1|Article 694 to Article 707 - NUISANCE
ARTICLE 694 especially sensitive characteristics will not render the house
1. G.R. NO. 166744, November 02, 2006
AC ENTERPRISES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. FRABELLE
PROPERTIES CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
DOCTRINE: Private and public nuisance; definition – The
term “nuisance” is so comprehensive that it has been
applied to almost all ways which have interfered with the
rights of the citizens, either in person, property, the
enjoyment of property, or his comfort; A private nuisance is
one which violates only private rights and produces damage
to but one or a few persons while a nuisance is public when
it interferes with the exercise of public right by directly
encroaching on public property or by causing a common
injury, an unreasonable interference with the right common
to the general public. In this case, the noise generated by an
airconditioning system is considered a private nuisance.
Noise emanating from air-con units not nuisance per se –
Noise becomes actionable only when it passes the limits of
reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the locality and
of the needs of the maker to the needs of the listener; Injury
to a particular person in a peculiar position or of especially
sensitive characteristics will not render the noise an
actionable nuisance. Whether or not the noise is a nuisance
is an issue to be resolved by the courts.
Test to determine noise as a nuisance – The test is whether
rights of property, of health or of comfort are so injuriously
affected by the noise in question that the sufferer is
subjected to a loss [i.e. Actual Physical Discomfort]which
goes beyond the reasonable limit imposed upon him by the
condition of living, or of holding property, in a particular
locality in fact devoted to uses which involve the emission
of noise although ordinary care is taken to confine it within
reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of property of another
owner who, though creating a noise, is acting with
reasonable regard for the rights of those affected by it.
Action to abate private nuisance; incapable of pecuniary
estimation – an action to abate private nuisance, even
wehere the plaintiff asks for damages is one incapable of
pecuniary estimation
FACTS:
AC enterprises (Petitioner) is a corporation owns a 10-
storey building in Makati City. Frabelle (Respondent) is a
condominium corporation who's condominium
development is located behind petitioner. Respondent
complained of the 'unbearable” noise emanating from the
blower of the air-conditioning units of petitioner.
ISSUES:
(1) Is it a nuisance as to be resolved only by the courts in the
due course of proceedings or a nuisance per se?
(2) Is an action for abatement of a private nuisance, more
specifically noise generated by the blower of an air-
conditioning system, even if the plaintiff prays for damages,
one incapable of pecuniary estimation?
(3) What is the determining factor when noise alone is the
cause of complaint?
HELD:
(1) It is a nuisance to be resolved only by the courts in the
due course of proceedings; the noise is not a nuisance per
se. Noise becomes actionable only when it passes the limits
of reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the locality
and of the needs of the maker to the needs of the listener.
Injury to a particular person in a peculiar position or of
an actionable nuisance–– in the conditions, of present
living, noise seems inseparable from the conduct of many
necessary occupations.
(2) Yes, the action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation
because the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money.
(3) The determining factor is not its intensity or volume; it is
that the noise is of such character as to produce actual
physical discomfort and annoyance to a person o fordinary
sensibilities rendering adjacent property less comfortable
and valuable.
FACTS:
AC ENTERPRISES, INC., owns the 10-storey Feliza Building
located along Herrera Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City.
The building was subdivided into commercial/office units
which were leased to private persons and entities. There are
36 blowers from 18 air-cooled type air-conditioning units in
the building, four blowers on each floor, from the 2nd to the
10th floors. The blowers are aesthetically covered by vertical
concrete type baffles.
Respondent Frabelle Properties Corporation (FPC), is the
developer of Frabella I Condominium (Frabella I), a 29-storey
commercial/residential condominium located at 109 Rada
Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City.
Rada and Herrera streets lie parallel to each other such that
Feliza Building is situated at the back of Frabella I and is
separated by Rodriguez Street, a two-lane road approximately
12 meters wide. The exhaust of the blowers from the air
conditioning units at the Feliza Building were directed towards
the rear of Frabella. I.
FRABELLE wrote AC ENTERPRISES demanding that the latter
abate the daily continuous, intense and ''unbearable noise"
and the hot air blast coming from the 36 blowers in the Feliza
Building.
The letter was rejected hence another letter but still rejected.
FRABELLE requested that the 36 blowers of Feliza Building be
tested by the NCR EMB- DENR and it received a report from
the EMB that the noise generated by the blowers of Feliza
Building is beyond the legal allowable level under Section 78(b)
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 984, as amended. FPC had the
blowers tested anew by the EMB on December 8, 1995 and
July 1, 1996 with the same results. Despite repeated demands,
petitioner refused to act on the matter.
Frabelle I Condominum Corporation, filed a complaint against
petitioner with the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) for the
abatement of noise and/or air pollution and damages with a
plea for injunctive relief.
In a letter dated March 7, 2002,FRABELLE requested Makati
City Mayor Jejomar C. Binay not to renew or to cancel the
Mayor's License and Business Permits of Feliza Building and to
compel petitioner to comply with the law. Copies of the letter
were forwarded to Engr. Nelson B. Morales, the City Building
Official, and Atty. Enrico Lainez, City Attorney.
Engr. Morales acted on the letter and wrote the EMB on April
30, 2002, requesting the investigation of the complaint relative
2|Article 694 to Article 707 - NUISANCE
to the noise from the air conditioning units of the Feliza
Building.
The Panel submitted its Investigation Report, stating that the
passing of vehicles along the street and the blowers of nearby
building contributed to the ambient noise quality in the area.
The report stated that since DENR Administrative Order No. 30
devolved the functions of the DENR on the abatement of noise
nuisance to the Local Government Unit, the case should be
endorsed to the City Government of Makati for appropriate
action.
Engr. Morales informed respondent that based on the result of
investigation conducted by the DENR Management Bureau on
Sound Pressure Levels (SPL) measured on the different
sampling stations, the excess in the noise quality standard
within the vicinity does not come from the air conditioning
system with 36 blowers of Feliza Building alone; there were
other prevailing factors to consider," which is beyond the
control of said building and since the final result has been
rendered and resolved by the concerned government agency,
it is properly advised that further inquiry or anything involving
a sound environment process which is not sanctioned by this
office, be addressed directly to the said agency. "
FRABELLE filed a complaint for the abatement of nuisance with
damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
and permanent injunction before the RTC of Malabon City
against petitioner.
Before the RTC court could resolve the motion to dismiss of
petitioner, the PAB resolved, on July 29, 2003 to dismiss the
complaint filed by Frabelle. The matter was then endorsed to
the LGU concerned in accordance with Section IV, Rule III of
PAB Resolution 1-C, Series of 1997, as amended. It noted that
based on the pleadings of the parties, and the testimonial
evidence, the case is more of a nuisance, and "[e]xcept where
such would constitute a pollution case, local government units
shall have the power to abate nuisance within their respective
areas pursuant to the Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code of the
Philippines), Republic Act 7160 (the Local Government Code),
Presidential Decree 856 (the Code of Sanitation of the
Philippines), DENR Department Administrative Order No. 30,
Series of 1992 and other pertinent laws, rules and regulations"
without prejudice to the institution of a pollution case, upon
proof that respondent had failed to comply with DENR
standards and the presentation of other evidence that would
warrant the PAB to take cognizance of and assert jurisdiction
over the case.
Thereafter, the RTC denied petitioner's motion to dismiss in an
Order dated September 15, 2003.
The court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner and the latter sought: relief from the CA via a
petition for certiorari.
On September 21, 2004, the CA rendered judgment denying
the petition.
The CA ruled that the action of respondent was one for the
abatement of a nuisance within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the RTC.
It agreed with respondents' contention that, under R.A. No.
7160, the LGUs are not divested of its jurisdiction over an
action for the abatement of a nuisance. Section 17, sub-
paragraphs (b)(3)(iii) in relation to (b)(4) of the law pertain to
the enforcement of pollution control law and not to the
abatement of nuisance.
While DENR A.O. No. 30 devolved to the LGUs the abatement
of noise and other forms of nuisance as defined by law, this
does not necessarily deprive the courts to hear and decide
actions pertaining thereon.
It was thus proper for respondent to bring the case before the
court since it had already sought the intercession of
Barangay San Lorenzo, Makati Commercial Estate Corporation
(MACEA), DENR, and the Makati City Government to no avail.
Petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari, praying for the reversal of the CA decision and
resolution.
ISSUE:
Who has jurisdiction over the complaint?
RULING:
RTC.
The RTC Has Jurisdiction Over the Action of the Respondent for
Abatement Of Nuisance
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and whether the
tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over such action are to be
determined from the material allegations of the complaint, the
law in force at the time the complaint is filed, and the character
of the relief sought irrespective of whether plaintiff is entitled
to all or some of the claims averred. Jurisdiction is not affected
by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant in an answer
to the complaint or a motion to dismiss the same. Otherwise,
jurisdiction would be dependent almost entirely upon the
whims of defendants.
