi City Jail and other affectedareas to
evacuate.
 By evening of 23 May 2017, at least three (3) bridges in Lanao del Sur,namely, Lilod,
Bangulo and Sauiaran, fell under the control of thesegroups. They threatened to bomb
the bridges to pre-empt militaryreinforcements.
 As of 2222H, persons connected with the Maute Group had occupiedseveral areas in
Marawi City, including Naga Street, Bangolo Street,Mapandi, and Camp Keithly, as well
as the following barangays: BasakMalutlot, Mapandi Saduc, Lilod Maday, Bangon,
Saber, Bubong,Marantao, Caloocan, Banggolo, Barionaga and Abubakar.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
 These Lawless armed groups had likely set up road blockades andcheckpoints at the
Iligan City-Marawi City junction.
 Later in the evening, the Maute Group burned Dansalan CollegeFoundation,
Cathedral of Maria Auxiliadora, the nun’s quarters in thechurch, and the Shia Masjid
Moncado Colony. Hostages were taken fromthe church.
 About five (5) faculty members of Dansalan College Foundation had beenreportedly
killed by the lawless groups.
 Other educational institutions were also burned namely Senator NinoyAquino College
Foundation, the Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School.
 The Maute Group also attacked Amai Pakpak Hospital and hoisted theDAESH flag
there, among other several locations. As of 600H of 24 May2017, members of the
Maute Group were seen guarding the entry gates ofAmai Pakpak Hospital and took
over the PhilHealth office located thereat.
 The groups likewise laid siege to another hospital, Filipino-LibyanFriendship Hospital,
which they later set ablaze.
 Lawless armed groups likewise ransacked the Landbank of the Philippinesand
commandeered one of its armored vehicles.
 Latest information indicates that about seventy-five percent (75%) ofMarawi City has
been infiltrated by lawless armed groups composed ofmembers of the Maute group and
the ASG. As of the time of this Report,eleven (11) members of the Armed Forces and
the Philippine NationalPolice have been killed in action, while thirty-five (35) others have
beenseriously wounded.
 There are reports that these lawless armed groups are searching forChristian
communities in Marawi City to execute Christians. They are alsopreventing Maranaos
from leaving their homes and forcing young maleMuslims to join their groups.
 Based on various verified intelligence reports from the AFP and the PNP,there exists a
strategic mass action of lawless armed groups in MarawiCity, seizing public and private
facilitates, perpetrating killings ofgovernment personnel, and committing armed uprising
against and opendefiance of the government.

The unfolding of these events, as well as the classified reports he received, ledthe President
to conclude that these exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting to deprive the
President of his power, authority, and prerogatives within Marawi City as a precedent to
spreading their control over the entire Mindanao, in an attempt to undermine his control over the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices in the said area, defeat his mandate to ensure that
all laws are faithfully executed; and remove his supervisory powers over local governments .
After all the submission of the report and the briefings, the senate issued P.SResolution No.
388 and the House of Representatives, House Resolution No. 1050, expressing full support to
the martial law and finding Proclamation No. 216 “to be satisfactory, constitutional and in
accordance with the law.” Hence the Petitions.

A) G.R No. 231658 (Lagman Petition)


First, the Lagman Petition claimed that the declaration of martial law has nosufficient factual
basis because there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of Mindanao, It
argued that acts of terrorism in Mindanao do not constitute rebellion, since there is no proof that

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
its purpose is to remove Mindanao or any part thereof from allegiance to the Philippine, its law,
or its territory.
Second, the Lagman Petition claimed that the declaration of martial law hasno sufficient
factual basis because the President’s report contained “false, inaccurate, contrived and
hyperbolic accounts.”
Third, the Lagman Petition claimed that the declaration of martial law has nosufficient basis
since the President’s report mistakenly included the attacks in the military outpost in Butig,
Lanao del Sur on February 2016, the mass jail break in Marawi City in August 2016, the
Zamboanga Siege, the Davao marking bombing, the Mamasapano Carnage and other
bombings incidents in Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, and Basilan, as additional factual basis for the
proclamation of martial law. It contended that these events either took place long before the
conflict in Marawi City began, had long been resolved, or with the culprits having already been
arrested.
Fourth, the Lagman Petition claimed that the declaration of martial law hadno sufficient
factual basis considering that the President acted alone and did not consult the military
establishment or any ranking official before making the proclamation.
Finally, the Lagman Petition claimed that the President’s proclamation ofmartial law lacked
sufficient factual basis owning to the fact that during the presentation before the Committee of
the whole of the House of Representatives, it was shown that the military was even successful in
pre-empting the ASG and the Maute Group’s plan to take over Marawi city and other parts of
Mindanao; there was absence of any hostile plan by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front; and the
number of foreign fighters allied with ISIS was “”undetermined” which indicates that there are
only a meagre number of foreign fighters who can lend support to the Maute Group.

Based on the foregoing augmentation, the Lagman Petition asked the Courtto:
(1) exercise its specific and special jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of thefactual basis of
Proclamation No. 216; and
(2)render “a Decision voiding and nullifying Proclamation No. 216” for lackof sufficient
factual basis.

B) G.R. No. 231771 (Cullamat Petition)


The Cullamat Petition, “anchored on Section 18, Article VII” of theConstitution, likewise
sought the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 for being unconstitutional because there is
rebellion in Mindanao and that public safety warrants its declaration. It averred that the
supposed rebellion described in Proclamation No. 216 relates to events happening in Marawi
City only and not the entire region in Mindanao.
The Cullamat Petition claimed that the alleged “Capability of the MauteGroup and other
rebel groups to sow terror and cause death and damage to properly does not rise to the level of
rebellion sufficient to declare martial law in the whole Mindanao. It also pointed there is no
lawless violence in other parts of Mindanao similar to that in Marawi City.
Moreover, the Cullamat Petition assailed the inclusion of the phrases “otherrebel groups” in
the last whereas clause of Proclamation No. 216 for being vague as it failed to identify these
rebel groups and specify the acts of rebellion that they were supposedly waging.
In addition, the Cullamat Petition cited alleged inaccuracies, exaggerationsand falsities in
the reports of the President to congress.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
In time, the Cullamat Petition prayed for the court to declare Proclamation No.216 as
unconstitutional or in the alternative, should the court find justification for the declaration of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Marawi City, to
declare the same as unconstitutional in so far as its inclusion of the other parts of Mindanao.

C) G.R No. 231774 (Mohamad Petition)


The Mohamad Petition posited that martial law is a measure of lastresort and should be
involved by the President only offer exhaustion of less sever remedies. It contented that the
extraordinary powers of the President showed be dispersed sequentially, i.e first, the power to
call the armed forces; second, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
and finally, the power to declare. It maintained that the President has no discretion to choose
which extraordinary power to use; moreover, his choice must be dictated only by, and
commensurate to, the exigencies of the situation.
Mohamad Petition prayed for the Court to exercise its power to review,“compel respondents
to present proof on the factual basis of the declaration of martial and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao” and declare as unconstitutional Proclamation
No. 216 for lack of sufficient factual basis.
Comments were filed thereto and were consolidated. There were alsooral arguments on the
issues raised by the parties.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitions docketed as GR Nos 231658, 231771, and 231774 are the
“appropriate proceeding” covered by Paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
sufficient to invoke the mode of review required of this court when a declaration of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus is promulgated;
2. Whether or not the President in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus:
a. Is required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciationof facts;
b. Is required to obtain the favourable recommendation thereon of thesecretary of National
Defense;
c. Is required to take into account only the situation of the proclamation, evenif subsequent
events prove the situation to have not been accurately reported;
3. Whether or not the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis [of] the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
independent of the actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately;
4. Whether or not there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
a. What are the parameters for review?
b. Who has the burden of proof?
c. What is the threshold of evidence?
5. Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of
graduated powers granted the President as Commander-inChief, namely calling out powers,
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and declaration of martial law;
6. Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 may be considered vague and thus null
and void:
a. With its inclusion of “other rebel groups;” or

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
b. Since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameterswithin the entire
Mindanao region;
7. Whether or not the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of
the President to Congress are sufficient [bases]:
a. For the existence of actual rebellion; or
b. For a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of thewrit of habeas
corpus in the entire Mindanao region;
8. Whether or not terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are equivalent to actual rebellion and
the requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus; and
9. Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 will:
a. Have the effect of recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or
b. Also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quelllawless
violence in Marawi and other parts of the Mindanao region.

After the oral argument, the parties submitted their respective memoranda
andsupplemental memoranda.

HELD:
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution sets the parameters to determiningthe sufficiency
of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, “namely (1) actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the
exercise of such power without the concurrence of the two conditions, the President’s
declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must be
struck down.
In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only needs to convincehimself that
there is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was committed
or being committed.
For declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus to be
valid, there must be concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the public safety
requirement. In his report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG
and the Maute Group were directed not only against government forces or establishments but
likewise against civilians and their properties.
In addition and in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats were issued,road blockages
and checkpoints were set up, schools and churches were burned; civilian hostages were taken
and killed, non-Muslims or Christians were targeted; young male Muslims were forced to join
their group; medical services and delivery of basic services were hampered; reinforcements of
government troops and civilian movement were hampered; and the security of the entire
Mindanao Island were compromised.
These particular scenarios convinced the President that the atrocities hadalready escalated
to a level that risked public safety and thus impelled him to declare martial law and suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Based on the foregoing, the SC held that the parameters for the declaration ofmartial law
and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus have been properly and fully complied with.
Proclamation No. 216 has sufficient factual basis there being probable cause to believe that

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
rebellion exists and the public safety requires themartial law declaration and the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeascorpus.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
POLITICAL LAW

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
GLORIA G. HALLASGO, Municipal Treasurer of Damulog, Bukidnon vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) Regional Office No. X, ELIEZER ASOMBRADO, the
former vice-mayor of the Municipality of Damulog, Bukidnon, ALEJANDRO S.
BERDERA, a former member of Sangguniang Bayan and ULYSES TIRADO and
ARMANDO AYCO, members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Damulog, Bukidnon
G.R. No. 171340 | September 11, 2009

DOCTRINE: The oft-repeated phrase, “public office is a public trust” is not—and should
not be—mere hortatory cliché. A public servant is expected to exhibit, at all times, the
highest degree of honesty and integrity, and is accountable to all those he or she serves.
Public officers—particularly those in custody of public funds—are held to the highest
standards of ethical behavior in both their public and private conduct, and are expected
to uphold the public interest over personal interest at all times. It is in this spirit that we
convey our deep disdain for all those whose actions betray the trust and confidence
reposed in public officers, and those who attempt to conceal wrongdoing through
misdirection and blatantly belated explanations.

FACTS:
Petitioner was the Municipal Treasurer of Damulog, Bukidnon and was accused of
unauthorized withdrawal of monies of the public treasury amounting to malversation of
public funds by the outgoing and incumbent officials of the municipality. After preliminary
review of the documents presented to support the pertinent claims and defenses of the
parties, the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao requested the Commission on Audit,
to audit the records of the alleged anomalous transactions as it could not make a
complete evaluation of the issues without conducting an extensive audit.
After thorough investigation and recommendation of the CoA, the Office of the
Ombudsman finds that there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of grave
misconduct against Hallasgo. Misconduct in office implies a wrongful intention and not a
mere error of judgment. In the instant case, she appears to have used her expertise in
financial management to obfuscate the subject transactions for the purposes of
concealing financial anomalies. Her acts cannot be considered as done in good faith or
constituting only errors of judgment. It is to be emphasized that the tasks and functions of
a treasurer is highly fiduciary in nature. Public office is a public trust.
In the case of Hallasgo, a higher degree of standard is expected from her and this
Office finds that she has abjectly failed to live up to that standard. In grave misconduct,
as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest. All of these are
evident in the instant case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Hallasgo is guilty of grave misconduct

HELD:
Yes.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by
a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. It is a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty. Qualified by
the term "gross," it means conduct that is "out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant;
shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused."
As treasurer of the municipality, it is petitioner's duty to perform her
responsibilities diligently, faithfully, and efficiently. It behooves her to exercise the
highest degree of care over the custody, management, and disbursement of municipal
funds. Even if petitioner may have justified some of the transactions, these explanations
were belatedly done, effected only after being directed to do so by the audit team. This
purported atonement, undertaken as an afterthought accompanied by neither shame nor
remorse, cannot exonerate her from liability.
We are not convinced that the anomalies complained of are the result of mere
inadvertence, or that responsibility can so easily be shifted by petitioner to her
subordinates. On the contrary, her actions demonstrate her wanton and deliberate
disregard for the demands of public service. Petitioner's failure to ensure that
disbursements are properly documented or that cash advances granted to her are
properly and timely liquidated certainly deserves administrative sanction. In particular,
we wish to denounce petitioner's practice of having the municipality issue checks in her
name, ostensibly to get cash immediately and avoid a three day clearing period, only to
discover that petitioner never actually deposited the cash in the municipality's bank
account. This is a highly pernicious practice that this Court condemns in the strongest
possible terms.
It bears stressing that petitioner never bothered to explain what took place with
respect to the funds subject of LBP Check Nos. 15627907 (for P350,000.00) and
15627921 (for P380,000.00). In stark contrast with the staunch defense she launched for
other matters, she never thought to account for these checks, whether before the Office
of the Ombudsman, the CA, or this Court. She cannot abdicate responsibility for the
checks by claiming that it was the audit team's duty to undertake forensic analysis to
uncover how these funds were spent. Rather, as treasurer, she should have deposited
the funds as she was tasked to do, and subsequently accounted for the use of said
funds.
All these collectively constitute gross misconduct. Pursuant to Section 52, Rule IV of
the Civil Service Rules, gross misconduct is a grave offense punishable with dismissal
for the first offense, without prejudice to the Ombudsman's right to file the appropriate
criminal case against the petitioner or other responsible individuals. We are, of course,
aware that in several administrative cases, this Court has refrained from strictly imposing
the penalties provided by the law, in light of mitigating factors such as the offending
employee's length of service, acknowledgment of his or her infractions and feeling of
remorse, family circumstances, advanced age, and other equitable considerations.
However, we find that petitioner's recalcitrant refusal to explain the use (or misuse) of the
more than P700,000.00 in cash placed in her possession makes her unworthy of such
humanitarian consideration, and merits the most serious penalty provided by law.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 394
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
RONNIE H. LUMAYNA, ROMEO O. CHULANA, HELEN A. BONHAON,PETER
G. LAHINA, JR.,JUANITO O. LICHNACHAN, JR.,SAMMY C. CHANG
AGAN,BONIFACIO L. BAICHON, REYNALDO B. UCHAYAN,JOHN L.
MARTIN,AUGUSTA C. PANITO,ROSENDO P. BONGYO, JR.,KLARISA MAE
C. CHAWANA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,PERALTA,vs. DEL CASTILLO,
and COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 185001 | September 25, 2009

DOCTRINE: Factual findings of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of
expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial
showing that such findings were made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence
presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of stability of the governmental
structure, should not be disturbed.

FACTS:
The Department of Budget and Management issued Local Budget Circular No.
74[4], authorizing the grant of maximum of 5% salary adjustment to personnel in the
local government units. Pursuant to the issuance, the Sanggunian of Mayoyao, Ifugao
enacted Resolution no. 41 approving their 2002 Annual Municipal Budget. They adopted
a first class salary scheme for the municipality and implementing the 5% salary increase
for its personnel. For this purpose, a resolution again was enacted to re-align its
approved budget.
On the following year, DBM issued Local Budget Circular No. 75[12] (LBC No. 75)
providing guidelines on personal services limitation, pursuant to Section 325(a) of the
Local Government Code. In pursuant to LBC N. 75, the Sanggunian enacted another
resolution approving its Annual Municipal Budget for 2003. However, the
SanggunianPanlalawigan disallowed the 5% salary increase and re-alignment of funds
on the ground that the re-alignment is not sufficient to implement a salary increase. Upon
request for the SanggunianPanllawigan to reconsider, finding good faith on the part of
the officials of the Municipality, it reconsidered its earlier position.
Meanwhile, the Regional Legal and Adjudication Office (RLAO) of the
COA-Cordillera Administrative Region (COA-CAR) issued a Notice of Disallowance
dated 16 May 2003 of the amount of P895,891.50, representing payments for salary
increases of municipal personnel, for the period 15 February - 30 September 2002.
According to COA-CAR, the grant of the increase was not in accordance with Sections
325 and 326 of the LGC; that the limitation on personal services had been exceeded;
and that the Sangguniang Bayan resolution was not the appropriate manner of granting
the increase. Therefore, those who received the salary increase for said period were
ordered to refund the same.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
disallowance of the amount of P895,891.50, representing the 5% salary increase of the
personnel of the municipality of Mayoyao for the period 15 February to 30 September
2002, and in ordering petitioners to refund the same.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 395
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
Yes.
At the outset, it must be stressed that factual findings of administrative bodies
charged with their specific field of expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts, and
in the absence of substantial showing that such findings were made from an erroneous
estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of stability
of the governmental structure, should not be disturbed.
In this case, the assailed Decisions of the COA clearly presented the factual
findings and adequately explained the legal basis for disallowing the said amount.
Indeed, as computed by Ms. Virginia Farro, the Provincial Budget Officer of Ifugao, the
annual budget of Mayoyao for 2002 exceeded the limit for personal services as
prescribed in Section 325(a) of the LGC by P3,944,568.05. Further, it was established
that the grant of the increase through the adoption of higher salary class schedule is not
among the list of items and activities whereby the limitation for personal services may be
waived pursuant to LBC No. 75. Finally, the municipality adopted the salary rates under
LBC No. 69 and not the salary rates under LBC No. 74. No grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction can thus be attributed to respondent COA.
Grave abuse of discretion exists where an act of a court or tribunal is performed with a
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an invasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law - mere abuse of discretion is not enough.
Although the 5% salary increase exceeded the limitation for appropriations for
personal services in the Municipality of Mayoyao, this alone is insufficient to overthrow
the presumption of good faith in favor of petitioners as municipal officials. It must be
mentioned that the disbursement of the 5% salary increase of municipal personnel was
done under the color and by virtue of resolutions enacted pursuant to LBC No. 74, and
was made only after the SangguniangPanlalawigan declared operative the 2002
municipal budget. In fact, the Notice of Disallowance was issued only on 16 May 2003,
after the municipality had already implemented the salary increase. Moreover, in its
Resolution No. 2004-1185,[38] the SangguniangPanlalawigan reconsidered its prior
disallowance of the adoption of a first class salary schedule and 5% salary increase of
the Municipality of Mayoyao based on its finding that the municipal officials concerned
acted in good faith.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 396
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LEAH M. NAZARENO, et. alvs. CITY OF DUMAGUETE, represented by CITY
MAYOR AGUSTIN PERDICES, DOMINADOR DUMALAG, JR., ERLINDA
TUMONGHA, JOSEPHINE MAE FLORES AND ARACELI CAMPOS
G.R. No. 181559 | October 2, 2009

DOCTRINE: The integrity and reliability of our civil service is, perhaps, never more
sorely tested than in the impassioned demagoguery of elections. Amidst the struggle of
personalities, ideologies, and platforms, the vigor and resilience of a professional civil
service can only be preserved where our laws ensure that partisanship plays no part in
the appointing process. Consequently, we affirm the validity of a regulation issued by the
Civil Service Commission (CSC or the Commission) intended to ensure that
appointments and promotions in the civil service are made solely on the basis of
qualifications, instead of political loyalties or patronage.

FACTS:
Agustin R. Perdices won over incumbent Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo for the
mayoralty post and he was to assume office on June 30, 2001. But before Perdices’
assumption, Remollo made fifteen (15) promotional appointments, and seventy-four (74)
original appointments for various positions in the city government. However, the
appointments made by Remollo were dishonored by Mayor Perdices.
Leah M. Nazareno, et al, filed with the RTC of Dumaguete City a Petition for
Mandamus, Injunction and Damages against the City of Dumaguete, represented by
Mayor Remollo. On the other hand, the Director of the Civil Service Commission Field
Ofice, Director Abucejo (CSCFO) invalidated and revoked the questioned appointments
as they were issued in violation of the guidelines set forth by the CSC.
RTC issued a writ of prelim injunction against the City Government pending the
final adjudication of the case. The court reversed Director Abucejo’s on the ground that
the questioned appointments may only be invalidated by the Regional Office upon
recommendation by the CSCFO. City of Dumaguete claimed that Director Abucejo’s
decision already became final after petitioner’s failed to move for reconsideration of the
same. They moved for the dismissal of the injunction case. RTC denied the motion to
dismiss but agreed with the finality of the decision. It permanently lifted the preliminary
injunction.
Nazareno et al, appealed to the CA. The appeal was denied and dismissed by the
court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for injunction filed by Nazareno et al. is premature.

HELD:
Yes.
Nazareno et al. prematurely filed the injunction because there was still no
invalidation of their appointments. The filing was only prompted by Mayor Perdices’
announcement that he was dishonoring the appointments made by former mayor
Remollo. The invalidation only took place on August 1, 2001. After the invalidation, they
could still file an appeal with the CSC Regional Office. Thus, they had ample

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 397
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
administrative remedies under the law to protect their rights but they chose to go straight
to the regular courts.Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights, and
as such, the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is no
ground for injunction.
The Court refused to rule on the validity of the appointments since it was the
subject of a separate petition for review before the Court of Appeals.Thus, it held that
there was no need for the separate case of injunction since Nazareno et al. are given by
law and related rules adequate remedies to protect their rights and interests.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 398
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
EUGENIO S. CAPABLANCA versus CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 179370 | November 18, 2009

DOCTRINE: Uniformed members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) are considered
employees of the National Government, and all personnel of the PNP are subject to civil
service laws and regulations. Petitioner cannot evade liability under the pretense that
another agency has primary jurisdiction over him. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction is
conferred only by the Constitution or the law. When it clearly declares that a subject
matter falls within the jurisdiction of a tribunal, the party involved in the controversy must
bow and submit himself to the tribunal on which jurisdiction is conferred.

FACTS:
PNP-Regional Office 10 appointed petitioner Eugenio S. Capablanca into the
PNP service with the rank of Police Officer 1 (PO1) with a temporary status and was
assigned at the PNP Station in Butuan City. The petitioner took the PNP Entrance
Examination conducted by the National Police Commission and passed the same. He
also took the Career Service Professional Examination-Computer Assisted Test
(CSP-CAT) given by the Civil Service Commission and likewise passed the same.
Thereafter, the Regional Director of Police Regional Office XIII conferred upon petitioner
the permanent status as PO1.
The CSC Caraga Regional Office XIII through its Regional Director informed PO1
Capablanca about certain alleged irregularities relative to the CSP-CAT which he took
on July 28, 2000. According to the CSC, the "person in the picture pasted in the Picture
Seat Plan (PS-P) is different from the person whose picture is attached in the Personal
Data Sheet (PDS)" and that the signature appearing in the PS-P was different from the
signature affixed to the PDS.The CSC further informed petitioner that such findings of
alleged examination irregularities constituted the offense of dishonesty if prima facie
evidence was established.
During the preliminary investigation, petitioner failed to appear but was
represented by counsel who moved to dismiss the proceedings. He argued that it is the
NAPOLCOM which has sole authority to conduct entrance and promotional
examinations for police officers to the exclusion of the CSC, pursuant to Civil Service
Commission v. Court of Appeals. Thus, the CSP-CAT conducted on July 28, 2000 was
void. Moreover, he alleged that the administrative discipline over police officers falls
under the jurisdiction of the PNP and/or NAPOLCOM.
The CSC Caraga held that there was no dispute that it was the NAPOLCOM
which had the sole authority to conduct the entrance and promotional examinations of
police officers. However, since petitioner submitted a CSC Career Service Professional
eligibility and not a NAPOLCOM eligibility to support his appointment on a permanent
status, then the CSC had jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CSC Caraga has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation of a possible administrative case of dishonesty against PO1 Capablanca for
alleged CSP examination irregularity.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 399
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
Yes
The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, is mandated to
establish a career service, to strengthen the merit and rewards system, and to adopt
measures to promote morale, efficiency and integrity in the civil service. The civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
Specifically, Section 91 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6975 (1990) or the "Department of
Interior and Local Government Act of 1990" provides that the "Civil Service Law and its
implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department," to
which herein petitioner belongs.
In addition, Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and
Regulations specifically confers upon the CSC the authority to take cognizance over any
irregularities or anomalies connected with the examinations, thus:
Sec. 28. The Commission shall have original disciplinary jurisdiction over all its
officials and employees and over all cases involving civil service examination
anomalies or irregularities.

To carry out this mandate, the CSC issued Resolution No. 991936, or the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, empowering its Regional Offices to
take cognizance of cases involving CSC examination anomalies:
SECTION 6. Jurisdiction of Civil Service Regional Offices. - The Civil Service
Commission Regional Offices shall have jurisdiction over the following cases:
A. Disciplinary
1. Complaints initiated by, or brought before, the Civil Service Commission
Regional Offices provided that the alleged acts or omissions were committed
within the jurisdiction of the Regional Office, including Civil Service examination
anomalies or irregularities and the persons complained of are employees of
agencies, local or national, within said geographical areas;
x xxx
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it
initiated the conduct of a preliminary investigation on the alleged civil service
examination irregularity committed by the petitioner.
It has already been settled in Cruz v. Civil Service Commission[30] that the
appellate power of the CSC will only apply when the subject of the administrative cases
filed against erring employees is in connection with the duties and functions of their
office, and not in cases where the acts of complainant arose from cheating in the civil
service examinations. Thus:
Petitioner's invocation of the law is misplaced. The provision is applicable to
instances where administrative cases are filed against erring employees in connection
with their duties and functions of the office. This is, however, not the scenario
contemplated in the case at bar. It must be noted that the acts complained of arose from
a cheating caused by the petitioners in the Civil Service (Subprofessional) examination.
The examinations were under the direct control and supervision of the Civil Service
Commission. The culprits are government employees over whom the Civil Service
Commission undeniably has jurisdiction. x xx

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 400
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
EVELYN S. CABUNGCAL, ELVIRA J. CANLAS, MARIANITA A. BULANAN,
REMEDIOS S. DE JESUS, and NUNILON J. MABINI, versus SONIA R. LORENZO, et.
Al
G.R. No. 160367 | December 18, 2009

DOCTRINE: As a rule, judicial intervention is allowed only after exhaustion of


administrative remedies. This principle goes hand-in-hand with the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, which precludes courts from resolving, in the first instance, controversies
falling under the jurisdiction of administrative agencies. Courts recognize that
administrative agencies are better equipped to settle factual issues within their specific
field of expertise because of their special skills and technical knowledge. For this reason,
a premature invocation of the court's judicial power is often struck down, unless it can be
shown that the case falls under any of the applicable exceptions.

FACTS:
The Sangguiniang Bayan of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija issued Resolution No27
declaring the reorganization of all offices of the municipal government which was
approved by the SangguinangPanlalawigan.
Pursuant to the resolution, the Municipal Mayor issued a memorandum informing
all employees of the municipal government, all positions were deemed vacant and that
all employees must file their respective applications for the newly created positions listed
in the approved staffing pattern. Otherwise, they would not be considered for any of the
newly created positions. Instead of submitting their applications, petitioners filed a
petition for prohibition and mandamus with application for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction and restraining order. Also, they alleged that they were permanent employees
of the Rural Health Unit with corresponding salary grade and date of employment.
While the case was pending, Mayor Sonia R. Lorenzo issued a letter terminating
the services of those who did not re-apply as well as those who were not selected for the
new positions.The CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit citing
that the assailed acts of respondents are clearly authorized under Section 76 of the
Local Government Code of 1991. Likewise, it ruled that the reorganization is justified for
it creates budgetary savings. Petitioners contend that the Decision and Resolution of the
CA were not in accordance with Republic Act (RA) No. 6656, otherwise known as "An
Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the
Implementation of Government Reorganization", specifically Section 2 thereof and RA
7305, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta of Health Workers". Respondents, for their
part, argue that petitioners' separation from service was a result of a valid reorganization
done in accordance with law and in good faith.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners' automatic resort to the Court of Appeals is proper.

HELD:
No.
Section 4 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99, states that:

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 401
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. - The Civil Service
Commission shall hear and decide administrative cases instituted by, or brought
before it, directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and shall review
decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it.
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service
Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation
and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all
matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and
employees. (Emphasis supplied)

Pursuant to the foregoing provision, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of
the Government, has jurisdiction over disputes involving the removal and separation of
all employees of government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Simply
put, it is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.
In this case, petitioners are former local government employees whose services were
terminated due to the reorganization of the municipal government under Resolution Nos.
27 and 80 of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. Considering that they
belong to the civil service, the CSC has jurisdiction over their separation from office.
Even the laws upon which petitioners anchor their claim vest jurisdiction upon the
CSC. Under RA 6656 and RA 7305, which were cited by the petitioners in their petition, it
is the CSC which determines whether an employee's dismissal or separation from office
was carried out in violation of the law or without due process. Accordingly, it is also the
CSC which has the power to reinstate or reappoint an unlawfully dismissed or terminated
employee.
The case does not fall either under any of the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion
of administrative remedies. The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies provides
that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies to give the administrative agency
an opportunity to decide the matter and to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to
the courts. This, however, is not an ironclad rule as it admits of exceptions, viz:
1. when there is a violation of due process;
2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction;
4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
5. when there is irreparable injury;
6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and
11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions. Petitioners' filing of a
petition for mandamus and prohibition with the CA was premature. It bears stressing that

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 402
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
the remedies of mandamus and prohibition may be availed of only when there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Moreover, being extraordinary remedies, resort may be had only in cases of extreme
necessity where the ordinary forms of procedure are powerless to afford relief.
Thus, instead of immediately filing a petition with the CA, petitioners should have first
brought the matter to the CSC which has primary jurisdiction over the case. Thus, we
find that the CA correctly dismissed the petition but not the grounds cited in support
thereof. The CA should have dismissed the petition for non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 403
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MANUEL N. MAMBA et al. vs. EDGAR R. LARA et al.
G.R. No. 165109, December 14, 2009

DOCTRINE: Decision to entertain a taxpayer’s suit is discretionary upon the Court. When
the issue hinges on the illegal disbursement of public funds, a liberal approach should be
preferred as it is more in keeping with truth and justice.

FACTS:
The SangguniangPanlalawigan of Cagayan passed a resolution authorizing
Governor Edgar R. Lara to engage the services of and appoint Preferred Ventures
Corporation as financial advisor or consultant for the issuance and flotation of bonds to
fund the priority projects of the governor without cost and commitment. It also ratified the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) entered into by Gov. Lara and Preferred Ventures
Corporation which provides that the provincial government of Cagayan shall pay
Preferred Ventures Corporation a one-time fee of 3% of the amount of bonds floated. In
addition, the SangguniangPanlalawigan, authorized Gov. Lara to negotiate, sign and
execute contracts or agreements pertinent to the flotation of the bonds of the provincial
government in an amount not to exceed P500 million for the construction and
improvement of his priority projects, including the construction of the New Cagayan
Town Center, to be approved by the SangguniangPanlalawigan. Subsequently, Lara
issued the Notice of Award to Asset Builders Corporation, giving to the latter the
planning, design, construction and site development of the town center project.

Petitioners Manuel N. Mamba, Raymund P. Guzman and Leonides N. Fausto filed


a Petition for Annulment of Contracts and Injunction with prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the respondents (Gov. Lara et
al.). The RTC, however, dismissed their petition on the grounds that the (1) petitioners
have no locus standi to file a case as they are not party to the contract and (2) that the
controversy is in the nature of a political question, thus, the court can’t take cognizance of
it.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi to sue as taxpayers
 Whether or not the controversy is in the nature of a political question

HELD:

 Yes, the petitioners have legal standing to sue as taxpayers.


 No, the controversy is not a political question but a justiciable one.

A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed, or that the public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.

For a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites must be met: (1) public funds derived
from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a
law is violated or some irregularity is committed and (2) the petitioner is directly affected
by the alleged act.

In the case at bar, although the construction of the town center would be primarily
sourced from the proceeds of the bonds, which respondents insist are not taxpayers’
money, a government support in the amount of P187 million would still be spent for paying
the interest of the bonds. The governor requested the SangguniangPanlalawigan to
appropriate an amount of P25 million for the interest of the bond. So clearly, the first
requisite has been met.

As to the second requisite, the Supreme Court explained that the court, in recent
cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test bearing in mind that locus standi is a
procedural technicality. By invoking transcendental importance, paramount public
interest, or far-reaching implications, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to sue
even if they failed to show direct injury. In cases where serious legal issues were raised or
where public expenditures of millions of pesos were involved, the court did not hesitate to
give standing to taxpayers.

It argued that, to protect the interest of the people and to prevent taxes from being
squandered or wasted under the guise of government projects, a liberal approach must
be adopted in determining locus standi in public suits.

A political question is a question of policy, which is to be decided by the people in their


sovereign capacity or by the legislative or the executive branch of the government to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated. A justiciable question on the other
hand, calls upon the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies wherein there are
rights involved which are legally demandable and enforceable. It is one which is proper to
be examined or decided in courts of justice because its determination would not involve
an encroachment upon the legislative or executive power. In simple terms, a political
question refers to the wisdom, while a justiciable question refers to the legality of the acts
complained of.

In the case at bar, the issues raised in the petition do not refer to the wisdom but to the
legality of the acts complained of. Thus, the Supreme Court found the instant controversy
within the ambit of judicial review.

Also, in the present case, petitioners alleged grave abuse of discretion and clear
violations of law by public respondents. They put in issue the overpriced construction of
the town center; the grossly disadvantageous bond flotation; the irrevocable assignment
of the provincial governments annual regular income, including the IRA, to respondent
RCBC to cover and secure the payment of the bonds floated; and the lack of consultation

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 405
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
and discussion with the community regarding the proposed project, as well as a proper
and legitimate bidding for the construction of the town center.

Thus, the high court said that, even if the issues were political in nature, it would still
come within their powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon them
by Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine
whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been
committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 406
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
THEMISTOCLES A. SAÑO, JR vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF DULAG, LEYTE, FERDINAND A. SERRANO, in his
capacity as Acting Chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Dulag, Leyte, and
MANUEL SIA QUE
G.R. No. 182221, February 3, 2010

DOCTRINE: Issues raised by the petitioner were not proper for a pre-proclamation
controversy. As we explained, claims that contested election returns are obviously
manufactured or falsified must be evident from the face of the said documents
themselves.

FACTS:
Saño alleged that after the casting and counting of votes, at about midnight of
May 14, 2007, a man was seen carrying a ballot box that was not locked; he then
inserted certain documents in said ballot box, took the aluminum seal, sealed the box,
and then turned it over to the Reception Group which happened to several precincts.
During the canvassing at the Dulag Municipal Hall, Saño sought to have the
contested ERs excluded on the following grounds: massive fraud, illegal proceedings,
and tampered/falsified and obviously manufactured returns.
Saño, through counsel, then verbally moved for the inhibition of Camposano as
MBOC Chairman but declined to inhibit herself until she was ordered to do so by her
superiors.
Saño filed his written Petition for Inhibition together with the affidavit of Lazar,
reiterating his request for the inhibition of the MBOC Chair.At midnight of May 16, 2007,
Camposano inhibited herself and declared the canvassing temporarily adjourned
At around 5:00 p.m. of May 17, 2007, Saño received a copy of the COMELEC
Regional Office's Memorandum designating Ferdinand Serrano as the Acting Election
Officer and MBOC Chairperson. Serrano verbally ruled that the contested ERs would be
opened. Serrano promised that this ruling would be put in writing within 24 hours.
Saño claimed that instead of suspending the canvass as required by law and the
canvassing rules, Serrano proceeded to hastily open and canvass the contested ERs.
Despite the filing of petitioner's Notice of Appeal, and the fact that the exclusion of the
contested ERs would materially affect the results of the election, the MBOC neither
made a written ruling nor elevated the appeal to the COMELEC together with the
MBOC's report and records of the case. Instead, the MBOC proclaimed Que as
Municipal Mayor.
On May 28, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation and/or
Proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Dulag, Leyte, before the
COMELEC. año argued that the MBOC violated Section 20, Republic Act No. 7166 and
Section 39 of COMELEC Resolution No. 7859. Petitioner also sought to exclude the
contested ERs from the canvass, on the ground that these were tampered with or
obviously manufactured. Finally, he also sought that he be declared and proclaimed,

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 407
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
after the exclusion of the contested ERs, as the winning candidate for the position of
Municipal Mayor.
COMELEC issued its Resolution dated October 3, 2007 upholding the
proclamation of Que. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by
the COMELEC En Banc. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the allegations raised by petitioner on the contested ERs are not proper
in a pre-proclamation controversy.

HELD:
Yes. It is settled that a pre-proclamation controversy is summary in character; indeed, it
is the policy of the law that pre-proclamation controversies be promptly decided, so as not to
delay canvass and proclamation. The Board of Canvassers will not look into allegations of
irregularity that are not apparent on the face of ERs that appear otherwise authentic and duly
accomplished.
Consistent with the summary character and limited scope of a pre-proclamation
controversy, Section 20 of RA 7166 lays down the procedure to be followed when ERs
are contested before the BOC. Compliance with this procedure is mandatory, so as to
permit the BOC to resolve the objections as quickly as possible.
Based on the records of this case, we find that petitioner failed to timely make his
objections to the contested ERs. Only one written petition for exclusion was filed for the
five contested ERs at 6:50 p.m.of May 15, 2007. Of course the law does not intend that
election lawyers submit their written objections at exactly the same second as their oral
manifestation; however, a lapse of over 12 hours, long after the ERs have been
presented for canvass, is simply inexplicable and unacceptable.
While we are willing to overlook the procedural lapses committed by the petitioner
his manifestation and subsequent Notice of Appeal do not serve to overturn the assailed
Resolutions. We find that the MBOC did not err in proclaiming the private respondent,
since the unsubstantiated issues raised by the petitioner were not proper for a
pre-proclamation controversy. As we explained, claims that contested ERs are obviously
manufactured or falsified must be evident from the face of the said documents
themselves. But counsel for petitioner herself admitted that "on their face", the ERs were
"okey". Contrary to petitioner's passionate remonstrations, there is absolutely no
indication that the contested ERs were falsified or tampered with. As such, there was no
valid ground to delay the proclamation.To justify the exclusion of election returns, the
allegations that the election returns were obviously manufactured must be evident from
the face of the said documents.
Essentially, petitioner argues that the contested ERs cannot be trusted because
all five of the contested ERs were prepared by one person; thus, no copy of the return
can be trusted and there must be a recount of the ballots.Unfortunately, petitioner has
failed to substantiate these allegations.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 408
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Unlike a pre-proclamation controversy, the annulment proceedings before the
COMELEC were not summary in character; petitioner had every opportunity to ventilate
his case and substantiate his allegations before the Commission below. This
notwithstanding, petitioner failed to present any evidence sufficient to overcome the
presumption that the contested ERs were valid.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 409
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
CITY OF ILOILO represented by HON. JERRY P. TREÑAS, City Mayor vs.
HON. LOLITA CONTRERAS-BESANA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 32, and ELPIDIO JAVELLANA
G.R. No. 168967, February 12, 2010

DOCTRINE: Just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which


usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the
institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.

FACTS:
In an expropriation case filed by petitioner against private respondent (Javellana),
the plaintiff was able to take possession of two parcels of land owned by Javellana for the
purpose of making the said lots the site for Lapaz High School. A writ of possession was
issued to plaintiff after it allegedly made a deposit of the amount of the value of the said
lots (Php 40,000). Such was issued by the trial court in an order dated May 17, 1983.
On April 2000, private respondent found out that the amount of Php 40,000 was
not eposited by the petitioner when he tried to withdraw the said amount (as proved by a
certification issued by the PNB). When no amicable resolution and a negotiated sale was
successful, he (Javellana) filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession, Fixing and
Recovery of Rental and Damages. He alleged that since he was not compensated for the
expropriation of his property, the possession by the plaintiff was illegal. This argument
was opposed by the petitioner, claiming that Javellana can no longer file an action for the
recovery of the possession of the lots since the same was already utilized for public use,
therefore can only demand for the payment of just compensation.
The RTC then issued an order (2003 order) which nullified the 1983 order, ordering
the petitioner to immediately deposit the 10% of the just compensation after determining
the value of the property at the time the complaint was filed. This was amended six
months later (2004 order), changing the reckoning point from the time of the filing of the
complaint to the date of the issuance of this order. A motion for reconsideration was filed
by the petitioner, arguing that there was no legal basis for its issuance. This was denied
by the trial court, ruling that since no deposit was made, the reckoning point for the
determination of the fair market value of the property should be the date of the issuance of
the order.
On April 15, 2004, the commission created for this case submitted a report
determining estimates of the fair market value of the properties in question in different
reckoning points.
Petitioner assailed the aforementioned orders claiming that the trial court gravely
abused its discretion in overturning the 1983 order which was already final and executory,
and that the just compensation for the expropriation should be based on the fair market
value of the property at the time of the taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint.
Private respondent argued that there was no error committed by the trial court, and that
the said orders were subject to amendment and nullification at the court’s discretion.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 410
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reckoning point of the determination of just compensation is
ascertained as of the time of the taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint.

HELD:
Petitioner claims that the computation should be made as of September 18, 1981,
the date when the expropriation complaint was filed. We agree.
In a long line of cases, we have constantly affirmed that: x x x just compensation is
to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action
precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time
of the filing of the complaint.
When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing
of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of
the date of the filing of the complaint. Even under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of
Procedure, under which the complaint for expropriation was filed, just compensation is to
be determined "as of the date of the filing of the complaint." Here, there is no reason to
depart from the general rule that the point of reference for assessing the value of the
Subject Property is the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation.
Private respondent claims that the reckoning date should be in 2004 because of
the "clear injustice to the private respondent who all these years has been deprived of the
beneficial use of his properties."
We commiserate with the private respondent. The school was constructed and has
been in operation since 1985. Petitioner and the residents of Iloilo City have long reaped
the benefits of the property. However, non-payment of just compensation does not entitle
the private landowners to recover possession of their expropriated lot.
Concededly, Javellana also slept on his rights for over 18 years and did not bother
to check with the PNB if a deposit was actually made by the petitioner. Evidently, from his
inaction in failing to withdraw or even verify the amounts purportedly deposited, private
respondent not only accepted the valuation made by the petitioner, but also was not
interested enough to pursue the expropriation case until the end. As such, private
respondent may not recover possession of the Subject Property, but is entitled to just
compensation. It is high time that private respondent be paid what was due him after
almost 30 years.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 411
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ROSE MARIE D. DOROMAL vs. HERNAN G. BIRON and COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 181809, February 17, 2010

DOCTRINE: While Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6646 authorizes the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to make use of the certificate of votes to prove tampering,
alteration, falsification or any anomaly committed in the election returns, this
presupposes that the certificate of votes was accomplished in accordance with Section
16 of said law.—The certificate of votes, which contains the number of votes obtained by
each candidate, is issued by the BEI upon the request of a duly accredited watcher
pursuant to Section 16 of RA 6646. Relative to its evidentiary value, Section 17 of said
law provides—Sec. 17. Certificate of Votes as Evidence.—The provisions of Sections
235 and 236 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 notwithstanding, the certificate of votes shall
be admissible in evidence to prove tampering, alteration, falsification or any anomaly
committed in the election returns concerned, when duly authenticated by testimonial or
documentary evidence presented to the board of canvassers by at least two members of
the board of election inspectors who issued the certificate: Provided, That failure to
present any certificate of votes shall not be a bar to the presentation of other evidence to
impugn the authenticity of the election returns. While the above-quoted provision
authorizes the COMELEC to make use of the certificate of votes to prove tampering,
alteration, falsification or any anomaly committed in the election returns, this
presupposes that the certificate of votes was accomplished in accordance with Section
16.

FACTS:
Petitioner Rose Marie D. Doromal (Doromal) and private respondent Hernan G. Biron
(Biron) were the vice mayoralty candidates for the Municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo in the
May 14, 2007 elections. During the canvassing of votes, Biron orally objected to the
inclusion of 25 election returns. Biron anchored his objections to the inclusion of the 21
returns on the alleged missing taras in Copy 4 of the contested returns, which he
obtained as the standard bearer of LAKAS-CMD, the recognized dominant majority party
in said elections. As regards the remaining four contested returns, Biron opposed their
inclusion allegedly because there was a discrepancy between the number of votes stated
in the said returns and those stated in the certificate of votes issued by the Board of
Election Inspectors (BEI). In view thereof, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC)
deferred the canvassing of the said returns. Thereafter, Biron filed his written objections
and supporting evidence.
On May 18, 2007, the MBC denied the petitions for exclusion. It found that there
was no tampering on the number of taras for Doromal in the copy of the election return for
the MBC. It also held that the copy of the election return of the MBC was complete with no
material defect and duly signed and thumbmarked by the BEIs.

Aggrieved, Biron appealed to the COMELEC. The case was docketed as SPC No.
07-147 and raffled to the Second Division. Pending the resolution of the appeal, the
proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate was ordered suspended.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
On September 12, 2007, the COMELEC Second Division, voting 2-1, issued a
Resolution partially granting Biron’s appeal. It ordered the exclusion of only 11 contested
election returns while at the same time ordered the inclusion of the remaining 14 election
returns in the canvassing of votes.
The COMELEC Second Division ordered the exclusion of the 11 election returns
(subject returns) because the same were allegedly tampered or falsified. It held that eight
of the 11 subject returns showed that the taras were either closed on the third or fourth
vote, instead of on the fifth vote, resulting in a discrepancy between the number
of tarasvis-à-vis the written figures and words in the said returns. With regard to the
remaining three returns, the Second Division noted a glaring dissimilarity between the
votes stated in the said returns and those stated in the certificate of votes. Further, it lent
credence to the affidavits of Biron’s poll watchers stating that numerous irregularities
attended the tallying of the votes at the precinct level. According to the Second Division,
these irregularities pointed to a scheme to increase the votes of Doromal, thus,
necessitating the exclusion of the subject returns.
Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento (Commissioner Sarmiento) registered a
dissent. He reasoned that the missing taras did not, by themselves, conclusively
establish that the subject returns were altered or tampered. Also, the affidavits of Biron’s
poll watchers should not have been given weight for being self-serving. In his view, the
proper recourse was not to exclude the subject returns but to order the correction of
manifest errors so that the number of votes in figures and words would conform to the
number of taras in the subject returns.
On February 1, 2008, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the ruling of the Second
Division. It held that the Second Division properly appreciated the affidavits of Biron’s poll
watchers given the serious allegations of irregularities that attended the tallying of votes;
that the use of the certificate of votes to establish tampering in the subject returns was
proper in a pre-proclamation controversy; and that an examination of the records of this
case supported the Second Division’s findings that the subject returns were tampered or
falsified.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it failed to
compare the contested returns with the other authentic copies thereof before ruling that
there was tampering or falsification of the said returns.

HELD:
Yes, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it failed to compare the
contested returns with the other authentic copies thereof before ruling that there was
tampering or falsification of the said returns.
The certificates of votes are inadmissible to prove tampering, alteration or
falsification for failure to comply with Sections 16 and 17 of RA 6646. In excluding three of
the 11 subject returns, the COMELEC relied on the alleged glaring dissimilarity between
the votes stated in the said returns and those stated in the certificates of votes. Hence, it
concluded that the subject returns were falsified and thereafter ordered their exclusion.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 413
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The certificate of votes, which contains the number of votes obtained by each
candidate, is issued by the BEI upon the request of a duly accredited watcher pursuant to
Section 16 of RA 6646. Relative to its evidentiary value, Section 17 of said law.
In the instant case, the certificates of votes from Precinct Nos. 90A/90Band
7A/7B are defective, for they do not contain (1) the thumbmarks of the members of the
BEI, (2) the total number of voters who voted in the precinct, and (3) the time of the
issuance of the certificates. Likewise, the certificate of votes from Precinct 208A is
defective because it does not contain (1) the names, signatures and thumbmarks of the
members of the BEI, (2) the total number of voters who voted in the precinct, and (3) the
time of the issuance of the certificate. Aida Pineda, private respondent’s poll watcher in
said precinct, claims that she prepared a certificate of votes reflective of the true tally in
the election return, but the members of the BEI refused to affix their signatures thereto.
Even if we were to concede that the BEI members unjustifiedly refused to sign, this would
not validate the said certificate. Private respondent’s remedy was to compel the BEI to
issue the certificate of votes under pain of prosecution for an election offense. At any rate,
we cannot admit the defective certificate because, by Pineda’s own admission, she was
the one who prepared the entries in the said certificate and not the BEI as required by
Section 16 of RA 6646, thus raising grave doubts as to its accuracy.
Moreover, before the certificate of votes may be admitted as evidence of
tampering, Section 17 requires that the certificate be duly authenticated by testimonial or
documentary evidence presented to the board of canvassers by at least two members of
the board of election inspectors who issued the certificate. This requirement originated
from Section 11 of House Bill (HB) No. 805 and was later consolidated, with minor
revisions, in Section 17 of HB 4046 – the precursor of RA 6646.
In other words, we should already dispense with requiring two other members at a
subsequent time, when they may no longer be present to authenticate a document which,
in the first place, has already been signed and thumbmarked by each member of the
board in accordance with the proposed Section 16 of House Bill No. 4046.
The rationale of the law is perceptible. By requiring that the certificate of votes be
duly authenticated by at least two members of the BEI who issued the same, the law
seeks to safeguard the integrity of the certificate from the time it is issued by the BEI to the
watcher after the counting of votes at the precinct level up to the time that it is presented
to the board of canvassers to prove tampering. The legislature may have reasonably
foreseen that the certificate may be easily altered while in the hands of the watcher in
order to orchestrate a sham pre-proclamation controversy. To counterbalance this
possibility, the law imposes the condition that the certificate, aside from complying with
Section 16, must be subsequently authenticated at the time of its presentment to the
board of canvassers in the event that it shall be used to prove tampering. This way the
COMELEC may be assured that the certificate of votes issued by the BEI to the watcher
of a protesting candidate contains the same entries as the one thereafter presented
before the MBC to prove tampering. The procedure is consistent with the over-all policy of
the law to place a premium on an election return, which appears regular on its face, by
imposing stringent requirements before the certificate of votes may be used to controvert
the election return’s authenticity and operate as an exception to the general rule that in a
pre-proclamation controversy, the inquiry is limited to the four corners of the election
return.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 414
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
In the instant case, the records indicate that Biron failed to comply with the
requirements set by Section 17.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 415
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LNS INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES vs. ARMANDO C. PADUA, JR.,

G.R. No. 179792, March 5, 2010

DOCTRINE: As a general rule, factual findings of administrative and quasi-judicial


agencies specializing in their respective fields, especially when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals must be accorded high respect, if not finality. Bare allegations which are not
supported by any evidence, documentary or otherwise, sufficient to support a claim, fall
short to satisfy the degree of proof needed.

FACTS:
On January 6, 2003, Padua filed a Sworn Statement before the Adjudication Office
of the POEA against LNS and Sharikat Al Saedi International Manpower for violation of
Section 2(b), (d), and (e) of Rule I, Part VI of the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations
Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-based Overseas Workers.
Padua alleged that on July 12, 2002, he applied as auto electrician with petitioner
LNS and was assured of a job in Saudi Arabia. He paid LNS the amounts of ₱15,000.00
as processing fees, ₱6,000.00 for medical expenses, and ₱1,000.00 for trade test, but he
was not issued the corresponding receipts. He further alleged that he signed an
employment contract with LNS as a body builder with a monthly salary of US$370.00.
Padua further alleged that it was another agency, Sharikat, which processed his
papers and eventually deployed him on September 29, 2002 to Saudi Arabia. However,
he returned to the Philippines on December 23, 2002 because he was not allegedly paid
his salaries and also because of violations in the terms and conditions of his employment
contract.
On April 28, 2004, the POEA issued its Order finding LNS liable for non-issuance
of receipt and misrepresentation. As to Sharikat, the POEA found no sufficient evidence
to hold it liable for the violations charged. Only LNS filed its Appeal Memorandum with the
DOLE. Padua did not appeal from the said POEA Order absolving Sharikat from any
liability. Hence, the same is already deemed final as against Sharikat.
On December 16, 2004, the DOLE dismissed the appeal of petitioner and affirmed
the ruling of the POEA. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied
for lack of merit in an Order dated May 12, 2005.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari but it was dismissed
in its November 30, 2006 Decision. The CA opined that the affirmative assertion of
respondent that he paid petitioner a placement fee is entitled to great weight than the bare
denials of petitioner; and, that respondent was made to believe that petitioner would be
solely responsible for the processing of his employment abroad.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CA in its
Resolution dated September 12, 2007.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is liable for non-issuance of receipt and misrepresentation.

HELD:

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Yes, the petitioner is liable for non-issuance of receipt and mirepresentation.
As a general rule, factual findings of administrative and quasi-judicial agencies
specializing in their respective fields, especially when affirmed by the CA, must be
accorded high respect, if not finality. However, we are not bound to adhere to the general
rule if we find that the factual findings do not conform to the evidence on record or are not
supported by substantial evidence, as in the instant case.
The self-serving and unsubstantiated allegations of respondent cannot defeat the
concrete evidence submitted by petitioner. We note that respondent did not deny the due
execution of the withdrawal form as well as the genuineness of his signature and thumb
mark affixed therein. On the contrary, he admitted signing the same. When he voluntarily
signed the document, respondent is bound by the terms stipulated therein.
Other than respondent’s self-serving claim, there is no proof whatsoever that
petitioner endorsed respondent’s application papers to Sharikat. Bare allegations which
are not supported by any evidence, documentary or otherwise, sufficient to support a
claim, fall short to satisfy the degree of proof needed. On the other hand, petitioner’s
denial of these allegations was corroborated by the withdrawal form proffered as
evidence, the existence and due execution of which were not disputed by respondent. In
addition, if respondent’s allegations were to be believed, we find it rather odd that LNS
would require him to fill up the withdrawal form if the intention of LNS was to endorse the
papers to Sharikat. If LNS allowed respondent to withdraw all his documents, then there is
nothing left for LNS to endorse to Sharikat.
No evidence whatsoever was adduced that LNS was acting as a conduit of
Sharikat. Likewise, there is no evidence, other than respondent’s unsubstantiated claim,
that petitioner endorsed his application to Sharikat.
In fine, for failure to adduce any shred of evidence of payment made to petitioner,
or that petitioner referred or endorsed respondent for employment abroad to another
agency, the charges of non-issuance of receipt and misrepresentation against petitioner
could not possibly prosper. By the voluntary withdrawal of respondent’s application from
petitioner, the latter could not have been involved in the recruitment and placement of
respondent and consequently could not be held liable for any violation.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 417
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party represented herein by its Chair, Danton Remoto v
Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010

DOCTRINE: The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not


exclusive; the crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but
whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and
Republic Act 7941.

FACTS:

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify


themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals. It was
incorporated in 2003 and first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The
application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no
substantial membership base. On 17 August 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a petition for
registration with the COMELEC. The COMELEC dismissed the petition on moral
grounds stating among others that Ang Ladlad collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code
which defines nuisance as ‘Any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of
property, or anything else which xxx (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency or
morality.’ AngLaglad sought reconsideration, which was denied on the ground that
Ladlad’s expressed sexual orientations per se would not benefit the nation as a whole. A
Petition for Certiorari was thereafter filed by Ang Ladlad.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ang Ladlad should be allowed to register with the COMELEC as a
party-list.

HELD:

Yes.The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not


exclusive; the crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but
whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and
Republic Act 7941. The denial of AngLadlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a
tool to further any substantial public interest. COMELEC’s blanket justifications give rise
to the inevitable conclusion that it (COMELEC) targets homosexuals themselves as a
class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is such selective
targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 418
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HAZEL MA. C. ANTOLIN vs. ANTONIETA FORTUNA-IBE.
G.R. No. 165036, 5 July 2010

DOCTRINE: Any claim for re-correction or revision of a party’s board examination


cannot be compelled by mandamus—the function of reviewing and re-assessing an
examinee’s answers to the examination questions is a discretionary function of the
Board, not a ministerial and mandatory one, hence, not within the scope of the writ of
mandamus.

FACTS:
Petitioner took the accountancy licensure examinations conducted by the Board
of Accountancy (the Board). Unfortunately, petitioner did not make it. When the results
were released, she received failing grades in four out of the seven subjects.
Convinced that she deserved to pass the examinations, she wrote to Abelardo T.
Domondon, Acting Chairman of the Board of Accountancy, and requested that her
answer sheets be re-corrected. Petitioner was shown her answer sheets, but these
consisted merely of shaded marks, so she was unable to determine why she failed the
exam. Thus, she again wrote to the Board to request for copies of (a) the questionnaire
in each of the seven subjects (b) her answer sheets; (c) the answer keys to the
questionnaires, and (d) an explanation of the grading system used in each subject
(collectively, the Examination Papers).
Acting Chairman Domondon denied petitioner's request on two grounds: first, that
Section 36, Article III of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and
Practice of Professionals, as amended by Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
Resolution No. 332, series of 1994, only permitted access to the petitioner's answer
sheet (which she had been shown previously), and that second, the Board was
precluded from releasing the Examination Papers (other than petitioner's answer sheet)
by Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994.
After a further exchange of correspondence, the Board informed petitioner that an
investigation was conducted into her exam and there was no mechanical error found in
the grading of her test papers.
Undeterred, petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages against the
Board of Accountancy and its members before RTC Manila. The matter was rendered
moot since the petitioner passed the May CPA Licensure Exam in 1998 and had already
taken her oath as a CPA.
Undaunted, petitioner sought and obtained leave to file a Second Amended
Petition for Mandamus with Damages where she finally impleaded the PRC as
respondent and prayed, among others, that judgment be still rendered ordering the
commission to give her all documents and other materials as would enable her to
determine whether respondents fairly administered the same examinations and correctly
graded petitioner's performance therein and, if warranted, to make the appropriate
revisions on the results of her examination.
On appeal, the CA ruled that the petition has become moot in view of petitioner's
eventual passing of the 1998 CPA Board Exam.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 419
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ISSUE:
Whether or not mandamus was proper.

HELD:
No. At the very outset let us be clear of our ruling. Any claim for re-correction or
revision of her 1997 examination cannot be compelled by mandamus.
For a writ of mandamus to issue, the applicant must have a well-defined, clear,
and certain legal right to the thing demanded. The corresponding duty of the respondent
to perform the required act must be equally clear. No such clarity exists here; neither
does petitioner's right to demand a revision of her examination results. And despite
petitioner's assertions that she has not made any demand for re-correction, the most
cursory perusal of her Second Amended Petition and her prayer that the respondents
"make the appropriate revisions on the results of her examination" belies this claim.
Like the claimants in Agustin, the remedy of petitioner from the refusal of the
Board to release the Examination Papers should have been through an appeal to the
PRC. Undoubtedly, petitioner had an adequate remedy from the Board's refusal to
provide her with copies of the Examination Papers. Under Section 5(a) of Presidential
Decree No. 223, the PRC has the power to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement policies for the regulation of the accounting profession. In fact, it is one such
regulation (PRC Resolution No. 338) that is at issue in this case. In addition, under
Section 5(c), the PRC has the power toreview, coordinate, integrate and approve the
policies, resolutions, rules and regulations, orders or decisions promulgated by the
various Boards with respect to the profession or occupation under their jurisdictions
including the results of their licensure examinations but their decisions on administrative
cases shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission within thirty (30)
days from the date of promulgation thereof.
Petitioner posits that no remedy was available because the PRC's power to
"review" and "approve" in Section 5(c) only refers to appeals in decisions concerning
administrative investigations and not to instances where documents are being
requested. Not only is this position myopic and self-serving, it is bereft of either statutory
or jurisprudential basis. The PRC's quasi-legislative and enforcement powers,
encompassing its authority to review and approve "policies, resolutions, rules and
regulations, orders, or decisions" cover more than administrative investigations
conducted pursuant to its quasi-judicial powers. More significantly, since the PRC itself
issued the resolution questioned by the petitioner here, it was in the best position to
resolve questions addressed to its area of expertise. Indeed, petitioner could have saved
herself a great deal of time and effort had she given the PRC the opportunity to rectify
any purported errors committed by the Board.
One of the reasons for exhaustion of administrative remedies is our
well-entrenched doctrine on separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a
becoming policy of non-interference with matters falling primarily (albeit not exclusively)
within the competence of other departments. Courts, for reasons of law, comity and
convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies
have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an appropriate
opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative
forum.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 420
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ENRIQUE LIVIOCO
G.R. No. 170685, (September 22, 2010)

DOCTRINE: For purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated
property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking. There are three
important concepts in this definition the character of the property, its price, and the time of actual
taking.

FACTS:
Respondent was the owner of 30.6329 hectares of sugarland located Pampanga.
Sometime between 1987 and 1988, respondent offered his sugarland to DAR for acquisition
under the CARP at P30.00 per square meter, for a total of P9,189,870.00. The DAR referred
Liviocos offer to the LBP for valuation. The LBP set the price at P3.21 per square meter or a total
of P827,943.48 for 26 hectares. The respodnent was then promptly informed of the
valuation and that the cash portion of the claim proceeds have been kept in trust pending [his]
submission of the [ownership documentary] requirements however that respodnent did not act
upon the notice given to him by both government agencies.
On September 20, 1991, LBP issued a certification to the Register of Deeds of
Pampanga that it has earmarked the amount of P827,943.48 as compensation for Liviocos 26
hectares. It was only two years later that Livioco requested for a reevaluation of the
compensation on the ground that its value had already appreciated from the time it was first
offered for sale. The request was denied by Regional Director on the ground that there was
already a perfected sale. He then filed a case before the RTC for judicial determination of just
compensation against DAR, LBP, and the CLOA holders. The RTC was of the opinion that
Livioco was able to prove the higher valuation of his property with a preponderance of
evidence. The CA affirmed the trial courts decision in toto.

ISSUE:
WON there was proper valuation of said land.

HELD:
NO. In expropriation cases (including cases involving lands for agrarian reform), the
propertys character refers to its actual use at the time of taking, not its potential
uses. Respondent himself admitted that his property was agricultural at the time he offered it for
sale to DAR in 1988. In his letter to the DAR in 1988, respondent manifested that his land is
agricultural and suitable for agricultural purposes, although it stood adjacent to residential
properties. Moreover, it has been conclusively decided by final judgment in the earlier

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 421
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
cases filed by respondent that his property was validly acquired under RA 6657 and validly
distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries.
Since the coverage of RA 6657 only extends to agricultural lands, respondents property
should be conclusively treated as an agricultural land and valued as such.The lower courts
erred in ruling that the character or use of the property has changed from agricultural to
residential, because there is no allegation or proof that the property was approved for
conversion to other uses by DAR. It is the DAR that is mandated by law to evaluate and to
approve land use conversionsso as to prevent fraudulent evasions from agrarian reform
coverage.
Even reclassification and plans for expropriation by local government units (LGUs) will
not ipso facto convert an agricultural property to residential, industrial or commercial. Thus, in
the absence of any DAR approval for the conversion of respondents property or an actual
expropriation by an LGU, it cannot be said that the character or use of said property changed
from agricultural to residential. Respondents property remains agricultural and should be valued
as such. Hence, the CA and the trial court had no legal basis for considering the subject
propertys value as residential.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 422
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPOUSES RICARDO HIPOLITO JR. and LIZA HIPOLITO vs. TERESITA CINCO,
CARLOTA BALDE CINCO and ATTY. CARLOS CINCO
G.R. No. 174143, (November 28, 2011)

DOCTRINE: By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies
over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment
thereon; thus, their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not
finality, by the courts. Such findings must be respected as long as they are supported by
substantial evidence, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant.

FACTS:
Edeltrudis Hipolito y Mariano entered into an agreement with Francisco Villena to rent a
portion of the property located at 2176 Nakar Street, San Andres Bukid, Manila and to construct
an apartment-style building adjacent to the existing house thereon. The contract was for a
period of 20 years. Pursuant to the agreement, Edeltrudis built a three-storey apartment building
without securing a building permit. Petitioners inherited the apartment building upon the death of
Edeltrudis. On June 17, 2002, herein respondents Atty. Cinco, Teresita Cinco and Dr. Carlota
Balde Cinco (respondents) filed with the OBO a verified request for structural inspection of an
old structure located at 2176 Nakar Street, San Andres Bukid, Manila. Acting on the request,
Building Inspector Engineer Leonardo B. Rico (Engr. Rico) conducted an initial inspection. In a
Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the OBO declared the buildings dangerous and ruinous, and
recommended their demolition which was affirmed by the DPWH, OP and the CA

ISSUE:
WON The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the resolution issued by the Office of the
President

HELD:
YES. The mandate of the OBO is to act motu proprio, or upon petition validly received,
on reported dangerous and ruinous buildings and structures that pose a threat to the life, health
and well-being of the inhabitants, and the general public. Hence, the OBO, based on its findings,
can still act on the matter pursuant to such mandate, notwithstanding petitioners claim that
respondents initiated the proceedings to circumvent their rights under the law as builders in
good faith. Otherwise stated, respondents motive in initiating the proceedings which led to the
issuance of the challenged OBO Resolution and Demolition Order is immaterial as far as the
OBO is concerned, so long as it is satisfied that a building or structure is dangerous and ruinous.
Remarkably, both the DPWH and the OP found no irregularities in the manner that officials of
the OBO performed their duties and in coming up with its Resolution and Demolition Order. This
conclusion was affirmed by the CA when it resolved the petition before it.
We find no error on the part of the CA when it relied on the findings of fact of the OBO
and the other administrative bodies. As correctly stated by the CA in its Decision: The powers
granted by law, particularly the National Building Code to the Building Official regarding
demolition of buildings are executive and administrative in nature. It is a well-recognized
principle that purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the
courts. In general, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the
administrative departments of the government. This is generally true with respect to acts

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 423
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
involving the exercise of judgment or discretion and findings of fact. The established exception to
the rule is where the issuing authority has gone beyond its statutory authority, exercised
unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave
abuse of discretion. None of these obtains in the case at bar.
By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over matters
falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon; thus, their
findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts.
Such findings must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if
such evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant. It is not the task of the appellate court
to once again weigh the evidence submitted before and passed upon by the administrative body
and to substitute its own judgment regarding sufficiency of evidence.
Similarly, this Court will not disturb these factual findings absent compelling reasons to
do so. This Court, in numerous occasions, has cited exceptions to the general rule that it is not a
trier of facts. None of the said exceptions is present in this case. The conclusion reached by the
administrative agencies involved after thoroughly conducting their ocular inspections and
hearings and considering all pieces of evidence presented before them, which finding was
affirmed by the CA, must now be regarded with great respect and finality by this Court.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 424
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JOSE CATACUTAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 175991, August 31, 2011

DOCTRINE: There is no violation of due process where the trial court did not allow a
party to introduce evidence which it considered irrelevant and impertinent to the
proceeding at hand, it is well within the court’s discretion to reject the presentation of
such evidence.

FACTS:
The Commission on Higher Education promoted private complainants Georgito
Posesano and Magdalena Divinagracia, employees of Surigao del Norte School of Arts
and trade. These promotions were duly approved and attested by the Civil Service
Commission. The appointments were transmitted to Catacutan being the
officer-in-charge of SNSAT. Despite receipt of the appointment letter, private
complainants were not able to assume their new position since Catacutan made known
that he strongly opposed their appointments and would not implement them.

Thus, private complainants filed a complaint against Catacutan before the


Ombudsman for grave abuse of authority and disrespect of lawful orders. Catacutan was
charged before the RTC of Surigao City.

Catacutan admitted that he did not implement the appointments because of


procedural lapses or infirmities attending the preparation of the appointment papers.

The RTC did not allow Catacutan to introduce as evidence the CA decision which
denied the administrative case filed against him and declared that this intention in
refusing to implement the promotions of the private complainants falls short of malice or
wrongful intent.

RTC found Catacutan guilty of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices. On appeal, the
Sandiganbayan affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Catacutan was denied due process when the RTC did not allow
him to introduce as evidence the CA decision?

HELD:
No. Catacutan was not denied Due Process.

Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard.Where an opportunity to be


heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial
of procedural due process.

It is well within the court’s discretion to reject the presentation of evidence which it
judiciously believes irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding on hand. This is
especially true when the evidence sought to be presented in a criminal proceeding

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 425
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
concerns an administrative matter. The findings in administrative case are not binding
upon the court trying a criminal case, even if the criminal proceedings are based on the
same facts and incidents which gave rise to the administrative matter.

Even assuming that the trial court erroneously rejected the introduction as evidence
of the CA decision, Catacutan is not left without legal recourse. Catacutan could have
availed of the remedy provided in Sec. 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 426
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
DU vs. JAYOMA
G.R. NO. 175042, April 23, 2012

DOCTRINE: A license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not


property of which the holder may not be deprived without due process of law, but a mere
privilege that may be revoked when public interests so require.

FACTS:
The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Mabini, Bohol, enacted Municipal
Ordinance No. 1, series of 1988, requiring the conduct of a public bidding for the
operation of a cockpit in the said municipality every four years. For the period January 1,
1989 to December 31, 1992, the winning bidder was Engr. Edgardo Carabuena. Due to
his failure to comply with the legal requirements for operating a cockpit, theSangguniang
Bayan adopted Resolution authorizing petitioner Danilo Du to continue his cockpit
operation until the winning bidder complies with the legal requirements.
Upon discovering that petitioner has been operating his cockpit in violation of
Municipal Ordinance, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Municipal Resolution suspending
petitioner’s cockpit operation. Pursuant to Municipal Resolution, respondent Venancio
R.Jayoma, then Mayor of Mabini, in a letter, ordered petitioner to desist from holding any
cockfighting activity.
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, a Petition for
Prohibition (Special Civil Action) against respondent mayor and nine members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Mabini. Petitioner prayed that a preliminary injunction and/or a
temporary restraining order be issued to prevent respondents from suspending his
cockpit operation. Petitioner claimed that he has a business permit to operate until
December 31, 1997; and that the Municipal Resolution was unlawfully issued as it
deprived him of due process. Respondents interposed that under the Local Government
Code (LGC) of 1991, the power to authorize and license the establishment, operation
and maintenance of a cockpit is lodged in the Sangguniang Bayan.
A Temporary Restraining Order was issued by the RTC enjoining respondents
from suspending the cockpit operation of petitioner until further orders from the court.
The Petition for Prohibition was later amended to include damages, which the RTC
admitted in an Order. The CA reversed the Decision of the RTC. According to the CA,
petitioner did not acquire a vested right to operate a cockpit in the municipality as he was
only granted a temporary privilege by the Sangguniang Bayan. CA denied petitioner’s
reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in finding that petitioner is not entitled to damages.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 427
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
No. There was no cause of action. A cause of action is defined as "the act or
omission by which a party violates a right of another."Corollarily, the essential elements
of a cause of action are:(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of
the defendant to respect such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of the
defendant in violation of the plaintiff’s right with a resulting injury or damage to the
plaintiff for which the latter may file an action for the recovery of damages or other
appropriate relief. Petitioner has no legal right to operate a cockpit.
In this case, we find that petitioner has no cause of action against the respondents
as he has no legal right to operate a cockpit in the municipality. Under Resolution, the
Sangguniang Bayan allowed him to continue to operate his cockpit only because the
winning bidder for the period January 1, 1989 to December 31, 1992 failed to comply
with the legal requirements for operating a cockpit. As we see it, the only reason he was
able to continue operating until July 1997 was because the Sangguniang Bayan of
Mabini failed to monitor the status of the cockpit in their municipality.
And even if he was able to get a business permit from respondent mayor for the
period January 1, 1997 to December 31,1997, this did not give him a license to operate a
cockpit. Under Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the LGC, it is the Sangguniang Bayan which is
empowered to "authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of
cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks."
Considering that no public bidding was conducted for the operation of a cockpit from
January1, 1993 to December 31, 1997, petitioner cannot claim that he was duly
authorized by the Sangguniang Bayan to operate his cockpit in the municipality for the
period January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1997. Respondent members of the
Sangguniang Bayan, therefore, had every reason to suspend the operation of
petitioner’s cockpit by enacting Municipal Resolution. As the chief executive of the
municipal government, respondent mayor was duty-bound to enforce the suspension of
the operation of petitioner’s cockpit pursuant to the said Resolution. License to operate a
cockpit is a mere privilege.
In addition, it is well enshrined in our jurisprudence that "a license authorizing the
operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder may not be
deprived without due process of law, but a mere privilege that may be revoked when
public interests so require." Having said that, petitioner’s allegation that he was deprived
of due process has no leg to stand on.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 428
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF MAXIMO PUYAT and GLORIA
PUYAT, represented by Attorney-in-Fact MARISSA PUYAT
G.R. NO. 175055, June 27. 2012

DOCTRINE: In agrarian reform cases, when the acquisition process under Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 27 remains incomplete upon the effectivity of Republic Act (RA) No.
6657, the process should be completed under the new law.

FACTS:
The respondents are the heirs of Maximo and Gloria Puyat, pro-indiviso coowners
of a parcel of rice land consisting of 46.8731 hectares located in Barangay Bakod Bayan,
Cabanatuan City. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed 44.3090 hectares
of Puyat’s land under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to PD 27. The DAR issued
several emancipation patents in favor of various farmerbeneficiaries in December 1989.
All of the said patents were annotated on Puyat Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 1773
on March 20, 1990, and thereby caused the concomitant partial cancellation of Puyat’s
title.
The Puyats did not receive any compensation for the cancellation of their title over
the awarded portions of the subject property.
It was only on September 18, 1992, more than two years after the DAR awarded the
property to the farmer-beneficiaries that the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) received
DAR’s instruction to pay just compensation to the Puyats. Accordingly, LBP made its
initial valuation of Php 2,012.50 per hectare or a total of Php 92,752.10. Deducting the
farmers’ lease rentals amounting to Php 5,241.20, the LBP recommended the payment
to the land owners of the net value of Php 87,510.90. Respondents received LBP’s initial
valuation together with the Notice of Acquisition and Valuation Form, and rejected the
valuation for being ridiculously low.
The heirs of Puyat filed a complaint for determination and payment of just
compensation with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija. The
RTC disposed of the case. Thus, the DAR through LBP was ordered to pay the heirs of
Puyat Php 4,687,310.00 representing just compensation of the property for a total aarea
of 46.8731 hectares, situated in Barangay Bakod Bayan, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija
covered by TCT No. 1773 with 6% legal interest per annum from date of taking (1990)
until fully paid.
Upon motion of LBP, the RTC modified its decision by reducing the compensable
area to only 44.3090 hectares.
LBP appealed the modified decision to the CA.
The CA held that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function, which
cannot be unduly restricted by requiring the courts to strictly adhere to formulae
appearing in legislative and executive acts. Being a judicial function, courts can choose
to rely on the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657, even if these factors do not
appear in PD 27 or EO 228.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The CA also explained that the legal interest was properly imposed considering that
the Puyats were deprived of their property since March 20, 1990 without receiving just
compensation therefor. However, the CA modified the RTC decision by imposing the
legal interest not from 1990, but from March 20, 1990, which is the date when the
emancipation patent were inscribed on TCT No. 1773.
Hence, this Petition for Review before the Supreme Court (SC).

ISSUES:
1. Can lands acquired pursuant to PD 27 be valued using the factors appearing in
Section 17 of RA 6657?
2. 2. Is it proper to impose the 6% legal interest per annum on the unpaid just
compensation?
3. 3. Should the case be remanded to the trial court for the recognition of just
compensation using Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended by RA 9700?

HELD:
1. When the government takes property pursuant to PD 27, but does not pay the
landowner of his just compensation until after RA 6657 has taken effect in 1988, it
becomes more equitable to determine the just compensation using RA 6657. In the case
at bar, respondent’s title to the property was cancelled and awarded to
farmer-beneficiaries on March 20, 1990. In 1992, LBP approved the initial valuation for
the just compensation that will be given to respondents. Both the taking of respondent’s
property and the valuation occurred during the effectivity of RA 6657. When the
acquisition process under PD 27 remains incomplete and is overtaken by RA 6657, the
process should be completed under RA 6657, with PD 27 and EO 228 having suppletory
effect only. This means that PD 27 applies only insofar as there are gaps in RA 6657;
where RA 6657 is sufficient, PD 27 is superseded. Among the matters where RA 6657 is
sufficient is the determination of just compensation. In Section 17 thereof, the legislature
has provided for the factors that are determinative of just compensation. Petitioner
cannot insist on applying PD 27 which would render Section 17 of RA 6657 inutile.

2. As to the interest rate awarded for the delay, the court is not unaware that the
current jurisprudence sets the interest rate for delay in payments of agrarian cases at
12% per annum. In this case, however, the respondent did not contest the interest
awarded by the lower courts and instead asked for the affirmance in toto of the appellate
court’s decision. In keeping with the demands of due process, therefore, the court deems
it fit not to disturb the interest rate imposed by the courts below.

3. No need to reward. The assailed June 28, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 430
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ALFONSO LAGAYA Y TAMONDONG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 176251, July 25, 2012
DOCTRINE: The freedom to express one’s sentiments and beliefs does not grant one
the license to vivify in public the honor and integrity of another. Any sentiments must be
expressed within the proper forum and with proper regard for the rights of others.
FACTS:
On or about August 5, 2002 in Caraig, Tuguegarao City, Province of Cagayan,
accused Alfonso Lagaya y Tamondong, Director General of the Philippine Institute of
Traditional and Alternative Health Care (PITAHC) an attached agency of the Department
of Health, with salary grade 28, issued a Memorandum all Plant Managers and staff,
distributed to the plants all over the country. The subject of said memorandum is
“Disclosure and Misuse of Confidential and Classified Information,” a salient portion
thereof states that private respondent Dr. Marilyn Martinez, Plant Manager of the
Cagayan Valley Herbal Processing Plant (HPP) of the PITAHC, needs to undergo
psychological and psychiatric treatment to prevent deterioration of her mental and
emotional stability as recommended by McGimpers. On account of the issuance of the
said memorandum, private respondent was exposed to public ridicule and humiliation.
She sought the assistance of a lawyer to file the necessary administrative, civil and
criminal charges against petitioner. Petitioner claimed that the issuance of the
memorandum was done in the performance of his official duty and in good faith
considering that his objective is to help the private respondent. In its decision
promulgated on October 26, 2006, the Sandiganbayan held that the prosecution has
convincingly established proof beyond reasonable doubt the existence of all the
elements essential to support the charge and thus adjudged petitioner guilty of the crime
of libel. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Sandiganbayan denied
the same. Hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the prosecution’s evidence to prove the commission of libel fell short
of the degree of proof, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt, required by law
2. Whether the subject memorandum falls within the ambit of the privileged
communication rule, hence, not libelous
HELD:
All the requisites of the crime of libel are obtaining in this case. A liber is defined
as “a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect real or imaginary,
or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstances tending to cause dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or blacken the memory of one who
is dead.” For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: a) it must
be defamatory; b) it must be malicious; c) it must be given publicly; and, d) the victim

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 431
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
must be identifiable. Petitioner’s invocation of the rule on privileged communication is
misplaced.
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Article 354: Requirement for
publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if
no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following
cases:
1. Private communication made by any person to another in the performance of
any legal, moral or social duty; and,
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature,
or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act
performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Though private respondent is a public officer, certainly, the defamatory remarks are not
related to or relevant to the discharge of her official duties but was purely an attack in her
mental condition which adversely reflect on her reputation and dignity.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 432
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES RODOLFO ZABALA and LILIA
BAYLON
G.R. No. 173520 January 30, 2013

DOCTRINE: Just compensation has been defined as "the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain, but
the owner’s loss. The word ‘just’ is used to qualify the meaning of the word ‘compensation’
and to convey thereby the idea that the amount to be tendered for the property to be taken
shall be real, substantial, full and ample."

In determining the just compensation of the property or property sought to be acquired


through expropriation proceedings, the same shall:

(a) With respect to the acquired land or portion thereof, not to exceed the market
value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the
property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.

(b) With respect to the acquired right-of-way easement over the land or portion
thereof, not to exceed ten percent (10%) of the market value declared by the owner
or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market
value as determined by the assessor whichever is lower.

FACTS:
On October 27, 1994, plaintiff-appellant National Power Corporation (Napocor)
filed a complaint for Eminent Domain against defendants-appellees Sps. R. Zabala& L.
Baylon, before the RTC, Balanga City, Bataan alleging that Spouses Zabala and Baylon
own parcels of land located in Balanga City, Bataan and that it urgently needed an
easement of right of way over the affected areas for its 230 KV Limay-Hermosa
Transmission Lines. The Commissioners submitted their Report/ Recommendation fixing
the just compensation at P150.00 per square meter. Napocor prayed that the report be
recommitted to the commissioners for the modification of the report and the
substantiation of the same with reliable and competent documentary evidence based on
the value of the property at the time of its taking. The Commissioners submitted their Final
Report fixing the just compensation at P500.00 per square meter.

On June 28, 2004, the RTC rendered its Partial Decision and ordered Napocor to pay
Php150.00 per square meter for the 6,820 square meters determined as of the date of the
taking of the property.

Napocor appealed to the CA arguing that the Commissioners reports are not supported
by documentary evidence. Napocor argued that the RTC did not apply Section 3A of R.A.
No. 6395 which limits its liability to easement fee of not more than 10% of the market
value of the property traversed by its transmission lines. CA affirmed the RTCs Partial
Decision.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 433
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC erred in fixing the amount of Php150.00 per square meter
as the fair market value of the property subject of the easement right of way of Napocor

HELD:

The petition is partially meritorious.

Sec. 3A of RA No. 6395 cannot restrict the constitutional power of the courts to
determine just compensation. The payment of just compensation for private property
taken for public use is guaranteed no less by our Constitution and is included in the Bill of
Rights. As such, no legislative enactments or executive issuances can prevent the courts
from determining whether the right of the property owners to just compensation has been
violated. It is a judicial function that cannot be usurped by any other branch or official of
the government. Statutes and executive issuances fixing or providing for the method of
computing just compensation are not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as mere
guidelines in ascertaining the amount thereof.

The Supreme Court has held in a long line of cases that since the high- tension electric
current passing through the transmission lines will perpetually deprive the property
owners of the normal use of their land, it is only just and proper to require Napocor to
recompense them for the full market value of their property.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS vs. HEIRS OF SPOUSES PEDRO BAUTISTA and
VALENTINA MALABANAN
G.R. No. 181218 January 28, 2013

DOCTRINE: In determining the just compensation of the property or property sought to


be acquired through expropriation proceedings, the same shall:

(a) With respect to the acquired land or portion thereof, not to exceed the market
value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the
property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.

(b) With respect to the acquired right-of-way easement over the land or portion
thereof, not to exceed ten percent (10%) of the market value declared by the owner
or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market
value as determined by the assessor whichever is lower.

FACTS:

Spouses Bautista are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Lipa City.
Respondents are their children. Republic of the Philippines, through DPWH, acquired by
negotiated sale a portion of the lot for use in the STAR (Southern tagalog Arterial Road)
Toll way project. Petitioner offered to purchase an additional 1,155 square meters of the
lot at P100 per square meter, but the Sps. Bautista refused to sell. Petitioner then filed a
complaint with the RTC of Lipa City for the expropriation of the 1,155-square meter
portion. Respondent s claimed that the valuation was based on the BIR zonal valuation,
which is not a fair consideration. The Lipa City Assessor and the Registrar of Deeds
concluded in their Joint Commissioners’ Report that just compensation for the subject
portion should be within the range of P1,960 and P2,500 per square meter. To this,
respondents filed their comment accepting such valuation as fair and reasonable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the reliance by the CA on the Joint Commissioners’ Report is


erroneous.

HELD:

No. In determining just compensation under R.A. No. 8974, there are standards for
the assessment of the value of the expropriated land which the trial court and the
commissioners concerned failed to consider. The only legal question raised by the
petitioner relates to the commissioners’ and the trial court’s alleged failure to take into
consideration, in arriving at the amount of just compensation.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 435
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AFP RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION
BENEFITS SYSTEM, HEIRS OF CABAL KUSOP and ATTY. NILO J. FLAVIANO
G.R. No. 180463 January 16, 2013

DOCTRINE: The processes of the State should not be trifled with. The failure of a party
to avail of the proper remedy to acquire or perfect one's title to land cannot justify a resort
to other remedies which are otherwise improper and do not provide for the full
opportunity to prove his title, but instead require him to concede it before availment.

FACTS:
Three lots which are of the public domain located in General Santos are the disputed
lands in this case were reserve for recreation and health purposes by Proc. No. 168. A
subsequent Proclamation declared that 2 of the 3 lots were open for disposition to
qualified applicants leaving the remaining lot which is Lot X to be remained part of the
reservation now known as Magsaysay Park.
In 1997, DENR approved respondents-intervenor’s application for issuance of
miscellaneous patents over Lot X and later that year those titles were conveyed to
AFP-RSBS. After a year, petitioner Republic instituted a civil case for reversion and
cancellation against AFP-RSBS of those titles, on the thesis that they issued over a
public park, which is classified as inalienable and non-disposable public land.
Respondent-intervenors together with AFP-RSBS argued that their
predecessors-in-interest Kusop had acquired vested rights having occupied the same for
more than 30 years. They claimed that these vested rights were alienable and
disposable land of public domain, as well as the subsequent issuance of sales patents in
their names, RTC rendered judgement nullifying the AFP_RSBS titles and ordering the
return of Lot X to the Republic. Their private rights, which were guaranteed under Proc.
168, have already been recognized and respected through the subsequently issued
Proc. 2273; as a consequence, the succeeding sales patents and OCT’s in the names of
the respondents-intervernors should be declared null and void not only for being in
iolation of law, but also because respondents-intervenors did not deserve to acquire
more land.
CA reversed the RTC decision based on that as a consequence of their
predecessor’s possession of Lot X since time immemorial, respondents-intervenors have
acquired title without need of judicial or other action, and the properly ceased to be public
land and thus became privately properly. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in their decision

HELD:

Yes, Evidently, the sales patents over Lot X are null and void, for at the time the
sales patents were applied for and granted, the land had lost its alienable and disposable

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
character. It was set aside and was being utilized for a public purpose, that is, as a
recreational park. Under Section 83 of CA 141, “the President may designate by
proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants
thereof, in accordance with regulations prescribed for this purpose, or for quasi-public
uses or purposes, when the public interest required it and under the present Constitution,
national parks are declared part of the public domain, and shall be conserved and may
not be increased nor dismissed, except by law.

The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest
or timber. Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions; agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing
lands, and such other classes as may be provided by law, giving the government great
leeway for classification. Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution
classification with one addition; national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be
alienated.

Respondents-intervenors no longer had any right to Lot X – not by acquisive


prescription, and certainly not by sales patent. In fact, their act of applying for the
issuance of miscellaneous sales patents operates as an express acknowledgement that
the State, and not respondents-intervenors, is the owner of Lot X. It is erroneous to
suppose that respondents-intervenors possessed to Lot X when they applied for
miscellaneous sales patents, for the premise of such grant or privilege is precisely that
the State is the owner of the land, and that the applicant acknowledges this and
surrenders to State ownership. The government, as the agent of the State, is possessed
of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored
recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such
privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what
otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.

Finally, as regards AFP-RSBS’ rights, the Court sustains the petitioner’s view that
“any title issued covering non-disposable lots even in the hands of an alleged innocent
purchaser for value shall be cancelled.” We deem this case worthy of such principle.
Besides, we cannot ignore the basic principle that a spring cannot rise higher than its
source; as successor-in-interest, AFP-RSBS cannot acquire a better title than its
predecessor, the herein respondents-intervenors. Having acquired no title to the properly
in question, there is no other recourse but for AFP-RSBS to surrender to the rightful
ownership of the State.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 437
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH vs. PHIL PHARMAWEALTH INC.
G.R. No. 182358 February 20, 2013

DOCTRINE: Defense of State Immunity does not apply where the public official is
charged in his official capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to
the rights of others neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not
in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may
have been committed while he occupied a public position.

FACTS:

Secretary of Health Romualdez, Jr. issued an Administrative Order providing for


additional guidelines for accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at ensuring that only
qualified bidders can transact business with petitioner DOH. Respondent Pharmawealth
, Inc. (Pharmawealth) submitted to DOH a request for the inclusion of additional items in
its list of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic – Penicillin G Benzathine.

Petitioner DOH issued an invitation for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials
of Penicillin G Benzathine. Despite the lack of response from DOH regarding
Pharmawealth’s request for inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products,
the latter submitted its bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract and gave the lowest
bid thereof. In view, however, of the non-accreditation of respondent’s Laboratories’
(YSS).

Respondent Pharmawealth filed a complaint for injunction, mandamus and damages


with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order with the Regional Trial praying, inter alia, that the trial court – nullify the
award of the Penicillin G Benzathine contract to YSS Laboratories, Inc. and direct
petitioners DOH et al. to declare Pharmawealth the lowest complying responsible bidder
for the Benzathine contract, and that they accordingly award the same to plaintiff
company and – adjudge defendants Romualdez, Galon and Lopez liable, jointly and
severally to plaintiff. Petitioners DOH et al. subsequently filed a motion to dismiss
praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state immunity. The
trial court, however, denied the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals (CA) denied
DOH’s petition for review which affirmed the order issued Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the change against the public officers acting in their official
capacity will prosper

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:

The suitability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned


was acting within his official jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the
performance of official functions will result in a change or financial liability against the
government. In its complaint, DOH sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against
petitioners in their official capacity. Since judicial review of acts alleged to have been
tainted with grave abuse of discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution, it necessarily
follows that it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as defendant or
respondent in an appropriate suit.

As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its
being an unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed
against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be directed against a party of a court, agency
or a person. Moreover, the defense of state immunity from suit does not apply in causes
of action which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the State.

Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity
for facts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Neither
does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in
his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while
he occupied a public position.

In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for damages
in connection with their alleged act – illegally abusing their official positions to make sure
that plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine contract [which act
was] done in bad faith and with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers
given by law is permissile, in consonance with the foregoing principles. For an officer who
exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot hide the plea of sovereign immunity
and must bear the liability personally.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 439
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS
G.R. No. 183110, October 7, 2013
DOCTRINE: "It is universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of
citizenship to an alien wife of one of its citizens could have had no other objective than to
maintain a unity of allegiance among the members of the family."
FACTS:
Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur.
After all the jurisdictional requirements mandated by Section 9 of CA 473 had been
complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Motion to Dismiss.
Neither the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor appeared on the day of the
hearing. Hence, Azucena's counsel moved that the evidence be presented ex-parte,
which the RTC granted. RTC found that Azucena has amply supported the allegations in
her Petition. Thus, petition for naturalization is granted.
OSG argued that the ex-parte presentation of evidence before the Branch Clerk of
Court violates Section 10 of CA 473, as the law mandates public hearing in naturalization
cases. Rejecting this argument, the RTC held that the public has been fully apprised of
the naturalization proceedings and was free to intervene.
The OSG then appealed the RTC judgment to the CA, contending that Azucena
failed to comply with the income requirement under CA 473. In dismissing the OSG's
appeal, the CA found that Azucena's financial condition permits her and her family to live
with reasonable comfort in accordance with the prevailing standard of living and
consistent with the demands of human dignity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Azucena failed to meet the income and public hearing requirements
of CA 473.

HELD:
No. Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either
judicial naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act
No. 9139 (the"Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000"). A third option, called
derivative naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands
is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that:
"[a]ny woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines."
Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be
deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do
they have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization. Copying from similar laws in the
United States which has since been amended, the Philippine legislature retained Section
15 of CA 473, which then reflects its intent to confer Filipino citizenship to the alien wife
thru derivative naturalization.
As the records before this Court show, Santiago's Filipino citizenship has been
adequately proven. Under judicial proceeding, Santiago submitted his birth certificate
indicating therein that he and his parents are Filipinos. He also submitted voter's
registration, land titles, and business registrations/licenses, all of which are public
records. He has always comported himself as a Filipino citizen, an operative fact that
should have enabled Azucena to avail of Section 15 of CA 473. On the submitted
evidence, nothing would show that Azucena suffers from any of the disqualifications
under Section 4 of the same Act.
Azucena is a teacher by profession and has actually exercised her profession
before she had to quit her teaching job to assume her family duties and take on her role as
joint provider, together with her husband, in order to support her family. Together,
husband and wife were able to raise all their five children, provided them with education,
and have all become professionals and responsible citizens of this country. Certainly, this
is proof enough of both husband and wife's lucrative trade. Azucena herself is a
professional and can resume teaching at any time. Her profession never leaves her, and
this is more than sufficient guarantee that she will not be a charge to the only country she
has known since birth.
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main objective of extending the
citizenship privilege to an alien wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among family
members.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 441
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HADJI HASHIM ABDUL vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH
DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES|||
G.R. No. 184496, December 2, 2013
DOCTRINE: "Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no
justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereof would be of no practical use or
value as courts do not sit to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging."
FACTS:
Petitioner was first elected as municipal mayor of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur in the May
1998 election and re-elected for a second term in the May 2001 election. It was while
serving his second term as municipal mayor when the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao filed an Information on September 5, 2002 charging petitioner,
along with Abdul and Domado, with falsification of public documents, defined and
penalized under Article 171 (2) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).| Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP) moved for the suspension pendente lite of the petitioner and his
co-accused as mandated under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019.
Finding the charge as squarely falling within the ambit of Section 13, RA 3019,
respondent granted in its Resolution of October 9, 2003 the OSP's motion and
accordingly ordered the suspension pendente lite of the petitioner and his co-accused
from their respective positions and from any other public office which they may now or
hereafter be holding for a period of 90 days from notice.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied.Thus, on March 2,
2004 he filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for TRO alleging that the
suspension order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. In a Resolution dated March 10, 2004, the Court dismissed the Petition,
which dismissal attained finality on July 12, 2004. The suspension order, however, was
no longer implemented because it was superseded by the expiration of petitioner's
second term as municipal mayor and his unsuccessful bid for re-election during the May
2004 election.
During the May 2007 election, petitioner emerged as the winner in the mayoralty
race and again sat as Mayor of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur. On February 21, 2008, the OSP
once again moved for his and his co-accused's suspension pendente lite to implement
respondent's final and executory suspension order of October 9, 2003.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in suspending him pendente lite from his position as mayor
of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur.
HELD:
We dismiss the Petition for being moot and academic.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 442
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or
controversy. Thus, in Mattel, Inc. v. Francisco, we have ruled that "[w]here the issue has
become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication
thereof would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit to adjudicate mere
academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest however intellectually challenging." In the
present case, the acquittal of herein petitioner operates as a supervening event that
mooted the present Petition. Any resolution on the validity or invalidity of the issuance of
the order of suspension could no longer affect his rights as a ranking public officer, for
legally speaking he did not commit the offense charged.
Notwithstanding the mootness of the present Petition, petitioner nevertheless
implores us to make a clear and categorical resolution on whether the offense of
falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the RPC is included in the term
"fraud" as contemplated under Section 13 of RA 3019.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. AND LA FUNERARIA PAZ-SUCAT, INC. vs.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND
DEVELOPMENT and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE|||
G.R. No. 175356, December 3, 2013
DOCTRINE: When a party challenges the constitutionality of a law, the burden of
proof rests upon him.
While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the
realities of business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in
the operations of a business which may result in an impairment of property rights in
the process.
FACTS:
On April 23, 1992, RA 7432 was passed into law, granting senior citizens
privileges|||. Feeling aggrieved by the tax deduction scheme, petitioners filed the
present recourse, praying that Section 4 of RA 7432, as amended by RA 9257,
and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and the DOF be
declared unconstitutional insofar as these allow business establishments to claim
the 20% discount given to senior citizens as a tax deduction; that the DSWD and
the DOF be prohibited from enforcing the same; and that the tax credit treatment of
the 20% discount under the former Section 4 (a) of RA 7432 be reinstated.
ISSUE:
a. Whether or not the petition presents an actual case or controversy.
b. Whether or not Section 4 of RA 9257 – insofar as it provide 20% discount to
Senior Citizens may be claimed as tax deduction by the private establishments- is
invalid and unconstitutional.
HELD:
a. Yes. When the constitutionality of a law is put in issue, judicial review may
be availed of only if the following requisites concur: "(1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of
the party raising the [question of constitutionality];(3) recourse to judicial review is
made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the [question of constitutionality] is the lis
mota of the case."
In this case, petitioners are challenging the constitutionality of the tax deduction
scheme provided in RA 9257 and the implementing rules and regulations issued by
the DSWD and the DOF. Respondents, however, oppose the Petition on the ground
that there is no actual case or controversy. We do not agree with respondents.
An actual case or controversy exists when there is "a conflict of legal rights" or
"an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution." The Petition
must therefore show that "the governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
effect on the individual challenging it." In this case, the tax deduction scheme
challenged by petitioners has a direct adverse effect on them. Thus, it cannot be
denied that there exists an actual case or controversy.
b. No. We found that the 20% discount as well as the tax deduction scheme is a
valid exercise of the police power of the State.||| The 20% discount is intended to
improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are less likely to be gainfully
employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy
in purchasing basic commodities. It may not be amiss to mention also that the
discount serves to honor senior citizens who presumably spent the productive years
of their lives on contributing to the development and progress of the nation. This
distinct cultural Filipino practice of honoring the elderly is an integral part of this law.
As to its nature and effects, the 20% discount is a regulation affecting the ability
of private establishments to price their products and services relative to a special class
of individuals, senior citizens, for which the Constitution affords preferential
concern. In turn, this affects the amount of profits or income/gross sales that a private
establishment can derive from senior citizens. In other words, the subject regulation
affects the pricing, and, hence, the profitability of a private establishment. However, it
does not purport to appropriate or burden specific properties, used in the operation or
conduct of the business of private establishments, for the use or benefit of the public,
or senior citizens for that matter, but merely regulates the pricing of goods and
services relative to, and the amount of profits or income/gross sales that such private
establishments may derive from, senior citizens.
The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial
distinctions from, price control or rate of return on investment control laws which are
traditionally regarded as police power measures. These laws generally regulate
public utilities or industries/enterprises imbued with public interest in order to protect
consumers from exorbitant or unreasonable pricing as well as temper corporate greed
by controlling the rate of return on investment of these corporations considering that
they have a monopoly over the goods or services that they provide to the general
public. The subject regulation differs therefrom in that (1) the discount does not
prevent the establishments from adjusting the level of prices of their goods and
services, and (2) the discount does not apply to all customers of a given establishment
but only to the class of senior citizens. Nonetheless, to the degree material to the
resolution of this case, the 20% discount may be properly viewed as belonging to the
category of price regulatory measures which affect the profitability of establishments
subjected thereto.
On its face, therefore, the subject regulation is a police power measure.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 445
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SR METALS, INC., SAN R MINING AND CONSTRUCTION CORP. and GALEO
EQUIPMENT AND MINING COMPANY, INC. vs. THE HONORABLE ANGELO T.
REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR)
G.R. No. 179669. June 4, 2014.

DOCTRINE: The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) treats all
small-scale miners equally as the production limit applies to all of them.

FACTS:
On March 9, 2006, each of the petitioners was awarded a 2-year Small-Scale Mining
Permit(SSMP) by the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board of Agusan del Norte; they were
allowed to extract Nickel and Cobalt (Ni-Co) in a 20-hectare mining site in SitioBugnang,
Brgy. La Fraternidad, Tubay, Agusan del Norte. The mining corporations’ ECCs contain
a restriction that the amount of Ni-Co ore they are allowed to extract annually should not
exceed 50,000 MTs pursuant to Section 1 of PD 1899. Subsequently, however, Agusan
del Norte Governor, Erlpe John M. Amante (Governor Amante), questioned the
quantityof ore that had been mined and shipped by the mining corporations.Meanwhile,
the EMB sent the mining corporations a Notice of Violationinforming them that they had
exceeded the allowed annual volume of 150,000 MTs combined production as their
stockpile inventory of NickelifeThe CA denied the mining corporations’ Petition, notonly
because the ECCs have been mooted by their expiration, but also due to its recognition
of the power of the DENR to issue the CDO as the agency reposed with the duty of
managing and conserving the country’s resources under Executive Order 192.rous ore
had already totaled 177,297 dry metric tons (DMT).On November 26, 2004, DENR
Secretary Angelo T. Reyes issued a Cease and Desist Order(CDO) against the
miningcorporations suspending their operations. The mining corporations then filed
before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction, imputing abuse of discretion on the part of DENR in
issuing the CDO.Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:
WON the 50,000-MTs production limit applies to small-scale miners.

HELD:
Yes. With the 50,000-MT limit likewise imposed on small-scale miners under RA
7076, the issue raised on the violation of the equal protection clause is moot. The fact is,
the DENR treats all small-scale miners equally as theproduction limit applies to all of
them. There is therefore no more reason for the mining corporations to not recognize
and comply with the said limitation. It must be stressed that the DENR is the government
agency tasked with the duty of managing and conserving the country’s resources; it is
also the agency vested with the authority to promulgate rules and regulations for the
implementation of mining laws.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 446
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
CHARLES BUMAGAT, JULIAN BACUDIO, ROSARIO PADRE, SPOUSES ROGELIO
and ZOSIMA PADRE, and FELIPE DOMINCIL, vs. REGALADO ARRIBAY,
G.R. No. 194818. June 9, 2014.

DOCTRINE:For the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) to


acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must exist a tenancy relation between the
parties.

FACTS:
Petitioners are the registered owners, successors-in-interest, or possessors of
agricultural land, consisting of about eight hectares, located in Bubog, Sto. Tomas,
Isabela. The certificates of title to the above titled properties were issued in 1986
pursuant to emancipation patents.On July 19, 2005, petitioners filed a Complaintfor
forcible entry against respondent before the 2nd Municipal CircuitTrial Court (MCTC) of
Cabagan-Delfin Albano, Isabela. The MCTC held that based on the evidence, petitioners
were in actual possession of the subject parcels of land, since respondent himself
admitted that he brought an action against petitioners before the MARO to collect rentals
which have remained unpaid since 1995 — thus implying that petitioners, and not
respondent, were in actual possession of the land, and belying respondent’s claim that
he took possession of the property in 1993 when petitioners supposedly abandoned the
same.The MCTC added that it had jurisdiction over the case since there is no tenancy
relationship between the parties, and the pleadings do not allege such fact; that
respondent’s own witnesses declared that the subject property was never tenanted nor
under lease to tenants.Respondent appealedthe MCTC Decision before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), insisting that the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case.Respondent
went up to the CA by Petition for Review. In reversing the trial court, the CA agreed that
the parties’ dispute fell under the jurisdiction of the DARAB since petitioners’ titles were
obtained pursuant to PD 27, and under the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure, cases
involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership
Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land
Registration Authority fall under DARAB jurisdiction.Petitioners moved for
reconsideration, but in a November 9, 2010 Resolution, the CA stood its ground. Hence,
the present recourse.

ISSUE:
WON the dispute is within the jurisdiction of DARAB.

HELD:
No.What the appellate court failed to realize, however, is the fact that as between
petitioners and the respondent, there is no tenurial arrangement, not even an implied
one. As correctly argued by petitioners, a case involving agricultural land does not
immediately qualify it as an agrarian dispute. The mere fact that the land is agricultural
does not ipso facto make the possessor anagricultural lessee or tenant. There are
conditions orrequisites before he can qualify as an agricultural lessee or tenant, and the
subject being agricultural land constitutes just one condition.For the DARAB to acquire
jurisdiction over the case, there must exist a tenancy relation between the parties. “[I]n

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 447
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it is essential to establish all
its indispensable elements, to wit: 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3)
that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation
onthe part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.”In the present case, it is quite
evident that not all of these conditions are present. For one, there is no tenant, as both
parties claim ownership over the property.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 448
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. SUSIE IRENE GALLE
GR No. 171836 Aug 11, 2014

DOCTRINE: It has been the consistent pronouncement of this Court that the
determination of just compensation is basically a judicial function. Also, it is settled that
in the computation of just compensation for land taken for agrarian reform, both Section
17 of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988/CARL) and the formula prescribed in the applicable Administrative Order of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) should be considered.

FACTS:
Respondent Susie Irene Galle owned two contiguous parcels of land known as
the Patalon Coconut Estate in Patalon, Zamboanga City, and covered by two titles
issued in her name. The estate is a fully developed and income-producing farm. The
estate contained between 35,810 to 38,666 coconut trees,producing copra. Likewise,
cattle, carabao and horses were raised therein.In August 1992, petitioner Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP) valued 356.2257 hectares of the estate at P6,083,545.26, which
valuation was rejected by Galle. The rejected amount was supposedly deposited in the
name of Galle, in the form of cash and bonds.
The Zamboanga City Registry of Deeds cancelled Galle's titles and transferred
the entire estate to the State; New titles were issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines Department of Agrarian Reform.
Meanwhile, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
conducted summary administrative proceedings for the acquisition of the estate it
rendered a decision directing the Land Bank of the Philippines to determine and include
the value of the 1.4 hectares barangay road in the total valuation. Respondent instituted
a case for "Cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title and Reconveyance,
Determination and Payment of Just Compensation, and Damages" with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City.
It favored the respondent ordering the Registry of Deeds to cancel the issue in
favor of the government. She likewise filed in DARAB Case seeking annulment of the
titles which were issued subsequent to her original titles. CA ruled that the RTC had no
power to review decisions of the DARAB, and it had no jurisdiction over the case for
cancellation of titles since it was not the designated Special Agrarian Court (SAC).

ISSUE:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE COMPLAINT
FOR JUST COMPENSATION FILED BY THE RESPONDENT BEFORE THE SPECIAL
AGRARIAN COURT HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED.

HELD:
The Court denies the Petition in G.R. No. 171836 and partially grants the Petition
in G.R. No. 195213.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 449
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. Moreover, both
Section 17 of RA 6657 and the formula prescribed in the applicable AO of the DAR must
be considered in the computation.
Reading the August 15, 2005 Resolution in its entirety, it readily appears that the
SAC did not apply the formula in the applicable Administrative Circulars of the DAR (AOs
6 and 11) in arriving at its own independent valuation of Galle's estate. It relied upon
Manalo's Commissioners' Report, which likewise did not apply the formula in AOs 6 and
11, although it took into consideration some of the factors laid down in Section 17 of RA
6657.
The CA is guilty of the same mistake. Nowhere in the appellate court's decision
can it be seen that the formula prescribed by AOs 6 and 11 were taken into account; all
that were considered were the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657, which thus
makes its pronouncement incomplete.
Thus, while this Court acknowledges that Galle's estate was expropriated to the
extent of 356.8257 hectares as the CA has found, the computation of the exact amount
of just compensation remains an issue that must be resolved, taking into
consideration both Section 17 of RA 6657 and AOs 6 and 11. In an earlier case
decided by this ponente, it was held that the evidence to be presented by the parties
before the trial court for the valuation of the property must conform to Section 17 of RA
6657 and, as far as practicable, DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, as
amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, series of 1994.
In other words, in the exercise of the Court's essentially judicial function of
determining just compensation, the RTC-SACs are not granted unlimited
discretion and must consider and apply the R.A. No. 6657-enumerated factors and
the DAR formula that reflect these factors. These factors and formula provide the
uniform framework or structure for the computation of the just compensation for a
property subject to agrarian reform. This uniform system will ensure that they do not
arbitrarily fix an amount that is absurd, baseless and even contradictory to the objectives
of our agrarian reform laws as just compensation. This system will likewise ensure that
the just compensation fixed represents, at the very least, a close approximation of the full
and real value of the property taken that is fair and equitable for both the
farmer-beneficiaries and the landowner.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 450
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. LUIS SAMAR and MAGDALENA SAMAR
G.R. No. 197329 September 8, 2014

DOCTRINE: Determination of just compensation under Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of


Civil Procedure.

FACTS:
Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) filed Civil Case No. IR-2243 with the
RTC, seeking to expropriate respondent spouses Luis and Magdalena Samar’s
1,020-square meter lot which NPC needed for the construction of a transmission line.
The RTC directed the issuance of a Writ of Condemnation in favor of NPC. Accordingly,
NPC entered the subject lot and constructed its transmission line denominated as Tower
No. 83. However, the trial court issued another Order5 dismissing Civil Case No. IR-2243
without prejudice for failure to prosecute, to wit - After almost three (3) years since the
said order was issued, the Committee has not met nor deliberated on said matter and the
parties in this case have not exerted efforts in pursuing their claims despite so long a
time. Case is dismissed without prejudice.
Respondents filed with the same trial court a Complaint, docketed as Civil Case
No. IR-2678, for compensation and damages against NPC relative to the subject lot
which NPC took over but for which it failed to pay just compensation on account of the
dismissal of Civil Case No. IR-224. Atty. WenifredoPornillo, recommended a valuation
within the range of ₱1,000.00 to ₱1,500.00 per square meter. Lorenzo C. Orense,
commissioner for NPC, did not set an amount, although he stated that the lot should be
valued at the prevailing market prices of agricultural, and not residential, lands within the
area. The court representative, Esteban D. Colarina, proposed a ₱1,100.00 per square
meter valuation. RTC, ruled the value of the subject lot at ₱1,000.00 per square meter.
NPC filed an appeal to CA which was denied.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
REMANDING THE COURT FOR DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF JUST
COMPENSATION FOR THE EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY INACCORDANCE WITH
SECTION 4, RULE 67 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.

HELD:
The Court grants the Petition. NPC insists that Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1964
Rules of Court should have been observed in fixing the amount of just compensation for
the subject lot, that the value of the lot at the time of NPC’s taking thereof or filing of Civil
Case No. IR-2243 in 1990 should have been the basis for computing just compensation
and not the prevailing market value at the time of the filing or pendency of Civil Case No.
IR-2678 in 1995. NPC thus prays that Civil Case No. IR-2678 be remanded to the trial
court for determination of just compensation applying Section 4, Rule 67 of the 1964
Rules of Court.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 451
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, Just compensation is based on the price or value
of the property at the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the
government. However, if the government takes possession before the institution of
expropriation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said
possession, not of the filing of the complaint. The value at the time of the filing of the
complaint should be the basis for the determination of the value when the taking of the
property involved coincides with or is subsequent to the commencement of the
proceedings.
The procedure for determining just compensation is set forth in Rule 67 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 5 of Rule 67 partly states that ‘upon the rendition
of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent
and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken.’ However, we held in Republic v.
Court of Appeals that Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing of complaint for eminent domain
with the appropriate court by the expropriator. If no such complaint is filed, the
expropriator is considered to have violated procedural requirements, and hence, waived
the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the appointment of commissioners
to ascertain just compensation. In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we
clarified that when there is no action for expropriation and the case involves only a
complaint for damages or just compensation, the provisions of the Rules of Court on
ascertainment of just compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule 67) are no longer applicable,
and a trial before commissioners is dispensable.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPOUSES NILO and ERLINDA MERCADO vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 196707. June 17, 2015
DOCTRINE: Expropriation Proceedings; Just Compensation; Guidelines for the Proper
Determination of Just Compensation (see ruling)

Remand of Cases; While remand is frowned upon for obviating the speedy
dispensation of justice, it becomes necessary to ensurecompliance with the law and to
give everyone — the landowner, the farmers, and the State — their due.

FACTS:
Petitioners spouses Nilo and Erlinda Mercado (petitioners) were the registered
owners of 9.8940 hectares of agricultural land in Kilate, Toril, Davao City covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-44107. Respondent, on the other hand, is a
government financial institution organized and existing by virtue of RA 3844,6 and is the
financial intermediary for the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Thru a
Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition,7 the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office
(PARO) of Davao City informed petitioners that 5.2624 hectares of their aforesaid
property (subject portion) shall be placed under the CARPcoverage, for which petitioners
were offered P287,227.16 as just compensation. In his letter dated October 27, 2002,
petitioner Nilo A. Mercado (Nilo) rejected respondent’s valuation. He claimed that the fair
market value of their property is P250,000.00 per hectare; that they sold the remaining
4.6316-hectare portion, which is hilly and uncultivated, compared to the subject portion
which is flat, suited for agriculture and has improvements, for such price; and, that said
property is adjacent to “Eden,” an eco-tourism area, and likewise suitable for housing
and other uses.Thus, petitioners filed a Complaint for payment of just compensation
before the RTC acting as SAC which was docketed as Civil Case No. 30,373-04.
Petitioners prayed that the DAR and respondent be ordered to pay them P250,000.00
per hectare as just compensation for the subject.

ISSUE:
Whether or not just compensation was properly determined by the RTC.

HELD:
No, As a final note, we remind the RTC to observe the following guidelines for
the proper determination of just compensation: (1) just compensation must be valued at
the time of taking of the property expropriated, or the time when the owner was deprived
of the use and benefit of his property; (2) interest may be awarded as may be warranted
by the circumstances of the case; and (3) just compensation must be arrived at pursuant
to the guidelines set forth in Section 17 of RA 6657 and outlined in a formula provided in
DAR A.O. No. 5. If the RTC finds these guidelines inapplicable, it must clearly explain the
reasons for deviating therefrom and for using other factors or formula in arriving at the
reasonable just compensation for the property expropriated.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 453
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Given all these, the Court finds that both parties failed to adduce satisfactory evidence of
the property’s value at the time of its taking. Thus, it is premature to make a final
determination of the just compensation due to petitioners. And as the Court cannot
receive new evidence from the parties for the prompt resolution of this case, its remand
to the RTC is deemed proper. Suffice it to state that “[w]hile remand is frowned upon for
obviating the speedy dispensation of justice, it becomes necessary to ensure compliance
with the law and to give everyone — the landowner, the farmers, and the State — their
due.”

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 454
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MACARIO CATIPON, JR. , vs. JEROME JAPSON
G.R. No. 191787. June 22, 2015.

DOCTRINE: Administrative Agencies; Civil Service Commission; Dismissal from


Service; The Civil Service Commission (CSC), as the central personnel agency of the
Government, has jurisdiction over disputes involving the removal and separation of all
employees of government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies,
including government-owned or -controlled corporations with original charters.
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a
court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over
which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.

FACTS:
On March 10, 2003, respondent Jerome Japson, a former Senior Member
Services Representative of SSS Bangued, filed a letter-complaint with the Civil Service
Commission-CAR Regional Director, alleging that petitioner made deliberate false
entries in his CSPE application, specifically, that he obtained his college degree in 1993
when actually he graduated in 1995 only, after removing his deficiency of 1.5 units in
Military Education. Also,that petitioner was not qualified to take the CSPE examination in
1993 since he was not yet then a graduate of a four-year college course, contrary to the
entry in his application form. After preliminary investigation, petitioner was charged with
Dishonesty, Falsification of Official documents, Grave Misconduct and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service by the CSC-CAR.
The CA held that instead of filing a petition for review directly with it, petitioner
should have interposed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (CSC), pursuant to
Sections 5(A)(1), 43 and 49 of the CSC Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA can take cognizance of the petition without violating well
established doctrines and procedures.

HELD:
No,The CA is further justified in refusing to take cognizance of the petition for
review, as “[t]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto
itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged
with an administrative body of special competence.” When petitioner’s recourse lies in an
appeal to the Commission Proper in accordance with the procedure prescribed in MC 19,
the CA may not be faulted for refusing to acknowledge petitioner before it. The doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that before a party is allowed to seek
the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the
means of administrative processes afforded him or her. “The CSC, as the central
personnel agency of the Government, has jurisdiction over disputes involving the
removal and separation of all employees of government branches, subdivisions,

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 455
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
instrumentalities and agencies, including government-owned or - controlled corporations
with original charters. Simply put, it is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil
service.”
In line with the above provisions of the Constitution and its mandate as the central
personnel agency of government and sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil
service.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 456
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
RUBY RUTH S. SERRANO MAHILUM vs. SPOUSES EDILBERTO ILANO and
LOURDES ILANO
G.R. No. 197923. June 22, 2015.

DOCTRINE: Civil Law; Land Registration; Torrens System; Since a new title was never
issued in respondents’ favor and, instead, title remained in petitioner’s name, the former
never came within the coverage and protection of the Torrens system, where the issue of
good or bad faith becomes relevant.

FACTS:
Petitioner Ruby Ruth S. Serrano Mahilum is the registered owner of a parcel of
land covered by TransferCertificate of Title No. 855336 (TCT 85533) of the Registry of
Deeds of Las Piñas City. In September 2003, she entrusted the original owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT 85533 to Teresa Perez (Perez) — a purported real estate broker
— who claimed that she can assist petitioner in obtaining a loan, with TCT 85533 serving
as collateral. After several months, petitioner demanded the return of the title, but Perez
failed to produce the same; after much prodding, Perez admitted that the title was lost.
Thus, in June 2004, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Loss andcaused the same to be
annotated upon the original registry copy of TCT 85533 as Entry No. 1668-247 on
October 7, 2004. In June 2006, petitioner received a letter from the Registry of Deeds of
Las Piñas City informing her that the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT 85533 was not lost,
but that it was presented to the registry by respondents, spouses Edilberto and Lourdes
Ilano, who claimed that the property covered by the title was sold to them. In this
connection, respondents — instead of registering the supposed sale in their favor —
executed an Affidavit of Non-Loss, which was entered on TCT 85533 on June 28, 2006
as Entry No. 1875- 27.8 Petitioner confronted respondents, who showed her a notarized
Agreement with right of repurchase dated December 4, 2003 and an unnotarized and
undated Deed of Absolute Sale, on which documents petitioner’s purported signatures
were affixed. These documents indicate that petitioner sold the property covered by TCT
85533 to respondents for P250,000.00 with right to repurchase thesame within a period
of 90 days. Petitioner told respondents that she did not execute these documents, and
that her purported signatures therein were in fact falsified and forged. She demanded the
return of TCT 85533, but respondents refused to surrender the title to her. They claimed
that the property was sold to them by Perez and “a companion.” All this time, title to the
property remained in petitioner’s name, as respondents have not registered the
unnotarized and undated Deed of Absolute Sale.On June 20, 2007, petitioner and her
husband Richard instituted against respondents and Perez Civil Case No. LP-07-0109
with the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is within the coverage and protection of the torrens
system, where the issue of good or bad faith becomes relevant.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 457
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
No, Since a new title was never issued in respondents’ favor and, instead, title
remained in petitioner’s name, the former never came within the coverage and protection
of the Torrens system, where the issue of good or bad faith becomes relevant. Since
respondents never acquired a new certificate of title in their name, the issue of their good
or bad faith which is central in an annulment of title case is of no consequence;
petitioner’s case is for annulment of the Agreement and Deed of Absolute Sale, and not
one to annul title since the certificate of title is still in her name. The jurisprudential bases
for the CA’s pronouncement that there is a failure to state a cause of action ifthere is no
allegation in the complaint that respondents were purchasers in bad faith — Castillo v.
Heirs of Vicente Madrigal, 198 SCRA 556 (1991), and Heirs of Julian Tiro v. Philippine
Estates Corporation, 563 SCRA 309 (2008) — involved complaints for annulment of new
titles issued to the buyers; they cannot apply to petitioner’s case where title remains in
her name.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 458
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JOEBERT C. GUAN, former Clerk of
Court, Municipal Trial Court, Bulan, Sorsogon,
A.M. No. P072293. July 15, 2015.*
(formerly A.M. No. 0612411MTC)

DOCTRINE: Any shortages in the amounts to be remitted and the delay in the actual
remittance “constitute gross neglect of duty for which the clerk of court shall be held
administratively liable.”

FACTS:
A financial audit of the books of accounts of MTC, Bulan, Sorsogon covering the
period July 28, 1993 to August 31, 2004 disclosed thatthere areincurred shortages in the
Judiciary Development Fund and Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund. A complaint
against Guan, former clerk, then followed.

Guan wrote the Court a letter dated March 12, 2007 requesting that the monetary
value of his leave credits be applied as payment for his accountability amounting to
P53,323.10. He explained that he could no longer account for the shortages because
some of the records pertaining thereto, as well as his Judiciary and General Fund
reports, could no longer be found.

The Court deferred action on Guan’s request. He was directed through a


Resolution(1) x x x and (2) to comply by submitting the said documents.

Guan explained that while he was able to secure from the MTO a list of cash bond
deposits made by him, the Fiscal Monitoring Division (FMD) of the OCA did not accept
the same for being incomplete.

The audit team noted that Guan’s FF accountability was not due to undeposited
collections but to lacking documentations, specifically the deficient supporting
documents on cashbonds withdrawal transactions.

The OCA concluded that Guan was remiss in the performance of his duties and is
administratively liable

ISSUES:
Whether Guan should be held accountable for simple neglect of duty

HELD:
As found by the audit team, Guan’s accountabilities were either due to unreported
or undeposited collections or to deposited collection but with lacking documentation.This
only demonstrates Guan’s disorganized way of managing and documenting his
collections

However, the Court disagrees with the OCA’s finding that Guan’s transgressions
constitute simple neglect of duty only. Any shortages in the amounts to be remitted and

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
the delay in the actual remittance thereof constitute gross neglect of duty for which the
clerk of court shall be held administratively liable.

As held, “[g]ross neglect is such neglect which, from the gravity of the case or the
frequency of instances, becomes so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten
the public welfare.”In this case, the frequency of the instances alone, i.e., for two
separate periods of accountability, Guan was both found to have incurred shortages with
respect to the JDF and SAJF due to unreported and undeposited collections, makes
respondent’s neglect of duty so serious in its character as to threaten the public welfare.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 460
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ALICIA Y. LAUREL, substituted by her sole heir and legal representative JUAN
MIGUEL Y. LAURELvs.FERDINAND M. VARDELEON
G.R. No. 202967. August 5, 2015.

DOCTRINE: The general rule is that dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is to be
regarded as adjudication on the merits and with prejudice to the filing of another action,
and the only exception is when the order of dismissal expressly contains a qualification
that the dismissal is without prejudice.

FACTS:
On July 23, 2004, petitioner Laurel filed a Complaint for recovery of possession
and ownership and/or quieting of title against respondent Vardeleon concerning an
island in Aklan.

Respondent denied the material allegations in the complaint, claiming that he


bought the island from Avelina Casimero, and that petitioner was guilty of laches in filing
her claim.

Petitioner essentially maintains in her Petition and Reply that during the October
12, 2005 scheduled hearing, her counsel and witness were present but they did not
commence trial because they honestly believed that the respondent’s pending motion for
reconsideration of the trial court’s August 19, 2005 Order denying his motion to
correct/amend the July 6, 2005 PreTrial Order needed to be resolved first. Petitioner
insists that said motion for reconsideration had a direct bearing on the course of the trial,
thus the necessity of resolving it first. In any case, it was already agreed upon during
pretrial and allowed by the trial court in its pretrial order, that she still had one more
opportunity to present her evidence on the scheduled hearing on November 23, 2005.
Thus, the RTC — instead of dismissing the case — should have allowed her to present
evidence on said date. Petitioner posits that agreements reached at the pretrial
conference and embodied in the pretrial order control the course of trial and should not
be disturbed unless there would be manifest injustice.Since she had one more
scheduled hearing available to her, it cannot be concluded that she has failed to
prosecute her case. In addition, petitioner claims that she has a meritorious case since
she purchased the property from a seller who has a valid tax declaration in his name,
while respondent himself admitted during pretrial that his supposed predecessor in
interest Avelina Casimero had no document or tax declaration to support her title to the
subject property. She points out that the trial court erred in not giving the parties the
opportunity to present their arguments on their pending motions for reconsideration, and
instead denied them outright on October 12, 2005; and that the power to dismiss the
case for failure to prosecute should be exercised with care, as it may forever bar a
litigant from pursuing judicial relief, and so the circumstances surrounding the case
should be considered to the end that technicality shall not take precedence over
substantial justice.

In Respondent’s Comment, he maintains that the CA is correct in affirming the


dismissal. He labels petitioner’s insistence for the RTC to resolve first the pending

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
motions for reconsideration before trial could commence, and for her to be allowed to
commence the presentation of evidence on November 23, 2005, as specious and flimsy.
He argues that these claims even constitute glaring proof of petitioner’s lack of interest in
prosecuting her case; and that if petitioner was keen on pursuing her case, then the
substitute counsel (Atty. Villa) should nonetheless have been prepared on October 12,
2005. He avers that petitioner has exhibited a complacent attitude toward her case in
violation of his right to speedy trial/dis position of his case. Finally, he contends that
petitioner has been accorded due process and given ample opportunity to present her
case.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether there is a failure to prosecute on the part of the plaintiff
(2) Whether there was unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving the
pending incident is a violation of the norms of judicial conduct

HELD:
(1) No. So long as the parties act within schedule, then none of them should
complain. Besides, the delay or failure to prosecute contemplated under Section 3, Rule
17 of the 1997 Rules must be for an “unreasonable length of time.” In petitioner’s case,
the continuance she sought was not for an unreasonable length of time. It was within the
period expected by and made known to the defendant and the trial court during pretrial.
In fact, it was only until the next scheduled setting on November 23, 2005, which was just
over one month away. This may not be characterized as delay; as such scheduled
hearing was expected by respondent and could not have come as a surprise to him. He
was expected, as he agreed, to wait until the termination of these three scheduled
hearings. Within such period, he can do nothing but await his turn to present evidence,
unless petitioner terminates it earlier. Moreover, respondent could not have been
prejudiced by the postponement being sought.

(2) Yes. For its part, the trial court was remiss in its duty to act on the two pending
motions before it. It appears that it did not even grant the parties the opportunity to
comment respectively on these motions, and instead simply summarily denied them in
open court during the October 12, 2005 scheduled hearing. The trial court should be
reminded that “the unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a pending incident is a
violation of the norms of judicial conduct and constitutes a ground for administrative
sanction against the defaulting magistrate.”

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 462
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATORvs. ANA MARIE ABARINTOS, Records
Officer IV, Court of Appeals, Cebu City
A.M. No. CA1226P. August 17, 2015.

DOCTRINE: Man is not perfect. At one time or another, he may commit a mistake. But
we should not look only at his sin. We should also consider the man’s sincerity in his
repentance, his genuine effort at restitution and his eventual triumph in the reformation of
his life.

FACTS:
This administrative complaint stemmed from an anonymous letter1 dated
February 9, 2011 addressed to Chief Justice Renato C. Corona charging respondent
Anna Marie Abarintos, former Records Officer IV at the Judicial Records Division of the
Court of Appeals, Cebu station, of tampering the date of receipt of the Petition for Review
filed in C.A.G.R. S.P. No. 05464.2 Respondent allegedly made it appear that said
pleading was timely filed on November 4, 2010 to favour her husband’s kumpadre who
filed it. In the same letter, respondent was likewise accused of taking the ATM card of
her officemate, Records Officer II Elizabeth Gilos (Gilos), and withdrawing therefrom
P10,000.00 without the latter’s knowledge and consent.

In her Comment, respondent denied the accusations. She averred that the issue
of tampering had already been clarified and that it did not prejudice the rights and
interest of any of the parties in C.A.G.R. S.P. No. 05464. With regard to the alleged
unauthorized withdrawal, respondent explained that the same is a personal issue
between two friends arising from a simple misunderstanding. According to respondent,
the anonymous letter does not deserve the attention of this Court and that the same has
caused undue stress and pain to her father-in-law,Associate Justice Pampio A.
Abarintos.

In OCA’s Memorandum dated February 17, 2015, it opined that respondent is


guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for having received a
pleading beyond office hours and without authority to do so. Anent the unauthorized
withdrawal, it agreed with the Investigating Justice that respondent is guilty of grave
misconduct OCA recommended the penalty of P20,000.00 fine with forfeiture of
retirement benefits, except accrued leave benefits, and perpetual disqualification from
holding public office.

ISSUES:
Whether the respondent should be liable for:
(1) tampering the date of actual receipt of the Petition
(2) taking the ATM card of her officemate and making unauthorized
withdrawal.
HELD:
(1) No. Administrative liability cannot rest on mere suspicion or speculation. There
must be substantial evidence to support a finding that respondent is responsible for the
reprehensible act imputed against her.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
As regards respondent’s alleged lack of authority,there is no proof that
respondent, who is the head of the Judicial Records Division, is prohibited from receiving
pleadings.Since it has not been established that respondent is forbidden to receive
pleadings, she should not be administratively held liable for doing so.

Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the recommendation of the OCA that


respondent’s receipt of subject pleading several minutes after office hours raises a
presumption that she used her office to extend a favour to a litigant. There is simply no
such presumption that exists inthe Rules on Evidence or in statute books. On the other
hand, it is basic that court officials and personnel are presumed to have regularly
performed their official duties. At this point, it may not be amiss to state that the circulars
issued by this Court pertaining to the observance of prescribed working hours19 are
intended to promote punctuality and prevent tardiness or absenteeism “if only to
recompense the government and, ultimately, the people, who shoulder the cost of
maintaining the Judiciary.”20 They are not intended to deny public service to the same
people who come to court to transact business, even if they arrive a few minutes after
the prescribed working hours, when there are still court personnel present who could
serve them.

(2) Yes. The Court adoptsthe recommendation of the OCA that the acts of
respondent in taking the ATM card of her officemate and making an unauthorized
withdrawal therefrom do not only constitute grave misconduct, but amount to dishonesty
as well.The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption,
willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be
established by substantial evidence.”22 Dishonesty, on the other hand, “has been
defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud. It implies untrustworthiness,
lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle on the part of the
individual who failed to exercise fairness and straightforwardness in his or her dealings

Out of compassion and mercy, The Court deem it just and proper to reduce the
recommended fine to P5,000.00.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 464
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ROMMEL C. ARNADO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND FLORANTE
CAPITAN
G.R. No. 210164, August 18, 2015

DOCTRINE: Only natural-born Filipinos who owe total and undivided allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines could run for and hold elective public office.

FACTS:
Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine
citizenship after he was naturalized as citizen of the United States of America (USA).
Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines,
Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act No. 9225 (RA 9225) before the
Consul General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA. He took an Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008 and, on even date, an Order of
Approval of Citizenship Retention and Re acquisition was issued in his favor. On April 3,
2009, Arnado executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the
mayoralty post of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010 national and local
elections. Disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC on the ground, among others, that
Arnado remained a US citizen because he continued to use his US passport for entry to
and exit from the Philippines after executing aforesaid Affidavit of Renunciation. While
Balua’s petition remained pending, the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded where Arnado
garnered the highest number of votes for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan.
Comelec First Division issued a Resolution holding that Arnado’s continued use of
his US passport effectively negated his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. Thus, he
was disqualified.
On May 10, 2013, Capitan, Arnado’s lone rival for the mayoralty post, filed a
Petition seeking to disqualify him from running for municipal mayor of Kauswagan and/or
to cancel his CoC based on the ruling of this Court in Maquiling.

On May 14, 2013, Arnado was proclaimed as the winning candidate. Unfazed,
Capitan filed another Petitionthis time seeking to nullify Arnado’s proclamation. He
argued that with the April 16, 2013 Decision of this Court in Maquiling, there is no doubt
that Arnado is disqualified from running for any local elective office. Hence, Arnado’s
proclamation is void and without any legal effect.

ISSUE:
Whether Arnaldo satisfied the twin requirements of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225.

HELD:

Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with “dual citizenship”
is disqualified from running for any elective local position. In Mercado v. anzano,it was
clarified that the phrase “dual citizenship” in said Section 4(d) must be understood as
referring to “dual allegiance.”Subsequent, Congress enacted RA 9225 allowing
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 465
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
reason of their naturalization abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full
civil and political rights upon compliance with the requirements of the law. They may now
run for public office in the Philippines provided that they: (1) meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and, (2) make
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC. Thus:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities– Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject
to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:

xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath;

In the case at bench, the Comelec Second Division, as affirmed by the


Comelec En Banc, ruled that Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite of Section
5 (2) of RA 9225 because, as held in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, his April 3,
2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport
after executing said affidavit. Consequently, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1,
2012 for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections, Arnado had yet to comply with said
second requirement. The Comelec also noted that while Arnado submitted an affidavit
dated May 9, 2013, affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same would
not suffice for having been belatedly executed.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 466
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
THE PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY (PPA) vs. COALITION OF PPA OFFICERS
AND EMPLOYEES, represented by HECTOR E. MIOLE, et al.,
G.R. No. 203142. August 26, 2015

DOCTRINE: Where the issues have become moot and academic, there ceases to be
any justiciable controversy, thus rendering the resolution of the same of no practical
value.

FACTS:
Petitioner is a government owned and controlled corporation in charge of port
administration and operation in the country. Respondent Coalition of PPA Officers and
Employees, represented by Hector E. Miole, is an aggrupation of PPA employees set up
as a result of the instant case.

Respondent sought mainly to compel petitioner to pay all its employees cost of
living allowance (COLA) and amelioration allowance (AA), pursuant to the mandate of
Republic Act No. 6758.

Petition for Certiorari was filed by the respondent, however, it was denied.
Thereafter filed an Amended Petition for Mandamus with Damages and was granted.

PPA, in its Petition and Reply praying for reversal of the assailed CA dispositions
and that the trial court be ordered to conduct a hearing on its affirmative defences said
the trial court’s refusal to conduct a hearing on its affirmative defenses violates Rule 3.05
of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Respondent in its Comment, seeks denial of the Petition and claims that the
Petition should be denied as the CA correctly held that the trial court did not act with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed Orders, and that the instant Petition has
been rendered moot and academic by judgment on the merits

ISSUES:
whether x x x respondent can be compelled to perform an act which the law (RA
6758)

HELD:
Considering that judgment on the merits has been issued in Civil Case No.
CEB-33982, there is no need to resolve the instant Petition, which has been rendered
moot and academic. There is no need to scrutinize the actions of the trial court relative to
its issuance of the assailed orders after it has rendered judgment in the case.

Courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider
questions where no actual interests are involved. Thus, the wellsettled rule that courts
will not determine a moot question. Where the issues have become moot and academic,
there ceases to be any justiciable controversy, thus rendering the resolution of the same
of no practical value. Courts will decline jurisdiction over moot cases because there is no

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
substantial relief to which petitioner will be entitled and which will anyway be negated by
the dismissal of the petition. The Court will therefore abstain from expressing its opinion
in a case where no legal relief is needed or called for.

While in their respective pleadings the parties insist on a resolution of the case on
its merits — respondent even went so far as to suggest that the instant case be ordered
consolidated with G.R. No. 209433 — the Court finds no cogent reason to do so; indeed,
there are no exceptional circumstances to justify such action. The case involves a simple
controversy regarding the application of a clearcut law that has become the subject of a
number of precedents; no constitutional question or paramount public interest is
involved.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC AND ESTRELLA
C. ELAMPARO

G.R. No. 221697

DOCTRINE: The right to choose is the single factor that controls the ambitions of those
who would impose through force or stealth their will on the majority of citizens. A person
who aspires to occupy the highest position in the land must obey the highest law of the
land. The President wields a vast array of powers which includes "control of all the
executive departn1ents, bureaus and offices.He/she is also the Commander-in-Chief of
all armed forces of the Philippines and can "grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons,
and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment, as well as amnesty,
subject to the concurrence of Congress. For the rest of the world, he/she is the
representation and the representative of the Filipino people.

FACTS:

On September 3, 1968, petitioner, who was then still an infant, was found
abandoned in Jaro, Iloilo City.Her biological parents were unknown. Five years later,
petitioner was adopted by spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe. In
1991, petitioner graduated from Boston College in Massachusetts, with a degree of
Bachelor of Arts in Political Studies. On July 27, 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael
Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines and the United States of America
(U.S.A. or U.S.) from birth, at the Santuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan. On July 29,
1991, the couple left the Philippines, settled in the U.S., and started a family there. On
October 18, 2001, petitioner became a naturalized U.S. citizen.

On July 7, 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegianceto the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225(RA 9225). On July 18, 2006, the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID) issued an Order granting her petition for reacquisition
of Filipino citizenship under the said law.

On August 31, 2006, petitioner registered as a voter in Barangay Sta. Lucia, San
Juan. After more than three years, petitioner secured a Philippine passport valid until
October 12, 2014.On October 6, 2010, petitioner was appointed as Chairperson of the
Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).On October 20, 2010,
petitioner executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of
America and Renunciation of American Citizenship (Affidavit of Renunciation). The
following day, October 21, 2010, petitioner took her Oath of Office as M1RCB
Chairperson before President Benigno S. Aquino III.

On July 12, 2011, petitioner executed a document entitled Oath/Affirmation of


Renunciation of Nationality of the United States before the U.S. Vice-Consul. Thus, on
December 9, 2011, the latter issued her a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
States.In a bid for a Senate seat, petitioner secured and accomplished a CoC for Senator
on September 27, 2012 (2012 CoC).

ISSUE:

The respective petitions filed by respondents with the Comelec were properly
characterized as petitions for cancellation and/or denial of due course to petitioner's 2015
CoC

HELD:

The controversy with respect to petitioner's residency qualification arose when it


was observed that she made the following entry in Item 11 of her 2012 CoC for Senator:

Based on the said entry, it could be deduced that by her own reckoning, petitioner
started residing in the Philippines in November 2006. Thus by May 8, 2016, or the day
immediately preceding the elections on May 9, 2016, her period of residency in the
Philippines would only be nine years and six months, or short of the mandatory 10-year
residency requirement for the presidential post. In contrast, petitioner attested in her 2015
CoC that her period of residency in the Philippines on the day before the May 9, 2016
elections is "10 years and 11 months." Clearly, these are contrasting declarations which
give the impression that petitioner adjusted the period of her residency in her 2015 CoC to
show that she is eligible to run for the Presidency. This rendered her vulnerable to the
charge that she committed material misrepresentations in her 2015 CoC.

Section 2 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as reproduced above, requires,


among others, that a person aspiring to become a President must be a resident of the
Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding the election. This requirement is
mandatory and must be complied with strictly. For one, no less than our Constitution itself
imposes it. For another, Section 2 was couched in a negative form - an indication of the
intention of the framers of our Constitution to make it mandatory. "A statute or provision
which contains words of positive prohibition, such as 'shall not,' 'cannot; or 'ought not,' or
which is couched in negative terms importing that the act shall not be done otherwise than
designated, is mandatory." Moreover, Section 63 of Article IX of the OEC imposes the
same 10-year residency requirement.

For purposes of election laws, this Court, as early as 1928,held that the term
residence is synonymous with domicile.Domicile denotes the place "'where a party
actually or constructively has his permanent home,' where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain"(animus manendi).

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LUZ S. ALMEDA vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (MINDANAO) AND THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 204267, July 25, 2016

DOCTRINE:The right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged towards the
objective of spurring dispatch in the administration of justice but also to prevent the
oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution suspended over him for an
indefinite time. Akin to the right to speedy trial, its 'salutary objective' is to assure that an
innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of
having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the
presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. This
looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the passage of time
should be weighed against the State and in favor of the individual.

FACTS:
In 2001, petitioner Luz S. Almeda, then Schools Division Superintendent of the
DepEd, Surigao del Norte, and several other public officers and employees were charged
administratively and criminally before the Ombudsman, in connection with the alleged
improper use and disbursement of the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) allotted to
petitioner's co-respondent Constantino H. Navarro, Jr., Surigao del Norte Congressman,
and implemented through the DILG and the DepEd. The criminal charges were
consolidated and Resolution was issued in said case by Graft Investigation and
Prosecution Officer (GIPO) II Hilde C. dela Cruz-Likit, to the effect that probable cause
existed to indict petitioner and her co-accused for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of RA
3019. This Resolution was disapproved in part by then Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) then took over the case, and it prepared the
corresponding Information against petitioner, which was approved by then Special
Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio and Marcelo. On May 19, 2003, the Information was
forwarded to the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, who in turn indorsed and forwarded
the same, together with the Ombudsman's Resolution, to the Provincial Prosecutor of
Surigao del Norte on June 3, 2003, for appropriate filing in court.

Petitioner received a copy of the Ombudsman's March 19, 2003 Resolution on


May 29, 2003 and filed via a commercial courier service her Motion for Reconsideration,
with a prayer for reversal of the Ombudsman's ruling and to hold in abeyance the filing of
an information against her until the motion is resolved. An advance copy of the motion
was transmitted to the Ombudsman by fax on June 16, 2003.On July 7, 2003, petitioner
filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Filing of Information before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Surigao del Norte, which in turn referred the said motion to the
Ombudsman. On July 18, 2003, dela Cruz-Likit issued an Order giving due course to
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and a similar motion filed by one of her
co-respondents. Navarro filed his Commentto petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.On
August 25, 2003, petitioner filed before the Ombudsman her Supplemental motion for
reconsideration. Through a June 16, 2004 Indorsement of the Ombudsman for Mindanao,
petitioner's motion for reconsideration and all other pleadings, orders, and
communications relative thereto were forwarded to Marcelo for appropriate action,

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
pursuant to Office Order No. 31 entitled "Review and Consideration of Motions for
Reconsideration Filed in Relation to Orders and Resolutions Issued by the Tanodbayan,"
which pertains to cases where the Ombudsman disapproves orders, resolutions, or
decisions emanating from sectoral offices, and considering that the OSP has taken over
the case. In another Indorsement dated October 11, 2004, then Deputy Ombudsman for
Mindanao Antonio E. Valenzuela forwarded a copy of an October 11, 2004 Order which
ultimately closed and terminated the complaint as far as the Ombudsman for Mindanao is
concerned, pursuant to an August 4, 2004 Order issued by Marcelo ordering the OSP to
conduct the preliminary investigation of the case.

In 2010, petitioner sent a letter to the Ombudsman, seeking the early resolution of
her motions. However, the letter was not acted upon, as the handling dela Cruz-Likit, was
then on official study leave and no GIPO was as yet assigned to the case.On
September2011, petitioner filed before the Ombudsman a Manifestation,seeking
resolution of her Motion for Reconsideration. On November2011, she filed a second
Manifestation with the Ombudsman with a prayer for dismissal of the complaint against
her. Meanwhile, petitioner received copies of Indorsements dated September 28, 2011
and December 9, 2011 and signed by Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao Humphrey T.
Monteroso, referring and forwarding to the OSP petitioner's September 1, 2011
Manifestation and other pleadings and documents filed in OMB-MIN-01-0183, and noting
and informing that the entire record of the case has been forwarded previously to the
OSP. On August 2012, petitioner filed a third Manifestation before the Ombudsman,
instead of the OSP, entitled "Manifestation Reiterating the Right of the Accused to
Speedy Trial with Prayer for Dismissal of the Case."This time petitioner bewailed the
inaction and procedure taken by the Ombudsman and OSP in not taking cognizance of
the complaint and instead indorsing and repeatedly tossing the case back and forth to
each other. On September 6, 2012, the Ombudsman through dela Cruz-Likit issued the
assailed Order denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The petitioner before the Supreme Court alleged that the Ombudsman's failure to
promptly act on her case for nine years from the filing of her motion for reconsideration, or
from July 2003 to September 2012, is a violation of her constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of her case; that despite her repeated manifestations and follow-ups, no
action was taken on her case.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent violated petitioner’s constitutional right to speedy trial and
prompt disposition of cases when it failed to resolve the motion for reconsideration and
motion to hold in abeyance the filing of information for a period of nine (9) years from the
date of its filing.

HELD:
Yes. Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that "[a]all persons
shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial,
or administrative bodies." This right applies to all cases pending before all judicial,
quasi-judicial or administrative bodies; it is "not limited to the accused in criminal

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as
well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party to a case
may demand expeditious action to all officials who are tasked with the administration of
justice."It "includes within its contemplation the periods before, during and after
trial," such as preliminary investigations and fact-finding investigations conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman.

The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when
without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the
party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine
whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of
a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are
weighed, and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant's
assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resultingfrom the
delay, are considered.

"The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical


reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts
and circumstances peculiar to each case." For this reason, "[a] balancing test of applying
societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court to approach
speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis."

Regarding delays, it may be said that "[i]t is almost a universal experience that the
accused welcomes delay as it usually operates in his favor, especially if he greatly fears
the consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction
by which dominant cases have been known to expire."41 These principles should apply to
respondents in other administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings as well. It must also be
remembered that generally, respondents in preliminary investigation proceedings are not
required to follow up on their cases; it is the State's duty to expedite the same "within the
bounds of reasonable timeliness."

A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as
the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process."It is the duty of the
prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the Constitution,
regardless of whether the (respondent) did not object to the delay or that the delay was
with his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly attributable to
him."Failure or inaction may not have been deliberately intended, yet unjustified delay
nonetheless causes just as much vexation and oppression. Indeed, delay prejudices the
accused or respondent -and the State just the same. Prejudice should be assessed in the
light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely:
to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the
accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the
most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his
case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 473
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the
accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty
and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial
resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public
obloquy.

Delay is a two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its
case beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible
for the government to carry its burden.

Not only should the adjudication of cases be "done in an orderly manner that is in
accord with the established rules of procedure but must also be promptly decided to
better serve the ends of justice. Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders the
rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations inutile."

Finally, the Court has held that inordinate delay in resolving a criminal complaint is
violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to the speedy
disposition of cases, which warrants the dismissal of the criminal case.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
TAINA MANIGQUE-STONE vs. CATTLEYA LAND, INC., AND SPOUSES TROADIO
B. TECSON AND ASUNCION ORTALIZ-TECSON
G.R. No. 195975, September 05, 2016

DOCTRINE: The sale of Philippine land to an alien or foreigner, even if titled in the name
of his Filipino spouse, violates the Constitution and is thus, void.

FACTS:
In July 1992, Cattleya Land, Inc. sent its legal counsel, Atty. Federico C. Cabilao,
Jr. to Tagbilaran City to investigate at the Office of the Register of Deeds in that city the
status of the properties of spouses Col. Troadio B. Tecson and Asuncion Tecson (Tecson
spouses), which Cattleya wanted to purchase. One of these properties, an 8,805-square
meter parcel of land located at Doljo, Panglao, Bohol, is registered in the name of the
Tecson spouses. Atty. Cabilao, Jr. found that no encumbrances or liens on the subject
property had been annotated on the TCT thereof, except for an attachment issued in
connection with Civil Case No. 3399 entitled "Tantrade Corporation vs. Bohol Resort
Hotel, Inc., et al."

On November 6, 1992, Cattleya entered into a Contract of Conditional Sale with


the Tecson spouses covering nine parcels of land, including the subject property. In this
transaction the Tecson spouses were represented by Atty. Salvador S. Pizarras. The
Contract of Conditional Sale was entered in the Primary Book of the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Bohol that same daythe parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale covering
the subject property. This Deed of Absolute Sale was also entered in the Primary Book on
October 4, 1993. However, neither the Contract of Conditional Sale nor the Deed of
Absolute Sale could be annotated on the certificate of title covering the subject property
because the then Register of Deeds of Bohol, Atty. Narciso S. De la Serna refused to
annotate both deeds because of the writ of attachment that was annotated on the
certificate of title of the subject property, in connection with the said Civil Case No. 3399.
On December 1, 1993, Atty. Cabilao, Jr. and Atty. Pizarras again requested Atty. De la
Serna to annotate the Deed of Absolute Sale but he refused anew – this time saying that
he would accede to the request only if he was presented with a court order to that effect.
The writ of attachment on the certificate of title to the subject property was, however,
lifted, after the parties in Civil Case No. 3399 reached an amicable settlement or
compromise agreement. Even then, however, Cattleya did not still succeed in having the
aforementioned Deed of Absolute Sale registered, and in having title to the subject
property transferred to its name, because it could not surrender the owner's copy of TCT
No. 17655, which was in possession of the Tecson spouses. According to Cattleya, the
Tecson spouses could not deliver TCT No. 17655 to it, because according to the Tecson
spouses this certificate of title had been destroyed in a fire which broke out in Sierra
Bullones, Bohol.

This claim by the Tecson spouses turned out to be false, however, because Atty.
Cabilao, Jr. came to know, that the owner's copy of TCT No. 17655 had in fact been
presented by Taina Manigque-Stone at the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bohol,
along with the Deed of Sale that was executed by the Tecson spouses, in favor of Taina

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 475
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
covering the subject property.It appears that when Taina's then common-law husband,
Michael (Mike) Stone, visited Bohol sometime in December 1985, decided to buy a
portion of the beach lot in Doljo, Panglao, Bohol. They met with Col. Tecson, and the latter
agreed to sell them a portion of the beach lot for US$8,805.00. Mike and Taina made an
initial downpayment of US$1,750.00 (or equivalent P35,000.00 at that time) for a portion
of a beach lot, but did not ask for a receipt for this initial downpayment. On June 1, 1987,
a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the subject portion was executed by Col. Tecson in
Taina's favor. Subsequent payments were made by Mike totaling P40,000.00, as of
August 29, 1986, although another payment of P5,000.00 was made sometime in August
1987. The last payment in the amount of P32,000.00, was made in September 1987. In
1990, Troadio Tecson, Jr., the son of Col. Tecson and Taina's brother-in-law, delivered to
Taina the owner's copy of TCT No. 17655. In the meantime, in October 1986, Taina and
Mike got married.

On April, 1994, Taina filed a Notice of Adverse Claim covering the subject portion,
after she learned that Col. Tecson and his lawyer had filed a petition for the issuance of a
second owner's copy over TCT No. 17655. Thereafter, Taina sought to have her Deed of
Absolute Sale registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bohol, and on that
occasion presented the owner's copy of TCT No. 17655. Taina also caused a
Memorandum of Encumbrance to be annotated on this certificate of title. The result was
that on February 10, 1995, a new certificate of title, TCT No. 21771, was issued in the
name of Taina, in lieu of TCT No. 17655, in the name of the Tecson spouses.Taina
likewise filed a motion for leave to admit a third-party complaint against the Tecson
spouses; this motion was granted by the RTC.

The RTC of Bohol gave judgment for Cattleya and held that the sale entered by the
Tecson spouses with Cattleya and with Taina involving one and the same property was a
double sale, and that Cattleya had a superior right to the lot covered thereby, because
Cattleya was the first to register the sale in its favor in good faith. As regards Taina's
third-party complaint against the Tecson spouses, the RTC ordered the return or
restitution to her of the sum of P77,000.00, plus legal interest.

The CA affirmed with modification the RTC’s decision and ratiocinatedthe


notarization of the deed of sale of Tania’s defective. Additionally, Article 1477 of the Civil
Code provides that the ownership of the thing sold is transferred upon the actual or
constructive delivery thereof; however, the delivery of the owner's copy of TCT 17655 to
TAINA is dubious. Anent the issue on validity of the sale to Taina Manigque-Stone, the
fundamental law is perspicuous in its prohibition against aliens from holding title or
acquiring private lands, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was
made by a former natural-born citizen. A scrutiny of the records would show that the trial
court aptly held that the petitioner was only a dummy for Mike Stone who is a foreigner.
Even if the Deed of Absolute Sale is in the name of Taina Manigque-Stone that does not
change the fact that the real buyer was Mike Stone, a foreigner. The appellant herself had
admitted in court that the buyer was Mike Stone and at the time of the negotiation she was
not yet legally married to Mike Stone. They cannot do indirectly what is prohibited directly
by the law.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 476
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ISSUE:
Whether the CA is legally correct in considering that the verbal contract of sale
between spouses Tecson and Mike transferred ownership to a foreigner, which falls
within the constitutional ban on sales of land to foreigners.

HELD:
Yes. Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or


conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain.

Given the plain and explicit language of this constitutional mandate, it has been
held that "[a]liens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring
lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private
lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of
the national patrimony."

In the case at bench, Taina herself admitted that it was really Mike who paid with
his own funds the subject lot; hence, Mike was its real purchaser or buyer. More than that,
it bears stressing that if the deed of sale at all proclaimed that she (Taina) was the
purchaser or buyer of the subject property and this subject property was placed under her
name, it was simply because she and Mike wanted to skirt or circumvent the constitutional
prohibition barring or outlawing foreigners or aliens from acquiring or purchasing lands in
the Philippines. Indeed, both the CA and the RTC exposed and laid bare Taina's
posturing and pretense for what these really are: that in the transaction in question, she
was a mere dummy, a spurious stand-in, for her erstwhile common-law husband, who
was not a Filipino then, and never attempted to become a naturalized Filipino citizen
thereafter. The CA put things in correct perspective, thus —
A scrutiny of the records would show that the trial court aptly held that the
petitioner was only a dummy for Mike Stone who is a foreigner. Even if the Deed of
Absolute Sale is in the name of Taina Manigque-Stone that does not change the
fact that the real buyer was Mike Stone, a foreigner. The appellant herself had
admitted in court that the buyer was Mike Stone and at the time of the negotiation
she was not yet legally married to Mike Stone. They cannot do indirectly what is
prohibited directly by the law.

Petitioner's arguments, which rest on the assumption that there was a double sale,
must fail.In the first place, there is no double sale to speak of. Art. 1544 of the Civil Code,
which provides the rule on double sale, applies only to a situation where the same
property is validly sold to different vendees. In this case, there is only one sale to advert
to, that between the spouses Tecson and respondent.

In Remalante v. Tibe, this Court ruled that the Civil Law provision on double sale is
not applicable where there is only one valid sale, the previous sale having been found to

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 477
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
be fraudulent. Likewise, in Espiritu and Apostol v. Valerio, where the same parcel of land
was purportedly sold to two different parties, the Court held that despite the fact that one
deed of sale was registered ahead of the other, Art. 1544 of the Civil Code will not apply
where said deed is found to be a forgery, the result of this being that the right of the other
vendee should prevail.

The trial court declared that the sale between the spouses Tecson and petitioner is
invalid, as it bears the forged signature of Asuncion.

In view of the fact that the sale in the case at bench is worse off (because it
is constitutionally infirm) than the sale in the Fudot case, which merely involves a
violation of the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, this Court must affirm, as it hereby
affirms the CA's ruling that, "there is only one sale to reckon with, that is, the sale to
Cattleya.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 478
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MARTIN VILLAMOR y TAYSON, and VICTOR BONAOBRA y GIANAN vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PIDLIPPINES
G.R. No. 200396 22 MARCH 2017

DOCTRINE: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose. A mere tip from an unnamed informant does not
vest police officers with the authority to barge into private homes without first securing a
valid warrant of arrest or search warrant. While there are instances where arrests and
searches may be made without a warrant, the Court finds that the
constitutionally-protected right against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated
in the case at bar.

FACTS:

Villamor was charged with violation of Section 3(c) of RA 9287 for collecting and
soliciting bets for an illegal numbers game locally known as lotteng and possessing a list
of various numbers, a calculator, a cellphone, and cash.

On June 17, 2005, PD Peñaflor received a call from an informant regarding an


on-going illegal numbers game at the residence of Bonaobra. A team composed of PD
Peñaflor, Saraspi, PO1 Ami, a driver, and a civilian asset proceeded to Bonaobra's
residence to confirm the report.

According to the police officers, they saw petitioners in the act of counting bets,
described by the Bicol term "revisar," which means collating and examining numbers
placed in "papelitos," which are slips of paper containing bet numbers, and counting
money bets.

When they entered the gate of the compound, they introduced themselves as
police officers and confiscated the items found on the table consisting of cash amounting
to P1,500.00 in different denominations, the "papelitos," a calculator, a cellular phone,
and a pen. Petitioners were then brought to Camp Francisco Camacho where they were
investigated for illegal gambling. Subsequently, a case was filed against the petitioners
before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. RTC rendered judgment declaring them
as guilty beyond reasonable doubt. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of the accused should be upheld.

HELD:
No. The High Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts. The Court finds that
the right of the petitioners against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated by
the arresting officers when they barged into Bonaobra's compound without a valid
warrant of arrest or a search warrant. While there are exceptions to the rule requiring a
warrant for a valid search and seizure, none applies in the case at bar. Consequently,

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 479
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
the evidence obtained by the police officers is inadmissible against the petitioners, the
same having been obtained in violation of the said right.

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two elements
must concur, namely "(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer."

The Court finds that there was no valid warrantless arrest on petitioners. It was
not properly established petitioners had just committed, or were actually committing, or
attempting to commit a crime and that said act or acts were done in the presence of the
arresting officers. Further the evidence purportedly seized from the Bonaobra compound
is inadmissible since it was obtained in violation of Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution. Since the alleged illegal gambling paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of
the crime charged, the Court acquits petitioners.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 480
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES ESTEBAN and CRESENCIA CHU
G.R. No. 192345 29 MARCH 2017

DOCTRINE: Case law dictates that when the acquisition process under PD 27 is still
incomplete, such as in this case where the just compensation due to the landowner has
yet to be settled, just compensation should be determined and the process concluded
under RA 6657, as amended.

For the purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an
expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, or
the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such
as when the title is transferred in the name of the beneficiaries.

FACTS:
Respondents were the registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land
located in Sorsogon which were acquired by the government pursuant to its agrarian
reform program.Respondents rejected LBP's valuation. Hence, summary administrative
proceedings were conducted before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
to determine the just compensation. LBP filed a petition for Determination of Just
Compensation before the RTC. Dissatisfied, LBP appealed the decision. CA modified
the ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether or not LBP was able to substantiate its valuation of the property

HELD:
No. In this case, we hold that the LBP was not able to justify its valuation.
Although the LBP maintained that it stringently applied the pertinent law and its relevant
implementing rules in arriving at its computation, it failed to adduce sufficient evidence to
prove the truthfulness or correctness of its assertions.

Under Section 17 of RA 6657, in determining just compensation, the cost of


acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and
income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, the assessment made by
government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property
as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing
institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation.

Therefore, as it stands, the RTC and the CA were duty-bound to utilize the basic
formula prescribed and laid down in pertinent DAR regulations existing prior to the
passage of RA 9700, to determine just compensation.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 481
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
CIVIL LAW

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ENGR. APOLINARIO DUEÑAS VS. ALICE GUCE-AFRICA
G.R. No. 165679 | October 5, 2009
DOCTRINE: It has already been held that the determination of the existence of a breach
of contract is a factual matter not usually reviewable in a petition filed under Rule 45.
FACTS:
A complaint for breach of contract and damages was filed against petitioner
before the RTC. The complaint alleged among others that a Construction Contract was
entered into for the demolition of the ancestral house and the construction of a new
four-bedroom residential house for the purpose of the forthcoming wedding. Also, the
project was started without securing the necessary permit from the City Engineer’s
Office. However, the house remained unfinished on the day of the wedding ceremony.
Respondent likewise alleged that, all in all, she gave petitioner P550,000.00 (which is
P50,000.00 more than the contract price). However, and despite knowledge that the
construction of the house was intended for the forthcoming marriage of respondent's
sister, petitioner unjustly and fraudulently abandoned the project leaving it substantially
unfinished and incomplete. Several demands were made, but petitioner obstinately
refused to make good his contractual obligations. Worse, petitioner's workmanship on
the incomplete residential house was substandard.
Petitioner, on the other hand, alleged that the delay in the construction of the
house was due to circumstances beyond his control, namely: heavy rains, observance of
Holy Week, and celebration of barangay fiesta. Ultimately, he was not able to complete
the project because on May 27, 1998, respondent went to his house and told him to stop
the work.
The RTC rendered decision in favor of the respondent. Likewise, the Appellate
Court found no reason to depart from the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Duenas can escape liability, alleging among others that the delay
in the construction was due to circumstances beyond his control
HELD:
No
Petitioner contends that he neither abandoned the project nor violated the
contract. He maintains that continuous rains caused the delay in the construction of the
house and that he was not able to finish the project because respondent ordered him to
stop the work. In fact, there was no reason for him to stop the project because he still
had available workers and materials at that time, as well as collectibles from the
respondent. Petitioner likewise contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the
trial court's finding that he was guilty of negligence.The contentions lack merit.
It has already been held that the determination of the existence of a breach of
contract is a factual matter not usually reviewable in a petition filed under Rule 45. We
will not review, much less reverse, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals especially

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 483
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
where, as in this case, such findings coincide with those of the trial court, since we are
not a trier of facts. The established rule is that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
affirming those of the RTC are conclusive and binding on us. We are not wont to review
them, save under exceptional circumstances as: (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(3) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4)
when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (7) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and (8) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 484
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPS. ISAGANI CASTRO and DIOSDADA CASTRO versus ANGELINA DE LEON
TAN, SPS. CONCEPCION T. CLEMENTE and ALEXANDER C. CLEMENTE, SPS.
ELIZABETH T. CARPIO and ALVIN CARPIO, SPS. MARIE ROSE T. SOLIMAN and
ARVIN SOLIMAN and JULIUS AMIEL TAN
G.R. No. 168940 | November 24, 2009
DOCTRINE: The imposition of an unconscionable rate of interest on a money debt, even
if knowingly and voluntarily assumed, is immoral and unjust. It is tantamount to a
repugnant spoliation and an iniquitous deprivation of property, repulsive to the common
sense of man. It has no support in law, in principles of justice, or in the human
conscience nor is there any reason whatsoever which may justify such imposition as
righteous and as one that may be sustained within the sphere of public or private morals.
FACTS:
Respondent Angelina de Leon Tan, and her husband Ruben Tan were the former
registered owners of a 240-square meter residential lot, situated at a barrio in
Bulacan.On February 17, 1994, they entered into an agreement with petitioners spouses
Isagani and Diosdada Castro denominated as Kasulatan ng Sanglaan ng Lupa at Bahay
(Kasulatan) to secure a loan of P30,000.00 they obtained from the latter. Under the
Kasulatan, the spouses Tan undertook to pay the mortgage debt within six months or
until August 17, 1994, with an interest rate of 5% per month, compounded monthly.
When her husband died on September 2, 1994, respondent Tan was left to pay
the loan. However, she failed to pay the same upon maturity. Thereafter, she offered to
pay petitioners the principal amount of P30,000.00 plus a portion of the interest but
petitioners refused and instead demanded payment of the total accumulated sum of
P359,000.00. Petitioners then caused the extrajudicial foreclosure and emerged as the
only bidder in the auction sale that ensued.
On September 26, 2000, respondent Tan, joined by respondents Sps. , Clemente,
Sps. Carpio, Sps. Soliman, and Julius Amiel Tan filed a Complaint for Nullification of
Mortgage and Foreclosure and/or Partial Rescission of Documents and Damages before
the RTC. They alleged, inter alia, that the interest rate imposed is unconscionable.
The RTC declared the foreclosure null and void and interest lowered to 12% a
year from 5% a month. The same was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not thejudgement nullifying the interest rate voluntarily agreed upon
by the petitioners and respondents and expressly stipulated in the contract was proper

HELD:
Yes.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 485
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The Court of Appeals correctly found that the 5% monthly interest, compounded
monthly, is unconscionable and should be equitably reduced to the legal rate of 12% per
annum.
While we agree with petitioners that parties to a loan agreement have wide
latitude to stipulate on any interest rate in view of the Central Bank Circular No. 905 s.
1982 which suspended the Usury Law ceiling on interest effective January 1, 1983, it is
also worth stressing that interest rates whenever unconscionable may still be declared
illegal. There is certainly nothing in said circular which grants lenders carte blanche
authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their borrowers or lead
to a hemorrhaging of their assets.
In several cases, we have ruled that stipulations authorizing iniquitous or
unconscionable interests are contrary to morals, if not against the law. In Medel v. Court
of Appeals, we annulled a stipulated 5.5% per month or 66% per annum interest on a
P500,000.00 loan and a 6% per month or 72% per annum interest on a P60,000.00 loan,
respectively, for being excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant. In Ruiz v.
Court of Appeals, we declared a 3% monthly interest imposed on four separate loans to
be excessive. In both cases, the interest rates were reduced to 12% per annum.
In this case, the 5% monthly interest rate, or 60% per annum, compounded
monthly, stipulated in the Kasulatan is even higher than the 3% monthly interest rate
imposed in the Ruiz case. Thus, we similarly hold the 5% monthly interest to be
excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant, contrary to morals, and the law. It
is therefore void ab initio for being violative of Article 1306 of the Civil Code. With this,
and in accord with the Medel and Ruiz cases, we hold that the Court of Appeals correctly
imposed the legal interest of 12% per annum in place of the excessive interest stipulated
in the Kasulatan.
The Court of Appeals did not unilaterally change the terms and conditions of the
Contract of Mortgage entered into between the petitioners and the respondents.
Petitioners allege that the Kasulatan was entered into by the parties freely and
voluntarily. They maintain that there was already a meeting of the minds between the
parties as regards the principal amount of the loan, the interest thereon and the property
given as security for the payment of the loan, which must be complied with in good faith.
Hence, they assert that the Court of Appeals should have given due respect to the
provisions of the Kasulatan. They also stress that it is a settled principle that the law will
not relieve a party from the effects of an unwise, foolish or disastrous contract, entered
into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of what he was doing.
Petitioners' contentions deserve scant consideration. In Abe v. Foster Wheeler
Corporation, we held that the freedom of contract is not absolute. The same is
understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of
public health, morals, safety and welfare. One such legislative regulation is found in
Article 1306 of the Civil Code which allows the contracting parties to "establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy."

