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physical theory of a “group mind” (Parsons, 1968:ix). Until the 1940s, U.S.
reviews and comments on his work were strongly hostile and disparaging
(Hinkle, 1960). Only with a wave of popularization during the 1940s did
Durkheim receive his present image (Alpert, 1939; Parsons, 1968; Merton,
1934).
While Durkheim is now a preeminent theoretical figure for American
sociology, his portrait in secondary sources is narrow and distorted. Durk-
heim’s popularizers in the 1930s and 1940s minimized or ignored political,
religious, methodological, and philosophical elements of his thought that were
unpopular in the United States and that conflicted with the individualism and
voluntaristic nominalism dominant in the United States (HinMe, 1960). Such
elements included his syndicalist quasi-socialism (Lukes, 1973:322-329), the
more controversial aspects of his analysis of religion, and his claim to have
founded a science of morals (Wallwork, 1972). Overall, the popularizers pro-
duced an ahistorical, positivist, Comtian theorist practicing synchronic analysis
of social integration (Bellah, 1959).
Selective attention to elements of Durkheim’s thought was buttressed by
a highly selective picture of the sources and origins of his thought. This pic-
ture broke Durkheim’s connections with neo-Hegelian, neo-Kantian, social-
ist, and historicist currents in his own milieu. The new Durkheim is thus dis-
continuous with Weberian Verstehen and Marxist praxis as well as with such
other trends within contemporary sociology as symbolic interactionism,
phenomenology, structuralism, conflict theory, and historical sociology.
There have been important theoretical attempts to reconnect Durkheimian
analysis to each of these five movements (for example, Falding, 1982: 725-733;
Coenen, 1981; Glucksmann, 1974; Therborn, 1976; Bellah, 1959). But these
attempts have been frustrated by the dominant, relatively one-dimensional
conception of Durkheim and his relation to his predecessors.
The present paper discusses parallels and breaks between Hegel and
Durkheim. The comparison can help to reestablish continuity between Durk-
heimian sociology and other approaches currently contrasted to it: first,
Weber and Marx; second, other approaches in contemporary sociology; final-
ly, work in neighboring disciplines. Since Hegel is often misunderstood, part
one not only shows key parallels with Durkheim but also reviews aspects of
Hegel’s thought. The interest of the parallels does not depend on establishing
the direct influence of Hegel on Durkheim. Nevertheless, the figures and
movements that intervened between Hegel and Durkheim show that such
influence cannot be ruled out.
Hegel’s system was encyclopedic in scope, entailing enormous internal
tensions. He synthesized a great many contrary lines of argument (“contra-
dictions”) into what he termed “absolute knowledge. ” Those who rejected
HEGELIAN INFLUENCE UPON DURKHEIM 3
the final synthesis could and did use these lines of argument to fuel opposed
positions. For example, it is well known that Hegel’s immanent conception of
spirit allows both theistic (Fackenheim, 1967; Crites, 1972) and atheistic in-
terpretations (Kojeve, 1969; Lukacs, 1978). Not long after Hegel’s death,
followers split over using his system to attack or defend organized religion
(Toews, 1980). Similarly, people drew on Hegel to defend opposed political
standpoints, from chauvinist celebration of the nation-state through liberal
limitations on the state (for example, T. H. Green) to socialist calls for its
abolition. Finally, people could and did use Hegelian arguments to defend
opposed positions about law, ethics, science, the intelligibility of history, the
interpretation of meaning, and many other issues. Not only Hegel’s notorious
style, but also the fact that internal tensions allowed opposing interpretations
make Hegel nearly as controversial now as a century ago (Kaufmann, 1966;
Lukks, 1978; Taylor, 1975).