We agree with the ruling of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that
as gleaned from the material averments of the complaint as
well as the character of the relief prayed for by respondent in
its complaint before the RTC, the petition is one for the
judicial abatement of a private nuisance, more specifically
the noise generated by the blowers of the air conditioning
system of the Feliza Building owned by petitioner, with a plea
for a writ of preliminary and permanent injunction, plus
damages.
Such action of respondent is incapable of pecuniary estimation
because the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money. Although respondent prayed for
judgment for temperate or moderate damages and exemplary
damages, such claims are merely incidental to or as a
consequence of, the principal relief sought by respondent. An
action incapable of pecuniary estimation is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTC as provided in Batas Pambansa
Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691.[31] In Tatel
v. Municipality of Virac,[32] the Court ruled that a simple suit for
abatement of a nuisance is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance, now the RTC.
Article 694 of the New Civil Code defines a nuisance as follows:
Art. 694. A nuisance is any act., omission, establishment,
business, condition of property, or anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public
highway or street, or any body of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
3|Article 694 to Article 707 - NUISANCE
The term "nuisance" is so comprehensive that it has been
applied to almost all ways which have interfered with the
rights of the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment
of his property, or his comfort.[33] According to Article 695 of
the Civil Code, a nuisance may be either public or private:
Art. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance
affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable
number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance,
danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal. A private
nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing definition.
A private nuisance has been defined as one which violates only
private rights and produces damages to but one or a few
persons.[34] A nuisance is public when it interferes with the
exercise of public right by directly encroaching on public
property or by causing a common injury.[35] It is an
unreasonable interference with the right common to the
general public.
Under Article 705 of the New Civil Code, a party aggrieved by
a private nuisance has two alternative remedies: (1) a civil
action; or (2) abatement, without judicial proceedings. A
person injured by a private nuisance may abate it as provided
in Article 706:
Art. 706. Any person injured by a private nuisance may abate
it by removing, or if necessary by destroying the thing which
constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of the
peace or doing unnecessary injury. However, it is
indispensable that the procedure for extrajudicial abatement
of a public nuisance by a private person be followed.
A private nuisance action is the remedy for an invasion of a
property right. On the other hand, the action for the
abatement of a public nuisance should be commenced by the
city or municipality.[37] A private person may institute an action
for the abatement of a public nuisance in cases wherein he
suffered a special injury of a direct and substantial character
other than that-which the general public shares.[38] The district
health officer shall determine whether or not abatement,
without judicial proceedings, is the best remedy against a
public nuisance.
In the present case, respondent opted to file an action in the
RTC for abatement of the private nuisance complained of and
damages under Article 697 of the New Civil Code for its past
existence.
One has an action to recover personal damages arising from a
private nuisance. The gist of the action is the unreasonable
interference by the defendant with the use and enjoyment of
properties. Indeed, petitioner may be compelled to adopt the
necessary measures to reduce or deaden the nuisance
emanating from the blowers of the airconditioning system at
the Feliza Building.
We agree with petitioner's contention that, under Section
447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is
empowered to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or
abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing,
however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a
particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its
condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact,
that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a
nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial
condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in
its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be
determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a
thing be in fact, a nuisance due to the manner of its operation,
that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of
the Sangguniang Bayan.
However, the LGUs have no power to declare a particular
thing as a nuisance unless such as thing is a nuisance per se;
nor can they effect the extrajudicial abatement of that as a
nuisance which in its nature or use is not such. Those things
must be resolved by the courts in the ordinary course of law.
Whether or not noise emanating from a blower of the air
conditioning units of the Feliza Building is nuisance is to be
resolved only by the court in due course of proceedings. The
plaintiff must prove that the noise is a nuisance and the
consequences thereof. Noise is not a nuisance per se. It may
be of such a character as to constitute a nuisance, even though
it arises from the operation of a lawful business, only if it
affects injuriously the health or comfort of ordinary people in
the vicinity to an unreasonable extent. Injury to a particular
person in a peculiar position or of especially sensitive
characteristics will not render the noise an actionable
nuisance. In the conditions of present living, noise seems
inseparable from the conduct of many necessary occupations.
Its presence is a nuisance in the popular sense in which that
word is used, but in the absence of statute, noise becomes
actionable only when it passes the limits of reasonable
adjustment to the conditions of the locality and of the needs
of the maker to the needs of the listener. What those limits
are cannot be fixed by any definite measure of quantity or
quality; they depend upon the circumstances of the particular
case. They may be affected, but are not controlled, by zoning
ordinances. The delimitation of designated areas to use for
manufacturing, industry or general business is not a license to
emit every noise profitably attending the conduct of any one
of them.
The test is whether rights of property, of health or of comfort
are so injuriously affected by the noise in question that the
sufferer is subjected to a loss which goes beyond the
reasonable limit imposed upon him by the condition of living,
or of holding property, in a particular locality in fact devoted
to uses which involve the emission of noise although ordinary
care is taken to confine it within reasonable bounds; or in the
vicinity of property of another owner who, though creating a
noise, is acting with reasonable regard for the rights of those
affected by it.
Commercial and industrial activities which are lawful in
themselves may become nuisances if they are so offensive to
the senses that they render the enjoyment of life and property
uncomfortable. The fact that the cause of the complaint must
be substantial has often led to expressions in the opinions that
to be a nuisance the noise must be deafening or loud or
excessive and unreasonable. The determining factor when
noise alone is the cause of complaint is not its intensity or
volume. It is that the noise is of such character as to produce
actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of
ordinary sensibilities, rendering adjacent property less
comfortable and valuable. If the noise does that it can well be
said to be substantial and unreasonable in degree; and
reasonableness is a question of fact dependent upon all the
circumstances and conditions. There can be no fixed standard
as to what kind of noise constitutes a nuisance.
The courts have made it clear that in every case the question
is one of reasonableness. What is a reasonable use of one's
property and whether a particular use is an unreasonable
invasion of another's use and enjoyment of his property so as
to constitute a nuisance cannot be determined by exact rules,
4|Article 694 to Article 707 - NUISANCE
but must necessarily depend upon the circumstances of each
case, such as locality and the character of the surroundings,
the nature, utility and social value of the use, the extent and
nature of the harm involved, the nature, utility and social value
of the use or enjoyment invaded, and the like.
Persons who live or work in thickly populated business districts
must necessarily endure the usual annoyances and of those
trades and businesses which are properly located and carried
on in the neighborhood where they live or work. But these
annoyances and discomforts must not be more than those
ordinarily to be expected in the community or district, and
which are incident to the lawful conduct of such trades and
businesses. If they exceed what might be reasonably expected
and cause unnecessary harm, then the court will grant
relief.[45]
2. is respondent a real party in interest? Yes.
A person injured by a nuisance may bring an action in his own
name and in behalf of others similarly affected to abate the
same.[58] One who has an interest in the property affected such
as the owner thereof or fix interest therein are proper parties
as plaintiffs.[59] Possession alone of real estate is sufficient to
sustain an action to recover damages from the maintenance of
a nuisance by the adjoining property in such manner as to
injure the enjoyment of the former.
In the present case, respondent made the following allegations
in its complaint below:
[Every time] the Feliza Building's air conditioning system is
turned on, all or a good number of the 36 blowers are made to
operate simultaneously. The operation of the Feliza's blowers
generates a continuous defeaning unbearable vibrating and
stressful noise affecting the tenants of Frabella I
Condominium. Hot air is also blasted from the [Feliza Building's
blowers to the direction of the Frabella 1 Condominium.
The tenants occupying the 5th to the 16th floors of the Frabella
1 Condominium facing Feliza Building are directly subjected to
a daily continuous intense noise and hot air blast coming from
the blowers of the [10-storey] Feliza Building. Some are
tenants of plaintiff, who have complained to plaintiff about the
matter. Tenants who could not bear the nuisance any longer
have vacated their units, and as a result, many units of plaintiff
have remained vacant, and unoccupied or uninhabitable
thereby depriving plaintiff with rental income that it should
have otherwise be receiving.
Defendant did not perform any remedial or rectification works
to lower the noise being generated by the blowers;
As a consequence of such unbearable, hot air and stressful
noise, the occupants of the Frabella I, including the tenants of
plaintiff, have been and still are, prevented from enjoying
peaceful and comfortable use of their property thereby forcing
them to vacate and or to transfer elsewhere.