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 486
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
To reiterate, we fully agree with the Court of Appeals in holding that the
compounded interest rate of 5% per month, is iniquitous and unconscionable. Being a
void stipulation, it is deemed inexistent from the beginning. The debt is to be considered
without the stipulation of the iniquitous and unconscionable interest rate. Accordingly, the
legal interest of 12% per annum must be imposed in lieu of the excessive interest
stipulated in the agreement.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 487
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Arsenio Olegario and HEIRS OF Aristoteles F. Olegario, versus Pedro C. Mari,
represented by Lilia C. Mari-Camba,
G.R. No. 147951 | December 14, 2009
DOCTRINE: Possession, to constitute the foundation of acquisitive prescription, must be
possession under a claim of title or must be adverse. Acts of a possessory character
performed by one who holds the property by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not
in the concept of an owner and such possessory acts, no matter how long continued, do
not start the running of the period of prescription.
FACTS:
Juan Mari, the father of respondent, declared his ownership over a parcel of land
in Nancasalan, Mangatarem for tax purposes. He took possession of the same by
delineating the limits with a bamboo fence, planting various fruit bearing trees and
bamboos and constructing a house thereon.
Meanwhile, WenceslaoOlegario, the husband of Magdalena Fernandez and
father of petitioner Arsenio Olegario, filed a new tax declaration for a certain 50-square
meter parcel of land, which encroached the land of Mari.
Respondent filed with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Regional Office in Pangasinan a protest against the petitioners because of their
encroachment into the disputed realty. After investigation, said office decided in favor of
the respondent and found the latter to be the owner of Lot Nos. 17526, 17553 and
14356. Petitioners did not appeal and the said decision became final and executory.
After discovering the amended entries in Arsenio Olegario's Tax Declaration,
respondent filed a complaint with the RTC for Recovery of Possession and Annulment of
Tax Declaration. Respondent alleged, inter alia, that Juan Mari, and subsequently his
successor, was deprived by the Olegarios of the possession of portions of subject realty
which respondent owned. The RTC in its decision ruled in favor of the petitioners
alleging that the complaint was filed beyond the prescriptive period and failed to prove
his ownership pf any portion of the lots in dispute.
Respondent appealed to the CA which reversed the trial court's findings. The CA
found respondent to have adduced stronger evidence of prior possession and ownership
of the disputed realty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription has set in, therefore the disputed land
belongs to the petitioners
HELD:
No
As previously mentioned, respondent's predecessor, Juan Mari, had declared the
disputed realty for tax purposes as early as 1916. The tax declarations show that he had
a two storey house on the realty. He also planted fruit bearing trees and bamboos

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 488
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
thereon. The records also show that the 897-square meter property had a bamboo fence
along its perimeter. All these circumstances clearly show that Juan Mari was in
possession of subject realty in the concept of owner, publicly and peacefully since 1916
or long before petitioners entered the disputed realty sometime in 1965.
Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the respondent is the preferred possessor
because, benefiting from his father's tax declaration of the subject realty since 1916, he
has been in possession thereof for a longer period. On the other hand, petitioners
acquired joint possession only sometime in 1965.
Despite 25 years of occupying the disputed lots, therefore, petitioners did not
acquire ownership. Firstly, they had no just title. Petitioners did not present any
document to show how the titles over Lot Nos. 17526 and 17533 were transferred to
them, whether from respondent, his predecessor, or any other person. Petitioners,
therefore, could not acquire the disputed real property by ordinary prescription through
possession for 10 years. Secondly, it is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by
mere occupation. Unless coupled with the element of hostility towards the true owner,
occupation and use, however long, will not confer title by prescription or adverse
possession. In other words, possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive
right, must be possession under claim of title, that is, it must be adverse.
Petitioners' acts of a possessory character - acts that might have been merely
tolerated by the owner - did not constitute possession. No matter how long tolerated
possession is continued, it does not start the running of the prescriptive period. Mere
material possession of land is not adverse possession as against the owner and is
insufficient to vest title, unless such possession is accompanied by the intent to possess
as an owner. There should be a hostile use of such a nature and exercised under such
circumstance as to manifest and give notice that the possession is under a claim of right.
Petitioners have failed to prove that their possession was adverse or under claim
of title or right. Unlike respondent, petitioners did not have either the courage or
forthrightness to publicly declare the disputed lots as owned by them for tax purposes.
Tax declarations "prove that the holder has a claim of title over the property. Aside from
manifesting a sincere desire to obtain title thereto, they announce the holder's adverse
claim against the state and other interested parties". Petitioners' omission, when viewed
in conjunction with respondent's continued unequivocal declaration of ownership over,
payment of taxes on and possession of the subject realty, shows a lack of sufficient
adverseness of the formers' possession to qualify as being one in the concept of owner.
The only instance petitioners assumed a legal position sufficiently adverse to
respondent's ownership of the disputed properties was when they declared Lot No.
17526 for tax purposes in their name in 1989. Since then and until the filing of the
complaint for recovery of possession in 1990, only one year had elapsed. Hence,
petitioners never acquired ownership through extraordinary prescription of the subject
realty.
On the other hand, being the sole transferree of his father, respondent showed
through his tax declarations which were coupled with possessory acts that he, through
his predecessor, had been in possession of the land for more than 30 years since 1916.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
"Open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the
requisite period - ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to
be public land and becomes private property." Ownership of immovable property is
acquired by extraordinary prescription through possession for 30 years. For purposes of
deciding the instant case, therefore, the possession by respondent and his predecessor
had already ripened into ownership of the subject realty by virtue of prescription as early
as 1946.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 490
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JESUS CAMPOS et al. vs. NENITA BUENVENIDA PASTRANA et al.
G.R. No. 175994, December 8, 2009
DOCTRINE: Contract; void contract; prescription. The sale of subject properties to
petitioners are null and void. Under Article 1410 of the Civil Code, an action or defense
for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract is imprescriptible. Hence, petitioners’
contention that respondents’ cause of action is already barred by prescription is without
legal basis.
FACTS:
The first case arose from the refusal of Carlito Campos (Carlito), the father of herein
petitioners, to surrender the possession of a fishpond he leased from respondents
mother, SalvacionBuenvenida, despite the expiration of their contract of lease in 1980.
Alleging that he was an agricultural lessee, Carlito filed an agrarian caseagainst his
lessor.Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 14, found that Carlito was not an
agricultural tenant. He then appealed to the CA and subsequently to this Court, but was
unsuccessful.
While the appeal in the Agrarian Case was pending before the CA, herein
respondents filed the second case, Civil Case, against Carlito for Recovery of
Possession and Damages with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction involving the same
fishpond subject of the earlier agrarian case. On November 27, 1990, the Regional Trial
Court rendered a Decision finding Carlito to have retained possession of the fishpond
notwithstanding the expiration of the contract of lease and ordering him to pay rentals,
the value of the produce and damages to the herein respondents. The Decision became
final and executory and a Writ of Execution was issued. Subsequently, on September 19,
1995, an Alias Writ of Execution was also issued. Both were returned unsatisfied as per
Sheriffs Return of Service.
When the respondents were about to levy these properties to satisfy the judgment in
the Possession Case, they discovered that spouses Carlito and Margarita Campos
transferred these lots to their children Rosemarie and Jesus Campos, herein petitioners,
by virtue of Deeds of Absolute Sale dated October 18, 1985 and November 2, 1988.
Specifically, spouses Campos sold the residential lots, with a total area of 1,393 square
meters, to their daughter Rosemarie for P7,000.00 and the agricultural lots with a
combined area of 7,972 square meters, to their son Jesus for P5,600.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract is
imprescriptible.
HELD:
No. Contract; void contract; rescission. Petitioners’ argument that the applicable law in
this case is Article 1381(3) of the Civil Code on rescissible contracts and not Article 1409 on

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
void contracts is not a question of first impression. This issue had already been settled several
decades ago when we held that “an action to rescind is founded upon and presupposes the
existence of a contract”. A contract which is null and void is no contract at all and hence could
not be the subject of rescission.
In the instant case, the Deeds of Absolute Sale are fictitious and inexistent for being
absolutely simulated contracts. It is true that the CA cited instances that may constitute badges
of fraud under Article 1387 of the Civil Code on rescissible contracts. But there is nothing else in
the appealed decision to indicate that rescission was contemplated under the said provision of
the Civil Code. The aforementioned badges must have been considered merely as grounds for
holding that the sale is fictitious. Consequently, we find that the CA properly applied the
governing law over the matter under consideration which is Article 1409 of the Civil Code on
void or inexistent contracts.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JOSEPHINE WEE vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 177384, December 8, 2009
DOCTRINE: In any event, in the absence of other competent evidence, tax declarations
do not conclusively establish either possession or declarants right to registration of
title.Even if we were to assume that the coffee was planted by petitioners
predecessor-in-interest, mere casual cultivation of the land does not amount to exclusive
and notorious possession that would give rise to ownership.
FACTS:
On December 22, 1994, petitioner filed an Application for Registration of Title over a
4,870-square meter parcel of land situated in Silang, Cavite.
In brief, petitioner alleged in her application that she is the owner in fee simple of
the subject property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 1, 1993
executed by Julian Gonzales in her favor. Petitioner claimed the benefits of the Property
Registration Decree or, should said Decree be inapplicable, the benefits of Chapter VIII
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, because she and her predecessor-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, public, peaceful and adverse possession of the land since time
immemorial.
On March 15, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed its Opposition alleging that neither the petitioner nor her
predecessor-in-interest has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of Lot No. 8349 since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. The
OSG likewise averred that the muniments of title and tax payment receipts submitted by
the petitioner do not constitute competent or sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition
of the subject lot, or of the petitioners open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto. It asserted that Lot No. 8349 is part of the public domain and consequently
prayed for the dismissal of the application for registration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier is applicable to this case.
HELD:
No. There is nothing in the records which would substantiate her claim that Julian
Gonzales was in possession of Lot No. 8349 since 1945, other than the bare allegations of
Juana Gonzales. Certainly, these unsubstantiated statements do not meet the required
quantum of evidence in land registration cases. In fact, contrary to her testimony that her late
husband inherited the property from his parents a long time ago, or even prior to 1945, the

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
earliest tax declaration that was presented in this case is one declared by Julian Gonzales only
in 1957 long after June 1945.
It bears stressing that petitioner presented only five tax declarations (for the years 1957,
1961, 1967, 1980 and 1985) for a claimed possession and occupation of more than 45 years
(1945-1993). This type of intermittent and sporadic assertion of alleged ownership does not
prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation. In any event, in
the absence of other competent evidence, tax declarations do not conclusively establish either
possession or declarants right to registration of title.
We agree with the CA that petitioner was unable to demonstrate that the alleged
possession was in the concept of an owner, since she could not point to any acts of occupation,
development, cultivation or maintenance over the property. Petitioner claims that because the
property is planted with coffee, a fruit-bearing tree, it automatically follows that the lot is
cultivated, showing actual possession and occupation. However, petitioner failed to explain who
planted the coffee, whether these plants are maintained or harvested or if any other acts were
undertaken by petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest to cultivate the property.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. DKS INTERNATIONAL, INC. and MICHAEL DY
G.R. No. 179161, January 22, 2010
DOCTRINE: It is only the execution of the MeTC or Municipal Trial Courts judgment
pending appeal with the RTC which may be stayed by compliance with the requisites
provided inSection 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
On June 9, 1978, the Philippine Government and petitioner Philippine National
Bank entered into a Contract of Lease where the former leased in favor of the latter its
21,727-square meter land located at Numancia St., Binondo, Manila. The contract was
effective from August 1, 1978 to July 31, 2003 and renewable for a similar period upon
agreement of the parties. It also stipulated that except for its subsidiary corporations,
petitioner shall not directly or indirectly sublease, assign or encumber its leasehold rights
in whole or in part on the leased area to any person or corporation without the prior
written approval of the government.
On October 12, 2000, respondent DKS International Inc., applied for the sublease
of a 9,500-square meter portion of the aforesaid property with petitioner. Petitioner
informed Mr. Andres S. Dy of DKS that petitioners Executive Committee had already
approved the amendments on the terms and conditions of the sublease. However, the
Land Management Bureau denied petitioners request to sublease said portion of the
property to DKS.
Petitioner signified its intention to renew the lease for another 25 years as the
original lease was about to expire. In a Memorandum dated May 6, 2002, then Secretary
Heherson Alvarez of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources approved
the recommendation of the LMB to renew the contract of lease for another 25 years with
several conditions on the sublease, among which were: (1) that petitioner shall sublease
the 9,500-square meter area in favor of DKS for the same period of 25 years and, (2) that
DKS shall start its development of the portion of the property within two years from May
6, 2002 and complete its development as proposed within seven years.
On August 6, 2002, however, Sec. Alvarez ordered the recall of his May 6, 2002
Memorandum until such time that the terms and conditions of the lease and the
capability of the sub-lessees are re-evaluated and approved.
Petitioner alleged that during the period recited above, it was in continuous and
peaceful possession of the property including the subject 9,500-square meter portion
which it operated as a car park until DKS, through force, intimidation, stealth and threat,
forcibly and unlawfully took over possession on October 9, 2002.
Petitioner filed a case for forcible entry against DKS and Dy. While said case was
pending, the DENR came up with a Final Endorsement signed by Sec. Alvarez on

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
November 29, 2002, informing petitioners president, Lorenzo V. Tan, of the DENRs
approval of petitioners request for renewal of the lease contract.
Upon motion of petitioner, the MeTC issued a Writ of Execution which, however,
was not implemented because of the timely appeal of respondents to the RTC.
On March 10, 2004, the RTC-Manila, rendered its Decision affirming the Decision
of the MeTC and ordering the issuance of a writ of execution with break open order.
RTC recalled the Writ of Execution with Break Open Order. It considered the
Sheriffs Partial Return.
Commander of Sphinx Security Investigation and Detective Services informed us
that DKS has already turned over the premises to Land Management Bureau. Mr.
MatusalemRuperto further informed the undersigned that Judge Marquez issued an
order [preventing us] from implementing the Writ. Our attention was caught by the
phrase posted in the premises that the same is government property.
On March 16, 2007, the CA promulgated its Decision in denying the petition for
lack of merit. It ruled that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when it recalled the writ of execution with break open
order. It held that the expiration of the lease contract between petitioner and the
government and the latter’s take-over and/or repossession of the premises from
respondents were supervening events.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of or in excess
of jurisdiction when it recalled the writ of execution with break open order
HELD:
No. We find that the CA correctly took notice of the governments take-over and
repossession of the subject property, as these are the very same facts which the RTC
considered to be the reasons why the writ of execution with break open order it earlier issued
cannot anymore be implemented. Without discussing these issues, the CA would not be able to
make a determination whether the recall of the writ of execution was proper under the
circumstances. Such an assessment is imperative because the resolution of the issue of
whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion hinges on it.

A Decision has already been rendered in the Pasay case on August 29, 2008 wherein it
was held that the Contract of Lease between petitioner and the government has been validly
and effectively renewed on July 31, 2003 for another period of 25 years.
By virtue of the Decisions of the MeTC and the RTC which both ruled in favor of
petitioner in the subject forcible entry case, petitioner was indeed, as a matter of right, entitled to
a writ of execution pursuant to Sec. 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the RTC ordered

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
the issuance of a writ of execution with break open in the dispositive portion of its March 10,
2004 Decision. But before said writ could be implemented, inescapable material facts and
circumstances were brought to the attention of the RTC. The respondents had already
surrendered possession of the subject premises to the government. Clearly, the portion of the
Decision ordering respondents to vacate the subject property and peacefully surrender
possession thereof to petitioner has become impossible to implement. For how can
respondents surrender possession of the premises when they were no longer in possession?
And, as correctly observed by the RTC, it would be a misstep if the government which is
admittedly the owner of the subject property and which was not a party to the ejectment case,
would be ordered to vacate the same in order that possession thereof may be delivered to
petitioner. We thus hold that under these circumstances, the recall of the writ of execution with
break open order was warranted.
Petitioner stresses that in order to stay the immediate execution of a judgment in an
ejectment case while an appeal is pending, the defendant must perfect his appeal, file a
supersedeas bond and periodically deposit the rentals which became due during the pendency
of the appeal. But despite the failure of respondents to post the required supersedeas bond, the
CA still affirmed the recall of the issuance of the writ of execution with break open order.
It is only the execution of the MeTC or Municipal Trial Courts judgment pending appeal
with the RTC which may be stayed by compliance with the requisites provided inSection 19,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.This is not the situation here. Respondents are not staying the
execution of the judgment of the MeTC pending appeal to the RTC as the latter court, in fact,
had already rendered its judgment on the appeal.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
BIENVENIDO T. BUADA et al. vs. CEMENT CENTER, INC.
G.R. No. 180374, January 22, 2010

DOCTRINE: Tenancy relations cannot be bargained away except for the strong reasons
provided by law which must be convincingly shown by evidence in line with the State's
policy of achieving a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious
institutional restraints and practices.
FACTS:
Petitioners Bienvenido T. Buadaet al., were tenant-farmers cultivating three
parcels of agricultural land owned by respondent Cement Center, Inc. On March 13,
1998, respondent filed a Complaint for Confirmation of Voluntary Surrender and
Damages against petitioners with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board, Region 1 in Urdaneta City, Pangasinan.
It claimed that on June 28, 1995, petitioners entered into a Compromise
Agreement with respondent whereby the former, for and in consideration of the sum of
P3,000.00 each, voluntarily surrendered their respective landholdings. However, despite
respondents repeated demands, petitioners refused to vacate subject landholdings.
In their Answer, petitioners alleged that their consent to the Compromise
Agreement was obtained through fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation. They claimed
that sometime in 1995, respondent induced them to sign a Compromise Agreement by
representing that the subject landholdings are no longer viable for agricultural purposes.
Petitioners alleged that respondent assured them that they would only apply for
the conversion of the land and that they would have to surrender the land only upon the
approval of said application and that thereafter, they will be paid a disturbance
compensation of P3,000.00 each. Petitioners also claimed that respondent promised to
hire them to work on the project that was planned for the converted land. But, should the
application for conversion be denied, petitioners will continue to be tenants and could
later become beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deficiency of consideration (which is not in accordance with
administrative order no. 12) nullifies the contract
HELD:
Yes.
A perusal of the subject Compromise Agreement reveals that the parties considered the
amount of P3,000.00 together with the income from a single cropping as comprising the
disturbance compensation package. Theindicated income derived from the properties and the

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
financial assistance of P3,000.00 shall be considered as the disturbance compensation
package in favor of the SECOND PARTY by reason or as a result of their vacating the
premises in accordance with Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990 of the Department of
Agrarian Reform.
Petitioners, however, assail the disturbance compensation package provided in the
Compromise Agreement as insufficient and contrary to Administrative Order No. 12, Series of
2004. They claim that they would not have acceded to such a measly amount were it not for the
agreement that respondent will hire them as workers on the planned project on the subject
land.
Despite the above contentions of petitioners, respondent failed to present evidence to
show that the disturbance compensation package corresponds with the compensation required
by the said Administrative Order. Neither was there any showing that said disturbance
compensation is not less than five times the average annual gross value of the harvest on
petitioner’s actual landholdings during the preceding five calendar years. Moreover, it was not
shown why petitioners as tenant-farmers would voluntarily give up their sole source of
livelihood. There was likewise no showing that the money was indeed advantageous to
petitioner’s families as to allow them to pursue other sources of livelihood. To stress, tenancy
relations cannot be bargained away except for the strong reasons provided by law which must
be convincingly shown by evidence in line with the State's policy of achieving a dignified
existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices.
It is the policy of the State to promote the Security of Tenure of Farmers over their
leasehold.As an exception to this security of tenure, however, Section 8 of RA 3844 specifically
enumerates the grounds for the extinguishment of agricultural leasehold relations:
(2) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice
of which shall be served three months in advance;
The voluntary surrender of the landholding by an agricultural lessee should be due to
circumstances more advantageous to him and his family.
In all cases of petitions for conversions resulting in the displacement of
farmer-beneficiaries, such beneficiaries shall be entitled to a disturbance compensation, which
should not be less than five (5) times the average of the annual gross value of the
harvest on their actual landholdings during the last 5 preceding calendar years.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MODESTO PALALI vs. JULIET AWISAN, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact
GREGORIO AWISAN
G.R. No. 158385, February 12, 2010

DOCTRINE: The absence of actual, public, and adverse possession, the declaration of
the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. Respondent’s tax declaration,
therefore, cannot serve as basis to oust petitioner who has been in possession (by
himself and his predecessors) of the subject property since before the war.

FACTS:

Respondent Juliet Awisan claimed to be the owner of a parcel of land in Sitio


Camambaey, Tapapan, Bauko, Mountain Province, allegedly consisting of 6.6698
hectares. On March 7, 1994, she filed an action for quieting of title against petitioner
Modesto Palali, alleging that the latter occupied and encroached on the northern portion
of her property and surreptitiously declared it in his name for tax purposes. Respondent
prayed to be declared the rightful owner of the northern portion, for the cancellation of
petitioner’s tax declaration, and for the removal of petitioner and his improvements from
the property.

According to respondent, the 6.6698 hectare land was originally owned by her
father, Cresencio Cadwising. The latter testified that he and his wife were able to
consolidate ownership over the land by declaring them from public land as well as by
purchasing from adjoining landowners. He admitted including in his tax declaration a
communal sacred lot (patpatayan) even if he did not acquire free patent title over the
same. As for the properties he bought, these were generally purchased without any
documentation, save for two.

Cadwising also claimed having introduced improvements on the subject property


as early as the 1960s. The 6.6698 hectare land was mortgaged to the Development Bank
of the Philippines (DBP), which acquired it in the foreclosure sale. DBP then sold the land
to one Tico Tibong, who eventually donated the same to respondent.

Palili, in his defense, denied the encroachment and asserted ownership over the
subject property. He maintained that he and his ancestors or predecessors-in-interest
have openly and continuously possessed the subject land since time immemorial. He and
his siblings were born on that land and, at that time, the area around the house was
already planted with bananas, alnos, and coffee. When his mother died, he buried her in
the lot beside the house in 1975; while his father was buried near the same plot in
1993. His own home had been standing on the property for the past 20 years. Petitioner
insisted that during this entire time, no one disturbed his ownership and possession
thereof.

Hence, this petition.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ISSUE:

Who between the parties has the better right to the subject property?
HELD:
Palili, the petitioner has the better right ti the subject property.

Thus, respondent having failed to prove possession, her claim rests solely on her tax
declaration. But tax declarations, by themselves, are not conclusive evidence of
ownership of real property. In the absence of actual, public, and adverse possession, the
declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. Respondent’s tax
declaration, therefore, cannot serve as basis to oust petitioner who has been in
possession (by himself and his predecessors) of the subject property since before the
war.

Neither can respondent rely on the public instruments dealing with the
6.6698-hectare property covered by her tax declaration. Such public documents merely
show the successive transfers of the property covered by said documents. They do not
conclusively prove that the transferor actually owns the property purportedly being
transferred, especially as far as third parties are concerned. For it may very well be that
the transferor does not actually own the property he has transferred, in which case he
transfers no better right to his transferee. No one can give what he does not have – nemo
dat quod non habet. Thus, since respondent’s predecessor-in-interest Cadwising
appeared not to have any right to the subject property, he transferred no better right to his
transferees, including respondent.

All told, we hold that as between the petitioner and the respondent, it is the
petitioner who has the better claim or title to the subject property. While the respondent
merely relied on her tax declaration, petitioner was able to prove actual possession of the
subject property coupled with his tax declaration. We have ruled in several cases that
possession, when coupled with a tax declaration, is a weighty evidence of ownership. It
certainly is more weighty and preponderant than a tax declaration alone.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs. MANUEL A. DAVID, SR. and MARTHA
S. DAVID
G.R. No. 169548, March 15, 2010

DOCTRINE: All property acquired during the marriage whether the acquisition appears to
have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses is
presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. Presumption applies even when
the manner in which property was acquired does not appear.

FACTS:

Manuel and Martha were married on March 25, 1957. In 1970, the spouses
acquired a 602 square meter lot located at White Plains, Quezon City, which was
registered in the name of "MARTHA S. DAVID, of legal age, Filipino, married to Manuel A.
David" and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 156043 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City. In 1976, the spouses separated de facto, and no
longer communicated with each other.

Sometime in March 1995, Manuel discovered that Martha had previously sold the
property to Titan Construction Corporation (Titan) for ₱1,500,000.00 through a Deed of
Sale dated April 24, 1995, and that TCT No. 156043 had been cancelled and replaced by
TCT No. 130129 in the name of Titan.

Thus, on March 13, 1996, Manuel filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and
Recovenyance against Titan before the RTC of Quezon City. Manuel alleged that the sale
executed by Martha in favor of Titan was without his knowledge and consent, and
therefore void. He prayed that the Deed of Sale and TCT No. 130129 be invalidated, that
the property be reconveyed to the spouses, and that a new title be issued in their names.

In its Answer with Counterclaim, Titan claimed that it was a buyer in good faith and
for value because it relied on a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated January 4, 1995
signed by Manuel which authorized Martha to dispose of the property on behalf of the
spouses. Titan thus prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.

On March 7, 2000, the RTC issued a Decision which (i) invalidated both the Deed
of Sale and TCT No. 130129; (ii) ordered Titan to reconvey the property to Martha and
Manuel, since the property was a conjugal property.

On Appeal, the CA affirmed the Decision of the trial court. Titan moved for
reconsideration but the motion was denied on August 31, 2005.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in declaring that the deed of
sale is null and void.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:

No, the Court of Appeals’ ruling is correct.

The property is part of the spouses’ conjugal partnership.

The Civil Code of the Philippines,21 the law in force at the time of the celebration of
the marriage between Martha and Manuel in 1957, provides:

Article 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

Article 153 of the Civil Code also provides:

Article 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:

(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the
spouses;

xxxx

These provisions were carried over to the Family Code. In particular, Article 117 thereof
provides:

Art. 117. The following are conjugal partnership properties:

(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common
fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;

xxxx

Article 116 of the Family Code is even more unequivocal in that "[a]ll property
acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
unless the contrary is proved."

We are not persuaded by Titan’s arguments that the property was Martha’s
exclusive property because Manuel failed to present before the RTC any proof of his
income in 1970, hence he could not have had the financial capacity to contribute to the
purchase of the property in 1970; and that Manuel admitted that it was Martha who
concluded the original purchase of the property. In consonance with our ruling
in Spouses Castro v. Miat, Manuel was not required to prove that the property was
acquired with funds of the partnership. Rather, the presumption applies even when the
manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. Here, we find that Titan

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
failed to overturn the presumption that the property, purchased during the spouses’
marriage, was part of the conjugal partnership.

In the absence of Manuel’s consent, the Deed of Sale is void.

Since the property was undoubtedly part of the conjugal partnership, the sale to
Titan required the consent of both spouses. Article 165 of the Civil Code expressly
provides that "the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership". Likewise,
Article 172 of the Civil Code ordains that "(t)he wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership
without the husband’s consent, except in cases provided by law".

Similarly, Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any disposition or
encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written consent of the other spouse,
otherwise, such disposition is void. Thus:

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall
belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in


the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers
of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by
the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors.

The Special Power of Attorney purportedly signed by Manuel is spurious and void.

As regards defendant Titan Construction Corporation’s assertion that plaintiff’s


failure to verify his Reply (wherein the validity of the Special Power of Attorney is put into
question) is an implied admission of its genuineness and due execution, [this] appears at
first blush a logical conclusion. However, the Court could not yield to such an argument
considering that a rigid application of the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court will not
be given premium when it would obstruct rather than serve the broader interest of justice.

Titan claimed that because Manuel failed to specifically deny the genuineness and
due execution of the SPA in his Reply, he is deemed to have admitted the veracity of said
document, in accordance with Rule 8, Sections 7 and 8,36of the Rules of Court.

On this point, we fully concur with the findings of the CA that:

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 504
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
It is true that the reply filed by Manuel alleging that the special power of attorney is
a forgery was not made under oath. However, the complaint, which was verified by
Manuel under oath, alleged that the sale of the subject property executed by his wife,
Martha, in favor of Titan was without his knowledge, consent, and approval, express or
implied; and that there is nothing on the face of the deed of sale that would show that he
gave his consent thereto.

It is true that a notarial document is considered evidence of the facts expressed


therein. A notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due
execution and only clear and convincing evidence will overcome such legal
presumption. However, such clear and convincing evidence is present
here.1avvph!1 While it is true that the SPA was notarized, it is no less true that there were
defects in the notarization which mitigate against a finding that the SPA was either
genuine or duly executed. Curiously, the details of Manuel’s Community Tax Certificate
are conspicuously absent, yet Martha’s are complete. The absence of Manuel’s data
supports his claim that he did not execute the same and that his signature thereon is a
forgery. Moreover, we have Manuel’s positive testimony that he never signed the SPA, in
addition to the expert testimony that the signature appearing on the SPA was not
Manuel’s true signature.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 505
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Voltaire Rovira v Heirs of Jose Deleste, namely JosefaDeleste, Jose Ray Deleste,
Raul Hector Deleste, and Ruben Alex Deleste
G.R. No. 160825, March 26, 2010

DOCTRINE: A trial court’s ruling on the matter of attorney’s fees initiated through a
motion, in a suite for recover of ownership and possession of land, may be appealed by
a mere notice of appeal. Since the suit is not one where multiple appeals are taken, a
record on appeal is not necessary.

FACTS:

A suit for recover of ownership and possession of 34 hectares of land was


instituted before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte. This case was decided
with finality in 1995 by the Supreme Court which declared the parties as co-owners of the
land and ordered defendant Dr. Jose Deleste to return half of it to the plaintiffs.

On 24 May 2001, Atty. Voltaire Rovira files as an incident to the said Civil Case a
motion to resolve his claim for attorney’s fees for services rendered to Dr. Deleste. The
respondents filed their opposition to the said motion.

The Regional Trial Court thereafter issued an order granting the motion of Atty.
Rovira and awarded him attorney’s fees of 25% of the 17-hectare portion adjudicated to
Dr. Deleste. Respondents filed a Notice of Appeal. Meanwhile, Atty. Rovira filed a Motion
for Writ of Execution and to Dismiss Appeal. The Court granted the Notice of Appeal.
However, Atty. Rovira filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging among other that the
respondent’s notice of appeal failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 13 of the
Rules of Court. Thereafter, the RTC dismissed the appeal filed by defendants and issued
a writ of execution in favor or Atty. Rovira.

Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The CA
reversed the decision of the RTC. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner,
which was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents perfected their appeal thereby divesting the trial court
of jurisdiction over petitioner’s claim for attorney’s fees.

HELD:

Yes.The main action involved herein, being a suit for recovery of ownership and
possession, is not one where multipleappeals can be taken or are necessary. The choice
of asserting a claim for attorney's fees in the very action inwhich the services in question
have been rendered, as done by the petitioner herein, will not convert a regular caseinto
one falling under the category of "other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the
law or these Rules sorequire." The main case handled by petitioner lawyer has already
been decided with finality up to the appeal stageand is already in the execution stage.
The trial court has also already resolved the incident of attorney's fees.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 506
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Hence, there is no reason why the original records of the case must remain with
the trial court. There was also no need for respondents to file a record on appeal
because the original records could already be sent to the appellate court for the
resolution of the appeal on the matter of the attorney's fees. The case has not been
made out for multiple appeals, a record on appeal is therefore unnecessary to perfect the
appeal. The only requirement to perfect the appeal in the present case is the filing of a
notice of appeal in due time. This the respondents did.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 507
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Atty. Pedro Ferrer vs. Spouses Alfredo Diaz and Imelda Diaz, Reina Comandante
and Spouses Beinvenideo Pangan and Elizabeth Pangan

G.R. No. 165300, April 23, 2010

DOCTRINE:

FACTS:

The suit originated from an alleged execution by Reina Comandante of a Waiver


of Hereditary Rights and Interests over a Real Property. The said waiver was annotated
at the back of TCT No. RT-6604 which became the subject of an alleged loan secured
by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract which was later on obtained by Comandante, by
virtue of a Special Power of Attorney, from Atty. Ferrer.

When Comandante failed to pay her obligation, Atty. Ferrer executed and Affidavit
of Adverse Claim. Meanwhile, Comandante asserted in her Answer to te amended
complaint that said complaint states no cause of action against her because the Real
Estate Mortgage Contract and the waiver referred to by petitioner in his complaint were
not duly and validly executed by her; that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests
Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) is a useless document as its execution is
prohibited by Article 1347 of the Civil Code, hence it cannot be the source of any right or
obligation in petitioner’s favor.

After the filing of the parties’ respective Oppositions to the said motions for
summary judgment, the trial court, in an order deemed both motions for summary
judgment submitted for resolution. Thereafter, a summary judgment was rendered in
favor of petitioner, Atty. Ferrer. The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals,
wherein it declared Comandante’s waiver of hereditary rights null and void. However, it
declared the Real Estate Mortgage as binding. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by
petitioner which was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a


future heir while the parents are still living valid.

HELD:

No.Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no


contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly
authorized by law. For the inheritance to be considered “future”, the succession must not
have been opened at the time of the contract. Hence, the contract entered into between
Ferrer and Comandante cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any
obligation among the parties.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 508
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, vs. KUDOS METAL CORPORATION.
G.R. No. 178087 May 5, 2010

DOCTRINE: The doctrine of estoppel is predicated on, and has its origin in equity which,
broadly defined, is justice according to natural law and right. As such, the doctrine of
estoppel cannot give validity to an act that is prohibited by law or one that is against
public policy.

FACTS:
Kudos Metal Corporation filed its Annual ITR for the taxable year 1998.Pursuant
to a Letter of Authority dated September 7, 1999, BIR served upon it three Notices of
Presentation of Records. However, it failed to comply with these notices. As a result,
Nelia Pasco, respondent's accountant, executed two Waivers of the Defense of
Prescription, which was received by the the BIR Tax Fraud Division on 4 February
2002 and 28 February 2003. The same was subsequently accepted by the Assistant
Commissioner of the Enforcement Service, Percival T. Salazar.

On August 25, 2003, the BIR issued a Preliminary Assessment Notice for the
taxable year 1998 against the respondent. This was followed by a Formal Letter of
Demand with Assessment Notices for taxable year 1998. This was challenged by the
latter by filing its "Protest on Various Tax Assessments"and its "Legal Arguments and
Documents in Support of Protests against Various Assessments".

The BIR rendered a final Decision on the matter, requesting the immediate
payment of its tax liabilities. Believing that the government's right to assess taxes had
prescribed, respondent fileda Petition for Review with the CTA.

CTA Second Division issued a Resolution canceling the assessment notices


issued against respondent for having been issued beyond the prescriptive period. It
found the first Waiver of the Statute of Limitations incomplete and defective for failure to
comply with the provisions ofRMO20-90. On appeal, the CTA En Banc affirmed the
cancellation of the assessment notices.

Petitioner argues that the government's right to assess taxes is not barred by
prescription as the two waivers executed by respondent, through its accountant,
effectively tolled or extended the period within which the assessment can be made. In
disputing the conclusion of the CTA that the waivers are invalid, petitioner claims that
respondent is estopped from adopting a position contrary to what it has previously taken.
Petitioner insists that by acquiescing to the audit during the period specified in the
waivers, respondent led the government to believe that the "delay" in the process would

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
not be utilized against it. Thus, respondent may no longer repudiate the validity of the
waivers and raise the issue of prescription.

Respondent maintains that prescription had set in due to the invalidity of the
waivers executed by Pasco, who executed the same without any written authority from it,
in clear violation of RDAO No. 5-01. As to the doctrine of estoppel by acquiescence
relied upon by petitioner, respondent counters that the principle of equity comes into play
only when the law is doubtful, which is not present in the instant case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of estoppel apply in this case.

HELD:
No.
We find no merit in petitioner's claim that respondent is now estopped from
claiming prescription since by executing the waivers, it was the one which asked for
additional time to submit the required documents.

In Collector of Internal Revenue v. Suyoc Consolidated Mining Company, the


doctrine of estoppel prevented the taxpayer from raising the defense of prescription
against the efforts of the government to collect the assessed tax. However, it must be
stressed that in the said case, estoppel was applied as an exception to the statute of
limitations on collection of taxes and not on the assessment of taxes, as the BIR was
able to make an assessment within the prescribed period.

It is obvious from the foregoing that petitioner refrained from collecting the tax by
distraint or levy or by proceeding in court within the 5-year period from the filing of the
second amended final return due to the several requests of respondent for extension to
which petitioner yielded to give it every opportunity to prove its claim regarding the
correctness of the assessment. Because of such requests, several reinvestigations were
made and a hearing was even held by the Conference Staff organized in the collection
office to consider claims of such nature which, as the record shows, lasted for several
months. After inducing petitioner to delay collection as he in fact did, it is most unfair for
respondent to now take advantage of such desistance to elude his deficiency income tax
liability to the prejudice of the Government invoking the technical ground of prescription.

While we may agree with the Court of Tax Appeals that a mere request for
reexamination or reinvestigation may not have the effect of suspending the running of
the period of limitation for in such case there is need of a written agreement to extend the
period between the Collector and the taxpayer, there are cases however where a
taxpayer may be prevented from setting up the defense of prescription even if he has not
previously waived it in writing as when by his repeated requests or positive acts the
Government has been, for good reasons, persuaded to postpone collection to make him
feel that the demand was not unreasonable or that no harassment or injustice is meant

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
by the Government. And when such situation comes to pass there are authorities that
hold, based on weighty reasons, that such an attitude or behavior should not be
countenanced if only to protect the interest of the Government.

This case has no precedent in this jurisdiction for it is the first time that such has
risen, but there are several precedents that may be invoked in American jurisprudence.
As Mr. Justice Cardozo has said: "The applicable principle is fundamental and
unquestioned. `He who prevents a thing from being done may not avail himself of the
nonperformance which he has himself occasioned, for the law says to him in effect "this
is your own act, and therefore you are not damnified."' "(R. H. Stearns Co. vs. U.S., 78 L.
ed., 647). Or, as was aptly said, "The tax could have been collected, but the government
withheld action at the specific request of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is now estopped and
should not be permitted to raise the defense of the Statute of Limitations." [Newport Co.
vs. U.S., (DC-WIS), 34 F. Supp. 588].

Conversely, in this case, the assessments were issued beyond the prescribed
period. Also, there is no showing that respondent made any request to persuade the BIR
to postpone the issuance of the assessments.

The doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied in this case as an exception to the


statute of limitations on the assessment of taxes considering that there is a detailed
procedure for the proper execution of the waiver, which the BIR must strictly follow. As
we have often said, the doctrine of estoppel is predicated on, and has its origin in, equity
which, broadly defined, is justice according to natural law and right. As such, the doctrine
of estoppel cannot give validity to an act that is prohibited by law or one that is against
public policy. It should be resorted to solely as a means of preventing injustice and
should not be permitted to defeat the administration of the law, or to accomplish a wrong
or secure an undue advantage, or to extend beyond them requirements of the
transactions in which they originate. Simply put, the doctrine of estoppel must be
sparingly applied.

Moreover, the BIR cannot hide behind the doctrine of estoppel to cover its failure
to comply with RMO 20-90 and RDAO 05-01, which the BIR itself issued. As stated
earlier, the BIR failed to verify whether a notarized written authority was given by the
respondent to its accountant, and to indicate the date of acceptance and the receipt by
the respondent of the waivers. Having caused the defects in the waivers, the BIR must
bear the consequence. It cannot shift the blame to the taxpayer. To stress, a waiver of
the statute of limitations, being a derogation of the taxpayer's right to security against
prolonged and unscrupulous investigations, must be carefully and strictly construed.

As to the alleged delay of the respondent to furnish the BIR of the required
documents, this cannot be taken against respondent. Neither can the BIR use this as an
excuse for issuing the assessments beyond the three-year period because with or
without the required documents, the CIR has the power to make assessments based on
the best evidence obtainable.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 511
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HEIRS OF MARIO PACRES, namely: VALENTINA Vda. DE PACRES, JOSERINO,
ELENA, LEOVIGILDO, LELISA, and LOURDES all surnamed PACRES, and
VEÑARANDA Vda. DE ABABA vs. HEIRS of CECILIA YGOÑA, namely BAUDILLO
YGOÑA YAP, MARIA YAP DETUYA, JOSEFINA YAP, EGYPTIANA YAP BANZON,
and VICENTE YAP1 and HILARIO RAMIREZ.
G.R. 174719, 5 May 2010

DOCTRINE:The statements in the legal redemption case are extrajudicial admissions,


which were not disputed by petitioners. These admissions may be given in evidence
against them. At the very least, the polarity of their previous admissions and their present
theory makes the latter highly suspect.

FACTS:
The subject lot in this case originally belonged to Pastor Pacres who left it
intestate to his heirs, the petitioners. They admitted that at the time of Pastor's death in
1962, his heirs were already occupying definite portions of the lot. It was also admitted
that they leased "the ground floor of the [ancestral home] together with a lot area of 300
square meters including the area occupied by the house" to respondent Hilario Ramirez,
who immediately took possession thereof. Subsequently in 1974, four of the Pacres
siblings sold their shares in the ancestral home and the lot on which it stood to Ramirez.
With the sale, respondent Ramirez's possession as lessee turned into a
co-ownership with petitioners Mario and Veñaranda, who did not sell their shares in the
house and lot.On various dates in 1971, Rodrigo, Francisco, and Simplicia sold their
remaining shares in Lot No. 9 to respondent Cecilia Ygoña. In 1983, Margarita also sold
her share to Ygoña. The total area sold to Ygoña was 493 square meters, a writ of
possession was also issued to her.
The Pacres siblingsexecuted a Confirmation of Oral Partition/Settlement of Estate
of Pastor Pacres. One of the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Mario, filed an
ejectment case against the successor-in-intererest of Hilario. He claimed sole ownership
of the lot occupied by the latter by virtue of the oral partition. He argued that he should
pay rentals to him for occupying the front lot and should transfer to the rear of Lot No. 9
where the lots of Ramirez's vendors are located.The court dismissed Mario's assertion
that his siblings sold the rear lots to Ramirez. It held that the deeds of sale in favor of
Ramirez clearly described the object of the sale as the ancestral house and lot. Thus,
Ramirez has a right to continue occupying the property he bought. The court further held
that since Mario did not sell his pro-indiviso shares in the house and lot, at the very least,
the parties are co-owners thereof. Co-owners are entitled to occupy the co-owned
property.
On June 3, 1996, Veñaranda and the heirs of Mario filed the instant complaint for
specific performance against Ygoña and Ramirez. Contrary to Mario's allegations of
co-ownership over Lot No. 9 in the legal redemption case, Mario's heirs insist in the
action for specific performance that the heirs agreed on a partition prior to the sale. They
seek compliance with such agreement from their siblings' vendees, Ygoña and Ramirez,

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
on the basis that the two were privy to these agreements, hence bound to comply
therewith. In compliance with such partition, Ygoña and Ramirez should desist from
claiming any portion of the expropriation payment for the front lots.
Their other cause of action is directed solely at Ygoña, whom they insist agreed to
additional, albeit unwritten, obligations other than the payment of the purchase price of
the shares in Lot No. 9. Veñaranda and Mario's heirs insist that Ygoña contracted with
her vendors to assume all obligations regarding the payment of past and present estate
taxes, survey Lot No. 9 in accordance with the oral partition, and obtain separate titles for
each portion. While these obligations were not written into the deeds of sale, petitioners
insist it is not subject to the Statute of Frauds since these obligations were allegedly
partly complied with by Ygoña. They cite as evidence of Ygoña's compliance the survey
of her purchased lots and payment of realty taxes.
Respondents denied privity with the heirs' oral partition. They further maintained
that no such partition took place and that the portions sold to and occupied by them were
located in front of Lot No. 9; hence they are the ones entitled to the expropriation
payment. To discredit petitioners' assertion of an oral partition, respondents presented
Exhibit No. 1, which demonstrated Valentina's recollection of the actual occupation of the
Pacres siblings, their heirs and vendees. The sketch undermined petitioners' allegation
that the heirs partitioned the property and immediately took possession of their allotted
lots/shares. Ygoña also denied ever agreeing to the additional obligations being imputed
against her.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondents. It held that petitioners failed to prove
partition of the lot in accordance with petitioners' version. Instead, the trial court held that
the parties' actual occupation of their portions in Lot No. 9, as evidenced by petitioner
Valentina's sketch, is the real agreement to which the parties are bound. Apparently
unsatisfied with the parties' state of affairs, the trial court further ordered that a survey of
the lot according to the parties' actual occupation thereof be conducted.
On appeal, the court sustained the ruling of the trial court insofar as it dismissed
petitioners' complaint for lack of evidence. It held that the oral partition was not valid
because the heirs did not ratify it by taking possession of their shares in accordance with
their oral agreement.It, however, reversed the trial court on the latter's order to survey
the lot in accordance with Valentina's sketch. The appellate court explained that while it
was conclusive that Ygoña and Ramirez bought portions of the property from some of
the Pacres siblings, the issue of the actual area and location of the portions sold to them
remains unresolved.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove the existence of the alleged oral
agreements.

HELD:

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 513
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
No. We find no compelling reason to deviate from the foregoing rule and disturb
the trial and appellate courts' factual finding that the existence of an oral partition was not
proven. Our examination of the records indicates that, contrary to petitioners' contention,
the lower courts' conclusion was justified.

Petitioners' only piece of evidence to prove the alleged oral partition was the joint
affidavit (entitled "Confirmation of Oral Partition/Settlement of Estate") supposedly
executed by some of the Pacres siblings and their heirs in 1993, to the effect that such
an oral partition had previously been agreed upon. Petitioners did not adequately explain
why the affidavit was executed only in 1993, several years after respondents Ygoña and
Ramirez took possession of the front portions of Lot No. 9. If there had been an oral
partition allotting the front portions to petitioners since Pastor's death in 1962, they
should have immediately objected to respondents' occupation. Instead, they only
asserted their ownership over the front lots beginning in 1993 (with the execution of their
joint affidavit) when expropriation became imminent and was later filed in court.
Petitioners' assertion of partition of Lot No. 9 is further belied by their
predecessor-in-interest's previous assertion of co-ownership over the same lot in the
legal redemption case filed 10 years before. The allegations therein, sworn to as truth by
Mario and Veñaranda, described Lot No. 9 as a parcel of land that is co-owned by the
Pacres siblings pro indiviso. It was further alleged that Ygoña bought the undivided
shares of Rodrigo, Francisco, Margarita, and Simplicia.
The statements in the legal redemption case are extrajudicial admissions, which
were not disputed by petitioners. These admissions may be given in evidence against
them. At the very least, the polarity of their previous admissions and their present theory
makes the latter highly suspect.
Moreover, petitioners failed to show that the Pacres siblings took possession of
their allotted shares after they had supposedly agreed on the oral partition. Actual
possession and exercise of dominion over definite portions of the property in accordance
with the alleged partition would have been strong proof of an oral partition. In this case,
however, petitioners failed to present any evidence that the petitioners took actual
possession of their respective allotted shares according to the supposed partition. In
fact, the evidence of the parties point to the contrary. Petitioner Valentina herself drew a
sketch showing the location of the actual occupants of Lot No. 9, but the actual
occupation shown in her sketch is not in accordance with the terms of the alleged oral
partition. According to the terms of the alleged oral partition, the front portions of Lot No.
9 were supposed to have been occupied by petitioners, but Valentina's sketch indicates
that the actual occupants of the said portions are respondents.
In fine, we rule that the records contain ample support for the trial and appellate
courts' factual findings that petitioners failed to prove their allegation of oral partition.
While petitioners claim that the trial and appellate courts did not appreciate their

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
evidence regarding the existence of the alleged oral partition, the reality is that their
evidence is utterly unconvincing.
With respect to the alleged additional obligations which petitioners seek to be
enforced against respondent Ygoña, we likewise find that the trial and appellate courts
did not err in rejecting them. Petitioners allege that when Ygoña bought portions of Lot
No. 9 from petitioners' four siblings, aside from paying the purchase price, she also
bound herself to survey Lot No. 9 including the shares of the petitioners (the non-selling
siblings); to deliver to petitioners, free of cost, the titles corresponding to their definite
shares in Lot No. 9; and to pay for all their past and present estate and realty taxes.
According to petitioners, Ygoña agreed to these undertakings as additional consideration
for the sale, even though they were not written in the Deeds of Sale.
Like the trial and appellate courts, we find that these assertions by petitioners
have not been sufficiently established.
In the first place, under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, contracts take effect only
between the parties, their assigns and heirs (subject to exceptions not applicable here).
Thus, only a party to the contract can maintain an action to enforce the obligations
arising under said contract. Consequently, petitioners, not being parties to the contracts
of sale between Ygoña and the petitioners' siblings, cannot sue for the enforcement of
the supposed obligations arising from said contracts.
It is true that third parties may seek enforcement of a contract under the second
paragraph of Article 1311, which provides that "if a contract should contain some
stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment." This refers to
stipulations pour autrui, or stipulations for the benefit of third parties. However, the
written contracts of sale in this case contain no such stipulation in favor of the petitioners.
While petitioners claim that there was an oral stipulation, it cannot be proven under the
Parol Evidence Rule. Under this Rule, "[w]hen the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can
be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other
than the contents of the written agreement." While the Rule admits of exception, no such
exception was pleaded, much less proved, by petitioners.
The Parol Evidence Rule applies to "the parties and their successors in interest."
Conversely, it has no application to a stranger to a contract. For purposes of the Parol
Evidence Rule, a person who claims to be the beneficiary of an alleged stipulation pour
autrui in a contract (such as petitioners) may be considered a party to that contract. It
has been held that a third party who avails himself of a stipulation pour autrui under a
contract becomes a party to that contract. This is why under Article 1311, a beneficiary of
a stipulation pour autrui is required to communicate his acceptance to the obligor before
its revocation.
Moreover, to preclude the application of Parol Evidence Rule, it must be shown
that "at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written

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instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right
originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby." A beneficiary of a
stipulation pour autrui obviously bases his claim on the contract. He therefore cannot
claim to be a stranger to the contract and resist the application of the Parol Evidence
Rule.
Thus, even assuming that the alleged oral undertakings invoked by petitioners
may be deemed stipulations pour autrui, still petitioners' claim cannot prosper, because
they are barred from proving them by oral evidence under the Parol Evidence Rule.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SELWYN F. LAO AND EDGAR MANANSALA vs. SPECIAL PLANS, INC.
G.R. No. 164791, 29 June 2010

DOCTRINE: Compensation shall take place when two persons, in their own right, are
creditors and debtors of each other.

FACTS:
Petitionerstogether with Benjamin Jim entered into a Contract of Lease with
Special Plans, Inc. (SPI) over the latter’s building at No. 354 Quezon Avenue, Quezon
City. Petitioners intended to use the premises for their karaoke and restaurant business
known as "Saporro Restaurant".Upon expiration of the lease contract, it was renewed for
a period of eight months at a rental rate of P23,000.00 per month.

SPI sent a Demand Letter to the petitioners asking for full payment of rentals in
arrears.Receiving no payment, it filed a Complaint for sum of money with the MeTC
Quezon City, claiming that Jim and petitioners have accumulated unpaid rentals of
P118,000.00.
After service of summons, petitioners filed their Verified Answer faulting SPI for
making them believe that it owns the leased property. They likewise asserted that SPI
did not deliver the leased premises in a condition fit for petitioners' intended use. Thus,
petitioners claimed that they were constrained to incur expenses for necessary repairs
as well as expenses for the repair of structural defects, which SPI failed and refused to
reimburse.
MeTC rendered its Decision finding that the unpaid rentals stood at only
P95,000.00. It also found that SPI is solely responsible for repairing the structural defects
of the leased premises, for which the petitioners spent P125,000.00. It held that even
assuming that petitioners did not notify SPI about the structural defects and the urgency
to repair the same, Article 1663 of the Civil Code allows the lessee to make urgent
repairs in order to avoid an imminent danger at the lessor's cost.
RTC rendered a Decision affirming with modification the MeTC Decision by
ordering petitioners to pay SPI the amount of P95,000.00 for unpaid rentals. The RTC
disagreed with the MeTC on the aspect of off-setting the amount allegedly spent by
petitioners for the repairs of the structural defects of subject property with their unpaid
rentals.
CA rendered a Decision affirming in toto the RTC Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to compensation.

HELD:
No. The Civil Code provides that compensation shall take place when two
persons, in their own right, are creditors and debtors of each other.

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Petitioners failed to properly discharge their burden to show that the debts are
liquidated and demandable. Consequently, legal compensation is inapplicable.

A claim is liquidated when the amount and time of payment is fixed. If


acknowledged by the debtor, although not in writing, the claim must be treated as
liquidated. When the defendant, who has an unliquidated claim, sets it up by way of
counterclaim, and a judgment is rendered liquidating such claim, it can be compensated
against the plaintiff's claim from the moment it is liquidated by judgment. We have
restated this in Solinap v. Hon. Del Rosario where we held that compensation takes
place only if both obligations are liquidated.
Based on the arguments presented by both parties, we agree with the observation
of the CA that:

Petitioners did not present any convincing evidence of proof which could support
their allegation on structural defects and the subsequent repairs made on the
leased premises, i.e. documentary evidence (receipts of payments made to
subcontractor Tamayo for the repairs made on the building) except for the
self-serving testimony of petitioner Lao. They (petitioners) merely submitted an
estimated statement of account which did not show that there were actual
expenses made for the alleged structural defects. Neither were they able to
submit proofs of actual expenses made on the alleged structural defects.
Besides, it is contrary to human experience that a lessee would continually
renew the lease contract if the subject property were not in good condition free
from structural defects.
Further, the testimony of Tamayo, the alleged subcontractor who made the
repairs on the leased premises did not convince Us that there were repairs made thereat
since he failed to present any receipts of acknowledgments of payments which was
allegedly made to him.
Further manifesting the present appeal's lack of merit, petitioner Lao, as shown
above in his testimony, did not define the lessor's and the lessees' understanding of the
demarcation between "repairs of structural defects" and "necessary repairs."

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VICENTE ADRIANO vs. ALICE TANCO, GERALDINE TANCO, RONALD TANCO,
and PATRICK TANCO.
G.R. No. 168164, 5 July 2010

DOCTRINE:Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landowner and


a tenant once they agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of a
land belonging to the landowner, as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the
right to continue working on and cultivating the land.

FACTS:
Alice purchased a parcel of land consisting of 28.4692 hectares located in
Norzagaray, Bulacan which was devoted to mango plantation. Later on, it was
partitioned amongher and her three children, namely, Geraldine, Ronald, and Patrick,
each receiving 7 hectares, except Alice who got an extra 0.4692 hectare.Controversy
arose when Alice sent to Vicenteinforming him that subject landholding is not covered by
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). She asked him to vacate the
property as soon as possible.
Seeing the letter of Alice as a threat to his peaceful possession of subject
farmland which might impair his security of tenure as a tenant, Vicente fileda Complaint
for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. He averred that in 1970, Arsenio Tanco, the
husband of Alice, instituted him as tenant-caretaker of the entire mango plantation. Since
then, he has been performing all phases of farm works, such as clearing, pruning,
smudging, and spraying of the mango trees. The fruits were then divided equally
between them. He also alleged that he was allowed to improve and establish his home at
the old building left by Ang Tibay Shoes located at the middle of the plantation.
Presently, he is in actual possession of and continues to cultivate the land.
In their Answer, respondents denied having instituted any tenant on their
property.Insofar as Alice is concerned, respondents asserted that Vicente is not a tenant
but a mere regular farm worker. Respondents maintained that Alice agreed to this setup
since the MARO made it clear to both parties that the contract was for the specific
purpose of spraying the mango trees only and that the same will not ripen into tenancy
relationship. They likewise alleged that it was impossible for the late Arsenio to institute
Vicente as tenant in 1970 since the Tanco family acquired the mango plantation from
Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co. only in December 1975.
PARAD rendered a Decision in favor of Vicente. It opined that since Vicente was
performing functions more than just a mere caretaker and was even allowed to live in
subject landholding with his family, he is therefore a tenant.Respondents moved for
reconsideration which was denied.
DARAB which affirmed the ruling of the PARAD. It held that since the landholding
is an agricultural land, that respondents allowed Vicente to take care of the mango trees,
and that they divided the fruits equally between them, then an implied tenancy was
created.
On appeal, CA rendered a Decision in favor of the respondents.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not there exists a tenancy relationship.

HELD:
No.Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landowner and a
tenant once they agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of a
land belonging to the landowner, as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the
right to continue working on and cultivating the land.
The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed and allegations that
one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. For tenancy
relationship to exist, the following essential requisites must be present: (1) the parties are
the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is
consent between the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is
personal cultivation by the tenant; and, (6) there is sharing of the harvests between the
parties. All the requisites must concur in order to establish the existence of tenancy
relationship, and the absence of one or more requisites is fatal.
After a thorough evaluation of the records of this case, we affirm the findings of
the CA that the essential requisites of consent and sharing are lacking.
The essential element of consent is sorely missing because there is no proof that
the landowners recognized Vicente, or that they hired him, as their legitimate tenant.
And, although Vicente claims that he is a tenant of respondents' agricultural lot in
Norzagaray, Bulacan, and that he has continuously cultivated and openly occupied it, no
evidence was presented to establish the presence of consent other than his self-serving
statements. These cannot suffice because independent and concrete evidence is
needed to prove consent of the landowner.
Likewise, the essential requisite of sharing of harvests is lacking. Independent
evidence, such as receipts, must be presented to show that there was sharing of the
harvest between the landowner and the tenant. Self-serving statements are not
sufficient.
Here, there was no evidence presented to show sharing of harvest in the context
of a tenancy relationship between Vicente and the respondents. The only evidence
submitted to establish the purported sharing of harvests were the allegations of Vicente
which, as discussed above, were self-serving and have no evidentiary value. Moreover,
petitioner's allegations of continued possession and cultivation do not support his cause.
It is settled that mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land does not
automatically convert a tiller or farm worker into an agricultural tenant recognized under
agrarian laws. It is essential that, together with the other requisites of tenancy
relationship, the agricultural tenant must prove that he transmitted the landowner's share
of the harvest.
Neither can we agree with the DARAB's theory of implied tenancy because the
landowner never acquiesced to Vicente's cultivating the land. Besides, for implied
tenancy to arise it is necessary that all the essential requisites of tenancy must be
present.

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SPS VALENZUELA vs.SPS MANO
G.R. No. 172611 July 9, 2010

DOCTRINE: “The rule that a Torrens Certificate of Title is conclusive evidence of


ownership of the land described therein does not apply when such land, or a portion
thereof, was illegally or erroneously included in said title.”

FACTS:

Petitioner Federico Valenzuela (Federico) is the son of Andres Valenzuela


(Andres) who was the owner and possessor of a parcel of land with an area of 938
square meters, more or less, located at Dampol 1st, Pulilan, Bulacan. The property was
declared in the name of Andres under Declaration of Real Property No. 7187. Andres
died on October 10, 1959, and the possession of the property was transferred to
Federico.
Meanwhile, on February 7, 1991, a Deed of Conditional Sale was executed
between Feliciano Geronimo (Feliciano) and herein respondent Jose Mano, Jr. (Mano),
wherein the former agreed to sell to the latter a 2,056-square meter parcel of land
located at Dampol 1st, Pulilan, Bulacan. The corresponding Deed of Salewas
subsequently executed in March 1991.On March 4, 1992, Mano applied for a Free
Patent and on April 10, 1992, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-351, was issued in
his name. This time, the property was indicated as covering an area of 2,739 square
meters.Subsequently, Mano sold a portion of the land covered by OCT No. P-351 to
Roberto S. Balingcongan (Balingcongan). On January 8, 1998, Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-112865 was issued in the name of Balingcongan covering 2,292
square meters. On the same date, TCT No. T-112864 was also issued in the name of
Jose covering 447 square meters.
Federico left the care of the property to his nephew, Vicente Joson (Vicente).
Sometime in 1999, Federico instructed Vicente to construct a perimeter fence on his
property but he was prevented by Jose, claiming that the 447 square meters was his
property as reflected in his TCT No. T-112864. On the other hand, Federico is claiming it
as part of the property he inherited from his father, Andres.When the matter could not be
settled amicably, the petitioners lodged a Complaintfor Annulment of Title and/or
Reconveyance, Damages with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. Thecase was set for
pre-trial conference on March 27, 2000. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The RTC ruled in favor of Frederico, but on appeal, the CA reversed the decision.
Hence the present case

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA properly heldrespondents as the owners of the disputed


447 square meter property

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HELD:

No. The disputed 447 square meter property should be declared as Frederico’s.

We rule that Federico is the owner of the disputed 447 square meter lot. The
Deed of Conditional Sale described the property purchased by Jose as follows:

A part of parcel of land (T.D. No. 14312) situated at Dampol 1st, Pulilan, Bulacan.
Bounded on the North- Lot 6225; East- Lot 1306 & 1311; South- Lot 1307 and
1308 and West- Lot 1304 & 1299. Containing an area of Two Thousand Fifty Six
(2,056) square meters, more or less. (Bulacan)."

Feliciano sold a portion of Lot 1305 to Jose. After the sale was made, a
Sketch/Special Plan was prepared by Geodetic Engineer Fortunato E. Chavez. It is clear
from such document that Lot 1305-A representing the upper portion with an area of
1,112 square meters was retained by Feliciano and what was sold was the lower portion
thereof which became Lot No. 1305-B with a total area of 2,292 square meters. This
exceeds the area of 2,056 square meters indicated in the above sale transaction.

In another Sketch/Special Plan prepared by Geodetic Engineer Norberto C.


Chavez, it is shown that Lot No. 10176-B with an area of 2,292 square meters with a
right of way going to Camino Provincial Highway was the one sold to Jose and which
was also sold by him to the Balingcongan spouses. This is also known as Lot No.
1305-B. TCT No. T-112865 was issued in the name of the spouses Balingcongan. Lot
No. 10175 which represents the upper portion of Lot No. 1305 was retained by Feliciano.
This is also known as Lot No. 1305-A. However, what is surprising is that the said plan
showed that Lot No. 10176-A with an area of 447 square meters had been made to
appear as part of the lot sold by Feliciano to Jose. TCT No. T-112864 was issued in the
name of Jose. If indeed this disputed area is part of Lot No. 1305 then it should have
been part of Lot No. 1305-A which was retained by Feliciano as it is at the East side of
the said property.

"Settled is the rule that a person, whose certificate of title included by mistake or
oversight the land owned by another, does not become the owner of such land by virtue of
the certificate alone. The Torrens System is intended to guarantee the integrity and
conclusiveness of the certificate of registration but is not intended to perpetrate fraud
against the real owner of the land. The certificate of title cannot be used to protect a
usurper from the true owner."

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ADRIAN WILSON INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATES, INC vs.TMX PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 162608 July 26, 2010

DOCTRINE:“Actual damages puts the claimant in the position in which he had been
before he was injured. The award thereof must be based on the evidence presented, not
on the personal knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative
and nonsubstantial proof. Under the Civil Code, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.”

FACTS:

TMX engaged the services of AWIA for the construction of its watch assembly
plant in Cebu (composed of twin modules and another separately designed module).
Their Agreement dated December 29, 1978 provided that AWIA would provide basic and
detailed architectural designs, plans, and specifications, as well as structural,
mechanical, and electrical engineering services.Specifically, one of AWIA’s duties was
construction administration, i.e., to guard TMX from defects and deficiencies during the
construction phase by determining the progress and quality of the work of the general
contractor, P.G. Dakay Construction Company (P.G. Dakay). This is to ensure that this
contractor works in accordance with the directed specifications.

Construction began in 1979 and was completed in 1980. After five years, however,
TMX noticed numerous cracks and beam deflections (vertical shifting) along the roof
girders and beams in columns B, C, F, and G of the twin modules. TMX, opining that the
problem may have been due to design errors, informed AWIA of the situation.

The RTC ruled in favor of TMX and ordered AWIA to reimburse TMX the partial
cost of the repair but denied the reimbursement of employee’s fees. On appeal to the CA,
the CA found AWIA negligent of its duties and ordered them to pay the employees fees
paid by TMX during the work stoppage.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not AWIA properly discharged its duty as construction administrator

(2) Whether or not AWIA should be liable for the reimbursement of the salaries paid to the
employees of TMX.

HELD:

(1) Yes. AWIA failed in its duty to guard TMX against the contractor’s work
deficiencies

As can be inferred from the contract, TMX could solely and absolutely rely on the
assessments and recommendations of AWIA. Under the aforementioned provisions,
AWIA was tasked to guard TMX against construction problems and to ensure the quality

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
of P.G. Dakay’s performance. It also had the authority to approve or reject the contractor’s
work, and it could issue certificates of payments for the progress billings of the contractor
only if it found the latter’s job as covered by each of the billings satisfactory. Thus, it is
irrelevant whether TMX has its own engineering staff to evaluate the reports about the
construction work. Under the contract, AWIA is not liable for the contractor’s construction
errors on the following conditions: a) that it promptly and adequately informs TMX of
whatever defects and deficiencies in the construction are and b) that it determines how
these problems could be repaired. AWIA should not release a final certification of
payment in favor of the contractor unless these had been done.

(2) Yes. AWIA should reimburse the cost of employment fees.

Had the effects on the marginal strength of the concrete been promptly disclosed
to TMX, the cracks and deflections could have been rectified by the contractor before it
was issued its final certification of payment and the owner could have been spared from
further expenses. There is a causal connection between AWIA’s negligence and the
expenses incurred by TMX. The latter was compelled to shutdown the plant during the
workdays in December to repair the roof. In the process, it incurred expenses for the
repairs, including the salaries of its workers who were put on forced leave, for which it can
ask for reimbursement as actual damages.

Actual damages puts the claimant in the position in which he had been before he
was injured. The award thereof must be based on the evidence presented, not on the
personal knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and
nonsubstantial proof. Under the Civil Code, one is entitled to an adequate compensation
only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.

While TMX failed to prove the exact amount of the salaries it had paid, we however
acknowledge that TMX had to pay its employees during the shutdown and had suffered
pecuniary loss for the structural problem. Moreover, we concede to AWIA’s stance that
the installation of only 11 shoring columns, instead of 118, would significantly reduce the
number of days allotted for the repairs. As a matter of equity, therefore, a relief to TMX in
the form of temperate damages is warranted. We find the amount of ₱500,000.00
reasonable and sufficient under the circumstances.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
COL. FRANCISCO DELA MERCED, substituted by his heirs namely, LUIS CESAR DELA
MERCED, BLANQUITA DELAMERCED nee MACATANGAY, and MARIA OLIVIA M.
PAREDES vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and Spouses
VICTOR and MILAGROS MANLONGAT
G.R. No. 167140, (November 23, 2011)

DOCTRINE: A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular
real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said
property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over the said
property.

FACTS:
The Zulueta spouses mortgaged several lots to the GSIS, which eventually foreclosed
on the mortgaged properties, including the subject properties. Upon consolidation of GSISs
ownership, TCT No. 26105 in Zuluetas name was cancelled, and TCT No. 23554 was issued in
GSISs name. Upon learning of the foreclosure, petitioners filed a complaint praying for the
nullity of the GSIS foreclosure on the subject properties on the ground that petitioner, not the
Zuluetas, was the owner of these lots at the time of the foreclosure. Dela Merced caused the
annotation of lis pendens on GSISs TCT No. 23554 on September 21, 1984 in order to protect
his interests in the subject properties. After a protracted litigation, the case reached the SC. On
September 11, 2001, a Decision was rendered in petitioners favor. The Court nullified GSIS’s
foreclosure of the subject properties because these lots were never part of its mortgage
agreement with the Zulueta spouses. Pursuant to the finality of the above Decision, petitioners
filed a Motion for Execution. In its October 28, 2005 Decision, the CA dismissed GSIS’s petition
and held that execution may be enforced against it. Further, GSIS argues that the inclusion of
derivative titles in the September 11, 2001 Decision in G.R. No. 140398 would deprive the
holders of these derivative titles their day in court. GSIS opines that the holders of the derivative
titles are not bound by the judgment against GSIS because these holders are strangers to the
action between GSIS and petitioners.

ISSUE:
WON a final and executory judgment against GSIS and Manlongat can be enforced
against their successors-in-interest or holders of derivative titles.

HELD:
NO. A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real
property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property
does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over the said property.
The effect of the annotation of lis pendens on future transactions over the subject property is

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
discussed by an authority on land titles and registration: Once a notice of lis pendens has been
duly registered, any cancellation or issuance of the title of the land involved as well as any
subsequent transaction affecting the same, would have to be subject to the outcome of the
litigation. In other words, upon the termination of the litigation there can be no risk of losing the
property or any part thereof as a result of any conveyance of the land or any encumbrance that
may be made thereon posterior to the filing of the notice of lis pendens. It is not disputed that
petitioners caused the annotation of lis pendens on TCT No. 23554, which covers Lots 7 and 8
of Block 2, as early as September 21, 1984. On July 29, 1985 and August 24, 1998, TCT No.
23554 was cancelled with respect to Lots 7 and 8 of Block 2 and new individual titles were
issued to Victorino and Dimaguila. Both titles had the notice of lis pendens which was carried
over from TCT No. 23554. Ineluctably, both Victorino and Dimaguila had notice of the litigation
involving GSISs ownership over the subject properties, and were bound by the outcome of the
litigation. When a transferee pendente lite takes property with notice of lis pendens, such
transferee undertakes to respect the outcome of the litigation. As held in Selph v. Vda. de
Aguilar, an order to cancel the transferors title may be enforced against his transferee, whose
title is expressly subject to the outcome of the litigation by the fact of the annotation of lis
pendens. The existence of these entries on Dimaguilas and Victorinos titles bars any defense of
good faith against petitioners and effectively makes Dimaguila and Victorino mere privies of
GSIS and subject to whatever rights GSIS might have in the subject properties, which (as it turns
out) is none at all. What Dimaguila and Victorino possess are derivative titles of the GSISs title
over Lots 7 and 8 of Block 2, which this Court has finally adjudicated to be null and void. Given
the legal maxim that a spring cannot rise higher than its source, it follows that Dimaguilas and
Victorinos titles, or any other title over the subject properties that are derived from TCT No.
23554 of the GSIS, are likewise null and void. As explained by this Court in another case, the
title obtained by the transferee pendente lite affords him no special protection; he cannot invoke
the rights of a purchaser in good faith and cannot acquire better rights than those of his
predecessor-in-interest. In Voluntad v. Spouses Dizon, the Court allowed the issuance of an
alias writ of execution against the transferees pendente lite, who had knowledge of the pending
litigation on the basis of the annotation of the notice of lis pendens on their titles. The Court
clarified therein that there was no need for the victorious [parties] to file a separate action to
enforce their right to recover the property as against the new registered owners. In Associated
Bank v. Pronstroller, the Court affirmed the judgments of the trial and appellate courts cancelling
the titles of the spouses Vaca, who were transferees pendente lite of Associated Bank, despite
the fact that the spouses Vaca were not parties to the case between Associated Bank and the
Pronstrollers. The Court explained therein: Admittedly, during the pendency of the case,
respondents timely registered a notice of lis pendens to warn the whole world that the property

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
was the subject of a pending litigation. Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to
the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending
the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. Founded upon public policy and
necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court
until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by
subsequent alienation.x x x The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a twofold effect: (1) to keep
the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment
to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a
purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the
court will promulgate subsequently. This registration, therefore, gives the court clear authority to
cancel the title of the spouses Vaca, since the sale of the subject property was made after the
notice of lis pendens. x x x

The Court cannot accept GSISs theory that the dispositive portion of the Decision in G.R.
No. 140398 is enforceable only against GSISs title because it does not contain the phrase and
all its derivative titles. GSISs narrow interpretation would render nugatory the principle that a
final judgment against a party is binding on his privies and successors-in-interest. We cannot
sustain this interpretation. In Cabresos v. Judge Tiro, the Court upheld the respondent judges
issuance of an alias writ of execution against the successors-in-interest of the losing litigant
despite the fact that these successors-in-interest were not mentioned in the judgment and were
never parties to the case. The Court explained that an action is binding on the privies of the
litigants even if such privies are not literally parties to the action. Their inclusion in the writ of
execution does not vary or exceed the terms of the judgment. In the same way, the inclusion of
the derivative titles in the writ of execution will not alter the Decision in G.R. No. 140398 ordering
the cancellation of GSISs title.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JOCELYN TOLEDO vs. MARILOU HYDEN
G.R. No. 172139, (December 8, 2010)

DOCTRINE: In view of Central Bank Circular No. 905 s. 1982, which suspended the Usury
Law ceiling on interest effective January 1, 1983, parties to a loan agreement have wide latitude
to stipulate interest rates. Nevertheless, such stipulated interest rates may be declared as illegal
if the same is unconscionable. There is certainly nothing in said circular which grants
lenders carte blanche authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their
borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets.

FACTS:
Petitioner obtained several loans from respondent. From August 15, 1993 up to
December 31, 1997, petitioner had been religiously paying respondent the stipulated monthly
interest by issuing checks and depositing sums of money in the bank account of the
latter. However, the total principal amount of P290,000.00 remained unpaid. Thus, in April 1998,
respondent visited petitioner in her office at CAP in Cebu City and asked petitioner and the other
employees who were likewise indebted to her to acknowledge their debts. A document entitled
Acknowledgment of Debt for the amount of P290,000.00 was signed by the petitioner with two
of her subordinates as witnesses. However petitioner ordered the stop payment on the
remaining checks and on October 27, 1998, filed with the RTC of Cebu City a complaint against
Marilou for Declaration of Nullity and Payment, Annulment, Sum of Money, Injunction and
Damages. However, The RTC did not find any showing that petitioner was forced, threatened,
or intimidated in signing the document referred to as Acknowledgment of Debt and in issuing the
postdated checks which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:

WON the CA gravely erred when it held that the imposition of interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) to seven percent (7%) is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy.

HELD:
NO. In view of Central Bank Circular No. 905 s. 1982, which suspended the Usury Law
ceiling on interest effective January 1, 1983, parties to a loan agreement have wide latitude to
stipulate interest rates. Nevertheless, such stipulated interest rates may be declared as illegal if
the same is unconscionable. There is certainly nothing in said circular which grants
lenders carte blanche authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their
borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets. In fact, in Medel v. Court of Appeals we
annulled a stipulated 5.5% per month or 6.6% per annum interest with additional service charge
of 2% per annum and penalty charge of 1% per month on a P500,000.00 loan for being
excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant. In this case, however, we cannot consider
the disputed 6% to 7% monthly interest rate to be iniquitous or unconscionable vis--vis the
principle laid down in Medel. Noteworthy is the fact that in Medel, the defendant-spouses were
never able to pay their indebtedness from the very beginning and when their obligations
ballooned into a staggering sum, the creditors filed a collection case against them. In this case,
there was no urgency of the need for money on the part of Jocelyn, the debtor, which compelled

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
her to enter into said loan transactions. She used the money from the loans to make advance
payments for prospective clients of educational plans offered by her employer. In this way, her
sales production would increase, thereby entitling her to 50% rebate on her sales. This is the
reason why she did not mind the 6% to 7% monthly interest. Notably too, a business transaction
of this nature between Jocelyn and Marilou continued for more than five years. Jocelyn
religiously paid the agreed amount of interest until she ordered for stop payment on some of the
checks issued to Marilou. The checks were in fact sufficiently funded when she ordered the stop
payment and then filed a case questioning the imposition of a 6% to 7% interest rate for being
allegedly iniquitous or unconscionable and, hence, contrary to morals. It was clearly shown that
before Jocelyn availed of said loans, she knew fully well that the same carried with it an interest
rate of 6% to 7% per month, yet she did not complain. In fact, when she availed of said loans, an
advance interest of 6% to 7% was already deducted from the loan amount, yet she never
uttered a word of protest. After years of benefiting from the proceeds of the loans bearing an
interest rate of 6% to 7% per month and paying for the same, Jocelyn cannot now go to court to
have the said interest rate annulled on the ground that it is excessive, iniquitous,
unconscionable, exorbitant, and absolutely revolting to the conscience of man. This is so
because among the maxims of equity are (1) he who seeks equity must do equity, and (2) he
who comes into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim
which is also expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have equity. It
signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct
has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in
issue. We are convinced that Jocelyn did not come to court for equitable relief with equity or with
clean hands. It is patently clear from the above summary of the facts that the conduct of Jocelyn
can by no means be characterized as nobly fair, just, and reasonable. This Court likewise notes
certain acts of Jocelyn before filing the case with the RTC. In September 1998, she requested
Marilou not to deposit her checks as she can cover the checks only the following month. On the
next month, Jocelyn again requested for another extension of one month. It turned out that she
was only sweet-talking Marilou into believing that she had no money at that time. But as testified
by Serapio Romarate, an employee of the Bank of Commerce where Jocelyn is one of their
clients, there was an available balance of P276,203.03 in the latters account and yet she
ordered for the stop payments of the seven checks which can actually be covered by the
available funds in said account. She then caught Marilou by surprise when she surreptitiously
filed a case for declaration of nullity of the document and for damages.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 529
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ROBERTO TUAZON vs. LOURDES Q. DEL ROSARIO-SUAREZ, CATALINA R.
SUAREZ-DE LEON, WILFREDO DE LEON, MIGUEL LUIS S. DE LEON, ROMMEL LEE S.
DE LEON, and GUILLERMA L. SANDICO-SILVA, as attorney-in-fact of the defendants,
except Lourdes Q. Del Rosario-Suarez
G.R. No. 168325, (December 8, 2010)

DOCTRINE: Option Contract is an agreement in writing to give a person the option to purchase
lands within a given time at a named price is neither a sale nor an agreement to sell. It is simply
a contract by which the owner of property agrees with another person that he shall have
the right to buy his property at a fixed price within a certain time. He does not sell his land;
he does not then agree to sell it; but he does sell something; that is, the right or privilege to buy at
the election or option of the other party. The second party gets in praesenti, not lands, nor an
agreement that he shall have lands, but he does get something of value; that is, the right to call
for and receive lands if he elects. The owner parts with his right to sell his lands, except to the
second party, for a limited period. The second party receives this right, or rather, from his point of
view, he receives the right to elect to buy.

FACTS:
Respondent was the owner of a parcel of land, located along Tandang Sora
Street, Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City. On June 24, 1994, petitioner and executed a
Contract of Lease over the abovementioned parcel of land for a period of three years. More than
four months after the expiration of the Contract of Lease, Lourdes sold subject parcel of land to
her only child, Catalina Suarez-De Leon, her son-in-law Wilfredo De Leon, and her two
grandsons, Miguel Luis S. De Leon and Rommel S. De Leon. The new owners through their
attorney-in-fact, Guillerma S. Silva, notified respondent to vacate the premises. Roberto refused
hence, the De Leons filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer before MeTC of Quezon
City against him. On August 30, 2000, the MeTC rendered a Decision ordering Roberto to
vacate the property for non-payment of rentals and expiration of the contract. On November 8,
2000, while the ejectment case was on appeal, respondent filed with the RTC of Quezon City a
Complaint for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale, Reconveyance, Damages and Application
for Preliminary Injunction against Lourdes and the De Leons. After trial, the court a
quo rendered a Decision declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale made by Lourdes in favor of the
De Leons as valid and binding. The offer made by Lourdes to Roberto did not ripen into a
contract to sell because the price offered by the former was not acceptable to the latter. The
offer made by Lourdes is no longer binding and effective at the time she decided to sell the
subject lot to the De Leons because the same was not accepted by Roberto. On May 30, 2005,
the CA issued its Decision dismissing Robertos appeal and affirming the Decision of the RTC.

ISSUES:
WON the petitioner violated the respondent’s right to buy subject property under the
principle of right of first refusal by not giving him notice and the opportunity to buy the property
under the same terms and conditions or specifically based on the much lower price paid by the
De Leons.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
NO. In Beaumont v. Prieto, the nature of an option contract is explained thus: In his Law
Dictionary, edition of 1897, Bouvier defines an option as a contract, in the following language: A
contract by virtue of which A, in consideration of the payment of a certain sum to B, acquires the
privilege of buying from, or selling to, B certain securities or properties within a limited time at a
specified price. (Story vs. Salamon, 71 N. Y., 420.) From Vol. 6, page 5001, of the work Words
and Phrases, citing the case of Ide vs. Leiser (24 Pac., 695; 10 Mont., 5; 24 Am. St. Rep., 17)
the following quotation has been taken: An agreement in writing to give a person the option to
purchase lands within a given time at a named price is neither a sale nor an agreement to sell. It
is simply a contract by which the owner of property agrees with another person that he
shall have the right to buy his property at a fixed price within a certain time. He does not
sell his land; he does not then agree to sell it; but he does sell something; that is, the right or
privilege to buy at the election or option of the other party. The second party gets in praesenti,
not lands, nor an agreement that he shall have lands, but he does get something of value; that
is, the right to call for and receive lands if he elects. The owner parts with his right to sell his
lands, except to the second party, for a limited period. The second party receives this right, or
rather, from his point of view, he receives the right to elect to buy. But the two definitions above
cited refer to the contract of option, or, what amounts to the same thing, to the case where there
was cause or consideration for the obligation x x x. On the other hand, in Ang Yu Asuncion v.
Court of Appeals, an elucidation on the right of first refusal was made thus: In the law on sales,
the so-called right of first refusal is an innovative juridical relation. Needless to point out, it cannot
be deemed a perfected contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code. Neither can the
right of first refusal, understood in its normal concept, per se be brought within the purview of an
option under the second paragraph of Article 1479, aforequoted, or possibly of an offer under
Article 1319 of the same Code. An option or an offer would require, among other things, a clear
certainty on both the object and the cause or consideration of the envisioned contract. In a right
of first refusal, while the object might be made determinate, the exercise of the right,
however, would be dependent not only on the grantor's eventual intention to enter into a
binding juridical relation with another but also on terms, including the price, that
obviously are yet to be later firmed up. Prior thereto, it can at best be so described as merely
belonging to a class of preparatory juridical relations governed not by contracts (since the
essential elements to establish the vinculum juris would still be indefinite and inconclusive) but
by, among other laws of general application, the pertinent scattered provisions of the Civil Code
on human conduct. Even on the premise that such right of first refusal has been decreed under
a final judgment, like here, its breach cannot justify correspondingly an issuance of a writ of
execution under a judgment that merely recognizes its existence, nor would it sanction an action
for specific performance without thereby negating the indispensable element of consensuality in
the perfection of contracts. It is not to say, however, that the right of first refusal would be
inconsequential for, such as already intimated above, an unjustified disregard thereof, given, for
instance, the circumstances expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code, can warrant a recovery for
damages. From the foregoing, it is thus clear that an option contract is entirely different and
distinct from a right of first refusal in that in the former, the option granted to the offeree is for
a fixed period and at a determined price. Lacking these two essential requisites, what is
involved is only a right of first refusal.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 531
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
RAUL PALOMATA, vs. NESTOR COLMENARES and TERESA GURREA
G.R. No. 174251, December 15, 2010

DOCTRINE: There is a presumption of regular performance of official duty only when


there is nothing on record that would arouse suspicions of irregularity. The refusal of the
Bureau of Lands and DAR officials to affirm their written findings in open court indicates
that the presumption should not apply in the evaluation of these reports.

FACTS:
This case involves a parcel of land along the Camambugan Creek in Balasan, Iloilo
on which stand petitioner’shouse and talyer. Letecia Colmenares,claiming ownership
over the said land, filed a criminal complaint for squatting against Raul in 1981. However,
for reasons undisclosed by the records, the case was eventually dismissed.
In order to prevent further ejectment from the subject property, Raul, together with
his father Alipio, filed a complaint for "maintenance and damages" against Letecia, her
son Nestor Colmenares, and Teresa Gurrea. The complaint alleged that Alipio Palomata
(Alipio) was the bona fide agricultural lessee of Letecia. Raul contended that the subject
property occupied by his house and talyer was part of Alipio’s farmlot.
The Colmenareses admitted that Alipio was their agricultural lessee but denied
any knowledge of the survey which led to the issuance of the CLT in Alipio’s favor. The
Colmenareses countered that the property claimed by Raul is within their subdivision, not
within the agricultural land tenanted by Alipio.
The trial court held that Raul, not being an agricultural lessee of the
Colmenareses, had no right to a homelot. The court explained that Raul’s unilateral
installation as Alipio’s successor was void because it violated the landowners’ right to
choose the successor as provided under Section 9 of the Code of Agrarian Reform.

Appellate Court ruled that since Raul did not prove that the subject property was
part of his father’s farmlot, the subject property remained part of Colmenareses’
landholding. As landowner, Colmenares had the right to oust an intruder thereon; hence,
the trial court’s order for Raul to vacate the subject property was correct

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial and appellate courts erred in ordering the petitioner to vacate
the subject property, remove the improvements thereon, and to return possession
thereof to respondents.

HELD:
All these circumstances support the trial and the appellate court’s refusal to give
the investigation reports much weight and credence. This Court will not disturb the
conclusions arrived at by the CAR and the appellate court when these are well-supported
by the evidence.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Raul then argues that the trial and appellate courts should have given more weight
to the surveys of the Bureau of Lands because these carry the presumption of the regular
performance of official duty.

The argument fails to convince. There is a presumption of regular performance of


official duty only when there is nothing on record that would arouse suspicions of
irregularity. The refusal of the Bureau of Lands and DAR officials to affirm their written
findings in open court indicates that the presumption should not apply in the evaluation of
these reports.

In sum, the CLT, tax declaration and investigation reports offered by the
Palomatas as evidence of their right to the subject property are, at best, inconclusive and
insufficient to prove their claim that the subject property is included in Alipio’s farmlot. In
fact, they even prove quite the opposite: that the subject property is actually not included
in the farmlot.

Raul then maintains that the Colmenareses did not prove their ownership over the
subject lot; hence it should be presumed that the lot is owned by its current possessor.

Raul’s argument ignores the fact that, by alleging their right to the subject property
as tenant-farmers of the Colmenareses, the Palomatas readily admitted that the land
belonged to the Colmenareses. Thus, if Raul fails, as he did fail, to prove that the subject
property was awarded to his father through a CLT, then the presumption is that it remains
the property of the Colmenareses.

Raul proceeds to question the trial and appellate court’s order for him to vacate the
premises and surrender possession thereof to the Colmenareses. He contends that the
said order goes beyond the prayer of the Colmenareses, which was limited to the
annulment of the CLT or the exclusion of the subject property from the CLT’s coverage.
The argument is specious at best. While the Colmenareses’ prayer does not
expressly include the ejectment of the Palomatas, it does include a prayer for the court to
declare that the subject property was excluded from Alipio’s CLT. A necessary
consequence to the exclusion of the subject property from Alipio’s CLT is the ejectment of
the Palomatas therefrom. The Palomatas have no right to stay on the subject property if it
is not covered by Alipio’s CLT.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK vs. ANGELES CATHERINE ENRIQUEZ
G.R. No. 168646, January 12, 2011

DOCTRINE: The contractual intention determines whether the property subject of the dation
will be considered as the full equivalent of the debt and will therefore serve as full satisfaction for
the debt. The dation in payment extinguishes the obligation to the extent of the value of the thing
delivered, either as agreed upon by the parties or as may be proved, unless the parties by
agreement, express or implied, or by their silence, consider the thing as equivalent to the
obligation, in which case the obligation is totally extinguished.

FACTS:
The BANK is a domestic financial corporation that extends loans to subdivision
developers/owners

Petitioner DELTA is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of developing and


selling real estate properties, particularly Delta Homes I in Cavite. DELTA is owned by Ricardo
De Leon who is the registered owner of a parcel of land which corresponds to Lot 4 of Delta
Homes I. Said Lot 4 is the subject matter of these cases. De Leon and his spouse obtained a P4
million loan from the BANK for the express purpose of developing Delta Homes I. To secure the
loan, the spouses De Leon executed in favor of the BANK a real estate mortgage. DELTA then
obtained a Certificate of Registration and a License to Sell from the HLURB.

DELTA executed a Contract to Sell with respondent Enriquez over the house and lot in
Lot 4. When DELTA defaulted on its loan obligation, the BANK, instead of foreclosing the REM,
agreed to a dation in payment or a dacion en pago. Unknown to Enriquez, among the properties
assigned to the BANK was the house and lot of Lot 4, which is the subject of her Contract to Sell
with DELTA. The records do not bear out and the parties are silent on whether the BANK was
able to transfer title to its name. It appears, however, that the dacion en pago was not annotated
on the TCT of Lot 4.

Enriquez filed a complaint against DELTA and the BANK before alleging that DELTA
violated the terms of its License to Sell. HLURB upheld the validity of the purchase price, but
ordered DELTA to accept payment of the balance of P108,013.36 from Enriquez, and (upon
such payment) to deliver to Enriquez the title to the house and lot free from liens and
encumbrances. The Board upheld the validity of the contract to sell between DELTA and
Enriquez despite the alleged violation of the price ceilings in BP 220. The Board held that
DELTA and Enriquez were presumed to have had a meeting of the minds on the object of the
sale and the purchase price. Absent any circumstance vitiating Enriquezconsent, she was
presumed to have willingly and voluntarily agreed to the higher purchase price; hence, she was
bound by the terms of the contract. Both Enriquez and the BANK appealed to the Office of the
President. The BANK disagreed with the ruling upholding Enriquezs Contract to Sell; and
insisted on its ownership over Lot 4. It argued that it has become impossible for DELTA to
comply with the terms of the contract to sell and to deliver Lot 4s title to Enriquez given that

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
DELTA had already relinquished all its rights to Lot 4 in favor of the BANK via the dation in
payment.

The OP adopted by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the HLURB
Decisions, which it affirmed in toto. The CA ruled against the validity of the dacion en
pago executed in favor of the BANK on the ground that DELTA had earlier relinquished its
ownership over Lot 4 in favor of Enriquez via the Contract to Sell.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the dacion en pago extinguished the loan obligation, such that DELTA has
no more obligations to the BANK.

HELD:
No. The BANK then posits that, if title to Lot 4 is ordered delivered to Enriquez, DELTA has
the obligation to pay the BANK the corresponding value of Lot 4. According to the BANK, the
dation in payment extinguished the loan only to the extent of the value of the thing
delivered. Since Lot 4 would have no value to the BANK if it will be delivered to Enriquez,
DELTA would remain indebted to that extent.

The Court is not persuaded. Like in all contracts, the intention of the parties to the dation
in payment is paramount and controlling. The contractual intention determines whether the
property subject of the dation will be considered as the full equivalent of the debt and will
therefore serve as full satisfaction for the debt. The dation in payment extinguishes the obligation
to the extent of the value of the thing delivered, either as agreed upon by the parties or as may
be proved, unless the parties by agreement, express or implied, or by their silence, consider the
thing as equivalent to the obligation, in which case the obligation is totally extinguished.

In the case at bar, the Dacion en Pago executed by DELTA and the BANK indicates a
clear intention by the parties that the assigned properties would serve as full payment for
DELTAs entire obligation: A dacion en pago is governed by the law of sales. Contracts of sale
come with warranties, either express (if explicitly stipulated by the parties) or implied (under
Article 1547 et seq. of the Civil Code). In this case, however, the BANK does not even point to
any breach of warranty by DELTA in connection with the Dation in Payment. To be sure, the
Dation in Payment has no express warranties relating to existing contracts to sell over the
assigned properties. As to the implied warranty in case of eviction, it is waivable and cannot be
invoked if the buyer knew of the risks or danger of eviction and assumed its consequences. As
the Court have noted earlier, the BANK, in accepting the assigned properties as full payment of
DELTAs total obligation, has assumed the risk that some of the assigned properties are covered
by contracts to sell which must be honored under PD 957.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Spouses FERNANDO and ANGELINA EDRALIN vs. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK
G.R. No. 168523 March 9, 2011

DOCTRINE: The right to possess a property follows the right of ownership;


consequently, it would be illogical to hold that a person having ownership of a parcel of
land is barred from seeking possession thereof.
FACTS:
Veterans Bank granted petitioner spouses Fernando and Angelina Edralin
(Edralins) a loan in the amount P270,000.00. As security thereof, petitioners executed a
REM in favor of Veterans Bank over a real property owned by Fenando. The Edralins
failed to pay their obligation to Veterans Bank. Veterans Bank foreclosed the property
extrajudicially. In due course, the foreclosure sale was held and Veterans Bank emerged
as the highest bidder at the said foreclosure sale and was issued the corresponding
Certificate of Sale. Upon the Edralinsâfailure to redeem the property during the one-year
period, Veterans Bank acquired absolute ownership of the subject property. Despite the
foregoing, the Edralins failed to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property
to Veterans Bank. Veterans Bank applied for a writ of possession in the trial court. The
trial court dismissed Veterans Bankâs application due to an agreement in the REM that
the bank shall take possession of the property without any judicial intervention. Veterans
Bank filed a petition for mandamus before the CA. First among its arguments, Veterans
Bank maintained that it was the trial courtâs ministerial duty to grant a writ of possession
to the mortgagee who has consolidated and registered the property in its name. The
appellate court ruled in favor of Veterans Bank.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Veterans Bank is entitled to a writ of possession
HELD:
Yes. The purchaser, who has a right to possession after the expiration of the
redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when no redemption is
made. The purchaser can demand possession at any time following the consolidation of
ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new TCT. After consolidation of title
in the purchaserâs name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the
purchaserâs right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner. At
that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title
becomes merely a ministerial function. Effectively, the court cannot exercise its
discretion.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 536
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA namely: RUBY B. OCHOA, MICAELA B.
OCHOA and JOMAR B. OCHOA,
vs.
G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 170071 July 16, 2012

x-----------------------x

G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION


vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA namely: RUBY B. OCHOA, MICAELA B.
OCHOA and JOMAR B. OCHOA
G.R. No. 170125 July 16, 2012

DOCTRINE: Acquittal in the criminal case does not affect the prosecution of an
independent civil action arising from a contract of carriage.

FACTS:
Jose Marcial K. Ochoa (Jose Marcial) died on the night of March 10, 1995 while
on board an Avis taxicab owned and operated by G & S Transport Corporation (G & S), a
common carrier.As G & S failed to heed the same, the heirs filed a Complaint for
Damages before the RTC. The RTC found the taxicab driver negligent and found the
evidence adduced by G & S to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its employees as insufficient. Hence, the trial
court declared G & S civilly liable to the heirs. However, for lack of receipts or any proof
of funeral expenses and other actual damages, the trial court denied the heirs’ claim for
actual damages. It also denied them moral and exemplary damages for lack of legal
basis.

Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision with the following
MODIFICATION: “appellant is ordered to pay appellees the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the death of the deceased Jose Marcial K. Ochoa, P200,000.00 as moral
damages, P50,000.00 as exemplarydamages, P100,000.00 for attorney’s fees and the

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 537
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
costs of litigation. The trial court’s award of P6,537,244.96 for the loss of earning
capacity of the deceased is DELETED for lack of basis.”

G.R. No. 170125


G & S reiterates its arguments that the proximate cause of the accident is a fortuitous
event and/or the negligence of the driver of the delivery van which bumped the right
portion of its taxicab and, that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees.

The heirs contend that fortuitous event was not the proximate cause of the
mishap. They point out that as correctly found by the trial court, Padilla was running at an
extremely high speed. This was why the impact was so strong when the taxicab rammed
the fly-over railings and was split into two when it hit the ground. Also, G & S remains to
be civilly liable to the heirs for its breach of contract of carriage and from its negligence in
the selection and supervision of its employees.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred when it overlooked the fact that the MTC Decision
convicting Padilla of reckless imprudence has already been reversed on appeal by the
RTC with Padilla having been accordingly acquitted of the crime charged.
HELD:
Regardless of Padilla’s acquittal or conviction in said criminal case, the
same has no bearing in the resolution of the present case. Article 31 of the Civil Code
provides, viz: When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
In this case, the action filed by the heirs is primarily for the recovery of damages
arising from breach of contract of carriage allegedly committed by G & S. Clearly, it is an
independent civil action arising from contract which is separate and distinct from the
criminal action for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide filed by the heirs against
Padilla by reason of the same incident. Hence, regardless of Padilla’s acquittal or
conviction in said criminal case, same has no bearing in the resolution of the present
case. There was therefore no error on the part of the CA when it resolved this case
without regard to the fact that Padilla has already been acquitted by the RTC in the
criminal case. Moreover, while the CA quoted some portions of the MTC Decision in said
criminal case, we however find that those quoted portions were only meant to belie G &
S’ claim that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the driver of the
delivery van which allegedly hit the Avis taxicab. Even without those quoted portions, the

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 538
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
appellate court’s ultimate finding that it was Padilla’s negligence which was the
proximate cause of the mishap would still be the same. This is because the CA has, in
fact, already made this declaration in the earlier part of its assailed Decision. The fact
that the MTC Decision from which the subject quoted portions were lifted has already
been reversed by the RTC is therefore immaterial.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 539
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI
ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO
G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011
DOCTRINE: A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of
subsequent marriage laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the
protection of the legitimate union of a married couple.

FACTS:

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice initially
under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently,
under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge on June 2, 1993. In their marriage
contracts, Sen. Tamanos civil status was indicated as divorced. On November 23, 1994,
private respondents HajaPutriZoraydaA.Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A.
Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamanos Legitimate
children with Zorayda,filed a complaint with the RTC for the declaration of nullity of
marriage between Estrellita and Sen.Tamano for being bigamous.The complaint
alleged,inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites,
and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.

Summons were served to Estrellita but she failed to file an Answer. Instead of
submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss on February 20, 1995,
argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because under
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines (Muslim Code), questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce
fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts.

The RTC denied, leaving Estrellita to file a petition for certiorari, referred to the CA.
Regarding the nullity case filed by Zorayda in the RTC, hearings there were repeatedly
postponed at the instance of Estrellita. The CA then denied Zoraydas Motion to Dismiss,
prompting her to file a petition of certiorari with the SC, which still upheld the jurisdiction of
the RTC. Meanwhile, the RTC declared the marriage between Estrellita And Sen.
Tamano void. The CA affirmed.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano is void
2. Whether or not Zorayda had standing to file the nullity case

HELD:

First issue: The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was
celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites.The only law in force
governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil
Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 540
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except
during the effectivity of Republic Act No.394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.

For Estrellita, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way
of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083
cannot benefit Estrellita.As ruled in Tamano v. Hon. Ortiz, Article 13 of PD 1083 does not
provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot
retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the
marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. In view of Sen. Tamanos prior marriage which
subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly
adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.

Second issue: Under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, "Only an aggrieved or injured


spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages." This refers to the "aggrieved or injured spouse," as in bigamy
cases. If Estrellitas interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is unjustly precluded from
filing an action.Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated. Zorayda and Adib filed the
case for declaration of nullity of Estrellitas marriage in November 1994.While the Family
Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage,
in which no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested
party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be
filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 541
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ENRICO SANTOS vs. NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE
G.R. No. 171129, April 6, 2011

DOCTRINE:The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by a


preponderance of evidence. If he claims a right granted or created by law, he must prove
his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not on the weakness of that of his opponent.

FACTS:
Enrico Santos filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer in the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. He claimed therein that he is the registered owner of the
subject property. He entered into a Contract of Leasewith respondent National Statistics
Office for the lease of the property which will be paid monthly. For failing to pay despite
demand the rentals for several months and for its refusal to vacate the property even after
the termination of the lease contracts, petitioner sent respondent a formal demand for the
latter to pay its unpaid monthly rentals and to vacate the property. Notwithstanding
receipt, respondent still refused to pay and to vacate the property. Hence, the complaint.

Respondent alleged that petitioner and his wife obtained a loan from China
Banking Corporation (China Bank) in the amount of ₱20 million, the payment of which
was secured by a Real Estate Mortgageconstituted over the subject property. It claimed
that when petitioner entered into a contract of lease with it in 1998, he did not inform
respondent of the existence of said loan. When petitioner failed to pay his obligation with
China Bank, the property was eventually sold in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale where
said bank emerged as the highest bidder. Since petitioner likewise failed to redeem the
property within the redemption period, title to the same was consolidated in favor of China
Bank and the title of the property was issued in its name. Despite this and again without
informing respondent, petitioner misrepresented himself as still the absolute owner of the
subject property and entered into the second and third contracts of lease with respondent.
According to respondent, it was only in November 2003 that it knew of the foreclosure of
the subject property when it received a letter from China Bank informing it that as early as
August 2000, title to the property had already been effectively consolidated in the name of

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 542
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
the bank. Petitioner having ceased to be the owner of said property, respondent believed
that the second and third contracts of lease it entered with him had ceased to be in effect.
Hence, petitioner has no legal right to demand that respondent pay him said rentals and
vacate the leased premises. Conversely, respondent has no legal obligation to pay to
petitioner the rentals for the use and occupancy of the subject property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lessor and the lessee has better possession of the premises
against the lessee.

HELD:
The Court ruled that the lessor cannot claim the subject property. The conclusive
presumption found in Sec. 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court known
as estoppel against tenants provides that “the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of
his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and
tenant between them”.
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that "[w]hat a tenant is estopped from
denying is the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant
relation. If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the
commencement of that relation, the presumption will not apply." Hence, "the tenant may
show that the landlord’s title has expired or been conveyed to another or himself; and he
is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has been ousted or evicted by title
paramount."
In other words, if there was a change in the nature of the title of the landlord during
the subsistence of the lease, then the presumption does not apply. Otherwise, if the
nature of the landlord’s title remains as it was during the commencement of the relation of
landlord and tenant, then estoppel lies against the tenant.
In this case, respondent has satisfactorily shown that title to the property has
already been conveyed to China Bank. The documents submitted before the court,
undeniably show that China Bank is the owner of the property and not petitioner. "As a
matter of law, a Torrens Certificate of Title is evidence of indefeasible title of property in

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 543
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
favor of the person in whose name the title appears. The title holder is entitled to all the
attributes of ownership of the property, including possession, subject only to limits
imposed by law." Not being the registered titleholder, we hold that petitioner does not
have a better right of possession over the property as against respondent who is in actual
possession thereof and who claims to derive its right of possession from the titleholder,
China Bank, to whom it pays rents for its use. Hence, petitioner’s action for unlawful
detainer must fail. This being settled, it is obvious that petitioner is likewise not entitled to
payment of damages for the fair rental value or reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the property.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 544
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPOUSES WILFREDO PALADAand BRIGIDA PALADA vs. SOLIDBANK CORPORATION
and SHERIFF MAYO DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 172227, June 29, 2011

DOCTRINE: Allegations of bad faith and fraud must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence.

FACTS:
Petitioners applied for a P3 million loan broken down as follows: P1 million as additional
working capital under the bills discounting line; P500,000.00 under the bills purchase line;
and P1.5 million under the time loan from respondent Solidbank Corporation (bank). They
received from the bank the amount of P1 million as additional working capital evidenced by a
promissory note and secured by a real estate mortgagein favor of the bank covering several real
properties situated in Santiago City.

Due to the failure of petitioners to pay the obligation, the bank foreclosed the mortgage
and sold the properties at public auction. Petitioners filed a Complaint for nullity of real estate
mortgage and sheriffs certificate of salewith prayer for damages. Petitioners alleged that the
bank, without their knowledge and consent, included their properties among the list of properties
mortgaged; that it was only when they received the notice of sale from the sheriff in August 1998
that they found out about the inclusion of the said properties; that despite their objection, the
sheriff proceeded with the auction sale; and that the auction sale was done in Santiago City in
violation of the stipulation on venue in the real estate mortgage.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the real estate mortgage and auction sale is valid.
2. Whether or not there is bad faith on the part of the bank when they executed the real
estate and the auction sale.

HELD:
The Court denied the petition.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 545
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
1. Under Article 1934of the Civil Code, a loan contract is perfected only upon the delivery of the
object of the contract.In this case, although petitioners applied for a P3 million loan, only the
amount of P1 million was approved by the bank because petitioners became collaterally
deficient when they failed to purchase the subject property which had an appraised value
of P1,944,000.00.Hence, only the amount of P1 million was released by the bank to petitioners.

2. Petitioners claim that there was fraud and bad faith on the part of the bank in the execution
and notarization of the real estate mortgage contract.There is nothing on the face of the real
estate mortgage contract to arouse any suspicion of insertion or forgery. Below the list of
properties mortgaged are the signatures of petitioners.Except for the bare denials of petitioner,
no other evidence was presented to show that the signatures appearing on the dorsal portion of
the real estate mortgage contract are forgeries.

A careful perusal of the real estate mortgage contract would show that the bank did not
make it appear that the real estate mortgage was executed on June 16, 1997, the same day that
it was notarized, as the date of execution of the real estate mortgage contract was left blank.
And the mere fact that the date of execution was left blank does not prove bad faith. Besides,
any irregularity in the notarization or even the lack of notarization does not affect the validity of
the document. Absent any clear and convincing proof to the contrary, a notarized document
enjoys the presumption of regularity and is conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 546
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ARMANDO V. ALANO vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK
G.R. No. 171628,June 13, 2011

DOCTRINE: No one can give what he does not have" (Nemodat quod non habet).

FACTS:
Petitioner executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing his brother to sell their
property in Manila. From the proceeds of the sale, the brothers purchased a residential
house. The title of the purchased property was not immediately transferred to them because the
duplicate and original copies of the title were destroyed by a fire that gutted the Quezon
City Hall Building.

The brother of the petitioner died leaving behind his wife, Lydia J. Alano (Lydia), and four
legitimate children, who adjudicated to themselves the property. Consequently, title to the said
property was reconstituted and registered solely in the names of Lydia and her four children.
This prompted petitioner to execute an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which was annotated on the
TCT. But because of the assurance of his nieces that they would put things right, petitioner
agreed to delay the filing of a case in court.Lydia filed with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
an Affidavit of Cancellation of Adverse Claim which caused the cancellation of the adverse claim
annotated on TCT. Slumberworld, Inc., represented by its President, Melecio A. Javier, and
Treasurer, Lydia, obtained from Maunlad Savings and Loan Association, Inc. a loan secured by
a Real Estate Mortgage over the property.

Petitioner filed a Complaint against Lydia, Melecio A. Javier, Maunlad Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City. Petitioner sought the cancellation of TCT, the issuance of a new title in
his name for his one-half share of the Quezon City property, and the nullification of real estate
mortgage insofar as his one-half share is concerned.
ISSUE:
Whether defendant Maunlad Savings and Loan Association, Inc. was an innocent
mortgagee in good faith.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 547
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
No. The general rule that a mortgagee need not look beyond the title does not apply to
banks and other financial institutions as greater care and due diligence is required of them.
Imbued with public interest, they are expected to be more cautious than ordinary individuals.
Thus, before approving a loan, the standard practice for banks and other financial institutions is
to conduct an ocular inspection of the property offered to be mortgaged and verify the
genuineness of the title to determine the real owner or owners thereof. Failure to do so makes
them mortgagees in bad faith.

In this case, petitioner contends that Maunlad Savings and Loan Association, Inc. failed
to exercise due diligence in inspecting and ascertaining the status of the mortgaged property
because during the ocular inspection, the credit investigator failed to ascertain the actual
occupants of the subject property and to discover petitioners apartment at the back portion of the
subject property.

While the credit investigator conducted an ocular inspection of the property as well as a
neighborhood checking and found the subject property occupied by the mortgagor Lydiaand her
children, he, however, failed to ascertain whether the property was occupied by persons other
than the mortgagor. Had he done so, he would have discovered that the subject property is
co-owned by petitioner and the heirs of his brother. Since Maunlad Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. was remiss in its duty in ascertaining the status of the property to be mortgaged
and verifying the ownership thereof, it is deemed a mortgagee in bad faith. Consequently, the
real estate mortgage executed in its favor is valid only insofar as the share of the
mortgagor Lydia in the subject property. We need not belabor that under Article 493of the Civil
Code, a co-owner can alienate only his pro indiviso share in the co-owned property, and not the
share of his co-owners.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 548
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JESUS M. MONTEMAYOR vs. VICENTE D. MILLORA
G.R. No. 168251,July 27, 2011

DOCTRINE: When the dispositive portion of a judgment is clear and unequivocal, it must be
executed strictly according to its tenor.

FACTS:
Atty. Vicente D. Millora (Vicente) obtained aloan of P400,000.00 from petitioner Dr.
Jesus M. Montemayor (Jesus) as evidenced by a promissory note executed by Vicente. The
parties executed a loan contractwherein it was provided that the loan has a stipulated monthly
interest of 2% and that Vicente had already paid the amount of P100,000.00 as well as
the P8,000.00 representing the interest for the period July 24 to August 23, 1990.Subsequently
and with Vicente’s consent, the interest rate was increased to 3.5% or P10,500.00 a
month. From March 24, 1991 to July 23, 1991, or for a period of four months, Vicente was
supposed to pay P42,000.00 as interest but was able to pay only P24,000.00. This was the last
payment Vicente made. Jesus made several demandsfor Vicente to settle his obligation but to
no avail.

The RTC ordered Vicente to pay Jesus his monetary obligation amounting
to P300,000.00 plus interest of 12% from the time of the filing of the complaint on August 17,
1993 until fully paid. At the same time, the trial court found merit in Vicente’s counterclaim and
thus ordered Jesus to pay Vicente his attorneys fees which is equivalent to the amount of
Vicente’s monetary liability, and which shall be set-off with the amount Vicente is adjudged to
pay Jesus. Intending to appeal the portion of the RTC Decision which declared him liable to
Jesus for the sum of P300,000.00 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum counted from the
filing of the complaint on August 17, 1993 until fully paid, Vicente filed on July 6, 2000 a Notice
of Appeal.This was however denied by the RTC in an Order dated July 10, 2000 on the ground
that the Decision has already become final and executory on July 1, 2000.

ISSUE:

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Whether the absence of a specific amount in the decision representing respondent’s
counterclaim, the same could be validly offset against the specific amount of award mentioned
in the decision in favour of the petitioner.

HELD:
Yes. For legal compensation to take place, the requirements set forth in Articles 1278
and 1279 of the Civil Code, quoted below, must be present.

ARTICLE 1278. Compensation shall take place when two persons, in


their own right, are creditors and debtors of each other.

ARTICLE 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary:

(1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at
the same time a principal creditor of the other;

(2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are
consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter
has been stated;

(3) That the two debts be due;

(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;

(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy,


commenced by third persons and communicated in due time to the debtor.

It is therefore clear that in the execution of the RTC Decision, there are two parts to be
executed. The first part is the computation of the amount due to Jesus. This is achieved by
doing a simple arithmetical operation at the time of execution. The principal amount
of P300,000.00 is to be multiplied by the interest rate of 12%. The product is then multiplied by

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
the number of years that had lapsed from the filing of the complaint on August 17, 1993 up to
the date when the judgment is to be executed. The result thereof plus the principal
of P300,000.00 is the total amount that Vicente must pay Jesus.

The second part is the payment of attorney’s fees to Vicente. This is achieved by
following the clear wordings of the above fallo of the RTC Decision which provides that Vicente
is entitled to attorney’s fees which is equivalent to whatever amount recoverable from him by
Jesus. Therefore, whatever amount due to Jesus as payment of Vicente’s debt is equivalent to
the amount awarded to the latter as his attorney’s fees. Legal compensation or set-off then
takes place between Jesus and Vicente and both parties are on even terms such that there is
actually nothing left to execute and satisfy in favor of either party.

A reading of the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision would clearly show that no
ambiguity of any kind exists. Furthermore, if indeed there is any ambiguity in the dispositive
portion as claimed by Jesus, the RTC had already clarified it through its Order by categorically
stating that the attorney’s fees awarded in the counterclaim of Vicente is of an amount
equivalent to whatever amount recoverable from him by Jesus. This clarification is not an
amendment, modification, correction or alteration to an already final decision as it is conceded
that such cannot be done anymore. What the RTC simply did was to state in categorical terms
what it obviously meant in its decision. Suffice it to say that the dispositive portion of the
decision is clear and unequivocal such that a reading of it can lead to no other conclusion, that
is, any amount due in favor of Jesus and against Vicente is set off by an equivalent amount in
the form of Vicente’s attorney’s fees for past legal services he rendered for Jesus.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 551
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. F.F. CRUZ and CO., INC.
G.R. NO. 173259, JULY 25, 2011

DOCTRINE: As between a bank and its depositor, where the bank’s negligence is the
proximate cause of the loss and the depositor is guilty of contributory negligence, the
greater proportion of the loss shall be borne by the bank. The allocation of damages
between the bank and the depositor is 60-40.

FACTS:
Respondent opened savings/current or so-called combo account with Petitioner with
its President Felipe Cruz and Secretary-treasurer Angelita Cruz as the named
signatories. The said signatories on separate dates left for and returned from the
United States.

While they were out of the country, applications for cashier’s and manager’s checks
bearing Felipe’s signature were presented to and both approved by the PNB. The
amounts of these checks were then debited by the PNB against the combo account of
FFCCI. When Angelita returned to the country, she examined the PNB statements of
account and she noticed the deductions of P9,950,000. and P3, 260, 500.31. Claiming
that these were unauthorized and fraudulently made, FFCCI requested PNB to credit
back and restore to its account the value of the checks. PNB refused. FFCI thus filed a
suit for damages against PNB and its own accountant Aurea Caparas.

PNB argued that it exercised due diligence in handling the account of FFCI. The
applications for manager’s check have passed through the standard bank procedures
and it was only after finding no infirmity that these were given due course.

RTC ruled in favor of PNB and held that FFCCI was guilty of negligence in clothing
Caparas with authority to make decisions on and dispositions of its account which paved
the way for the fraudulent transactions. It also found PNB negligent in not calling or
personally verifying from the authorized signatories the legitimacy of the subject
withdrawals considering that they were in huge amounts. For this reason, PNB had the
last clear chance to prevent the unauthorized debits from FFCCI’s account, thus, PNB
should bear the whole loss. On appeal to the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
WON the CA is correct in holding PNB of negligence and FCCI guilty for
contributory negligence?

HELD:
Yes. The CA is correct in holding PNB negligence and FFCCI to be guilty of
contributory negligence, making it partly liable for the loss arising from the unauthorized
withdrawal from its combo account.

The banking business is impressed with public trust. A higher degree of diligence is
imposed on banks relative to the handling of their affairs than that of an ordinary

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 552
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
business enterprise. Thus the degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness
expected of their officials and employees is far greater than those of ordinary officers and
employees in other enterprises. In the case at bar, PNB failed to meet the high standard
of diligence required by the circumstances to prevent fraud. Where the banks
negligence is the proximate cause of the loss and the depositor is guilty of contributory
negligence, we allocate the damages between the bank and the depositor on a 60-40
ratio.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 553
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
THE ESTATE OF SOLEDAD MANINANG AND THE LAW FORM OF QUISUMBING
TORRES vs.CA, SPS. SALVACNION SERRANO LADAGNGA and AGUSTIN
LADANGA AND BERNARDO ASENETA
G.R. NO. 167285, JULY 6, 2011

DOCTRINE: The CA’s actions of refraining from acting on the motions of one party does
not amount to grave abuse of discretion considering the issues raised by petitioners
were not related to the subject matter of the appeal before the CA.

FACTS:
Celemencia Aseneta, through her adopted son and judicially-appointed guardian,
Bernardo Aseneta filed a reconveyance case against Sps. Salvacion and Agustin
Ladanga. The complaint sought to annul the Deeds of Sale allegedly executed by
Clemencia in favor of the Sps. Ladanga over a Diliman property and a Cubao property
on grounds of lack of intent to convey and lack of consideration. Celemencia died during
the pendency of the reconveyance case and was substituted as plaintiff by Bernardo.

Clemencia’s death also brought about estate proceedings between Soledad


Maninang, and Bernardo. Maninang claimed that Clemencia bequeathed to her the
entire estate in her last will and testament. Bernardo countered that the will is void on the
ground of preterition.

The probate case was eventually decided based on a compromise agreement


executed by Bernardo and Maninang. The compromise agreement identified certain
properties of the estate and provided for their distribution among the parties. It also
provided that as to “any other properties, known or unknown” Maninang would get 35%
interest while Quisumbing Torres will get 15% interest.

While the probate case was still pending, a development in the Reconveyance case
took place. According to Bernardo, Bernardo and Sps. Ladanga entered into a
Compromise Agreement with respect to the Cubao property which they agreed to sell the
Cubao property to a third party.

The Reconveyance case was decided in favor of Clemencia’s estate. The RTC
ordered the reconveyance of both the Diliman Property and Cubao property to Bernardo.

Sps. Ladanga appealed the Reconveyance case to the CA. It was in this stage that
Maninang and QT attempted to join Bernardo as appellees in the Reconveyance case.
They contended that under the Probate case they have a 50% undivided interest in the
Cubao property which the RTC hearing the reconveyance case adjudicated in favor of
Clemencia. Bernardo opposed stating that the appeal in the reconveyance case does
not include the Cubao property.

Without acting on petitioner’s Motion for Joinder of Additional Parties, the CA


affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. Later on, Sps. Ladangan appealed the CA
decision to the SC. The SC affirmed the CA decision with regard the Diliman property.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 554
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Maninang and QT filed a Motion for partial reconsideration, they prayed for the
nullification of the compromise agreement between Bernardo and Sps. Ladanga over the
Cubao property. The CA refused to act on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration
because of the pending appeal in the SC. Maninang again filed for MR which was also
denied.

ISSUE:
WON Maninang have a right to adjudicate their claim to the Cubao property in the
appeal in the Reconveyance case. Or, WON the CA was correct in refusing to act on the
Motion for Joinder of Additional Parties and in refusing to act on the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration on the basis of a pending appeal to the SC.

HELD:
No. Maninang’s and QT’s motions was improper and moot.

The SC held, there is no need for Petitioners to join the appeal in the
Reconveyance case because: First, such appeal covered the Diliman property and not
the Cubao property; and Second, as to the Cubao property, it has already been settled
with finality that such property must be reconveyed by the Sps. Ladanga to Clemencia’s
estate.

Based on the foregoing, the CA did not abuse its discretion when it did not allow
Maninang to join and participate in the appeal in the reconveyance case. In the case at
bar, while the CA’s actions may not have been ideal, the same did not amount to grave
abuse of discretion considering the issues raised by petitioners were not related to the
subject before the CA. Maninang’s interest is in the Cubao property, while the subject of
the appeal was the Diliman property.

As to Maninang’s objective of getting their share in the Cubao property, this


cannot be litigated in the appeal of the reconveyance case but must be subject of a
separate suit or proceeding.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 555
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALAIN JUNIAT, WINWOOD APPAREL,
INC., NONWOVEN FABRIC PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 171569, August 1, 2011

DOCTRINE: A pledge shall not take effect against third persons if a description of the
thing pledged and the date of the pledge do not appear in a public instrument.

FACTS:
Union Bank filed with the RTC of Makati a complaint against Juniat, Winwood and
Wingyan, and the person in possession of the mortgaged motorized sewing machines
and equipment. UCPB alleged that Juniat acting for and in behalf of Winwood and
Wingyan executed a promissory note and a Chattel mortgage over several motorized
sewing machines and other equipment to secure their obligation arising from export
transactions; that the loans remains unpaid and that the mortgaged properties are
insufficient to answer for the obligation.

RTC issued writs of preliminary attachment and replevin in favor of UCPB. The writ
was served upon Nonwoven as it was in possession of the motorized sewing machines
and equipment. Although Nonwoven was not impleaded in the complaint, the RTC
likewise served summons upon Nonwoven since it was in possession of the mortgage
properties.

Nonwoven contended that the unnotarized Chattel Mortgage executed in favor of


petitioner has no binding effect on Nonwoven and that is has a better title over the
motorized sewing machines and equipment because these were assigned to it by Juniat
pursuant to their Agreement.

RTC ruled in favor of UCPB. It ruled that both the Chattel Mortgage and the
Agreement in favor of Nonwoven have no obligatory effect on third persons because the
documents were not notarized. However, since the Chattel Mortgage in favor of UCPB
was executed earlier, UCPB has a better right over the motorized sewing machines and
equipment under the doctrine of ‘first in time, stronger in right”.

On Appeal, the CA reversed the RTC, holding that the contract of pledge entered
into between Juniat and Nonwoven is valid and binding, and that the motorized sewing
machines and equipment were ceded to Nonwoven by Juniat by virtue of a dacion en
pago.

ISSUE:
WON UCPB has a better right over Nonwoven over the mortgaged equipments

HELD:
Yes. UCPB has a better right than Nonwoven over the mortgaged properties.

The fact that the Chattel Mortgage executed in favor of UCPB was not notarized
does not affect UCPB’s cause of action. UCPB only needed to show that the loan of

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 556
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Juniat, Wingyan, and Winwood remains unpaid and that it is entitled to the issuance of
the writs of attachment and replevin. Considering that the writs were issued by the RTC,
Nonwoven had to prove that is has a better right of possession or ownership over the
attached properties. However, under Article 2096 of the NCC: “a pledge shall not take
effect against third persons if a description of the thing pledged and the date of the
pledge do not appear in a public instrument.” Hence, just like the chattel mortgage
executed in favor of petitioner, the pledge executed by Juniat in favor of Nonwoven
cannot bind petitioner.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 557
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. CIRIACO JUMAMOY and HEIRS OF ANTONIO
GO PACE
G.R. No. 169901, August 3, 2011

DOCTRINE: If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is,
by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes.

FACTS:
The RTC Branch 19 of Digos City, Davao del Sur rendered a Decision ordering the
exclusion of 2,5002 hectares from Lot 13521. The court found out that the said land
belonged to Sesinando Jumamoy (predecessor-in-interest of Ciriaco) and was
erroneously included in OCT No. P-4952 which is registered in the name of Antonio
Pace. The court then ordered the heirs of Antonio to reconvey said land to Ciriaco. Said
decision by the RTC became final and executory but the Deed of Conveyance issued in
favor of Ciriaco could not be annotated on OCT No. P-4952 since said title was already
cancelled and transferred in favor of PNB and since PNB was not impleaded in the said
case.

Apparently, Antonio and his wife Rosalia mortgaged Lot 13521 to PNB as security
for a series of loans. After Antonio and Rosalia failed to pay their obligation, PNB
foreclosed the mortgage and title to Lot 13521 was transferred to PNB.

Ciriaco then filed a complaint against PNB and Pace for Declaration of Nullity of
Mortgage, foreclosure sale, reconveyance and damages. Ciriaco averred that PNB is not
an innocent mortgagee/purchaser for value because prior to the execution and
registration of PNB’s deed of sale with the RD, the bank had prior notice that the
disputed lot is subject of litigation. On the other hand, PNB argued that it is a mortgagee
and a buyer in good faith since at the time of the mortgage Antonio’s certificate of title
was clean and devoid of any adverse annotations.

RTC found out that PNB was not a mortgagee/purchaser in good faith because it
failed to take necessary steps to protect its interest and thus ordered PNB to reconvey
the subject land claimed by Ciriaco. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PNB is a mortgagee/purchaser in good faith?

HELD:
PNB is not an innocent purchaser/mortgagee for value.

Since PNB is a banking institution, it is expected to exercise due diligence before


entering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition of a
property offered to it as a security for a loan must be a standard and indispensable part
of its operations.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 558
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PNB cannot raise as a defense that it relied on Antonio’s clean title. Since the 2,
5002 hectare portion of the mortgaged property has been adjudged in favor of Ciriaco’s
predecessor-in-interest, PNB has the burden of evidence that it acted in good faith from
the time the land was offered as collateral. There was no showing that PNB conducted
an investigation; that it observed due diligence and prudence by checking for flaws in the
title; that it verified the identity of the true owner and possessor of the land; and, that it
visited subject premises to determine its actual condition before accepting the same as
collateral.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 559
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SWIFT FOODS, INC vs. SPS. JOSE MATEO, JR AND IRENE MATEO
G.R. No. 170486, September 12, 2011

DOCTRINE: A contract is the law between the parties and those who are guilty of
negligence in the performance of their obligations are liable for damages.

Unless a contracting party cannot read or does not understand the language in
which the agreement was written, he is presumed to know the import of his contract and
is bound thereby.

FACTS:
Jose and Swift entered into an agreement where Jose will lease their warehouse to
Swift. Under the Agreement, Jose were required to post a bond to secure his faithful
compliance with his obligations. Respondents in compliance with the bond
requirement delivered three land titles to Swift. The acknowledgement receipt indicates
that they were for “collateral for feeds warehousing.’ The receipt was duly signed by
Swift officials and Jose.

Thereafter, Swift personnel conducted an audit of the stocks stored in respondents’


warehouse. The audit revealed that one bag was missing. Swift informed respondents
that it was terminating their contract for violations of their agreement wherein it is stated
that the warehouse operator should release stocks only to Swift’s sales personnel. The
violations were evident on the document which does not contain the signatures of Swift’s
sales personnel. Swift alleged that such unauthorized release caused Swift a cash
shortage of 2 million pesos, for which respondents should be held liable. Swift also
retained respondent’s three land titles until the latter shall have fully complied with their
obligation.

As for their defense, respondent’s explained that they were instructed by Swift
personnel to release the stocks directly to customers. As proof of these instructions they
presented handwritten letter they received from a Swift personnel. Respondent’s
maintained that the Swift personnel who instructed them to release the stocks to
customers should answer for the cash shortages. Respondent’s also demanded the
return of their land titles. Swift refused to surrender the said titles.

Respondent’s filed a complaint against Swift arguing that Swift is retaining the said
titles without justification, and that the cash shortages is attributable to Swift’s negligence
in the supervision of its personnel. Swift countered by alleging that it was respondent’s
breach of the agreement which facilitated the unauthorized sales committed by the sales
personnel.

The RTC held that respondents did not breach the agreement; they merely followed
the instructions given to them by Swift’s sales personnel. The RTC further held that since
respondents were first-time warehouse operators, it was therefore incumbent upon Swift
to have conducted training and seminars for respondents’. It was Swift’s failure to

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 560
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
conduct such trainings that allowed Swift sales personnel to take advantage of novice
warehouse operators.

RTC ruled in favor of respondent, and ordered Swift to return the three land titles. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decisions of the RTC and CA are proper finding Jose’s
breach of the agreement excusable due to his being a novice in the warehousing
business.

HELD:
At the heart of the case is the issue of whether respondent committed a breach of the
warehousing agreement for which they may be held liable to Swift.

The RTC and CA side-stepped the issue of breach. Both decisions did not make
categorical findings on the matter. Instead, they pronounced that respondents’ actions
were justified because petitioner neglected to inform respondents of their duties under
the agreement and to conduct trainings and seminars to orient respondents to
warehouse operations.

The vinculum that binds the parties is their contract. Under the said contract, the
parties agreed that petitioner will pay respondents a monthly warehousing fee and in
return, respondents will warehouse petitioner’s stocks and be accountable for all the
stocks duly received and released by them. Their contract also required respondents to
post a bond to answer for whatever obligations they may have the petitioner.

Under the agreement, the warehouseman should only release stocks to Swift’s sales
personnel who present a clearance to withdraw stocks. The records reveal that,
respondents released stocks without the necessary clearance. They admitted in court
that they never required a clearance prior to the release of stocks. Jose admitted not
reading, much less understanding, the agreement. He simply followed all the verbal
instructions given to him. These admissions were ignored by the RTC and CA which
seemed to brush off Jose’s negligence. One’s newness to the business is not an excuse
to violate the clear terms of one’s contract.

Further, the court determines that Swift has no basis for retaining the titles for
“collateral for feeds warehousing.” Although the respondent delivered their land titles to
Swift, they did not execute any bond agreement or security instrument. In the absence of
such bond agreement or security agreement, it cannot be said that a bond has actually
been posted or constituted.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 561
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
VALERIO E. KALAW vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 166357, September 19, 2011

DOCTRINE: Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take


cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; the burden of proving
psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff; the psychological problem must be grave,
mush have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.

FACTS:
Valerio and Elena got married in Hong Kong and had 4 children. Shortly after the
birth of their youngest son, Valerio had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano, who
also gave birth to a son.

Elena left the conjugal home and their 4 children with Valerio. Meanwhile, Valerio
started living with Jocelyn, who bore him 3 more children. Later on, Valerio went to the
United States with Jocelyn and their children. He left his 4 children with Elena in a rented
house in Valle Vered with only a house help and a driver. Upon the return of Valerio and
Jocelyn in the Philippines, they resumed physical custody of the two younger children.
According to Elena, from that time on, the children refused to go to her house on
weekends because of alleged weekend plans with their father.

9 years after their de facto separation, Valerio filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage against Elena. He alleged that Elena was psychologically incapacitated to
perform and comply with her marital obligations.

On Trial, Valerio narrated the alleged infidelity of Elena and presented a psychologist
to testify on Elena’s psychological incapacity by her constant mahjong sessions, going
out with friends, and neglect of their children. Elena on her defense denied being
psychologically incapacitated. Elena narrated that she left the conjugal home because
Valerio was an abusive husband. She further alleged that Valerio was the one
psychologically incapacitated as manifested by his drug dependence, habitual drinking,
womanizing and physical violence.

RTC held that both parties are psychologically incapacitated and declared the
parties marriage void ab initio. Elena appealed to the CA, the CA reversed the decision
of the RTC and held that the ruling of the RTC was not supported by the facts on record.
The allegations and incriminations against each other do not support a finding of
psychological incapacity. The parties’ faults tend to only to picture their immaturity and
irresponsibility. At most, there may be sufficient grounds for a legal separation.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from
psychological incapacity.

HELD:
Psychological Incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume the basic marital obligations. In the case at bar, petitioner failed to

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 562
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
prove that his wife suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of
two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised in the alleged acts
or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven.

For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and
neglected their children as a result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was
not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a
mother and wife.

Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the


behaviors described as constitutive of narcissistic personality disorder, there is no basis
for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 563
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION vs. ASEA BROWN BOVERI, INC., BBC
BROWN BOVERI, CORP., AND TORD B. ERIKSON
G.R. No. 177160, October 17, 2011

DOCTRINE: Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate


compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
FACTS: Sometime in July 1990, petitioner Continental Cement Corporation (CCC), a
corporation engaged in the business of producing cement, obtained the services of
respondents, Asea Brown Boveri, Inc. (ABB) and BBC Brown Boveri, Corp. to repair its 160
KW Kiln DC Drive Motor (Kiln Drive Motor).
On October 23, 1991, due to the repeated failure of respondents to repair the Kiln Drive Motor,
petitioner filed with Branch 101 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Complaint
for sum of money and damages. After the first repair by the defendants, the 160 KW Kiln Drive
Motor was installed for testing on October 3, 1990. On October 4, 1990 the test failed. The
plaintiff removed the DC Drive Motor and replaced it with its old motor. It was only on October 9,
1990 that the plaintiff resumed operation. The plaintiff lost 1,040 MTD per day from October 5 to
October 9, 1990.On November 14, 1990, after the defendants had undertaken the second
repair of the motor in question, it was installed in the kiln. The test failed again. The plaintiff
resumed operation with its old motor on November 19, 1990. The plaintiff suffered production
losses for five days at the rate of 1,040 MTD daily. The defendants were given a third
chance to repair the 160 KW Kiln DC Drive Motor. On March 13, 1991, the motor was installed
and tested. Again, the test failed. The plaintiff resumed operation on March 15, 1991. The
plaintiff sustained production losses at the rate of 1,040 MTD for two days. A claim for damages
amounting to P10,983,017.42, including production and opportunity losses of P 10,600,000.00.
Respondents, however, claimed that under Clause 7 of the General Conditions, attached to
the letter of offer dated July 4, 1990 issued by respondent ABB to petitioner, the liability of
respondent ABB does not extend to consequential damages either direct or indirect. Moreover,
as to respondent Eriksson, there is no lawful and tenable reason for petitioner to sue him in his
personal capacity because he did not personally direct the repair of the Kiln Drive Motor.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner entitling him recovery of production
losses. The RTC rejected the defense of limited liability interposed by respondents since they
failed to prove that petitioner received a copy of the General Conditions. On appeal, the CA
reversed the ruling of the RTC. The CA applied the exculpatory clause in the General
Conditions and ruled that there is no implied warranty on repair work; thus, the repairman
cannot be made to pay for loss of production as a result of the unsuccessful repair.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to recovery of production and


opportunity losses.

HELD: NO. To support its claim, petitioner presented its monthly production reports for the
months of April to June 1990 showing that on the average it was able to produce 1040 MT of
cement per day. However, the production reports for the months of August 1990 to March 1991
were not presented. Without these production reports, it cannot be determined with reasonable

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 564
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
certainty whether petitioner indeed incurred production losses during the said period. It may not
be amiss to say that competent proof and a reasonable degree of certainty are needed to justify
a grant of actual or compensatory damages; speculations, conjectures, assertions or
guesswork are not sufficient. Besides, consequential damages, such as loss of profits on
account of delay or failure of delivery, may be recovered only if such damages were reasonably
foreseen or have been brought within the contemplation of the parties as the probable result of
a breach at the time of or prior to contracting. Considering the nature of the obligation in the
instant case, respondent ABB, at the time it agreed to repair petitioners Kiln Drive Motor, could
not have reasonably foreseen that it would be made liable for production loss, labor cost and
rental of the crane in case it fails to repair the motor or incurs delay in delivering the same,
especially since the motor under repair was a spare motor.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 565
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ORIX METRO LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION vs. MINORS: DENNIS,
MYLENE, MELANIE AND MARIKRIS, ALL SURNAMED MANGALINAO
G.R. No. 174089, January 25, 2012
SONNY LI AND ANTONIO DE LOS SANTOS vs. MINORS: DENNIS, MYLENE,
MELANIE AND MARIKRIS, ALL SURNAMED MANGALINAO
G.R. No. 174266, January 25, 2012

DOCTRINE: Where a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who


the supposed transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others or
otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or
to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or
injury done. A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to
discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. He has no means
other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who
is the owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusory
were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his
ownership.
FACTS: On June 27, 1990, at about 11:15 p.m., three vehicles were traversing the
two-lane northbound NLEX in the vicinity of Barangay Tibag, Pulilan, Bulacan. It was
raining that night. Anacleto Edurese, Jr. (Edurese) was driving a Pathfinder with plate
number BBG-334. His Isabela-bound passengers were the owners of said vehicle,
spouses Roberto and Josephine Mangalinao (Mangalinao spouses), their daughter
Marriane, housemaid Rufina Andres and helper Armando Jebueza (Jebueza). Before
them on the outer lane was a Pampanga-bound Fuso 10-wheeler truck (Fuso), with plate
number PAE-160, driven by Loreto Lucilo (Loreto), who was with truck helper Charlie
Palomar (Charlie). The Fuso was then already moving in an erratic and swerving motion.
Following behind the Pathfinder was another 10-wheeler truck, an Isuzu Cargo (Isuzu)
with plate number PNS-768 driven by Antonio, who was then with helper Rodolfo Navia
(Rodolfo).
Just when the Pathfinder was already cruising along the NLEX’s fast lane and about to
overtake the Fuso, the latter suddenly swerved to the left and cut into the Pathfinder’s
lane thereby blocking its way. As a result, the Pathfinder hit the Fuso’s left door and left
body. The impact caused both vehicles to stop in the middle of the expressway. Almost
instantly, the inevitable pileup happened. Although Antonio stepped on the brakes, the
Isuzu’s front crashed into the rear of the Pathfinder leaving it a total wreck. Soon after, the
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) patrol arrived at the scene of the
accident and informed the Pulilan police about the vehicular mishap. Police Investigator
SPO2 Emmanuel Banag responded at about 2:15-2:30 a.m. of June 28, 1990 and
investigated the incident as gathered from the information and sketchprovided by the
PNCC patrol as well as from the statements provided by the truck helpers Charlie and
Rodolfo.

As their letters to the registered owners of the trucks demanding compensation for the
accident were ignored, the minor children of the Mangalinao spouses, Dennis, Mylene,

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 566
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Melanie and Marikris, through their legal guardian, consequently filed on January 16,
1991 a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict, before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati impleading the drivers Loreto and Antonio, as well as the registered
owners of the Fuso and the Isuzu trucks, namely Orix and Sonny, respectively. Orix in
its Motion to Dismiss interposed that it is not the actual owner of the Fuso truck. As the
trial court denied the motion, it then filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and
Cross-claim. Orix reiterated that the children had no cause of action against it because on
September 9, 1983, it already sold the Fuso truck to MMO Trucking owned by Manuel
Ong (Manuel). The latter being the alleged owner at the time of the collision, Orix filed a
Third Party Complaint against Manuel, a.k.a. Manuel Tan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the registered owner who already transferred ownership of
vehicle at the time of accident, be held liable.

HELD: YES. Where a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving who
the supposed transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion with others or
otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite person, or
to one who possesses no property with which to respond financially for the damage or
injury done. A victim of recklessness on the public highways is usually without means to
discover or identify the person actually causing the injury or damage. He has no means
other than by a recourse to the registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who
is the owner. The protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusory
were the registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his
ownership.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 567
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
OLIVEROS vs. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 173531, February 1, 2012

DOCTRINE: A certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown that the same
land had already been registered and an earlier certificate for the same is in existence.
FACTS:
In 1986, Ramitex consolidated and subdivided its 17 lots including the disputed
LOT 1131 into six lots. By virtue of this consolidation, The Caloocan RD cancelled
Ramitex’ individual title to Lot 1131 (TCT No. T-18460) and issued a new title, TCT No.
T-137261, for consolidated Lot 4 which included Lot 1131.
Meanwhile, Oliveros filed a petition before the RTC for the reconstitution of TCT
No. T-17186, his alleged title over Lot 1131. He claimed that the original copy was
destroyed in the fire that gutted the office of the Bulacan RD on March 7, 1987.
Ramitex filed its opposition to Oliveros’ petition asserting that TCT No. T-17186
never existed in the records of the Bulacan RD and cannot therefore be reconstituted.
In light of Ramitex’ opposition and ownership claims over Lot 1131, Oliveros filed a
complaint for the declaration of nullity of Ramitex’ title over Lot 1131. Oliveros claimed
that he bought the subject property sometime in November 1956 from the spouses
Domingo De Leon and Modesta Molina, and pursuant to such sale, the Bulacan RD
issued TCT No. T-17186 in his favor on November 14, 1956.
After trial, the trial court found sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that
Oliveros’ TCT No. T-17186 does not exist. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s
Decision. After reviewing the factual findings of the trial court, the CA agreed that there is
no evidence that Oliveros’ title came from official sources. Hence this petition.
Petitioners insist that the mere existence of Oliveros’ earlier title negates the
conclusiveness of Ramitex’ title. Oliveros’ TCT No. T-17186, as the older title, should
enjoy presumptive conclusiveness of ownership and indefeasibility of title. Corollarily,
Ramitex’s title being a later title should have the presumption of invalidity. Thus, SMC
has the burden of overcoming this presumption. Oliveros argues that SMC failed to
prove the validity of its title, which should be cancelled accordingly.
Respondent SMC (which substituted Ramitex) argues that the principle of
indefeasibility of titles applies only to an existing valid title to the litigated property. In the
instant case, SMC showed that Oliveros’ title, while claiming priority, is actually spurious;
thus, between SMC and Oliveros, it is only SMC which has a valid title and in whose
favor the doctrine of indefeasibility of title applies.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA erred in applying the doctrines of indefeasibility and conclusiveness
of title in favor of respondent SMC;

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 568
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
2. Whether the decisions of the CA and the trial court allowed a collateral attack on
Oliveros’ certificate of title.
HELD:
1.No. The principle that the earlier title prevails over a subsequent one applies when
there are two apparently valid titles over a single property. The existence of the earlier
valid title renders the subsequent title void because a single property cannot be
registered twice. As stated in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems v. Court
of Appeals, which petitioners themselves cite, “a certificate is not conclusive evidence of
title if it is shown that the same land had already been registered and an
earlier certificate for the same is in existence.” Clearly, a mere allegation of an earlier
title will not suffice. Since petitioners allege that they have a title which was issued earlier
than SMC’s title, it was their burden to prove the alleged existence and priority of their
title. The trial and appellate courts’ shared conclusion that petitioners’ TCT No. T -17186
does not exist in the official records is a finding of fact that is binding on
this Court. Without a title, petitioners cannot assert priority or presumptive
conclusiveness.
2. No. The prohibition against collateral attack does not apply to spurious or non-existent
titles, since such titles do not enjoy indefeasibility. “Well -settled is the rule that the
indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and
misrepresentation. In view of these circumstances, it was as if no title was ever issued in
this case to the petitioner and therefore this is hardly the occasion to talk of collateral
attack against a title.” Moreover, the attack on Oliveros’ title was not a collateral
attack. “An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when the object of the
action is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title
was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of the action is to annul or set aside
such judgment, or to enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, it is indirect or collateral
when, in an action or proceeding to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is
nevertheless made as an incident thereof.” Here, SMC/Ramitex assailed the validity of
Oliveros’ title as part of its counterclaim in an action to declare SMC/Ramitex’s title a
nullity. A counterclaim is essentially a complaint filed by the defendant against the
plaintiff and stands on the same footing as an independent action. Thus, Ramitex’s
counterclaim can be considered a direct attack on Oliveros’ title.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 569
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JAKOSALEM AND DULFO vs. BARANGAN
G.R. NO. 175025, February 15, 2012

DOCTRINE: Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that [i]n an action to recover, the
property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not
on the weakness of the defendants claim. In other words, in order to recover possession,
a person must prove (1) the identity of the land claimed, and (2) his title.

FACTS:
Respondent Col. Roberto S. Barangan entered into a Land Purchase Agreement
with Citadel Realty Corporation. Upon full payment of the purchase price, a Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed in his favor. The TCT over the land was likewise transferred
to his name.
Barangan was unable to physically occupy the subject land as he was then a
member of the Philippine Air Force. Thus, he was often assigned to different stations in
the Philippines. Upon his retirement from the government service, he went to visit his
property and discovered that it was being occupied by petitioner Godofredo Dulfo and his
family.
Barangan sent a letter to Dulfo demanding that they vacate the property. Dulfo,
through his son-in-law Atty. Jakosalem, replied that the said property was owned by
them through a deed of assignment from the previous owner, Samson.
Barangan filed a complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law before the barangay.
No amicable settlement was reached; hence, the complaint was filed before the
Prosecutor’s office. The case was dismissed as the issue of ownership must be resolved
in a civil action.
Barangan filed a complaint for recovery of possession before the RTC of Antipolo
and presented the following as evidence: (1) testimony of Estrado (caretaker of the
subdivision) to the effect that the Dulfos were previously occupying an adjacent lot, but
then started squatting on Barangan’s property; (2) testimony of an employee of the
Municipal Assessor of Rizal, to prove that Barangan was the registered owner of the lot;
and (3) testimony of Engr. Jonco, to prove that the land owned by Barangan and that
occupied by Dulfo were one and the same.
The RTC dismissed the case. Prescription and laches are already set in and
Barangan was not able to sufficiently prove his claim. But the CA reversed the decision
of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Barangan is entitled to recover possession of the property?

HELD:
Yes.
The Property was sufficiently identified. Barangan offered the testimonies of Engr.
Joco, who conducted the relocation survey, and Estrado, the caretaker of the

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 570
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Subdivision, who showed Barangan the exact location of the Property. He likewise
submitted the Verification Survey Plan of the lot based on the technical description in the
TCT.
Moreover, Barangan was able to prove his title thereto. Barangan presented the
following in evidence: (1) Land Purchase Agreement; (2) Deed of Absolute Sale; and (3)
TCT.
Laches and prescription do not apply. Prescription does not apply to registered land
covered by the Torrens system. Under PD 1529, no title to registered land in derogation
to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 571
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
GOLDLOOP PROPERTIES, INC. vs. GSIS
G.R. NO.171076, April 1, 2012
DOCTRINE: It is basic that a contract is the law between the parties, and the stipulations
therein – provided that they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy – shall be binding as between the parties. In contractual relations, the law
allows the parties much leeway and considers their agreement to be the law between
them.
FACTS:
The petitioner Goldloop Properties executed a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) with the respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) undertaking
the construction of a condominium on the parcel of land and the renovation of the façade
of Philcomcen Building atits own expense, which both was owned by the GSIS.
Under the terms of their agreement,
the petitioner will pay GSIS for the land in eight installments. Also, the parties will share
for the profits of every condominium sold with a certain percent. Goldloop then
performed the preparatory works, such as selling the condominiums but was not able to
proceed because the building permits was not yet been approved and there were still
accrued real property taxes that were unpaid. Later on, Goldloop received a letter from
GSIS to rescind the MOA and Goldloop replied that the work stoppage was caused of
the pendingapproval of the building permits.
Still, GSIS sent a notice of rescission because Goldloop stillhave pending
obligations under their MOA.Goldloop filed a complaint with the RTC contending that it
had begun with
the preparatory works and such MOA should not be rescinded, which RTC granted in fa
vor of Goldloop.
Upon the decision, GSIS appealed with the CA that it had the right to rescind the
contract for failure of Goldloop to comply with the obligation as stated in the MOA, which
the CA granted in favor of the GSIS. Thus, the petitioner appealed with the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Memorandum of Agreement may be rescinded?
HELD:
Yes, the Court ruled that GSIS have every right to rescind the contract under the
terms of the MOA. The parties may validly stipulate the unilateral rescission of their
contract. Under Section 2.4 of the MOA, if Goldloop fail to start construction Should
Goldloop fail to start the construction works within the thirty (30) working days from date
all relevant permits and licenses from concerned agencies are obtained, or within six (6)

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 572
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
months from the date of the execution of this Agreement, whichever is earlier, or at any
given time abandon the same or otherwise commit any breach of their obligations and
commitments under this Agreement, this agreement shall be deemed terminated and
cancelled without need of judicial action by giving thirty (30) days written notice to that
effect to Goldloop who hereby agrees to abide by the decision of the GSIS.
It is the duty of both parties to surrender whatever amount received or property to
part with. Goldloop should return to GSIS the possession and control of the property
subject of their agreements while GSIS should reimburse Goldloop whatever amount it
had received from the latter by reason of the MOA and the Addendum. The Court also
held that rescission constitute a mutual restitution of the things pursuant toArticle 1191 of
the Civil Code. In case both parties have committed a breach of the obligation, the
liability of the first infractor shall be equitably tempered by the courts. If it cannot be
determined which of the parties first violated the contract, the same shall be deemed
extinguished, and each shall bear his own damages. The first infractor cannot be
determined in this case but it cannot be conclusively presumed who is the first infractor,
thus both parties shall bear the damages. Thus, it was direct by the Court for Goldloop to
surrender possession of the land to the GSIS and that Goldloop should be reimbursed
for the amount of expenses plus the return of the machineries, equipment and materials
in the premises of the lot.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 573
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
BALTAZAR vs. LAXA
G.R. NO. 174489, April 11, 2012

DOCTRINE: To be of unsound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full


possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the
testator was able at the time of making the Will to know the nature of the estate to be
disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.

FACTS:
Paciencia was a 78 y/o spinster when she made her last will and testament in the
Pampango dialect on Sept. 13, 1981. The will, executed in the house of retired Judge
Limpin, was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of
the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She
thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page 3 and then on
the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her
properties to respondent Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon Laza and their children
Luna and Katherine. Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as her own son.
Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as his own mother.
Six days after the execution of the Will (Sept. 19, 1981), Paciencia left for USA.
There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on Jan. 4, 1996. In the
interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.
More than 4 years after the death of Paciencia or on Apr. 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed
a petition with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia
and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor.
On June 23, 2000 one of petitioners, Antonio Baltazar filed an opposition to
Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belong
to Nicomeda Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to
bequeath them to Lorenzo. Also, one of the petitioners, Rosie Mateo testified that
Paciencia is in the state of being “mangulyan” or forgetful making her unfit for executing
a will and that the execution of the will had been procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence.
Petitioners also opposed the issuance of the Letters of Administration in
Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such, he being
a citizen and resident of the USA. Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration be
instead issued in favor of Antonio.
RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and concluded that when Paciencia
signed the will, she was no longer possessed of the sufficient reason or strength of mind
to have the testamentary capacity. On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the RTC and

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 574
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
granted the probate of the will. The petitioner went up to SC for a petition for review on
Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the authenticity and due execution of the will was sufficiently established
to warrant its allowance for probate?
HELD:
Yes. A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with
the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her
instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present and evident on the Will.
Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the testatrix
and her instrumental witnesses attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the
testator and of one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of
Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they question of her state of mind when
she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of
the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners. The SC agree with the position of the CA
that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so
as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of
unsound mind. Besides, Art. 799 of the NCC states: “To be of unsound mind, it is not
necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his
mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It
shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the Will to know the
nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character
of the testamentary act.”

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
DEL CARMEN vs. BACOY
G.R. NO. 17738770, April 25, 2012

DOCTRINE: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an injury to
justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument
causing the injury.
FACTS:
Spouses Monsalud and their daughter died from being run over by a jeepney
driven by a certain Allan Maglasang. The jeepney was owned by Oscar del Carmen Jr.
Allan was declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal case while the father of
the late Mrs. Monsalud, Geronimo Bacou filed an independent civil action againt the
former in behalf of the minor children left by the Monsalud spouses.
Del Carmen Jr. claimed he was a victim as well as Allan stole the jeep and was
not hired as a driver by the former; he was a conductor (and had been released from
employment lately) and it was the brother of Allan, Rodrigo who was hired as a driver.
Del Carmen Jr. filed a carnapping case against Allan but was dismissed by the court for
insufficient evidence.
RTC held del Carmen Jr. subsidiary liable and held the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur.
The CA adjudged Oscar Jr. liable to the heirs of the victims based on the principle
that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily responsible for the injuries
or death of third parties caused by the operation of such vehicle. It disbelieved Oscar
Jr.’s defense that the jeep was stolen not only because the carnapping case filed against
Allan and his companions was dismissed but also because, given the circumstances,
Oscar Jr. is deemed to have given Allan the implied permission to use the subject vehicle
because the brothers were assigned to said jeep. After a day’s work, the jeepney would
be parked beside the brothers’ house and not returned to del Carmen’s residence; the
jeep could easily be started even without the use of an ignition key; the said parking area
was not fenced or secured to prevent the unauthorized use of the vehicle which can be
started even without the ignition key.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the owner of vehicle is directly and primarily liable for injuries
caused by the operation of such?

HELD:
Yes. Del Carmen Jr. was held to be primarily liable and not merely subsidiary
liable. Del Carmen Jr.’s own evidence cast doubt that Allan stole the jeepney. Given the
dismissal of the carnapping case filed by del Carmen Jr. against Allan, the former also
admitted to such dismissal in the SC. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, “where the
thing that caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the
defendant or his servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not
happen if those who had management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 576
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
evidence – in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by
defendant – that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care.
All three are present in the case at bar.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. SPOUSES CHONG
G.R. NO.170865, April 25, 2012
DOCTRINE: Gross negligence can never be equated with a mere mistake of fact, which
must be something excusable and which requires the
exercise of prudence. No recovery is due if the mistake done is one of gross negligence.
FACTS:
Ofelia and her friend Adelina were having a conversation in the latter’s office
when Adelina’s friend, Filipina, approached her to ask if she could have Filipina’s check
cleared and encashed for a service fee of 0.%1. The check is Bank of America Check
No. 190 under the account of Alejandria Pineda and Eduardo Rosales and drawn by
Atty. Eduardo Rosales against Bank of America with a face amount of $300,000.00,
payable to cash. Because Adelina does not have a dollar account in
which to deposit the check, she asked Ofelia if she could accommodate Filipina’s
request since she has a joint dollar savings account with her Malaysian husband Cheah
Chee Chong. Ofelia agreed. Hence, it was processed by PNB.
The Cable Division of PNB received a SWIFT
message from Philadelphia Nationa lBank informing PNB of the return of the subject
check for insufficient funds. Informed about the bounced check, Ofelia immediately
contacted Filipina to get the money back. But the latter told her that all the money
had already been given to several people who asked for the check’s encashment. In
their effort to recover the money, spouses Cheah then sought the help of the NBI. Said
agency’s Anti-Fraud and Action Division was later able to apprehend some of the
beneficiaries of the proceeds of the check and recover from them $20,000.00
Spouses Cheah have been constantly meeting with the bank officials to discuss
matters regarding the incident and the recovery of the value of the check while the cases
against the alleged perpetrators remain pending. Chee Chong in the end
signeda PNB drafted letter which states that the spouses Cheah are offering their
condominium units as collaterals for the amount withdrawn. Ander this setup, the
amount withdrawn would be treated as a loan account with deferred interest while the
spouses try to recover the money from those who defrauded them. Asperilla likewise
assured the spouses Cheah that the letter was a mere formality and that the mortgage
will be disregarded once PNB receives its claim for indemnity from Philadelphia National
Bank.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Spouses Cheah should return the withdrawn money under the
Principle of Solution Indebiti?

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
No. Incidentally, PNB obliges the spouses Cheah to return the withdrawn money
under the principle of solutio indebiti, which is laid down in Article 2154 of the Civil Code:
If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered
through mistake, the obligation to return it arises.
The indispensable requisites of the juridical relation known as solution indebiti, are, (a)
that he who paid was not under obligation to do so; and (b) that the payment was made
by reason of an essential mistake of fact
In the case at bench, PNB cannot recover the proceeds of the check under the
principle it invokes. In the first place, the gross negligence of PNB wherein the cash was
withdrawn before the required 15 days clearing period, can never be equated with a
mere mistake of fact, which must be something excusable and which requires the
exercise of prudence. No recovery is due if the mistake done is one of gross negligence

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 579
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ESTORES vs. SPS. ARTURO and SUPANGAN
G.R. NO. 175139, April 28, 2012

DOCTRINE: Anent the interest rate, the general rule is that the applicable rate of interest
„shall be computed in accordance with the stipulation of the parties.‰ Absent any
stipulation, the applicable rate of interest shall be 12% per annum “when the obligation
arises out of a loan or a forbearance of money, goods or credits. In other cases, it shall
be six percent (6%).”

FACTS:

In Oct. 1993, Hermojina Estores and Spouses Supangan entered into a


Conditional Deed ofSale where Estores offered to sell, and Spouses offered to buy a
parcel of land in Cavite forP4.7M.

After almost 7 years and despite the payment of P3.5M by the Spouses, Estores
still failed to comply with her obligation to handle the peaceful transfer of ownership as
stated in provisions in the contract.

In a letter in 2000, Spouses demanded the return of the amount within 15 days
from receipt.

In reply, Estores promised to return the same within 120 days. Spouses agreed
but imposed an interest of 12% annually. Estores still failed despite demands. Spouses
filed a complaint with the RTC against Estores and Roberto Arias (allegedly acted as
Estores’ agent)

In Answer, Estores said they were willing to pay the principal amount but without
theinterest as it was not agreed upon that since the Conditional Deed of Sale provided
only for the return of the down payment in case of breach, they can’t be liable for legal
interest as well

RTC ruled saying that the Spouses are entitled to the interest but only at 6% per
annum and also entitled to attorney’s fees.