The scope and internal tensions that make it hard to delineate Hegel’s in-
fluence with precision also. made his indirect influence far more extensive and
important than his direct influence. If we measure Hegel’s impact simply by
how many people are styled “Hegelians,” it hardly extended to the twentieth
century. When Hegel died in Germany, perhaps a half-dozen philosophers
edited and explicated his works. At the end of the century, Dilthey’s writings
signaled something of a revival, merging with neo-Kantian strands of thought
and providing the main background to Weber. Outside Germany, several
dozen major theorists, mostly philosophers, produced four main Hegelian and
neo-Hegelian movements at staggered intervals in Eastern Europe, the United
States, Italy, and Britain. They created few “Hegelians” except in philosophy,
but Hegel was much more influential than is evident from any listing of
“Hegelian” philosophers. Even in philosophy his influence came in the form
of rebellions against him. Five groups of authors to whom Durkheim was
deeply indebted owed the great part of their common ideas to Hegelian in-
fluence: ( 1) neo-Kantian ethical philosophers such as Boutroux, Renouvier,
and Hamelin; (2) idealist-positivist literary figures in debate with religion such
as Cousin, Renan, Taine, and Smith; (3) socialists and especially the “social-
ists of the chair” such as Schmoller, Wagner, and Schaffle; (4) the “folk-
psychologist” Wundt and his followers; and ( 5 ) the historicist current of Ger-
man scholarship associated with Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert, Tonnies, and
others. The Durkheimian theoretical synthesis depended importantly on the
common stock of ideas that he found among these figures. They are key to his
relation to Marx, Weber, and other contemporary tendencies. The first sec-
tion of this essay will outline ten social doctrines that Durkheim shared with
Hegel; these are schematized in Figure 1. However, an equally important
way in which Hegel served as the common starting point of twentieth-century
4 PETERKNAPP
theorists stems from the fact that key elements of sociology derived from nega-
tions or refutations of one or another element of Hegel’s system. Thus, part
two of this essay notes ten ruptures separating Hegel and Durkheim.
Hegel and Parallels wth Durkheim
As new disciplines emerged in humanities and social science, their pro-
ponents felt stifled by Hegel’s systematics. The goal of Hegel’s system was to
represent human knowledge as a unified whole, each part related to each
other. But each part of his system became enmeshed in heated religious, politi-
cal, and methodological controversies. The scope of the system and the con-
troversies extended Hegelian ideas into the new disciplines. Although the
ideas did not dominate any of these fields, they often coalesced with powerful
critiques to establish major, persisting problem areas in many fields. From
distant disciplines like religion, art, history, ethics, and political theory,
Hegelian constructs reverberated upon sociology a generation later. Durk-
heim’s generation was preoccupied with the creation of sociology as a spe-
cialized discipline (Bendix, 197l), but its central territory was the crossroads
of numerous lines of intellectual influence, each importantly shaped by Hegel
in the previous generation.
One of these lines of influence is Hegel’s concept of Geist. Geist is a rela-
tive of such distinctive Durkheimian concepts as social integration, the col-
lective conscience, collective representations, society as a sui generis reality,
homo duplex, the constraint exercised by social facts, and the transition from
mechanical to organic solidarity. The very different language in which Hegel
and Durkheim state their social theories often masks the similarity of what
they say. Whatever the correct philosophical interpretation of Ceist, it has very
often a straightforward sociological meaning. For the social sciences, Geist is
usually most usefully conceived as culture, especially political culture (Shklar,
1976:42ff.; Plamanatz, 1963:150-204).
Hegel saw Geist as prior to and constitutive of individuals. First, the con-
cept formulates the insight that objective, supraindividual processes shape and
constrain human thought and action. Durkheim made the concept of objec-
tive, supraindividual processes the center of sociology as a discipline, and he
always acknowledged the crucial importance of studies by historians, “folk-
psychologists,” and the “socialists of the chair” in establishing this insight
(for example, 1887:37-42, 113-125; 1889; 1897a; 1897b; compare Giddens,
1970).
Second, Hegel used the concept of Geist to formulate and popularize ex-
isting forms of social analysis. The language of Geist provided a terminology
for the unity of culture and social structure, especially language, law, cus-
tom, morality, kinship, politics, religion, and science. The postulate or issue
HEGELIAN INFLUENCE UPON DURKHEIM 5
Figure 1
Commonalities and Breaks between Durkheim and Hegel.
as well as both cognitive and practical (or normative) theories. At the other ex-
treme, the concept of absolute spirit refers basically to cultural products that
transcend the social structure within which they arise. Hegel subdivided
absolute spirit into art, religion, and philosophy. He made each the subject of
multivolume cycles of lectures that, during the nineteenth century, had a wide
impact on literary criticism, theology, history, and philosophy. Studies stem-
ming from these-lectures were a major source of Durkheim’s insight that
humans become fully human only through participation in nested, inter-
related, historically developing social and cultural structures. Sandwiched be-
tween the analyses of subjective and of absolute spirit and central to any direct
Hegelian influence on Durkheim is the analysis of objective spirit. Objective spirit
is, roughly, the realm of social institutions and obligatory, sanctioned be-
havior, especially law. While Hegel and Durkheim sharply disagreed on some
basic political questions, they also shared important views stemming from the
analysis of spirit.