Notwithstanding the foregoing results, repeated
requests/demands from the plaintiff and recommendation of
the DENR, MACEA and MMDA to abate nuisance, the
defendant has ignored and still continues to ignore such
requests/demands/recommendation.
Appended to respondent's complaint are its letters of demand
to the petitioner for the latter to abate the nuisance
complained of, as well as the results of the tests conducted by
the DENR showing that the noise generated by the blowers of
the Feliza Building is beyond the legally allowable level
standards under Section 78 of P.D. No. 984.
By filing a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
the complaint does not state a sufficient cause of action for
abatement of nuisance and damages, petitioner hypothetically
admitted the material allegations of the complaint. A plain
reading of the material averments therein and its appendages
will readily show that respondent had a cause of action for
abatement of a private nuisance and for damages.
Respondent is the real party-in-interest as party plaintiff in the
complaint below because it owned several units in Frabelle I
and, as a result of the defeaning and unbearable noise from
the blowers of the airconditioning units of the Feliza Building
owned by petitioner, many tenants of the respondent vacated
their units. The units remained unoccupied, thereby depriving
respondent of income. Some of the tenants even threatened
to sue respondent on account of the noise from the Feliza
Building. In fine, respondent is obliged to maintain its tenants
in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the units.[60]
Under Article 697 of the New Civil Code, the aggrieved party is
entitled to damages for the present and past existence of a
nuisance.[61] He is entitled to actual or compensatory
damages[62] or indemnification for damages inclusive of the
value of the loss suffered and profits which respondent failed
to obtain.
Liability for nuisance may be imposed upon one who sets in
motion the force which entirely caused the tortuous act; upon
one who sets in motion a force or a chain of events resulting in
the nuisance. In an action for damages resulting from a
nuisance, responsibility arises not only from the creator of the
nuisance but from its continued maintenance as well. One is
entitled to damages on account of the conduct by another of
his business which unreasonably and substantially interferes
with the quiet enjoyment of his premises by himself or of his
tenants. It is sufficient to maintain an action for abatement of
a nuisance if his buildings is rendered valueless forthe purpose
it was devoted.
A negligent act may constitute a nuisance. An intentional act
may also constitute a nuisance. A nuisance may be formed
from a continuous, known invasion, where, after complaint,
and notice of damage, the defendant continues to offend and
refuses to correct or discontinue the nuisance. In such a case,
the nuisance is deemed intentional.[65] An unreasonable use,
perpetrated and uncorrected even after complaint and notice
of damage is deemed intentional.[66]
In this case, as alleged in the complaint, the subject nuisance
had been existing continuously since 1995 and, despite
repeated demands by respondent, petitioner intransigently
refused to abate the same.
2. CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY
AKLAN,
G.R. No. 211356; September 29, 2014
DOCTRINE: Based on law and jurisprudence, the office of the
mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the closing and
demolition of establishments. This power granted by the LGC,
as earlier explained, We believe, is not the same power
devolved in favor of the LGU under Sec. 17 (b)(2)(ii), as above-
quoted, which is subject to review by the DENR. The fact that
the building to be demolished is located within a forestland
under the administration of the DENR is of no moment, for
what is involved herein, strictly speaking, is not an issue on
environmental protection, conservation of natural resources,
5|Article 694 to Article 707 - NUISANCE
and the maintenance of ecological balance, but the legality
or illegality of the structure. Rather than treating this as an
environmental issue then, focus should not be diverted from
the root cause of this debacle compliance.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer
of Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc.
(Boracay West Cove). On January 7, 2010, the company
applied for a zoning compliance with the municipal
government of Malay, Aklan. While the company was already
operating a resort in the area, and the application sought the
issuance of a building permit covering the construction of a
three-storey hotel over a parcel of land measuring 998 sqm.
located in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay Island,
Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land Use
Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in
favor of Boracay West Cove.
Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010, the
Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s
application on the ground that the proposed construction site
was within the “no build zone” demarcated in Municipal
Ordinance 2000-131 (Ordinance).
Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the
Mayor but despite follow up, no action was ever taken by the
respondent mayor. A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the
municipal government, enjoining the expansion of the resort,
and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan
issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition
of Boracay West Cove’s hotel.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for
injunctive relief with the CA Alleging that the order was issued
and executed with grave abuse of discretion.
PETITIONER CONTENTION: The hotel cannot summarily be
abated because it is not a nuisance per se, given the hundred
million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture. And the
Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court
order before proceeding with the demolition.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The demolition needed no court
order because the municipal mayor has the express power
under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal
of illegally constructed buildings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a judicial proceeding be conducted first before
the LGU can order the closure and demolition of the property
in question.
RULING:
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular
thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a nuisance per se.
Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per
accidens, however, we still find in this case that the LGU may
nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is
because, in the exercise of police power and the general
welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected
to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the
government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property,
lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general
welfare.
Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are
concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the requirement of
due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition.
One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which
authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through
their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. Under
existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only
relative to its function as the executive official of the town; it
has also been endowed with authority to hear issues involving
property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective
order or resolution thereon.20 Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b)
(3) (vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to order the
closure and removal of illegally constructed establishments for
failing to secure the necessary permits.
3. LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner, vs.
JAC LINER, INC., respondent
G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005
FACTS:
Respondent JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier
operating buses which ply various routes to and from Lucena
City, assailed City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 as
unconstitutional on the ground that these constituted an
invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private
property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition
against monopolies.
Ordinance No. 1631
AN ORDINANCE GRANTING THE LUCENA GRAND
CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., A FRANCHISE TO
CONSTRUCT, FINANCE, ESTABLISH, OPERATE AND
MAINTAIN A COMMON BUS-JEEPNEY TERMINAL
FACILITY IN THE CITY OF LUCENA
Ordinance No. 1778
AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ENTRANCE TO THE
CITY OF LUCENA OF ALL BUSES, MINI-BUSES AND
OUT-OF-TOWN PASSENGER JEEPNEYS AND FOR THIS
PURPOSE, AMENDING ORDINACE NO. 1420, SERIES
OF 1993, AND ORDINANCE NO. 1557, SERIES OF 1995
The above-mentioned ordinances, by granting an exclusive
franchise for twenty five years, renewable for another twenty
five years, to Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., its
successors or assigns, for the construction and operation of
one common bus and jeepney terminal facility in Lucena City,
to be located outside the city proper, were professedly aimed
towards alleviating the traffic congestion alleged to have been
caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals
within the city.
Further, the subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all
bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena, including those
already existing, and allow the operation of only one common
terminal located outside the city proper, the franchise for
which was granted to petitioner. The common carriers plying
routes to and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close
down their existing terminals and use the facilities of
petitioner.
Respondent, who had maintained a terminal within the city,
was one of those affected by the ordinances.
6|Article 694 to Article 707 - NUISANCE
The petitioner via petition for review, sought the wisdom of
Supreme Court, assailing the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power
when it enacted City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778
RULING:
. SPS. ROSARIO and WILSON UY, WILSON UY as attorney-in-fact
As with the State, the local government may be
considered as having properly exercised its police power only
if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the
object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a
concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the
objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena,
involve public interest warranting the interference of the
State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police
power is thus present
But the ordinances go beyond what is reasonably necessary to
solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the compulsory
use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the
users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such measure is
unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court.
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede
the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the
existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to
petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve
the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium
between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised
within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with
due deference to rights.
As for petitioner’s claim that the challenged ordinances have
actually been proven effective in easing traffic congestion:
Whether an ordinance is effective is an issue different from
whether it is reasonably necessary. It is its reasonableness,
not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If
the constitutionality of a law were measured by its
effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified
whenever they happen to be effective.
Hence, Ordinance No. 1631 is valid, having been issued in the
exercise of the police power of the City Government of Lucena
insofar as the grant of franchise to the Lucena Grand Central
Terminal, Inc., to construct, finance, establish, operate and
maintain common bus-jeepney terminal facility in the City of
Lucena.
Sec. 4(c) of Ordinance No. 1631 is illegal and ultra vires
because it contravenes the provisions of Republic Act No.
7160, otherwise known as “The Local Government Code”.
City Ordinance No. 1778 is null and void, the same being also
an ultra vires act of the City Government of Lucena arising from
an invalid, oppressive and unreasonable exercise of the police
power.
ARTICLE 695
1. G.R. No. 192861; June 30, 2014
LINDA RANA vs. TERESITA LEE WONG, SPS. SHIRLEY LEE ONG
and RUBEN ANG ONG
G.R. No. 192862
of TERESITA LEE WONG, and SPS. SHIRLEY LEE ONG and
RUBEN ANG ONG vs. SPS. REYNALDO and LINDA RANA
Doctrine:
It is a standing jurisprudential rule that unless a
nuisance is a nuisance per se, it may not be summarily abated.