On appeal, CA said that the issue to resolve is whether it is proper to impose


interest for an obligation that does not involve a loan or forbearance of money in the
absence of stipulation of the parties.
CA affirmed RTC that interest should start on date of formal demand by Spouses
to return the money not when contract was executed as stated by the RTC and that Arias
not be solidarily liable as he acted as agent only and did not expressly bind himself or
exceeded his authority

Estores contends she is not bound to pay interest because the deed only provided
for the return of the down payment in case of failure to comply with her obligations. That
attorney’s fees not proper because both RTC and CA sustained her contention that12%
interest was uncalled for so it showed that Spouses did not win.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 580
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Spouses contend that It is only fair that interest be imposed because Estores
failed to return the amountupon demand and used the money for her benefit and Estores
failed to relocate the house outside the perimeter of the subject lot and complete the
necessary documents. As to the fees, they claim that they were forced to litigate when
Estores unjustly held the amount

ISSUE:
Whether or not the imposition of interest and attorney’s fees is proper?
HELD:
Yes. Interest may be imposed even in the absence of stipulation in the contract.
Article 2210 of the Civil Code expressly provides that “interest may, in the discretion of
the court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract.” Estores failed on
her obligations despite demand. She admitted that the conditions were not fulfilled and
was willing to return the full amount of P3.5M but hasn’t done so. She is now in default.
The interest at the rate of 12% is applicable in the instant case. The General Rule
is that the applicable interest rate shall be computed in accordance with the stipulation of
the parties. While the exception is if there is no stipulation, applicable rate of interest
shall be 12% per annum. When obligation arises out of a loan or forbearance of money,
goods or credits. In other cases, it shall be 6%. In this case, no stipulation was made.
Contract involved in this case is not a loan but a Conditional Deed of Sale. No
question that the obligations were not met and the return of money not made. Even if
transaction was a Conditional Deed of Sale, the stipulation governing the return of the
money can be considered as a forbearance of money which requires 12% interest. In
Crismina Garments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Forbearance “contractual obligation of
lender or creditor to refrain during a given period of time, from requiring the borrower or
debtor to repay a loan or debt then due and payable.” Estores’ unwarranted withholding
of the money amounts to forbearance of money which can be considered as an
involuntary loan so rate is 12% starting in Sept. 2000. The award of attorney’s fees is
warranted.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 581
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. LOURDES K.
MENDOZA
G.R NO. 176949 June 27, 2012
DOCTRINE: In civil cases, the party with the most convincing evidence prevails.
FACTS:
On January 6, 2000, respondent Lourdes K. Mendoza, sole proprietor of Highest
Steel Fabrications (Highett), filed before Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City,
Branch 126, a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner Asian Construction and
Development Corporation. In the complaint, respondent alleged that from the period of
August 7, 1997 to March 4, 1998, petitioner purchased from Highett various fabricated
steel materials and supplies amounting to Php 1,206,177.00, exclusive of interests; that
despite demand, petitioner failed and/or refused to pay; and that due to the failure and/or
refusal of petitioner to pay the said amount, respondent was compelled to engage the
services of council. Petitioner moved for a bill of particulars on the ground that no copies
of the purchase orders and invoices were attached to the complaint to enable petitioner
to prepare a responsive pleading to the complaint. The RTC, however, in an order dated
March 1, 2000, denied the motion. Accordingly, petitioner filed its Answer with
Counterclaims denying liability for the claims and interposing the defense of lack of
cause of action. The presentation of evidence for petitioner, however, was deemed
waived and terminated due to the repeated non-appearance of petitioner and its counsel.
On December 1, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision in favour or respondent. On appeal,
the CA affirmed with modification the Decision of the RTC the modification was that the
reckoning point for the computation of the 1% monthly interest shall be 30 days from the
date of each delivery.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the charge invoice are actionable documents
2. Whether the delivery of the alleged materials was duly proven
3. Whether respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees
HELD:
I. The petition is partly meritorious. Sec 7 of Rule of the Rules of Court states:
Section 7. Action or defense based on document. Whenever an action is based upon a
written document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the
pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attacked to the pleading as an
exhibit, which, shall be deemed to be part of the pleading, or said copy may like effect be
set forth in the pleading. Based on the foregoing provision, a document is actionable
when an action or defense is grounded upon such written instrument or document. On
the instant the charge invoice are not actionable documents per se as these only provide
details on the alleged to or stated in the complaint as these are evidenciary in nature. In

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 582
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
fact, respondent’s cause of action is not based on these documents but on the contract
of sale between the parties.
II. Delivery of the supplies and materials was duly proved. But although the
charge invoices are not actionable documents, the Court found that these, along with the
Purchase Order, was sufficient to prove that the petitioner indeed ordered supplies and
materials from Highett and that these were delivered to petitioner.
III. Basis for the award of Attorney’s fees must be stated in the decision. However,
with respect to the award of attorney’s fees to respondent, we are constrained to disallow
the same as the rationale for the award was no stated in the text of the RTC Decision but
only in the dispositive portion.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 583
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LUCIANO LADANO VS. FELINO NERI, EDWIN SOTO, ADAN ESPANOLA and
ERNESTO BLANCO
G.R. No. 178622, November 12, 2012
DOCTRINE: A person who is not an agricultural tenant cannot claim the right to security
of tenure under the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines, or Republic Act No.
3844, as amended. Moreover, he cannot pursue his complain before the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board whose jurisdiction lies over agrarian disputes
between parties in a tenancy relationship.
FACTS:
This case originated from a Complaint10 filed by petitioner Luciano Ladano
(Ladano) before the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator against respondents FelinoNeri
(Neri), Edwin Soto, Adan Espanola and Ernesto Blanco. Ladano alleged that on May 7,
2003, the respondents forcibly entered the two-hectare land, located in Manalite I,
Barangay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City, which he and his family have been peaceably
occupying and cultivating since 1970. The said respondents informed him that the
property belongs to Neri and that he should vacate the same immediately. Not too long
afterwards, the respondents fenced the property and destroyed some of the trees and
kawayan planted thereon. Ladano prayed that he be declared the rightful
“occupant/tiller” of the property, with the right to security of tenure thereon. In the
alternative that the judgment is in the respondents’ favor, he prayed that the respondents
compensate him for the improvements that he introduced in the property.
Respondents countered that Ladano’s Complaint should be dismissed for lack of
merit. He is not entitled to the reliefs he sought because he does not have, as he did
not even allege having, a leasehold arrangement with Neri, the supposed owner of the
land he is occupying.
Instead of arguing that he has a right to remain on the property as its bona
fide tenant, Ladano maintained that he has been its possessor in good faith for more
than 30 years. He believed then that the property was part of the “public land and [was]
open to anybody.” As a possessor and builder in good faith, he cannot be removed
from the subject property without being compensated for the improvements that he had
introduced.
The Provincial Adjudicator dismissed Ladano’s Complaint. She determined that
the two-hectare property, while agricultural, is not covered by RA No. 6657, as amended,
which only covers agricultural properties beyond five hectares. Presidential Decree No.
27, as amended, does not apply either because the property was not planted with rice
and corn. Neither is it covered by other agrarian tenancy laws because Ladano had not
presented any evidence of his tenancy relationship with the landowner.
The DARAB held that Ladano’s 30-year occupation and cultivation of the land
could not have possibly escaped the landowner’s notice. Since the landowner must

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 584
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
have known about, and acquiesced to, Ladano’s actions, an implied tenancy is deemed
to exist between them. The landowner, who denied the existence of a tenancy
relationship, has the burden of proving that the occupant of the land is a mere intruder
thereon. In the instant case, respondents failed to discharge such burden.
The CA concluded that there is no evidence supporting the DARAB’s conclusion
that a tenancy relationship exists between Ladano andNeri. In fact, Ladano himself
admitted that he entered and tilled the subject property without the knowledge and
consent of the landowner. Such admission negates the requisites of consent and of an
agreement to share harvests.
The CA also faulted the DARAB for considering Ladano’s lengthy occupation of
the land as an indication of the existence of a leasehold relationship. A person’s tillage
of another’s landholding, without anything else, will not raise the presumption of an
agricultural tenancy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is an agricultural tenant on the subject property.
RULING:
No. The petitioner is not an agricultural tenant.
Ladano’s Complaint did not assert any right that arises from agrarian laws. He
asserted his rights based on his prior physical possession of the two-hectare property
and on his cultivation of the same in good faith. The issues that he wanted resolved are
who between himself and the respondents have a better right to possess the property,
and whether he has a right to be compensated for the improvements he introduced on
the property.
“A tenancy relationship arises between a landholder and a tenant once they
agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to
the landholder, as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to continue
working on and cultivating the land.” For a tenancy relationship, express or implied, to
exist, the following requisites must be present: (1) the parties must be landowner and
tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is
consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is sharing of harvests between the landowner and
the tenant. Independent and concrete evidence of the foregoing elements must be
presented by the party asserting the existence of such a relationship. They cannot be
arrived at by mere conjectures or by presumptions. “Unless a person has established
his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure [nor is he] covered by
the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.
In the case at bar, the DARAB held that there is an implied tenancy because
Ladano had been occupying and cultivating the subject property for more than 30 years.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
From such a lengthy occupation, the DARAB concluded that the landowner must have
consented to petitioner’s occupation.
The CA rightfully reversed this conclusion. The DARAB failed to consider that
one’s occupancy and cultivation of an agricultural land, no matter how long, will not ipso
facto make him a de jure tenant. It should not have considered such occupation as a
basis for assuming the landowner’s consent, especially when the occupant himself never
alleged that he obtained the landowner’s consent. Petitioner did not even allege in his
Complaint that he is a tenant of the landowner. Neither did he allege that he shared his
harvests with the landowner. Without such factual assertions from Ladano, the DARAB
arrived at a conclusion that is utterly bereft of factual bases. Petitioner is not a tenant
on the land and is not entitled to security of tenure nor to disturbance compensation.
His Complaint was properly dismissed for lack of merit.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
COMMUNITIES CAGAYAN, INC. vs SPOUSES ARSENIO, and ANGELES NANOL
G.R. No. 176791, November 14, 2012
DOCTRINE: Under the Maceda Law, the actual cancellation of a contract to sell takes
place after 30 days from receipt by the buyer of the notarized notice of cancellation, and
upon full payment of the cash surrender value to the buyer. In other words, before a
contract to sell can be validly and effectively cancelled, the seller has (1) to send a
notarized notice of cancellation to the buyer and (2) to refund the cash surrender value.
FACTS:
Respondent-Spouses Arsenio and Angeles Nanol agreed to enter into a Contract
to Sell with petitioner Communities Cagayan Inc., whereby the latter agreed to sell to
spouses a house and lot at Camella Homes Subdivision, Cagayan de Oro City.
Respondent-spouses, however, did not avail of petitioner’s inhouse financing due to its
high interest rates. Instead, they obtained a loan from Capitol Development Bank, a
sister company of petitioner, using the property as collateral. To facilitate the loan, a
simulated sale over the property was executed by petitioner in favor of
respondent-spouses. Accordingly, titles were transferred in the names of
respondent-spouses and submitted to Capitol Development Bank for loan processing.
Unfortunately, the bank collapsed and closed before it could release the loan.
Thus, respondent-spouses entered into another Contract to Sell with petitioner
over the same property for the same price of P368,000.00. This time,
respondent-spouses availed of petitioner’s in-house financing thus, undertaking to pay
the loan over four years, from 1997 to 2001.
Sometime in 2000, respondent Arsenio demolished the original house and
constructed a three-story house allegedly valued at P3.5 million, more or less.
In July 2001, respondent Arsenio died, leaving his wife, herein respondent
Angeles, to pay for the monthly amortizations.
On September 10, 2003, petitioner sent respondent-spouses a
notarized Notice of Delinquency and Cancellation of Contract to Sell due to the latter’s
failure to pay the monthly amortizations.
Petitioner filed before Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cagayan de Oro City, an
action for unlawful detainer, against respondent-spouses. When the case was referred
for mediation, respondent Angeles offered to pay P220,000.00 to settle the case but
petitioner refused to accept the payment. The case was later withdrawn and
consequently dismissed because the judge found out that the titles were already
registered under the names of respondent-spouses.
Unfazed by the unfortunate turn of events, petitioner, filed before Branch 18 of the
RTC, Cagayan de Oro City, a Complaint for Cancellation of Title, Recovery of
Possession, Reconveyance and Damages, against respondent-spouses and all persons

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 587
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
claiming rights under them. Petitioner alleged that the transfer of the titles in the names
of respondent-spouses was made only in compliance with the requirements of Capitol
Development Bank and that respondent-spouses failed to pay their monthly
amortizations beginning January 2000. Thus, petitioner prayed that TCT Nos. T-105202
and T-105203 be cancelled, and that respondent Angeles be ordered to vacate the
subject property and to pay petitioner reasonable monthly rentals from January 2000
plus damages.
In her Answer, respondent Angeles averred that the Deed of Absolute Sale is
valid, and that petitioner is not the proper party to file the complaint because petitioner is
different from Masterplan Properties, Inc.
The RTC rendered judgment declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale invalid for lack
of consideration.
Instead of appealing the Decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), petitioner opted to
file the instant petition directly with this Court on a pure question of law.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is obliged to reimburse respondent-spouses the value of the
new house minus the cost of the original house, and
Whether petitioner is obliged to refund to respondent-spouses all the monthly
installments paid
HELD:
Respondent-spouses are entitled to the cash surrender value of the payments on
the property equivalent to 50% of the total payments made.
Considering that this case stemmed from a Contract to Sell executed by the
petitioner and the respondent-spouses, we agree with petitioner that the Maceda Law,
which governs sales of real estate on installment, should be applied.
Under the Maceda Law, the actual cancellation of a contract to sell takes place
after 30 days from receipt by the buyer of the notarized notice of cancellation, and upon
full payment of the cash surrender value to the buyer. In other words, before a contract to
sell can be validly and effectively cancelled, the seller has (1) to send a notarized notice
of cancellation to the buyer and (2) to refund the cash surrender value. Until and unless
the seller complies with these twin mandatory requirements, the contract to sell between
the parties remains valid and subsisting. Thus, the buyer has the right to continue
occupying the property subject of the contract to sell, and may “still reinstate the contract
by updating the account during the grace period and before the actual cancellation” of
the contract.
In this case, petitioner complied only with the first condition by sending a notarized
notice of cancellation to the respondent-spouses. It failed, however, to refund the cash

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
surrender value to the respondent-spouses. Thus, the Contract to Sell remains valid
and subsisting and supposedly, respondent-spouses have the right to continue
occupying the subject property. Unfortunately, we cannot reverse the Decision of the
RTC directing respondent-spouses to vacate and turnover possession of the subject
property to petitioner because respondent-spouses never appealed the order. The
RTC Decision as to respondent-spouses is therefore considered final.
Respondent-spouses are entitled to reimbursement of the improvements made on
the property.
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or
planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige
the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the
proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value
is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or
trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in
case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
We thus hold that Article 448 is also applicable to the instant case. First, good
faith is presumed on the part of the respondent-spouses. Second, petitioner failed to
rebut this presumption. Third, no evidence was presented to show that petitioner
opposed or objected to the improvements introduced by the respondent-spouses.
Consequently, we can validly presume that petitioner consented to the improvements
being constructed. This presumption is bolstered by the fact that as the subdivision
developer, petitioner must have given the respondent-spouses permits to commence
and undertake the construction.
In conformity with the foregoing pronouncement, we hold that petitioner, as
landowner, has two options. It may appropriate the new house by reimbursing
respondent Angeles the current market value thereof minus the cost of the old house.
Under this option, respondent Angeles would have “a right of retention which negates the
obligation to pay rent.” In the alternative, petitioner may sell the lots to respondent
Angeles at a price equivalent to the current fair value thereof. However, if the value of
the lots is considerably more than the value of the improvement, respondent Angeles
cannot be compelled to purchase the lots. She can only be obliged to pay petitioner
reasonable rent.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JOAQUIN CHUNG, JR., vs JACK DANIEL MONDRAGON
G.R. No. 179754, November 21, 2012
DOCTRINE: In making the indictment that a court’s decision fails in the fundamental
mandate that no decision shall be rendered without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, the demurring party should not
mistake brevity for levity.
FACTS:
Petitioners Joaquin G. Chung, Jr., Paz Royeras-Soler, and MansuetoMaceda are
descendants of Rafael Mondragon (Rafael) by his first wife, EleuteriaCalunia (Eleuteria),
while respondent Jack Daniel Mondragon (Jack Daniel) is Rafael’s descendant by his
second wife, Andrea Baldos (Andrea).Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 22447 is
registered in the name of “Heirs of Andrea Baldos represented by Teofila G. Maceda”
and covers 16,177 square meters of land in Macrohon, Southern Leyte (the land).
Petitioners claim that from 1921 up to 2000, Rafael appeared as owner of the land
in its tax declaration, and that a free patent was issued in 1987 in the name of Andrea’s
heirs upon application of Teofila G. Maceda (Teofila), who is petitioners’ sister.
On the other hand, respondents claim that Andrea is the exclusive owner of the
land, having inherited the same from her father Blas Baldos. They add that during
Andrea’s lifetime, she was in lawful, peaceful and continuous possession thereof in the
concept of owner; that in 1954, Andrea conveyed a portion thereof to one Crispina Gloria
de Cano via a document written in the vernacular wherein she categorically stated that
she inherited the land from her father and she was the true and exclusive owner of the
land; that after Andrea died in 1955, her son Fortunato Mondragon took over, paying
taxes thereon religiously; and when Fortunato died, his son Jack Daniel (herein
respondent) came into possession andenjoyment thereof.
Jack Daniel sold a 1,500-square meter portion of the land to his co-respondent
Clarinda Regis-Schmitz (Regis-Schmitz).On the claim that Jack Daniel had no right to
sell a portion of the land and that the sale to Regis-Schmitz created a cloud upon their
title, petitioners filed Civil Case No. R-3248, with a prayer that Jack Daniel be declared
without right to sell the land or a portion thereof; that their rights and those belonging to
the legitimate heirs of Rafael and Eleuteria be declared valid and binding against the
whole world; that the respondents be restrained from creating a cloud upon OCT No.
22447; and that Jack Daniel’s sale to Regis-Schmitz be declared null and void.
After trial, the court a quo rendered its May 19, 2003 Decision dismissing the
case. It held that with the admission that Jack Daniel is an heir of Andrea, he being the
latter’s grandson and therefore her heir, he is thus a co-owner of the land which forms
part of Andrea’s estate, and thus possesses the right to dispose of his undivided share
therein. The trial court held that petitioners’ remedy was to seek partition of the land in
order to obtain title to determinate portions thereof.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 590
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The CA sustained the trial court. It held that petitioners were bound by the
agreement during pre-trial and by the pre-trial order to limit the determination of the case
to the sole issue of whether Jack Daniel possessed the capacity to dispose a portion of
the land. Since they did not object to the trial court’s pre-trial order, petitioners are bound
to abide by the same. It concluded that the other issues which were not related to Jack
Daniel’s capacity to dispose deserved no consideration, that “the determination of issues
at a pre-trial conference bars the consideration of other questions on appeal.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale by Jack Daniel to Regis-Schmitz be declared null and
void.
And whether or not the Decision of the trial court violated the constitutional
requirement that a decision must state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based.
HELD:
The Court finds in this case no breach of the constitutional mandate that decisions
must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based. The
trial court’s Decision is complete, clear, and concise. Petitioners should be reminded
that in making their indictment that the trial court’s Decision fails to express clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, they should not mistake brevity for
levity.
It is evident from the title that the land belongs to no other than the heirs of
AndreaBaldos, Rafael’s second wife. The land could not have belonged to Rafael,
because he is not even named in OCT No. 22447. With greater reason may it be said
that the land could not belong to petitioners, who are Rafael’s children by his first wife
Eleuteria. Unless Eleuteria and Andrea were related by blood – such fact is not borne out
by the record – they could not be heirs to each other. And if indeed Eleuteria and
Andrea were blood relatives, then petitioners would have so revealed at the very first
opportunity. Moreover, the fact that Rafael died ahead of Andrea, and that he is not even
named in the title, give the impression that the land belonged solely to the heirs of
Andrea, to the exclusion of Rafael. If this were not true, then the title should have as
registered owners the “Heirs of Rafael and Andrea Mondragon”, in which case the
petitioners certainly would possess equitable title, they being descendants-heirs of
Rafael. Yet OCT No. 22447 is not so written.
Add to this the fact that petitioners are not in possession of the land. A different
view would have been taken if they were. Indeed, not even the fact that their sister
Teofila Maceda’s name appears in the title could warrant a different conclusion. Her
name appears therein only as a representative of Andrea’s heirs. As mere
representative, she could have no better right.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 591
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Petitioners do not possess legal or equitable title to the land, such that the only
recourse left for the trial court was to dismiss the case. Thus said, although they both
arrived at the correct conclusion, the trial court and the CA did so by an erroneous
appreciation of the facts and evidence.
Petitioners cannot, on the pretext of maintaining a suit for quieting of title, have
themselves declared as Andrea’s heirs so that they may claim a share in the land. If they
truly believe that they are entitled to a share in the land, they may avail of the remedies
afforded to excluded heirs under the Rules of Court, or sue for the annulment of the title
and seek issuance of new titles in their name, or recover damages in the event
prescription has set in.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 592
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
DIONISIO MANAQUIL vs ROBERTO MOICO
G.R. No. 180076, November 21, 2012
DOCTRINE: In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, it is essential that
the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the property which is the
subject-matter of the action. Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title
means beneficial ownership. In the absence of such legal or equitable title, or interest,
there is no cloud to be prevented or removed.
FACTS:
Lots 18 and 19 in Dagat-Dagatan, Navotas form part of the land previously
expropriated by the National Housing Authority (NHA) and placed under its
TondoDagat-Dagatan Foreshore Development Project – where occupants, applicants or
beneficiaries may purchase lots on installment basis. In October 1984, Lot 18 was
awarded to spouses Iluminardo and PrescillaMananquil under a Conditional Contract to
Sell. Lot 19, on the other hand, was sold to Prescilla in February 1980 by its occupant.
In 1991, Iluminardo and Prescilla died without issue, but it turned out that Prescilla had a
child by a previous marriage – namely Eulogio Francisco Maypa (Eulogio). After the
spouses’ death, Iluminardo’s supposed heirs (Mananquil heirs) – his brothers and sisters
and herein petitioners Dionisio and EstanislaoMananquil (Estanislao),
LaudenciaMananquil-Villamor (Laudencia), and Dianita Mananquil-Rabino (Dianita) –
executed an Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs and adjudicated ownership over Lots
18 and 19 in favor of Dianita. They took possession of Lots 18 and 19 and leased them
out to third parties.
Sometime later, the Mananquil heirs discovered that in 1997, Eulogio and two
others, EulogioBaltazarMaypa and Brenda Luminugue, on the claim that they are
surviving heirs of Iluminardo and Prescilla, had executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate with Waiver of Rights and Sale, and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Roberto
Moico (Moico).
In May 1997, Moico began evicting the Mananquils’ tenants and demolishing the
structures they built on Lots 18 and 19. In June, the Mananquils instituted Civil Case
No. 2741-MN for quieting of title and injunctive relief.
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order, thus suspending eviction and
demolition. After trial on the merits, a Decision was rendered in favor of the
Mananquils.
The CA noted that Lots 18 and 19 must still belong to the NHA, in the absence of
proof that Iluminardo and Prescilla have completed installment payments thereon, or
were awarded titles to the lots. And if the couple disposed of these lots even before title
could be issued in their name, then they may have been guilty of violating conditions of
the government grant, thus disqualifying them from the NHA program. Consequently,

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 593
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
there is no right in respect to these properties that the Mananquils may succeed to. If
this is the case, then no suit for quieting of title could prosper, for lack of legal or
equitable title to or interest in Lots 18 and 19.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have equitable or legal title to initiate the action of
quieting the title.
HELD:
No, the court ruled “Proof of heirship alone does not suffice : the Mananquils must
prove to the satisfaction of the courts that they have a right to succeed Illuminardo under
the law or terms of the NHA project, and are not disqualified by non-payment, prohibition,
lack of qualifications or otherwise.
An action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on
equity. The competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the
complainant and other claimants, not only to place things in their proper place, to make
the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also
for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over
the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the
improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best.
But “for an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur,
namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the
real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.”
From the evidence adduced below, it appears that the petitioners have failed to
show their qualifications or right to succeed Iluminardo in his rights under the NHA
program/project. They failed to present any title, award, grant, document or certification
from the NHA or proper government agency which would show that Iluminardo and
Prescilla have become the registered owners/beneficiaries/ awardees of Lots 18 and 19,
or that petitioners are qualified successors or beneficiaries under the Dagat-Dagatan
program/project, taking over Iluminardo’s rights after his death. They did not call to the
witness stand competent witnesses from the NHA who can attest to their rights as
successors to or beneficiaries of Lots 18 and 19. They failed to present proof, at the very
least, of the specific law, provisions, or terms that govern the TondoDagat-Dagatan
Foreshore Development Project which would indicate a modicum of interest on their part.
For this reason, their rights or interest in the property could not be established.
It was erroneous, however, for the CA to assume that Iluminardo and Prescilla
may have violated the conditions of the NHA grant under the TondoDagat-Dagatan
Foreshore Development Project by transferring their rights prior to the issuance of a title
or certificate awarding Lots 18 and 19 to them. In the absence of proof, a ruling to this

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 594
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
effect is speculative. Instead, in resolving the case, the trial court – and the CA on appeal
– should have required proof that petitioners had, either: 1) a certificate of title, award, or
grant from the proper agency (NHA or otherwise) in the name of their predecessor
Iluminardo, or, in the absence thereof, 2) a right to succeed to Iluminardo’s rights to Lots
18 and 19, not only as his heirs, but also as qualified legitimate successors/beneficiaries
under the TondoDagat-Dagatan Foreshore Development Project terms and conditions
as taken over by the NHA. Petitioners should have shown, to the satisfaction of the
courts that under the NHA program project governing the grant of the lands in question,
they are entitled and qualified to succeed or substitute for Illuminardo in his rights upon
his death. As earlier stated, this takes the form of evidence – apart from proof of heirship,
of course – of the specific law, regulation or terms covering the program/project which
allows for a substitution or succession of rights in case of death; the certificate of title,
award or grant itself, or the testimony of competent witnesses from the NHA.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 595
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ALBERT M. CHING and ROMEO J. BAUTISTAvs.
FELIX M. BANTOLO, ANTONIO O. ADRIANO and EULOGIO STA. CRUZ JR.,
substituted by his children, represented by RAUL STA. CRUZ JR.
G.R. No. 177086 December 5, 2012
DOCTRINE: It is essential that for damages to be awarded, a claimant must satisfactorily
prove during the trial that they have a factual basis and that the defendant’s acts have a
casual connection to them.
FACTS:
Respondents Felix M. Bantolo (Bantolo), Antonio O. Adriano and Eulogio Sta. Cruz,
Jr. are owners of several parcels of land situated in Tagaytay City. On April 3, 2000,
respondents executed in favor of petitioners Albert Ching (Ching) and Romeo J. Bautista
a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing petitioners to obtain a loan using
respondents’ properties as collateral. On July 18, 2000, the Philippine Veterans Bank
(PVB) approved the loan application of petitioner Ching in the amount of P25M. On July
31, 2000, petitioner Ching thru a letter informed respondents of the approval of the loan.
Sometime in the first week of August 2000, petitioners learned about the revocation of the
SPA.
Petitioners alleged that the SPA is irrevocable because it is a contract of agency
coupled with interest. According to them, they agreed to defray the costs or expenses
involved in processing the loan because respondents promised that they would have an
equal share in the proceeds of the loan or the subject properties. On the other hand,
respondents alleged that they executed the SPA in favor of petitioners because of their
assurance that they would be able to get a loan in the amount of P50M and that P30M
would be given to respondents within a month’s time. Later, they were informed that the
loan was approved in the amount of P25M and that their share would be P6M. Since it
was not the amount agreed upon, respondents revoked the SPA and demanded the
return of the titles.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract of agency may be revoked
HELD:
Yes. There is no question that the SPA executed by respondents in favor of
petitioners is a contract of agency coupled with interest. This is because their bilateral
contract depends upon the agency. Hence, it cannot be revoked at the sole will of the
principal.
Furthermore, petitioner Ching is entitled to actual damages in the amount of
P500,000.00 without any condition. In exchange for his possession of the titles, petitioner
Ching advanced the amount of P500,000.00 to respondents. Considering that the loan
application with PVB did not push through, respondents are liable to return the said
amount to petitioner Ching.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 596
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPOUSES ALBERTO AND SUSAN CASTRO vs.
AMPARO PALENZUELA, for herself and as authorized representative of VIRGINIA
ABELLO, GERARDO ANTONIO ABELLO, ALBERTO DEL ROSARIO,
INGEBORGREGINA DEL ROSARIO, HANS DEL ROSARIO, MARGARET DEL
ROSARIO ISLETA, ENRIQUE ALENZUELA and CARLOS MIGUEL PALENZUELA
G.R. No. 184698 January 21, 2013

DOCTRINE: Exemplary damages may also be awarded when a wrongful act is


accompanied by bad faith or when the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner.
FACTS:
Respondents own several fishponds in Bulacan. In 1994, respondents, through their
duly appointed attorney-in-fact and co-respondent Palenzuela, leased out these
fishponds to petitioners. The lease was for five years. When the lease expired, the
petitioners did not vacate and continued to occupy and operate the fishponds.
Respondents then sent a letter to petitioners declaring the latter as trespassers and
demanding the settlement of the latter’s outstanding obligations. Subsequently,
respondents instituted a civil case for collection of a sum of money with damages before
the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. On appeal, CA sustained in toto the
decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are liable and thus ordered to pay moral and exemplary
damages to the respondents.

HELD:
The Court finds no reason to disturb the trial and appellate courts’ award in this
regard. Petitioners have not been exactly above-board in dealing with respondents. They
have been found guilty of several violations of the agreement, and not just one. They
incurred delay in their payments, and their check payments bounced, for one; for
another, they subleased the premises to Reyes, in blatant disregard of the express
prohibition in the lease agreement; thirdly, they refused to honor their obligation, as
stipulated under the lease agreement, to pay the fishpond license and other permit fees
and; finally, they refused to vacate the premises after the expiration of the lease.

Even though respondents received payments directly from the sublessee Reyes,
this could not erase the fact that petitioners are guilty of subleasing the fishponds to her.
Respondents may have been compelled to accept payment from Reyes only because
petitioners have been remiss in honoring their obligation to pay rent.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 597
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Bad faith means breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will.
By refusing to honor their solemn obligations under the lease, and instead unduly
profiting from these violations, petitioners are guilty of bad faith. Moral damages may be
awarded when the breach of contract is attended with bad faith.Exemplary damages
may also be awarded when a wrongful act is accompanied by bad faith or when the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
And since the award of exemplary damages is proper in this case, attorney's fees and
costs of the suit may also be recovered, as stipulated in the lease agreement.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 598
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
THE MANILA INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.vs. SPOUSES ROBERTO and AIDA
AMURAO
G.R. No. 179628 January 16, 2013
DOCTRINE: The jurisdiction of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC)
is conferred by law. Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. I 008, otherwise known as
the Construction Industry Arbitration Law, is broad enough to cover any dispute arising
from, or connected with construction contracts, whether these involve mere contractual
money claims or execution of the works.
FACTS:
Spouses Roberto and Aida Amurao (Sps. Amurao) entered into a Construction
Contract Agreement (CCA) with Aegean Construction and Development Corp. (Aegean)
for the construction of a six-storey commercial building. To guarantee its obligation,
Aegean posted performance bonds secured by petitioner Manila Insurance Company,
Inc. (Manila Insurance) and Intra Strata Assurance Corporation (Intra Strata). Aegean
failed to comply with its obligation. Hence, the spouses filed a complaint before the RTC
to enforce its claim against the sureties.
During the pre-trial, Manila Insurance and Intra Strata discovered that the CCA
contained an arbitration clause. Consequently, they filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. The RTC denied the motion to
dismiss.
Manila Insurance appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the
petition.Hence, Manila Insurance elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.
Manila Insurance argues that it cannot be held liable as a surety because the
claim of Sps. Amurao is premature. Manila Insurance contends that the dispute between
the spouses and Aegean should be brought first before the CIAC for arbitration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Manila Insurance can be held liable as surety of Aegan
HELD:
Yes. A contract of suretyship is defined as “an agreement whereby a party, called the
surety, guarantees the performance by another party, called the principal or obligor, of
an obligation or undertaking in favor of a third party, called the obligee.
The Court has consistently held that a surety’s liability is joint and several, limited
to the amount of the bond, and determined strictly by the terms of contract of suretyship
in relation to the principal contract between the obligor and the obligee.It bears stressing,
however, that although the contract of suretyship is secondary to the principal contract,
the surety’s liability to the obligee is nevertheless direct, primary, and absolute. But while
there is a cause of action against Manila Insurance, the complaint must still be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 599
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
NICOLAS P. DIEGO vs. RODOLFO P. DIEGO and EDUARDO P. DIEGO
G.R. No. 179965 February 20, 2013

DOCTRINE: An agreement which stipulates that the seller shall execute a deed of sale
only upon or after until payment of the purchase price is a contract to sell, not a contract of
sale. In Reyes v. Tuparan, this Court declared in categorical terms that "[w]here the
vendor promises to execute a deed of absolute sale upon the completion by the vendee
of the payment of the price, the contract is only a contract to sell. The aforecited
stipulation shows that the vendors reserved title to the subject property until full payment
of the purchase price."

FACTS:
Petitioner Nicolas and his brother Rodolfo, respondent herein, entered into an oral
contract to sell covering Nicola’s share, as co-owner of the family’s Diego Building.
Rodolfo made a down payment. It was agreed that the Deed of Sale should be executed
upon payment of the remaining balance. Meanwhile, another brother of Nicolas, Eduardo
gave Nicolas’ monthly share in the rents to Rodolfo. However, Rodolfo and Eduardo
failed to pay the remaining balance. Despite demands and protestations, Rodolfo failed to
render an accounting and remit his share in the rents and fruits of the building prompting
Nicolas to file a complaint. He prayed that Eduardo be ordered to deliver to Nicolas his
share in the rents. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of merit and ordering Nicolas to
execute a Deed of absolute sale in favor of Rodolfo upon payment by the latter of the
balance of the agreed purchase price. On appeal, the CA sustained the RTC’s decision in
toto. It held that since there was a perfected contract of sale between Nicolas and
Rodolfo, the latter may compel the former to execute the proper sale document.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract is a contract to sell
HELD:
Yes. The contract entered into by Nicolas and Rodolfo was a contract to sell.

The stipulation to execute a deed of sale upon full payment of the purchase price is
a unique and distinguishing characteristic of a contract to sell. It also shows that the
vendor reserved title to the property until full payment.

There is no dispute that in 1993, Rodolfo agreed to buy Nicolas’s share in the
Diego Building for the price of ₱500,000.00. There is also no dispute that of the total
purchase price, Rodolfo paid, and Nicolas received, ₱250,000.00. Significantly, it is also
not disputed that the parties agreed that the remaining amount of ₱250,000.00 would be
paid after Nicolas shall have executed a deed of sale.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 600
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
This stipulation, i.e., to execute a deed of absolute sale upon full payment of the
purchase price, is a unique and distinguishing characteristic of a contract to sell.
In Reyes v. Tuparan, this Court ruled that a stipulation in the contract, "[w]here the
vendor promises to execute a deed of absolute sale upon the completion by the vendee
of the payment of the price," indicates that the parties entered into a contract to sell.
According to this Court, this particular provision is tantamount to a reservation of
ownership on the part of the vendor. Explicitly stated, the Court ruled that the agreement
to execute a deed of sale upon full payment of the purchase price "shows that the
vendors reserved title to the subject property until full payment of the purchase price." In
Tan v. Benolirao, The Court further held that "[j]urisprudence has established that where
the seller promises to execute a deed of absolute sale upon the completion by the buyer
of the payment of the price, the contract is only a contract to sell."

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 601
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ROBERN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. PEOPLE’S LANDLESS
ASSOCIATION
G.R. No. 173622 March 11, 2013

DOCTRINE: This Court cannot presume the existence of a sale of land, absent any
direct proof of it.

FACTS:
Al-Amanah owned a 2000-square meter lot located in Magtu-od, Davao City and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 138914.4 On December 12, 1992,
Al-Amanah Davao Branch, thru its officer-in-charge Febe O. Dalig (OIC Dalig), asked
some of the members of PELA to desist from building their houses on the lot and to
vacate the same, unless they are interested to buy it. The informal settlers thus
expressed their interest to buy the lot at P100.00 per square meter, which Al-Amanah
turned down for being far below its asking price. Consequently, Al-Amanah reiterated its
demand to the informal settlers to vacate the lot.

The informal settlers together with other members comprising PELA offered to
purchase the lot for P300,000.00, half of which shall be paid as down payment and the
remaining half to be paid within one year. In the lower portion of the said letter,
Al-Amanah made the following annotation: Subject offer has been
acknowledged/received but processing to take effect upon putting up of the partial amt.
of P150,000.00 on or before April 15, 1993.

By May 3, 1993, PELA had deposited P150,000.00 as evidenced by four bank


receipts. In the meantime, the PELA members remained in the property and introduced
further improvements.

On November 29, 1993, Al-Amanah, thru Davao Branch Manager Abraham D.


Ututalum-Al Haj, wrote then PELA President BonifacioCuizon, Sr. informing him of the
Head Office's disapproval of PELA's offer to buy the said 2,000-square meter lot. They,
then, sent demand letter to vacate the lot.

Meanwhile, acting on Robern's undated written offer, Al-Amanah issued a


Recommendation Sheet dated December 27, 1993 addressed to its Board Operations
Committee, indicating therein that Robern is interested to buy the lot for P400,000.00;
that it has already deposited 20% of the offered purchase price; that it is buying the lot on
"as is" basis; and, that it is willing to shoulder the relocation of all informal settlers
therein. On December 29, 1993, the Head Office informed the Davao Branch Manager
that the Board Operations Committee had accepted Robern's offer.Eight days later,
Robern was informed of the acceptance. Al-Amanah stressed that it is Robern's
responsibility to eject the occupants in the subject lot, if any, as well as the payment of

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 602
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
the remaining amount within 15 days; otherwise, the P80,000.00 deposit shall be
forfeited. Robern expressed to Al-Amanah its uncertainty on the status of the subject lot.

Three months later, as its members were already facing eviction and possible
demolition of their houses, and in order to protect their rights as vendees, PELA filed a
suit for Annulment and Cancellation of Void Deed of Sale against Al-Amanah, its Director
Engr. Farouk Carpizo (Engr. Carpizo), OIC Dalig, Robern, and Robern's President and
General Manager, petitioner Rodolfo Bernardo (Bernardo) before the RTC of Davao City.
It insisted that as early as March 1993 it has a perfected contract of sale with Al-Amanah.
However, in an apparent act of bad faith and in cahoots with Robern, Al-Amanah
proceeded with the sale of the lot despite the prior sale to PELA.

ISSUE:
Whether or notthere was a perfected contract of sale between PELA and
Al-Amanah, the resolution of which will decide whether the sale of the lot to Robern
should be sustained or not.

HELD:
NO.A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon
the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.48 Thus, for a contract of
sale to be valid, all of the following essential elements must concur: "a) consent or
meeting of the minds; b) determinate subject matter; and c) price certain in money or its
equivalent."49chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In the case at bench, there is no controversy anent the determinate subject


matter, i.e., the 2,000-square meter lot. This leaves us to resolve whether there was a
concurrence of the remaining elements.

As for the price, fixing it can never be left to the decision of only one of the
contracting parties. "But a price fixed by one of the contracting parties, if accepted by the
other, gives rise to a perfected sale."

As regards consent, "when there is merely an offer by one party without


acceptance of the other, there is no contract." The decision to accept a bidder's proposal
must be communicated to the bidder. However, a binding contract may exist between the
parties whose minds have met, although they did not affix their signatures to any written
document, as acceptance may be expressed or implied. It "can be inferred from the
contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the contracting parties." Thus, we held:
x xx The rule is that except where a formal acceptance is so required, although the
acceptance must be affirmatively and clearly made and must be evidenced by some acts
or conduct communicated to the offeror, it may be made either in a formal or an informal
manner, and may be shown by acts, conduct, or words of the accepting party that clearly
manifest a present intention or determination to accept the offer to buy or sell. Thus,

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acceptance may be shown by the acts, conduct, or words of a party recognizing the
existence of the contract of sale.

There is no perfected contract of sale between PELA and Al-Amanah for want of
consent and agreement on the price.

In the case at bench, the transaction between Al-Amanah and PELA remained in
the negotiation stage. The offer never materialized into a perfected sale, for no oral or
documentary evidence categorically proves that Al-Amanah expressed amenability to
the offered P300,000.00 purchase price. Before the lapse of the 1-year period PELA had
set to pay the remaining balance, Al-Amanah expressly rejected its offered purchase
price, although it took the latter around seven months to inform the former and this
entitled PELA to award of damages. Al-Amanah's act of selling the lot to another buyer is
the final nail in the coffin of the negotiation with PELA. Clearly, there is no double sale,
thus, we find no reason to disturb the consummated sale between Al-Amanah and
Robern.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MOLDEX REALTY INC. vs FLORA SABERON
G.R. No. 176289 : April 8, 2013

DOCTRINE: The lack of a license to sell or the failure on the part of a subdivision
developer to register the contract to sell or deed of conveyance with the Register of
Deeds does not result to the nullification or invalidation of the contract to sell it entered
into with a buyer. The contract to sell remains valid and subsisting.

FACTS:
Interested in acquiring a 180-square meter lot known as Lot 2, Block 1 of
Metrogate Subdivision in Dasmariñas, Cavite, respondent Flora A. Saberon (Flora)
asked Moldex, the developer, to reserve the lot for her as shown by a Reservation
Application dated April 11, 1992. While the cash purchase price for the land is
P396,000.00, the price if payment is made on installment basis is P583,498.20 at
monthly amortizations of P8,140.97 payable in five years with 21% interest per annum
based on the balance and an additional 5% surcharge for every month of delay on the
monthly installment due. Flora opted to pay on installment and began making aperiodical
payments from 1992 to 1996 in the total amount of P375,295.49.

In April, August, and October 1996,Moldex sent Flora notices reminding her to
update her account. Upon inquiry, however, Flora was shocked to find out that as of July
1996, she owed Moldex P247,969.10. In November 1996, the amount ballooned to
P491,265.91.

Moldex thus suggested to Flora to execute a written authorization for the sale of
the subject lot to a new buyer and a written request for refund so that she can get half of
all payments she made. However, Flora never made a written request for refund.

As of April 1997, Moldex computed Flora’s unpaid account at P576,569.89. It then


sent Flora a Notarized Notice of Cancellation of Reservation Application and/or Contract
to Sell. Flora, on the other hand, filed before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) Regional Field Office IV a Complaint for the annulment of the contract to
sell, recovery of all her payments with interests, damages, and the cancellation of
Moldex’s license to sell.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a valid and binding contract to sell between Moldex and
Flora.

HELD:
NO. In Spouses Co Chien v. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development Corporation, Inc.
this Court has already ruled that the lack of a certificate of registration and a license to

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sell on the part of a subdivision developer does not result to the nullification or
invalidation of the contract to sell it entered into with a buyer. The contract to sell remains
valid and subsisting. In said case, the Court upheld the validity of the contract to sell
notwithstanding violations by the developer of the provisions of PD 957. We held that
nothing in PD 957 provides for the nullity of a contract validly entered into in cases of
violation of any of its provisions such as the lack of a license to sell. Thus:
A review of the relevant provisions of P.D. 957 reveals that while
the law penalizes the selling of subdivision lots and condominium units
without prior issuance of a Certificate of Registration and License to Sell
by the HLURB, it does not provide that the absence thereof will
automatically render a contract, otherwise validly entered, void. The
penalty imposed by the decree is the general penalty provided for the
violation of any of its provisions. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the
clear language of the law shall prevail. This principle particularly enjoins
strict compliance with provisions of law which are penal in nature, or when
a penalty is provided for the violation thereof. With regard to P.D. 957,
nothing therein provides for the nullification of a contract to sell in the
event that the seller, at the time the contract was entered into, did not
possess a certificate of registration and license to sell. Absent any specific
sanction pertaining to the violation of the questioned provisions (Secs. 4
and 5), the general penalties provided in the law shall be applied. The
general penalties for the violation of any provisions in P.D. 957 are
provided for in Sections 38 and 39. As can clearly be seen in the
aforequoted provisions, the same do not include the nullification of
contracts that are otherwise validly entered.

The Co Chien ruling has been reiterated in several cases and remains to be the
prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. Thus, the contract to sell entered into between
Flora and Moldex remains valid despite the lack of license to sell on the part of the latter
at the time the contract was entered into.

Moreover, Flora claims that the contract she entered into with Moldex is void
because of the latter’s failure to register the contract to sell/document of conveyance with
the Register of Deeds, in violation of Section 17 of PD 957. However, just like in Section
5 which did not penalize the lack of a license to sell with the nullification of the contract,
Section 17 similarly did not mention that the developer’s or Moldex’s failure to register
the contract to sell or deed of conveyance with the Register of Deeds resulted to the
nullification or invalidity of the said contract or deed. Extrapolating the ratio decidendi in
Co Chien, thus, non-registration of an instrument of conveyance will not affect the validity
of a contract to sell. It will remain valid and effective between the parties thereto as
under PD 1529 or The Property Registration Decree, registration merely serves as a
constructive notice to the whole world to bind third parties.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PO2 PATRICK MEJIA GABRIEL vs. SHERIFF WILLIAM JOSE RAMOS
A.M. No. P-06-2256 : April 10, 2013

DOCTRINE: A formal investigation is necessary to thresh out the truth and also to afford
herein respondent the chance to face his accusers.

FACTS:
On 10 May 2007 at around 4:00 oclock in the afternoon at Barangay Calsapa,
Municipality of San Teodoro, Oriental Mindoro said respondent together with several
persons, in conspiracy and on agreement with former Municipal Mayor Manuel
RoxasBae, entered the house of Ms. AdelaidaCaegHael. Soon thereafter, two (2) pieces
of Five Hundred (P500.00) bills were handed to Adelaida and Ariel Hael to vote for
Mayoralty Candidate Homer RoxasAlumisin and other candidates listed in the yellow
pages. The said vote buying incident was reported by Adelaida and Ariel Hael to San
Teodoro Municipal Police Station, who both executed their respective Sworn Statements
enclosed as Annexes A and B hereof. A case for Violation of Article 22, Section 261 (a)
of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines was also filed against respondent
together with his co-conspirators.

Respondent alleges that the charges in the complaint are utterly false, malicious
and intended to intimidate him from prosecuting cases of robbery as well as
administrative charges against several policemen, including herein complainant for
openly campaigning for a certain candidate during the election period. He admits that on
the date stated in the complaint he was indeed at Barangay Calsapa, San Teodoro,
Oriental Mindoro to buy charcoal which he sells for a profit to augment his income.
Respondent adds that he was with Manuel RoxasBae and that he was able to talk with
Ariel [Caeg] Hael but their discussion has nothing to do with politics. He insists that he
was not financially capable to buy two (2) votes at P500.00 each. He is aware that as a
government employee he cannot campaign, much less take part in partisan politics. He
points out that buying votes several days before election is incongruous because the
voters could change their mind on election day.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mr. Ramos may be held liable for Grave Misconduct

HELD:
NO.The conflicting versions of both parties present a factual issue which could
not be resolved based only on the pleadings submitted before us. A formal investigation
is necessary to thresh out the truth and also to afford herein respondent the chance to
face his accusers.

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The Court took note of the OCA report and referred the case to the Executive
Judge of the RTC, Pasig City, for investigation. Accordingly, the OCA forwarded the case
record to Executive Judge Amelia C.Manalastas, RTC, Pasig City.

In a report submitted on January 26, 2009, Judge Manalastas recommended the


dismissal of the complaint for lack of evidence. The report states:
1) On November 24, 2008, this Office notified all the parties for conference/hearing with
directive to submit their respective sworn statements on December 8 and 15, 2008, both
at 10:00 oclock in the morning;
2) On both dates, only respondent and his counsel appeared while respondent who was
notified via LBC failed to appear despite due notice;
3) In the conduct of the investigation, respondent vehemently denied all the charges
against him. The evidence submitted to this Office reveals that the filing of the instant
administrative case appears to be a mere leverage and stemmed from a case filed by
herein respondent against the complainant for Robbery.
4) From the evidence adduced, complainant failed to establish the allegations of grave
misconduct against herein respondent. In administrative proceedings, the burden of
proof that respondent committed the act complained of rests on the complainant
(Gotgotao versus Millora, 459 SCRA 340).
5) With no hard evidence except unconfirmed self serving assertions to back up the
complaint, this Office has no choice but to recommend dismissal of the present
complaint.

The Court finds Judge Manalastas recommendation to be in order. Indeed, PO2


Gabriel failed to prove his complaint against Sheriff Ramos.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MARLON CODERIAS vs. ESTATE OF JUAN CHIOCO
G.R. No. 180476 : June 26, 2013

DOCTRINE: The Court cannot sanction the use of force to evict beneficiaries of land
reform. Eviction using force is reversion to the feudal system, where the landed elite
have free rein over their poor vassals. In effect, might is right.

FACTS:
The deceased Juan O. Chioco (Chioco) owned a 4-hectare farm in Lupao, Nueva
Ecija (the farm). As tiller of the farm, petitioner Raymundo Coderias was issued a
Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) on April 26, 1974.

In 1980, individuals connected with Chioco – who was a former Governor of


Nueva Ecija – threatened to kill petitioner if he did not leave the farm. His standing
crops (corn and vegetables) and house were bulldozed. For fear of his life, petitioner,
together with his family, left the farm.

In 1993 upon learning of Chioco’s death, petitioner and his family re-established
themselves on the farm. On March 9, 1995 petitioner filed with the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Talavera, Nueva Ecija a Petition
against respondent Chioco’s estate praying that his possession and cultivation of the
farm be respected; that the corresponding agricultural leasehold contract between them
be executed; that he be awarded actual damages for the destruction of his house, his
standing crops, unrealized harvest from 1980 up to 1993, attorney’s fees and costs of
litigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Chioco has a right to evict the petitioner and enter the property

HELD:
NO.It must be recalled from the facts that the farm has been placed under the
coverage of RA 3844. It is also undisputed that a tenancy relation existed between
Chioco and petitioner. In fact, a CLT had been issued in favor of the petitioner; thus,
petitioner already had an expectant right to the farm. A CLT serves as “a provisional
title of ownership over the landholding while the lot owner is awaiting full payment of just
compensation or for as long as the tenant-farmer is an amortizing owner. This
certificate proves inchoate ownership of an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice and
corn production. It is issued in order for the tenant-farmer to acquire the land he was
tilling.” Since the farm is considered expropriated and placed under the coverage of the
land reform law, Chioco had no right to evict petitioner and enter the property. More
significantly, Chioco had no right to claim that petitioner’s cause of action had prescribed.

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x xx [T]he Land Reform Code forges by operation of law, between the landowner and the
farmer — be [he] a leasehold tenant or temporarily a share tenant — a vinculum juris
with certain vital consequences, such as security of tenure of the tenant and the tenant's
right to continue in possession of the land he works despite the expiration of the contract
or the sale or transfer of the land to third persons, and now, more basically, the farmer's
pre-emptive right to buy the land he cultivates under Section 11 of the Code, as well as
the right to redeem the land, if sold to a third person without his knowledge, under
Section 12 of this Code.
To strengthen the security of tenure of tenants, Section 10 of R.A. No. 3844 provides that
the agricultural leasehold relation shall not be extinguished by the sale, alienation or
transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. With unyielding consistency, we
have held that transactions involving the agricultural land over which an agricultural
leasehold subsists resulting in change of ownership, such as the sale or transfer of legal
possession, will not terminate the rights of the agricultural lessee who is given protection
by the law by making such rights enforceable against the transferee or the landowner's
successor in interest. x xx
In addition, Section 7 of the law enunciates the principle of security of tenure of the
tenant, such that it prescribes that the relationship of landholder and tenant can only be
terminated for causes provided by law. x xx [S]ecurity of tenure is a legal concession to
agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation of their [landholdings] is
tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. Perforce, the termination of
the leasehold relationship can take place only for causes provided by law. x xx
(Emphasis supplied and citations omitted)

The CA has failed to recognize this vinculum juris, this juridical tie, that exists
between the petitioner and Chioco, which the latter is bound to respect.

Under Section 8 of RA 3844, the agricultural leasehold relation shall be


extinguished only under any of the following three circumstances, to wit: “(1)
abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor; (2)
voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of which
shall be served three months in advance; or (3) absence of the persons under Section 9
to succeed the lessee x xx.” None of these is obtaining in this case. In particular,
petitioner cannot be said to have abandoned the landholding. It will be recalled that
Chioco forcibly ejected him from the property through threats and intimidation. His
house was bulldozed and his crops were destroyed. Petitioner left the farm in 1980 and
returned only in 1993 upon learning of Chioco’s death. Two years after, or in 1995, he
filed the instant Petition.

Indeed, Section 38 of RA 3844 specifically provides that “[a]n action to enforce


any cause of action under this Code shall be barred if not commenced within three years
after such cause of action accrued.” In this case, we deem it proper to reckon

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petitioner’s cause of action to have accrued only upon his knowledge of the death of
Chioco in 1993, and not at the time he was forcibly ejected from the landholding in 1980.
For as long as the intimidation and threats to petitioner’s life and limb existed, petitioner
had a cause of action against Chioco to enforce the recognition of this juridical tie.
Since the threats and intimidation ended with Chioco’s death, petitioner’s obligation to
file a case to assert his rights as grantee of the farm under the agrarian laws within the
prescriptive period commenced. These rights, as enumerated above, include the right
to security of tenure, to continue in possession of the land he works despite the
expiration of the contract or the sale or transfer of the land to third persons, the
pre-emptive right to buy the land, as well as the right to redeem the land, if sold to a third
person without his knowledge.

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SPOUSES DELFIN TUMIBAY vs SPOUSES MELVIN LOPEZ
G.R. No. 171692 : June 3, 2013

DOCTRINE: In a contract to sell, the seller retains ownership of the property until the
buyer has paid the price in full. A buyer who covertly usurps the seller's ownership of
the property prior to the full payment of the price is in breach of the contract and the
seller is entitled to rescission because the breach is substantial and fundamental as it
defeats the very object of the parties in entering into the contract to sell.

FACTS:
On March 23, 1998, petitioners filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity ab initio
of sale, and recovery of ownership and possession of land with the RTC of Malaybalay
City.

In their Complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land
located in Sumpong, Malaybalay, Bukidnon covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-25334 (subject land) in the name of petitioner Aurora; that they are natural born
Filipino citizens but petitioner Delfin acquired American citizenship while his wife,
petitioner Aurora, remained a Filipino citizen; that petitioner Aurora is the sister of
ReynaldaVisitacion (Reynalda); that on July 23, 1997, Reynalda sold the subject land to
her daughter, Rowena Gay T. Visitacion Lopez (respondent Rowena), through a deed of
sale for an unconscionable amount of P95,000.00 although said property had a market
value of more than P2,000,000.00; that the subject sale was done without the knowledge
and consent of petitioners; and that, for these fraudulent acts, respondents should be
held liable for damages. Petitioners prayed that (1) the deed of sale dated July 23, 1997
be declared void ab initio, (2) the subject land be reconveyed to petitioners, and (3)
respondents be ordered to pay damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners and respondent Rowena entered into a contract to
sell over the subject land

HELD:
YES.In the case at bar, while there was no written agreement evincing the
intention of the parties to enter into a contract to sell, its existence and partial execution
were sufficiently established by, and may be reasonably inferred from the actuations of
the parties, to wit: (1) the title to the subject land was not immediately transferred,
through a formal deed of conveyance, in the name of respondent Rowena prior to or at
the time of the first payment of $1,000.00 by respondent Rowena to petitioner Aurora on
January 25, 1995; (2) after this initial payment, petitioners received 22 intermittent
monthly installments from respondent Rowena in the sum of $500.00; and, (3) in her
testimony, respondent Rowena admitted that she had the title to the subject land
transferred in her name only later on or on July 23, 1997, through a deed of sale,

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
because she believed that she had substantially paid the purchase price thereof, and
that she was entitled thereto as a form of security for the installments she had already
paid.

Although we rule that there was a contract to sell over the subject land between
petitioners and respondent Rowena, we find that respondent Rowena was in breach
thereof because, at the time the aforesaid deed of sale was executed on July 23, 1997,
the full price of the subject land was yet to be paid.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPOUSES NAMEAL and LOURDES BONROSTRO vs. SPOUSES JUAN and
CONSTANCIA LUNA
G.R. No. 172346, July 24, 2013
DOCTRINE: In a contract to sell, payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition.
Failure of which is not a breach of contract warranting rescission under Article 1191 of the
Civil Code, but rather just an event that prevents the supposed seller from being bound to
convey title to the supposed buyer.
FACTS:
Constancia Luna (respondent), as buyer, entered into a contract to sell with Bliss
Development Corporation involving a house located in Quezon City. A year after,
respondent sold it to Lourdes Bonrostro (petitioner) under the ff. terms:
The stipulated price of P1,250,000.00 shall be paid by the VENDEE to the
VENDOR in the following manner:
(a) P200,000.00 upon signing x xx [the] Contract To Sell,
(b) P300,000.00 payable on or before April 30, 1993,
(c) P330,000.00 payable on or before July 31, 1993,
(d) P417,000.00 payable to the New Capitol Estate, for 15 years at [P6,867.12] a month,

x xx [I]n the event the VENDEE fails to pay the second installment on time, [t]he VENDEE
will pay starting May 1, 1993 a 2% interest on the P300,000.00 monthly. Likewise, in the
event the VENDEE fails to pay the amount of P630,000.00 on the stipulated time, this
CONTRACT TO SELL shall likewise be deemed cancelled and rescinded and x xx 5% of
the total contract price [of] P1,250,000.00 shall be deemed forfeited in favor of the
VENDOR. Unpaid monthly amortization shall likewise be deducted from the initial down
payment in favor of the VENDOR.
After execution of the contract, petitioner took possession of the property. However,
except for P200,000.00downpayment, she failed to pay subsequent amortization.
respondent then filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Complaint for Rescission of
Contract and Damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not rescission is the proper remedy for failure to pay the installments in
a contract to sell real property.

HELD:
No, rescission is not the proper remedy for failure to pay the installments in a
contract to sell real property.
In a contract to sell, payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition. Failure
of which is not a breach of contract warranting rescission under Article 1191 of the Civil
Code, but rather just an event that prevents the supposed seller from being bound to
convey title to the supposed buyer.
Also worth noting is the fact that the contract to sell entered by the parties refers to real
property on installment basis, in which Art. 1191 cannot apply since they are governed by
the Maceda Law.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
CARLOS LIM, CONSOLACION LIM, EDMUNDO LIM, CARLITO LIM, SHIRLEY
LEODADIA DIZON AND ARLEEN LIM FERNANDEZ vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 177050 , July 01, 2013
DOCTRINE: Personal notice to the mortgagor of the auction sale is necessary if the
same has been stipulated in the Mortgage contract.
FACTS:
Carlos, Consolacion, Edmundo, Carlito, Shirley and Arleen (petitioners), all
surnamed Lim, obtained loans from the Development Bank of the Philippines
(respondent). The loans were secured by a real estate mortgage over several parcels of
land. Due to the iolent confrontations between government troops and Muslim rebels in
Mindanao from 1972 to 1977, petitioners were forced to abandon their cattle ranch. As a
result, their business collapsed and they failed to pay the loan amortizations. After years
of negotiation between the petitioners and respondent for the payment of their loan, on
July 11, 1994, a public auction sale for the mortgaged properties was held where
respondent was the highest bidder. Such public auction sale was held after a Notice of
such sale was published for 3 consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in General Santos City. Petitioners subsequently filed a complaint for the Annulment of
Foreclosure and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioners, among other things, claim that the
foreclosure sale was void for lack of personal notice as provided in Mortgage contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lack of personal notice, as agreed upon by the parties, of the
foreclosure sale would render such sale void.
HELD:
Yes, the lack of personal notice, as agreed upon by the parties, of the foreclosure
sale would render such sale void.

But while DBP had a right to foreclose the mortgage, we are constrained to nullify
the foreclosure sale due to the bank’s failure to send a notice of foreclosure to petitioners.

We have consistently held that unless the parties stipulate, "personal notice to the
mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not necessary because Section 3of
Act 3135 only requires the posting of the notice of sale in three public places and the
publication of that notice in a newspaper of general circulation.

In this case, the parties stipulated in paragraph 11 of the Mortgage that:

11. All correspondence relative to this mortgage, including demand letters, summons,
subpoenas, or notification of any judicial or extra-judicial action shall be sent to the
Mortgagor at xxx or at the address that may hereafter be given in writing by the Mortgagor
or the Mortgagee;

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 615
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
However, no notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure was sent by DBP to petitioners
about the foreclosure sale scheduled on July 11, 1994. The letters dated January 28,
1994 and March 11, 1994 advising petitioners to immediately pay their obligation to avoid
the impending foreclosure of their mortgaged properties are not the notices required in
paragraph 11 of the Mortgage. The failure of DBP to comply with their contractual
agreement with petitioners, i.e., to send notice, is a breach sufficient to invalidate the
foreclosure sale.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 616
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ANTIPOLO INING et al. vs. LEONARDO R. VEGA et al.
G.R. No. 174727, August 12, 2013
DOCTRINE: One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from
the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent’s property. Consequently, he
cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among the
decedent’s heirs.
FACTS:

Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a 3,120-square
meter parcel of land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan. Leon and Rafaela died without
issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria
Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both deceased.
Sibling #1: Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson,
herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased). Leonardo in turn
is survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega,
Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents.
Sibling # 2: Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children. In short, herein
petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera),
are Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses thereof (Gregoria’s heirs). Tresvalles and
Tajonera are transferees of the said property. In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half
of subject property belonged to him as Romana’s surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case No. 5275 for partition, recovery of
ownership and possession, with damages, against Gregoria’s heirs. In their Answer with
counterclaim, Gregoria’s heirs (through son Antipolo) claimed that Leonardo had no
cause of action against them; that they have become the sole owners of the subject
property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan
Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware
of this fact. RTC ruled, among others that Leonardo only had 30 years to file the partition
case from the time of Leon’s death in 1962 since Article 1141 of the Civil Code provides
that an action for partition and recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land
is a real action over immovable property which prescribes in 30 years. Consequently, the
property should go to Gregoria’s heirs exclusively. The Court of Appeals (CA), on the
other hand, ruled that prescription began to run not from Leon’s death in 1962, but from
Lucimo Sr.’s execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979, which amounted to
a repudiation of his co-ownership of the property with Leonardo. Applying the fifth
paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[n]o prescription shall run
in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership," the CA held that it was only when
Lucimo Sr. executed the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979 and obtained a new tax
declaration over the property (TD 16414) solely in his name that a repudiation of his
co-ownership with Leonardo was made, which repudiation effectively commenced the
running of the 30-year prescriptive period under Article 1141. The CA did not consider
Lucimo Sr.’s sole possession of the property for more than 30 years to the exclusion of
Leonardo and the respondents as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership either, stating
that his exclusive possession of the property and appropriation of its fruits – even his

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 617
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
continuous payment of the taxes thereon – while adverse as against strangers, may not
be deemed so as against Leonardo in the absence of clear and conclusive evidence to
the effect that the latter was ousted or deprived of his rights as co-owner with the
intention of assuming exclusive ownership over the property, and absent a showing that
this was effectively made known to Leonardo.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Leonardo’s right of action prescribed because 30 years had
lapsed as provided in Article 1141 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
No, Leonardo’s right of action did not yet prescribe.

While the CA was correct in Held that prescription had not yet set in against
Leonardo, its ratio is mistaken.

What escaped the trial and appellate courts’ notice, however, is that while it may
be argued that Lucimo Sr. performed acts that may be characterized as a repudiation of
the co-ownership, the fact is, he is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir
of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolo’s son-in-law, being married to Antipolo’s daughter
Teodora.Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for
succession, exclude relations by affinity.

Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parents and children;

(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and

(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.

In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property; Teodora is.
Consequently, he cannot validly effect a repudiation of the co-ownership, which he was
never part of. For this reason, prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo, and
his right to seek a partition of the property has not been lost.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 618
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ANTONIO LOCSIN II vs. MEKENI FOOD CORPORATION|||
G.R. No. 192105, December 9, 2013
DOCTRINE: In the absence of specific terms and conditions governing a car plan
agreement between the employer and employee, the former may not retain the
installment payments made by the latter on the car plan and treat them as rents for the
use of the service vehicle, in the event that the employee ceases his employment and is
unable to complete the installment payments on the vehicle. The underlying reason is that
the service vehicle was precisely used in the former's business; any personal benefit
obtained by the employee from its use is merely incidental.|||
FACTS:
In February 2004, respondent Mekeni Food Corporationoffered petitioner Antonio
Locsin II the position of Regional Sales Manager to oversee Mekeni's National Capital
Region Supermarket/Food Service and South Luzon operations. In addition to a
compensation and benefit package, Mekeni offered petitioner a car plan, under which
one-half of the cost of the vehicle is to be paid by the company and the other half to be
deducted from petitioner's salary. Mekeni's offer was contained in an Offer Sheet which
was presented to petitioner.
Petitioner began his stint as Mekeni Regional Sales Manager on March 17, 2004.
To be able to effectively cover his appointed sales territory, Mekeni furnished petitioner
with a used Honda Civic car valued at P280,000.00, which used to be the service vehicle
of petitioner's immediate supervisor. Petitioner paid for his 50% share through salary
deductions of P5,000.00 each month.
Subsequently, Locsin resigned effective February 25, 2006. By then, a total of
P112,500.00 had been deducted from his monthly salary and applied as part of the
employee's share in the car plan. Mekeni supposedly put in an equivalent amount as its
share under the car plan. In his resignation letter, petitioner made an offer to purchase his
service vehicle by paying the outstanding balance thereon. The parties negotiated, but
could not agree on the terms of the proposed purchase. Petitioner thus returned the
vehicle to Mekeni on May 2, 2006.
Petitioner made personal and written follow-ups regarding his unpaid salaries,
commissions, benefits, and offer to purchase his service vehicle. Mekeni replied that the
company car plan benefit applied only to employees who have been with the company for
five years; for this reason, the balance that petitioner should pay on his service vehicle
stood at P116,380.00 if he opts to purchase the same.
On May 3, 2007, petitioner filed against Mekeni and/or its President, Prudencio S.
Garcia, a Complaint for the recovery of monetary claims consisting of unpaid salaries,
commissions, sick/vacation leave benefits, and recovery of monthly salary deductions
which were earmarked for his cost-sharing in the car plan.
Labor Arbiter Cresencio G. Ramos rendered a Decision directing respondents to
turn-over to complainant the subject vehicle upon the said complainant's payment to them

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 619
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
of the sum of P100,435.84. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. The NLRC held that
petitioner's amortization payments on his service vehicle amounting to P112,500.00
should be reimbursed; if not, unjust enrichment would result, as the vehicle remained in
the possession and ownership of Mekeni. In addition, the employer's share in the monthly
car plan payments should likewise be awarded to petitioner because it forms part of the
latter's benefits under the car plan. It held further that Mekeni's claim that the company car
plan benefit applied only to employees who have been with the company for five years
has not been substantiated by its evidence, in which case the car plan agreement should
be construed in petitioner's favor.|||CA modified NLRC’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a refund of all the amounts applied to the
cost of the service vehicle under the car plan.|||
HELD:
Yes. From the evidence on record, it is seen that the Mekeni car plan offered to
petitioner was subject to no other term or condition than that Mekeni shall cover one-half
of its value, and petitioner shall in turn pay the other half through deductions from his
monthly salary. Mekeni has not shown, by documentary evidence or otherwise, that there
are other terms and conditions governing its car plan agreement with petitioner. There is
no evidence to suggest that if petitioner failed to completely cover one-half of the cost of
the vehicle, then all the deductions from his salary going to the cost of the vehicle will be
treated as rentals for his use thereof while working with Mekeni, and shall not be
refunded. Indeed, there is no such stipulation or arrangement between them.
It was made clear in the above pronouncement that installments made on the car
plan may be treated as rentals only when there is an express stipulation in the car plan
agreement to such effect. It was therefore patent error for the appellate court to assume
that, even in the absence of express stipulation, petitioner's payments on the car plan
may be considered as rentals which need not be returned.
Indeed, the Court cannot allow that payments made on the car plan should be
forfeited by Mekeni and treated simply as rentals for petitioner's use of the company
service vehicle. Nor may they be retained by it as purported loan payments, as it would
have this Court believe. In the first place, there is precisely no stipulation to such effect in
their agreement. Secondly, it may not be said that the car plan arrangement between the
parties was a benefit that the petitioner enjoyed; on the contrary, it was an absolute
necessity in Mekeni's business operations, which benefited it to the fullest extent: without
the service vehicle, petitioner would have been unable to rapidly cover the vast sales
territory assigned to him, and sales or marketing of Mekeni's products could not have
been booked or made fast enough to move Mekeni's inventory. Poor sales, inability to
market Mekeni's products, a high rate of product spoilage resulting from stagnant
inventory, and poor monitoring of the sales territory are the necessary consequences of
lack of mobility. Without a service vehicle, petitioner would have been placed at the mercy
of inefficient and unreliable public transportation; his official schedule would have been
dependent on the arrival and departure times of buses or jeeps, not to mention the

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 620
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
availability of seats in them. Clearly, without a service vehicle, Mekeni's business could
only prosper at a snail's pace, if not completely paralyzed.
In light of the foregoing, it is unfair to deny petitioner a refund of all his contributions
to the car plan. Under Article 22 of the Civil Code,"[e]very person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same
to him." Article 2142 of the same Code likewise clarifies that there are certain lawful,
voluntary and unilateral acts which give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract, to
the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another. In
the absence of specific terms and conditions governing the car plan arrangement
between the petitioner and Mekeni, a quasi-contractual relation was created between
them. Consequently, Mekeni may not enrich itself by charging petitioner for the use of its
vehicle which is otherwise absolutely necessary to the full and effective promotion of its
business. It may not, under the claim that petitioner's payments constitute rents for the
use of the company vehicle, refuse to refund what petitioner had paid, for the reasons that
the car plan did not carry such a condition; the subject vehicle is an old car that is
substantially, if not fully, depreciated; the car plan arrangement benefited Mekeni for the
most part; and any personal benefit obtained by petitioner from using the vehicle was
merely incidental.|||

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 621
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
\ THE METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. ANA GRACE ROSALES
AND YO YUK TO|||
G.R. No. 183204, January 13, 2014
DOCTRINE: Bank deposits, which are in the nature of a simple loan or mutuum, must be
paid upon demand by the depositor.|||
FACTS:
Petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company is a domestic banking corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. Respondent Ana Grace
Rosales (Rosales) is the owner of China Golden Bridge Travel Services, a travel
agency. Respondent Yo Yuk To is the mother of respondent Rosales.
In 2000, respondents opened a Joint Peso Account with petitioner's Pritil-Tondo
Branch. As of August 4, 2004, respondents' Joint Peso Account showed a balance of
P2,515,693.52. In May 2002, respondent Rosales accompanied her client Liu Chiu
Fang, a Taiwanese National applying for a retiree's visa from the Philippine Leisure and
Retirement Authority (PLRA), to petitioner's branch in Escolta to open a savings account,
as required by the PLRA. Since Liu Chiu Fang could speak only in Mandarin, respondent
Rosales acted as an interpreter for her. On March 3, 2003, respondents opened with
petitioner's Pritil-Tondo Branch a Joint Dollar Account with an initial deposit of
US$14,000.00. On July 31, 2003, petitioner issued a "Hold Out" order against
respondents' accounts. On September 3, 2003, petitioner, through its Special Audit
Department Head Antonio Ivan Aguirre, filed before the Office of the Prosecutor of Manila
a criminal case for Estafa through False Pretences, Misrepresentation, Deceit, and Use of
Falsified Documents, docketed as I.S. No. 03I-25014, against respondent
Rosales. Petitioner accused respondent Rosales and an unidentified woman as the ones
responsible for the unauthorized and fraudulent withdrawal of US$75,000.00 from Liu
Chiu Fang's dollar account with petitioner's Escolta Branch. Respondents filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a Complaint for Breach of Obligation and Contract
with Damages. RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner liable for damages for breach
of contract. CA affirmed.
ISSUES:
Whether petitioner breached its contract with respondents and if so, whether it is
liable for damages.|||
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner's reliance on the "Hold Out" clause in the Application and Agreement
for Deposit Account is misplaced.
The "Hold Out" clause applies only if there is a valid and existing obligation arising
from any of the sources of obligation enumerated in Article 1157 of the Civil Code,to wit:
law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delict, and quasi-delict. In this case, petitioner failed to
show that respondents have an obligation to it under any law, contract, quasi-contract,
delict, or quasi-delict. And although a criminal case was filed by petitioner against

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 622
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
respondent Rosales, this is not enough reason for petitioner to issue a "Hold Out" order
as the case is still pending and no final judgment of conviction has been rendered against
respondent Rosales. In fact, it is significant to note that at the time petitioner issued the
"Hold Out" order, the criminal complaint had not yet been filed. Thus, considering that
respondent Rosales is not liable under any of the five sources of obligation, there was no
legal basis for petitioner to issue the "Hold Out" order. Accordingly, we agree with the
findings of the RTC and the CA that the "Hold Out" clause does not apply in the instant
case.
In view of the foregoing, we find that petitioner is guilty of breach of contract when
it unjustifiably refused to release respondents' deposit despite demand. Having breached
its contract with respondents, petitioner is liable for damages

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 623
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPOUSES BERNADETTE and RODULFO VILBAR vs. ANGELITO L. OPINION
G.R. No. 176043, January 15, 2014
DOCTRINE: "Registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or
creates a lien upon the land."|||
FACTS:
This is the case of conflicting claims over two parcels of land in a subdivision more
particularly designated as Lots 20 and 21.
The first claimant here is the Spouses Vilbar who bought said lots under contracts
to sell with the subdivision developer Dulos Realty and Development Corporation (or
Dulos Realty for Brevity) sometime in July 1979. Spouses Vilbar took possession of Lot
20 (B) in the concept of owners and exercised acts of ownership (or occupied the
same), with the permission of Dulos Realty after making an advance payment thereon.
Later on, in 1981 Spouses Vilbar also took possession of Lot 21 and obtained tax
declarations thereon in their name and paid its realty taxes. Subsequently, they
mortgaged Lot 21 to a bank and used the proceeds of the loan to pay in full the purchase
price of Lot 20 Upon full payment of the purchase price for Lot 20, Dulos Realty
executed a duly notarized “Deed of Absolute Sale” in favor of the spouses and delivered
to them the owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT (No. S-39849).
However, they were not able to register and transfer the title in their name because
the developer allegedly failed to have the lot formally subdivided despite its commitment
to do so, until its President, Juan B. Dulos (Juan), died without the subdivision being
accomplished. But eventually she was able to obtain title (TCT No. 36777) although she
only presented the contract to sell. But it turned out that said lots were among those
levied upon by (a certain) Gorospe, Sr., the former Board Chairman and CEO of Dulos
Realty by virtue of a Court judgment he obtained for recovery of benefits, privileges and
various allowances that said developer failed to pay him as Chairman. These lots were
sold at public auction with Gorospe emerging as highest bidder under which TCT Nos.
44797 (Lot 20) and 44796 (Lot 21) were issued in his name. Subsequently, he mortgaged
said lots to herein respondent, Opinion, and when Gorospe defaulted in paying Opinion
the obligation secured by said mortgage, the lots were awarded to him at an
Extra-Judicial Foreclosure Sale.
When the Sps. Vilbar learned about such titles, they filed a complaint in the
Regional Trial Court against Opinion claiming the latter is a buyer in bad faith because
Gorospe’s titles from which Opinion derived the titles were acquired in bad faith. The
spouses pointed out that as an officer of Dulos Realty, Gorospe should have known
that the subject lots were already sold to them. To prove the spouses’ claim, they
presented (1) the copies of the contracts to sell on the two lots; (2) the Deed of Absolute
Sale over Lot 20; (3) the Real Estate Mortgage Agreement with the bank over Lot 21; (4)
original Official Receipts issued by SLR for installment payments of the purchase price of
the lots; (5) owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 36777 in her name; and, (6) tax
declarations and receipts. On one hand, respondent Opinion alleged that he is a buyer

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 624
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
in good faith because before entering into the mortgage agreement with Gorospe, he had
verified with the Registry of Deeds that there were no annotations or encumbrances
registered in the titles of Lots 20 and 21. Further, he was assured by Gorospe that the
spouses were merely tenants of the lots and not the owners. RTC ruled in favor of
Opinion declaring him to have better right over Lots 20 and 21. “Deed of Absolute Sale”
over Lot 20 was never annotated in the transfer certificate of title. TCTs in the hands of
respondent were the ones which cancelled the titles of Dulos Realty over the lots and
not the TCT presented by the spouses Vilbar. Issuance of TCT No. 36777 (TCT
respecting LOT 21) was questionable because there was no proof that the purchase
price was already paid since only the “Contract to Sell” was available. Registry of Deeds
of Pasay itself certified that the TCT respecting Lot 21 is presumed not to be validly
issued. Herein petitioners only had an inchoate right over the property, said the RTC.
This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA).
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners only have an inchoate right over the property.
HELD:
YES. The evidence proves that respondent Opinion lawfully acquired his title over the
lots. Gorospe, Sr. cannot be considered to be in bad faith because he was not the one
who executed and signed the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioners. Bad faith
cannot be presumed and there was no clear and convincing proof that Gorospe had
knowledge of such transaction.
A review of the documents presented by the Spouses in support of their claim of
ownership, the SC reached a conclusion same with that of as that of the RTC. With regard
to Lot 20, spouses Vilbar brag of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Dulos Realty in
their favor and aver that they have the owner’s copy of TCT No. S-39849 and are
presently enjoying actual possession of said property. However, these are not sufficient
proofs of ownership. For some unknown reasons, the spouses Vilbar did not cause the
transfer of the certificate title in their name, or at the very least, annotate or register such
sale in the original title in the name of Dulos Realty. This, sadly, proved fatal to their
cause. Time and time again, this Court has ruled that "(1) a certificate of title serves as
evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein." Having no certificate of title issued in their names,
spouses Vilbar have no indefeasible and incontrovertible title over Lot 20 to support their
claim. Further, it is an established rule that (2) "registration is the operative act which
gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land." (3) "Any buyer or mortgagee
of realty covered by a Torrens certificate of title x x x is charged with notice only of such
burdens and claims as are annotated on the title." Failing to annotate the deed for the
eventual transfer of title over Lot 20 in their names, the spouses Vilbar cannot claim a
greater right over Opinion, who acquired the property with clean title in good faith and
registered the same in his name by going through the legally required procedure.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 625
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
BIGNAY EX-IM PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 171590 February 12, 2014

DOCTRINE: The gross negligence of the seller in defending its title to the property
subject matter of the sale - thereby contravening the express undertaking under the deed
of sale to protect its title against the claims of third persons resulting in the buyer's eviction
from the property -. amounts to bad faith, and the buyer is entitled to the remedies
afforded under Article 1555 of the Civil Code.

FACTS:
Alfonso de Leon mortgaged to Union Bank of the Philippines a real property
situated at Esteban Abada, Loyola Heights, Quezon City, which was registered in his and
his wife Rosario’s name. The property was foreclosed and sold at auction to Union Bank.
After the redemption period expired, the bank consolidated its ownership. In 1988,
Rosario filed a case for annulment of the mortgage alleging that the property was
mortgaged without her consent. In 1989 Bignay Ex-Im Philippines, Inc purchased
property from the bank. As indicated in the offer, a Deed of Absolute Sale will be executed
instead of a conditional sale. This documentation is intended to isolate the property from
any lis pendens that the former owner may annotate on the title and to allow immediate
reconstitution thereof since the original Torrens title was burned in 1988 when the City
Hall housing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City was gutted by fire. Later, Bignay
mortgaged the property to Union Bank, presumably to secure a loan obtained from the
bank. In the lower court’s ruling, it annulled the mortgage and declared that Rosario was
still the owner of the undivided one-half of the property. Union Bank and Bignay
separately appealed to CA. Both were dismissed. Thereafter, Bignay filed a case for
breach of warranty against eviction under Articles 1547 and 1548 of the Civil Code, with
damages, against Union Bank and Robles. The trial court ruled that Union Bank, through
VP Robles, acted in bad faith in selling the subject property to Bignay. On appeal, the CA
held that Union Bank is for the amount of the land and the building constructed on it. It
also granted Union Bank’s counterclaim as to Bignay’s loan. Hence, petitions were filed.

ISSUES:
(1) w/n Union Bank is liable to pay Bignay for the cost of the land and the amount of
the building constructed
(2) w/n Union Bank’s counterclaim is a permissive counterclaim

HELD:
(1) Yes. From an examination of the evidence and by the concurring opinions of
the courts below – that Bignay purchased the property without knowledge of the pending
Civil Case filed by Rosario. Indeed, in culpa contractual or breach of contract, gross
negligence of a party amounting to bad faith is a ground for the recovery of damages by
the injured party. Eviction shall take place whenever by a final judgment based on a right
prior to the sale or an act imputable to the vendor, the vendee is deprived of the whole or
of a part of the thing purchased. In case eviction occurs, the vendee shall have the right to
demand of the vendor, among others, the return of the value which the thing sold had at
the time of the eviction, be it greater or less than the price of the sale; the expenses of the

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 626
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
contract, if the vendee has paid them; and the damages and interests, and ornamental
expenses, if the sale was made in bad faith. The award is proper.

(2) Yes. Although the counterclaims were denominated as compulsory in the


answer, the matters therein alleged were not connected with the plaintiff’s complaint. The
counterclaims could stand independently from the plaintiff’s complaint hence they are
permissive counterclaims. During the pre-trial, this Court had already ruled that the
counterclaims were permissive yet the records showed that defendant had not paid the
docket fees. This Court therefore has not acquired jurisdiction over said case. The Court
finds true and credible the trial court's express declaration that no docket fees have been
paid on the bank's counterclaim; the trial court's pronouncement enjoys the presumption
of regularity. Indeed, the sudden appearance of the receipts supposedly evidencing
payment of the docket fees is highly questionable and irregular, and deserves to be
thoroughly investigated; the actuations of the bank relative thereto go against the
common experience of mankind, if they are not entirely anomalous.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 627
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MICHAELINA RAMOS BALASBAS vs. PATRICIA B. MONAYAO
G.R. No. 190524 February 17, 2014

DOCTRINE: While the law and justice abhor all forms of abuse committed by public
officers and employees whose sworn duty is to discharge their duties with utmost
responsibility, integrity, competence, accountability, and loyalty, the Court must protect
them against unsubstantiated charges that tend to adversely affect, rather than
encourage, the effective performance of their duties and functions.

FACTS:

A complaint was filed in DSWD wherein Atty. Michaelina Ramos Balasbas


accused Patricia B. Monayao of misrepresentation, fraud, dishonesty and refusal to
implement an Order issued by DENR in a land dispute filed by petitioner’s brother against
respondent’s father. Michaelina alleged that Patricia illegally sold the portion, over which
she had waived her rights, to her children via a 1992 deed of sale purportedly executed by
her father, which was simulated because as early as 1987, respondent’s father was
already deceased. In 2003, DSWD informed Michaelina that respondent was no longer
an employee thereof. She was advised to file the complaint in the municipality of Alfonso
Lista in the province of Ifugao. However, the Mayor stated that the complaint may not be
acted upon as the acts complained of were not in relation to the latter’s duties and
responsibilities as Municipal Population Officer. The complaint was filed in CSC. The
CSC Office of the Legal Affairs held that it had no jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint
as it stemmed from a private transaction between the protagonists. Upon appeal, CA also
dismissed complaint stating that CSC cannot take cognizance of the complaint. Hence,
the petition.

ISSUE:
w/n the respondent committed acts of dishonesty
HELD:
No. Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of
fact relevant to one’s office or connected with the performance of his duty. It implies a
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness. On
the other hand, misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of
action, is a forbidden act, is a dereliction of duty, is willful in character, and implies
wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. More particularly, it is an unlawful
behavior by the public officer. As long as the questioned conduct tarnished the image and
integrity of his/her public office, the corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring
public officer or employee. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees (Republic Act No. 6713) enunciates, inter alia, the State policy of
promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.
However, petitioner’s accusations do not appear to hold water. Petitioner is a lawyer; she
should know that as the complainant in the administrative case, upon her lies the burden
of proof to establish her cause of action against the respondent. All that is required is
substantial evidence, yet she could produce none; the allegations in her complaint are not

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 628
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
duly supported by necessary documents that would demonstrate the justness of her
claims. While technicalities may be dispensed with in administrative proceedings, "this
does not mean that the rules on proving allegations are entirely dispensed with. Bare
allegations are not enough; these must be supported by substantial evidence at the very
least."Thus, in the eyes of the law, respondent committed as yet no visible wrong.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 629
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
NICANORA G. BUCTON (deceased), substituted by REQUILDA B. YRAY vs. RURAL
BANK OF EL SALVADOR, INC., MISAMIS ORIENTAL, and REYNALDO CUYONG vs.
ERLINDA CONCEPCION AND HER HUSBAND AND AGNES BUCTON LUGOD
G.R. No. 179625 February 24, 2014

DOCTRINE: A mortgage executed by an authorized agent who signed in his own name
without indicating that he acted for and on behalf of his principal binds only the agent and
not the principal.

FACTS:

Nicanora G. Bucton filed a casefor Annulment of Mortgage, Foreclosure, and SPA


against Erlinda Concepcion. Petitioner alleged that she is the owner of a parcel of land.
Concepcion borrowed the title on the pretext that she was going to show it to an interested
buyer. Concepcion obtained a loan in the amount of ₱30,000.00 from respondent
bank;that as security for the loan, Concepcion mortgaged petitioner’s house and lot to
respondent bank using a SPA. Concepcion failed to pay the loan so the petitioner’s house
and lot were foreclosed. The bank denied the allegation of petitioner that the SPA was
forged. Since summons could not be served upon Concepcion, petitioner moved to drop
her as a defendant,which the RTC granted in its Order. This prompted respondent bank to
file a Third-Party Complaintagainst spouses Concepcion and Agnes Bucton Lugod
(Lugod), the daughter of petitioner. The trial court sustained the claim of petitioner that the
SPA was forged. It also rendered judgment on the Third-Party Complaint ordering Erlinda
Concepcion and her husband to indemnify the bank. On appeal, the CA reversed the
decision. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:
w/n petitioner is liable on the litigated loan/mortgage when she did not execute
either in person or by attorney-in-fact subject mortgage

HELD:

No. The Real Estate Mortgage was entered into by Concepcion in her own
personal capacity. As early as the case of Philippine Sugar Estates Development Co. v.
Poizat,the court already ruled that "in order to bind the principal by a deed executed by an
agent, the deed must upon its face purport to be made, signed and sealed in the name of
the principal."The mere fact that the agent was authorized to mortgage the property is not
sufficient to bind the principal, unless the deed was executed and signed by the agent for
and on behalf of his principal. In Far East Bank and Trust Company, the mother executed
an SPA authorizing her daughter to contract a loan from the bank and to mortgage her
properties. The mortgage, however, was signed by the daughter and her husband as
mortgagors in their individual capacities, without stating that the daughter was executing
the mortgage for and on behalf of her mother. Similarly, in this case, the authorized agent
failed to indicate in the mortgage that she was acting for and on behalf of her principal.
The Real Estate Mortgage, explicitly shows on its face, that it was signed by Concepcion

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
in her own name and in her own personal capacity. In fact, there is nothing in the
document to show that she was acting or signing as an agent of petitioner.

Consistent with the law on agency and established jurisprudence, petitioner


cannot be bound by the acts of Concepcion. In light of the foregoing, there is no need to
delve on the issues of forgery of the SPA and the nullity of the foreclosure sale. For even
if the SPA was valid, the Real Estate Mortgage would still not bind petitioner as it was
signed by Concepcion in her personal capacity and not as an agent of petitioner. Simply
put, the Real Estate Mortgage is void and unenforceable against petitioner. Concepcion,
on the other hand, is liable to pay respondent bank her unpaid obligation under the
Promissory Note dated June 11, 1982, with interest. As we have said, Concepcion signed
the Promissory Note in her own personal capacity; thus, she cannot escape liability. She
is also liable to reimburse respondent bank for all damages, attorneys' fees, and costs the
latter is adjudged to pay petitioner in this case.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 631
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPOUSES SOMBILON vs. ATTY. GARAY and PNB
G.R. No. 179914, June, 16, 2014
DOCTRINE: During the one-year redemption period, the purchaser may possess the
property by filing a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession before the court, upon
the posting of a bond. But after the one-year period, the purchaser has a right to
consolidate the title and to possess the property, without need of a bond. Once title is
consolidated under the name of the purchaser, the issuance of the writ of possession
becomes ministerial on the part of the court; thus, no discretion is left to the court.
FACTS:
Reynaldo and Hilly Sombilon (Spouses Sombilon) were the previous owners of a
property, with two buildings constructed on it, inBukidnon. The said property, which they
mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as security for their loan, was
foreclosed and sold at public auction where PNB emerged as the winning bidder. The
one-year redemption period lapsed but spouses Sombilon failed to redeem the property.
They sought the help of Atty. Rey Ferdinand T. Garay, owner of a lot adjacent to the
property. They told Atty. Garay that they wanted to reacquirethe property from PNB, but
had no money to repurchase it. Thus, they were hoping that he would agree to advance
the money and, in exchange, they promised to sell him a portion of the property where
one of the buildings is located.
The bank informed them that the property could be purchased at the fair market
value of ₱2.9M. The following day, Atty. Garay went to the bank alone and offered to buy
the property by making a down payment. Upon learning that Atty. Garay intended to
purchase the entire property for himself, spouses Sombilon offered to buy back the
property from PNB. The bank advised them to make a 10% down payment of the bank’s
total claimto formalize their offer. Eventually, a Final Deed of Conveyance was issued in
favor of PNB.On April 14, 2005, Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of
PNB.On the same date, PNB decided to approve the purchase offer of Atty. Garaysince
spouses Sombilon failed to make the required down payment.
RTC Bukidnon issued a Writ of Possessionin favor of PNB. The petitioners moved
for a reconsiderationof the issuance of the Writ of Possession. The RTC issued an
Orderholding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of the RTC Bukidnon in holding in abeyance the
implementation of the said writ is proper
HELD:
No. The issuance of a writ of possession isministerial upon the court.
A debtor has one year from the date the Certificate of Sale is registered with the
Register of Deeds within which to redeem his property.During the one-year redemption
period, the purchaser may possess the property by filing a petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession before the court, upon the posting of a bond.But after the one-year

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 632
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
period, the purchaser has a right to consolidate the title and to possess the property,
without need of a bond.And once title is consolidated under the name of the purchaser,
the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part of the court; thus,
no discretion is left to the court.Questions regarding the regularity and validity of the
mortgage or the foreclosure sale may not be raised as a ground to oppose or hold in
abeyance the issuance of the writ of possession as these must be raised in a separate
action for the annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale.The pendency of such
action is also not a ground to stay the issuance of a writ of possession. In this case, the
redemption period had long lapsed when PNB applied for the issuance of the Writ of
Possession. In fact, the title over the subject property had already been consolidated in
PNB’s name. Thus, it was ministerial upon the judge to issue the Writ of Possession in
favor of PNB, the registered owner of the subject property.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 633
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPOUSES SILOS vs.PNB
G.R. No. 181045, July 2, 2014
DOCTRINE: Any modification in the contract, such as the interest rates, must be made
with the consent of the contracting parties.The minds of all the parties must meet as to
the proposed modification, especially when it affects an important aspect of the
agreement. In the case of loan agreements, the rate of interest is a principal condition, if
not the most important component.
FACTS:
To secure a one-year revolving credit line obtained from PNB, Spouses Silos
(petitioners) constituted in a Real Estate Mortgageover two lots. They issued eight
Promissory Notesand signed a Credit Agreement which contained a stipulation on
interest which provides as follows:
(a) The Loan shall be subject to interest at the rate of 19.5% per annum.
Interest shall be payable in advance every one hundred twenty days at the
rate prevailing at the time of the renewal.
(b) The Borrower agrees that the Bank may modify the interest rate in the
Loan depending on whatever policy the Bank may adopt in the future,
including without limitation, the shifting from the floating interest rate
system to the fixed interest rate system, or vice versa. Where the Bank has
imposed on the Loan interest at a rate per annum, which is equal to the
Bank’s spread over the current floating interest rate, the Borrower hereby
agrees that the Bank may, without need of notice to the Borrower, increase
or decrease its spread over the floating interest rate at any time depending
on whatever policy it may adopt in the future.
The Promissory Notes, on the other hand, contained a stipulation granting PNB
the right to increase or reduce interest rates "within the limits allowed by law or by the
Monetary Board.The Real Estate Mortgage agreement provided the same right to
increase or reduce interest rates "at any time depending on whatever policy PNB may
adopt in the future."Petitioners failed to pay the amount demanded by PNB, thus the
latter foreclosed on the mortgage. The spouses filed a case, seeking annulment of the
foreclosure sale and an accounting of the PNB credit. Petitioners theorized that after the
first promissory note where they agreed to pay 19.5% interest, the succeeding
stipulations for the payment of interest in their loan agreements with PNB – which
allegedly left to the latter the sole will to determine the interest rate – became null and
void. Petitioners added that because the interest rates were fixed by respondent without
their prior consent or agreement, these rates are void, and as a result, petitioners should
only be made liable for interest at the legal rate of 12%.
PNB denied that it unilaterally imposed or fixed interest rates; that petitioners
agreed that without prior notice, PNB may modify interest rates depending on future
policy adopted by it; and that the imposition of penalties was agreed upon in the Credit
Agreement. It added that the imposition of penalties is supported by the all-inclusive
clause in the Real Estate Mortgage agreement which provides that the mortgage shall

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 634
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
stand as security for any and all other obligations of whatever kind and nature owing to
respondent, which thus includes penalties imposed upon default or non-payment of the
principal and interest on due date.The RTC ruled in favor or PNB. The CA affirmed the
RTC decision with modification as to the interest, applying the legal interest of 12% per
annum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA is correct in declaring that PNB is not entitled to any interest
except the legal rate from the time of demand
HELD:
Yes.
It is plainly obvious, therefore, from the undisputed facts of the case that
respondent bank unilaterally altered the terms of its contract with petitioners by
increasing the interest rates on the loan without the prior assent of the latter. In fact, the
manner of agreement is itself explicitly stipulated by the Civil Code when it provides, in
Article 1956 that "No interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in
writing." What has been "stipulated in writing" from a perusal of interest rate provision of
the credit agreement signed between the parties is that petitioners were bound merely to
pay 21% interest, subject to a possible escalation or de-escalation, when 1) the
circumstances warrant such escalation or de-escalation; 2) within the limits allowed by
law; and 3) upon agreement.
Indeed, the interest rate which appears to have been agreed upon by the parties
to the contract in this case was the 21% rate stipulated in the interest provision. Any
doubt about this is in fact readily resolved by a careful reading of the credit agreement
because the same plainly uses the phrase "interest rate agreed upon," in reference to
the original 21% interest rate. Petitioners never agreed in writing to pay the increased
interest rates demanded by respondent bank in contravention to the tenor of their credit
agreement. That an increase in interest rates from 18% to as much as 68% is excessive
and unconscionable is indisputable.In this case no attempt was made by PNB to secure
the conformity of private respondents to the successive increases in the interest rate.
Private respondents’ assent to the increases cannot be implied from their lack of
response to the letters sent by PNB, informing them of the increases. For as stated in
one case, no one receiving a proposal to change a contract is obliged to answer the
proposal.
Any modification in the contract, such as the interest rates, must be made with the
consent of the contracting parties.The minds of all the parties must meet as to the
proposed modification, especially when it affects an important aspect of the agreement.
In the case of loan agreements, the rate of interest is a principal condition, if not the most
important component. Thus, any modification thereof must be mutually agreed upon;
otherwise, it has no binding effect. The interest rates imposed and indicated in the 2nd
up to the 26th Promissory Notes are DECLARED NULL AND VOID, and such notes shall
instead be subject to interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum up to June
30, 2013, and starting July 1, 2013, six percent (6%) per annum until full satisfaction.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 635
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PRO-GUARD SECURITY SERVICES CORPORATION vs. TORMIL REALTY AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 176341, July 7, 2014
DOCTRINE: In such a case, the date of unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.
FACTS:
Manuel A.Torres, Jr., (Manuel)assigned to respondent Tormil Realty and
Development Corporation (Tormil) three parcels of land and all the improvements
thereon in exchange for shares of stock in the said corporation.Despite the assignment,
however, title to the real properties remained in Manuel’s name as he neither registered
the transaction in the Registry of Deeds nor provided Tormil the necessary documents to
have the titles over the properties transferred inits name. Later,Manuel unilaterally
revoked the transaction.Subsequently, Manuel, together with two other persons, one of
whom is Edgardo Pabalan (Edgardo), established Torres Pabalan Realty, Incorporated
(Torres-Pabalan).Tormil filed a case before the Securities and Exchange Commission to
compel Manuel to fulfill his obligation by turning over the documents necessary to effect
the registration and transfer of titles in its name of the properties assigned to it by
Manuel.
Meanwhile, Edgardo continued to actas the administrator of Torres Building
allegedly on behalf of Torres-Pabalan. He then set up a law office with Atty. Augustus
Cesar Azura (Augustus) in the 2nd floor of the building. Torres Building was thereafter
declared by Torres-Pabalan for tax purposes. The SEC rendered judgment in favor of
Tormil,and this was later affirmed by the SEC en banc.Manuel appealed to the CA.
During the pendency thereof, Pro-Guard entered into an agreement with Edgardo for the
rentof a unit in the 3rd floor of Torres Building. Tormil sent lettersto Edgardo and
Augustus (for the law office) and Pro-Guard asking them to validate their
possession/enter into a lease contract with Tormil and at the same time settle their past
and current rentals. Since these letters were ignored, Tormilsent them separate
demands to vacate the premises and pay the monthly rental from the time of their
occupation thereof untilthe same are actually turned over to Tormil. The same was
ignored thus Tormil filed an ejectment suit before the MeTC. The MeTC ruled in favor of
Tormil. The RTC and the CA affirmed the same.
Pro-Guard stresses that the CA erred in affirming the lower courts’ award of
₱20,000.00 monthly rental reckoned from the time it occupied the unit. It contends that it
cannot be blamed if it relied on the representations of Torres-Pabalan when it entered
into a lease contract with it, the latter being then in possession of the building. Pro-Guard
maintains that in any case, it owes no unpaid rentals to Tormil for the entire period of its
stay in the building out of Tormil’s tolerance. On the other hand, Tormil argues that
Pro-Guard’s stay ‘out of tolerance’ does not bar it from claiming arrears from the time the
latter occupied a unit in the building. It contends that the demand to vacate was not for
the purpose of counting the reckoning period for payment of rental arrears, but only for
the purpose of counting the prescriptive period to file a case for unlawful detainer.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tormil is entitled to collect the rentals from Pro-Guard
HELD:
Yes.
While indeed Tormil, as the victor in the unlawful detainer suit, is entitled to the fair
rental value for the use and occupation of the unit in the building, such compensation
should not be reckoned from the time Pro-Guard began to occupy the same, but from the
time of the demand to vacate. "In unlawful detainer cases, the defendant is necessarily in
prior lawful possession of the property but his possession eventually becomes unlawful
upon termination or expiration of his right to possess."In other words, the entry is legal
but the possession thereafter became illegal. With regard to the effects of withdrawal of
tolerance, it is settled that:
A person who occupies the land ofanother at the latter’s tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. His status is analogous to that of
a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy
continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the date of unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possessionis to be counted from the date of the
demand to vacate.
The allegation in the complaint for ejectment that Tormil initiated the same not
because of non-payment of rentals, but because of withdrawal of tolerance. Tolerance or
"toleration isdefined as ‘the act or practice ofpermitting or enduring something not wholly
approved of,"while tolerated acts are "those which by reason of neighborliness or
familiarity, the owner of the property allowshis neighbor or another person to do on the
property; they are generally those particular services or benefits which one’s property
can give to another without material injury or prejudice to the owner, who permitsthem
out of friendship or courtesy."
Pro-Guard is to pay for the fair and reasonable rental of the premises in the
amount of ₱20,000.00 per month with legal interest beginning of the demand to vacate
up to the time that the premises are fully vacated.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 637
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
OWEN PROSPER A. MACKAY vs.SPOUSES DANA CASWELL and CERELINA
CASWELL
G.R. No. 183872 November 17, 2014

DOCTRINE: Art. 1715 of the New civil code The contractor shall execute the work in
such a manner that it has the qualities agreed upon and has no defects which destroy or
lessen its value or fitness for its ordinary or stipulated use.

FACTS:
In their search for someone who could provide electrical installation service in
their newly built home in San Narciso, Zambales, the Caswells asked the sole distributor
of electricity in the area, ZambalesII Electric Cooperative (Zameco II), thru its sub-office
manager, Engr. Victor Pulangco (Engr. Pulangco), how much its service for the
installation would be. Engr. Pulangco quoted an estimate of ₱456,000.00. However, the
Caswells hired Owen who offered to do the job for only ₱250,000.00. With the help of
Cesar Badua (Badua) and Albert Galeng, Owen claimed that the installation was
completed and ready for power service connection as of August 1998. At Cerelina
Caswell’s (Cerelina) request, Zameco II inspected the installation work and tested the
distribution transformers.The inspection showed the defects which lead him to spend
Php53,805.00 to rectify the mistakes in the construction made by the petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Owen Mackay may be held liable for the reconstruction and repair
of the electrical installations.

HELD:
Yes, Owen failed to execute his work in such a manner that it has no defects
which destroy or lessen its value or fitness for its ordinary or stipulated use. Owen insists
that as far as he is concerned, he had done what was required of him. i.e., the installation
of electrical materials in the Caswell home. Anent the permits, he avers that securing the
same is not part of his work but is the responsibility of the Caswells. Considering all the
undisputed facts, the Court, however, finds that the Caswells were not only after
securing permits, but the installation of an electrical system. They suffered other major
problems as shown by their narration.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 638
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
First Optima Realty Corporation vs. Securitron Security Services, Inc.,
G.R. No. 199648, January 28, 2015

DOCTRINE: in a potential sale transaction, the prior payment of earnest money even
before the property owner can agree to sell his property is irregular, and cannot be used
to bind the owner to the obligations of a seller under an otherwise perfected contract of
sale.

FACTS:
The petitioner looking to expand business and add to its existing offices,
respondent –through its General Manager, Antonio Eleazar (Eleazar) sent a letter to the
petitioner offering to purchase the subject property at P6,000.00 per square meter. A
series of telephone calls ensued, but only between Eleazar and Young’s secretary;
Eleazar likewise personally negotiated with a certain Maria Remoso (Remoso), who was
an employee of petitioner. At this point, Eleazar was unable to personally negotiate with
Young or the petitioner’s board of directors. Subsequently, Eleazer went directly to First
Optima’s office offering to pay the property in cash which he brought with him, but Young
refused to accept the payment, averring that she still need to secure her sister’s advice.
She also informed him that prior approval of the Board of Directors is required for the
sale. Eleazar then told her he will await the approval.

On February 4, 2005, respondent sent a Letter of even date to petitioner. It was


accompanied by Philippine National Bank Check No. 24677, issued for P100,000.00 and
made payable to petitioner. The check was eventually deposited with and credited to
petitioner’s bank account Thereafter, respondent through counsel demanded in writing
that petitioner proceed with the sale of the property.

Because of the refusal of First Optima to sell the property, Securitron then filed a
complaint for specific performance with damages to compel First Optima to proceed with
the sale of the property. In the Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, First Optima
denied that it agreed to sell the subject property; that its board of directors did not
authorize the sale thereof to respondent, as no corresponding board resolution to such
effect was issued; that the P100,000.00 check payment cannot be considered as earnest
money for the subject property, since said payment was merely coursed through
petitioner’s receiving clerk, who was forced to accept the same; and that respondent was
simply motivated by a desire to acquire the subject property at any cost.

After trial, the RTC ruled in favour of Securitron and opined that there was a
perfected contract of sale between the parties. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
decision, hence First Optima filed the instant petition for review on certiorari to assail the
CA ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a perfected contract of sale between First Optima and
Securitron.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 639
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
The Court grants the Petition. It cannot be denied that there were negotiations
between the parties conducted after the respondent’s December 9, 2004 letter-offer and
prior to the February 4, 2005 letter. These negotiations culminated in a meeting
between Eleazar and Young whereby the latter declined to enter into an agreement and
accept cash payment then being tendered by the former. Instead, Young informed
Eleazar during said meeting that she still had to confer with her sister and petitioner’s
board of directors; in turn, Eleazar told Young that respondent shall await the necessary
approval.

In the present case, the parties never got past the negotiation stage. Nothing
shows that the parties had agreed on any final arrangement containing the essential
elements of a contract of sale, namely, (1) consent or the meeting of the minds of the
parties; (2) object or subject matter of the contract; and (3) price or consideration of the
sale.

Since there is no perfected sale between the parties, respondent had no


obligation to make payment through the check; nor did it possess the right to deliver
earnest money to petitioner in order to bind the latter to a sale. As contemplated under
Art. 1482 of the Civil Code, “there must first be a perfected contract of sale before we can
speak of earnest money.” “Where the parties merely exchanged offers and
counter-offers, no contract is perfected since they did not yet give their consent to such
offers. Earnest money applies to a perfected sale.”

In a potential sale transaction, the prior payment of earnest money even before
the property owner can agree to sell his property is irregular, and cannot be used to bind
the owner to the obligations of a seller under an otherwise perfected contract of sale; to
cite a well-worn cliché, the carriage cannot be placed before the horse. The property
owner-prospective seller may not be legally obliged to enter into a sale with a
prospective buyer through the latter’s employment of questionable practices which
prevent the owner from freely giving his consent to the transaction; this constitutes a
palpable transgression of the prospective seller’s rights of ownership over his property,
an anomaly which the Court will certainly not condone. An agreement where the prior
free consent of one party thereto is withheld or suppressed will be struck down, and the
Court shall always endeavor to protect a property owner’s rights against devious
practices that put his property in danger of being lost or unduly disposed without his prior
knowledge or consent.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 640
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Rodolfo S. Aguilar vs. Edna G. Siasat
G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015

DOCTRINE: filiation may be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public


document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and
such due recognition in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required.

FACTS:
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses)
died, intestate and without debts. Included in their estate are two parcels of land.
Petitioner Aguilar filed with the RTC of Bacolod City a civil case for mandatory injunction
with damages against respondent Siasat and alleged that petitioner is the only son and
sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that the petitioner discovered that the subject
titles were missing, and thus he suspected that someone from the Siasat clan could have
stolen the same.

In her Answer,respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole surviving
heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised by' the Aguilar spouses
out of generosity and kindness; that petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the
Aguilar spouses; that since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife, Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar, the latter inherited the conjugal share of the former; that upon the death
of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, her brothers and sisters inherited her estate as she had no
issue; and that the subject titles were not stolen, but entrusted to her for safe.eeping by
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner can prove filiation to the Spouse Aguilar by presenting
Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1.

HELD:
Yes. As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the
requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172
of the Family Code. By itself, said document constitutes an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live
Birth since all the records covering the period 1945-1946, when he was born, of the
Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed, which necessitated the introduction
of other documentary evidence, particularly Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 to prove
filiation. It was erroneous for the CA to treat said document as mere proof of open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under the second paragraph of
Article 172of the Family Code. It is evidence of filiation under the first paragraph thereof,
the same being an express recognition in a public instrument.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 641
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Alex Ortega Tioncovs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 192284, March 11, 2015

DOCTRINE: The failure of the arresting officers to strictly comply with the law is not fatal
and will not render the accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination
of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

FACTS:
At around 3: 45 in the afternoon of July 24, 2002, PO1 Joel G. Sta. Maria and PO1
Fernando Reyes were conducting an anti-criminality patrol in Parola Compound, Tondo,
Manila. From a distance of about three meters, they saw petitioner holding and
examining a plastic sachet with white crystalline substance believed to be shabu. They
approached petitioner and after ascertaining the contents of the plastic sachet,
confiscated the same. Petitioner was arrested, told of his alleged violation, and apprised
of his constitutional rights. Thereupon, petitioner and the confiscated plastic sachet were
brought to the police station where the seized item was marked by PO1 Garcia for
investigation and disposition. PO1 Garcia prepared a letter request for the examination
of the substance found inside the plastic sachet by the WPD Crime Laboratory. Together
with PO1 Sta. Maria, PO1 Garcia then brought the seized item to the crime laboratory,
which after examination by P/Insp. Macapagal, was found to be positive for
metamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

Petitioner denied the charges against him. He recounted that in the morning of
July 24, 2002, he was sitting in from of his uncle’s house when policemen approached
and arrested him. When he asked them why he was being arrested, he was merely told
to follow their instructions. He was brought to the Police Station 2 where he was frisked
but nothing illegal was found on him. He was detained after being informed that he
violated the law pertaining to drugs. PO1 Sta. Maria demanded P 6,000.000 from him in
exchange for his release but no money was forthcoming.

The RTC found the petitioner guilty of the crime of violation of Section 11 (3), Art.
II of RA 9165. On appeal, the CA found the elements of illegal possession of dangerous
drug present in the case. It accorded the police officers the presumption of regularity in
the performance of their duties since they were not impelled by the improper motive of
imputing the crime against petitioner. It also upheld the integrity and evidentiary value of
the confiscated item after observing that its chain of custody was duly established.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution’s evidence was able to discharge the burden of
proof notwithstanding the apprehending team’s failure to prove the integrity and identity
of the alleged confiscated shabu.

HELD:

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 642
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Failure to conduct physical inventory and the fact that no photograph of the seized
item was taken did not convince the Court to rule in favour of the Accused-Petitioner. It
reiterated that it has already ruled in several cases that the failure of the arresting officers
to strictly comply with the law is not fatal and will not render the accused’s arrest illegal or
the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.

What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the


evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination
of the guilt or innocence of the accused.The prosecution in this case was able to
establish through testimonial, documentary and object evidence the elements to
establish the crime charged.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 643
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Republic of the Philippines vs. Spouses Dante and Lolita Benigno
G.R. No. 205492, March 11, 2015

DOCTRINE: The State will not be allowed to abdicate its authority over lands of the
public domain just because its agents and officers have been negligent in the
performance of their duties.

FACTS:
Spouses Dante and Lolita Benigno (respondents, collectively) filed with the RTC
of Calamba, Laguna an Application for Registration of title under Presidential Decree No.
1529 or the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529) to a 293-square meter lot in
Barangay BatongMalake, Los Baños, Laguna.

Petitioner filed an appeal. The CA directed petitioner to file its appellant’s brief
within 45 days from receipt of the notice. On June 22, 2012, petitioner filed a Motion for
Extension of time to file its brief. It sought an extension of 60 days from June 21, 2012,
or until August 20, 2012, within which to file the same. In a Resolution25 dated June 26,
2012, the CA required petitioner to comment on respondents’ Manifestation and Motion
to Suspend Proceedings. It likewise granted petitioner’s Motion for Extension.

On August 17, 2012, petitioner filed a second Motion for Extension of time to file
its appellant’s brief, praying for an extension of 30 days from August 20, 2012, or until
September 19, 2012, within which to file its brief.However, petitioner did not file its brief
within the period stated in its second motion for extension. Thus, on October 9, 2012,
the CA issued another Resolution denying petitioner’s second motion for extension and
dismissing its appeal pursuant to Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure (Rules).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals gravely erred on a question of law when it
ordered the dismissal of the appeal although the delay in the filing of the appellant’s brief
was caused by the trial court and the respondents.

HELD:
The Court finds for petitioner.It is truethat the power conferred upon the CA to
dismiss an appeal for failure to file an appellant’s brief is discretionary. We likewise
agree with the CA’s application of Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Rules. Indeed, petitioner
took its liberties in the prosecution of its appeal, filing at least three motions for extension
of time before finally turning in its appellant’s brief, and taking the demeanor consistent
with expecting that each motion for extension of time would be granted.

However, while petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, was
admittedly ornery in the prosecution of its case, it is nonetheless true that “[a]s a matter
of doctrine, illegal acts of government agents do not bind the State,” and “the
Government is never estopped from questioning the acts of its officials, more so if they
are erroneous, let alone irregular.” This principle applies in land registration cases.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 644
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Certainly, the State will not be allowed to abdicate its authority over lands of the public
domain just because its agents and officers have been negligent in the performance of
their duties.

Therefore, even if the Office of the Solicitor General was remiss in the handling of
the State’s appeal, we nevertheless cannot allow respondents’ application for
registration since they failed to prove that the land applied for is alienable and disposable
public land.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 645
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Republic of the Philippines vs. Huang Te Fu
G.R. No. 200983, March 18, 2015

DOCTRINE: An applicant for naturalization must show full and complete compliance with
the requirements of the naturalization law; otherwise, his petition for naturalization will be
denied.

FACTS:
Huang Te Fu, a.k.a. Robert Uy, a Chinese businessman allegedly engaged in the
business of manufacturing zippers, married to Irene D. Chan, and born in Taiwan, filed a
petition for naturalisation with RTC of Quezon City. Highlights of his petition to prove
compliance with C.A. 473 are the following:he had resided continuously in the
Philippines for 23 years; received primary, secondary and tertiary education in Philippine
schools; and he derive a monthly income of P15,000.00 from their family business of
manufacturing zippers.

After trial, the RTC granted the petition for naturalisation filed by Huang, hence
the OSG appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its brief, the OSG pointed to the following
disqualifications warranting the reversal of Huang’s grant of naturalisation: he does not
own real estate in the Philippines; he does not possess a lucrative trade or profession,
and is not even included in the payroll of the company; does not have sufficient
monthly income since he merely receives salary from the family corporation which is not
even sufficient for his family, much less lucrative; in a Deed of Sale executed on August,
2001 for a parcel of land in Antipolo City, Huang signed in the Deed of Sale and falsely
misrepresented himself as a Filipino, exhibiting his lack of good moral character; and, his
income tax returns for the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 reveal that his actual monthly
income differs from his monthly income as declared in his petition for naturalization,
leading to the conclusion that either he is evading taxes or concealing the truth regarding
his income; and, on cross-examination by petitioner, he could not cite any of the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution which he is supposed to believe in. In
his Comment, Huang alleged that he merely signed and did not prepare the Deed of
Sale; he does not prepare his income tax returns; most of his expenses are taken care of
by his parents who own the corporation; his failure to cite particular principles underlying
the Philippine Constitution were brought about by his not having been confronted about
it.

The CA denied the OSG’s appeal hence, the OSG elevated the case to the
Supreme Court on petition for review via certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the grant of Philippine citizenship to Huang was proper.

HELD:
Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law or CA 473 requires, among others,
that an applicant for naturalization must be of good moral character and must have some

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 646
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation. In regard to the requirement
that the applicant must have a known lucrative trade, this ponente declared:

Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of “some known lucrative trade,


profession, or lawful occupation” means “not only that the person having the employment
gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment
gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his
expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of
unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one’s becoming the object
of charity or a public charge.” His income should permit “him and the members of his
family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of
living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our
civilization.”

Moreover, it has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative income,
the courts should consider only the applicant’s income; his or her spouse’s income
should not be included in the assessment. The spouse’s additional income is
immaterial “for under the law the petitioner should be the one to possess ‘some known
lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation’ to qualify him to become a Filipino
citizen.” Lastly, the Court has consistently held that the applicant’s qualifications must be
determined as of the time of the filing of his petition.

From the above, it may be concluded that there is no basis for the CA finding that
respondent is engaged in a lucrative trade. Indeed, his supposed income of
P15,000.00 to P18,000.00 per month as found by the CA is not enough for the support of
his family. By his own admission, most of his family’s daily expenses are still
shouldered by his parents who own the zipper manufacturing business which employs
him. This simply means that respondent continues to be a burden to, and a charge
upon, his parents; he lives on the charity of his parents. He cannot support his own
family on his own.

Indeed, it is even doubtful that respondent is carrying on a trade at all. He


admitted during trial that he was not even listed or included in the payroll of his family’s
zipper business. If this is the case, then he may not be considered an employee
thereof. One of the most effective pieces of evidence to prove employment – aside
from the employment contract itself and other documents such as daily time records –
is a worker’s inclusion in the payroll. With this admitted fact, one may not be faulted for
believing that respondent’s alleged employment in his family’s zipper business was
contrived for the sole purpose of complying with the legal requirements prior to obtaining
Philippine citizenship.

On the other hand, even assuming that respondent was indeed employed by his
parents, his non-inclusion in the payroll for all the years he has worked in his parents’
businesssuggests – as correctly argued by petitioner – an intent to evade taxes or to
conceal the true nature of his employment and the amount of his salary or income. It is
concealment of the truth; an attempt to circumvent with impunity the tax laws, labor laws

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 647
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
relative to the employment of aliens, and other laws that would otherwise regulate
respondent’s actions during his stay in this country. Indeed, without payroll records, it
can never be said that respondent works for his parents’ zipper business. If such is the
case, then respondent is not required to state in his income tax return – as is the case –
his employer and what he actually receives as salary therefrom; he is free to
conveniently declare any amount of income in his tax returns.

Moreover, respondent’s admitted false declaration under oath contained in the


August 2001 deed of sale that he is a Filipino citizen – which he did to secure the
seamless registration of the property in the name of his wife – is further proof of
respondent’s lack of good moral character. It is also a violation of the constitutional
prohibition on ownership of lands by foreign individuals.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 648
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Republic of the Philippines vs. Federico Daclan, et.al
G.R. No. 197115/197267, March 23, 2015

DOCTRINE: As a general rule, rights and obligations derived from contract are
transmissible.

FACTS:
Sometime in May 1972, the Agoo Breeding Station (or “breeding station”) was
established by the Department of Agriculture, through the Bureau of Animal Industry
(BAI), Region I, for the purpose of breeding cattle that would be distributed to the
intended beneficiaries pursuant to the livelihood program of the national government.
In support of the said project, plaintiffs6 executed four (4) documents denominated as
Deed of Donation in favor of defendant Republic of the Philippines (or “Republic”)
donating to the latter four (4) parcels of land.

The donation was subject to the conditions that these parcels of land 1) shall be
used solely for the establishment of a breeding station, and 2) shall not be used for any
other purpose, except with the previous consent of the donors or their heirs.

Sometime in 1991, the powers and functions of certain government agencies,


including those of the Department of Agriculture (DA), were devolved to the local
government units pursuant to Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the “Local
Government Code”. Thus, defendant Province of La Union (or “Province”) assumed the
powers and functions of the DA, in the operation of the breeding station. In particular, the
deeds of donation8 stipulated – a.That the land herein mentioned shall be used for the
establishment of a breeding station and shall not be used for any other purpose, except
with the previous consent of the DONOR or his heirs; c.That in case of non-use,
abandonment or cessation of the activities of the BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY,
possession or ownership shall automatically revert to the DONOR and all permanent
improvements existing thereon shall become the property of the DONOR;

All in all, the petitioners in G.R. No. 197267 – Federico Daclan, Josefina Collado,
Teodoro Daclan, Jose Daclan (the Daclans) – and several others donated around 13
hectares of land to the Republic. The uniform deeds of donation covering these parcels
of land contained the same conditions, including the above stipulations relative to
exclusive purpose/use and automatic reversion. Sometime after the donations were
made, the La Union Medical Center (LUMC) was constructed on a 1.5-hectare portion of
the 13-hectare donated property.

In a September 4, 2003 Letter to the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture,


the Daclans and other donors demanded the return of their donated lands on the ground
that the breeding station has ceased operations and that the land has been abandoned.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner violated the provisions of the deeds of donation.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 649
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
The preponderance of evidence points to the fact that the breeding station
remained operational even after its transfer from the Republic to the Province. The
activities of the BAI did not cease even after it was dissolved after the government
adopted the policy of devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991; these
activities were merely transferred to the Province. Thus, the witnesses for the Daclans
and the Republic uniformly declared that the breeding station remained operational even
after the Local Government Code of 1991 was put into effect. Particularly, Regional
Director ReinerioBelarmino, Jr. of the Department of Agriculture, Region 1 declared that
after the breeding station was transferred to the Province, he saw upon ocular inspection
that there remained six cows and fifty goats on the premises. CresenciaIsibido testified
that as Farm Foreman, she exercised supervision over her co-employees in the breeding
station; that in 1989, there were six personnel assigned at the breeding station; that from
1974 until 1989, she received her salary from the BAI; that after devolution, she started
receiving her salary from the Province; and that even after devolution, the operation of
the Agoo Breeding Station continued, and goats, cattle and swine were being maintained
thereat. Dr. Nida Gapuz, La Union Provincial Veterinarian, said that natural as well as
artificial insemination activities were being conducted at the breeding station, as well as
goat dispersal and cattle production. Atty. Mauro Cabading, La Union Provincial
Assessor, testified that he was directed by the Governor and the Provincial Administrator
to take photographs of the breeding station in order to verify the complaint filed by the
Daclans; that he then proceeded to the Agoo Breeding Station; that he took photographs
of the animals – cows and goats – therein; and that the Province owned said animals at
the breeding station.

As against the bare assertions of the Daclans that the breeding station was
abandoned and became non-operational, the testimonies of the above public officers are
credible. “In the absence of any controverting evidence, the testimonies of public
officers are given full faith and credence, as they are presumed to have acted in the
regular performance of their official duties.”

Thus, even if the BAI ceased to exist or was abolished as an office, its activities
continued when its functions were devolved to the local government units such as the
Province of La Union. It cannot be said that the deeds of donation may be nullified just
by the fact that the BAI became defunct; its functions continued in the government
offices/local government units to which said functions were devolved.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 650
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. VICTORIANO VILLAR @ Boy
G.R. No. 202708. April 13, 2015.

DOCTRINE: Damages; Loss of Earning Capacity; It is already settled jurisprudence that


“the formula that has gained acceptance over time has limited recovery to net earning
capacity; x xx [meaning], less the necessary expense for his own living.”

It is settled that the indemnity for loss of earning capacity is in the form of actual damages;
as such, it must be proved by competent proof, “not merely by the self-serving testimony
of the widow.

FACTS:
Respondents were charged with the murder of Jesus Ylarde. After it has been
sufficiently established that appellant, in conspiracy with his co-accused, treacherously
shot and killed the victim, Jesus Ylarde. Damages including Loss of Earning Capacity was
awarded to the heirs of Jesus Ylarde.

Records show that the widow of the deceased testified that her husband “has a net
income of P16,000.00 a year as farmer, sari-sari store owner, driver and operator of two
tricycles and caretaker of Hacienda Bancod.” Thus, lost earnings in the amount of
P320,000.00 was awarded computed as follows: “2/3 x (80-49)=life expectancy of 20
years . . . multiplied by the annual net income of the deceased (P16,000.00), equivalent to
P320,000.00.” However, it is also on record that the widow of the deceased subsequently
testified that “before his death, her husband earns P50.00 a day as tricycle driver and
P150.00 from their sari-sari store and had a net income of P4,000.00 a month. As a
farmer her husband produces 270 cavans of palay a year with a price of P135.00 a cavan
weighing 50 kilos.”

ISSUE:
How should the court compute the award for damages based on the loss of
earning capacity?

HELD:

Preliminarily, we note that the indemnity for lost earnings was erroneously
computed. It is already settled jurisprudence that “the formula that has gained acceptance
over time has limited recovery to net earning capacity; x xx [meaning], less the necessary
expense for his own living.” Here, the computation for lost income of P16,000.00 did not
take into consideration the deceased’s necessary expenses.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 651
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
In fine, it is settled that the indemnity for loss of earning capacity is in the form of
actual damages; as such, it must be proved by competent proof, “not merely by the
self-serving testimony of the widow.” By way of exception, damages for loss of earning
capacity may be awarded in two instances: 1) the victim was self-employed and receiving
less than the minimum wage under the current laws and no documentary evidence is
available in the decedent’s line of business; and 2) the deceased was employed as a daily
wage worker and receiving less than the minimum wage.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 652
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. CESAR C. PASICOLAN and GREGORIO C.
PASICOLAN,
G.R. No. 198543. April 15, 2015

DOCTRINE: Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Reconstitution of Titles; The absence of
opposition from government agencies is of no controlling significance, because the State
cannot be estopped bythe omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents. Nor is the
Republic barred from assailing the decision granting the petition for correction of entries
if, on the basis of the law and the evidence on record, such petition has no merit

FACTS:
Respondents argues that “no person came forward to contest the reconstitution of
the subject title even after the requirements of posting and publication have been
complied with,” in light with our ruling in Macawadib v. Philippine National Police
Directorate for Personnel and Records Management, 702 SCRA 496 (2013), thus: On the
question of whether or not respondent is estopped from assailing the decision of the RTC
for failure of the OSG, as government representative, to participate in the proceedings
before the trial court or to file an opposition to petitioner’s petition for correction of entries
in his service records.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the absence of opposition from government agencies equates to
estoppel by omission.

HELD:
No, This Court has reiterated time and again that the absence of opposition from
government agencies is of no controlling significance, because the State cannot be
estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents. Nor is the Republic
barred from assailing the decision granting the petition for correction of entries if, on the
basis of the law and the evidence on record, such petition has no merit.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 653
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. ANGELINE L. DAYAOEN, AGUSTINA TAUEL,**
andLAWANA T. BATCAGAN
G.R. No. 200773. July 8, 2015.*

DOCTRINE: The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of


the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who must prove
that the properties subjects of the application are alienable and disposable. Even the
notations on the survey plans submitted by the petitioner cannot be admitted as
evidence of the subject properties’ alienability and disposability. Such notations do not
constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the subject
properties remain part of the inalienable public domain.

FACTS:
Dayaoen (Angeline), Agustina Taule (Agustina) and Lawana Batcagan4
(Lawana) filed an Applicationfor Registration5 of three parcels of land located in
Barangay Tabangaoen, La Trinidad, Benguet. The subject parcels of land were originally
owned and possessed since prewar time by Antonio Pablo (Antonio), Antonio gave the
parcels of land in question to appellee Angeline and Dado as a wedding gift. From that
time on, they continuously occupied and possessed the properties. In 1976 and 1977,
appellee Angeline sold Lots 6 and 7 to co-appellees Agustina and Lawana, pursuant to
an Affidavit of Quitclaim and a Deed ofAbsolute Sale of a Portion of Unregistered Land,
respectively. Since 12 June 1945, appellees and their predecessorininterest have been
in public, open, exclusive, uninterrupted and continuous possession thereof in the
concept of an owner. Appellees declared the questioned properties for taxation
purposes. There was no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting the
said parcels of land.November 2007, the court a quo granted appellees’ application for
registration.

Previously, or in 1979, herein respondents Angeline, Agustina and Lawana filed a


similar application for registration of the herein subject property. The Republic opposed
the application. the application on the ground that respondents failed to prove that they
or their predecessorsininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier.

It is clear, therefore, that the applicants have satisfactorily complied with their
burden of proving “that the land subject of anapplication for registration is alienable”
considering that they have established “the existence of a positive act of the
governmentsuch as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, anadministrative
action, investigation reports of Bureau of Landsinvestigators, and a legislative act or
statute.” The certifications categorically cited Proclamation No. 209, LotA, as the basis in
attesting that the land, which is the subject of the survey and present application, is
alienable and disposable because it is inside Lot A opened by the presidential
proclamation “todisposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act.” It is incumbent
upon the State, and not the applicants, to show that the land still forms part of the public

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 654
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
domain. The State has utterly failed to overcome the presumption with the sole testimony
of Irene Leaño Caayas, which the Court does not even accord any weight and credence.

The tax declaration of applicant Angeline Dayaoen and religious payment of real
property taxes lend strong corroboration to the evidence of the applicants. The DENR
certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the contrary.

Petitioner argued that RTC erred in granting respondents’ application for


registration since they failed to prove that the subject property constitutes alienable and
disposable land.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC and CA correctly ruled in favour of the applicants?

HELD:
No. In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject
lands as required by law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect
that the said properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of
proof required by law. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action,
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.
The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied
for are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the
notation was certified by the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification
refers only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has
nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed.
Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove
that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.
InRepublic v. Roche, the Court declared that: Respecting the third requirement,
the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In this connection,
theCourt has held that he must present a certificate of land classification status issued by
the CENRO or PENRO of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and
that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or
PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.
While respondents have complied with most of the requirements in connection
with their application for registration, they have not sufficiently shown that the property
applied for is alienable and disposable at the time their application for registration was
filed. The Court is left with no alternative but to deny their application for registration. To
be sure, the nation’s interests will be best served by a strict adherence to the provisions
of the land registration laws.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 655
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LIWAYWAY ANDRES, RONNIE ANDRES, AND PABLO B. FRANCISCO v. STA.
LUCIA REALTY & DEVELOPMENT, INCORPORATED
G.R. No. 201405 August 24, 2015

DOCTRINE: Not all may demand for an easement of right-of-way. Under the law, an
easement of right-of-way may only be demanded by the owner of an immovable property
or by any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use the same.

FACTS:
Petitioners and Liza filed a Complaint for Easement of Right-of-Way against
respondent. They alleged that they are co-owners and possessors for more than 50
years of three parcels of unregistered agricultural land in Pagasa, Binangonan, Rizal
with a total area of more or less 10,500 square meters (subject property). A few years
back, however, respondent acquired the lands surrounding the subject property,
developed the same into a residential subdivision known as the Binangonan Metropolis
East, and built a concrete perimeter fence around it such that petitioners and Liza were
denied access from subject property to the nearest public road and vice versa.

In its Answer, respondent denied knowledge of any property adjoining its


subdivision owned by petitioners and Liza. At any rate, it pointed out that petitioners and
Liza failed to sufficiently allege in their complaint the existenceof the requisites for the
grant of an easement of right-of-way.

RTC ruled, that based on Article 113724 of the Civil Code,petitioners and Liza are
consideredowners of the subject property through extraordinary prescription. Having real
right over the same, therefore, they are entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way.
However, CA held that the evidence adduced by petitioners and Liza failed to sufficiently
establish their asserted ownership and possession of the subject property.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are entitled to demand an easement of right-of-way from
respondent.

HELD:
Anent petitioners’ invocation of ordinary acquisitive prescription, the Court notes
that the same was raised for the first time on appeal. Before the RTC, petitioners based
their claim of ownership on extraordinary acquisitive prescription under Article 1137 of
the Civil Code such that the said court declared them owners of the subject property by
virtue thereof in its May 22, 2006 Decision.Also with the CA, petitioners initially asserted
ownership through extraordinary acquisitive prescription. It wasonly later in their Motion
for Reconsideration39 therein that they averred that their ownership could also be based
on ordinary acquisitive prescription.Even if timely raised, such argument of petitioners,
as well as with respect to extraordinary acquisitive.

It was clarified in the Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of thePhilippines, that only
lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 656
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
public use or for the development of national wealth, or removed from the sphere of
public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private
ownership, may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring
ownership under the Civil Code. And if the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether
ordinary or extraordinary, it must first be shown that the land has already been converted
to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period. Otherwise,
Article 1113 of the Civil Code, which provides that property ofthe State not patrimonial in
character shall not be the subject of prescription, applies.

In the absence of such proof of declaration in this case, petitioners’ claim of


ownership over the subject property based on prescription necessarily crumbles.
Conversely, they cannot demand an easement of right-of-way from respondent for lack
of personality.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 657
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MOVERTRADE CORPORATION v.THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
G.R. No. 204835, September 22, 2015

DOCTRINE: Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
entered into a Contract Agreement5 for dredging and other related works in Pampanga
Bay and the primary Pasac-Guagua-San Fernando Waterways in Pampanga, which
were affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruptions and mudflows.
On August 13, 1997, due to the alleged absence of spoil sites, petitioner
requested permission from Director Soriquez to allow it to undertake side dumping
(dumping within the river) chargeable against the dredging works.
On August 18, 1997, Director Soriquez issued a letter9 denying the request. He
reminded petitioner that side dumping was not allowed and that as per the report of Engr.
Marcelino P. Bustos (Engr. Bustos), the Area Engineer of respondent DPWH, petitioner
could still pump the dredge spoils to the following spoil sites: Pascual "A," Pascual "B,"
and the Regala fishpond.
On September 29, 1997, Engr. Bustos issued a letterrequiring petitioner to
provide additional pipelines for distance pumping. Engr. Bustos also reiterated in his
letter that "Pascual spoil site can still accommodate more materials" and that
'[respondent DPWH] is not allowing or giving any instruction to use side dumping
process for whatsoever reason."
However, despite the denial and the prohibition issued by Director Soriquez and
Engr. Bustos, petitioner continued to side dump.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner's blatant defiance of the prohibition on side dumping is a
violation of the contract that should not be ignored just because petitioner was able to
complete the project.

HELD:
It is a basic principle in law that contracts have the force of law between the
parties and should be complied with in good faith.63 In this case, the contract specifically

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 658
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
provides the manner of disposing dredge spoils. Thus, petitioner cannot unilaterally
change the manner of disposal without first amending the contract or obtaining the
express consent or approval of respondent DPWH. Otherwise, petitioner would be guilty
of breaching the contract. "[A] breach occurs where the contractor inexcusably fails
to perform substantially in accordance with the terms of the contract." 64 Without a
doubt, petitioner's failure to dump the dredge spoils at the designated spoil sites
constitutes a breach.
As a last-ditch effort, petitioner for the first time claims that the dredge spoils were
not side dumped but were "freely" dumped. Petitioner's attempt to split hairs between
"side dumping" and "free dumping" is unavailing as both are not allowed under
paragraph 11 of the Contract Agreement. It makes no difference whether petitioner
performed side dumping or free dumping activities considering that in both instances,
dredge spoils are not dumped at spoil sites. What is crucial is the admission of petitioner
that it did not dump the dredge spoils at the designated spoil sites but dumped them
back into the river.65 The act of dumping dredge spoils back into the river clearly violates
paragraph 11 of the Contract Agreement.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 659
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
REYNALDO INUTAN, HELEN CARTE, NOEL AYSON, IVY CABARLE, NOELJAMILI,
MARITES HULAR, ROLITOAZUCENA, RAYMUNDO TUNOG, ROGER BERNAL,
AGUSTEV ESTRE, MARILOU SAGUN, AND ENRIQUE LEDESMA, JR. v.NAPAR
CONTRACTING & ALLIED SERVICES, NORMAN LACSAMANA, *** JONAS
INTERNATIONAL, INC., AND PHILIP YOUNG
G.R. No. 195654, November 25, 2015

DOCTRINE: A judicially approved compromise agreement has the effect and authority of
res judicata.2 It is final, binding on the parties, and enforceable through a writ of
execution. Article 2041 of the Civil Code, however, allows the aggrieved party to rescind
the compromise agreement and insist upon his original demand upon failure and refusal
of the other party to abide by the compromise agreement.
FACTS:
Petitioners Inutan, Carte, Ayson, Cabarle, Jamili, Hular, Azucena, Tunog, Bernal,
Estre, Sagun, and Ledesma were employees of respondent Napar, a recruitment agency
owned and managed by respondent Lacsamana. Napar assigned petitioners at
respondent Jonas, a corporation engaged in the manufacture of various food products
with respondent Young as its President, to work as factory workers, machine operator,
quality control inspector, selector, mixer, and warehouseman.
Sometime in September of 2002, petitioners and other co-workers (complainants)
filed before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC three separate complaints for wage
differentials, 13th month pay, overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest
day, service incentive leave pay, and unpaid emergency cost of living allowance
(ECOLA) against respondents.
On January 13, 2003, complainants and respondents entered into a Joint
Compromise Agreement which was approved by the Labor Arbiter.
In accordance with the Joint Compromise Agreement, complainants, on several
instances, reported to Napar. They were paid P7,000.00 each as part of the agreement
but were required by Napar; (1) to submit their respective bio-data/resume and several
documents such as Police Clearance, NBI Clearance, Barangay Clearance, Mayor's
Permit, Health Certificate, drug test results, community tax certificate, eye test results
and medical/physical examination results; (2) to attend orientation seminars; (3) to
undergo series of interviews; and (4) to take and pass qualifying examinations, before
they could be posted to their new assignments. These requirements, according to Napar,
are needed to properly assess complainants' skills for new placement with the agency's
other clients.
Complainants failed to fully comply, hence they were not given new assignments.
ISSUE:

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 660
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Whether Petitioners validly exercised the option of rescinding the Joint
Compromise Agreement under Article 2041 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as a contract
whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions in order to avoid litigation or put an
end to one already commenced. If judicially approved, it becomes more than a binding
contract; it is a determination of a controversy and has the force and effect of a
judgment.32 Article 227 of the Labor Code provides that any compromise settlement
voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the Bureau of Labor
Relations or the regional office of the Department of Labor and Employment shall be final
and binding upon the parties. Compromise agreements between employers and workers
have often been upheld as valid and accepted as a desirable means of settling disputes.
Thus, we have held that a compromise agreement which is not contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals or good customs is a valid contract which is the law
between the parties themselves. It has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata
even if not judicially approved, and cannot be lightly set aside or disturbed except for
vices of consent and forgery.
However, in Heirs of Zari, et al v. Santos, we clarified that the broad precept
enunciated in Art, 2037 is qualified by Art. 2041 of the same Code, which provides:
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party
may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original
demand.
We explained, viz.:
[B]efore the onset of the new Civil Code, there was no right to rescind
compromise agreements. Where a party violated the terms of a compromise agreement,
the only recourse open to the other party was to enforce the terms thereof.

When the new Civil Code came into being, its Article 2041 xxx created for the first time
the right of rescission. That provision gives to the aggrieved party the right to "either
enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand."
Article 2041 should obviously be deemed to qualify the broad precept enunciated in
Article 2037 that "[a] compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res
judicata.
In exercising the second option under Art. 2041, the aggrieved party may, if he
chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand, as if there had
never been any compromise agreement, without bringing an action for rescission. This is
because he may regard the compromise as already rescinded by the breach thereof of
the other party.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 661
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
AUGUSTO ONG TRINIDAD II, AUGUSTO ONG TRINIDAD III FOR HIMSELF AND
REPRESENTING LEVY ONG TRINIDAD AND ROHMEL ONG TRINIDAD v.SPOUSES
BONIFACIO PALAD AND FELICIDAD KAUSAPIN
G.R. No. 203397, December 09, 2015

DOCTRINE: in actions for annulment or reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it


should establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing
evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his.

FACTS:
On July 23, 1985, respondents spouses BonifacioPalad and FelicidadKausapin-
bought from Renato Ramos an eight-hectare parcel of land located within Lucena City,
Respondents later caused the subject property to be surveyed, and it was discovered
that a two-hectare portion thereof was occupied by Augusto Trinidad who converted the
same into a fishpond. On May 29, 1992, respondents filed with the RTC of Lucena City a
Complaint for recovery of possession with damages against Augusto, Augusto claimed
that respondents were not the owners of the subject property; that Felicidad secured her
title through dubious means; that the subject property formed part of a five-hectare piece
of property that was given to him by his father, Atty. Joaquin Trinidad that this
five-hectare property was acquired by his father from GenaroKausapin who was his
father's client; that said five-hectare property was declared for taxation purposes by his
father; that since 1980, he has been in possession of the five-hectare property; that he
filed criminal cases for falsification against Felicidad; and that Felicidad was motivated
by greed and bad faith in filing the case. Augusto thus prayed that the complaint be
dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, that the respondents have a better right of possession over the
disputed 2-hectare portion of the 8-hectare property by the mere fact that said disputed
portion is covered by a certificate of title in their names?
HELD:
The Court denies the Petition.
The fact is undisputed that the subject two-hectare property lies within Lot 13-C which is
registered in the name of respondents as TCT T-47318.
The evidence on record also suggests that contrary to petitioners' claim, the
subject property constitutes a portion of an eight-hectare parcel of land acquired by
respondents from Ramos by purchase in 1985, and was not the result of a June 5, 1985
deed of extrajudicial settlement and September 9, 1985 segregation agreement between

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 662
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
the original owners and respondent Felicidad. This is a finding of fact arrived at by both
the RTC and the CA - and this is admitted by petitioners in their Petition, which
specifically adopted the findings of fact of the RTC on this score.petitioners are mere
intruders with respect to the subject property; they have no right to own or possess the
same. On the other hand, as registered owners of the subject property, respondents
have the right to exercise all attributes of ownership including possession which they
cannot do while petitioners remain there.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 663
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE B. SAREÑOGON, JR.,

G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016

DOCTRINE: A petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the
proper remedy to challenge a trial court''s declaration of presumptive death under Article
41 of The Family Code of the Philippines
FACTS:
On November 4, 2008, respondent Jose B. Sarefiogon, Jr. filed a Petition before
the Regional Trial Court of Ozamiz City-Branch 15 the declaration of presumptive death
of his wife, Netchie S. Sareñogon Jose testified that he first met Netchie in Clarin,
Misamis Occidental in 1991, They later became sweethearts and on August 10,1996,
they got married in civil rites at the Manila City Hall. However, they lived together as
husband and wife for a month only because he left to work as a seaman while Netchie
went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For three months, he did not receive any
communication from Netchie. He likewise had no idea about her whereabouts. While still
abroad, he tried to contact Netchie''s parents, but failed, as the latter had allegedly left
Clarin, Misamis Occidental. He returned home after his contract expired. He then
inquired from Netchie''s relatives and friends about her whereabouts, but they also did not
know where she was. Because of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie was
already dead. He filed the Petition before the RTC so he could contract another marriage
pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
THE ALLEGED EFFORTS OF RESPONDENT IN LOCATING HIS MISSING
WIFE DO NOT SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORT A "WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF" THAT
RESPONDENT'S ABSENT WIFE IS PROBABLY DEAD.
HELD:
This Court finds the Republic''s petition meritorious.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper
remedy to question the RTC''s Decision in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death
The "well-founded belief" requisite under Article 41 of the Family Code is
complied with only upon a showing that sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had
indeed been made to ascertain whether the absent spouse is still alive or is
already dead
Given the Court''s imposition of "strict standard" in a petition for a declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code, it must follow that there was no
basis at all for the RTC''s finding that Jose''s Petition complied with the requisites of Article

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 664
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
41 of the Family Code, in reference to the "well-founded belief standard. If anything,
Jose''s pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing Netchie are notches below the
required degree of stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For, aside from his
bare claims that he had inquired from alleged friends and relatives as to Netchie''s
whereabouts, Jose did not call to the witness stand specific individuals or persons whom
he allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the allegedly missing
Netchie.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 665
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
GIL MACALINO, JR., TERESITA MACALINO, ELPIDIO MACALINO, PILAR
MACALINO, GILBERTO MACALINO, HERMILINA MACALINO, EMMANUEL
MACALINO, EDELINA MACALINO, EDUARDO MACALINO, LEONARDO
MACALINO, EDLLANE** MACALINO, APOLLO MACALINO, MA. FE MACALINO,
AND GILDA MACALINO v. ARTEMIO PIS-AN

G.R. No. 204056, June 01, 2016

DOCTRINE: In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, it is essential that the
plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the property which is the
subject-matter of the action. Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title
means beneficial ownership. In the absence of such legal or equitable title, or interest,
there is no cloud to be prevented or removed.
FACTS
:Under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No, 2393-A, Emeterio Jumento
(Emeterio) was the owner of the half portion, and his children Hospicio Jumento
(Hospicio) and Severina Jumento (Severina) of the other half in equal shares, of Lot 3154
consisting of 469 square meters and located in Junob, Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental.
When Hospicio and Severina died single and without issue, Emeterio as their sole heir
inherited the portions pertaining to them and thus became the owner of the whole lot.
Subsequently, Emeterio also passed away.Apparently, the City of Dumaguete built in the
1950's a barangay road which cut across said lot. As a result, Lot 3154 was divided into
three portions, to wit: the portion which was converted into a barangayroad and the
portions on both sides of said barangay road.
ISSUE:
Who between the parties have the better right over the land in dispute?
HELD:
There is no merit in the Petition.
It is necessary to determine the true intention of the parties to the instruments
relevant to this case.Petitioners, in order to further their case, rely on the failure of the
Absolute Sale to state that the 207-square meter portion conveyed by Artemio and his co-
heirs to the spouses Sillero was Lot 3154-A. Artemio, on the other hand, puts emphasis
on the fact that the Deed of Sale between Gil and the spouses Sillero expressly stated
that the lot subject of the sale was Lot 3154-A only.The subject of the sale between
Artemio and his co-heirs and the spouses Sillero was Lot 3154-A only.As mentioned, the
Absolute Sale did not specifically indicate that Artemio and his co-heirs were conveying to
the spouses Sillero Lot 3154-A, It simply stated that they were selling to the said spouses
a 207-square meter portion of Lot 3154.Since what the spouses Sillero bought from

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 666
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Artemio and his co-heirs was Lot 3154-A, it logically follows that what they sold to Gil was
the same and exact property.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 667
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LUZ S. NICOLAS vs. LEONORA C. MARIANO
G.R. No. 201070, August 01, 2016

DOCTRINE: When both parties are in pari delicto or in equal fault, none of them may
expect positive relief from the courts in the interpretation of their agreement; instead, they
shall be left as they were at the time the case was filed.

FACTS:
The subject of the instant controversy is the one-half portion of a 155-square meter
parcel of land which is part of the National Housing Authority's (NHA) Bagong Barrio
Project and built thereon is Leonora Mariano's five-unit apartment which she leases out to
tenants. Leonora Mariano filed with the NHA Application No. 99-02-0323 for a land grant
under the Bagong Barrio Project. In 1978, the NHA approved the Application, thus, her
institution as grantee of the foregoing parcel of land. The grant, however, is subject to a
mortgage.

On January 28, 1998, Leonora Mariano obtained a P100,000.00 loan from


petitioner Luz Nicolas with a payment term often (10) months at the monthly interest rate
of 7%. To secure the loan, she executed a Mortgage Contract over the subject property,
comprising the one-half portion of the parcel of land. Leonora Mariano, having defaulted
in the payment of her obligation, executed in favor of Luz Nicolas a second mortgage
deed denominated as Sanglaan ng Lupa at Bahay, this time mortgaging the subject
property and the improvements thereon for a consideration of P552,000.00 inclusive of
the original loan of P100,000.00. The Sanglaan ng Lupa at Bahay provides for a payment
term of one (1) year.

On June 7, 2000, Leonora Mariano, similarly defaulting on the second obligation,


executed a deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property, conveying to Luz Nicolas the
ownership of the subject property and the improvements thereon for a purchase price of
P600,000.00. A document denominated Pagtanggap ng Kabuang Halaga, executed
before Punong Barangay Crispin C. Peña, Sr. attested to the full payment of the
P600,000.00 to Leonora Mariano. It appears that from June 1999, the tenants of Leonora
Mariano's five-unit apartment have been remitting monthly rentals to Luz Nicolas in the
amount of P2,000.00, or P10,000.00 in the aggregate. From said period until June 2004,
Luz Nicolas' rental collection amounted to P600,000.00.

On July 8, 2004, Mariano sued Nicolas before the RTC of Caloocan City and
sought to be released from the second mortgage agreement and stop Nicolas from
further collecting upon her credit through the rentals from her apartments, claiming that
she has fully paid her debt. In her Answer, Nicolas denied that she collected rentals from
Mariano's apartments; that Mariano's debt remained unpaid; that the subject property and
the improvements thereon were later sold to her via a deed of absolute sale executed by
Mariano which, however, did not bear the written consent of the latter's husband; and that
as a result of the sale, she obtained the right to collect the rentals from the apartment
tenants. After trial, the trial court ruled in favor of Marano and inclined to believe that what
had been entered into by and between the parties was a mere contract of mortgage of

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
real property and not a sale of real property. The Court could not uphold the validity of the
Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property dated June 7, 2000 because it is tainted with
flaws and defects.

Nicolas filed an appeal before the CA and maintained that the Absolute Sale of
Real Property is valid. The CA agreed with the RTC in declaring the Absolute Sale of Real
Property invalid, but cannot uphold that the invalidity thereof due to lack of the essential
requisites of consent, object, and consideration. The CA declared the Absolute Sale of
Real Property is invalid on the ground that Leonora Mariano, the supposed vendor of the
subject property, is not the owner thereof. For a sale to be valid, it is imperative that the
vendor is the owner of the property sold. Leonora Mariano, being not the owner of the
subject property, both the Mortgage Contract and the Sanglaan ng Lupa at Bahay she
executed are void ab initio. For a person to validly constitute a mortgage on real estate,
he must be the absolute owner of the property mortgaged as required by Article 2085 of
the New Civil Code. Otherwise stated, the mortgagor must be the owner of the property
subject of the mortgage; otherwise, the mortgage is void.

ISSUE:
Whether the deed of sale over the subject property between the parties is valid and
binding.

HELD:

While title is in the name of Mariano, she has not completed her installment
payments to NHA; this fact is not disputed, and as a matter of fact, Mariano admits it.
Indeed, Mariano even goes so far as to concede, in her Comments and Opposition to the
Petition, that she is not the owner of the subject property. Thus, if she never became the
owner of the subject property, then she could not validly mortgage and sell the same to
Nicolas. The principle nemo dat quod non habetcertainly applies.

By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document.


Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of land under the
mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be
disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best
proof of ownership of a piece of land. Besides, the certificate cannot always be
considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.

Indeed, the Torrens system of land registration "merely confirms ownership and
does not create it. It cannot be used to divest lawful owners of their title for the purpose of
transferring it to another one who has not acquired it by any of the modes allowed or
recognized by law."

Nicolas is charged with knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the subject


property. The original owner's copy of TCT No. C-44249 is not in Mariano's possession,
and the latter could only present a photocopy thereof to her. Before one could part with his
money as mortgagee or buyer of real property, it is only natural to demand to be

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 669
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
presented with the original owner's copy of the certificate of title covering the same.
Secondly, Entry No. 98464/C-39393 on the dorsal side of TCT No. C-44249 constitutes
sufficient warning as to the subject property's condition at the time. In other words,TCT
No. C-44249 was not a clean title, and if Nicolas exercised diligence, she would have
discovered that Mariano was delinquent in her installment payments to the NHA, which in
turn would have generated the necessary conclusion that the property belonged to the
said government agency.

Mariano cannot recover damages on account of her claimed losses arising from
her entering into contract with Nicolas. Realizing that she is not the owner of the subject
property and knowing that she has not fully paid the price therefor, she is as guilty as
Nicolas for knowingly mortgaging and thereafter selling what is not hers. As correctly held
by the CA, both parties herein are not in good faith; they are deemed in pari delicto or in
equal fault, and for this, "[n]either one may expect positive relief from courts of justice in
the interpretation of their contract. The courts will leave them as they were at the time the
case was filed."

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 670
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
CONCHITA A SONLEY vs. ANCHOR SAVINGS BANK/EQUICOM SAVINGS BANK
G.R. No. 205623August 10, 2016

DOCTRINE: The main purpose of a compromise agreement is to put an end to litigation


because of the uncertainty that may arise from it. Once the compromise is perfected, the
parties are bound to abide by it in good faith. Should a party fail or refuse to comply with
the terms of a compromise or amicable settlement, the other party could either enforce
the compromise by a writ of execution or regard it as rescinded and so insist upon his/her
original demand.

FACTS:
The petitioner filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of rescission of contract
and damages in the trial court against Anchor Savings Bank, a thrift banking institution
whose business name was later changed to Equicom Savings Bank. Petitioner alleged
thatshe agreed to purchase a real property from Anchor for the sum of Php2,200,000.00.
The said real property pertained to a parcel of land that had been foreclosed by Anchor.
Pursuant to the said agreement, the parties entered into a Contract to Sell whereby the
petitioner agreed to pay the amount of Php200,000.00 asdownpaymentwith the balance
ofPhp2,000,000.00 payable in 60 monthly installments amounting to Php47,580.00.
Petitioner defaulted in paying her monthly obligations which prompted [Anchor] to rescind
the contract to sell. In filing the complaint, petitioner averred that the rescission of the
contract to sell was null and void because she had already substantially paid her
obligation to the bank. In its Answer,Anchor contended that the post-dated checks which
were issued by the petitioner in its favor covering the monthly installments for the
purchase of the subject property were all dishonored by the drawee bank when they were
presented for payment. After the issuance of a Pre-Trial Order by the trial court, the
parties agreed to an amicable settlement and entered into a Compromise Agreement. On
the basis thereof, the trial court rendered a Judgment whereby the petitioner agreed to
repurchase the subject property from [Anchor. However, Anchor later on filed a
Manifestation and Motion for Execution in the trial court claiming that petitioner had not
been paying the agreed monthly installments in accordance with the compromise
agreement. Thus, [Anchor] prayed that a writ of execution be issued by the trial court in its
favor ordering: (1) that the contract to sell that was entered into between the parties be
rescinded; (2) that [Anchor] be allowed to apply all the payments that were made to it by
the petitioner as rentals; and (3) that petitioner immediately vacate the subject property.
The said motion was granted.

Before the CA, it ruled against the petitioner and held that petitioner’s failure to
abide by the terms and conditions of the Compromise Agreement, which had the force
and effect of a final and executory judgment when it was approved by the trial court in its
August 16, 2010 Judgment, authorized the enforcement thereof by execution, and thus
the trial court may not be faulted for granting respondent’s motion for execution and
directing the issuance of the corresponding writ.

ISSUE:

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 671
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Whether that the trial court had no power to issue a writ of execution in Civil Case
No. 09-217 as the issuance thereof was not authorized and specifically provided for in its
August 16, 2010 Judgment.

HELD:
No. Under Article 2041 of the Civil Code, "(i)f one of the parties fails or refuses to
abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it
as rescinded and insist upon his original demand." "The language of this Article 2041 x x
x denotes that no action for rescission is required x x x, and that the party aggrieved by
the breach of a compromise agreement may, if he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or
involved in his original demand, as if there had never been any compromise agreement,
without bringing an action for rescission thereof. He need not seek a judicial declaration of
rescission, for he may ‘regard’ the compromise agreement already ‘rescinded’." 19 This
principle was reiterated in a subsequent case, thus:
In the case of Leonor v. Sycip, the Supreme Court (SC) had the occasion to
explain this provision of law. It ruled that Article 2041 does not require an action for
rescission, and the aggrieved party, by the breach of compromise agreement, may
just consider it already rescinded, to wit:
It is worthy of notice, in this connection, that, unlike Article 2039 of
the same Code, which speaks of "a cause of annulment or rescission of the
compromise" and provides that "the compromise may be annulled r
rescinded" for the cause therein specified, thus suggesting an action for
annulment or rescission, said Article 2041 confers upon the party
concerned, not a "cause" for rescission, or the right to "demand" the
rescission of a compromise, but the authority, not only to "regard it as
rescinded", but, also, to "insist upon his original demand". The language of
this Article 2041, particularly when contrasted with that of Article
2039, denotes that no action for rescission is required in said Article
2041, and that the party aggrieved by the breach of a compromise
agreement may, if he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or
involved in his original demand, as if there had never been any
compromise agreement, without bringing an action for rescission
thereof. He need not seek a judicial declaration of rescission, for he
may "regard" the compromise agreement already "rescinded".

The parties’ Compromise Agreement states that –


(c) Penalty. In case of failure of the plaintiff to pay, for any reason whatsoever, the amount
provided in the Schedule of Payment, the plaintiff hereby agrees to pay, in addition to,
and separate from, the interest rate agreed upon, a penalty charge of FIVE PERCENT
(5%) per month or a fraction thereof, based on unpaid installments computed from due
date until fully paid. This shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to
rescind this Compromise Agreement as provided under the "Contract to Sell"
dated 21 December 2007 upon compliance with the requirements provided for under the
law.

The Contract to Sell provides, on the other hand, that –

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 672
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The failure of the BUYER to pay on due date any monthly installment in accordance
with the Schedule of Payment provided in Paragraph 2 – Manner of Payment, or if, at any
time, the SELLER is of the opinion that the BUYER would be unable to pay or meet his
obligations under this Contract or in case the BUYER was declared in default by any other
creditor, then the SELLER shall be entitled, as a matter of right, to rescind this
Contract.

While the assailed dispositions of the trial court and the CA do not specify the
remedies that respondent is entitled to, it is clear that rescission and eviction were
specifically sought and prayed for in respondent’s Manifestation and Motion for
Execution, and petitioner was given the opportunity to oppose the same. In her
Opposition to the Motion for Execution,21 she in fact acknowledged and admitted that she
was in default and that she violated the Compromise Agreement by her failure to make
regular payments as required therein. Indeed, it may be said that respondent’s motion for
execution, with a prayer for rescission, for the application of petitioner’s payments as
rental, and for her eviction, constituted sufficient written notice to petitioner, and it was
duly heard; petitioner opposed the motion and even filed a rejoinder to respondent’s
reply, but she could not proffer any defense; quite the opposite, she openly admitted
liability. The facts, evidence, and pleadings are clear and within the cognizance of the trial
court; petitioner’s failure to abide by the agreement should result in execution,
cancellation and rescission of the Compromise Agreement and Contract to Sell, and her
eviction from the property.

Certainly, a compromise agreement becomes the law between the parties and will
not be set aside other than [sic] the grounds mentioned above. In Ramnani v. Court of
Appeals, we held that the main purpose of a compromise agreement is to put an end to
litigation because of the uncertainty that may arise from it. Once the compromise is
perfected, the parties are bound to abide by it in good faith. Should a party fail or refuse to
comply with the terms of a compromise or amicable settlement, the other party could
either enforce the compromise by a writ of execution or regard it as rescinded and so
insist upon his/her original demand.

Petitioner may be right in arguing that respondent has the option to proceed with
the sale and charge corresponding penalties instead, pursuant to the stipulations in the
Contract to Sell; however, respondent chose to rescind the same, an option which it is
equally entitled to by contract and under the law, and thus evict petitioner from the
premises. Respondent must have thought that if past actions were a gauge, petitioner
was no longer in a position to honor her obligations under the Contract to Sell.
Respondent’s claim is straightforward: it seeks rescission and eviction, with whatever
amount paid by petitioner to be applied as rental for the use and occupation of the subject
property as agreed upon.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 673
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
IBM PHILIPPINES, INC. vs.PRIME SYSTEMS PLUS, INC.
G.R. No. 203192 August 15, 2016

DOCTRINE: In the absence of agreement as to the exact rate of interest, the Court
properly applied the legal rate of 6% annual interest.

FACTS:
Petitioner entered into an agreement with respondent whereby the former will
deliver 45 automated teller machines (ATMs) and several computer hardware to
respondent's customers for the total price of ₱24,743,610.43. On September 2002,
petitioner instituted a Complaint for sum of moneyagainst respondent and sought to have
respondent pay the former ₱45,997,266.22 representing respondent's unpaid obligation
with 3% monthly interest. In its Answer, respondent alleged among others that ''it had fully
paid for the (56 ATMs it purchased from petitioner during the December 1997 to February
1998."

The RTC in its Decision ordered the respondent to pay the petitioner and
debunked respondent's allegation of payment finding that respondent's only evidence - a
handwritten memorandum of respondent's president - was not even verified by the
finance or accounting employees of respondent and is overturned by petitioner's
evidence that respondent's checks were all dishonored. The CA in its Decision partly
granting respondent's Petition and found that there were certain pieces of evidence -
particularly those relating to the imposition of 3% monthly interest - which were
misappreciated by the trial court, thus, leading to a different conclusion. Citing Article
1956 of the Civil Code, the CA found that "there is no showing that the parties had
actually agreed on the imposition of the 3% monthly interest for invoices which remained
unpaid 30 days from its delivery."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner's imposition of 3% monthly interest constitute a
written stipulation under Article 1956 of the Civil Code

HELD
No. It has been a long-standing rule that for interest to become due and
demandable, two requisites must be present: (1) that there must be an express stipulation
for the Payment of interest and (2) .the agreement to pay interest is reduced in writing.

Here, petitioner insists that there was an express agreement for a 3% monthly
interest, which petitioner placed in writing in its letter dated December 29, 1997. Petitioner
has gone through great lengths to. attribute respondent's alleged silence, coupled with
respondent's request for the reduction of monthly interest to the latter's express
agreement to a 3% monthly interest. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The Court found that the evidence points to respondent's lack of consent to a 3%
monthly interest. Petitioner adamantly claims that respondent's act of requesting for a
lower interest rate shows the latter's agreement to a 3% monthly interest. Such askewed

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 674
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
reasoning escapes us - especially here where respondent's authorized representative
never assented to petitioner's letter. To accept petitioner's misplaced argument that the
parties mutually agreed to a 3% monthly interest when respondent subsequently ordered
ATMs despite receiving petitioner's letter in1posing a 3% monthly interest will render the
second condition - that the agreement be reduced in writing - futile. Although respondent
did agree to the imposition of interest per se, the fact that there was never a clear rate of
interest still leaves room to guess as to how much interest respondent will pay. This is
precisely the reason why Article 1956 was included in the Civil Code - so that both parties
clearly agree to and are fully aware of the price to be paid in a contract.

In the absence of agreement as to the exact rate of interest, the CA properly


applied the legal rate of 6% annual interest following our ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals26 and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas MB Circular No. 799, series
of 2013.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PHILIPPINE SCIENCE HIGH SCHOOL-CAGAYAN VALLEY CAMPUS vs. PIRRA
CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES
G.R. No. 204423, September 14, 2016

DOCTRINE:If the obligation had been substantially performed in good faith, the obligor,
may recover as if it had strictly and completely fulfilled its obligation, less the damages
suffered by the obligee.

FACTS:
PIRRA Construction Enterprises (PIRRA), a business engaged in general
contracting and a licensed contractor filed with the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission (CIAC) a Complaint for Damages against Philippine Science High
School-Cagayan Valley Campus' (PSHS) relative to the construction contracts for PSHS'
Project A (Academic Building I - Phases IV and V, and Girls' Dormitory Building I - Phase
IV); and its Project C (Academic Building II - Phase I, Boys' Dormitory Building - Phase I,
and School Canteen - Phase I).

With regard to Project A, duration of which was for 180 days from December 20,
2008, with approved 65-day extension until August 22, 2009. As mobilization fee, PSHS
paid PIRRA 15% of the contract price. Thereafter, it paid PIRRA its Partial Billing (PB)
Nos. 1 to 4 amounting to P23,194,020.95.

On July 2009, PIRRA requested payment for its PB No. 5. On August 6, 2009, it
sent PSHS a letter requesting for substantial acceptance and completion of Project A and
submitted its Summary of Accomplishment Report stating that as of July 24, 2009, the
accomplishment for Project A was already at 94.09%. In its reply, PSHS reminded PIRRA
that the due date of the contract was August 22, 2009 but the power distribution activities
had not yet been installed.PSHS replied to PIRRA's request for substantial acceptance
and completion of Project A, and for payment of PB No. 5. It stated that the payment could
not yet be made pending correction of the noted defects and remaining work activities,
the final inspection of the concerned agencies, among other reasons. At the same time,
PSHS declared that it considered PB No. 5 as PIRRA's final billing such that it had to
account PIRRA's liabilities relating to Project A. Later, PSHS informed PIRRA that the
Commission on Audit (COA) would inspect Project A on September 29, 2009 to validate
PIRRA's accomplishment thereon. On October 2009, PIRRA and PSHS entered into a
Joint Inspection Agreement and agreed that the inspection date must be mutually agreed
upon by the parties; and that representatives from the COA, the DOST and the
Consultant (D&D Engineering Co.) shall be invited for the inspection. Later, PSHS
informed PIRRA that its PB No. 5 could not be processed yet as it was awaiting the COA
Report. On the same day, the COA sent its Inspection Report dated October 7, 2009 to
PSHS.Another Joint Inspection Agreement was agreed. On January 2010, PSHS
informed PIRRA that it would take over Project A in the interest of the government, and to
prepare for its occupancy for School Year 2010-2011. It also stated that it would
implement the repair of the identified defects through a third party, the expenses of which
would be deducted from PIRRA's final billing. It declared that the disallowances indicated
in the COA Report (particularly its Findings Nos. 3 and 7) and its construction materials,

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
which PIRRA allegedly used without permission would also be deducted from the final
billing.

On Project C, PIRRA requested the suspension of the construction of the canteen


because PSHS decided to relocate the canteen site to a difficult place of
construction. PSHS granted this request.PIRRA requested a time suspension on Project
C because of affected footings, columns, and footing tie beams.But PSHS informed
PIRRA that suspension was not the solution, there being no changes in the structural
design. Instead, it directed PIRRA to file a variation order (VO) with time extension.As
cited earlier, when parties entered into a Joint Inspection Agreement, regards Project C,
they agreed that PIRRA shall submit to the Consultant the shop drawing for the
foundation; in turn, the Consultant shall submit the cross-sections of the foundation and
evaluate PIRRA's claim. On October 12, 2009, PIRRA sent a letter to PSHS stating that
delay was incurred on Project C because it received no response from PSHS or from the
Consultant on its request for time suspension. In the same letter, PIRRA requested a total
time suspension on Project C. In its reply, PSHS alleged that it found out that as of
October 12, 2009, PIRRA suspended work on Project C without its approval. Eventually,
PSHS informed PIRRA that it was terminating the Project C contract because of the
latter's delay, default, and abandonment. PIRRA contended that the termination of the
contract is unjustified. It stressed that PSHS failed to give it the intended revisions of the
building plan for Project C as well as the necessary documents to secure a building permit
for the project; and, as a, result, Project C was stopped and PIRRA incurred a slippage of
75.99%.

The CIAC rendered its Final Award in favor of PIRRA. The CIAC decreed among
others that PSHS had no basis in taking over Project A and that the COA inspection is not
a condition precedent for the payment of any progress billing or for the acceptance of
Project A; thus, the COA Report cannot be used to refuse or delay payment of PB No. 5.
It likewise declared that the contract for Project A did not specify that the completion date
on August 22, 2009 was due to the opening of classes in June 2010, and the notice of
takeover did not elite PIRRA's purported delay as the cause of the takeover. As regards
Project C, the CIAC stated that PSHS failed to comply with the November 20, 2009 Joint
Agreement that PSHS would submit revised drawings and issue a VO on Project C. It
thus held that PSHS breached its obligations and invalidly terminated the contract for
Project C. However, despite such invalid termination, the CIAC explained that PSHS may
withdraw at will the construction of work, subject to indemnification for the expenses,
work, and the uselessness PIRRA may have obtained, and damages.

Before the CA, with regard to Project A, the CA ruled that when PSHS created an
Inspectorate Team and ordered an inspection for punch listing, it treated Project A as
substantially completed. It noted that even the COA Report indicated that Project A was
practically 100% complete, save for some minor deficiencies. Thus, it held that PSHS
should be held liable for the PB No. 5 less the defective works. Anent Project C, the CA
decreed that PSHS validly terminated the contract for it. It held that during the pendency
of Project C contract, PIRRA requested the suspension of work due to the relocation of
the canteen site; PSHS approved this request. PIRRA requested another suspension,

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
this time, for time suspension; PSHS denied this second request.The CA reasoned that
since there was no showing that the affected work fell on critical path, there was no
reason for the second suspension of work. It noted that without PSHS' approval, PIRRA
suspended work on Project C on October 12, 2009; thus, even before the November 20,
2009 Agreement (which CIAC used as basis in justifying PIRRA's work suspension),
PIRRA already incurred delay on Project C. The CA added that PIRRA not only incurred
delay but was also guilty of refusing to accept correspondences from PSHS and of failing
to comply with the requirements for a VO. Nonetheless, the CA affirmed that PSHS is
liable for the value of the work done on Project C because otherwise there would be
unjust enrichment on the part of PSHS. It also sustained the award of the value of
fabricated steel bars, steel awnings, windows with grills and steel ratings to PIRRA as
there was no showing that the CIAC misappreciated facts in arriving at this technical
finding.

ISSUE:
I. Whether or not PSHS treated Project A as substantially completed such that it is
liable for the residual value of PB No.5.
II. Whether or not PSHS validly terminated the contract for Project C

HELD
I. Yes, the SC sustained the finding that PSHS accepted and treated Project A as a
substantially completed project, and for which reason. When PIRRA requested
substantial acceptance and completion of Project A, PSHS did not object to such a
request. It acted upon it and even created an Inspectorate Team for punch listing, and for
the purpose of determining PIRRA's PB No. 5. Notably, PSHS repeatedly referred to PB
No. 5 as the final billing for Project A. In fact, PSHS initially expressed its willingness to
pay only to put it on hold because of the COA Report. Nonetheless, as correctly explained
by the CIAC, such Report cannot affect PSHS' obligation to pay PIRRA because the
existence of the defective or undelivered items was not an excuse to avoid payment of the
progress billing, as the payment was due on the performed items that were completed or
were otherwise performed, save for the defects.

In addition, as provided for under Article 1234 of the Civil Code, if the obligation
had been substantially performed in good faith, the obligor, in this case, PIRRA, may
recover as if it had strictly and completely fulfilled its obligation, less the damages suffered
by the obligee or in this instance, PSHS.

II. Yes, the Court agreed with the CA that the contract for Project C was validly
terminated. In the November 20, 2009 Agreement, the parties agreed on how to proceed
with the contract for Project C, and the pertinent portions of their Agreement read:
1. [PSHS] together with its consultant shall visit the project site and the latter shall
prepare a detailed drawing for the variation order to be submitted to [PIRRA].

2. [PIRRA], based on the detailed drawing submitted by Consultant, shall


prepare a proposal for variation order.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
3. [PSHS] shall evaluate the variation order.

4. [PIRRA] shall submit revised payment schedule (Bar Chart) for [PSHS]'s
approval.

5. [PSHS] shall process Billing 1 and 2 of the project.

While records reveal that PSHS failed to submit the revised drawing for the
preparation of a VO, PIRRA, on its end, is not entirely faultless. This is because after the
November 20, 2009 Agreement, PIRRA no longer coordinated with PSHS. Neither did it
explain why it did riot demand from PSHS the submission of the needed drawing, as
observed by the CA. Thus, similar to their non-compliance with their October 2, 2009 Joint
Agreement, both parties failed to abide by their November 20, 2009 Agreement. Such
being the case, PIRRA and PSHS were brought back to their previous situation as if the
November 20, 2009 Agreement was not entered. Thus, the suspension of work as of
October 12, 2009 made by PIRRA on Project C, without PSHS' approval, cannot be
ignored.

Pursuant to the General Conditions of Contract, PSHS may terminate the contract
if PIRRA incurs delay, abandons the project, causes stoppage of work without the
authority of PSHS, among other grounds. Indeed, by reason of PIRRA's delay,
suspension of work without any approval from PSHS, and abandonment of the project,
PSHS has sufficient basis to terminate the contract for Project C.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
GREENSTAR EXPRESS, INC. AND FRUTO L. SAYSON, JR., vs. UNIVERSAL
ROBINA CORPORATION AND NISSIN UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION
G.R. No. 205090, October 17, 2016

DOCTRINE:

FACTS:
Petitioner Greenstar Express, Inc. (Grepistar) is a domestic corporation engaged
in the business of public transportation, while petitioner Fruto L. Sayson, Jr. is one of its
bus drivers. Respondents Universal Robina Corporation (URC), and its subsidiary, Nissin
Universal Robina Corporation (NURC), the registered owner of a Mitsubishi L-300 van
with plate number WRN 403 (URC van). On February 25, 2003, a declared national
holiday, petitioner's bus, which was then being driven toward the direction of Manila by
Sayson, collided head-on with the URC van, which was then being driven Quezon
province-bound by NURC's Operations Manager, Renante Bicomong. Bicomong died on
the spot, while the colliding vehicles sustained considerable damage.

Petitioners filed a Complaintagainst NURC to recover damages sustained during


the collision, premised on negligence and later URC was impleaded as additional
defendant. URC and NURC filed their respective Answers, where they particularly
alleged and claimed lack of negligence on their part and on the part of Bicomong. The
RTC dismissed the complaint and found that the accident having occurred
outsideBicomong's assigned tasks, the employers cannot be held liable to the plaintiffs,
even assuming that it is the fault of defendants' employee that was the direct and
proximate cause of their damages. Petitioners filed an appeal before the CAbut the latter
affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in ruling that the respondents are not liable to petitioners for
the damages they sustained considering that the accident was attributed to the
negligence of their employee.

HELD:
No. In Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. v. Abejar, the Court made the
following relevant pronouncement:
The resolution of this case must consider two (2) rules. First, Article 2180's
specification that 'employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees ... acting within the scope of their assigned tasks [.]' Second, the
operation of the registered-owner rule that registered owners are liable for
death or injuries caused by the operation of their Vehicles.

Therefore, the appropriate approach is that in cases where both the


registered-owner rule and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first
establish that the employer is the registered owner of the vehicle in
question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there arises a
disputable presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to
show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen.

This disputable presumption, insofar as the registered owner of the vehicle in


relation to the actual driver is concerned, recognizes that between the owner and
the victim, it is the former that should carry the costs of moving forward with the
evidence. The victim is, in many cases, a hapless pedestrian or motorist with
hardly any means to uncover the employment relationship of the owner and the
driver, or any act that the owner may have done in relation to that employment.

The registration of the vehicle, on the other hand, is accessible to the public.

Here, respondent presented a copy of the Certificate of Registration of the van that
hit Reyes. The Certificate attests to petitioner's ownership of the van. Petitioner
itself did not dispute its ownership of the van. Consistent with the rule we have just
stated, a presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been satisfied
arises. It is now up to petitioner to establish that it incurred no liability under Article
2180. This it can do by presenting proof of any of the following: first, that it
had no employment relationship with Bautista; second, that Bautista acted
outside the scope of his assigned tasks; or third, that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
Bautista.

Applying the above pronouncement in the Caravan Travel and Tours case,
it must be said that when by evidence the ownership of the van and Bicomong's
employment were proved, the presumption of negligence on respondents' part
attached, as the registered owner of the van. and as Bicomong's employer. His
burden of proof then shifted to respondents to show that no liability under Article
2180 arose. This may be done by proof of any of the following:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. That they had no employment relationship with Bicomong; or
2. That Bicomong acted outside the scope of his assigned tasks;
3. That they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of Bicomong.

In denying liability, respondents claimed in their respective answers the defense of


absence of negligence on their part. During trial, they presented evidence to the effect
that on the day of the collision, which was a declared national non-working holiday,
Bicomong was not perforating his work, but was on his way home to Quezon on a
personal undertaking, that is, to give money to his daughter and spend the holiday with
his family; and that the vehicle he was driving was not an NURC vehicle, nor was it
assigned to him, but was registered to URC and assigned to its Logistics Manager.

Respondents succeeded in overcoming the presumption of negligence, having


shown that when the collision took place, Bicomong was not in the performance of his
work; that he was in possession of a service vehicle that did not belong to his employer

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
NURC, but to URC, and which vehicle was not officially assigned to him, but to another
employee; that his use of the URC van was unauthorized - even if he had used the same
vehicle in furtherance of a personal undertaking in the past, this does not amount to
implied permission; that the accident occurred on a holiday and while Bicomong was on
his way home to his family in Quezon province; and that Bicomong had no official
business whatsoever in his hometown in Quezon, or in Laguna where the collision
occurred, his area of operations being limited to the Cavite area.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
EVELYN V. RUIZ vs. BERNARDO F. DIMAILIG
G.R. No. 204280 November 09, 2016

DOCTRINE: In order for a mortgagee to invoke the doctrine of mortgagee in good faith,
the impostor must have succeeded in obtaining a Torrens title in his name and thereafter
in mortgaging the property. Where the mortgagor is an impostor who only pretended to
be the registered owner, and acting on such pretense, mortgaged the property to
another, the mortgagor evidently did not succeed in having the property titled in his or
her name, and the mortgagee cannot rely on such pretense as what appears on the title
is not the impostor's name but that of the registered owner.
FACTS:
Bernardo F. Dimailig was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by
TCT No. T-361747 located in Alapan, Imus, Cavite. In 19 October 1997, he entrusted the
owner's copy of the said TCT to his brother, Jovannie, who in turn gave the title to Editha
Sanggalang, a broker, for its intended sale. In January 1998, the property was
mortgaged to Evelyn V. Ruiz as evidenced by a Deed of REM without Bernardo's
knowledge and consent so Bernardo instituted this suit for annulment of the Deed of
REM. In her Answer, Evelyn contended that she met Jovannie when she inspected the
subject property and assured her that Bernardo owned the property and his title thereto
was genuine. She further claimed that Jovannie mortgaged the property to her. She also
insisted that as a mortgagee in good faith and for value, the REM cannot be annulled
and that she had the right to keep the owner's copy of TCT No. T-361747 until the loan
was fully paid to her. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint. It held that while
Bernardo was the registered owner of the subject property, Evelyn was a mortgagee in
good faith because she was unaware that the person who represented himself as
Bernardo was an impostor. Bernardo's Motion for Reconsideration was denied so he
appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the trial court’s decision.
It held that the innocent purchaser (mortgagor in this case) for value protected by law is
one who purchases a titled land by virtue of a deed executed by the registered owner
himself, not by a forged deed. Since the Deed of REM was forged, and the title to the
subject property is still in the name of the rightful owner, and the mortgagor is a different
person who only pretended to be the owner, then Evelyn cannot seek protection from the
cloak of the principle of mortgagee in good faith. Evelyn filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari is filed in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Evelyn V. Ruiz is a mortgagee in good faith.
HELD:
In order for a mortgagee to invoke the doctrine of mortgagee in good faith, the
impostor must have succeeded in obtaining a Torrens title in his name and thereafter in

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
mortgaging the property. Where the mortgagor is an impostor who only pretended to be
the registered owner, and acting on such pretense, mortgaged the property to another,
the mortgagor evidently did not succeed in having the property titled in his or her name,
and the mortgagee cannot rely on such pretense as what appears on the title is not the
impostor's name but that of the registered owner.
In this case, Evelyn V. Ruiz insists that she is a mortgagee in good faith and for
value. She has the burden to prove such claim and must provide necessary evidence to
support the same. Unfortunately, Evelyn failed to discharge her burden.
First, the Deed of REM was established to be a forged instrument. Its nullity
conveys no title.
Second, Evelyn cannot invoke the protection given to a mortgagee in good faith.
As discussed, the title to the subject property remained registered in the name of
Bernardo. It was not transferred to the impostor's name when Evelyn transacted with the
latter. Hence, the principle of mortgagee in good faith finds no application;
correspondingly, Evelyn cannot not seek refuge therefrom.
Third, even assuming that the impostor has caused the property to be titled in his
name as if he had rightful ownership thereof, Evelyn would still not be deemed a
mortgagee in good faith. This is because Evelyn did not take the necessary steps to
determine any defect in the title of the alleged owner of the mortgaged property. She
deliberately ignored pertinent facts that should have aroused suspicion on the veracity of
the title of the mortgagor "Bernardo."