A seventh Hegelian view crucial for Durkheim is the view that the thrust
of western history is the development of freedom in law that is rational and
universal (allgemeine: also universalistic, popular, general, and common).
Eighth, Hegel viewed the basis of liberty as obedience to law. Humans can
only be free insdfar as they have mastered themselves through law. Thus,
Durkheim argued, in a passage equally distinctive of Hegel, “Nothing is
falser than this antagonism too often presented between legal authority and in-
dividual liberty. Quite the contrary, liberty (we mean genuine liberty, which
it is society’s duty to have respected) is the product of regulation” (1933:3).
These similarities in Hegel’s and Durkheim’s overall formulations are grounded
upon a host of more specific commonalities in their detailed views on the im-
portance of Roman property law, Christianity, and other historical sources of
western political beliefs and on the function of punishment, custom, and or-
ganizations in maintaining them.
For example, Hegel and Durkheim both viewed the basic problem of
modernity as the creation of authoritative intermediary bodies between the
individual and the state. Important differences separate Hegel’s analysis of the
corporation (1952: 152- 155) from the quasi-syndicalist proposals closing
Durkheim’s major early works (1933: 1-31, 406-409; 1951: 378-392; 1957:
1-41). Nevertheless, both men sought to modify the medieval corporation to
provide normative mediation between the individual and the modern state.
Finally, tenth, it can be argued that the central theme of Hegel’s philos-
ophy as a whole is the breakdown of religious, intellectual, organizational,
moral, and political bases of community in modern society. The fundamental
concepts of alienation, splitting, and contradiction and the antinomies be-
tween subject and object, individual and universal, finite and infinite, truth
8 PETERKNAPP
and certainty, etc., may be related to this central issue (Cullen 1979). How-
ever one reads Hegel’s famous dialectic, most theorists believe its main topic
is the splitting of an immediate whole into antagonistic parts and their later
reconciliation. For example, the Phenomenology d Spirit portrays some thirty-
three scientific, philosophical, artistic, political, moral, or religious configura-
tions or gestalts. Each of these is subject to irresolvable internal conflicts, and
after about fifteen pages each self-destructs, creating a new configuration. A
recurrent theme in Hegel’s analyses is the breakup of medieval society repre-
sented by the Reformation and the French Revolution.
Durkheim’s main lifetime theoretical concern likewise centered on the
breakup of social integration, in egoism and anomie. While he adopted neither
the terms nor the constructs of Hegel, he did depend upon critiques of in-
dividualism that extended from the far right to the far left of the political spec-
trum (Lukes, 1973:206-207, 330-354). Durkheim’s work on individualism
and anomie resembles important aspects of Hegel because of their common
concern with the breakdown of normative integration. The fundamental
analysis of the shift from mechanical to organic solidarity as well as major
aspects of the historical analyses on which it is based are prefigured in Hegel’s
analyses (for example, that of the relation of individuality and universalism
within civil society).
Breaks between Hegel and Durkheim
The preceding argument is not intended to substitute a Hegelian Durk-
heim for a Comtian one. Rather, it attempts to underscore conceptual parallels
important to the development of social theory in the nineteenth century that
are also important to the integration of contemporary sociology. One reason
the relationships have been overlooked is that it is taken for granted in today’s
history of social theory that Durkheim was almost exclusively influenced b y
theorists in the French tradition (Parsons, 1968:307; Lukes, 1973:90-94). The
idea that French influence is preeminent in Durkheim’s thought is central to
Parsons’ argument that there occurred a convergence to voluntarism from
independent traditions (1968: 11-12; but compare Durkheim, 1953:xiv and
contrast Pope, 1973).
Durkheim refers to Hegel rarely and disparagingly (for example, 1957:
54). Partly this reflected a number of sharp oppositions between the two. In
addition to the commonalities between Hegel and Durkheim discussed above,
Figure 1 also schematizes ten oppositions between them, briefly discussed
below.
First, methodologically, Durkheim had a central and lifelong aim to
guarantee sociology as a specialized, empirical, academic discipline (Bendix,
1971). Hence he directed sharp polemics against any speculative system that
HEGELIAN INFLUENCE UPON DURKHEIM 9
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