Aside from the remedy of summary abatement which should
be taken under the parameters stated in Articles 704 (for public
nuisances) and 706 (for private nuisances) of the Civil Code, a
private person whose property right was invaded or
unreasonably interfered with by the act, omission,
establishment, business or condition of the property of another
may file a civil action to recover personal damages. Abatement
may be judicially sought through a civil action therefor if the
pertinent requirements under the Civil Code for summary
abatement, or the requisite that the nuisance is a nuisance per
se, do not concur. To note, the remedies of abatement and
damages are cumulative; hence, both may be demanded.
FACTS:
Teresita Lee Wong and Spouses Shirley and Ruben Ang Ong
(Wong, et. al) are co-owners pro-indiviso of a residential land
situated in Peace Valley Subdivision, Lahug, Cebu City, abutting
a 10-meter wide subdivision road (subject road).
On the opposite side of the subject road, are the adjacent lots
of Spouses Wilson and Rosario Uy (Sps. Uy) and Spouses
Reynaldo and Linda Rana (Sps. Rana). The said lots follow a
rolling terrain with the Rana property standing about 2 meters
higher than and overlooking the Uy property, while the Wong-
Ong property is at the same level with the subject road.
Sometime in 1997, Sps. Rana elevated and cemented a portion
of the subject road that runs between the Rana and Wong-Ong
properties (subject portion) in order to level the said portion
with their gate. They likewise backfilled a portion of the
perimeter fence separating the Rana and Uy properties
without erecting a retaining wall that would hold the weight of
the added filling materials.
The matter was referred to the Office of the Barangay Captain
of Lahug as well as the Office of the Building Official of Cebu
City (OBO), but to no avail.
Wong, et al. then filed a Complaint for Abatement of Nuisance
with Damages against Sps. Rana before the RTC, seeking to: (a)
declare the subject portion as a nuisance which affected the
ingress and egress of Wong and Sps. Ong to their lot; (b)
declare the subject backfilling as a nuisance; (c) compel Sps.
Rana to restore the subject portion to its original condition; (d)
compel Sps. Rana to remove the backfilling materials along
Sps. Uy’s perimeter fence and repair the damage to the fence;
and (e) pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses, and costs of suit.
7|Article 694 to Article 707 - NUISANCE
In their Answer Sps. Rana countered that prior to the
construction of their residence, there was no existing road and
they merely developed the subject portion which abuts their
gate in view of the rolling terrain. They claimed that Wong and
Sps. Ong do not have any need for the subject portion because
their property is facing an existing road. They likewise denied
having undertaken any backfilling along the boundary of the
Uy property considering the natural elevation of their own
property, which renders backfilling unnecessary.
After the filing of Sps. Rana’s Answer, Wong, et al., in turn, filed
a Motion for Leave to be Allowed to Bring in Heavy Equipment
for the intermediate development of the Wong-Ong property
with a view to the use of the subject road as access to their lot.
Notwithstanding Sps. Rana’s opposition, the RTC granted
Wong, et al.’s motion in a November 27, 1997 Order (Order).
Despite the limited tenor of the Order, Wong, et al., proceeded
to level the subject portion, which, in the process, hampered
Sps. Rana’s ingress and egress to their residence, resulting too
to the entrapment of their vehicle inside their garage.
Feeling aggrieved, Sps. Rana, filed a Supplemental Answer,
praying for: (a) the restoration of the soil, boulders, grade,
contour, and level of the subject portion; and (b) payment of
moral damages, actual and consequential damages, and
exemplary damages.
Meanwhile, Sps. Rana filed with another branch of the same
trial court a Complaint for Recovery of Property and Damages
against Sps. Uy. They alleged that Sps. Uy encroached upon an
11-sq. m. portion along the common boundary of their
properties. Their demands for rectification as well as barangay
conciliation efforts were, however, ignored. Thus, they prayed
that Sps. Uy be ordered to remove their fence along the
common boundary and return the encroached portion, as well
as to pay moral damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation
expenses. After the filing of Sps. Rana’s complaint, the
separate cases were consolidated.
In response thereto, Sps. Uy filed an Answer with
Counterclaim, averring that while they encroached around 3
sq. m. of the Rana property, Sps. Rana intruded into 7 sq. m. of
their property. Hence, they posited that they had "a bigger
cause than that of Sps. Rana in so far as encroachment is
concerned." Accordingly, they prayed for the dismissal of Sps.
Rana’s complaint with counterclaim for damages, attorney’s
fees, and litigation expenses.
The RTC found that: (a) Sps. Rana, without prior consultation
with the subdivision owner or their neighbors, developed to
their sole advantage the subject portion consisting of one-half
of the width of the 10-meter subject road by introducing filling
materials, and rip rapping the side of the road; (b) the said act
denied Wong and Sps. Ong the use of the subject portion and
affected the market value of their property; (c) Sps. Uy have
no intention of using the subject portion for ingress or egress
considering that they built a wall fronting the same; and (d)
Wong, et al.’s manner of enforcing the November 27, 1997
Order caused damage and injury to Sps. Rana and amounted
to bad faith.
In view of these findings, the RTC declared that the parties all
acted in bad faith, and, therefore, no relief can be granted to
them against each other.
Separately, however, the RTC found that the backfilling done
by Sps. Rana on their property exerted pressure on the
perimeter fence of the Uy property, thereby constituting a
nuisance. As such, the former were directed to construct a
retaining wall at their own expense. Meanwhile, the RTC,
despite having adopted the findings of Atty. Reuel T. Pintor – a
court-appointed commissioner who determined that Sps. Uy
encroached the Rana property by 2 sq. m – dismissed both the
complaint and counterclaim for damages because of the
failure of both parties to substantiate their respective claims
of bad faith against each other.
Dissatisfied, the parties filed separate appeals with the CA.
The CA rendered a Decision affirming the RTC.
The parties filed separate motions for reconsideration which
were denied.
Hence, the recourse to the SC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the RTC errs in (a) not finding Wong and Sps.
Uy guilty of malice and bad faith both in instituting the Civil
Cases and in erroneously implementing the November 27,
1997 Order, and (b) failing or refusing to grant the reliefs
prayed for. (Sps. Rana)
Whether or not the RTC errs in (a) applying the in pari delicto
doctrine against the parties and failing to abate the nuisance,
and (b) not finding Sps. Rana guilty of bad faith in instituting
the Civil Cases and ordering them to pay damages. (Wong, et.
al)
RULING:
The petitions are partly meritorious.
For Abatement of Nuisance and Damages.
Under Article 694 of the Civil Code, a nuisance is defined as
"any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of
property, or anything else which: (1) Injures or endangers the
health or safety of others; or (2) Annoys or offends the senses;
or (3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4)
Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public
highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) Hinders or
impairs the use of property." Based on case law, however, the
term "nuisance" is deemed to be "so comprehensive that it has
been applied to almost all ways which have interfered with the
rights of the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment
of his property, or his comfort."
Article 695 of the Civil Code classifies nuisances with respect
to the object or objects that they affect. In this regard, a
nuisance may either be: (a) a public nuisance (or one which
"affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable
number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance,
danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal"); or (b) a
private nuisance (or one "that is not included in the foregoing
definition" [or, as case law puts it, one which "violates only
private rights and produces damages to but one or a few
persons"]).
Jurisprudence further classifies nuisances in relation to their
legal susceptibility to summary abatement (that is, corrective
action without prior judicial permission). In this regard, a
nuisance may either be: (a) a nuisance per se (or one which
"affects the immediate safety of persons and property and
may be summarily abated under the undefined law of
necessity"); or (b) a nuisance per accidens (or that which
8|Article 694 to Article 707 - NUISANCE
"depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its
existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without
due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide
whether such a thing does in law constitute a nuisance.")
It is a standing jurisprudential rule that unless a nuisance is a
nuisance per se, it may not be summarily abated. Aside from
the remedy of summary abatement which should be taken
under the parameters stated in Articles 704 (for public
nuisances) and 706 (for private nuisances) of the Civil Code, a
private person whose property right was invaded or
unreasonably interfered with by the act, omission,
establishment, business or condition of the property of
another may file a civil action to recover personal damages.
Abatement may be judicially sought through a civil action
therefor if the pertinent requirements under the Civil Code for
summary abatement, or the requisite that the nuisance is a
nuisance per se, do not concur. To note, the remedies of
abatement and damages are cumulative; hence, both may be
demanded.