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
NICOLAS S. MATUDAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND MARILYN B.
MATUDAN
G.R. No. 203284 November 14, 2016

DOCTRINE: 'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36


of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical –
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage.
FACTS:
Nicolas S. Matudan and Marilyn B. Matudan were married in Laoang, Northern
Samar on October 26, 1976. They had four children. In 1985, Marilyn left to work abroad
an she had not been seen nor heard from by her husband and children thereafter. On 20
June 2008, Nicolas filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 alleging that (1) before, during, and after his
marriage to Marilyn, the latter was psychologically incapable of fulfilling her obligations
as a wife and mother; (2) she consistently neglected and failed to provide for him and
their children with the necessary emotional and financial care, support, and sustenance,
and even so after leaving for work abroad; (3) based on expert evaluation conducted by
Clinical Psychologist Nedy L. Tayag, Marilyn's psychological incapacity is grave,
permanent, and incurable. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, opposed the Petition. The Quezon City Office of the City Prosecutor
having determined that there is no collusion between the parties, proceedings were
conducted in due course. The trial proceeded in Marilyn's absence. The following
documents were submitted in evidence: (1) Nicolas’ Judicial Affidavit which was adopted
as his testimony on direct examination; (2) Judicial Aftidavit of Maricel which was
adopted as part of her testimony on direct examination; and (3) Sworn Affidavit of Dr.
Tayag which was considered part of her testimony on direct examination. The Regional
Trial Court issued its Decision dismissing the Petition in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 on
the ground that the evidence failed to sufficiently prove Marilyn's claimed psychological
incapacity. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling so a Petition for Review on Certiorari
was filed in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Marilyn B. Matudan is psychological incapacited.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical – incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage.
If any, Nicolas S. Matudan's accusations against Marilyn B. Matudan are untrue,
at the very least. At most, they fail to sufficiently establish the degree of Marilyn's claimed
psychological incapacity.
On the other hand, Maricel cannot be of help either. She was only two years old
when Marilyn left the family. Growing up, she may have seen the effects of Marilyn's
abandonment – such as the lack of emotional and financial support; but she could not
have any idea of her mother's claimed psychological incapacity, as well as the nature,
history, and gravity thereof.
Just as well, Dr. Tayag's supposed expert findings regarding Marilyn's
psychological condition were not based on actual tests or interviews conducted upon
Marilyn herself; they are based on the personal accounts of petitioner. This fact gave
more significance and importance to Nicolas’ other pieces of evidence, which could have
compensated for the deficiency in the expert opinion which resulted from its being based
solely on his one-sided account. But since these other pieces of evidence could not be
relied upon, Dr. Tayag's testimony and report must fail as well.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SPOUSES DESIDERIO AND TERESA DOMINGO vs. SPOUSES EMMANUEL AND
TITA MANZANO, FRANKLIN ESTABILLO, AND CARMELITA AQUINO
G.R. No. 201883 November 16, 2016

DOCTRINE: A contract to sell is one where the prospective seller reserves the transfer
of title to the prospective buyer until the happening of an event, such as full payment of
the purchase price. What the seller obliges himself to do is to sell the subject property
only when the entire amount of the purchase price has already been delivered to him. 'In
other words, the full payment of the purchase price partakes of a suspensive condition,
the non-fulfillment of which prevents the obligation to sell from arising and thus,
ownership is retained by the prospective seller without further remedies by the
prospective buyer'
FACTS:
Spouses Emmanuel and Tita Manzano were the registered owners of a
35,281-square meter parcel of land with improvements in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City
covered by TCT No. 160752. Spouses Manzanos, through their duly appointed
attorney-in-fact Franklin Estabillo, executed a notarized agreement involving the property
with spouses Desiderio and Teresa Domingo on June 1, 2001. Spouses Domingo paid
the P100,000.00 reservation fee upon the execution of the agreement. They
subsequently made payments amounting to P160,000.00, but failed to tender full
payment of the balance on March 200. Franklin advised them to continue their additional
payments amounting to P85,000.00. As of November 2001, they paid the total amount of
P345,000.00, while spouses Manzano remained in possession of the subject property.
They offered to pay the remaining P555,000.00 balance in December 2001, but Franklin
refused to accept payment. He advised them to await Tita’s arrival from abroad. She
refused spouses Domingo’s tender of payment and informed them the property was no
longer for sale which prompted them to cause the annotation of an affidavit of adverse
claim upon TCT No. 160752. They later discovered that Carmelita Aquino bought the
subject property on May 7, 2002, and a new title - TCT No. C-359293 - had been issued
in her name with their adverse claim carried over to the new title. They filed a complaint
for specific performance and damages with injunctive relief against spouses Manzano
and Franklin. They later filed an Amended Complaint, praying further that Carmelita's
new title be cancelled and spouses Manzano be reinstated. The Regional Trial Court
declared that spouses Domingo have priority in the contract of sale. The Court of
Appeals rendered a decision in favor of spouses Manzano, Franklin and Carmelita.
ISSUE:
Whether or not spouses Desiderio and Teresa Domingo have a better right over
Carmelita Aquino over the property sold.
HELD:

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A contract to sell is one where the prospective seller reserves the transfer of title
to the prospective buyer until the happening of an event, such as full payment of the
purchase price. What the seller obliges himself to do is to sell the subject property only
when the entire amount of the purchase price has already been delivered to him. 'In
other words, the full payment of the purchase price partakes of a suspensive condition,
the non-fulfillment of which prevents the obligation to sell from arising and thus,
ownership is retained by the prospective seller without further remedies by the
prospective buyer'.
And it is precisely for the above reason that Article 1544 of the Civil Code cannot
apply. Since failure to pay the price in full in a contract to sell renders the same
ineffective and without force and effect, then there is no sale to speak of. Even spouses
Desiderio and Teresa Domingo’s posture that their annotation of an adverse claim on
TCT No. 160752 is equivalent to registration or claim of ownership necessarily fails, on
account of the fact that there was never a sale in their favor - and without a sale in their
favor, they could not register or claim ownership of the subject property. Thus, as
between the parties to the instant case, there could be no double sale which would justify
the application of Article 1544. They failed to pay the purchase price in full, while
Carmelita Aquino did, and thereafter she was able to register her purchase and obtain a
new certificate of title in her name. As far as this Court is concerned, there is only one
sale - and that is, the one in Carmelita's favor. "Since there is only one valid sale, the rule
on double sales under Article 1544 of the Civil Code does not apply."

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
BANKARD vs. LUZ P. ALARTE

G.R. No. 202573 19 APRIL 2017

DOCTRINE: This Court cannot completely blame the MeTC, RTC, and CA for their
failure to understand or realize the fact that a monthly credit card statement of account
does not always necessarily involve purchases or transactions made immediately prior
to the issuance of such statement; certainly, it may be that the card holder did not at all
use the credit card for the month, and the statement of account sent to him or her refers
to principal, interest, and penalty charges incurred from past transactions which are too
multiple or cumbersome to enumerate but nonetheless remain unsettled by the card
holder. This Court cannot judge them for their lack of experience or practical
understanding of credit card arrangements, although it would have helped if they just
endeavoured to derive such an understanding of the process.

FACTS:
Petitioner Bankard (now RCBC) is a duly constituted domestic corporation doing
business as a credit card provider, extending credit accommodations to its
member-cardholders for the purchase of goods and services. In 2007, petitioner filed a
collection case against respondent Luz P. Alarte before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig City. The court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. RTC
reversed the decision and ruled in favour of Bankard. On appeal, CA affirmed holding
Alarte liable to pay his credit card dues.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner can collect from respondent from her purchases from
the credit card

HELD:
Yes. The Court ruled to remand the case to the MeTC where petitioner would be
required to amend its Complaint and adduce additional evidence to prove its case. That
way, the lower court can better understand the nature of the claim, and this time it may
arrive at a just resolution of the case. This is to say that while the Court believes that
petitioner's claim may be well-founded, it is not enough as to allow judgment in its favor
on the basis of extant evidence. It must prove the validity of its claim; this it may do by
amending its Complaint and adducing additional evidence of respondent's credit history
and proving the loan transactions between them. After all, credit card arrangements are
simple loan arrangements between the card issuer and the card holder.Simply put, every
credit card transaction involves three contracts, namely: (a) the sales contract between
the credit card holder and the merchant or the business establishment which accepted
the credit card; (b) the loan agreement between the credit card issuer and the credit card
holder; and lastly, (c) the promise to pay between the credit card issuer and the
merchant or business establishment.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 689
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS v. MARIA ELENA L. MALAGA

G.R. No. 204906 05 June 2017

DOCTRINE: The procurement process basically involves the following steps: (1)
pre-procurement conference; (2) advertisement of the invitation to bid; (3) pre-bid
conference; (4) eligibility check of prospective bidders; (5) submission and receipt of
bids; (6) modification and withdrawal of bids; (7) bid opening and examination; (8) bid
evaluation; (9) post qualification; (10) award of contract and notice to proceed.

FACTS:

Respondent Maria Elena L. Malaga owns B.E. Construction, a private contractor


and the lowest bidder for two concreting projects of the Department of Public Works and
Highways.

However, it appears that after the publication of the invitation to bid but prior to the
scheduled bidding, the road condition in Barangay Hibao-an was severely deteriorated to
an almost impassable state on account of the prevailing typhoon and monsoon season,
prompting calls for immediate repairs and other appropriate action from local
government units, a Member of the House of Representatives, and concerned private
citizens and interest groups. An urgency of the request was acted upon. Since no
response was forthcoming from Datumanong, the DPWH Regional Office VI proceeded
with the dropping and opening of bids as scheduled. Thus, respondent won as the lowest
bidder for the above-mentioned projects.

On November 15, 2001, Lagoc informed respondent that the Mandurriao-San


Miguel Road, Barangay Hibao-an Section project may not be awarded to her, in view of
Datumanong's November 7, 2001 Memorandum. Respondent replied with formal written
demands that the project be awarded to her in spite of Datumanong's directive, under
pain of civil action and claim for damages. Lagoc wrote back disavowing any liability and
claiming that Datumanong's directive was a supervening event that prevented the award
of the subject project to respondent, and until it is nullified or set aside, the
Mandurriao-San Miguel Road, Barangay Hibao-an Section project shall be undertaken
by administration as directed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Malaga is entitled for damages sustained

HELD:

No.

Thus, before a government project is awarded to the lowest calculated bidder, his
bid must undergo a mandatory post-qualification procedure whereby the procuring entity

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
verifies, validates, and ascertains all statements made and documents submitted by the
bidder with the lowest calculated or highest rated bid using a non-discretionary criteria as
stated in the bidding documents.

From the foregoing, it must be concluded that since respondent's lowest


calculated bid for the subject project did not undergo the required post-qualification
process, then she cannot claim that the project was awarded to her. And if the project
was never awarded to her, then she has no right to undertake the same. If she has no
right to the project, then she cannot demand indemnity for lost profits or actual damages
suffered in the event of failure to carry out the same. Without a formal award of the
project in her favor, such a demand would be premature. Consequently, she has no right
of action against petitioners, and no cause of action in Civil Case No. 27059. Indeed,
only when there is an invasion of primary rights, not before, does the adjective or
remedial law become operative.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 691
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LABOR LAW

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
EFREN M. HERRERA and ESTHER C. GALVEZ, for and on their behalf and on
behalf of OTHER SEPARATED, UNREHIRED and RETIRED EMPLOYEES OF THE
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION versus NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
G.R. No. 166570 | December 18, 2009
DOCTRINE: Absent an express provision of law, the grant of both separation and
retirement benefits from one single act of separation from employment would amount to
double compensation.
FACTS:
RA No. 9136 was enacted to provide a framework for the restructuring of the
electric power industry, including the privatization of NPC's assets and liabilities. One
necessary consequence of the reorganization was the displacement of employees from
the Department of Energy, the Energy Regulatory Board, the National Electrification
Administration and the NPC. As a consequence, all NPC employees, including the
petitioners, were separated from the service. As a result, all the employees who held
permanent positions at the NPC opted for and were paid the corresponding separation
pay equivalent to one and a half months' salary per year of service. Nonetheless, in
addition to the separation package mandated by the EPIRA, a number of NPC
employees also claimed retirement benefits under CA No. 186, as amended by RA No.
660 and RA No. 1616. Under these laws, government employees who have rendered at
least 20 years of service are entitled to a gratuity equivalent to one month's salary for
every year of service for the first 20 years, one and a half months' salary for every year of
service over 20 but below 30 years, and two months' salary for every year of service in
excess of 30 years.
The NPC, on the other hand, took the position that the grant of retirement benefits
to displaced employees in addition to separation pay was inconsistent with the
constitutional proscription on the grant of a double gratuity. Unable to amicably resolve
this matter with its former employees, the NPC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief
against several parties, including the petitioners, to obtain confirmation that RA No. 9136
did not specifically authorize NPC to grant retirement benefits in addition to separation
pay.
After submission of the respondents' respective Answers and Comments, the
court a quo rendered the assailed Decision, finding that employees who received the
separation benefit under RA No. 9136 are no longer entitled to retirement benefits.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners, former employees of the National Power Corporation
(NPC) who were separated from service due to the government's initiative of
restructuring the electric power industry, are entitled to their retirement benefits in
addition to the separation pay granted by law.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 693
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
No.
Section 8 of Article IX(B) of the Constitution provides that "[n]o elective or
appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law". In prior decisions, we have ruled
that there must be a clear and unequivocal statutory provision to justify the grant of both
separation pay and retirement benefits to an employee. Here, absent an express
provision of law, the grant of both separation and retirement benefits would amount to
double compensation from one single act of separation from employment.
The CSC has previously ruled that employees similarly situated to petitioners
herein were not entitled to both separation pay and retirement benefits; instead, the
concerned employee must either avail of the separation benefit or opt to retire if qualified
under existing laws. In CSC Resolution No. 021112, the CSC interpreted the phrase
"separation pay and retirement" in RA No. 6656 as follows:
x xx While the aforequoted provision of law used the conjunctive "and" between the
words "separation pay" and "retirement", this does not mean that both benefits shall be
given to an affected employee. This interpretation is supported by the phrase "if entitled
thereto" found before the phrase "be paid the appropriate separation pay and retirement
and other benefits under existing laws". Thus, payment of both separation and retirement
benefits is not absolute.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 694
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ARSENIO S. QUIAMBAO vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
G.R. No. 171023 | December 18, 2009
DOCTRINE: Labor adjudicatory officials and the Court of Appeals must demur the award
of separation pay based on social justice when an employee’s dismissal is based on
serious misconduct or willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or
willful breach of trust, or commission of a crime against the person of the employer or his
immediate family—grounds under Article 282 of the Labor Code that sanction dismissals
of employees.
FACTS:
Petitioner was employed as branch teller by respondent Manila Electric Company.
He was assigned at respondent's Mandaluyong office and was responsible for the
handling and processing of payments made by respondent's customers. It appears from
his employment records, however, that petitioner has repeatedly violated the Company
Code of Employee Discipline and has exhibited poor performance in the latter part of his
employment.
Notice of investigation was served upon the petitioner for his unauthorized and
unexcused absences. He was likewise required to appear at the investigation and to
present his evidence in support of his defense. However, despite receipt of such notice,
petitioner did not participate in the investigation. As a result, a notice of dismissal was
sent to the petitioner which eventually led to his termination.
Petitioner filed a complaint before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC against
respondent assailing the legality of his dismissal. While petitioner did not dispute his
absences, he nonetheless averred that the same were incurred with the corresponding
approved application for leave of absence. He also claimed that he was denied due
process. The LA rendred a decision dismissing the petitioner’s complaint for lack of
merit. It ruled that no evidence was presented to prove that the absences of petitioner
were authorized, he was not deprived of due process and his habitual absenteeism
without leave did not violate the company’s rules and regulations which justified his
termination. The same was affirmed by the NLRC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to separation pay.
HELD:
No
We have examined the records which indeed show that petitioner's unauthorized
absences as well as tardiness are habitual despite having been penalized for past
infractions. In Gustilo v. Wyeth Philippines, Inc., we held that a series of irregularities
when put together may constitute serious misconduct. We also held that gross neglect of
duty becomes serious in character due to frequency of instances. Serious misconduct is
said to be a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden
act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and indicative of wrongful intent and not

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 695
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
mere error of judgment. Oddly, petitioner never advanced any valid reason to justify his
absences. Petitioner's intentional and willful violation of company rules shows his utter
disregard of his work and his employer's interest. Indeed, there can be no good faith in
intentionally and habitually incurring unexcusable absences. Thus, the CA did not
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in equating
petitioner's gross neglect of duty to serious misconduct.
Besides, even assuming that the ground for petitioner's dismissal is gross and
habitual neglect of duty, still, he is not entitled to severance pay. In Central Philippines
Bandag Retreaders, Inc. v. Diasnes, we discussed the parameters of awarding
separation pay to dismissed employees as a measure of financial assistance, viz:
To reiterate our ruling in Toyota, labor adjudicatory officials and the CA must
demur the award of separation pay based on social justice when an employee's
dismissal is based on serious misconduct or willful disobedience; gross and
habitual neglect of duty; fraud or willful breach of trust; or commission of a crime
against the person of the employer or his immediate family - grounds under Art.
282 of the Labor Code that sanction dismissals of employees. They must be most
judicious and circumspect in awarding separation pay or financial assistance as
the constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be an
instrument to oppress the employers. The commitment of the Court to the cause
of labor should not embarrass us from sustaining the employers when they are
right, as here. In fine, we should be more cautious in awarding financial
assistance to the undeserving and those who are unworthy of the liberality of the
law.(Emphasis supplied.)

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 696
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JIMMY ARENO, JR vs. SKYCABLE PCC-BAGUIO
G.R. No. 180302, February 5, 2010
DOCTRINE: As a just cause for dismissal of an employee under Article 282 of the Labor
Code, willful disobedience of the employers lawful orders requires the concurrence of
two elements: (1) the employees assailed conduct must have been
willful, i.e., characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated
must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to
the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.
FACTS:
On January 17, 1995, petitioner was employed as a cable technician by
respondent Skycable PCC-Baguio. On January 17, 2002, an accounting clerk of
respondent, Hyacinth Soriano, sent to the human resource manager a letter-complaint
against petitioner alleging that on two separate occasions, the latter spread false rumors
about her. On January 27, 2002, she was again insulted by petitioner when the latter
approached her and said that she was seen going out with Aldrin Estrada, their field
service supervisor, at Central Park, Baguio City. During that incident, petitioner uttered,
"Ikawlangangnakakaalamngtotoo" with malicious intent and in a provocative manner.
Soriano averred that petitioner's unscrupulous behavior constituted serious and grave
offense in violation of the company's Code of Discipline.
On the same day, respondent issued a Memorandum requiring petitioner to
submit an explanation within 76 hours from notice thereof. Petitioner submitted his
written explanationdated January 23, 2002 denying all the allegations in Soriano's
letter-complaint.
An administrative investigation was accordingly conducted on January 31, 2002.
In a Memo dated February 6, 2002, the investigating committee found petitioner guilty of
having made malicious statements against Soriano during the January 7, 2002
conversation, which is categorized as an offense under the Company Code of Discipline.
Consequently, petitioner was suspended for three days without pay effective February
13-15, 2002. The Memo was allegedly served on February 7, 2002 but petitioner refused
to sign it.
Notwithstanding the suspension order, however, petitioner still reported for work
on February 13, 2002. By reason thereof, respondent sent petitioner a letter
denominated as 1st Notice of Termination requiring him to explain in writing why he
should not be terminated for insubordination.

On March 15, 2002, an investigation on the insubordination case was conducted


which was attended by the parties and their respective counsels. Through a Final Notice

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
of Termination dated April 1, 2002, petitioner was dismissed from service on the ground
of insubordination or willful disobedience in complying with the suspension order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was validly dismissed from work due to insubordination
HELD:
Yes. As a just cause for dismissal of an employee under Article 282 of the Labor
Code, willful disobedience of the employer’s lawful orders requires the concurrence of
two elements: (1) the employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful, i.e.,
characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have
been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties
which he had been engaged to discharge. Both requisites are present in the instant
case. It is noteworthy that upon receipt of the notice of suspension, petitioner did not
question such order at the first instance. He immediately defied the order by reporting on
the first day of his suspension. Deliberate disregard or disobedience of rules by the
employee cannot be countenanced. It may encourage him to do even worse and will
render a mockery of the rules of discipline that employees are required to observe.

Petitioner was served the first notice of termination and was given time to submit
his written explanation. A hearing was conducted wherein both parties with their
respective counsels were present. After finding cause for petitioner’s termination, a final
notice apprising him of the decision to terminate his employment was served. All things
considered, respondent validly dismissed petitioner for cause after complying with the
procedural requirements of the law.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
TIGER CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. REYNALDO
ABAY, ET.AL.

G.R. No. 164141, February 26, 2010

DOCTRINE: Under Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act (RA)
No. 7730, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Secretary and her
representatives, the regional directors, have jurisdiction over labor standards violations
based on findings made in the course of inspection of an employer’s premises, which
jurisdiction is not affected by the amount of claim involved, as Republic Act No. 7730 had
effectively removed the jurisdictional limitations found in Articles 129 and 217 of the
Labor Code insofar as inspection cases, pursuant to the visitorial and enforcement
powers of the DOLE Secretary, are concerned.
FACTS:
On the basis of a complaint filed by respondents Reynaldo Abay and fifty-nine
(59) others before the Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), an inspection was conducted by DOLE officials at the premises of petitioner
Tiger Construction and Development Corporation (TCDC). Several labor standard
violations were noted. The case was then set for summary hearing. However, before the
hearing could take place, the Director of Regional Office No. V, Ma. Glenda A. Manalo
(Director Manalo), issued an Order on July 25, 2002 referring the case to the NLRC on
the ground that the aggregate money claim of each worker exceeds the jurisdictional
amount which is Five Thousand Pesos Only (P5,000.00). Before the NLRC could take
any action, DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas (Secretary Sto. Tomas), in an
apparent reversal of Director Manalos endorsement, issued another inspection authority
on August 2, 2002 in the same case. Pursuant to such authority, DOLE officials
conducted another investigation of petitioners’ premises and the same violations were
discovered.
The DOLE officials issued a Notice of Inspection Results to petitioner directing it
to rectify the violations within five days from notice. For failure to comply with the
directive, the case was set for summary hearing. Petitioner allegedly questioned the
inspectors findings and argued that the proceedings before the regional office had been
rendered moot by the issuance of the July 25, 2002Order endorsing the case to the
NLRC. According to petitioner, this July 25, 2002 Order was tantamount to a dismissal
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, which dismissal had attained finality; hence, all
proceedings before the DOLE regional office after July 25, 2002 were null and void for
want of jurisdiction.
On September 30, 2002, Director Manalo issued an Order directing TCDC to pay
P2,123,235.90 to its employees representing underpayment of salaries, 13thmonth pay,
and underpayment of service incentive leave pay and regular holiday pay. TCDC filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, reiterating the argument that Director Manalo had lost

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
jurisdiction over the matter. Apparently convinced by petitioners’ arguments, Director
Manalo again endorsed the case to the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch V
(LegaspiCity). The NLRC returned the entire records of the case to Director Manalo on
the ground that the NLRC does not have jurisdiction over the complaint. Director Manalo
finally denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Director Manalo
then issued a writ of execution. Acting on the ill-timed appeal, Secretary Sto. Tomas
issued an Order dismissing petitioners appeal for lack of merit. Petitioner then filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA but the petition was dismissed for failure to certify
against non-forum shopping.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner can still assail the Order of Director Manalo allegedly on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, after said Order has attained finality and is already in
the execution stage.
HELD:
Yes, the petitioner can still assail the Order of Director Manalo allegedly on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, after said Order has attained finality and is already in the
execution stage.
While it is true that orders issued without jurisdiction are considered null and void
and, as a general rule, may be assailed at any time, the fact of the matter is thatin this
case,Director Manaloactedwithin her jurisdiction. Under Article 128 (b) of the Labor
Code,as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7730,the DOLE Secretary and her
representatives, the regional directors, have jurisdiction over labor standards violations
based on findings made in the course of inspection of an employers’ premises.The said
jurisdiction isnotaffected by the amount of claim involved, as RA 7730 had effectively
removed the jurisdictional limitations found in Articles 129 and 217 of the Labor Code
insofar as inspection cases, pursuant to the visitorial and enforcement powers of the
DOLE Secretary, are concerned.The last sentence of Article 128(b) of the Labor Code
recognizes anexceptionto the jurisdiction of the DOLE Secretary and her
representatives, but such exception is neither an issue nor applicable here.
Director Manalos initial endorsement of the case to the NLRC, on the mistaken
opinion that the claim was within the latters’ jurisdiction, did not oust or deprive her of
jurisdiction over the case.She therefore retained the jurisdiction to decide the case when
it was eventually returned to her office by the DOLE Secretary. Jurisdiction or authority to
try a certain case is conferred by law and not by the interested parties, much less by one
of them, and should be exercised precisely by the person in authority or body in whose
hands it has been placed by the law.
Petitioners theory that Director Manalos initial endorsement of the case to the
NLRC served as a dismissal of the case, which prevented her from subsequently
assuming jurisdiction over the same, is wrong.The said endorsement was evidently not

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
meant as a final disposition of the case; it was a mere referral to another agency, the
NLRC, on the mistaken belief that jurisdiction was lodged with the latter. It cannot
preclude the regional director from subsequently deciding the case after the mistake was
rectified and the case was returned to her by the DOLE Secretary, particularly since it
was a labor case whereprocedural lapses may be disregarded in the interest of
substantial justice.
When a decision has already become final and executory, an appellate court
loses jurisdiction to entertain an appeal much less to alter, modify or reverse the final and
executory judgment. In the instant case, the January 29, 2003 Order was rendered with
jurisdiction and can no longer be questioned (as it is final and executory), therefore,
petitioners half-hearted and unsubstantiated arguments that the said Order was
allegedly based on erroneous computation and included non-employees, can no longer
be entertained.Likewise, there is no more need to address petitioners contention that the
CA erred in dismissing its petition on the ground of its belated compliance with the
requirement of certification against forum-shopping.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARITESS MARTINEZ y DULAY

G.R. No. 158627, March 5, 2010

DOCTRINE:No less than the Constitution ordains that labor – local and overseas,
organized and unorganized – shall be given full protection. Further it mandates the
promotion of full employment and equality of employment opportunities. Thus, if an
individual illegally recruits another for employment abroad, he shall be meted the penalty
of life imprisonment and fined. The same individual could also be held liable for the crime
of Estafa.

FACTS:

On June 21, 1995, herein appellant Maritess Martinez and her daughter, Jenilyn
Martinez, were charged with seven counts of Estafa before the RTC of Manila. On even
date, appellant together with her children Jenilyn Martinez and Julius Martinez, were also
charged with the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale.

The cases were raffled to Branch 3 of the RTC of Manila. Thereafter, warrants of
arrest were issued against the three accused. However, the same were served only
against appellant and Julius Martinez whereas accused Jenilyn Martinez remains at
large.

During his arraignment on August 18, 1995, Julius Martinez pleaded not guilty to
the charge of Illegal Recruitment.Meanwhile, appellant was arraigned on September 6,
1995 where she entered a plea of not guilty to the charges of Estafa and Illegal
Recruitment in large scale.

The cases were consolidated upon motion of the prosecution. Trial on the merits
thereafter ensued.

The following complainants were presented by the prosecution as witnesses, to


wit: Dominador Ilacin, Necito Serquiña, Vivencio Martinez, and Arnulfo Suyat. However,
complainants Walter Isuan, Nelson Laplano, and Crizaldo Fernandez failed to testify
despite being given several opportunities.

On October 12, 1999, the trial court issued its Decision acquitting JuliusMartinez of
the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale while finding appellant guilty of Illegal
Recruitment and four counts of Estafa.

The trial court found that appellant was not a holder of a license or authority to
deploy workers abroad; that appellant falsely represented herself to have the capacity to
send complainants as factory workers in South Korea; that she asked from complainants
various amounts allegedly as placement and processing fees; that based on said false
representations, complainants parted with their money and gave the same to appellant;
that appellant appropriated for herself the amounts given her to the damage and

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 702
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
prejudice of the complainants; and that she failed to deploy complainants for work
abroad.

Appellant appealed to the CA arguing that no evidence was presented to show that
she falsely represented herself as having the capacity to send complainants as factory
workers in South Korea. She alleged that there was no proof that she personally
undertook to deploy them for work abroad. She maintained that she merely assisted
complainants in their applications with JH Imperial Organization Placement Corp. and
that she was merely an agent of the latter. She claimed that there is no truth to the claim
of the complainants that she was holding office in her residence considering its very
limited space and that the same is occupied by her six family members.

On December 11, 2002, the CA rendered its assailed Decision denying the appeal
for lack of merit. It found appellant guilty of Illegal Recruitment in large scale. The Court
hereby certifies this case and elevates the entire records to the Honorable Supreme
Court for the mandated review.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed palpable error in not finding that the
prosecution’s evidence is insufficient to prove the guilt of the appellant.

HELD:

No, the Court of Appeals did not commit an error in proving the guilt of the appellant.

In this case, all the four complainants unanimously declared that appellant offered
and promised them employment abroad. They also testified that they gave various
amounts to appellant as payment for placement and processing fees. Notwithstanding
said promises and payments, they were not able to leave for abroad to work. These
testimonies, as well as the documentary evidence they submitted consisting of the
receipts issued them by the appellant, all prove that the latter was engaged in recruitment
and placement activities.

Even conceding that appellant merely referred the complainants to JH Imperial


Organization Placement Corp., the same still constituted an act of recruitment. As
explicitly enumerated in Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, "recruitment and placement"
includes the act of making referrals, whether for profit or not. Thus, the CA correctly held
that:

x x x Even if [appellant] did no more that "suggest" to complainants where they could
apply for overseas employment, her act constituted "referral" within the meaning of Article
13(b) of the Labor Code (People v. Ong, 322 SCRA 38). Referral is the act of passing
along or forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial interview of a selected

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 703
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
applicant for employment to a selected employer, placement officer or bureau. (People v.
Goce, 247 SCRA 780).

Having already established that appellant was engaged in "recruitment and


placement," the issue that must be resolved next is whether such activities may be
considered illegal and whether the acts were committed in large scale.

In the instant case, the prosecution satisfactorily established that appellant was
not a licensee or holder of authority to deploy workers abroad. By this fact alone, she is
deemed to have engaged in illegal recruitment and the same was committed in large
scale because it was carried out against the four complainants.

The fact that JH Imperial Organization Placement Corp. was a holder of a valid
license to deploy workers abroad did not serve to benefit herein appellant. There was no
evidence at all that said recruitment agency authorized herein appellant to act as its
agent. As aptly noted by the appellate court:

From the testimonies of the complainants, it is clearly shown that [appellant] did
more than just make referrals. It was [appellant] whom they approached regarding their
plans of working overseas. It was [appellant] who collected the fees and receipts
[therefor] were issued in her name. It was x x x [appellant] from whom they learned what
papers or documents to submit. Despite the denial, [appellant], nevertheless, failed to
explain why recruitment activities were done in her residence. Likewise, she failed to
present Milagros Lopez, one of the staff of Imperial, to whom she allegedly turned over
the money she collected from the complainants or any officer from the recruitment agency
to prove that she was merely a conduit thereof. x x x

The three elements of the crime of illegal recruitment, to wit: a) the offender has no
valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment
and placement of workers; b) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the
meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of
the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the said Code (now Section 6 of
RA 8042); and c) the offender committed the same against three or more persons,
individually or as a group, are present in the instant case. Consequently, we rule that the
trial court and the CA correctly found appellant guilty of Illegal Recruitment in large scale.

In the instant case, the applicable law at the time of the commission of the crime of
Illegal Recruitment in large scale was Article 39 of the Labor Code. Under said law, the
imposable penalty is life imprisonment and a fine of ₱100,000.00. The CA therefore
correctly imposed upon herein appellant the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
₱100,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 95-143318.

We also affirm the findings of the trial court and the CA that appellant is guilty of
four counts of Estafa, the elements of which are: a) the accused defrauded another by
abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and b) the offended party suffered damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 704
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Criminal liability for estafa already committed is not affected by the fact that
[appellant] returned a portion of their money. Compromise or novation of contract pertains
and affects only the civil aspect of the case. Estafa is a public offense that must be
prosecuted and punished by the Court in its motion even though complete reparation
should have been made of the damage suffered by the offended party.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 705
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JOEB M. ALIVIADO, ET.AL. vs. PROCTER & GAMBLE PHILS., INC., and
PROMM-GEM INC.,

G.R. No. 160506, June 6, 2011

DOCTRINE:The law and its implementing rules allow contracting arrangements for the
performance of specific jobs, works or services. Indeed, it is management prerogative to
farm out any of its activities, regardless of whether such activity is peripheral or core in
nature. However, in order for such outsourcing to be valid, it must be made to an
independent contractor because the current labor rules expressly prohibit labor-only
contracting. To emphasize, there is labor-only contracting when the contractor or
sub-contractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or
service for a principal and any of the following elements are present: i) The contractor or
subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to the job,
work or service to be performed and the employees recruited, supplied or placed by such
contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which are directly related to the main
business of the principal; or ii) The contractor does not exercise the right to control over
the performance of the work of the contractual employee.

FACTS:

Petitioners worked as merchandisers of P&G. They all individually signed


employment contracts with either Promm-Gem or SAPS. They were assigned at different
outlets, supermarkets and stores where they handled all the products of P&G. They
received their wages from Promm-Gem or SAPS.

SAPS and Promm-Gem imposed disciplinary measures on erring merchandisers


for reasons such as habitual absenteeism, dishonesty or changing day-off without prior
notice.

To enhance consumer awareness and acceptance of the products, P&G entered


into contracts with Promm-Gem and SAPS for the promotion and merchandising of its
products. In December 1991, petitioners filed a complaint against P&G for regularization,
service incentive leave pay and other benefits with damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Procter and Gamble is the employer of the petitioners.

HELD:

Yes, Proctor and Gamble is the employer of the petitioners.

In order to resolve the issue of whether P&G is the employer of petitioners, it is


necessary to first determine whether Promm-Gem and SAPS are labor-only contractors
or legitimate job contractors.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Clearly, the law and its implementing rules allow contracting arrangements for the
performance of specific jobs, works or services. However, in order for such outsourcing to
be valid, it must be made to an independent contractor because the current labor rules
expressly prohibit labor-only contracting.

To emphasize, there is labor-only contracting when the contractor or


sub-contractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or
service for a principal and any of the following elements are present:

i) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment


which relates to the job, work or service to be performed andthe employees recruited,
supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which are
directly related to the main business of the principal; or

ii) The contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the
work of the contractual

Under the circumstances, Promm-Gem cannot be considered as a labor-only


contractor. We find that it is a legitimate independent contractor.

Considering that SAPS has no substantial capital or investment and the workers it
recruited are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of
P&G, we find that the former is engaged in “labor-only contracting”.

Where labor-only contracting exists, the Labor Code itself establishes an


employer-employee relationship between the employer and the employees of the
labor-only contractor. The statute establishes this relationship for a comprehensive
purpose: to prevent a circumvention of labor laws. The contractor is considered merely an
agent of the principal employer and the latter is responsible to the employees of the
labor-only contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the principal
employer.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 707
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
RENO FOODS INC., and/or Vicente Khu v NagkakaisangLakasngManggagawa
(NLM) – Katipunan on behalf of its member, NenitaCapor

G.R. No. 164016, March 15, 2010

DOCTRINE:Social justice and equity are not magical formulas to erase the unjust acts
committed by the employee against his employer. While compassion for the poor is
desirable, it is not meant to coddle those who are unworthy of such consideration.

FACTS:

It is a standard operating procedure of Reno Foods to subject all its employees to


reasonable search of their belongings upon leaving the company premises. On 19
October 1998, six Reno canned goods were found inside NenitaCapor’s fabric clutch
bag. Thereafter, the company sent a Notice of Termination to Capor after her repeated
failure to provide an explanation. On 8 December 1998, Reno filed a complaint-affidavit
against Capor for qualified theft. Meanwhile, NagkakaisangLakasngManggagawanfiled
on behalf of Capor a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims against Reno
Foods Inc.

The Labor Arbiter decided against Capor, finding the latter guilty of serious
misconduct which is a just cause for termination and that as such, Capor is not entitled to
reinstatement and backwages, as well as moral and exemplary damages. On appeal
with the National Labor Relations Commission, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was
affirmed but added an award of financial assistance in the form of separation pay
equivalent to on-half month pay for every year of service. Aggrieved, Reno Foods Inc.
filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, they argued that theft of
company property is a form of serious misconduct for which no financial assistance in
the form of separation pay should be allowed. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the NLRC’s award of financial assistance to Capor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not financial assistance should be granted to an employee who was


validly dismissed for theft of company property.

HELD:

No. The award of separation pay is not warranted under the law and
jurisprudence. The law is clear in saying that separation pay is only warranted when the
cause for termination is not attributable to the employee’s fault, as well as in cases of
illegal dismissal in which reinstatement is no longer feasible. The same is not allowed
when an employee is dismissed for just cause, such as serious misconduct. While the
Court sympathize with Capor’s plight, being of retirement age and having served
petitioners for 39 years, the Court cannot award any financial assistance in her favor
because it is not only against the law but also a retrogressivepublic policy. As decided in
San Miguel Corporation vs NLRC: “a dishonest employee cannot be rewarded with
separation pay or any financial benefit after his culpability is established xxx. To hold

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 708
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
otherwise, even in the name of compassion, would be to send a wrong signal not only
that ‘crime pays’ but also that one can enrich himself at the expense of another in the
name of social justice.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 709
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Romeo Basay, Julian Literal, and Julian Abueva v Hacienda Consolacion, and/or
Bruno Bouffard III, Jose Ramon Bouffard, MalotBouffard, Spouses Carmen and
Steve Bumanlag, Bernie Bouffard, AnalynBouffard, and Dona Bouffard, as owners

G.R. No. 175532, April 19, 2010

DOCTRINE: Fair evidentiary rule dictates that before employers are burdened to prove
that they did not commit illegal dismissal, it is incumbent upon the employee to first
establish the fact of his or her dismissal.

FACTS: Romeo Basay, Julian Literal, and Julian Abueva were hired by Hacienda
Consolacion as tractor operators and laborer, respectively. On 29 August 2001, Basay,
Abueva and Consolacion filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with monetary claims
against Hacienda Consolacion. Employer Hacienda denied that Abueva is an employee,
rather he is a mere contractor hence there can be no dismissal to speak of, while as
regards Basay and Literal, it was admitted that both were regular employees but were
allegedly to have abandoned their jobs.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision exonerating respondent company from the charge
of illegal dismissal as petitioner were the ones who did not report for work despite
respondent’s call. The decision was appealed by both parties to the National Labor
Relations Commission. The NLRC decided in favor of the respondents after finding that
respondents have satisfactorily proven payment of the correct amount of wages and 13th
month pay. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
NLRC. Thereafter, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
however, the same was dismissed and affirmed the findings of the NLRC.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed and are entitled to their
money claims.

HELD:No. There was no illegal dismissal. The one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and the proof should be clear, positive and convincing. In the case at bar, aside
from mere allegations, no evidence was proffered by the petitioners that they were
dismissed from employment. The records are bereft of any indication that petitioners
were prevented from returning to work or otherwise deprived of any work assignment by
respondents. In fact, in the three months following the case filed against respondent,
petitioners remained listed and included in respondent’s payroll.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 710
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Dannie M. Pantoja v SCA Hygiene Products Corporation

G.R. No. 163554, April 23, 2010

DOCTRINE:The employer’s exercise of its management prerogative is upheld because


it was done for the advancement of its interest and not for the purpose of defeating the
lawful rights of an employee.

FACTS:

Petitioner Pantoja was employed as a utility man at SCA Hygiene Products


Corporation. Petitioner was later on offered to be transferred to Paper Mill No. 5 as part
of respondent’s reorganization plan. However, petitioner rejected the offer for his
transfer. Hence, a notice of termination of employment was sent to petitioner as his
position was declared redundant. He then received separation pay. On 5 April 1999,
respondent informed DOLE of its reorganization and partial closure. Meanwhile, on 20
June 2000, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal assailing his termination as
without any valid cause. He contested that the alleged redundancy never occurred as
there was no permanent shutdown of Paper Mill No. 4 due to its continuous operation.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing petitioner’s complaint. Upon


appeal with the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was reversed by finding
petitioner’s separation from employment illegal. Employer SCA Hygiene was ordered to
reinstate Pantoja. A Motion for Reconsidered was filed but was denied. Thereafter,
respondent filed a petitioner for certiorari with the Court of Appeals where the NLRC
decision was reversed reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of illegal dismissal.

HELD:

No.Respondent Corporation’s exercise of management prerogative was


exercised in good faith.Despite an apparent reason to implement a retrenchment
program as a cost-cutting measure, respondent, however, did not outrightly dismiss the
workers affected by the closure of Paper Mill No. 4 but gave them an option to be
transferred to posts of equal rank and pay. Retrenchment was utilized only as an
available option in case that the affected employee would not want to be transferred.
Such act of the corporation is an indication of good faith as it exhausted other possible
measure other than retrenchment.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 711
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SOUTHEASTERN SHIPPING GROUP, LTD., vs. FEDERICO U. NAVARRA, JR.
G.R. No. 167678, 22 June 2010

DOCTRINE: Article 291 of the Labor Code covers all money claims from
employer-employee relationship—it is not limited to money claims recoverable under the
Labor Code, but applies also to claims of overseas contract workers.

FACTS:
Southeastern Shipping, on behalf of its foreign principal, hired Federico to work
on board the vessel "George McLeod." Federico signed 10 successive separate
employment contracts of varying durations. His latest contract was approved by the
POEAfor 56 days extendible for another 56 days. He worked as roustabout during the
first contract and as a motorman during the succeeding contracts.

While on board the vessel, Federico complained of having a sore throat and on
and off fever with chills. He also developed a soft mass on the left side of his neck and
was given medication. Federico went back to the Philippines where he was diagnosed at
the Philippine General Hospital to be suffering from a form of cancer called Hodgkin's
Lymphoma, Nodular Sclerosing Type (also known as Hodgkin's Disease), the diagnosis
was confirmed in another test conducted at the Medical Center Manila.

Federico filed a complaint against petitioners with the arbitration branch of the
NLRC claiming entitlement to disability benefits, loss of earning capacity, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Unfortunately, he died during the pendency of
the case. The case was pursued by his widow, Evelyn.

Labor Arbiter Ermita T. Abrasaldo-Cuyuca dismissed the complaint on the ground


that Hodgkin's Lymphoma is not one of the occupational or compensable diseases or the
exact cause is not known. The decision was reversed by NLRC.

The CA found that the claim for benefits had not yet prescribed despite the
complaint being filed more than one year after Federico's return to the Philippines. It also
found that although Federico died 17 months after his contract had expired, his heirs
could still claim death benefits because the cause of his death was the same illness for
which he was repatriated.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the claims of Federico is covered by the Labor Code.

HELD:

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Yes. The employment contract signed by Federico stated that "the same shall be
deemed an integral part of the Standard Employment Contract for
Seafarers,"Recognizing the peculiar nature of overseas shipboard employment, the
employer and the seafarer agree that all claims arising from this contract shall be made
within one (1) year from the date of the seafarer's return to the point of hire.

On the other hand, the Labor Code states:


Art. 291. Money claims.-All money claims arising from employer-employee
relations during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years
from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall forever be barred.

The Constitution affirms labor as a primary social economic force. Along this vein,
the State vowed to afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for
all.

"The employment of seafarers, including claims for death benefits, is governed by


the contracts they sign every time they are hired or rehired; and as long as the
stipulations therein are not contrary to law, morals, public order or public policy, they
have the force of law between the parties."

In Cadalin v. POEA's Administrator, we held that Article 291 of the Labor Code
covers all money claims from employer-employee relationship. "It is not limited to money
claims recoverable under the Labor Code, but applies also to claims of overseas contract
workers".

Based on the foregoing, it is therefore clear that Article 291 is the law governing
the prescription of money claims of seafarers, a class of overseas contract workers. This
law prevails over Section 28 of the Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers which
provides for claims to be brought only within one year from the date of the seafarer's
return to the point of hire. Thus, for the guidance of all, Section 28 of the Standard
Employment Contract for Seafarers, insofar as it limits the prescriptive period within
which the seafarers may file their money claims, is hereby declared null and void. The
applicable provision is Article 291 of the Labor Code, it being more favorable to the
seafarers and more in accord with the State's declared policy to afford full protection to
labor. The prescriptive period in the present case is thus three years from the time the
cause of action accrues.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 713
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
In the present case, there is no exact showing of when the cause of action
accrued. Nevertheless, it could not have accrued earlier than January 21, 1998 which is
the date of his last contract. Hence, the claim has not yet prescribed, since the complaint
was filed with the arbitration branch of the NLRC on September 6, 1999.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 714
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LAMBERT PAWNBROKERS and JEWELRY CORPORATION vs.HELEN BINAMIRA
G.R. No. 170464 July 12, 2010

DOCTRINE:“Retrenchment is the termination of employment initiated by the employer


through no fault of and without prejudice to the employees. It is resorted to during periods
of business recession, industrial depression, seasonal fluctuations, or during lulls
occasioned by lack of orders, shortage of materials, conversion of the plant to a new
production program, or automation.”

“A redundant position is one rendered superfluous by any number of factors, such as over
hiring of workers, decreased volume of business, dropping of a particular product line
previously manufactured by the company, or phasing out of a service activity previously
undertaken by the business.”

“only the employer-corporation, partnership or association or any other entity, and not its
officers, which may be held liable for illegal dismissal of employees or for other wrongful
acts. This is as it should be because a corporation is a juridical entity with legal personality
separate and distinct from those acting for and in its behalf and, in general, from the
people comprising it.”

FACTS:

Petitioner Lambert Lim (Lim) is a Malaysian national operating various businesses


in Cebu and Bohol one of which is Lambert Pawnbrokers and Jewelry Corporation. Lim is
married to Rhodora Binamira, daughter of Atty. Boler Binamira, Sr., (Atty. Binamira), who
is also the counsel and father-in-law of respondent Helen Binamira (Helen). Lambert
Pawnbrokers and Jewelry Corporation – Tagbilaran Branch hired Helen as an appraiser
in July 1995 and designated her as Vault Custodian in 1996.

On September 14, 1998, Helen received a letter from Lim terminating her
employment effective that same day. Lim cited business losses necessitating
retrenchment as the reason for the termination.

Helen thus filed a case for illegal dismissal against petitioners. In her Position
Paper, Helen alleged that she was dismissed without cause and the benefit of due
process. She claimed that she was a mere casualty of the war of attrition between Lim
and the Binamira family. Moreover, she claimed that there was no proof that the company
was suffering from business losses.

In their Position Paper, petitioners asserted that they had no choice but to retrench
respondent due to economic reverses. The corporation suffered a marked decline in
profits as well as substantial and persistent increase in losses. In its Statement of Income
and Expenses, its gross income for 1998 dropped from ₱1million to ₱665,000.00.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Lim, and declared no illegal dismissal.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 715
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. It
observed that for retrenchment to be valid, a written notice shall be given to the employee
and to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) at least one month prior to the
intended date thereof. Since none was given in this case, then the retrenchment of Helen
was not valid.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, wherein the NLRC set aside its
Decision dated September 27, 2002 and entered a new one declaring that what was
actually implemented by the petitioners was not retrenchment due to serious business
losses but termination due to redundancy. The NLRC observed that the Tagbilaran
operations was overstaffed thus necessitating the termination of some employees.
Moreover, the redundancy program was not properly implemented because no written
notices were furnished the employee and the DOLE one month before the intended date
of termination.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Helen was denied by the NLRC.

On petition for certiorari, the CA found that both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
failed to consider substantial evidence showing that the exercise of management
prerogative, in this instance, was done in bad faith and in violation of the employee’s right
to due process. The CA ruled that there was no redundancy because the position of vault
custodian is a requisite, necessary and desirable position in the pawnshop business.
There was likewise no retrenchment because none of the conditions for retrenchment is
present in this case.

The CA rendered a new decision, declaring the dismissal of petitioner, Helen B.


Binamira, as illegal and directing the private respondents to pay to the petitioner
monetary awards:

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied.

ISSUES:

(1) Wherther or not the Certiorari petition was proper

(2) Whether or not the CA was correct in finding the dismissal of Helen as illegal

(3) Whether or not Private Petitioner Lim should be held personally liable for the
illegal dismissal

HELD:

(1) Yes. The CA correctly reviewed the factual findings of the labor tribunals.

As a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the question
involved is an error of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 716
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial
functions. Hence, courts exercising certiorari jurisdiction should refrain from reviewing
factual assessments of the respondent court or agency. Occasionally, however, they are
constrained to wade into factual matters when the evidence on record does not support
those factual findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare
or incomplete facts appearing on record, as in the present case.

We find that the CA rightfully reviewed the correctness of the labor tribunals’
factual findings not only because of the foregoing inadequacies, but also because the
NLRC and the Labor Arbiter came up with conflicting findings. The Labor Arbiter found
that Helen’s dismissal was valid on account of retrenchment due to economic reverses.
On the other hand, the NLRC originally ruled that Helen’s dismissal was illegal as none of
the requisites of a valid retrenchment was present. However, upon motion for
reconsideration, the NLRC changed its posture and ruled that the dismissal was valid on
the ground of redundancy due to over-hiring. Considering the diverse findings of the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, it behooved upon the CA in the exercise of
its certiorari jurisdiction to determine which findings are more in conformity with the
evidentiary facts.

(2) (a) No. There was no valid dismissal based on retrenchment.

Retrenchment is the termination of employment initiated by the employer through no fault


of and without prejudice to the employees. It is resorted to during periods of business
recession, industrial depression, seasonal fluctuations, or during lulls occasioned by lack
of orders, shortage of materials, conversion of the plant to a new production program, or
automation. It is a management prerogative resorted to avoid or minimize business
losses, and is recognized by Article 283 of the Labor Code

To effect a valid retrenchment, the following elements must be present:

(1) the retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses
which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial, serious and real, or
only if expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by
the employer;

(2) the employer serves written notice both to the employee/s concerned and the
DOLE at least one month before the intended date of retrenchment;

(3) the employer pays the retrenched employee separation pay in an amount
prescribed by the Code;

(4) the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench in good faith; and

(5) the employer uses fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be
retrenched or retained.22

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 717
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The losses must be supported by sufficient and convincing evidence. The normal
method of discharging this is by the submission of financial statements duly audited by
independent external auditors.

In this case, however, the Statement of Income and Expenses for the year
1997-1998 submitted by the petitioners was prepared only on January 12, 1999. Thus, it
is highly improbable that the management already knew on September 14, 1998, the date
of Helen’s retrenchment, that they would be incurring substantial losses.

We perused over the financial statements submitted by petitioners and we find no


evidence at all that the company was suffering from business losses. Their Position
Paper, petitioners merely alleged a sharp drop in its income in 1998 from ₱1million to only
₱665,000.00. This is not the business losses contemplated by the Labor Code that would
justify a valid retrenchment. A mere decline in gross income cannot in any manner be
considered as serious business losses. It should be substantial, sustained and real.

To make matters worse, there was also no showing that petitioners adopted other
cost-saving measures before resorting to retrenchment. They also did not use any fair
and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be retrenched. Finally, no written
notices were served on the employee and the DOLE prior to the implementation of the
retrenchment. Helen received her notice only on September 14, 1998, the day when her
termination would supposedly take effect. This is in clear violation of the Labor Code
provision which requires notice at least one month prior to the intended date of
termination.

(2) (b) No. There was no valid dismissal based on redundancy.

Redundancy, on the other hand, exists when the service capability of the workforce is in
excess of what is reasonably needed to meet the demands of the enterprise. A redundant
position is one rendered superfluous by any number of factors, such as over hiring of
workers, decreased volume of business, dropping of a particular product line previously
manufactured by the company, or phasing out of a service activity previously undertaken
by the business. Under these conditions, the employer has no legal obligation to keep in
its payroll more employees than are necessary for the operation of its business.

For the implementation of a redundancy program to be valid, the employer must comply
with the following requisites:

(1) written notice served on both the employees and the DOLE at least one month
prior to the intended date of termination of employment;

(2) payment of separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay for every year
of service;

(3) good faith in abolishing the redundant positions; and

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 718
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
(4) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared
redundant and accordingly abolished.

In this case, there is no proof that the essential requisites for a valid redundancy
program as a ground for the termination of the employment of respondent are present.
There was no showing that the function of respondent is superfluous or that the business
was suffering from a serious downturn that would warrant redundancy considering that
such serious business downturn was the ground cited by petitioners in the termination
letter sent to respondent.

In fine, Helen’s dismissal is illegal for lack of just or authorized cause and failure to
observe due process of law.

(3) No. Lambert Pawnbrokers and Jewelry Corporation is solely liable for the illegal
dismissal of respondent.

As a general rule, only the employer-corporation, partnership or association or any


other entity, and not its officers, which may be held liable for illegal dismissal of
employees or for other wrongful acts. This is as it should be because a corporation is a
juridical entity with legal personality separate and distinct from those acting for and in its
behalf and, in general, from the people comprising it. A corporation, as a juridical entity,
may act only through its directors, officers and employees. Obligations incurred as a
result of the directors’ and officers’ acts as corporate agents, are not their personal liability
but the direct responsibility of the corporation they represent.It is settled that in the
absence of malice and bad faith, a stockholder or an officer of a corporation cannot be
made personally liable for corporate liabilities. They are only solidarily liable with the
corporation for the illegal termination of services of employees if they acted with malice or
bad faith.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 719
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
VIRGINIA D. BAUTISTAvs.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 185215 July 22, 2010

DOCTRINE: “There is demotion when an employee is appointed to a position resulting to


a diminution in duties, responsibilities, status or rank which may or may not involve a
reduction in salary. Where an employee is appointed to a position with the same duties
and responsibilities but a rank and salary higher than those enjoyed in his previous
position, there is no demotion and the appointment is valid.”

FACTS:

Petitioner began her career in DBP on June 1, 1978 when she was appointed as
Chief of Division. On December 1, 1982, she was promoted to the position of Technical
Assistant. On December 3, 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive
Order No. 81 which authorized, among others, the reorganization of DBP pursuant to
Sections 32 and 33 thereof. As part of DBP’s reorganization, petitioner was temporarily
appointed in January 1987 as Account Officer with an annual salary of ₱62,640.00 which
is equivalent to the 14th step of Salary Grade (SG)-20. In November 1988, this
appointment was made permanent subject to the result of the ongoing reorganization of
DBP and the approval of the CSC.

RA 6758 or "The Compensation and Classification Act of 1989," took effect on July
1, 1989. To implement the aforesaid law, the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) promulgated the Government Financial Institutions’ (GFIs) Index of Occupational
Services which mandated GFIs, like the DBP, to adopt a uniform set of position titles in
their plantilla. On October 2, 1989, the DBM issued Corporate Compensation Circular No.
10 (DBM-CCC No. 10) which authorized the GFIs to match their current set of position
titles to those prescribed by the GFIs Index of Occupational Services. As a consequence,
on February 15, 1991, petitioner was appointed on a permanent status as BEO II with an
annual salary of ₱131,250.00 or the 8th step of SG-24 which was made to retroact to July
1, 1989 (the date of effectivity of RA 6758). Prior to her appointment thereto, petitioner
occupied the position of Account Officer with SG-20 (24th step) with an annual salary of
₱102,000.00.

Petitioner protested her appointment as BEO II before the Head of the Personnel
Administration Department of the DBP because it allegedly amounted to a demotion.
According to petitioner, prior to the reorganization of DBP, she occupied the position of
Account Officer which, under the GFIs Index of Occupational Services, was assigned a
salary grade of 25 while that of BEO II has a salary grade of 24. She thus opined that her
appointment to the position of BEO II constituted a demotion due to the attendant
diminution of benefits and emoluments arising from said appointment.

The Department of Budget and Management and the CSC as well as the CA
denied petitioners claims that there was demotion.

ISSUES:

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 720
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Whether or not the appointment of petitioner as BEO II constitutes as demotion

HELD:

No. We affirm the findings of the CA and DENY the petition. There was no
demotion when petitioner was appointed as BEO II.

In this jurisdiction, a reorganization is valid provided that it is done in good faith. As


a general rule, the test of good faith lies in whether the purpose of the reorganization is for
economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient.Removal from office as a result of
reorganization must, thus, pass the test of good faith.

There was no demotion because petitioner was appointed to a position


comparable to the one she previously occupied. There was even an increase in her rank
and salary.

As correctly found by the CA, petitioner failed to prove that the position of Account
Officer with SG-20 in the plantilla of DBP prior to its reorganization and the position of
Account Officer with SG-25 under the GFIs Index of Occupational Services are the same.
Upon the passage of RA 6758, the DBM promulgated the GFIs Index of Occupational
Services which mandated the adoption of a uniform system of position titles in GFIs,
including DBP. The DBM then issued DBM-CCC No. 10 which authorized DBP to match
its current set of position titles to those prescribed under the GFIs Index of Occupational
Services based on the nature of duties and responsibilities, qualification requirements for
the position, hierarchy of jobs, and existing salary range. Consequently, petitioner’s
position of Account Officer with SG-20 was matched to the position of BEO II with SG-24
because she exercised supervisory functions over certain bank personnel.

It will also be recalled that the DBM had earlier denied petitioner’s request that her
position as Account Officer with SG-20 be matched to Account Officer with SG-25 under
the GFIs Index of Occupational Services because the Account Officer position in DBP is
not commensurate with the position of Account Officer with SG-25 under the said
index. While there was a change in title from "Account Officer" to "Bank Executive
Officer," petitioner’s duties and responsibilities before and after the reorganization
remained practically the same. Thus, her new appointment merely stated as reason
therefor: "Change in Item Number due to Reorganization." What is more, said
appointment resulted to an increase of her salary grade from 20 to 24 translating to an
increase of her annual salary from ₱102,000.00 to ₱131,250.00. Under these
circumstances, there is no room for us to rule that a demotion took place because
petitioner even benefited from an increase in rank and salary.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 721
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ATTY. ALLAN S. MONTAÑO vs.ATTY. ERNESTO C. VERCELES
G.R. No. 16858 July 26, 2010

DOCTRINES:“The Federation/Union’s Constitution and By-Laws govern the relationship


between and among its members. They are akin to ordinary contracts in that their
provisions have obligatory force upon the federation/ union and its member. What has
been expressly stipulated therein shall be strictly binding on both.”

FACTS:
During the 21st National Convention and Election of National Officers of FFW,
Atty. Montaño was nominated for the position of National Vice-President. In a letter dated
May 25, 2001, however, the FFW COMELEC, informed him that he is not qualified for
the position.
Election ensued on May 26-27, 2001. Despite the pending motion for
reconsideration with the FFW COMELEC, and strong opposition and protest of
respondent Atty. Ernesto C. Verceles (Atty. Verceles), a delegate to the convention and
president of UEEA-FFW, which is an affiliate union of FFW, the convention delegates
allowed Atty. Montaño’s candidacy. He emerged victorious and was proclaimed as the
National Vice-President.
On May 28, 2001, through a letter to the Chairman of FFW COMELEC, Atty.
Verceles reiterated his protest over Atty. Montaño’s candidacy which he manifested
during the plenary session before the holding of the election in the Convention. On June
18, 2001, Atty. Verceles sent a follow-up letter to the President of FFW requesting for
immediate action on his protest.
On July 13, 2001, Atty. Verceles, as President of UEEA-FFW and officer of the
Governing Board of FFW, filed before the BLR a petition for the nullification of the
election of Atty. Montaño as FFW National Vice-President. He alleged that, as already
ruled by the FFW COMELEC, Atty. Montaño is not qualified to run for the position
because Section 76 of Article XIX of the FFW Constitution and By-Laws prohibits
federation employees from sitting in its Governing Board. Claiming that Atty. Montaño’s
premature assumption of duties and formal induction as vice-president will cause serious
damage, Atty. Verceles likewise prayed for injunctive relief.
The BLR rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit, the Motion
for Reconsideration was denied by the BLR.Atty. Verceles thus elevated the matter to
the CA via a petition for certiorari. The CA set aside the BLR’s Decision and nullified the
election of Atty. Montaño as FFW National Vice-President.The CA denied both Atty.
Montaño’s motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the BLR has jurisdiction over the issues at hand

(2) Whether or not the petition to annul the election of Atty. Montaño’s election as VP
was prematurely filed

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 722
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
(3) Whether or not Atty. Montaño is qualified for the election

HELD:

(1) Yes. The BLR has jurisdiction over intra-union disputes involving a federation.

Section 226 of the Labor Code clearly provides that the BLR and the Regional
Directors of DOLE have concurrent jurisdiction over inter-union and intra-union disputes.
Such disputes include the conduct or nullification of election of union and workers’
association officers. There is, thus, no doubt as to the BLR’s jurisdiction over the instant
dispute involving member-unions of a federation arising from disagreement over the
provisions of the federation’s constitution and by-laws.

(2) No. The petition to annul Atty. Montaño’s election as VP was not prematurely
filed.

It is true that under the Implementing Rules, redress must first be sought within
the organization itself in accordance with its constitution and by-laws. However, this
requirement is not absolute but yields to exception under varying circumstances.

After the election, Atty. Verceles made his written/formal protest over Atty.
Montaño’s candidacy/proclamation with the FFW COMELEC. He exhausted the
remedies under the constitution and by-laws to have his protest acted upon by the
proper forum and even asked for a formal hearing on the matter. Still, the FFW
COMELEC failed to timely act thereon. Thus, Atty. Verceles had no other recourse but to
take the next available remedy to protect the interest of the union he represents as well
as the whole federation, especially so that Atty. Montaño, immediately after being
proclaimed, already assumed and started to perform the duties of the position.

(3) No. Atty. Montaño is not qualified to run as FFW National Vice-President

The FFW COMELEC is vested with authority and power, under the FFW
Constitution and By-Laws, to screen candidates and determine their qualifications and
eligibility to run in the election and to adopt and promulgate rules concerning the conduct
of elections.

The FFW Constitution and By-laws are clear that no member of the Governing
Board shall at the same time perform functions of the rank-and-file staff.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 723
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
NEW PUERTO COMMERCIAL AND RICHARD LIM vs.RODEL LOPEZ AND FELIX
GAVAN
G.R. No. 16999 July 26, 2010

DOCTRINE:“In order to validly dismiss an employee, he must be accorded both


substantive and procedural due process by the employer. Procedural due process
requires that the employee be given a notice of the charge against him, an ample
opportunity to be heard, and a notice of termination. Even if the aforesaid procedure is
conducted after the filing of the illegal dismissal case, the legality of the dismissal, as to
its procedural aspect, will be upheld provided that the employer is able to show that
compliance with these requirements was not a mere afterthought.”

FACTS:

Petitioner New Puerto Commercial hired respondent Felix Gavan (Gavan) as a


delivery panel driver on February 1, 1999 and respondent Rodel Lopez (Lopez) as roving
salesman on October 12, 1999. Petitioner Richard Lim is the operations manager of New
Puerto Commercial.Under a rolling store scheme, petitioners assigned respondents to
sell goods stocked in a van on cash or credit to the sari-sari stores of far-flung barangays
and municipalities outside Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. Respondents were
duty-bound to collect the accounts receivables and remit the same upon their return to
petitioners’ store on a weekly basis.
On November 3, 2000, respondents filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and
non-payment of monetary benefits against petitioners with the Regional Office of the
Department of Labor and Employment in Puerto Princesa City. On November 20, 2000,
a conciliation conference was held but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.
As a result, the complaint was endorsed for compulsory arbitration at the Regional
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC on February 13, 2001.
Previously or on November 28, 2000, petitioners sent respondents notices to
explain why they should not be dismissed for gross misconduct based on (1) the alleged
misappropriation of their sales collections, and (2) their absence without leave for more
than a month. The notice also required respondents to appear before petitioners’ lawyer
on December 2, 2000 to give their side with regard to the foregoing charges.
Respondents refused to attend said hearing.
The LA and the NLRC upheld the legality of the dismissal.When the case reached
the Court of Appeals, the CA modified the decision, ordering petitioners to pay nominal
damages for failure to comply with procedural due process.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents were accorded procedural due process

HELD:

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 724
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Yes. When the requirements of procedural due process are satisfied.

In termination proceedings of employees, procedural due process consists of the


twin requirements of notice and hearing. The employer must furnish the employee with
two written notices before the termination of employment can be effected: (1) the first
apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is
sought; and (2) the second informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss
him. The requirement of a hearing is complied with as long as there was an opportunity
to be heard, and not necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted.

The mere fact that the notices were sent to respondents after the filing of the labor
complaint does not, by itself, establish that the same was a mere afterthought. The
surrounding circumstances of this case adequately explain why the requirements of
procedural due process were satisfied only after the filing of the labor complaint.
Sometime in the third week of October 2000, petitioners received information that
respondents were not remitting their sales collections to the company. Thereafter,
petitioners initiated an investigation by sending one of their trusted salesmen, Bagasala,
in the route being serviced by respondents. To prevent a possible cover up, respondents
were temporarily reassigned to a new route to service. Subsequently, respondents
stopped reporting for work (i.e., starting from October 22, 2000 for respondent Lopez and
October 28, 2000 for respondent Gavan) after they got wind of the fact that they were
being investigated for misappropriation of their sales collection, and, on November 3,
2000, respondents filed the subject illegal dismissal case to pre-empt the outcome of the
ongoing investigation. On November 18, 2000, Bagasala returned from his month-long
investigation in the far-flung areas previously serviced by respondents and reported that
respondents indeed failed to remit ₱2,257.03 in sales collections. As a result, on
November 28, 2000, termination proceedings were commenced against respondents by
sending notices to explain with a notice of hearing scheduled on December 2, 2000. As
narrated earlier, respondents failed to give their side despite receipt of said notices.
Petitioners sent another set of notices to respondents on December 7, 2000 to attend a
hearing on December 15, 2000 but respondents again refused to attend. Thus, on
December 18, 2000, petitioners served notices of termination on respondents for gross
misconduct in misappropriating their sales collections and absence without leave for
more than a month.

As can be seen, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, it cannot be concluded
that the sending of the notices and setting of hearings were a mere afterthought because
petitioners were still awaiting the report from Bagasala when respondents pre-empted
the results of the ongoing investigation by filing the subject labor complaint. For this
reason, there was sufficient compliance with the twin requirements of notice and hearing
even if the notices were sent and the hearing conducted after the filing of the labor
complaint.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 725
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
NAGKAKAISANG LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWA SA KEIHIN (NLMK-OLALIA-KMU)
and HELEN VALENZUELA vs. KEIHIN PHILIPPINES CORPORATION
G.R. No. 171115 August 9, 2010

DOCTRINE:“For serious misconduct to justify dismissal under the law, "(a) it must be
serious, (b) must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties; and (c) must show
that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer."

“The employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before termination of
employment can be legally effected: (a) a notice apprising the employee of the particular
acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, and (b) a subsequent notice
informing the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him."

FACTS:

Petitioner Helen Valenzuela (Helen) was a production associate in respondent


Keihin Philippines Corporation (Keihin).

It is a standard operating procedure of Keihin to subject all its employees to


reasonable search before they leave the company premises. On September 5, 2003,
while Helen was about to leave the company premises, she saw a packing tape near her
work area and placed it inside her bag because it would be useful in her transfer of
residence. When the lady guard on duty inspected Helen’s bag, she found the packing
tape inside her bag. The guard confiscated it and submitted an incident report dated
September 5, 2003 to the Guard-in-Charge, who, in turn, submitted a memorandum
regarding the incident to the Human Resources and Administration Department on the
same date.

The following day, or on September 6, 2003, respondent company issued a show


cause notice to Helen accusing her of violating F.2 of the company’s Code of Conduct,
which says, "Any act constituting theft or robbery, or any attempt to commit theft or
robbery, of any company property or other associate’s property. Penalty: D (dismissal)."
Paul Cupon, Helen’s supervisor, called her to his office and directed her to explain in
writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against her.

Helen, in her explanation, admitted the offense and even manifested that she
would accept whatever penalty would be imposed upon her. She, however, did not
reckon that respondent company would terminate her services for her admitted offense.

On September 26, 2003, Helen received a notice of disciplinary action informing


her that Keihin has decided to terminate her services.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 726
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Petitioners filed a complaint against respondent for illegal dismissal, non-payment of
13th month pay, with a prayer for reinstatement and payment of full backwages, as well
as moral and exemplary damages. Petitioners alleged that Helen’s act of taking the
packing tape did not constitute serious misconduct, because the same was done with no
malicious intent. They believed that the tape was not of great value and of no further use
to respondent company since it was already half used. Although Helen admitted that she
took the packing tape, petitioners claimed that her punishment was disproportionate to
her infraction.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of KEIHIN, which the NLRC and the CA affirmed

ISSUE:

(1)Whether or not the punishment of dismissal was proper

(2) Whether or not HELEN was afforded proper due process

HELD:

(1) YES. The issue boils down to whether, in taking the packing tape for her own
personal use, Helen committed serious misconduct, which is a just cause for her
dismissal from service.

Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for termination. It
provides:

ARTICLE 282. Termination by employer. – An employer may terminate an


employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful
orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his
employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 727
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Misconduct is defined as "the transgression of some established and definite rule
of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies
wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment." For serious misconduct to justify
dismissal under the law, "(a) it must be serious, (b) must relate to the performance
of the employee’s duties; and (c) must show that the employee has become unfit
to continue working for the employer.”

In the case at bar, Helen took the packing tape with the thought that she could use
it for her own personal purposes. When Helen was asked to explain in writing why she
took the tape, she stated, "Kumuha po ako ng isang packing tape na gagamitin ko sa
paglilipat ng gamit ko sa bago kong lilipatang bahay." In other words, by her own
admission, there was intent on her part to benefit herself when she attempted to bring
home the packing tape in question.

It is noteworthy that prior to this incident, there had been several cases of theft
and vandalism involving both respondent company’s property and personal belongings
of other employees. In order to address this issue of losses, respondent company issued
two memoranda implementing an intensive inspection procedure and reminding all
employees that those who will be caught stealing and performing acts of vandalism will
be dealt with in accordance with the company’s Code of Conduct. Despite these
reminders, Helen took the packing tape and was caught during the routine inspection. All
these circumstances point to the conclusion that it was not just an error of judgment on
the part of Helen, but a deliberate act of theft of company property.

We hold that Helen is guilty of serious misconduct in her act of taking the packing
tape.

(2) Yes. Helen was afforded procedural due process

We reject petitioners’ claim that respondent company failed to observe the


requirements of procedural due process. "In the dismissal of employees, it has been
consistently held that the twin requirements of notice and hearing are essential elements
of due process. The employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before
termination of employment can be legally effected: (a) a notice apprising the employee of
the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, and (b) a subsequent
notice informing the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him."

In this case, respondent company furnished Helen a show-cause notice dated


September 6, 2003 accusing her of violating F.2 of the company’s Code of Conduct
which says, "Any act constituting theft or robbery, or any attempt to commit theft or
robbery, of any company property or other associate’s property." We find that such
notice sufficiently informed Helen of the charge of theft of company property against her.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 728
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
We are convinced that such notice satisfies the due process requirement to apprise the
employee of the particular acts or omissions for which dismissal is sought.

With regard to the requirement of a hearing, the essence of due process lies in an
opportunity to be heard. Such opportunity was afforded the petitioner when she was
asked to explain her side of the story. In Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v.
Barrientos, we held that, "the essence of due process lies simply in an opportunity to be
heard, and not that an actual hearing should always and indispensably be held."
Similarly in Philippine Pasay Chung Hua Academy v. Edpan, we held that, "[e]ven if no
hearing or conference was conducted, the requirement of due process had been met
since he was accorded a chance to explain his side of the controversy."

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 729
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MEDLINE MANAGEMENT, INC. and GRECOMAR SHIPPING AGENCY vs. GLICERIA
ROSLINDA AND ARIEL ROSLINDA
G.R. No. 168715, (September 15, 2010)

DOCTRINE: All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the
effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action
accrued; otherwise they shall forever be barred.

FACTS:
Petitioners hired Juliano Roslinda to work on board the vessel MV Victory. Juliano was
previously employed by the petitioners under two successive separate employment contracts of
varying durations. In accordance with which, he boarded the vessel MV Victory on October 25,
1998 as an oiler and, after several months of extension, was discharged on January 20, 2000.
Months after his repatriation, or on March 6, 2000, Juliano consulted Dr. Pamela R. Lloren. He
complained about abdominal distention which is the medical term for a patient who vomits
previously ingested foods. From March 8 to August 24, 2000, On August 27, 2001, Juliano
died. On September 4, 2003, his wife Gliceria Roslinda and son Ariel Roslinda, respondents
herein, filed a complaint against MMI and GSA for payment of death compensation,
reimbursement of medical expenses, damages, and attorney's fees before the Labor Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC

ISSUE:
WON claim is not yet barred by prescription despite the fact that it was filed beyond the
one-year prescriptive period provided by the POEA Standard Employment Contract.

HELD:
NO. The employment contract signed by Juliano stated that Upon approval, the same
shall be deemed an integral part of the Standard Employment Contract (SEC) for seafarers.
Section 28 of the POEA SEC states: The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) or the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over any and all disputes or controversies arising out of or by virtue of this Contract.
Recognizing the peculiar nature of overseas shipboard employment, the employer and the
seafarer agree that all claims arising from this contract shall be made within one (1) year from
the date of the seafarer's return to the point of hire. (Emphasis supplied) On the other hand, the
Labor Code states: ART. 291. Money claims. All money claims arising from employer-employee
relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the
time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall forever be barred.

In Southeastern Shipping v. Navarra, Jr.,[19] we ruled that Article 291 is the law governing
the prescription of money claims of seafarers, a class of overseas contract workers. This law
prevails over Section 28 of the Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers which provides for
claims to be brought only within one year from the date of the seafarer's return to the point of
hire. We further declared that for the guidance of all, Section 28 of the Standard Employment
Contract for Seafarers, insofar as it limits the prescriptive period within which the seafarers may
file their money claims, is hereby declared null and void. The applicable provision is Article 291
of the Labor Code, it being more favorable to the seafarers and more in accord with the State's

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 730
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
declared policy to afford full protection to labor. The prescriptive period in the present case is
thus three years from the time the cause of action accrues. In the present case, the cause of
action accrued on August 27, 2001 when Juliano died. Hence, the claim has not yet prescribed,
since the complaint was filed with the arbitration branch of the NLRC on September 4, 2003.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 731
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SHIMIZU PHILS. CONTRACTORS INC. vs. VIRGILIO P. CALLANTA
G.R. No. 165923, (September 29, 2010)

DOCTRINE: As an authorized cause for separation from service under Article 283 of the Labor
Code, retrenchment is a valid exercise of management prerogative subject to the strict
requirements set by jurisprudence: (1) That the retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely
to prevent business losses which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial,
serious, actual and real, or if only expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively
and in good faith by the employer; (2) That the employer served written notice both to the
employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the
intended date of retrenchment; (3) That the employer pays the retrenched employees
separation pay equivalent to one month pay or at least month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher; (4) That the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in
good faith for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees
right to security of tenure; and (5) That the employer used fair and reasonable criteria in
ascertaining who would be dismissed and who would be retained among the employees, such
as status, x x x efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial hardship for certain
workers. In the present case, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found sufficient compliance
with these substantive requirements, there being enough evidence to prove that petitioner was
sustaining business losses, that separation pay was offered to respondent, and that notices of
termination of service were furnished respondent and DOLE.

FACTS:
Petitioner, employed respondent as Safety Officer assigned at petitioners Yutaka-Giken
Project and eventually as Project Administrator of petitioners Structural Steel Division (SSD) in
1995. In a Memorandum dated June 7, 1997 respondent was informed that his services will be
terminated effective July 9, 1997 due to the lack of any vacancy in other projects and the need to
re-align the company’s personnel requirements brought about by the imperatives of maximum
financial commitments. Respondent then filed an illegal dismissal complaint against petitioner
assailing his dismissal as without any valid cause. The LA rendered a decision holding that there
was a valid retrenchment which was affirmed by the NLRC. However, CA invalidated the
retrenchment, held respondent to have been illegally dismissed, and ordered respondents
reinstatement and payment of backwages.

ISSUE:
WON There was substantial compliance for a valid retrenchment.

HELD:
YES. As an authorized cause for separation from service under Article 283 of the Labor
Code, retrenchment is a valid exercise of management prerogative subject to the strict
requirements set by jurisprudence: (1) That the retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely
to prevent business losses which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial,
serious, actual and real, or if only expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively
and in good faith by the employer; (2) That the employer served written notice both to the
employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the
intended date of retrenchment; (3) That the employer pays the retrenched employees

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 732
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
separation pay equivalent to one month pay or at least month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher; (4) That the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in
good faith for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees
right to security of tenure; and (5) That the employer used fair and reasonable criteria in
ascertaining who would be dismissed and who would be retained among the employees, such
as status, x x x efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial hardship for certain
workers. In the present case, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found sufficient compliance
with these substantive requirements, there being enough evidence to prove that petitioner was
sustaining business losses, that separation pay was offered to respondent, and that notices of
termination of service were furnished respondent and DOLE. In fine, we hold that petitioner was
able to prove that it incurred substantial business losses, that it offered to pay respondent his
separation pay, that the retrenchment scheme was arrived at in good faith, and lastly, that the
criteria or standard used in selecting the employees to be retrenched was work efficiency which
passed the test of fairness and reasonableness.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 733
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs. MANUEL P. BESITAN
G.R. No. 178901 (November 23, 2011)

DOCTRINE: Under the increased risk theory, there must be a reasonable proof that the
employees working condition increased his risk of contracting the disease, or that there is a
connection between his work and the cause of the disease. Only a reasonable proof of
work-connection, not direct causal relation, however, is required to establish compensability of a
non-occupational disease. Probability, and not certainty, is the yardstick in compensation
proceedings; thus, any doubt should be interpreted in favor of the employees for whom social
legislations, like PD No. 626, were enacted.

FACTS:
Respondent was employed by the Central Bank of the Philippines (now Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas) on January 21, 1976 as a Bank Examiner. Subsequently, he was promoted as
Bank Officer II and eventually as Bank Officer III. In October 2005, Besitan was diagnosed with
End Stage Renal Disease secondary to Chronic Glomerulonephritis and thus, had to undergo a
kidney transplant at the National Kidney and Transplant Institute (NKTI), for which he incurred
medical expenses amounting to P817,455.40. Believing that his working condition increased his
risk of contracting the disease, Besitan filed with the GSIS a claim for compensation benefits
under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 626, as amended. The GSIS, however, denied the claim
and the ECC affirmed the denial by the GSIS. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the
ECC. The CA ruled that respondent is entitled to compensation benefits under PD No. 626, as
amended, because his ailment was aggravated by the nature of his work, as evidenced by the
Medical Certificate.

ISSUE:
WON the respondent is entitled to compensation benefits under PD No. 626, as
amended.

HELD:
YES. Under the increased risk theory, there must be a reasonable proof that the
employees working condition increased his risk of contracting the disease, or that there is a
connection between his work and the cause of the disease. Only a reasonable proof of
work-connection, not direct causal relation, however, is required to establish compensability of a
non-occupational disease. Probability, and not certainty, is the yardstick in compensation
proceedings; thus, any doubt should be interpreted in favor of the employees for whom social
legislations, like PD No. 626, were enacted. Moreover, direct and clear evidence, is not
necessary to prove a claim. Strict rules of evidence do not apply as PD No. 626 only requires
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. In this case, since Besitans ailment, End Stage Renal Disease
secondary to Chronic Glomerulonephritis is not among those listed under Annex A, of the
Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, he needs to show by substantial evidence that
his risk of contracting the disease was increased by his working condition. After a careful study
of the instant case, we find that Besitan has sufficiently proved that his working condition
increased his risk of contracting Glomerulonephritis, which according to GSIS may be caused
by bacterial, viral, and parasitic infection (i.e. Typhoid fever, Syphilis, Leptospirosis,

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 734
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Toxoplasmosis, Varicella, Mumps, Measles, Schistosomiasis, Hepatitis B and C infection, etc.).
When Besitan entered the government service in 1976, he was given a clean bill of health. In
2005, he was diagnosed with End Stage Renal Disease secondary to Chronic
Glomerulonephritis. It would appear therefore that the nature of his work could have increased
his risk of contracting the disease. His frequent travels to remote areas in the country could have
exposed him to certain bacterial, viral, and parasitic infection, which in turn could have caused
his disease. Delaying his urination during his long trips to the provinces could have also
increased his risk of contracting his disease. As a matter of fact, even the Bank Physician of
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Dr. Gregorio Suarez II, agreed that Besitans working condition
could have contributed to the weakening of his kidneys, which could have caused his disease.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 735
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
EQUITABLE PCI BANK (Now BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC.) vs. CASTOR
DOMPOR
G.R. Nos. 163293 and 163297, (December 8, 2010)

DOCTRINE: To justify willful disobedience or insubordination as a valid ground for termination,


the employees assailed conduct must have been willful [or] characterized by a wrongful or
perverse attitude and the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the
employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. On the
other hand, willful breach of trust requires that the loss of confidence must not be simulated; it
should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are illegal, improper or unjustified; it may
not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; it must be
genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith; and, the employee
involved holds a position of trust and confidence.

FACTS:
Respondent was employed by then PCIB, which came to be Equitable PCI Bank and
now herein petitioner Banco De Oro Unibank, Inc. In 1995, he was assigned as branch
manager of PCIBs Makati Cinema Branch. On July 24, 1996, PCIBs Operations Subcenter
Head, called the attention of PCIBs Ayala-Makati Area Head, regarding a number of PLDT
dividend checks being sent for clearing by PCIB Makati Cinema Branch. It appears that
respondent allowed Luz Fuentes to deposit several second-endorsed PLDT dividend checks
beginning the last quarter of 1995. A special audit was then conducted and the audit found out
that such transaction made by the respondent was anomalous transactions. On September 2,
1996, a hearing was held by the investigating committee whereby several officers and
personnel including respondent were queried in relation to the irregular transactions involving
the account of Fuentes. After the hearing, on February 7, 1997, respondent received a
Memo dated January 7, 1997 dismissing him from employment on the grounds of serious policy
violations, willful breach of trust, and loss of confidence, with further sanction of forfeiture of
benefits and contingent restitution of the total amount of P6,712,756.61 including
costs. Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal which was dismissed by the LA and
affirmed by the NLRC. However, such decision was reversed by the CA.

ISSUE:
WON respondent committed willful disobedience and willful breach of trust sufficient as
just causes for his dismissal.

HELD:

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 736
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
YES. To justify willful disobedience or insubordination as a valid ground for termination,
the employees assailed conduct must have been willful [or] characterized by a wrongful or
perverse attitude and the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the
employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. On the
other hand, willful breach of trust requires that the loss of confidence must not be simulated; it
should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are illegal, improper or unjustified; it may
not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; it must be
genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith; and, the employee
involved holds a position of trust and confidence. In the case at bench, we hold that respondent
was validly dismissed on the grounds of willful disobedience and willful breach of trust under
Article 282 of the Labor Code. While petitioners manual of procedures does not absolutely
prohibit the negotiation or acceptance of second-endorsed checks for deposits, it does
expressly disallow the acceptance of checks endorsed by corporations, societies, firms, etc. and
checks with unusual endorsements. As shown by the records, this explicit policy was
transgressed by respondent intentionally and willfully. It was not denied that on June 27, 1996,
respondent was instructed by management to stop accepting second-endorsed checks due to
the irregularities attendant to the transactions with Fuentes. Despite such reasonable order, on
two occasions, respondent unhesitatingly accommodated the request of Fuentes to accept her
checks allegedly on the strength of the Area Heads approval on the first instance and on the
second instance, respondent justifies his acceptance of the checks as the same were
nevertheless returned and cancelled on the ground that the checks include those payable to
corporations. Indeed, the return and cancellation of these checks do not change the fact that
respondent had accepted for deposit checks which are payable to corporations, thereby
flagrantly violating bank guidelines. Respondent admittedly disobeyed not only his superiors
directives but also simple bank rules. Moreover, in the investigation conducted on September 2,
1996, Gabriel observed that the signatures appearing at the back of the checks accepted by
respondent bore the same strokes. As correctly noted by the Labor Arbiter, the negotiation of
checks by hundreds of payees to only one individual should have alerted respondent as to the
authenticity of the endorsements. These considerations have convinced the Court that the
PLDT dividend checks indeed contain unusual and suspicious endorsements and cannot be
overruled by the mere denial of respondent. . . Respondent, as bank manager, has the duty to
ensure that bank rules are strictly complied with not only to ensure efficient bank operation which
is imbued with public interest but also to serve the best interest of the bank as he holds a position
of trust and confidence. As emphasized by petitioner, respondent was in charge of the overall
administration of the branch and is tasked to ensure that all policies and procedures are strictly
followed. Indubitably, any negligence in the exercise of his responsibilities can be sufficient

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 737
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ground for loss of trust and confidence demanded by his position. As held in Etcuban, Jr. v.
Sulpicio Lines, Inc., the mere existence of a basis for believing that [a managerial] employee has
breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal x x x. [P]roof beyond
reasonable doubt is not required. Respondent’s wanton violation of bank policies equates to
abuse of authority and, therefore, abuse of the trust reposed in him. Such intention to violate the
trust of petitioner is enough for his dismissal from service.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 738
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PLDT vs. EUSEBIO HONRADO
G.R. No. 189366, (December 8, 2010)

DOCTRINE: The requisites for a valid dismissal are: (a) the employee must be afforded due
process, i.e., he must be given an opportunity to be heard and defend himself; and (b)
the dismissal must be for a valid cause as provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code or for
any of the authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284 of the same Code.

FACTS:
Private respondent was an employee of petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company assigned at the PLDT North Paraaque Exchange. On November 29, 1999, spouses
Mueda went to PLDT to verify their application for telephone because according to them, a
person named Rony Hipolito who introduced himself as a PLDT employee went to their house
on November 26, 1999 in the afternoon and that they can pay directly to him since he is a PLDT
employee and that the balance can be paid to PLDT within six months on installment basis.
Spouses Mueda further stated: that because of this, they paid Hipolito P1,500.00 as partial
payment for the installation of their new telephone line. However, the spouses found out that the
respondent and Rony Hipolito was only one person who defrauded the spouses. Thus, they
filed a complaint against the respondent. There was a formal hearing that took place which both
sides were heard. Thereafter, per inter-office memorandum dated February 13, 2001, private
respondent was notified that he was found liable as charged, hence, dismissed from service
effective February 15, 2001 at the close of business hours. Thus the respondent filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal which was denied by the LA. However on appeal, the NLRC
granted such appeal which was also affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:
WON there was a valid termination against the respondent.

HELD:
YES. The requisites for a valid dismissal are: (a) the employee must be afforded due
process, i.e., he must be given an opportunity to be heard and defend himself; and (b)
the dismissal must be for a valid cause as provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code or for
any of the authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284 of the same Code. It is hornbook in
employee dismissal cases that [t]he essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side x x x. A formal or trial
type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process, the requirements of
which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
side of the controversy. Neither is it necessary that the witnesses be cross-examined by counsel
for the adverse party. The CA cited this Courts ruling in Asuncion v. National Labor Relations
Commission citing Ruffy v. National Labor Relations Commission that ample opportunity would
be every kind of assistance that management must accord to the employee to enable him to
prepare for his defense. However, a careful reading of the factual setting of both cases belies

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 739
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
their inapplicability to the instant case. In Asuncion, this Court took note of the fact that the
two-day period for the petitioner to answer the charges against her was unreasonable
considering that she was charged with several infractions (35 absences, 23 half-days and 108
tardiness. On the other hand, in Ruffy, the employee was terminated prior to the
investigation. We further held in the latter case that in order to enable the employee to prepare
adequately for his defense, he may be provided with a representative. In this case, in addition to
the actual confrontation proceeding with Mrs. Mueda, Honrado asked for and was given a
formal hearing where he together with his counsel and his union representative had ample
opportunity to rebut the accusation lodged against him. However, despite said opportunity, other
than his general denial, he did not present his counter-statement in the company
proceedings. Clearly, Honrado was afforded ample opportunity to air his side and defend
himself. Hence, there was no denial of his right to due process.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 740
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PABLO POLSOTIN, JR., ARWIN RAYALA, GERONIMO LIMPANTE, RAUL
DOMDOM, AND OSCAR ANDRIN, vs. DE GUIA ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 172624, December 5, 2011

DOCTRINE: A worker cannot be deprived of his job, a property right, without satisfying
the requirements of due process. As enshrined in our bill of rights, no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

FACTS:
Petitioners Polsotin, Rayala, Limpante, Domdom and Andrin (petitioners) were bus
drivers and conductors of respondent De Guia Enterprises, Inc. (respondent). Alleging
that they were dismissed without cause and due process, petitioners filed on July 17,
2001 a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of backwages and damages against
respondent before the NLRC.

Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing petitioners’ complaint for lack of


merit. It held that petitioners were validly terminated from employment for violation of
company rules and regulations as well as for gross and habitual neglect of duties. NLRC
dismissed the appeal for failure of petitioners to append thereto a certificate of non-forum
shopping and proof of service upon the other party. The NLRC then affirmed the Decision
appealed from. CA rendered a Decision denying due course and dismissing the petition
for the following reasons: first, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping
attached to the petition was not signed by all of the petitioners; and, second, there was no
showing of grave abuse of discretion since the NLRC merely complied with the
procedural rules governing appeals before it. Therefore, it could not be faulted in denying
petitioners’ appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not in spite of the technicalities, petitioners are still entitled to due
consideration of their petition

HELD:
Yes. Strict application of technical rules should be set aside to serve the broader
interest of substantial justice.

It bears stressing that "the dismissal of an employee’s appeal on purely technical ground
is inconsistent with the constitutional mandate on protection to labor." The Court has
often set aside the strict application of procedural technicalities to serve the broader
interest of substantial justice.
A careful consideration of the facts of the case convinces us that petitioners’ appeal
should have been given due course. It may be recalled that respondent failed to timely
submit its position paper when required by the Labor Arbiter, hence, the case was

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 741
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
submitted for decision sans the same. Nonetheless, when respondent filed its position
paper, the Labor Arbiter admitted the same and relied on it in coming up with a decision
that petitioners were validly terminated. More important is that petitioners were not even
furnished a copy of respondent’s position paper in order for them to refute the contents
and allegations therein. And since neither did respondent appear in any of the hearings
conducted before the Labor Arbiter, petitioners were never really afforded an opportunity
to rebut respondent’s allegations and charges against them or to introduce evidence to
refute them. Petitioners’ right to due process was thus clearly violated.

Indeed, labor tribunals are mandated to use all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts in each case speedily, objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure. However, in every proceeding before it, the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process should not to be ignored but must at all times be
respected. Besides, petitioners’ case concerns their job, considered as a property right,
of which they could not be deprived of without due process.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 742
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
RENATO REAL, vs. SANGU PHILIPPINES, INC. and/ or KIICHI ABE
G.R. No. 168757, January 19, 2011

DOCTRINE: To determine whether a case involves an intra-corporate controversy, and is


to be heard and decided by the branches of the RTC specifically designated by the Court
to try and decide such cases, two elements must concur: (a) the status or relationship of
the parties, and (2) the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy.

FACTS:
Petitioner was removed from his position as Manager through Board Resolution
adopted by respondent corporation’s Board of Directors. Petitioner complained that he
was neither notified of the Board Meeting during which said board resolution was passed
nor formally charged with any infraction. Respondents, on the other hand, refuted
petitioner’s claim of illegal dismissal by alleging that after petitioner was appointed
Manager, he committed gross acts of misconduct detrimental to the company since
2000. As he was almost always absent, petitioner neglected to supervise the employees
resulting in complaints from various clients about employees’ performance. Labor Arbiter
in a Decision declared petitioner and his co-complainants as having been illegally
dismissed.

Respondents thus appealed to the NLRC and raised therein as one of the issues the
lack of jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter over petitioner’s complaint. Respondents claimed
that petitioner is both a stockholder and a corporate officer of respondent corporation,
hence, his action against respondents is an intra-corporate controversy over which the
Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction. The NLRC found such contention of respondents to be
meritorious. CA sided with respondents and affirmed the NLRC’s finding that aside from
being a stockholder of respondent corporation, petitioner is also a corporate officer
thereof and consequently, his complaint is an intra-corporate controversy over which the
labor arbiter has no jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s complaint for illegal dismissal constitutes an
intra-corporate controversy and thus, beyond the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.

HELD:
Two-tier test in determining the existence of intra-corporate controversy. The better
policy to be followed in determining jurisdiction over a case should be to consider
concurrent factors such as the status or relationship of the parties or the nature of
the question that is subject of their controversy. In the absence of any one of these
factors, the SEC will not have jurisdiction. Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that
every conflict between the corporation and its stockholders would involve such corporate
matters as only SEC (now the Regional Trial Court) can resolve in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 743
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Guided by recent jurisprudence, we thus find no merit in respondents’ contention
that the fact alone that petitioner is a stockholder and director of respondent corporation
automatically classifies this case as an intra-corporate controversy. To reiterate, not all
conflicts between the stockholders and the corporation are classified as intra-corporate.
There are other factors to consider in determining whether the dispute involves corporate
matters as to consider them as intra-corporate controversies.

An examination of the complaint for illegal dismissal, however, reveals that the root
of the controversy is petitioner’s dismissal as Manager of respondent corporation, a
position which respondents claim to be a corporate office. Hence, petitioner is involved in
this case not in his capacity as a stockholder or director, but as an alleged corporate
officer. In applying the relationship test, therefore, it is necessary to determine if petitioner
is a corporate officer of respondent corporation so as to establish the intra-corporate
relationship between the parties.

The Court have have however examined the records of this case and we find
nothing to prove that petitioner’s appointment was made pursuant to the above-quoted
provision of respondent corporation’s By-Laws. No copy of board resolution appointing
petitioner as Manager or any other document showing that he was appointed to said
position by action of the board was submitted by respondents. What we found instead
were mere allegations of respondents in their various pleadings that petitioner was
appointed as Manager of respondent corporation and nothing more.” Having said this, we
find that there is no intra-corporate relationship between the parties insofar as petitioner’s
complaint for illegal dismissal is concerned and that same does not satisfy the
relationship test.

With the elements of intra-corporate controversy being absent in this case, we thus
hold that petitioner’s complaint for illegal dismissal against respondents is not
intra-corporate. Rather, it is a termination dispute and, consequently, falls under the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Section 217 of the Labor Code.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 744
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ISLRIZ TRADING/VICTOR HUGO LU, vs. EFREN CAPADA, LAURO LICUP,
NORBERTO NIGOS, RONNIE ABEL, GODOFREDO MAGNAYE, ARNEL SIBERRE,
EDMUNDO CAPADA, NOMERLITO MAGNAYE and ALBERTO DELA VEGA.
G.R. No. 168501, January 31, 2011

DOCTRINE: Employees are entitled to their accrued salaries during the period between
the Labor Arbiter’s order of reinstatement pending appeal and the resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) overturning that of the Labor Arbiter.
Otherwise stated, even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on
appeal, the employer is still obliged to reinstate and pay the wages of the employee
during the period of appeal until reversal by a higher court or tribunal.

FACTS:
Respondents filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay,
holiday pay, rest day pay, allowances and separation pay against petitioner. On his part,
petitioner imputed abandonment of work against respondents. Labor Arbiter ruled in favor
of the respondents and ordered payment of full back wages from date of dismissal to
actual reinstatement. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the NLRC which granted the
appeal. NLRC ordered respondents’ reinstatement but without backwages. Labor Arbiter
issued a Writ of Execution. Before the CA, petitioner imputed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction upon Labor Arbiter Castillon for issuing the
questioned Writ of Execution. The CA ruled in favor of the respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents may collect their wages during the period between the
Labor Arbiter’s order of reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC Resolution
overturning that of the Labor Arbiter.

HELD:
In resolving the case, the Court examined its conflicting rulings with respect to the
application of paragraph 3 of Article 223 of the Labor Code, viz:
At the core of the seeming divergence is the application of paragraph 3 of Article 223 of
the Labor Code which reads:
‘In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be
executory, pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under
the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the
option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the
employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.’
The view as maintained in a number of cases is that:

‘x x x [E]ven if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal,


it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 745
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher
court. On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period
and such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to
reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually
rendered services during the period.

In other words, a dismissed employee whose case was favorably decided by the
Labor Arbiter is entitled to receive wages pending appeal upon reinstatement, which is
immediately executory. Unless there is a restraining order, it is ministerial upon the Labor
Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement and it is mandatory on the employer to
comply therewith.

Hence, the conclusion is that respondents have the right to collect their accrued
salaries during the period between the Labor Arbiter’s Decision ordering their
reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC Resolution overturning the same because
petitioner’s failure to reinstate them either actually or through payroll was due to
petitioner’s unjustified refusal to effect reinstatement. In order to enforce this, Labor
Arbiter Castillon thus correctly issued the Writ of Execution dated March 9, 2004 as well
as the Order dated June 3, 2004 denying petitioner’s Motion to Quash Writ of Execution
and granting respondents’ Urgent Motion for Issuance of Break-Open Order.
Consequently, we find no error on the part of the CA in upholding these issuances and in
dismissing the petition for certiorari before it.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 746
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
EXODUS INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and ANTONIO P.
JAVALERA, vs. GUILLERMO BISCOCHO, FERNANDO PEREDA, FERDINAND
MARIANO, GREGORIO BELLITA and MIGUEL BOBILLO
G.R. No. 166109, February 23, 2011

DOCTRINE: In illegal dismissal cases, it is incumbent upon the employees to first


establish the fact of their dismissal before the burden is shifted to the employer to prove
that the dismissal was legal.

FACTS:
Exodus obtained from Dutch Boy a contract for the painting of the Imperial Sky
Garden. Guillermo was assigned at the Imperial. Fernando worked in the same project.
All of them were then transferred to Pacific Plaza Towers. Guillermo, Fernando,
Ferdinand, and Miguel filed a complaint8 for illegal dismissal and non-payment of holiday
pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and night-shift differential pay. Labor
Arbiter rendered a Decision exonerating petitioners from the charge of illegal dismissal as
respondents chose not to report for work. Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision exonerating
petitioners from the charge of illegal dismissal as respondents chose not to report for
work. The Labor Arbiter ruled that since there is neither illegal dismissal nor abandonment
of job, respondents should be reinstated but without any backwages. NLRC affirmed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the findings of the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. It opined that in a situation where the employer has
complete control over the records and could thus easily rebut any monetary claims
against it but opted not to lift any finger, the burden is on the employer and not on the
complainants. This is so because the latter are definitely not in a position to adduce any
documentary evidence, the control of which being not with them.

ISSUE:
Whether there is illegal dismissal in this case

HELD:
No. There was no dismissal in this case. As found by the Labor Arbiter, there was no
evidence that respondents were dismissed nor were they prevented from returning to
their work. It was only respondents’ unsubstantiated conclusion that they were dismissed.
As a matter of fact, respondents could not name the particular person who effected their
dismissal and under what particular circumstances. The rule is that one who alleges a fact
has the burden of proving it; thus, petitioners were burdened to prove their allegation that
respondents dismissed them from their employment. It must be stressed that the
evidence to prove this fact must be clear, positive and convincing. The rule that the
employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases finds no application here
because the respondents deny having dismissed the petitioners. In this case, petitioners
were able to show that they never dismissed respondents.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 747
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Hence, as between respondents’ general allegation of having been orally dismissed
from the service vis-a-vis those of petitioners which were found to be substantiated by the
sworn statement of foreman Wenifredo, we are persuaded by the latter. Absent any
showing of an overt or positive act proving that petitioners had dismissed respondents,
the latters’ claim of illegal dismissal cannot be sustained. Indeed, a cursory examination
of the records reveal no illegal dismissal to speak of.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 748
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LEGEND INTERNATIONAL RESORTS LIMITED vs. KILUSANG MANGGAGAWA NG
LEGENDA (KML-INDEPENDENT)
G.R. No. 169754, February 23, 2011

DOCTRINE: The legitimacy of the legal personality of KML cannot be collaterally


attacked in a petition for certification election.

FACTS:
KML filed a Petition for Certification Election. KML alleged that it is a legitimate labor
organization of the rank and file employees of Legend International Resorts Limited
(LEGEND). LEGEND moved to dismiss the petition alleging that KML is not a legitimate
labor organization because its membership is a mixture of rank and file and supervisory
employees in violation of Article 245 of the Labor Code. KML argued that even if 41 of its
members are indeed supervisory employees and therefore excluded from its
membership, the certification election could still proceed because the required number of
the total rank and file employees necessary for certification purposes is still sustained.
KML also claimed that its legitimacy as a labor union could not be collaterally attacked in
the certification election proceedings but only through a separate and independent action
for cancellation of union registration. Finally, as to the alleged acts of misrepresentation,
KML asserted that LEGEND failed to substantiate its claim. Med-Arbiter concluded that
KML is not a legitimate labor organization. Office of the Secretary of DOLE rendered its
Decision granting KML’s appeal thereby reversing and setting aside the Med-Arbiter’s
Decision. The Office of the Secretary of DOLE held that KML’s legitimacy as a union
could not be collaterally attacked.

Court of Appeals rendered its Decision finding no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Office of the Secretary of DOLE.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the legal personality of KML cannot be collaterally attacked in a
petition for certification election

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the legal personality of KML cannot be collaterally attacked in
a petition for certification election.

The Court agree with the ruling of the Office of the Secretary of DOLE that the
legitimacy of the legal personality of KML cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for
certification election proceeding. This is in consonance with our ruling in Laguna
Autoparts Manufacturing Corporation v. Office of the Secretary, Department of Labor and
Employment that "such legal personality may not be subject to a collateral attack but only
through a separate action instituted particularly for the purpose of assailing it."

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 749
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
This is categorically prescribed by Section 5, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of
Book V, which states as follows:

SEC. 5. Effect of registration. – The labor organization or worker’s association


shall be deemed registered and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its
certificate of registration. Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral
attack but may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in
accordance with these Rules.

Hence, to raise the issue of the respondent union’s legal personality is not proper
in this case. The pronouncement of the Labor Relations Division Chief, that the
respondent union acquired a legal personality x x x cannot be challenged in a petition for
certification election.

The discussion of the Secretary of Labor and Employment on this point is also
enlightening, thus:

. . . Section 5, Rule V of D.O. 9 is instructive on the matter. It provides that the legal
personality of a union cannot be the subject of collateral attack in a petition for certification
election, but may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation of union
registration. This has been the rule since NUBE v. Minister of Labor, 110 SCRA 274
(1981). What applies in this case is the principle that once a union acquires a legitimate
status as a labor organization, it continues as such until its certificate of registration is
cancelled or revoked in an independent action for cancellation.

Equally important is Section 11, Paragraph II, Rule IX of D.O. 9, which provides for
the dismissal of a petition for certification election based on the lack of legal personality of
a labor organization only in the following instances: (1) appellant is not listed by the
Regional Office or the BLR in its registry of legitimate labor organizations; or (2)
appellant’s legal personality has been revoked or cancelled with finality. Since appellant
is listed in the registry of legitimate labor organizations, and its legitimacy has not been
revoked or cancelled with finality, the granting of its petition for certification election is
proper. "[T]he legal personality of a legitimate labor organization x x x cannot be subject
to a collateral attack. The law is very clear on this matter. x x x The Implementing Rules
stipulate that a labor organization shall be deemed registered and vested with legal
personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration. Once a certificate of
registration is issued to a union, its legal personality cannot be subject to a collateral
attack. In may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in
accordance with Section 5 of Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules."

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 750
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
IMELDA PANTOLLANO (for herself as surviving spouse and in behalf of her 4
children Honeyvette, Tierra Bryn, KienneDionnes, Sherra Veda Mae, then all
minors, with deceased seaman VEDASTO PANTOLLANO)
vs.
KORPHIL SHIPMANAGEMENT AND MANNING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 169575: March 30, 2011

DOCTRINE:The heirs of a missing seaman may file their claim for death compensation
benefits within the three-year period fixed by law from the time the seaman has been
presumed dead.

FACTS:
KorphilShipmanagement and Manning Corporation (Korphil) is a domestic
corporation engaged in the recruitment of seafarers for its foreign principals, hired
Vedasto C. Pantollano (Vedasto) as 4th Engineer on board the vessel M/V Couper under
a Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) approved contractof employment.
Vedasto was seen by MessmanNolito L. Tarnate (MessmanNolito) to be in deep
thought, counting other vessels passing by and talking to himself. At about 8:15 A.M., the
Chief Engineer of the vessel reported to the Master of the vessel, Mr. Kim Jong Chul,
that Vedasto did not show up for his duty. The Master of the vessel thus ordered all
personnel on standby. The vessel then altered its course to search for Vedasto. Some
crew members were tasked to search the vessel while others were assigned to focus
their search on the open sea to locate and rescue Vedasto. Assistance from other
vessels was also requested. Thesearch and rescue operation lasted for about six hours,
but Vedasto was not found. On August 3, 1994, a Report was issued by the Master of
M/V Couper declaring that Vedasto was missing. Since then, Vedasto was never seen
again.
For this reason, Imelda, wife of Vedasto, filed a complaint before the NLRC where
she sought to recover death benefits, damages and attorneys fees.
The LA rendered a decision holding that the legal heirs of Vedasto are entitled to
the payment of death benefits and attorneys fees. On appeal to the NLRC, the LA
decision was affirmed. Aggrieved, a petition for certiorari was filed before the CA where
the NLRC decision was reversed. Upon denial of Imelda's motion for reconsideration, the
present petition is filed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of Vedasto are entitled to the benefits

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 751
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
A person missing under the circumstances as those of Vedasto may not legally be
considered as dead until the lapse of the period fixed by law on presumption of death,
and consequently Imelda cannot yet be considered as a widow entitled to compensation
under the law.

On August 2, 1994, when Vedasto was reported missing, Imelda cannot as yet file
her claim for death benefits as it is still premature. The provisions of Article 391 of the
Civil Code therefore become relevant. With the known facts, namely, that Vedasto was
lost or missing while M/V Couper was navigating the open sea, there is no doubt that he
could have been in danger of death. Paragraph (3) of Article 391 of the Civil Code will
then be applicable in this case. Thus, Vedasto can only be presumed dead after the
lapse of four years from August 2, 1994 when he was declared missing. But of course,
evidence must be shown that Vedasto has not been heard of for four years or thereafter.
This is the case here.
Vedasto is presumed legally dead only on August 2, 1998. It is only at this time
that the rights of his heirs to file their claim for death benefits accrued.
Having already established that Imeldas cause of action accrued on August 2,
1998, it follows that her claim filed on May 29, 2000 was timely. It was filed within three
years from the time the cause of action accrued pursuant to Article 291 of the Labor
Code. Hence, Imelda and her children are entitled to the payment of said compensation.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 752
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs.
TERESA G. FAVILA
G.R. No. 170195 March 28, 2011

DOCTRINE: A spouse who claims entitlement to death benefits as a primary beneficiary


under the Social Security Law must establish two qualifying factors, to wit: (1) that
he/she is the legitimate spouse; and (2) that he/she is dependent upon the member for
support.

FACTS:
Teresa Favila was married to FloranteFavila on January 17, 1970. Florante
designated her as the sole beneficiary in the E-1 Form on June 30, 1970. He likewise
designated each one of his children as beneficiaries when he begot them. When
Florante died on February 1, 1997, his pension benefits under the SSS were given t o
their only minor child at that time, Florante II, but only until his emancipation at age 21.
Teresa subsequently filed her claim for said benefits before the SSS. The SSS, however,
denied the claim. The ruling of SSC held that death benefits are dependent on 2 factors:
(1) legality of the marital relationship; and (2) dependency for support, which is affect ed
by factors such as separation de facto of the spouses, marital infidelity and such other
grounds sufficient to disinherit a spouse under the law. SSC ruled t hat Teresa is
disqualified from claiming the death benefits because she was deemed not dependent
for support from Florante due to marital infidelity. SSC further held that Teresa did not
timely contest her non-entitlement to the award of benefits. It was only when Florante II’s
pension was stopped that she filed her claim.

CA found Teresa's petition with merit. It gave weight to the fact that she is a
primary beneficiary because she is the lawful surviving spouse of Florante and i n
addition, she was designated by Florante as such beneficiary. There was no leg al
separation or annulment of marriage that could have disqualified her from claiming the
death benefits. It opined that once a spouse is designated by an SSS m ember as his/her
beneficiary, same forecloses any inquiry as to whether the spouse is indeed a dependent
deriving support from the member.

ISSUE:
Is Teresa a primary beneficiary in contemplation of the Social Security Law as t o
be entitled to death benefits accruing from the death of Florante?

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 753
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
No. For a spouse to qualify as a primary beneficiary, he/she must not be a legit
imate spouse but also a dependent as provided by Section 8 (e) and (k) of RA 116 1.
Dependent is defined under under paragraph (e) as one who is dependent upon t he
member for support. In Re: Application for Survivors Benefits of Manlavi, the Court
defined "dependent" as "one who derives his or her main support from another [or]
relying on, or subject to, someone else for support; not able to exist o r sustain oneself,
or to perform anything without the will, power or aid of some one else." As Teresa had
been separated from Florante for 17 years prior to his death, she was not dependent on
her husband for any support, financial or otherwise, hence, she is not a dependent.
Court ruled in Aguas that "a wife who is already separated de facto from her husband
cannot be said to be dependent for support upon the husband, absent any showing to
the contrary.
Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish his or
her right thereto by substantial evidence. Teresa failed to present any proof to show that
at the time of her husband’s death, she was still dependent on him for support even if
they were already living separately. Teresa Favila was declared to be not a dependent
spouse and therefore not entitled to death benefits.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 754
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SANDEN AIRCON PHILIPPINES and ANTONIO ANG vs. LORESSA P. ROSALES
G.R. No. 169260 March 23, 2011

DOCTRINE: An employer has the discretion to dismiss an employee for loss of trust and
confidence but the former may not use the same to cloak an illegal dismissal.

FACTS:
Sanden employed Loressa P. Rosales (Loressa) as Management Information
System (MIS) Department Secretary. On December 26, 1996, she was promoted as
Data Custodian and Coordinator. As such, Loressa had access to all computer programs
and marketing computer data, including the Delivery Receipt Transaction files of
Sanden.
Sanden discovered that the marketing delivery receipt transactions computer files
were missing. Hence, a technical investigation was conducted. On the basis of the
investigation, Atty. Reynaldo B. sent a letter to Loressa charging her with data sabotage
and absences without leave (AWOL). She was given 24 hours to explain her side.
Loressa denied the allegations.
Loressa received a Notice of Disciplinary Action from Sanden notifying Loressa
that management is terminating Loressas employment effective upon receipt of the said
communication. The reason cited by Sanden was the loss of trust on her capability to
continue as its Coordinator and Data Custodian. For this reason, Loressa filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal.
The LA rendered a decision finding that there was illegal dismissal. On appeal,
the NLRC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Aggrieved, Loressa filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA where the NLRC decision was reversed and set aside.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Loressa was illegally dismissed

HELD:
As firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence, loss of trust and confidence as a just
cause for termination of employment is premised on the fact that an employee
concerned holds a position where greater trust is placed by management and from
whom greater fidelity to duty is correspondingly expected.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 755
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The first requisite for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence is
that the employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and confidence.
In this case, we agree that Loressa, who had immediate access to Sandens
confidential files, papers and documents, held a position of trust and confidence as
Coordinator and Data Custodian of the MIS Department.
The second requisite is that there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust
and confidence. Loss of trust and confidence, to be a valid cause for dismissal, must be
based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. The basis for
the dismissal must be clearly and convincingly established but proof beyond reasonable
doubt is not necessary.

As correctly found by the Labor Arbiter, nowhere in the records can be found
evidence that directly point to complainant as having committed acts of sabotage. Also,
during the administrative investigation, the guilt of complainant-appellee was based on
mere allegations not supported by documentary evidence nor any factual basis.
On the other hand, Loressa was able to provide documentary evidence to show
that Sandens computer system was experiencing some problems even before May 16,
1997. The entries as reported by the System Administrator clearly show that the problem
of missing data already existed as early as 1995, when Loressa was still an MIS
Secretary and was not yet tasked to back up the Marketing Delivery Receipt Transaction
files.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 756
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER CHEMICAL SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS
IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS [SMCC-SUPER],
ZACARRIAS JERRY VICTORIO - UNION PRESIDENT
vs.
CHARTER CHEMICAL AND COATING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 169717 March 16, 2011.

DOCTRINE: The right to file a petition for certification election is accorded to a labor
organization provided that it complies with the requirements of law for proper
registration. The inclusion of supervisory employees in a labor organization seeking to
represent the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees does not divest it of its status as
a legitimate labor organization.

FACTS:
On February 19, 1999,SamahangManggagawasa Charter Chemical Solidarity of
Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (petitioner union) filed a
petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of Charter
Chemical and Coating Corporation (respondent company) with the Mediation Arbitration
Unit of the DOLE, National Capital Region. On April 14, 1999, respondent company filed
an Answer with Motion to Dismiss on the ground that petitioner union is not a legitimate
labor organization because of (1) failure to comply with the documentation requirements
set by law, and (2) the inclusion of supervisory employees within petitioner union.
The Med-Arbiter agreed with the respondent company. Though the DOLE
disagreed with the Med-Arbiter on its findings regarding the documentation requirements
and the inclusion of supervisory employees in the union, it ruled that the petitioner union
did not file its petition on time. Another union, supposedly, had filed a petition for
certification election and its petition has been decided with finality. The CA upheld the
findings of the Med-Arbiter.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the unions charter certificate needed to be certified under
oath
2. Whether or not the mingling of supervisory employees with rank and file
employees nullifies the legal personality of the union

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 757
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
First issue: Section 1, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules of Book V, as amended
by D.O. No. 9, series of 1997 does require that a charter certificate be under oath.
However, in San Miguel Corporation (Mandaue Packaging Products Plants) v. Mandaue
Packing Products Plants-San Miguel Corporation Monthlies Rank-and-File Union-FFW
(MPPP-SMPP-SMAMRFU-FFW), which was decided under the auspices of D.O. No. 9,
Series of 1997, we ruled that it was not necessary for the charter certificate to be certified
and attested by the local/chapter officers, since it does not make sense to have the
local/chapters officers certify or attest to a document which they had no hand in the
preparation of. In accordance with this ruling, petitioner unions charter certificate need
not be executed under oath. Consequently, it validly acquired the status of a legitimate
labor organization upon submission of (1) its charter certificate, (2) the names of its
officers, their addresses, and its principal office, and (3) its constitution and by-laws the
last two requirements having been executed under oath by the proper union officials as
borne out by the records.

Second issue: In Tagaytay Highlands Int'l. Golf Club, Inc. v. Tagaytay Highlands
Employees Union-PGTWO in which the core issue was whether mingling affects the
legitimacy of a labor organization and its right to file a petition for certification election,
the Court, given the altered milieu, abandoned the view inToyotaandDunlopand reverted
to its pronouncement in Lopez that while there is a prohibition against the mingling of
supervisory and rank-and-file employees in one labor organization, the Labor Code does
not provide for the effects thereof. Thus, the Court held that after a labor organization
has been registered, it may exercise all the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor
organization. Any mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file employees in its
membership cannot affect its legitimacy for that is not among the grounds for
cancellation of its registration, unless such mingling was brought about by
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article 239 of the Labor Code. As a
result, petitioner union was not divested of its status as a legitimate labor organization
even if some of its members were supervisory employees; it had the right to file the
subject petition for certification election.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 758
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HARPOON MARINE SERVICES, INC. AND JOSE LIDO T. ROSIT VS. FERNAN H.
FRANCISCO
G.R. No. 167751 March 02, 2011

DOCTRINE:Satisfactory evidence of a valid or just cause of dismissal is indispensably


required in order to protect a laborer's right to security of tenure. In the case before us,
the employer presented none despite the burden to prove clearly its cause.

FACTS:
Harpoon Marine Services hired Francisco as a Yard Supervisor. On June 15,
2001, Francisco averred that Harpoon dismissed him from work but promised to pay his
separation pay and accrued commissions. He continued reporting for work, but was
barred from entering the premises. He thereafter tried to claim his separation pay and
commissions, but Harpoon, through its president Rosit, denied payment of his
commissions. Refusing to sign a quitclaim, Francisco demanded payment of his
commissions, then filed a case before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal. He
supported his claim for commissions with two vouchers evincing payments for vessel
repairs, arguing that he was paid P10,000 for each vessel he repaired.
Harpoon averred that on June 15, 2001, Rosit merely met with Francisco to warn
him regarding his habitual absences and tardiness. When Francisco continued to be
absent, Harpoon sent him memoranda informing him of his absences, which were filed
with the DOLE on August 15, 2001. Francisco was then terminated on July 30, 2001.
With regard to the commissions claimed, Harpoon averred that Francisco was only a
regular employee, with a regular salary, and that the supposed "commissions" were
merely additional money recognizing Franciscos efforts.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that Francisco was legally dismissed and that due
process was served through the several memoranda sent to him. It also ruled that
commissions were due Francisco, and gave credence to the vouchers. The NLRC,
however, held that Francisco was illegally dismissed, for his timecard for June 2001 only
showed three absences, which could hardly be called habitual and therefore cannot be a
ground for termination. It upheld the Labor Arbiter with regard to the commissions. The
CA affirmed the NLRC, and held that Harpoon president Rosit should be solidarily liable
with the company.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Francisco was illegally dismissed
2. Whether or not he was entitled to his commissions

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 759
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
3. Whether Rosit is solidarily liable with Harpoon

HELD:
First issue: The SC held that the termination was illegal. As stated by the NLRC,
Franciscos timecard only showed three consecutive absences and no record of
tardiness, which hardly constitutes gross or habitual absence/tardiness. Moreso, the
reasons for Franciscos three-day absence were not contested by Harpoon before the
Labor Arbiter, and no other evidence was presented before the Labor Arbiter to prove
such "habitual" tardiness/absence. The argument that Francisco abandoned his work
and went AWOL also does not hold water, since Harpoon failed to prove that the two
elements of work abandonment existed: namely, that there is absence of failure to report
to work for no justifiable reason, and that there is intent to sever the employee-employer
relationship. Here, Harpoon failed to prove that it was respondent who voluntarily
refused to report back for work by his defiance and refusal to accept the memoranda and
the notices of absences sent to him.Harpoon failed to present evidence that they sent
these notices to respondents last known address for the purpose of warning him that his
continued failure to report would be construed as abandonment of work. Verily, an
absence of three days does not constitute habitual absence justifying a termination from
work.

Second issue: The SC held that Francisco was not entitled to the commissions.
The check vouchers contained very scant details and did not state that they were paid for
the construction or repair of a vessel. They did not state the purpose for which the
amounts were paid. Moreover, the list of vessels presented with the vouchers does not
validate Franciscos monetary claim for it only contains a list of vessels, and nothing
more. The vouchers patent vagueness makes them unreliable as a basis for Franciscos
claim of commissions. Entitlement to commissions cannot be proved by vouchers which
are silent as to the purpose for which they are issued.

Third issue: The SC disagrees with the Labor Arbiter and NLRC in according
solidary liability on Rosit and Harpoon for the illegal dismissal. As held in the case
ofMAM Realty Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
"obligations incurred by [corporate officers], acting as such corporate agents, are not
theirs but the direct accountabilities of the corporation they represent." As such, they
should not be generally held jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation. The Court,
however, cited circumstances when solidary liabilities may be imposed, as when the
officer acted in bad faith or gross negligence in handling corporate affairs. Here, the CA
imposed personal liability on Rosit based on bad faith, even though there was no proof
that Rosit acted with bad faith or outside of his authority as company president. At most,
his acts merely showed the absence of a just or valid cause in terminating the
employment of Francisco.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 760
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JAMES BEN JERUSALEM vs. KEPPEL MONTE BANK, HOE ENG HOCK, SUNNY
YAP and JOSEFINA PICART
G.R. No. 169564, April 6, 2011

DOCTINE: For breach of trust and confidence to become a valid ground for the dismissal of an
employee, the cause of loss of trust and confidence must be related to the performance of the
employee’s duties.

FACTS:
James Ben L. Jerusalem (James) was employed by Keppel Monte Bank (Keppel) as
Assistant Vice-President. He was assigned as Head of the newly created VISA Credit Card
Department. The bank subsequently re-organized the VISA Credit Card Department and
reduced it to a mere unit. Carrying the same rank, James was reassigned as Head of the
Marketing and Operations of the Jewelry Department. James received from Jorge Javier
(Jorge) a sealed envelope said to be containing VISA Card application forms. James
immediately handed over the envelope with accomplished application forms to the VISA Credit
Card Unit. All in all, the VISA credit card applications referred by Jorge which James forwarded
to the VISA Credit Card Unit numbered 67, all of which were subsequently approved. As it
turned out, all the accounts under these approved applications became past due.Marciana sent
a letterto Jorge asking the latter to assist the bank in the collection of his referred VISA accounts.
James upon knowing the status of the accounts referred by Jorge, sent a Memorandum to
Roberto recommending the filing of a criminal case for estafa against Jorge. He further
recommended that a coordination with the other banks where Jorge has deposits should be
made promptly so that they can ask said banks to freeze Jorge’s accounts. James even warned
Keppel that immediate action should be taken while Jorge is still in the country.
James sent a Memorandum to Keppel. He summarized in the said Memorandum the
events that transpired during the meeting with Jorge and reiterated his suggestion for Keppel to
file a case against Jorge. He further suggested that Keppel look into the inside job angle of the
approval of the VISA cards and that all key officers and staff should be probed for possible
involvement.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 761
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
On August 18, 2000, James received a Notice to Explain from Keppel’s Vice President
for Operations, Sunny Yap (Sunny), why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for
referring/endorsing fictitious VISA card applicants.James submitted his written explanation to
Sunny. He pointed out that he had no participation in the processing of the VISA card
applications since he was no longer connected with the VISA Credit Card Unit at the time of
such transactions. He explained that he can only endorse the applications referred by Jorge to
the VISA Credit Card Unit because he was already transferred to Jewelry Department, as Head.
Later on, the Manager for Human Resources Department, Josefina Picart, handed to James a
Notice of Terminationinforming the latter that he was found guilty of breach of trust and
confidence for knowingly and maliciously referring, endorsing and vouching for VISA card
applicants who later turned out to be impostors resulting in financial loss to Keppel.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Keppel legally terminated James’ employment on the ground of willful
breach of trust and confidence.

HELD:
The Court ruled that Keppel failed in discharging the burden of proof that the
dismissal of Jerusalem is for a just cause.Law and jurisprudence have long recognized the
right of employers to dismiss employees by reason of loss of trust and confidence.As provided
for in Article 282, an employer may terminate an employee’s employment for fraud or willful
breach of trust reposed in him. But, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act
complained of must be work-related such as would show the employee concerned to be unfit to
continue working for the employer.Unlike in other cases where the complainant has the burden
of proof to discharge its allegations, the burden of establishing facts as bases for an employer’s
loss of confidence in an employee facts which reasonably generate belief by the employer that
the employee was connected with some misconduct and the nature of his participation therein is
such as to render him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded of his position is on the
employer. From the findings of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC it is clear that James did
nothing wrong when he handed over to Marciana the envelope containing the applications of
persons under the referred accounts of Jorge who were later found to be fictitious. As the

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 762
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
records now stand, James was no longer connected with the VISA Credit Card Unit when the 67
applications for VISA card were approved.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 763
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
WILLIAN ENDELISEO BARROGA vs. DATE CENTER COLLEGE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 174158, June 27, 2011

DOCTRINE:Our labor laws are enacted not solely for the purpose of protecting the working
class but also the management by equally recognizing its right to conduct its own legitimate
business affairs.

FACTS:
Petitioner was employed as an Instructor in Data Center College Laoag City branch. In a
Memorandum, respondents transferred him to University of Northern Philippines (UNP) in
Vigan, Ilocos Sur where the school had a tie-up program. Petitioner was informed through a
letter that he would be receiving, in addition to his monthly salary, a P1,200.00 allowance for
board and lodging during his stint as instructor in UNP-Vigan. Petitioner received a
Memorandumtransferring him to Data Center College Bangued, Abra branch as Head for
Education/Instructor due to an urgent need for an experienced officer and computer instructor
thereat.However, petitioner declined to accept his transfer to Abra citing the deteriorating health
condition of his father and the absence of additional remuneration to defray expenses for board
and lodging which constitutes implicit diminution of his salary.
On November 10, 2003, petitioner filed a Complaint for constructive dismissal against
respondents. Petitioner alleged that his proposed transfer to Abra constitutes a demotion in rank
and diminution in pay and would cause personal inconvenience and hardship. He argued that
although he was being transferred to Abra branch supposedly with the same position he was
then holding in Laoag branch as Head for Education, he later learned through a
Memorandumfrom the administrator of Abra branch that he will be re-assigned merely as an
instructor, thereby relegating him from an administrative officer to a rank-and-file
employee. Moreover, the elimination of his allowance for board and lodging will result to an
indirect reduction of his salary which is prohibited by labor laws.
For their part, respondents claimed that they were merely exercising their management
prerogative to transfer employees for the purpose of advancing the schools interests. They
argued that petitioner’s refusal to be transferred to Abra constitutes insubordination. They
claimed that petitioner’s appointment as instructor carries a proviso of possible re-assignments

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 764
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
to any branch or tie-up schools as the schools necessity demands. Respondents argued that
petitioner’s designation as Head for Education in Laoag branch was merely temporary and that
he would still occupy his original plantilla item as instructor at his proposed assignment in Abra
branch.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action of Data Center College constitutes constructive dismissal on
the part of the petitioner.

HELD:
No.The Court ruled that there was no sufficient basis to conclude that petitioner’s
re-assignment amounted to constructive dismissal.
Constructive dismissal is quitting because continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, or because of a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay. It
exists when there is a clear act of discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer which
becomes unbearable for the employee to continue his employment.
The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC both relied on the condition laid down in petitioner’s
employment contract that respondents have the prerogative to assign petitioner in any of its
branches or tie-up schools as the necessity demands. In any event, it is management
prerogative for employers to transfer employees on just and valid grounds such as genuine
business necessity.It is also important to stress at this point that respondents have shown that it
was experiencing some financial constraints.
The rule against diminution of benefits is applicable only if the grant or benefit is founded
on an express policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period which is consistent and
deliberate. Petitioner failed to present any other evidence that respondents committed to
provide the additional allowance or that they were consistently granting such benefit as to have
ripened into a practice which cannot be peremptorily withdrawn. Moreover, there is no
conclusive proof that petitioner’s basic salary will be reduced as it was not shown that such
allowance is part of petitioner’s basic salary. Hence, there will be no violation of the rule against
diminution of pay enunciated under Article 100 of the Labor Code.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 765
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
UNIVERSITY PLANS INCORPORATED vs. SOLANO
G.R. No. 170416, June 22, 2011

DOCTRINE: The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is not precluded from
conducting a preliminary determination of the merit or lack of merit of a motion to reduce bond.

FACTS:
Respondents filed before the Labor Arbiter complaints for illegal dismissal, illegal
deductions, overriding commissions, unfair labor practice, moral and exemplary damages, and
actual damages against petitioner University Plans Incorporated. Petitioner filed before the
NLRC its Memorandum on Appeal as well as a Motion to Reduce Bond. In its Motion to
Reduce Bond, petitioner alleged that it was under receivership and that it cannot dispose of its
assets at such a short notice. The NLRC denied petitioners Motion to Reduce Bond and
directed it to post an additional appeal bond. The CA held that the NLRC in meritorious cases
and upon motion by the appellant may reduce the amount of the bond. However, in order for
the NLRC to exercise this discretion, it is imperative for the petitioner to show veritable proof
that it is entitled to the same. Since petitioner failed to provide the NLRC with sufficient basis to
determine its incapacity to post the required appeal bond, the CA opined that the NLRCs denial
of petitioners Motion to Reduce Bond was justified. Hence, it denied the petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioner is under receivership.
2. Whether the NLRC can reduced the bond.
3. Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to reduction of its bond.
HELD:

Yes. The Court ruled that the petitioner is under receivership and as such it is entitled to
reduction of appeal bond. From the said SEC Orders, it is unmistakable that petitioner was
under receivership. And from the tenor and contents of said Orders, it is possible that petitioner
has no liquid asset which it could use to post the required amount of bond. Also, it is quite
understandable that because of petitioner’s financial state, it cannot raise the amount of more
than P3 million within a period of 10 days from receipt of the Labor Arbiters judgment. In this

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
case, the NLRC ignored petitioners allegations and instead remained adamant that since the
amount of bond is fixed by law, petitioner must post an additional bond of more than P3
million. This, to us, is an utter disregard of the provision of the Labor Code and of the NLRC
Revised Rules of Procedure allowing the reduction of bond in meritorious cases. While the
NLRC tried to correct this error in its March 21, 2003 Resolution by further explaining that it was
not persuaded by petitioners alleged incapability of posting the required amount of bond for
failure to submit financial statement, list of sources of income and other details with respect to
the alleged receivership, we still find the hasty denial of the motion to reduce bond not proper.
Under Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRCs Revised Rulesof Procedure, the bond may be
reduced albeit only on meritorious grounds and upon posting of a partial bond in a reasonable
amount in relation to the monetary award. Suffice it to state that while said Rules allows the
Commission to reduce the amount of the bond, the exercise of the authority is not a matter of
right on the part of the movant, but lies within the sound discretion of the NLRC upon a showing
of meritorious grounds.
The NLRC is no precluded from conducting preliminary determination of the
merit or lack of merit of a motion to reduce a bond. It only bears stressing that the NLRC is
not precluded from receiving evidence on appeal as technical rules of evidence are not binding
in labor cases. On the contrary, the Labor Code explicitly mandates it to use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard
to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES,
INC.
G.R. No. 168382, June 6, 2011

DOCTRINE:A judgment that has attained finality is immutable and could thus no longer
be modified.

FACTS:

The present controversy stemmed from a labor dispute between respondent


Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) and ALPAP, the legitimate labor organization and exclusive
bargaining agent of all commercial pilots of PAL. Claiming that PAL committed unfair
labor practice, ALPAP filed a notice of strike against respondent PAL with the DOLE.
Upon PAL’s petition and considering that its continued operation is impressed with public
interest, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. DOLE
Secretary reiterated the prohibition contained in the December 23, 1997 Order. Despite
such reminder to the parties, however, ALPAP went on strike. This constrained the DOLE
to issue a return-to-work order on June 7, 1998. However, it was only on June 26, 1998
when ALPAP officers and members reported back to work as shown in a logbook signed
by each of them. As a consequence, PAL refused to accept the returning pilots for their
failure to comply immediately with the return-to-work order. ALPAP contended that there
is a need to conduct a proceeding in order to determine who actually participated in the
illegal strike since not only the striking workers were dismissed by PAL but all of ALPAP’s
officers and members, even though some were on official leave or abroad at the time of
the strike. , PAL argued that the motions cannot legally prosper since the DOLE Secretary
has no authority to reopen or review a final judgment of the Supreme Court relative to
NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97; that the requested proceeding is no longer necessary as the
CA or this Court did not order the remand of the case to the DOLE Secretary for such
determination; that the NLRC rather than the DOLE Secretary has jurisdiction over the
motions as said motions partake of a complaint for illegal dismissal with monetary claims;
and that all money claims are deemed suspended in view of the fact that PAL is under
receivership.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 768
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DOLE Secretary commit grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to act on ALPAP’s motions and
merely noted the same.

HELD:

No.From the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution, which declared the strike of June 5,
1998 as illegal and pronounced all ALPAP officers and members who participated therein
to have lost their employment status, an appeal was taken by ALPAP. This was dismissed
by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 54880, which ruling was affirmed by this Court and which
became final and executory on August 29, 2002.

Settled in law is that once a decision has acquired finality, it becomes immutable
and unalterable, thus can no longer be modified in any respect. Subject to certain
recognized exceptions, the principle of immutability leaves the judgment undisturbed as
"nothing further can be done except to execute it." In the instant case, ALPAP seeks for a
conduct of a proceeding to determine who among its members and officers actually
participated in the illegal strike because, it insists, the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution did
not make such determination. However, as correctly ruled by Sto. Tomas and Imson and
affirmed by the CA, such proceeding would entail a reopening of a final judgment which
could not be permitted by this Court. True, the dispositive portion of the DOLE Resolution
does not specifically enumerate the names of those who actually participated in the strike
but only mentions that those strikers who failed to heed the return-to-work order are
deemed to have lost their employment. This omission, however, cannot prevent an
effective execution of the decision.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 769
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JERRY MAPILI vs. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, Inc./ NATIVIDAD NISCE
G.R. NO. 172506, JULY 27, 2011

DOCTRINE: Termination of Employment; A Bus Conductor is a position imbued with


trust and confidence because it involves handling of money and failure to collect the
proper fare from the riding public constitutes a grave offense which justifies his dismissal.

FACTS:
Natividad P. Nische is the president of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, INC (PRBLI).
PRBLI hired Jerry Mapili as a bus conductor. While on duty en route from Manila to
Alaminos, Pangasinan, Mapili was caught by PRBLI’s filed inspector extending a free
ride to a lady passenger. Upon order of the filed inspector, the lady passenger, who
happened to be the wife of Julio Ricardo, also a driver of PRBI was issued a passenger
ticket.
Mapili was preventively suspended and was directed to appear in an administrative
investigation where he was given an opportunity to present and explain his side.
On November 9, 2001, Mapili was terminated from employment for committing a
serious irregularity by extending free rides to passengers in violation of company rules.
This was Mapili’s third time committing the said violation.
On February 19, 2002, Mapili filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal
against PRBLI. Mapili’s contention was that his employment was terminated without
cause and due process. He argued that the infraction was only trivial. It was done without
malice and resulted from his honest belief that immediate family members of PRBLI’s
employees are entitled to free ride. He further argued that his two previous violations of
the same company regulation cannot be considered in the imposition of the penalty of
dismissal. The first involved a police officer supposedly on official duty, while the second
involved a former employee of PRBI who misrepresented himself to be a current
employee. Also, he argued that he was already penalized for the previous violations and
to consider them anew would be tantamount to penalizing him twice for the same
offense.
PRBI argued that Mapiili’s act of offering free rides out of gratitude to the wife of his
co-employee and that it was his third offense, justified his termination considering that
his position is imbued with trust and confidence.
The Labor Arbiter held that Mapili was illegally dismissed and that he had no
intention to defraud the PRBI by his failure to issue a ticket to the wife of a co-employee
as the same was done out of gratitude and under the wrong impression that she is
entitled to such privilege. Furthermore, the Labor Arbiter opined that Mapili’s actuations
merited a less punitive penalty such as a suspension of 30 days which he already served
during his suspension.
NLRC set aside the decision of the LA. The NLRC found out that the non-issuance of
a ticket to a passenger and failure to collect money due to the company was a deliberate
and intentional act of Mapili which prejudiced the company’s interest.

CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 770
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ISSUE: WON Mapili was illegally dismissed?

HELD:

No. Mapili’s violation of company rules was intentional, willful, serious and a just
cause for dismissal.
As a bus conductor whose duties primarily include the collection of transportation
fares which is the lifeblood of the PRBLI, petitioner should have exercised the required
diligence in the performance thereof and his habitual failure to exercise the same cannot
be taken for granted. Petitioner’s position is imbued with trust and confidence because it
involves handling of money and failure to collect the proper fare from the riding public
constitutes grave offense which justifies his dismissal. Moreover, petitioner’s series of
irregularities when put together may constitute serious misconduct.
While a penalty may no longer be imposed on offenses for which Mapili was already
been punished, these offenses, among other offenses, may still be used as justification
for an employee’s dismissal.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 771
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS vs. BPI EMPLOYEES UNION and ZENAIDA
UY
G.R. Nos. 178699/178735, September 21, 2011

DOCTRINE: Award of back wages is without qualifications and deductions; the base
figure to be used in the computation of back wages is pegged at the wage rate at the
time of the employee’s dismissal unqualified by deductions, increases and/or
modifications.

FACTS:
Zenaida Uy a bank teller in BPI Escolta branch was terminated on the grounds of
gross disrespect/discourtesy towards an officer, insubordination and absence without
leave. Uy together with the Union thus filed a case for illegal dismissal.
The Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision finding Uy’s dismissal as illegal and
ordering BPI to immediately reinstate Uy and to pay her full back wages, including all her
other benefits under the CBA. The CA affirmed the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator
but with modifications. Instead of reinstatement, the CA ordered BPI to pay Uy her
separation pay. Further, instead of full back wages, the CA fixes Uy’s back wages to
three years. It reached the SC, where the SC ordered BPI to pay Uy her full backwages
from the time of her illegal dismissal until her actual reinstatement and to reinstate Uy to
her former position, or to substantially equivalent one, without loss of seniority right and
other benefits.
After the decision became final and executory, Uy and the Union filed with the
Voluntary Arbitrator a motion for issuance of writ of execution. In Uy’s computation, she
based the amount of her back wages on the current wage level and included all the
increases in wages and benefits under the CBA that were granted during the entire
period of her illegal dismissal. BPI disputed Uy’s and the Union’s computation arguing
that it contains items which are not included in the term “back wages” and that no proof
was presented to show that Uy was receiving all the listed items therein before her
termination. It claimed that the basis for the computation of back wages should be the
employee’s wage rate at the time of dismissal.
The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled in favor of Uy and the Union and granted the motion
for writ of execution. BPI filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for TRO with the CA.
BPI averred that the VA erred in computing back wages based on the current rate.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the basis for the award of backwages is the current rate?

HELD:
The CA was correct in not including salary increases and CBA benefits.
Jurisprudence dictates that such award of back wages is without qualifications and
deductions, that is, “unqualified by any wage increases or other benefits that may have
been received by co-workers who were not dismissed.” It is likewise settled that the base
figure to be used in the computation of back wages is pegged at the wage rate at the
time of the employee’s dismissal unqualified by deductions, increases and/or
modifications.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 772
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The CA also correctly deleted the award of CBA benefits as they were all not proven
to have been granted to Uy at the time of her dismissal from service.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 773
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
CARMELITO VALENZONA vs. FAIR SHIPPING CORP.
G.R. No. 176884, October 19, 2011

DOCTRINE: Permanent disability refers to the inability of a worker to perform his job for more
than 120 days, regardless of whether he loses the use of any part of his body. What determines
petitioner’s entitlement to permanent disability benefits is his inability to work for more than 120
days. On the other hand, permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn
wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed
to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do. It does
not mean absolute helplessness.
FACTS: On May 5, 2001, respondent Fair Shipping Corporation, for and on behalf of its
principal, respondent Sejin Lines Company Limited, hired petitioner as 2nd Assistant Engineer
aboard its vessel M/V Morelos for a duration of nine months. Before, his embarkation on May
23, 2001 he was declared medically fit to work. The petitioner was diagnosed then with
hypertensive crisis, high blood pressure. A day after his repatriation to the Philippines on
October 8, 2001, petitioner was examined by Dr. Nicomedes G. Cruz (Dr. Cruz), the
company-designated physician who diagnosed his illness as hypertension. Dr. Cruz
continuously treated petitioner for six months, i.e., from October 9, 2001 until April 25, 2002.

On April 18, 2002, however, petitioner consulted another doctor, a certain Dr. Mapapala at the
Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center who diagnosed him with Hypertensive Cardiovascular
Disease. Considering his prolonged sickness, petitioner, on April 18, 2002, through Atty.
Anastacio P. Marcelo, wrote a letter to respondents demanding payment of the balance of his
sickness allowance and permanent disability benefits. However, same went
unheeded. Thereafter, or on April 25, 2002, Dr. Cruz issued a certification declaring petitioner as
fit to work.

Unconvinced, on April 27, 2002, petitioner consulted Dr. Rodrigo F. Guanlao, an


Internist-Cardiologist at the Philippine Heart Center who diagnosed him with Ischemic heart
disease, Hypertensive cardiovascular disease and congestive heart failure and also declared
him unfit to work in any capacity. Hence, petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of disability
benefits, sickness allowance, attorney's fees and moral damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to permanent disability benefits.

HELD: YES. Considering the circumstances prevailing in the instant case, we likewise rule
that it does not matter that the company-designated physician assessed petitioner as fit to
work. It is undisputed that from the time petitioner was repatriated on October 8, 2001, he was
unable to work for more than 120 days as he was only certified fit to work on April 25,
2002.Consequently, petitioner's disability is considered permanent and total.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 774
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. MA. LUISA BELTRAN
G.R. No. 173774, January 30, 2012

DOCTRINE: As the law regards workers with compassion, an employer’s right to discipline
them should be tempered with compassion as well. In line with this, the imposition of the
supreme penalty of dismissal is justified only when there are sufficient grounds as supported by
substantial evidence.

FACTS: Beltran was employed by MERALCO on December 16, 1987. At the time material to
this case, she was holding the position of Senior Branch Clerk at
MERALCOs Pasig branch. While rendering overtime work on September 28, 1996, a Saturday,
Beltran accepted P15,164.48 from Collection Route Supervisor Berlin Marcos (Marcos), which
the latter received from customer Andy Chang (Chang). The cash payment was being made in
lieu of a returned check earlier issued as payment for Changs electric bill. Beltran was at first
hesitant as it was not part of her regular duties to accept payments from customers but was later
on persuaded by Marcos persistence. Hence, Beltran received the payment and issued
Auxiliary Receipt No. 87964 which she dated September 30, 1996, a Monday, instead of
September 28, 1996. This was done to show that it was an accommodation, an accepted
practice in the office. She thereafter placed the money and the original auxiliary receipt and
other documents pertinent to the returned check underneath her other files inside the drawer of
her table. Since, Chang’s payment was only remitted on January 13, 1997, Beltran was
placed under preventive suspension effective January 20, 1997 pending completion of an
investigation. MERALCO considered as misappropriation or withholding of company funds her
failure to immediately remit said payment in violation of its Code on Employee Discipline. Beltran
nevertheless explained the circumstances which caused the delay of the turn-over of Changs
payment. She recounted that on the day following her receipt of the money, she had a huge fight
with her husband which led to their separation; that on September 30, 1997, she reported at
MERALCOs Taguig branch where she worked until 8:30 p.m.; and, that subsequent marital
woes coupled with her worries for her ailing child distracted her into forgetting Changs payment.
Unfortunately, Beltran was terminated effective March 13, 1997. Beltran thus filed an illegal
dismissal case.

The Labor Arbiter regarded the penalty of dismissal as not commensurate to the degree of
infraction committed as there was no adequate proof of misappropriation on the part of Beltran.
If there was delay in Beltrans remittance of Changs payment, it was unintentional and same
cannot serve as sufficient basis to conclude that there was misappropriation of company
funds. In fact, Beltran did not even attempt to deny possession of, or refuse to hand in, the
money. The Labor Arbiter thus gave compassionate consideration for the neglect to remit the
money promptly, stating that it is excusable for Beltran to commit lapses in her work due to
serious family difficulties. Taking into account her long and untainted service, forfeiture only of
salary was imposed for her neglect in remitting the funds at once. The NLRC, reversed the
decision, ratiocinating that Beltran withheld company funds for almost 4 months and family
problems is not an excuse. The CA reversed the NLRC decision. The CA instead agreed with

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 775
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
the findings of the Labor Arbiter that there were no serious grounds to warrant Beltrans
dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the reinstatement of Beltran despite
the undisputed finding that she is guilty of withholding company funds.

HELD: NO. It should be emphasized at this point that the burden of proving the legality of an
employee’s dismissal lies with the employer. Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and
conclusions of employers do not provide legal justification for dismissing employees. Mere
conjectures cannot work to deprive employees of their means of livelihood. To begin with,
MERALCO cannot claim or conclude that Beltran misappropriated the money based on mere
suspicion. The NLRC thus erred in concluding that Beltran made use of the money from the
mere fact that she took a leave of absence after having been reminded of the unremitted
funds. And even if Beltran delayed handing over the funds to the company, MERALCO still has
the burden of proof to show clearly that such act of negligence is sufficient to justify termination
from employment. Moreover, we find that Beltran’s delay does not clearly and convincingly
establish a willful breach on her part, that is, which is done intentionally, knowingly and
purposely, without any justifiable excuse. True, the reasons Beltran proffered for her delay in
remitting the cash payment are mere allegations without any concrete proof. Nonetheless, we
emphasize that as the employer, the burden still lies on MERALCO to provide clear and
convincing facts upon which the alleged loss of confidence is to be made to rest.

Under the circumstances, MERALCOs sanction of dismissal will not be commensurate to


Beltran’s inadvertence not only because there was no clear showing of bad faith and malice but
also in consideration of her untainted record of long and dedicated service to MERALCO

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 776
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ABDULJAHID PIGCAULAN vs. SECURITY & CREDIT INVESTIGATION and/or RENE
AMBY REYES
G.R. No. 173648, January 16, 2012

DOCTRINE: It is not for an employee to prove non-payment of benefits to which he is entitled


by law. Rather, it is on the employer that the burden of proving payment of these claims rests.

FACTS: Canoy and Pigcaulan were both employed by SCII as security guards and were
assigned to SCIIs different clients. Subsequently, however, Canoy and Pigcaulan filed with the
Labor Arbiter separate complaints for underpayment of salaries and non-payment of overtime,
holiday, rest day, service incentive leave and 13th month pays. These complaints were later on
consolidated as they involved the same causes of action.

Canoy and Pigcaulan, in support of their claim, submitted their respective daily time records
reflecting the number of hours served and their wages for the same. They likewise presented
itemized lists of their claims for the corresponding periods served.

Respondents, however, maintained that Canoy and Pigcaulan were paid their just salaries and
other benefits under the law; that the salaries they received were above the statutory minimum
wage and the rates provided by the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency
Operators (PADPAO) for security guards; that their holiday pay were already included in the
computation of their monthly salaries; that they were paid additional premium of 30% in addition
to their basic salary whenever they were required to work on Sundays and 200% of their salary
for work done on holidays; and, that Canoy and Pigcaulan were paid the corresponding
13th month pay for the years 1998 and 1999. In support thereof, copies of payroll listings and
lists of employees who received their 13th month pay for the periods December 1997 to
November 1998 and December 1998 to November 1999 were presented. In addition,
respondents contended that Canoys and Pigcaulans monetary claims should only be limited to
the past three years of employment pursuant to the rule on prescription of claims.

ISSUE: Whether or not Pigcaulan is entitled to holiday pay, service incentive leave
benefit and 13th month pay.

HELD: YES. Under the Labor Code, Pigcaulan is entitled to his regular rate on holidays even if
he does not work. Likewise, express provision of the law entitles him to service incentive leave
benefit for he rendered service for more than a year already. Furthermore, under Presidential
Decree No. 851, he should be paid his 13th month pay. As employer, SCII has the burden of
proving that it has paid these benefits to its employees.

SCII presented payroll listings and transmittal letters to the bank to show that Canoy and
Pigcaulan received their salaries as well as benefits which it claimed are already integrated in
the employees monthly salaries. However, the documents presented do not prove SCIIs
allegation. SCII failed to show any other concrete proof by means of records, pertinent files or
similar documents reflecting that the specific claims have been paid. With respect to 13th month
pay, SCII presented proof that this benefit was paid but only for the years 1998 and 1999. To

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 777
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
repeat, the burden of proving payment of these monetary claims rests on SCII, being the
employer. It is a rule that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even when the
plaintiff alleges non-payment, still the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to
prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. Since, SCII failed to provide
convincing proof that it has already settled the claims, Pigcaulan should be paid his holiday pay,
service incentive leave benefits and proportionate 13th month pay for the year 2000

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 778
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JULIE’S BAKESHOP and/or EDGAR REYES vs. HENRY ARNAIZ, EDGAR NAPAL
AND JONATHAN TOLORES
G.R. No. 173774, February 15, 2012

DOCTRINE: Management has wide latitude to conduct its own affairs in accordance with the
necessities of its business. This so-called management prerogative, however, should be
exercised in accordance with justice and fair play.

FACTS: Reyes hired respondents as chief bakers in his three franchise branches of Julies
Bakeshop in Sibalom and San Jose, Antique. On January 26, 2000, respondents filed separate
complaints against petitioners for underpayment of wages, payment of premium pay for holiday
and rest day, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, cost of living allowance (COLA) and
attorneys fees. These complaints were later on consolidated.

Subsequently, in a memorandum dated February 16, 2000, Reyes reassigned respondents as


utility/security personnel tasked to clean the outside vicinity of his bakeshops and to maintain
peace and order in the area. Upon service of the memo, respondents, however, refused to sign
the same and likewise refused to perform their new assignments by not reporting for work.

In a letter-memorandum dated March 13, 2000, Reyes directed respondents to report back for
work and to explain why they failed to assume their duties as utility/security personnel. A second
letter-memorandum of the same tenor dated March 28, 2000 was also sent to
respondents. Respondents did not heed both memoranda.

ISSUE: Whether or not management prerogative was reasonably exercised.


HELD: NO.We agree with the CA in ruling that the transfer of respondents amounted to a
demotion. Although there was no diminution in pay, there was undoubtedly a demotion in titular
rank. One cannot deny the disparity between the duties and functions of a chief baker to that of a
utility/security personnel tasked to clean and manage the orderliness of the outside premises of
the bakeshop. Respondents were even prohibited from entering the bakeshop. The change in
the nature of their work undeniably resulted to a demeaning and humiliating work condition.
Demotion involves a situation in which an employee is relegated to a subordinate or less
important position constituting a reduction to a lower grade or rank, with a corresponding
decrease in duties and responsibilities, and usually accompanied by a decrease in salary.
When there is a demotion in rank and/or a diminution in pay; when a clear discrimination,
insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee; or when
continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, the transfer of an
employee may constitute constructive dismissal

As the transfer proves unbearable to respondents as to foreclose any choice on their part except
to forego continued employment, same amounts to constructive dismissal for which
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time their compensation was withheld
up to the time of their actual reinstatement, should be granted.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 779
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JARL CONSTRUCTION vs. ATENCIO
G.R. NO. 175969, April 1, 2012
DOCTRINE: In dismissing an employee from service, the employer has the burden of
proving its observance of the two-notice requirement and its accordance to the employee
of a real opportunity to be heard.
FACTS:
JARL, through Tejada, hired Atencio as its chief operating manager, whose
primary function was to direct and manage JARL’s construction projects in accordance
with its company policies and contracts. Further, as chief operating manager, he is
the recommending authority with respect to the award of subcontracts and purchase
orders.
During Atencio’s tenure as chief operating manager, his employer JARL had an
existing contract with Caltex. The contract with Caltex prohibited JARL from
subcontracting the project. According to Atencio, he discovered during his employment
that JARL did not have the proper facilities, personnel, and equipment to undertake the
Caltex project. Further, Tejada allegedly gave Atencio full authority as JARL’s chief
operating manager to hire other subcontractors if necessary. Pursuant to his blanket
authority, Atencio hired DDK Steel Construction and Building Multi-Technology (DDK
Steel) for the electrical installations of the Caltex project.
Tejada informed Atencio and Safemark that JARL was terminating Atencio’s
management and supervision works for the Caltex project. JARL assured Atencio and
Safemark that it will pay for the rendered services. Atencio construed such as
a termination of the subcontract between his company and JARL. Thus, he threatened
JARL and Tejadathat he will report their unethical conduct with the Philippine
Accreditation Board for possible sanctions.
Believing, however, that his employment as JARL’s chief operating manager was
separate from their subcontracting agreement, Atencio allegedly continued reporting for
work to the Caltex project site until, sometime in June 1999, he was barred from entering
the said premises. Atencio filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of salaries,
and 13th month pay with the NLRC against JARL and Tejada.
The Labor Arbiter found just cause for Atencio’s Removal but found the dismissal
ineffectual because of petitioners’ failure to observe the twin requirements of
due process. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision. The NLRC gave
emphasis to two letters adduced in evidence. The first is Atencio’s letter to JARL wherein
Atencio acknowledges his mistakes and apologizes for them and JARL’s earlier letter
which clearly informed Atencio of its decision to terminate his employment as its chief
operating manager.
The CA held that Atencio’s dismissal was ineffectual for the employer’s failure to observe
the procedural requirements for a proper termination of employment. CA also reversed
the NLRC with respect to the issue of the unpaid salaries and 13th month pay.
ISSUE:

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 780
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
1. Whether petitioners were able to prove their substantial compliance with the
procedural due process requirements
2. Whether the receipts issued by Safemark evidencing JARL’s payment
for "Professional Services" suffice as proof of payment of salaries and 13th month pay
HELD:
No.The Court agrees with the shared conclusions of the Labor Arbiter and the
appellate court that petitioners’ evidence fails to prove their contention that they afforded
Atencio with due process. The letter, which allegedly proves Atencio’s knowledge of
the charges against him, and which allegedly constitutes Atencio’s explanation, clearly
discusses an entirely different topic – which is the removal of his construction company
from the Caltex project.
In the letter, Atencio states that he was wrong for assuming that there was a
subcontracting agreement between his firm and JARL. He took responsibility for the
misunderstanding between them and apologized. Nowhere in the said letter does
Atencio refer to the charges, which JARL mentioned before the Labor Arbiter as the
causes for his dismissal. Logically, he did not also explain himself as regards the said
charges.
As for the letter which allegedly constitutes the notice of termination of Atencio’s
employment as JARL’s chief operating manager, the Court agrees with the CA’s
appreciation that the said letter involves the termination of the subcontracting agreement
between JARL and Atencio’s company, and not the termination of Atencio’s
employment.
With respect to the issue of unpaid salaries and 13 th month pay, the Court
agrees with the appellate court that petitioners’ evidence does not support their
contention of payment. Since JARL admits that the said company actually rendered
services for JARL on its Caltex project, the payment can only be assumed as covering
for the said services. There is nothing on the face of the receipts to support the
conclusion that Atencio (and not his company) received it as payment for his service as
a JARL employee

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 781
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
APO CEMENT CORPORATION vs. ZALDY E. BAPTISMA
G.R. NO. 176671, June 20, 2012
DOCTRINE: In labor cases, all that is required is for the employer to show substantial
evidence to justify termination of the employee.
FACTS:
On June 16, 1998, respondent Zaldy E. Baptisma was employed by petitioner
APO Cement operating a cement manufacturing plant in Tinaan, Naga City. Sometime in
September 2003, petitioner received information from one of its employees, Armando
Moralda (Moralda) that some of its personnel, including respondent who was then the
manager of petitioner’s Power Plant Department, were receiving commissions or
kickbacks from suppliers. To ascertain the veracity of the information given by Moralda,
the top management of petitioner conducted an investigation during which Jerome
Lobitaa (Lobitaa), one of petitioner’s accredited suppliers, doing business under the
name and style Precision Process, came forward to corroborate the statement of
Moralda. Moralda and Lobitaa executed separate affidavits to substantiate their claims.
Having been implicated in the irregularities, respondent, on November 3, 2003, received
a show cause letter with Notice of Preventive Suspension from Plant Director Ariel
Mendoza. November 5, 2003, respondent submitted his written explanation denying the
accusations hurled against him. To further afford respondent ample opportunity to
defend himself, petitioner conducted a series of administrative investigation hearings
during which respondent was able to face his accusers. On March 22, 2004,
respondents received the Notice of Termination dated March19, 2004 informing him of
his dismissal from employment effective immediately on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence. At the time of his termination, respondent was a Power Plant Manager
earning a monthly salary of Php 71,100.00. On March 31, respondent filed with the
Regional Arbitration Branch VII of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in
Cebu City a complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for non-payment of salaries, 13th
month pay, service incentive leave, damages, and attorney’s fees, docketed as RAB
Case No. VII-03- 0701-04 against petitioner and its Vice President for Human
Resources, Atty. Maria Virginia Ongkiko-Eala. On January 5, 2005, Labor Arbiter Jose
G. Gutierrez rendered judgment in favor of respondent. The labor arbiter opined that
since respondent was not involved in the canvassing and purchasing of supplies, he
could not have entered into any irregular arrangement with suppliers. The labor arbiter
likewise considered the testimony of Moralda as hearsay and the testimony of Lobitaa as
self-serving and doubtful. Hence, he ruled that there was no justifiable ground to support
the validity of respondent’s dismissal. Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the
NLRC docketed as NLRC Case No. V-000248-2005. On July 11, 2005, the NLRC
reversed the ruling of the labor arbiter. It ruled that respondent’s personal and direct
involvement in the irregularities complained of renders him unworthy of trust and
confidence demanded of his position. Respondent elevated the matter to the CA. On
November 15, 2006, the CA reinstated the decision of the labor arbiter. It ruled that

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 782
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
petitioner failed to prove the existence of a just cause to warrant the termination of
respondent as the alleged loss of trust and confidence was not based on established
facts. In reconsideration, the CA pat on its finding that there was no basis for petitioner’s
loss of trust and confidence on respondent. It, however, modified the petition x x x
directing Atty. Maria Ongkiko-Eala to pay the monetary award in favor of (respondent)
was SET ASIDE. (Petitioner) APO Cement was ORDERED to pay (respondent) his
separation pay, in lieu of the order to reinstate the latter to his former position, at the rate
of one (1) month salary for every year of his employment, with a fraction of at least six (6)
months being considered as one (1) year, computed from the first day of employment up
to the finality of his decision. Hence, this petition for review on certoriari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Simply put, the crux of the controversy is whether there was just cause for the
dismissal of respondent.
HELD:
In this case, we agree with the NLRC that the termination on the ground of loss
of trust and confidence was justified. Unlike the labor and the CA, we find the testimony
of Lobitaa credible and truthful. The testimony of Lobitaa constitute substantial evidence
to prove that respondent, as the then Power Plant Manager, accepted commissions and
kickbacks from suppliers, which is a clear violation of Section 2.04 of petitioner’s
Company Rules and Regulations. Jurisprudence consistently holds that for managerial
employees the mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached
the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal. As we then sees it, respondent
termination was for a just and valid cause.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 783
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
FLORDELIZA MARIA REYES-RAYEL vs. PHILIPPINE LUEN THAI HOLDING,
CORPORATION / L&T INTERNATIONAL GROUP PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. NO. 174896, July 11, 2012
DOCTRINE: The law is fair and just to both labor and management. Thus, while the
Constitution accords an employee security of tenure, it abhors oppression to an
employer who cannot be compelled to retain an employee whose continued employment
would be patently inimical to its interest.
FACTS:
In February 2000, Philippine Luen Thai Holdings, Corp. (PLTHC) hired petitioner
as Corporate Human Resources (CHR) Director for Manufacturing for its
subsidiary/affiliate company L&T International Group Phil, Inc. (L&T). In the employment
contract, petitioner was tasked to perform functions in relation administration,
recruitment, benefits, audit / compliance, policy development / structure, project plan,
and such other works as may be assigned by her immediate superior, Frank Sauceda
(Sauceda), PLTHC’s Corporate Director for Human Resources. On September 6, 2001,
petitioner received a Prerequisite Notice from Sauceda and the Corporate Legal Counsel
of PLTHC, Ma. Lorelie T. Edles (Edles), giving her 48 hours from receipt to submit a
written reply to the Memorandum on alleged unsatisfactory performance rating.
Petitioner filed her written response thereto. She explained that her alleged failure to
perform management directives could be attributed to the lack of effective
communication with her superiors due to malfunctioning email system. This caused her
to miss certain directives coming from her superiors and likewise, for her superiors to
overlook the reports she was submitting. She denied uttering negative comments about
the HR2 Program and instead claimed to have intimated her support for it. She further
denied causing disharmony in her division. In a Termination Notice dated September 12,
2001, respondents through Sauceda and Edles, dismissed petitioner from service for
loss of confidence on her ability to promote the interests of the company. This led
petitioner to file a complaint for illegal dismissal, payment of separation pay, 13th month
pay, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and other company benefits against
respondents and its officers, namely, Sauceda, Edles, and Willie Tan (Tan), the
Executive Vice President of PLTHC. In a decision dated October 21, 2002, the Labor
Arbiter declared petitioner to have been illegally dismissed by respondent corporation. It
directed the respondent corporation to reinstate complainant/petitioner to her position
and pay her full backwages and benefits. Respondents appealed to the NLRC. For her
part, petitioner filed before the Labor Arbiter a Motion for Reconsideration of the awards.
The motion was, however, denied. On August 20, 2003, the NLRC found merit in
respondents appeal. The decision appealed from was MODIFIED, it declared the
dismissal of complainant legal but ordered respondents to pay complainant the sum of
Php 240,000.00 representing three months as expressed in complainant’s contract of
employment. All other claims were DISMISSED for lack of merit. Respondents thus filed
with the CA a Petition for Certoriari with Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 784
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Subsequently, the CA denied
respondents’ prayer for TRO. On July 18, 2006, the CA rendered a decision finding merit
in the petition. The CA found sufficient evidence to support the dismissal of the petitioner
on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. The NLRC resolution dated March 23,
2004 was REVERSED. Respondents were ordered to pay petitioner the amount
corresponding to three months salary pursuant to the termination provision of the
employment contract.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed from her employment by
respondents.

2. Whether or not respondents deprived petitioner of her right to due process


when respondents dismissed her.

HELD:
The petition was devoid of merit. The court found no cogent reason to depart from
the ruling of the CA that petitioner was validly dismissed.
1. There exists a valid ground for petitioner’s termination from employment.
Jurisprudence provides that an employer has a distinct prerogative and wider latitude of
discretion dismissing a managerial personnel who performs functions which by their
nature require the employer’s full trust and confidence. As distinguished from a rank and
file personnel, mere existence of a basis for believing that a managerial employee has
breached the trust of the employer justifies dismissal. Loss of confidence as a ground for
dismissal does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt as the law requires only that
there be at least some basis to justify it.

2. 2. Neither can there be any denial of due process due to the absence of a
hearing or investigation at the company level. It has been held in a plethora of cases that
due process requirement is met when there is simply an opportunity to be heard and to
explain one’s side even if no hearing is conducted. In the case of Perez v. Philippine
Telegraph Company, this court pronounced that an employee may be afforded ample
opportunity to be heard by means of any method, verbal or written, whether in a hearing,
conference or some other fair, just and reasonable way. Petitioner’s written response to
the prerequisite notice provided her with an avenue to explain and defend her side and
thus served the purpose of due process. As she was served with notice apprising her of
the charges against her and also a subsequent notice informing her of the
management’s decision to terminate her services after respondents found her written
response to the first notice unsatisfactory, petitioner was clearly afforded her right to due
process.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 785
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HEIRS OF RAMON B. GAYARES, represented by Emelinda Gayares and Rhayan
Gayares in their capacity as legal heirs of the late Ramon Gayares vs. PACIFIC
ASIA OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORPORATION and KUWAIT OIL TANKER, CO.,
S.A.K.,
G.R NO. 178477, July 16, 2012
DOCTRINE: Heavy pressure of works is not considered compelling reason to justify a
request for an extension of time to file a petition for certiorari. “Heavy workload is relative
and often self-serving. Standing alone, it is no sufficient reason to deviate from the
60-day rule”.
FACTS:
In February 1998, Ramon B. Gayares (Gayares) was hired by Pacific Asia
Overseas Shipping Corporation in behalf of its principal, Kuwait Oil Tanker Co., S.A.K.,
as an Able Seaman aboard its vessel M/T A1 Awdah. The contract was for a period of
nine months with a monthly salary of US$499.00
Prior to embarkation on March 12, 1998, Gayares underwent medical
examination and was found “fit to work” by the examining physician. However, on April
22, 1998 he was repatriated to the Philippines for medical reasons. On December 18,
1998, Gayares filed a complaint for disability/medical benefits, illness allowance,
damages and attorney’s fees against herein respondents.
On February 24, 2000, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision ordering
respondents to pay Gayares disability benefits, sickness allowance, and attorney’s fees.
According to the Labor Arbiter, Gayares’ disability of “blephasrospasm with
oramandibular dystonia” was contracted during his employment and not pre-existing as
contended by respondent considering that he was diagnosed “fit to work” by the
company physician.
Respondent filed an appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). During the pendency of the appeal, Gayares died and was substituted by his
heirs, herein petitioners. On February 10, 2006, the NLRC rendered its Decision deleting
the award of disability benefits but affirming the awards of sickness allowance and 10%
thereof as attorney’s fees. The NLRC also opined that Gayares could not have contacted
the illness during the term of his employment contract, it having manifested a mere 22
days after embarkation and considering that the said disease is hereditary.
Whether was there any proof that Gayares’ employment contributed or even
aggravated his illness. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution
dated November 30, 2006. Petitioners received on January 3, 2007 a copy of the
November 30, 2006 NLRC Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration.
However, instead filing a Petition for Certiorari, petitioners opted to file a Motion for
Extension of Time which was received by the CA on March 05, 2007. On March 13,

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 786
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
2007, the CA issued a Resolution which denied petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time
and dismissed the case. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether heavy workload can be considered “compelling reason to justify a
request for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari.
HELD:
Section 4, Rule 65 of Rules of Court provides:
“Section 4: When and where petition filed – the petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trials is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
sixty (60) day period shall be counted frim notice of the denial of said motion.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling
reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
It is thus, explicit from the foregoing that as a general rule, the petition shall be
filed within the 60-day reglementary period. As an exception, an extension of time may
be granted but only for a compelling reason and only for 15 days. More important, th
discretion to grant or deny said request lies solely in the court. Hence, the party
requesting such extension must not expect that his request will be granted as he has no
inherent right to the same.
It is settled jurisprudence that heavy pressure of work is not considered
compelling reason to justify a request for an extension of time to file a petition for
certiorari. Heavy workload x x x ought to be coupled with more compelling reasons such
as illness of counsel or other emergencies that could be substantiated by affidavits of
merit. In the instant case, petitioner’s counsel merely referred to “heavy pressure of
work”, nothing more, in asking for additional time.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 787
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MISAMIS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC SERVICE COOPERATIVE (MORESCO II) VS
VIRGILIO CAGALAWAN,
G.R. No. 175170, September 5, 2012
DOCTRINE: In labor cases, strict adherence with the technical rules is not required. This
liberal policy, however, should still conform with the rudiments of equitable principles of
law. For instance, belated submission of evidence may only be allowed if the delay is
adequately justified and the evidence is clearly material to establish the party’s cause.
FACTS:
MORESCO II, a rural electric cooperative, hired Cagalawan as a Disconnection
Lineman on a probationary basis. On March 1, 1994 Cagalawan was appointed to the
same post this time on a permanent basis.9 On July 17, 2001, he was designated as
Acting Head of the disconnection crew in Area III sub-office of MORESCO II in
Balingasag, Misamis Oriental (Balingasag sub-office). In a Memorandum11 dated May
9, 2002, MORESCO II General Manager Amado B. Ke-e (Ke-e) transferred Cagalawan
to Area I sub-office in Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental (Gingoog sub-office) as a member
of the disconnection crew. Said memorandum stated that the transfer was done “in the
exigency of the service.
In a letter dated May 15, 2002, Cagalawan assailed his transfer claiming he was
effectively demoted from his position as head of the disconnection crew to a mere
member thereof. He also averred that his transfer to the Gingoog sub-office is
inconvenient and prejudicial to him as it would entail additional travel expenses to and
from work. He likewise sought clarification on what kind of exigency exists as to justify
his transfer and why he was the one chosen to be transferred.
In a Memorandum dated May 16, 2002, Ke-e explained that Cagalawan’s transfer
was not a demotion since he was holding the position of Disconnection Head only by
mere designation and not by appointment. Ke-e did not, however, state the basis of the
transfer but instead advised Cagalawan to just comply with the order and not to question
management’s legitimate prerogative to reassign him.
In reply, Cagalawan claimed that he was transferred because he executed an
Affidavit in support of his co-employee Jessie Rances, who filed an illegal dismissal case
against MORESCO II. He emphasized though that his action was not an act of disloyalty
to MORESCO II, contrary to what was being accused of him. Nonetheless, Cagalawan
still reported for work at Gingoog sub-office on May 27, 2002 but reserved his right to
contest the legality of such transfer.
Cagalawan eventually stopped reporting for work. On July 1, 2002, he filed a Complaint
for constructive dismissal before the Arbitration branch of the NLRC against MORESCO
II and its officers, Ke-e and Danilo Subrado (Subrado), in their capacities as General
Manager and Board Chairman, respectively.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 788
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision declaring that Cagalawan’s transfer
constituted illegal constructive dismissal. Aside from finding merit in Cagalawan’s
uncontroverted allegation that the transfer became grossly inconvenient for him, the
Labor Arbiter found no sufficient reason for his transfer and that the same was calculated
to rid him of his employment, impelled by a vindictive motive after he executed an
Affidavit in favor of a colleague and against MORESCO II.
MORESCO II invoked the liberal application of the rules and prayed for the NLRC
to admit its evidence on appeal. MORESCO II denied that Cagalawan’s transfer was
done in retaliation for executing an affidavit in favor of a co-worker. MORESCO II
explained that the transfer was in response to the request of the area manager in
Gingoog sub-office for additional personnel in his assigned area. To substantiate this, it
submitted a letter dated May 8, 2002 from Gingoog sub-office Area Manager, Engr.
Ronel B. Canada (Engr. Canada), addressed to Ke-e. In said letter, Engr. Canada
requested for two additional disconnection linemen in order to attain the collection quota
allocated in his area. MORESCO II then averred that as against this letter of Engr.
Canada who is a managerial employee, the certification issued by Ortiz should be
considered as incompetent since the latter is a mere disconnection crew.
The NLRC, through a Resolution dated February 27, 2004, set aside and vacated
the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed Cagalawan’s complaint against
MORESCO II. The NLRC admitted MORESCO II’s evidence even if submitted only on
appeal in the interest of substantial justice. It then found said evidence credible in
showing that Cagalawan’s transfer to Gingoog sub-office was required in the exigency of
the cooperative’s business interest. It also ruled that the transfer did not entail a
demotion in rank and diminution of pay as to constitute constructive dismissal and thus
upheld the right of MORESCO II to transfer Cagalawan in the exercise of its sound
business judgment.
The CA found the NLRC to have gravely abused its discretion in admitting
MORESCO II’s evidence, citing Section 3, Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure which
prohibits the parties from making new allegations or cause of action not included in the
complaint or position paper, affidavits and other documents. It held that what
MORESCO II presented on appeal was not just an additional evidence but its entire
evidence after the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision adverse to it. To the CA,
MORESCO II’s belated submission of evidence despite the opportunities given it cannot
be countenanced as such practice “defeats speedy administration of justice” and
“smacks of unfairness.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the letter presented by MORESCO II can be admitted as evidence
on appeal with the NLRC.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 789
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
No. MORESCO II’s belated submission of evidence cannot be permitted.
Labor tribunals, such as the NLRC, are not precluded from receiving evidence
submitted on appeal as technical rules are not binding in cases submitted before them.
However, any delay in the submission of evidence should be adequately explained and
should adequately prove the allegations sought to be proven.
MORESCO II did not cite any reason why it had failed to file its position paper or
present its cause before the Labor Arbiter despite sufficient notice and time given to do
so. Only after an adverse decision was rendered did it present its defense and rebut
the evidence of Cagalawan by alleging that his transfer was made in response to the
letter-request of the area manager of the Gingoog sub-office asking for additional
personnel to meet its collection quota. To our mind, however, the belated submission
of the said letter request without any valid explanation casts doubt on its credibility,
specially so when the same is not a newly discovered evidence. For one, the
letter-request was dated May 8, 2002 or a day before the memorandum for Cagalawan’s
transfer was issued. MORESCO II could have easily presented the letter in the
proceedings before the Labor Arbiter for serious examination. Why it was not
presented at the earliest opportunity is a serious question which lends credence to
Cagalawan’s theory that it may have just been fabricated for the purpose of appeal.
The rule is that it is within the ambit of the employer’s prerogative to transfer an
employee for valid reasons and according to the requirement of its business, provided
that the transfer does not result in demotion in rank or diminution of salary, benefits and
other privileges. This Court has always considered the management’s prerogative to
transfer its employees in pursuit of its legitimate interests. But this prerogative should
be exercised without grave abuse of discretion and with due regard to the basic
elements of justice and fair play, such that if there is a showing that the transfer was
unnecessary or inconvenient and prejudicial to the employee, it cannot be upheld.
Notably, the only evidence adduced by MORESCO II to support the legitimacy of
the transfer was the letter-request of Engr. Canada. However, this piece of evidence
cannot in itself sufficiently establish that the Gingoog sub-office was indeed suffering
from losses due to collection deficiency so as to justify the assignment of additional
personnel in the area. Engr. Canada’s letter is nothing more than a mere request for
additional personnel to augment the number of disconnection crew assigned in the area.
While it mentioned that the area’s collection efficiency should be improved and that there
is a shortage of personnel therein, it is, standing alone, self-serving and thus cannot be
considered as competent evidence to prove the accuracy of the allegations therein.
MORESCO II could have at least presented financial documents or any other concrete
documentary evidence showing that the collection quota of the Gingoogsuboffice has not
been met or could not be reached. It should have also submitted such other documents
which would show the lack of sufficient personnel in the area. Unfortunately, the area

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 790
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
manager’s letter provides no more than bare allegations which deserve not even the
slightest credit.
When there is doubt between the evidence submitted by the employer and that
submitted by the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the employee.
This is consistent with the rule that an employer’s cause could only succeed on the
strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the employee’s evidence. Thus,
MORESCO II cannot rely on the weakness of Ortiz’s certification in order to give more
credit to its own evidence. Self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations are not
sufficient where the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact is substantial
evidence, described as more than a mere scintilla. “The evidence must be real and
substantial, and not merely apparent.” MORESCO II has miserably failed to discharge
the onus of proving the validity of Cagalawan’s transfer.
Clearly, not only was the delay in the submission of MORESCO II’s evidence not
explained, there was also failure on its part to sufficiently support its allegation that the
transfer of Cagalawan was for a legitimate purpose. This being the case, MORESCO
II’s plea that its evidence be admitted in the interest of justice does not deserve any
merit.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 791
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SOLIDBANK UNION VS. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
G.R. No. 153799, September 17, 2012
DOCTRINE: In any event, it is well-settled that only substantial, and not absolute,
identity of the parties is required for res judicata to lie. “There is substantial identity of
the parties when there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a
party in the second case albeit the latter was not impleaded in the first case.
FACTS:
Solidbank Union (Union) was a legitimate labor organization and the duly certified
sole bargaining representative of all rank-and-file employees of Solidbank. On
November 17, 1999, the Union and Solidbank negotiated for a new economic package
for the remaining two years of the 1997-2001 collective bargaining agreement (CBA).
However, the parties reached an impasse. Thus, on January 18, 2000, then Secretary
of Labor Bienvenido E. Laguesma (Secretary Laguesma) assumed jurisdiction over the
dispute and enjoined the parties from holding a strike or lockout or any activity which
might exacerbate the situation.
Displeased with Secretary Laguesma’s ruling, about 712 union members and
officers skipped work in the morning of April 3, 2000 (a Monday) and trooped to his office
in Intramuros, Manila, not only to accompany their lawyer in filing the Union’s Motion for
Reconsideration but also to stage a brief public demonstration. Other rank and file
employees in the provincial branches of Solidbank also absented themselves from work
that day.
Solidbank also filed its Motion for Reconsideration. With respect to the mass
demonstration conducted by its employees, however, Solidbank perceived the same to
be an illegal strike, a deliberate abandonment of work calculated to paralyze its
operations. Thus, Solidbank issued a memorandum informing all the participants in the
mass demonstration that they had put their jobs at risk. In another memorandum,
Solidbank informed the employees that the bank was willing to take back those who
would report for work on April 6, 2000.
About 513 of the striking employees obliged with the second memorandum. With
regard to the 199 employees who did not comply with the aforesaid memorandum,
another memorandum was issued requiring them to explain within 24 hours from notice
thereof why they should not be dismissed from employment. Pending receipt of
explanations, Solidbank placed the concerned employees under preventive suspension
status.
On April 17, 2000, Solidbank dismissed all 199 employees. Eventually, however,
it re-admitted 70 employees, bringing down the number of dismissed employees to 129.
On varying dates, some 21 employees executed a Release, Waiver, and Quitclaim25 in
favor of Solidbank.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 792
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
On May 8, 2000, Secretary Laguesma issued an Order denying the motions for
reconsideration separately filed by Solidbank and the Union.
Meanwhile, First Metro and Solidbank entered into a merger agreement, with
Solidbank as the surviving entity and First Metro ceasing to exist as a corporation.
However, the surviving corporation was renamed First Metro Investment Corporation.
Subsequently, Metrobank bought all banking-related assets and liabilities of Solidbank
(renamed First Metro), which ceased operations on August 31, 2000.
The Union, together with its members who were dismissed by Solidbank
(hereinafter collectively referred to as complainants), filed a Complaint for illegal
dismissal against Solidbank, its President and Chief Executive Officer Deogracias N.
Vistan (Vistan), Senior Vice-President DiwataCastanos (Castanos), and First Metro.
Labor Arbiter Flores rendered his Decision declaring the disputed April 3, 2000
incident not a strike but a mere expression of the employees’ displeasure over the
Secretary’s ruling; that the 24-hour deadline imposed by Solidbank within which the
employees should submit their written explanation was not sufficient to give them
reasonable opportunity to refute the charges against them; and that Solidbank was guilty
of unfair labor practice for using union membership as one of the bases for recalling or
terminating employment. Accordingly, he awarded full backwages and attorney’s fees
in favor of the employees.
The NLRC’s Second Division rendered its Decision finding the dismissal of the
complainants valid. It opined that the mass action held on April 3, 2000 was a strike
within the contemplation of Article 212(o) of the Labor Code and in violation of the
Secretary of Labor’s January 18, 2000 assumption order. Notably, however, the NLRC
Second Division still awarded separation benefits in favor of the complainants on
equitable grounds.
The NLRC Second Division likewise ruled that Solidbank did not interfere with
complainants’ right to self-organization and, hence, did not commit unfair labor practice.
It also dismissed the complaint with respect to complainant Jose A. Antenor for violating
the rule against forum shopping, as well as with respect to the 21 individual complainants
who already executed Release, Waiver and Quitclaim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the res judicata applies in the case.
HELD:
YES. The petition is denied, and the decision of the CA is affirmed.
It should be recalled that in G.R. No. 153799, the complainants assailed the
Resolutions dated January 14, 2002116 and February 20, 2002117 of the CA’s Fourth
Division granting Metrobank’s request for injunctive reliefs. They claimed that the
reinstatement aspect of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision is immediately executory. Hence,

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 793
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
they are entitled to backwages from the time the Labor Arbiter promulgated his Decision
until it was reversed by the NLRC.
The November 15, 2010 Decision of this Court in G.R. Nos. 159460 and 159461
already adjudicated the respective rights and liabilities of the parties. Said Decision
pronouncing the monetary awards to which the parties herein are entitled became final
and executory on May 20, 2011. Under the rule on immutability of judgment, this Court
cannot alter or modify said Decision. It is a well-established rule that once a judgment
has become final and executory, it is no longer susceptible to any modification.
The Decision of this Court in G.R. Nos. 159460 and 159461 became final and
executory on May 20, 2011. It is a decision based on the merits of the case and
rendered by this Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction after the parties invoked
its jurisdiction. There is also, between the two sets of consolidated cases, identity of the
parties, subject matter and causes of action. The parties in G.R. Nos. 159460 and
159461 are also impleaded as parties in these consolidated cases. And while some of
the parties herein are not included in G.R. Nos. 159460 and 159461, the same are only
few. In any event, it is well-settled that only substantial, and not absolute, identity of the
parties is required for res judicata to lie. “There is substantial identity of the parties
when there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the
second case albeit the latter was not impleaded in the first case.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 794
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
DIONISIO F. AUZA, JR. vs MOL PHILIPPINES INC.,
G.R. No. 175481, November 21, 2012
DOCTRINE: Justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the
established facts and the applicable law and doctrine. Although we are committed to
protect the working class, it behooves us to uphold the rights of management too if only
to serve the interest of fair play. As applied in this case, the employees who voluntarily
resigned and executed quitclaims are barred from instituting an action or claim against
their employer.
FACTS:
Respondent MOL is a common carrier engaged in transporting cargoes to and
from the different parts of the world. On October 1, 1997, it employed Auza and
Jeanjaquet as Cebu’s Branch Manager and Administrative Assistant, respectively. It also
employed Otarra as its Accounts Officer on November 1, 1997.
On October 14, 2002, Otarra tendered her resignation letter effective November
15, 2002 while Auza and Jeanjaquet submitted their resignation letters on October 30,
2002 to take effect on November 30, 2002. Petitioners were then given their separation
pay and the monetary value of leave credits, 13th month pay, MOL cooperative shares
and unused dental/optical benefits as shown in documents entitled “Remaining
Entitlement Computation,” which documents were signed by each of them
acknowledging receipt of such benefits. Afterwhich, they executed Release and
Quitclaims10 and then issued Separation Clearances.
In February 2004 or almost 15 months after their severance from employment,
petitioners filed separate Complaints for illegal dismissal before the Arbitration Branch of
the NLRC against respondents and MOL’s Manager for Corporate Services, George
Dolorfino.
In their Position Paper, respondents alleged that petitioners were not dismissed
but voluntarily resigned from employment. In fact, separation benefits were paid to them
for which quitclaims were duly executed. Hence, petitioners are effectively barred from
instituting any action or claim in connection with their employment. They likewise posited
that petitioners are guilty of laches by estoppel considering that they filed their
complaints only after the lapse of 15 months from their severance from employment. To
support these allegations, respondents submitted together with the said Position Paper,
documentary evidence, affidavit of witnesses and a formal offer of exhibits.
Petitioners filed a verified Position Paper signed by the said counsel. They
averred in said pleading that their consent to resign was not voluntarily given but was
instead obtained through mistake and fraud. They claimed that they were led to believe
that MOL’s Cebu branch would be downsized into a mere skeletal force due to alleged
low productivity and profitability volume. Pressured into resigning prior to the branch’s
closure as they might be denied separation pay, petitioners were constrained to resign.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 795
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Petitioners further averred that their separation from employment amounts to
constructive dismissal due to the shabby treatment they received from Tiutan at the time
they were being compelled to quit employment. Aside from Tiutan’s incessant
imputations that the Cebu branch is overstaffed, manned by incompetent employees,
and is heavily losing money, Auza was stripped of his authority to sign checks for the
branch’s expenditures; his and Otarra’s assigned company cars, cellphones and landline
phones were recalled; representation expenses were cutoff; and travel and hotel
expenses were drastically reduced. These were done to them despite the fact that the
Cebu branch had consistently surpassed the performance goal set by the Manila office
as shown by documentary evidence submitted. Later, they discovered that the planned
downsizing of the Cebu branch was a mere malicious scheme to oust them and to
accommodate Tiutan’s own people. This is because after they were duped to resign,
additional employees were hired by the management as their replacement; they moved
to a bigger office; and more telephone lines were installed.
In this case, petitioners’ counsel of record, Atty. Boiser, received on June 22,
2004 the May 26, 2004 Order requiring the parties to file position papers within 10 days
from receipt thereof. However, petitioners were only able to file their Position Paper on
August 11, 2004, way beyond the said 10-day period. And for being filed late, said
pleading must be stricken off the records. Consequently, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the
Complaints without prejudice for failure to prosecute pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of
the Rules of Court.
The NLRC set aside the Labor Arbiter’s ruling that petitioners’ Position Paper was
filed late. It held that the 10day period given to petitioners for filing their Position Paper
should be reckoned from Atty. Cañete’s receipt on August 9, 2004 of the July 29, 2004
Order of the Labor Arbiter. The filing, therefore, of petitioners’ Position Paper on August
11, 2004 is well within the allowed period, hence, there was no basis in dismissing the
Complaints for failure to prosecute.
The NLRC concluded that petitioners were illegally dismissed and thus granted
them the relief of reinstatement, full backwages computed in accordance with the
computation presented by petitioners in their Supplemental Position Paper, and
attorney’s fees. For Tiutan’s bad faith in pressuring both Auza and Otarra to resign,
moral and exemplary damages were likewise awarded to the two.
The CA rendered its Decision annulling and setting aside the Decision of the
NLRC. The CA did not find any element of coercion and force in petitioners’ separation
from employment but rather upheld the voluntary execution of their resignation letters as
gleaned from the tenor thereof. It opined that petitioners were aware of the
consequences of their acts in voluntarily resigning and executing quitclaims.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were illegally dismissed.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 796
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
Petitioners voluntarily resigned from employment.
“Resignation is the formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office.” The overt act
of relinquishment should be coupled with an intent to relinquish, which intent could be
inferred from the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation.
It appears that petitioners, on their own volition, decided to resign from their
positions after being informed of the management’s decision that the Cebu branch would
eventually be manned by a mere skeletal force. As proven by the email correspondences
presented, petitioners were fully aware and had, in fact, acknowledged that Cebu branch
has been incurring losses and was already unprofitable to operate. Note that there was
evidence produced to prove that indeed the Cebu branch’s productivity had deteriorated
as shown in a Profit and Loss Statement for the years 2001 and 2002. Also, there was a
substantial reduction of workforce as all of the Cebu branch staff and personnel, except
one, were not retained. On the other hand, petitioners’ assertions that the Cebu branch
was performing well are not at all substantiated. What they presented was adocument
entitled “1999 Performance Standards”, which only provides for performance objectives
but tells nothing about the branch’s progress. Likewise, the Cebu Performance Reports
submitted which showed outstanding company performance only pertained to the year
1999 and the first quarter of year 2000. No other financial documents were submitted to
show that such progress continued until year 2002.
In addition, it is well to note that Auza and Otarra are managerial employees and
not ordinary workers who cannot be easily coerced or intimidated into signing something
against their will. As borne out by the records, Auza was the Local Chairman of
International Shipping Lines Association for five years, president of their Homeowner’s
Association and an active member of his community. Otarra, on the other hand, was
officer of various church organizations and a college professor at the University of the
Visayas. Their standing in society depicts how highly educated and intelligent persons
they are as to know fully well the consequences of their acts in executing and signing
letters of resignation and quitclaims. Although quitclaims are generally against public
policy, voluntary agreements entered into and represented by a reasonable settlement
are binding on the parties which may not be later disowned simply because of a change
of mind. “It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an
unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of the settlement are unconscionable, that
the law will step in to bail out the employee.” Hence, we uphold the validity of the
quitclaims signed by petitioners in exchange for the separation benefits they received
from respondents. unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of the settlement are
unconscionable, that the law will step in to bail out the employee.” Hence, we uphold the
validity of the quitclaims signed by petitioners in exchange for the separation benefits
they received from respondents.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 797
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
CARLOS L. OCTAVIO vs. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY
G.R. No. 175492 February 27, 2013

DOCTRINE: When parties have validly agreed on a procedure for resolving grievances
and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure should be strictly
observed.

FACTS:
PLDT and Gabay ng UnyonsaTelekominaksyon ng mgaSuperbisor (GUTS)
entered into a CBA covering the period January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2001 (CBA of
1999-2001). On October 1, 2000, PLDT hired Octavio as Sales System Analyst I on a
probationary status. He became a member of GUTS.
On May 31, 2002, PLDT and GUTS entered into another CBA covering the period
January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2004 (CBA of 2002-2004). Claiming that he was not
given the salary increases of P2,500.00 effective January 1, 2001 and P2,000.00
effective January 1, 2002, Octavio wrote the President of GUTS, Adolfo Fajardo
(Fajardo). Acting thereon and on similar grievances from other GUTS members, Fajardo
wrote the PLDT Human Resource Head to inform management of the GUTS members’
claim for entitlement to the across-the-board salary increases. The committee denied the
claims of Octavio. Octavio filed before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC a Complaint
for payment of said salary increases.
PLDT countered that the issues advanced by Octavio had already been resolved
by the Union-Management Grievance Committee when it denied his claims through the
Committee Resolution. Moreover, the grant of across-the board salary increase for those
who were regularized starting January 1, 2002 and the exclusion thereto of those who
were regularized on January 1, 2001, do not constitute an act of unfair labor practice as
would result in any discrimination or encourage or discourage membership in a labor
organization. In fact, when the Union-Management Grievance Committee came up with
the Committee Resolution, they considered the same as the most practicable and
reasonable solution for both management and union. At any rate, the said Committee
Resolution had already become final and conclusive between the parties for failure of
Octavio to elevate the same to the proper forum. In addition, PLDT claimed that the
NLRC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide Octavio’s claims.

ISSUE:
Whether or notthe decision of the Grievance Committee is binding.

HELD:
YES. It is settled that "when parties have validly agreed on a procedure for
resolving grievances and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure
should be strictly observed." Moreover, we have held time and again that "before a party
is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have
availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 798
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power
can be sought. The premature invocation of the court’s judicial intervention is fatal to
one’s cause of action." "The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies rests on the presumption that when the administrative body, or
grievance machinery, is afforded a chance to pass upon the matter, it will decide the
same correctly."
By failing to question the Committee Resolution through the proper procedure
prescribed in the CBA, that is, by raising the same before a Board of Arbitrators, Octavio
is deemed to have waived his right to question the same. Clearly, he departed from the
grievance procedure mandated in the CBA and denied the Board of Arbitrators the
opportunity to pass upon a matter over which it has jurisdiction. Hence, and as correctly
held by the CA, Octavio’s failure to assail the validity and enforceability of the Committee
Resolution makes the same binding upon him. On this score alone, Octavio’s recourse to
the labor tribunals below, as well as to the CA, and, finally, to this Court, must therefore
fail.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 799
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
TANGGA-AN vs. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS INC.
G.R. No. 180636 March 13, 2013

DOCTRINE: An illegally dismissed overseas employee is not entitled to three (3) months
salary only.

FACTS:
Under the employment contract entered by Tangga-an with Philippine
Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (PTC) for and in behalf of its foreign employer, Universe
Tankship Delaware, LLC., he was to be employed for a period of six months as chief
engineer of the vessel the S.S. “Kure”. He was to be paid a basic salary of US$5,000.00;
vacation leave pay equivalent to 15 days a month or US$2,500.00 per month and
tonnage bonus in the amount of US$700.00 a month. On February 2002, Tangga-an was
deployed but was dismissed on April 2002. Tangga-an filed a Complaint for illegal
dismissal with prayer for payment of salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract,
leave pay, exemplary and moral damages, attorney’s fees and interest.
The Labor Arbiter found petitioner to be illegally dismissed. As regards petitioner’s
claim for back salaries, LA said he is entitled not to four months which is equivalent to the
unexpired portion of his contract, but only to three months, inclusive of vacation leave
pay and tonnage bonus (or US$8,200 x 3 months = US$24,600) pursuant to Section 10
of Republic Act (RA) No. 8042 or The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
2005.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegally dismissed overseas employee is only entitled to
3months back salaries.

HELD:
NO. As held in Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. vs. NLRC, involving Section 10
of Republic Act No. 8042, that an illegally dismissed overseas employee is not entitled to
three (3) months salary only. A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of
which amount to award an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or three (3) months salary
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play only when the
employment contract concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or more. This is
evident from the wording “for every year of the unexpired term” which follows the wording
“salaries x xx for three months.” To follow the thinking that private respondent is entitled
to three (3) months salary only simply because it is the lesser amount is to completely
disregard and overlook some words used in the statute while giving effect to some.
Petitioner must be awarded his salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of
his six-month employment contract, or equivalent to four months. This includes all his
corresponding monthly vacation leave pay and tonnage bonuses which are expressly
provided and guaranteed in his employment contract as part of his monthly salary and

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 800
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
benefit package. Thus, petitioner is entitled to back salaries of US$32,800 (or US$5,000
+ US$2,500 + US$700 = US$8,200 x 4 months). “Article 279 of the Labor Code
mandates that an employee’s full backwages shall be inclusive of allowances and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent.” As we have time and again held, “it is the
obligation of the employer to pay an illegally dismissed employee or worker the whole
amount of the salaries or wages, plus all other benefits and bonuses and general
increases, to which he would have been normally entitled had he not been dismissed
and had not stopped working.”

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 801
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES SALARIED EMPLOYEES UNION (MMPSEU) vs
MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 175773 : June 17, 2013

DOCTRINE: The conditions set forth in the CBA provision indicate an intention to limit
MMPC’s liability only to actual expenses incurred by the employees’ dependents, that is,
excluding the amounts paid by dependents’ other health insurance providers.To allow
reimbursement of amounts paid under other insurance policies shall constitute double
recovery which is not sanctioned by law.

FACTS:
The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) of the parties in this case provides
that the company shoulder the hospitalization expenses of the dependents of covered
employees subject to certain limitations and restrictions. Accordingly, covered
employees pay part of the hospitalization insurance premium through monthly salary
deduction while the company, upon hospitalization of the covered employees’
dependents, shall pay the hospitalization expenses incurred for the same.
The conflict arose when a portion of the hospitalization expenses of the covered
employees’ dependents were paid/shouldered by the dependent’s own health insurance.
While the company refused to pay the portion of the hospital expenses already
shouldered by the dependents’ own health insurance, the union insists that the covered
employees are entitled to the whole and undiminished amount of said hospital expenses.
By this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner Mitsubishi Motors Philippines
Salaried Employees Union (MMPSEU) assails the March 31, 2006 Decisionand
December 5, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75630,
which reversed and set aside the Voluntary Arbitrator’s December 3, 2002 Decision and
declared respondent Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation (MMPC) to be under no
legal obligation to pay its covered employees’ dependents’ hospitalization expenses
which were already shouldered by other health insurance companies.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the covered employees are entitled to the whole and undiminished
amount of said hospital expenses

HELD:
NO. The condition that payment should be direct to the hospital and doctor implies
that MMPC is only liable to pay medical expenses actually shouldered by the employees’
dependents. It follows that MMPC’s liability is limited, that is, it does not include the
amounts paid by other health insurance providers. This condition is obviously intended
to thwart not only fraudulent claims but also double claims for the same loss of the
dependents of covered employees.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 802
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
It is well to note at this point that the CBA constitutes a contract between the parties and
as such, it should be strictly construed for the purpose of limiting the amount of the
employer’s liability. The terms of the subject provision are clear and provide no room for
any other interpretation. As there is no ambiguity, the terms must be taken in their
plain, ordinary and popular sense. Consequently, MMPSEU cannot rely on the rule that a
contract of insurance is to be liberally construed in favor of the insured. Neither can it
rely on the theory that any doubt must be resolved in favor of labor.
MMPSEU insists that MMPC is also liable for the amounts covered under other
insurance policies; otherwise, MMPC will unjustly profit from the premiums the
employees contribute through monthly salary deductions. This contention is
unmeritorious.
To constitute unjust enrichment, it must be shown that a party was unjustly
enriched in the sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully. A claim for
unjust enrichment fails when the person who will benefit has a valid claim to such benefit.
The CBA has provided for MMPC’s limited liability which extends only up to the
amount to be paid to the hospital and doctor by the employees’ dependents, excluding
those paid by other insurers. Consequently, the covered employees will not receive
more than what is due them; neither is MMPC under any obligation to give more than
what is due under the CBA.
Moreover, since the subject CBA provision is an insurance contract, the rights and
obligations of the parties must be determined in accordance with the general principles
of insurance law. Being in the nature of a non-life insurance contract and essentially a
contract of indemnity, the CBA provision obligates MMPC to indemnify the covered
employees’ medical expenses incurred by their dependents but only up to the extent of
the expenses actually incurred. This is consistent with the principle of indemnity which
proscribes the insured from recovering greater than the loss. Indeed, to profit from a loss
will lead to unjust enrichment and therefore should not be countenanced. As aptly ruled
by the CA, to grant the claims of MMPSEU will permit possible abuse by employees.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 803
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LUCIANO CANEDO vs. KAMPILAN SECURITY AND DETECTIVE AGENCY INC.
G.R. No. 179326 : June 31, 2013

DOCTRINE: In illegal dismissal cases, “while the employer bears the burden x xx to
prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause, the employee must first
establish by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal from service.” The burden of
proving the allegations rests upon the party alleging and the proof must be clear, positive
and convincing.

FACTS:
Respondent agency hired petitioner as security guard and assigned him at the
NPC. For not wearing proper uniform while on duty, petitioner was suspended for a
month. Later on NPC was no longer interested in petitioner’s services and thus
requested for his replacement. On the same month, petitioner requested to issue a
certification in connection with his intended retirement effective that month which was
issued. Five days later, petitioner filed before the Labor Arbiter a Complaint for illegal
dismissal, illegal suspension and non-payment of monetary benefits against
respondents, relying on the word “terminated” as used in the said certification.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CA an employee allegedly dismissed has to prove his claim of
dismissal.

HELD:
Yes. In illegal dismissal cases, “while the employer bears the burden x xx to prove
that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause, the employee must first
establish by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal from service.” The burden of
proving the allegations rests upon the party alleging and the proof must be clear, positive
and convincing. Thus, in this case, it is incumbent upon petitioner to prove his claim of
dismissal.
Petitioner relies on the word “terminated” as used in the Certification issued him
and argued that the same is a clear indication that he was dismissed from service.
Petitioner cannot simply rely on this piece of document since the fact of dismissal must
be evidenced by positive and overt acts of an employer indicating an intention to dismiss.
Here, aside from this single document, petitioner proffered no other evidence showing
that he was dismissed from employment. While it is true that he was not allowed to report
for work after the period of his suspension expired, the same was due to NPC’s request
for his replacement as NPC was no longer interested in his services. And as correctly
argued by respondents, petitioner from that point onward is not considered dismissed
but merely on a floating status. “Such a ‘floating status’ is lawful and not unusual for
security guards employed in security agencies as their assignments primarily depend on
the contracts entered into by the agency with third parties.”

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Countering such status, petitioner contends that even at present, he is still not given any
new duties. A floating status can ripen into constructive dismissal only when it goes
beyond the six-month maximum period allowed by law. In this case, petitioner filed the
Complaint for illegal dismissal even before the lapse of the six-month period. Hence, his
claim of illegal dismissal lacks basis. Moreover and as aptly observed by the NLRC, it
was in fact petitioner who intended to terminate his relationship with respondents
through his planned retirement. This is further bolstered by his prayer in his Complaint
where he sought for separation pay and not for reinstatement.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
VICENTE ANG vs. CEFERINO SAN JOAQUIN, JR., AND DIOSDADO FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 185549, August 07, 2013
DOCTRINE: The employer's act of tearing to pieces the employee's time card may be
considered an outright - not only symbolic - termination of the parties' employment
relationship.
FACTS:
San Joaquin and Fernandez (respondents) were employed by Vicente Ang
(petitioner) in his business as helper and driver respectively. In a hearing relative to 41
criminal cases filed by his former employee, the respondents testified against the
petitioner. After that, the latter began to treat them with hostility and antagonism.
One day, a heated argument between San Joaquin and petitioner's wife Rosa took
place, in view of the former's refusal to obey her her instruction to transfer the monobloc
chairs in her restaurant. Upon reporting for work two days later, he found out that his
DTR was torn into pieces by petitioner. He learned that the DTR of Fernandez also
suffered the same fate after they testified in Court.

Fernandez was suspended for a week for insubordination but the act of
insubordination was not specified by petitioner in his memorandum to the latter.

Respondents filed complaints for illegal constructive dismissal.

ISSUE:
Whether tearing of DTRs of the employees by the employerconstitutes
constructive dismissal.

HELD:
Yes, tearing of the DTR of the employees by the employer constitute constructive
dismissal.
“Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work because continued
employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a
demotion in rank and a diminution in pay.” It is a “dismissal in disguise or an act
amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not.”Constructive dismissal may
likewise exist if an “act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer
becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by
him except to forego his continued employment.” “Constructive dismissal exists when the
employee involuntarily resigns due to the harsh, hostile, and unfavorable conditions set
by the employer.” “The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in
the employee’s position would have felt compelled to give up his position under the
circumstances.”
"The CA is correct in its pronouncement that respondents were constructively
dismissed from work. Moreover, by destroying respondents’ time cards, Ang discontinued
and severed his relationship with respondents. The purpose of a time record is to show an
employee’s attendance in office for work and to be paid accordingly, taking into account
the policy of “no work, no pay”. A daily time record is primarily intended to prevent

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
damage or loss to the employer, which could result in instances where it pays an
employee for no work done; it is a mandatory requirement for inclusion in the payroll, and
in the absence of an employment agreement,it constitutes evidence of employment.
Thus, when Ang tore the respondents’ time cards to pieces, he virtually removed them
from Virose’s payroll and erased all vestiges of respondents’ employment; respondents
were effectively dismissed from work. The act may be considered an outright – not only
symbolic – termination of the parties’ employment relationship; the “last straw that finally
broke the camel’s back”, as respondents put it in their Position Paper."

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
COLEGIO DEL SANTISIMO ROSARIO AND SR. ZENAIDA S. MOFADAVs.
EMMANUEL ROJO
G.R. No. 170388, September 04, 2013
DOCTRINE: Cases dealing with employment on probationary status of teaching
personnel are not governed solely by the Labor Code as the law is supplemented, with
respect to the period of probation, by special rules found in the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools (the Manual).
FACTS:
ColegiodelSantisimo Rosario (petitioner) hired Emmanuel Rojo (respondent)
as a high school teacher on probationary basis for the school years 1992-1995. On April
5, 1995, CSR, through petitioner Sr. Zenaida S. Mofada, OP (Mofada), decided not to
renew respondent’s services.
Respondent filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal. He alleged that since he
had served three consecutive school years which is the maximum number of terms
allowed for probationary employment, he should be extended permanent employment.
Citing paragraph 75 of the 1970 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1970
Manual), respondent asserted that "full- time teachers who have rendered 3 consecutive
years of satisfactory services shall be considered permanent."
On the other hand, petitioners argued that respondent knew that his Teachers
Contract for school year 1994-1995 with CSR would expire on March 31,
1995.Accordingly, respondent was not dismissed but his probationary contract merely
expired and was not renewed. Petitioners also claimed that the "3 years" mentioned in
paragraph 75 of the 1970 Manual refer to "36 months," not three school years. And since
respondent served for only three school years of 10 months each or 30 months, then he
had not yet served the "three years" or 36 months mentioned in paragraph 75 of the
1970 Manual.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent had become a permanent employee upon serving
for 3 years.
HELD:
Yes, respondent had become a permanent employee upon serving for 3
years.
In Mercado v. AMA Computer College-Paraque City, Inc.,we had occasion to
rule that cases dealing with employment on probationary status of teaching personnel
are not governed solely by the Labor Code as the law is supplemented, with respect to
the period of probation, by special rules found in the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools (the Manual). With regard to the probationary period, Section 92 of the 1992
Manual provides

Section 92. Probationary Period. Subject in all instances to compliance with the
Department and school requirements, the probationary period for academic personnel

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
shall not be more than three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory service for those in the
elementary and secondary levels, six (6) consecutive regular semesters of satisfactory
service for those in the tertiary level, and nine (9) consecutive trimesters of satisfactory
service for those in the tertiary level where collegiate courses are offered on a trimester
basis.
However, this scheme "of fixed-term contract is a system that operates during
the probationary period and for this reason is subject to Article 281 of the Labor Code,"
which provides-

x xx The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may
be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in
accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at
the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary
period shall be considered a regular employee.

However, for teachers on probationary employment, in which case a fixed


term contract is not specifically used for the fixed term it offers, it is incumbent upon the
school to have not only set reasonable standards to be followed by said teachers in
determining qualification for regular employment, the same must have also been
communicated to the teachers at the start of the probationary period, or at the very least,
at the start of the period when they were to be applied. Corollarily, should the teachers
not have been apprised of such reasonable standards at the time specified above, they
shall be deemed regular employees.
In this case, glaringly absent from petitioner's evidence are the reasonable
standards that respondent was expected to meet that could have served as proper
guidelines for purposes of evaluating his performance. Nowhere in the Teacher's
Contract could such standards be found.Neither was it mentioned that the same were
ever conveyed to respondent. Even assuming that respondent failed to meet the
standards set forth by CSR and made known to the former at the time he was engaged
as a teacher on probationary status, still, the termination was flawed for failure to give the
required notice to respondent.
Curiously, despite the absence of standards, Mofada mentioned the existence
of alleged performance evaluations in respondent's case. We are, however, in a
quandary as to what could have been the basis of such evaluation, as no evidence were
adduced to show the reasonable standards with which respondents performance was to
be assessed or that he was informed thereof. Notably too, none of the supposed
performance evaluations were presented. These flaws violated respondent's right to due
process. As such, his dismissal is, for all intents and purposes, illegal.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ASIA BREWERY, INC.vs. TUNAY NA PAGKAKAISA NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA
ASIA (TPMA)
G.R. Nos. 171594-96, September 18, 2013
DOCTRINE: In cases of compulsory arbitration before the Secretary of labor pursuant to
Article 263(g) of the labor Code, the financial statements of the employer must be
properly audited by an external and independent auditor in order to be admissible in
evidence for purposes of determining the proper wage award.
FACTS:
Tunay Na Pagkakaisa ng mgaManggagawasa Asia (respondent union) is a
legitimate labor organization, certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all
regular rank and file employees of Asia Brewery , Inc. (petitioner). Respondent union and
petitioner corporation had been negotiating for a new collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) for the years 2003-2006 since the old CBA expired last July 2003. After about 18
sessions or negotiations, the parties were still unable to reconcile their differences on
their respective positions on most items, particularly on wages and other economic
benefits. Respondent union declared a deadlock and, after going through the process to
legitimately stage a strike, held a strike. The Secretary of Labor (public respondent)
assumed jurisdiction over the issue after determining that that the business of petitioner
is indispensable to the national interest. Subsequently, public respondent issued an
arbitral award which included, among others, a computation of the wage increase.
Respondent union filed a petition for certiorari against the public respondent before the
Court of Appeals (CA). The CA rendered a decision remanding the computation of the
wage increase to the public respondent. It opined that the computation of the wage
increase was invalid as the same was based merely on the unaudited financial
statements of the petitioner which had no probative value. The petitioner filed a petition
for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court (SC).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the unaudited financial statements of petitioner can serve as
the basis for public respondent’s computation of wage increase.
HELD:
No, the unaudited financial statements of petitioner cannot serve as the basis
for public respondent’s computation of wage increase.
In Restaurante Las Conchas v. Llego,several employees filed a case for illegal
dismissal after the employer closed its restaurant business. The employer sought to
justify the closure through unaudited financial statements showing the alleged losses of
the business. We ruled that such financial statements are mere self-serving declarations
and inadmissible in evidence even if the employees did not object to their presentation
before the Labor Arbiter. Similarly, in Uichico v. National Labor Relations
Commission,the services of several employees were terminated on the ground of
retrenchment due to alleged serious business losses suffered by the employer. We ruled
that by submitting unaudited financial statements, the employer failed to prove the

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
alleged business losses, viz:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary

x xx It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not bound by
the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases. However, this procedural
rule should not be construed as a license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary
rules. While the rules of evidence prevailing in the courts of law or equity are not
controlling in proceedings before the NLRC, the evidence presented before it must at
least have a modicum of admissibility for it to be given some probative value. The
Statement of Profit and Losses submitted by Crispa, Inc. to prove its alleged
losses, without the accompanying signature of a certified public accountant or audited by
an independent auditor, are nothing but self-serving documents which ought to be treated
as a mere scrap of paper devoid of any probative value. For sure, this is not the kind of
sufficient and convincing evidence necessary to discharge the burden of proof required of
petitioners to establish the alleged losses suffered by Crispa, Inc. in the years
immediately preceding 1990 that would justify the retrenchment of respondent
employees. x xx
While the above-cited cases involve proof necessary to establish losses in
cases of business closure or retrenchment, we see no reason why this rule should not
equally apply to the determination of the proper level of wage award in cases where the
Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction in a labor dispute pursuant to Article 263(g)of the
Labor Code.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ROMEO R. ARAULLO vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, HON.
MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, HON. GERARDO C. NOGRALES, HON.
ROMEO L. GO, HON. PERLITA B. VELASCO, and HON. ARDEN S. ANNI
G.R. No. 194169, December 4, 2013
DOCTRINE: A public officer who acts pursuant to the dictates of law and within the
limits of allowable discretion can hardly be considered guilty of misconduct.
FACTS:
A case for illegal dismissal with a prayer for the recovery of salaries, benefits,
and damages filed by herein petitioner Romeo R. Araullo against his former
employer Club Filipino, Inc. (Club Filipino) with the Quezon City NCR Office of the
NLRC, judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals. Arbiter Anni issued a Writ
of Execution ordering the collection of the P2,338,152.25 award as computed by
the NLRC Computation and Examination Unit, as well as execution fees in the
amount of P23,380.00.
Club Filipino moved to quash the Writ of Execution, claiming that Arbiter Anni
improvidently issued the writ without resolving the pending incidents and issues
and in violation of the NLRC rules of procedure in that it was issued without the
required order approving the computation and without giving notice of such
approval to the parties.
Petitioner filed a Complaint before the Ombudsman against the respondent
Commissioners and Arbiter Anni, for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Article 206 of the Revised
Penal Code. The criminal aspect was docketed as OMB-C-C-09-0410-H; it was
later dismissed by the Ombudsman via an undated Resolution. On the other hand,
the administrative case docketed as OMB-C-A-09-0437-H was based on a charge
of grave misconduct.
ISSUE:
Whether there is substantial evidence to hold respondents liable for grave
misconduct.
HELD:
No. During execution proceedings, errors may be committed such that the rights of a
party may be prejudiced, in which case corrective measures are called for. These may
involve instances where
1) the [W]rit of [E]xecution varies the judgment;

there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable
2)
or unjust;

3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
4) it appears that the controversy has never been subject to the judgment of the court;

the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for
5)
interpretation thereof; or

x x x the [W]rit of [E]xecution [was] improvidently issued, or x x x is defective in


substance, or [was] issued against the wrong party, or x x x the judgment debt has
6)
been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority.

In such event, one of the corrective measures that may be taken is the
quashing of the Writ of Execution. There is no doubt that Arbiter Anni's July 29,
2008 Writ of Execution was procedurally irregular, as it pre-empted the NLRC
Rules which require that where further computation of the award in the decision is
necessary during the course of the execution proceedings, no Writ of Execution
shall be issued until after the computation has been approved by the Labor Arbiter
in an order issued after the parties have been duly notified and heard on the
matter. When the writ was issued, there was as yet no order approving the
computation made by the NLRC Computation and Examination Unit, and there
was a pending and unresolved Motion to Recompute filed by Club Filipino. A
cursory examination of the motion reveals that it raised valid issues that required
determination in order to arrive at a just resolution, so that none of the parties
would be unjustly enriched. For example, it appears that petitioner owed Club
Filipino a substantial amount of money which the latter sought to deduct from the
judgment award by way of compensation; if this is true, then the necessary
adjustment in the award may be made to allow Club Filipino to recover what
petitioner owes it, to the extent allowable by law.
Since the Writ of Execution was issued in contravention of the law, it is
irregular and defective, and there was no need to further hear Club Filipino's
motion to quash the writ; Arbiter Anni's issuance of the August 12, 2008 Order
quashing the writ ahead of the scheduled August 20, 2008 hearing is therefore not
improper. "A void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect, force or
efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. x x x It is not
even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order;
it may simply be ignored."
The Court cannot blame the respondents for not treating the Writ of
Execution as an implicit approval of the NLRC Computation and Examination
Unit's computation, or even as an implied denial of Club Filipino's Motion to
Recompute, because the NLRC Rules precisely require that the computation must
be approved by the Labor Arbiter in an order issued after the parties have been
duly notified and heard. Besides, the pending motion to recompute was not
touched upon in the Writ of Execution. Finally, given petitioner's threats of exacting
criminal and administrative liability if he did not have his way, respondents chose to
act with extreme caution and took an academic and literal approach in construing
and applying the NLRC Rules.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Finding no irregularity in the acts of respondents, the Ombudsman did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in exonerating them from the administrative
charge of grave misconduct. As a matter of fact, its disposition is correct in every
respect. Thus, the Court's policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman's
exercise of sound discretion and judgment stands.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ALPHA SHIP MANAGEMENT CORPORATION/JUNEL M. CHAN and/or
CHUO-KAIUN COMPANY, LIMITED vs. ELEOSIS V. CALO
G.R. No. 192034, January 13, 2014
DOCTRINE: An employee's disability becomes permanent and total when so declared by
the company-designated physician, or, in case of absence of such a declaration either of
fitness or permanent total disability, upon the lapse of the 120- or 240-day treatment
period, while the employee's disability continues and he is unable to engage in gainful
employment during such period, and the company-designated physician fails to arrive at
a definite assessment of the employee's fitness or disability.
FACTS:
Respondent Eleosis V. Calo worked for petitioners — Alpha Ship Management
Corporation, Junel M. Chan and their foreign principal, Chuo-Kaiun Company Limited
(CKCL) — since 1998 under seven employment contracts. On February 17, 2004,
respondent was once more hired by petitioners as Chief Cook on board CKCL's vessel,
MV Iris. Respondent commenced his duties as Chief Cook aboard MV Iris on March 5,
2004.
On July 13, 2004, while MV Iris was in Shanghai, China, respondent suffered back
pain on the lower part of his lumbar region and urinated with solid particles. On checkup,
the doctor found him suffering from urinary tract infection and renal colic, and was given
antibiotics. When respondent's condition did not improve, he consulted another doctor in
Chile sometime in August 2004, and was found to have kidney problems and urinary tract
infection but was declared fit for work on a "light duty" basis.
On September 19, 2004, respondent suffered an attack of severe pain in his loin
area below the ribs radiating to his groin. At the Honmoku Hospital in Yokohama, Japan,
respondent was diagnosed with suspected renal and/or ureter calculus. He was declared
"unfit for work" and advised to be sent home and undergo further detailed examination
and treatment. Respondent was thus repatriated on October 12, 2004 and was referred
by petitioners to Dr. Nicomedes G. Cruz (Dr. Cruz), the company-designated physician.
Respondent underwent surgery for his nephrolithiasis on August 31, 2005. on
October 18, 2005, respondent filed against the petitioners a Complaint for the recovery of
total permanent disability benefits, illness allowance, reimbursement of medical
expenses, damages and attorney's fees.||| The Labor Arbiter granted permanent total
disability benefits and attorney's fees to respondent, but denied his claim for moral and
exemplary damages.||| NLRC rendered its Decision granting petitioners' appeal and
reversing the Labor Arbiter's decision. CA reversed decision of NLRC and reinstated the
decision of LA.
ISSUE:
.Whether or not respondent is entitled to disability benefits under the POEA Standard
Employment Contract for Seafarers despite the fact that he was declared fit to work.|||
HELD:

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Yes. Article 192 (c) (1) of the Labor Code provides that:
Art. 192.Permanent total disability. — . . .
(c)The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:
(1)Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one
hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided for in the
Rules;
The 120-day period may be extended up to 240 days, under Rule X, Section 2 of
the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation and pursuant to the pronouncement
in Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc. stating that a temporary total disability
becomes permanent when so declared by the company-designated physician within the
period allowed, or upon expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period in
case of absence of a declaration of fitness or permanent disability.
It is settled that the above provisions of the Labor Code and the Amended Rules
on Employees Compensation on disabilities apply to seafarers; the POEA Standard
Employment Contract, which respondent holds, is not the sole basis for determining their
rights in the event of work-related injury, illness or death. It may likewise be true that
under respondent's POEA Standard Employment Contract, only those injuries or
disabilities that are classified as Grade 1 are considered total and permanent.
Thus, from the above, it can be said that an employee's disability becomes
permanent and total when so declared by the company-designated physician, or, in case
of absence of such a declaration either of fitness or permanent total disability, upon the
lapse of the 120 or 240-day treatment period, while the employee's disability continues
and he is unable to engage in gainful employment during such period, and the
company-designated physician fails to arrive at a definite assessment of the employee's
fitness or disability. This is true "regardless of whether the employee loses the use of any
part of his body."
Respondent was repatriated on October 12, 2004 and underwent treatment by the
company-designated physician, Dr. Cruz, until October 14, 2005, or for a continuous
period of over one year — or for more than the statutory 120-day or even 240-day period.
During said treatment period, Dr. Cruz did not arrive at a definite assessment of
respondent's fitness or disability; thus, respondent's medical condition remained
unresolved. It was only on July 18, 2006 that respondent was declared fit to work by Dr.
Cruz. Such declaration, however, became irrelevant, for by then, respondent had been
under medical treatment and unable to engage in gainful employment for more than 240
days. Pursuant to the doctrine in Kestrel, the conclusive presumption that the respondent
is totally and permanently disabled thus arose. The CA is therefore correct in declaring
that respondent suffered permanent total disability.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JONAS MICHAEL R. GARZA vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. and
CHRISTINE BANAL/CALIXTO MANAIG

G.R. No. 180972 January 20, 2014

DOCTRINE: Unsubstantiated accusations or baseless conclusions of the employer are


insufficient legal justifications to dismiss an employee. The unflinching rule in illegal
dismissal cases is that the employer bears the burden of proof.

FACTS:

Jonas Michael R. Garza is a regular employee of Coca-Cola. He was promoted as


a Dealer Development Coordinator and likewise designated as Acting District Sales
Supervisor. Due to changes in Coca-Cola’s structure, the position of Dealer Development
Coordinator was abolished so he was designated as an Account Specialist. Petitioner
was an employee of good standing with an unblemished record. As Account Specialist,
petitioner was tasked mainly with booking customers’ orders and collecting on their
accounts. Account Specialists are obliged to remit all cash sales and credit cash
collections. During this time, Garza received several memoranda from his immediate
supervisor, Macatangay directing him to explain alleged past cash shortages and
misappropriation of company funds. Petitioner sought verbal clarification from
Macatangay and said that he could not submit a written explanation unless the charges
against him are specified. Instead of furnishing details, Macatangay issued another
memorandum. Later, he was placed under preventive suspension and investigation of the
case was set. Petitioner asked for the investigation to be rescheduled for his wife has just
given birth. Instead of a rescheduling, a Notice of Termination was sent to Garza. The
Management after carefully evaluating the records of the investigation held that he has
embezzled company funds amounting to Php105,653.00. Petitioner the filed for illegal
dismissal. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Garza and ordered reinstatement. NLRC
also ruled in favor of Garze but held that reinstatement was no longer possible due to
strained relations. When the case was appealed, CA held that the dismissal was proper
because one account showed non-remittance. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:

w/n petitioner’s dismissal was with just cause

HELD:

No.The irregularity attributed to petitioner with regard to the Asanza account


should fail. To be sure, Asanza herself confirmed that she did not make any payment in
cash or check of ₱8,160.00 covering the October 15, 2003 delivery for which petitioner is
being held to account. This being the case, petitioner could not be charged with
embezzlement/failure to remit for the simple reason that as regards such October 15,
2003 delivery, there was nothing to embezzle or remit because no payment thereon has
as yet been made by the customer Asanza. Although petitioner may be faulted for this act

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 817
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
– issuing an official receipt without receiving the corresponding payment – he could not
be accused of embezzlement or failure to remit as defined and punished under CCBPI’s
November 18, 2002 Inter-Office Memorandum, because he received no cash or check
from Asanza. Without receiving anything from her, there was nothing for petitioner to
embezzle or remit, and thus CCBPI had no basis to charge him for violation of the
November 18, 2002 Inter-Office Memorandum which punished embezzlement and
failure/delay in remitting collections. it was impossible for him to embezzle/not remit the
other customers’ cash and check payments, not only because of the existence of the
abovementioned policy, but likewise due to the sworn avowals of these customers that all
their check payments have been issued in CCBPI’s name and have been duly debited
from their accounts. Certainly, petitioner could not have encashed check payments
because they were issued in the name of CCBPI; for the same reason, he could not have
engaged in kiting operations. As earlier stated, the burden is on the employer to prove
that the termination was for valid cause.1âwphi1Unsubstantiated accusations or
baseless conclusions of the employer are insufficient legal justifications to dismiss an
employee. The unflinching rule in illegal dismissal cases is that the employer bears the
burden of proof.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 818
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
GRAND ASIAN SHIPPING LINES, INC., EDUARDO P. FRANCISCO and WILLIAM
HOW vs. WILFREDO GALVEZ, JOEL SALES, CRISTITO GRUTA, DANILO
ARGUELLES, RENATO BATAYOLA, PATRICIO FRESMILLO, JOVY NOBLE, EMILIO
DOMINICO, BENNY NILMAO, and JOSE AUSTRAL
G.R. No. 178184 January 29, 2014

DOCTRINE: The employer has broader discretion in dismissing managerial employees


on the ground of loss of trust and confidence than those occupying ordinary ranks. While
plain accusations are not sufficient to justify the dismissal of rank and file employees, the
mere existence of a basis for believing that managerial employees have breached the
trust reposed on them by their employer would suffice to justify their dismissal.

FACTS:
Petitioner Grand Asian Shipping Lines, Inc. (GASLI) transports LPG from Petron
Corporation’s refinery in Limay, Bataan to Petron’s Plant in Ugong, Pasig and Petron’s
Depot in Rosario, Cavite. One of the vessel’s Oilers, Richard Abis, reported to GASLI’s
Office and Crewing Manager, Elsa Montegrico an alleged illegal activity being committed
by respondents aboard the vessel. Abis revealed that after about four to five voyages a
week, a substantial volume of fuel oil is unconsumed and stored in the vessel’s fuel tanks.
However, Gruta would misdeclare it as consumed fuel in the Engineer’s Voyage Reports.
Then, the saved fuel oil is siphoned and sold to other vessels out at sea usually at
nighttime. Respondents would then divide among themselves the proceeds of the sale. A
formal complaint for qualified theft was filed with CIDG. It referred the case to the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Manila, which, after finding a prima facie case, filed the
corresponding Information for Qualified Theft with RTC. Meanwhile, GASLI placed
respondents under preventive suspension. After conducting administrative hearings,
petitioners decided to terminate respondents from employment. Several other employees
and crewmembers of GASLI’s two other vessels were likewise suspended and
terminated from employment. Respondents and other dismissed crewmembers filed with
the Labor Arbiter separate complaints for illegal suspension and dismissal. The LA held
that all dismissals were illegal and ordered reinstatement. As to the respondents, the
Labor Arbiter ruled that the filing of a criminal case for qualified theft against them did not
justify their termination from employment. In the NLRC, it was ruled that petitioners
presented sufficient evidence to show just causes for terminating complainants’
employment and compliance with due process. The CA, however, conformed with the
Labor Arbiter’s ruling that petitioners’ evidence was inadequate to support the charge of
pilferage and justify respondents’ termination. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:
w/n the respondents were terminated for just causes

HELD:

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 819
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
No. After examination of the evidence presented, however, we find that petitioners
failed to substantiate adequately the charges of pilferage against respondents. The mere
filing of a formal charge, to our mind, does not automatically make the dismissal valid.
Evidence submitted to support the charge should be evaluated to see if the degree of
proof is met to justify respondents’ termination. The affidavit executed by Montegrico
simply contained the accusations of Abis that respondents committed pilferage, which
allegations remain uncorroborated. "Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and
conclusions of employers do not provide for legal justification for dismissing employees."
The other bits of evidence were also inadequate to support the charge of pilferage.

As for the ground, loss of trust and confidence, distinction should be made
between managerial and rank and file employees. With respect to rank-and-file
personnel, loss of trust and confidence, as ground for valid dismissal, requires proof of
involvement in the alleged events while for managerial employees, the mere existence of
a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer would
suffice for his dismissal. There is some basis for the loss of confidence reposed on Galvez
and Gruta, the ship captain and chief engineer. Their position requires the full trust and
confidence of their employer for they are entrusted with the custody, handling and care of
company property and exercise authority over it. Joel Sales was not dismissed from
employment. The employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of
dismissalbefore shifting to the employer the burden of proving the validity of such
dismissal. Respondents Danilo Arguelles, Renato Batayola, Patricio Fresmillo, Jovy
Noble, Emilio Dominico, Benny Nilmao, and Jose Austral are declared to have been
illegally dismissed.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 820
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
THENAMARIS PHILIPPINES, INC. (Formerly INTERMARE MARITIME AGENCIES,
INC.)/ OCEANIC NAVIGATION LTD. and NICANOR B. ALTARES vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and AMANDA C. MENDIGORIN (In behalf of her deceased husband
GUILLERMO MENDIGORIN)
G.R. No. 191215 February 3, 2014

DOCTRINE: The general rule is that a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60
days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. This
is in accordance with the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC where no
provision for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari exists.

FACTS:
This case stemmed from a complaint for death benefits, unpaid salaries, sickness
allowance, refund of medical expenses, damages and attorney’s fees filed by private
respondent Amanda C. Mendigorin against petitioner Thenamaris Philippines, Inc.
Amanda is the widow of seafarer Guillermo M. Mendigorin who was employed by
Thenamaris for 27 years as an oiler and eventually, as second engineer in the latter’s
vessels. Guillermo was diagnosed with and died of colon cancer during the term of the
employment contract between him and Thenamaris. The Labor Arbiter awarded death
benefits, reimbursement of medical expenses, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA’s Decision. The private
respondent was not able to timely file a petition for certiorari but CA entertained such in
the interest of justice. Petitioner moved to dismiss due to the procedural infirmities. The
CA denied petitioners’ motion and, instead, gave private respondent one last opportunity
to fully comply with its Resolution by submitting clear and legible copies of the still lacking
pleadings within five days from notice thereof. Thus, the present Petition for Certiorari.

ISSUES:
(1) w/n CA committed a grave abuse of discretion when it noted the petition for
certiorari instead of dismissing outright for having been filed beyond the mandatory
and jurisdictional 60-day period required by section 4, rule 65 of the rules of court,
as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC
(2) w/n CA committed a grave abuse of discretion in ignoring the recent jurisprudence
which disallowed any motions for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari
under rule 65.

HELD:
(1) Yes. In Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc. we had the occasion to
settle the seeming conflict on various jurisprudence touching upon the issue of whether
the period for filing a petition for certiorari may be extended. In said case we stated that
the general rule, as laid down in Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, is that a
petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from
the order denying a motion for reconsideration. This is in accordance with the amendment
introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC where no provision for the filing of a motion for
extension to file a petition for certiorari exists, unlike in the original Section 4 of Rule 65
which allowed the filing of such a motion but only for compelling reason and in no case

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 821
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
exceeding 15 days. Under exceptional cases, the 60-day period may be extended subject
to the court’s sound discretion.

There are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most
persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of
the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the
default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the
case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by
the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal
and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial
justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound
discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances.1âwphi1Thus, there
should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or
meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.

(2) Yes. Private respondent’s motion for extension should have been denied
outright. Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most
mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end
to litigation and the parties’ right to due process. In numerous cases, this Court has
allowed liberal construction of the rules when to do so would serve the demands of
substantial justice and equity. Here, even assuming that the late filing of the petition
would merit relaxation of the rules, the CA’s resolution would have only been acceptable
had private respondent shown respect for the rules by submitting a petition for certiorari
which is sufficient in form. In contrast, what private respondent filed was a petition
plagued by several infirmities. Worse, when the CA allowed petitioner to cure the
deficiencies, she failed to fully comply such that she had to be given, albeit undeservingly,
one last chance to submit the still lacking copies of the pertinent pleadings required of her
by the CA. More importantly, the CA should have dismissed the petition outright in view of
the fact that the Resolution of the NLRC denying private respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration had already become final and executory.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 822
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
FIL-PRIDE SIDPPING COMPANY, INC., CAPTAIN NICOLAS T. DOLLOLASA and
OCEAN EAGLE SIDPMANAGEMENT COMPANY, PTE.LTD. vs. EDGAR A.
BALASTA
G.R. No. 193047 March 3, 2014

DOCTRINE: The company-designated physician must arrive at a definite assessment of


the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240 days,
pursuant to Article 192 (c)(l) of the Labor Code and Rule X, Section 2 of the Amended
Rules on Employees Compensation (AREC). If he fails to do so and the seafarer's
medical condition remains unresolved, the latter shall be deemed totally and permanently
disabled. On the other hand, an employee's disability becomes permanent and total even
before the lapse of the statutory 240-day treatment period, when it becomes evident that
the employee's disability continues and he is unable to engage in gainful employment
during such period because, for instance, he underwent surgery and it evidently appears
that he could not recover therefrom within the statutory period.

FACTS:

Edgar A. Balasta was hired by petitioner Fil-Pride Shipping Company, Inc. for its
foreign principal, Ocean Eagle Ship Management Company, PTE. Ltd. While aboard the
vessel, respondent experienced chest pains, fatigue, and shortness of breath. He was
examined by a physician in Gangyou Hospital in Tianjin, China, and was diagnosed as
having myocardial ischemia and coronary heart disease. He was declared unfit for duty
and was recommended for repatriation. Respondent was thus repatriated and was
immediately referred to the company-designated physician, Dr. Cruz. His medical report
indicated that respondent was diagnosed with severe 3-vessel coronary artery disease.
He was scheduled for coronary artery bypass surgery. On his own initiative, respondent
underwent coronary angiogram at the St. Luke’s Medical Center before the bypass
surgery. Dr. Vicaldo issued a medical certificate which stated among others that he was
already unfit to resume work as seaman in any capacity. His illness was considered work
aggravated/related. Respondent filed a claim for permanent disability benefits with
petitioners but it was denied. Respondent filed against the petitioners a complaint with the
labor arbiter for the recovery of disability benefits, illness allowance, reimbursement of
medical expenses, damages and attorney’s fees. The labor arbiter ordered respondents
to pay him disability benefit and attorney’s fees. NLRC, however, reversed such order and
declared that respondent’s illness – atherosclerosis/coronary artery disease – was not
work-connected. On appeal, CA reinstated the LA’s ruling. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:

w/n the respondent may receive disability compensation

HELD:
Yes. Regarding the issue of compensability, it has been the Court’s consistent
ruling that in disability compensation, "it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather
it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one’s earning

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 823
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
capacity."Moreover, "the list of illnesses/diseases in Section 32-Adoes not preclude other
illnesses/diseases not so listed from being compensable. The POEA-SEC cannot be
presumed to contain all the possible injuries that render a seafarer unfit for further sea
duties."Just the same, in several cases, cardiovascular disease, coronary artery disease,
as well as other heart ailments were held to be compensable. Likewise, petitioners failed
to refute respondent’s allegations in his Position Paper that he was exposed to hazardous
tasks and chemicals at work.

The company-designated physician must arrive at a definite assessment of the


seafarer’s fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240 days,
pursuant to Article 192 (c)(1) of the Labor Code and Rule X, Section 2 of the AREC.If he
fails to do so and the seafarer’s medical condition remains unresolved, the latter shall be
deemed totally and permanently disabled. The period September 18, 2005 to April 19,
2006 is less than the statutory 240-day – or 8-month – period. Nonetheless, it is
impossible to expect that by May 19, 2006, or on the last day of the statutory 240-day
period, respondent would be declared fit to work when he recently underwent coronary
artery bypass graft surgery. Respondent would not have sufficiently recovered. In other
words, it became evident as early as April 19, 2006 that respondent was permanently and
totally disabled, unfit to return to work as seafarer and earn therefrom, given his delicate
post-operative condition; a definitive assessment by Dr. Cruz before May 19, 2006 was
unnecessary. Respondent would to all intents and purposes still be unfit for sea-duty.
Even then, with Dr. Cruz’s failure to issue a definite assessment of respondent’s condition
on May 19, 2006, or the last day of the statutory 240-day period, respondent was thus
deemed totally and permanently disabled pursuant to Article 192 (c)(1) of the Labor Code
and Rule X, Section 2 of the AREC.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 824
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY -PHILIPPINES vs. WESLEYAN
UNIVERSITY-PHILIPPINES FACULTY and STAFF ASSOCIATION
G.R. No. 181806. March 12, 2014.

DOCTRINE:When the provision of the CBA is clear, leaving no doubt on the intention of
the parties, the literal meaning of the stipulation shall govern. However, if there is doubt
in its interpretation, it should be resolved in favor of labor, as this is mandated by no less
than the Constitution.

FACTS:
In December 2003, petitioner Wesleyan University-Philippines andRespondent
Wesleyan University-Philippines Faculty and Staff Association the parties signed a
5-year CBAeffective June 1, 2003 until May 31, 2008. The respondentis a duly registered
labor organizationacting as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file
faculty and staff employees of petitioner.On August 16, 2005, petitioner, through its
President, Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya, issued a Memorandumproviding guidelines on the
implementation of vacation and sick leave credits as well as vacation leave
commutation. On August 25, 2005, respondent’s President, Cynthia L. De Lara wrote a
letterto Atty. Maglaya informing him that respondent is not amenable to the unilateral
changes made by petitioner.De Lara questioned the guidelines for being violative of
existing practices and the CBA. Labor Management Committee (LMC) Meeting was held
during which petitioner advised respondent to file a grievance complaint on the
implementation of the vacation and sick leave policy.In the same meeting, petitioner
announced its plan of implementing a one-retirement policy,which was unacceptable to
respondent. Unable to settle their differences at the grievance level,the parties referred
the matter to a Voluntary Arbitrator. Itrendered a Decisiondeclaring the one-retirement
policy and the Memorandum dated August 16, 2005 contrary to law.Aggrieved, petitioner
appealed the case to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court. The CA rendered a Decisionfinding the rulings of the Voluntary Arbitrator
supportedby substantial evidence. It also affirmed the nullification of the one-retirement
policy and the Memorandum dated August 16, 2005 on the ground that these unilaterally
amended the CBA without the consent of respondent. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but the same wasdenied by the CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
WON the Memorandum dated Aug. 16, 2005 is contrary to the existing CBA.

HELD:
Yes. Sections 1 and 2 of Article XII of the CBA provide that all covered employees
are entitled to 15 days sick leave and 15 days vacation leave with pay every year and
that after the second year of service, all unused vacation leave shall be converted to
cash and paid to the employee at the end of each school year, not later than August 30
of each year. The Memorandum dated August 16, 2005, however, states that vacation
and sick leave credits are not automatic as leave credits would be earned on a
month-to-month basis. This, in effect, limits the available leave credits of an employee at
the start of the school year. For example, for the first four months of the school year or

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 825
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
from June to September, an employee is only entitled to five days vacation leave and five
days sick leave.Considering that the Memorandum dated August 16, 2005imposes a
limitation not agreed upon by the parties nor stated in the CBA, we agree with the CA
that it must be struck down. In closing, it may not be amiss to mention that when the
provision of the CBA is clear, leaving no doubt on the intention of the parties, the literal
meaning of the stipulation shall govern.However, if there is doubt in its interpretation, it
should be resolved in favor of labor,as this is mandatedby no less than the Constitution.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 826
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
AVELINO S. ALILIN, TEODORO CALESA, CHARLIE HINDANG, EUTIQUIO
GINDANG, ALLAN SUNGAHID, MAXIMO LEE, JOSE G. MORATO, REX GABILAN,
and EUGEMA L. LAURENTE vs. PETRON CORPORATION
G.R. No. 177592. June 9, 2014.

DOCTRINE:Generally, the contractor is presumed to be a labor-only contractor, unless


such contractor overcomes the burden of proving that it has the substantial capital,
investment, tools and the like.

FACTS:
In 1968, Romualdo D. Gindang Contractor, which was owned and operated by
Romualdo D. Gindang (Romualdo), started recruiting laborers for fielding to Petron’s
Mandaue Bulk Plant. When Romualdo died in 1989, his son Romeo D. Gindang
(Romeo), through Romeo D. Gindang Services (RDG), took over the business and
continued to provide manpower services to Petron. Petitioners were among those
recruited by Romualdo D. Gindang Contractor and RDG to work in the premises of the
said bulk plant. On June 1, 2000, Petron and RDG entered into a Contract for
Servicesfor the period from June 1, 2000 to May 31, 2002, whereby RDG undertook to
provide Petron with janitorial, maintenance, tanker receiving, packaging and other utility
services in its Mandaue Bulk Plant. This contract was extended on July 31, 2002 and
further extended until September 30, 2002. Upon expiration thereof, no further renewal
of the service contract was done. October 16, 2002, petitioners Alilin, Calesa, Hindang,
Gindang, Sungahid, Lee, Morato and Gabilan filed a Complaintfor illegal dismissal,
underpayment of wages, damages and attorney’s fees against Petron and RDG on
November 12, 2002. Petitioner Laurente filed another Complaintfor illegal dismissal,
underpayment of wages, nonpayment of overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for
holiday, rest day, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, allowances, separation
pay, retirement benefits, damages and attorney’s fees against Petron and RDG. The
said complaints were later consolidated. The Labor Arbiter declared them to have been
illegally dismissed. The NLRC ruled that petitioners are Petron’s regular employees
because they are performing job assignments which are germane to its main
business.Petron filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or writ of injunction before the CA. The said court resolved to grant the
injunction. The CA found no employer-employee relationship between the parties.

ISSUE:
WON RDG is a legitimate contractor.

HELD:
No. Petron failed to discharge the burden of proving that RDG is a legitimate
contractor. Hence , the presumption that RDG is a labor-only contractor stands.In sum,
the Court finds that RDG is a labor-only contractor. As such, it is considered merely as
an agent of Petron. Consequently, the employer-employee relationship which the Court
finds to exist in this case is between petitioners as employees and Petron as their
employer. Petron therefore, being the principal employer and RDG, being the

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 827
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
labor-onlycontractor, are solidarily liable for petitioners’ illegal dismissal and monetary
claims.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 828
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LIBCAP MARKETING CORP., CELIZ, and MONDRAGON vs. BAQUIAL
G.R. No. 192011, June 30, 2014
DOCTRINE: The law and jurisprudence, on the other hand, allow the award of nominal
damages in favor of an employee in a case where a valid cause for dismissal exists but
the employer fails to observe due process in dismissing the employee.
FACTS:
Lanny Jean B. Baquial (respondent) was employed by Libcap as accounting clerk for
Libcap’s Super Express branch in Cagayan de Oro City. An audit showed that
respondent made a double reporting of a single deposit. She claimed she deposited with
the bank two separate amounts of ₱1,437.00 each, but that it appears that both separate
deposits were covered by a single bank validation, which defect should not be blamed on
her but on the bank. On verification with PS Bank, its branch head confirmed that only a
single deposit made, and that there was no misposting or deposits to other accounts of
the same amount made on such date.
Baguial received a Notice of Terminationstating that she was terminated from
employment for dishonesty, embezzlement, inefficiency, and for commission of acts
inconsistent with Libcap’s work standards. Respondent filed a labor complaint for illegal
dismissal against petitioners. The Labor Arbiter held that respondent was dismissed for
just cause, but the dismissal was ineffectual as she was deprived of procedural due
process; it was error for Libcap to schedule the investigation at its Iloilo office when it
could very well have held it in Cagayan de Oro City. Both petitioners and respondent
appealed to the NLRC which dismissed both their appeals and affirmed the Labor
Arbiter’s decision. The CA affirmed the NLRC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is entitled to nominal damages due to illegal
dismissal
HELD:
Yes.
Petitioners claim that respondent is not entitled to financial assistance given that
she is guilty of theft or embezzlement. The law and jurisprudence, on the other hand,
allow the award of nominal damages in favor of an employee in a case where a valid
cause for dismissal exists but the employer fails to observe due process in dismissing
the employee.Financial assistance is granted as a measure of equity or social justice,
and is in the nature or takes the place of severance compensation. While it is correct to
conclude that there was valid cause for dismissal considering that respondent did not
contest the NLRC or CA findings to such effect through an appropriate appeal or petition,
the only issue that remains to be tackled is the correctness of the award of nominal
damages.
Petitioners claim that respondent is not entitled to financial assistance given that
she is guilty of theft or embezzlement. The law and jurisprudence, on the other hand,

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 829
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
allow the award of nominal damages in favor of an employee in a case where a valid
cause for dismissal exists but the employer fails to observe due process in dismissing
the employee.Financial assistance is granted as a measure of equity or social justice,
and is in the nature or takes the place of severance compensation.
On the other hand, nominal damages "may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right
has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or
recognizing that right, and not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
Its award is thus not for the purpose of indemnification for a loss but for the recognition
and vindication of a right."The amount of nominal damages to be awarded the employee
is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into consideration the relevant
circumstances.Nominal damages are awarded for the purpose of vindicating or
recognizing a right and not for indemnifying a loss. Hence, the CA should have limited
the justification of the award of nominal damages to petitioners’ violation of respondent’s
right to due process in effecting her termination. It should not have considered the
claimed unpaid overtime pay.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 830
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
AMECOS INNOVATIONS, INC. and ANTONIO F. MATEO vs. LOPEZ
G.R. No.178055, July 2, 2014
DOCTRINE: Article 217(a)(4) of the Labor Code bestows upon the Labor Arbiter
original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from
employer-employee relations.
FACTS:
Amecossent a demand letter to Eliza Lopez (respondent) for ₱27,791.65
representing her share in the SSS contributions and expenses for processing, but to no
avail. Thus, petitioners filed the instant Complaint for sum of money and damages
against respondent. Respondent filed her Answer with Motion to Dismissclaiming that
she was formerly an employee of Amecos until her illegal dismissal; that Amecos
deliberately failed to deduct and remit her SSS contributions; and that petitioners filed
the instant Complaint in retaliation to her filing of an illegal dismissal case. Respondent
also averred that the regular courts do not have jurisdiction over the instant case as it
arose out of their employer-employee relationship.The MeTC dismissed the case. The
RTC affirmed the view taken by the MeTC that under Article 217(a)(4) of the Labor
Code,claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from
employer-employee relationship are under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters or the
National Labor Relations Commission. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. Amecos
argue that their Complaint is one for recovery of a sum of money and damages based on
the Civil Code; that their cause of action is based on solutioindebitior unjust enrichment,
which arose from respondent’s misrepresentation that there was no need to enroll her
with the SSS as she was concurrently employed by another and that she was
self-employed as well. They argue that the employer-employee relationship between
Amecos and respondent is merely incidental.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Labor Code should apply or the Civil Code should apply
HELD:
This Court holds that as between the parties, Article 217(a)(4) of the Labor Code is
applicable. Said provision bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original and exclusive
jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations. The
observation that the matter of SSS contributions necessarily flowed from the
employer-employee relationship between the parties – shared by the lower courts and
the CA – is correct. Petitioners’ claims should have been referred to the labor tribunals.
Since Amecos did not remit respondent’s full SSS contributions, the latter was never
covered by and protected under the System. If she was never covered by the System,
certainly there is no sense in making her answerable for the required contributions during
the period of her employment. In this connection, it is noteworthy to state that "the Labor
Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by labor laws, but also
damages governed by the Civil Code."

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 831
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ICO vs. SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE, INC., JACOB and FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 185100, July 9, 2014
DOCTRINE: When another employee is soon after appointed to a position which the
employer claims has been abolished, while the employee who had to vacate the same is
transferred against her will to a position which does not exist in the corporate structure,
there is evidently a case of illegal constructive dismissal.
FACTS:
Respondents Monico V. Jacob (Jacob) and Peter K. Fernandez (Fernandez) are STI
officers, the former being the President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the latter
Senior Vice-President.Petitioner Girly G. Ico, a master’s degree holder with doctorate
units earned, was hired as Faculty Member by STI College Makati Inc. She was
promoted to the position of Chief Operating Officer (COO) of STI-Makati. She
concurrently served as STI-Makati School Administrator.During petitioner’s stint as COO
and School Administrator of STI-Makati, a Plan of Mergerwas executed between STI and
STI College Makati (Inc.), whereby the latter would be absorbed by STI.
A Memorandumwas issued by STI Human Resources Division Head cancelling
her COO assignment at STI-Makati, citing management’s decision to undertake an
"organizational restructuring" in line with the merger of STI and STI-Makati. Petitioner
received another Memorandumthis time stating that charges havealready been filed
against her allegedly "based on the Audit Findings",without informing petitioner of the
particulars of the charges or the results of the audit. Ico then received a notice of
termination signed by Jacob.
She then filed with NLRC a labor case against herein respondents, Fabul and
Briones alleging illegal constructive dismissal and illegal suspension, and that during her
stint as COO of STI-Makati and up to her transfer and appointment as Compliance
Manager, she was discriminated against and unfairly treated by respondents; that she
was denied the salary corresponding to the COO position. The Labor Arbiter ruled in her
favor.
On appeal, the respondents argued that petitioner was merely "laterally
transferred" to the School Compliance Group as Compliance Manager, and was not
demoted in rank; nor did she suffer a diminution in her salary and benefits, as the
positions of STI-Makati COO and Compliance Manager are equivalent in rank under the
STI structure. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. The CA affirmed the
NLRC’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the transfer of the position of petitioner amounts to constructive
dismissal

HELD:
Yes.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 832
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work because ‘continued
employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a
demotion in rank or a diminution in pay’ and other benefits. Aptly called a dismissal in
disguise or anact amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not,
constructive dismissal may, likewise, exist if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility,
or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it
could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment. In cases
of a transfer of an employee, the rule is settled that the employer is charged with the
burden of proving that its conduct and action are for valid and legitimate grounds such as
genuine business necessity and that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient or
prejudicial to the employee. If the employer cannot overcome this burden of proof, the
employee’s transfer shall be tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal. When
another employee is soon after appointed to a position which the employer claims has
been abolished, while the employee who had to vacate the same is transferred against
her will to a position which does not exist in the corporate structure, there is evidently a
case of illegal constructive dismissal.
Fernandez threatened petitioner, that if she pushed him further, she would suffer
the fate of a former employee who was separated fromSTI without the benefit of clearing
his name. In other words, she could find herself without a job at STI even before her
innocence or guilt could be established. It can be seen that petitioner’s fate in STI was a
foregone conclusion. She was threatened to accept her fate or else she would find
herself without work, either through dismissal or forced resignation. Evidently, she
became the subject of an illegal constructive dismissal in the guise of a transfer.Since
the position of STI-Makati COO was never abolished, it follows that petitioner should
bereinstated to the very same position.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 833
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ROYALE HOMES MARKETING CORPORATION vs. ALCANTARA
G.R. No. 195190, July 28, 2014
DOCTRINE: As long as the level of control does not interfere with the means and
methods of accomplishing the assigned tasks, the rules imposed by the hiring party on
the hired party do not amount to the labor law concept of control that is indicative of
employer-employee relationship.
FACTS:
Royale Homes appointed Alcantara as its Marketing Director for a fixed period of
one year. Royale Homes reappointed him for several consecutive years, the last of
which he held the position of Division 5 Vice-President-Sales. Alcantara filed a
Complaint for Illegal Dismissalagainst Royale Homes. He alleged that he is a regular
employee of Royale Homes since he is performing tasks that are necessary and
desirable to its business’ and that petitioner gave him ₱1.2 million for the services he
rendered to it. However, the executive officers of Royale Homes told him that they were
wondering why he still had the gall to come to office and sit at his table;and that the acts
of the executive officers of Royale Homes amounted to his dismissal from work without
any valid or just cause and in gross disregard of the proper procedure for dismissing
employees.
Royale Homes denied that Alcantara is its employee. It argued that it engaged his
services as an independent sales contractorfor a fixed term of one year only. He never
received any salary, 13th month pay, overtime pay or holiday pay from Royale Homes as
hewas paid purely on commission basis. They had no control on how Alcantara would
accomplish his tasks and responsibilities as he was free to solicit sales at any time and
by any manner which he may deem appropriateand necessary. He is even free to recruit
his own sales personnel to assist him in pursuance of his sales target.
They alleged that: a. Alcantara decided to leave the company after his wife, who
was once connected with it as a sales agent, had formed a brokerage company that
directly competed with its business, and even recruited some of its sales agents; and b.
Alcantara announced publicly and openly that he would leave the company and that he
would no longer finish the unexpired term of his contract. He has decided to join his wife
and pursue their own brokerage business.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision holding that Alcantara is an employee of
Royale Homes with a fixed-term employment period. The NLRC ruled that Alcantara is
not an employee but a mere independent contractor of Royale Homes. The CA reversed
the NLRC’s Decision. Applying the four-fold and economic reality tests, it held that
Alcantara is an employee of Royale Homes. Royale Homes exercised some degree of
control over Alcantara since his job, as observed by the CA, is subject to company rules,
regulations, and periodic evaluations. He was also bound by the company code of ethics.
Moreover, the exclusivity clause of the contract has made Alcantara economically
dependent on Royale Homes, supporting the theory that he is an employee of said
company.
ISSUE:

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 834
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Whether or not Alcantara is an employee of Royal Homes
HELD:
No. Applying the four-fold test in determining whether an employer-employee
relationship exists, the Court concludes that not every form of control is indicative of
employer-employee relationship.A person who performs work for another and is
subjected to its rules, regulations, and code of ethics does not necessarily become an
employee. A person who performs work for another and is subjected to its rules,
regulations, and code of ethics does not necessarily become an employee.As long as
the level of control does not interfere with the means and methods of accomplishing the
assigned tasks, the rules imposed by the hiring party on the hired party do not amount to
the labor law concept of control that is indicative of employer-employee
relationship.Alcantarafailed to cite specificrules, regulations or codes of ethics that
supposedly imposed control on his means and methods of soliciting sales and dealing
with prospective clients. On the other hand, this case is replete with instances that
negate the element of control and the existence of employer-employee relationship.
Notably, Alcantara was not required to observe definite working hours. Except for
soliciting sales, RoyaleHomes did not assign other tasks to him. He had full control over
the means and methods of accomplishing his tasks as he can "solicit sales at any time
and by any manner which [he may] deem appropriate and necessary." He performed his
tasks on his own account free from the control and direction of Royale Homes in all
matters connected therewith, except as to the results thereof.Neither does the repeated
hiring of Alcantara prove the existence of employer-employee relationship.Neither does
the repeated hiring of Alcantara prove the existence of employer-employee relationship.
The absence of control over the means and methodsdisproves employer-employee
relationship. The continuous rehiring of Alcantara simply signifies the renewal of his
contract with Royale Homes, and highlights his satisfactory services warranting the
renewal of such contract.
The element of payment of wages is also absent in thiscase. As provided in the
contract, Alcantara’s remunerations consist only of commission override of 0.5%, budget
allocation, sales incentive and other forms of company support. There is no proof that he
received fixed monthly salary. No payslip or payroll was ever presented and there is no
proof that Royale Homes deducted from his supposed salary withholding tax or that it
registered him with the Social Security System, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation,
or Pag-Ibig Fund. All of these indicate an independent contractual relationship.Besides, if
Alcantara indeed consideredhimself an employee of Royale Homes, then he, an
experienced and professional broker, would have complained that he was being denied
statutorily mandated benefits.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 835
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC.v. VICTOR M. CREER III
G.R. No. 181921, September 17, 2014
DOCTRINE: The oft repeated rule is that whoever claims entitlement to the benefits
provided by law should establish his or her right thereto by substantial evidence.
FACTS:
On April 4, 2001, InterOrient hired Victor as Galley Boy on board the vessel M/V
MYRTO owned by Calidero Shipping Company, Ltd.for a period of nine months, which
may be extended for three more months upon mutual consent of the parties. Victor was
required to work 48 hours a week, with a basic monthly salary of US$235.00 and
US$94.00 fixed overtime pay per month.Prior to embarkation, Victor went through the
requisite Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) and was declared fit for sea
duty.As 2nd Cook, Victor was tasked to get provisions from the cold storage which is kept
at its coldest temperature to maintain freshness of the food stored therein. He would do
this either immediately before or after his exposure to intense heat in the galley.On May
9, 2002, Victor arrived in Manila. The following day, he reported to the office of
InterOrient and informed the company about the pain he experienced while he was on
board. Victor averred that InterOrient merely advised him to consult a doctor without
giving him any doctor’s referral. He did, however, sign a Receipt and Release where he
acknowledged receipt of the full payment of his monetary entitlements under the
employment contract. Dr. Fernando G. Ayuyao found Victor to be suffering from
Community-Acquired Pneumonia 1 and Bronchial Asthma. But when he consulted
another doctor, a certain Dr. Purugganan from Citihealth Diagnostic Center on June 5,
2003, it was found out that he had far-advanced pulmonary tuberculosis.Victor
contended that during the course of his treatment, he regularly informed InterOrient of
his sickness. However, he was neither apprised of his rights to nor paid sickness
allowance amounting to US$940.00 as mandated in the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA) 2000. In its Position Paper, InterOrient negated Victor’s
claim for disability benefits averring that the same has no factual, contractual or legal
basis. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC affirmed in toto the decision of NLRC. CA
reversed the decision of NLRC.
ISSUE/S:
Whether InterOrient can be held accountable for Victor’s disease even if the same
was diagnosed 11 months after he disembarked from the vessel upon the termination of
his employment contract.

HELD:
The Petition is impressed with merit.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 836
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
As a rule, this Court is not a trier of facts and only questions of law may be raised in
petitions brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, the Court is
constrained to decide factual issues in exceptional cases, one of which is when there is
conflict between the findings and position of the CA, on one hand, and that of the
quasi-judicial bodies, on the other as in this case.We are not persuaded by Victor’s
contention. It must be stressed that his repatriation was not due to any medical reasons
but because his employment contract had already expired. Other than his self-serving
allegation that he experienced pain while on board, he was not able to substantiate the
same. Victor’s illness is not compensable.or an illness to be compensable, Section
20(B)(6)29 of the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels (2000 Amended
Standard Terms and Conditions), deemed incorporated in the POEA Contract, requires
the concurrence of two elements: first, that the illness must be work-related; and second,
that the work-related illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer’s
employment contract, both requirements are not present in this case.
SECTION 32-A OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES
For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied:

1. The seafarer’s work must involve the risks describe herein;


2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s exposure to the describe[d]
risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors
necessary to contract it;
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer. Victor miserably failed
to comply with these conditions.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 837
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MAGSAYSAY MITSUI OSK MARINE, INC. and/or MOL TANKSHIP MANAGEMENT
(ASIA) PTE LTD. vs. JUANITO G. BENGSON*
G.R. No. 198528 October 13, 2014

DOCTRINE: The company-designated physician must issue a disability assessment;


absence of such will result in the permanent and total disability classification of an
employee
.
FACTS:
Since the year 1986 Juanito G. Bengson has been working as a seafarer for
Magsaysay Mitsui OSK Marine, Inc. (Magsaysay, Inc.). On August 7, 2007, at the age of
45, Respondent entered into his 22nd contract of employment with Magsaysay, Inc. for
and in behalf of its foreign principal MOL Tankship Management (Asia) Pte., Ltd., as a
Third Mate Officer on board the vessel "KN TRADER". Prior to his deployment, he
underwent and passed the Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) and was
found to be "fit for sea duty" on August 11, 2007. Thereafter, [Bengson] boarded the ship
and performed his assigned tasks.
On October 5, 2007, after doing his usual duties on board the vessel, [Bengson]
suddenly experienced difficulty in breathing and numbness on half of his body. Thinking
that it was caused by fatigue, he rested for a while. On October 7, 2007, [Bengson] was
brought to the Neurological Department of the Izola General Hospital in Slovenia where
he was confined for three days. While in the hospital, [Bengson] had partial paralysis of
the right hand and a minor partial paralysis of the right leg. He was repatriated on
October 21, 2007.
On November 4, 2007, Dr. Agbayani issued an Initial Out-Patient Consult Report
which stated that [Bengson’s] illness of "hematoma in the cranium" was not work-related.

ISSUE:
Whether Bengson’s illness – which petitioners claim and admit to be hypertensive
cardio-vascular disease (HCVD) is an occupational disease.

HELD:
Having worked for petitioners since 1988 under employment contracts that were
continuously renewed, it can be said that respondent spent much of his productive years
with petitioners; his years of service certainly took a toll on his body, and he could not
have contracted his illness elsewhere except while working for petitioners.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 838
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
GOODYEAR PHILIPPINES, INC. and REMEGIO M. RAMOS vs. MARINA L. ANGUS
G.R. No. 185449 November 12, 2014

DOCTRINE: Early retirement benefits and separation pay can be received by an


employee in the absence of an agreement to the contrary.

FACTS:
Angus was employed by Goodyear on November 16, 1966 and occupied the
position of Secretary to the Manager of Quality and Technology. In order to maintain the
viability of its operations in the midst of economic reversals, Goodyear implemented
cost-saving measures which included the streamlining of its workforce. Angus was
terminated from employment. The company offered him to pay separation benefits but
Angus was determined to received both early retirement pay and separation pay. She
filed a case against Goodyear in the Labor Arbiter, which rendered the decision that she
cannot received both retirement benefits and separation pay. Which was affirmed by the
NLRC but was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Angus can receive both Separation pay and retirement benefits.

HELD:
Yes, Angus is entitled to both separation pay and early retirement benefit due to
the absence of a specific provision in the CBA prohibiting recovery of both.
In Aquino v. National Labor Relations Commission, citing Batangas Laguna Tayabas
Bus Company v. Court of Appeals and University of the East v. Hon. Minister of
Labor, the Court held that an employee is entitled to recover both separation pay and
retirement benefits in the absence of a specific prohibition in the Retirement Plan or
CBA.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 839
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEAK VENTURES CORPORATION and/or EL TIGRE SECURITY and
INVESTIGATION AGENCY vs. HEIRS OF NESTOR B. VILLAREAL
G.R. No. 184618 November 19, 2014

DOCTRINE: An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to the twin relief of (a) either
reinstatement or separation pay, if reinstatement is no longer viable, and (b) back wages.
The award of one does not bar the other.

FACTS:
On June 16, 1989, Peak Ventures, the owner/operator of El Tigre, hired Villareal
as security guard and assigned him at East Greenhills Village. On May 14, 2002,
however, he was relieved from duty without any apparent reason. Villareal was later
informed by the management that he would no longer be given any assignment because
of his age. At that time, he was 42. His repeated requests for a new posting during the
months of June and July of 2002 were likewise declined. Villareal was constrained to
claim his security bond deposits from petitioners. However, he was advised to first tender
a letter of resignation before the samecould be released to him. Out of sheer necessity,
Villareal submitted a letter of resignation. He stated therein that he was constrained to
resign effective July 31, 2002 since he cannot expect to be given any assignment for
another one and a half months and that he can no longer afford the fare going to
petitioners’ office. Villareal alleged that the tenor of his resignation letter was not
acceptable to petitioners, who required him to submit another one stating that his
resignation is voluntary.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the respondent is entitled to backwages and or reinstatement.

HELD:
Respondent is entitled to back wages from the time he was relieved from duty up
to the time he was reinstated and not from the time he submitted his resignation letter.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 840
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs.
AURELIA Y. CALUMPIANO
G.R. No. 196102 November 26, 2014

DOCTRINE: It is not necessary that there be proof of causal relation between the work
and the illness which resulted in the respondent’s disability.

FACTS:
On March 7, 2002, shortly before her retirement, [respondent] filed before the
Supreme Court, an application for disability retirement on account of her ailment[s],
Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease [and] Acute Angle Closure Glaucoma. To bolster
her claim, [respondent] submitted the medical certificates issued by her attending
physicians, Dr. Alfred I. Lim and Dr. Elmer Montes, both of whom are Ophthalmologists
at Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital. She submitted them together with the results of
her perimetry test. On September 30, 2002, the Supreme Court approved [respondent’s]
application for disability retirement, The GSIS together with Employee compensation
commission disallowed her benefits on account that there is no direct relation between
her illness and her work.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the illness of the employee is compensable.

HELD:
Yes, Cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are considered as
occupational diseases under Implementing Rules of P.D. No. 626, as amended. Thus, it
is not necessary that there be proof of causal relation between the work and the illness
which resulted in the respondent’s disability. The open-ended Table of Occupational
Diseases requires no proof of causation. However, although cerebro-vascular accident
and essential hypertension are listed occupational diseases, their compensability
requires compliance with all the conditions set forth in the Rules. For cerebro-vascular
accident, the claimant must prove the following: (1) there must be a history, which should
be proved, of trauma at work (to the head specifically) due to unusual and extraordinary
physical or mental strain or event, or undue exposure to noxious gases in industry; (2)
there must be a direct connection between the trauma or exertion in the course of the
employment and the cerebro-vascular attack; and (3) the trauma or exertion then and
there caused a brain hemorrhage. On the other hand, essential hypertension is
compensable only if it causes impairment of function of body organs like kidneys, heart,
eyes and brain, resulting in permanent disability, provided that, the following documents
substantiate it: (a) chest X-ray report; (b) ECG report; (c) blood chemistry report; (d)
funduscopy report; and (e) C-T scan.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 841
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE DELFIN DELA CRUZ, represented by his SPOUSE,
CARMELITA DELA CRUZ, vs. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC.,
represented by MR. CARLOS C. SALINAS and/or TECTO BELGIUM N.V.,
G.R. No. 196357. April 20, 2015

DOCTRINE: Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits provided by law should establish
his right to the benefits by substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally
reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise.

FACTS:
The LA rendered a Decision8 dated May 30, 2005 in favor of Delfin. The LA opined
that Delfin contracted his illness during the period of his employment with respondents
and that such illness is a compensable occupational disease. Hence, Delfin is entitled to
his claims. The 1996 POEA-SEC clearly provides that a seafarer must submit himself to a
post- employment medical examination within three days from his arrival in the
Philippines (mandatory reporting requirement) so that his claim for disability and sickness
allowance can prosper.

ISSUE:
The degree of evidence the claimant has to establish in order to be entitled with the
benefits provided by law.

HELD:
The only exception to this rule (1996 POEA-SEC) is when the seafarer is
physically incapacitated to do so, but there must be a written notice to the agency within
the same period of three days for the seaman to be considered to have complied with the
requirement. The court reiterates the rule that “whoever claims entitlement to the benefits
provided by law should establish his right to the benefits by substantial evidence” or “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise.”
Absent a showing thereof, any decision set forth will only be based on unsubstantiated
allegations. Accordingly, the Court cannot grant a claim for disability benefits without
adequate substantiation for to do so will offend due process. The foregoing jurisprudential
principle effectively shows that the burden of proving entitlement to disability benefits lies
on petitioners. Thus, they must establish that Delfin suffered or contracted his injury or
illness which resulted in his disability during the term of the employment contract. An
examination of the records, however, shows that petitioners failed to discharge such
burden.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 842
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LITEX GLASS AND ALUMINUM SUPPLY and/or RONALD ONG-SITCO, vs.
DOMINADOR B. SANCHEZ,
G.R. No. 198465. April 22, 2015.

DOCTRINE: Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Abandonment; Mere failure to


report for work after notice to return does not constitute abandonment.

FACTS:
Sanchez alleged that since 1994, he was employed as driver and aluminum
installer in several companies owned and managed by Ong-Sitco, the last of which was
with Litex. Since February 1996, Ong-Sitco had been remitting his Social Security System
(SSS) monthly contributions. Sanchez averred that he has no record of any work related
offense for which he has been reprimanded, suspended or warned and that for the past
15 years, he has been diligently serving his employer. He was thus surprised when on
December 23, 2008, Ong-Sitco and his wife scolded and threw insulting words and
invectives upon him and then ordered him to go on indefinite leave. Due to the incident,
he decided to just leave the work premises with the hope that the animosity between him
and his employer would eventually subside. On December 28, 2008, he went back to the
office to talk to Ong-Sitco, but the latter just ignored him. He again returned on January 2,
2009 to purportedly discuss his employment status, but Ong-Sitco was again unwilling to
talk to him. The same thing happened after he went back a week later. These, thus, led
Sanchez to file a case for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of benefits against petitioners

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sanchez is guilty of abandonment.

HELD:
The Court is not convinced that Sanchez abandoned his work. To constitute
abandonment, it is essential that an employee failed to report for work without any valid
and justifiable reason and that he had a clear intention to sever the employment
relationship by some overt act. Mere failure to report for work after notice to return does
not constitute abandonment. As mentioned, Sanchez reported back to Ong-Sitcoseveral
time to ask about his employment status but was not entertained. Oddly, while Ong-Sitco
did not deny this, he never bothered to explain why during these instances, he did not
warn Sanchez about his continued absence or ask him to return to work, if only to bolster
the claim that he was not dismissed. Instead, Ong-Sitco just ignored him and this, under
the circumstances, only shows his intention not to retain him. This is further bolstered by
the fact, as shown by the records, that the two memorandum-letters were sent to Sanchez
after he filed a complaint against petitioners. Clearly, Sanchez cannot be said to have
unjustifiably refused to return to work. He cannot be faulted from reasonably concluding
that the memorandum-letters were merely made in order to give semblance of validity to

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 843
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
his termination. In addition and as aptly observed by the CA, Sanchez’s immediate filing
of the complaint is proof of his desire to return to work. It has been held that the filing of a
complaint negates any intention of abandoning foregoing employment.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANGEL MATEO y JACINTO and VICENTA LAPIZ
y MEDINA
G.R. No. 198012. April 22, 2015.
DOCTRINE: Illegal Recruitment; Money is not material to a prosecution for illegal
recruitment considering that the definition of “illegal recruitment” under the law includes
the phrase “whether for profit or not.”
Estafa; Well-settled is the rule that a person convicted for illegal recruitment under the
law may, for the same acts, be separately convicted for estafa under Article 315, par.
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
FACTS:
Sometime during the period from January to March 1998, the five private
complainantsmet appellants on separate occasions at Plaza Ferguzon, Malate, Manila to
apply for overseas employment. Appellant Mateo, representing himself to have a tie-up
with some Japanese firms, promised them employment in Japan as conversion
mechanics, welders, or fitters for a fee. After the private complainants paid the required
fees ranging from P18,555.00 to P25,000.00, appellants failed to secure any overseas
employment for them. Appellants likewise failed to return private complainants’ money.
This prompted Manuel to go to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) where he was issued a Certification3 stating that appellants are not licensed to
recruit applicants for overseas employment.
For their defense, appellants proffered denials. Mateo claimed that he is a
legitimate car importer and not a recruiter, on the other hand, denied knowing any of the
private complainants whom she claimed to have met for the first time at the Prosecutor’s
Office.In their appeal before the CA, appellants essentially claimed that the prosecution
failed to prove the elements of the crimes for which they were charged. They contended
that Abel has not shown any receipt to prove that they received money from him; that
there is likewise no proof that Virgilio borrowed money from a friend of his aunt which
money he, in turn, gave to them; that the testimony of Emilio that appellants were holding
office inside the van of Abel cannot be easily accepted; and that their transactions with
Manuel and Victorio were limited to the processing of their travel documents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not proof of payment of money is an essential element of illegal
recruitment.

HELD:
No, Appellants’ argument that there was no proof that they received money from
the private complainants deserves no credence. Suffice it to say that money is not

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 845
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
material to a prosecution for illegal recruitment considering that the definition of “illegal
recruitment” under the law includes the phrase “whether for profit or not.” Besides, even
if there is no receipt for the money given by the privatecomplainants to appellants, the
former’s respective testimonies and affidavits clearly narrate the latter’s involvement in
the prohibited recruitment.
Anent the charge for estafa, “[w]ell-settled is the rule that a person convicted for
illegal recruitment under the [law] may, for the same acts, be separately convicted for
estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the [Revised Penal Code]. The elements of estafa
are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit;
and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation.”

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 846
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PETRON CORPORATION vs. ARMZ CABERTE, ANTONIO CABERTE, JR.,
MICHAEL SERVICIO, ARIEL DEVELOS, ADOLFO GESTUPA, ARCHIE PONTERAS,
ARNOLD BLANCO, DANTE MARIANO, VIRGILIO GALOROSA, and CAMILO TE
G.R. No. 182255. June 15, 2015.
DOCTRINE: The repeated and continuing need for the performance of the job is
sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability of the activity to the business.
A finding that a contractor is a ‘labor-only’ contractor is equivalent to declaring that there
is an employeremployee relationship between the principal and the employees of the
supposed contractor, and the ‘labor-only’ contractor is considered as a mere agent of the
principal, the real employer.
FACTS:
On various dates from 1979 to 1998, respondents were hired to work at Petron’s
Bacolod Bulk Plant in San Patricio, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental as LPG/Gasul
fillers, maintenance crew, warehousemen, utility workers and tanker receiving crew.For
the periods from March 1, 1996 to February 28, 1999 and November 1, 1996 to June 30,
1999, Petron and ABC, a labor contracting business owned and operated by Caberte
Sr., entered into a Contract for Services and a Contract for LPG Assistance
Services.Under both service contracts,ABC undertook to provide utility and maintenance
services to Petron in its Bacolod Bulk Plant.On July 2, 1999, respondents Caberte,
Caberte, Jr., Servicio, Develos, Gestupa, Ponteras, Blanco and Mariano filed before the
Labor Arbiter a Complaint9 for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and
nonpayment of allowances, 13th month pay, overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive
leave pay, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees against Petron, ABC and
Caberte, Sr., docketed as NLRC RAB VI Case No. 06-07-10588-99. Subsequently,
respondents Galorosa and Te separately filed similar Complaints10 docketed as NLRC
RAB VI Case No. 06-07-10675-99 and RAB Case No. 06-09-10785-99, respectively.
The three Complaints were consolidated in an Order11 dated October 25, 1999 of the
Labor Arbiter. Respondents averred that even before Petron engaged ABC as contractor
in 1996, most of them had already been working for Petron for years. However, every
time Petron engages a new contractor, it would designate such new contractor as their
employer. Despite such arrangement, Petron exercised control and supervision over
their work, the performance of which is necessary and desirable in its usual trade and
business. Respondents added that ABC is a mere labor-only contractor which had no
substantial capital and investment, and had no control over the manner and method on
how they accomplished their work. Thus, Petron is their true employer. On July 1, 1999,
however, Petron no longer allowed them to enter and work in the premises of itsBacolod
Bulk Plant. Hence, the complaints for illegal dismissal. On the other hand, Petron
asserted that ABC is an independent contractor which supplied the needed manpower
for the maintenance of its bulk handling premises and offices, as well as for tanker
assistance in the receiving and re-filling of its LPG products; that among the workers

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 847
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
supplied by ABC were respondents, except Caberte, Jr., who does not appear to be one
of those assigned by ABC to work for it; that it has no direct control and supervision over
respondents who were tasked to perform work required by the service contracts it
entered into with ABC; and, that it cannot allow the continuous employment of
respondents beyond the expiration of the contracts with ABC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship with the contractor
and the respondents.
HELD:
Yes, It is clear that Petron failed to discharge its burden of proving that ABC is not
a labor-only contractor. Consequently, and as warranted by the facts, the Court declares
ABC as a mere laboronly contractor. “A finding that a contractor is a ‘labor-only’
contractor is equivalent to declaring that there is an employeremployee relationship
between the principal and the employees of the supposed contractor, and the ‘labor-only’
contractor is considered as a mere agent of the principal, the real employer.” Accordingly
in this case, Petron is declared to be the true employer of respondents who are
considered regular employees in view of the fact that they have been regularly
performing activities which are necessary and desirable to the usual business of Petron
for a number of years.
Gestupa, Ponteras, Develos, Blanco and Mariano were LPG fillers and
maintenance crew; Caberte was an LPG operator supervisor; Te was a warehouseman
and utility worker; and Servicio and Galorosa were tanker receiving crew and utility
workers. Undoubtedly, the work they rendered were directly related to Petron’s main
business, vital as they are in the manufacture and distribution of petroleum products.
Besides, some of the respondents were already working for Petron even before it
engaged ABC as a contractor in 1996. Albeit it was made to appear that they were under
the different contractors that Petron engaged over the years, respondents have been
regularly performing the same tasks within the premises of Petron. This “the repeated
and continuing need for the performance of the job is sufficient evidence of the
necessity, if not indispensability of the activity to the business.”

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 848
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
BEDUYA VS. ACE PROMOTION AND MARKETING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 195513. June 22, 2015.
DOCTRINE: Supersedeas Bond; The filing of supersedeas bond for the perfection of an
appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional and failure to comply with this requirement
renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter (LA) final and executory.
The filing of a motion to reduce bond predicated on meritorious grounds coupled with the
posting of areasonable amount of cash or surety bond suffice to suspend the running of
the period within which to appeal.
FACTS:
In pursuance of its business, APMC entered into a Promotional Contract with Delfi
Marketing, Inc. (Delfi) whereby the former undertook to conduct promotional activities for
the latter’s confectionery products. For this purpose, APMC employed workers, including
petitioners as merchandisers and assigned them to various retail outlets and
supermarkets under fixed-term employment contracts. The last contracts of employment
that petitioners signed were until January 30, 2007. In a letter10 dated December 27,
2006, Delfi notified APMC that their Promotional Contract will expire effective January
31, 2007. On January 29, 2007, APMC informed petitioners, among other workers, that
their last day of work would be on January 30, 2007.
Before the Labor Arbiter, three separate complaints11 for illegal dismissal and
money claims against respondents were filed by petitioners and by other employees.
Respondents filed a Memorandum of Appeal with Motion for Reduction of Bond
with the NLRC. They maintained that complainants were contractual employees. As
such, their contracts of employment were terminated upon the expiration of APMC’s
Promotional Contract with Delfi. Anent their motion for reduction of appeal bond,
respondents contended that the awards granted to complainants amounting to
P6,269,856.89 should be decreased. In their Opposition with Motion to Dismiss Appeal,
complainants prayed for the dismissal of respondents’ appeal based on insufficiency of
the bond posted. This thusresulted in the non-perfection of the appeal, and
consequently, the Labor Arbiter’s Decision had become final and executor.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the filing of bond is mandatory and jurisdictional.
Whether or not the appeal to reduce bond is permissible and should be granted.
HELD:
Yes, It is thus clear from the foregoing that the filing of supersedeas bond for the
perfection of an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional and failure to comply with this
requirement renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory. However, this
Court, in many cases, has relaxed this stringent requirement whenever justified. Thus,

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 849
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
the rules, specifically Section 6 of Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules ofProcedure of the
NLRC, allows the reduction of the appeal bond subject to the conditions that: (1) the
motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable
amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant. Otherwise, the filing
of a motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
Still, the rule that the filing of a motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the
period to perfect an appeal is not absolute. The Court may relax the rule under certain
exceptional circumstances which include fundamental consideration of substantial
justice, prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment and special
circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits, and the amount and the issue
involved. Indeed, in meritorious cases, the Court was propelled to relax the requirements
relating to appeal bonds such as when there are valid issues raised in the appeal and in
the absence of any valid claims against the employer.
The Court finds no merit in petitioners’ contention that the NLRC failed to
establish its jurisdictional authority over respondents’ appeal. Again, the filing of a motion
to reduce bond predicated on meritorious grounds coupled with the posting of a
reasonable amount of cash or surety bond suffice to suspend the running of the period
within which to appeal. As discussed, respondents in this case have substantially
complied with these requirements and, on account thereof, their appeal from the Labor
Arbiter’s Decision was timely filed. Clearly, the NLRC was conferred with jurisdiction over
respondents’ appeal thus placing the same within the power of the said labor tribunal to
review.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 850
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
DOHLE-PHILMAN MANNING AGENCY, INC. VS. HEIRS OF ANDRES G.
GAZZINGAN
G.R. No. 199568. June 17, 2015.
DOCTRINE: Compensable Illness; Two (2) elements must concur for an injury or illness
of a seafarer to be compensable. First, the injury or illness must be work-related; and
second, x xx the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the
seafarer’s employment contract.
The 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment
Contract (POEA-SEC) has created a presumption of compensability for those illnesses
which are not listed as an occupational disease.
It is the company-designated physician’s findings which should form the basis of any
disability claim of the seafarer
The Supreme Court (SC) is inclined to rule that Gazzingan suffered from a permanent
total disability as he was unable to return to his regular job for more than one hundred
twenty (120) days.
FACTS:
In May 2006, while M/V Gloria was docked at the port of Cartagena, Colombia,
Gazzingan experienced chest pains. On July 16, 2006, he was confined at the
Cartagena de Indias Hospital due to chest pain, shortness of breath and back pain. The
hospital’s cardiovascular and thoracic surgeon, Dr. Hernan Fernandez Cuartas,
diagnosed him to have Acute Type-B Dissection.8 On August 3, 2006, Gazzingan was
medically repatriated.Upon arrival in Manila on August 5, 2006, Gazzingan was brought
directly to Manila Doctors Hospital for further medical evaluation under the care of Dr.
Justo Cammayo (Dr. Cammayo). On August 8, 2006, petitioners received a letter from its
company-designated physician, Dr. Raymond C. Banaga (Dr. Banaga), stating that
Gazzingan is suffering from a non-work-related illness.He was discharged from the
hospital over the objection of his physician. In a medical certificate Dr. Cammayo’s final
diagnosis of Gazzingan’s illness was Dissecting Aneurysm.Gazzingan filed a
Complaint12 for nonpayment or under payment of salaries/wages, sickness allowance,
disability benefits and reimbursement of medical expenses and attorney’s fees.
Petitioners disclaimed Gazzingan’s entitlement to his claims by arguing that his
medical condition is preexisting for which no compensation is warranted under the
POEASEC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents illness qualifies as a compensable illness.

HELD:

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Yes, “It is beyond cavil that it is the company-designated physician who is
entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman’s disability.” It is the
company-designated physician’s findings which should form the basis of any disability
claim of the seafarer. Such assessment is arrived at after the seafarer submits himself to
the company-designated physician for a postemployment medical examination within
three days from his repatriation. It is significant to note, however, that courts are not
bound by the assessment of the company-designated physician. While the
company-designated physician must declare the nature of a seafarer’s disability, the
former’s declaration is not conclusive and final upon the latter or the court. Its inherent
merit will still be weighed and duly considered.
Anent the nature of disability caused by his work-related illness, the Court notes
that Gazzingan was no longer provided work after being diagnosed with aortic
dissection/dissecting aneurysm. He was constrained to seek further medical attention at
his own expense and was continuously unable to work until his death. Thus, the Court
isinclined to rule that Gazzingan suffered from a permanent total disability as he was
unable to return to his regular job for more than one hundred twenty days. Accordingly,
his permanent total disability benefits should beUS$60,000.00 or 120% of
US$50,000.00, pursuant to the Schedule of Disability Allowances under the POEA-SEC.
The Labor Arbiter thus erred in fixing his disability benefits at US$50,000.00. As regards
sickness allowance, the award of US$1,300.00 for his incapacity to work for 120 days
was proper. The grant of attorney’s fees is likewise affirmed for being justified in
accordance with Article 2208(2) of the Civil Code since respondents were compelled to
litigate to satisfy their claims for Gazzingan’s disability benefits.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 852
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MALABUNGA, JR. VS. CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL CORPORATION
G.R. No. 198515. June 15, 2015.
DOCTRINE: Labor Law; Supreme Court; In labor cases, issues of fact are for the labor
tribunals to resolve, as the Supreme Court (SC) is not a trier of facts; Exceptions (See
Ruling)
FACTS:
On July 9, 2004, an inventory of respondent’s tools and items at the company
warehouse was made, and it was found that one aluminum level was issued to
respondent’s Fabrication Unit, and another to petitioner.On July 11, 2004, petitioner
returned an aluminum level to the warehouse. On July 24, 2004, respondent served a
written Notice upon petitioner, charging the latter with theft of the aluminum level issued
to its Fabrication Unit and requiring him to submit a written explanation. Petitioner was
suspended without pay from January 10, 2005 up to February 13, 2005. Thereafter, he
returned to work.
Petitioner filed a Complaint for illegal suspension before the NLRC NCR, Quezon City
which was denied. On appeal NLRC affirmed the previous decision. CA also affirmed the
decision.
Praying that the assailed CA dispositions be set aside and that the NLRC’s
February 27, 2009 Decision in NLRC CA Case No. 050647-06 be reinstated instead,
petitioner essentially maintains in the Petition and Reply that the evidence does not
support respondent’s claim that he is guilty of theft and that what he returned was the
Fabrication Unit’s aluminum level; that the witnesses’ statements are biased, self-serving
and intended to exonerate the declarants from liability for their negligence and failure to
secure the Fabrication Unit’s aluminum level both in the warehouse and in the
Fabrication Unit, thus making him a mere scapegoat; and that the witnesses’ statements
are doubtful, as they are uniformand were executed on the same date and notarized by
the same notary public.
In its Comment, respondent maintains that petitioner raises issues of fact which
are beyond the purview of a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner may raise issues of facts upon a petition for certiorari
to the supreme court.
HELD:
Yes, In labor cases, issues of fact are for the labor tribunals to resolve, as this
Court is not a trier of facts. However, in exceptional cases, this Court may be urged to
resolve factual issues: “[1] where there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence to support
the findings of the tribunal or the court below; or [2] when too much is concluded, inferred

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts submitted by the parties[;] or [3] where the
[Labor Arbiter] and the NLRC came up with conflicting positions.” “When there is a
divergence between the findings of facts of the labor tribunals and the CA, there is a
need to refer to the record.”

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
U-BIX CORPORATION and EDILBERTO B. BRAVOvs. VALERIE ANNE H. HOLLERO
G.R. No. 199660. July 13, 2015.*

DOCTRINE: It is a settled rule that “the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within
the period prescribed by law is, notonly mandatory, but jurisdictional, and failure to
conformto the rules will render the judgment sought to be reviewedfinal and
unappealable.”

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint against respondent for reimbursement of training
costs plus interest, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. On the
other hand, respondent filed against petitioners a complaint for illegal dismissal, unpaid
wages, backwages, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. The two
complaints were later on consolidated.
The Labor Arbiter found respondent’s dismissal to be valid; she was also ordered
to reimburse the amount spent by petitioners for her training
NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision. Finding respondent to have been
illegally dismissed, it awarded her backwages from the date of her dismissal up to the
date of the NLRC Decision and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement due to strained
relations.
Labor Arbiter Flores issued a Writ of Execution dated April 20, 2010.
Petitioners filed before the NLRC a Notice and Memorandum of Appeal. At the
same time, they posted a corresponding supersedeas bond issued by Mapfre Insular
Insurance Corporation (Mapfre). However, NLRC denied their appeal and held that the
supersedeas bond posted by petitioners has no force and effect.
In the CA, it found the supersedeas bond posted by Petitioners Mapfre’s authority
totransact business was limited only to Civil/Special cases and does not cover labor
cases.

ISSUE:
Whether the supersedeas bond is invalid considering that Mapfre failed to submit,
among others, any proof of security deposit or collateral

HELD:
The Court still finds that petitioners failed to comply with the bond requirement in
perfecting their appeal. (Refer to Article 223 of the Labor Code.)
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer
may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
In case of a surety bond, the applicable Section 6, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC requires that the same should be accompanied by
original
and certified true copies of the following:

xxx

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 855
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
c) proof of security deposit or collateral securing the bond; provided, that a check shall
not be considered as an acceptable security;

xxx

Here, petitioners did not submit any proof of security deposit or collateral securing the
bond. They themselves admit this in their Petition by stating that they no longer attached
a separate document of security deposit or collateral securing the bond because Mapfre
did not find it necessary to require them to give a security deposit and/or collateral.
According to them, Mapfre finds it sufficient that the Indemnity Agreement attached to
the Memorandum of Appeal was signed by petitioner Bravo, the president of petitioner
UBix, in his personal capacity.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 856
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
CENTENNIAL TRANSMARINE, INC. and/or MR. EDUARDO R. JABLA, CENTENNIAL
MARITIME SERVICES & M/V BONNIE SMITHWICKvs.PASTOR M. QUIAMBAO
G.R. No. 198096. July 8, 2015.*

DOCTRINE:“[T]he company designated physician is expected to arrive at a definite


assessment of the seafarer’s fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of
120 or 240 days. That should he fail to do so and the seafarer’s medical condition
remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled,”

FACTS:
Pastor boarded M/V Bonnie Smithwick on June 5, 2006. Shortly thereafter or
during the first week of August 2006, however, he figured in an accident while carrying
heavy food provisions. Pastor filed a complaint against petitioners for permanent
disability compensation.
NLRC affirmed LA’s decision which ordered petitioners Centennial Transmarine,
Inc. and/or Mr. Eduardo M. Jabla, Centennial Marine Services and M/V Bonnie
Smithwick (petitioners) to pay respondent Pastor Quiambao (Pastor) total and
permanent disability benefits amounting to US$78,750.00 and attorney’s fees.
Pastor claimed that the lapse of 120 days from the time of his repatriation without
any disability grading being issued by the companydesignated physician, coupled by his
worsening lumbar pain despite continuous treatment, rendered him permanently unfit for
sea duties. In support of this, he presented a medical certificate dated April 17, 2007
issued by the Seamen’s Hospital attesting to his unfitness for sea service due to
workrelated total disability. For their part, petitioners countered that except for his bare
allegations, Pastor had not proffered sufficient evidence to support his claim that his
spinal disc degeneration or osteoarthritis is work related or was aggravated by his
working conditions. While admitting that osteoarthritis is considered as a workrelated
disease under the provisions of the POEA Standard Employment Contract (SEC), they
argued that Pastor has not satisfactorily established any of the conditions for
compensability. For one, his work as a messman does not entail heavy physical labor as
to have caused his illness. This only means that his ailment is a pre-existing disease.
Petitioners also asserted that Pastor cannot claim permanent disability
compensation based on his mere inability to work for more than 120 days because a
seafarer is only entitled to full disability benefits if he has been assessed with Grade I
disability. If no such assessment has been made, the seafarer is not entitled to disability
compensation even if he was unable to perform his job for more than 120 days.

ISSUE:
Whether Pastor suffers from a work-related and compensable illness

HELD:
A seaman’s entitlement to disability benefits is governed, not only by medical
findings, but by law (the Labor Code) and by contract (the POEASEC and the parties’
CBA). Here, the POEASEC, as provided under Department Order No. 4, Series of 2000
of the Department of Labor and Employment, which contains the Standard Terms and

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 857
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On board Ocean Going
Vessels, governs the employment contract between Pastor and petitioners.

“Pursuant to the Section 20(B), paragraph 6, two elements must concur for an injury or
illness to be compensable. First, that the injury or illness must be workrelated; and
second, that the workrelated injury or illness must have [arisen] during the term of the
seafarer’s employment contract.” For disability to be compensable under Section 20(B)
of the 2000 POEASEC, it must be the result of a work related injury or a work related
illness, which are defined as “injury(ies) resulting in disability or death arising out of and
in the course of employment” and as “any sickness resulting to disability or death as a
result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32(A) of this contract with the
conditions set therein satisfied.”

To recapitulate, the Labor Arbiter ruled that Pastor’s illness is work related.

The NLRC affirmed this finding by holding that the accident he met while carrying
heavy food provisions was the proximate cause of his injury. For its part, the CA
ultimately concluded that the illness was acquired by Pastor due to his work as a
messman whose primary duties and responsibilities include cleaning accommodations,
galley, pantries, alleys, storerooms, salons and messrooms, washing, cleaning and
preparing tables, collecting and laundering dirty linen, serving food and restocking
supplies in pantries, engine room, bridge, etc. It further ruled that Pastor was able to
prove the conditions necessary for osteoarthritis to be considered as having arisen in the
course of his employment either by direct causation or aggravation due to the nature of
his work. The Court is not inclined to depart from the aforementioned findings of the
Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 858
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs.DEBBIE UBAÑA.
G.R. No. 200114. August 24, 2015.*

DOCTRINE:In legitimate job contracting, no employer-employee relation exists between


the principal and the job contractor’s employees. The principal is responsible to the job
contractor’s employees only for the proper payment of wages.

FACTS:
Respondent Debbie Ubaña filed a civil case for damages against the DBP Service
Corporation, petitioner Social Security System (SSS), and the SSS Retirees Association.
Respondent applied for employment with the petitioner. However, after passing
the examinations and accomplishing all the requirements for employment, she was
instead referred to DBP Service Corporation for “transitory employment.” She took the
pre-employment examination given by DBP Service Corporation and passed the same.
A six-month Service Contract Agreement by DBP Service Corporation, appointing her as
clerk for assignment with SSS Daeteffective May 27, 1996. From December 16, 1999 to
May 15, 2001, she was assigned to the Membership Section as Data Encoder.
On December 16, 2001, she was transferred to the SSS Retirees Association as
Processor at the Membership Section until her resignation on August 26, 2002. Because
of the oppressive and prejudicial treatment by SSS, she was forced to resign on August
26, 2002 as she could no longer stand being exploited, the agony of dissatisfaction,
anxiety, demoralization, and injustice. She asserted that she dedicated six years of her
precious time faithfully serving SSS that defendants conspired to exploit her and violate
civil service laws and regulations and Civil Code provisions on Human Relations,
particularly Articles 19, 20, and 21.
She filed before the RTC for damages, however, was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. An MR was filed and was granted. The petitioner filed petition for certiorari
before CA seeking reversal of the Order made by RTC reinstating the civil case before
the court.

ISSUE:
Whether the Labor Code has any relevance to the principal relief sought in the
complaint.

HELD:
There being no employer-employee relation or any other definite or direct contract
between respondent and petitioner, the latter being responsible to the former only for the
proper payment of wages, respondent is thus justified in filing a case against petitioner,
based on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, to recover the proper salary due her as
SSS Processor. At first glance, it is indeed unfair and unjust that as Processor who has
worked with petitioner for six long years, she was paid only P5,038.00 monthly, or
P229.00 daily, while a regular SSS employee with the same designation and who
performs identical functions is paid amonthly salary of P18,622.00, or P846.45 daily
wage. Petitioner may not hide under its service contracts to deprive respondent of what
is justly due her.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 859
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
As a vital government entity charged with ensuring social security, it should lead
in setting the example by treating everyone with justice and fairness. If it cannot
guarantee the security of those who work for it, it isdoubtful that it caneven discharge its
directive to promote the social security of its members in line with the fundamental
mandate to promote social justice and to insure the wellbeing and economic security of
the Filipino people.

For Article 217 of the Labor Code to apply, and in order for the Labor Arbiter to
acquire jurisdiction over a dispute, there must be an employer-employee relation
between the parties thereto.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 860
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
GRACE MARINE SHIPPING CORPORATION AND/OR CAPT. JIMMY BOADO
v.ARON S. ALARCON
G.R. No. 201536, September 09, 2015
DOCTRINE:Permanent disability is inability of a worker to perform his job for more than
120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. Total
disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn wages in
the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to
perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do.

A total disability does not require that the employee be completely disabled, or totally
paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that the employee cannot
pursue his or her usual work and earn from it. A total disability is considered permanent if
it lasts continuously for more than 120 days.
FACTS:
In 2006, respondent Aron S. Alarcon was hired by petitioner Grace Marine
Shipping Corporation (Grace Marine Shipping) for its foreign principal, Universal Marine
Corporation. He was assigned as Messman onboard the vessel "M/V Sunny Napier II.
As Messman, respondent maintained messroom sanitation, washed clothes and
dishes, cleaned the area on board and was in charge of general cabin sanitation. He
used cleaning agents such as surfactants, alkalines, phosphates, acids, complexing and
bleaching agents, enzymes and other strong chemical substances.
On August 6, 2007, while aboard "M/V Sunny Napier II," respondent developed a
skin condition. He was examined by a physician in New Zealand, and was diagnosed as
having "infected fungal dermatitis."6 On August 27, 2007, respondent was diagnosed by
another doctor as having "eczema squamosum" and declared unfit for duty.
Respondent was repatriated on August 29, 2007 and was immediately referred to
the company-designated physician, Dr. Nicomedes G. Cruz (Dr. Cruz). On August 30,
2007, respondent was diagnosed with "nummular eczema" on his arms, body, legs and
scalp by the company-designated dermatopathologist.
ISSUE:
Whether or not complainant is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.
HELD:
Permanent disability is inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120
days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.
Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn
wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed
to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could do.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 861
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
A total disability does not require that the employee be completely disabled, or totally
paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury must be such that the employee cannot
pursue his or her usual work and earn from it. A total disability is considered permanent if
it lasts continuously for more than 120 days. x xx.
It is undisputed that from the time the respondent was medically repatriated on October
7,2005 he was unable to work for more than 120 days. In fact, Dr. Alegre's certification
was issued only after 259 days with the respondent needing further medical treatments
thus rendering him unable to pursue his customary work. Despite the declaration in the
medical reports that psoriasis is not contagious, no profit-minded employer will
hire him considering the repulsive physical manifestation of the disease, its
chronic nature, lack of long-term cure and the vulnerability of the patient to
cardiovascular diseases and some cancers. Its inevitable impact [on] the
respondent's chances of being hired and capacity to continue working as a
seaman cannot be ignored. His permanent disability thus effectively became total
in nature entitling him to permanent total disability benefits as correctly awarded
by the LA and the CA.32 (Emphasis supplied)chanrobleslaw
Adopting the pronouncement in Maersk in its entirety and applying it to the
present case, the Court finds that respondent's psoriasis and nummular eczema, which
have not been cured, are work-connected and thus compensable. He is unfit to continue
his duties as messman, as his illness prevents him from performing his functions as
such. Up to this point, it does not appear that petitioners took him back to work for their
principal, or that a declaration of fitness to work or that his condition has been resolved
or cured has been issued. "[A]n employee's disability becomes permanent and total
when so declared by the company-designated physician, or, in case of absence of such
a declaration either of fitness or permanent total disability, upon the lapse of the 120 or
240-day treatment period under Article 192 (c) (1) of the Labor Code 33 and Rule X,
Section 2 of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation Commission, 34 while the
employee's disability continues and he is unable to engage in gainful employment during
such period, and the company-designated physician fails to arrive at a definite
assessment of the employee's fitness or disability. This is true regardless of whether the
employee loses the use of any part of his body or if the injury or disability is classified as
Grade 1 under the POEA-SEC."35

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 862
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ICT MAJRKETING SERVICES, INC. (NOW KNOWN AS SYKES MARKETING
SERVICES, INC.) v.MARIPHIL L. SALES
G.R. No. 202090, September 09, 2015
DOCTRINE:The managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must be exercised without
grave abuse of discretion, bearing in mind the basic elements of justice and fair play.
Having the right should not be confused with the manner in which that right is exercised.
Thus, it cannot be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable
worker.
FACTS:
On February 22, 2006, petitioner hired respondent Mariphil L. Sales as its
Customer Service Representative (CSR) or Telephone Service Representative (TSR),
and assigned her to its Capital One account.
On February 21, 2007, respondent was assigned to the Washington Mutual
account, where she was awarded with a certificate for being the "Top Converter/Seller
(Second Place)" for the month of April 2007.8
On July 3, 2007, respondent wrote to Glen Odom (Odom) - petitioner's Vice
President - complaining about supposed irregularities in the handling of funds entrusted
to petitioner by Washington Mutual which were intended for distribution to outstanding
Washington Mutual CSRs and TSRs as prizes and incentives. However, no action
appears to have been taken on her complaint.
Respondent was then transferred to the Bank of America account on July 30,
2007. Without prior notice to respondent, petitioner scheduled her for training from July
30 to August 6, 2007 on the very same day of her transfer. On the third day of training
(August 1), respondent was unable to attend. When she reported for training the next
day, respondent was informed that she could not be certified to handle calls for Bank of
America due to her failure to complete the training. From then on, respondent was
placed on "floating status" and was not given any work assignment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent was constructively dismissed.
HELD:
In causing respondent's transfer, petitioner clearly acted in bad faith and with
discrimination, insensibility and disdain; the transfer was effected as a form of
punishment for her raising a valid grievance related to her work. Furthermore, said
transfer was obviously unreasonable, not to mention contrary to experience, logic, and
good business sense. This being the case, the transfer amounted to constructive
dismissal.
The managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must be exercised without

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 863
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
grave abuse of discretion, bearing in mind the basic elements of justice and fair
play. Having the right should not be confused with the manner in which that right is
exercised. Thus, it cannot be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of
an undesirable worker. In particular, the employer must be able to show that the
transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee; nor
does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and
other benefits. Should the employer fail to overcome this burden of proof, the
employee's transfer shall be tantamount to constructive dismissal, which has been
defined as a quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely; as an offer involving a demotion in rank and diminution in pay.
Likewise, constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination,
insensibility or disdain by an employer has become so unbearable to the
employee leaving him with no option but to forego with his continued
employment45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The instant case can be compared to the situation in Veterans Security Agency, Inc.
v. Gonzalvo, Jr.,46 where the employee concerned - a security guard who was brave
enough to complain about his employer's failure to remit its employees' Social Security
System premiums - was "tossed around" and finally placed on floating status for no valid
reason.
True, it is the inherent prerogative of an employer to transfer and reassign its
employees to meet the requirements of its business. Be that as it may, the prerogative of
the management to transfer its employees must be exercised without grave abuse of
discretion. The exercise of the prerogative should not defeat an employee's right to
security of tenure. The employer's privilege to transfer its employees to different
workstations cannot be used as a subterfuge to rid itself of an undesirable worker.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 864
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
GERARDO A. CARIQUE v.PHILIPPINE SCOUT VETERANS SECURITY AND
INVESTIGATION AGENCY, INC., AND/OR RICARDO BONA AND SEVERO**
SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 197484, September 16, 2015
DOCTRINE: This Court is not unmindful of the rule that the employer has the burden of
proving that the employee's termination was for a valid or authorized cause. However,
before the employer is tasked to discharge this burden, it is incumbent upon the
employee to prove by substantial evidence the fact that he was indeed illegally
dismissed from employment.
FACTS:
On November 8,1990, petitioner was hired as security guard by respondent
agency owned by respondent Santiago and managed by respondent Bona. He was
thereafter assigned/posted to respondent agency's several clients, the last of which was
at National Bookstore - Rosario, Pasig Branch.6 On October 28, 2002, petitioner was
relieved from his post at the National Bookstore - Rosario, Pasig Branch and was
replaced by Security Guard Roel Juan pursuant to a rotation policy being implemented
by respondent agency.
Petitioner alleged that on October 30, 2002, shortly after his relief, he reported to
respondent agency's office and inquired about his next assignment. He was, however,
informed of the lack of available assignment. He then reported continuously but was
repeatedly advised to wait for a new posting. He was thus surprised when on March 9,
2003, he received a memorandum8 from respondent agency requiring him to explain his
Absence Without Leave (AWOL) since November 30, 2002. He submitted an
explanation9 on the charge, but no assignment at all was given to him. On May 5, 2003,
he again returned, but was compelled to acknowledge receipt of a memorandum 10 dated
April 30, 2003 requiring him to explain his unjustified refusal to accept the posts offered
to him and his AWOL. Attached to the memorandum were three Special Security Detail
(SSD) which required him to report for assignment at the National Bookstore, SM
Bicutan, Taguig on March 11, 2003 and at East Asia Diesel Power Corporation and
Country Space Condominium on March 17, 2003. Contending that the SSDs attached to
the memorandum were fabricated by respondent agency in order to evade liability,
petitioner refused to acknowledge receipt of the said memorandum. These events led
him to file an illegal dismissal case against respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed considering the fact that he
failed to adduce substantial evidence to prove that he was indeed illegally dismissed
from employment.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
The Petition is without merit.
We find no cogent reason to depart from the factual finding of both the NLRC and
the CA that petitioner was not illegally dismissed. The evidence on record clearly shows
that respondents did offer petitioner new assignments. The SSDs and the affidavits
executed by Duty Officer Basal and by Investigator General Amor attest to this
incontrovertible fact.
This Court is not unmindful of the rule that the employer has the burden of proving
that the employee's termination was for a valid or authorized cause. However, before the
employer is tasked to discharge this burden, it is incumbent upon the employee to prove
by substantial evidence the fact that he was indeed illegally dismissed from
employment.23 Illegal dismissal must be established by positive and overt acts clearly
indicative of a manifest intention to dismiss. This critical affirmative fact must be proved
by the party alleging the same with substantial evidence as required by the nature of this
case.24 Mere allegation is neither proof nor evidence.
Here, we find that petitioner anchored his claims on unfounded and unproven
allegations. No positive or direct evidence was adduced to show that he was indeed
illegally dismissed from employment, either factually or constructively. If anything, the
evidence on record showed that petitioner was relieved from his last assignment
because of the implementation of a rotation policy by respondent agency which was
requested by its clients; and that as correctly found by the CA, petitioner, from that point
on, was considered on floating status or on temporary off-detail which is not an unusual
occurrence for security guards given that their assignments primarily depend on the
contracts entered into by the agency with third parties.26 Placing petitioner on floating or
off-detail status for not more than six months is not prohibited by law and did not amount
to dismissal.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MAERSK-FILIPINAS MAERSK-FILIPINAS CREWEVG, INC., INC./A.P. MOLLER A/S,
v.ROMMEL RENE O. JALECO
G.R. No. 201945, September 21, 2015
DOCTRINE: There is nothing inherently wrong with the consultations as the POEA-SEC
and the CBA allow him to seek a second opinion. The problem only arose when he
pre-empted the mandated procedure by filing a complaint for permanent disability
compensation on the strength of his chosen physicians' opinions, without referring the
conflicting opinions to a third doctor for final determination.
FACTS:
On December 4, 2006, respondent Rommel Rene O. Jaleco was hired by
petitioner Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. (Maersk), on behalf of its foreign principal and
co-petitioner herein, A.P. Moller A/S (Moller), as Able Bodied Seaman on board the
vessel "M/T Else Maersk." Respondent boarded "M/T Else Maersk" on January 16, 2007
and commenced his work.
Sometime in February 2007, respondent complained of intermittent pain on the
left buttock radiating to the. lower back and left groin. When examined in Singapore on
April 13, 2007, his lumbosacral spine x-ray generated normal results but he was
diagnosed as having "suspected prolapsed intervertebral disc." Nonetheless, he was
declared fit to sail.
Respondent was repatriated on May 1, 2007 and was immediately referred to the
company-designated physician, Dr. Natalio Alegre II (Dr. Alegre), who examined him on
May 2 and 3, 2007. He found respondent to be suffering from "paralumbar spasm and
limitation of movement due to pain.
On April 28, 2008, respondent consulted an independent physician, Dr. Alan
Leonardo R. Raymundo (Dr. Raymundo) - an orthopedic surgeon of the Philippine
Orthopedic Institute - who issued his own Medical Report.
No attempt to secure the opinion of a third physician was made by the parties.
Instead, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of salaries/wages
and other benefits, disability claims, medical expenses, damages, and attorney's fees
against petitioners and Maersk General Manager Jerome P. delos Angeles (delos
Angeles) before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
ISSUE:
Whose disability assessment should prevail in a maritime disability claim - the
fit-to-work assessment of the company-designated physician or the contrary opinion of
the seafarer's chosen physicians that he is no longer fit to work?
HELD:

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The POEA-SEC and the CBA govern the employment relationship between
Dumadag and the petitioners. The two instruments are the law between them. They are
bound by their terms and conditions, particularly in relation to this case, the mechanism
prescribed to determine liability for a disability benefits claim. In Magsaysay Maritime
Corp. v. Velasquez, the Court said: "The POEA Contract, of which the parties are both
signatories, is the law between them and as such, its provisions bind both of them."
Dumadag, however, pursued his claim without observing the laid-out procedure. He
consulted physicians of his choice regarding his disability after Dr. Dacanay, the
company-designated physician, issued her fit-to-work certification for him. There is
nothing inherently wrong with the consultations as the POEA-SEC and the CBA
allow him to seek a second opinion. The problem only arose when he pre-empted
the mandated procedure by filing a complaint for permanent disability
compensation on the strength of his chosen physicians' opinions, without
referring the conflicting opinions to a third doctor for final determination.

xxxx

The filing of the complaint constituted a breach of Dumadag's contractual


obligation to have the conflicting assessments of his disability referred to a third
doctor for a binding opinion. The petitioners could not have possibly caused the
non-referral to a third doctor because they were not aware that Dumadag secured
separate independent opinions regarding his disability. Thus, the complaint should have
been dismissed, for without a binding third opinion, the fit-to-work certification of the
company-designated physician stands, pursuant to the POEA-SEC and the CBA. x xx

xxxx

Whatever his reasons might have been, Dumadag's disregard of the


conflict-resolution procedure under the POEA-SEC and the CBA cannot and should not
be tolerated and allowed to stand, lest it encourage a similar defiance. We stress in this
respect that we have yet to come across a case where the parties referred conflicting
assessments of a seafarer's disability to a third doctor since the procedure was
introduced by the POEA-SEC in 2000 - whether the Court's ruling in a particular case
upheld the assessment of the company-designated physician, as in Magsaysay Maritime
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission (Second Division) and similar other
cases, or sustained the opinion of the seafarer's chosen physician as in HFS Philippines,
Inc. v. Filar, cited by the CA, and other cases similarly resolved. The
third-doctor-referral provision of the POEA-SEC, it appears to us, has been
honored more in the breach than in the compliance. This is unfortunate
considering that the provision is intended to settle disability claims voluntarily at
the parties' level where the claims can be resolved more speedily than if they were
brought to court.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Given the circumstances under which Dumadag pursued his claim, especially the
fact that he caused the non-referral to a third doctor, Dr. Dacanay's fit-to-work
certification must be upheld. In Santiago v. Pacbasin Ship Management, Inc., the Court
declared: "[t]here was no agreement on a third doctor who shall examine him anew and
whose finding shall be final and binding, x xx [T]his Court is left without choice but to
uphold the certification made by Dr. Lim with respect to Santiago's disability." (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 869
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION, PRINCESS CRUISE LINES, LTD.
AND/OR MR. EDUARDO U. MANESE v.VIRGILIO L. MAZAREDO,
G.R. No. 201359, September 23, 2015

DOCTRINE: Under Article 192 (c)(l) of the Labor Code50 and Rule X, Section 2 of the
Amended Rules on Employees Compensation,51 the company-designated physician
must arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent
disability within the period of 120 or 240 days; if he fails to do so and the seaman's
medical condition remains unresolved, the latter shall be deemed totally and
permanently disabled.
FACTS:
Magsaysay was assigned as Upholsterer onboard the vessel MY "Tahitian
Princess" and was deployed on July 5, 2008.
On February 4, 2009, while aboard M/V "Tahitian Princess," respondent
experienced back pain. Upon examination by the ship's doctor Lana Strydom on March
12, 2009, the following diagnosis was issued: "a) uncontrolled hypertension on
medication; b) probable previous silent inferior myocardial infarct; c) left ventricular
hypertrophy; d) tachycardia (95-107); xxx f) needs CXR, Echo, Stress Test and
Angiogram; g) needs cardiologist specialist consultation; h) needs another seafarer's
fitness to work at sea medical before next contract.
On March 22,2009, respondent was medically repatriated and immediately
referred to the company-designated physician. Respondent underwent a series of
examinations10 such as electrocardiogram (ECG), 2D Echo, and coronary
arteriography.11 On May 30, 2009, he was found to be suffering from "coronary artery
disease, three-vessel involvement;" the recommendation was for him to undergo
coronary artery bypass graft surgery (CABG12).
On September 25, 2009, respondent sought the opinion of an independent
physician, Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo (Dr. Vicaldo), who issued a Medical Certificate 21
declaring that respondent is unfit to resume work as seaman in any capacity; that he
requires maintenance medication to control his hypertension to prevent cardiovascular
complications such as worsening coronary artery disease, stroke and renal insufficiency;
and that respondent is not expected to land gainful employment given his medical
background.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondent’s condition is compensable.
2. Whether or not the seaman’s medical condition must be deemed a total and
permanent disability.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
1. On the issue of compensability, there is no question that respondent's condition
— "coronary artery disease, three-vessel involvement" — is a covered illness. It
has consistently been held that cardiovascular disease, coronary artery disease,
as well as other heart ailments, are compensable.47 It likewise remains
undisputed that given his 12 years of employment with petitioners and the
conditions he was subjected to as a seafarer, respondent's illness can be
attributed to his work. As correctly held by the CA, there is a reasonable
connection between respondent's work and the development and exacerbation of
his heart ailment. During his employment as seafarer, respondent was
consistently exposed to varying temperatures and harsh weather conditions as
the ship crossed ocean boundaries, and he may have been required to perform
overtime work. Indeed, "any kind of work or labor produces stress and strain
normally resulting in wear and tear of the human body."48 Moreover, as seafarer,
respondent was constantly plagued by homesickness and emotional strain as he
is separated from his family, even as he had to contend with the perils of the sea
while at work.

2. Under Article 192 (c)(l) of the Labor Code50 and Rule X, Section 2 of the Amended
Rules on Employees Compensation,51 the company-designated physician must
arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent
disability within the period of 120 or 240 days; if he fails to do so and the seaman's
medical condition remains unresolved, the latter shall be deemed totally and
permanently disabled.

Respondent was repatriated on March 22, 2009 and was examined and treated
by the company-designated physician. On May 30, 2009, he was found to be
suffering from "coronary artery disease, three-vessel involvement," and
recommended to undergo CABG, or bypass surgery. However, instead of the
recommended bypass surgery, respondent underwent percutaneous coronary
intervention or angioplasty - an outpatient procedure - on July 6, 2009, because
he did not have the resources to pay for the more expensive bypass surgery. On
July 6, 2009, the company-designated physician issued a Cardiac Catheterization
Laboratory Report recommending the administration of dual antiplatelets; he
likewise stated that the medical management of respondent's condition should be
"maximized." Thereafter, it appears mat respondent's treatment was
discontinued, and no assessment of respondent's fitness to work or disability was
made. Indeed, up to this stage of the proceedings, there is no such declaration of
fitness or disability issued by the company-designated physician.

Petitioners argue that there is a March 27, 2009 Medical Report issued by the
company-designated physician which declared that respondent's condition was
not work-connected and not compensable. However, the record of the case is

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 871
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
bereft of such report. On the contrary, the last medical report issued by the
company-designated physician on July 6, 2009 indicates that respondent's
condition has not been resolved; he has not been cured, and instead, the
attending physician recommended that medical management of respondent's
condition should be maximized, meaning that his treatment must continue and the
medical care to be given to him must be augmented.

Respondent's condition remains unresolved even up to this day, and petitioners


did not renew his contract; nor was respondent able to work for other employers
on account of his condition. Thus, applying the doctrine enunciated in Magsaysay
Mitsui OSK Marine, Inc. v. Bengson52 and Alpha Ship Management Corporation v.
Cab53 - that an employee's disability becomes permanent and total when so
declared by the company-designated physician, or, in case of absence of such a
declaration either of fitness or permanent total disability, upon the lapse of the
statutory 120- or 240-day treatment period, while the employee's disability
continues and he is unable to engage in gainful employment during such period,
and the company-designated physician fails to arrive at a definite assessment of
the employee's fitness or disability - respondent is thus deemed totally and
permanently disabled and entitled to the corresponding benefit under the POEA
SEC in the amount US$60,000.00.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 872
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
NEW FILIPINO MARITIME AGENCIES, INC., TAIYO NIPPON KISEN CO., LTD., AND
ANGELINA T, RIVERA v.VINCENT H. D ATAYAN -HEIR OF SIMON VINCENT H.
DATAYAN III
G.R. No. 202859, November 11, 2015
DOCTRINE:As a rule, the death of a seafarer during the term of his employment makes
his employer liable for death benefits. The employer, may, however, be exempt from
liability if it can successfully establish that the seafarer's death was due to a cause
attributable to his own willful act.
FACTS:
New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc. (NFMA), for and on behalf of St. Paul
Maritime Corp. (SPMC), employed Simon Vincent Datayan II (Simon) as deck cadet on
board the vessel Corona Infinity.Prior to his deployment, Simon underwent
pre-employment medical examination (PEME) and was declared fit for sea duties.
On December 30,2007, at 12:40 a.m., the Master authorized the conduct of an
emergency fire drill in which the crew participated. At about 1:25 a.m., he declared that
Simon jumped overboard. A futile search-and-rescue operation ensued. After a few
weeks, Simon was declared missing and was presumed dead.
Simon's father, Vincent H. Datayan (respondent), alleged that he went to NFMA to
claim death benefits but his claim was unheeded.11 On May 11, 2009, he filed a
complaint12 for death benefits and attorney's fees against NFMA, Taiyo Nippon Kisen
Co., Ltd.,13 and Angelina T. Rivera (petitioners).
Respondent averred that because Simon died during the term of his employment,
the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) among All Japan Seamen's
Union, Associated Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP),
and the International Mariners Management Association of Japan, must be applied in the
grant of death benefits and burial assistance in his favor, being the heir of Simon.
Respondent also stated that the fire drill was conducted at 12:40 a.m. where there
was heavy concentration of fishing boats in the area; and during which the water
temperature was expected to cause hypothermia. He asserted that petitioners were
presumed to be at fault or had acted negligently, unless they could prove that Simon's
death was due to causes not legally compensable.15 He declared that there was no
evidence that Simon committed suicide and maintained that his death was a result of
negligence and reckless instruction of the Master.
The LA held that Simon's suicide was established by the evidence on record.On
appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA Decision.26Like the LA, the NLRC gave probative
weight to the suicide note, the Master's Report, along with other pieces of documentary
evidence adduced, to establish that Simon committed suicide. It held that considering
that the death of the seafarer was due to his willful act, then his heir is not entitled to his

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
death benefits. Subsequently, the CA ruled in favor of the respondent stating that
Simon committed suicide and hence, his death is compensable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Simon’s death is compensable.
HELD:
As claimant for death benefits, respondent has the burden to prove by substantial
evidence that his son's death is work-related and that it transpired during the term of his
employment contract. In this respect, respondent has discharged his burden. It is beyond
question that Simon died during the term of his contract. The next question is whether
Simon's death was due to his deliberate act. If such is the case, then respondent is not
entitled to death benefits. That Simon's death was a result of his willful act is a matter of
defense.38 Thus, petitioners have the burden to prove this circumstance by substantial
evidence.

The Court finds that petitioners discharged their burden to prove that Simon
committed suicide. The Master's Report39 clearly described the situation on the vessel
prior to, during and after the time that Simon went overboard, to wit:
x xx WE CONDUCTED EMERGENCY FIRE DRILL AT NIGHT TIME 0040LT 30th
DECEMBER 2007/ 1540TC 29th DECEMBER 2007. AFTER THE DRILL AT
ABOUT 0055LT WE CONDUCTED MEETING AT CREW MESSHALL FOR
MASTER'S EVALUATION AND AT THE SAME TIME SAFETY MEETING
DURING EVALUATION, I STRONGLY MENTIONED ABOUT HIS (SIMON'S)
BEHAVIOUR ON BOARD THE SHIP TO MOTIVATE HIM AND TO IMPROVE
HIS PERFORMANCE SINCE HE IS A DECK CADET AND ABOUT TO BE
PROMOTED AS ORDINARY SEAMAN x xx

xxx AFTER THE MEETING [I] OBSERVED THAT HE WAS NOT AROUND IN
THE MESSHALL. KNOWING THAT HE WAS SLIGHTED I ORDER TO LOOK
FOR HIM IN WHICH THE CREW COMPLIED. ONE OF THE CREW WIPER
RAYMOND C. OCLEASA xxx SAW DECK CADET SIMON VINCENT H.
DATAYAN II WAS STANDING [SIC] ON THE FAIRLEAD PORT QUARTER AND
AT THAT POINT HE (WIPER) SAW TORCH LIGHT PASS HIS (DECK CADET)
FACE AND CAUGHT HIS (DECK CADET) ATTENTION THEN WHEN HE
ATTEMPTED TO JUMP, HE (WIPER) CALLED HIS NAME BUT HE (DECK
CADET) JUMPED OVERBOARD. THEN WIPER WENT TO SHIP'S OFFICE
AND DIAL 0 FOR PUBLIC ADDRESS AND SHOUT MANOVERBOARD
PORTSIDE. BUT THAT ANNOUNCEMENT WAS NOT CLEAR ENOUGH. SO
WHEN I REACH THE BRIDGE I ASKED SECOND OFFICER WHICH SIDE HE
FELL OVERBOARD BUT SECOND OFFICER ALSO NOT SURE [SIC] WHICH
SIDE HE FELL. IN ORDER TO RETURN I ORDERED HARD STARBOARD TO

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 874
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MANEUVER WILLIAMSON TURN AND RETURN TO RECIPROCAL COURSE
AND DROP LIFEBOUY WITH BOUYANT SMOKE SIGNAL AND SELF IGNITING
LIGHT. TURN ON ALL DECK LIGHTS AND POSTED LOOKOUTS x xx

At the same time, the Statement of Facts41 submitted by petitioners indicated that
after the vessel retraced its course to where Simon fell, the incident was reported to the
Japan Coast Guard and to petitioners' local agents in the Philippines. The Yokohama
Coastguard Patrol also conducted search-and-rescue but to no avail.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 875
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ISLAND OVERSEAS TRANSPORT CORPORATION/PINE CREST SHIPPING
CORPORATION/CAPT. EMMANUEL L. REGIO v.ARMANDO M. BEJA
G.R. No. 203115, December 07, 2015
DOCTRINE: The determination of entitlement to disability benefits must, consequently,
be governed by the POEA-SEC and relevant labor laws.
FACTS:
Beja was hired by Island Overseas Transport Corp. for and on behalf of its foreign
principal, petitioner Pine Crest Shipping Corporation, for a period of nine months as
Second Assistant Engineer for the vessel M/V Atsuta. Beja underwent the
pre-employment medical examination, where he was declared fit for work.
In November 2007, Beja experienced pain and swelling of his right knee, which he
immediately reported to the Master of the vessel. On November 10, 2007, he was
brought to a hospital in Italy and was diagnosed to have Arthrosynovitis. He underwent
arthrocentesis of the right knee, was referred to an orthopedic surgeon and was advised
to take a rest.7 However, while in Spain, the pain in his right knee recurred and persisted.
He was brought to a physician on November 19, 2007 and was advised to be medically
repatriated.
Meantime, while undergoing therapy, or on May 15, 2008, Beja filed a complaint 11
against petitioners for permanent total disability benefits, medical expenses, sickness
allowance, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Beja alleged that his
knee injury resulted from an accident he sustained on board the vessel when a drainage
pipe fell on his knee. He claimed that from the time of his repatriation on November 22,
2007, his knee has not recovered which rendered him incapable of returning to his
customary work as seafarer. This, according to him, clearly entitles him to permanent
total disability benefits pursuant to AMOSUP-JSU Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) which provides:
Article 28.1:

A seafarer who surfers permanent disability as a result of an accident whilst in the


employment of the Company regardless of fault, including, accidents occurring
while travelling to or from the ship, and whose ability to work as a seafarer is
reduced as a result thereof, but excluding permanent disability due to willful acts,
shall in addition to sick pay, be entitled to compensation, according to the
provisions of this Agreement.12ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
He claimed for compensation in the amount of US$137,500.00 in accordance with the
degree of disability and rate of compensation indicated in the said CBA.
ISSUE:

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Whether or not the POEA-SEC prevails over the rate of compensation provided in
the CBA.
HELD:
The Court also takes notice of the fact that Beja's medical condition cannot be
solely attributable to accidents. His injury could have possibly been caused by other
factors such as chronic wear and tear35 and aging.36 Thus, the NLRC's conclusion that
the tear and injury on Beja's knee was caused by an accident on board had no factual
basis but was anchored merely on speculation. The Court cannot, however, rest its
rulings on mere speculation and presumption.37
Thus, we find the CBA inapplicable; the determination of Beja's entitlement to
disability benefits must, consequently, be governed by the POEA-SEC and relevant
labor laws.
Beja is entitled to a total and permanent disability compensation of US$60,000.00
under the POEA-SEC.

Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code provides that:


Art. 192. Permanent total disability. - x xx

(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and


permanent:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty
days, except as otherwise provided for in the Rules;
The Rule referred to in this Labor Code provision is Section 2, Rule X of the Amended
Rules on Employees Compensation (AREC) implementing Title II, Book IV of the Labor
Code, which states:
Sec. 2. Period of Entitlement — (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the
first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer
than 120 consecutive days except where such injury or sickness still requires medical
attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which
case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may
declare the total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous
temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment
of physical or mental functions as determined by the System.
Section 20 B (3) of the POEA-SEC, meanwhile provides that:
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to
sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the
degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated
physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical
examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his
return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice
to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to
comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right
to claim the above benefits.

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may
be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision
shall be final and binding on both parties.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
VICMAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND/OR ROBERT KUA, OWNER, AND
ENGR. JUANITO C. PAGCALIWAGAN,1 MANAGER v.CAMILO ELARCOSA, et al.
G.R. No. 202215, December 09, 2015
DOCTRINE: In labor cases, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC
when its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence or such
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
FACTS:
This case stemmed from a Complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims filed
by Ruben Panes, RuelCabanday and JonardAbugho (respondents) against Vicmar
Development Corporation (Vicmar) and/or Robert Kua (Kua), its owner and
JuanitoPagcaliwagan (Pagcaliwagan), its manager, and consolidated Complaints for
illegal dismissal and money claims filed by CamiloElarcosa et al. Respondents declared
that Vicmar paid them minimum wage and a small amount for overtime but it did not give
them benefits as required by law, such as Philhealth, Social Security System, 13 th month
pay, holiday pay, rest day and night shift differential. They added that Vicmar employed
more than 200 regular employees and more than 400 "extra" workers. Respondents
claimed that they were illegally dismissed after "vicmar learned that they instituted the
subject Complaint through the simple expedience of not being scheduled for work. Even
those persons associated with them were dismissed. They also asserted that Vicmar did
not comply with the twin notice requirement in dismissing employees.
ISSUE:
Did the CA err in finding that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in affirming
the ELAs' Decisions dismissing the complaint?
HELD:
In labor cases, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when its
findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence or such relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Section 280 of the Labor Code defines a regular employee as one who is 1) engaged to
perform tasks usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer, unless the employment is one for a specific project or undertaking or where
the work is seasonal and for the duration of a season; or 2) has rendered at least 1 year
of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, with respect to the activity for
which he is employed and his employment continues as long as such activity exists.
there is substantial evidence to prove that respondents were regular employees such
that their separation from work without valid cause amounted to illegal dismissal.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LORELEI O. ILADAN v.LA SUERTE INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER AGENCY, INC.,
AND DEBBIE LAO
G.R. No. 203882, January 11, 2016
DOCTRINE: In illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of proving that the
employee's dismissal was legal. However, to discharge this burden, the employee must
first prove, by substantial evidence, that he had been dismissed from employment.
FACTS:
La Suerte is a recruitment agency duly authorized by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) to deploy workers for overseas employment. La
Suerte hired Iladan to work as a domestic helper in Hongkong for a period of two years
with a monthly salary of HK$3,580.00. barely eight days into her job, Iladan executed a
handwritten resignation letter. On August 6, 2009, in consideration of P35,000.00
financial assistance given by Domestic Services, Iladan signed an Affidavit of Release,
Waiver and Quitclaim, Thereafter, or on November 23, 2009, Iladan filed a Complaint for
illegal dismissal, refund of placement fee, payment of salaries corresponding to the
unexpired portion of the contract, as well as moral and exemplary damages, against
respondents. Iladan claimed to have been illegally dismissed and entitled to backwages
corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contract, reimbursement of the placement
fee in the amount of P90,000.00, as well as payment of damages and attorney's fee for
the litigation of her cause.
ISSUE:
whether Iladan's resignation and her execution of the Affidavit of Release, Waiver
and Quitclaim and the Agreement were all voluntarily made; was Iladan illegally
dismissed?
HELD:
The Petition is without merit. The CA did not err in finding that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in its decision.In illegal dismissal cases, the
employer has the burden of proving that the employee's dismissal was legal. However,
to discharge this burden, the employee must first prove, by substantial evidence, that he
had been dismissed from employment, The Court is not convinced as we find no proof of
Iladan's allegations. It is a settled jurisprudence that it is incumbent upon an employee to
prove that his resignation is not voluntary.

Iladan contends that the CA failed to prove any grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NLRC and thus had no basis in reversing the NLRC resolutions which
affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision. She argues that a writ of certiorari may not be used
to correct, the Labor Arbiter's and NLRC's evaluation of evidence and factual findings.
She avers that the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are entitled to great
weight and should be accorded respect and finality.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
TABUK MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC. (TAMPCO), JOSEPHINE DOCTOR,
AND WILLIAM BAO-ANGAN v. MAGDALENA DUCLAN

G.R. No. 203005, March 14, 2016

DOCTRINE: An employee's willful and repeated disregard of a resolution issued by a


cooperative's board of directors (BOD) declaring a moratorium on the approval and
release of loans, thus placing the resources of the cooperative and ultimately the
hard-earned savings of its members in a precarious state, constitutes willful disobedience
which justifies the penalty of dismissal under Article 282 of the Labor Code.
FACTS:
Petitioner Tabuk Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (TAMPCO) is a duly registered
cooperative based in Tabuk City, Kalinga. It is engaged in the business of obtaining
investments from its members which are lent out to qualified member-borrowers.
Petitioner Josephine Doctor is TAMPCO Chairperson and member of the cooperative's
BOD, while petitioner William, Bao-Angan is TAMPCO Chief Executive
Officer.Respondent Magdalena Duclan was employed as TAMPCO Cashier on August
15, 1989, In 2002, TAMPCO introduced Special Investment Loans (SILs) to its members
and prospective borrowers. Among those who availed themselves of the SILs were
Brenda Falgui (Falgui) and Juliet Kotoken (Kotoken).In June 2003, the TAMPCO BOD
issued Board Action (BA) No. 28 which limited the grant of SILs to P5 million and
instructed management to collect outstanding loans and thus reduce the amount of loans
granted to allowable levels. This was prompted by a cooperative report stating that too
many SILs were being granted, the highest single individual borrowing reached a
staggering P14 million, which thus adversely affected the cooperative's ability to grant
regular loans to other members of the cooperative.However, despite said board action,
SILs were granted to Falgui and Kotoken over and above the ceiling set. This prompted
the BOD to issue, on October 26, 2003, BA No. 55 completely halting the grant of SILs
pending collection of outstanding loans.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD
TO REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION THEREBY AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE LABOR
ARBITER.
HELD:
The Court grants the Petition.

Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, the employer may terminate the services of its
employee for the latter's serious misconduct or willful disobedience of its or its
representative's lawful orders. And for willful disobedience to constitute a ground, it is

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
required that: "(a) the conduct of the employee must be willful or intentional; and (b) the
order the employee violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the
employee, and must pertain to the duties that he had been engaged to discharge.
Willfulness must be attended by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude rendering the
employee's act inconsistent with proper subordination, hi any case, the conduct of the
employee that is a valid ground for dismissal under the Labor Code constitutes harmful
behavior against the business interest or person of his employer. It is implied that in every
act of willful disobedience, the erring employee obtains undue advantage detrimental to
the business interest of the employer.
The persistent refusal of the employee to obey the employer's lawful order
amounts to willful disobedience. Indeed, "one of the fundamental duties of an employee is
to obey all reasonable rules, orders and instructions of the employer. Disobedience, to be
a just cause for termination, must be willful or intentional, willfulness being characterized
by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude rendering the employee's act inconsistent with
proper subordination. A willful or intentional disobedience of such rule, order or instruction
justifies dismissal only where such rule, order or instruction is (1) reasonable and lawful,
(2) sufficiently known to the employee, and (3) connected with the duties which the
employee has been engaged to discharge.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
DOEHLE-PHILMAN1 MANNING AGENCY INC., DOHLE (IOM) LIMITED AND CAPT.
MANOLO T. GACUTAN vs. HENRY C. HARO

G.R. No. 206522

DOCTRINE: The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be
a sword to oppress employers. The commitment of this Court to the cause of labor does
not prevent us from sustaining the employer when it is in the right. We should always be
mindful that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed with in the light of
established facts, the applicable law, and existing Jurisprudence.

FACTS:

On May 30, 2008, Doehle-Philman, in behalf of its foreign principal, Dohle Ltd.,
hired respondent as oiler aboard the vessel MV CMA CGM Providenciafor a period of
nine months with basic monthly salary of US$547.00 and other benefits. Before
deployment, respondent underwent pre-employment medical examination (PEME) and
was declared fit for sea duty. Respondent stated that on June 1, 2008, he boarded the
vessel and assumed his duties as oiler; however, in November 2008, he experienced
heartache and loss of energy after hammering and lifting a 120-kilogram machine;
thereafter, he was confined at a hospital in Rotterdam where he was informed of having a
hole in his heart that needed medical attention.After his repatriation on December 6,
2008, respondent reported to Doehle-Philman which in turn referred him to Clinico-Med.
Respondent claimed that he was confined for two days in UST Hospital and that a heart
operation was recommended to him. He nevertheless admitted that he has not yet
undergone any surgery.On April 24, 2009, respondent’s personal doctor, Dr. Luminardo
M. Ramos (Dr. Ramos), declared him not fit to work.

ISSUE:

Is the CA correct in setting aside the NLRC Resolutions denying respondent’s


claim for permanent and total disability benefits?

HELD:

The Court finds merit in the Petition.

This Court does not review factual issues as only questions of law can be raised in
a Rule 45 Petition. However, such rule admits of exceptions including a situation where
the factual findings of the tribunals or courts below are conflicting. Here, there being
contrary findings of fact by the LA and NLRC, on one hand, and the CA, on the other, we
deem it necessary to make our own determination and evaluation of the evidence on
record.

Essentially, petitioners claim that respondent is not entitled to permanent and total
disability benefits on the sole basis that he was unable to work for more than 120 days.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino
Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels (POEA-SEC), particularly Section 20(B)
thereof, provides that the employer is liable for disability benefits when the seafarer
suffers from a work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract. To emphasize,
to be compensable, the injury or illness 1) must be work-related and 2) must have arisen
during the term of the employment contract.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORP., CSCS BMTERNATIONAL NV AND/OR
MARLON* RONO, v. RODEL A. CRUZ
G.R. No. 204769, June 06, 2016

DOCTRINE: The company-designated doctor is expected to arrive at a definite


assessment of the fitness of the seafarer to work or to determine the degree of his
disability within a period of 120 or 240 days from repatriation, as the case may be. If after
the lapse of the 120/240-day period the seafarer remains incapacitated and the
company-designated physician has not yet declared him fit to work or determined his
degree of disability, the seafarer is deemed totally and permanently disabled.

FACTS:
Magsaysay Maritime Corp. (MMC), in behalf of its foreign principal, CSCS
International NV (CSCS), employed respondent Rodel A. Cruz as housekeeping cleaner
on board the vessel Costa Fortuna. Respondent's employment was for eight months (with
three months extension upon mutual consent of the parties). On January 27, 2008,
respondent boarded the vessel. On April 23, 2008, while lifting heavy objects in the
course of performing his duties, respondent experienced low back pain. He was
repatriated on June 19, 2008, and was immediately referred to Dr. Benigno A. Agbayani
(Dr. Agbayani), the company-designated doctor who noted that there was no limitation on
respondent's motion but the latter still complained of pain. Respondent' MRI scan
revealed that he was afflicted with "Mild L4-5 disc bulge but with no evidence of a focal
disc herniation." Respondent had undergone 13 physical therapy (PT) sessions. He had
shown improvement but still complained of slight but tolerable pain upon trunk flexion. Dr.
Agbayani diagnosed respondent and gave him an interim disability rating of Grade 8 for
"Moderate rigidity of two thirds loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk.” Then Dr.
Agbayani declared that despite more than 20 PT sessions, respondent showed little signs
of improvement and possible surgical intervention was being considered. He noted that
respondent would be referred to the Pain Management Clinic.On November 4, 2008,
respondent successfully underwent provocative discogram and percutaneous
nucleoplasty. Later Dr. John Joseph O. Laceste (Dr. Laceste), Pain Management
Specialist, declared that respondent's "discogenic pain over the L4-5 area has improved
by at least 85% to a pain score of 0-1/10."On December 11, 2008, respondent underwent
another MRI scan revealing that he was suffering from mild degenerative changes in the
lumbar spine which remained unchanged when compared to his July 7, 2008 MRI scan.
The next day, Dr. Agbayani declared that respondent's illness was work-related.Then
respondent received sickness allowance for 120 days (from June 18, 2008 to October 15,
2008) amounting to €1,198.66. Dr. Agbayani reported that respondent's condition had not
improved despite various treatments since April 2008. Nevertheless, he reiterated that
respondent's condition was work-related.On March 10, 2009, respondent's MRI scan
showed that there was "small central disc protrusion with disc desiccation changes at
L4-L5 level" but there were no compression deformities, spondylolisthesis nor spinal
canal stenosis.On June 1, 2009, after almost one year from respondent's repatriation, Dr.
Agbayani gave respondent a disability rating of Grade 8 for "moderate rigidity or two third
loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk."

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Consequently, respondent filed a Complaint for permanent and total disability
benefits, sickness allowance, damages and attorney's fees. Respondent's
physician-of-choice, Dr. Venancio P. Garduce, opined that it would be impossible for
respondent to work as a seaman and recommended a disability rating of Grade
3.Respondent argued that he is entitled to disability benefits because of the reasonable
connection between his work and his illness. He stressed that before his embarkation lie
was declared fit to work; as such, it can be logically inferred that he acquired his illness
while aboard the vessel and by reason of its harsh working environment. He added that
he is entitled to disability benefits as he already suffered loss and impairment in his
earning capacity.

The LA rendered his Decision ordering MMC and CSCS to jointly and severally
pay respondent disability compensation amounting to US$39,180.00 or its peso
equivalent at the time of payment and 10% thereof as attorney's fees. The LA gave
credence to the fact that respondent was medically repatriated and that his "lumbar disc
disease (disc desiccation) L4-L5 with mild disc herniation lumbar" was work-related, as
confirmed by the company-designated doctor himself. Accordingly, the LA awarded
disability benefits to respondent amounting to US$39,180.00 based on the Grade 3
disability rating given by respondent's physician-of-choice.
The NLRC found respondent entitled to partial and permanent disability compensation of
Grade 8 amounting to US$16,795.00 and upheld the company-designated physician's
Grade 8 disability rating on the ground that it was supported by medical findings and was
arrived at after close monitoring and treatment of respondent. The CA nullified the
NLRC’s decision and decreed that while it is a rule that the company-designated
physician is tasked to determine the degree of disability of a seafarer,
company-designated doctor assessed respondent's disability as Grade 8 only on June 1,
2009, or almost a year after his repatriation on June 19, 2008.

ISSUE:
Whether not respondent is entitled to disability compensation.

HELD:
Yes. Notably, the September 5, 2008 Report provides: "Interim Disability Grade: If
a disability grading will be made today, our patient falls under 'Moderate rigidity of two
thirds loss of motion or lifting power' - Grade (8) eight."Being an interim disability grade,
this declaration is an initial determination of respondent's condition for the time being. It is
only an initial prognosis of the health status of respondent because after its issuance,
respondent was still required to return for re-evaluation, and to continue therapy and
medication; as such, it does not fully assess respondent's condition and cannot provide
sufficient basis for the award of disability benefits in his favor.

Moreover, in Carcedo v. Maine Marine Philippines, Inc. the Court did not give
credence to the disability assessment given by the company-designated doctor as the
same was merely interim and not definite. This is because after its issuance, Dario A.
Carcedo (seafarer therein) still continued to require medical attention. Similarly, herein

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
respondent needed further treatment and physical therapy even after the Interim
Disability Grade was given by the company-designated doctor on September 5, 2008.

The Court gave emphasis to the finding of the CA that Dr. Agbayani in fact issued
his disability rating on June 1, 2009, almost a year from respondent's repatriation. The
company-designated doctor is expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the
seafarer's fitness to work or to determine his disability within a period of 120 or 240 days
from repatriation. The 120-day period applies if the duration of the seafarer's treatment
does not exceed 120 days, On the other hand, the 240-day period applies in case the
seafarer requires further medical treatment after the lapse of the initial 120-day period. In
case the company-designated doctor failed to issue a declaration within the given
periods, the seafarer is deemed totally and permanently disabled.

Here, it is undisputed that respondent required medical treatment even after the
lapse of 120 days from repatriation. As such, Dr. Agbayani should have made his definite
assessment on respondent's condition within the aforesaid 240-day period.
Unfortunately, Dr. Agbayani failed to timely issue a declaration as he only issued an
assessment on respondent's disability on June 1, 2009, almost one year from the latter's
repatriation. By operation of law, respondent is deemed permanently and totally disabled
and is thus entitled to full disability compensation.

Moreover, by reason of the lapse of the 240-day period, the opinions of the
company-designated physician and of respondent's personal doctor are rendered
irrelevant. As stated, after the lapse of said period, respondent is already deemed totally
and permanently disabled, which entitles him to full disability benefits amounting to
US$60,000.00. Notably, in his complaint respondent prayed for total permanent disability
benefits. Also, the medical opinion of his doctor-of-choice was issued only after the filing
of the complaint.