With respect to the elevated and cemented subject portion,
the Court finds that the same is not a nuisance per se. By its
nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the
community. It was built primarily to facilitate the ingress and
egress of Sps. Rana from their house which was admittedly
located on a higher elevation than the subject road and the
adjoining Uy and Wong-Ong properties. Since the subject
portion is not a nuisance per se (but actually a nuisance per
accidens as will be later discussed) it cannot be summarily
abated.
As such, Wong, et al.’s demolition of Sps. Rana’s subject
portion, which was not sanctioned under the RTC’s November
27, 1997 Order, remains unwarranted.
Resultantly, damages ought to be awarded in favor of Sps.
Rana particularly that of (a) nominal damages – for the
vindication and recognition of Sps. Rana’s right to be heard
before the court prior to Wong, et al.’s abatement of the
subject portion (erroneously perceived as a nuisance per se) –
and (b) temperate damages – for the pecuniary loss owing to
the demolition of the subject portion, which had been
established albeit uncertain as to the actual amount of loss.
Sps. Rana’s entitlement to the above-mentioned damages,
however, is precluded by the damage they themselves have
caused Wong, et al. in view of their construction of the subject
portion.
As the records establish, Sps. Rana, without prior consultation
with Wong, et al. and to their sole advantage, elevated and
cemented almost half of the 10-meter wide subject road. As
homeowners of Peace Valley Subdivision, Wong, et al.
maintain the rights to the unobstructed use of and free
passage over the subject road. By constructing the subject
portion, Sps. Rana introduced a nuisance per accidens that
particularly transgressed the aforesaid rights. Thus, for the
vindication and recognition of Wong, et al.’s rights, Sps. Rana
should be similarly held liable for nominal damages.
Under Article 2216 of the Civil Code, courts have the discretion
to determine awards of nominal and temperate damages
without actual proof of pecuniary loss, as in this case.
Assessing the respective infractions of the parties herein, the
Court finds it prudent to sustain the CA’s verdict offsetting the
damage caused by said parties against each other.
Inapplicability of the in Pari Delicto Principle
The principle of in pari delicto provides that when two parties
are equally at fault, the law leaves them as they are and denies
recovery by either one of them. However, this principle does
not apply with respect to inexistent and void contracts.
Clearly, no void or inexistent contract is herein at issue.
As for the subject backfilling touching the perimeter fence of
the Uy property, records show that the said fence was not
designed to act as a retaining wall but merely to withhold
windload and its own load.
Both the RTC and the CA found the subject backfilling to have
added pressure on the fence, consequently endangering the
safety of the occupants of the Uy property, especially
considering the higher elevation of the Rana property.
With these findings, the Court thus agrees with the courts a
quo that there is a need for Linda Rana to construct a retaining
wall which would bear the weight and pressure of the filling
materials introduced on their property.
For Recovery of Property.
The Court finds that the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s
dismissal thereof.
Settled is the rule that in order that an action for the recovery
of property may prosper, the party prosecuting the same need
only prove the identity of the thing and his ownership thereof.
In the present cases, the Report of the court-appointed
commissioner, showed that Sps. Uy’s perimeter fence intruded
on 2 sq. m. of the Rana property. Both the RTC and the CA
relied upon the said report; thus, absent any competent
showing that the said finding was erroneous, the Court sees no
reason to deviate from the conclusions reached by the courts
a quo. Having sufficiently proven their claim, Sps. Rana are,
therefore entitled to the return of the 2 sq. m. encroached
portion.
Corollary thereto, compliance by Linda Rana with the directive
to build a retaining wall on their property shall be held in
abeyance pending return of the encroached portion.
Expenses
Lastly, considering that neither of the parties was able to
successfully prove (a) their claims for malicious prosecution,
(b) their entitlement to moral and exemplary damages, and (c)
the attendance of any of the circumstances under Article 2208
of the Civil Code, their respective claims for attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses against each other are also denied.
2. G.R. No. L-18390 August 6, 1971
PEDRO J. VELASCO, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC CO., WILLIAM SNYDER, its President; JOHN
COTTON and HERMENEGILDO B. REYES, its Vice-Presidents;
and ANASTACIO A. AGAN, City Engineer of Quezon
City, defendants-appellees.
FACTS:
Appellant Velasco bought from the People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation three (3) adjoining lots situated at the
corner of South D and South 6 Streets, Diliman, Quezon City.
Subsequently, the appellant sold two (2) lots to the Meralco,
9|Article 694 to Article 707 - NUISANCE
but retained the third lot, which was farthest from the street-
corner, whereon he built his house.
Appellee company started the construction of the sub-station
in question and finished it the following November, without
prior building permit or authority from the Public Service
Commission (Meralco vs. Public Service Commission, 109 Phil.
603). It was constructed at a distance of 10 to 20 meters from
the appellant's house. The company built a stone and cement
wall at the sides along the streets but along the side adjoining
the appellant's property it put up a sawale wall but later
changed it to an interlink wire fence.
It is undisputed that a sound unceasingly emanates from the
substation. Whether this sound constitutes an actionable
nuisance or not is the principal issue in this case.
Plaintiff-appellant Velasco contends that the sound
constitutes an actionable nuisance under Article 694 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, reading as follows:
A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business
condition of property or anything else which:
(1) Injuries or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses;
xxx xxx xxx
because subjection to the sound since 1954 had disturbed the
concentration and sleep of said appellant, and impaired his
health and lowered the value of his property.
After trial, as already observed, the court below dismissed the
claim of the plaintiff, finding that the sound of substation was
unavoidable and did not constitute nuisance; that it could not
have caused the diseases of anxiety neurosis, pyelonephritis,
ureteritis, lumbago and anemia.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sound coming from the electric substation
of MERALCO constitutes nuisance.
RULING:
YES. While no previous adjudications on the specific issue have
been made in the Philippines, our law of nuisances is of
American origin, and a review of authorities clearly indicates
the rule to be that the causing or maintenance of disturbing
noise or sound may constitute an actionable nuisance (V. Ed.
Note, 23 ALR, 2d 1289). The basic principles are laid down
in Tortorella vs. Traiser & Co., Inc., 90 ALR 1206:
A noise may constitute an actionable nuisance, Rogers vs.
Elliott, 146 Mass, 349, 15 N.E. 768, 4 Am. St. Rep. 316, Stevens
v. Rockport Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486, 104 N.E. 371, Ann. Cas.
1915B, 1954, Stodder v. Rosen Talking Machine Co., 241 Mass.
245, 135 N. E. 251, 22 A. L. R. 1197, but it must be a noise which
affects injuriously the health or comfort of ordinary people in
the vicinity to an unreasonable extent. Injury to a particular
person in a peculiar position or of specially sensitive
characteristics will not render the noise an actionable
nuisance. Rogers v. Elliott, 146 Mass. 349, 15 N. E. 768, 4 Am.
St. Rep. 316. In the conditions of present living noise seems
inseparable from the conduct of many necessary occupations.
Its presence is a nuisance in the popular sense in which that
word is used, but in the absence of statute noise becomes
actionable only when it passes the limits of reasonable
adjustment to the conditions of the locality and of the needs
of the maker to the needs of the listener. What those limits are
cannot be fixed by any definite measure of quantity or quality.
They depend upon the circumstances of the particular case.
They may be affected, but are not controlled, by zoning
ordinances. Beane v. H. J. Porter, Inc., 280 Mass. 538, 182 N. E.
823, Marshal v. Holbrook, 276 Mass. 341, 177 N. E.
504, Strachan v. Beacon Oil Co., 251 Mass. 479, 146 N. E. 787.
The delimitation of designated areas to use for manufacturing,
industry or general business is not a license to emit every noise
profitably attending the conduct of any one of them. Bean v.
H. J. Porter, Inc.. 280 Mass. 538, 182 N. E. 823. The test is
whether rights of property of health or of comfort are so
injuriously affected by the noise in question that the sufferer
is subjected to a loss which goes beyond the reasonable limit
imposed upon him by the condition of living, or of holding
property, in a particular locality in fact devoted to uses which
involve the emission of noise although ordinary care is taken
to confine it within reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of
property of another owner who though creating a noise is
acting with reasonable regard for the rights of those affected
by it. Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486, 104 NE
371, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1054.