To recapitulate, the company-designated doctor's interim assessment on


September 5,2008 is a mere initial finding on respondent's condition; on the other hand,
his disability rating given on June 1, 2009 was issued beyond the 240-day period. Thus,
petitioners' contention - that the disability compensation in favor of respondent must be
based on the disability grading given by the company-designated doctor - is untenable.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 887
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
EMERTIA G. MALIXI vs. MEXICALI PHILIPPINES AND/OR FRANCESCA MABANTA
G.R. No. 205061, June 08, 2016

DOCTRINE: Expressions of gratitude and appreciation as well as manifestation of regret


in leaving the company negates the notion that she was forced and coerced to resign. In
the same vein, an inducement for a higher position and salary cannot defeat the
voluntariness of her actions. It should be emphasized that petitioner had an option to
decline the offer for her transfer, however, she opted to resign on account of a promotion
and increased pay. "In termination cases, the employee is not afforded any option; the
employee is dismissed and his only recourse is to institute a complaint for illegal dismissal
against his employer

FACTS:
Petitioner alleged on her complaint for illegal dismissal against respondentsthat on
August 12, 2008, she was hired by the latter as a team leader assigned at the delivery
service, receiving a daily wage of P382.00 with no employment contract and identification
card (ID). In October 2008, Mexicali's training officer, Jay Teves, informed her of the
management's intention to transfer and appoint her as store manager at a newly opened
branch in Alabang Town Center, which is a joint venture between Mexicali and Calexico
Food Corporation, due to her satisfactory performance. She was apprised that her
monthly salary as the new store manager would be P15,000,00 with service charge, free
meal and side tip. She then submitted a resignation letter dated October 15, 2008, as
advised by Teves. On October 17, 2008, she started working as the store manager of
Mexicali in Alabang Town Center although, again, no employment contract and ID were
issued to her. However, in December 2008, she was compelled by Teves to sign an
end-of-contract letter by reason of a criminal complaint for sexual harassment she filed on
December 3, 2008 against Mexicali's operations manager, John Pontero. When she
refused to sign the letter, Mexicali's administrative officer, Ding Luna,personally went to
the branch and was informed by Luna that it was her last day of work.

Respondents averred that petitioner has resigned from Mexicali in October 2008
but rather he was an employee of Calexico, a franchisee of Mexicali located in Alabang
Town Center which is a separate and distinct corporation. In her reply, petitioner admitted
having resigned from Mexicali but averred that her resignation was a condition for her
promotion as store manager at Mexicali's Alabang Town Center branch.

The Labor Arbiter declared petitioner to have been illegally dismissed by


respondents. By piercing the veil of corporate fiction, the Labor Arbiter ruled that Mexicali
and Calexico are one and the same with interlocking board of directors.Then respondents
filed an Appeal Memorandum with Prayer for Injunction with the NLRC which dismissed
the appeal for having been filed beyond the 10-day reglementary period to appeal. The
NLRC ruled that the Appeal Memorandum was filed only on October 26, 2009 despite
respondents' receipt of the Labor Arbiter's Decision on October 13, 2009.Respondents
filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Issuance of TRO/Injunction explaining
that the Appeal Memorandum filed by them contained a typographical error. The NLRC
granted respondents' motion and reinstated the appeal. It partly granted it by sustaining

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
respondents' contention that Mexicali and Calexico are separate and distinct entities,
Calexico being the true employer of petitioner at the time of her dismissal. Contrary to the
findings of the Labor Arbiter, petitioner voluntarily resigned from Mexicali to transfer to
Calexico in consideration of a higher pay and upon doing so severed her employment ties
with Mexicali. The NLRC, nevertheless, ordered Mexicali, being the employer of Teves
and Luna who caused petitioner's termination from her employment with Calexico, to
reinstate petitioner to her job at Calexico but without paying her any backwages. Before
the CA, it dismissed the Petition for Certiorari of the petitioner.

ISSUES:
I. Whether the CA erred in sustaining the NLRC’s decision reinstating the
respondent’s appeal despite being filed out of time.

II. Whether the CA committed a reversible error in holding that there was no illegal
dismissal.

HELD:
I. No. The appeal before the NLRC was filed on time.Section 6, Rule III of the 2005
Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (2005 NLRC Rules) expressly mandates that
"(f)or purposes of appeal, the period shall be counted from receipt of such decisions,
resolutions, or orders by the counsel or representative of record." This procedure is in line
with the established rule that if a party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall
be made upon his counsel."The purpose of the rule is to maintain a uniform procedure
calculated to place in competent hands the prosecution of a party's case." Thus, Section
9, Rule III of the NLRC Rules provides that "attorneys and other representatives of parties
shall have authority to bind their clients in all matters of procedure x x x."

Accordingly, the 10-day period for filing an appeal with the NLRC should be
counted from the receipt by respondents' counsel of a copy of the Labor Arbiter's Decision
on October 15, 2009. Petitioner's contention that the reckoning period should be the date
respondents actually received the Decision on October 13, 2009 is bereft of any legal
basis. As mentioned, when a party to a suit appears by counsel, service of every
judgment and all orders of the court must be sent to the counsel. Notice to counsel is an
effective notice to the client, while notice to the client and not his counsel is not notice in
law.Therefore, receipt of notice by the counsel of record is the reckoning point of the
reglementary period.From the receipt of the Labor Arbiter's Decision by respondent's
counsel on October 15, 2009, the 10thday falls on October 25, 2009 which is a Sunday,
hence, Monday, October 26, 2009, is the last day to file the appeal. Consequently,
respondents' appeal was timely filed.

II. No. Petitioner voluntarily resigned from Mexicali. No employer-employee


relationship between petitioner and Mexicali at the time of alleged dismissal. The Court
finds that there exists no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and
respondents as to hold the latter liable for illegal dismissal.Petitionerclaims that she was
induced into resigning considering the higher position and attractive salary package;

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
moreover, she avers that her resignation cannot effectively sever her employment ties
with Mexicali.

The SC disagreed. "Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a


situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the
exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from
employment. It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the
intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the
intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the
employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining
whether he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her employment." Here, petitioner
tendered her resignation letter preparatory to her transfer to Calexico for a higher position
and pay. In the said letter, she expressed her gratitude and appreciation for the two
months of her employment with Mexicali and intimated that she regrets having to leave
the company. Clearly, expressions of gratitude and appreciation as well as manifestation
of regret in leaving the company negate the notion that she was forced and coerced to
resign. In the same vein, an inducement for a higher position and salary cannot defeat the
voluntariness of her actions. It should be emphasized that petitioner had an option to
decline the offer for her transfer, however, she opted to resign on account of a promotion
and increased pay. "In termination cases, the employee is not afforded any option; the
employee is dismissed and his only recourse is to institute a complaint for illegal dismissal
against his employer x x x."Clearly, this does not hold true for petitioner in the instant
case. Further, as aptly observed by the CA, petitioner is a managerial employee, who, by
her educational background could not have been coerced, forced or induced into
resigning from her work.

Upon petitioner's resignation, petitioner ceased to be an employee of Mexicali and chose


to be employed at Calexico. Petitioner, however, claims that Mexicali and Calexico are
one and the same and that Mexicali was still her employer upon her transfer to Calexico
since she was hired and dismissed by Mexicali's officers and that Mexicali exercised the
power of control over her work performance.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PICOP RESOURCES, INC. vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and MATEO A
BELIZAR
G.R. No. 206936 August 3, 2016

DOCTRINE: The clear intent of the law is to grant condonation only to employers with
delinquent contributions or pending cases for their delinquencies and who pay their
delinquencies within the six (6)-month period set by the law. It was never the intention of
RA 9903 to give the employer the option of remitting and settling only some of its
delinquencies, and not all; of paying the lowest outstanding delinquencies and ignoring
the most burdensome; of choosing the course of action most beneficial to it, while leaving
its employees and government to enjoy the least desirable outcome. If this were so, then
the purpose of the law would be defeated.

FACTS:
On October 28, 2004, respondent Mateo A. Belizar filed SSC Case No.
11-15788-04 before the Social Security Commission (SSC), to establish his actual period
of employment with herein petitioner PICOP Resources, Inc.6 and compel the latter to
remit unpaid Social Security System (SSS) premium contributions, in order that he may
collect his SSS retirement benefits.
The SSS intervened in the case, and, after proceedings, found thatBelizar was
continuously employed as a preventive maintenance mechanic by petitioner from 1966 to
1978. Despite the respondent’s claim that he was employed starting 1965, the SSC found
no sufficient evidence to warrant such a finding as both the testimonial and documentary
evidence on record preponderates as to show that he was first employed by the
respondent only in November 1966, which, incidentally, is also the date he was reported
to the SSS for coverage by the respondent. As per the SSC, t is paramount to clarify that
not all casual employment are exempt from SS coverage. Section 8 (j) 3 of R.A. No. 1161,
as amended, only exempts from SS coverage employment which is purely casual in
nature and not for the purpose of the occupation or business of the employer. It is also
settled that the determination of whether employment is casual or regular does not
depend on the will or word of the employer, and the procedure of hiring but the nature of
the activities performed by the employee, and to some extent, the length of performance
and its continued existence x x x. And the primary standard of determining regular
employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activities performed by
the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is
whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer. The Commission ruled that petitioner s liable to pay the SSS, the unremitted
SS contributions corresponding to the petitioner’s employment from November 1966 to
December 1978 in the amount of P1,373.10, the 3% per month penalty imposed thereon
for late payment in the amount P17,068.99, and damages The SSS is directed to
immediately process and pay the petitioner’s retirement benefit upon filing of the
appropriate claim,

Before the CA and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 110724, petitioner sought


reversal of the above SSC dispositions, arguing that the latter committed grave abuse of
discretion in declaring that Belizar was employed by it until 1978, and in giving more

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
weight to Belizar’s testimonial evidence instead of its documentary evidence.While
petitioner appealed before the CA, petitioner remitted to the SSS Davao City Branch
Office the amount of ₱1,373.10, or the total adjudged unremitted/delinquent SSS
contributions corresponding to Belizar’s employment from November 1966 to December
1978. This was supposedly done in availment of Republic Act No. 9903 (RA 9903), or the
Social Security Condonation Law of 2009. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

Before the SC, petitioner maintained that with its availment of the condonation
program under RA 9903 and payment of delinquent and unpaid SSS contributions
relative to Belizar’s account within the period allowed by the law and applicable circulars,
its other adjudged liabilities for penalties and damages should be eliminated and
condoned as well; that since it is now undergoing rehabilitation, RA 9903 should be
applied liberally in its case to allow it to fully recover; and that SSS’s opposition,
intervention, and chosen courses of action in the case are inconsistent with the concept of
condonation mandated by RA 9903.
.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can avail of the provisions of RA 9903.

HELD:
No. RA 9903, or the Social Security Condonation Law of 2009, provides:

Section 2. Condonation of Penalty. – Any employer who is delinquent or has not


remitted all contributions due and payable to the Social Security System (SSS),
including those with pending cases either before the Social Security Commission,
courts or Office of the Prosecutor involving collection of contributions and/or
penalties, may within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act:
(a) remit said contributions; or
(b) submit a proposal to pay the same in installments, subject to the implementing
rules and regulations which the Social Security Commission may prescribe:
Provided, That the delinquent employer submits the corresponding collection lists
together with the remittance or proposal to pay installments: Provided, further,
That upon approval and payment in full or in installments of contributions due and
payable to the SSS, all such pending cases filed against the employer shall be
withdrawn without prejudice to the refiling of the case in the event the employer
fails to remit in full the required delinquent contributions or defaults in the payment
of any installment under the approved proposal.

In order to avail of the benefits under the said law, the employer must pay "all
contributions due and payable" to the SSS, and not merely a portion thereof. In
petitioner’s case, it paid only the delinquent contributions corresponding to Belizar’s
account. The February 28, 2013 Certification issued by the SSS Bislig City Branch bears
this out:
This is to certify that Picop Resources, Inc. (PRI) with SSS ER No. 09-1512165-0
had not filed an Application for Condonation of Penalty Program under R.A. No.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 892
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
9903 or Social Security Condonation Law of 2009 in connection with SSC Case
No. 11-15788-04 entitled ‘Mateo Belizar vs PRI.’

This is to certify further that PRI had paid Php1,373.10 on May 24, 2010 for the
principal amount of its premium delinquency covering the period from
January 1967 to December 1978 in favor of Mateo Belizar in compliance with
the resolution of the Social Security Commission in SSC Case No. 11-15788-04.
The penalties and damages, however, remain unpaid up to present.

Had the PRI applied for condonation of penalties under R.A. No. 9903 involving
only one employee, Mateo Belizar, the same would be denied considering that the
availment of the condonation of penalty program under R.A. 9903 should be for all
employees of the delinquent employer.

SSS Circular No. 2010-004, Series of 2010, which provides for the implementing
rules and regulations of RA 9903, states that "any employer who is delinquent or has not
remitted all contributions due and payable to the SSS may avail of" the condonation
program under the law. In order to be covered by the program, the employer must a)
"remit within the period of the Program the full amount of the delinquent
contributions through any SSS Branch with tellering facility or authorized collection
agents of the SSS e.g. banks, payment centers," or b) "submit a proposal x within the
period of the Program to pay the delinquent contributions in installment to the SSS
Branch having jurisdiction over its place of business or household address." It would
appear from the February 28, 2013 Certification issued by the SSS Bislig City Branch that
petitioner failed to pay the full amount of its delinquent contributions; nor did it submit a
proposal to pay the same in installments. Therefore, petitioner has not placed itself under
the coverage of RA 9903.

"The clear intent of the law is to grant condonation only to employers with
delinquent contributions or pending cases for their delinquencies and who pay their
delinquencies within the six (6)-month period set by the law." It was never the intention of
RA 9903 to give the employer the option of remitting and settling only some of its
delinquencies, and not all; of paying the lowest outstanding delinquencies and ignoring
the most burdensome; of choosing the course of action most beneficial to it, while leaving
its employees and government to enjoy the least desirable outcome. If this were so, then
the purpose of the law would be defeated.

To repeat, the clear implication of the February 28, 2013 SSS Certification is that
petitioner did not settle its delinquencies in full. Well into the present proceedings,
petitioner has failed to disprove such fact. For this reason, it cannot avail of the benefits
under RA 9903. "Laws granting condonation constitute an act of benevolence on the
government’s part, similar to tax amnesty laws; their terms are strictly construed against
the applicants, " If petitioner desires to be covered under RA 9903, it must show that it is
qualified to avail of its provisions. This it failed to do, and for this reason, it may not escape
payment of its adjudged liabilities under the SSC's February 4, 2009 Resolution.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 893
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Having gone into the very heart of the case and resolved the main issue that
needed to be addressed, the Court finds no need to dwell on the other matters raised by
the parties. The resolution thereof cannot alter the inevitable outcome; on the other hand,
these issues have become unessential and irrelevant. Since this Court has declared that
petitioner did not qualify for availment of the provisions of RA 9903, it must therefore
answer for its adjudged liabilities as determined by the SSC in its February 4, 2009
Resolution.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs. ROGELIO F. MANALO
G.R. No. 208979, September 21, 2016

DOCTRINE: “Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence ‘refers to negligence


characterized by the want of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally,
with a conscious indifference to the consequences, insofar as other persons may be
affected. It is the omission of that care that even inattentive and thoughtless men
never fail to give to their own property.’ It denotes a flagrant and culpable refusal or
unwillingness of a person to perform a duty. In cases involving public officials, gross
negligence occurs when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.”

FACTS:
In 2004, Rogelio F. Manalo, Computer Operator IV, Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) was assigned as membership processor at the Membership
Department I (Manila) where his main duty was to process membership applications and
was assigned computer access/operator code “A6HT” and terminal ID “A8GJ.”Sometime
in 2005, an audit examination found that on several occasions in July 2004, Manalo’s
operator code and terminal ID was used in creating the membership records and policies
of fictitious and terminated employees of the City Government of Manila (CGM) which
granted loans because of their membership records and policies. The names of the
fictitious CGM employees, when he City Government of Manila issued a certification, do
not belong to any of the employees of the said agency. Also, specimen signatures of the
individuals who purportedly endorsed the membership applications were not found in the
list of authorized endorsing officials and have never been employed of the City
Government of Manila. In a Memorandum dated May 29, 2006, Manalo was directed to
submit an explanation under oath why he should not be charged administratively for his
role in the creation of spurious membership records and policy contracts. In a notarized
letter dated June 6, 2006, Manalo explained that the “said policy contracts were issued by
me because when I processed the applications, I had checked the specimen signatures
of the then endorsing officer and when all the documents were in order, I caused to be
issued (sic) the contract. As far as I am concerned, I was just doing my job as stated in the
charter of commitment…and doing it in good faith…” Manalo was formally charged on
August 29, 2007 with Serious Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Gross Neglect of Duty.

During the hearing of the case, the prosecution showed that the access/operator
code “A6HT” and terminal ID “A8GJ” issued to appellant Manalo were used to create
membership records and policy contracts for separated or fictitious employees of CGM
which resulted in the grant of several spurious loans.On the other hand, Manalo was the
only witness for his defense. He alleged that he had been with the GSIS for 31 years and
denied that he was the reason for the anomalous creation of membership records and
electronic policies.

In a Decision, former GSIS President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia


found Manalo guilty of Serious Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct and imposed upon him
the penalty of dismissal from the service with the accessory penalties of cancellation of

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and the perpetual disqualification from
re-employment in the government service.

The GSIS found respondent guilty of serious dishonesty and grave misconduct.
The Civil Service Commissionaffirmed respondent’s dismissal from the GSIS.
Respondent filed a Petition for Review before the CA contesting the CSC’s findings and
insisting he is innocent. The CA issued the assailed Decision which partially granted
respondent’s petition and ruled that while the latter committed misconduct in his duties
as computer operator/membership processor, the former foundthat petitioner’s
misconduct cannot be characterized as grave. No substantial evidence was adduced to
support the elements of corruption, or clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard
of established rules, that must be present to characterize the misconduct as grave.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in partially granting the respondent’s petition on the ground
that there was no substantial evidence to support the existence of the elements of
corruption or clear intent to violate the law.

HELD:
For failing to perform his duty which thus caused the creation of 17 anomalous
policy records which were in turn used to defraud GSIS of P621,165.00, respondent is
guilty not of grave misconduct or dishonesty, but gross neglect of duty which is punished
with dismissal under Rule 10, Section 46(A)(2) of the Revised Rules of Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service.

As compared to Simple Neglect of Duty which is defined as the failure of an


employee to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to
carelessness or indifference, Gross Neglect of Duty is characterized by want of even
the slightest care, or by conscious indifference to the consequences, or by
flagrant and palpable breach of duty.

Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some established and definite


rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public
officer. To warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious,
important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful
intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of the public officer’s official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the
office. In order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be
manifest in the former.

Finally, Dishonesty is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;


unworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive, or betray.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Needless to say, these constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service as they violate the norm of public accountability and diminish – or tend to diminish
– the people’s faith in the Judiciary.

Under the Revised Rules of Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS),
Gross Neglect of Duty, Grave Misconduct, and Serious Dishonesty are grave offenses
which merit the penalty of dismissal from service even for the first offense. Corollary
thereto, such penalty carries with it the following administrative disabilities: (a)
cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement and other benefits, except
accrued leave credits, if any; (c) perpetual disqualification from reemployment in any
government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled
corporation or government financial institution; and (d) bar from taking civil service
examination.

Gross neglect of duty refers to negligence that is characterized by glaring want of


care; by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally; or by acting with a conscious indifference to
consequences with respect to other persons who may be affected. It is the omission of
that care that even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own
property. In cases involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of
duty is flagrant and palpable. Gross inefficiency is closely related to gross neglect as both
involve specific acts of omission on the part of the employee resulting in damage to the
employer or to the latter's business.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 897
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LEO'S RESTAURANT AND BAR CAFÉ MOUNTAIN SUITE BUSINESS
APARTELLE, LEO Y. LUA AND AMELIA LUA vs. LAARNE C. BENSING
G.R. No. 208535 October 19, 2016

DOCTRINE: Loss of trust and confidence as a ground for dismissal is never intended for
abuse by reason of its subjective nature. It must be pursuant to a breach done willfully,
knowingly and purposely without any valid excuse. It must rest on substantial grounds
and not on mere suspicion, whims, or caprices of the employer.
FACTS:
On 2 January 2002, Kimwa Construction & Development Corporation (Kimwa)
employed Laarne C. Bensing as liaison officer. It also appointed her as Administrative
Officer/Human Resource Head of Leo's Restaurant and Bar Cafe (Restobar), and the
Mountain Suite Business Apartelle (Apartelle) with a salary of P15,000.00 per month on
July 4, 2005. The said appointment took effect on October 18, 2005 when the
establishments became fully operational. Leo Y. Lua, the Manager of the Restobar and
the Apartelle, issued a Memorandum requesting her to temporarily report at Kimwa's
Main Office starting December 30, 2005. She is further requested in another
Memorandum to answer the following charges: (1) she committed dishonesty when she
charged to the Restobar's account 50% of the food she ordered therefrom without
approval of its Owner or Manager; (2) she violated her duties when she did not inform
Leo of the signing of the Pepsi contract; and (3) she failed to account for 47 soft drinks
cases that Pepsi gave the Restobar. In her Explanation, she stated that she did not
receive personal benefits arising from the contract. She insisted that Leo authorized her
to sign the contract with Pepsi on October 24, 2005 in the presence of Sales Manager of
Pepsi, Jovenal Ablanque which she he signed the contract the following day. She further
stated that Restobar received only 10 and additional 20 cases of Pepsi drinks which
Pepsi’s Settlement and Credit Manager Jerome T. Eslabon certified in a letter. On
January 12, 2006, Leo terminated her effective January 15, 2006 on the ground of loss of
trust and confidence which prompted her to file an Amended Complaint for illegal
dismissal, illegal suspension, non-payment of 13th month pay, separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees against Kimwa, the
Restobar, the Apartelle, Leo, and/or Amelia Y. Lua. The Executive Labor Arbiter
rendered a Decision dismissing the Complaint for lack of merit, but Kimwa, et al. to pay
her separation pay amounting to P15,000.00. The National Labor Relations Commission
issued its Resolution finding Laarne's dismissal illegal. Kimwa, et. Al. moved for a
reconsideration of the November 28, 2008 NLRC Resolution which was granted and
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals reiterated that she was
illegally dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is valid dismissal of Laarne C. Bensing.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
An employer has the right to dismiss an employee for just causes, which include
willful breach of trust and confidence reposed on him or her by the employer. To temper
such right to dismiss, and to reconcile it with the employee's security of tenure, it is the
employer who has the burden to show that the dismissal of the employee is for a just
cause. Such determination of just cause must also be made with fairness, in good faith,
and only after observance of due process of law.
Moreover, to dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of trust and confidence,
two requisites must concur: (a) the concerned employee must be holding a position of
trust; and, (b) the loss of trust must be based on willful breach of trust based on clearly
established facts.
Loss of trust and confidence as a ground for dismissal is never intended for abuse
by reason of its subjective nature. It must be pursuant to a breach done willfully,
knowingly and purposely without any valid excuse. It must rest on substantial grounds
and not on mere suspicion, whims, or caprices of the employer.
In fine, "loss of confidence should not be simulated. It should not be used as a
subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified. Loss of confidence may
not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. It must
be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith."
As far as the first requisite is concerned, Laarne C. Bensing is shown to occupy a
position of trust as her managerial work was directly related to management policies, and
generally required exercise of discretion and independent judgment. Nonetheless, the
second requirement is wanting since Kimwa, et.al. failed to prove that their loss of trust
on her was founded on clearly established facts.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JUAN B. HERNANDEZ vs. CROSSWORLD MARINE SERVICES, INC., MYKONOS
SHIPPING CO., LTD., AND ELEAZAR DIAZ
G.R. No. 209098 November 14, 2016

DOCTRINE: As a rule, quitclaims and waivers or releases are looked upon with disfavor
and frowned upon as contrary to public policy. They are thus ineffective to bar claims for
the full measure of a worker's legal rights, particularly when the following conditions are
applicable: 1) where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an
unsuspecting or gullible person, or (2) where the terms of settlement are unconscionable
on their face. To determine whether the Quitclaims signed by respondents are valid, one
important factor that must be taken into account is the consideration accepted by
respondents; the amount must constitute a reasonable settlement equivalent to the full
measure of their legal rights. In this case, the Quitclaims signed by the respondents do
not appear to have been made for valuable consideration
FACTS:
Juan B. Hernandez has been working continuously for Mykonos Shipping Co.,
Ltd. (Mykonos), Crossworld Marine Services, Inc. (Crossworld), and Eleazar Diaz -
Crossworld's President/Chief Executive Officer - since November 14, 2005, under
different employment contracts covering the latter's several oceangoing vessels. On 7
October 2008, he was once more engaged to work as Chief Cook aboard the vessel M/V
Nikomarin. This latest employment was for a period of nine months, with a monthly
salary ofUS$587.00, plus fixed overtime pay, food allowance, leave pay, and long
service bonus. When his contract expired, his service was extended for an additional five
months. Thereafter, he was repatriated on December 19, 2009. Under a new contract,
he underwent a pre-employment medical examination on March 22, 2010 wherein he
was found to be suffering from hypertension and diabetes mellitus. He was declared fit
for duty and required to take maintenance medication; however, they deferred his
employment on account of his state of health. In 2011, he consulted two separate
physicians who turned out the same diagnosis and declared him unfit for sea duty in
whatever capacity as seaman. He demanded compensation by way of disability benefits
and medical expenses from them, but the latter refused to pay. On 8 April 2011, he filed
a claim for disability benefits, medical expenses, allowances, damages, and attorney's
fees against them before the Labor Arbiter. Labor Arbiter Jose G. De Vera dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit. The National Labor Relations Commission granted the appeal
of Juan. It ruled that there is work connection between the complainant's aggravation of
his illness and his work. In a Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals, the
said court annulled and set aside the NLRC decision. Mykonos, Crossworld and Eleazar
paid the P2,702,766.00 judgment award on July 17, 2012. In return, Juan signed a
Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment (All Without Prejudice to the Pending Petition for
Certiorari in the Court of Appeals), Receipt of Payment, and Affidavit - which were duly
filed with the NLRC and CA. He later filed a Motion for Reconsideration insisting that the
Petition for Certiorari has been rendered moot and academic by their satisfaction of the

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
judgment in full. The CA denied the same so a Petition for Certiorari is filed in the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the voluntary payment of the judgment award by Mykonos
Shipping Co., Ltd., Crossworld Marine Services, Inc., and Eleazar Diaz to Juan B.
Hernandez resulted in the full and final satisfaction of the judgment.
HELD:
In More Maritime Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC, the Court ruled that: The law does not
consider as valid any agreement to receive less compensation than what a worker is
entitled to recover nor prevent him from demanding benefits to which he is entitled.
Quitclaims executed by the employees are thus commonly frowned upon as contrary to
public policy and ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the workers legal rights,
particularly when the following conditions are applicable: 1) where there is clear proof
that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or (2) where the
terms of settlement are unconscionable on their face. To determine whether the
Quitclaims signed by respondents are valid, one important factor that must be taken into
account is the consideration accepted by respondents; the amount must constitute a
reasonable settlement equivalent to the full measure of their legal rights. In this case, the
Quitclaims signed by the Mykonos Shipping Co., Ltd., Crossworld Marine Services, Inc.,
and Eleazar Diaz do not appear to have been made for valuable consideration
Mykonos, Crossworld, and Eleazar could have simply paid the judgment award
without attaching conditions that have far-reaching consequences other than those
intended by a simple compliance with what was required under the circumstances - that
is, the mandatory execution proceedings following a favorable judgment allowed under
the Labor Code. But they did not; they had to find a way to tie Juan B. Hernandez’s
hands permanently, dangling the check as bait, so to speak. To borrow from a fairly
recent ruling of the Court, "the execution of the documents cannot be tolerated as it
amounts to a deceptive scheme to unconditionally absolve employers from every liability.
.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JESUS B. VILLAMOR vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
G.R. No. 204422 November 21, 2016

DOCTRINE: Cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are considered as


occupational diseases under Nos. 19 and 29, respectively, of Annex 'A' of the
Implementing Rules of P.D. No.626, as amended. Thus, it is not necessary that there be
proof of causal relation between the work and the illness which resulted in the
respondent's disability.
FACTS:
In 1978, Jesus B. Villamor with Social Security System No. 03-4047063-3, was
employed by Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. (VVCCI). On 3 November 2006, he was
brought to Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital, Manila, due to dizziness associated with
numbness and weakness on his left arm and leg. After more than a week of confinement,
he was discharged from the said hospital with diagnoses of Hypertension Stage 1;
Cerebro-Vascular Disease (CVD) Acute, Non-Hemorrhagic Infarct Right Pons and Right
Basal Ganglia; Dyslipidemia (abnormal levels of lipids [cholesterol triglycerides, or both]
carried by lipoproteins in the blood). On 9 March 2007, he filed before SSS Pasig City
Branch, claims for sickness benefits under the SSS law and the EC TTD benefits under
the EC law for his CVD or stroke, Infarct Hypertension. SSS Pasig Branch granted his
claim for sickness benefits under the SSS law, but denied his claim for EC TTD benefits
on the ground that there is no causal relationship between his illness and his working
conditions. Upon further evaluation by SSS-Medical Operations Department, it denied
the claim for lack of a causal relationship between his job as clerk and illness. It also
noted that his smoking history, alcoholic beverage drinking habit, and poor compliance
with anti-hypertensive medication increased his risk of developing his illness. Both his
appeal and motion for reconsideration was denied by the Employees' Compensation
Commission which the Court of Appeals affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jesus B. Villamor is entitled to his claim for EC TTD benefits under
PD No. 626, as amended.
HELD:
In Government Service Insurance System v. Baul whether the claimant who was
diagnosed with essential hypertension later suffered a stroke, the Court affirmed the
claimant's entitlement to compensation as both essential hypertension and stroke are
considered occupational diseases. The Court ruled that: Cerebro-vascular accident and
essential hypertension are considered as occupational diseases under Nos. 19 and 29,
respectively, of Annex 'A' of the Implementing Rules of P.D. No.626, as amended. Thus,
it is not necessary that there be proof of causal relation between the work and the illness
which resulted in the respondent's disability. The open-ended Table of Occupational

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Diseases requires no proof of causation. In general, a covered claimant suffering from an
occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.
However, although cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are
listed occupational diseases, their compensability requires compliance with all the
conditions set forth in the Rules. In short, both are qualified occupational diseases. For
cerebro-vascular accident, the claimant must prove the following: (1) there must be a
history, which should be proved, of trauma at work (to the head specifically) due to
unusual and extraordinary physical or mental strain or event, or undue exposure to
noxious gases in industry; (2) there must be a direct connection between the trauma or
exertion in the course of the employment and the cerebro-vascular attack; and (3) the
trauma or exertion then and there caused a brain hemorrhage. On the other hand,
essential hypertension is compensable only if it causes impairment of function of body
organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain, resulting in permanent disability, provided
that, the following documents substantiate it: (a) chest X-ray report; (b) ECG report; (c)
blood chemistry report; (d) funduscopy report; and (e) c-T scan.
Taking the cue from the Baul case, the Court finds that Jesus B. Villamor is
entitled to compensation for his illness. Just like in Baul, he was diagnosed with
hypertension and stroke, as evidenced by his medical reports: Cranial CT Scan, Chest
X-Ray Result, Laboratory or Blood Chemistry Result, and Electrocardiogram Result. He
was also able to show that his work and position in the union caused him physical and
mental strain as he had to deal with the demands of various types of people. Thus, there
is a probability that his work and position in the union increased his risk of suffering a
stroke, which affected his brain, caused cerebral infarctions, paralysis of the left side of
his body, difficulty in speaking, and loss of muscular coordination.
As to the findings of respondents SSS and ECC that he is a chronic smoker and
drinker, the Court finds that it should not bar him claim for compensation, whether or not
such findings are true. In Government Service Insurance System v. De Castro, the Court
said that: We find it strange that both the ECC and the GSIS singled out the presence of
smoking and drinking as the factors that rendered De Castro's ailments, otherwise listed
as occupational, to be non-compensable. To be sure, the causes of CAD and
hypertension that the ECC listed and explained in its decision cannot be denied; smoking
and drinking are undeniably among these causes. However, they are not the sole causes
of CAD and hypertension and, at least, not under the circumstances of the present case.
For this reason, we fear for the implication of the ECC ruling if it will prevail and be read
as definitive on the effects of smoking and drinking on compensability issues, even on
diseases that are listed as occupational in character. The ruling raises the possible
reading that smoking and drinking, by themselves, are factors that can bar
compensability.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 903
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
INTERADENT ZAHNTECHNIK PHILIPPINES, INC., BERNARDINO G. BANTEGUI,
JR. AND SONIA J. GRANDEA vs. REBECCA F. SIMBILLO
G.R. No. 207315 November 23, 2016

DOCTRINE: For loss of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for dismissal, it must
be substantial and founded on clearly established facts. Loss of confidence must not be
used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified; it must be
genuine, not a mere afterthought, to justify earlier action taken in bad faith.
FACTS:
Rebecca F. Simbillo worked at Interadent Zahntechnik Philippines, Inc.
(Interadent) as a rank-and-file employee from May 2, 2004 up to March 2006. In April
2008, she was rehired as Accounting Manager and subsequently promote to Finance
and Accounting manager on April 16, 2010. She was also elected by the Board of
Director as Treasurer on March 31, 2010. On 23 July 2010, Interadent sought a
company-wide implementation of security measures such as body frisking and
bag/personal items inspection of all employees upon ingress and egress of office,
disconnection of all USB ports and prohibition of cellular phone usage due to an alleged
leakage of security information uncovered by the external auditors. On 28 July 2010,
upon the directive of Bernardino G. Bantegui, Jr., all network and internet connections in
the Accounting Department were removed and disabled. Rebecca’s e-mail account was
likewise suspended. A Memorandum was served to her the next day requiring her to
submit a written explanation and attend an administrative hearing on August 2, 2010,
regarding a message she posted on her Facebook account referring to company
concerns with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and insulting statements against a
co-worker. She was preventively suspended for seven days effective July 29, 2010 to
August 6, 2010. On the following day, Rebecca through her counsel, wrote a reply-letter
arguing that she was already constructively dismissed even prior to her receipt of the
Notice to Explain when certain security procedures were directed exclusively against
her. Her suspension was extended up to August 25, 2010. On 9 August 2010, she filed
with the Labor Arbiter a Complaint for constructive illegal dismissal, non-payment of
service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, illegal suspension, claims for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees against Interadent, Bernardino and Sonia J.
Grandea. On 24 August 2010, Interadent issued a Second Notice informing her
termination from service effective August 25, 2010 on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence. She asserts that her dismissal was without just cause or compliance with
procedural due process since the alleged loss of trust and confidence was based on
self-serving allegations and mere speculation. On the other hand, Interdadent insisted
that she was terminated for a valid and just cause and with compliance with procedural
due process. The Labor Arbiter ruled that she was not constructively dismissed, because
she failed to prove her claim of discrimination. Such ruling was affirmed by the National
Labor Relations Commission. She filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals which was granted.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 904
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of Rebecca F. Simbillo is valid.
HELD:
It bears emphasizing that the right of an employer to dismiss its employees on the
ground of loss of trust and confidence must not be exercised arbitrarily. For loss of trust
and confidence to be a valid ground for dismissal, it must be substantial and founded on
clearly established facts. Loss of confidence must not be used as a subterfuge for
causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified; it must be genuine, not a mere
afterthought, to justify earlier action taken in bad faith. Because of its subjective nature,
this Court has been very scrutinizing in cases of dismissal based on loss of trust and
confidence because the same can easily be concocted by an abusive employer.
In this case, the act alleged to have caused the loss of trust and confidence of
Interadent Zahntechnik Philippines, Inc. in Rebecca F. Simbillo was her Facebook post
which supposedly suggests that Interadent was being "feasted on" by the BIR and also
contains insulting statements against a co-worker and hence has compromised the
reputation of the company. According to them, there was disclosure of confidential
information that gives the impression that Interadent is under investigation by the BIR for
irregular transactions. However, we agree with the CA's observation that the Facebook
entry did not contain any corporate record or any confidential information. Otherwise
stated, there was really no actual leakage of information. No company information or
corporate record was divulged by Rebecca.
Their contention that her second offense of divulging confidential company
information merits her termination deserves scant consideration. Other than Interadent’s
self-serving allegations, there was no concrete proof that she had a past infraction
involving disclosure of confidential information of the company. If indeed Rebecca has
been found guilty for not being trustworthy due to an incident that happened in July 2009
as alleged by them, she should not have been promoted to a higher position as Finance
and Accounting Manager in April 2010 and elected as Treasurer in March 2010.
Moreover, she was given salary and merit increases for the period covering June
2009-May 2010,40 which is an indication of her high performance rating.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 905
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
TURKS SHAWARMA COMPANY/GEM ZEÑAROSA vs. FELICIANO Z. PAJARON
AND LARRY A. CARBONILLA
G.R. No. 207156 January 16, 2017

DOCTRINE: The posting of cash or surety bond is therefore mandatory and


jurisdictional; failure to comply with this requirement renders the decision of the Labor
Arbiter final and executory
FACTS:
Gem Zeñarosa hired Feliciano Z. Pajaron in May 2007 as service crew and Larry
A. Carbonilla in April 2007 as head crew for Turks Shawarma. On 9 April 2010, Gem
asked Feliciano to sign a piece of paper stating that he was receiving the correct amount
of wages and that he had no claims whatsoever from him. He refused to sign the paper
so Gem fired him from work. Larry, on the other hand, had an altercation with his
supervisor Conchita Marcillana while at work. He was immediately dismissed from
service by Gem. He was also asked by Gem to sign a piece of paper acknowledging his
debt amounting to P7,000.00. Both claimed that there was no just or authorized cause
for their dismissal so they filed their respective complaints for constructive and actual
illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, holiday premium, rest day
premium, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay against Turks Shawarma/Gem
Zeñarosa on April 15, 2010. Both complaints were consolidated. Turks and Gem denied
their dismissal. They averred that they actually abandoned their work. The Labor Arbiter
found credible Feliciano and Larry's version and held them constructively and illegally
dismissed. Due to alleged non-availability of counsel, Gem himself filed a Notice of
Appeal with Memorandum and Motion to Reduce Bond with the NLRC. The motion to
reduce bond was denied stating financial difficulties may not be invoked as a valid
ground to reduce bond. The partial bond in the amount of P15,000.00 is not reasonable
in relation to the award which totalled to P197,936.27. Turks and Gem appeal was thus
dismissed by the NLRC for non-perfection. The motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied so he filed a Petition for Certiorari with application for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals which
was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the payment of bond is necessary in the perfection of appeal.
HELD:
"It is clear from both the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules of Procedure that there
is legislative and administrative intent to strictly apply the appeal bond requirement, and
the Court should give utmost regard to this intention." The posting of cash or surety bond
is therefore mandatory and jurisdictional; failure to comply with this requirement renders
the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory. This indispensable requisite for the
perfection of an appeal "is to assure the workers that if they finally prevail in the case, the

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
monetary award will be given to them upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal and is
further meant to discourage employers from using the appeal to delay or evade payment
of their obligations to the employees."
However, the Court, in special and justified circumstances, has relaxed the
requirement of posting a supersedeas bond for the perfection of an appeal on technical
considerations to give way to equity and justice. Thus, under Section 6 of Rule VI of the
2005 NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure, the reduction of the appeal bond is allowed,
subject to the following conditions: (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on
meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is
posted by the appellant. Compliance with these two conditions will stop the running of
the period to perfect an appeal.
In the case at bar, Turks Shawarma and Gem Zeñarosa filed a Motion to Reduce
Bond together with their Notice of Appeal and posted a cash bond ofP15,000.00 within
the 10-day reglementary period to appeal. The CA correctly found that the NLRC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' motion to reduce bond as such
motion was not predicated on meritorious and reasonable grounds and the amount
tendered is not reasonable in relation to the award. The NLRC correctly held that the
supposed ground cited in the motion is not well-taken tor there was no evidence to prove
Gem's claim that the payment of the full amount of the award would greatly affect his
business due to financial setbacks. Besides, "the law does not require outright payment
of the total monetary award; the appellant has the option to post either a cash or surety
bond. In the latter case, appellant must pay only a moderate and reasonable sum for the
premium to ensure that the award will be eventually paid should the appeal fail."
In the case of McBurnie v. Ganzon, the Court has set a provisional percentage of
10% of the monetary award (exclusive of damages and attorney's fees) as reasonable
amount of bond that an appellant should post pending resolution by the NLRC of a
motion for a bond's reduction. Only after the posting of this required percentage shall an
appellant's period to perfect an appeal be suspended. Applying this parameter, the
P15,000.00 partial bond posted by Gem is not considered reasonable in relation to the
total monetary award of P197,936.27.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 907
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JULIETA B. STA. ANA vs. MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC.
G.R. No. 208459February 15, 2017

DOCTRINE: In this regard, to legally dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of trust,
the employer must establish that a) the employee occupied a position of trust and
confidence, or has been routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer's
money or property; b) the employee committed a wilful breach of trust based on clearly
established facts; and c) such loss of trust relates to the employee's performance of
duties. In fine, there must be actual breach of duty on the part of the employee to justify
his or her dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.

It is a cardinal rule that loss of trust and confidence should be genuine, and not
simulated; it must arise from dishonest or deceitful conduct, and must not be arbitrarily
asserted in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence. While proof beyond reasonable
doubt is not required, loss of trust must have some basis or such reasonable ground for
one to believe that the employee committed the infraction, and the latter's participation
makes him or her totally unworthy of the trust demanded by the position.

FACTS:
MJCI, a domestic corporation with legislative franchise to operate horse race
betting, hired Julieta B. Sta. Ana as outlet teller of its off-track betting station in Tayuman,
Manila. Because horse racing was not on a daily basis, Sta. Ana's work schedule was
reduced.
In a memorandum, the Treasury Department discovered that she was illegally
appropriating funds and lending it out to employees. As a result, MJCI required its
employees to report if they have obtained a loan. During the audit, there was an
unaccounted check remittances amounting to 44.3 Million.
The Special Disciplinary Committee formally charged Sta. Ana with Dishonesty
and Other Fraudulent Acts. After an investigation of which she was notified, she was
further informed of her suspension for 30 days without pay.
During the hearing conducted by SDC and submission of affidavits, they found
Sta. Ana guilty of conspiring to defraud, illegally take funds, and cause irreparable
damage to MJCI. That she committed gross inexcusable negligence for failure to
perform her duties and protect the interest of MJCI. SDC recommended the dismissal of
Sta. Ana and the filing of criminal cases for qualified theft and other appropriate charges.
MJCI immediately issue Notice of Termination. Sta. Ana filed before the Labor Arbiter
illegal dismissal. The latter ruled against Sta. Ana that the filing of criminal cases by
MJCI resulted to their lost of trust and confidence. NLRC and Court of Appeals affirmed
the ruling of lower court.

ISSUE:
Whether Sta. Ana was validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence

HELD:

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 908
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
No. The High Court reversed the ruling of the lower court.
It is settled that the employer has the right to dismiss an employee for just causes,
which include willful breach of trust and confidence. Complementary to such right is the
burden of the employer to prove that the employee's dismissal is for a just cause, and the
employer afforded the latter due process before termination. The employer has to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that there was breach of the trust given.
In this case, Sta. Ana derived capital from the bank loans she obtained secured
by real estate mortgage on her property and from the income of her fishing business.
Later, her fishing vessels were sold and the proceeds thereof were infused as additional
capital in her lending business. Simply put, she had funds derived from sources other
than her monthly salary; and, there was no direct linkage shown between Sta. Ana's
business and the alleged stolen funds of MJCI.
It is a cardinal rule that loss of trust and confidence should be genuine, and not
simulated; it must arise from dishonest or deceitful conduct, and must not be arbitrarily
asserted in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence. While proof beyond reasonable
doubt is not required, loss of trust must have some basis or such reasonable ground for
one to believe that the employee committed the infraction, and the latter's participation
makes him or her totally unworthy of the trust demanded by the position.
Therefore, Sta. Ana was illegally dismissed from work.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 909
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ERNESTO BROWNvsMARSWIN* MARKETING, INC., and SANY** TAN, represented
by BERNADETTE S. AZUCENA
G.R. No. 206891 15 MARCH 2017

DOCTRINE: In dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that the
employee was not terminated, or if dismissed, that the dismissal was legal. Resultantly,
the failure of the employer to discharge such burden would mean that the dismissal is
unjustified and thus, illegal. The employer cannot simply discharge such burden by its
plain assertion that it did not dismiss the employee; and it is highly absurd if the employer
will escape liability by its mere claim that the employee abandoned his or her work. In
fine, where there is no clear and valid cause for termination, the law treats it as a case of
illegal dismissal.

FACTS:
Brown filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salary and 13th
month pay as well as damages against its employer.
Brown alleged that in 2009, he employed him as building maintenance or
electrician with a salary of ₱500.00 per day. He was assigned at Marswin 's warehouse
in Valenzuela, and was tasked to maintain its sanitation and make necessary electrical
repairs thereon.
Brown further averred that on May 28, 20l0, he reported at the Main Office of
Marswin, and was told that it was already his last day of work. Allegedly, he was made to
sign a document that he did not understand and, thereafter he was no longer admitted
back to work. Thus, he insisted that he was terminated without due process of law. The
Labor Arbiter declared that Brown was illegally dismissed and ordered his reinstatement.
NLRC. However, CA decreed that this case did not involve the dismissal of an employee
on the ground of abandonment, there being no evidence proving that Brown was actually
dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA erred in reversing the ruling of the NLRC

HELD:
No. In order for the employer to discharge its burden to prove that the employee
committed abandonment, which constitutes neglect of duty, and is a just cause for
dismissal, the employer must prove that the employee 1) failed to report for work or had
been absent without valid reason; and 2) had a dear intention to discontinue his or her
employment. The second requirement must be manifested by overt ads and is more
determinative in concluding that the employee is guilty of abandonment. This is because
abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot be lightly presumed from indefinite acts.
Here, Brown contends that on May 28, 2010, his employer informed him that it
was already his last day of work. Thereafter, he was no longer admitted back to work.
Clearly, there was no showing that Brown committed abandonment. Instead, evidenced
proved that he was illegally dismissed from work.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 910
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
TSM SIDPPING PHILS., INC. and/or DAlVIPSKIBSSELSKABET NORDEN A/S.
and/or CAPT. CASTILLO vs LOUIE L. PATIÑO
G.R. No. 210289 20 MARCH 2017

DOCTRINE: To stress, the rule is that a temporary total disability only becomes
permanent when the company-designated physician, within the 240-day period, declares
it to be so, or when after the lapse of the said period, he fails to make such declaration.

FACTS:
Based on a contract of employment, respondent will work for 6 months for the
vessel Nord Nightingale.
On May 20, 2010, while working on board the vessel, respondent injured his right
hand while securing a mooring rope. He was brought to a medical facility in Istanbul,
Turkey, where X-ray showed a fracture on his 5th metacarpal bone. Respondent's right
hand was placed in a cast and thereafter he was repatriated.
Upon arrival in Manila on May 24, 2010, petitioners referred respondent to the
company-designated physician, Dr. Cruz for further treatment. Respondent was also
referred to an orthopedic surgeon who recommended surgical operation to correct the
malunited fractured metacarpal bone. Respondent underwent Open Reduction and
Internal Fixation of the fractured 5th metacarpal bone at Manila Doctors Hospital.After
extensive medical treatments, therapy, and follow-up examinations, Dr. Cruz, on August
17, 2010, rendered an interim assessment of respondent's disability under the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration - Standard Employment Contract at Grade 10, or
loss of grasping power for small objects between the fold of the finger of one hand.On
November 19, 2010, respondent consulted Dr.NicanorEscutin (Dr.Escutin), who
assessed him to have permanent disability unfit for sea duty in whatever capacity as a
seaman. Respondent asked for a permanent total disability benefit before the Labor
Arbiter. Labor Arbiter granted. On appeal, NLRC reversed and ruled that an illness which
lasted for more than 120 days does not necessarily mean that a seafarer is entitled to full
disability benefits, and that the company-designated physician's partial disability grading
is still binding and controlling. Court of Appeals affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is entitled to the total and permanent disability
benefit

HELD:
No. The Court ruled that respondent is not entitled to total and permanent
disability compensation. The filing of his complaint is premature and in breach of his
contractual obligation with the petitioners. Dr. Cruz's Grade 10 disability rating prevails
for failure to properly dispute it in accordance with an agreed procedure. Respondent is
thus entitled to the amount corresponding to Grade 10 based on the certification issued
by Dr. Cruz.

To stress, the rule is that a temporary total disability only becomes permanent
when the company-designated physician, within the 240-day period, declares it to be so,

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 911
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
or when after the lapse of the said period, he fails to make such declaration. After the
initial interim assessment of Dr. Cruz, respondent continued with his medical treatment.
Dr. Cruz then rendered on September 29, 2010 a final assessment of Grade 10 upon
reaching the maximum medical cure. Counting from the date of repatriation on May 24,
2010 up to September 29, 2010, this assessment was made within the 240-day period.
Clearly, before the maximum 240-day medical treatment period expired, respondent was
issued a Grade 10 disability rating which is merely equivalent to a permanent partial
disability under the POEA-SEC.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 912
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HERMA SHIPYARD vs. Danilo Oliveros
G.R. No. 208936 17 April 2017

DOCTRINE: A project employee under Article 294 of the Labor Code is one whose
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee.

The repeated and successive rehiring of respondents as project-based employees does


not by and of itself, qualify them as regular employees. Case law states that length of
service through rehiring is not the controlling in the employment tenure of project-based
employees but, as earlier mentioned, whether the employment has been fixed for a
specific project or undertaking, with its completion having been determined at the time of
their engagement.

FACTS:
Herma Shipyard a domestic corporation engaged in the business of shipbuilding
and repair. The respondents were its employees occupying various positions such as
welder, leadman, pipe fitter, laborer, helper among others.

The respondents filed before the Regional Arbitration Branch III a Complaint for
illegal dismissalagainst petitioners. Respondents alleged that they are Herma Shipyard's
regular employees who have been continuously performing tasks usually necessary and
desirable in its business. On various dates, however, petitioners dismissed them from
employment.

It was alleged also that petitioners made them sign employment contracts for a
fixed period ranging from one to four months to make it appear that they were
project-based employees. Per respondents, petitioners resorted to this scheme to defeat
their right to security of tenure, but in truth there was never a time when they ceased
working for Herma Shipyard due to expiration of project-based employment contracts. In
fact, if they were indeed project employees, petitioners should have reported to the
Department of Labor and Employment the completion of such project. But petitioners
have never submitted such report to the DOLE.

For their defense, petitioners argued that respondents were its project-based
employees in its shipbuilding projects and that the specific project for which they were
hired had already been completed.

Labor Arbiter dismissed their complaints and ruled that they were project
employees and was validly terminated. NLRC and Court of appeals also find them as
project employees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents herein are project employees

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:

Yes respondents are project employees. If we consider the nature of Herma


Shipyard's business, it is clear that Herma Shipyard only hires workers when it has
existing contracts for shipbuilding and repair. It is not engaged in the business of building
vessels for sale which would require it to continuously construct vessels for its inventory
and consequently hire a number of permanent employees. The services of project-based
employees are co-terminous with the project and may be terminated upon the end or
completion of the project or a phase thereof for which they were hired.

The principal test in determining whether particular employees were engaged as


project-based employees, as distinguished from regular employees, is whether they
were assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration and scope of
which was specified at, and made known to them, at the time of their engagement.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 914
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
CRIMINAL LAW

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 915
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTON MADEO
G.R. No. 176070 | October 2, 2009
DOCTRINE: Rape is nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by
which a man keeps a woman in a state of fear and humiliation. Thus, it is not even
impossible for a victim of rape not to make an outcry against an unarmed assailant.
Physical resistance is immaterial in a rape case when the victim is sufficiently intimidated
by her assailant and she submits against her will because of fear for her personal safety.
FACTS:
On 7 December 1999 at about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, while she (victim – AAA)
was on her way to her grandmother's house, her classmate, Jovelyn Fortuna (Jovelyn),
invited her to the house of her uncle, Madeo. Soon thereafter,Jovelyn left AAA alone with
Madeowho summoned AAA to his room. When she did not comply, Madeo forcibly
pulled her inside the room, undressed her and thereafter touched her private parts. He
likewise undressed, ordered AAA to lie down, went on top of her and proceeded to have
carnal knowledge of her. After which, she felt pain in her private parts; that thereafter,
appellant warned AAA not to reveal to anyone what happened or he would kill her and
her family; that after the sexual assault, appellant put on his pants; that AAA also put on
her shorts and was told to go home; that after some time she narrated the incident to her
mother who brought her to the hospital for medical examination and to the NBI to report
the incident.
In defense, Madeo alleged that at the day of the said rape, he was working at the
rolling rice mill together with Berting Jacob, Etong, Rommel, RogerMadolid who owned
the rice mill and another person whose name he forgot. On rebuttal, the prosecution
presented Roger Madolid who denied hiring Virgilio Jacob and appellant as workers in
his rolling rice mill. He testified that on 7 December 1999, his rolling rice mill was under
repair at the Andrada Repair Shop in Nancamaliran, Urdaneta City.
The RTC rendered judgment convicting Madeo of Simple Rape. The same was
affirmed by the Appellate Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Madeo is guilty of simple rape
HELD:
Yes
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above is present;
Although it was specifically alleged in the Information that appellant knew of AAA's
"mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap," still, no proof was
presented that appellant indeed knew AAA's alleged mental deficiency. In People v.
Limio, we held that:
By itself, the fact that the offended party in a rape case is a mental retardate does
not call an imposition of the death penalty, unless knowledge by the offender of
such mental disability is specifically alleged and adequately proved by the
prosecution.
For the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, now embodied in Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), expressly provides that the death penalty shall also be imposed if the
crime of rape is committed with the qualifying circumstance of "(10) when the offender
knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the
offended party at the time of the commission of the crime." Said knowledge, in our view,
qualifies rape as a heinous offense. Absent said circumstance, which must be proved by
the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, the conviction of appellant for qualified rape
under Art. 266-B (10), RPC, could not be sustained, although the offender may be held
liable for simple rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly disregarded appellant's
denial and alibi. These two defenses are inherently the weakest as they are negative
defenses. Mere denials of involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over the
positive testimony of the offended party. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the
defendant to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he
must likewise demonstrate that it is physically impossible for him to be at the scene of
the crime at the time.
In the instant case, AAA positively identified appellant as the author of the crime.
It should be noted that affirmative testimony, like that of the victim's, is stronger than
appellant's bare denial, which is a negative assertion. As regards appellant's alibi, we
find that he failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of
the crime at the time it was committed.
In view of the foregoing, we find that appellant was correctly found guilty of the
crime of simple rape; i.e., by having carnal knowledge of a woman committed through
the use of force, threats or intimidation. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty therefor is reclusion perpetua.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REYNALDO ALBALATE, JR.
G.R. No. 174480 | December 18, 2009
DOCTRINE:The bare testimony of the victim as to her age is insufficient proof of her
age.
FACTS:
On the morning of the said day when Maria, 12 years of age, was raped on two
separate incidents by Albalate, she was alone in the house of her grandparents, Albalate
armed with an ice pick, forcibly removed her dress and placed himself on top of her.
Afterwards, he inserted his penis in her private and warned her that if she will tell
anybody what he had done to her, he will kill her. On the evening of the same day, he
once again did the same thing to her. Maria reported the rape incidents to her
grandmother who is also the mother of the accused but her grandmother told her that
she was lying.
On the other hand, the accused in order to exculpate himself from the crime
charged in the two Informations interposed the defense of denial and alibi. Accused
denied that he twice raped the victim because at about 8 in the morning and about 9 in
the evening of that day. He also claimed that the parents of the victim were mad at him
that is why they filed the instant cases against him. He explained that when they were
young, the victim's father was angry with him because of the sharing of copras in their
farm. One day, they had a fight and "Maria's" father chased and boxed him so he boxed
the former.
The RTC rendered judgment finding Albalate guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
rape. Affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the mere testimony of the victim as to her age is sufficient proof of
her age
HELD:
No.
The Informations alleged that “Maria” was a 12-year old minor when she was
ravished by her uncle, a relative by consanguinity within the 3rd civil degree. The
prosecution’s evidence as to the age of the victim constituted merely of the victim’s
testimony. We find this bare testimony insufficient proof of her age. As we held in People
v. Manalili, “the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must be alleged
in the criminal complaint or information and proved conclusively and indubitably as the
crime itself”. We also ruled in People v. Tabanggay, that there must be independent
evidence proving the age of the victim, other than the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses and the absence of denial by the accused.
We also reiterate the guidelines set forth in People v. Pruna in appreciating the
age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, viz:

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1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would
suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be


proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document or the testimony of the
victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The
failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be
taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JULIUS CACAO y PRIETO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 180870, January 22, 2010
DOCTRINE: There can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when
nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the same specimen
examined and established to be the prohibited drug.
FACTS:
On October 15, 2004, two separate informations were filed against Joseph Canlas
y Naguit and Cacao indicting them for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 before
the RTC of Laoag City. When arraigned on November 30, 2004, Cacao pleaded not
guilty. Thereafter trial on the merits followed.
On November 25, 2005, the trial court rendered its judgment finding Cacao guilty
of the offense charged. On July 27, 2007, the appellate court rendered judgment
affirming Cacaos conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court gravely erred in ruling that the guilt of the accused was
proven beyond reasonable doubt considering the myriad material inconsistencies,
discrepancies, and incredible statements in the prosecution evidence
HELD:
Yes. There was a failure to identify indubitably the prohibited drug allegedly confiscated
from Cacao. The testimonies of the prosecutions principal witnesses are inconsistent as to who
delivered the prohibited drug to the evidence custodian. PO3 Celso Pang-ag and PO2
JonelMangapit both testified that it was the latter who brought the item confiscated from
petitioner to the evidence custodian, SPO3 Loreto Ancheta. The foregoing assertions are totally
at odds with the testimony of Ancheta, the evidence custodian. The latter denied that it was
Mangapit who delivered the item allegedly recovered from Cacao. Instead, he repeatedly and
categorically declared that it was SP03 Balolong from whom he received the plastic sachet of
shabu. Ancheta confirmed his declaration that it was Balolong and definitely not Mangapit who
handed to him the plastic sachet of shabu.
The prosecution failed to satisfactorily establish that the item presented in court was the
same item confiscated from Cacao. The patent inconsistency between the testimonies of
Mangapit and Pang-ag, on one hand, and the testimony of Ancheta on the other hand,
necessarily leads us to doubt that the plastic sachet of shabu identified in court is the same item
that was allegedly seized and confiscated from petitioner. If the version of Mangapit is to be
believed, then the most lamentable aspect pertains to his failure to identify the seized item with
certainty. For sure Mangapit, who is the most competent person to make the proper
identification being the officer who confiscated the item from Cacao, never actually identified the
same.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Any identification made by these witnesses on the item allegedly seized from petitioner
is rendered meaningless and bereft of probative value in view of the categorical denial of the
evidence custodian that he received the same from Mangapit. It is now clearly evident from the
records that the sachet of shabu which the evidence custodian received, marked and submitted
for examination and later presented in court is not the same sachet of shabu which Mangapit
claimed to have confiscated from petitioner and subsequently transmitted to the evidence
custodian.
There can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts
persist on whether the item confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to
be the prohibited drug. It must be stressed that the corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases
constitutes the drug itself. This means that proof beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of the
prohibited drug is essential.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSELITO NOQUE y GOMEZ
G.R. No. 175319, January 15, 2010
DOCTRINE: An offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter..

FACTS:
Accused JoselitoNoque was caught in a buy-bust operation conducted by SPO4
Norberto Murillo on January 30, 2001. Two Informations were filed before the RTC of
Manila docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 01-189458 and 01-189459 charging of the
crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of a regulated drug.
The trial court convicted the accused on both charges. The trial court held that
while the Informations alleged methamphetamine hydrochloride as the drug seized from
the appellant, the drug actually confiscated which was ephedrine, which by means of
chemical reaction could change into methamphetamine.
Thus, the trial court ruled that the appellant can be convicted of the offenses
charged, which are included in the crimes proved.
The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. The CA held that the designations and
allegations in the informations are for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of
regulated drugs.
Hence, the accused appealed the case before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation was violated
HELD:
No. As correctly observed by CA, the offenses designated in the Informations are for
violations of Sections 15 and 16 of RA 6425, which define and penalize the crimes of illegal sale
and possession of regulated drugs. The allegations in the Informations for the unauthorized
sale and possession of “shabu” or methamphetamine hydrochloride are immediately followed
by the qualifying phrase “which is a regulated drug”. Thus, it is clear that the designations and
allegations in the Informations are for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of
regulated drugs. Ephedrine has been classified as a regulated drug by the Dangerous Drugs
Board in Board Resolution No. 2, Series of 1988.

The CA correctly ruled that Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, can be
applied by analogy in convicting the appellant of the offenses charged, which are included in
the crimes proved. Under these provisions, an offense charged is necessarily included in the

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offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those
constituting the latter. At any rate, a minor variance between the information and the evidence
does not alter the nature of the offense, nor does it determine or qualify the crime or penalty, so
that even if a discrepancy exists, this cannot be pleaded as a ground for acquittal. In other
words, his right to be informed of the charges against him has not been violated because where
an accused is charged with a specific crime, he is duly informed not only of such specific crime
but also of lesser crimes or offenses included therein.

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ARMANDO VIDAR @ Ricky, NORBERTO BUTALON, SONNYMARBELLA @ Spike
and JOHN DOES and PETER DOES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 177361, February 1, 2010
DOCTRINE: The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses thus established beyond
reasonable doubt the elements of robbery with homicide, namely: 1) the taking of
personal property was committed with violence or intimidation against persons; 2) the
property taken belongs to another; 3) the taking was done with animolucrandi; and 4) by
reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, the crime of homicide which is therein
used in a generic sense, was committed.
FACTS:
It was early evening of April 30, 2001, when army officer, Sgt. Julio D. Dioneda,
was brutally murdered and valuables taken from his house located at SitioBurabod,
Barangay Poblacion, Bacon District, Sorsogon City.
Consequently, a criminal charge for Robbery with Homicide against herein
petitioners Armando Vidar @ Ricky, Norberto Butalon, Sonny Marbella @ Spike, and
several Does was filed under an Information.
At about 7:00 oclock in the evening of April 30, 2001, Florecita, wife of the victim,
and her sister-in-law Nia, were inside the formers house at Burabod, Poblacion, Bacon
District, Sorsogon City. They were watching television when three armed men suddenly
barged inside. One of them, later identified as Marbella, poked a gun at Florecita while
the other two ransacked the house taking a wallet, crash helmet and a .45 caliber firearm
with its magazine. These items belong to Dioneda who was then taking a bath outside
the house. Florecita and Nia followed the three men when the latter went out. At the
yard, they saw the three men together with more or less 10 other persons surrounding
Dioneda who was lying facing the ground. Despite Florecitas pleas not to kill her
husband, Marbella and Vidar still fired a volley of shots causing Dionedas instantaneous
death. The three then boarded Dionedasmotorcylcle and fled the area.
The Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 52, relying on the credible and
positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, rejected the defense interposed by the
petitioners and accordingly rendered a Decision on September 2, 2004 finding all of
them guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide.
CA affirmed the findings of the trial court but modified the penalty imposed from
Death to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is proof beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of
robbery with homicide

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
Yes. One thing which bolsters the prosecution witness’ credibility is the fact that they
had no motive to prevaricate against the petitioners. They were not actuated by improper
motive to fabricate the facts and to foist a very serious offense against them. Where there is no
evidence, as in this case, to indicate that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper
motive, the presumption is that they were not so actuated and that their testimonies are entitled
to full faith and credit. For personal motive on the part of a witness to testify against the accused
to be appreciated as showing bias, its presence should be supported by satisfactory proof.
Aside from their bare allegation, petitioners miserably failed in this regard.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the prosecution witnesses had an unobstructed
view of the petitioner’s appearance who were not donning masks to hide their faces when the
latter barged inside the house. There is no indication that darkness prevailed inside the house
so as to have an obscure view at the time. They even testified that one of the petitioners even
poked a gun at them while the others were ransacking the house. Thus even for a while, there
was a frontal confrontation between petitioners and the witnesses, giving the latter an
opportunity to take a good look at petitioners. Nothing in the records allows the presence of any
distraction that would have disrupted the witness’ attention during the occurrence of the
incident.Though a considerable length of time had elapsed, the witnesses never wavered in
their identification of petitioners. They cannot forget their faces.
The weight of testimony of witnesses is neither impaired nor in any way affected by their
relationship to the victim when there is no showing of improper motive on their part.
Relationship per se of a witness with the victim of the crime does not necessarily mean that the
witness is biased. These prosecution witnesses are the most aggrieved parties, being the
victim’s widow and sister. Thus, their motive of putting the killers behind bars cannot be
considered improper. It would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in avenging the crime
to implicate persons other than the real culprit lest the guilty go unpunished.
Assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge
because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness
stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts and when his findings have been affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses thus established beyond reasonable


doubt the elements of robbery with homicide, namely: 1) the taking of personal property was
committed with violence or intimidation against persons; 2) the property taken belongs to
another; 3) the taking was done with animolucrandi; and 4) by reason of the robbery or on the
occasion thereof, the crime of homicide which is therein used in a generic sense, was
committed.
The twin defenses of denial and alibi raised by petitioners must necessarily fail in view of
the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses. Alibi and denial are inherently

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weak defenses and must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively
ascertained the identity of the accused. And it is only axiomatic that positive testimony prevails
over negative testimony.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILSON SUAN y JOLONGON

G.R. No. 184546, February 22, 2010

DOCTRINE: In prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance itself constitutes


the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment
of conviction beyond reasonable doubt—of paramount importance therefore in these
cases is that the identity of the dangerous drug be likewise established beyond
reasonable doubt. The failure to establish the evidence’s chain of custody is fatal to the
prosecution’s case—there can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug
when nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the same specimen
examined and established to be the prohibited drug.
FACTS:

On August 12, 2003 at about 3:30 a.m., PO2 Labasano and PO1 Gondol
conducted a buy-bust operation at Purok 4, Saray, Iligan City. PO1 Gondol, who was
provided with two pieces of ₱50.00 bills, acted as the buyer while PO2 Labasano served
as back-up. Upon reaching the target area, the two saw appellant sitting outside the
house. PO1 Gondol approached appellant and the latter asked the former if he wanted to
buy a narcotic substance. PO1 Gondol replied "I will buy "Piso", meaning ₱100.00. After a
brief exchange of the money and the stuff, appellant was informed of his constitutional
rights and thereafter was arrested. Appellant was brought to the police headquarters and
presented before the investigator. At the police headquarters, PO2 Labasano prepared a
Certificate of Inventory. The buy-bust money and the plastic sachet containing the stuff
they recovered were turned over to the evidence custodian as related by PO1 Gondol,
and to the Team Leader, as testified to by PO2 Labasano. Upon request, the plastic
sachet was sent to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory for examination.

Forensic Chemist Carvajal received the written request for laboratory examination
of one sachet containing white crystalline substance submitted to their office. She
conducted the test and the result showed that it contained methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. She then prepared Chemistry Report No.
D-500-2003 on her finding on the tests.

Appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that while he was sleeping
on a bench beside the road, PO2 Labasano suddenly held his arm and handcuffed him.
PO2 Labasano inserted his hand into appellant’s pocket, frisked him and shabu was later
shown to him. He was brought to Tipanoy for a drug test and detained in jail for violation of
the anti-drugs law.

In support of his prayer for a reversal of the verdict of his conviction, appellant
contends: a) that the testimonies of the police operatives contained material
inconsistencies and contradictions as to (i) whether a surveillance was made prior to the
buy-bust operation, (ii) whether there was marked money used in the operation, and, (iii)
the amount of the shabu sold; b) there was no proper identification of the illegal drug; c)

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
the prosecution witnesses failed to testify on matters regarding the possession of the
illegal drug; and, d) the defense of alibi was not properly appreciated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution witnesses were able to properly identify the
dangerous drug taken from appellant.
HELD:

No, the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the
substance recovered from the appellant.

For while the drug may be admitted in evidence it does not necessarily follow that
the same should be given evidentiary weight. It must be stressed that admissibility should
not be equated with its probative value in proving the corpus delicti.

Appellant submits that the shabu alleged to have been sold was not properly
identified by the police officers thus rendering doubtful and open to suspicion if
the shabu submitted for examination is indeed the same substance sold by him.

We agree. As we have stated at the outset, the prosecution miserably failed to


establish the identity of the substance allegedly recovered from the appellant. Records
show that while the police officers were able to prove the factuality of the buy-bust
operation, the prosecution dismally failed to prove the identity of the substance taken
from appellant.

The Certificate of Inventory prepared by PO2 Labasano merely stated that a


sachet of a substance weighing 0.01 gram was seized from the appellant. PO2 Labasano
made no mention that he placed some markings on the sachet for purposes of future
identification.

Thus, when the Certificate of Inventory was prepared by P02 Labasano, the item
allegedly seized from the appellant bore no markings. However, in the Request for
Laboratory Examination/Urine Test prepared by the Provincial Chief of Police, the item
being subjected for laboratory examination was already referred to as Exhibit A. Next, in
the Memorandum of the Regional Chief of PNP, the item that was referred to the Forensic
Chemist already had other markings. From the foregoing, there is already doubt as to the
identity of the substance being subjected for laboratory examination. At this time, we are
no longer sure whether the item allegedly seized by PO2 Labasano from the appellant
was the same item referred to by the Provincial Chief and then the Regional Chief of PNP
to the Forensic Chemist for laboratory examination.

Worse, in the Certificate of Inventory prepared by PO2 Labasano, the


Memorandum prepared by the Provincial Chief, and the transmittal letter prepared by the
Regional Chief, the substance supposedly weighed 0.01 gram. However, in the

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Chemistry Report No. D-500-2003 prepared by Forensic Chemist Carvajal, the
substance was indicated as weighing 0.1 gram.

Indeed there is absolutely nothing in the evidence on record that tends to show
identification of the drug. For sure, the difference particularly in the weight of the
substance is fatal to the case of the prosecution.

The prosecution failed to establish the unbroken chain of custody of the


confiscated substance.

Not only did the prosecution fail to identify the substance that was allegedly seized
from the appellant; it also failed to establish that the chain of custody of the substance
was unbroken.

The testimonies of PO2 Labasano are contradictory. At first, he testified that the
substance recovered from the appellant was delivered to the crime laboratory but he did
not know who received the same. On cross-examination, however, he claimed that the
substance was delivered to their team leader, SPO2 Cañonero.

Notably, the prosecution failed to put on the witness stand SPO2 Cañonero or the
person from the crime laboratory who allegedly received the substance. Consequently,
there was a break in the chain of custody because no mention is made as regards what
happened to the substance from the time SPO2 Cañonero received it to the time the
transmittal letter was prepared by Police Chief Inspector Jesus Atchico Rebua addressed
to the Provincial Chief of Police, Lanao del Norte requesting for laboratory
examination/urine test. We do not know how or from whom Police Chief Inspector Jesus
Atchico Rebua received the substance.

There is no dispute that in the Chemistry Report it was established that the object
examined was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous
drug. While the Forensic Chemist showed the contents of the sachet as the substance
she examined and confirmed to be shabu, nonetheless, it is not positively and
convincingly clear from her testimony that what was submitted for laboratory examination
and later presented in court as evidence was the same shabu actually recovered from the
appellant. The Forensic Chemist did not testify at all as to the identity of the person from
whom she received the specimen for examination.

Verily, there is a break in the chain of custody of the seized substance. The
standard operating procedure on the seizure and custody of the drug as mandated in
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations was not
complied with. As we observed, the chain of custody of the drug from the time the same
was turned over to the Team Leader, as testified by PO2 Labasano or the Records
Custodian as related by PO1 Gondol, to the time of submission to the crime laboratory
was not clearly shown. There is no indication whether the Team Leader and the Records
Custodian were one and the same person. Neither was there reference to the person who
submitted it to the crime laboratory. The prosecution needs to establish that the Team

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Leader or Records Custodian indeed submitted such particular drug to the crime
laboratory for examination. The failure on the part of the Team Leader or Records
Custodian as the case may be, to testify on what he did with the drug while he was in
possession resulted in a break in the chain of custody of the drug. There is obviously a
missing link from the point when the drug was in his hands to the point when the same
was submitted for examination. The failure to establish the evidence’s chain of custody is
fatal to the prosecution’s case. Under no circumstance can we consider or even safely
assume that the integrity and evidentiary value of the drug was properly preserved by the
apprehending officers. There can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug
when nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the same specimen
examined and established to be the prohibited drug.

Jurisprudence abounds with cases where deviation from the standard procedure
in an anti-narcotics operation produces doubts as to the identity and origin of the drug
which inevitably results to the acquittal of the accused.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICTOR VILLARINO y MABUTE

G.R. No. 185012, March 5, 2010

DOCTRINE: In this special complex crime of rape with homicide, the unsolicited and
spontaneous confession of guilt by the appellant to the police officer is admissible in
evidence. The circumstantial evidence is also sufficient to sustain the conviction of the
appellant even if no spermatozoa was found in the victim’s body during an autopsy.

FACTS:

April 28, 1995, "BBB", together with her 10-year old daughter "AAA" and her
younger son "CCC" went to the house of their relative in Barangay "D" to attend the fiesta
to be held the next day.

On even date, from 7:00 o’clock to 9:00 o’clock in the evening, SPO4 Jesus
Genoguin (SPO4 Genoguin) was in his house in Barangay "D" entertaining his guests,
one of whom was appellant. While personally serving food and drinks to appellant, SP04
Genoguin noticed that the latter was wearing a bracelet and a necklace with pendant.
Appellant even allowed SPO4 Genoguin to put on the bracelet. Rodrigo Ojare and “BBB”
also noticed that he was wearing a white sleeveless t-shirt and jewelry

At around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, "BBB" told "AAA" to go home


to Barangay "D1" to get a t-shirt for her brother. "AAA" obeyed. However, she no longer
returned. While "BBB" was anxiously waiting for "AAA" in the house of her aunt
in Barangay "D", she received information that a dead child had been found
in Barangay "D1". She proceeded to the area where she identified the child’s body as that
of her daughter, "AAA".

At around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Rodrigo, who was the barangay captain
of Barangay "D1" received information that a dead child was found in their barangay. He
instructed a barangay tanod to inform the police about the incident. Thereafter, Rodrigo
proceeded to the specified area together with other barangay tanods.

SPO4 Genoguin also went to the crime scene after being informed by his
commander. Upon arrival, he saw the corpse of a little girl behind a big boulder that was
about 10 meters away from the trail junction of the barangays. People had gathered
seven to 10 meters away from the dead body, but no one dared to approach.

"AAA’s" lifeless body lay face up with her buttocks on top of a small rock. Her body
was slanted downward with her legs spread apart and dangling on the sides of the small
boulder. She was no longer wearing short pants and panty, and blood oozed from her
vagina. Wrapped around her right hand, which was positioned near her right ear, was a
white sando.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
"AAA’s" panty was found a meter away from her body, while her short pants was
about two meters farther. A bracelet and a pendant were also recovered from the crime
scene. Rodrigo and "BBB" identified these pieces of jewelry as those seen on the
appellant. They also identified the sando on "AAA’s" arm as the appellant’s. Thus, the
hunt for appellant began.

On the same day, the appellant was found in the house of Aurelia Susmena near
the seashore of Barangay "D1". He was drunk and violent. He resisted arrest and had to
be bodily carried to the motorboat that would take him to the municipal building in
Almagro, Samar. The arresting team made the appellant take off his clothes since they
were wet. When he complied, his briefs revealed bloodstains.

Dr. Arleen P. Lim, Medical Officer III, testified that four of the five lacerated wounds
could have been caused by a hard irregular or blunt object, like a rock or stone. While the
fifth lacerated wound could have been the result of a strong force, as when the head is
forcibly banged. "AAA’s" hematoma was just above her buttocks. She further testified that
the ease with which two fingers entered "AAA’s" vaginal orifice could have been caused
by sexual intercourse. The lacerations in her vaginal wall could also have been the result
of sexual intercourse or by the forcible entry of an object into the vaginal canal, such as a
penis. Dr. Lim confirmed that the cause of death of "AAA" was cardio-respiratory arrest
secondary to multiple lacerated wounds and skull fracture.

On May 19, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Calbayog City, Branch 32 rendered a
Decision30 finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
rape with homicide.

Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) found the appellant guilty only of
homicide.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Trial Court erred in convicting accused-appelleant of rape with
homicide solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence.

HELD:

No, the Trial Court did not errin convicting accused-appelleant of rape with homicide.

In the instant case, appellant voluntarily confessed to raping and killing "AAA" to
SPO4 Genoguin. He even offered to give the pieces of jewelry to the latter if his sando is
thrown into the sea. The appellant did not deny this accusation nor assail its truthfulness.

When appellant confessed to the crime, he was alone with SPO4 Genoguin, and
no force or intimidation was employed against him. The confession was spontaneously

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
made and not elicited through questioning. The trial court did not, therefore, err in holding
that compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is not
applicable in the instant case.

At any rate, even without his confession, appellant could still be convicted of the
complex crime of rape with homicide. The prosecution established his complicity in the
crime through circumstantial evidence which were credible and sufficient, and led to the
inescapable conclusion that the appellant committed the complex crime of rape with
homicide. When considered together, the circumstances point to the appellant as the
culprit.

The appellant argues that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses which were replete with contradictions and improbabilities.
According to him, Rodrigo’s declaration that it was around 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of
April 29, 1995 when he was told of the discovery of a dead body contradicts "BBB’s"
testimony that she instructed the victim to go home to Barangay "D1" at around 3:00
o’clock in the afternoon of the same day. Moreover, Rodrigo’s claim that the appellant, a
fisherman, always wore the pieces of jewelry in question while at work, is contrary to
human experience. Lastly, SPO4 Genoguin’s contention that he saw appellant wearing
the pieces of jewelry on separate occasions prior to the commission of the crime is
inconsistent with his subsequent testimony that he was not even sure of the ownership of
the said jewelry.

Appellant’s contentions are not worthy of credence.

Moreover, the time when Rodrigo was informed of the incident and the time stated
by "BBB" when she sent "AAA" on an errand to Barangay "D1", were mere
approximations, which cannot impair their credibility. An error in the estimation of time
does not discredit the testimony of a witness when time is not an essential element.

The inconsistencies indicated by the appellant are likewise inconsequential since


they do not detract from the fact that "BBB" sent "AAA" on an errand in Barangay "D1"
where her dead body was later discovered. Far from being badges of fraud and
fabrication, the discrepancies in the testimonies of witnesses may be justifiably
considered as indicative of the truthfulness on material points of the facts testified to.
These minor deviations also confirm that the witnesses had not been rehearsed.

The credibility of SPO4 Genoguin is not adversely affected by his inability to


immediately identify the ownership of the jewelry found near the dead body of the victim
despite his testimony that he saw the appellant wearing the same jewelry on previous
occasions. The workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable leading people to act differently. There is simply no standard form of
behavioral response that can be expected from anyone when confronted with a startling
or frightful occurrence. SPO4 Genoguin, despite being a policeman since 1977, was
affected by the gruesome crime. His years in the police service did not prepare him to
witness the lifeless body of a 10-year old girl who had been brutally raped and murdered.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
In sum, the inconsistencies raised by the appellant are too inconsequential to
warrant a reversal of the trial court’s ruling. The decisive factor in the prosecution for rape
with homicide is whether the commission of the crime has been sufficiently proven. For a
discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as a basis for
acquittal, it must establish beyond doubt the innocence of the appellant for the crime
charged. As the contradictions alleged by the appellant had nothing to do with the
elements of the crime of rape with homicide, they cannot be used as ground for his
acquittal.

The appellant imputes improper motive to witness Rodrigo who, allegedly, had an
axe to grind against him because Rodrigo’s fishing venture incurred huge losses after
appellant abandoned his job as a cook. Such imputation, however, deserves scant
consideration. Other than appellant’s self-serving allegation, there is no proof that his
sudden departure from work adversely affected the operations of the fishing
venture.1avvphi1

The CA ruled that the evidence adduced by the prosecution are sufficient to
produce a conviction for homicide but not for the crime of rape. In so ruling, the CA
ratiocinated that while there were lacerations in the vaginal orifice of the victim, the
absence of spermatozoa, however, belied that she was raped.

We disagree. The absence of spermatozoa does not necessarily result in the


conclusion that rape was not committed. Convictions for rape with homicide have been
sustained on purely circumstantial evidence. In those cases, the prosecution presented
other tell-tale signs of rape such as the laceration and description of the victim’s pieces of
clothing, especially her undergarments, the position of the body when found and the like.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ERPASCUAL DIEGA y PAJARES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 174099

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERPASCUAL DIEGA y PAJARES

G.R. No. 173510, March 15, 2010

DOCTRINE: Considering that there were no witnesses to the commission of the crime
charged herein, the weight of the prosecution’s evidence must then be appreciated in
light of the well-settled rule that an accused can be convicted even in the absence of an
eyewitness, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime. Circumstantial
evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence
of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. It is
sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts
from which the inferences were derived have been established; and (c) the combination
of all circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS:

The victim, "AAA", was a 13-year old girl residing with her family in Rodriguez,
Rizal. She was a 1st year high school student and would usually leave her home at 4:00
o’clock in the morning and walk for about a kilometer to a terminal where she could take a
ride to school. The path towards the terminal passes a farm within a 50-hectare plantation
located at Upper Ciudad Real, Araneta, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, where the
appellant was employed as a stay-in security guard. "AAA" uses the same route on her
way home.

On March 17, 1995, "AAA" failed to return home at the usual time. Her parents
frantically searched for her, but it was only on the next day, March 18, 1995, between 9:00
and 10:00 o’clock in the morning, when the dead body of "AAA" was discovered inside the
plantation.

"AAA’s" corpse was covered with leaves. A wood vine was tied around her neck
and her head bore several wounds. Her school uniform was crumpled and her panty was
missing. The medico-legal examination conducted around 24 hours from "AAA’s" death
indicated that she died of "asphyxia by strangulation, hemorrhages as a result of
traumatic injuries, head and body". There were deep, fresh lacerations at 3:00 and 9:00
o’clock positions and a shallow fresh laceration at 7:00 o’clock position in her hymen
which "are compatible with recent loss of virginity." Moreover, the doctor who conducted
the examination on the cadaver of "AAA" saw several injuries in the middle left forearm,
suggesting that "AAA" used her hands to protect herself.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The police investigation revealed that on March 17, 1995, between 1:00 and 2:00
o’clock in the afternoon, Juanito Manalo III (Juanito) was tending to the grazing carabaos
inside the plantation when he saw the appellant stooping down. The appellant stood up
clad only in his shorts and waved his pistol to call Juanito. As Juanito approached, he saw
that the appellant had a menacing look and noticed "AAA" lying unconscious on the
ground. The appellant then pointed his pistol to Juanito and ordered him to touch the body
of "AAA" and to tie a vine around her neck. Out of fear, Juanito obeyed and discovered
that "AAA" no longer had undergarments. He was permitted to leave, but only after the
appellant threatened to kill him and his family if he would reveal to anyone what he
witnessed. As Juanito fled from the scene, he was seen by Martin Gailan (Martin) and
Arnel Alminana (Arnel).

Initially the appellant voluntarily submitted himself to detention. However, he was


released to the custody of his former counsel after his waiver was withdrawn. Pending
trial, he absconded and remained at-large until his arrest in his hometown in Baybay
Gamay in Northern Samar.

On March 3, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment convicting the appellant of rape
with homicide.

The case was forwarded to this Court for automatic review and the CA affirmed
with modification the trial court’s Decision.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in upholding the
findings of the Regional Trial Court that circumstantial evidence are strong enough to
convict the accused and sentenced him to death.

HELD:

No, the appeal lacks merit.

In a special complex crime of rape with homicide, both rape and homicide must be
established beyond reasonable doubt.

Considering that there were no witnesses to the commission of the crime charged
herein, the weight of the prosecution’s evidence must then be appreciated in light of the
well-settled rule that an accused can be convicted even in the absence of an eyewitness,
as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime.

Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from


which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
experience. It is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences were derived have been
established; and (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the


circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that
accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. In other words, a
judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the
circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.

Here, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution leads to the


inescapable conclusion that the appellant committed the complex crime of rape with
homicide. When considered together, the circumstances point to the appellant as the
culprit to the exclusion of all others.

Juanito’s presence at the crime scene at the time "AAA" was raped and killed does
not necessarily mean that he was the author of the crime. Juanito has sufficiently
explained in a clear and categorical manner his presence thereat. He testified on how he
unexpectedly found the appellant clad only in his shorts stooping down on the grassy
portion of the banana grove inside the farm. He recounted how the appellant told him to
approach the unconscious body of "AAA" and forced him under threat of death, to tie her
with a wood vine. He also narrated his flight after the appellant decided to let him go.
Juanito’s testimony deserves credence since it was unshaken by cross-examination and
unflawed by contradictions.

The credibility of Juanito is not adversely affected by his initial silence since he was
under constant threat by the appellant. After learning of the fate suffered by "AAA" at the
hands of the appellant, it was only natural for Juanito to take the threat against him and
his family seriously. The threat was real and present even after Juanito left. In fact,
appellant told Martin and Arnel that he would kill Juanito.

Moreover, it is not true that Juanito kept the matter to himself. He told his mother of
the crime he witnessed and even wrote a letter to her before leaving for the province to
avoid the appellant.

Motive has also been proven by the prosecution. "AAA’s" aunt testified that prior to
the commission of the crime, the appellant maliciously stared at and uttered remarks with
sexual overtones to "AAA" on several occasions. Her failure to relay these incidents to
"AAA’s" parents did not render her testimony unworthy of credence. While it may have
been best for the aunt to report the malicious acts of the appellant to the parents of "AAA",
there was no legal imperative to do so.

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Appellant’s voluntary submission to a polygraph test even without the assistance
of counsel also deserves scant consideration. When he was taken to the polygraph
section of the police department, appellant was declared unfit for a polygraph test. Thus,
he was told to return on another day, but did not comply. Consequently, no polygraph
examination was ever conducted on the appellant.

Against the prosecution’s evidence, the appellant presents the defense of denial
and alibi. Denial is intrinsically a weak defense and must be supported by strong evidence
of non-culpability in order to be credible. Courts likewise view the defense of alibi with
suspicion and caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also
because it can be fabricated easily. For alibi to prevail, it must also be established by
positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the appellant to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely that the
appellant was somewhere else.

Thus, the appellant’s twin defenses of denial and alibi pale in the light of the array
of circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution. The positive assertions of the
prosecution witnesses deserve more credence and evidentiary weight than the negative
averments of the appellant.

Lastly, the appellant’s contention that his arrest was attended with irregularity is
unworthy of credence. Records show that the "prepared statements" were given by the
witnesses after they answered the questions of the police authorities. His arrest,
therefore, was not based merely on statements prepared by the police authorities for the
prosecution witnesses.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
People of the Philippines v Richard Napalit y De Guzman

G.R. No. 181247, March 19, 2010

DOCTRINE:The qualifying circumstance of treachery is present when the offender


employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime which tend directly and
especially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from any defensive or
retaliatory act which the victim might make.

FACTS:

An information was filed against herein appellant containing the following:

On or about the 16th day of October, 2001 in the City of Malabon, Philippines
Richard De Guzman and two John Does, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another, while armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab one Joseph Genete, hitting him on the nape and back of the body, thereby[inflicting]
injuries which caused his death.

Appellant pleaded not guilty. Based on the testimonies of the witnesses, it was
established that the victim, Genete, with Guanzon and three other companions were
walking along Langaray Street, Malabon after a drinking spree. When they passed by the
group of De Guzman, the latter provoked the group to a fight and thereafter stabbed
Ganete with an ice pick at the back. Guanzon attempted to help Genete but was also
stabbed by a companion of the appellant.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court found the version of the prosecution more
credible. De Guzman was found guilty of the crime of murder. The trial court also found
the qualifying circumstance of treachery to have attended the commission of the crime.
Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the conviction should not be
murder but for homicide. The Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings of the
Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of


treachery.

HELD:

Yes. The eyewitness account of Guanzon undoubtedly showed that the killing
was treacherous. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the
aggressor on an unsuspecting victim,depriving him of any real chance to defend himself.
Even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to hisperson, treachery may still be
appreciated since what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made itimpossible
for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. In the instant case, there is no doubt that
the victim wassurprised by the attack coming from the appellant. The victim was merely

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
walking along the street unsuspecting ofany harm that would befall his person. That
appellant shouted "ano, gusto n’yo, away?" immediately before stabbingthe victim could
not be deemed as sufficient warning to the latter of the impending attack on his person.
Recordsshow that after challenging the unsuspecting victim to a fight, appellant
immediately lunged at him and stabbed himat the back. Under the circumstances, the
victim was indisputably caught off guard by the sudden and deliberateattack coming from
the appellant, leaving him with no opportunity to raise any defense against the attack.
The modeof the attack adopted by the appellant rendered the victim unable and
unprepared to defend himself.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
People of the Philippines v Roldan Morales y Midarasa

G.R. No. 172873, March 19, 2010

DOCTRINE: A society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should
not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his
guilt. To this end, the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable, for it impresses on the
trier of fact the necessity of reaching certitude of the facts in issue.

FACTS:
Appellant was charged in two separate informations before the Regional Trial
Court with possession and sale of methyl amphetamine hydrochloride. He pleaded not
guilty during the arraignment. Appellant was arrested during a buy-bust operation.
However, during trial, he testified that there was no buy-bust operation conducted. And
that it was while he was sidelining as a parking attendant when two male persons in
civilian clothes suddenly approached him and his co-attendant, identified themselves as
policemen and poked their guns at them.He also alleges that the arresting officers did
not even place the proper markings on the alleged shabu and paraphernalia at the time
and place of the alleged buy-bust operation. He likewise denied having received the
buy-bust money and further testified that he personally knew PO3 Rivera prior to his
arrest , since is first cousin and PO3 Rivera has a quarrel prior to the incident.
Ruling on the case, the Regional Trial Court decided against the appellant, finding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous
drugs. On appeal with the Court of Appeals, the decision of the Regional Trial Court was
affirmed in toto. Hence, a notice of appeal was filed with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Morales is proven to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
No.In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements
must first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place, and (2) the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. On the other
hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that
(1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or
regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was
freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. Similarly, in this case,
the evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case at bar, PO1 Roy, failed to concretely identify the items seized from the
appellant. Moreover, he confirmed that they did not make a list of the items seized. The
patent lack of adherence to the procedural mandate of R.A. No. 9165 is manifest in his
testimony. Thus, the procedural lapses in the handling and identification of the seized
items collectively raise doubts as to whether the items presented in court were the exact
same items that were confiscated from appellant when he was apprehended.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 941
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
People of the Philippines v Marcelo Bustamante y Zapanta, Neil Baluyot y
Tabisora, Richard Delos Trino y Sarcilla, Herminio Jose y Monson, Edwin Soriano
y Dela Cruz, and Elmer Salvador y Javale

G.R. No. 172357, March 19, 2010

DOCTRINE: The uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, if credible, is enough to


warrant conviction.

FACTS:
On 22 May 1998, two informations were filed against appellants, charging them
with the crimes of murder and arbitrary detention. For the murder case, the information
alleges that the appellants, all being members of the Philippine National Police,
conspiring and confederating with one another, with intent to kill and taking advantage of
their superior strength, unlawfully tie a plastic nylon cord around the neck of one
RomeleoQuintos, and hang him at the end portion of the detention cell, which cause his
instantaneous death. As for the arbitrary detention case, the information likewise alleges
that the appellants, unlawfully detained and restrained on RomeleoQuintos without his
consent and against his will.
During the trial, the records show that Quintosarrived that NAIA to fetch his
brother who was arriving from the United States. However, he was then after seen to be
arguing with a man who arrested him for expired license. Due to his refusal to be
arrested, he was brought to the Intelligence and Investigation Division of NAIA for
questioning.Quintos was then shoved into a cell already occupied by Noel Gabornes,
who had earlier been arrested for being an unauthorized porter. Gabornes was
transferred to another cell. Intrigued with what will be done to Quintos, he saw Baluyot
handing a plastic cord to Salvador. Thereafter he head Romeleo gasping and coughing.
He then saw the body being carried out of the cell.
After due proceedings, the Regional Trial Court found the appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for the murder of Quintos. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the RTC. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed, which was
denied.

ISSUE:

Whether the uncorroborated testimony of the lone eyewitness, is sufficient to


produce a judgment of conviction.

HELD:

Yes.Gabornes positively identified and categorically pointed to appellants as the


ones who conspired with one another to kill Romeleo. He narrated the incident in a clear
and convincing manner. Moreover, Gabornes’ testimony given before the National
Bureau of Investigation and the trial court was replete with details that only a person who
witnessed such gruesome crime could narrate. Even during cross-examination, he
remained steadfast in his account.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 942
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
DaniloAnsaldo v People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 159381, March 26, 2010

DOCTRINE: For a complex crime of estafa through falsification of a public document to


prosper, all the elements of both the crimes of estafa and falsification of public document
must exist.

FACTS:

The case originated from an alleged falsification and forgery of a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage which was subsequently notarized and therefore a public and/or official
document by then and there misrepresenting that petitioner are the real spouses Nina
Ramirez and Mariano Ramirez; that after the said Deed of Real Esate Mortgage was
forged and falsified, it was presented to one Nora Herrera, who, believing in the
authenticity and genuiness of the same gave and delivered the mortgage consideration
in the amount of P300,000 to the said accused, who then feloniously misappropriated,
misapplied and converted the same to their own personal use and benefit to the damage
and prejudice of Spouses Ramirez in the amount of P500,000, the value of the property
in question.

After trial, petitioner was found guilty of falsification; the trial court noted that no
other person was in possession of the TCT prior to the falsification other than petitioner
and his wife. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification
the decision of the RTC. The CA found petitioner guilty of the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of a public document. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed, but
was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellate court was correct in modifying the decision and
finding the accused guilty of complex crime thereby increasing the original sentence.

HELD:

No.For petitioner to be convicted of the complex crime of estafa through


falsification of public document committed inthe manner described in the Information, all
the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of public document must exist.
To secure a conviction for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), the followingrequisites must concur:

(1) The accused made false pretenses or fraudulent representations as to his power,
influence, qualifications,property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions

(2) The false pretenses or fraudulent representations were made prior to or simultaneous
with thecommission of the fraud;

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 943
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
(3) The false pretenses or fraudulent representations constitute the very cause which
induced the offendedparty to part with his money or property; and

(4) That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.

It is undisputed that petitioner committed estafa. He and his wife falsely


represented to Ramirez that they had theinfluence and capability to cause the
subdivision of the lot. In view of said false representation, Ramirez wasinduced to part
with the owner’s copy of her TCT on the condition that the same would be returned after
a month asevidenced by the Acknowledgment Receipt.

However, as to the crime of forgery and falsification, the court cannot conclude
beyond reasonable doubt that it was Spouses Ansaldo who committed it. In the first
place, there was no witness presented to corroborate the testimony of Ramirez
regarding the mortgage.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 944
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Rose Quidet v People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 170289, April 8, 2010

DOCTRINE: Conspiracy must be proved as clearly and convincingly as the commission


of the offense itself for it is a facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and
kept within the penal fold. In case of reasonable doubt as to its existence, the balance
tips in favor of the milder form of criminal liability as wat is at stake is the accused’s
liberty.

FACTS:

The case originated from the stabbing of one Jimmy Tagarda which resulted to his
instantaneous death. Andrew Tagarda, Jimmy’s cousin also sustained stab wound
during the same incident. Thereafter, informations for homicide and frustrated homicide
were issued against petitioners.

The Regional Trial Court rendered a judgment finding petitioner guilty of homicide
and all three others accused guilty of frustrated homicide. On appeal with the Court of
Appeals, the court modified the decision of the RTC changing the crime committed to
attempted homicide of Andrew Tagarda. The CA justified the modification in the basis
that the accused failed to inflict mortal wound on Andrew because the latter successfully
deflected the attack. Moreoever, Andrew suffered only minor injuries which could have
healed within five to seven days even without medical treatment.

ISSUE:

Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals finding petitioner to have acted in
conspiracy with the other accused in the commission of the offenses charged is in
accordance with law and/or jurisprudence.

HELD:

No. The existence of conspiracy was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus,
petitioner is criminally liable only for his individual acts. Conspiracy can be inferred from
and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point toa joint
purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests. However, in
determining whether conspiracy exists, it is not sufficient that the attack be joint and
simultaneous for simultaneousness does not of itself demonstrate the concurrence of will
or unity of action and purpose which are the bases of the responsibility of the assailants.
What is determinative is proof establishing that the accused were animated by one and
the same purpose. In the case at bar, it was revealed that after Andrew was stabbed by
Taban using a double-bladed knife, Taban subsequently stabbed Jimmy before fleeing
from the crime scene. Moments later, while Andrew was recovering, Tubo straddled
Jimmy and stabbed him twice with an icepick before he left. The stabbing incident
appears to have arisen from a purely accidental encounter between Taban’s and
Andrew’s groups with both having had a drinking session.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 945
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
People of the Philippines v Rogelio Asis y Lacson

G.R. No. 179935, April 19, 2010

DOCTRINE: Findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are accorded great weight and respect.

FACTS:

The case originated from a rape incident by a father upon his minor daughter. The
felonious sexual intercourse was performed twice, first in 1994, and the second in 1996.
In both cases, the father threatened to kill her if she refused to follow his orders to
remove her clothes, and lie down on the ground.During trial, the brother of the victim
testified that he witnessed the appellant raping his sister. But he did not reveal to anyone
what he saw because he was scared of his father who was always carrying a bolo.

The trial court found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
rape. On appeal, the appellant questioned the credibility and minority of the
victim.However, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the child witness was credible.

HELD:

Yes.In rape cases, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is addressed to


the sound dicretion of the trial judge whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight
and respect, because the judge as the opportunity to observe them on the stand and
ascertain whether they are telling the truth or not. Moreover, an accused could justifiably
be convicted based solely on the credible testimony of the victim. As to the minority of
the victim, the same was satisfactorily established. The court found that the express
admission by the accused as regards the age of the victimwas sufficient to establish her
minority.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 946
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Rono Seguritan y Jara v People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 172896, April 19, 2010

DOCTRINE: Factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded greatweight and
respect on appeal, especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence
on record. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court
overlooked material and relevant matters that this Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the
factual findings of the court below.

FACTS:

Seguritan was charged with homicide for the assault and death of Lucrecio
Seguritan. During trial, it was revealed that petitioner Rono Seguritan was having a
drinking session with his uncles Lucrecio Seguritan, MelchorPanis, and BaltazarPanis, in
Cagayan. A heated discussion thereafter ensued, during which Rono punched Lucrecio,
causing the latter to fall face-up to the ground and hit a hollow block. Lucrecio lost
consciousness but was revived. Lucrecio then went home and slept. The following
morning, Lucrecio was found dead. On the contrary, the defense alleged that Lucrecio
dies of cardiac arrest.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision convicting the petitioner of
homicide. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the judgment of the RTC. A
Motion for Reconsideration was filed by was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in convicting the accused of homicide.

HELD:

No.It is on record that Lucrecio suffered two external injuries and one internal
injury in his head. The court cannot find a reason to doubt the findings of the trial court,
as affirmed by the appellate court, that petitioner punched Lucrecio twice causing him to
fall to the ground. Melchor categorically testified that petitioner punched Lucrecio twice
and as a result, Lucrecio fell to the ground and lost consciousness. Moreover, Melchor’s
eyewitness account of the fist blows delivered by petitioner to Lucrecio and the manner
by which the latter fell from the bench and hit his head on the improvised stone is
consistent with the autopsy findings.

Lastly, petitioner cannot be held liable only for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide due to the absence of intent to kill Lucrecio. When death resulted, even if there
was no intent to kill, the crime is homicide, not just physical injuries, since with respect to
crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results
following the unlawful act and hold the aggressor responsible for all the resulting
consequences.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 947
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ANUNCIO C. BUSTILLO, EMILIO SUMILHIG, JR., and AGUSTIN BILLEDO, JR.,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
G.R. 160718, 12 May 2010

DOCTRINE: Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption of


official acts and in case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful,
construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.

FACTS:
Congressman Ceferino Paredes, Jr.used a portion of his Countryside
Development Fundto purchase one unit of Toyota Tamaraw FX and six units of
Kawasaki motorcycles. All vehicles were registered in the name of the Municipality of
Bunawan and were turned over to the municipality through its mayor, herein petitioner
Anuncio C. Bustillo.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed Resolution No. 95-27 which
authorized the transfer without cost of the aforesaid vehicles to the San Francisco Water
District (SFWD). Pursuant thereto, Bustillo executeda Deed of Transfer relative to the
aforementioned vehicles in favor of the SFWD represented by its General Manager,
Elmer T. Luzon.
The aforementioned resolution was disapproved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur for being violative of Section 381 of the Local
Government Code. It also issued another resolution canceling and declaring the Deed of
Transfer as null and void for being highly irregular and grossly violative of the same
provision.
A complaint was filed charging Bustillo, Vice-Mayor Agustin Billedo, Jr., and the
Sangguniang Bayan members, with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. Also included in
the complaint were the Board Secretary and General Manager of SFWD.
The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao found probable cause to prosecute
the case. Consequently,an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan charging
Bustillo, Billedo, and Sangguniang Bayan members for violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019.
On June 15, 1999, the SFWD executed a Deed of Donation effecting the transfer
of the aforesaid vehicles in favor of the Municipality of Bunawan because according to
SFWD, the water projects funded by the CDF of Congressman Paredes were already
completed.
The Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision finding petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction made by Sandiganbayan was proper.

HELD:
No. The Sandiganbayan based its conviction of (Mayor) Bustillo, (Vice-Mayor)
Billedo and (Councilor) Sumilhig on the finding that they conspired to effect the transfer
of the vehicles to the prejudice of the Municipality of Bunawan in violation of the provision
of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 948
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) that the accused are public officers
or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officers commit
the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their
public positions; (3) that they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government
or a private party; (4) that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) that the public officers have acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

In this case, only the first element was proven. At the time material to this case, all
the petitioners are public officers, namely, Bustillo as Municipal Mayor, Billedo as Vice
Mayor, and Sumilhig as member of the Sangguniang Bayan.

All the other elements were not present. It cannot be denied that the transfer of
the vehicles to SFWD was made in furtherance of the purpose for which the funds were
released which is "to help in the planning, monitoring and coordination of the
implementation of the waterworks projects located throughout the Province of Agusan
del Sur." The Deed of Donation expressly provided that the subject vehicles shall be
used for the same purpose for which they were purchased.

Moreover, the transfer was made to ensure the success of the implementation of
the CDF-funded waterworks projects of the province of Agusan del Sur. In the
Memorandum of Agreement dated February 10, 1993, SFWD was designated to
implement, control or supervise all the CDF-funded waterworks projects. Clearly, the
vehicles were donated to SFWD not because it was given any preference, unwarranted
benefits or undue advantage, but in recognition of its technical expertise.

We find no evidence on record which would show that petitioners were motivated
by bad faith when they transferred the vehicles to SFWD. Bustillo, as Mayor, is
authorized by law to enter into contracts for and in behalf of the local government unit.
Billedo, as Vice Mayor, acted as the Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan and did
not even vote for the passage of Resolution No. 95-27. Said Resolution was
unanimously passed by the Sangguniang Bayan and Sumilhig was only one of those
who voted for its passage.

In sum, the petitioners have in their favor the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties which the records failed to rebut. The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure
to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less
than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption in
rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of
the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful,
construction should be in favor of its lawfulness.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 949
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ERIBERTO S. MASANGKAY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
G.R. No. 164443, 18 June 2010

DOCTRINE: A conviction for perjury cannot be obtained by the prosecution by merely


showing the inconsistent or contradictory statements of the accused, even if both
statements are sworn—the prosecution must additionally prove which of the two
statements is false and must show the statement to be false by evidence other than the
contradictory statement.

FACTS:
Eriberto Masangkay, his common-law wifeMagdalena Ricaros, Cesar Masangkay
and his wife Elizabeth, and Eric Dullano were the incorporators and directors of Megatel
Factors, Inc. (MFI) which was incorporated in June 1990.
Eriberto filed before SEC a petition for the involuntary dissolution of MFI for
violation of Section 6 of PD902-A. The named respondents were MFI, Cesar, and
Elizabeth. The said petition was made under oath before a notary public, and alleged,
among others, that a secretary’s certificate issued by Elizabeth was absolutely fictitious
and simulated because the alleged meeting of the Board of Directors, with regard to the
execution of a Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct, did not actually
materialize.
Claiming that Eriberto lied under oath when he said that there was no meeting of
the Board held and that the Deed of Exchange with Cancellation of Usufruct is a fictitious
instrument, Cesar filed a complaint for perjury against Eriberto before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. An information was consequently filed before the court.
The MeTC rendered a judgment holding that the prosecution was able to prove
that themeeting actually took place and that petitioner attended the same as evidenced
by his signature in the minutes thereof. As for Eriberto's statement that the Deed of
Exchange was "fictitious," the MeTC held that his participation in the approval and
execution of the document, as well as his avowals before the guardianship court
regarding the proposed exchange all militate against his previous statement. The
decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court.
The CA also affirmed the appealed ruling of the trial courts, holding that the
prosecution was able to prove that the falsehoods in the petition for involuntary
dissolution were deliberately made. It explained that Eriberto's signatures on the two
allegedly fictitious documents show that he participated in the execution of the Deed of
Exchange and was present in the meeting. Having participated in these two matters,
Eriberto knew that these were not simulated and fictitious, as he claimed in his verified
petition for involuntary dissolution of MFI. Thus, he deliberately lied in his petition.The CA
rejected petitioner's argument that the two statements were not material. It ruled that
they were material because petitioner even cited them as principal basis for his petition
for involuntary dissolution.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 950
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the accused’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

HELD:
No. We rule that the prosecution failed to prove the crime of perjury beyond
reasonable doubt.
For perjury to exist, (1) there must be a sworn statement that is required by law;
(2) it must be made under oath before a competent officer; (3) the statement contains a
deliberate assertion of falsehood; and (4) the false declaration is with regard to a
material matter.The presence of the first two elements is not disputed by the petitioner
and they are indeed present in the instant case.It is the elements of deliberate falsehood
and materiality of the false statements to the petition for involuntary dissolution which are
contested.
On the element of materiality, a material matter is the main fact which is the
subject of the inquiry or any fact or circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or any
fact or circumstance which tends to corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative to
the subject of inquiry, or which legitimately affects the credit of any witness who testifies.
The statements for which the petitioner is tried for perjury are the very grounds he
relied upon in his petition for corporate dissolution. They refer to acts of the MFI directors
which are allegedly fraudulent, illegal and prejudicial, and which would allegedly justify
corporate dissolution under Section 105 of the Corporation Code. Evidently, these
statements are material to his petition for involuntary dissolution. The element of
materiality is therefore present.
The prosecution, however, failed to prove the element of deliberate falsehood.The
prosecution has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt the falsehood of
petitioner's statement that the December 5, 1992 meeting "did not actually materialize."
In other words, the prosecution has to establish that the said meeting in fact took place,
i.e., that the directors were actually and physically present in one place at the same time
and conferred with each other.
To discharge this burden, the prosecution relied mainly on the minutes of the
alleged December 5, 1992 meeting, signed by the accused, which are inconsistent with
his statement that the December 5, 1992 meeting did not actually materialize. According
to the minutes, a meeting actually took place. On the other hand, according to the
petitioner's statement in the petition for dissolution, the meeting did not actually
materialize or take place. The two statements are obviously contradictory or inconsistent
with each other. But the mere contradiction or inconsistency between the two statements
merely means that one of them is false. It cannot tell us which of the two statements is
actually false. The minutes could be true and the sworn statement false. But it is equally
possible that the minutes are false and the sworn statement is true, as explained by the
petitioner who testified that the minutes were simply brought to his house for signature,

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 951
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
but no meeting actually transpired. Given the alternative possibilities, it is the
prosecution's burden to affirmatively prove beyond reasonable doubt that the first
statement (the minutes) is the true one, while the other statement (in the petition for
dissolution) is the false one.
We have held before that a conviction for perjury cannot be obtained by the
prosecution by merely showing the inconsistent or contradictory statements of the
accused, even if both statements are sworn. The prosecution must additionally prove
which of the two statements is false and must show the statement to be false by
evidence other than the contradictory statement.
In this case, however, the prosecution was unable to prove, by convincing
evidence other than the minutes, that the December 5, 1992 meeting actually took place.
It merely presented, aside from the minutes, the testimony of private complainant Cesar,
who is a respondent in the corporate dissolution case filed by the petitioner and is
therefore not a neutral or disinterested witness. The prosecution did not present the
testimony of the other directors or participants in the alleged meeting who could have
testified that the meeting actually occurred. Neither did the prosecution offer any
explanation why such testimony was not presented. It likewise failed to present any
evidence that might circumstantially prove that on December 5, 1992, the directors were
physically gathered at a single place, and there conferred with each other and came up
with certain resolutions. Notably, the prosecution failed to present the notice for the
alleged meeting. The corporate secretary, Elizabeth, who was presented by the
petitioner, could not even remember whether she had sent out a prior notice to the
directors for the alleged December 5, 1992 meeting. The lack of certainty as to the
sending of a notice raises serious doubt as to whether a meeting actually took place, for
how could the directors have been gathered for a meeting if they had not been clearly
notified that such a meeting would be taking place?
The insufficiency of the prosecution's evidence is particularly glaring considering
that the petitioner had already explained the presence of his signature in the minutes of
the meeting. He testified that while the meeting did not actually take place, the minutes
were brought to his house for his signature. He affixed his signature thereto because he
believed that the proposed exchange of the assets, which was the subject of the
minutes, would be beneficial to his child, Gilberto. Acting on this belief, he also supported
the approval of the exchange by the guardianship court.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 952
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALDRIN BERDADERO y ARMAMENTO.
G.R. No. 179710, 29 June 2010

DOCTRINE: Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the
police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation.

FACTS:
An Information was filed against appellant for violation of Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165. He pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. In the trial that ensued, the
prosecution and the defense presented different accounts of the events that transpired
prior to and during the appellant's arrest.
The prosecution states that they received a report from an informant that the
appellant was selling shabu. The police officers organized a buy-bust operation
whereinthe appellantallegedly handed to the informant two plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance in exchange for the marked money. Thereafter, they
proceeded to arrest the appellant.
On the other hand, the appellant claimed that he was a victim of frame-up. He
testified that two men came to his house and introduced themselves as locksmiths. His
mother allowed them to enter and showed them the defective keys. After a while, the
men left, but they returned 10 minutes later, kicked the door open and handcuffed him.
He asked why he was being arrested but no explanation was forthcoming. He was
instead brought to the police station.
The Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision convicting the appellant. The Court
of Appeals affirmed in toto the ruling of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction was properly rendered.

HELD:
Yes. The elements necessary to establish a case for illegal sale of shabu are: (1)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material in a prosecution for
illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug in
evidence.
The prosecution successfully proved the existence of all the essential elements of
the illegal sale of shabu. The appellant was positively identified by police officers who
conducted the buy-bust operation as the seller of the shabu presented in the case. PO3
Balmes and PO2 Villas testified that their confidential informant acted as the buyer of the
shabu from the appellant. It was likewise established that the sale actually occurred and
that two sachets of shabu were sold for the price of P500.00. The marked money used in
the buy-bust operation was duly adduced in evidence. The shabu sold by the appellant
was also positively and categorically identified during trial.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police
officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. The trial court in this case, as affirmed by
the CA, held that the testimonies of PO3 Balmes and PO2 Villas were unequivocal,
straightforward, and consistent in material respects with each other and with other
testimonies and physical evidence. We find no cogent reason to overturn said findings.
The appellant's defense of frame-up must fail. We have previously ruled that
frame-up is a banal defense of those accused in drug-related cases that is viewed with
disfavor. Like the defense of alibi, frame-up is an allegation that can easily be concocted.
For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence, which
the appellant failed to do. There was no proof proffered to overturn the presumption that
the arresting police officers regularly performed their duties. The appellant also did not
prove that the prosecution witnesses were maliciously motivated, which would put their
credibility in doubt. Moreover, the failure to present the appellant's mother to testify and
corroborate his defense of frame-up renders the same as self-serving thus unworthy of
any weight in evidence.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 954
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LYDIA C. GELIG vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 173150 July 28, 2010

DOCTRINE: “a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority


expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.”

FACTS:

Lydia and private complainant Gemma B. Micarsos (Gemma), were public school
teachers at the Nailon Elementary School, in Nailon, Bogo, Cebu. Lydia’s son, Roseller,
was a student of Gemma at the time material to this case.

On July 17, 1981, at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning, Lydia confronted
Gemma after learning from Roseller that Gemma called him a "sissy" while in class.
Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed her, thereby causing her to fall and hit a
wall divider. As a result of Lydia’s violent assault, Gemma suffered a contusion in her
"maxillary area", as shown by a medical certificate issued by a doctor in the Bogo
General Hospital. However, Gemma continued to experience abdominal pains and
started bleeding two days after the incident. On August 28, 1981, she was admitted in
the Southern Islands Hospital and was diagnosed, to her surprise, to have suffered
incomplete abortion. Accordingly, a medical certificate was issued.

On October 11, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Lydia of the
complex crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion.

Thus, Lydia filed an appeal.The CA vacated the trial court’s judgment. It ruled that
Lydia cannot be held liable for direct assault since Gemma descended from being a
person in authority to a private individual when, instead of pacifying Lydia or informing
the principal of the matter, she engaged in a fight with Lydia. Likewise, Lydia’s purpose
was not to defy the authorities but to confront Gemma on the alleged name-calling of her
son.

The appellate court also ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for unintentional
abortion since there was no evidence that she was aware of Gemma’s pregnancy at the
time of the incident. However, it declared that Lydia can be held guilty of slight physical
injuries,

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the CA was correct in ruling out Direct Assault, because there
was no person in authority

(2) Whether or not Lydia should be held liable for the unintentional abortion

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 955
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:

No. There was in fact Direct Assault

Art. 148. Direct assaults. - Any person or persons who, without a public uprising,
shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes
enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition, or shall attack,
employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his
agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, when the assault is
committed with a weapon or when the offender is a public officer or employee, or
when the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. If none of these
circumstances be present, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.

It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an offense against
public order that may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who,
without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of
the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by
any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or
seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged
in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance.

The case of Lydia falls under the second mode, which is the more common form
of assault. Its elements are:

1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious
intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.

2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.

3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is
engaged in the actual performance of official duties, or [b] that he is assaulted by
reason of the past performance of official duties.

4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or
his agent in the exercise of his duties.

5. That there is no public uprising.

On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in the
performance of her official duties, that is, she was busy with paperwork while supervising
and looking after the needs of pupils who are taking their recess in the classroom to

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
which she was assigned. Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of
persons in authority expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.

Undoubtedly, the prosecution adduced evidence to establish beyond reasonable


doubt the commission of the crime of direct assault. The appellate court must be
consequently overruled in setting aside the trial court’s verdict. It erred in declaring that
Lydia could not be held guilty of direct assault since Gemma was no longer a person in
authority at the time of the assault because she allegedly descended to the level of a
private person by fighting with Lydia. The fact remains that at the moment Lydia initiated
her tirades, Gemma was busy attending to her official functions as a teacher. She tried to
pacify Lydia by offering her a seat so that they could talk properly, but Lydia refused and
instead unleashed a barrage of verbal invectives. When Lydia continued with her
abusive behavior, Gemma merely retaliated in kind as would a similarly situated person.
Lydia aggravated the situation by slapping Gemma and violently pushing her against a
wall divider while she was going to the principal’s office. No fault could therefore be
attributed to Gemma.

(2) No. It is worth stressing that Gemma was admitted and confined in a hospital
for incomplete abortion on August 28, 1981, which was 42 days after the July 17, 1981
incident. This interval of time is too lengthy to prove that the discharge of the fetus from
the womb of Gemma was a direct outcome of the assault. Her bleeding and abdominal
pain two days after the said incident were not substantiated by proof other than her
testimony. Thus, it is not unlikely that the abortion may have been the result of other
factors.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 957
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELIZER BEDUYA and RIC BEDUYA
G.R. No. 175315 August 9, 2010

DOCTRINE: "Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious


inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of
superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime."

"The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se
establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no
proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim."

FACTS:

On May 6, 2002, at around 11:45 p.m., Roy Bughao (Bughao) was carrying a
torch on his way home from the birthday celebration of his cousin when Elizer and Ric
suddenly appeared. Ric went around him while his brother Elizer pointed a knife. He
drew back and swung the torch at them and shouted, "Why do you hurt me, what is my
fault?"The Beduya brothers did not reply and continued their assault. Bughao then
scrambled for safety and ran towards the yard of victim Dominador S. Acope, Sr. (Acope,
Sr.) and hid in a dark area.The victim went outside while his son peeped through the
window. The victim saw Bughao who readily identified himself and said that Elizer
pointed a knife at him. As the Beduya brothers entered the yard of the victim’s house,
Bughao hid himself. While in hiding, he saw the Beduya brothers approach the victim
after they were advised to go home since it was already late. The Beduya brothers did
not heed the advice and instead Ric slapped the victim while Elizer stabbed him. The
victim retaliated by striking them with a piece of wood he got hold of. Elizer and Ric ran
away.

The incident was also reported to their Barangay Captain, who responded by
going to the residence of the victim. Upon arrival, he saw the victim lying on the ground
and bleeding from a stab wound. The victim told him that, "I will die because of this. x x x
I was boxed by Ric and I was stabbed by Elizer." He also told the Barangay Captain that
he had no previous quarrel with the Beduya brothers.The Barangay Captain took the
victim to the Jimenez Medicare Hospital but was later advised to proceed to the MHARS
General Hospital in Ozamis City, where the police officer took the statement of the victim
and Acope, Jr. On the next day, May 8, 2002, the victim died due to "septic and
hypovolemic shock secondary to stabbed wound."

The accused were found guilty of the crime of Murder.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 958
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ISSUES:

Whether or not the trial court properly applied the qualifying circumstance of
abuse of superior strength.

HELD:

No abuse of Superior Strength as a Qualifying Circumstance in the Crime of


Murder

Murder is the unlawful killing by the accused of a person, which is not parricide or
infanticide, provided that any of the attendant circumstances enumerated in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code is present. Abuse of superior strength is one of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned therein that qualifies the killing of the victim to
murder.

In this case, the trial and appellate courts commonly concluded that there was
intent to kill on the part of the appellants and that they employed abuse of superior
strength to ensure the execution and success of the crime. The appellate court even
adopted the trial court’s finding and conclusion that as Ric punched the victim in the
shoulder and appellant Elizer delivered the fatal stab wound, this combined assault
"gave them the advantage over the victim who must have been taken by surprise.
Although the victim struck at accused with a piece of wood, he did so only after he had
been stabbed, causing the two accused to run away."

This reasoning is erroneous.

"Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of


forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by
him in the commission of the crime.""The fact that there were two persons who attacked
the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior
strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the
victim." The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage,
or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage."To take advantage of
superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means
of defense available to the person attacked."The appreciation of this aggravating
circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties.

The prosecution in this case failed to adduce evidence of a relative disparity in


age, size and strength, or force, except for the showing that two assailants, one of them
(Elizer) armed with a knife, assaulted the victim. The presence of two assailants, one of
them armed with a knife, does not ipso facto indicate an abuse of superior
strength. Mere superiority in numbers is not indicative of the presence of this

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 959
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
circumstance. Neither did the prosecution present proof to show that the victim suffered
from an inferior physical condition from which the circumstance can be inferred. In fact,
there is evidence that the victim was able to get hold of a piece of wood and deliver
retaliatory blows against the knife-wielder, Elizer.

In view of the foregoing, we are compelled to rule out the presence of abuse of
superior strength as a qualifying circumstance. Hence, appellants’ guilt must be limited
to the crime of homicide.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 960
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE vs. EDGAR CONCILLADO
G.R. No. 181204, (November 28, 2011)

DOCTRINE:
Wellsettled is the rule in criminal cases that the prosecution has the burden
of proof to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. However, once
the accused admits the commission of the offense charged but raises a justifying
circumstance as a defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him. He cannot rely on the
weakness of the evidence for the prosecution for even if it is weak, it cannot be doubted
especially after he himself has admitted the killing. This is because a judicial confession
constitutes evidence of a high order.

FACTS:
In the early moning of August 24, 2002, Diosdado Pido was shot, stabbed and
hacked in Barangay Guinciaman, San Miguel, Leyte. Having sustained a total of 26
wounds, he instantly succumbed to death. Blamed for his untimely demise were Edgar
Concillado, Erlito Concillado and Dolores Concillado. Thus, on November 5, 2002, an
Information was filed charging them with murder. On March 12, 2004, the RTC of
Carigara, Leyte, Branch 13, rendered its Decision finding all three accused guilty as
charged. However, the CA rendered its Decision acquitting Erlito and Dolores of the crime
charged and finding Edgar guilty only of homicide. As regards Edgar who admitted the
killing, the CA was not convinced of his self-defense theory. However, for lack of evidence
to establish the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, the CA
convicted Edgar only of the crime of homicide.

ISSUE:
WON there was complete self-defense on the part of the accused.

HELD:
NO.
Well-settled is the rule in criminal cases that the prosecution has the burden
of proof to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. However, once
the accused admits the commission of the offense charged but raises a justifying
circumstance as a defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him. He cannot rely on the
weakness of the evidence for the prosecution for even if it is weak, it cannot be doubted
especially after he himself has admitted the killing. This is because a judicial confession
constitutes evidence of a high order. In this case, Edgar admits responsibility for the
death of Diosdado but desires to avoid criminal responsibility therefor by claiming that he
was only acting in self-preservation and that it was in fact Diosdado who was the unlawful
aggressor. It is therefore incumbent upon Edgar to prove that he deserves an acquittal.
For the justifying circumstance of self-defense to be properly appreciated, the following
elements must concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. The most important among all the elements is x x x unlawful
aggression. Unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be
successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete." "There can be no self-defense

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 961
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
unless there was unlawful aggression from the person injured or killed by the accused; for
otherwise, there is nothing to prevent or repel." "Unlawful aggression is an actual physical
assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person." We subscribe to
the findings of both the trial court and the CA that there is no unlawful aggression on the
part of Diosdado. According to the trial court, "[t]he distance of the accused from the
fence while he was urinating was about 1½ meters, while the victim was outside and
in-between them was a bamboo fence about four feet high. With the height of the fence
and his distance from the fence, there is an impossibility of unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim. It also concluded that the victim could not have entered the yard of the
accused. The dead body of Diosdado was found lying on the road about eight meters
from the house of Edgar. However, no traces of blood could be found in the yard of the
accused. We also agree with the ruling of the CA that the disparity of the injuries
sustained belies all pretensions of self-defense. Diosdado suffered a total of 26 incised,
stab and bullet wounds. On the other hand, Edgar suffered only three superficial
wounds. "As has been repeatedly ruled, the nature, number and location of the wounds
sustained by the victim disprove a plea of self-defense." Moreover, during his
cross-examination, Edgar admitted that he continued to inflict injuries on Diosdado
notwithstanding the fact that he was already lying lifeless on the ground. There being
no unlawful aggression to speak of, Edgar's theory of self defense has no leg to
stand on. Having miserably failed to discharge his burden of proof, we therefore find
Edgar criminally responsible for the death of Diosdado.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 962
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EMINIANO BARCELA
G.R. No. 179948, (December 8, 2010)

DOCTRINE: In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the four well-established principles
x x x: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; (2) it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (3) [considering] the intrinsic
nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and, (4) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness
of the evidence for the defense. Thus, the primordial consideration in a determination
concerning the crime of rape is the credibility of the private complainants testimony.

FACTS:
On January 4, 2004, AAA, then 11 years old, was at the residence of her parents in
Calabanga, Camarines Sur, tending to her younger siblings. Her father, the appellant, arrived at
around five o’clock in the afternoon from the Bicol Medical Center, where his pregnant wife and
mother of AAA was left behind to take care of their two children who were confined thereat. After
eating dinner prepared by appellant, AAA and her siblings went to sleep at around six to seven
o’clock in the evening while appellant attended to his youngest child who was suffering from an
asthma attack. At around nine o’clock in the evening, AAA was awakened due to a pain in her
vagina. She then noticed that she was naked with her hands tied above her head. Her feet were
spread apart and tied to the bamboo poles of their house. While in this exposed position,
appellant was on top of her, inserting his penis into her vagina and making a push and pull
movement. While she was being violated by appellant, AAA cried in pain. Thereafter, appellant
untied her, used a lighter to illuminate himself and the ice pick poked at her, and told her to go
back to sleep. The following morning, AAA just lay in bed and continued crying. Appellant told
her to wake up and wash her bloodstained panty. She got up, but instead of obeying appellant,
she burned said underwear together with her mat to rid herself of any reminder of the horrible
fate she suffered in the hands of her father. AAA told her mother about the appellants beastly
sexual aggression on January 21, 2004. The following day, January 22, 2004, the mother of
AAA took her to the Bicol Medical Center for a medical examination conducted by Dr. Augusto
M. Quilon, Jr. who issued a medical certificate confirming that AAA had old hymenal lacerations
at two and seven o’clock positions. When asked to clarify, Dr. Quilon explained that it takes
about two weeks for a laceration to heal. In this case, since the rape took place on January 4,
2004, the lacerations were already considered old and healed by the time AAA was examined
on January 22, 2004, or 17 days after the rape. The RTC rendered its decision finding the
accused guilty of qualified rape and which was affirmed by the CA

ISSUE:
WON the accused is guilty of qualified rape

HELD:
YES. In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the four well-established principles
x x x: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; (2) it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (3) [considering] the intrinsic
nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and, (4) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness
of the evidence for the defense. Thus, the primordial consideration in a determination
concerning the crime of rape is the credibility of the private complainants testimony. In this case,
the trial court gave complete credence to AAAs testimony. She positively identified the appellant
as her sexual aggressor and never wavered in her declaration on the details of the horrible
experience she suffered in the hands of her father. On January 4, 2004, she was just 11 years
old when her father undressed her, and tied her hands and feet while she was asleep. He was
already having carnal knowledge of her when she was awakened due to the excruciating pain
caused by the penetration of her own fathers penis into her vagina. This incident occurred in the
evening in the privacy of their family home. [T]he findings of the trial court as to the credibility of
witnesses [will not be disturbed on appeal] considering that [the trial court] is in a better position
to observe their candor and [conduct] on the witness stand. Evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, [due to] its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, especially
under cross-examination. Its assessment is respected unless certain facts of substance and
value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the outcome of the case.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELIPE NACHOR
G.R. No. 177779, (December 14, 2010)

DOCTRINE: In determining the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are
guided by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility
and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though
innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually
involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and, (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

FACTS:
AAA was born on September 11, 1986, and lived with her parents and four siblings. She
was 14 years old when in the morning of May 9, 2001, she was left alone with her father, the
appellant. While she was cooking at around 11:00 oclock in the morning, the appellant suddenly
poked a bolo at her neck, pulled her wrist and dragged her towards the room which she shared
with her brother and sisters. Gripped with fear, she struggled and attempted to escape but the
appellants strength was too much for her. Her shouts for help were futile since the house of their
nearest neighbor was about a hundred meters away and separated by trees and hilly terrain
from their house. While inside the room, the appellant, with a bolo still in his hand, forced AAA to
lie down on the bed. When she obeyed, the appellant removed her shorts and
panty. Thereafter, he took off his shorts and underwear and started kissing her neck and
breasts. He proceeded to mount AAA, inserted his penis inside her vagina and executed a
pumping motion. During this ordeal, AAA continued to struggle, but her attempt to resist the
appellants lewd desires was unsuccessful. She instead experienced intense pain and cried.
After the appellant satisfied his lust, he again poked his bolo at AAA and threatened to kill her,
her mother and siblings if she would report the incident to anyone. The appellant then stood up,
put on his clothes and departed. AAA kept the incident to herself out of fear. AAA was again
raped by the appellant in the first week of June, 2001 when her mother and siblings were not
around. A few months later, the abdomen of AAA started to bulge. Having been threatened by
the appellant, she refused to divulge any information. The mother of AAA therefore sought the
assistance of one of her wedding sponsors to whom AAA finally revealed the sexual abuse she
experienced in the hands of her father. After this revelation was relayed to her mother, AAA was
immediately taken to the Regional Office of the Department of Social Welfare and Development
where she declared in an interview that her father sired the child she was carrying. She was then
taken to the National Bureau of Investigation for a medico-legal examination. The results
confirmed that AAA was pregnant. On December 27, 2001, AAA gave birth to a baby boy she
named BBB. The RTC rendered a decision convicting the accused which was also affirmed by
the CA.

ISSUE:

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
WON the accused is guilty of rape.

HELD:
YES. In determining the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are
guided by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility
and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though
innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually
involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and, (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Guided by these legal precepts, we find the testimony of AAA, who was 14 years old when the
two incidents of rape occurred, credible and untainted by any hint of falsehood or
prevarication. We agree with the observations of the trial court, as sustained by the CA, that the
testimony of AAA on both occasions of her rape is worthy of credence. Her statements under
oath are sufficient evidence to convict the appellant for having carnal knowledge of her by
means of force and intimidation on May 9, 2001 and the first week of June, 2001. AAA positively
identified the appellant as her abuser. She never wavered in her testimony and maintained even
on cross-examination that the appellant was her rapist. On the issue of credibility of witnesses,
the trial courts assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight or influence x x
x. Having the [advantage of directly observing the] deportment and manner of testifying [of the
witness], the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial
evidence properly. In this case, we see no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court as
affirmed by the CA. The evaluation of the testimony of AAA has been appreciated properly and
the evidence is overwhelming to convict the appellant of the crime charged.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 966
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
AZUCENA B. CORPUZ vs. ROMAN G. DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. 149261, December 15, 2010

DOCTRINE: It is a rule too firmly established that the "determination of probable cause
for the filing of an Information in court is an executive function, one that properly pertains
at the first instance to the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of
Justice." "Judicial review of the resolution of the Secretary of Justice is limited to a
determination of whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction considering that the full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the executive branch in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation."

FACTS:
The controversy has its root in an affidavit-complaint[4] filed with the City Prosecutor's
Office of Makati City by Assistant Solicitor General Roman G. del Rosario accusing herein
petitioner Assistant Solicitor General Azucena B. Corpuz for Libel. In said complaint,
respondent claimed that petitioner's June 13, 1997 memorandum was maliciously issued
without any good intention but to discredit and cause dishonor to his good name as a
government employee. He insisted that the import of the memorandum affected his
credibility and the performance of his official functions as Assistant Solicitor General
among others.
Prosecutor Ata issued a Resolution stating that the evidence has sufficiently
established a probable cause to indict respondent with the crime of libel, and accordingly.
Petitioner's appeal from the prosecutor's resolution was not given due course. The DOJ
Secretaiy considered the appeal as a second motion for reconsideration and resolved to
deny the appeal with finality. Petitioner then elevated the matter via a petition for certiorari
before the CA contending that the public prosecutors gravely abused their discretion in
finding a prima facie case of libel against her and exceeded their jurisdiction when her
appeal from the resolution of the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati City was not given due
course. Court of Appeals found that the petitioner failed to clearly show exceptional
circumstances to justify her resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or nor the CA correctly ruled that no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the Assistant City Prosecutor in concluding that her findings have prima
facie established the elements of libel despite their not being in accordance with law and
jurisprudence on the matter.

HELD:
No. The contentions of petitioner are devoid of merit.

"Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as
such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof." A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed and was committed by the suspect. It "need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt." A
prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable
cause justifying the filing of criminal information against the respondent since the
determination of existence of a probable cause is the function of the prosecutor. Judicial
review is allowed only where respondent has clearly established that the prosecutor
committed grave abuse of discretion.

Contrary to petitioner's contention, the Court find that in arriving at their unanimous
conclusion that probable cause for libel exists, the prosecutor and the Secretary of
Justice had clearly determined and carefully deliberated on the factual and legal
antecedents of the case. The resolution of the prosecutor as sustained by the Secretary
of Justice and the CA shows that it squarely addressed and took into consideration all the
arguments and evidence submitted. The evidence before the prosecutor served as basis
in arriving at her findings of fact.

As defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of libel has the following
elements:
1. imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition,
status or circumstance;

2.the imputation must be malicious;

3. it must be given publicity; and

4. the victim must be identifiable.

As extant from the resolution of the prosecutor, the presence of these elements was
duly established during the preliminary investigation stage clearly showing prima facie a
well-founded belief that a crime of libel has been committed and that petitioner probably
committed it. It must be stressed that an accusation is not synonymous with guilt. That is
why a trial has to follow, precisely to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 968
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. FLORENCIO AGACER, EDDIE AGACER,
ELYNOR AGACER, FRANKLIN AGACER and ERIC* AGACER
G.R. No. 177751, December 14, 2011

DOCTRINE: Evidence as to who among the appellants delivered the fatal blow is
therefore no longer indispensable since in conspiracy, a person may be convicted for the
criminal act of another. In a conspiracy, the act of one is deemed the act of all.

FACTS:
Cesario was clearing a section of his farm and preparing the beddings for the rice
seedlings. While Cesario was tending to his farm when appellants suddenly emerged
from a nearby banana plantation and surrounded Cesario. Visibly intimidated, Cesario
moved backwards and retreated to where the other farm laborers were working.
However, Franklin set afire the rice straws that covered Cesario’s rice seedlings. This
prompted Cesario to return to put out the fire and save his rice seedlings. At this point,
Franklin and Eric started throwing stones at Cesario which forced the latter to retreat
again. Thereafter, Florencio, while standing side by side with Eric, signaled Cesario to
come closer. Cesario obliged but when he was just around five meters away from the
group, Eddie suddenly pulled out a gun concealed inside a sack and, without warning,
shot Cesario hitting him in the left portion of his chest. Almost simultaneously, Elynor took
aim at Cesario with his bow and arrow but missed his mark. As Cesario fell, appellants
fled towards the irrigation canal, where another gunshot rang. Thereafter, a short firearm
was thrown from where the appellants ran towards the direction of Cesario’s fallen body.
Appellants then immediately left the scene of the crime onboard a hand tractor and a
tricycle.
The trial court found the prosecution’s evidence sufficient to prove
appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It held that appellants acted in conspiracy in
inflicting upon Cesario, in a treacherous manner, multiple gunshot wounds. The CA
affirmed the ruling of the trial court in all respects.

ISSUE:
Whether or not both lower courts erred in finding that they conspired to kill Cesario.

HELD:
No. The appeal is unmeritorious. Conspiracy was sufficiently established.
"Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it." In conspiracy, it is not necessary to
adduce direct evidence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It "may be shown
through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such
lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest." Proof of
a previous agreement and decision to commit the crime is not essential but the fact that
the malefactors acted in unison pursuant to the same objective suffices.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 969
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Here, while there is no proof of any previous agreement among appellants to
commit the crime and while it was established during trial that Eddie alone shot Cesario,
the acts of all appellants before, during and after the incident establish the existence of
conspiracy to kill Cesario beyond reasonable doubt. First, all of them emerged at the
same time from a banana plantation beside the ricefield. Second, they surprised Cesario
by immediately surrounding him. Third, all of them were armed at the time of the incident.
Eddie had a shotgun concealed in a sack, Florencio was armed with a bolo, Elynor had a
bow and arrow, while Eric and Franklin had stones in their hands. Fourth, Eric and
Franklin struck Cesario with stones moments before the shooting. Fifth, Eddie
immediately shot Cesario at close range while the latter was approaching the group of
appellants upon being summoned by Florencio. Sixth, Florencio, Franklin, Eric and
Elynor stood just a meter away from Eddie when he shot Cesario, but did not do anything
to stop or dissuade Eddie from the assault. Seventh, after Cesario was shot, all appellants
departed from the scene of the crime together.
Undoubtedly, the acts of the assailants constitute proof of their unanimity in
design, intent and execution. They "performed specific acts with closeness and
coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design" to ensure the
death of Cesario. We thus uphold the lower courts’ finding that appellants conspired to
commit the crime of murder against Cesario.
Having established conspiracy, appellants’ assertion that each of them can only be
made liable for his own acts deserves no merit. Evidence as to who among the appellants
delivered the fatal blow is therefore no longer indispensable since in conspiracy, a person
may be convicted for the criminal act of another. In a conspiracy, the act of one is deemed
the act of all.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. RODRIGuez LUCERO y PAW-AS alias "Kikit,"
G.R. No. 179044, December 6, 2010

DOCTRINE: The settled rule is that treachery can exist even if the attack is frontal, as
long as the attack is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or
to defend himself. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack, without the slightest
provocation from an unarmed victim, made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or
to retaliate.

FACTS:

Maceda went out of his house to get "kasla," a medicinal herb for his sick child.
After getting the herb, he went to a waiting shed located about 10 meters away from his
house as he saw a certain Linda Basalo thereat waiting for a ride. While at the waiting
shed, the victim Edgar Aydaon passed by. But after a while, the victim returned and
helped Basalo load the vegetables in the jeepney.

After the jeepney left, appellant arrived and called out the victim. Appellant pleaded that
he be allowed by the victim to go with him as the appellant was allegedly being pursued
by a certain Pandeta. The victim acceded to the request and even invited appellant to
sleep in his house. However, after walking a distance of about 10 meters, appellant
suddenly hacked the victim at the left side of his head causing the victim to fall to the
ground. In spite of the fact that the victim was already lying on the ground, appellant
further stabbed him on his waist. Thereafter, appellant left the premises. The defense
presented appellant as its lone witness who could only offer denial and alibi. He claimed
that he was at his farm located at Nyholm, Agusan del Sur. He alleged that he had no prior
disagreement with the victim or any of the prosecution witnesses. Hence, he could not
understand why he was being implicated in the crime.

The trial court found appellant guilty of murder qualified by treachery. The trial court
however found that the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was not present.
The trial court found the inconsistencies in the testimony of Maceda only minor and trivial
as they did not touch on the elements of the crime. The CA affirmed with modifications the
Decision of the trial court. The appellate court also affirmed the findings of the trial court
that treachery attended the commission of the crime.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellate court erred in giving full weight and credence to the
inconsistent testimony of Maceda and disregarding the defense interposed by the
appellant

HELD:

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No. The defense basically assails the credibility of prosecution eyewitness Maceda.
As it did before the CA, the defense claims that credence should not have been given to
the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Maceda as it bore several inconsistencies.

The Court find this contention untenable. Basic is the rule that the Supreme Court
accords great respect and even finality to the findings of credibility of the trial court, more
so if the same were affirmed by the CA, as in this case. Besides, upon our review of the
records of this case, we find that both the trial court and the CA did not overlook or
misunderstand any substance or fact which would have materially affected the outcome
of this case.

Moreover, the alleged inconsistencies referred to by the defense indeed refer to


minor details which are very inconsequential to the outcome of the case. According to
the defense, "Maceda first testified that when the victim was about to leave, appellant
came out and mauled the victim. However, he contradicted himself when he further
testified that when [appellant] came out, the latter conversed with the victim and it was
only after the victim and the appellant reached the distance of ten (10) meters that he
saw the appellant [hack] the victim."

This contention was satisfactorily debunked by the prosecution. We thus agree


that whether the appellant immediately mauled the victim or he mauled him only after
walking a distance of 10 meters does not deviate from the fact that appellant did indeed
maul and hack the victim. Moreover, the prosecution correctly argued that "appellant
quoted x x x Maceda’s testimony separately and took it out of context." The records
show that after making a general statement that appellant came out and mauled the
victim, Maceda further explained when pressed for details that appellant hacked the
victim after they conversed and walked the distance of about 10 meters.

Finally, the Court agree with both the trial court and the CA that treachery
attended the commission of the crime. Records show that appellant lulled the victim into
believing that he was being pursued by somebody. Believing in the tale being spun by
the appellant, the victim even offered appellant the security and protection of his house.
However, appellant reciprocated the victim’s trust and hospitality by suddenly hacking
him on the head and stabbing him on the waist. "The settled rule is that treachery can
exist even if the attack is frontal, as long as the attack is sudden and unexpected, giving
the victim no opportunity to repel it or to defend himself. What is decisive is that the
execution of the attack, without the slightest provocation from an unarmed victim, made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate."

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MANUEL "AWIL" POJO
G.R. No. 183709, December 6, 2010

DOCTRINE: Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct
and difficult to disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such
defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Secondly, alibi is
unacceptable when there is a positive identification of the accused by a credible witness.
Lastly, in order that alibi might prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has
been somewhere else during the commission of the crime; it must also be shown that it
would have been impossible for him to be anywhere within the vicinity of the crime
scene.

FACTS:

"AAA" testified that appellant is the common-law husband of her mother. On October
20, 2003, at about three o’clock in the afternoon, her mother sent her to bring food to the
appellant who was working at the camote plantation of a certain Tuason. While thereat,
appellant made her lie on the ground which he covered with banana leaves. After
ordering "AAA" to remove her shorts and panty, he also removed his undergarments and
inserted his penis into the vagina of "AAA." However, appellant’s penis failed to
completely penetrate "AAA’s" vagina but merely touched the same. However, "AAA" still
felt pain in her private organ. After a while, appellant stood up and ordered "AAA" to go
home. "AAA" however noticed a whitish substance coming out of appellant’s private part.
Appellant denied raping her.

The trial court lent credence to the version of the prosecution. It noted that rape was
consummated although there was no complete penetration considering the categorical
statement of "AAA" that she felt the penis of the appellant touch her private part. "AAA"
was only 10 years old when the rape incident transpired; and only 12 years old when
placed on the witness stand. According to the trial court, "AAA" could not have concocted
the rape incident if it did not actually transpire. Being a minor, she lacked the
sophistication to fabricate the crime of rape against the appellant. The appellate court
affirmed in toto the Decision of the trial court. Likewise, the appellate court held that
appellant’s alibi does not inspire belief as he failed to present any independent evidence
to establish his whereabouts

ISSUE:
Whether or not the alibi of the appellant should be given weight and credence

HELD:

No. Both the trial court and the appellate court correctly disregarded appellant’s alibi.
It is an established jurisprudential rule that a mere denial, without any strong evidence to

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
support it, can scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and
involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to him. The defense of alibi is likewise
unavailing. Firstly, alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and
difficult to disprove. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is
negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Secondly, alibi is
unacceptable when there is a positive identification of the accused by a credible witness.
Lastly, in order that alibi might prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused has
been somewhere else during the commission of the crime; it must also be shown that it
would have been impossible for him to be anywhere within the vicinity of the crime scene.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LYZAH SY FRANCO, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 171328, February 16, 2011

DOCTRINE: In the prosecution for the crime of estafa committed under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, there must be evidence of false
representation or false pretense on the part of the accused to prove reasonable doubt. In
this case, the employee’s act of soliciting a client despite previous knowledge of several
complaints against his or her employer for failure to deliver the motor vehicle that was the
subject of the agreement, is tantamount to misrepresentation.

FACTS:
Lourdes G. Antonio testified that petitioners swindled her. Lourdes was interested in
the offer of Franco since she and her husband were actually looking for a used car for
their taxicab operation. She therefore contacted Franco to take up her offer. Franco and
Lourdes went to a showroom; Lourdes immediately chose a blue Mazda 323 car. Franco
went to the house of Lourdes and presented a sales proposal, where she can buy the car
through a down payment and installments. The car, however, was not delivered as
promised. When the car was still undelivered, Lourdes sought the aid of "Hoy Gising."
Franco denied involvement in the alleged conspiracy to commit estafa against Lourdes.
The trial court rendered its Decision finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b). The CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of estafa

HELD:
Yes. The conviction of Franco and Besario for conspiring to commit estafa against
Lourdes must therefore stand. The prosecution satisfactorily established their
participation in the scheme to defraud Lourdes, their acts were not isolated from but
related to a plot to deceive her. The prosecution likewise proved beyond reasonable
doubt that the well-planned swindling scheme of Franco and Besario resulted to estafa.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and
decide to commit it. "Conspiracy must be proven on the same quantum of evidence as the
felony subject of the agreement of the parties. [It] may be proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct of the alleged conspirators
[prior to], during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or
purpose."
Evidently, petitioners’ actions were in relation to the attainment of a common
objective. They had vital roles in the nefarious scheme to sell a vehicle that they knew
would never be delivered, but for which they obtained a substantial sum of money from
Lourdes.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Having established the existence of a conspiracy between Franco and Besario,
the prosecution proceeded to present evidence to prove that the acts of the petitioners
constituted estafa.
Estafa by Means of Deceit
Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code penalizes fraud or deceit when
committed as follows:
xxxx

2. by means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of fraud:

(a) by using fictitious name, or actions, falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualification, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by
means of other similar deceits.

"The elements of the crime of estafa under the foregoing provision are: (1) there must be
a false pretense, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means; (2) such false pretense, fraudulent
act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means and was thus induced to part with his money or
property; and (4) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage."

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SEA LION FISHING CORPORATION vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 172678 March 23, 2011

DOCTRINE: When an instrument or tool used in a crime is being claimed by a third-party


not liable to the offense, such third-party must first establish its ownership over the same.

FACTS:
In response to fishermen's report of poaching off Mangsee Island in Balabac,
Palawan, a combined team of Philippine Marines, Coast Guard and barangay officials
conducted search and seizure operations therein. There they found F/V Sea Lion
anchored three nautical miles northwest of Mangsee Island. Beside it were five boats
and a long fishing net already spread over the water. The team boarded the vessel and
apprehended her captain, a Filipino, and a crew composed of threeFilipinos and three
Chinese. Also arrested were 17 Chinese fishermen aboard F/V Sea Lion. TheProvincial
Prosecutor of Palawan dismissed the charges except those against the 17 Chinese
fishermen.

This was after it was found out that the crew of F/V Sea Lion did not assent to the
illegal acts of said 17 Chinese fishermen who were rescued by the crew of the F/V Sea
Lion from a distressed Chinese vessel. The prosecutor concluded that the crew,
unarmed, outnumbered and hampered by language barrier, acted only out of
uncontrollable fear of imminent danger to their lives and property which hindered them
from asserting their authority over these Chinese nationals.With the crew of F/V Sea Lion
now exculpated, F/V Sea Lion was thus, recommended to be released to the petitioner
upon proper showing of evidence of its ownership of the aforesaid vessel.
Petitioner,however, failed to act in accordance with said Resolutions.The Seventeen (17)
accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals for the crime of
Violation of Section 88, sub-par. (3) of R.A. 8550 and sentenced them to suffer an
imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS TO SIX (6) YEARS, SIX (6) MONTHS AND SEVEN (7)
DAYS. The Fishing VesselF/V Sea Lion I as well as the fishing paraphernalia and
equipments used by the accused in committing the crime was ordered confiscated in
favor of the government.The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration to delete from
said Sentences the confiscation of F/VSea Lion but was denied by RTC and CA, thus
this petitioner was filed.Petitioner contends that F/V Sea Lion should be released to it
because it is the registered owner of said vessel and her captain and crew members
were not among those accused of and convicted invoking Article 45 of the Revised Penal
Code. The OSG contends that even if Article 45 of theRevised Penal Code is applicable,
still the present petition must fail due to petitioner's failure to present its third-party claim
at the earliest opportunity.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ISSUE:
Whether or not the confiscation of F/V Sea Lion was valid.

HELD:
YES. Evidently, the remedial relief pursued by the petitioner was infirm and
improper. Significantly, the lack of any factual basis for the third-party claim of ownership
was not cured at all when the petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration before the trial
court. At that point, evidence should have been adduced to support the petitioner's claim
(so that a new trial or reopening of the trial on the confiscation aspect should have been
prayed for, rather than a mere motion for reconsideration.)

Given the absence of any admissible evidence of third-party ownership and the
failure to comply with the additional Article 45 requirement, the court's order to confiscate
the F/V Sea Lion pursuant to Article 87 of R.A. No. 8550 cannot be incorrect to the point
of being an act in grave abuse of discretion.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORANTE RELANES alias "DANTE,"
G.R. No. 175831 April 12, 2011

DOCTRINE: In rape cases, if the testimony of the victim passes the test of credibility, the
accused may be convicted solely on that basis" for "rape is generally unwitnessed and
oftentimes, the victim is left to testify for herself.

FACTS:
Private complainant AAA was only eight years old when her father, the accused
herein raped her on the first week of Aug. 2002 and on Jan. 9, 2003. The victim got
pregnant as a result of the abuses where the accused threatened to kill her and her
family if she would tell anyone. AAAgave a testimony and described how she was
abused. Accused denied the rape incident on Jan. 2003 but eventually admitted on
having sexual intercourse with AAA on Aug. 2002. During the course of the trial, he
pleaded forgiveness to his wife, daughter and other members of his family. He was
convicted for each count of rape with a penalty of death. Judgment was affirmed by CA
hence, the automatic review.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred gravely in giving full weight and credence to
the incredible statement of AAA;
2. Whether or not the plea for forgiveness by the accused can be considered as
an attempt to compromise and is therefore admissible in evidence as an admission of
guilt

HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: NO. The defense of the accused of denial and alibi should be
dismissed outright in light of his positive identification of AAA. It is an established rule
that denial and alibi, being negative self-serving defences, cannot prevail over the
positive allegations of the victim and her categorical and positive identification of the
accused as her assailant.

2. SECOND ISSUE: Evidently, no one would ask for forgiveness unless he


committed some wrong and a plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to
an attempt to compromise. Settled is the rule that in criminal cases, except those

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 979
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
involving quasi-offenses as those allowed by law to be settled through mutual
concessions, an offer to compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an
implied admission of guilt. Under the circumstances, his plea for forgiveness should be
received as an implied admission of guilt.Judgment of CA was affirmed. Penalty of death
reduced to reclusion perpetua.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 980
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REYNALDO OLESCO Y ANDAYANG
G.R. No. 174861 April 11, 2011

DOCTRINE: In rape, the sweetheart defense must be proven by compelling evidence:


first, that the accused and the victim were lovers; and, second, that she consented to the
alleged sexual relations. The second is as important as the first, because this Court has
held often enough that love is not a license for lust.

FACTS:
On October 17, 2001, at around 10:00 o’clock in the evening, AAA passed by a
bakery where Olesco was working. Thereafter, somebody pulled her and covered her
mouth with a hanky which caused her to be unconscious. When she regained
consciousness at around 11:00 o’clock p.m., AAA found herself naked beside Olesco
inside a room located near the bakery. Her whole body ached, especially her cheeks,
tummy and her private part. AAA then slapped the accused three times and asked him
why he raped her. Olesco answered that he would kill her should she report the incident
to the police. After a while, accused told her to go home. She dressed up immediately
and went home running.
When she arrived home, AAA told her cousin about what happened. After two (2)
days, AAA reported the incident to the barangay. The barangay officials asked her the
whereabouts of the accused which she did not know then as she saw the accused only
once and knows him only by face. AAA explained that she was able to report the incident
to the barangay officials two days after it happened since when she woke up in the
morning of October 18, 2001, it was already 9:00 o’clock a.m. and she could not stand
asher whole body ached. Thereafter, the barangay officials referred the matter to the
police. An investigation was subsequently conducted.
Olesco denied the accusations against him and put up Sweetheartdefense as his
defense.

ISSUE:
Whether AAA voluntarily perfomed sexual intercourse with the accused.

HELD:
The sweetheart theory or sweetheart defense is an oft-abused justification that
rashly derides the intelligence of this Court and sorely tests our patience. For the Court
to even consider giving credence to such defense, it must be proven by compelling

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
evidence. The defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of the theory,
as in the instant case. Independent proof is required -- such as tokens, mementos, and
photographs. There is none presented here by the defense.
In any event, the claim is inconsequential since it is well-settled that being
sweethearts does not negate the commission of rape because such fact does not give
appellant license to have sexual intercourse against her will, and will not exonerate him
from the criminal charge of rape. Being sweethearts does not prove consent to the
sexual act.[28] Thus, having failed to satisfactorily establish that AAA voluntarily
consented to engage in sexual intercourse with him, the said act constitutes rape on the
part of the appellant.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 982
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARLO DUMADAG Y ROMIO
G.R. No. 176740, June 22, 2011

DOCTRINE:The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse with a woman


against her will or without her consent.

FACTS:
Version of the Prosecution
"AAA", a young barrio lass, 16 years of age at the time she testified that she was
on her way home after hearing the midnight mass at "BBB", "CCC", "DDD". All of a
sudden, appellant approached her from behind and poked a Batangas knife on her
threatening to stab her if she shouts. He pulled her towards the house. Once inside, she
was forced to remove her pants and panty because of fear. Appellant also removed his
pants and brief and pushed her on a bamboo bed. Pointing the knife at the left portion of
her abdomen, appellant ordered her to hold his penis against her vagina. Appellant
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. Pleading that she be allowed to go home,
appellant finally let her go after threatening to kill her if she reports the incident to her
parents. "AAA" decided not to disclose what transpired because of fear. Nevertheless,
"AAA's" uncle, "EEE" learned from appellant himself that the latter had sexual intercourse
with her.
Version of the Defense
Appellant does not deny having had sexual intercourse with "AAA". Instead, he
claimed that it was voluntary and without the use of force since they were lovers. To
support his claim that "AAA" was his girlfriend, appellant presented witnesses who both
corroborated his sweetheart defense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sexual congress between Dumayag and private complainant
was done through force and intimidation or was voluntary and consensual.
HELD:
No.The Court finds "AAA" candidly and categorically recounted the manner
appellant threatened her and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her against her

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
will. It bears to stress that "as a rule, testimonies of child victims of rape are given full
weight and credit for youth and immaturity are badges of truth. Neither is it improbable
for appellant to employ such criminal design in the presence of his (appellant) own family
especially when overcome by lust. "It is a common judicial experience that rapists are
not deterred from committing their odious act by the presence of people nearby." Thus,
the reason for "AAA's" failure to shout or cry for help is because she was overcame by
fear. It has been held that minors, like "AAA", could be easily intimidated and cowed into
silence even by the mildest threat against their lives.
The failure of "AAA" to flee despite opportunity does not necessarily deviate from
natural human conduct. It bears emphasis that human reactions vary and are
unpredictable when facing a shocking and horrifying experience such as sexual
assault. There is no uniform behavior expected of victims after being raped. Moreover,
not all rape victims can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of
everyone. "AAA", being then a minor and subjected to a threat to her life, should not be
judged by the norms of behaviour expected of mature persons. The fact that there is no
evidence of resistance on the part of "AAA" does not cloud her credibility. "The failure of
a victim to physically resist does not negate rape when intimidation is exercised upon her
and the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapist’s assault because of fear for
life and physical safety.
A `sweetheart defense,' to be credible, should be substantiated by some
documentary or other evidence of relationship [such as notes, gifts, pictures, mementos]
and the like. Besides, even if it were true that appellant and "AAA" were sweethearts, this
fact does not necessarily negate rape. Definitely, a man cannot demand sexual
gratification froma fiancé and worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext of love.
Love is not a license of lust.With the credibility of "AAA" having been firmly established,
the courts below did not err in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape
committed through force and intimidation.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 984
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. ROSAURO ASETRE Y DURAN
G.R. No. 175834, June 08, 2011

DOCTRINE: Inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim create a reasonable doubt in


court as to whether appellant did in fact rape the victim.

FACTS:
The prosecution established that appellant was the common-law husband of
"DDD", who is the aunt of "AAA". According to "AAA", she started living with "DDD" and
appellant when she was still small. particularly during her summer vacation at "BBB",
appellant raped her four times. The first rape happened during the first week. Appellant
took off her clothesthen inserted his penis into her vagina. Appellant even threatened
"AAA" that she and "DDD" would be killed if she would report the incident. Thereafter,
appellant sexually molested "AAA" three more times. The first witness for the defense
was Rosita Clarin (Clarin) who testified that appellant was her neighbor for four years.
Clarin asserted that at the time the alleged rapes were committed, "AAA" was not in
"BBB" but in "EEE" attending school, hence appellant could not have raped her. Clarin
averred that "AAA" arrived at "BBB" only one day after the latest alleged rape was
committed.
The last witness for the defense was the appellant himself. He denied having raped
"AAA". He claimed that from the first week up to the third week of March 2001, he was at
"BBB" together with "DDD", his live-in partner, and his helpers. He averred that at that
time, or until March 23, 2001, "AAA" was not in "BBB" but in "EEE" attending school.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court must give credence to the testimonies of “AAA” as to its
chronological consistency of narrating the incident of rape.

HELD:
The appeal is partially meritorious.The Court have thoroughly reviewed the
records of the case and we find that the evidence presented by the prosecution showed

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 985
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
that appellant is guilty of only one count of rape, and not four counts. The Informations
charged appellant with having raped "AAA" on the first week, second week, and third
week, of March 2001, and on March 23, 2001. However, as argued by the defense, the
testimony of "AAA" with regard to the first three incidents particularly on the dates when
and the places where the offenses were supposedly committed contains disturbing
discrepancies.
Thus, the Court could not agree with the findings of the trial court and the CA that
the inconsistencies in the testimony of "AAA" regarding the first three rape incidents are
inconsequential. These inconsistencies create a reasonable doubt in court as to whether
appellant did in fact rape "AAA" during those occasions. In contrast, "AAA's" testimony as
regards the March 23, 2001 incident was candid and consistent. She never wavered in
her narration that through threats and intimidation, appellant had carnal knowledge of her
against her will.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 986
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BINGKY CAMPOS AND DANNY “BOY”
ACABO
G.R. NO. 176061, July 4, 2011

DOCTRINE: Once the accused admits the commission of the offense charged but raises
a justifying circumstance as a defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him.

FACTS:
Lester Huck Baldivino was tending his sari-sari store when the victim Romeo Abad,
his uncle, came to buy cigarettes and candies. When Lester and the victim was chatting,
Lester heard footsteps and immediately saw Danny Boy and Bingky running towards the
victim. Before Lester can utter a word of warning, Danny stabbed the victim while Bingky
stood nearby, which caused the victim’s death.
As for his defense, Danny narrated that while on their way to the house of their uncle,
Danny and Bingky met four men who mauled Bingky. When Bingky was able to run
away, they approached Danny and kicked him. Danny pulled out a knife and thrust it
towards one of the men. Danny then ran away to escape.
RTC convicted Bingky and Danny to reclusion perpetua.
Appellants pray for the reversal of their conviction alleging that the prosecutor failed
to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They claim that the stabbing of the victim
was done in self-defense and that the mere presence of Bingky at the scene of the crime
does not prove the existence of conspiracy. The Appellee, argues that Danny failed to
prove his plea of self-defense; that conspiracy attended the killing of the victim and that
appellant’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:
WON the conviction of Danny and Bingky is proper.

HELD:
Yes. The convictions of the Appellants are proper.

Well-settled is the rule in criminal cases that the prosecution has the burden of
proof to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. However, once the
accused admits the commission of the offense charged but raises a justifying
circumstance as a defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him. He cannot relay on the
weakness of the evidence for the prosecution for even if it is weak, it cannot be doubted
especially after he himself has admitted the killing. This is because judicial confession
constitutes evidence of a high order.
In the case at bar, Danny categorically admits that he stabbed the victim.
However, he claims that he did it in self defense. Danny asserts that his reaction was
arising from a prior act of aggression and provocation by the victim and his companions.
However, based from the trial there was no mention at all that the victim was among the
four persons who allegedly attacked Danny and Bingky, likewise, there is nothing in the
trial which evinces unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN and ANIANO LATAYDA vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 175289, August 31, 2011

DOCTRINE: An accused, by entering his plea, and actively participating in the trial, is
deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation.

Any right that an accused may have in questioning the non-inclusion of another
person in the Information should be raised in a motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor which recommended the dismissal of the
complaint against said individual.

FACTS:
A criminal complaint was filed before the MTCC of Cagayan de Oro City against
Latayda, Camilo Sudaria, Marlon Bailloo, and Cipriano Boyatac for violation of gathering
and/or collecting timer, or other forest products without license. However, the Prosecutor
recommended the filing of an information not only against the aforementioned persons
but also against Villarin and also recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
Sudaria. Thus, an information was filed against Villarin, Latayda, Baillo and Boyatac.
(Respondents are Barangay Captain and Kagawads)

Villarin, Boyatac and Baillo filed a motion for reinvestigation. They alleged that the
Affidavit on which the information was based never mentioned Villarin as one of the
perpetrators of the crime, while the accusations against Boyatac and Baillo were not
based on personal knowledge of the affiants. The RTC directed the petitioners to file
their motion with the Ombudsman which filed the information. The motion was denied by
the Ombudsman.

RTC found petitioners guilty. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in
toto.

ISSUE: Whether or not Villarin was denied due process when he was not afforded to
participate in the preliminary investigation and Whether or not the non-inclusion of
Sudaria in the complaint is proper.

HELD:
Petitioners argue that the refusal of the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation is
tantamount to a denial of the right to due process. As Villarin was indicated in the
Information despite his not being including in the criminal complaint that he was not
afforded a preliminary investigation. They also questioned the non-inclusion of Sudaria in
the Information. They argue that the denial of the motion by the Ombudsman deprived
Villarin of his right to preliminary investigation.

It is submitted that the complaint did not include Villarin as respondent, but such
infirmities do not constitute denial of due process on the part of Villarin. Villarin and all
the accused participated in the scheduled preliminary investigation that was conducted

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
prior to the filing of the criminal case. They were also given the opportunity to submit
countervailing evidence to convince the prosecutor of their innocence.

Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised


and must not have been waived. Here it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack
of a preliminary investigation in his motion for reinvestigation. However after the denial of
the motion, he never raised this issue again. He accepted the verdict, entered a plea of
not guilty and actively participated in the trial. It was only after judgment against him that
he once again assailed the lack of preliminary investigation in the motion for
reconsideration. Whatever argument Villarin may have regarding the alleged absence of
preliminary investigation has therefore been mooted. By entering his plea, actively
participating in the trial, he is deemed to have waived his right to preliminary
investigation.

Petitioners also contend that Sudaria should also have been included as principal.
However, whether Sudaria should or should not be included as co-accused can no
longer be raised on appeal. The non-inclusion of Sudaria in the information should have
been raised in a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the prosecutor
recommending the dismissal of the complaint against Sudaria.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANGELINO YANSON
G.R. No. 179195, October 03, 2011

DOCTRINE: The alleged inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open


court and his sworn statement before the investigators are not fatal defects to justify a
reversal of judgment. Such discrepancies do not necessarily discredit the witness since ex
parte affidavits are almost always incomplete. A sworn statement or an affidavit does not
purport to contain a complete compendium of the details of the event narrated by the
affiant. Sworn statements taken ex parte are generally considered to be inferior to the
testimony given in open court. The discrepancies in the witness’s testimony do not damage the
essential integrity of the prosecution’s evidence in its material whole. Instead, the
discrepancies only erase suspicion that the testimony was rehearsed or
concocted. These honest inconsistencies serve to strengthen rather than destroy the
witness’s credibility.

FACTS: In the afternoon of May 12, 1991, Elmo Galfo (Galfo) and the victim, Carlito Magan
(Magan), were drinking whisky in the store of a certain Lorna Tamson (Tamson). After a while,
they were joined by appellant and Salcedo. They finished drinking at around 8:45 in the evening
after which Galfo and Magan walked home together
After traversing a distance of about half a kilometer, Galfo noticed two persons following them,
one of whom suddenly stabbed Magan at the back. Galfo positively identified Angelino Yanson,
as the person who stabbed Magan. Galfo tried to approach the victim but appellant and his
companion, Salcedo, rushed towards him thus prompting him to run away for safety. While
running, however, he managed to look back and saw appellant and Salcedo stab the victim
some more. According to Dr. Edgardo Jabasa, the Provincial Health Officer of Guimaras, the
victim suffered eight stab wounds, two of which were fatal and were inflicted at the back.

The trial court found the testimony of Galfo that he personally saw appellant stab Magan at the
back as credible because he was positioned only five arms length away from the victim. The trial
court also appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery considering the suddenness and
the surreptitiousness of the attack on the victim. However, it did not lend credence to Galfo's
testimony that he also saw Salcedo stab the victim. According to the trial court, it would be highly
improbable for Galfo to look back and witness the stabbing by Salcedo while running at a fast
pace. Thus, it exonerated Salcedo of any participation in the crime

The CA affirmed the trial court's finding that it was indeed appellant who stabbed Magan. Aside
from his positive identification by Galfo, the CA also found appellant's defense of alibi to be weak
and undeserving of belief because he failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the crime scene. Appellant asserts that in Galfo's sworn statement before the police
officers, he did not identify him as the assailant that Galfo described him only through his outfit
without any mention at all of his features or identifying marks notwithstanding that he (Galfo) was
familiar with him. Appellant thus concludes that all these circumstances create doubt as to
whether he was indeed the assailant. Appellant next posits that Galfo's behavior after the
stabbing incident is not in accord with the normal course of things. Appellant finds it strikingly odd

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
or unusual for Galfo to take a rest for 30 minutes at his house after having witnessed the
stabbing incident. Also, he could not fathom why the victim's family would not immediately come
to the rescue of their fallen kin after they have been informed about the incident.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the findings of the trial court.

HELD: NO. The alleged inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open court and
his sworn statement before the investigators are not fatal defects to justify a reversal of
judgment. Such discrepancies do not necessarily discredit the witness since ex parte affidavits
are almost always incomplete. A sworn statement or an affidavit does not purport to contain a
complete compendium of the details of the event narrated by the affiant. Sworn statements
taken ex parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court. The
discrepancies in the witness’s testimony do not damage the essential integrity of the
prosecution’s evidence in its material whole. Instead, the discrepancies only erase suspicion
that the testimony was rehearsed or concocted. These honest inconsistencies serve to
strengthen rather than destroy the witness’s credibility.

Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that people react differently when confronted with
a frightful occurrence. Some may react violently while others may exhibit nonchalance or even
boredom. The settled rule is that witnessing a crime is an unusual experience that elicits different
reactions from witnesses for which no clear-cut standard of behavior can be drawn. Different
people react differently to a given situation. There is no standard form of human behavioral
response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOEL T. SALES
G.R. No. 177218, October 03, 2011

DOCTRINE: A father ought to discipline his children for committing a misdeed. However, he
may not employ sadistic beatings and inflict fatal injuries under the guise of disciplining them.

FACTS: On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years old,
respectively, left their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Penafrancia without
the permission of their parents. They did not return home that night. When their mother, Maria
Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day, she found them in the nearby Barangay of
Magsaysay. Afraid of their fathers rage, Noemar and Junior initially refused to return home but
their mother prevailed upon them. When the two kids reached home at around 8 oclock in the
evening of September 20, 2002, a furious appellant confronted them. Appellant then whipped
them with a stick which was later broken so that he brought his kids outside their house. With
Noemar’s and Junior’s hands and feet tied to a coconut tree, appellant continued beating them
with a thick piece of wood. During the beating Maria stayed inside the house and did not do
anything as she feared for her life.

When the beating finally stopped, Maria noticed a crack in Noemar’s head and injuries in his
legs. She also saw injuries in the right portion of the head, the left cheek, and legs of
Junior. Shortly thereafter, Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness. Maria tried to revive him
and when Noemar remained motionless despite her efforts, she told appellant that their son was
already dead. However, appellant refused to believe her. Maria then told appellant to call a
quack doctor. He left and returned with one, who told them that they have to bring Noemar to a
hospital. Appellant thus proceeded to take the unconscious Noemar to the junction and waited
for a vehicle to take them to a hospital. As there was no vehicle and because another quack
doctor they met at the junction told them that Noemar is already dead, appellant brought his son
back to their house. Noemar’s wake lasted only for a night and he was immediately buried the
following day. His body was never examined by a doctor.

Information for parricide and slight physical injuries were thus filed and consolidated. The
trial court found appellant guilty of the crime beyond reasonable doubt but considered
voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as mitigating
circumstances.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming findings of the trial court.
HELD: NO. In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which
he intended to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong
done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the
perpetrator. Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon him
physical injuries, committed a felony. As a direct consequence of the beating suffered by the
child, he expired. Appellants criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.
Appellants claim that it was Noemars heart ailment that caused his death deserves no
merit. This declaration is self-serving and uncorroborated since it is not substantiated by
evidence.While Dr. Salvador Betito, a Municipal Health Officer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 992
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
issued a death certificate indicating that Noemar died due to cardio-pulmonary arrest, the same
is not sufficient to prove that his death was due mainly to his poor health. It is worth emphasizing
that Noemars cadaver was never examined. Also, even if appellant presented his wife, Maria, to
lend credence to his contention, the latters testimony did not help as same was even in conflict
with his testimony. Appellant testified that Noemar suffered from a weak heart which resulted in
his death while Maria declared that Noemar was suffering from epilepsy. Interestingly, Marias
testimony was also unsubstantiated by evidence. A parent or guardian must exercise restraint
and caution in administering the proper punishment. They must not exceed the parameters of
their parental duty to discipline their minor children. It is incumbent upon them to remain rational
and refrain from being motivated by anger in enforcing the intended punishment. A deviation will
undoubtedly result in sadism.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDGAR CONCILLADO
G.R. No. 181204, November 28, 2011

DOCTRINE: When an accused admits the commission of the crime but claims the justifying
circumstance of self-defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him. When the accused miserably
fails to discharge his burden, he does not deserve an acquittal. His conviction must be
sustained, as in the instant case.

FACTS:
In the early moning of August 24, 2002, Diosdado Pido (Diosdado) was shot, stabbed and
hacked in Barangay Guinciaman, San Miguel, Leyte. Having sustained a total of 26 wounds, he
instantly succumbed to death. Blamed for his untimely demise were Edgar Concillado (Edgar),
Erlito Concillado (Erlito) and Dolores Concillado (Dolores).
Lorenzo Vias (Lorenzo) recalled that on August 23, 2002, he and the victim, Diosdado, went
to Barangay Malaguinabut, San Miguel, Leyte, to attend the fiesta. At around 12:30 a.m. of
August 24, 2002, they went home to Barangay Guinciaman aboard a motorcycle. Upon
reaching Barangay Guinciaman, they parted ways. Shortly thereafter and from a distance of
about 10 meters, Lorenzo saw Edgar shoot Diosdado using a surit-surit (homemade
gun). When Diosdado fell to the ground, Edgar and Dolores approached the victim and
simultaneously stabbed him using small bolos about 10 inches in length. Thereafter, Erlito
joined the fray and delivered hacking blows on the victim using a long bolo. Edgar, Dolores and
Erlito then left the crime scene, crossed the nearby river and proceeded to the rice field.
The trial court held that there was conspiracy among the accused because they waited in
ambush for the victim; and after shooting him, simultaneously delivered hacking and stabbing
blows on him. The RTC also found that the plan to kill Diosdado was not hatched on the spur of
a moment thus it appreciated the qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.
The court a quo ruled that the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim
belied the allegation of Edgar that he merely acted in self-defense and that the victim was the
unlawful aggressor. Neither did it lend credence to Edgars asseveration that he was hacked
while urinating near the fence by the victim. The CA acquitted Erlito and Dolores of the crime
charged and found Edgar guilty only of homicide. According to the CA, it was unnatural for
Lorenzo to just stare and not bother to hide or take cover while the frenzied attack on Diosdado
was ongoing.
As regards Edgar who admitted the killing, the CA was not convinced of his self-defense theory.
However, for lack of evidence to establish the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation, the CA convicted Edgar only of the crime of homicide
ISSUE: Whether or not the allegation of self-defense is tenable.
HELD: NO. Well-settled is the rule in criminal cases that the prosecution has the burden of
proof to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. However, once the
accused admits the commission of the offense charged but raises a justifying circumstance as a
defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him. He cannot rely on the weakness of the evidence
for the prosecution for even if it is weak, it cannot be doubted especially after he himself has

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
admitted the killing. This is because a judicial confession constitutes evidence of a high order.
There can be no self-defense unless there was unlawful aggression from the person injured or
killed by the accused; for otherwise, there is nothing to prevent or repel. Unlawful aggression is
an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person.

According to the trial court, the distance of the accused from the fence while he was urinating
was about 1 meters, while the victim was outside and in-between them was a bamboo fence
about four feet high. With the height of the fence and his distance from the fence, there is an
impossibility of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. It also concluded that the victim
could not have entered the yard of the accused. The dead body of Diosdado was found lying on
the road about eight meters from the house of Edgar. However, no traces of blood could be
found in the yard of the accused.

We also agree with the ruling of the CA that the disparity of the injuries sustained belies all
pretensions of self-defense. Diosdado suffered a total of 26 incised, stab and bullet wounds. On
the other hand, Edgar suffered only three superficial wounds. As has been repeatedly ruled, the
nature, number and location of the wounds sustained by the victim disprove a plea of
self-defense. Moreover, during his cross-examination, Edgar admitted that he continued to inflict
injuries on Diosdado notwithstanding the fact that he was already lying lifeless on the ground.

There being no unlawful aggression to speak of, Edgar’s theory of self-defense has no leg to
stand on. Having miserably failed to discharge his burden of proof, we therefore find Edgar
criminally responsible for the death of Diosdado.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORENCIO AGACER, EDDIE AGACER,
ELYNOR AGACER, FRANKLIN AGACER AND ERIK AGACER
G.R. No. 177751, December 14, 2011

DOCTRINE: While it is the burden of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, this burden shifts when the accused admits the killing and pleads
self-defense by way of justification. It therefore becomes vital for the accused to show clear and
convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense. In so doing, he must rely on the strength of
his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecutions evidence.

FACTS: Florencio was Cesarios nephew and is the father of Franklin while the brothers
Elynor, Eric and Eddie are his nephews. Cesario was a 55-year old farmer and owner of a
ricefield situated in Dungeg, Santa Ana, Cagayan. On April 2, 1998, at around 9:00 a.m., he was
clearing a section of his farm and preparing the beddings for the rice seedlings intended for the
coming planting season. Farm laborers Genesis Delantar (Genesis), his brother Andy, Rafael
Morgado and brothers Roden (Roden) and Ric (Ric) Vallejo were nearby in a separate section
of the same ricefield harvesting Cesarios palay.

According to prosecution witnesses Genesis and Roden, it was at that moment while Cesario
was tending to his farm when appellants suddenly emerged from a nearby banana plantation
and surrounded Cesario. Visibly intimidated, Cesario moved backwards and retreated to where
the other farm laborers were working. However, Franklin set afire the rice straws that covered
Cesarios rice seedlings. This prompted Cesario to return to put out the fire and save his rice
seedlings. At this point, Franklin and Eric started throwing stones at Cesario which forced the
latter to retreat again. Thereafter, Florencio, while standing side by side with Eric, signaled
Cesario to come closer. Cesario obliged but when he was just around five meters away from the
group, Eddie suddenly pulled out a gun concealed inside a sack and, without warning, shot
Cesario hitting him in the left portion of his chest. Almost simultaneously, Elynor took aim at
Cesario with his bow and arrow but missed his mark. As Cesario fell, appellants fled towards the
irrigation canal, where another gunshot rang. Thereafter, a short firearm was thrown from where
the appellants ran towards the direction of Cesarios fallen body. Appellants then immediately left
the scene of the crime onboard a hand tractor and a tricycle. The appellants pleaded not guilty
invoking self-defense and defense of relatives.

The trial court found the prosecutions evidence sufficient to prove appellants guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. It held that appellants acted in conspiracy in inflicting upon Cesario, in a
treacherous manner, multiple gunshot wounds. However, the trial court did not appreciate
evident premeditation as a qualifying aggravating circumstance for failure to establish its
elements as clearly as the criminal act itself. It also did not consider as aggravating
circumstance the use of an unlicensed firearm since the firearm used in the killing was not
presented in evidence. The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court in all respects. Hence, this
present appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the findings of the lower court.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD: NO. While it is the burden of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, this burden shifts when the accused admits the killing and pleads
self-defense by way of justification. It therefore becomes vital for the accused to show clear and
convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense. In so doing, he must rely on the strength of
his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecutions evidence. In the justifying
circumstance of self-defense, unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non.

Here, Florencio failed to prove that he defended himself against the unlawful aggression of
Cesario. He failed to present any evidence to substantiate his claim that there was an actual or
imminent peril to his life or limb. Aside from his unreliable and self-serving claim, there is no
proof that Cesario assaulted and shot him with a firearm during their struggle or, if at all, that
there was indeed a struggle between them. On the other hand, the separate testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Genesis and Roden negate Florencios claim of unlawful aggression. Like
in the case of self-defense, unlawful aggression is also an indispensable element in defense of
relative. As discussed, there is no unlawful aggression on the part of Cesario. Hence, Florencios
reliance on this justifying circumstance is likewise unavailing.

Another basis for appellants conviction is the finding of the medico-legal expert that the cause of
Cesarios death was multiple gunshot wounds found mostly at the infero-lateral portion of the
anterior chest, right side. This corroborates the testimonies of Genesis and Roden that Cesario
was shot in his chest. These dovetailing findings of the medico-legal expert and the eyewitness
accounts of Genesis and Roden also deserve more credence than the unsubstantiated claim of
self-defense of Florencio, who, interestingly, gave contradictory testimony

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENANDANG MAMARUNCAS, PENDATUM
AMPUAN
G.R. No. 179497, January 25, 2012

DOCTRINE: The well-known rule, though subject to certain recognized exceptions, is


that findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to
the trial court. Hence, “unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked
which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, the trial court’s assessment must
be respected.”
FACTS: Around noontime on February 1, 1996, Baudelio Batoon, Richard Batoon,
Juanito Gepayo and a certain “Nito” were working on vehicles inside Baudelio Batoon’s
auto repair shop situated along the highway in Tubod, Baraas, Iligan City.Baginda Palao
then entered the shop accompanied by appellants Renandang Mamaruncas and
Pendatum Ampuan. Baginda Palao wore desert camouflage fatigues; while his two (2)
companions wore Philippine Army tropical green fatigues. Baginda Palao showed
Baudelio Batoon an arrest warrant and told the latter he was serving it against
Batoon.The arrival of Baginda Palao’s group prompted Juanito Gepayo and Richard
Batoon to stop their work and observe what was happening.Baudelio Batoon told
Baginda Palao to just wait awhile, as they would settle the matter after he finishes
tuning-up an engine he had been working on.Baginda Palao reacted by slapping the
victim’s stomach and pointing a .45 caliber pistol at him. Baudelio Batoon then tried to
grab Palao’s gun, causing the two of them to grapple for the same. As these two
wrestled for control of the gun, Renandang Mamaruncas, who was behind Baudelio
Batoon, shot from behind Batoon’s right thigh with a .38 cal. homemade gun. Pendatum
Ampuan, who was also standing behind Baudelio Batoon, followed up by shooting
Batoon’s left arm pit with a .45 cal. homemade pistol. Baudelio Batoon fell to the ground
and Baginda Palao finished him off with a single .45 cal. shot to the back. Juanito
Gepayo and Richard Batoon saw the entire scene, stunned and unable to do anything.
From their vantage points three (3) to four (4) meters away, these witnesses had a clear
and unobstructed view of the entire incident.Meanwhile, Iligan City PNP Mobile Force
Company proceeded to the source of the gunshots. At the repair shop, they saw three
(3) men in camouflage gear with guns drawn and pointed at a person already lying on
the ground. Inspector Mijares’ group shouted at the camouflaged gunmen to stop what
they were doing and to drop their firearms, at the same time announcing that they
(Mijares’ group) were policemen.The camouflaged gunmen reacted by firing at the
policemen. The latter fired back. During the exchange of gunfire, Baginda Palao ran
behind the Batoon house, while Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan ran
towards the road and a nearby car. Inspector Mijares was able to hit Mamaruncas and
Ampuan, while SPO3 Yee likewise hit Ampuan. Mamaruncas, who managed to get
inside the car, and Ampuan were then captured by the policemen. The lawmen also
gave chase to Baginda Palao; but he escaped.Other responding policemen brought
Mamaruncas and Ampuan to the hospital for treatment and they were eventually placed
under detention. Baudelio Batoon was brought to the hospital by his wife; but he was
pronounced dead on arrival.Based on the necropsy examination of the victim’s body, Dr.
Leonardo Labanen established that the three (3) gunshot wounds found on the body of

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Baudelio Batoon (i.e., at the right thigh, left armpit and back) were inflicted at close range
due to the presence, or at least traces, of gunpowder burns.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can be convicted beyond reasonable doubt
despite inconsistencies in witnesses’ statements and whose credibility is being assailed.

HELD: YES. The inconsistency pointed out by appellants pertains only to collateral or
trivial matters and has no substantial effect on the nature of the offense. In fact, it even
signifies that the witness was neither coached nor was lying on the witness stand. What
matters is that there is no inconsistency in Gepayo’s complete and vivid narration as far
as the principal occurrence and the positive identification of Ampuan as one of the
principal assailants are concerned. “The Court has held that although there may be
inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses on minor details, they do not impair their
credibility where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive
identification of the assailant.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 999
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CABRILLAS AND CABTALAN
G.R. NO. 175980, February 15, 2012

DOCTRINE: Minor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not


affect the credibility of witnesses, as well as their positive identification of the accused as
the perpetrators of the crime.
FACTS:
The Information against Benny and his co-accused Adriano contains the following
accusatory allegations: That on or about the 11th day of July 1999, at nighttime which
was purposely sought, in Barangay Laygayon, Municipality of Pinabacdao, Province of
Samar, Philippines, and within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and abuse of superior strength, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault, and stab one Jesus
Cabujat with the use of long bolos, with which both accused have provided themselves
for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the victim multiple stab wounds, which wounds
resulted to his instantaneous death.
Two years after the incident, Benny was arrested in Las Pinas City while to date,
Adriano remains at large. During his arraignment, Benny entered a plea of “not guilty.”
Trial thereafter ensued.
Verification of the Prosecution. Prosecution witness Wilfredo narrated that on July
11, 1999 at around 7:00 p.m., he went to the store of Susan to buy salt. While thereat,
Benny and Adriano asked him to join them in their drinkinng spree to which Wilfredo
obliged. In the course of their drinking spree, Wilfredo noticed that Benny and Adriano
had bolos, locally known as sundang, tucked on their waists. He also heard the two
talking about their plan to assault someone that same night. Sensing that something
wrong would happen, Wilfredo left them and walked home.
Upon reaching his house, Wilfredo soon noticed Benny and Adriano circling the
house of Jesus’ daughter, Elena, which is just about two arms length away from his
house. Thereafter, the duo stood on a dark portion of the road. Later on, he saw Jesus
and his 9-year-old granddaughter Jonalyn walking towards the house of Jonalyn’s
mother, Elena. Jesus stopped and turned towards a grassy area to urinate when
suddenly, Benny and Adriano emerged from their hiding place. They held Jesus by his
shoulders and alternately stabbed him. At that moment, Jesus shouted “I am wounded;
please help me because I was stabbed by Benny and Adriano.” Jesus then fell to the
ground while Benny and Adriano immediately fled from the crime scene.
A case for murder was accordingly filed against Benny and Adriano and a warrant
was issued for their arrest which was, however, returned unserved since they could no
longer be located. It appears that on July 13, 1999, at around noontime, Benny and
Adriano escaped by ferryboat to Catbalogan, Samar. Two years later, or on July 31,
2001, Benny was arrested in Las Pinas City by virtue of an alias warrant of arrest.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The Trial court rendered a decision convicting Benny of the crime of murder. The
CA Affirmed the decision of the trial court. However, it did not anymore consider the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength as qualifying circumstance of
treachery already absorbed it.

ISSUE:
Are minor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters affect the
credibility of witnesses, as well as their positive identification of the accused as the
perpetrators of the crime?
HELD
No.
The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses usually remains
undisturbed. The trial and appellate courts reached the same conclusion that the
testimonies of
eyewitnesses Wilfredo and Jonalyn deserve credence as both narrated in a straight
forward manner the details of Benny and Adriano’s attack upon Jesus.
Benny, however, still disputes the credibility of these witnesses by pointing out
that Wilfredo’s testimony that he and Adriano took turns in stabbing Jesus differs from
that of Jonalyn who stated that while the two assailants attacked Jesus in unison, it was
only Benny who inflicted the mortal wounds. The Court, however, finds this inconsistency
to pertain merely to the manner the fatal stab wounds were inflicted on Jesus. The
materiality of the assailants’ exact position during their attack on the victim is a trivial and
insignificant detail which cannot defeat the witnesses’ positive identification of Benny as
one of the assailants. Besides, it is perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying on
the occurrence of a crime to give varying details as there may be some details which one
witness may notice while the other may not
observe or remember. In fact, Jurisprudence even warns against a perfect dovetailing of
narration by different witnesses as it could mean that their testimonies were fabricated
and rehearsed.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
VICTOR RONDINA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R NO. 179059 JUNE 13, 2012
DOCTRINE: An accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but
more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove.
FACTS:
On 15th day of July 1998 at around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, while AAA was
inside their toilet located outside their house, accused Victor Rondina armed with a knife
entered their toilet, removed the towel from his waist as well as his brief. He then poked a
knife on AAA’s neck, covered her mouth and threatened her by saying don’t even tell
anybody otherwise “I will kill your parents, your siblings including yourself.” Because her
mouth was covered, AAA was not able to shout. Victor ordered AAA to stand against the
wall with her hands in both sides and forcefully inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. AAA
felt pain. After a while, she felt a liquid-like substance discharged from Victor’s penis.
After Victor had satisfied his bestial desire, he uttered “do not tell your mother or else I
will kill you.”
When AAA could no longer keep silent of her misfortunate, she finally told her
mother BBB that Victor raped her. When BBB had AAA examined by physician, it was
discovered that aside from having healed hymenal lacerations, AAA was more or less six
months pregnant. Hence, Victor was charged with crime of rape.
After nine months, AAA gave birth to a baby girl, CCC. Victor interposed the
defense of denial and alibi. He averred that he could not have raped AAA at 4:00pm of
July 15, 1998 because during that time, he was in a cockpit with Alex Oliveros and
Ruben Bertulfo in Brgy. Macabug, Ormoc City.
The RTC declared itself convinced that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, sentencing him to suffer to suffer
imprisonment of 40 years reclusion perpetua, to pay P75,000 to the offended party as
indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages and cost, also to acknowledge the offspring CCC
and to give support. The CA found no compelling rearm to depart from the RTC ruling.
However, it reduced the award of civil indemnity from P75,000 to P50,000, it affirmed the
trial courts judgment in all other respects in a Decision dated July 24, 2007.
ISSUE:
With the two conflicting version of the prosecution and the defense, the RTC
declared the issue to be one of credibility, that is, whether AAA’s claim that she was
raped by Victor vis-vis the latter’s denial and alibi, is credible, convincing and satisfactory
as to hold the latter guilty beyond reasonable doubt the crime of rape.
HELD:

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
It order for the defense of alibi to prosper, two requisites must concur: first, the
appellant was at a different place at the time the crime was committed, and second, it
was physically impossible for him to be a t the crime scene at the time of its commission.
It has been held that alibi becomes more unworthy of merit where it is established
mainly by the accused himself and his relatives, friends, and comradesin-arms and not
by credible persons.
Moreover and most importantly, denial and alibi are practically worthless against
the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses, especially the rape victim.
Victor’s weak alibi cannot thus overcome AAA’s positive identification of him as her
rapist.
Henceforth, the Decision of the CA dated July 24, 2007 was AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION with regards to his civil liability.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ANDRE L.D AIGLE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R NO. 174181, June 27, 2012
DOCTRINE: The failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.
FACTS:
June 05, 1997, petitioner Andre L.D Aigle was charged with Estafa before the
RTC, committed as follows: Sometime in November 1996, petitioner who was then the
Managing Director and President of Samfit Philippines, Inc. (SPI) received from said
Samfit Philippines personal properties with a total value of Php 681,665.35 for his
management care and custody. At that time, he was likewise a majority stockholder of
TAC Manufacturing Corporation (TAC), an entity engaged in the fabrication of wire
bending machine similar to that being used by SPI. Due to alleged conflict of interest. He
was divested of his duties and responsibilities as SPI’s Managing Director. Because of
this, Parducho conducted an audit and inventory of SPI’s properties and reviewed its
financial statements, vouchers, books of accounts and other pertinent documents. He
also interviewed some SPI’s employees. These revealed that several of SPI, such as
wire materials, electronic transformer, electronic and computer boxes, machine spare
parts, while still under the management, care and custody of petitioner went missing and
was left unaccounted for. Further investigation revealed that some of SPI’s wire bending
machines, computer and electronic boxes were inside the premises of TAC. On January
14, 1997 through SPI counsel formally demanded upon petitioner to turnover to SPI all
its equipment under his care and custody. Ignoring the demand, petitioner was thus
indicted with the present case. In defense, claimed that SPI owes him about a million
pesos for the repairs of this machine, while he admitted that SPI’s electronic transformer,
computer boxes and motor drives was recovered while in his possession thru a writ of
replevin, he reasoned out that he did not return them to SPI after his dismissal because
he intended to exercise his right of lien over them since he has properties which were still
in the possession of SPI, collectibles amounting to Php 980,000.00, and unpaid
one-month salary of Php 80,000.00. Finally, he denied having appropriated the computer
boxes for his own benefit. After trial the RTC found that the prosecution had established
the guilt of petitioner for the crime of Estafa under paragraph 1(b) Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). It ratiocinated that the unjustified failure of petitioner to
account for and deliver to SPI, upon demand, the properties entrusted to his care,
custody and management is sufficient evidence of actual conversion thereof to his
personal use. Petitioner seasonably appealed to the CA. In a Decision dated March 31,
2006, the CA denied petitioner’s appeal and affirmed with modification the trial court’s
Decision. Hence, this petition before the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
The prosecution’s evidence has fully established all the elements of the crime
charged. Based on SPI’s record, petitioner received from it various equipment of SPI on
several occasions for the sole purpose of manufacturing under wires for brassier.
However, after the conduct of an audit in December 1996, petitioner failed to properly
account therefor. Entrenched in jurisprudence are the following essential elements of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC: 1. The money, goods or other
personal properties are received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or
return of or return the same; 2. That there is misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; 3. That such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and 4. That there
is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. From petitioner’s own
assertions the existence of the first and fourth of the aforementioned element is very
clear. SPI’s properties was received by the petitioner in trust. He received them for a
particular purpose that is, for the fabrication of bending machines and spare parts for
SPI. And when SPI made a demand for their return after petitioner’s alleged dismissal
therefrom, petitioner deliberately ignored the same. As borne out of the records, the
equipment subject matter of this case were received in trust by petitioner from SPI to be
utilized in the fabrication of bending machines. Petitioner was given absolute option in
how to use them without any participation on the part of SPI. Thus, petitioner acquired
not only physical possession but also juridical possession over the equipment. With
regards to the element of misappropriation or conversion, the prosecution was able to
prove this through circumstantial evidence. Misappropriation or conversion may be
proved by the prosecution by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. The failure to
account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence or
misappropriation. Lastly, it is obvious that petitioner failure to return SPI’s properties
valued at Php 191,665.35 caused damage and prejudice to the latter. All the elements
have been sufficiently established by the prosecution.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CALEXTO FUNDALES, JR.
G.R. No. 184606, September 5, 2012
DOCTRINE: “Conviction is proper in prosecutions involving illegal sale of [dangerous]
drugs if the following elements are present: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller,
the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
thereto.”
FACTS:
Appellant – CalextoFundales Jr., was charged with violations of Section 5 (illegal
sale of dangerous drugs, Section 11 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs), and
Section 12 in relation to Section 14 (illegal possession of drug paraphernalia) of Article II,
RA No. 9165.
In the charge for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, appellant was charged
together with Ricardo Duque Fundales (Ricardo), Chulo Duque Fundales (Chulo),
JericoCabangon Hugo (Jerico), and Joel Manuel Gomez (Joel).
During arraignment, the appellant and his co-accused pleaded not guilty.
Thereafter, the parties agreed to terminate the pre-trial and set the case for trial on the
merits.
Version of the Prosecution
On the evening of December 2, 2003, the Chief of the Intelligence Unit of the
Station Anti-Illegal Drug Special Task Force of Parañaque City Police, Police
Superintendent Alfredo Valdez (P/Supt. Valdez), received an information from a
confidential informant about the illegal drug trade operations conducted by the Fundales
brothers. P/Supt. Valdez thus formed a buy-bust team composed of PO1 Ariel Ilagan,
PO1 CesarieSoquiña (PO1 Soquiña), PO1 Emmanuel Salvaloza, PO3 Regalado
Adriatico and CE Ronald Tangcoy. The group then proceeded to 008 Jordan Street,
Sitio Nazareth, Barangay San Isidro, Parañaque City for the buy-bust operation.
The group arrived in the vicinity of the target area at around 9:00 p.m. PO1
Soquiña, who was designated as the poseur-buyer, and the informant proceeded to the
house of the appellant. The team remained inside their vehicles about 20 meters away
from the target area. The informant then introduced PO1 Soquiña to the appellant as
the person interested in buying shabu worth P500.00.
After PO1 Soquiña handed the P500.00 marked money to the appellant, the latter
then went inside his house and when he reappeared, he handed to PO1 Soquiña five
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance. PO1 Soquiña then lit a cigarette
which was the pre-arranged signal to inform the rest of the team that the buy-bust
operation had been consummated. Hence, the team of back-up police officers
proceeded to appellant’s house to apprehend him.14 Inside the house, the police

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
officers saw Jerico, Ricardo, Chulo, and Joel who appeared to be engaged in a pot
session hence they were also arrested along with the appellant.
Version of the Defense
On December 2, 2003, appellant was at home with Ricardo, Chulo, Joel, and
Jerico repairing a washing machine. At around 4:30 p.m., eight persons suddenly
entered his house without warning and permission. Aside from their weapons and
handcuffs, there was no indication that the men were police officers since they were all in
civilian clothing. Once inside, the men shouted, “Walanggagalaw, sumama kayo
saamin”. They were then brought to the Coastal Police Station and detained there for
two days.
ISSUE:
Whether the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5,
Article II of RA No. 9165.
HELD:
YES. The Court is convinced that the prosecution sufficiently discharged the
burden of establishing the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs and in proving the
guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
“Conviction is proper in prosecutions involving illegal sale of [dangerous] drugs if
the following elements are present: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object,
and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereto.”
The identity of the buyer and the seller were both established by the prosecution,
appellant being the seller and PO1 Soquiña as the poseur-buyer. The object of the
transaction was the five sachets of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu and the
consideration was the P500.00 marked money. Both such object and consideration
have also been sufficiently established by testimonial and documentary evidence
presented by the prosecution. As to the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor, PO1 Soquiña caught appellant in flagrante delicto selling and delivering the
prohibited substance during a buybust operation. He also personally handed to
appellant the marked money as payment for the same. Clearly, the above-mentioned
elements are present in this case.
Appellant insists that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He argues that the prosecution’s failure to present the forensic
chemist during trial was fatal to its cause. According to the appellant, the laboratory
report has no probative value since the forensic chemist did not attest to the report’s
authenticity. In view of this, he points out that the prosecution failed to establish the
corpus delicti.
It is of no moment that Forensic Chemical Officer Mangalip was not presented as
witness. The non-presentation as witnesses of other persons who had custody of the

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
illegal drugs is not a crucial point against the prosecution. “It is the prosecution which has
the discretion as to how to present its case and it has the right to choose whom it wishes
to present as witnesses.” What is important is that the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized drugs are properly preserved as it had been so in this case.
Appellant’s contention does not deserve serious consideration. It is well settled
that the testimonies of the police officers in dangerous drugs cases carry with it the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions. “Law enforcers are
presumed to have performed their duties regularly in the absence of evidence to the
contrary.” In this case, PO1 Soquiña narrated in a straightforward manner the
circumstances leading to the sale of shabu. He positively and categorically identified
appellant as the seller of the drugs. Absent any clear showing that the arresting officers
had ill motive to falsely testify against the appellant, their testimonies must be respected
and the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties must be upheld.
Appellant himself testified that he never had any personal encounter with the police prior
to his arrest, thus negating any ill-motive on the part of the police officers.
The appellant, on the other hand, offers mere denial as his defense. He claims
that he was merely fixing a washing machine at the time of the arrest and that the alleged
buy-bust operation was fictitious. However, other than his own self-serving testimony,
appellant has not offered any evidence to support this claim. We have held that “[a]
bare denial is an inherently weak defense x xx.” Appellant’s denial is unsubstantiated by
any credible and convincing evidence. Between the positive and categorical
testimonies of the arresting officers on one hand, and the unsubstantiated denial of the
appellant on the other, we are inclined to uphold the former.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANTONIO VENTURINA
G.R. No. 183097, September 12, 2012
DOCTRINE: Not even the most ungrateful and resentful daughter would push her own
father to the wall as the fall guy in any crime unless the accusation against him is true.
As has been repeatedly ruled, “[n]o young girl x xx would concoct a sordid tale of so
serious a crime as rape at the hands of her own father, undergo medical examination,
then subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive were
other than a fervent desire to seek justice.
FACTS:
Appellant was charged with two counts of rape in the Informations, the accusatory
portions of which are similarly worded as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of April, 2002, in the municipality of “XXX,” province
of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused being the father of “AAA,” did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation have carnal knowledge of his
daughter, “AAA,” a minor 16 yrs. of age against her will and without her consent.
In his defense, appellant denied the charges hurled against him. As summarized
by the Public Attorney’s Office, his version of the incident is as follows:
[Appellant] tilled the land beside the hut where he and his family slept from 7:00
o’clock in the morning until 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 24 April 2002. He went home
at 8:00 o’clock in the morning and took his snack. Thereafter, he returned to work. When
he went home at 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, [AAA] was not there. She left without
asking his permission but later returned home.
He had forbidden the private complainant to mingle with her friends who were
known to be drug users as they might influence her. He also grounded her for a week.
Due to his chest pains, the accused fell on the wooden bed as he passed by
[AAA]. He only regained consciousness at 4:00 o’clock in the early morning of the
following day.
The RTC rendered its consolidated Decision finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of rape and sentencing him to death by lethal injection in
both cases.
The CA affirmed with modification the RTC Decision by reducing the penalty to
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
ISSUE:
Whether accused-appellant is proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
YES!
In the appreciation of the evidence for the prosecution and the defense, the
settled rule is that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is left largely to the trial
court. And in almost all rape cases, the credibility of the victim’s testimony is crucial in
view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only the participants therein can testify to
its occurrence. “[The victim’s] testimony is most vital and must be received with the
utmost caution.” Once found credible, the victim’s lone testimony is sufficient to sustain a
conviction. Absent therefore any substantial reason to justify the reversal of the
assessments and conclusions of the trial court especially if such findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is well-nigh
conclusive to this Court.
This Court, like the courts below, is convinced that “AAA” truthfully narrated her
ordeal. In this regard, a restatement of a consistent ruling, that “testimonies of child
victims of rape are given full weight and credit, for youth and immaturity are badges of
truth,” is in order.
At the center of appellant’s defense of denial is his assertion that the accusation
against him was a mere concoction. According to him, “AAA” filed the case because
she resented being disciplined by him.
We are, however, inclined to believe that it was appellant instead who concocted
his defense. Not even the most ungrateful and resentful daughter would push her own
father to the wall as the fall guy in any crime unless the accusation against him is true.
As has been repeatedly ruled, “[n]o young girl x xx would concoct a sordid tale of so
serious a crime as rape at the hands of her own father, undergo medical examination,
then subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive were
other than a fervent desire to seek justice.” Thus, taking into consideration that the
parties are close blood relatives, “AAA’s” testimony pointing to her father as the person
who raped her must stand.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ENERIO ENDING ONYONG
G.R. No. 183827, November 12, 2012
DOCTRINE: As often stressed, “mere denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, has no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the
positive testimony of a rape victim.”
FACTS:
In three separate Informations, ONYONG was indicted for raping his own
daughter, “AAA.”
That on or about January 2, 2001 at about 3:00 in the afternoon at barangay
“CCC,” municipality of “DDD,” province of Misamis Occidental, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd designs
ordered his own daughter “AAA,” to help him pasture their cows at the land of her
grandfather and while there accused [forcibly] brought her beneath [sic] a banana
plantation then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did then and there through threat,
force and intimidation have carnal knowledge with [sic] his own daughter “AAA,” a minor,
15 years old against her will and consent.
Version of the prosecution:
ONYONG is 47 years old, married, and a resident of “CCC,” [Municipality] of
“DDD,” Misamis Occidental. He has four x xx children, one of whom is “AAA” x xx.
Sometime in 1998, he and his wife sent “AAA” to the house of his parents-in-law
because she [had] been raped by a certain “GGG,” wherein a complaint [had] been filed
before the barangay. Eventually, the said case was amicably settled. As far as the
instant case is concerned, [appellant] could not think of any reason, why her own
daughter, whom he loves so dearly would file charges of rape against him. In the first
place, “AAA” was then living with her grandparents at the time the alleged incident
occurred. [He] recounted though that sometime in 1999 during a town fiesta in Oroquieta
City, he reprimanded “AAA” for seeing [her] boyfriend “HHH”. [He] warned her not to see
her boyfriend again. He remembered that when he scolded her, he was then armed with
a scythe. During their confrontation, h[e] slapped her. He knew that her daughter
harbored ill feelings toward him.
After trial, the RTC was firmly convinced that “AAA” was telling the truth about her
defilement and that it was appellant, her own father, who abused her. Thus, in its
Decision16 of October 17, 2001, the RTC declared appellant guilty of three counts of
rape and imposed upon him the penalty of death for each count of rape with damages.
The CA, in its Decision of September 28, 2007, upheld the RTC’s judgment of
conviction after likewise being morally convinced that appellant consummated his
debauched design over his daughter through intimidation, threat and force. However,
considering the proscription on the imposition of the death penalty, it reduced the penalty

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
imposed from death to reclusion perpetua, but increased the amounts of moral and
exemplary damages awarded to “AAA.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in declaring him guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of three counts of rape.
HELD:
Yes, the court did not erred in declaring the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.
Appellant’s denial and alibi deserve no merit.
The defense of appellant is anchored on denial and alibi which do not impress
belief. As often stressed, “[m]ere denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, has no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the
positive testimony of a rape victim.” In this case, appellant’s testimony, particularly his
denial, was not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Also, for his alibi to
prosper, appellant must establish that he was not at the locus delicti at the time the
offense was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission. Appellant failed to establish these elements.
The fact that “AAA” was living with her grandparents did not preclude the possibility that
appellant was present at the crime scenes during their commission. Appellant himself
admitted that the distance between his residence and that of “AAA’s” grandparents is
only approximately 7½ kilometers and which can be traversed by riding a pedicab in less
than 30 minutes. In other words, it was not physically impossible for appellant to have
been at the situs of the crimes during the dates when the separate acts of rape were
committed. Moreover, it has been invariably ruled that alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused. Here, appellant was positively identified by “AAA”
as the perpetrator of the crimes without showingany dubious reason or fiendish motive
on her part to falsely charge him. The contention of appellant that “AAA” was motivated
by hatred because he prevented her from having a boyfriend is unconvincing. There is
nothing novel in such a contrived defense. “Motives such as resentment, hatred or
revenge have never swayed this Court from giving full credence to the testimony of a
rape victim.” It is a jurisprudentially conceded rule that “[i]t is against human nature for
a young girl to fabricate a story that would expose herself as well as her family to a
lifetime of shame, especially when her charge could mean the death or lifetime
imprisonment of her own father.
The Court, like the courts below, finds that “AAA” was without doubt telling the
truth when she declared that her father raped her on three separate occasions. She
was consistent in her narration on how she was abused by her father in their own house,
in the copra drier, and even in a nearby pasture land. After she was forced to lie down,
appellant removed her clothes, went on top of her, inserted his penis into her vagina and
threatened her with death if she would report the incidents. Hence, appellant’s attempt

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
to discredit the testimony of “AAA” deserves no merit. “[W]hen credibility is in issue, the
[Court] generally defers to the findings of the trial court considering that it was in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed
their deportment during trial.” Here, there is nothing from the records that would impel
this Court to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the trial court as affirmed by the
CA.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BENJAMIN SORIA y GOMEZ
G.R. No. 179031, November 12, 2012
DOCTRINE: Where an offense may be committed in any of the different modes and the
offense is alleged to have been committed in two or more modes specified, the
indictment is sufficient, notwithstanding the fact that the different means of committing
the same offense are prohibited by separate sections of the statute. The allegation in
the information of the various ways of committing the offense should be regarded as a
description of only one offense and the information is not thereby rendered defective on
the ground of multifariousness.” Any objection from the appellant with respect to the
Information is held to have been waived failing any effort to oppose the same before trial.
He therefore can be convicted of rape through sexual intercourse or rape by sexual
assault, depending on the evidence adduced during trial.
FACTS:
Benjamin Soria was charged of the crime of rape against his daughter.
Version of the Prosecution
On February 26, 2000, “AAA” and her siblings enjoyed the spaghetti their father
(appellant) brought home for merienda. After eating, “AAA” went to the bedroom to rest.
Thereafter, appellant also entered the room and positioned himself on top of “AAA”, took
off her clothes and inserted his penis into her vagina. “AAA” felt intense pain from her
breast down to her vagina and thus told her father that it was painful. At that point,
appellant apologized to his daughter, stood up, and left the room. This whole incident
was witnessed by “AAA’s” brother, “BBB”.
The pain persisted until “AAA’s” vagina started to bleed. She thus told her aunt
about it and they proceeded to a hospital for treatment. Her mother was
alsoimmediately informed of her ordeal. Subsequently, “AAA” was taken into the
custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
Version of the Defense
Appellant admitted that he was at home on the day and time of “AAA’s” alleged
rape but denied committing the same. Instead, he claimed that the filing of the rape
case against him was instigated by his wife, whom he confronted about her illicit affair
with a man residing in their community. According to appellant, he could not have
molested “AAA” because he treated her well. In fact, he was the only one sending his
children to school since his wife already neglected them and seldom comes home.
The trial court rendered its Judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape against “AAA”, his daughter of minor age, as charged in the
Information. It ruled that the lack of tenacious resistance on the part of “AAA” is
immaterial considering that appellant’s moralascendancy and influence over her
substitute for violence and intimidation.8 It also held that his wife could not have

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
instigated the filing of the rape case since as the mother of “AAA”, it would not be natural
for her to use her child as a tool to exact revenge especially if it will result in her
embarrassment and stigma. The trial court gave credence to the testimony of “AAA”
and her positive identification of appellant as her rapist, and rejected the latter’s defense
of denial.
The CA found partial merit in the appeal. While the appellate court was
convinced that appellant raped “AAA”, it nevertheless noted the prosecution’s failure to
present her birth certificate as competent proof of her minority. Thus, the CA concluded
that the crime committed by appellant against his daughter was only simple rape and
accordingly modified the penalty imposed by the trial court from death to reclusion
perpetua and reduced the civil indemnity awarded from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape through sexual intercourse, or through
sexual assault.
HELD:
It is rape through sexual assault.
Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, classified
the crime of rape as a crime against persons. It also amended Article 335 of the RPC
and incorporated therein Article 266-A which reads:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation; b) When the offended party is deprived of
reason or is otherwise unconscious, c) By means of fraudulent machination or
grave abuse of authority; d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years
of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above
be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person.
Thus, rape can now be committed either through sexual intercourse
or by sexual assault. Rape under paragraph 1 of the above-cited article is referred to
as rape through sexual intercourse. Carnal knowledge is the central element and it
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
On the other hand, rape under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A is
commonly known as rape by sexual assault. The perpetrator, under any of the

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attendant circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1, commits this kind of rape by
inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object
into the genital or anal orifice of another person. It is also called “instrument or object
rape”, also “gender-free rape”.
In determining whether appellant is indeed guilty of rape through
sexual intercourse under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A, it is essential to establish beyond
reasonable doubt that he had carnal knowledge of “AAA”. There must be proof that his
penis touched the labia of “AAA” or slid into her female organ, and not merely stroked the
external surface thereof, to ensure his conviction of rape by sexual intercourse.
It is evident from the testimony of “AAA” that she was unsure
whether it was indeed appellant’s penis which touched her labia and entered her organ
since she was pinned down by the latter’s weight, her father having positioned himself on
top of her while she was lying on her back. “AAA” stated that she only knew that it was
the “bird” of her father which was inserted into her vagina after being told by her brother
“BBB”. Clearly, “AAA” has no personal knowledge that it was appellant’s penis which
touched her labia and inserted into her vagina. Hence, it would be erroneous to
conclude that there was penile contact based solely on the declaration of “AAA’s”
brother, “BBB”, which declaration was hearsay due to “BBB’s” failure to testify. Based
on the foregoing, it was an error on the part of the RTC and the CA to conclude that
appellant raped “AAA” through sexual intercourse.
In the instant case, it was clearly established that appellant committed an act of
sexual assault on “AAA” by inserting an instrument or object into her genital. We find it
inconsequential that “AAA” could not specifically identify the particular instrument or
object that was inserted into her genital. What is important and relevant is that indeed
something was inserted into her vagina. To require “AAA” to identify the instrument or
object that was inserted into her vagina would be contrary to the fundamental tenets of
due process. It would be akin to requiring “AAA” to establish something that is not even
required by law. [Moreover, it might create problems later on in the application of the
law if the victim is blind or otherwise unconscious.] Moreover, the prosecution
satisfactorily established that appellant accomplished the act of sexual assault through
his moral ascendancy and influence over “AAA” which substituted for violence and
intimidation. Thus, there is no doubt that appellant raped “AAA” by sexual assault.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BERNABE ANESLAG y ANDRADE
G.R. No. 185386, November 21, 2012
DOCTRINE: In the prosecution of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
prosecution must prove that the chain of custody rule was complied with.
FACTS:
An Information for illegal sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride (or shabu) was
filed against MendaAneslag (Menda), Mae Elarmo (Mae), appellant BernabeAneslag
(Bernabe) and appellant Jocelyn Concepcion (Jocelyn) with the RTC of Iligan City.
The trial court held that the prosecution was able to establish all the essential
elements of the crime charged. The buyers were SPO2 Salo and the civilian asset
while the sellers were appellants Bernabe and Jocelyn in the presence of Mae and
Menda. The object of the transaction was six packs of shabu. After appellant Bernabe
received the boodle money, appellant Jocelyn delivered the shabu contained in a red
bag to SPO2 Salo. The six packs were tested positive for shabu as per the laboratory
examination by the forensic chemist, P/Sr. Insp. Bernido.
The trial court found the testimonies of the appellants to be conflicting and a case
of finger-pointing. In contrast, the version of the prosecution showed a logical,
consistent and smooth flow of events leading to the arrest of appellants. Thus, the trial
court held that the version of the prosecution was more credible. However, with respect
to Mae and Menda, the trial court rendered a judgment of acquittal because it was not
sufficiently established that the two were in conspiracy with the appellants. Reasonable
doubt existed owing to the fact that Mae and Menda appeared to be merely a messenger
and a companion, respectively, of appellant Bernabe.
In affirming the conviction of the appellants, the CA ruled that: (1) the purported
inconsistencies between the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are trivial and/or
reconcilable, (2) the police operatives in the buy-bust operation did not need to secure a
search warrant because the appellants were caught in flagrante delicto, (3) the use of
fluorescent powder and fingerprinting are not indispensable in buy-bust operations, (4)
the presentation of the marked money is, likewise, not indispensable in buy-bust
operations, (5) the presentation of the confidential informant is not required, (6) the use
of thin layer chromatography to ascertain the purity of the shabu is not necessary, (7) the
case passes the chain of custody test because from the time of seizure up to the time of
laboratory examination the shabu was in the possession of SPO2 Salo, and (8) the minor
discrepancy in the weight of the shabu can be attributed to the weighing scale used by
the police officers.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA gravely erred in convicting appellants of the crime charged
despite the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
THE COURT affirmed the decision of the CA.
The chain of custody rule was dulycomplied with.
In the case at bar, while the procedure under Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No.
9165 was not strictly complied with, we find that the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized shabu was duly preserved consistent with the chain of custody rule. As
correctly observed by the appellate court, from the time of the arrest of the appellants
and the confiscation of the subject shabu packs until their turnover for laboratory
examination, SPO2 Salo was in sole possession thereof. During his testimony, he
identified the subject shabu packs and the markings that he had previously made
thereon.
Subsequently, when this case was called for hearing, P/Sr. Insp. Mary
LeocyJabonillo Mag-abo (P/Sr. Insp. Mag-abo), the forensic chemist from the PNP
Crime Laboratory of Iligan City who conducted the examination on the subject shabu
packs, was unavailable because she had to undergo training in Makati City. Thus, the
trial court issued an order for the conduct of another examination on the subject shabu
packs by a forensic chemist in Cagayan de Oro City in order to expedite the
proceedings. Consequently, the subject shabu packs were turned over to SPO2 Salo, as
evidenced by an acknowledgement receipt, and thereafter delivered to the PNP Crime
Laboratory of Cagayan de Oro City where the said packs were received by PNCO PO3
Paltinca who, in turn, forwarded the same to P/Sr. Insp. Bernido, the examiner assigned
to this case. The chemistry report21 and testimony of P/Sr. Insp. Bernido corroborated
the testimony of SPO2 Salo.
Relative to the markings the latter made on the packs of shabu (i.e., GRS-1 and
GRS-2 for the bigger packs, and GS-1, GS-2, GS-3, and GS-4 for the smaller packs)22
as well as the number and size of the shabu packs (i.e., two big packs and four smaller
packs). P/Sr. Insp. Bernido identified the shabu packs in court as well as the separate
markings she made thereon; she further testified that the six packs tested positive for
shabu.
Based on the foregoing, we find that the chain of custody rule was complied with.
The prosecution’s evidence sufficiently established an unbroken link in the chain of
custody which precluded the alteration, substitution or tampering of the subject shabu
packs.
We have examined the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and we find that
the alleged inconsistencies are minor or trivial which serve to strengthen, rather than
destroy, the credibility of the said witnesses as they erase doubts that the said
testimonies had been coached or rehearsed.
Anent the matter of who was holding the red bag containing the shabu before it
was confiscated by the police operatives, the trial court found more credible the

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
testimony of SPO2 Salo that the said bag was given to him (SPO2 Salo) by appellant
Jocelyn after he paid for the shabu with boodle money. We cannot fault the trial court for
making this finding because SPO2 Salo was the one present during the buying
transaction. SPO2 Englatiera arrived only after the prearranged signal (as to the
completion of the sale of the shabu) was given to him, along with the other members of
the backup team, who then entered the room and arrested the appellants. SPO2
Englatiera’s testimony, therefore, on this matter is hearsay.
Neither law nor jurisprudence requires that the police must apply fluorescent
powder to the buy-bust money to prove the commission of the offense. The same holds
true for the conduct of finger print examination on the money used in the buy-bust
operation. What is crucial is that the prosecution proves, as in this case, the delivery of
the prohibited drugs to the poseur-buyer and the presentation of the confiscated drugs
before the court.
Lastly, anent appellants’ contention that the police operatives should have first
secured a search warrant, we agree with the observation of the trial court that it would
have been impracticable to secure such a search warrant because appellants were not
residing in the agreed meeting place (i.e., Room 65 of Patria Pension) at the time of the
surveillance. The surveillance was conducted for the mere purpose of determining the
respective roles and positions of the police operatives in anticipation of the buying
transaction which was to happen there three days later. More important, in a buy-bust
operation, the police operatives are not required to secure a search warrant because the
violator is caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers, in the course of the
operation, are not only authorized but duty-bound to apprehend the violator and to
search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the
crime.
All in all, we find that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the elements of the crime of illegal of shabu(I) the identity of the buyer and seller, the
object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the drug sold and its payment. Hence,
the conviction of the appellants was proper.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE vs. GEORGE EYAM Y WATANG

GR No. 184056 Nov 26, 2012

DOCTRINE: “For illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the prosecution


must establish the following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object, which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by
law; and, (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug."

FACTS:

Information was filed charging the appellant with violation of Sec. 11, Article II of RA
No. 9165 or otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Thatthe above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess and/or use
dangerous drugs and without any license or proper prescription, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control one (1)
small heat sealed transparent plastic sachet of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride
weighing forty seven point eighty (47.80) gram[s], a dangerous drug, in violation of the
aforesaid law. According to the prosecution, Security Guard Sahidwas doing routinary
inspection of people entering the Guadalupe Commercial Complex. When it was
appellant's turn to be inspected,Sahid patted appellant's back pocket and felt something
bulky. Thinking that appellant was carrying a bomb, Sahid ordered him to empty his
pocket. Appellant brought out a plastic sachetand when asked what it contained, replied
"shabu". The defense interposed, among others, that while appellant was at the entrance
of the Guadalupe Commercial Complex, a man in front of him was frisked by Sahid. The
guard recovered something wrapped in a newspaper from the man's right
pocket. However, the man suddenly ran away so S/G Sahid pursued him. Unable to
pursue the man, accused was pointed as the man’s companion and even asked money
from him in exchange for his release, but to no avail. RTC found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal, it was dismissed and affirmed in toto the decision
of the RTC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of the violation of Sec. 11, Article II of RA No.
9165.

HELD:

Yes. The Court is convinced of appellant's commission of the crime


charged. In People v. Sembrano,we ruled that "[f]or illegal possession of regulated or
prohibited drugs, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) the accused
is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and, (3) the accused freely and consciously

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1020
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
possessed the drug." All the foregoing elements were duly established by the
prosecution in this case. Appellant was caught in possession of “shabu”, a dangerous
drug. He failed to show that he was authorized to possess the same. Lastly, by his
mere possession of the drug, there is already a prima facie evidence of knowledge,
which he failed to rebut.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH ROBELO y TUNGALA

G.R. No. 184181 November 26, 2012

DOCTRINE: As long as the constitutional rights of the suspected drug dealer are not
violated, the regularity of the operation will always be upheld. And if carried out with due
regard to constitutional and legal safeguards, buy-bust operation deserves judicial
sanction.
FACTS:
The Station of Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force (SAID) in Manila
conducted a buy-bust operation after receiving an information from a civilian informer
that a certain alias “kalbo” (appellant) is involved in the sale of illegal drugs. After
qualitative examination, the forensic chemist found the items positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. Appellant was
accordingly charged with illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu in two separate
Informations. Appellant denied being a drug pusher and claimed complete ignorance as
to why he was being implicated in the said crimes. He averred that he was repairing the
floor of his mothers house when two police officers in civilian clothes went inside the
house, ransacked the closet and without any reason handcuffed and brought him to the
precinct. He also asserts that the alleged buy-bust operation is tainted with infirmity due
to the absence of a prior surveillance or investigation. Appellant points out that it is
contrary to human nature that the seller would say nothing to the buyer who is a
complete stranger to him.At the precinct, the police officers demanded from him
P10,000.00 in exchange for his liberty. The RTC found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. On appeal, the CA concurred with the RTC’s
findings and conclusions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the buy-bust operation is valid
HELD:
Yes. A buy-bust operation has been proven to be an effective mode of apprehending
drug pushers. In this regard, police authorities are given a wide latitude in employing
their own ways of trapping or apprehending drug dealers in flagrante delicto. There is no
prescribed method on how the operation is to be conducted. As ruled in People v.
Garcia, the absence of a prior surveillance or test-buy does not affect the legality of the
buy-bust operation as there is no text book method of conducting the same. As long as
the constitutional rights of the suspected drug dealer are not violated, the regularity of
the operation will always be upheld. Thus, in People v. Salazar, we ruled that "if carried
out with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards, buy-bust operation deserves
judicial sanction."

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORENCIO AGACER, EDDIE AGACER,
ELYNOR AGACER, FRANKLIN AGACER and ERIC AGACER
G.R. No. 177751 December 14, 2011
DOCTRINE: Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. In conspiracy, it is not
necessary to adduce direct evidence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It may
be shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in which
the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when
such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interest. Proof of a previous agreement and decision to commit the crime is not essential
but the fact that the malefactors acted in unison pursuant to the same objective suffices.
FACTS:
The victim, Cesario, was a 55-year old rice field farmer of Cagayan. Cesario was
preparing his farm for the coming planting season. However, Cesario was surrounded
and attacked by the accused, Franklin, Eric, Florencio, Eddie and ElynorAgacer. Franklin
set fire on the rice straw to keep Cesario from retreating, Franklin and Eric threw stones,
Elynor attempted to struck an arrow and Eddie pulled out a gun and shot the victim. When
the victim fell, the accused immediately fled the crime scene on board a tractor and a
tricycle.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a conspiracy
HELD:
Yes. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. In conspiracy, it is not
necessary to adduce direct evidence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It may
be shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in which
the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when
such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interest. Proof of a previous agreement and decision to commit the crime is not essential
but the fact that the malefactors acted in unison pursuant to the same objective suffices.
Here, while there is no proof of any previous agreement among appellants to commit the
crime and while it was established during trial that Eddie alone shot Cesario, the acts of
all appellants before, during and after the incident establish the existence of conspiracy
to kill Cesario beyond reasonable doubt. First, all of them emerged at the same time from
a banana plantation beside the rice field. Second, they surprised Cesario by immediately
surrounding him. Third, all of them were armed at the time of the incident. Eddie had a
shotgun concealed in a sack, Florencio was armed with a bolo, Elynor had a bow and
arrow, while Eric and Franklin had stones in their hands. Fourth, Eric and Franklin struck
Cesario with stones moments before the shooting. Fifth, Eddie immediately shot Cesario

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1023
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
at close range while the latter was approaching the group of appellants upon being
summoned by Florencio. Sixth, Florencio, Franklin, Eric and Elynor stood just a meter
away from Eddie when he shot Cesario, but did not do anything to stop or dissuade
Eddie from the assault. Seventh, after Cesario was shot, all appellants departed from the
scene of the crime together.

Undoubtedly, the acts of the assailants constitute proof of their unanimity in


design, intent and execution. They performed specific acts with closeness and
coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design to ensure the
death of Cesario. We thus uphold the lower courts’ finding that appellants conspired to
commit the crime of murder against Cesario.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1024
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE vs. ROLANDO CABUNGAN

GR No. 189355 January 23, 2013

DOCTRINE: In any event, this Court has already ruled that a medical examination of the
victim as well as the medical certificate are merely corroborative in character and are not
indispensable for conviction in rape cases. What is important is that the testimony of the
private complainant about the incident is clear, unequivocal and credible, and this we find
to be the case here. "Further, well-settled is the rule that prior sexual intercourse which
could have resulted in hymenal laceration is not necessary in rape cases for virginity is
not an element of rape." Neither can the absence of bodily injury negate the commission
of rape.
FACTS:
Appellant was charged with the crime of rape before the RTC of Alaminos City,
Pangasinan. On a plea of guilty, he was tried upon an Information which alleges:
“That sometime in November, 2002 in Siapar, Anda, Pangasinan, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force,
threats and intimidation, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and felon[i]ously have
carnal knowledge of his step-daughter (daughter of his wife or common-law wife),
"AAA",a fifteen (15) [yr.] old minor, in their own house to her damage and prejudice.”
The RTC declared appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On appeal, CA affirmed with
modifications the RTC Decision in that amount of civil indemnity was reduced and
ordered to further pay “AAA” moral damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape
HELD:
Yes. The court disagrees with the contentions of the appellant. In People v.
Domingo, we held that "it is not uncommon that a rape victim conceal for some time the
assault against her person on account of fear of the threats posed by her assailant." This
is exactly the situation in this case. "AAA's" delay in filing the Complaint is not without a
valid reason. She was cowed by appellant's threats, which hindered her from
immediately reporting her painful ordeal to the authorities.

The fact that "AAA" was acting in a manner outside the normal behavior will not result in
appellant's exoneration. Moreover, it bears stressing that not all victims can be expected
to act conformably with the usual expectation of everyone or in the manner suggested by
the accused. Besides, it has been established that the place of the incident is "AAA's"

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
own house where she has the right to stay and go home to after staying in a boarding
house during the weekdays. She also has no other place to go home to since the place
of her brother in Solano, Nueva Vizcaya is too far away. Thus, "AAA's" actuations can
hardly be considered contrary to normal human conduct.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1026
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs JAIME FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 188841 March 6, 2013

DOCTRINE: It bears to stress that "the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been
invariably viewed with disfavor by this Court for it can easily be concocted and is a
common defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act."

FACTS:
At about 10:00 p.m. of July 21, 2001, combined elements of the Bula Police and
the Camarines Sur Provincial Intelligence Forces implemented a search warrant at the
residence of appellant in SagradaFamilia, Bula, Camarines Sur. Police operatives found
inside the house of appellant four transparent plastic sachets suspected to contain
shabu, one tin can containing dried marijuana leaves, 49 pieces of rolled suspected dried
marijuana leaves, one roll aluminum foil and cash money amounting to P3,840.00. After
seizing these items, an inventory was conducted in the presence of Barangay Chairman
Cesar Dolfo and Barangay Kagawad Pedro Ballebar. Pictures of the seized items were
also taken by the police photographer while SPO1 NiloPornillos (SPO1 Pornillos)
marked and brought the seized items to their office. The suspected marijuana leaves
were later brought by SPO1 Pornillos and the suspected shabu by PO3 Jamie S. Villano
(PO3 Villano) to the Camarines Sur Crime Laboratory. The items were both received by
P/S Insp. Ma. Cristina Nobleza (PSI Nobleza) who, in turn, transmitted them to the
Regional Office. After receiving the same, Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Josephine M.
Clemen (PI Clemen) conducted chemical examination of the specimens and per her
Chemistry Report Nos. D-120-019 and D-128-01, they yielded positive results for the
presence of marijuana and methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, respectively.
Appellant and Erick pleaded not guilty to both charges when arraigned. They
interposed denial and frame-up as their defenses.

ISSUE:
Whether or notthe defenses of denial and frame-up were properly rejected by the
lower courts.

HELD:
YES. Appellants defenses hinge primarily on denial and frame-up. He claims that
while denial, like alibi, is generally considered a weak defense, it is not always false and
bereft of merit where the evidence for the prosecution is even weaker. This is true but not
in all cases and certainly not in this case. It bears to stress that "the defense of denial or
frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed with disfavor by this Court for it can easily
be concocted and is a common defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act." Here, the lower courts properly rejected this defense not only
because the prosecution’s evidence against appellant is so overwhelming but also
because he miserably failed to substantiate such defense with clear and convincing
evidence.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCELINO COLLADO et al
G.R. No. 185719 : June 17, 2013

DOCTRINE: Mere allegations and self-serving statements will not overcome the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties accorded to police officers.
There must be a showing of clear and convincing evidence to successfully rebut this
presumption.

FACTS:
On October 14, 2004, appellants MarcelinoCollado (Marcelino) and Myra Collado
(Myra) were charged with the crimes of sale of dangerous drugs and maintenance of a
den, dive or resort in violation of Sections 5 and 6 of Article II, RA 9165 docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 13781-D and 13782-D. Marcelino was also charged with illegal
possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of the same law docketed as
Criminal Case No. 13783-D. On the other hand, appellants Mark Cipriano (Cipriano),
Samuel Sherwin Latario (Latario), Reynaldo Ranada (Ranada), together with
co-accused Melody Apelo (Apelo), MarwinAbache (Abache), Michael Angelo Sumulong
(Sumulong), and Jay Madarang (Madarang), were charged with possession of drug
paraphernalia in violation of Section 14, Article II of RA 9165, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 13784-D.
Upon arraignment on November 4, 2004, all the appellants and the other accused
pleaded not guilty and put up the defense of denial.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there are irregularities attended the arrest and detention as well as
the procedure in handling the specimen allegedly seized from the accused.

HELD:
NO. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties must be
upheld in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overturn the same.
Section 5(a) is what is known as arrest in flagrante delicto. For this type of
warrantless arrest to be valid, two requisites must concur: “(1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and, (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.” A common example of an arrest in flagrante
delicto is one made after conducting a buy-bust operation.
This is precisely what happened in the present case. The arrest of the
appellants was an arrest in flagrante delicto made in pursuance of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court. The arrest was effected after Marcelino and Myra performed the
overt act of selling to PO2 Noble the sachet of shabu and Ranada of having in his control
and custody illegal drug paraphernalia. Thus, there is no other logical conclusion than
that the arrest made by the police officers was a valid warrantless arrest since the same
was made while the appellants were actually committing the said crimes.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Moreover, assuming that irregularities indeed attended the arrest of appellants,
they can no longer question the validity thereof as there is no showing that they objected
to the same before their arraignment. Neither did they take steps to quash the
Informations on such ground. They only raised this issue upon their appeal to the
appellate court. By this omission, any objections on the legality of their arrest are
deemed to have been waived by them.
Anent their claim of unreasonable search and seizure, it is true that under the
Constitution, “a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial
warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.” This proscription, however, admits
of exceptions, one of which is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest.
The arrest of the appellants was lawful. Under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court, “[a] person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense
without a search warrant.” The factual milieu of this case clearly shows that the search
was made after appellants were lawfully arrested. Pursuant to the above-mentioned
rule, the subsequent search and seizure made by the police officers were likewise valid.
Hence, appellants’ claim of unreasonable search and seizure must fail.

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FREDERICK JAMES ORAIS vs. DR. AMELIA ALMIRANTE
G.R. No. 181195 : June 10, 2013

DOCTRINE: Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, or in case of conviction,


where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than
one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the Ombudsman’s decision shall be
final, executory, and unappealable. Indeed, in one case, the Court went so far as to
declare that in such cases, the Court of Appeals (CA) had no appellate jurisdiction to
review, rectify or reverse the order or decision of the Ombudsman

FACTS:
In 2003, petitioner Frederick James C. Orais, Veterinary Quarantine
Inspector-Seaport of the Veterinary Quarantine Service-Seaport, Region VII Office of the
Department of Agriculture (DA), filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Complaint4for
corruption and grave misconduct against his superior, herein respondent Dr. Amelia C.
Almirante, Veterinary Quarantine Officer-Seaport. Docketed as OMB-V-A-03-0184-D,
petitioner accused respondent of committing anomalies.
Petitioners contended that her actions were in line with DAO 22 which authorized
her to do it although she admitted that the DAO 22 is susceptible to graft and corruption,
as there is no transparency and the money collected is not subject to audit.
The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the case and held that respondent’s act
were in accordance with law and the regulations of her office.

ISSUE:
Whether or not decisions of the Ombudsman in cases absolving the respondent
of the charge are deemed final and unappealable

HELD:
YES. The Court agrees with the CA that the instant Petition presents no
opportunity to depart from past pronouncements – consistent with law and the rules of
procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman – that where the respondent is absolved of
the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month
salary, the Ombudsman’s decision shall be final, executory, and unappealable. Indeed,
in one case, the Court went so far as to declare that in such cases, "it follows that the
[Court of Appeals] has no appellate jurisdiction to review, rectify or reverse" the order or
decision of the Ombudsman.
But of course, the above principles are subject to the rule that decisions of
administrative agencies which are declared final and unappealable by law are still
"subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of grave
abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law, or when such administrative or quasi-judicial
bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary
conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings."

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
However, there is no reason to apply the abovestated exception. The Court
notes that the sole basis of the instant Petition rests on the Office of the Ombudsman’s
observation in its Decision that the practice and procedure for payment and
reimbursement of overtime services, transportation, meal, and lodging expenses present
an opportunity for graft and corruption and; that the issuance of mere acknowledgment
receipts by respondent warrants the filing of charges against her. First of all, this
argument is flawed; if petitioner’s argument is allowed, then charges should just as well
be filed against all who are covered by the said practice and procedure, including the
petitioner. They are all part of the system covered by DAO 22, which petitioner claims
to be a defective system.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGELIO RAMOS and MARISSA INTERO
RAMOS
G.R. No. 190340, July 24, 2013

DOCTRINE: When the accused admits that he is the author of the death of the victim
and his defense is anchored on self-defense, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove
the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, "the accused must prove (a) that she was present at
another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically
impossible for her to be at the scene of the crime" during its commission. "Physical
impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and
the location of the accused when the crime was committed. She must demonstrate that
she was so far away and could not have been physically present at the crime scene and
its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed."
FACTS:
Rogelio Ramos and Marissa Ramos (accused) were charged with the crime of
murder for the death of Ronald Abacco (Abacco). The prosecution alleges, through its
witnesses, that Abacco went to the house of the accused to tell them to stop throwing
stones at the latter’s house. However, upon opening the gate of accused’s house,
Rogelio repleatedly hacked Abacco with a samurai sword until the latter was dead while
Marissa kept on shouting “kill him, kill him.” On the other hand, accused Rogelio claims
that while he indeed killed Abacco, he only did it for self-defense alleging that Abacco
was armed with a bolo when he came to his house. According to Rogelio, Abacco
suddenly hacked him with his bolo and, to defend himself, he grabbed the samurai sword
inside the house. Rogelio also alleges that he only started hacking Abacco when he
successfully disarmed the latter. Marissa, on the other hand, claims that she wasn’t there
during the incident as she was seeking help from the KagawadTavora because prior to
such incident, Abacco kept throwing stones at their roof.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the justifying circumstance of self-defense may lie in favor of
Rogelio.
Whether or not Marissa’s denial and alibi is tenable.
HELD:
No, the justifying circumstance of self-defense cannot lie in favor of Rogelio.

Rogelio admits that he killed Abacco albeit in self-defense. "The rule consistently
adhered to in this jurisdiction is that when the accused admits that he is the author of the
death of the victim and his defense is anchored on self-defense, it becomes incumbent
upon him to prove the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court."With this
admission, the burden of evidence is shifted to the appellant to prove that all the essential

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
elements of self-defense are present. On this score, the accused must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence.

To successfully invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the following requisites


must be present:

(1) unlawful aggression;

(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

(3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Among other things, the eye witnesses stating that Abacco went to Rogelio’s
house unarmed, the multiple and fatal injuries that Abacco sustained and the minor
wound Rogelio sustained that required no special attention and could even have been
self-inflicted all points to the fact that it was indeed Rogelio who was the unlawful
aggressor.
No, Marissa’s denial and alibi is not tenable.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, "the accused must prove (a) that she was
present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was
physically impossible for her to be at the scene of the crime" during its commission.
"Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the crime
scene and the location of the accused when the crime was committed. She must
demonstrate that she was so far away and could not have been physically present at the
crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed."
Not only was it not impossible for Marissato be at their house because the house
of KagawadTavora was only 400 meters away, she was also positively identified by the
witnesses during the trial.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOJIE SUANSING
G.R. No. 189822, September 2, 2013
DOCTRINE: Carnal knowledge of a woman suffering from mental retardation is rape
since she is incapable of giving consent to a sexual act. Under these circumstances, all
that needs to be proved for a successful prosecution are the facts of sexual congress
between the rapist and his victim, and the latter’s mental retardation.
FACTS:
Sometime in April 8, 2001, AAA, the victim, FFF and her brother went to
JojieSuansing’s (accused) boarding house to get an electric fan and transformer. After
appellant handed the items to them he told FFF and her brother to leave AAA with him.
FFF later returned to the boarding house upon the request of GGG to fetch AAA. Upon
arriving at the boarding house FFF noticed that the door was locked and called out to
AAA to go home so that she won’t be scolded by EEE, AAA’s aunt. When AAA opened
the door FFF noticed that the former was fixing her shorts and asked her if anything had
happened. AAA told FFF that accused raped her but swore her to secrecy. Subsequently
EEE learned about the rape and confronted AAA. EEE then reported the incident to the
police. On examination, aside from discovering old hymen lacerations, AAA’s psychiatric
evaluation revealed that she was suffering from mild retardation with the mental age of
9-12 years old. Although with impaired adaptive skills, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
found "AAA" qualified to testify. The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime of rape
stating that it found convincing evidence that "AAA" is a mental retardate; that in spite of
her mental inadequacy, her testimony was credible as shown from her "intelligent and
coherent answers to questions propounded to her by the prosecution, the defense and
the Court;" that appellant was aware that "AAA" is a mental retardate; that appellant
raped "AAA;" that "AAA" or "FFF" was not ill-motivated to falsely accuse appellant of
such crime; and, that proof of force or intimidation was unnecessary as a mental
retardate is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. Upon appeal by the accused,
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused can be convicted of the crime of rape despite the
lack of the elements of force, violence and intimidation.
HELD:
Yes, the accused can be convicted of the crime of rape despite the lack of the
elements of force, violence and intimidation.
"[F]or the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove that (1) the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, (2) through force or intimidation, or when
she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years
of age or was demented." From these requisites, it can thus be deduced that rape is
committed the moment the offender has sexual intercourse with a person suffering from
mental retardation. "[C]arnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape. A
mental condition of retardation deprives the complainant of that natural instinct to resist a

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
bestial assault on her chastity and womanhood. For this reason, sexual intercourse with
one who is intellectually weak to the extent that she is incapable of giving consent to the
carnal act already constitutes rape[,] without requiring proof that the accused used force
and intimidation in committing the act." Only the facts of sexual congress between the
accused and the victim and the latter’s mental retardation need to be proved.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPO1 ALFREDO ALAWIG
G.R. No. 187731, September 18, 2013
DOCTRINE: Direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial court
may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules on evidence allow a trial court to
rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt.
FACTS:
Alfredo Alawig (Alawig) is one of the many accused of murder for the death of
Miel de Ocampofe (deceased). According to the prosecution, in the early morning of
November 30, 1996, the deceased and Macgregor Reyes (Reyes) went to the market
afterwhich the latter left the deceased at his house. When Reyes went back to the
deceased’s house at noon, he saw several police officers, including Alawig, enter the
deceased house. Reyes positioned himself so that he could hear the conversation
between the deceased and his fellow police officers. Reyes heard that the deceased was
being summoned by PonicanoMirapales to help in an operation regarding illegal drugs.
When the deceased and the other police officers left, Reyes went inside the deceased’s
house and subsequently answered a call from the deceased. The deceased told him
“Pare walapalakamingtratrabahuin, akopalaangtratrabahuin. Tulunganmoako,
sumundoka ng taonatutulongsa akin.” Before Reyes could say anything the telephone
conversation was cut off. Later that day Reyes learned that the deceased had died. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Alawig guilty of murder qualified by treachery. The
RTC also considered the killing of the victim as attended by the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the circumstantial evidence against Alawig is sufficient to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
Yes, the circumstantial evidence against Alawig is sufficient to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Indeed, no prosecution witness has actually seen the commission of the
crime. But jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix
from which a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules on
evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of
guilt.Circumstantial evidence is that evidence "which indirectly proves a fact in issue
through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established."

In this case, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly synthesized the
circumstances constituting circumstantial evidence as culled from the entire testimony of
Reyes, the prosecution’s key witness, to wit:

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1. Around x xx noon of November 30, 1996, Reyes saw appellant and the late PO3
x xxVentinilla enter the house of the victim after the latter’s friend Tomas Beroy,
opened the door upon the instruction of the victim;

2. Reyes saw appellant and [PO3] Ventinilla carrying an armalite rifle and [a] .38
caliber pistol;

3. Reyes heard appellant and [PO3] Ventinilla tell the victim that he was being
instructed by SPO4 x xxMiraples, the Chief of Police of Police Kababayan Center I,
Doña Ata Subdivision Station, Marulas, Valenzuela, to join a team of police which
will apprehend a big person x xx involved in illegal drugs in Malanday, Valenzuela;

4. Because of the alleged instruction of the victim’s superior, Reyes saw the victim
leave his house together with appellant and PO3 Ventinilla around 1:00 p.m. of
November 30, 1996;

5. A few minutes thereafter, Reyes received a telephone call from the victim who
nervously told him, "Pare walapalakamingtatrabahuhin, akopalaangtatrabahuhin.
Tulunganmoakosumundoka ng taonatutulongsaakin."But before Reyes could
respond, the line at the other end of the telephone wassuddenly cut x xx; and

6. Later in the afternoon, Reyes learned from his friend that the victim was already
dead.

The prosecution likewise presented corroborating evidence which constitute an


unbroken chain leading to the inevitable conclusion that appellant is guilty of killing the
victim. For instance, the presence of gunpowder nitrates on appellant after a paraffin
test;the firearm used in the killing which could either be a .38 caliber or 9 mm
pistol dovetails with the testimony of Reyes that he saw appellant carrying a .38 caliber
short firearm which was later found to have been recently fired; and the absence of
gunpowder nitrates on the hands of the victim after a paraffin test which belies appellant’s
claim that he was shot by the victim or that the latter exchanged fire with PO3 Ventinilla.

"Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if (i) there is more than


one circumstance; (ii) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and (iii) the
combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable
doubt."All the foregoing elements were sufficiently established in this case.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCIANO CIAL y LORENA|||
G.R. No. 191362, October 9, 2013
DOCTRINE: Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit,
since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed.
When the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give
credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative
vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to
which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth
and sincerity.
FACTS:
"AAA" is one of the six (6) children born to "BBB" and "CCC." After "CCC"
died, "BBB" cohabited with appellant Marciano Cial.
In 2002, "AAA", then thirteen (13) years old, was a Grade I pupil and was
residing with her family and appellant in Quezon Province. "AAA'' calls appellant
"Papa." Sometime in December 2002, appellant called "AAA" and told her to go to
the bedroom inside their house. Once inside, appellant took off "AAA's" shorts and
panty and spread her legs. Appellant pulled his pants down to his thighs and
inserted his penis into the little girl's vagina. "AAA" felt intense pain but she did not
try to struggle because appellant had a bolo on his waist. After satiating his lust,
appellant threatened to kill "AAA" and her family if she reported the incident to
anyone. At that time, "AAA's" maternal grandmother was in the house but was
unaware that "AAA" was being ravished.
Unable to endure the torment, "AAA" confided her ordeal to her mother. But
"AAA's" mother did not believe her. "AAA" ran away from home and went to her
maternal uncle's house. Her uncle allowed appellant to bring her home when
appellant fetched her. For fear that she might be raped again, "AAA" ran away and
went to the house of her aunt. Her aunt helped her file the complaint against her
stepfather.
On March 19, 2003, "AAA" was brought to Doña Marta Memorial District
Hospital in Atimonan, Quezon where she was physically examined by Dr. Arnulfo
Imperial. According to Dr. Imperial, the negative result for pubic hair as indicated
in his report means that the victim has not yet fully developed her secondary
characteristics which usually manifests during puberty. Dr. Imperial explained that
the easy insertion of one finger into her vagina means that the child was no longer
a virgin and that it would be difficult to insert even the tip of the little finger into the
private part of a virgin as she would have suffered pain. On the absence of
spermatozoa on the victim's genitals, Dr. Imperial explained that a sperm has a life
span of three (3) days. The lapse of almost four months from the time of the rape
would naturally yield negative results for spermatozoa.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
RTC found accused Marciano Cial is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether of not Marciano Cial is guilty of the crime of rape?
HELD:
Yes. As a general rule, this Court accords great respect to the factual findings of the
RTC, especially when affirmed by the CA. We find no cogent reason to depart from this
rule.
||| Besides, it would not be amiss to point out that "AAA" was only 13 years of age
when she testified in court.
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit,
since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has in fact
been committed. When the offended party is of tender age and immature,
courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired,
considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which
she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth
and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering
her tender age, AAA could not have invented a horrible story.
We find however that both the trial court and the CA erred in convicting appellant of
the crime of qualified rape. According to both courts, the twin qualifying circumstances of
minority and relationship attended the commission of the crime. We rule otherwise.|
Suffice it to state that qualifying circumstances must be proved beyond reasonable doubt
just like the crime itself. In this case, the prosecution utterly failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship. As such,
appellant should only be convicted of the crime of simple rape, the penalty for which
is reclusion perpetua.||

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDY ZULIETA a.k.a. "Bogarts,"|||
G.R. No. 192183, November 11, 2013
DOCTRINE: Settled is the rule that factual findings of the trial court and its assessment
on the credibility of witnesses deserve utmost respect by this Court.
FACTS:
On June 13, 2006, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening at Sto. Niño, Lapasan,
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, Andy Zulieta a.k.a. “Bogarts”, with treachery and with
intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab one Armand
Labando, with the use of a Batangas knife, hitting on the chest, the latter thereby inflicting
mortal wounds which caused his immediate death.|||
The RTC rendered its Judgment finding appellant guilty of Murder for killing the victim
Armand Labando, Jr. with the attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery. ||| CA
affirmed with modification the Judgment of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution failed to proved accused-appellant’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt
HELD:
No. Appellant's alibi, being inherently weak, deserves no credence at all especially
when measured up against the positive identification by the prosecution witness, Bryan
Pascua (Pascua), pointing to appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Besides, nobody
corroborated appellant's alibi other than his wife who is obviously biased in his favor thus
making her testimony self-serving. Moreover, appellant failed to prove that it was
physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene at the time of its
commission. As observed by the CA, Cagayan de Oro City could be traversed from
Gingoog City within two hours; hence, it is not physically impossible for appellant to
commit the crime in Cagayan de Oro City and still go home to Gingoog City after its
commission.|||
Settled is the rule that factual findings of the trial court and its assessment on the
credibility of witnesses deserve utmost respect by this Court. In this case, we find no
reason to deviate from the findings or assessment of the trial court there being no
showing that it has overlooked or mis-appreciated some facts which if considered would
materially impact on or change the outcome of the case. On the contrary, we find that the
trial court meticulously studied the case and properly weighed the evidence presented by
the parties.||

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DONEY GADUYON y TAPISPISAN
G.R. No. 181473, November 11, 2013
DOCTRINE: "Where a victim's testimony is corroborated by the physical findings of
penetration, there is sufficient basis for concluding that sexual intercourse did take place."
FACTS:
Appellant is married to the mother of "AAA" with whom he has three daughters.
Their eldest child is "AAA," who at the time material to this case was only 12 years old.
On August 21, 2002, the mother and sisters of "AAA" attended the wake of her
auntie in Caloocan City. "AAA" and her father, the appellant, were thus the only ones left
in the family residence in San Mateo, Rizal. At around 9:00 p.m. of the said date, "AAA"
was lying in her bed in the family room when appellant fondled her breasts and touched
her arms. At around 11:00 p.m. of the following day and while her mother and sisters were
still in Caloocan City, "AAA" was awakened when appellant lowered her shorts and panty.
Appellant spread her legs and inserted his penis into her vagina. "AAA" felt pain but could
do nothing but cry.Appellant pulled out his penis and inserted it again into "AAA's" vagina.
When he was done, appellant put her shorts and panty back on and again threatened
"AAA."
After more than a month ,when "AAA" went to school the following day, she was
asked by her religion teacher if her father did something bad to her. "AAA" who was
teary-eyed did not answer. Later, "AAA's" class adviser called her. They ate in the
canteen and thereafter proceeded to the adoration chapel to pray. After praying, the
teacher asked "AAA" the same question propounded by the religion teacher. This time,
"AAA" replied that her father did something bad to her twice but did not reveal the details
surrounding the same. "AAA's" mother then came and asked her daughter if appellant did
something bad to her. "AAA" answered "Yes. It happened twice." Thus, "AAA" and her
mother went to the police station and reported the incidents of her defilement. A physical
examination done upon "AAA" revealed that she was in a non-virgin physical state but
that there are no signs of any form of trauma. A psychiatric evaluation likewise revealed
that "AAA" was suffering from Post-traumatic Stress Disorder with Depressed
Mood.Three Informations were filed against appellant for Qualified Rape, Sexual Abuse,
Qualified Object Rape. RTC ruled in favor of “AAA”. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt
that Doney committed the crimes attributed to him.
HELD:
No. The enactment of Republic Act (RA) No. 8353, otherwise known as the
Anti-Rape Law of 1997, reclassified the crime of rape as a crime against persons. It also
amended Article 335 of the RPC and incorporated therein Article 266-A which reads:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. — Rape is committed —

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person.

Thus, rape can now be committed either through sexual intercourse or through
sexual assault. In rape under paragraph 1 or rape through sexual intercourse, carnal
knowledge is the crucial element which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. This
is also referred to as "organ rape" or "penile rape" and must be attended by any of the
circumstances enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1. There must be
evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrator's penis touched
the labia of the victim or slid into her female organ, and not merely stroked the external
surface thereof, to ensure his conviction of rape by sexual intercourse.
On the other hand, rape under paragraph 2 of the above-quoted article is
commonly known as rape by sexual assault. The perpetrator, under any of the attendant
circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1, commits this kind of rape by inserting his penis
into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or
anal orifice of another person. It is also called "instrument or object rape", also
"gender-free rape", or the narrower "homosexual rape."
Our examination of the testimony of "AAA" reveals that there was carnal
knowledge or sexual intercourse through force, threat and intimidation on August 22,
2002. Appellant also committed rape by sexual assault when he inserted his finger into
the genitalia of "AAA" on October 9, 2002. He also subjected "AAA," a minor at 12 years
of age, to sexual abuse by means of lascivious conduct through intimidation or influence,
when he mashed her breasts and stroked her arms on August 21, 2002.
We agree with the observation of the lower courts that the testimony of "AAA" is
worthy of credence. She positively identified appellant as her abuser. She did not waver
on the material points of her testimony and maintained the same even on
cross-examination. Indeed, her statements under oath are sufficient evidence to convict
appellant for the crimes alleged in the Informations.
Moreover, "AAA's" testimony is corroborated by the result of her medical
examination which showed the presence of a deep healed laceration in her private
part. This finding is consistent with her declaration that appellant inserted his penis and
finger into her vagina. "Where a victim's testimony is corroborated by the physical findings
of penetration, there is sufficient basis for concluding that sexual intercourse did take
place."

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JONAS GUILLEN y ATIENZA|||
G.R. No. 191756, November 25, 2013
DOCTRINE: Alibi and denial are weak defenses especially when measured up
against the positive identification made by the victim pointing to appellant as the
malefactor.
FACTS:
On May 20, 2002, around 12 midnight, "AAA" was inside her room on the
second floor of a two-storey house located at Sampaloc, Manila. At that time "AAA"
was playing cards while waiting for her common-law husband to arrive.
Momentarily, someone knocked at the door. When "AAA" opened the door,
appellant Jonas Guillen y Atienza, who was her neighbor, entered the room and
suddenly poked a balisong on her neck. Appellant then turned off the lights,
removed his clothes, placed himself on top of "AAA," and inserted his penis inside
her private parts. After the rape was consummated, appellant stood up and
casually left the room. "AAA" immediately went out and sought assistance from
her sister-in-law. After being told of the incident, "AAA's" sister-in-law contacted
the police. When the responding police officers arrived, appellant, who was readily
identified by "AAA" since he was her neighbor, was immediately arrested.
Per request for a medico legal examination prepared by P/Sr. Supt. Amador
Serrano Pabustan of the Western Police District, "AAA" was brought to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for physical examination. Dra. Annabelle
Soliman, NBI medico-legal officer, conducted medical and genital examinations on
"AAA". The Preliminary Report dated May 20, 2002 issued by Dra. Soliman shows
that private complainant's hymen had "deep healed laceration at 7 o'clock
position;" positive for spermatozoa; and that there was "evident sign of extragenital
physical injury noted on the body of the subject at the time of the examination.
RTC found Jonas Guillen guilty of rape. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jonas is guilty of the crime of rape.
HELD:
Yes. In any case, we agree with the Decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA,
finding appellant guilty of the crime of rape. The trial court's Decision convicting appellant
of rape was anchored not solely on his silence and so-called implied admission. More
importantly, it was based on the testimony of "AAA" which, standing alone, is sufficient to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code specifically provides that rape may be
committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threats
or intimidation. In this case, "AAA" categorically testified that appellant forcibly undressed
her, poked a knife at her neck, and inserted his penis into her vagina without her consent

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1043
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
and against her will. Thus, all the elements of the crime of rape were duly established
from the testimony of "AAA". Moreover, "AAA" positively identified appellant as her
assailant.
Appellant could only offer alibi and denial as his defenses. However, alibi and
denial are weak defenses especially when measured up against the positive identification
made by the victim pointing to appellant as the malefactor. Besides, appellant failed to
prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of its
commission. Aside from claiming that he was at Galas, Quezon City when the rape
incident happened, he failed to submit any proof to show that it is physically impossible for
him to be at Sampaloc, Manila where and when the rape happened. Besides, appellant's
alibi crumbles in the face of his apprehension near the scene of the crime immediately
after "AAA" reported the incident to the police authorities.
Likewise, the failure of "AAA" to shout for help should not be taken against her.
People react differently when confronted with a shocking or startling situation. Some may
show aggressive resistance while others may opt to remain passive. The failure of "AAA"
to shout for help and seek assistance should not be construed as consent, or as
voluntarily engaging in an illicit relationship with the appellant, as implied by the defense.
It would be recalled that appellant poked a knife at "AAA's" neck. Such threat of
immediate danger to her life cowed "AAA" to submit to the carnal desires of the appellant.
However, immediately after appellant left, "AAA" lost no time in seeking the help of her
sister-in-law and in reporting the incident to the police authorities. In fact, the police
authorities were able to apprehend appellant because "AAA" immediately reported the
incident to them.
Anent appellant's contention that "AAA's" healed hymenal laceration does not
prove rape, we find the same irrelevant and immaterial. Hymenal laceration, whether
fresh or healed, is not an element of the crime of rape. Even a medical examination is not
necessary as it is merely corroborative. As we mentioned before, the fact of rape in this
case was satisfactorily established by the testimony of "AAA" alone.
All the elements of rape having been established beyond reasonable doubt, both
the trial court and the CA properly found appellant guilty as charged and correctly
imposed on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
|||

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAY MONTEVIRGEN y OZARAGA
G.R. No. 189840, December 11, 2013
DOCTRINE: Failure to physically inventory and photograph the shabu seized from an
accused in the manner prescribed by law do not invalidate his arrest or render said drug
inadmissible in evidence if its integrity and evidentiary value remain intact. It could still be
utilized in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.
FACTS:
On July 18, 2005, P/Supt. Marietto Valerio (P/Supt. Valerio) of the Makati City Police
Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force received a report from a
confidential informant that appellant was selling shabu in Malvar Street, Barangay South
Cembo, Makati City. Thus, he immediately formed a team composed of police officers
and personnel of the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC) to conduct a buy-bust
operation against appellant. The members of the entrapment team were PO3 Esterio M.
Ruiz, Jr. (PO3 Ruiz), PO1 Percival Mendoza, PO1 Honorio Marmonejo (PO1
Marmonejo),Barangay Captain Rodolfo Doromal, Eugenio Dizer, Miguel Castillo, Leo
Sese, and Anthony Villanueva. PO3 Ruiz was designated as poseur-buyer and was
provided with two 100-peso bills marked money. PO1 Marmonejo, on the other hand,
coordinated the operation with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), which
issued a Certificate of Coordination. The buy-bust team then proceeded to the subject
area but could not locate appellant.
The next day, July 19, 2005, the buy-bust team returned to Malvar Street and found
appellant talking to three men. After these men departed, PO3 Ruiz, accompanied by the
confidential informant, approached appellant. The confidential informant introduced PO3
Ruiz to appellant and told him that PO3 Ruiz wanted to buy shabu. Appellant asked PO3
Ruiz how much he wanted to buy and he replied, P200.00. Appellant pulled out from his
pocket three plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance and told PO3 Ruiz to
choose one. He complied and gave the marked money to appellant as payment.
Appellant pocketed the remaining plastic sachets together with the marked money. PO3
Ruiz then took off his cap — the pre-arranged signal that the transaction had been
consummated. The other buy-bust team members then rushed to the scene to assist PO3
Ruiz in apprehending appellant. The two other plastic sachets and marked money were
recovered from appellant after PO3 Ruiz ordered him to empty his pockets. PO3 Ruiz
then marked the plastic sachets — "EMR" for the one appellant sold to him and "EMR-1"
and "EMR-2" for the other two sachets confiscated from appellant.
Appellant was taken to the police headquarters where he was booked and the incident
recorded in the police blotter. The items seized from him were turned over to the duty
investigator who prepared a request for laboratory examination and then sent to the crime
laboratory. The results revealed that the contents of the plastic sachets are positive
for shabu.
The RTC gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses on the events
that transpired prior to and during the buy-bust operation. It rendered Jay Montevirgen

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge for violation of Sec. 5 and Sec. 11, Art.
II, RA 9165. CA affirmed.
||ISSUE:
Whether or not there is non-compliance with the requirements for the proper custody
of seized dangerous drugs under RA No. 9165.
HELD:
No. In every prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu, under Section 5, Article II of RA
9165, the following elements must be proved: "(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller,
the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. . . . What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the
proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti" or the illicit drug in evidence. On the other hand, in prosecuting
a case for illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of the same
law, the following elements must concur: "(1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object, which is identified as a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
In this case, all the elements for the illegal sale of shabu were established. PO3
Ruiz, the poseur-buyer, positively identified appellant as the person he caught
in flagrante delicto selling a white crystalline substance believed to be shabu in the
entrapment operation conducted by the police and MADAC operatives. Upon receipt of
the P200.00 buy-bust money, appellant handed to PO3 Ruiz the sachet containing 0.04
gram of white crystalline substance which later tested positive for shabu. "The delivery of
the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money
successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction .
Appellant's defense of denial cannot prevail against the positive testimony of
prosecution witnesses. There is also no imputation by appellant of any evil motives on the
part of the buy-bust team to falsely testify against him. Their testimonies and actuations
therefore enjoy the presumption of regularity.|||
The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the
required physical inventory and take photograph of the objects confiscated does not ipso
facto render inadmissible in evidence the items seized. There is a proviso in the
implementing rules stating that when it is shown that there exist justifiable grounds and
proof that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence have been preserved, the
seized items can still be used in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. 21
Here, the absence of evidence that the buy-bust team made an inventory and took
photographs of the drugs seized from appellant was not fatal since the prosecution was
able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the shabu. PO3 Ruiz, the
poseur-buyer and apprehending officer, marked the seized items in front of appellant,
the barangay captain and other members of the buy-bust team, immediately after the
consummation of the drug transaction. He then delivered the seized items to the duty
investigator, who in turn sent the same to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination on

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
the same day. During trial, PO3 Ruiz was able to identify the said markings and explain
how they were made.
Clearly, there was no hiatus or confusion in the confiscation, handling, custody and
examination of the shabu. The illegal drugs that were confiscated from appellant, taken to
the police headquarters, subjected to qualitative examination at the crime laboratory, and
finally introduced in evidence against appellant were the same illegal drugs that were
confiscated from him when he was caught in flagrante delicto selling and possessing the
same.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORO MANIGO y MACALUA
G.R. No. 194612 January 27, 2014

DOCTRINE: Rape is generally unwitnessed and oftentimes, the victim is left to testify for
herself. Thus, in resolving rape cases, the victim's credibility becomes the primordial
consideration. If a victim's testimony is straightforward, convincing and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things, unflawed by any material or significant
inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility and the accused may be convicted solely
on the basis thereof.

FACTS:

Floro Manigo alias Jun was charged of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A, par.
1 in relation to the 2nd par. of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Republic Act No. 8353 in relation to Republic Act No. 8369. "AAA," a 13 year-old minor,
and her classmate "BBB" went home together and rode the same tricycle. After "BBB"
alighted, the tricycle took a different route and went to a banana plantation. When they
stopped, appellant alighted and urinated nearby. He then positioned himself beside
"AAA" who was still inside the tricycle and told the latter to undress. While pointing a knife
on "AAA," appellant took off her panties and his own clothes. "AAA" noticed a tattoo on
appellant’s right upper hand. After warning "AAA" not to make any movement, appellant
forced his penis inside her vagina and made a pumping motion. Once satiated, appellant
told "AAA" to dress up. They then left the place and when they reached Makulay
Restaurant, appellant gave "AAA" ₱40.00 pesos and allowed her to go home. The
following day, "AAA" disclosed her ordeal to her mother. Together, they went to the
Davao Regional Hospital where she was subjected to physical examination that revealed
a laceration on her hymen consistent with her claim of sexual abuse. Jun denied the crime
and said that on the day of the incident, he was at their home in Uraya Subdivision,
Mankilam, Tagum City, Davao del Norte. He is also happily married to Lyn, a teacher, and
is not a tricycle driver but engaged in a lucrative business of money lending. In fact, the
first time he saw "AAA" was when he was made to stand in a police line-up with several
detainees for identification. Both RTC and CA ruled that accused was guilty. Hence, Jun
filed this final review of conviction.

ISSUE:

w/n “AAA” is credible and her testimony deserves full faith and credence

HELD:

Yes. "The legal aphorism is that factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of
the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of their probative weight are given
great respect if not conclusive effect, unless it ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood, or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would
alter the outcome of the case." A careful scrutiny of the records reveals that the case at
bench is not an exception. Like the lower courts, we find the narration of "AAA" to be

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
candid, frank and straightforward.1âThere is nothing therein that appears to be unnatural
or illogical. Moreover, "AAA’s" claim of rape is supported by the medical findings of Dr.
Perez, another prosecution witness. "Where a victim’s testimony is corroborated by the
physical findings of penetration, there is sufficient basis for concluding that sexual
intercourse did take place. A rape victim’s account is sufficient to support a conviction for
rape if it is straightforward, candid and corroborated by the medical findings of the
examining physician, as in the present case.

The defenses of denial and alibi proffered by appellant were correctly rejected by
the courts below in view of "AAA’s" positive testimony and unflawed identification of
appellant as the culprit. Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and "must be
brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the
identity of the accused." And as often stressed, positive testimony prevails over negative
testimony. Also, for his defense of alibi to prosper, appellant must prove not only that he
was somewhere else when the crime was committed but he must also satisfactorily
establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of its
commission. Appellant miserably failed in this regard.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL CRISOSTOMO y MALLIAR
G.R. No. 196435 January 29, 2014

DOCTRINE: The trial court's evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses is entitled to the
highest respect absent a showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case.

FACTS:

Joel Crisostomo was charged of two counts of rape by sexual assault and one
count of statutory rape. The father of "AAA" had a vulcanizing shop where accused was
employed. Joel lived nearby. It was in the house of the accused that her genitals and
buttocks were burned with a lighted cigarette. "AAA" testified further that her clothes were
taken off by the same accused who also took his clothes off after which he allegedly
placed himself on top of her, inserted his penis and proceeded to have illicit carnal
knowledge of the then 6 year old girl. Dr. Emmanuel Reyes the Medico-Legal Officer who
examined "AAA" testified that the victim indeed had 2 third degree burns in the perianal
region. Dr. Reyes testified that it was possible that the said burns were caused by a
lighted cigarette stick being forced on the victim’s skin. Moreover, Dr. Reyes confirmed
that there was a loss of virginity on the part of the victim and that the same could have
been done 24 hours from the time of his examination. On the other hand, accused denied
the allegation of rape against him. Accused presented his brother-in-law Rogelio Oletin
who testified that Joel was asleep during the day. According to Rogelio that is the usual
routine of accused Joel worked in the night shift schedule as vulcanizer. The RTC and CA
ruled for the conviction of the accused. Hence, the appeal to SC.

ISSUE:

w/n inconsistencies and contradictions on the testimony are enough to set aside
the verdict of conviction imposed upon the accused

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court agrees with the CA that "AAA’s" "uncertainty" on whether
it was a match, rod or a cigarette stick that was inserted into her private parts, did not
lessen her credibility. Such "uncertainty" is so inconsequential and does not diminish the
fact that an instrument or object was inserted into her private parts. This is the essence of
rape by sexual assault. "The gravamen of the crime of rape by sexual assault is the
insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into another person’s genital or anal orifice." In any event, "inconsistencies in a
rape victim’s testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer
to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape."
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of
tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1050
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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she
would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA could not have
invented a horrible story.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1051
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILFREDO GUNDA alias FRED
G.R. No. 195525 February 5, 2014

DOCTRINE: There is treachery when the offender commits a crime against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.

FACTS:
Wilfredo Gunda alias Fred was charged with the crime of murder. The victim,
Eladio Globio, Sr., and his son, Eladio Jr., were walking along a trail at Sitio Candulungon,
Barangay Cabay, Balangkayan, Eastern Samar. Suddenly, when Eladio Jr. was about 10
meters ahead of his father, the latter was waylaid by appellant and his unidentified
companions. The John Does held the victim's arms whereupon appellant stabbed him
several times. Fortunately, Eladio Jr. was able to outrun them and was able to reach their
house. In the morning of the following day, Eladio Jr. went to the house of his sister and
informed her of the death of their father. They then reported the incident to the police
authorities who eventually arrested the appellant. The body of the victim was recovered
and post-mortem examinations revealed that he suffered multiple stab wounds which
caused his death. RTC found the accused guilty. The CA affirmed the factual findings of
the trial court that indeed, it was appellant, in conspiracy with the other John Does, who
killed the victim. Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE:
w/n the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder

HELD:
Yes. Based on the above narrations, there is no cogent reason to depart from the
findings of the trial court as affirmed by the CA. Two prosecution witnesses positively
identified him as the person who waylaid the victim, and with the help of his conspirators,
stabbed the victim several times. According to the postmortem findings, the victim
suffered 12 stab wounds which caused his death. There is also no doubt in our mind that
the attack on the victim was attended by treachery. The victim was unarmed and had no
inkling of the impending attack on his person. In fact, he was just on his way home
together with his son Eladio Jr. The victim was attacked by appellant from behind with a
blow to his head with a wooden pole. His cohorts then held the victim’s arms rendering
him helpless and immobile. In such position, there is no opportunity for the victim to
escape or even offer a feeble resistance. Undoubtedly, treachery qualified the killing to
murder. There is treachery when the offender commits a crime against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GLENN SALVADOR y BALVERDE, and DORY
ANN PARCON y DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. 190621 February 10, 2014

DOCTRINE: In a buy-bust operation, the failure to conduct a physical inventory and to


photograph the items seized from the accused will not render his arrest illegal or the items
confiscated from him inadmissible in evidence as long as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the said items have been preserved.

FACTS:

Through the report of a confidential informant, a police team was formed to


conduct a buy-bust operation. PO2 Soriano was designated as poseur-buyer while PO2
Richard Vecida, PO1 Alexander Pancho, PO1 Alvin Pineda and P/C Insp. De Vera would
serve as his backup. During the operation, PO2 Soriano handed to Glenn the buy-bust
money consisting of two 100-peso bills and the latter, in turn, gave him a heat-sealed
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. PO2 Soriano then immediately
arrested appellant and recovered from his right hand pocket the buy bust money. In his
testimony, Glenn claimed that he was parking his tricycle outside his residence at Brgy.
Pag-asa, Quezon City when a patrol car suddenly stopped in front of his house. Three
policemen alighted, aimed their guns at him, and forced him to board their vehicle. The
police car then proceeded to Police Station 2 in Baler, Quezon City. He denied knowing
Dory Ann and the arresting officers and claimed that he saw her for the first time during
the inquest and the arresting officers when they arrested him. RTC and CA both ruled that
the Glenn is guilty. Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE:

w/n non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is fatal

HELD:

No. In arguing for his acquittal, appellant heavily relies on the failure of the
buy-bust team to immediately photograph and conduct a physical inventory of the seized
items in his presence. The failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers
conducted the required physical inventory and photographed the objects confiscated
does not ipso facto result in the unlawful arrest of the accused or render inadmissible in
evidence the items seized. This is due to the proviso added in the implementing rules
stating that it must still be shown that there exists justifiable grounds and proof that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence have not been preserved. "What is crucial
is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved for they will be
used in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused." The links in the chain
of custody must be established. In this case, the prosecution established clearly the
integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu. There is no evidence that PO2
Soriano lost possession and control of the seized shabu from the time it was recovered
from the appellant until its turnover to the police station. He marked the seized item

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1053
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
immediately upon arrival at the police station. He turned it over to PO1 Calatay, the
investigating officer, who prepared the letter request for the laboratory examination of the
contents of the plastic sachets. These facts were admitted by Glenn.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1054
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN SORIA y GOMEZ
G.R. No. 179031 February 24, 2014

DOCTRINE: Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto.

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Benjamin Soria y Gomez was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape by sexual assault by the Supreme Court. Subsequently,
however, the Court received a letter from the Bureau of Corrections about the death of
accused-appellant. In compliance with the directive, the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections submitted a certified true copy of the death certificate. Clearly,
accused-appellant’s demise on August 16, 2012 transpired before the promulgation of
this Court’s Decision on November 14, 2012 or before its finality on December 20, 2012.
Therefore, when accused-appellant died, his appeal before this Court was still pending
resolution.

ISSUE:
w/n criminal and civil liability of the accused is extinguished

HELD:
Yes. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides that the criminal
liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. As to the personal penalties;
and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment. In People v. Amistoso, this Court encountered a
similar situation wherein the accused-appellant died before his appeal could be resolved.
It is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil
action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal case. When Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court
was still pending and unresolved. 1 The Court ruled upon Amistoso’s appeal only
because it was not immediately informed of his death. Amistoso’s death which happened
before promulgation of judgment rendered the decision irrelevant and ineffectual.
Likewise, the November 14, 2012 Decision of this Court finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape had become irrelevant and ineffectual by
reason of his death on August 16, 2012. Consequently, the same must be set aside and
the case against accused-appellant must consequently be dismissed.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1055
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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JERRY OBOGNE
G.R. No. 199740. March 24, 2014.

DOCTRINE: For alibi to prosper, it must not only be shown that appellant was at another
place at the time of the commission of the crime but that it was also impossible for him to
be present at the crime scene.

FACTS:
Jerry Obogne was charged with the crime of rape in an Information, that on or about
the 29th day of July 2002, in the afternoon, in barangay Ogbong, municipality of Viga,
province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
said accused by means of force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of “AAA,”a 12-year old mentally retarded person,
to the damage and prejudice of the said “AAA.”When arraigned on December 17, 2004,
appellant entered a plea of not guilty.On March 13, 2008, the RTC finds Jerry Obogne
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape committed against “AAA”.
The trial court did not consider “AAA’s” mentalretardation as a qualifying circumstance
considering that the Information failed to allege that appellant knew of “AAA’s” mental
disability. Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals, but affirmed the trial
court’s decision with modifications.Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
WON the appellant’s alibi may be considered.

HELD:
No. Appellant argues that the testimony of “AAA” deserves no credence because
she was incapable of intelligently making known her perception to others by reason of
her mental disability. In this case, “AAA” is totally qualified to take the witness stand
notwithstanding her mental condition. As correctly observed by the trial court, “AAA” was
a very credible witness, even in her mental condition. Contrary to accused-appellant’s
assertions, mental retardation per se does not affect a witness’ credibility. A mental
retardate may be a credible witness. Appellant’s assertion that the trial court and the
appellate court should have considered his alibi must likewise fail. For alibi to prosper, it
must not only be shown that appellant was at another place at the time of the
commission of the crime but that it was also impossible for him to be present at the crime
scene. In this case, appellant attempted to show that he was at barangay Ananong at the
time of the rape incident. However, as found by the trial court, the distance between
barangay Ananong and barangay Ogbong is only four kilometers and could be traversed
in one hour or even less.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO LUJECO y MACANOQUIT alias
“TONYO,”
G.R. No. 198059. April 7, 2014.

DOCTRINE: It has been held, time and again, that alibi, as a defense, is inherently weak
and crumbles in light of positive identification by truthful witnesses.

FACTS:
Appellant Antonio Lujeco y Macanoquit was charged with the crime of
rapecommitted on June 29, 2002 against “AAA,”a seven-year old minor.Appellant
pleaded not guilty when arraigned on February 27, 2003.After trial, the Regional Trial
Court of Malaybalay rendered a Decisionfinding appellant guilty of statutory rape.
Aggrieved, appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered its
Decisionaffirming in full the Decision of the trial court. Hence, this appeal. In his
Supplemental Brief, appellant claims that thetrial court and the appellate court erred in
giving credence to the testimony of “AAA.”He argues that “AAA” was “under pressure by
her mother” or was coached as the latter was embracing “AAA” while “AAA” was on the
witness stand. Appellant claims that his alibi, although
concededly a weak defense, should not be disregarded.

ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred in convicting the appellant.

HELD:
No. The SC agreed with the ruling of the appellate court, viz.: As regards appellant’s
contention that the trial court gravely erred in convicting him despite the fact that during
the time that the alleged rape was committed, he was at the public market of Don Carlos,
the Court finds the same wanting in merit. It has been held, time and again, that alibi, as
a defense, is inherently weak and crumbles in light of positive identification by truthful
witnesses. It should be noted that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to
prove that he was in another place when the crime was committed. He must likewise
prove that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. As testified by the appellant, he was at
the public market of Don Carlos, Bukidnon. Undoubtedly, it [was not] impossible for him
to be at the crime scene.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1057
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERWIN LALOG, ROOSEVELT CONCEPCION,
EDWIN RAMIREZ, and RICKY LITADA
G.R. No. 196753. April 21, 2014.

DOCTRINE: There being no aggravating circumstance other than the qualifying


circumstance of treachery, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals properly
sentenced appellants to reclusion perpetua. However, appellants are not eligible for
parole.

FACTS:
On September 29, 1999 at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, Ryan Gain, Roswel
Mercado, Rex Rey and Jayson Manzo were strolling at the Municipal Park of Poblacion,
Municipality of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, when they were blocked by four (4)
persons, namely Erwin Lalog, Roosevelt Concepcion, Edwin Ramirez and Ricky Litada.
Lalog angrily talked to Gain, but Mercado intervened and apologized to the group of
Lalog. Later, Gain and Mercado went down the stairs of the park locally known as the
“RAINBOW.” Mercado was walking ahead of Gain by six (6) arms length; when he
looked back, he saw Gain being ganged upon by the group of the accused-appellants
held both the hands of Gain, while Lalog stabbed Gain. Fearing for his life, Roswel
immediately fled the scene. An Informationwas filed charging appellants Lalog,
Concepcion, Ramirez, and Litada with the crime of murder. During their arraignment,
appellants pleaded not guilty. The Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro
found appellants guilty as charged. Aggrieved, appellants appealed to the Court of
Appeals. However, in its Decision,the appellate court affirmed in full the Decision of the
trial court.Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
WON Mercado’s testimonies should have been given credence by the court.

HELD:
Yes. Appellants claim that Mercado’s testimony should nothave been given
credence by the trial court and the appellate court as there were inconsistencies. They
allege that Mercado initially testified that appellants attacked the victim at the place
known in the locality as the “rainbow” but later recanted and stated that the stabbing
occurred on the ground near the “rainbow.” The Court does not agree with the
appellant’s claim. Whether the victim was stabbed at the “rainbow” or near the “rainbow”
is inconsequential. What is important is the fact that Mercado unwaveringly testified that
he saw appellants gang up on the victim, render him immobile, and then stab him at the
back several times.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1058
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ALOYSIUS DAIT LUMAUIG vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No.166680, July 7, 2014
DOCTRINE: The acquittal of petitioner in the anti- graft case is not a bar to his conviction
for failure to render an account in the violation of Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
COA Auditor Florence L. Paguirigan examined the year-end reports involving the
municipal officials of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao. During the courseof her examination of the
records and related documents of the municipality, she came across a disbursement
voucherfor ₱101,736.00 prepared for petitioner, a former mayor of the municipality, as
cash advance for the payment of freight and other cargo charges for 12 units of
motorcycles supposed to be donated to the municipality. Petitioner admitted having
obtained the cash advance of ₱101,736.00 during his incumbency as municipal mayor of
Alfonso Lista, Ifugao. This amount was intended for the payment of freight and insurance
coverage of 12 units of motorcycles to be donated to the municipality by the City of
Manila. However, instead of motorcycles, he was able to secure two buses and five
patrol cars. He claimed that it never came to his mind to settle or liquidate the amount
advanced since the vehicles were already turned over to the municipality.
Informations for violation of Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 and of Article
218 of the Revised Penal Codehave been filed against petitioner for having allegedly
utilized the cash advance for a purpose other than for which it was obtained. The
Sandiganbayan rendered a decision acquitting Lumauig for violation of RA 3019, but
convicted of the felony of Failure of Accountable Officer to Render Accounts under
Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acquittal of a public officer from a special penal law also applies
to a criminal case arising from the Revised Penal Code
HELD:
No.
It is undisputed that the two charges stemmed from the same incident. "However,
[we have] consistently held thatthe same act may give rise to two or more separate and
distinct charges."Further, because there is a variance between the elements of the two
offenses charged, petitioner cannot safely assume that his innocence in one case will
extend to the other case even if both cases hinge on the same set of evidence. To hold a
person criminally liable under Section 3(e)of RA 3019, the following elements must be
present:
(1) That the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in
conspiracy with the former;
(2) That said public officer commitsthe prohibited acts during the
performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions;

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
(3) That he or she causes undue injury toany party, whether the
government or a private party;
(4) That such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to such parties; and
(5) That the public officer has acted withmanifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
On the other hand, the elements of the felony punishable under Article 218 of the
Revised Penal Code are:
(1) That the offender is a public officer whether in the service or separated
therefrom;
(2) That he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property;
(3) That he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA
or to a provincial auditor; and,
(4) That he fails to do so for a period of two months after such account
should be rendered.
The glaring differences between the elements of these two offenses necessarily
imply that the requisite evidence to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused would
certainly differ in each case. Hence, petitioner’s acquittal in the anti-graft case provides
no refuge for him in the present case given the differences between the elements of the
two offenses.The acquittal of petitioner in the anti-graft case is not a bar to his conviction
for failure to render an account in the present case.
The central aspect of petitioner’s next argument is that he was not reminded of his
unliquidated cash advances. The Office of the Special Prosecutor countered that Article
218 does not require the COA orthe provincial auditor to first make a demand before the
public officer should render an account. It is sufficient that there is a law or regulation
requiring him to render an account.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE vs. GEORGE ZAPATA
G.R. No. 197046, July 21, 2014
DOCTRINE: In the crime of parricide, only the following elements need to be
satisfactorily established: "(1) the death of the deceased; (2) that he or she was killed by
the accused; and (3) that the deceased was a legitimate ascendant or descendant, or
the legitimate spouse of the accused."
FACTS:
George Zapata was having a drinking spree with his brother Manny Zapata and his
cousin Edwin Bautista in their family home. After several hours of continuous alcohol
splurge or at around 7 o’clock in the evening, a gunshot was heard emanating from the
bedroom of George Zapata and his wife Queeny. It appears that George killed his wife
with a single gunshot fired at close range at her chest.Appellant fled from the scene of
the crime without seeking help for his wife. He claimed that the shooting of his wife was
accidental. He alleged that he wanted toshow his gun to his cousin but it fell when he
tried to retrieve the gun from the cabinet. In his attempt tocatch the gun, he accidentally
squeezed the trigger hitting his wife in the process. The RTC found Zapata guilty of
Parricide. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of parricide
HELD:
Yes, he is guilty.
In the crime of parricide, only the following elements need to be satisfactorily
established: "(1) the death of the deceased; (2) that he or she was killed by the accused;
and (3) that the deceased was a legitimate ascendant or descendant, or the legitimate
spouse of the accused."All these elements have been proven beyond doubt.
Appellant was a former Corporal in the Philippine Marines and is thus “assumed
to know and undertake all safety precautions in storing his firearm.”In this case, appellant
apparently threw caution to the wind when he placed the gun on top of a cabinet and not
insidea locked draweror cabinet. Second, the gun was loaded. Third, the gun is equipped
with several safety measures. Interestingly, all these safety measures werenot in place
at the time of the shooting making appellant’s claim of accident highly
unbelievable.Indeed, if the shooting was accidental, appellant would have immediately
sought help from his relatives and neighbors to bring the victim to the hospital.Instead,
he just left her sitting on a chair soaked in her blood.Appellant would not have become
alarmed by the arrival of the police authorities. Instead he fled from the crime scene
leaving his neighbors to tend to his bleeding wife.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE vs. BUNAGAN
G.R. No. 196786, July 23, 2014
DOCTRINE: Rape may be committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman
through threat or intimidation.
FACTS:
"AAA" testified thataccused-appellant (Stanley Bunagan) is the husband of her
grandmother; that she resided in the house of her grandmother since she was nine years
old; that when she was already 13 years of age, appellant started raping her; that her
grandmother leaves the house to work while appellant is unemployed and just stays at
the house; thatthe last rape incident happened when she was 16 years old; that
appellant threatened to kill her mother and grandmother if she would not succumb to his
desire; that after the last rape incident, she got pregnant; that whenher mother and
grandmother confronted her about her pregnancy, she told them that appellant raped her
several times; and that her mother and grandmother reported the incident to the police
authorities resulting in the arrest of the appellant.
The accused-appellant alleged that he did not rape"AAA";that he and "AAA" had a
relationship when the former was 14 years of age; that "AAA" got pregnant and that he is
the father of "AAA’s" child; and that he was charged with rape when his live-in partner
discovered "AAA’s" pregnancy. The RTC held that he is guilty. The CA affirmed the
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is correctly charged with the crime of rape
HELD:
Yes.
Both the trial court and the CA correctly disregarded the "sweetheart theory"
proffered by the appellant for being self-serving and uncorroborated. No evidence such
as love letters, pictures, gifts, etc. was offered to show the existence of such
relationship.Besides, such claim is totally absurd and preposterous. Going by the
testimony of the appellant that his love relationship with "AAA" started sometime in 1997,
"AAA" would havebeen only 12 years of age while appellant would be about 46 years
old.It is also on record that "AAA" vehemently denied her alleged love relationship with
the appellant.
Rape may be committedby a man having carnal knowledge of a woman through
threat or intimidation.According to "AAA," every time appellant will have sexual
intercoursewith her, he would issue threats that he would kill her, her mother and
grandmother.Thus, both the RTC and the CA correctly found appellant guilty of the crime
of rape.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1062
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOJO SUMILHIG, RICARDO SUMILHIG alias
CARDING SUMILHIG, PASOT SALOLI, ERIC ENOC, WARLITO MONTEBON, and
CIO LIMAMA.
G.R. No. 178115 July 28, 2014
DOCTRINE: Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
FACTS:
The prosecution established that on October 31, 1998, at around 6:30 p.m., Jerry
Masaglang, together with Eugenio Santander and his son Mario, were in the living room
of Eugenio’s house in Sitio Overland, Kimlawis, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. Suddenly, they
heard gun bursts and saw six persons firing at the kitchen where members of the
Santander family were having dinner. Jerry and Mario recognized the assailants to be
the appellants and their co-accused. The strafing of the kitchen lasted for about two
minutes. Before the gunmen dispersed, Jojo shouted, "At last, I have retaliated!".Jojo,
Carding, and Pasot had their alibis thus, it is impossible for them to commit the crime
charged. The RTC convicted the appellants of the complex crime of double murder and
double frustrated murder and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death. On appeal,
the CA did not find any reason to disturb the findings of the RTC. However, it found merit
in appellants’ argument that the crime committed could not have been a complex crime
since the death and injuries complained of did not result from a single act but from
several and distinct acts of shooting. And as treachery was alleged in the Amended
Information and sufficiently proven during trial, appellants should be convicted instead of
two counts of murder and two counts of frustrated murder.
ISSUE/S:
GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY,
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY WAS
PRESENT AND INFINDING THAT THE CRIMES COMMITTED WERE MURDER AND
FRUSTRATED MURDER.
HELD:
The appeal has no merit.
Appellants’ conviction was based on their positive identification by the prosecution
witnesses.
There was conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. It is not necessary to adduce evidence of a previous agreement to commit a
crime. Conspiracy may be shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the
mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
accused themselves when such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and
community of interest.

Here, there is no proof of a previous agreement among the accused but there is a
series of events that clearly established conspiracy among them. First, they were all
armed with firearms. Second, they surreptitiously approached the crime scene. Third,
when they were within close range of the intended victims, they simultaneously
discharged their firearms. Fourth, they ceased firing at the same time and fled together.
Undoubtedly, their acts before, during and immediately after strafing the house of
Eugenio evince their unanimity in design, intent and execution. Treachery attended the
commission of the crime.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure the execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense
which the offended party might make.

Treachery is evident in this case as the suddenness and unexpectedness of the


assault deprived the victims of an opportunity to resist it or offer any defense of their
persons. This is considering that the victims were unaware that they would be attacked by
appellants with a hail of bullets from their firearms fired at close range. Indeed, "[t]he
suddenness of the attack, without the slightest forewarning thereof, placed the victims in
such a position that they could not have defended themselves from the aggression.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE C. GO, AIDA C. DELA ROSA, and
FELECITAS D. NECOMEDES

G.R. No. 191015 August 6, 2014

DOCTRINE: The power of courts to grant demurrer in criminal cases should be


exercised with great caution, because not only the rights of the accused – but those of
the offended party and the public interest as well – are involved. Once granted, the
accused is acquitted and the offended party may be left with no recourse. Thus, in the
resolution of demurrers, judges must act with utmost circumspection and must engage in
intelligent deliberation and reflection, drawing on their experience, the law and
jurisprudence, and delicately evaluating the evidence on hand.

FACTS:

On October 14, 1998, the Monetary Board of the BangkoSentralngPilipinas (BSP)


issued Resolution No. 1427 ordering the closure of the Orient Commercial Banking
Corporation (OCBC) and placing such bank under the receivership of the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). PDIC, as the statutory receiver of OCBC,
effectively took charge of OCBC’s assets and liabilities in accordance with its mandate
under Section 30 of Republic Act 7653.

The PDIC conducted an investigation and allegedly came out with a finding that
the loans purportedly in the names of Timmy's, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. were
released in the form of manager's checks in the name of Philippine Recycler's and Zeta
International, Inc. These manager's checks were then allegedly deposited to the
savings account of the private respondent Jose C. Go with OCBC and, thereafter, were
automatically transferred to his current account in order to fund personal checks issued
by him earlier. On September 24, 1999, PDIC filed a complaint for two (2) counts of
Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
the City of Manila against the private respondents in relation to the purported loans of
Timmy's, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. the private respondents pleaded not guilty to the
criminal cases filed against them. A pre-trial was conducted. Thereafter, trial of the
cases ensued and the prosecution presented its evidence. After the presentation of all
of the prosecution's evidence, the private respondents filed a Motion for Leave to File
Demurrer to Evidence and a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition. The presiding judge
granted the private respondents' Motion for Voluntary Inhibition and ordered the case to
be re-raffled to another branch. The case was subsequently re-raffled to the branch of
the respondent RTC judge.The RTC judge finding the private respondents' Demurrer to
Evidence to be meritorious, dismissing the Criminal Case. OSG appealed to the CA,
denied their appeal.

ISSUE/S:

WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS


COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT RTC JUDGE IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1065
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
EVIDENCE;
WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER OF ACQUITTAL HAS ALREADY ATTAINED
FINALITY WHEN IT WAS NOT CHALLENGED IN A TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE
MANNER.

HELD:

The Court grants the Petition.

Demurrer to the evidenceis an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the


effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law,
whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring
challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in
passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to
ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or
to support a verdict of guilt. Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer
thereto is such evidence in character, weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial
or official action demanded according to the circumstances.

To be considered sufficient therefore, the evidence must prove:

(a) the commission of the crime, and

(b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused. Thus, when the
accused files a demurrer, the court must evaluate whether the prosecution evidence is
sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1066
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE v. MARISSA MARCELO
GR No. 181541, Aug 18, 2014

DOCTRINE: Apply the law without compassion against those who engage in illegal drug
trade.

FACTS:
On August 4, 2003, an Informationcharging appellant with violation of Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165, otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002," as amended, was filed in the RTC of Sorsogon City. ImrieTarog informed P/Insp.
Rabulan that appellant would arrive at his rented unit in Visitor's Inn, Brgy. Punta
Waling-Waling, Donsol, Sorsogon to deliver and sell an unspecified quantity
of shabu. Prior thereto, there were already reports that appellant and her husband are
engaged in selling shabu. P/Insp. Rabulan thus ordered a surveillance of the area
where the transaction would take place and coordinated the matter with Arbitria, the
Barangay Chairperson of Brgy. Punta Waling-Waling. He subsequently formed a
buy-bust team and requested Tarog to participate in the operation. Appellant arrived at
the Visitor's Inn. The buy bust operation ensued. PO2 Salvatierra took the shabu from
Tarog and handed it to P/Insp. Rabulan, while the latter took the buy-bust money.
Appellant averred that there was no buy-bust operation conducted against her and that
she was just a victim of a frame-up. the RTC rendered a Decisionconvicting appellant for
violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, as amended. The RTC was convinced that
the prosecution's evidence established the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
The CA affirmed the RTC's ruling in its Decision
ISSUE/S:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED- APPELLANT
GUILTY WITH VIOLATION OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE II OF R.A. 9165 DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE OFFENSE CHARGED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE ARREST OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHICH WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY A WARRANT
AUTHORIZING THE SAME.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-


APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF THE WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE EVIDENCE
AND BY RELYING ON THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY ON THE PART OF THE
POLICE OFFICERS IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTY.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1067
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Elements for the Prosecution of Illegal Sale of Shabu.

In a prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must concur: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material in a prosecution for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug in evidence.
A Warrant of Arrest was not Necessary.

Appellant's argument that her warrantless arrest was not valid is untenable. We
emphasize that the prosecution proved that appellant was apprehended after she
exchanged the shabu in her possession for the marked money of the
poseur-buyer. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, the police officers were not only
authorized but were even duty-bound to arrest her even without a warrant.
There was no Evidence of Denial and Frame-up.

Appellant's defenses of denial and frame-up do not deserve credence. Denial cannot
prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses. On the other hand,
frame-up is viewed with disfavor since it can easily be fabricated and is a common ploy
in prosecution for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Law. For this defense to prosper, it
must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. There must also be evidence that
the police officers were inspired by improper motive.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1068
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES vs. REYNALDO BATURI
G.R No. 189812 September 1, 2014

DOCTRINE: Failure to strictly comply with the Chain of Custody Rule is not Fatal.

FACTS:
On August 6, 2005, a confidential informant reported to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) office in Dagupan City the illegal drug activities of
appellant in Brgy.Carmen East, Rosales, Pangasinan. PO3 Velasquez received and
relayed the information to SP02 Pedro Rabago, the Special Enforcement Team Leader
of the PDEA, who, in turn, ordered the former to conduct a surveillance to verify the
information. SPO2 Rabago thus immediately formed a team to conduct an entrapment
operation where PO3 Velasquez was to act as poseur-buyer and SPO1 Ferrer as
back-up. The next day, August 7, 2005, the buy-bust team coordinated with the police
authorities stationed in the Municipality of Rosales and held a final briefing before
proceeding to appellant’s abode. Upon arrival thereat, PO3 Velasquez and the
confidential informant approached appellant who was sitting in front of his house while
SPO1 Ferrer positioned himself about 15 meters away from them. When PO3 Velasquez
informed appellant that he already had the payment, appellant took out a carton, opened
it and showed the contents thereof to PO3 Velasquez, who, in turn, gave the boodle
money. SPO1 Ferrer immediately showed up and recovered the buy-bust money from
appellant, while PO3 Velasquez seized the carton containing the sachets of white
crystalline granules. After informing appellant of his rights, the police officers arrested
and took him to the PDEA office for further investigation. P/Insp. Roderos issued
Chemistry Report No. D-121-2005-U stating that the white crystalline substance was
positive for shabu. Version of the Defense Appellant denied selling shabu and claimed
that he was a victim of frame up by the PDEA. The RTC convicted appellant. In CA
appellant pointed out that the buy-bust team failed to comply with the procedure
governing the handling, custody and disposition of the illegal drugs. Because of this,
there was failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the corpus delicti. Hence, it
denied the appeal.
ISSUE/S:
WHETHER OR NOT RTC AND CA ERRED IN FINDING HIM GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED.
HELD:
The appeal is unmeritorious.

Elements for the Prosecution of Illegal Sale of Shabu are present.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1069
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
In a successful prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must
concur: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material in a
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit
drug in evidence.

In this case, the prosecution successfully established all the essential elements of
the illegal sale of shabu. PO3 Velasquez, who acted as poseur-buyer, positively
identified appellant as the seller of the shabu and categorically testified that the shabu
was received by him, and the payment therefor by appellant, in a legitimate buy-bust
operation. In view of the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses, appellant’s
defense of denial becomes unavailing. It has been consistently held that mere denial
cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a prosecution witness. A defense of denial
which is unsupported and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence becomes
negative and self-serving, deserving no weight in law, and cannot be given greater
evidentiary value over convincing, straightforward and probable testimony on affirmative
matters. The Court is not persuaded by appellant’s averment that the prosecution failed
to establish that the shabu allegedly seized from him was the same shabu submitted for
laboratory examination. The failure of the police officers to comply strictly with the chain
of custody rule is not fatal. It will not render the arrest of appellant illegal or the items
seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1070
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. REYNALDO TORRES, JAY TORRES, BOBBY
TORRES ROBERTO TORRES y NAVA, and RONNIE TORRES; BOBBY TORRES
AND ROBERTO TORRES y NAVA.

G.R. No. 189850 September 22, 2014

DOCTRINE: When appellant appealed the RTC’s judgment of conviction for murder, he
is deemed to have abandoned his right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy
since it became the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the
appealed judgment.

FACTS:

On January 28, 2004, an Amended lnformation was filed before the charging
siblings Reynaldo Jay, Ronnie Torres (accused) and appellant with the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide committed against Jaime M. Espino (Accused-Appellant).
Only appellant was arrested. Reynaldo, Jay and Ronnie remain at-large to date. During
arraignment, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty". After the termination of the pre-trial
conference, trial ensued. Appellant denied any participation in the crime. The RTC held
that appellant could not have committed robbery. The crime of robbery not having been
indubitably established, the accused cannot be convicted of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide. Thus, he is liable of murder. CA modified the RTC decision,
finding appellant guilty of robbery with homicide instead of murder.

ISSUE/S:

The acquittal of the accused-appellant in the robbery charge should be left


undisturbed as being final and executory which cannot be overturned without violating the
proscription against double jeopardy.

The appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it reviewed the entire case
despite the fact that the accused-appellant only appealed his conviction for murder.

HELD:

The appeal is unmeritorious.

In an appeal by an accused, he waives his right not to be subject to double


jeopardy. Appellant maintains that the CA erred in finding him liable for robbery with
homicide as charged in the Amended Information. We cannot give credence to
appellant’s contentions. An appeal in [a] criminal case opens the entire case for review
on any question including one not raised by the parties. When an accused appeals from
the sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double
jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is
then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable
or unfavorable to the appellant. In other words, when appellant appealed the RTC’s

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1071
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
judgment of conviction for murder, he is deemed to have abandoned his right to invoke
the prohibition on double jeopardy since it became the duty of the appellate court to
correct errors as may be found in the appealed judgment. Thus, appellant could not have
been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA modified the ruling of the RTC by finding him
guilty of robbery with homicide as charged in the Information instead of murder.
Appellant is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1072
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE C. GO, AIDA C. DELA ROSA, and
FELECITAS D. NECOMEDES
G.R. No. 191015 August 6, 2014

DOCTRINE: Estafa could be committed by falsification of commercial document.

FACTS:
On October 14, 1998, the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP) issued Resolution No. 1427 ordering the closure of the Orient Commercial
Banking Corporation (OCBC) and placing such bank under the receivership of the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC).The PDIC conducted an investigation
and allegedly came out with a finding that the loans purportedly in the names of Timmy’s,
Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. were released in the form of manager’s checks in the
name of Philippine Recycler’s and Zeta International, Inc. These manager’s checks were
then allegedly deposited to the savings account of the private respondent Jose C. Go
with OCBC and, thereafter, were automatically transferred to his current account in order
to fund personal checks issued by him earlier.
Filed a complaint for two (2) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial
Documents in the Office of the City Prosecutor of the City of after finding probable cause,
the Office of the City Prosecutor of the City of Manila filed Informations against the
private respondents which were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and
00-187319 in the RTC in Manila.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Estafa could be committed by falsification of commercial
document.

HELD:
Yes, for estafa through falsification of commercial documents against the
respondents are based on the theory that in 1997, fictitious loans in favor of two entities
Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. – were approved, after which two manager’s
checks representing the supposed proceeds of these fictitious loans were issued but
made payable to two different entities – Philippine Recycler’s Inc. and Zeta International
– without any documents issued by the supposed borrowers Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia
Textile Mills, Inc. assigning the supposed loan proceeds to the two payees. Thereafter,
these two manager’s checks – together with several others totaling ₱120,819,475.00–
were encashed, and then deposited in the OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0
of Go which were then used to fund Go’s previously dishonored personal checks.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1073
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES vs.MELCHOR D. BRITA
G.R. No. 191260 November 24, 2014

DOCTRINE: Direct account of law enforcement officers enjoy the presumption of


regularity in the performance of their duties. unless there is clear and convincing
evidence that the members of the buy bust team were inspired by any improper motive.

FACTS:
At about 4:30 p.m. of the same day, the buy-bust team went to the house of
appellant. The informant, together with PO2 Tejero, called appellant who thereupon
came out of his house and approached them. After having been introduced by the
informant to the appellant as a potential buyer of shabu worth ₱500.00, PO2 Tejero gave
appellant the marked money. In return, appellant took from his right pocket a plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance and handed the same to PO2 Tejero. PO2
Tejero then executed the pre-arranged signal by lighting a cigarette. Thereupon, PO3
Orias and the rest of the team rushed to the scene. Alarmed, appellant went inside his
house but was caught by the police officers. After he was placed under arrest, PO2
Tejero recovered from appellant the buy-bust money. Anent the white crystalline
substance he bought from appellant, PO2 Tejero marked the plastic sachet thereof with
"MDB-1."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the presumption of innocence overcome the presumption of
regularity of performance of the police officers.

HELD:
No, presumption of regularity should not by itself prevail over the presumption of
innocence, still, he must be able to present a viable defense. Here, what appellant
interposed is merely denial and a claim of frame-up. For the claim of frame-up to
prosper, the defense must be able to present clear and convincing evidence to overcome
[the] presumption of regularity.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1074
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DATSGANDAWALI y GAPAS and NOL
PAGALAD y ANAS
G.R. No. 193385 December 1, 2014

DOCTRINE: The essential requirements for a successful prosecution of illegal sale of


dangerous drugs, are: "(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and
consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment there of.

FACTS:
On July 3, 2003, an Information for Violation of Section Article II of RA 9165 was
filed against Gandawali and Pagalad That on or about the 30th day of June 2003, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping each other, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver,
transport, or distribute any dangerous drug, did then and there, willfully and unlawfully
sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction, zero
point twenty four (0.24) gram of white crystalline substance containing methyl
amphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. Appellants’ contention that the
consideration of the sale was not established since the buy-bust money was not
presented as evidence is unavailing.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure of the prosecution to present the money used in a buy
bust operation amounts to the acquittal of the accused.

HELD:
No. neither law nor jurisprudence requires the presentation of any of the money
used in a buy-bust operation."It is sufficient to show that the illicit transaction did take
place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti in evidence. These
were done, and were proved by the prosecution’s evidence. The integrity and evidentiary
value of the dangerous drug seized from appellants were duly proven by the prosecution
to have been properly preserved; its identity, quantity and quality remained untarnished.
Appellants persistently argue that the prosecution failed to establish with moral certainty
the identity of the substance seized and the preservation of its integrity
Thus, gleaned from a plain reading of the implementing rules, the most important
factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as
they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. As long as the
evidentiary value and integrity of the illegal drug are properly preserved, strict
compliance of the requisites under Section 21 of RA 9165 may be disregarded.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1075
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANCASIO DELFIN
G.R. No. 190349 December 10, 2014

DOCTRINE: The inconsistencies in statements are trivial matters that do not involve the
essential elements of the crime.

FACTS:
That on or about the 30th day of June, 2001, in the evening, in the Municipality of
Naval, Biliran Province, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
one "AAA," an 11-year old lass, after watching a billiard game in front of the new
municipal building of said municipality went to a jeep parked near the back of said
building, closed its windows and slept thereat but was awakened when herein accused,
who was then carrying a nightstick beamed his flashlight towards her, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by means of force and intimidation [go] inside the
vehicle and there, [take] off her panty and his short pants and [succeed] in having carnal
knowledge [of] the said "AAA," to her damage and prejudice. While the version of the
prosecution: When she went outside the public market, appellant summoned her.
"AAA" tried to run away, but appellant threatened to shoot her with a slingshot. She thus
approached appellant hesitantly. When already near him, appellant suddenly grabbed
"AAA’s" hand and dragged her to the second floor of a newly-constructed commercial
building facing the public market. The defense of the prosecution is based on the
inconsistencies of the testimonies of the victim.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the inconsistency of the testimony is enough to acquit the suspect.

HELD:
No, The alleged inconsistencies on matters relating to the amount that was given
to AAA after she was raped and as to whether it was a stone or a slingshot that was used
by appellant to force AAA to go near him concern only minor and collateral matters. It
has been held that where the inconsistency is not an essential element of the crime,
such inconsistency is insignificant and cannot have any bearing on the essential fact
testified to. Indeed, the inconsistencies in "AAA’s" statements are trivial matters that do
not involve the essential elements of the crime. It has been held that inconsistencies on
matters of minor details do not detract from the actual fact of rape.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1076
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.BMANOLITO OPIANA Y TANAEL
G.R. No. 200797 January 12, 2015

DOCTRINE: What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the
proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug in evidence.

FACTS:
Appellant Manolito Opiana y Tanael was charged with the crimes of violations of
Section 5 (sale of illegal drugs; 0.05 gram) and Section 11 (possession of dangerous
drugs; 0.74 gram), both of Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The facts of the case showed that on
April 8, 2008, the Makati police officers and Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC)
operatives conducted an entrapment/buy-bust operation on appellant who was
reportedly engaged in illegal drug trade in Brgy. Guadalupe Viejo, Makati City. Serrano
gave appellant the ₱300 marked money and in exchange, appellant handed to Serrano a
heat-sealed sachet containing white crystalline substance. After making the
pre-arranged signal, appellant was apprehended and when bodily frisked, 19
heat-sealed sachets were recovered from his possession. Laboratory examination
revealed that all 20 heat-sealed sachets yielded positive results for shabu.
Accused-appellant alleged that the buy-bust team did not observe the proper procedure
governing the handling, custody and disposition of the illegal drugs. In particular, he
contended that there was a gap in the chain of custody as it was unclear what happened
to the specimen after it was delivered to the crime laboratory and examined by the
forensic chemist or how it was brought to the court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a break in the chain of custody of the illegal drugs.

HELD:
None, After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds the appeal
to be lacking in merit. Both the RTC of Makati City, Branch 65 and the CA correctly found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
RA 9165, as amended by RA 9346. For the violation of Section 5, the prosecution
satisfactorily established the following elements: "(1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is
the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug in evidence.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1077
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DOMINGO DILLA y PAULAR
G.R. No. 200333 January 21, 2015

DOCTRINE: Direct proof needed to convict an accused is not required.

FACTS:
Appellant Domingo Dilla y Paular was charged with the crime of murder for the
death of his brother, Pepito Dilla y Paular (Pepito). it was shown that at around 5:30 in
the afternoon of July 22, 2003, at Sitio Ilaud, Himaao, Pili, Camarines Sur, Pepito was
working on his farm when appellant suddenly appeared and shot the victim with a gun
hitting him on his left thigh. The victim managed to run but was overtaken by appellant
who then stabbed him with a bolo. The son of the victim, Pepito Jr., and Mary Jane
Renegado (Renegado), witnessed the incident and testified on the same. Accused
interpose the defense that there was no direct proof that he killed his brother.

ISSUE:
Whether or not direct proof is required to convict the accused.

HELD:
No, direct proof is not required, testimonial evidence provided by the witnesses
are sufficient to provide proof beyond reasonable doubt. the Court findsthe appeal to be
lacking in merit. The records belie appellant’s contention that there was no direct proof
identifying him as the perpetrator of the crime. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Pepito, Jr. and Renegado established without a shadow of doubt that it was appellant
who mercilessly killed his brother, Pepito.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1078
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
People of the Philippines vs. Tomas Dimacuha
GR No. 191060, February 2, 2015

DOCTRINE: In order to convict an accused for the crime of murder, the following must
exist: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC); and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.

FACTS:
Appellants Edgar Allen Alvarez (Alvarez) and Rodel Caballero (Caballero),
together with the accused who remain at-large, were charged with the crime of murder
for the fatal shooting of NicanorMorfeAgon (Agon). During the arraignment, appellants
entered separate pleas of not guilty. After trial, the RTC of Batangas City, rendered a
Decision finding the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellants are guilty of the crime charged.

HELD:
Yes. The elements of the crime of murder are: (1) a person was killed; (2) the
accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (4) that
the killing is not parricide or infanticide. These requisites have been established by the
prosecution.

That appellants killed Agon was established through the prosecution witnesses
composed of Vitan and two other self-confessed former members of "Black Shark",
ArnelBalocon and Romulo Gasta. Their testimonies pointed to appellants as among
those who planned and executed the killing of Agon. Also, the fatal shooting of Agon was
attended by treachery, a qualifying circumstance listed under Article 248 and notably,
alleged in the Information. Finally, the killing of Agon was neither parricide nor
infanticide.

All the elements of the crime of murder being present in this case, the RTC and
the CA thus correctly ruled in finding appellants guilty of the said crime.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1079
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
People of the Philippines v. Jomer Butial
G.R. No. 192785, February 04, 2015

DOCTRINE: The prosecution’s evidence must establish that the illegal drug presented in
court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from appellant.

FACTS:
Accused Appellant was charged with Violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act
[No.] 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The
RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses and convicted
appellant of the offense charged.
In this appeal, appellant questions his warrantless arrest. He posits that his
arrest was illegal since he was not arrested in flagrante delicto. The police officers did
not have personal knowledge that he was committing a crime as they were hiding behind
houses seven meters away from the place where the alleged transaction took place and
did not actually see the whole incident. This being the case, the sachets allegedly
seized from him cannot be used in evidence against him being “fruits of a poisonous
tree.” Appellant also contends that the prosecution was unable to prove all the
elements of the offense of illegal sale of drugs. He likewise points to the failure of the
police officers to properly observe the procedure outlined in Section 21, RA 9165 and
argues that the same constitutes a break in the chain of custody.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there were irregularities in the chain of custody of the seized
items.

HELD:
There is merit in appellant’s contention that not all elements of the offense of
illegal sale of shabu were proven and that there were unexplained gaps and irregularities
in the chain of custody of the seized items.
In a successful prosecution for the illegal sale of drugs, there must be evidence of
the following elements: “(1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.” The
evidence of corpus delicti must also be established beyond doubt. In this case, the
shabu “constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and in sustaining a conviction
under [RA 9165], the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must definitely be shown
to have been preserved.” “The chain of custody requirement performs this function in
buy-bust operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed.”
In the instant case, the prosecution failed to show that the identity and integrity of
the corpus delicti have been preserved. The absence of markings creates an uncertainty
that the two sachets seized during the buy-bust operation were part of the five sachets
submitted to the police crime laboratory. There was also no testimony from the police
officers that they conducted a physical inventory and took photographs of the sachets of
shabu confiscated from appellant pursuant to Section 21(1)27 of Article II of RA 9165.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1080
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
People of the Philippines v. NiloColentava
G.R. No. 190348, February 09, 2015

DOCTRINE: The elements therefore of qualified rape are: (1) sexual congress; (2) with a
woman; (3) done by force and without consent; (4) the victim is under 18 years of age at
the time of the rape; (5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or
adopted) of the victim.

FACTS:
Appellant was charged and convicted with qualified rape defined and penalized
under paragraph (1) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), in relation to
paragraph (1) of Article 266-B thereof.
In this appeal, appellant argues that the charges against him should not have
been given credence because “AAA’s” narration of the events leading to the alleged rape
were vague and highly improbable. The surrounding circumstances leading to the
alleged three incidents of rape were all the same which is highly unusual and contrary to
common experience. Appellant also contends that “AAA’s” conduct after the alleged rape
incidents is questionable. Appellant argues that if he indeed raped “AAA,” then the latter
should have avoided returning to his house at SitioBaco after the alleged first incident of
rape. Appellant also suggests that the normal thing to do on the part of “AAA” was to
report the rape to her grandmother which she failed to do. Appellant likewise posits that
the prosecution failed to rebut his allegation that “AAA” was mad at him because he
chastised her due to her improper ways. According to appellant, this could have been the
reason why “AAA” pressed charges against him.
Appellant further argues that the prosecution failed to prove the attendance of
intimidation in the commission of the crimes.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant is guilty of the crime charged.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that both the trial court and the CA correctly ruled that
the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish all the elements of qualified rape. Thus,
it sees no reason to depart from the findings of the lower courts. ”AAA’s” testimony on
her harrowing experience in the hands of appellant was found by the lower courts to be
positive, straightforward, categorical and steadfast. Moreover, the evidence on record
established that “AAA” was just 16 years old when appellant, her own father, had carnal
knowledge of her. Clearly, all the elements of qualified rape are present in this case.
Also, it cannot be reasonably expected that “AAA” would hastily report the rape to
her grandmother or to the authorities considering that appellant threatened to kill her and
her grandmother should she divulge the incident. “AAA” was justified in thinking that
appellant would make good his threat considering that he has a gun which he even
poked at “AAA” everytime he would warn her against telling others of the rape. Indeed,
failure to immediately disclose the rape does not warrant the conclusion that the victim
was not raped especially in this case where a minor was threatened at gunpoint.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1081
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
This, thus, brings the Court to appellant’s contention that intimidation was not
established in this case, of which this Court is unconvinced. To recall, “AAA” had
unequivocally stated in her testimony that appellant, during the first incident, pointed his
.357 gun at her before raping her. During the succeeding rape incidents, appellant used
the same gun to threaten her should she reveal her defilement to her grandmother or to
anyone. Verily, the element of intimidation was sufficiently established. At any rate, even
assuming that the prosecution failed to establish the presence of intimidation, the same
would not alter the outcome of this case. “Settled is the rule that in incestuous rape, the
father’s moral ascendancy and influence over his daughter substitutes for violence and
intimidation.”
All told, the Court affirms the lower court’s conviction of appellant for three counts
of qualified rape.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1082
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
People of the Philippines v. Gloria Nepomuceno Y Pedraza
G.R. No. 194999, February 09, 2015

DOCTRINE: A cursory reading of the implementing rules that the crucial factor is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items since they will
be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.

FACTS:
Accused Appellant was charged with violation of Sections 5 (Sale of Dangerous
Drugs) and 15 (Use of Dangerous Drugs), Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and violation of Section 15, Article II of
RA 9165. The RTC rendered a Decision convicting appellant for illegal sale of shabu in
but acquitting her for illegal use of the same due to insufficiency of evidence. The CA
affirmed the RTC’s Decision.
Appellant thus interposed this appeal reiterating that her positive identification by
the police officers cannot be relied upon since the police officers were not familiar with
her appearance. Thus, there was no assurance that she was the person reported by the
CI to be engaged in an illegal drug activity. Appellant insists that the warrantless arrest,
search and seizure carried out by the police officers against her were illegal since they
merely suspected that she committed a crime. She continues to argue that the evidence
allegedly recovered from her has no evidentiary value for failure of the buy-bust team to
photograph the seized shabu in the presence of a representative from media, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and any elected public official who shall sign copies of the
inventory pursuant to RA 9165.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to discharge the burden of proof relative
to the illegal sale of shabu.

HELD:
The Court is satisfied that the prosecution discharged its burden in a prosecution
for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, which are: “(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller,
the object and consideration; and, (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.” This offense merely requires the consummation of the selling transaction,
which occurs the moment the buyer exchanges his money for the drugs of the seller.

PO2 Barrameda, the police officer who acted as buyer, testified on the buy-bust
operation against appellant and positively identified her as the seller of the seized shabu
that was sold to him for P100.00. PO1 Santos, another police officer and member of the
buy-bust team, corroborated the testimony of PO2 Barrameda. While they had not seen
appellant prior to the buy-bust operation, the CI readily identified and introduced her to
PO2 Barrameda. Against the evidence of the prosecution, her defenses of alibi, denial
and frame-up crumble. Aside from being weak and uncorroborated, such defenses are
viewed with disfavor since they can easily be concocted and are common and standard
ploy in prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1083
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Also, while it is admitted that there was no physical inventory and photographing
of the seized drug as mandated by law, it was shown that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the item has been preserved and remained intact. The crucial links in the chain
of custody of the seized drug subject matter of the case from its confiscation from
appellant up to its presentation as evidence was duly accounted for and shown to have
not been broken. It was established that after the seizure of the small plastic sachet, PO2
Barrameda immediately marked it with the initials “GPN” while PO1 Santos confiscated
the buy-bust money from appellant’s possession. Considering this sequence of events,
there is no doubt that the sachet marked “GPN” submitted for laboratory examination
and found positive for shabu was the same one sold to the poseur-buyer during the
buy-bust operation and the very same item presented during the trial as the corpus
delicti. No irregularity was shown to have attended the chain of custody of the shabu. Its
identity, integrity and probative value were preserved and kept intact by the police
officers.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1084
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
People of the Philippines vs. Abola Bio Y Panayangan
G.R. No. 195850, February 16, 2015

DOCTRINE: The requirements under [R.A.] 9165 and its implementing rules are not
inflexible. What is essential is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.

FACTS:
Accused Appellant was charged with violation of Sections 5 (sale of dangerous
drugs) and 11 (possession of dangerous drugs), Article II of Republic Act No. 91653
(R.A. 9165). The RTC rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. 9165. It ruled that the elements
for the prosecution of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs have been
established. The CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision.

Appellant posits that the prosecution failed to prove the indispensable element of
corpus delicti of the crime. He maintains that the prosecution failed to show that the
police officers complied with the requirements of R.A. 9165 in handling the seized
evidence, particularly with respect to the immediate marking, physical inventory and
taking of photographs of the items confiscated. According to him, this raises serious
doubts as to the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence. Moreover, appellant
claims that he was not assisted by counsel during the investigation and inquest
proceedings in violation of his fundamental right to due process.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there were irregularities in the chain of custody of the seized
items.

HELD:
The Court ruled that the links in the chain have been duly proven. During the
conduct of the buy-bust operation,PO2 SALONGA, the poseur-buyer, was able to
confiscate two (2) plastic sachets of shabu from accused-appellant: the first one was
sold to him in exchange for the buy-bust money, and the second one was recovered from
the latter during the routinary frisk conducted by PO2 SALONGA. He thereafter gave the
plastic sachets to SPO3 CONCEPCION, who kept the same in his custody until they
reached the police station, where SPO3 CONCEPCION, in turn, surrendered them to the
desk officer who placed the appropriate markings thereon. Subsequently, the seized
items were turned over to PO1 ESTRELLES, the police officer on duty, who prepared the
request for laboratory examination on the specimens, which he delivered, together with
the seized plastic sachets, to the PNP Crime Laboratory on September 9, 2003.
[Thereupon], forensic chemist P/INSP ARBAN duly received the request for laboratory
examination and the confiscated items and conducted the qualitative examination
thereon, which yielded positive results.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1085
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Thus, the prosecution in this case was able to establish the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the shabu seized from accused-appellant, hence, there was
substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. It must be stressed that
non-compliance with Sec.21 of [R.A.] 9165 does not render an accused’s arrest illegal or
the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. The requirements under [R.A.] 9165
and its implementing rules are not inflexible. What is essential is ‘the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.’

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1086
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
People of the Philippines vs. Virgilio Largo Perondo
G.R. No. 193855, February 18, 2015

DOCTRINE: What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the
proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti.

FACTS:
Accused Appellant was charged with violation of Sections 5 (sale of dangerous
drugs) Article II of Republic Act No. 91653 (R.A. 9165). The RTC rendered a Decision
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5 Article II of
R.A. 9165 and imposing upon him the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
P500,000.00.The CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision.

In this appeal, Appellant posits that the prosecution failed to prove the
indispensable element of corpus delicti of the crime.

ISSUE:
Whether or not all the elements of the offense of Illegal Sale of Shabu were
proven in this case.

HELD:
In a successful prosecution for illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must
concur: “(1) [the] identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material in a
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.

In this case, the prosecution successfully proved the existence of all the essential
elements of illegal sale of shabu. Appellant was positively identified by the police
officers who conducted the buy-bust operation as the person who sold the shabu to the
poseur buyer.

Moreover, the testimony of the poseur-buyer was not indispensable or necessary;


it would have been cumulative merely, or corroborative at best. Lastly, appellant’s
argument that the buy-bust operation is fatally flawed for failure of the police officers to
coordinate with the PDEA deserves scant consideration. Coordination with the PDEA
is not a crucial requisite of a proper buy-bust operation; it is not invalidated by mere
non-coordination with the PDEA.

All told, there is no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the
CA, that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu, as defined
and penalized under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1087
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
People of the Philippines vs. Alfredo Santos Reyes
G.R. No. 194606, February 18, 2015

DOCTRINE: The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the
seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. Without
the monetary consideration, the proper crime to be charged is illegal delivery of
dangerous drugs.

FACTS:
Accused Appellant was charged with violation of Sections 5 (sale of dangerous
drugs) Article II of Republic Act No. 91653 (R.A. 9165). The RTC rendered a Decision
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The CA affirmed
the RTC’s Decision and ruled that the prosecution’s evidence duly established the
consummation of the illegal sale of shabu and that the seizure, handling, custody and
examination of the seized drug were well-documented and undertaken in an
uninterrupted manner.

Adopting the same issues he raised in the CA, appellant argues that the
prosecution was unable to establish the elements of the illegal sale of shabu by failing to
identify him as the seller of the shabu and to prove that payment was given in
consideration thereof. He also asserts that there is no proof that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized shabu was preserved in accordance with Section 21(a) of
the Implementing Rules of R.A. 9165. Aside from the fact that the marking of the seized
items was not done immediately after seizure in the presence of the persons mentioned
by the said law, not even a single photograph of the seized items was taken and
submitted by the apprehending officers. Appellant likewise calls attention to the absence
of marked money in the buy-bust operation, the failure to provide him with a counsel
immediately after his arrest, and his detention for more than 24 hours. According to
appellant, these considerations disqualify the arresting officers from enjoying the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duty. Hence, more credence
should have instead been given to his defense of denial.

ISSUE:
Whether or not all elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs were proven and
the receipt of appellant of payment for the purported sale of shabu was established in
this case.

HELD:
In this case, SPO1 Acosta positively identified appellant as the person he
transacted with and who handed to him the two sachets of shabu presented in court.
However, and as correctly pointed out by appellant, the prosecution was unable to
discharge its burden of establishing the element of consideration or payment for the
sachets of shabu. SPO1 Acosta practically admitted in his testimony the lack of
consideration or payment for the sachets of shabu delivered to him by appellant.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1088
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Clearly, the element of receipt of payment for the thing sold is absent in this case.
Hence, the offense of illegal sale of shabu against appellant cannot stand. However,
Appellant is guilty instead of illegal delivery of shabu.

To establish the guilt of an accused for the illegal delivery of a dangerous drug,
there must be evidence that "(1) the accused passed on possession of a dangerous drug
to another, personally or otherwise, and by any means; (2) such delivery" is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused knowingly made the delivery with or without
consideration.
In this case, there was a prior arrangement between SPO1 Acosta and appellant to
meet. During the scheduled meeting, SPO1 Acosta introduced himself and asked
appellant for the shabu. Appellant responded by taking out from his pocket the shabu
and handing over its possession to SPO1 Acosta without receiving any payment
therefor. Appellant had no authority under the law to deliver the shabu since he was
working as a carpenter at the time of his arrest. Appellant likewise knowingly and
voluntarily made the delivery. On the basis therefore of the charges against appellant
and the evidence presented by the prosecution, he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal delivery of shabu under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1089
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
People of the Philippines vs. Rafael David Cunanan
G.R. No. 198024, March 16, 2015

DOCTRINE: Non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 will not


necessarily render the item seized or confiscated in a buy-bust operation inadmissible.
Strict compliance with the letter of Section 21 is not required if there is a clear showing
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item have been preserved.

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Cunanan was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165 for selling methamphetamine hydrochloride. The RTC and the CA found her
guilty beyond reasonable of the crime charged.

Acting on a tip from a confidential informant that a certain “PaengPutol”, later


identified as the appellant, was engaging in selling illegal drugs, PSI Abalos organized a
buy-bust team. PO1 Gunda was designated as the poseur-buyer and was thus given two
100-peso bills as marked money while the rest of the team would act as back-ups.
Thereafter, the team proceeded to and arrived at the target area.

PO1 Gunda and the informant walked towards a store along an alley while the
others strategically positioned themselves some five to seven meters away. PO1 Gunda
was introduced to appellant as a drug user who wanted to buy shabu worth P200.00.
After receiving the marked money from PO1 Gunda, appellant entered a narrow alley
and came back with a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which
he handed to PO1 Gunda. Thereupon, PO1 Gunda gave the pre-arranged signal to
inform the buy-bust team of the consummated transaction and arrested appellant.

Appellant denies the charge and interposes the defenses of denial and frame-up
or extortion. He further avers that (1) there was no inflagrante delicto arrest as he was
not committing any crime at the time he was apprehended; (2) it was inconceivable for
him to openly sell illegal drugs as PO1 Gunda himself testified that at the time of the
alleged sale transaction there were many people around the target area; and (3) the
apprehending officers failed to comply with the guidelines on the proper custody of the
seized dangerous drug, specifically with respect to its inventory and taking of
photograph.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the guilt of accused-appellant was proven beyond reasonable
doubt

HELD:
YES. Appellant was lawfully arrested after he was caught in flagrante delicto
selling an illegal drug in a buy-bust operation, and contrary to his contention, it was not
inconceivable that he would openly sell an illegal drug in public. The transaction made in
the buy-bust operation involved the illegal sale of dangerous drug. This was sufficiently
shown by the prosecution through its establishment of the following elements of the

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1090
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
offense: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, object and consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.” Undoubtedly, appellant was lawfully
arrested after he was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu in a buy-bust operation.

Anent the contention of the officers’ non-compliance with the guidelines on the
proper custody of the seized item, particularly with respect to the inventory and taking of
its photograph, appellant’s contention is untenable. Non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 will not necessarily render the item seized or
confiscated in a buy-bust operation inadmissible. Strict compliance with the letter of
Section 21 is not required if there is a clear showing that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized item have been preserved.

Here, records reveal that after the consummation of the sale and the consequent
arrest of appellant, the plastic sachet sold by appellant was marked at the place where it
was confiscated. Thereafter, appellant and the seized drug were brought to the police
station. And as stipulated by the parties, a request for laboratory examination of a plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance with the marking. During trial, the marked
plastic sachet was presented and identified by PO1 Gunda as the same item sold to him
by appellant.

From this sequence of events, the prosecution was able to show an unbroken link
in the chain of custody of the subject item which is the proof of the corpus delicti. Its
integrity and evidentiary value were shown not to have been compromised
notwithstanding the fact that the inventory and photograph thereof which PO1 Gunda
claimed to have been made were not offered in evidence.

Ultimately, appellant’s defense of denial and frame-up or extortion fails to


convince. Appellant’s violation of Section 5 Article II of RA 9165 was duly established
beyond reasonable doubt, hence, his conviction is affirmed.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1091
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JORIE WAHIMAN y RAYOS
G.R. No. 200942. June 16, 2015
DOCTRINE: Criminal Law; Alibi; Appellant was not able to establish that it was
physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene at the time of its
commission.Hence, inadmissible.
FACTS:
Appellant JorieWahiman y Rayos (appellant) was charged with the crime of
murder for the death of JoseBuensuceso which the same pleaded not guilty. The
prosecution established that on April 2, 2003, at around 10 o’clock in the evening,
Buensuceso, the manager of Stanfilco-Dole, Phils. inMalaybalay City, was on his way
back to the company staff house onboard his Isuzu pickup after attending a despedida
for one of his employees. While he was about to enter the gate of the staff house, he was
gunned down by persons riding in tandem on a black motorcycle. The guard on duty,
David Azucena (Azucena), who was then opening the gate, identified one of the
assailants as herein appellant. During trial, the prosecution submitted in evidence the
extrajudicial confession of appellant taken during the preliminary investigation of the
case, admitting to the killing of Buensuceso. However, when it was appellant’s turn to
testify, he narrated that at the time of the killing, he was at Landing Casisang,
Malaybalay City attending the birthday celebration of his brother-in-law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appelant’s alibi is established for acquittal or parole.
HELD:
Neither, In any event, it must be stressed that appellant’s conviction was not
based solely on his extrajudicial confession. The prosecution likewise presented the
eyewitness account of Azucena who testified that immediately after hearing gunshots, he
saw appellant about 5 meters away from the Isuzu pickup of the victim. Appellant was
riding in tandem aboard a black motorcycle and was holding a gun. The ballistic report
also confirmed that the slugs found at the crime scene were fired from the firearm earlier
confiscated from the appellant. Moreover, appellant was not able to establish that it was
physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene at the time of its
commission. The RTC and the CA thus properly found appellant guilty of murder and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. However, it must be stated
that appellant is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 or
the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1092
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ROBERT CHUA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 196853, July 13, 2015

DOCTRINE: It is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was
sent to the drawee of the check — the prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said
notice because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such
notice of dishonor by the drawee of the check.

FACTS:
Chua and private complainant Philip See (See) were longtime friends and
neighbors. On different dates from 1992 until 1993, Chua issued several postdated
PSBank checks of varying amounts. However, See claimed that when he deposited the
checks, they were dishonored either due to insufficient funds or closed account. Despite
demands, Chua failed to make good the checks. Hence, See filed on December 23,
1993 a Complaintfor violations of BP 22.

Accused-appellant argues that there is no proof that he received the same


considering that there is no date on his signature appearing on the document.
Considering that the demand letter was dated November 30, 1993, the reckoning of the
crucial fiveday period was established.

ISSUE:
Whether the accused should be criminally liable for BP 22.

HELD:
In order to successfully hold an accused liable for violation of BP 22, the following
essential elements must be present: “(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any
check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer
that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment.” “Of the three (3) elements, the second element is the hardest to prove as
it involves a state of mind. Thus, Section 2 of BP 22 creates a presumption of knowledge
of insufficiency of funds, which, however, arises only after it is proved that the issuer had
received a written notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he
failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment.”

In the instant case, what is in dispute is the existence of the second element.
Chua asserts that the absence of the date of his actual receipt on the face of the demand
letter dated November 30, 1993 prevented the legal presumption of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds from arising. On the other hand, the MeTC opined that while the
date of Chua’s actual receipt of the subject demand letter is not affixed thereon, it is
presumed that he received the same on the date of the demand letter (November 30,
1993). Moreover, the lower courts banked on the stipulation entered into by Chua’s
counsel as to the existence of the demand letter and of Chua’s signature thereon. By

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1093
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
reason of such stipulation, they all held that Chua could no longer impugn the said
demand letter.

Similarly in the present case, there is no way to ascertain when the five-day
period under Section 22 of BP 22 would start and end since there is no showing when
Chua actually received the demand letter dated November 30, 1993. The MeTC cannot
simply presume that the date of the demand letter was likewise the date of Chua’s
receipt thereof. There is simply no such presumption provided in our rules on evidence.
In addition, from the inception of this case Chua has consistently denied having received
subject demand letter. He maintains that the paper used for the purported demand letter
was still blank when presented to him for signature and that he signed the same for
another purpose. Given Chua’s denial, it behooved upon the prosecution to present
proof of his actual receipt of the November 30, 1993 demand letter. However, all that the
prosecution did was to present it without, however, adducing any evidence as to the date
of Chua’s actual receipt thereof.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1094
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.JOHNLIE LAGANGGA Y DUMPA
G.R. No. 207633, December 09, 2015

DOCTRINE: Since the crime of rape is essentially one committed in relative isolation or
even secrecy, it is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the
forced coitus. In its prosecution, therefore, the credibility of the victim is almost always
the single and most important issue to deal with. If the testimony of the victim is credible,
convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, the
accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof.

FACTS:
On February 9, 2004 at 2:00 A.M., private complainant (AAA), and her three (3)
children were sleeping inside the room of their house xxx when she was awakened by
the presence of a man wearing black clothes and a mask. Mistaking him for a dog, she
simply shooed him away until she suddenly felt a knife being poked at her neck. The
man took off his makeshift mask that was made from a t-shirt and because of the light
from the kerosene lamp, private complainant recognized him as her neighbor and
appellant JohnlieLagangga, which prompted her to shout "Oy! Johnlieikaw man diayna!
(So, Johnlie it was you)." After covering her mouth, appellant boxed her on the stomach
near the epigastric region or "kuto-kuto," rendering her unconscious.

When the private complainant regained consciousness at around 3:00 A.M., she saw
appellant standing outside the room. He threatened her, saying:
"Basigipablaterkonimougma, hasigmosumbongka, patyon ta na long kakaron. Rung
mosumbongka, patyongtamongtanan. (What if you will have me blottered tomorrow?
What if you will report? I might as well kill you now, if you will report, then I will kill all of
you.)"

Private complainant then noticed that her panty was gone, her private part smelled
differently and that "there was the presence of mucous and probably a secretion of the
male organ," concluding that she was used that night.
In his defense, appellant admitted having sexual intercourse with "AAA" but
claimed it to be a consensual congress.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1095
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The appeal is barren of merit.

"Since the crime of rape is essentially one committed in relative isolation or even
secrecy, it is usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced
coitus. In its prosecution, therefore, the credibility of the victim is almost always the
single and most important issue to deal with."8 "If the testimony of the victim is credible,
convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, the
accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof."9

Essentially, the argument of appellant as premised, boils down to the issue of


credibility. Often, when the credibility of the witness is in issue, the trial court's
assessment is accorded great weight unless it is shown that it overlooked,
misunderstood or misappreciated a certain fact or circumstance of weight which, if
properly considered, would alter the result of the case.10

In the present case, the RTC found "AAA's" account of her painful ordeal credible
and sincere and gave it full probative weight. "AAA's" positive identification of appellant
as the one who threatened her by poking a knife at her and her testimony that he boxed
her on the abdomen rendering her unconscious and upon regaining consciousness
noticed that her undergarment was removed, are clear and consistent. The CA was
convinced of the veracity of "AAA's" testimony. Thus:
Here, private complainant narrated a realistic account of her ordeal in a simple yet
clear-cut manner. She expressed her anger and bitterness towards appellant who, by his
dastardly act, ruined her and her family. Nowhere in the course of her testimony, not
even in her cross examination, did it appear that she was impelled by improper motive.

The testimony of a witness who has no motive or reason to falsify or perjure oneself
should be given credence. A virtuous woman will not, as [a] rule, admit in public that she
had been raped, as she thereby blemishes her honor and compromises her future,
unless she is telling the truth. It is her natural instinct to protect her honor. The testimony
of a married rape victim is given full weight and credence because no married woman
with a husband and children would place herself on x xx public trial for rape where she
would be subjected to suspicion, morbid curiosity, malicious imputations, and close
scrutiny of her personal life, not to speak of a humiliation and scandal she and her family
would suffer, if she was merely concocting her charge and would not be able to prove it
in court.11

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1096
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v.FERNANDO RANCHE HAVANA A.K.A.
FERNANDO RANCHE ABANA
G.R. No. 198450, January 11, 2016

DOCTRINE: Statutory rules on preserving the chain of custody of confiscated prohibited


drugs and related items are designed to ensure the integrity and reliability of the
evidence to be presented against the accused. Their observance is the key to the
successful prosecution of illegal possession or. illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
FACTS:
That on or about the 4th day of November, 2005, at about 6:30 p.m., in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, the said accused, with deliberate intent and without authority of law,
did then and there sell, deliver or give away to a poseur buyer the following:cwhite
crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, locally known as
"SHABU", a dangerous drug.hanRoblesvirtualLawlibrAppellant put in a negative plea.
Trial then followed.On the afternoon of November 4, 2005, a civilian informant, one
"Droga", went to Police Station 10, Punta Princesa, Cebu City and reported to the duty
officer SPO1 Vicente R. Espenido, Jr. (SPO1 Espenido) that the appellant was actively
engaged in the illegal drug trade. The appellant denied that he was a shabu-seller; he
also denied that he was arrested in a buy-bust operation. He claimed that on that
evening of November 4, 2005 he was eating bread when SPO2 Nuñez barged inside his
house, handcuffed him and brought him to the police precinct.
ISSUE:
the non-compliance by the police officers with the prescribed procedure under
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and lastly, the dubious chain of custody of the subject
shabu.
HELD:
The appeal is well-taken.
Prefatorily, we stress again that generally, the trial court's findings of fact,
especially when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight, and will not be disturbed
on appeal.13 Even as this Court must defer to this salutary rule, it must likewise pay
homage to a higher duty which is to dispense real, conscientious and
honest-to-goodness justice by conducting a thorough examination of the entire records
of the case based on the settled principle that an appeal in a criminal case opens the
whole case for review on all questions including those riot raised by the parties. While
the chain of custody should ideally be perfect and unbroken, in reality it is not, 'as it is
almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. As such, what is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1097
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FEDERICO DE LA CRUZ y SANTOS

G.R. No. 207389

DOCTRINE: For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove (a) that he was
present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene during its commission.
FACTS:
That on or about March 27, 2002, in the City of Manila Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously, intent to kill and with
evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one
Corazon Claudio y Nadera by then and there stabbing the latter with a knife on the
different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon the said Corazon Claudio y Nadera
mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of her death.
ISSUE:
SHOULD THE APPELLANT BE ACQUITTED BECAUSE HIS GUILT WAS NOT
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT?