With particular reference to noise emanating from electrical
machinery and appliances, the court, in Kentucky & West
Virginia Power Co. v. Anderson, 156 S. W. 2d 857, after a review
of authorities, ruled as follows:
There can be no doubt but that commercial and industrial
activities which are lawful in themselves may become
nuisances if they are so offensive to the senses that they
render the enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable. It is
no defense that skill and care have been exercised and the
most improved methods and appliances employed to prevent
such result. Wheat Culvert Company v. Jenkins, 246 Ky. 319, 55
S. W. 2d 4; 46 C.J. 683, 705; 20 R. C. L. 438; Annotations, 23 A.
L. R. 1407; 90 A. L. R. 1207. Of course, the creation of trifling
annoyance and inconvenience does not constitute an
actionable nuisance, and the locality and surroundings are of
importance. The fact that the cause of the complaint must be
substantial has often led to expressions in the opinions that to
be a nuisance the noise must be deafening or loud or excessive
and unreasonable. Usually it was shown to be of that
character. The determinating factor when noise alone is the
cause of complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that the
noise is of such character as to produce actual physical
discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities,
rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable. If
the noise does that it can well be said to be substantial and
unreasonable in degree; and reasonableness is a question of
fact dependent upon all the circumstances and conditions. 20
R. C. L. 445, 453; Wheat Culvert Company v. Jenkins, supra.
There can be no fixed standard as to what kind of noise
constitutes a nuisance. It is true some witnesses in this case
say they have been annoyed by the humming of these
transformers, but that fact is not conclusive as to the
nonexistence of the cause of complaint, the test being the
effect which is had upon an ordinary person who is neither
sensitive nor immune to the annoyance concerning which the
complaint is made. In the absence of evidence that the
complainant and his family are supersensitive to distracting
noises, it is to be assumed that they are persons of ordinary
and normal sensibilities. Roukovina v. Island Farm Creamery
Company, 160 Minn. 335, 200 N. W. 350, 38 A. L. R. 1502.
In Wheat Culvert Company vs. Jenkins, supra, we held an
injunction was properly decreed to stop the noise from the
operation of a metal culvert factory at night which interfered
with the sleep of the occupants of an adjacent residence. It is
true the clanging, riveting and hammering of metal plates
10 | A r t i c l e 6 9 4 t o A r t i c l e 7 0 7 - N U I S A N C E
produces a sound different in character from the steady hum
or buzz of the electric machinery described in this case. In the
Jenkins case the noise was loud, discordant and intermittent.
Here it is interminable and monotonous. Therein lies the
physical annoyance and disturbance. Though the noise be
harmonious and slight and trivial in itself, the constant and
monotonous sound of a cricket on the earth, or the drip of a
leaking faucet is irritating, uncomfortable, distracting and
disturbing to the average man and woman. So it is that the
intolerable, steady monotony of this ceaseless sound, loud
enough to interfere with ordinary conversation in the dwelling,
produces a result generally deemed sufficient to constitute the
cause of it an actionable nuisance. Thus, it has been held the
continuous and monotonous playing of a phonograph for
advertising purposes on the street even though there were
various records, singing, speaking and instrumental, injuriously
affected plaintiff's employees by a gradual wear on their
nervous systems, and otherwise, is a nuisance authorizing an
injunction and damages. Frank F. Stodder, et al. v. Rosen
Talking Machine Company, 241 Mass. 245, 135 N. E. 251, 22 A.
L. R. 1197.
Instructions from the Director of Health, samplings of the
sound intensity were taken by Dr. Jesus Almonte using a sound
level meter and other instruments. Within the compound of
the plaintiff-appellant, near the wire fence serving as property
line between him and the appellee, on 27 August 1957 at 11:45
a.m., the sound level under the sampaloc tree was 46-48
decibels, while behind Velasco's kitchen, the meter registered
49-50; at the same places on 29 August 1957, at 6:00 a.m., the
readings were 56-59 and 61-62 decibels, respectively; on 7
September 1957, at 9:30 a.m., the sound level under the
sampaloc tree was 74-76 decibels; and on 8 September 1957
at 3:35 in the morning, the reading under the same tree was
70 decibels, while near the kitchen it was 79-80 decibels.
Several measurements were also taken inside and outside the
house (Exhibit "NN-7, b-f"). The ambient sound of the locality,
or that sound level characteristic of it or that sound
predominating minus the sound of the sub-station is from 28
to 32 decibels. (T.s.n., 26 March 1958, pages 6-7)
Thus the impartial and objective evidence points to the sound
emitted by the appellee's substation transformers being of
much higher level than the ambient sound of the locality. The
measurements taken by Dr. Almonte, who is not connected
with either party, and is a physician to boot (unlike appellee's
electrical superintendent Buenafe), appear more reliable. The
conclusion must be that, contrary to the finding of the trial
court, the noise continuously emitted, day and night,
constitutes an actionable nuisance for which the appellant is
entitled to relief, by requiring the appellee company to adopt
the necessary measures to deaden or reduce the sound at the
plaintiff's house, by replacing the interlink wire fence with a
partition made of sound absorbent material, since the
relocation of the substation is manifestly impracticable and
would be prejudicial to the customers of the Electric Company
who are being serviced from the substation.
Appellee company insists that as the plaintiff's own evidence
(Exhibit "NN-7[c]") the intensity of the sound (as measured by
Dr. Almonte) inside appellant's house is only 46 to 47 decibels
at the consultation room, and 43 to 45 decibels within the
treatment room, the appellant had no ground to complain.
This argument is not meritorious, because the noise at the
bedrooms was determined to be around 64-65 decibels, and
the medical evidence is to the effect that the basic root of the
appellant's ailments was his inability to sleep due to the
incessant noise with consequent irritation, thus weakening his
constitution and making him easy prey to pathogenic germs
that could not otherwise affect a person of normal health.
In Kentucky and West Virginia Co., Inc. vs. Anderson, 156 SW.
857, the average of three readings along the plaintiff's fence
was only 44 decibels but, because the sound from the sub-
station was interminable and monotonous, the court
authorized an injunction and damages. In the present case, the
three readings along the property line are 52, 54 and 55
decibels. Plaintiff's case is manifestly stronger.
ARTICLE 699
1. JOSE “PEPITO” TIMONER vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-62050, Nov. 25, 1983
FACTS:
At about 10:00 in the evening of December 13, 1971,
petitioner, then mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte,
accompanied by two uniformed policemen and six laborers,
arrived in front of the stalls along Maharlika highway, the main
thoroughfare of the same town. Upon orders of petitioner,
these laborers proceeded to nail together rough lumber slabs
to fence off the stalls which protruded into the sidewalk of the
Maharlika highway. Among the structures thus barricaded
were the barbershop of Pascual Dayaon, the complaining
witness and the store belonging to one Lourdes Pia-
Rebustillos. These establishments had been recommended for
closure by the Municipal Health Officer for non-compliance
with certain health and sanitation requirements. Petitioner
filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Norte against Lourdes Pia Rebustillos and others for judicial
abatement of their stalls which constituted public nuisances as
well as nuisances per se. Dayaon was never able to reopen his
barbershop business. Subsequently, petitioner and the two
policemen were charged with the offense of grave coercion
before the Municipal Court of Daet. The said court exonerated
the two policemen, but convicted petitioner of the crime
charged as principal by inducement. On appeal, the Court
affirmed in full the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sealing off of Dayaon's barbershop was
done in abatement of a public nuisance and therefore, under
lawful authority.
RULING:
YES. Unquestionably, the barbershop in question did
constitute a public nuisance as defined under Article Nos. 694
and 695 of the Civil Code, to wit: ART. 694. A nuisance is any
act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property,
or anything else which: (1) Injures or endangers the health or
safety of others; or (2) Annoys or offends the senses; or (3)
Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4)
Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public
highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) Hinders or
impairs the use of property. ART. 695. Nuisance is either public
or private. A public nuisance affects a community or
neighborhood or any considerable number of persons,
although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon
individuals may be unequal, a private nuisance is one that is
not included in the foregoing definition. There is no semblance
of any legality or right that exists in favor of the defendants
to build a stall and conduct their business in a sidewalk,
especially in a highway where it does not only constitute a
11 | A r t i c l e 6 9 4 t o A r t i c l e 7 0 7 - N U I S A N C E
menace to the health of the general public passing through
the street and also of the unsanitary condition that is bred
therein as well as the unsightly and ugly structures in the said
place.
The barbershop occupied a portion of the sidewalk of the
poblacion's main thoroughfare and had been recommended
for closure by the Municipal Health Officer. Such nuisance
affects the community or neighborhood or any considerable
number of persons and the general public which posed a
danger to the people in general passing and using that place,
for in addition, this is an annoyance to the public by the
invasion of its rights, the fact that it is in a public place and
annoying to all who come within its sphere.
But even without this judicial pronouncement, petitioner
could not have been faulted for having fenced off said
barbershop. Paragraph 3, Article 699 of the Civil Code
authorizes the abatement of a public nuisance without judicial
proceedings. ART. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance
are: [l] A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local
ordinance; or [2] A civil action; or [3] Abatement, without
judicial proceedings. Petitioner, as mayor of the town, merely
implemented the aforesaid recommendation of the Municipal
Health Officer. Having then acted in good faith in the
performance of his duty, petitioner incurred no criminal
liability. Furthermore, as the third element of grave coercion
being absent in the case at bar, petitioner cannot be held guilty
thereof and is hereby acquitted of the crime charged.