HELD:

After a careful review of the records, we find no reason to depart from the uniform
findings of the RTC and the CA. Both courts correctly found appellant guilty of murder.It
bears stressing that the Information for murder instituted in this case alleged only two
aggravating/qualifying circumstances in support thereof, to wit: evident premeditation and
treachery. But, as correctly found by both the RTC and the CA – with which finding we are
in full accord – the aggravating/qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation did not
attend the killing of the deceased Corazon because there is no evidence at all that the
killing was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the decision to carry out the
criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. In fact, the
prosecution here has adduced no evidence at all to show that sufficient time had lapsed
before appellant decided or determined to commit the crime; nor that appellant, by some
convincing act or action, had indeed clung to his determination to kill the victim; let alone
that sufficient time had indeed lapsed or transpired between the decision to kill and its
actual execution, to allow appellant time or opportunity to reflect upon the consequences
of his act.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1098
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONALD BACALAN GABUYA AND RYANNEAL
MENESES GIRON
G.R. No. 209038, June 08, 2016

DOCTRINE:The Court found the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery
with rape under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the RPC. Indeed, the State in this case had
satisfactorily established the following essential elements of that felony: "a) the taking of
personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; b) the
property taken belongs to another; c) the taking is done with animo lucrandi, and d) the
robbery is accompanied by rape."

FACTS:
Ronald Bacalan Gabuya and Ryanneal Meneses Giron were charged with the
crime of robbery with rape for robbing "AAA" by taking her personal belongings through
violence and intimidation and thereafter taking turns raping her.On March 18, 2002, at
around 12:20 a.m., "AAA" was walking along Visitacion Street, Cebu City on her way
home from work when she saw two men with familiar faces near a lamp post by the CAP
Building. She noticed that the two men were following her.At first, "AAA" was not alarmed
as she continued on her way. However, she noticed that when she walked fast, the men
who were following her picked up speed, too. As a result, "AAA" became frightened.
When she turned around to see the men who were following her, she saw that they were
already very close behind her. At this point, Gabuya quickly pointed a knife at her neck
and held her left shoulder.5 He told her not to shout or else he would kill her.6 Gabuya and
Giron then dragged her to a vacant lot along Visitacion Street. These two took all of her
belongings which consisted of a bag"AAA" was then pushed to the ground. Giron
removed "AAA's" pants and underwear while Gabuya touched her breasts. Giron also
removed his short pants and brief; went on top of "AAA" inserted his penis into her private
parts while Gabuya was over "AAA's" head, holding her, while his right hand was pointing
a knife at her, threatening to kill her if she shouts for help. "AAA" tried to get Giron off her
body but was no match to his strength. Giron then swapped places with Gabuya. Gabuya
went on top of "AAA;" inserted his penis into the latter's private parts; and then forcibly
copulated with her.

Dr. Maniwang examined "AAA" and found that the wounds on the victim's body are
consistent with possible struggle in a robbery with rape case. With respect to the
allegation of rape, Dr. Marilee Solana found traces of spermatozoa in "AAA's" private
parts. After her medical examination, "AAA" went to the Fuente Osmena Police Station
where she reported the robbery with rape. The police officers eventually caught the
appellants in an alley at the back portion of the CAP building. After being informed of their
Constitutional rights, Gabuya and Giron were then arrested.At the police station, "AAA"
positively identified Gabuya and Giron as the persons who robbed and violated her.

Gabuya and Giron interposed the defense of denial and alibi. Gabuya claimed that
on March 18, 2002, around 12:20 in the early morning, he was asleep in his house in
Sambag II, Cebu City. Giron, likewise claimed that he was asleep in his house in Sambag
II, Cebu City at the date and time the robbery and rape were committed.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1099
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The RTC of Cebu Citygave judgment finding both Gabuya and Giron guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with rape as defined and penalized under Article
294, paragraph 1 of the RPC.Both appellants elevated their case to the CA. They argued
that because they were not assisted by counsel at the time of their arrest and during the
police line-up, it follows that their out-of-court identification by "AAA" was inadmissible
against them; and that in any event the prosecution had failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the essential elements of the crime of robbery with rape.The CA
gave short shrift to the appellants' argument. The CA ruled that "AAA's" identification of
the appellants was convincing and credible because she was familiar with them, as
indeed she had seen these appellants a number of times prior to the incident; that
assuming arguendo that the out-of-court identification of these appellants by "AAA" was
defective, this defect was cured by the subsequent positive identification of these
appellants by "AAA" in open court. The CA denied the accused’s’ petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the accused are guilty of the crime charged.

HELD:
Both the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 24, and the CA correctly found the appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with rape under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the
RPC. Indeed, the State in this case had satisfactorily established the following essential
elements of that felony: "a) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or
intimidation against persons; b) the property taken belongs to another; c) the taking is
done with animo lucrandi, and d) the robbery is accompanied by rape."

Under Article 294, paragraph 1, when robbery is accompanied by rape, the penalty
is reclusion perpetua to death. Although the trial court imposed the death penalty, the CA
correctly modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, pursuant
to RA 9346.

The amount of civil damages awarded by the CA, should be modified, however.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1100
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ESTHER PASCUAL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 204873 July 27, 2016

DOCTRINE: Falsification of public document carries with it the following elements: (a)
That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; (b) That he takes
advantage of his official position; and (c) That he falsifies a document by causing it to
appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding.

FACTS:
Esther Pascual and Remegio Montero were indicted for the crime of Estafa
through Falsification of Public Document for colluding and making it appear that they had
facilitated the payment of the capital gains tax of private complainant Ernesto Y. Wee to
the BIR when, in truth and in fact, they converted and misappropriated the money for their
own personal benefit. Montero was arraigned on April 11, 2005, but was later acquitted of
the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence in a Decision rendered on March 31, 2008.
On the other hand, Pascual was arraigned on January 10, 2007; she entered a negative
plea to the crime charged.

Sometime in 2003, private complainant Ernesto Wee and his wife Susana Wee
purchased a real property in Las Piñas City. Since Wee was based in Bacolod City, he
directed his secretary, Leonor Tiongco, to go to Manila to process the transfer of title to
the said property and to pay the capital gains tax thereon. Tiongco informed Wee that she
had paid the capital gains tax through Pascual, an employee at the City Assessor’s Office
of Las Piñas City, who was referred to her by Montero, a part-time businessman from
Bacolod City and an acquaintance of Wee. According to Tiongco, Montero told her to
prepare ₱130,000.00 as payment for the capital gains tax. Pascual personally offered to
facilitate the payment through her alleged "connections" or "contacts" at the BIR office.
Tiongco asked if she could meet Pascual’s "connection" or "contact" at the BIR, but
Pascual replied in the negative. Tiongco, Pascual, and Montero went to the BIR office
located inside the Metropolis Mall in Las Piñas City. When they got there, Pascual then
asked for the money so she could "facilitate payment of the taxes." At first, Tiongco was
apprehensive about giving the money to Pascual. Because Pascual was insisting on
getting possession of the money, saying that she even had to go on leave from work for
two days just to accommodate her (Tiongco); and because Montero also told her
(Tiongco) that she (Tiongco) might as well make use of the opportunity to conclude the
business for that day since that was her purpose in being there after all, Tiongco gave the
₱130,000.00 to Pascual and made her sign a voucher dated June 26, 2003.Pascual and
a lady companion then went inside the BIR office with the money, and after some time
Pascual came out with a photocopy of BIR Receipt No. 2145148. Pascual told Tiongco
that the original of this BIR receipt was left inside her "contact" at the BIR. Pascual then
hastened to assure Tiongco that the certificate of title to Wees’ property would be issued
in three months’ time. But the three months came and went, and despite repeated
demands, Pascual still did not deliver on her promise. Worse, the Wee spouses
discovered that the photocopy of BIR Receipt No. 2145148 was fake. Pascual waived her
right to present countervailing evidence in her defense.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1101
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 201, rendered judgment finding Pascual guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Document.
Before the CA, it affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in upholding the judgment of the RTC and in giving full
weight and credence to the State’s account of the indictment against the accused.

HELD:
The State was able to satisfactorily establish the elements of estafa, to wit: "(1) that
the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (2)
that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party
or third person." Here, Pascual defrauded Tiongco by pretending that she had
"connections" or "contacts" within the BIR to whom she could allegedly directly pay the
capital gains tax at a reduced amount and also with whose help and assistance the
transfer certificate of title to the property purchased could be expedited. In fact, in their
first meeting, Pascual impressed upon Tiongco that she is a person of some power and
influence because she was an employee of the Las Piñas City Assessor’s Office and thus
had "connections" or "contacts" within the BIR and the City Registry of Deeds.

Moreover, the State was also able to establish the following elements of the crime
of Falsification of Public Document: "(1) that the offender is a public officer, employee, or
notary public; (2) that he takes advantage of his official position; (3) that he falsifies a
document by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding;
(4) [and] that such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the proceeding."

It was established that the accused won over Tiongco by appearing to have
expertly facilitated transfers of title in the past while accelerating the payment of taxes
along the way. To this end, she assured Tiongco that she knew people from the BIR to
whom they could directly pay the capital gains tax for less. When Tiongco appeared
apprehensive, she would sound urgent (she was allegedly absent from work for two days
to accommodate Tiongco) and, at one point, incensed (she told Tiongco that she was
wasting her time for not having the cash). To allay Tiongco’s fears, the accused
consistently appeared resolute in her purpose especially when it was time for her to pay
the capital gains tax. In this instance, she ‘transacted’ inside the BIR in plain view of
Tiongco and thereafter presented her with a photocopy of the BIR receipt that later turned
out to be forged.

The deceit by which the charade was accomplished is unmistakable. Deceit as


used in this instance is defined as any act or devise intended to deceive; a specie of
concealment or distortion of the truth for the purpose of misleading. Concomitantly, for it
to prosper, the following elements must concur: (a) that an accused defrauded another by
abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit; and (b) that damage and prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused the offended party or third person.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
In the present instance, the accused made certain that Tiongco would fall prey to
her artifice by presenting herself as someone with extensive connections in the BIR and
the Registry of Deeds being herself an employee of the Assessor’s Office whose function
is the appraisal and assessment of real properties essentially for taxation purposes. She
did not relent until Tiongco prepared the amount of ₱130,000.00 supposedly necessary
for the payment of taxes. The accused guaranteed that the money will go as intended
because she has done it many times before and her transactions turned out well. This, of
course, was pure farce because the title of the property was not transferred to the private
respondent’s spouse as intended, while the capital gains tax remained unpaid. More
importantly, it was discovered later that the BIR receipt furnished by the accused was a
falsified document per testimony of the assistant district revenue officer of BIR-Las Piñas.
This constitutes as the other half of the offense.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCELINO CAGA y FABRE
G.R. No. 206878 August 22, 2016

DOCTRINE: The case thus falls under the second paragraph of rape: "when the offended
party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious." It is altogether immaterial that
the prosecution's evidence failed to establish the presence of physical force, threat, or
intimidation because, as the evidence at bar shows, Caga raped an unconscious and
extremely intoxicated woman.

FACTS:
Marcelino Caga was charged with the crime of rape for having carnal knowledge of
"AAA"3 after having a drinking spree with her and her boyfriendArraigned thereon. On
September 17, 2006, "AAA" and her boyfriend, Randy Bomita, went to Caga's residence
for a drinking spree. After consuming about four bottles of Red Horse Grande, "AAA" and
Randy decided to spend the night at Caga's house since they were both very intoxicated.
Caga was already asleep on a foam cushion on the floor when "AAA" and Randy slept
beside him. While still intoxicated and asleep, "AAA" felt someone kiss her vagina. At first,
she thought it was her boyfriend Randy who did it. She tried to push him away as she had
menstruation at that time, but failed to stop him. Caga succeeded in mounting her and in
penetrating her private parts with his penis. All the while, "AAA" thought that it was her
boyfriend Randy who was having coitus with her.When she ("AAA") slowly opened her
eyes, a tiny glimmer of light coming from the window revealed that it was Caga who had
copulated with her while she was in a drunken stupor. "AAA" then became hysterical. She
started hitting and slapping Caga and accused him of violating her. She also kicked
Randy who was still asleep on the floor. She yelled at Randy exclaiming, "Bakit mo ako
pinabayaan?""AAA" immediately reported the incident at the Barangay Hall and the
Police Station in Pandacan, Manila; and thereafter submitted herself to a medical
examination at the Philippine General Hospital.

During trial, "AAA" positively identified Caga in open court as the person who
raped her.
Barangay Kagawad Aquino testified that "AAA" appeared at the Barangay Hall where she
declared that Caga had raped her. After this, he accompanied "AAA'' to the Police Station
in Pandacan. SPOI Saturnina testified that she received a complaint for rape lodged by
"AAA" against Caga; and that she conducted an investigation into the complaint for rape.
She identified "AAA:s" sworn statement and the booking sheet she prepared relative to
Caga's arrest and detention.

The RTC of Manilafound Caga guilty of rape punishable under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant appealed to the CA contending that
the RTC gravely erred in finding him guilty based only on the incredible, implausible and
uncorroborated testimony of "AAA." The CA however, rejected this posture.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC and the CA correctly found the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
Yes. Under Article 266-A of the RPC, rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge ofa woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force, threat, or intimidation;
2. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious’
3. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
4. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

This Court finds that Caga did have sexual intercourse with "AAA" when she was
asleep and still under the influence of alcohol. The case thus falls under the second
paragraph of rape: "when the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious." It is altogether immaterial that the prosecution's evidence failed to
establish the presence of physical force, threat, or intimidation because, as the evidence
at bar shows, Caga raped an unconscious and extremely intoxicated woman - a fact that
was duly alleged in the Information and duly established by the prosecution's evidence
during the trial. In the case at bench, physical force, threat or intimidation is not
necessary, for the simple reason that an unconscious and extremely intoxicated woman
cannot freely and voluntarily give her consent to engaging in sexual intercourse.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.STANLEY BUENAMER STANLEY BUENAMER y
MANDANE
G.R. No. 206227August 31, 2016

DOCTRINE: The legal postulate enshrined under Article 3 of the RPC decrees that every
person shall be held responsible for all the natural and logical consequences of his
felonious act And, complementing this Article 3 is Article 4 of the same RPC, which
provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred (1) by any person committing a felony,
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." These two
articles of the RPC must thus apply with implacable force against appellant; he must be
called to account for all the natural and logical consequences of his felonious act; and
hence must be deemed to have incurred criminal liability, although the felonious act he
committed might have been different from that which he intended.

FACTS:
Stanley Buenamer and his co-accused Jerome Lambada were indicted for the
felony of robbery with homicide for staging a robbery inside a passenger FX taxi and
causing the death of one of the passengers therein. On October 20, 2009, at around 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon, Diana David was on board a passenger FX taxi on her way home
from Quezon City to Sampaloc, Manila, when along Espana Boulevard, a hold-up was
announced by Buenamer and Lambada. The two threatened to shoot and blow up the
brains of anyone who resisted them (''pasabugin ang ulo namin").' David heard the now
deceased Ferrarie Tan, who was then wearing a nurse's uniform, crying and pleading to
robbers that he had already given to them his cellphone, a Sony PSP, and that he was
only a student. Nevertheless, the armed robbers proceeded to divest, as indeed they
divested, the passengers of their personal effects, including David's own Nokia cellphone
and coin purse. When the FX stopped at an intersection along Maceda Street and
Espana Boulevard in Sampaloc, Manila, David quickly got off the FX and shouted for
help. Traffic enforcers and bystanders heard her shout and plea for assistance, and at
once chased after Buenamer; and Lambada who were trying to flee from the scene of the
crime. Not long after this, David saw the lifeless Ferrarie lying along Espania Boulevard in
Sampaloc.Peter PaulDe Jesus was an MTPB traffic enforcer on duty along Espania
Boulevard when the incident took place. De Jesus testified that he responded to David's
call for help.

Carolyn Tan was the mother of the victim. She identified her son Ferrarie at the
Universal Funeral Parlor, despite his broken face. Dr. Romeo Salen, the Medico-Legal
Officer of the Manila Police District Crime Laboratory, conducted the post-mortem
examination on the corpse of Ferrarie. Dr. Salen testified that he found a 10 x 3 cm.
lacerated wound on Ferrarie's forehead, abrasions from the right and left side of the
following: nose; chest; knees; feet; thighs; and from the victim's abdomen; and two
lacerated wounds at the lower lip and on the chin. According to Dr. Salen, Ferrarie's ribs
were fractured and his lungs macerated. The accused waived their right to present their
defense.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The RTC rendered judgment finding Buenamer guilty of robbery with homicide and
Lambada guilty merely of simple robbery. Buenamer appealed to the CA, arguing that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt since his' identity as the
alleged perpetrator of the crime was not sufficiently established and that the mitigating
circumstance under Article 13(3) of the RPC should/have been appreciated in his favor
because he had no intention to commit so gravel a wrong as that he committed.
Buenamer insisted that when he hit or boxed Ferrarie on the arm, he had no intention of
killing him at all. The CA affirmed the RTC.

ISSUE:
I. Whether or not both the RTC and the CA correctly found the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of robbery with homicide.

II. Whether or not CA erred in not appreciating in his favor the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed

HELD:
I. Yes. Indeed, we are satisfied that in this case the prosecution was able to
satisfactorily establish the elements of robbery with homicide, to wit:
(1) The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against
persons;
(2) The property taken belongs to another;
(3) The taking is with animo lucrandi; and
(4) By reason of the robbery, or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.

All the elements mentioned above are present in this case. In point of fact, the
prosecution succeeded in showing that the primary aim or objective of the malefactors
Buenamer and Lambada was to rob the passengers of the FX taxi. Prosecution witness
David, a passenger of the FX taxi in which the two robbers staged the heinous felony, was
herself a victim of the robbery that was staged by the malefactors that afternoon of
October 20, 2009 along Espana Boulevard in Sampaloc, Manila. David positively
identified Buenamer as the very perpetrator of the crime together with his co-accused
Lambada. David testified that she saw the faces of these two malefactors when these two
boarded the FX taxi at the Pantranco terminal in Quezon Avenue, Quezon City; that
Buenamer and Lambada, then armed with firearms, declared a hold-up on board the
moving vehicle, after which these two divested the passengers of their personal
belongings, while threatening the passengers that they would blow off their heads
(''pasabugin ang ulo namin") should the passengers resist the robbery. By taking the
personal belongings and valuables of the passengers, employing force, violence, and
intimidation, and motivated moreover by animus lucrandi or intent to gain or profit, and
thereafter hitting Ferrarie causing him to fall from the passenger jeepney resulting to his
death, there can be no question that Buenamer did commit robbery with homicide.

Traffic enforcer Mendez saw Buenamer box or strike Ferrarie who, in


consequence of such a blow, lost his grip on the estribo (or the handle bar) of the moving
vehicle, and fell off that vehicle, and at once ran over by the vehicles right rear tire,

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
resulting in Ferrarie’s sustaining lacerated wounds, and numerous abrasions in various
parts of his body that ultimately led to his death. In the face of these actual,
incontrovertible facts, there can be no doubt that all the elements of robbery with
homicide are present in this case.

II. No. "This mitigating circumstance addresses itself to the intention of the
offender at the particular moment when the offender executes or commits the criminal
act" - an intention that must comport, amongst others, with the weapon’s used by the:
offender and the mode of attack adopted by the latter, vis-a-vis the injuries sustained by
his victim. Thus, in People v. Gonzalez, Jr., we explained- ,
this mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there is a notable disparity between
the means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime
committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the commission of the
crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed,
and the injury sustained by the victim. x x x

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. MENARDO BOMBASI Y VERGARA
G.R. No. 211608, September 07, 2016

DOCTRINE: For a successful prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous


drugs like shabu, the prosecution is bound not only to establish the following elements:
(1) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration of the sale and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor but also it is equally essential that the
prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance
offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug be established with the same
unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt.

FACTS:
On January 23, 2006 at about 9:00 p.m., an asset-informant came to the office of
the San Pedro Police Station, Laguna and reported to SPO1 Melchor dela Peña about the
drug pushing activity of appellant. SPO1 Dela Peña relayed the information to their chief
who ordered PO1 Jifford Signap and SPO1 Alejandro Ame to conduct surveillance within
the area. After the surveillance the chief called a briefing and formed a buy-bust team
composed of PO1 Signap as the poseur-buyer, while SPO1 Dela Peña, SPO1 Ame and
SPO1 Arnel Gonzales acted as perimeter security. The team accompanied by the
informant immediately proceeded to the house of appellant. Thereat, the informant
introduced PO1 Signap to appellant as a prospective buyer of shabu. PO1 Signap gave
the two 100-peso bills to appellant who, in turn, handed to the former a small plastic
sachet containing substance suspected to be shabu. After the exchange, PO1 Signap
went out of the house to call his back-up. However, when they returned, appellant was no
longer inside the house. Instead, they arrested two persons inside from whom two plastic
sachets of shabu were recovered. PO1 Signap marked the sachet subject of the sale with
"MB," corresponding to the initials of appellant. After preparing the request for laboratory
examination of the suspected specimen, SPO1 Ame brought the specimen to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory. Per Chemistry Report No. D-023-06,
the specimen submitted and examined contains methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.

Appellant denied the accusation against him claiming that in the evening of
January 23, 2006, he was at home with his wife watching television when he saw
policemen pass by their house and arrest Ariel Aranda and Sergio Bagtas.

The RTC found accused guilty as charged. From this judgment, appellant
appealed to the CA affirmed the judgment of conviction of the RTC against appellant. The
appellate court held that the elements for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs
under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 were satisfied.

ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drug which
constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense, an essential requirement in a drug-related
case.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
Yes. Based on the testimony of PO1 Signap, the poseur-buyer who marked the
seized illegal drug, the Court inescapably note the prosecution's failure to give even a
simple indication that the substance that was being presented in court was identified to be
the same substance sold by appellant. In fact it was not presented or shown to the
witness for the intended identification.

Still on the matter of identifying the illicit substance, we further note the glaring
inconsistency which the lower courts wittingly overlooked. Recall that PO1 Signap
categorically testified that he marked the seized substance placed in a small heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet with appellant's initial "M.B." However, when the same
substance was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination, per written request,
the specimen submitted bore a different marking "MB-B." Precisely, this is the same
substance with the corresponding marking that was examined by PCI Tria and eventually
offered in court as evidence which undoubtedly is not the same substance marked by the
poseur-buyer. Worse, there was no explanation given on the discrepancy in the
markings.

To recapitulate, for a successful prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of


dangerous drugs like shabu, the prosecution is bound not only to establish the following
elements: (1) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration of the sale
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor but also it is equally
essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very
same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug be
established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of
guilt. This requirement is found wanting in this case. It is evident that the identity of
the corpus delicti has not been properly preserved and established by the prosecution.
We therefore find that the prosecution has not been able to prove the guilt of appellant
beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty invoked by the prosecution and relied upon by the courts a quo cannot by itself
overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
FEDERATED LPG DEALERS ASSOCIATION vs. MA. CRISTINA L. DEL ROSARIO,
CELSO E. ESCOBIDO II, SHIELA M. ESCOBIDO, AND RESTY P. CAPILI
G.R. No. 202639 November 09, 2016
.
DOCTRINE: A member of the Board of Directors of a corporation, cannot, by mere
reason of such membership, be held liable for corporation's probable violation of BP 33.
If one is not the President, General Manager or Managing Partner, it is imperative that it
first be shown that he/she falls under the catch-all "such other officer charged with the
management of the business affairs," before he/she can be prosecuted.
FACTS:
On 8 June 2006, Federated LPG Dealers Association, represented by Atty.
Genesis M. Adarlo, wrote the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, Anti-Fraud
and Commercial Crimes Division (CIDG-AFCCD for brevity) informing the latter of its
confirmation that ACCS Ideal Gas Corporation (ACCS) has unauthorized refilled
branded LPG cylinders in its refilling plant at 882 G. Araneta Avenue, Quezon City.
P/Supt. Francisco M. Esguerra, PO2 Joseph R. Faeldonia and a team of paralegal
investigators observed that various vehicles and individuals carrying branded LPG
cylinders have been going in and out of ACCS refilling plant during their surveillance so
they conducted a test-buy operation on July 15, 2006. They first brought one empty
Petron Gasul 11 kg. LPG cylinder and one empty Shellane 11 kg. LPG cylinder for
refilling that costs Php954.00. ACCS Control Receipt No. 12119 was issued. They
subsequently brought one empty Totalgaz 11 kg. LPG cylinder and one Superkalan Gaz
2.7 kg. LPG cylinder for refilling which costs Php590.00. ACCS Control No. 12120 was
issued for said refilling. All refilled branded LPG Cylinders did not have any LPG valve
seals so they proceeded to the CIDG-AFCCD Headquarters and made the proper
identification markings on the branded LPG cylinders. Having reasonable grounds to
believe that ACCS was in violation of BP 33, P/Supt. Esguerra filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila applications for search warrant against the officers of ACCS
namely: Antonio G. Del Rosario, Ma. Cristina L. Del Rosario, Celso E. Escobido II, and
Shiela M. Escobido. Pursuant to search warrants accordingly issued by the said court on
August 1, 2006, a search and seizure operation was conducted on August 3, 2006 at No.
882 G. Araneta Avenue, Quezon City. This resulted in the seizure of an electric motor, a
hose with filling head, scales, v-belt, vapor compressor, booklets of various receipts, and
73 LPG cylinders of various brands and sizes, four of which were filled, i.e., two
Superkalan 3.7 kg. LPG cylinders, one Shellane 11 kg. LPG cylinder, and one Totalgaz
11 kg. cylinder.Inspection and evaluation of the said filled LPG cylinders showed that
they were underfilled by 0.5 kg. to 0.9 kg.18. On 14 December 2006, P/Supt Esguerra
filed with the Department of Justice Complaints-Affidavits against them for illegal trading
of petroleum products and for underfilling of LPG cylinders under Section 2(a) and 2(c),
respectively, of BP 33, as amended. Antonio admitted that he was the General Manager
of ACCS but denied that the company was engaged in illegal trading and underfilling.
The others corroborated the statements of Antonio that (1) they were merely

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
incorporators/stockholders of ACCS who have no active participation in the operation,
management, and control of the business; (2) ACCS was only engaged in the distribution
of LPG products and not in the refilling of LPG cylinders; and (3) ACCS did not commit
any violation of BP 33 as amended. In a Joint Resolution dated June 25, 2008, Chief
State Prosecutor Jovencito R Zuño approved the finding of probable cause by Senior
State Prosecutor Edwin S. Dayog charging Antonio for illegal trading and dismissing the
other complaints. P/Supt. Esguerra, now joined by Federated LPG Dealers Association,
filed a Petition for Review before the Secretary of Justice who upheld the said issuances
and dismissed the Petition in a Resolution dated September 4, 2009. The Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied in a Resolution dated June 23, 2010. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the ruling. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution
dated July 6, 2012 so a Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the Ma. Cristina L. Del Rosario, Celso E. Escobido II, Shiela M.
Escobido, and Resty P. Capili as members of the Board of Directors of ACCS can be
criminally prosecuted for Antonio G. Del Rosario's alleged violation/s of BP 33 as
amended.
(2) Whether or not the offenses of illegal trading of petroleum products under
Section 2(a) and underfilling under Section 2(c) of BP 33 as amended are distinct
offenses.
HELD:
(1) As clearly enunciated in Ty v. NBI Supervising Agent De Jemil, a member of
the Board of Directors of a corporation, cannot, by mere reason of such membership, be
held liable for corporation's probable violation of BP 33. If one is not the President,
General Manager or Managing Partner, it is imperative that it first be shown that he/she
falls under the catch-all "such other officer charged with the management of the business
affairs," before he/she can be prosecuted. However, it must be stressed, that the matter
of being an officer charged with the management of the business affairs is a factual issue
which must be alleged and supported by evidence. Here, there is no dispute that neither
of the respondents was the President, General Manager, or Managing Partner of ACCS.
Hence, it becomes incumbent upon petitioner to show that respondents were officers
charged with the management of the business affairs. However, the Complaint-Affidavit
attached to the records merely states that Ma. Cristina L. Del Rosario, Celso E. Escobido
II, Shiela M. Escobido, and Resty P. Capili were members of the Board of Directors
based on the AOI of ACCS. There is no allegation whatsoever that they were in-charge
of the management of the corporation's business affairs.
Therefore, it is only Antonio G. Del Rosario, who undisputedly was the General
Manager – a position among those expressly mentioned as criminally liable under
paragraph 4, Section 3 of BP 33, as amended – can be prosecuted for ACCS' perceived
violations of the said law.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
(2) Illegal trading and underfilling are among the eight acts prohibited under
Section 2 of BP 33, as amended.
By definition, the acts penalized by both offenses are essentially different. Under
paragraph 1(c) of Section 3 of the said law, illegal trading in petroleum and/or petroleum
products is committed by refilling LPG cylinders without authority from the Bureau of
Energy Utilization, or refilling of another company's or firm's cylinder without such
company's or firm's written authorization. Underfilling or underdelivery, on the other
hand, under paragraph 3 of the same section refers to a sale, transfer, delivery or filling
of petroleum products of a quantity that is actually below the quantity indicated or
registered on the metering device of a container. While it may be said that an act could
be common to both of them, the act of refilling does not in itself constitute illegal trading
through unauthorized refilling or that of underfilling. The concurrence of an additional
requisite different in each one is necessary to constitute each offense. Thus, aside from
the act of refilling, the offender must have no authority to refill from the concerned
government agency or the company or firm owning the LPG cylinder refilled for the act to
be considered illegal trading through unauthorized refilling. Whereas in underfilling, it is
necessary that apart from the act of refilling, the offender must have refilled the LPG
cylinder below the authorized limits in the sale of petroleum products. Moreover, the
offense of underfilling is not limited to the act of refilling below the authorized limits.
Possession of an underfilled LPG cylinder another way of committing the offense. As
therefore correctly argued by petitioner, the offenses of illegal trading through
unauthorized refilling and underfilling are separate and distinct offenses.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JUAN RICHARD TIONLOC y MARQUEZ

G.R. No. 212193 February 15, 2017

DOCTRINE: When the evidence fails to establish all the elements of the crime, the
verdict must be one of acquittal of the accused. This basic legal precept applies in this
criminal litigation for rape.

FACTS:
On or about 29 September 2008, in the City of Manila said accused conspiring
and confederating with one whose true name, real identity and present whereabouts are
still unknown and mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, commit sexual
abuse upon the person of AAA by then and there making her drink liquor which made her
dizzy and drunk, depriving her of reason or otherwise unconsciousness, bringing her to a
room and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her, against her will.She also
underwent a medical examination and the results revealed two lacerations in her hymen.
Appellant denied raping AAA. He claimed that on that fateful night, he was having a
drinking session with his cousin. RTC ruled on the conviction of the accused. On appeal
it was affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused should be acquitted for failure of the prosecution to
establish the required quantum of evidence.

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in favour of the acquittal of the accused. It has
been ruled repeatedly that in criminal litigation, the evidence of the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the
defense. The burden of proof rests on the State. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to
discharge its burden of evidence in this case entitles appellant to an acquittal.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1114
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SALIM RADANG

G.R. No. 208093 20 FEBRUARY 2017

DOCTRINE: The obligations of the prosecution in a criminal case: (1) overcome the
presumption of innocence which appellant enjoys; (2) prove the corpus delicti of the
crime; (3) establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs; and (3) offer any
explanation why the provisions of Section 21, RA 9165 were not complied with.

It is important that the seized drugs be immediately marked, if possible, as soon as they
are seized from the accused.

FACTS:
Salim was charged with violation of Sections 5 and II, Article II of RA 9165 for
selling and possessing methamphetamine hydrochloride or also known as shabu.
The defense presented appellant as its lone witness. Accused denied both
charges; he denied selling shabu to SPO1 Santiago, just as he denied having shabu in
his possession when he was arrested on August 25, 2003.
According to appellant, on August 25, 2003, he went to a store to buy cellphone
load so that he could call his wife. After buying the cellphone load, he went back to his
house on board a sikad-sikad, a bicycle-driven vehicle with a sidecar. When he was
about 160 meters away from the Muslim cemetery in Barangay Talabaan, he was
arrested by five persons in civilian attire who introduced themselves as police officers.
The police officers conducted a search on his person but did not find any dangerous
drugs. Thereafter, he was brought to Culianan Police Station where he was detained for
two days. Appellant insisted that he never sold shabu to the police officers who arrested
him. He said that the first time he saw the alleged shabu was when it was presented
before the trial court. He denied that the police officers had confiscated a cellular phone
from him. He also asserted that all these police officers took away from him was his
money and that he had never met the said police officers prior to his arrest.
RTC found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having violated Sections 5
and 11, Article II of RA 9165 which the CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA gravely erred in convicting the accused when his guilt was
not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:
Yes, the High Court acquitted the accused. To secure a conviction for illegal sale
of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the prosecution must
establish the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of
the sale and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. What is important is that the sale transaction of drugs actually took place and
that the object of the transaction is properly presented as evidence in court and is shown
to be the same drugs seized from the accused.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1115
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
On the other hand, for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following
elements must be established: [1] the accused was in possession of dangerous drugs;
[2] such possession was not authorized by law; and [3] the accused was freely and
consciously aware of being in possession of dangerous drugs.
Further, the first stage in the chain of custody rule is the marking of the dangerous
drugs or related items. Marking, which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related
items by the apprehending officer or the poseur- buyer of his initials or signature or other
identifying signs, should be made in the presence of the apprehended violator
immediately upon arrest. The importance of the prompt marking cannot be denied,
because succeeding handlers of dangerous drugs or related items will use the marking
as reference. Also, the marking operates to set apart as evidence the dangerous drugs
or related items from other material from the moment they are confiscated until they are
disposed of at the close of the criminal proceedings, thereby forestalling switching,
planting or contamination of evidence. In short, the marking immediately upon
confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drugs or related items is indispensable in the
preservation of their integrity and evidentiary value.
The requirements of making an inventory and taking of photographs of the seized
drugs were likewise omitted without offering an explanation for its non-compliance.
Due to the apparent breaks in the chain of custody, it was possible that the seized
item subject of the sale transaction was switched with the seized items subject of the
illegal possession case. This is material considering that the imposable penalty for illegal
possession of shabu depends on the quantity or weight of the seized drug.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1116
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
People of the Philippines Vs. Jessie Gabriel y Gajardo

G.R. No. 213390 25 MARCH 2014

DOCTRINE: In rape, the force and intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim’s
perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime. It ls settled that not
all victims react the same way. Some victims may cry out, some may faint, some may be
shocked into insensibility, while others may appear to yield to the intrusion. Some may
offer strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to after any resistance at all.
Moreover, resistance is not an element of rape. A rape victim has no burden to prove
that she did all within her power to resist the force or intimidation employed upon her. As
long as the force or intimidation is present, whether it was more or less irresistible is
beside the point.

FACTS:
On 17 of February 2010 in a boarding house located at Dagupan Philippines, the
appellant, Gajardo suspected ‘AAA’ and ‘BBB’ for stealing items from his store that was
near the boarding house. The girls denied the suspected action and were directed at the
appellant’s house. When AAA was at the appellant’s room, the appellant insisted AAA
about the accused action and threatened them that they will be forwarded to the police
for theft. The appellant started directing AAA to some actions that she didn’t like as
expressed. Actions such as sitting on his lap, caressing her back and unhooking her bra.
AAA tried to leave the room but with the accused forceful manner to she wasn’t not able
to.
Based from the proceedings that Pros. Peralta had examined, AAA explained the
actions that the appellant made at the time of the crime. AAA expressed that the
appellant made her lie down and forced and “raped” her. AAA also recounted that the
accused inserted his penis to her vagina and was scared from his actions. AAA stated
that she felt pain when the accused inserted his penis into her. AAA stated that the
crime happened approximately 30 minutes while the appellant was on top of him. AAA
tried to escape from the accused forceful grasps but he was too strong for her. The court
has decided that the appellant was guilty as charged and were then taken to higher court
for further consideration. RTC and Court of Appeals both convicted Gajardo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is guilty of crime of rape

HELD:

Yes. The High Court has affirmed the decisions of the lower courts.

Also, it is highly improbable that a young, decent woman taking up nursing would
concoct a rape story against a man who is accusing her of a petty crime which she
denies. A woman who claims rape exposes herself to the spectacle of a public trial

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1117
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
where she would recount the sordid details of her ordeal. Thus, it has been repeatedly
ruled that no young and decent woman in her right mind would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by
being subjected to a public trial if she was not motivated solely by her desire to obtain
justice for the wrong committed against her.

Inasmuch as the crime of rape is essentially committed in relative isolation or


even secrecy, it is usually the victim alone who can testify on the forced sexual
intercourse. Therefore, in a prosecution for rape, the credibility of the victim is almost
always the single and most important point to consider. If the victim’s testimony meets
the test of credibility, the accused can justifiably be convicted on the basis of her lone
testimony.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1118
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MYRNA GAYOSO y ARGUELLES

G.R. No. 206590 27 MARCH 2017

DOCTRINE: Chain of custody is defined as "duly recorded authorized movements and


custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping, to presentation in court for destruction."

In criminal prosecutions for the illegal sale and possession of shabu, primordial
importance must be given to the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.

FACTS:
On 24 March, 2004the accused who acted without the necessary permit or
authority whatsoever, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally sell, deliver
and dispense one piece of small heat sealed sachet of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride. A surveillance was conducted prior to several reports that she was
peddling prohibited drugs. However, prior to implementing the search warrant, PI Barber
decided to conduct a confirmatory test-buy designating SP03 De Dios as poseur-buyer
and giving him ₱200.00 marked money for the operation.

On March 24, 2004, SP03 De Dios and a civilian asset proceeded to the house of
appellant and asked her if they could buy shabu. The sale was consummated when
appellant took the marked money from SP03 De Dios after giving him a sachet of shabu.
SP03 De Dios immediately informed PI Barber by text message about the successful
confirmatory test-buy. Her house was searched and drug paraphernalia were found. The
RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale and illegal
possession of shabu. On appeal, the decision was affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused was innocent of the acquitted charged

HELD:

Yes. The High Court ruled for the acquittal of the accused. In the chain of custody,
marking is the placing by the arresting officer or the poseur-buyer of his initials and
signature on the items after they have been seized. It is the starting point in the custodial
link. Also, it is vital that the seized items be marked immediately since the succeeding
handlers thereof will use the markings as reference. The chain of custody rule also
requires that the marking of the seized contraband be done "(l) in the presence of the
apprehended violator, and (2) immediately upon confiscation.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1119
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
In this case, the records do not show that the arresting officers marked the seized items
with their initials in the presence of appellant and immediately upon confiscation. While
P02 Isip testified that the seized sachets of shabu were marked in the police station, no
evidence was presented to show that the marking was accomplished in the presence of
appellant. Moreover, the author of the markings on said items was never identified. None
of the police officers admitted placing the markings. There was therefore a complete
absence of evidence to prove authorship of the markings.

While marking of the evidence is allowed in the nearest police station, this
contemplates a case of warrantless searches and seizures. Here, the police officers
secured a search warrant prior to their operation. They therefore had sufficient time and
opportunity to prepare for its implementation. However, the police officers failed to mark
immediately the plastic sachets of shabu seized inside appellant's house in spite of an
Inventory of Property Seized that they prepared while still inside the said house. The
failure of the arresting officers to comply with the marking of evidence immediately after
confiscation constitutes the first gap in the chain of custody. And that the presumption of
the regularity in the performance of their duty cannot be upheld.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PEOPLE OF TIIE PHlLIPPINES vs TIRSO SIBBU

G.R. No. 214757 29 March 2017

DOCTRINE: Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to him arising from the defense which
the offended party might make.

FACTS:
Accused Sibbu Benny and others were charged for murder and attempted
murder.

Private Complainant testified that between 6:30 and 7:00 p.m. of December 6,
2004, he was with his three year old daughter, Trisha May Julian, his mother Ofelia
Julian and his father, Warlito Julian the victim in Criminal Case No. 11724 in the azotea
of his parents’ house in Baranga, Elizabeth, Marcos, llocosNorte when he saw from a
distance of about five meters a person in camouflage uniform with a long firearm slung
across his chest and a black bonnet over his head. When the armed man inched closer
to the house, he tried to fix his bonnet thereby providing Bryan the opportunity to see his
face. Bryan had a clear look at the armed man because there were Christmas lights
hanging from the roof of their porch. Bryan recognized the armed man as the accused.
Bryan also saw two men in crouching position at a distance of three meters away from
the appellant. Fearing the worst, Bryan shouted a warning to his family. Accused then
fired upon them killing Trisha, Ofelia and Warlito.

Accused denied the charges against him. He testified that on December 6, 2004,
he never left the house of his in-laws because he was taking care of his sick son. He
claimed to have heard the explosions but thought that those were so of firecrackers
since it was nearing Christmas. Appellant-accused denied having any misunderstanding
with the Julian family, or knowing Bryan and Benny personally, or possessing
camouflage clothing. RTC found accused guilty which was affirmed by the CA with
modifications on the penalty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, accused should be convicted for the crime of attempted murder

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that appellant commenced the commission of
murder through overt acts such as firing his firearm at the residence of the victims but did
not perform all the acts of execution which should produce murder by reason of some
cause other than his own spontaneous desistance. Appellant simply missed his target;

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1121
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
he failed to perform all the acts of execution to kill Bryan. Appellant is therefore guilty of
attempted murder, Unfortunately, Warlito, Ofelia and Trisha had to bear the brunt of
appellant’s firearm.

Appellant was correctly convicted of three counts of murder considering the


qualifying circumstance of treachery and one count of attempted murder. Since two
aggravating circumstances of dwelling and use of disguise attended the commission of
the crime of murder, appellant should be sentenced to death.The law provides that in lieu
of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed with no eligibility
for parole.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1122
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
COMMERCIAL LAW

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MOF COMPANY, INC. vs SHIN YANG BROKERAGE CORPORATION
G.R. No. 172822 | December 18, 2009
DOCTRINE: While the bill of lading is oftentimes drawn up by the shipper/consignor and
the carrier without the intervention of the consignee, the latter can be bound by the
stipulations of the bill of lading when a) there is a relation of agency between the shipper
or consignor and the consignee or b) when the consignee demands fulfillment of the
stipulation of the bill of lading which was drawn up in its favor.
FACTS:
Halla Trading Co., a company based in Korea, shipped to Manila secondhand
cars and other articles on board the vessel Hanjin Busan. The bill of lading covering the
shipment which was prepared by the carrier Hanjin Shipping Co., Ltd. Named Shin Yang
Brokerage Corp. as the consignee and indicated that payment was on a “Freight Collect”
basis.
When the shipment arrived in Manila, MOF Company, Inc., Hanjin’s exclusive
general agent in the Philippines, repeatedly demanded payment of ocean freight,
documentation fee and terminal handling charges from Shin Yang. However, it failed and
refused to pay contending that it did not cause the importation of goods and that it is only
the Consolidator of the said shipment and that the ultimate consignee did not endorse in
its favor the original bill of lading nad it was prepared without its consent.
MOF then files a case for sum of money alleging that Shin Yang caused the
importation of goods and assured it that ocean freight and other charges would be paid
upon arrival of goods in Manila yet Shin Yang unjustly breached its obligation to pay. The
MeTC rendered its decision in favor of MOF and that Shin Yang cannot disclaim being a
party to the contract of affreighment because its name would not be included in the bill of
lading had there been no prior agreement to that effect. The same ruling was affirmed by
the RTC
ISSUE:
Whether or not a consignee, who is not a signatory to the bill of lading, is bound
by the stipulations thereof.
Whether or not respondent who was not an agent of the shipper and who did not
make any demand for the fulfillment of the stipulations of the bill of lading drawn in its
favor is liable to pay the corresponding freight and handling charges.
HELD:
The bill of lading is oftentimes drawn up by the shipper/consignor and the carrier
without the intervention of the consignee. However, the latter can be bound by the
stipulations of the bill of lading when a) there is a relation of agency between the shipper
or consignor and the consignee or b) when the consignee demands fulfillment of the
stipulation of the bill of lading which was drawn up in its favor.
A consignee, although not a signatory to the contract of carriage between the
shipper and the carrier, becomes a party to the contract by reason of either a) the

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
relationship of agency between the consignee and the shipper/ consignor; b) the
unequivocal acceptance of the bill of lading delivered to the consignee, with full
knowledge of its contents or c) availment of the stipulation pour autrui, i.e., when the
consignee, a third person, demands before the carrier the fulfillment of the stipulation
made by the consignor/shipper in the consignee's favor, specifically the delivery of the
goods/cargoes shipped.
In the instant case, Shin Yang consistently denied in all of its pleadings that it
authorized Halla Trading, Co. to ship the goods on its behalf; or that it got hold of the bill
of lading covering the shipment or that it demanded the release of the cargo. Basic is the
rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies upon him who asserts it, not upon him who
denies, since, by the nature of things, he who denies a fact cannot produce any proof of
it. Thus, MOF has the burden to controvert all these denials, it being insistent that Shin
Yang asserted itself as the consignee and the one that caused the shipment of the goods
to the Philippines.
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by
preponderance of evidence, which means evidence which is of greater weight, or more
convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. Here, MOF failed to meet the
required quantum of proof. Other than presenting the bill of lading, which, at most,
proves that the carrier acknowledged receipt of the subject cargo from the shipper and
that the consignee named is to shoulder the freightage, MOF has not adduced any other
credible evidence to strengthen its cause of action. It did not even present any witness in
support of its allegation that it was Shin Yang which furnished all the details indicated in
the bill of lading and that Shin Yang consented to shoulder the shipment costs. There is
also nothing in the records which would indicate that Shin Yang was an agent of Halla
Trading Co. or that it exercised any act that would bind it as a named consignee. Thus,
the CA correctly dismissed the suit for failure of petitioner to establish its cause against
respondent.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER vs. BRITISH AIRWAYS

G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010

DOCTRINE: It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in
this country. For the purposes of this Convention the expression “international carriage”
means any carriage in which, according to the contract made by the parties, the place of
departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the carriage or
a transhipment, are situated either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or
within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place
within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another
Power, even though that Power is not a party to this Convention. A carriage without such
an agreed stopping place between territories subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty,
mandate or authority of the same High Contracting Party is not deemed to be
international for the purposes of this Convention. Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before the court where the
carrier is domiciled; 2. the court where the carrier has its principal place of business; 3. the
court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has beenmade; or 4.
the court of the place of destination.

FACTS:

On April 28, 2005, petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier filed a Complaint for damages
against respondent British Airways before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
The tortuous conduct by the flight attendants of said Airways, which prompted petitioner
to file a case for damages, allegedly transpired when petitioner boarded respondent’s
flight 548 from London, United Kingdom to Rome, Italy. On May 30, 2005, respondent,
by way of special appearance through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of
lack of jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the respondent. Respondent
alleged that only the courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have jurisdiction
over the complaint for damages pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, Article 28(1) of
which provides:
“An action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, either before
the court of domicile of the carrier or his principal place of business, or where he has a
place of business through which the contract has been made, or before the court of the
place of destination.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not Philippines, a signatory to the Warsaw Convention, should adhere


to the provision of the Warsaw Convention in the determination of its jurisdiction with
respect to a case for damages involving a tortuous conduct committed by an airline
personnel while in an international carrier against a Filipino citizen.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:

Yes, it is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this
country.
In Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, 210 SCRA 256 (1992), we held that: The
Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw
Convention. It took effect on February 13, 1933. The Convention was concurred in by the
Senate, through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The Philippine instrument of
accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950, and was
deposited with the Polish government on November 9, 1950. The Convention became
applicable to the Philippines on February 9, 1951. On September 23, 1955, President
Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring our formal adherence
thereto, “to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed
and fulfilled in good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof.”
The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine
government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. vs. MALAYAN INSURANCE, CO., INC.
G.R. No. 171406,April 4, 2011

DOCTRINE: Once the insurer pays the insured, equity demands reimbursement as no one
should benefit at the expense of another.

FACTS:
Shandong Weifang Soda Ash Plant shipped on board the vessel MV Jinlian I 60,000
plastic bags of soda ash dense (each bag weighing 50 kilograms) from China to Manila.The
shipment, with an invoice value of US$456,000.00, was insured with respondent Malayan
Insurance Company, Inc. under Marine Risk Note No. RN-0001-21430, and covered by a Bill of
Lading issued by Tianjin Navigation Company with Philippine Banking Corporation as the
consignee and Chemphil Albright and Wilson Corporation as the notify party.Upon arrival of the
vessel at Pier 9, South Harbor, Manila, the stevedores of petitioner Asian Terminals, Inc., a duly
registered domestic corporation engaged in providing arrastre and stevedoring
services, unloaded the 60,000 bags of soda ash dense from the vessel and brought them to the
open storage area of petitioner for temporary storage and safekeeping, pending clearance from
the Bureau of Customs and delivery to the consignee. When the unloading of the bags was
completed on November 28, 1995, 2,702 bags were found to be in bad order condition.
The stevedores of petitioner began loading the bags in the trucks of MEC Customs
Brokerage for transport and delivery to the consignee. After all the bags were unloaded in the
warehouses of the consignee, a total of 2,881 bags were in bad order condition due to spillage,
caking, and hardening of the contents.Respondent, as insurer, paid the value of the lost/
damaged cargoes to the consignee in the amount of P643,600.25.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is fatal to respondent’s
cause of action.
2. Whether the proximate cause of the damage/loss to the shipment was the negligence of
petitioner’s stevedores.

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3. Whether the court can take judicial notice of the Management Contract between petitioner
and the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) in determining petitioner’s liability.

HELD:
The Court ruled that the petition is bereft of merit.

1. The presentation of the insurance contract or policy was not necessary. Although petitioner
objected to the admission of the Subrogation Receipt in its Comment to respondents formal
offer of evidence on the ground that respondent failed to present the insurance contract or
policy, a perusal of petitioners Answer and Pre-Trial Briefshows that petitioner never questioned
respondents right to subrogation, nor did it dispute the coverage of the insurance contract or
policy. Since there was no issue regarding the validity of the insurance contract or policy, or any
provision thereof, respondent had no reason to present the insurance contract or policy as
evidence during the trial.

2. Factual finding of Court of Appeals, affirmed by the Regional Trial Court, is binding and
conclusive before the Supreme Court. Thus, both the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court
found that the negligence of petitioner is the proximate cause of the damage goods evidenced
by the testimony of one of the witnesses which testified that “Considering that the shipment
arrived on November 21, 1998 and the unloading operation commenced on said date and was
completed on November 26, 1998, while the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes, reflecting
a figure of 2,702 damaged bags, was prepared and signed on November 28, 1998 by ATIs BO
Inspector and co-signed by a representative of the shipping company, the trial courts finding that
the damage to the cargoes was due to the improper handling thereof by ATIs stevedores cannot
be said to be without substantial support from the records.

3. The Court ruled that petitioner cannot avail judicial notice.Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court provide that:

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial


notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality,
the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals,
the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the
legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial


notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions.

The Management Contract entered into by petitioner and the PPA is clearly not among
the matters which the courts can take judicial notice of. It cannot be considered an official act of
the executive department. The PPA, which was created by virtue of Presidential Decree No.
857, as amended, is a government-owned and controlled corporation in charge of administering
the ports in the country.Obviously, the PPA was only performing a proprietary function when it
entered into a Management Contract with petitioner. As such, judicial notice cannot be applied.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, vs. SPECIAL STEEL PRODUCTS, INC. and
AUGUSTO L. PARDO
G.R. NO. 175350, June 13, 2012
DOCTRINE: A crossed check with the notation account payee can only be deposited in
the named payee’s account. It is gross negligence for a bank to ignore this rule solely on
the basis of a third party’s oral representation of having a good title thereto.
FACTS:
In 1991, respondent Special Steel Products, Inc. (SSPI) sold welding electrodes
to Interco, as evidenced by the following invoices:
a. Sales Invoice No. 65042 dated February 14, 1991 for Php 325,976.34;
b. Sales Invoice No. 65842 dated April 11, 1991 for Php 345,412.80;
c. Sales Invoice No. 65843 dated April 11, 1991 for Php 313,845.84.
In payment for the above welding electrodes, Interco issued three checks payable
to the order of SSPI on July 10, 1991, July 16, 1991 and July 29, 1991. Each check was
crossed with the notation account payee only and was drawn against Equitable Bank.
The records do not identify the signatory for these three checks, or explain how Jose
Isidro Uy, alias Jolly Uy (Uy), Purchasing Officer, came into possession of these checks.
The records only disclose that Uy presented each crossed check to Equitable Bank on
the day of its issuance and claimed that he had good title thereto. He demanded the
deposit of the checks in his personal account in Equitable Bank Account No. 18841-2
and Account No. 03474-0. Equitable Bank acceded to Uy’s demands in the assumption
that Uy, as the son-in-law of Interco majority stockholder, was acting pursuant to
Interco’s orders. The bank also relied on Uy’s status as a valued client. Thus, Equitable
Bank accepted the checks for deposit in Uy’s personal accounts and stamped ALL
PRIOR ENDORSEMENT AND/OR LACK OF ENDORSEMENT GUARANTEED on their
dorsal portions. Uy promptly withdrew the proceeds of the checks.
In October 1991, SSPI reminded Interco of the unpaid welding electrodes
amounting to Php 985,234.98. It reiterated its demand on January 14, 1992. Interco
replied that it had already issued three checks payable to SSPI and drawn against
Equitable Bank. SSPI denied receipt of these checks. Nevertheless, it was determined
that Uy, not SSPI, received the proceeds of the three checks that were payable to SSPI.
Thus, on June 30, 1993, Interco finally paid the value of the three checks to SSPI, plus a
portion of the accrued interests. Interco refused to pay the entire accrued interest of Php
767,345.64 on the ground that it was not responsible for the delay.
SSPI and its President, Augusto L. Pardo (Pardo), filed a complaint for damage
with application for a writ of preliminary attachment against Uy and Equitable Bank. In
his personal capacity, Pardo claimed Php 3 million as moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The trial court granted plaintiff’s application. It issued the writ of preliminary
attachment on September 20, 1993, upon the filing of a bond for Php 500,000.00. The
sheriff served and implemented the writ against the personal properties of both
defendants.
Upon Equiatble Bank’s motion and filing of a counter-bond, however, the trial
court eventually discharged the attachment against it. Equitable Bank then argued for
the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action. It maintained that interest
income is due only when it is expressly stipulated in writing. Since Equitable Bank and
SSPI did not enter into any contract, Equitable Bank is not liable for damages, in the form
of unobtained interest income to SSPI. Equitable Bank further argued that it is not liable
to SSPI because it accepted the three checks in good faith. The bank counter-claimed
that SSPI is liable to it in damages for the wrongful and malicious attachment of
Equitable Bank’s personal properties.
Meanwhile, Uy answered that the checks were negotiated to him; that he is a
holder for value of the checks and that he has a good title thereto. During trial, Uy did not
present any evidence but adopted Equitable Bank’s evidence as his own. On May 4,
1998, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs SSPI and Augusto L. Pardo and
against Equitable Banking Corp. and Jose Isidoro Uy, alias Jolly Uy, ordering defendants
to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs the following:
a. Pho 437,040.35 as actual damages;
b. Php 3,000,000.00 as moral damages to Augusto L. Pardo;
c. Php 500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
d. Php 200,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and,
e. Costs of suit.
Defendant EBC’s counterclaim was DISMISSED for lack of factual and legal
basis. Likewise, the cross claim filed by defendant EBC against defendant Jose Isidro Uy
and the cross claim filed by defendant Jose Isidro Uy against EBC were DISMISSED for
lack of factual and legal basis. Only Equitable Bank appealed to the CA. The appellate
court found no merit in Equitable Bank’s appeal. It affirmed the trial court’s ruling that
SSPI had a cause of action for quasi-delict against Equitable Bank. It also found factual
and legal basis to affirm the trial courts of moral damages in favor of Pardo. It likewise
affirmed the award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees in favor of SSPI.

ISSUES:
1. Whether SSPI has a cause of action against Equitable Bank for quasi-delict;
2. Whether SSPI can recover, as actual damages, the stipulated 36% per annum interest
from Equitable Bank;
3. Whether speculative fears and imagined scenarios, which cause sleepless nights,
may be the basis for the award for moral damages; and,
4. Whether the attachment of Equitable Bank’s personal properties was wrongful.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
1. SSPI asserts cause of action based in quasi-delict. A quasi-delict is an act or
omission, there being fault or negligence, which causes damage to another.
Quasi-delicts exist even without a contractual relation between the parties. The courts
below correctly ruled that SSPI has a cause of action for quasidelict against Equitable
Bank. EBC did not observe the required degree of diligence expected of a banking
institution under the existing factual circumstances.
2. For its role in the conversion of the checks, which deprived SSPI of the use thereof,
Equitable Bank is solidarily liable with Uy to compensate SSPI for the damages it
suffered. Among the compensable damages are actual damages, which encompass the
value of the loss sustained by the plaintiff, and the profits that the plaintiff failed to obtain.
Interest payments, which SSPI claims, fall under the second category of actual
damages. SSPI cannot invoke the contractual stipulation in interest payment against
Equitable Bank because it is neither a party to the contract, nor an assignee or an heir to
the contracting parties. Nevertheless, it is clear the defendants’ actions deprived SSPI of
the present use of its money for a period of two years. SSPI is therefore entitled to obtain
from the fortfeasors the profits that it failed to obtain from July 1991 to June 1993. SSPI
should recover interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum, this being an award for
damages based on quasi-delict and not for a loan or forbearance of money.
3. The Court, however, finds the award of Php 3,000,000.00 excessive. Moral damages
are given not to punish the defendant but only to give the plaintiff the means to assuage
his sufferings with diversions and recreation. We find that the award of Php 50,000.00 as
moral damages is reasonable under the circumstances.
Equitable Bank should be allowed to recover from Uy whatever amounts
Equitable bank may be made to pay under the judgment. It is clear that Equitable Bank
did not profit in Uy’s scheme. Disallowing Equitable Bank’s cross claim against Uy is
tantamount to allowing Uy to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of Equitable Bank.
For this reason, the court allows Equitable Bank’s cross claim against Uy.
4. The affidavit and the allegations of the complaint are bereft of specific and definite
allegations of fraud against Equitable Bank that would justify the attachment of its
properties. For such wrongful preliminary attachment, plaintiff may be held liable for
damages. The court has gone over the records and found that Equitable Bank has duly
proved its claims for, and is entitled to recover actual damages. In order to lift the
wrongful attachment of Equitable Bank properties, the bank was compelled to pay the
total amount of Php 30,204.26 in premiums for a counterbond. However, Equitable Bank
failed to prove that it sustained damage to its goodwill and business credit in
consequence of the alleged wrongful attachment. There was no proof of Equitable
Bank’s contention that respondent’s action caused it public embarrassment and a bank
run

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
VITALIANO N. AGUIRRES II and FIDEL N. AGUIRRE vs. FQB+7, INC., NATHANIEL
D. BOCOBO, PRISCILA BOCOBO and ANTONIO DE VILLA
G.R. No. 170770 January 9, 2013
DOCTRINE: To be considered as an intra-corporate dispute, the case: (1) must arise out
of intra-corporate or partnership relations ("relationship test"), and (2) the nature of the
question subject of the controversy must be such that it is intrinsically connected with the
regulation of the corporation or the enforcement of the parties' rights and obligations
under the Corporation Code and the internal regulatory rules of the corporation ("nature
of the controversy test"). So long as these two-criteria are satisfied, the dispute is
intra-corporate and the RTC, acting as a special commercial court, has jurisdiction over
it.
FACTS:
On October 5, 2004, Vitaliano (as subscriber) filed, in his individual capacity and
onbehalf of FQB+7, Inc. a complaint for intra-corporate dispute, injunction, inspection
of corporate books and records, and damages against the respondents.The complaint
alleges that in April 2004, Vitaliano discovered a new General InformationSheet (GIS) of
FQB+7 in the SEC records, which was filed by Nathaniel and Priscila asheirs of the
corporate president, Francisco Bacobo. The GIS provided for a substantialchange in the
composition of BOD. It was stated therein an annual meeting held onSeptember 2002
has elected a new set of BOD, naming Nathaniel and PriscilaasDirectors.Questioning
the validity of the alleged stockholders meeting, Vitaliano wrote a letter tothe "real" BOD.
He further asked for the rectification of the erroneous entries in the GIS,and for the
inspection of corporate books and records. However, the BOD did not granthis request.
Nathaniel, acting as the newly appointed president, appointed Antonio, as
thecorporation's attorney-in-fact, with the power of administration over the corporation's
farm. Fidel Aguirre, as director, prevented Antonio to take possession of the
farm.Believing that respondents are usurping the management powers of the "real"
BOD, thesaid complaint for intra-corporate dispute, injunction, inspection of corporate
books andrecords, and damages was filed.
The RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction.Aggrieved, respondents filed a
petition for certiorari in the CA questioning the jurisdictionof Manila RTC. They
contended, inter alia, that FQB+7's Certificate of Registration wasalready revoked by
SEC on September 29, 2003 for failure to comply with the reportorialrequirements; and
that, the corporation has been dissolved for that purpose, affectingthe trial court's
jurisdiction to hear the intra-corporate dispute.

CA held that the RTC does not have jurisdiction to entertain an intra-corporate
disputewhen a corporation is already dissolved, since its juridical personality is lost as a
result thereof.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ISSUE:
Whether or not a corporate dissolution renders an existing intra-corporate dispute
moot andacademic, and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over it.
HELD:
No.Vitaliano's complaint seeks to determine and vindicate an alleged
stockholder's right tothe return of his stockholdings and to participate in the election of
directors, and acorporation's right to remove usurpers and strangers from its affairs.
These issuescannot be mooted by the dissolution of the corporation. Corporation's BOD
is notrendered functus officio by its dissolution. Since, Section 122 of the Corporation
Codeallows a corporation to continue its existence for a limited purpose, necessarily
theremust be a board that will continue acting for and on behalf of the dissolved
corporationfor that purpose.
To be considered as an intra-corporate dispute, the case: (1) must arise out of
intra-corporate or partnership relations ("relationship test"), and (2) the nature of the
questionsubject of the controversy must be such that it is intrinsically connected with
theregulation of the corporation or the enforcement of the parties' rights and
obligationsunder the Corporation Code and the internal regulatory rules of the
corporation ("natureof the controversy test"). So long as these two-criteria are satisfied,
the dispute is intra-corporate and the RTC, acting as a special commercial court, has
jurisdiction over it.
The nature of the case as intra-corporate dispute is not affected by the dissolution
of thecorporation. Section 145 assures an aggrieved party that the corporation's
dissolutionwill not impair, much less remove, his/her rights or remedies against the
corporation, itsstockholders, directors or officers. It preserves a corporate actor's cause
of action andremedy against another corporate actor. In so doing, Section 145 preserves
the natureof the controversy between the parties as an intra-corporate dispute.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. CRESENCIA P. ABAN
G.R. No. 175666, July 29, 2013
DOCTRINE:The ultimate aim of Section 48 of the Insurance Code is to compel insurers
to solicit business from or provide insurance coverage only to legitimate and bona
fide clients, by requiring them to thoroughly investigate those they insure within two
years from effectivity of the policy and while the insured is still alive. If they do not, they
will be obligated to honor claims on the policies they issue, regardless of fraud,
concealment or misrepresentation. The law assumes that they will do just that and not sit
on their laurels, indiscriminately soliciting and accepting insurance business from any
Tom, Dick and Harry.
FACTS:
On July 3 1993, Delia Sotero (Sotero) obtained a life insurance policy from Manila
Bankers Life Insurance Corporation (petitioner) designating CresenciaAban
(respondent), her niece, as her beneficiary. On April 10, 1996, when the insurance
policy had been in force for more than two years and seven months, Sotero died. When
respondent filed a claim for the insurance proceeds, petitioner, after conducting its
investigation, denied the claim stating, among others, that the insurance policy was
obtained fraudulently because it was allegedly respondent pretending to be Soreto who
obtained the insurance policy .Petitioner filed a civil case for rescission and/or annulment
of the policy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The main thesis of the petitioner was
that since the policy was obtained through fraud, concealment or misrepresentation, the
contract is voidable under Art 1390 of the Civil Code. Respondent filed a motion to
dismiss which was granted by the RTC. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the insurance policy can be avoided/anulled by virtue of the
alleged fraud committed in obtaining the same.
HELD:
No, the insurance policy cannot be annulled by virtue of the alleged fraud
committed in obtaining the same.
[t]he "incontestability clause" is a provision in law that after a policy of life
insurance made payable on the death of the insured shall have been in force during the
lifetime of the insured for a period of two (2) years from the date of its issue or of its last
reinstatement, the insurer cannot prove that the policy is void ab initio or is rescindible by
reason of fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation of the insured or his agent.

The purpose of the law is to give protection to the insured or his beneficiary by
limiting the rescinding of the contract of insurance on the ground of fraudulent
concealment or misrepresentation to a period of only two (2) years from the issuance of
the policy or its last reinstatement.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HEIRS OF SPOUSES JOAQUIN MANGUARDIA and SUSANA MANALO, et.al. and
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAPIZ vs. HEIRS OF SIMPLICIO VALLES and
MARTA VALLES, represented by GRACIANO VALLES, SULPICIO VALLES,
TERESITA VALLES et.al.
G.R. No. 177616 August 27, 2014

DOCTRINE: The burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value
lies upon him who asserts that standing.
FACTS:
The facts show that Marta, Simplicio, Melquiades, Rustico, Visitacion and
Catalina, all surnamed Valles, were siblings. Simplicio and Marta were the registered
owners of a property in Barrio Cudian, Ivisan, Capiz and covered by Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. R0-4017. Marta died in 1943 and was survived by her illegitimate
daughter, EncarnacionOrdas. On the other hand, Simplicio died on April 20, 1957. He
was survived by his wife VillaricaOrdas, who passed away sometime in 1969, and his
children, Felicisimo, Adelaida, Rosario, Juan, and Dominica, all surnamed Valles. With
the exception of Felicisimo, all of Simplicio's children died single and childless. Felicisimo
was survived by his wife, PresentacionCapapas, and his children Graciano, Sulpicio,
Teresita and Antonio (now deceased).
It appears that on October 28, 1968, a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot
835 was executed by Simplicio and Marta in favor of their brothers, Melquiades and
Rustico; Simplicio’s daughter, AdelaidaValles (Adelaida); and Marta’s daughter,
Encarnacion. The Deed ofAbsolute Sale ostensibly bore the signatureof Marta and the
thumb marks of Simplicio and his wife. On even date, said deed was registered in the
Registryof Deeds of Capiz, resulting in the cancellation of OCT No. RO-4017 and the
issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.T-9409. With the subsequent sales of
the property, the registered owners of Lot 835 are:a) Adelaida (Lot 835-A);b) Spouses
Manguardia (Lots 835-B and 835-C); andc) Leonardo and Rebecca (Lot 835-D).
On December 13, 1999, the heirs of Simplicio and Marta commenced an action
for the Declaration of Nullity of Certificates of Title and Deeds of Sale, Cancellation of
Certificates of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages against the heirs of spouses
Manguardia and the heirs of spouses Leonardo and Rebecca petitioners in the RTC of
Roxas City. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of herein respondents. It
declared the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 28, 1968 void ab initio because there
was no proof that the vendors, Marta and Simplicio, were still alive in 1968 and had
signed/thumb marked the sale document. Petitioners appealed the trial court’s Decision
to the CA, it affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ISSUE/S:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE APPEAL OF
PETITIONERS AND AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO
PETITIONERS HEREIN BEING BUYERS IN GOOD FAITH.

HELD:
The Petition lacks merit. The Court finds no reason to depart from the factual
findings of the lower courts.
This Court has reiterated that it is not a trier of facts. Well entrenched is the
principle that factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the CA,
are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal by this Court. The Court’s
"role in a petition under Rule 45 is limited to reviewing or reversing errors of law allegedly
committed by the appellate court." This rule, however, is not without well defined
exceptions. "Findings of fact of the trial court and the CA may be set aside when such
findings are not supported by the evidence or where the lower courts' conclusions are
based on a misapprehension of facts. Petitioners failed to discharge the burden of
proving that their predecessors-in-interest were buyers in good faith.
The general rule that a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on
the Torrens Certificate of Title without need of inquiring further cannot apply when the
party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably
cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or
lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to
[inquire] into the status of the title of the property in litigation (Voluntad vs. Dizon, 313
SCRA 209). If circumstances exist that [require] a prudent man to investigate and he
does not, he is deemed to have acted in mala fide, and his mere refusal to believe that a
defect exists or his willful closing of his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect
in his vendor’s title will not make him an innocent purchaser for value (Voluntad vs.
Dizon, supra).

It must be emphasized that the burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good
faith and for value lies upon him who asserts that standing. In discharging the burden, it is
not enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith that everyone is presumed to
act in good faith. The good faith that is here essential is integral with the very status that
must be proved. Petitioners have failed to discharge that burden.
Acquisitive prescription is not applicable in the case at bar. Laches cannot be used
to perpetrate injustice. On the claim of laches, this Court reiterates that laches is based
upon equity and the public policy of discouraging stale claims. Since laches is an
equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be
used to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice. Thus, the assertion of laches to
thwart the claim of respondents is foreclosed because the deed upon which petitioners
base their claim is first and foremost, a forgery.

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Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ROLANDO C. DE LA PAZ vs. L & J DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
G.R. No. 183360 September 8, 2014

DOCTRINE: No interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.
FACTS:
On December 27, 2000, Rolando lent ₱350,000.00 without any security to L&J, a
property developer with Atty. Esteban Salonga as its President and General Manager.
The loan, with no specified maturity date, carried a 6% monthly interest, i.e., ₱21,000.00.
From December 2000 to August 2003, L&J paid Rolando a total of ₱576,000.00
representing interest charges. As L&J failed to pay despite repeated demands, Rolando
filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with Damages against L&J and Atty.
Salonga in his personal capacity before the MeTC. In their Answer, L&J and Atty.
Salonga denied Rolando’s allegations. While they acknowledged the loan as a corporate
debt, they claimed that the failure to pay the same was due to a fortuitous event, that is,
the financial difficulties brought about by the economic crisis. The MeTC upheld the 6%
monthly interest and favored the plaintiff. RTC affirmed the MeTC but the CA reversed
the decision.
ISSUE/S:
The Court’s determination of whether to uphold the judgment of the CA that the principal
loan is deemed paid is dependent on the validity of the monthly interest rate imposed.
And in determining such validity, the Court must necessarily delve into matters regarding
a) the form of the agreement of interest under the law and b) the alleged
unconscionability of the interest rate.
HELD:
The Petition is devoid of merit.
The lack of a written stipulation to pay interest on the loaned amount disallows a
creditor from charging monetary interest. Under Article 1956 of the Civil Code, no
interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. Jurisprudence on
the matter also holds that for interest to be due and payable, two conditions must concur:
a) express stipulation for the payment of interest; and b) the agreement to pay interest is
reduced in writing. Here, it is undisputed that the parties did not put down in writing their
agreement. Thus, no interest is due. The collection of interest without any stipulation in
writing is prohibited by law.

Even if the payment of interest has been reduced in writing, a 6% monthly interest
rate on a loan is unconscionable, regardless of who between the parties proposed the
rate.

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Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Indeed at present, usury has been legally non-existent in view of the suspension of
the Usury Law by Central Bank Circular No. 905 s. 1982.Even so, not all interest rates
levied upon loans are permitted by the courts as they have the power to equitably reduce
unreasonable interest rates.
While the Court recognizes the right of the parties to enter into contracts and who
are expected to comply with their terms and obligations, this rule is not absolute.
Stipulated interest rates are illegal if they are unconscionable and the Court is allowed to
temper interest rates when necessary. In exercising this vested power to determine what
is iniquitous and unconscionable, the Court must consider the circumstances of each
case. What may be iniquitous and unconscionable in one case, may be just in another.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1140
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ROBINSON’S BANK CORPORATION v. SAMUEL H. GAERLAN
GR No. 195289, Sep 24, 2014
DOCTRINE: In the exercise of our superintending control over inferior courts, we are to
be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case "as the ends of justice may
require.
FACTS:
In December 4, 2006, Nation Granary, Inc. (now World Granary Corporation, or
WGC) filed a Petition for Rehabilitation with Prayer for Suspension of Payments, Actions
and Proceedingsbefore the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. WGC is engaged in the
business of mechanized bulk handling, transport and storage, warehousing, drying, and
milling of grains. It incurred loans amounting to P2.66 billion from RBC and other banks
and entities such as herein private respondent Trade and Investment Development
Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP). RBC filed its Oppositionto the Petition for
Rehabilitation. the RTC gave due course to the Petition for Rehabilitation and directed
the receiver to evaluate the rehabilitation plan submitted by WGC, and thereafter submit
his recommendations thereon. The RTC issued an Order approving WGC's rehabilitation
plan. TIDCORP thus filed a Petition for Review, but was denied by the CA.
ISSUE/S:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROPER REMEDY OF THE PETITIONER WAS TO
FILE A PETITION FOR REVIEW INSTEAD OF A MERE MOTION FOR
INTERVENTION.
HELD:
The Court partially grants the Petition.
Incipiently, on the procedural issue covering verification and the certification
against forum-shopping, it must be said that the matter has been rendered irrelevant by
this Court's November 26, 2012 Resolutionwhich gave due course to the
Petition. Indeed, TIDCORP no longer reiterated the issue in its Memorandum. is
beyond question that under Rule 3, Section 5 of the Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation, the review of any order or decision of the rehabilitation court or on appeal
therefrom shall be in accordance with the Rules of Court, unless otherwise provided.
Thus, the nature of TIDCORP's Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 104141 is such that
the other creditors like RBC must be allowed to participate in the proceedings. They
have an interest in the controversy where a final decree would necessarily affect their
rights. Indeed, the appellate court, on its own, should have seen that the rights of RBC
stand to be adversely affected by the remedies prayed for by TIDCORP. Thus, the CA
could have ordered RBC to file its comment in CA-G.R. SP No. 104141 and allowed to
participate therein. Just as the trial court allowed RBC and TIDCORP to participate in
the proceedings below, the CA should have likewise allowed RBC to participate in the

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1141
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
proceedings before it. This is only fair and logical considering that, as admitted by
TIDCORP, RBC is already a party in the rehabilitation case, and that the instant Petition
for Review is merely a continuation of the proceedings below.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1142
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SUN LIFE OF CANADA (PHILIPPINES), INC. vs. SANDRA TAN KIT and The Estate
of the Deceased NORBERTO TAN KIT
G.R. No. 183272 October 15, 2014

DOCTRINE: The insurance company is liable to pay interest when there is unjustified
refusal or withholding of payment of the claim by the insurer.

FACTS:
Respondent Tan Kit is the widow and designated beneficiary of Norberto Tan Kit
(Norberto), whose application for a life insurance policy, with face value of ₱300,000.00,
was granted by petitioner on October 28, 1999. On February 19, 2001, Norberto died of
disseminated gastric carcinoma. Consequently, respondent Tan Kit filed a claim under
the subject policy. Petitioner denied respondent Tan Kit’s claim on account of Norberto’s
failure to fully and faithfully disclose in his insurance application certain material and
relevant information about his health and smoking history. Specifically, Norberto
answered "No" to the question inquiring whether he had smoked cigarettes or cigars
within the last 12 months prior to filling out said application. The CA found that prior to his
death, Norberto had consulted two physicians, Dr. Chua on August 19, 2000, and Dr.
John Ledesma (Dr. Ledesma) on December 28, 2000, to whom he confided that he had
stopped smoking only in 1999. At the time therefore that he applied for insurance policy
on October 28, 1999, there is no truth to his claim that he did not smoke cigarettes within
12 months prior to the said application. Hence the Court of Appeals dismissed the claim
of the Respondent and ordered the Insurance company to refund the premium with
interest.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable to pay the interest.

HELD:
Yes, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86923 is modified in
that petitioner Sun Life of Canada (Philippines), Inc. is ordered to reimburse to
respondents Sandra Tan Kit and the Estate of the Deceased Norberto Tan Kit the sum of
PHP13,080.93 representing the premium paid by the insured within fifteen (15) days
from date of finality of this Decision. If the amount is not reimbursed within said period,
the same shall earn interest of 6% per annum until fully paid. Such interest is not
compensatory interest but interest if the insurer delays in refunding the premium.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1143
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MARINA PORT SERVICES, INC. vs. AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 201822, August 12, 2015
DOCTRINE: Marina Port Services, Inc. (MPSI) cannot just the same be held liable for
the missing bags of flour since the consigned goods were shipped under “Shipper’s Load
and Count” arrangement.

FACTS:
Countercorp Trading PTE., Ltd., shipped 10 container vans of soft wheat flour
with seals intact on board the vessel M/V Uni Fortune. The shipment was insured against
all risks by AHAC and consigned to MSC Distributor (MSC).

The shipment was discharged in good and complete order condition and with
safety seals in place to the custody of the arrastre operator, MPSI. After unloading and
prior to hauling, agents of the Bureau of Customs officially broke the seals, opened the
container vans, and examined the shipment for tax evaluation in the presence of MSC’s
broker and checker. Thereafter, the customs inspector closed the container vans and
refastened them with safety wire seals while MSC’s broker padlocked the same. MPSI
then placed the said container vans in a backtoback arrangement at the delivery area of
the harbor’s container yard where they were watched over by the security guards of
MPSI and of the Philippine Ports Authority.

MSC’s representative, AD’s Customs Services (ACS), took out five container
vans for delivery to MSC. At the compound’s exit, MPSI issued to ACS the
corresponding gate passes for the vans indicating its turnover of the subject shipment to
MSC. However, upon receipt of the container vans at its warehouse, MSC discovered
substantial shortages in the number of bags of flour delivered. Hence, it filed a formal
claim for loss with MPSI.

MPSI denied both claims of MSC. As a result, MSC sought insurance indemnity
for the lost cargoes from AHAC. AHAC paid MSC the value of the missing bags of flour
after finding the latter’s claim in order. In turn, MSC issued a subrogation receipt in favor
of AHAC. Thereafter, AHAC filed a Complaint6 for damages against MPSI before the
RTC.

ISSUE:
The core issue to be resolved in this casewhether MPSI is liable for the loss of the
bags of flour.

HELD:
MPSI cannot just the same be held liable for the missing bags of flour since the
consigned goods were shipped under “Shipper’s Load and Count” arrangement.

“This means that the shipper was solely responsible for the loading of the container,
while the carrier was oblivious to the contents of the shipment. Protection against
pilferage of the shipment was the consignee’s lookout. The arrastre operator was, like

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1144
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
any ordinary depositary, dutyboundtotake good care of the goods received from the
vessel and to turn the same over to the party entitled to their possession, subject to such
qualifications as may have validly beenimposed in the contract between the parties. The
arrastre operator was not required to verify the contents of the container received and to
compare them with those declared by the shipper because, as earlier stated, the cargo
was at the shipper’s load and count. The arrastre operator was expected to deliver to the
consignee only the container received from the carrier.”All told, the Court holds that
MPSI is not liable for the loss of the bags of flour.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1145
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD. v. PAZ Y. KHU, FELIPE Y. KHU,
JR., AND FREDERICK Y. KHU

G.R. No. 195176, April 18, 2016

DOCTRINE:The date of last reinstatement mentioned in Section 48 of the Insurance


Code pertains to the date that the insurer approved' the application for reinstatement.
However, in light of the ambiguity in the insurance documents to this case, this Court
adopts the interpretation favorable to the insured in determining the date when the
reinstatement was approved.
FACTS:
On March 6, 1997, Felipe N. Khu, Sr. (Felipe) applied for a life insurance policy
with Insular Life under the latter's Diamond Jubilee Insurance Plan. Felipe accomplished
the required medical questionnaire wherein he did not declare any illness or adverse
medical condition. Insular Life thereafter issued him Policy Number A000015683 with a
face value of PI million. This took effect on June 22, 1997.On June 23, 1999, Felipe's
policy lapsed due to non-payment of the premium covering the period from June 22, 1999
to June 23, 2000.On September 7, 1999, Felipe applied for the reinstatement of his policy
and paid P25,020.00 as premium. Except for the change in his occupation of being
self-employed to being the Municipal Mayor of Binuangan, Misamis Oriental, all the other
information submitted by Felipe in his application for reinstatement was virtually identical
to those mentioned in his original policy.On October 12, 1999, Insular Life advised Felipe
that his application for reinstatement may only be considered if he agreed to certain
conditions such as payment of additional premium and the cancellation of the riders
pertaining to premium waiver and accidental death benefits. Felipe agreed to these
conditions and on December 27, 1999 paid the agreed additional premium of P3,054.50.
ISSUE:
The fundamental issue to be resolved in this case is whether Felipe's reinstated life
insurance policy is already incontestable at the time of his death.
HELD:
We deny the Petition.

The Insurance Code pertinently provides that:

Sec. 48. Whenever a right to rescind a contract of insurance is given to the insurer by any
provision of this chapter, such right must be exercised previous to the commencement of
an action on the contract.

After a policy of life insurance made payable on the death of the insured shall have
been in force during the lifetime of the insured for a period of two years from the date of its

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1146
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
issue or of its last reinstatement, the insurer cannot prove that the policy is void ab initio or
is rescindible by reason of the fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation of the insured
or his agent.Thus, it is settled that the reinstatement of an insurance policy should be
reckoned from the date when the same was approved by the insurer.

In this case, the parties differ as to when the reinstatement was actually approved.
Insular Life claims that it approved the reinstatement only on December 27, 1999. On the
other hand, respondents contend that it was on June 22, 1999 that the reinstatement took
effect.The resolution of this issue hinges on the following documents: 1) Letter of
Acceptance; and 2) the Endorsement.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1147
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
MANULIFE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. HERMENEGILDA YBAÑEZ
G.R. No. 204736 November 28, 2016

DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
Insurance Policy Nos. 6066517-18 and 6300532-69 was issued by Manulife
Philippines, Inc. on October 25, 2002 and July 25, 2003 to Dr. Gumersindo Solidum
Ybañez. His wife, Hermenegilda Ybañez, was revocably designated as the beneficiary in
said insurance policies. She filed a Claimant's Statement-Death Claim on December 10,
2003. The Death Certificate dated November 17, 2003 stated that the insured had
"Hepatocellular CA., Crd Stage 4, secondary to Uric Acid Nephropathy; SAM
Nephropathy recurrent malignant pleural effusion; NASCVC. Upon investigation,
Manulife concluded that the insured misrepresented or concealed material facts at the
time the subject insurance policies were applied for so it denied the death claims and
refunded the premiums that the insured paid on the insurance policies. It subsequently
instituted a Complaint for Rescission of Insurance Contracts against Hermenegilda and
the BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI Family). On 25 November 25, 2005, BPI Family filed a
Manifestation praying that either it be dropped from the case or that the case be
dismissed with respect to it, because it no longer had any interest in the subject
insurance policies as asssignee because the insured’s obligation had already been
settled or paid. Since no objection was interposed to this prayer by either Manulife or
Hermenegilda, the RTC granted this prayer in its Order of November 25, 2005. The
Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint due to insufficiency of evidence. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Manulife Philippines, Inc. can rescind of insurance contracts of Dr.
Gumersindo Solidum Ybañez.
HELD:
This Court must defer to the findings of fact of the RTC - as affirmed or confirmed
by the CA - that Manulife's Complaint for rescission of the insurance policies in question
was totally bereft of factual and legal bases because it had utterly failed to prove that the
insured had committed the alleged misrepresentation/s or concealment/s of material
facts imputed against him. The RTC correctly held that the CDH's medical records that
might have established the insured's purported misrepresentation/s or concealment/s
was inadmissible for being hearsay, given the fact that Manulife failed to present the
physician or any responsible official of the CDH who could confirm or attest to the due
execution and authenticity of the alleged medical records. Manulife had utterly failed to
prove by convincing evidence that it had been beguiled, inveigled, or cajoled into selling
the insurance to the insured who purportedly with malice and deceit passed himself off

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1148
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
as thoroughly sound and healthy, and thus a fit and proper applicant for life insurance.
Manulife's sole witness gave no evidence at all relative to the particulars of the purported
concealment or misrepresentation allegedly perpetrated by the insured. In fact,
Victoriano merely perfunctorily identified the documentary exhibits adduced by Manulife;
she never testified in regard to the circumstances attending the execution of these
documentary exhibits much less in regard to its contents. Of course, the mere
mechanical act of identifying these documentary exhibits, without the testimonies of the
actual participating parties thereto, adds up to nothing. These documentary exhibits did
not automatically validate or explain themselves. "The fraudulent intent on the part of the
insured must be established to entitle the insurer to rescind the contract.
Misrepresentation as a defense of the insurer to avoid liability is an affirmative defense
and the duty to establish such defense by satisfactory and convincing evidence rests
upon the insurer." For failure of Manulife to prove intent to defraud on the part of the
insured, it cannot validly sue for rescission of insurance contracts.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1149
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
DUTCH MOVERS, INC., CESAR LEE and YOLANDA LEE vs.
EDILBERTO LEQUIN, CHRISTOPHER SALVADOR, REYNALDO SINGSING and
RAFFY G. MASCARDO

G.R. No. 210032 25 APRIL 2017

DOCTRINE: Piercing the veil of corporate fiction is allowed, and responsible persons
may be impleaded, and be held solidarily liable even after final judgment and on
execution, provided that such persons deliberately used the corporate vehicle to unjustly
evade the judgment obligation, or resorted to fraud, bad faith, or malice in evading their
obligation.

FACTS:

DMI is a domestic corporation engaged in the hauling liquefied petroleum gas


wherein Lequin was employed as truck driver and other respondents as helpers. On
December 28, 2004, Cesar Lee, through the Supervisor NazarioFurio, informed them
that DMI would cease its hauling operation for no reason. As such, they requested DMI
to issue a formal notice regarding the matter but to no avail. Later, upon respondents'
request, the DOLE NCR issued a certificationrevealing that DMI did not file any notice of
business closure. Thus, respondents argued that they were illegally dismissed as their
termination was without cause and only on the pretext of closure. LA Mangandog
dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. NLRC reversed the latter’s decision
because DMI placed them on standby and no longer provided them work. Respondents
moved for the Motion for Writ of Execution. However, petitioners filed a motion to quash
the writ of execution. The quashal was denied by the Labor Arbiter. On appeal, CA
granted the quashal of the writ of execution insofar as it holds individual respondents
Cesar Lee and Yolanda Lee liable for the judgment award against the complainants.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioners are personally liable to pay for the judgment awards and the
veil of corporate fiction be pierced

HELD:

Yes. During the execution stage, DMI ceased its operation, and the same did not
file any formal notice regarding it. Added to this, in their Opposition to the Motion to
Implead, spouses Smith revealed that they only lent their names to petitioners, and they
were included as incorporators just to assist the latter in forming DMI. After such
undertaking, spouses Smith immediately transferred their rights in DMI to petitioners,
which proved that petitioners were the ones in control of DMI, and used the same in
furthering their business interests. Here, petitioners used DMI as shield in evading legal
liabilities, including payment of the judgment awards in favor of respondents.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1150
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
While it is true that one's control does not by itself result in the disregard of corporate
fiction; however, considering the irregularity in the incorporation of DMI, then there is
sufficient basis to hold that such corporation was used for an illegal purpose, including
evasion of legal duties to its employees, and as such, the piercing of the corporate veil is
warranted. The act of hiding behind the cloak of corporate fiction will not be allowed in
such situation where it is used to evade one's obligations, which "equitable piercing
doctrine was formulated to address and prevent."

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1151
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
TAXATION LAW

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1152
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
DUMAGUETE CATHEDRAL CREDIT COOPERATIVE [DCCCO], Represented by
Felicidad L. Ruiz, its General Manager vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 182722, January 22, 2010
DOCTRINE: Cooperatives, including their members, deserve a preferential tax treatment
because of the vital role they play in the attainment of economic development and social
justice. Thus, although taxes are the lifeblood of the government, the States power to tax
must give way to foster the creation and growth of cooperatives. To borrow the words of
Justice Isagani A. Cruz: The power of taxation, while indispensable, is not absolute and
may be subordinated to the demands of social justice..
FACTS:
Petitioner Dumaguete Cathedral Credit Cooperative is a credit cooperative duly
registered with and regulated by the Cooperative Development Authority.
On November 27, 2001, the Bureau of Internal Revenue Operations Group
Deputy Commissioner, Lilian B. Hefti, issued Letters of Authority, authorizing BIR
Officers of Revenue Region No. 12, Bacolod City, to examine petitioner’s books of
accounts and other accounting records for all internal revenue taxes for the taxable
years 1999 and 2000.
On June 26, 2002, petitioner received two Pre-Assessment Notices for deficiency
withholding taxes for taxable years 1999 and 2000 which were protested by petitioner.
On November 29, 2002, petitioner availed of the VAAP and paid the amounts of
P105,574.62 and P143,867.24 corresponding to the withholding taxes on the payments
for the compensation, honorarium of the Board of Directors, security and janitorial
services, and legal and professional services, for the years 1999 and 2000, respectively.
On April 24, 2003, petitioner received from the BIR Regional Director, Sonia L.
Flores, Letters of Demand, with attached Transcripts of Assessment and Audit
Results/Assessment Notices, ordering petitioner to pay the deficiency withholding taxes,
inclusive of penalties, for the years 1999 and 2000 in the amounts of P1,489,065.30 and
P1,462,644.90, respectively.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is liable to pay the deficiency withholding taxes on interest from
savings and time deposits of its members for taxable years 1999 and 2000, and the
consequent delinquency interest of 20% per annum
HELD:
No. The BIR had earlier ruled without any qualification that since interest from any
Philippine currency bank deposit and yield or any other monetary benefit from deposit
substitutes are paid by banks, cooperatives are not required to withhold the corresponding tax
on the interest from savings and time deposits of their members. The fact that “similar

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1153
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
arrangements” is preceded by banking terms means that that those subject to withholding must
have deposit peculiarities. This is consistent with the preferential treatment accorded to
members of cooperatives who are exempt in the same way as the cooperatives themselves.
On November 16, 1988, the BIR declared in BIR Ruling No. 551-888 that cooperatives
are not required to withhold taxes on interest from savings and time deposits of their members.
Petitioners invocation of BIR Ruling No. 551-888, is proper.
There is nothing in the ruling to suggest that it applies only when deposits are
maintained in a bank. Rather, the ruling clearly states, without any qualification, that since
interest from any Philippine currency bank deposit and yield or any other monetary benefit from
deposit substitutes are paid by banks, cooperatives are not required to withhold the
corresponding tax on the interest from savings and time deposits of their members. This
interpretation was reiterated in BIR Ruling [DA-591-2006], which was issued by Assistant
Commissioner James H. Roldan upon the request of the cooperatives for a confirmatory ruling
on several issues, among which is the alleged exemption of interest income on members
deposit from the 20% final withholding tax.
It bears stressing that interpretations of administrative agencies in charge of enforcing a
law are entitled to great weight and consideration by the courts, unless such interpretations are
in a sharp conflict with the governing statute or the Constitution and other laws. In this case, BIR
Ruling No. 551-888 and BIR Ruling [DA-591-2006] are in perfect harmony with the Constitution
and the laws they seek to implement. Accordingly, the interpretation in BIR Ruling No. 551-888
that cooperatives are not required to withhold the corresponding tax on the interest from
savings and time deposits of their members, which was reiterated in BIR Ruling [DA-591-2006],
applies to the instant case.
The National Internal Revenue Code states that a final tax at the rate of twenty percent
(20%) is hereby imposed upon the amount of interest on currency bank deposit and yield or
any other monetary benefit from the deposit substitutes and from trust funds and similar
arrangement x xx for individuals under Section 24(B)(1) and for domestic corporations under
Section 27(D)(1). Considering the members deposits with the cooperatives are not currency
bank deposits nor deposit substitutes, Section 24(B)(1) and Section 27(D)(1), therefore, do not
apply to members of cooperatives and to deposits of primaries with federations, respectively.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1154
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ALLIED BANKINGCORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OFINTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 175097, February 5, 2010
DOCTRINE: We have time and again reminded the CIR to indicate, in a clear and
unequivocal language, whether his action on a disputed assessment constitutes his final
determination thereon in order for the taxpayer concerned to determine when his or her
right to appeal to the tax court accrues. Viewed in the light of the foregoing, respondent
is now estopped from claiming that he did not intend the Formal Letter of Demand with
Assessment Notices to be a final decision.
FACTS:
In April 2004, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued a preliminary
assessment notice (PAN) to Allied Banking Corporation (ABC) demanding payment of
P50 million in taxes. ABC then filed a protest in May 2004. In July 2004, the BIR issued a
formal assessment notice (FAN). The FAN included a formal demand as well as this
phrase:
xxx
This is our final decision based on investigation. If you disagree, you may appeal
this final decision within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof, otherwise said deficiency tax
assessment shall become final, executory and demandable.
ABC then appealed the FAN with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) then filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that ABC did not exhaust all administrative remedies for failing to file a protest against
the FAN.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is correct
HELD:
No. It is true that a FAN is not appealable with the CTA. However, this case holds an
exception. The wordings of the FAN issued by the CIR made it appear that the FAN is actually
the CIR’s final decision. It even advised ABC to file an appeal instead of filing a protest. ABC
cannot therefore be faulted for filing an appeal with the CTA instead of filing a protest with the
CIR. We have time and again reminded the CIR to indicate, in a clear and unequivocal
language, whether his action on a disputed assessment constitutes his final determination
thereon in order for the taxpayer concerned to determine when his or her right to appeal to the
tax court accrues. Viewed in the light of the foregoing, respondent is now estopped from
claiming that he did not intend the Formal Letter of Demand with Assessment Notices to be a
final decision.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1155
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC. and
FIRST ASIA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

G.R. No. 183505, February 26, 2010

DOCTRINE: A cursory reading of Section 108 of the National Internal Revenue Code of
1997 clearly shows that the enumeration of the “sale or exchange of services” subject to
Value-Added Tax (VAT) is not exhaustive—the words, “including,” “similar services,” and
“shall likewise include,” indicate that the enumeration is by way of example only. Several
amendments were made to expand the coverage of Value Added Tax but none pertain to
cinema/theater operators or proprietors—at present, only lessors or distributors of
cinematographic films are subject to Value-Added Tax (VAT).

FACTS:

In a number of CTA cases, the BIR sent SM Prime and First Asia a Preliminary
Assessment Notice for VAT deficiency on cinema ticket sales for the taxable year 2000
(SM), 1999 (First Asia), 2000 (First Asia), 2002 (First Asia) and, 2003 (First Asia).

SM and First Asia filed for protest but the BIR just denied them and sent them a Letter
of Demand subsequently. All the Preliminary Assessment Notices were subjected to a
Petition for Review filed by SM and First Asia to the CTA.

The CTA First Division ruled that there should only be one business tax applicable to
theater and movie houses, the 30% amusement tax. Hence, the CIR is wrong in collecting
VAT from the ticket sales.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the cinema ticket sales are subject to VAT and thus included in the
meaning of “Sale or Exchange of Services”?

HELD:

No, the cinema ticket sales are not subject to VAT.

Section 108 of the NIRC of the 1997 reads: x x x A cursory reading of the foregoing
provision clearly shows that the enumeration of the “sale or exchange of services”
subject to VAT is not exhaustive. The words, “including,” “similar services,” and “shall
likewise include,” indicate that the enumeration is by way of example only. Among those
included in the enumeration is the“lease of motion picture films, films, tapes and discs.”
This, however, is not the same as the showing or exhibition of motionpictures or
films. As pointed out by the CTA En Banc:“Exhibition” in Black’s Law Dictionary is

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1156
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
defined as “To show or display. x x x To produce anything in public so that it may
betaken into possession” (6th ed., p. 573). While the word “lease” isdefined as “a
contract by which one owning such property grantsto another the right to possess, use
and enjoy it on specified period of time in exchange for periodic payment of a
stipulatedprice, referred to as rent (Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed., p. 889).x x x Since
the activity of showing motion pictures, films or movies by cinema/theater operators or
proprietors is not included in theenumeration, it is incumbent upon the court to the
determinewhether such activity falls under the phrase “similar services.”
The intent of the legislature must therefore be ascertained.
In 1994, RA7716 restructured the VAT system by widening its tax baseand
enhancing its administration. Three years later, RA7716 was amended by RA 8241.
Shortly thereafter, theNIRC of 1997 was signed into law. Several amendments were
made to expand the coverage of VAT. However, nonepertain to cinema/theater
operators or proprietors. Atpresent, only lessors or distributors of cinematographicfilms
are subject to VAT. While persons subject to amusement tax under the NIRC of 1997 are
exempt fromthe coverage of VAT.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1157
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v Far East Bank and Trust Company (Now
Bank of the Philippine Islands)

G.R. No. 173854, March 15, 2010

DOCTRINE: Entitlement to a tax refund is for the taxpayer to prove and not for the
government to disprove.

FACTS:

On 10 April 1995, Far East Bank filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue two
Corporate Annual Income Tax Returns, on for its Corporate Banking Unit (CBU) and
another for its Foreign Currency Deposit Unit (FCDU) for taxable year ending 31
December 1994. The return for the CBU consolidated reflected a refundable income tax
of P12,682,864. Pursuant to the NIRC, the said refundable amount was carried over and
applied against Far East Bank’s income tax liability for the taxable year ending 31
December 1995. On 15 April 1996, respondent bank filed its 1995 Annual Income Tax
Return, which showed a total overpaid income tax in the amount of P17,443,133.00. Out
of this amount, only P13,645,109 was sought to be refunded by respondent while the
remaining P3,798,024 was opted to be carried over to the next taxable year. On 17 May
1996, respondent bank filed a claim for the refund of P13,645,109 with the BIR. The BIR
did not act upon the complaint, thus respondent brought the matter to the Court of Tax
Appeals via a Petition for Review.

The CTA denied the bank’s claim for refund on the ground that it failed to show
that the income derived from rentals and sale of real property from which the taxes were
withheld were reflected in it 1994 Annual Income Tax Return. A Motion for New Trial was
filed based on excusable negligence which was denied by the CTA. On appeal with the
Court of Appeals, the CTA decision was reversed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent has proven its entitlement to the refund.

HELD:

No. Respondent miserably failed to prove its entitlement to the refund. A taxpayer
claiming for a tax credit or refund of creditable withholding tax must comply with the
following requisites:

1) The claim must be filed with the CIR within the two-year period from the date
of payment of the tax;
2) It must be shown on the return that the income received was declared as part
of the gross income; and
3) The fact of withholding must be established by a copy of a statement duly
issued by the payor to the payee showing the amount paid and the amount of
the tax withheld.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1158
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
As to the first requirement, respondent was able to file the claim within the 2-year period.
However, as to the second requirement, respondent was unable to comply due to its
failure to present all the Certificates of Creditable Tax Withheld at Source.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Page 1159
Echiverri, Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez,
Rañigo, Reyes, Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
TFS, Incorporated v Commissioner of Internal Revenue

G.R. No. 166829, April 19, 2010

DOCTRINE: It is only in highly meritorious cases may the rules for perfecting an appeal
be brushed aside in the interest of substantial justice.

FACTS:

TFS Incorporated is a domestic corporation engaged in the pawnshop business.


On 15 January 2002, TFS received a Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN for
deficiency value added tax, expanded withholding tax, and compromise penalty for the
taxable year 1998. TFS requested BIR through a letter to withdraw and set aside the
assessments stating the same have no basis. On 7 February 2002, CIR informed TFS
that a Final Assessment Notice (FAN) was already issued and that petitioner had until 22
February 2002 to file a protest letter. A protest letter was filed by petitioner on 20
February 2002.

Due to the inaction of the CIR, a Petition for Review was filed by TFS with the
CTA. During trial, petitioner offered to compromise and to settle the assessment for
deficiency EWT with the BIR thereby leaving only the issue of VAT on pawnshops to be
threshed out. Thereafter, the CTA rendered a decision upholding the assessment issued
against petitioner. The CTA rules that pawnshops are subject to VAT under Section
108(A) of the NIRC as they are engaged in the sale of services for a fee, remuneration or
consideration. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied. Petitioner filed with a Petition for Review with the CA but thereafter corrected
itself and filed instead with the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc pursuant to the enactment
of Republic Act No. 9282 removing the Court of Appeals of its jurisdiction to hear appeals
from the decisions of Court of Tax Appeals division. The petition was dismissed for
having been filed out of time. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but was denied.

ISSUE:

a) Whether or not petitioner is subject to the 10% VAT.

b) Whether or not Court of Tax Appeals En Banc should have given due course to
the petition for review and not strictly applied the technical Rules of Procedure to the
detriment of justice.

HELD:

a) Petitioner is not subject to the 10% VAT. As ruled in First Planters Pawnshop,
Inc. v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the full implementation of the VAT system
on non-bank financial intermediaries starting January 1, 2003, petitioner is liable for 10%
VAT for said tax year. And beginning 2004 up to the present, by virtue of R.A. No. 9238,
petitioner is no longer liable for VAT but it is subject to percentage tax on gross receipts

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1160
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
from 0% to 5% as the case may be. Since the assessment was made prior to the
implementation of R.A. No. 9238, TFS cannot be subjected to the 10% VAT.

b) Yes. Although strict compliance with the rules for perfecting an appeal is
indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious
dispatch of judicial business, strong compelling reasons such as serving the ends of
justice and preventing a grave miscarriage may nevertheless warrant the suspension of
the rules. In the case at bar, this Court is constrained to disregard procedural rules
because we cannot in conscience allow the government to collect deficiency VAT from
petitioner considering that the government has no right at ll to collect or to receive the
same.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1161
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. SMART COMMUNICATION, INC.
G.R. Nos. 179045-46 August 25, 2010
DOCTRINE:The right of a withholding agent to claim a refund of erroneously or illegally
withheld taxes comes with the responsibility to return the same to the principal taxpayer.

FACTS:

Respondent Smart Communications, Inc., entered into three Agreements for


Programming and Consultancy Services with Prism Transactive (M) Sdn. Bhd. (Prism).
Under the agreements, Prism was to provide programming and consultancy services for
the installation of the Service Download Manager (SDM) and the Channel Manager
(CM), and for the installation and implementation of Smart Money and Mobile Banking
Service SIM Applications (SIM Applications) and Private Text Platform (SIM
Application).

Prism billed respondent in the amount of US$547,822.45. Thinking that these


payments constitute royalties, respondent withheld the amount of US$136,955.61 or
₱7,008,840.43, representing the 25% royalty tax under the RP-Malaysia Tax Treaty.

On September 25, 2001, respondent filed its Monthly Remittance Return of Final
Income Taxes Withheld (BIR Form No. 1601-F)for the month of August 2001. And on
September 24, 2003, or within the two-year period to claim a refund, respondent filed
with the BIR, through the International Tax Affairs Division, an administrative claim for
refund of the amount of ₱7,008,840.43.

The CTA 2nd Division upheld respondent’s right, as a withholding agent, to file the
claim for refund. However, it found respondent entitled only to a partial refund. Although
it agreed with respondent that the payments for the CM and SIM Application Agreements
are "business profits,"and therefore, not subject to taxunder the RP-Malaysia Tax Treaty,
the CTA2nd Division found the payment for the SDM Agreement a royalty subject to
withholding tax.

The CTA En Banc affirmed the rulling of the CTA 2nd Division

ISSUES:

(1) whether respondent has the right to file the claim for refund

(2) if respondent has the right, whether the payments made to Prism constitute
"business profits" or royalties.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1162
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:

(1)Yes. Withholding agent may file a claim for refund

Sections 204(c) and 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) provide:

Sec. 204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate, and Refund or Credit
Taxes. – The Commissioner may –

xxxx

(C) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received or penalties imposed without
authority, refund the value of internal revenue stamps when they are returned in good
condition by the purchaser, and, in his discretion, redeem or change unused stamps that
have been rendered unfit for use and refund their value upon proof of destruction. No
credit or refund of taxes or penalties shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files in writing
with the Commissioner a claim for credit or refund within two (2) years after the payment
of the tax or penalty: Provided, however, that a return filed showing an overpayment
shall be considered as a written claim for credit or refund.

xxxx

Sec. 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. – No suit or proceeding


shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax
hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any
penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have
been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit
has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be
maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or
duress.

In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2)
years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening
cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may,
even without a written claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the
return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been
erroneously paid. (Emphasis supplied)

Pursuant to the foregoing, the person entitled to claim a tax refund is the taxpayer.
However, in case the taxpayer does not file a claim for refund, the withholding agent may
file the claim.

(2)Yes. The payments for the CM and the SIM Application Agreements constitute

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1163
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
"business profits"

Under the RP-Malaysia Tax Treaty, the term royalties is defined as payments of
any kind received as consideration for: "(i) the use of, or the right to use, any patent,
trade mark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, any copyright of literary,
artistic or scientific work, or for the use of, or the right to use, industrial, commercial, or
scientific equipment, or for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific
experience; (ii) the use of, or the right to use, cinematograph films, or tapes for radio or
television broadcasting." These are taxed at the rate of 25% of the gross amount.

Under the same Treaty, the "business profits" of an enterprise of a Contracting


State is taxable only in that State, unless the enterprise carries on business in the other
Contracting State through a permanent establishment.The term "permanent
establishment" is defined as a fixed place of business where the enterprise is wholly or
partly carried on.However, even if there is no fixed place of business, an enterprise of a
Contracting State is deemed to have a permanent establishment in the other Contracting
State if it carries on supervisory activities in that other State for more than six months in
connection with a construction, installation or assembly project which is being
undertaken in that other State.

In the instant case, it was established during the trial that Prism does not have a
permanent establishment in the Philippines. Hence, "business profits" derived from
Prism’s dealings with respondent are not taxable. The question is whether the payments
made to Prism under the SDM, CM, and SIM Application agreements are "business
profits" and not royalties.

Prism has intellectual property right over the SDM program, but not over the CM
and SIM Application programs as the proprietary rights of these programs belong to
respondent. In other words, out of the payments made to Prism, only the payment for the
SDM program is a royalty subject to a 25% withholding tax. A refund of the erroneously
withheld royalty taxes for the payments pertaining to the CM and SIM Application
Agreements is therefore in order.

Indeed, the government has no right to retain what does not belong to it. "No one,
not even the State, should enrich oneself at the expense of another."

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1164
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. AICHI FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA
INC.
G.R. No. 184823, (October 6, 2010)

DOCTRINE: Section 112 (A) of the NIRC clearly provides in no uncertain terms that unutilized
input VAT payments not otherwise used for any internal revenue tax due the taxpayer
must be claimed within two years reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when
the relevant sales were made pertaining to the input VAT regardless of whether said tax
was paid or not.

FACTS:
On September 30, 2004, respondent filed a claim for refund/credit of input VAT for the
period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 in the total amount of P3,891,123.82 with the
petitioner CIR, through the Department of Finance One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and
Duty Drawback Center. On even date, respondent filed a Petition for Review with the CTA for
the refund/credit of the same input VAT. Trial ensued, after which, on January 4, 2008, the
Second Division of the CTA rendered a Decision partially granting respondents claim for
refund/credit. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, insisting that the
administrative and the judicial claims were filed beyond the two-year period to claim a tax
refund/credit provided for under Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC. On July 30, 2008, the
CTA En Banc affirmed the Second Divisions Decision allowing the partial tax refund/credit in
favor of respondent.

ISSUE:
WON respondents judicial and administrative claims for tax refund/credit were filed
within the two-year prescriptive period provided in Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC.

HELD:
YES. The administrative claims for tax refund were filed within the
two-year-period but the judicial claim was premature. The pivotal question of when to
reckon the running of the two-year prescriptive period, however, has already been resolved
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation, where we ruled that
Section 112(A) of the NIRC is the applicable provision in determining the start of the two-year
period for claiming a refund/credit of unutilized input VAT, and that Sections 204(C) and 229 of
the NIRC are inapplicable as both provisions apply only to instances of erroneous payment or
illegal collection of internal revenue taxes. We explained that: The above proviso [Section 112
(A) of the NIRC] clearly provides in no uncertain terms that unutilized input VAT payments
not otherwise used for any internal revenue tax due the taxpayer must be claimed within
two years reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the relevant sales were
made pertaining to the input VAT regardless of whether said tax was paid or not. As the
CA aptly puts it, albeit it erroneously applied the aforequoted Sec. 112 (A), [P]rescriptive period

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1165
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
commences from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made and not from the
time the input VAT was paid nor from the time the official receipt was issued. Thus, when a
zero-rated VAT taxpayer pays its input VAT a year after the pertinent transaction, said taxpayer
only has a year to file a claim for refund or tax credit of the unutilized creditable input VAT. The
reckoning frame would always be the end of the quarter when the pertinent sales or transaction
was made, regardless when the input VAT was paid. In view of the foregoing, we find that the
CTA En Banc erroneously applied Sections 114(A) and 229 of the NIRC in computing the
two-year prescriptive period for claiming refund/credit of unutilized input VAT. To be clear,
Section 112 of the NIRC is the pertinent provision for the refund/credit of input VAT. Thus, the
two-year period should be reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were
made.
However, notwithstanding the timely filing of the administrative claim, we are constrained
to deny respondents claim for tax refund/credit for having been filed in violation of Section
112(D) of the NIRC, which provides that: SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax.
(D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. In
proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit
certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days
from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the
application filed in accordance with Subsections (A) and (B) hereof.

In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure
on the part of the Commissioner to act on the application within the period
prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from the
receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the one
hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with
the Court of Tax Appeals.

Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR has 120 days, from the date of
the submission of the complete documents in support of the application [for tax
refund/credit], within which to grant or deny the claim. In case of full or partial denial by
the CIR, the taxpayers recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from
receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if after the 120-day period the CIR fails to act
on the application for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the
inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30 days. In this case, the administrative and the judicial
claims were simultaneously filed on September 30, 2004. Obviously, respondent did not
wait for the decision of the CIR or the lapse of the 120-day period. For this reason, we
find the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA premature.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1166
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
BELLE CORPORATION, PETITIONER, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 181298, January 10, 2011

DOCTRINE: Section 69 of the old National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) allows
unutilized tax credits to be refunded as long as the claim is filed within the prescriptive
period. This, however, no longer holds true under Section 76 of the 1997 NIRC as the
option to carry-over excess income tax payments to the succeeding taxable year is now
irrevocable.

FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the BIR its Income Tax Return (ITR) for the first quarter of 1997,
showing a gross income of P741,607,495.00, a deduction of P65,381,054.00, a net
taxable income of P676,226,441.00 and an income tax due of P236,679,254.00.
petitioner filed with the BIR its second quarter ITR, declaring an overpayment of income
taxes in the amount of P66,634,290.00. In view of the overpayment, no taxes were paid
for the second and third quarters of 1997.
Instead of claiming the amount as a tax refund, petitioner decided to apply it as a tax
credit to the succeeding taxable year by marking the tax credit option box in its 1997 ITR.
For the taxable year 1998, petitioner's amended ITR showed an overpayment. Petitioner
filed with the BIR an administrative claim for refund of its unutilized excess income tax
payments for the taxable year 1997 in the amount of P106,447,318.00. Notwithstanding
the filing of the administrative claim for refund, petitioner carried over the amount of
P106,447,318.00 to the taxable year 1999 and applied a portion thereof to its 1999
Minimum Corporate Income Tax (MCIT) liability.
CTA rendered a Decision denying petitioner's claim for refund.
It bears stressing that the applicable provision in the case at bar is Section 69 of the old
Tax Code and not Section 76 of the 1997 Tax Code. Settled is the rule that under Section
69 of the old Tax Code, the carrying forward of any excess/overpaid income tax for a
given taxable year is limited only up to the succeeding taxable year. However, Petitioner
even went further to the taxable year 1999 and applied the Prior Year's (1998) Excess
Credit of P106,447,318.00 to its income tax liability.
True enough, upon verification of Petitioner's 1999 Corporate Annual Income Tax Return
(Exh. I), this Court found that the whole amount of P106,447,318.00 representing its prior
year's excess credit (subject of this claim) was carried forward to its 1999 income tax
liability. It is an elementary rule in taxation that an automatic carry over of an excess
income tax payment should only be made for the succeeding year. On appeal, CA denied
the petition and affirmed the decision of the CTA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a refund of its excess income tax payments for
the taxable year 1997

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1167
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
HELD:
No. Both the CTA and the CA erred in applying Section 69 [52] of the old NIRC. The
law applicable is Section 76 of the NIRC. Under Section 69 of the old NIRC, in case of
overpayment of income taxes, a corporation may either file a claim for refund or
carry-over the excess payments to the succeeding taxable year. Availment of one
remedy, however, precludes the other.
Thus, under Section 69 of the old NIRC, unutilized tax credits may be refunded as
long as the claim is filed within the two-year prescriptive period. The option to carry over
excess income tax payments is irrevocable under Section 76 of the 1997 NIRC.
This rule, however, no longer applies as Section 76 of the 1997 NIRC now reads:

Section 76. Final Adjustment Return. - Every corporation liable to tax under Section 24 shall file a
final adjustment return covering the total net income for the preceding calendar or fiscal year. If
the sum of the quarterly tax payments made during the said taxable year is not equal to the total
tax due on the entire taxable net income of that year the corporation shall either:
(a) Pay the excess tax still due; or

(b) Be refunded the excess amount paid, as the case may be.

In case the corporation is entitled to a refund of the excess estimated


quarterly income taxes paid, the refundable amount shown on its final adjustment return
may be credited against the estimated quarterly income tax liabilities for the taxable
quarters of the succeeding taxable years. Once the option to carry over and apply
the excess quarterly income tax against income tax due for the taxable quarters of
the succeeding taxable years has been made, such option shall be considered
irrevocable for that taxable period and no application for tax refund or issuance of
a tax credit certificate shall be allowed therefor.
Under the new law, in case of overpayment of income taxes, the remedies
are still the same; and the availment of one remedy still precludes the other. But unlike
Section 69 of the old NIRC, the carry-over of excess income tax payments is no longer
limited to the succeeding taxable year. Unutilized excess income tax payments may now
be carried over to the succeeding taxable years until fully utilized. In addition, the option
to carry-over excess income tax payments is now irrevocable. Hence, unutilized excess
income tax payments may no longer be refunded.
In the instant case, both the CTA and the CA applied Section 69 of the old NIRC in
denying the claim for refund. We find, however, that the applicable provision should be
Section 76 of the 1997 NIRC because at the time petitioner filed its 1997 final ITR, the
old NIRC was no longer in force.
Accordingly, since petitioner already carried over its 1997 excess income tax
payments to the succeeding taxable year 1998, it may no longer file a claim for refund of
unutilized tax credits for taxable year 1997. To repeat, under the new law, once the option
to carry-over excess income tax payments to the succeeding years has been made, it
becomes irrevocable. Thus, applications for refund of the unutilized excess income tax
payments may no longer be allowed.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1168
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
SILICON PHILIPPINES, INC., (Formerly INTEL PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING,
INC.), vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 172378, January 17, 2011

DOCTRINE: The burden of proving entitlement to a refund lies with the claimant.

FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the respondent CIR, through the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency
Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the Department of Finance (DOF), an
application for credit/refund of unutilized input VAT for the period October 1, 1998 to
December 31, 1998 in the amount of ₱31,902,507.50. Due to the inaction of the
respondent, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CTA Division. CTA Division
rendered a Decision partially granting petitioner’s claim for refund of unutilized input VAT
on capital goods. Not satisfied with the Decision, petitioner moved for reconsideration.17 It
claimed that it is not required to secure an ATP since it has a "Permit to Adopt
Computerized Accounting Documents such as Sales Invoice and Official Receipts" from
the BIR. On its part, respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration contending that
petitioner is not entitled to a credit/refund of unutilized input VAT on capital goods
because it failed to show that the goods imported/purchased are indeed capital goods.

CTA En Banc on its decision discussed Capital thegoods or properties, as defined


under Section 4.106-1(b) of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, refer "to goods or properties
with estimated useful life greater than one year and which are treated as depreciable
assets under Section 29 (f), used directly or indirectly in the production or sale of taxable
goods or services." Considering that the items (training materials, office supplies, posters,
banners, t-shirts, books and the like) purchased by petitioner as reflected in the summary
were not duly proven to have been used, directly or indirectly in the production or sale of
taxable goods or services, the same cannot be considered as capital goods as defined
above. Consequently, the same may not then be claimed as such.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CTA En Banc erred in denying petitioner’s claim for credit/ refund
of input VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales

HELD:
No. In a claim for credit/refund of input VAT attributable to zero-rated sales, Section
112 (A) of the NIRC lays down four requisites, to wit:
1) the taxpayer must be VAT-registered;
2) the taxpayer must be engaged in sales which are zero-rated or effectively
zero-rated;
3) the claim must be filed within two years after the close of the taxable quarter
when such sales were made; and

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1169
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
4) the creditable input tax due or paid must be attributable to such sales, except the
transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been applied against
the output tax.

To prove that it is engaged in zero-rated sales, petitioner presented export sales


invoices, certifications of inward remittance, export declarations, and airway bills of lading
for the fourth quarter of 1998. The CTA Division, however, found the export sales invoices
of no probative value in establishing petitioner’s zero-rated sales for the purpose of
claiming credit/refund of input VAT because petitioner failed to show that it has an ATP
from the BIR and to indicate the ATP and the word "zero-rated" in its export sales
invoices.

Printing the ATP on the invoices or receipts is not required. It has been settled in Intel
Technology Philippines, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the ATP need not
be reflected or indicated in the invoices or receipts because there is no law or regulation
requiring it. Thus, in the absence of such law or regulation, failure to print the ATP on the
invoices or receipts should not result in the outright denial of a claim or the invalidation of
the invoices or receipts for purposes of claiming a refund.

This brings the Court to the question of whether a claimant for unutilized input VAT
on zero-rated sales is required to present proof that it has secured an ATP from the BIR
prior to the printing of its invoices or receipts. The Court rules in the affirmative.

Under Section 112 (A) of the NIRC, a claimant must be engaged in sales which are
zero-rated or effectively zero-rated. To prove this, duly registered invoices or receipts
evidencing zero-rated sales must be presented. However, since the ATP is not indicated
in the invoices or receipts, the only way to verify whether the invoices or receipts are duly
registered is by requiring the claimant to present its ATP from the BIR. Without this proof,
the invoices or receipts would have no probative value for the purpose of refund. In the
case of Intel, we emphasized that:

It bears reiterating that while the pertinent provisions of the Tax Code and the rules
and regulations implementing them require entities engaged in business to secure a BIR
authority to print invoices or receipts and to issue duly registered invoices or receipts, it is
not specifically required that the BIR authority to print be reflected or indicated therein.
Indeed, what is important with respect to the BIR authority to print is that it has been
secured or obtained by the taxpayer, and that invoices or receipts are duly registered.
Failure to print the word "zero-rated" on the sales invoices is fatal to a claim for
refund of input VAT. Similarly, failure to print the word "zero-rated" on the sales invoices
or receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/refund of input VAT on zero-rated sales.

Capital goods are defined under Section 4.106-1(b) of RR No. 7-95

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1170
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
To claim a refund of input VAT on capital goods, Section 112 (B) of the NIRC requires
that:
1. the claimant must be a VAT registered person;
2. the input taxes claimed must have been paid on capital goods;
3. the input taxes must not have been applied against any output tax liability; and
4. the administrative claim for refund must have been filed within two (2) years after
the close of the taxable quarter when the importation or purchase was made.

Corollarily, Section 4.106-1 (b) of RR No. 7-95 defines capital goods as follows:

"Capital goods or properties" refer to goods or properties with estimated useful life
greater that one year and which are treated as depreciable assets under Section 29
(f), used directly or indirectly in the production or sale of taxable goods or services.

Based on the foregoing definition, the Court find no reason to deviate from the
findings of the CTA that training materials, office supplies, posters, banners, T-shirts,
books, and the other similar items reflected in petitioner’s Summary of Importation of
Goods are not capital goods. A reduction in the refundable input VAT on capital goods
from ₱15,170,082.00 to ₱9,898,867.00 is therefore in order.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1171
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
BELLE CORPORATION VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 181298, March 02, 2011

DOCTRINE: Once a taxpayer opted to carry-over its excess income tax payments, it can
no longer seek refund of the unutilized excess income tax payments. The taxpayer,
however, may apply the unutilized excess income tax payments as a tax credit to the
succeeding taxable years until such has been fully applied pursuant to Section 76 of the
NIRC

FACTS:
For Resolution is the Motion for Clarification filed by petitioner Belle Corporation.
In the Motion, petitioner prays that the Decision dated January 10, 2011 be modified or
clarified to indicate petitioner's entitlement to a tax credit of unutilized excess income tax
payments for the taxable year 1997.

In the Decision, the Court held that Section 76 of the 1997 National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC) and not Section 69 of the old NIRC applies. Section 76 provides
that a taxpayer has the option to file a claim for refund or to carry-over its excess income
tax payments. The option to carry-over, however, is irrevocable. Thus, once a taxpayer
opted to carry-over its excess income tax payments, it can no longer seek refund of the
unutilized excess income tax payments. The taxpayer, however, may apply the
unutilized excess income tax payments as a tax credit to the succeeding taxable years
until such has been fully applied pursuant to Section 76 of the NIRC.

Petitioner's claim for refund was denied because it has earlier opted to carry over
its 1997 excess income tax payments by marking the tax credit option box in its 1997
income tax return.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is entitled to a tax credit of unutilized excess income tax
payments for the taxable year 1997.
HELD:
We must clarify, however, that while petitioner may no longer file a claim for
refund, it properly carried over its 1997 excess income tax payments by applying

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1172
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
portions thereof to its 1998 and 1999 Minimum Corporate Income Tax in the amounts of
P25,596,210.00 and P14,185,874.00, respectively.

Pursuant to our ruling, petitioner may apply the unutilized excess income tax
payments as a tax credit to the succeeding taxable years until fully utilized. Thus, as of
the taxable year 1999, petitioner still has an unutilized excess income tax payments of
P92,261,444.00 which may be carried over to the succeeding taxable years until fully
utilized.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1173
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PRUDENTIAL BANK vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. NO. 180390, July 27, 2011

DOCTRINE: A document to be considered a certificate of deposit need not be in a


specific form.

FACTS:
Petitioner received from the CIR a final Assessment Notice and a Demand Letter for
deficiency Documentary Stamp Tax for taxable year 1995 on its repurchase agreement
with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Purchase of Treasury Bills from the BSP, and on its
Savings Account Plus product, in the amount of P18, 982, 734.38

Petitioner protested the assessment on the ground that the documents subject
matters of the assessment are not subject to DST. Petitioner contends that its SAP is not
subject to DST because it is not included in the list of documents under the old NIRC.
Petitioner insists that unlike a time deposit, its SAP is evidenced by a passbook and not
by a deposit certificate. CIR denied the protest.

Petitioner filed with the CTA a Petition for Review. CTA first division affirmed the
assessment for deficiency DST insofar as the SAP is concerned, but cancelled and set
aside the assessment on petitioner’s repurchase agreement and purchase of treasury
bills.

CTA En Banc affirmed the ruling of its first division that petitioner’s SAP is a
certificate of deposit bearing interest subject to DST.

ISSUE:
WON CIR is correct in assessing the SAP as interest bearing deposit subject to
DST.

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner’s Savings Account Plus is subject to Documentary stamp Tax.

DST is imposed on certificates of deposit bearing interest pursuant to Section 180 of


the old NIRC. The fact that the SAP is evidenced by a passbook cannot remove its
coverage from section 180 of the old NIRC. A document to be considered a certificate of
deposit need not be in a specific form. A certificate of deposit is defined as “a written
acknowledgment by a bank or banker of the receipt of a sum of money on deposit which
the bank or banker promises to pay to the depositor, to the order of the depositor, or to
some other person or his order, whereby the relation of debtor and creditor between the
bank and the depositor is created.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1174
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORP VS. COMMISSONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE
G.R. No. 173425, September 4, 2012
DOCTRINE:
Section 105 of the old NIRC reads:
SEC. 105. Transitional input tax credits. – A person who becomes liable to value-added
tax or any person who elects to be a VAT-registered person shall, subject to the filing of
an inventory as prescribed by regulations, be allowed input tax on his beginning
inventory of goods, materials and supplies equivalent to 8% of the value of such
inventory or the actual value added tax paid on such goods, materials and supplies,
whichever is higher, which shall be creditable against the output tax. (Emphasis
supplied.)
FACTS:
Petitioner claims that it is entitled to recover the amount of P359,652,009.47
erroneously paid as output VAT for the first quarter of 1997 since its transitional input tax
credit of P5,698,200,256 is more than sufficient to cover its output VAT liability for the
said period.
Petitioner assails the pronouncement of the CA that prior payment of taxes is
required to avail of the 8% transitional input tax credit. Petitioner contends that there is
nothing in Section 105 of the old NIRC to support such conclusion. Petitioner further
argues that RR 7-95, which limited the 8% transitional input tax credit to the value of the
improvements on the land, is invalid because it goes against the express provision of
Section 105 of the old NIRC, in relation to Section 10033 of the same Code, as amended
by RA 7716.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that petitioner is not entitled to a
transitional input tax credit because no taxes were paid in the acquisition of the Global
City property. Respondents assert that prior payment of taxes is inherent in the nature
of a transitional input tax. Regarding RR 7-95, respondents insist that it is valid because
it was issued by the Secretary of Finance, who is mandated by law to promulgate all
needful rules and regulations for the implementation of Section 105 of the old NIRC.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is entitled to a refund of P359,652,009.47 erroneously paid as
output VAT for the first quarter of 1997.
HELD:
YES! In view of the foregoing, we find petitioner entitled to the 8% transitional
input tax credit provided in Section 105 of the old NIRC. The fact that it acquired the

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1175
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Global City property under a tax-free transaction makes no difference as prior payment
of taxes is not a pre-requisite.
Prior payment of taxes is not required for a taxpayer to avail of the 8% transitional input
tax credit.
Contrary to the view of the CTA and the CA, there is nothing in the above quoted
provision to indicate that prior payment of taxes is necessary for the availment of the 8%
transitional input tax credit. Obviously, all that is required is for the taxpayer to file a
beginning inventory with the BIR.
To require prior payment of taxes, as proposed in the Dissent is not only
tantamount to judicial legislation but would also render nugatory the provision in Section
105 of the old NIRC that the transitional input tax credit shall be “8% of the value of [the
beginning] inventory or the actual [VAT] paid on such goods, materials and supplies,
whichever is higher” because the actual VAT (now 12%) paid on the goods, materials,
and supplies would always be higher than the 8% (now 2%) of the beginning inventory
which, following the view of Justice Carpio, would have to exclude all goods, materials,
and supplies where no taxes were paid. Clearly, limiting the value of the beginning
inventory only to goods, materials, and supplies, where prior taxes were paid, was not
the intention of the law. Otherwise, it would have specifically stated that the beginning
inventory excludes goods, materials, and supplies where no taxes were paid.
Moreover, prior payment of taxes is not required to avail of the transitional input
tax credit because it is not a tax refund per se but a tax credit. Tax credit is not
synonymous to tax refund. Tax refund is defined as the money that a taxpayer overpaid
and is thus returned by the taxing authority. Tax credit, on the other hand, is an amount
subtracted directly from one’s total tax liability. It is any amount given to a taxpayer as a
subsidy, a refund, or an incentive to encourage investment. Thus, unlike a tax refund,
prior payment of taxes is not a prerequisite to avail of a tax credit. In fact, in
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corp., we declared that prior
payment of taxes is not required in order to avail of a tax credit.
In this case, when petitioner realized that its transitional input tax credit was not
applied in computing its output VAT for the 1st quarter of 1997, it filed a claim for refund
to recover the output VAT it erroneously or excessively paid for the 1st quarter of 1997.
In filing a claim for tax refund, petitioner is simply applying its transitional input tax credit
against the output VAT it has paid. Hence, it is merely availing of the tax credit
incentive given by law to first time VAT taxpayers. As we have said in the earlier case of
Fort Bonifacio, the provision on transitional input tax credit was enacted to benefit first
time VAT taxpayers by mitigating the impact of VAT on the taxpayer. Thus, contrary to
the view of Justice Carpio, the granting of a transitional input tax credit in favor of
petitioner, which would be paid out of the general fund of the government, would be an
appropriation authorized by law, specifically Section 105 of the old NIRC.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1176
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE and REVENUE DISTRICT OFFICER, REVENUE DISTRICT NO.
44, TAGUIG and PATEROS, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
G.R. No. 173425 January 22, 2013
DOCTRINE: The purpose of granting transitional input tax credit to be utilized as payment
for output VAT is primarily to give recognition to the sales tax component of inventories
which would qualify as input tax credit had such goods been acquired during the
effectivity of the VAT Law of 1988.
FACTS:
Petitioner was a real estate developer that bought from the national government a
parcel of land that used to be the Fort Bonifacio military reservation. At the time of the
said sale there was as yet no VAT imposed so Petitioner did not pay any VAT on its
purchase. Subsequently, Petitioner sold two parcels of land to Metro Pacific Corp. In
reporting the said sale for VAT purposes (because the VAT had already been imposed in
the interim), Petitioner claimed transitional input VAT corresponding to its inventory of
land. The BIR disallowed the claim of presumptive input VAT and thereby assessed
Petitioner for deficiency VAT.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner entitled to claim the transitional input VAT on its sale of
real properties given its nature as a real estate dealer and if so (i) is the transitional input
VAT applied only to the improvements on the real property or is it applied on the value of
the entire real property and (ii) should there have been a previous tax payment for the
transitional input VAT to be creditable.
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner is entitled to claim transitional input VAT based on the value of not
only the improvements but on the value of the entire real property and regardless of
whether there was in fact actual payment on the purchase of the real property or not.
The amendments to the VAT law do not show any intention to make those in the real
estate business subject to a different treatment from those engaged in the sale of other
goods or properties or in any other commercial trade or business. On the scope of the
basis for determining the available transitional input VAT, the CIR has no power to limit
the meaning and coverage of the term "goods" in Section 105 of the Tax Code without
statutory authority or basis. The transitional input tax credit operates to benefit newly
VAT-registered persons, whether or not they previously paid taxes in the acquisition of
their beginning inventory of goods, materials and supplies.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1177
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUEvs. LA TONDEÑA DISTILLERS, INC.,
(LTDI [now GINEBRA SAN MIGUEL])
G.R. No. 175188. July 15, 2015.*

DOCTRINE: Tax laws must be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor
of the taxpayer. The transfer of real property to a surviving corporation pursuant to a
merger is not subject to Documentary Stamp Tax (DST).

FACTS:
Respondent La Tondeña Distillers, Inc. entered into a Plan of Merger5 with
Sugarland Beverage Corporation (SBC), SMC Juice, Inc. (SMCJI), and Metro Bottled
Water Corporation (MBWC). As a result of the merger, the assets and liabilities of the
absorbed corporations were transferred to respondent, the surviving corporation.
Respondent later changed its corporate name to Ginebra San Miguel, Inc. (GSMI).
On September 26, 2001, Respondent requested for a confirmation of the taxfree
nature of the said merger from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
On November 5, 2001, the BIR issued a ruling stating that pursuant to Section
40(C)(2)10 and (6)(b)11 of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), no gain or
loss shall be recognized by the absorbed corporations as transferors of all assets and
liabilities. However, the transfer of assets, such as real properties, shall be subject to
DST imposed under Section 19613 of the NIRC.
On October 14, 2003, claiming that it is exempt from paying DST, respondent filed
with petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) an administrative claim for tax
refund or tax credit. It allegedly erroneously paid on the occasion of the merger.

ISSUE:
whether the CTA En Banc erred in ruling that respondent is exempt frompayment
of DST

HELD:
No. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation,the Supreme Court already ruledthat Section 196 of the NIRC does not
include the transferof real property from one corporation to another pursuantto a merger.

Section 196 covers all transfers and conveyances of real property for a valuable
consideration. A perusal of the subject provision would clearly show it pertains only to
sale transactions where real property is conveyed to a purchaser for a consideration.
The phrase “granted, assigned, transferred or otherwise conveyed” is qualified by the
word “sold” which means that documentary stamp tax under Section 196 is imposed on
the transfer of realty by way of sale and does not apply to all conveyances of real
property. Indeed, as correctly noted by the respondent, the fact that Section 196 refers to
words “sold,” “purchaser” and “consideration” undoubtedly leads to the conclusion that
only sales of real property are contemplated therein.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1178
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v.TOLEDO POWER COMPANY
G.R. No. 196415, December 02, 2015
TOLEDO POWER COMPANY v.COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 196451
DOCTRINE: Pursuant to Section 112 (A)42 and (D)43 of the NIRC, a taxpayer has two (2)
years from the close of the taxable quarter when the zero-rated sales were made within
which to file with the CIR an administrative claim for refund or credit of unutilized input
VAT attributable to such sales. The CIR, on the other hand, has 120 days from receipt of
the complete documents within which to act on the administrative claim. Upon receipt of
the decision, a taxpayer has 30 days within which to appeal the decision to the CTA.
However, if the 120-day period expires without any decision from the CIR, the taxpayer
may appeal the, inaction to the CTA within 30 days from the expiration of the 120-day
period.
FACTS:
Toledo Power Corporation (TPC) is a general partnership principally engaged in
the business of power generation and sale of electricity to the National Power
Corporation (NPC), Cebu Electric Cooperative III (CEBECO), Atlas Consolidated Mining
and Development Corporation (ACMDC), and Atlas Fertilizer Corporation (AFC). 4

On December 22, 2003, TPC filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
Regional District Office (RDO) No. 83 an administrative claim for refund or credit of its
unutilized input Value Added Tax (VAT) for the taxable year 2002 in the total amount of
P14,254,013.27 under Republic Act No. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act
of 2001 (EPIRA) and the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC).5

On April 22, 2004, due to the inaction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(OR), TPC filed with the CTA a Petition for Review, docketed as CTA Case No. 6961 and
raffled to the CTA First Division (CTA Division).6

In response to the Petition for Review, the CIR argued that TPC failed to prove its
entitlement to a tax refund or credit.
On November 11, 2009, the CTA Division rendered a Decision 8 partially granting
TPC's claim in the reduced amount of P7,598,279.29.9 Since NPC is exempt from the
payment of all taxes, including VAT, the CTA Division allowed TPC to claim a refund or
credit of its unutilized input VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales of electricity to NPC
for the taxable year 2002.
Subsequently, the CTA E Banc rendered a decision affirming the decision of the
CTA Division ruling that that both the administrative and the judicial claims were timely
filed.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1179
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ISSUE:
Whether or not the administrative and the judicial claims were timely and validly
filed.
HELD:
Pursuant to Section 112 (A)42 and (D)43 of the NIRC, a taxpayer has two (2) years
from the close of the taxable quarter when the zero-rated sales were made within which
to file with the CIR an administrative claim for refund or credit of unutilized input VAT
attributable to such sales. The CIR, on the other hand, has 120 days from receipt of the
complete documents within which to act on the administrative claim. Upon receipt of the
decision, a taxpayer has 30 days within which to appeal the decision to the CTA.
However, if the 120-day period expires without any decision from the CIR, the taxpayer
may appeal the, inaction to the CTA within 30 days from the expiration of the 120-day
period.

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,44 we said


that the 120+30-day period must be strictly observed except from the date of issuance of
BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on December 10, 2003, which allowed taxpayers to file a
judicial claim without waiting for the end of the 120-day period, up to the date of
promulgation of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia,
Inc.45 on October 6, 2010, where we declared that compliance with the 120+30-day
period is mandatory and jurisdictional.

In this case, TPC applied for a claim for refund or credit of its unutilized input VAT for
the taxable year 2002 on December 22, 2003. Since the CIR did not act on its application
within the 120-day period, TPC appealed the inaction on April 22, 2004. Clearly, both the
administrative and the judicial claims were filed within the prescribed period provided in
Section 112 of the NIRC.

Also, the administrative claim was not pro forma as TPC submitted documents to
support its claim for refund and even manifested its willingness to submit additional
documents if necessary.46 The CIR, however, never requested TPC to submit additional
documents. Thus, she cannot now raise the issue that TPC failed to submit the complete
documents.

Neither do we find the alleged failure of TPC to submit all relevant documents set out
in RMO No. 53-98 fatal to its claim. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Team Sual
Corporation (formerly Mirant Sual Corporation),47 we said that:
The CIR's reliance on RMO 53-98 is misplaced. There is nothing in Section 112 of
the NIRC, RR 3-88 or RMO 53-98 itself that requires submission of the complete
documents enumerated in RMO 53-98 for a grant of a refund or credit of input VAT. The
subject of RMO 53-98 states that it is a "Checklist of Documents to be Submitted by a

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1180
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Taxpayer upon Audit of his Tax Liabilities ...." In this case, TSC was applying for a grant
of refund or credit of its input tax. There was no allegation of an audit being conducted by
the CIR. Even assuming that RMO 53-98 applies, it specifically states that some
documents are required to be submitted by the taxpayer "if applicable."

Moreover, if TSC indeed failed to submit the complete documents in support of its
application, the CIR could have informed TSC of its failure, consistent with Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. (RMC) 42-03. However, the CIR did not inform TSC of the
document it failed to submit, even up to the present petition. The CIR likewise raised the
issue of TSC's alleged failure to submit the complete documents only in its motion for
reconsideration of the CTA Special First Division's 4 March 2010 Decision. Accordingly,
we affirm the CTA EB's finding that TSC filed its administrative claim on 21 December
2005, and submitted the complete documents in support of its application for refund or
credit of its input tax at the same time.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1181
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AS REPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. MANILA HOME TEXTILE, INC, THELMA LEE AND
SAMUEL LEE
G.R. No. 203057, June 06, 2016

DOCTRINE: There is grave abuse of discretion when the determination of probable


cause is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner due to passion or personal hostility,
so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law.

FACTS:
The BIR, represented herein by the CIR filed is a criminal complaint for tax evasion
and perjury against respondents Manila Home Textile, Inc. (MHI), its President Thelma
Lee (Thelma), and its Vice-President Samuel Lee (Samuel), and certain unidentified John
Does and/or Jane Does, with having violated Sections 254, 255, 257 and 267 of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).

MHI, a domestic corporation dealing in home textiles, was issued a license by the
Garments and Textiles Export Board (GTEB) to operate a Customs Bonded
Manufacturing Warehouse (CBMW) which operates by having imported raw materials
stored at the warehouse. These raw materials are duty-free provided that these are
consumed for the manufacture of its final product, which are intended for export, as the
same would have a different treatment in terms of "tax incentives" than the regular
importations. The investigation of the MHI's importations documents revealed that for the
taxable years 2001 and 2002, MHI made several importations of PVC (or polyvinyl
chloride) materials and other raw materials used in the manufacture of its end-products.
On January 14, 2005, BIR issued a Letter of Authority (LOA) to the MHI advising it that
BIR agents had been authorized to examine its books of accounts and other accounting
records for all internal revenue taxes for taxable years 1997 to 2002 and unverified prior
years all these efforts proved futile because MHI could not be located at the address
given in its Annual Income Tax Returns and other BIR records. GTEB issued a
certification to the effect that MH had been inactive since 1997; and, that the SEC issued
a certification that the MHI failed to file its General Information Sheet for the years
1998-2005 and financial statements for the period 1997-2002. It is alleged that the
MHIwillfully under-declared the amount of its purchases and/or importations for taxable,
years 2001 and 2002 by as much as P428,408,634,00 and P554,802,368.00,
respectively. This under-declaration resulted in estimated Deficiency Income Taxes in the
amount of P43,716,161,84 for taxable year 2001, and P34,561,975,40 for taxable year
2002, both inclusive of interests and increments.

Respondentsasserted that the "MHI as an independent contractor and supplier of


work, labor and other materials for the manufacture of garments and similar products like
handbags. It merely "received various consignments of raw materials, imported tax-free
and that it did not declare as purchases the foregoing importations of raw materials
because it did not buy them; that it "processed them into finished products for its foreign
customers; the rest it returned as excess raw materials.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1182
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The investigating prosecutor ruled that the complaint be dismissed andthat
criminal intent is irrelevant in a special law, however the intent to commit the prohibited
act must be established. Obviously, respondents have not been shown to have intended
to deliberately understate the importation and/or purchases in their income tax returns for
the years 2001 and 2002 considering that the raw materials were imported duty-free and
as clearly explained, respondents did not pay for the imported raw materials which were
merely consigned to them to be used in the manufacture of finished products for re-export
under CMT invoices.Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this motion was
denied and appealed to the Secretary of Justice who dismissed it also. The CA rendered
judgment dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled that the private respondents
were able to substantiate their claim that the amount they failed to include are not
purchases/importations subject to tax but consignments exclusively used for the
manufacture of its finished products for export, and hence duty-free. While it is true that
no direct evidence was presented by [p]private [respondent to prove such fact, the
records are however replete with strong circumstantial evidence inexorably leading to the
same conclusion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not all the Resolutions issued by the investigating prosecutor, the DOJ
Undersecretary, as well as the Decision and the Resolution of the CA were all tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.

HELD
Yes.Viewed in this context, it is easy to see that petitioner has clearly made out
a prima facie case or shown probable cause to indict respondents for tax evasion under
the pertinent sections of the NTRC, Indeed, we believe that by themselves the annexes
appended to the records of this case, Annexes "A" to "M", submitted in amplification of
petitioner's affidavit-complaint do already provide viable support to petitioner's plea for the
indictment of the said respondents for tax evasion. By contrast, respondents' argument in
this case is the nebulous, murky and unsubstantiated claim of "consignment" with an
alleged tax-free guaranty, not a shred or scintilla of which has been adduced in this case.
To repeat, respondents have not produced even a slip of paper purporting to prove that
the raw materials valued at hundreds of millions of pesos were delivered to them on
"consignment."

It must be borne in mind that tax exemption, which respondents obviously want or
desire to avail of in this case, are strictissimi juris. Indeed, taxation is the rule and tax
exemption the exception. Tax exemptions should be granted only by clear and
unequivocal provision of law on the basis of language too plain to be misunderstood. We
hold that in this case respondents have utterly failed to make out even a prima facie for
tax exemption in their favor.

Nevertheless, we must hasten to add at this juncture that we are here only to
determine probable cause, As to whether respondents are guilty of tax evasion and/or
perjury under the pertinent provisions of the NIRC and other penal statutes is an issue

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1183
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
that must be resolved during the trial of the criminal case/s where the quantum of proof
required is proof beyond reasonable doubt.

On top of these, we must stress that our ailing in this ease should not be construed
as an unbridled license for our tax officials to engage in fishing expeditions and
witch-hunting. They should not abuse their investigative powers and should exercise the
same within the parameters and ambit of the law. By no means is this Court signaling mat
it is opening the floodgates to inundate the courts of justice with frivolous and malicious
tax suits.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1184
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ASIA TRUST DEVELOPMENT BANK INC. vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

G.R. No. 201530 19 APRIL 2017

DOCTRINE: An application for tax abatement is considered approved only upon the
issuance of a termination letter.

FACTS:
On separate dates in February 2000, Asiatrustreceived from the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, three Formal Letters of Demand with Assessment Notices for
deficiency internal revenue taxes. Asiatrust timely protested the assessment notices.Due
to the inaction of the CIR on the protest, Asiatrust filed before the CTA a Petition for
Review. On April 19, 2005, the CIR approved Asiatrust’s Offer of Compromise of DST –
regular assessments for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1996, 1997, and 1998.
The CTA Division declared void the tax assessments for fiscal year ending June
30, 1996 for having been issued beyond the three-year prescriptive period.
On November 16, 2011, the CTA En Banc denied both appeals. It denied the
CIR’s appeal for failure to file a prior motion for reconsideration of the Amended Decision
while it denied Asiatrust’s appeal for lack of merit.

ISSUES:
Whether or not CTA en banc committed error in affirming said tax assessment

HELD:
No. An application for tax abatement is considered approved only upon the
issuance of a termination letter.In this case, Asiatrust failed to present a termination letter
from the BIR. Instead, it presented a Certification issued by the BIR to prove that it
availed of the Tax Abatement Program and paid the basic tax. It also attached copies of
its BIR
Tax Payment Deposit Slips and a letter issued by RDO Nacar, these documents,
however, do not prove that Asiatrust’s application for tax abatement has been approved.
If at all, these documents only prove Asiatrust’s payment of basic taxes, which is not a
ground to consider its deficiency tax assessment closed and terminated.
Since no termination letter has been issued by the BIR, there is no reason for the
Court to consider as closed and terminated the tax assessment on Asiatrust’s final
withholding tax for fiscal year ending June 30, 1998. Asiatrust’s application for tax
abatement will be deemed approved only upon the issuance of a termination letter, and
only then will the deficiency tax assessment be considered closed and terminated.
However, in case Asiatrust’s application for tax abatement is denied, any payment made
by it would be applied to its out ding tax liability. For this reason, Asiatrust’s allegation of
double taxation must also fail.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1185
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LEGAL ETHICS

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1186
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
LUMINZA DELOS REYES vs. JUDGE DANILO S. CRUZ andCLERK OF COURT
VGODOLFO R. GUNDRAN,of the Regional Trial Court,Branch 152, Pasig City
A.M. No. RTJ- 08-2152, January 18, 2010

DOCTRINE: A heavy caseload may excuse a judges failure to decide cases within the
reglementary period but not their failure to request an extension of time within which to
decide the case on time.
FACTS:
The case stemmed from a letter-complaint filed by complainant Luminza Delos
Reyes against respondents Judge Danilo S. Cruz and Clerk of Court V Godolfo R.
Gundran, both of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152, for dereliction of
duty. Specifically, Judge Cruz is charged with delay in the disposition of LRC Case No.
R-5740 while Clerk of Court Gundran is charged with failure to timely transmit the
records of said case.
Complainant alleged that she is the defendant in LRC Case No. R-5740 pending
before Branch 152 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. She claimed that on March
25, 2004, Judge Cruz issued an Order giving the parties 15 days within which to file their
respective memorandum after which the case would be deemed submitted for decision.
The parties complied; hence, on April 9, 2004 the case was deemed submitted for
decision.
However, it was only on July 30, 2007, or more than three years since the case
was submitted for resolution, that a decision in the said case was rendered.
Consequently, complainant argued that Judge Cruz incurred delay in disposing the case
thus should be held administratively liable therefor.
Complainant also alleged that after receipt of the adverse decision, she timely
filed on September 6, 2007 a notice of appeal and paid the corresponding appeal and
docket fees. However, despite the lapse of more than six months from the time the
appeal was filed, respondent Clerk of Court Gundran still failed to transmit the records to
the appellate court in violation of Section 10, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not both Judge Cruz and Clerk of Court V Gundran are negligent
HELD:
Yes. As regards Judge Cruz, we find him grossly inefficient in failing to decide LRC
Case No. R-5740 within 90 days from the time it was submitted for decision. He should be
mindful that failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the period fixed by law
constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to the speedy disposition
of their cases.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1187
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
As such, lower courts are given a period of 90 days only within which to decide or
resolve a case from the time it is submitted for decision. In this case, it is undisputed that LRC
Case No. R-5740 was submitted for decision on April 9, 2004 but the decision was rendered
only on July 30, 2007 or more than three years beyond the 90-day reglementary period.
A heavy caseload may excuse a judges failure to decide cases within the reglementary
period but not their failure to request an extension of time within which to decide the case on
time.
As regards respondent Clerk of Court Gundran, we find him guilty of simple neglect of
duty for failure to timely transmit the records of LRC Case No. R-5740. The duty to verify the
correctness and completeness of the records of the case rests with the respondent. However,
in this case, respondent Clerk of Court Gundran relegated the performance of his job to another
court employee without any justifiable reason.
When the records cannot be completed, respondent should indicate in his letter of
transmittal the exhibits or transcripts not included in the records being transmitted to the
appellate court, the reasons for their non-transmittal, and the steps taken or that could be taken
to have them available. Finally, it has not escaped our notice that the records were eventually
transmitted only on March 28, 2008 or more than six months after complainant filed her appeal,
or about two weeks after the instant administrative complaint was filed.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1188
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JUDGE PELAGIA DALMACIO-JOAQUIN vs. NICOMEDES DELA CRUZ, Process
Server, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan
AM. No. P-06-2241, July 10, 2012 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 06-2422-P)

DOCTRINE: Dishonesty x x x is not simply bad judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a


question of intention. In ascertaining the intention of a person accused of dishonesty,
consideration must be taken not only of the facts and circumstances which gave rise to
the act committed by the respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense
was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating
on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that
moment.

FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Judge Pelagia Dalmacio-Joaquin
(Judge Dalmacio-Joaquin) against Process Server Nicomedes Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz),
both of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan for Conduct
Unbecoming of Court Personnel and Dishonesty. In her complaint, Judge
Dalmacio-Joaquin alleged that Dela Cruz submitted belated and false return of service of
notice. In particular, she claimed that Dela Cruz received the order dated November 25,
2005 relative to Criminal Case No. 5744-96 on December 9, 2005 but served the same
to the parties only on March 23, 2006. She also alleged that Dela Cruz submitted false
returns relative to Criminal Case Nos. 04-0488 and 04-0489, No. 04-0483 and No.
05-0213. According to Judge Dalmacio-Joaquin, Dela Cruz stated in his return of service
in Criminal Case Nos. 04-0488 and 04-0489 that the accused therein was no longer
residing at her given address.
However, during pre-trial, this was denied by the accused herself who declared
in open court that she has not transferred residence. Dela Cruz likewise indicated in his
return of service that therein accused is no longer residing at his given address and that
the houses thereat have already been demolished. However, during the scheduled
pre-trial, the complainant manifested that the accused who is her neighbor still resides at
his given address and that his house is still standing thereon. Finally, as regards Criminal
Case No. 05-0213, two of the accused therein manifested during their scheduled
arraignment that they are still residing at their given address contrary to the report of
Dela Cruz. Judge Dalmacio-Joaquin also alleged that notwithstanding receipt of three
orders dated March 10, 2006, relative to Criminal Case Nos. 04-0488 and 04-0489, No.
04-0483 and No. 05-0213 directing him to explain why no administrative action should be
taken against him for submitting false returns, Dela Cruz still failed to submit any
explanation or compliance therein.
According to Judge DalmacioJoaquin, the aforesaid acts of Dela Cruz were
unbecoming, undesirable, dishonest and even more reprehensible, undermined the
integrity of the court processes and tarnished the trustworthiness of the court employees
and of the judiciary. In his comment, Dela Cruz denied the allegation that he deliberately
delayed the service of the November 23, 2005 order relative to Criminal Case N0.
5744-96. He claimed that the same was served to the parties concerned three days

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1189
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
before the scheduled hearing. Anent the returns relative to Criminal Case Nos. 04-0488
and 04- 0489, No. 04-0483, No. 05-0213, and other cases, Dela Cruz denied submitting
false returns. In view of the factual issues presented, the matter was referred to the
Executive Judge of the RTC, Malolos, Bulacan for investigation and recommendation.
For the above infractions, the Investigating Judge recommended that Dela Cruz be
suspended from employment for a period of one year. The report of the Investigating
Judge was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report
and recommendation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dela Cruz is guilty of dishonesty.
HELD:
In sum, the court finds Dela Cruz guilty not of dishonesty but only of simple
neglect of duty which is defined as the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a
required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference. Considering his
24 years of service in the judiciary and his health condition, as well as the fact that no
prejudice was caused to the party-litigants in the abovementioned cases as they were all
able to attend the scheduled hearings, we deem it proper to impose upon Dela Cruz the
penalty of suspension of three months. However, in view of Dela Cruz’s resignation on
June 10, 2008, forfeiture of his salaries of three months should instead be imposed in
lieu of suspension, to be deducted from whatever benefits he may be entitled under
existing laws.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1190
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
JASPER RODICA vs. ATTY. MANUEL LAZARO
A.C. No. 9259 March 13, 2013

DOCTRINE: The disbarment Complaint against respondent therein was motupropio


dismissed by this Court after finding "no sufficient justification for the exercise of its
disciplinary power

FACTS:
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration & Motion for Inhibition1 filed by
complainant Jasper Junno F. Rodica of our August 23, 2012 Resolution2the dispositive
portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Complaint for disbarment against
respondents Atty. Manuel "Lolong" M. Lazaro, Atty. Edwin M. Espejo, Atty. Abel M.
Almario, Atty. Michelle B. Lazaro and Atty. Joseph C. Tan is DISMISSED. Atty. Edwin M.
Espejo is WARNED to be more circumspect and prudent in his actuations. SO
ORDERED.”
In her Motion for Reconsideration & Motion for Inhibition, complainant argues that
this Court unfairly ignored the supporting affidavits attached to the Complaint and that
this Court should expressly declare whether it is lending credence to said affidavits or not
and why.
Complainant next claims that this Court deviated from usual practice and
procedure when it proceeded to resolve the disbarment Complaint after the separate
Comments of the respondents have been filed without giving her the opportunity to file a
Reply. She also faults the Court for deciding the case without first declaring the same to
have already been submitted for resolution. To her, this constitutes denial of due
process.
Lastly, complainant asserts that this Courts reference to her Affidavit supposedly
executed on July 21, 2011 as un-notarized was misplaced. She also insists that the
Courts observation that the withdrawal of pending cases should not have been limited "to
the RTC case," is erroneous considering that there were no other pending cases to
speak of at that time. She also maintains that the Court erroneously gave the impression
that the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Kalibo had already become final.
Complainant also prays for the inhibition of the justices who participated in this
case in the belief that they have been biased against her.

ISSUE:
Whether or notthe complainant was denied due process

HELD:
NO. Complainants contention that she was denied due process because she was
not allowed to file a Reply deserves scant consideration. This is equally true of

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1191
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
complainants argument that this Court deviated from usual procedure when it resolved
the disbarment Complaint without first declaring the case to have been submitted for
resolution. The Court will outrightly dismiss a Complaint for disbarment when on its face,
it is clearly wanting in merit. Thus, in International Militia of People Against Corruption &
Terrorism v. Chief Justice Davide, Jr. (Ret.) the Court, after finding the Complaint
insufficient in form and substance, dismissed the same outright for utter lack of merit. It
took the same stand in Battad v. Senator Defensor-Santiago, where the disbarment
Complaint against respondent therein was motupropio dismissed by this Court after
finding "no sufficient justification for the exercise of its disciplinary power." In this case,
the Court did not dismiss outright the disbarment Complaint. In fact, it even required the
respondents to file their respective Answers. Then, after a judicious study of the records,
it proceeded to resolve the same although not in complainants favor. Based on the
Complaint and the supporting affidavits attached thereto, and the respective Comments
of the respondents, the Court found that the presumption of innocence accorded to
respondents was not overcome. Moreover, the Court no longer required complainant to
file a Reply since it has the discretion not to require the filing of the same when it can
already judiciously resolve the case based on the pleadings thus far submitted. And
contrary to complainants mistaken notion, not all petitions or complaints reach reply or
memorandum stage. Depending on the merits of the case, the Court has the discretion
either to proceed with the case by first requiring the parties to file their respective
responsive pleadings or to dismiss the same outright. Likewise, the Court can proceed to
resolve the case without need of informing the parties that the case is already submitted
for resolution.
The Motion to Inhibit is denied for lack of basis. "An inhibition must be for just and
valid reason. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground x xx to
inhibit, especially when the charge is without basis." In this case, complainant's
imputation that her Complaint was decided by the magistrates of this Court with extreme
bias and prejudice is baseless and clearly unfounded.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1192
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
ROLANDO VIRAY vs. ATTY. EUGENIO T. SANICAS

A.C. No. 7337 September 29, 2014

DOCTRINE: The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of


fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their
fiduciary relationship

FACTS:

Complainant alleges that he engaged the services of respondent relative to a


labor case he filed against Ester and Teodoro Lopez III. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor
of complainant. Subsequently, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued relative to aforesaid
decision. During the implementation of said writ, however, complainant discovered that
respondent had already collected the total amount of ₱95,000.00 from spouses Lopez.
Respondent received said amount. Complainant also discovered that respondent
misrepresented to spouses Lopez that he is authorized to receive payments on his
behalf, when in truth and in fact he is not. Respondent admits that he received
₱95,000.00 from spouses Lopez on installments, but denies that he was not authorized
to accept it. He explains that complainant agreed to pay him additional attorney's fees
equivalent to 25o/o of the total monetary award, on top of the attorney's fees that may be
awarded by the labor tribunal, and to refund all expenses respondent incurred relative to
the case. IBP recommended that the respondent be meted the penalty of two (2) years
suspension.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for his failure to promptly
account to his client the funds received in the course of his professional engagement and
return the same upon demand.

HELD:

The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity


and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary
relationship. Specifically, Rule 16.01 of the Code imposes upon the lawyer the duty to
account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.03
thereof, on the other hand, mandates that a lawyer shall deliver the funds of his client
when due or upon demand.

The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney's fees on the money in his hands
collected for his client does not relieve him from the obligation to make a prompt
accounting. Moreover, a lawyer has no right to unilaterally appropriate his client's money
for himself by the mere fact alone that the client owes him attorney's fees.In sum,
respondent's failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1193
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
upon demand violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity and
moral soundness, and warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1194
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
DARIA O. DAGINGvs. ATTY. RIZ TINGALON L. DAVIS
A.C. No. 9395 November 12, 2014

DOCTRINE: A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as
counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client.

FACTS:
Complainant was the owner and operator of Nashville Country Music Lounge.
She leased from Benjie Pinlac (Pinlac) a building space located at No. 22 Otek St.,
Baguio City where she operated the bar. Complainant received a Retainer Proposal from
Davis & Sabling Law Office signed by respondent and his partner Atty. Amos Saganib
Sabling (Atty. Sabling). This eventually resulted in the signing by the complainant, the
respondent and Atty. Sabling of a Retainer Agreement. That complainant entered into a
Retainer Agreement dated March 7, 2005 with respondent's law firm. This agreement
was signed by the respondent and attached to the rollo of this case. And during the
subsistence of said Retainer Agreement, respondent represented and defended
Balageo, who was impleaded as one of the defendants in the ejectment case
complainant filed before the MTCC of Baguio City. In fact, respondent filed on behalf of
said Balageo an Answer with Opposition to the Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction dated July 11, 2005. It was only on August 26, 2005 when
respondent withdrew his appearance for Balageo.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of representing clients who have
conflicting interest.

HELD:
Yes, a lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as
counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. The
prohibition against representing conflicting interests is absolute and the rule applies even
if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting
interests.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1195
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
DAVAO IMPORT DISTRIBUTORS, INC., vs. ATTY. JOHNNY LANDERO,
A.C. No. 5116. April 13, 2015

DOCTRINE: Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Code of Professional Responsibility;The Supreme


Court (SC) has already held in People v. Sevilleno, 305 SCRA 519 (1999) and reiterated
in Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Atty. Alpon, Jr., 452 SCRA 668 (2005), every lawyer to
serve his client with utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in this regard renders him
administratively liable.

Respondent needs lecturing that sympathy towards a client does not justify his act of
stating in his motion forextension that he received the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Decision at a later date to make it appear that the filing of the said motion is well within the
period for filing an appeal.

FACTS:
On this Complaint for Disbarment where complainant asserts that respondent’s
actuations of (1) not appearing in the pretrial of the case, (2) not availing of the
legal remedies against the dismissal of the Complaint due to non suit, and (3) failing to file
a petition for review, constitute unprofessional behavior or misconduct and violations of
Canon 12 of the CPR, which merit disciplinary action, if not, disbarment.

On the respondent’s defense, Pandili allegedly took from respondent the case
folder
despite the latter’s warning that they only have 15 days to file a Petition for Review with
the CA. It was only after 30 days that Pandili returned to him and begged that he file an
appeal, again, for fear that he would be terminated by complainant. Out of pity, and
despite knowledge of the expiration of the period for filing an appeal, respondent still filed
a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Lawyer’s actions is justified by sympathy for his client.

HELD:
No, Given his years of experience in the legal profession, respondent should be
well aware that “[a] lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. Thus, while he owes
his entire devotion to the interest and causes of his client, he must ensure that he acts
within the bounds of reason and common sense, always aware that he is an instrument of
truth and justice. More importantly, as an officer of the court and its indispensable partner
in the sacred task of administering justice, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer
than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to its processes.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1196
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Thus, any act on his part which tends visibly to obstruct, pervert or impede and degrade
the administration of justice constitutes professional misconduct calling for the exercise
of disciplinary action against him.”

Canon 18 of the CPR requires every lawyer to serve his client with utmost
dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him and his negligence in this regard renders him administratively liable.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1197
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
PATROCINIA H. SALABAOvs.ATTY. ANDRES C. VILLARUEL, JR.
A.C. No. 8084. August 24, 2015.
DOCTRINE: While the Supreme Court agrees that lawyers owe their entire devotion to
the interest of their clients, they should not forget that they are also officers of the court,
bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

FACTS:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Patrocinia H. Salabao (complainant)
against Atty. Andres C. Villaruel, Jr. (respondent) for abuse of court processes in
violation of Canons 10 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. After
respondent filed his Answer we referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation

She narrates as follows: In 2002, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 162, Pasig City
which tried Civil Case No. 65147 issued its resolution in her favor. In order to delay the
case, Respondent brought the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals under C.A.G. R.
CV No. 76360. The Court of Appeals decided in her favor on January 13, 2004 but
Respondent again filed an appeal before the Supreme Court under G.R. No. 167413.
Lumberio lost and the case became final and executory.

Undeterred, respondent tried to defer the execution of the decision of the RTC,
Branch 162, by bringing to the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
under C.A.G. R. S.P. No. 97564. When rebuffed, he again appealed to the Supreme
Court under G.R. No. 181243 sans a clear or new arguments other than what he had
presented before the Court of Appeals. Still, Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari
seeking to annul the 29 November 2007 Order of the RTC before the Court of Appeals
under C.A.G.R. S.P. No. 101992 which was however dismissed. From hereon, there was
not stopping the Respondent. Once again he filed a new complaint before the RTC of
Mauban, Quezon, Branch 64 under Civil Case No. 080666M. Apart from this,
Respondent filed several Motion, Inhibition and Contempt that were meant to delay the
resolution of the case. He likewise filed an administrative case against Judge Briccio
Ygaña of RTC Branch 153, Taguig City. Complainant then complained that Respondent
had done more than enough to suppress her rights as a winning litigant and filed this
case for abuse of processes pursuant to Rule 10.03 and Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 and
Rule12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility(CPR).

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent should be meted with suspension for the abuse of
judicial process (or in his point of view exhausting the remedies)

HELD:
Yes. From the nature and sheer number of motions and cases filed, it is clear that
respondent’s intention was to delay the execution of the final judgment. But even
assuming for the sake of argument that respondent was only doing his duty as a lawyer
to exhaust all legal remedies to protect the interest of his client, his other actions belie his
claim of good faith. Respondent filed a civil case for damages with the Regional Trial

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1198
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
Court of Mauban, Quezon in what was clearly a case of forum shopping. Moreover,
respondent filed three Motions to Inhibit against the three judges hearing these cases,
and even a motion to cite the sheriff in contempt of court who was simply carrying out his
duty to execute the decision.

It is quite clear that respondent has made a mockery of the judicial process by
abusing Court processes, employing dilatory tactics to frustrate the execution of a final
judgment, and feigning ignorance of his duties as an officer of the court.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1199
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
WILSON CHUA vs. ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ,
A.C. No. 9880 November 28, 2016
DOCTRINE: A lawyer's negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the
relationship of counsel and client may cause delay in the administration of justice and
prejudice the rights of a litigant particularly his client. Thus, from the perspective of the
ethics of the legal profession, a lawyer's lethargy in carrying out his duties to his client is
both unprofessional and unethical."
FACTS:
Wilson Chua entered into a retainership agreement with Atty. Diosdado B.
Jimenez for the latter to handle all his legal problems against Excellent Quality,
Alexander Ty, Benny Lao, Clarita Tan. and Amosup. He entrusted to him all the pertinent
documents and gave P235,127.00 for the necessary filing fees. For the last seven years
prior, he had never attended a single hearing on any case that he had assigned to him,
except those involving Clarita Tan and Union Bank where he was a defendant. On 24
September 2003, he terminated Atty. Jimenez’s legal services for failure to file the
necessary cases and filed a complaint for grave misconduct, malpractice, dishonesty,
and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar against him with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline on October 20, 2003. On 23 October
2003, the IBP directed Atty. Jimemez to file his Answer within 15 days, but he requested
for additional 15 days within which to comply. He filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars and
another Urgent Motion to File Answer, but the IBP denied. Wilson subsequently moved
that Atty. Jimenez be declared in default which the IBP granted and set the mandatory
conference on April 28, 2004. In the meantime, Atty. Jimenez moved for the lifting of the
default order attaching thereto his Answer with Counterclaim. Atty. Jimenez alleged that
he withheld the filing of the complaints due to Wilson’s non-payment of his professional
fees. He also denied receiving the amount of P235,127.00 from complainant. By way of
Reply, Wilson insisted that Atty. Jimenez had received P235,127.00 intended for
payment of filing fees as evidenced by photocopies of checks payable to him and cash
vouchers showing details of said payment. After the termination of the mandatory
conference, both parties were directed to submit their verified position papers. Wilson
complied, while Atty. Jimenez failed to submit his position paper. The IBP Investigating
Commissioner found Atty. Jimenez guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 as well as Canon 22, Rule
22.02. It recommended suspension from the practice of law for a period of 3 months and
that he be ordered to return the pertinent files and documents to complainant. The IBP
Board of Governors resolved to adopt the findings of the Investigating Commissioner,
but modified the recommended penalty to suspension of 1 year from the practice of law
and to return the files and documents of the complainant, and the amounts duly
supported by receipts. Atty. Jimenez filed a motion for reconsideration which was
granted and reinstated the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner.

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1200
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
The records of the case was thereafter transmitted by the IBP to Supreme Court
pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD:
In particular, the Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 15, states: A lawyer
shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his
clients. Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez fell short in being fair and loyal to his client, Wilson
Chua.
Rules 18.03 further states: A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. He did not even file the
cases for which he was engaged and upon which he collected filing fees.
Rule 18.04 continues: A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information. He was
utterly lacking in this responsibility to his client as he unfairly kept him in the dark,
misleading him for seven years,
While the same Code of Professional Responsibility recognizes the right of a
lawyer to have a lien over the funds and property of his client as may be necessary to
satisfy his lawful fees, Rule 16.03 demands that "a lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon demand." This is a reiteration of Rule 16.01,
which states that "a lawyer shall account for all money and property collected or received
for or from the client."
"A lawyer should be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to him in his
professional capacity. Consequently, when a lawyer receives money from a client for a
particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to his client, showing
that he spent the money for the purpose intended." He miserably disregarded the
mandate of accountability expected of him.
His issue on the supposed non-payment of his fees should have prompted him to
seek communication with Wilson and resolve such matter. He should not have used the
same as a ground for his inaction insofar as the cases referred to him were concerned.
"A lawyer's negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the relationship of
counsel and client may cause delay in the administration of justice and prejudice the
rights of a litigant particularly his client. Thus, from the perspective of the ethics of the
legal profession, a lawyer's lethargy in carrying out his duties to his client is both
unprofessional and unethical." "Indeed, under their sacred oath, lawyers pledge not to
delay any person for money or malice."

Albano, Alcazaren, Asensi, Cabañgon, Castillo, Catindig, Coronel, Corporal, Corpuz, De la Cruz, De Mesa, Echiverri, Page 1201
Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois
------ NOTHING FOLLOWS -----

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Espina, Francisco, Gloria, Inguillo, Lastimosa, Lumberio, Marquez, Martinez, Palad, Ramirez, Rañigo, Reyes,
Rodriguez, Sandoval, Santos, Sy, Tabugan, Tecson, Valiente, Valois

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