2. G.R. No. 150194 March 6, 2007
ROBERT TAYABAN y CALIPLIP, FRANCISCO MADDAWAT y
TAYOBAN, ARTEMIO BALANGUE* y LANGA, FRANCISCO
MAYUMIS y BAHEL and QUIRINO PANA y
CUYAHEN, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1988, then Mayor Tayaban submitted a project
proposal to provincial governor Benjamin Cappleman for the
construction of the Tinoc Public Market. Subsequently,
Tayaban was informed by the Governor that his proposal was
approved and that the project shall be funded by the Cordillera
Executive Board (CEB).3Subsequently, a bidding was
conducted and private complainant Lopez Pugong (Pugong)
won the contract for the construction of the said public
market. On March 1, 1989, a formal contract4 was executed by
and between Pugong, as the contractor, and the CEB, as the
project owner. Actual construction of the public market was
commenced in June 1989. On August 15, 1989,
the Sangguniang Bayan of Tinoc adopted Resolution No. 20
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
the Sandiganbayan denied it.
Hence, herein petition for review with the following
assignment of errors:
I prosecution witness Abe Belingan considering that he is not a
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTS ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED
BY THE ACCUSED CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(E)
OF R.A. NO. 3019 AS AMENDED, AND THEREFORE ACCUSED
SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED BY THE RESPONDENT COURT.
II
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT RESOLUTION NO. 20 IS A VALID LEGISLATION AND THAT
THE DEMOLITION OF THE FIVE POSTS WAS AN
IMPLEMENTATION OF LOI NO. 19 AND AN EXERCISE OF THE
POLICE POWER VESTED IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT.
III
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, IN VIOLATION OF THE
RULES OF EVIDENCE, LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE ERRED IN
CONSIDERING FACTS WITHOUT REFERRING TO THE EVIDENCE
ON RECORD.
In their first assigned error, petitioners argue that one of the
elements of the offense which constitutes a violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is that the government or any
private party suffers undue injury by reason of the prohibited
acts committed by the public officer being charged. Petitioners
argue that this element was not proved because the CEB.
Petitioners further contend that the itemized list of expenses
submitted in evidence by Pugong should not have been made
a basis of the presently assailed Decision because such list is
not supported by receipts and, therefore, self-serving.
Moreover, Pugong was never mentioned in the Information as
one of the injured parties. Petitioners assert that undue injury
could only mean actual injury or damage which must be
established by evidence.
Petitioners also contend that the element of bad faith on their
part was not proved. On the contrary, they argue that their act
of exerting efforts to communicate with the contractor and his
foreman, by sending three letters in order to remind them of
the proper site of construction, only shows that they were
acting in good faith; that the eventual passage of Resolution
No. 20 is also an additional evidence of good faith on their part
because it was adopted by the Sangguniang Bayan as a
collective body acting within the scope of its authority.
In their second assigned error, petitioners argue that
the Sandiganbayan erred in applying Sections 56 and 59(a) of
the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, which provide,
respectively, for the review by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of component city and municipal ordinances
and resolutions approving local development plans and public
investment programs and for the posting in conspicuous
places in the local government unit concerned of the said
resolutions and ordinances.
They argue that the applicable law at the time of the passage
of Resolution No. 20 is Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 337
or the Local Government Code of 1983. Petitioners assert that
their act of demolishing the structures erected on the
construction site is an implementation of the provisions of the
Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 1916which empowers certain
public officials, like the municipal mayor, to remove illegal
constructions which were built, either in public places or
private property, without permit. Petitioners further contend
that the demolition is a valid exercise of police power and that
their act is justified by the general welfare clause under the
LGC which empowers them to enact and implement measures
for the general well-being of their constituents.
In their third assigned error, petitioners argue that
the Sandiganbayan erred in relying on the testimony of
disinterested witness because he is given the contract of
cementing the supposed second floor of the public market.
Moreover, petitioners contend that the testimony of Belingan
regarding the reason why Mayor Tayaban demolished the
structures is mere hearsay and as such should not be given any
probative value. Petitioners assert that the complaint was filed
against them for purposes of political harassment considering
12 | A r t i c l e 6 9 4 t o A r t i c l e 7 0 7 - N U I S A N C E
that Pugong’s political allies who also signed Resolution No. 20
were not included in the said complaint.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
contends that, as properly held by the Sandiganbayan, undue
injury has been caused to the Government and that it is
immaterial whether the CEB filed a complaint against herein
petitioners because the real party-in-interest is the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The OSG also
argues that private complainant Pugong also suffered undue
injury because he already incurred expenses for labor, tools,
equipment, and materials for the construction project. As to
the issue of credibility of witnesses, the OSG asserts that the
matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand
is a function most competently performed by the trial judge
who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess
their credibility by the various indicia available but not
reflected on record.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) also filed its
Comment, contending that it is not necessary for the CEB to
initiate a complaint against herein petitioners because the real
party-in-interest is the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines; that there is actual injury on the part of the
Government as shown by the fact that construction was
commenced and that petitioners did not deny that they
demolished the structures which were erected.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tayaban’s demolition of the structure is a valid
exercise of police power by a LGU officer.
RULING:
No. The Court finds the petition without merit.
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts
or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices
or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.
The following indispensable elements must be established to
constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or
official functions or private persons charged in conspiracy with
them;
2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the
performance of his official duty in relation to his public
position;
3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
4. His action caused undue injury to the government or any
private party, or gave any party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference to such parties.
Herein petitioners’ contention that the Sandiganbayan erred
in ruling that they are guilty of bad faith and that they caused
undue injury to the Government is not plausible.
With respect to the element of bad faith, the Court, in a
number of cases, held:
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn
duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the
nature of fraud. (Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, 8 NE 2nd
Series, 895, 1007). It contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some
motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes. (Air
France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155, 166-167). Evident bad faith
connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the
accused to do wrong or cause damage.
The Court agrees with the findings of the Sandiganbayan that
petitioners were guilty of bad faith in causing the demolition.
Evidence of this is the fact that Resolution No. 20 was
implemented on the same day that it was adopted without due
notice of the planned demolition given to the CEB and the
private contractor. In fact, Raymundo Madani, one of the
Municipal Councilors who signed Resolution No. 20, testified
that the said Resolution was passed only in the afternoon of
August 15, 1989, after the subject demolition was conducted
in the morning of the same day.
Proof of petitioners’ bad faith is also shown by Pugong’s
testimony, which was given credence by the Sandiganbayan,
that the site where his laborers began construction of the
demolished public market was pointed out by petitioner
Tayaban himself when the former asked the latter where they
were going to erect the said market.
The following admissions made by petitioners
bolster Sandiganbayan’s finding of bad faith on their part:
First, petitioner Tayaban admitted that when he submitted the
project proposal for the construction of the Tinoc Public
Market, he did not indicate the exact location where the
market should be put up saying that he shall specify the
location when the budget for the project shall have been
approved. However, despite meeting the Governor twice in
1989, and being informed by the latter that the project had
already been approved and funded, Tayaban still did not
suggest to the Governor nor mention to him the specific place
where he and the Sangguniang Bayan desire to have the
public market erected. Worse, when the construction was
commenced and petitioners discovered that the public market
was being built allegedly in a place where it should not be,
petitioner Tayaban even admits that he still did not inform the
Governor of such fact.
Second, Tayaban admits that they never bothered to check
with the CEB where the latter intended to put up the public
market. There is no evidence to show that, when the
construction was commenced, petitioners informed the CEB of
the alleged mistake in the location of the project. In fact,
petitioner Tayaban testified that it was only in the first or
second week of August, 1989 that he informed the CEB
regarding the supposed error,30 even when he came to know
the exact site where Pugong intended to build the market as
early as April 1989. Moreover, when the Sangguniang
13 | A r t i c l e 6 9 4 t o A r t i c l e 7 0 7 - N U I S A N C E
Bayan convened on August 15, 1989 and passed Resolution
No. 20, they did not invite any representative from the CEB.
Third, while petitioners aver that they have come up with a Site
Development Plan wherein the exact location of the public
market was specified, Tayaban admits that the blue print of
the said development plan was completed only in August
1989. However, the construction of the public market was
commenced as early as June 1989.
From the foregoing, it is evident that petitioners were moved
by a manifest and deliberate intent to cause damage.
It is clear from the Information filed that the injured party in
the instant case is the Government, as represented by the CEB.
The fact that the CEB did not initiate the filing of the instant
criminal action is of no moment considering that a complaint
for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal need not
be filed by the "offended party".
As to whether the Government suffered undue injury, it
cannot be denied that the unceremonious demolition of the
five concrete posts and the other improvements built as part
of the foundation of the supposed public market resulted in
damage to the Government. Evidence presented by the
prosecution shows that, at the time of the questioned
demolition, the CEB had already disbursed in favor of Pugong
the amount of ₱134,632.80.
On the other hand though, as held by the OSG, Sec 56 and 59
of the LGC of 1991 is not applicable as said law was not yet
passed in 1989 hence there was no need for Tayaban to post
the ’89 resolution in a conspicuous place. Also, Tayaban’s
defense that he acted by virtue of LOI 19 and PD 1096 is a mere
afterthought, nowhere in the resolution was it said that they
are going to demolish because of these two laws but rather
only on the ground that the market being built is in the wrong
place. Further, Tayaban actually never specified as to where he
intended the market to be built.
3. G.R. No. 97477 May 8, 1992
RTC JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 23, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur and the
MUNICIPALITY OF DUMINGAG, ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR;
represented by MAYOR DOMICIANO E. REAL, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE MEDINA and FORTUNATA
ROSELLON, respondents.
FACTS:
On September 24, 1990, petitioner municipality
represented by its mayor Domiciano E. Real filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur, presided by the
petitioner Judge, an ejectment complaint against respondents
Vicente Medina and Fortunata Rosellon.
The complaint alleged that petitioner municipality is
the owner of a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion,
Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur. It was also alleged that the
parcel of land was reserved for public plaza under Presidential
Proclamation No. 365 dated March 15, 1968. During the
incumbency of the late Mayor Isidoro E. Real, Sr. or in 1958,
the municipality leased an Area of 1,350 square meters to the
respondents subject to the condition that they should vacate
the place in case it is needed for public purposes. The
respondents religiously paid the rentals until 1967; that
thereafter, the respondents refused to pay the rentals.
Respondents refused to vacate the place despite efforts of the
municipality. The national government had alloted an
appropriation for the construction of a municipal gymnasium
within the public plaza but the said construction which was
already started could not continue because of the presence of
the buildings constructed by the respondents.
Petitioner Judge ordered the demolition of the
buildings to place petitioners in possession of the land subject
of this case. thus, the petitioner municipality implemented the
orders (the writ of possession and ancillary writ of demolition
) issued by the petitioner Judge resulting in the dispossession
of the private respondents from the parcel of land and the
demolition of structures and buildings thereon owned by the
respondents.
The private respondents filed a petition for review
before the Court of Appeals and contended that the subject
parcel of land has been owned, occupied and possess by
respondent Vicente Medina since 1947 when he bought the
subject parcel from a Subanan native; that the other
respondent Fortunata Rosellon leased from Medina a portion
of the parcel of land; that the respondents were never lessees
of the petitioner municipality; and that Proclamation No-365
issued on March 15, 1968 recognized "private rights”.
The Court of Appeals rendered decision in favor of
respondents. Hence, this petition.
The petitioners now contend that the allegations in
the complaint constitute an action for abatement of public
nuisance under Article 694 of the Civil Code. On the basis of
this proposition, the petitioners assert that petitioner
municipality is entitled to the writ of possession and writ of
demolition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the municipality has a cause of action for the
abatement of public nuisance under Article 694 of the
Civil Code - YES
2. WON the petitioner municipality is entitled to a writ
of possession and a writ of demolition even before
the trial of the case starts – NO, the issuance of the
writ of possession and writ of demolition by the
petitioner Judge in the ejectment proceedings was
premature.
3. WON the State’s power of eminent domain will justify
the issuance of the writ of possession and writ of
demolition. -NO
RULING:
1. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as
follows:
Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition of property or anything else which:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
while Article 695 provides:
Art. 695 Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance
affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable
number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance,
danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal. . . .
14 | A r t i c l e 6 9 4 t o A r t i c l e 7 0 7 - N U I S A N C E
Applying these criteria, we agree with the
petitioners that the complaint alleges factual circumstances
of a complaint for abatement of public nuisance. Thus, the
complaint states: that petitioner municipality is the owner of a
parcel of land covered by Presidential Proclamation No 365
which is reserved for a public plaza; that the private
respondents by virtue of a contract of lease entered into by the
former mayor occupied a portion of the parcel of land
constructing buildings thereon; that the private respondents
refused to vacate the premises despite demands; that the
municipality is constructing a municipal gymnasium in the area
financed by appropriations provided by the national
government; and that the appropriations are in danger of
being reverted to the national treasury because the
construction had to be stopped in view of the refusal of the
private respondents to vacate the area.
2. Article 699 of the Civil Code provides for the following
remedies against a public nuisance:
(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance;
or
(2) A civil action; or
(3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
The petitioner municipality had three remedies from
which to select its cause of action. It chose to file a civil action
for the recovery of possession of the parcel of land occupied
by the private respondents. Obviously, petitioner municipality
was aware that under the then Local Government Code (B.P.
Blg. 337) the Sangguniang Bayan has to first pass an ordinance
before the municipality may summarily abate a public
nuisance.
On the premise that the parcel of land forms part of a
public plaza, the petitioners now contend that the Judge was
justified in issuing the writ of possession and writ of
demolition.
A public plaza is outside the commerce of man and
constructions thereon can be abated summarily by the
municipality.
If, therefore, the allegations in the complaint are
true and that the parcel of land being occupied by the private
respondents is indeed a public plaza, then the writ of
possession and writ of demolition would have been justified.
In fact, under such circumstances, there would have been no
need for a writ of possession in favor of the petitioner
municipality since the private respondents' occupation over
the subject parcel of land cannot be recognized by any law. A
writ of demolition would have been sufficient to eject the
private respondents.
However, not only did the municipality avoid the use
of abatement without judicial proceedings, but the status of
the subject parcel of land has yet to be decided.
We have to consider the fact that Proclamation No.
365 dated March 15, 1968 recognizes private rights which may
have been vested on other persons.
It is to be noted that even before the Proclamation,
the parcel of land was the subject of cadastral proceedings
before another branch of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Sur. At the time of the filing of the instant
case, the cadastral proceedings intended to settle the
ownership over the questioned portion of the parcel of land
under Proclamation No. 365 were still pending. One of the
claimants in the cadastral proceedings is private respondent
Vicente Medina who traced his ownership over the subject
parcel of land as far back as 1947 when he allegedly bought the
same from a Subanan native.
Considering therefore, the nature and purpose of the
Cadastral proceedings, the outcome of said proceedings
becomes a prejudicial question which must be addressed in
the resolution of the instant case.
Technically, a prejudicial question shall not rise in the
instant case since the two actions involved are both civil in
nature. However, we have to consider the fact that the
cadastral proceedings will ultimately settle the real owner/s of
the disputed parcel of land. In case respondent Vicente
Medina is adjudged the real owner of the parcel of land, then
the writ of possession and writ of demolition would
necessarily be null and void. Not only that. The demolition of
the constructions in the parcel of land would prove truly
unjust to the private respondents.
Parenthetically, the issuance of the writ of
possession and writ of demolition by the petitioner Judge in
the ejectment proceedings was premature. What the
petitioner should have done was to stop the proceedings in the
instant case and wait for the final outcome of the cadastral
proceedings.
At any rate, affirmative relief based on the above
discussions is no longer possible. The demolition of the
buildings owned by the private respondents was already
executed.
The legality of the occupation by the private
respondents of the subject parcel of land is still to be resolved
in the cadastral proceedings. In the event that respondent
Vicente Medina is declared owner of the subject parcel of land,
necessarily, the private respondents would be entitled to just
compensation for the precipitate demolition of their buildings.
On the other hand, if private respondent Medina is declared to
have no rights over the subject parcel of land then, the private
respondents would not be entitle to any compensation for the
demolition of their buildings. In such a case the private
respondents are considered squatters and therefore, the
demolition of their buildings would turnout to have been
justified.
Faced with these alternative possibilities, and in the
interest of justice, we rule that the petitioner municipality
must put up a bond to be determined by the trial court to
answer for just compensation to which the private
respondents may be entitled in case the demolition of their
buildings is adjudged to be illegal.
3. Moreover, the appellate court correctly ruled this Rule 67 of
the Revised Rules of Court on eminent domain cannot be made
a subterfuge to justify the petitioner Judge's issuance of a writ
of possession in favor of petitioner municipality.
Hence, even if we concede that Rule 67 is applicable
to the instant case and that petitioner municipality had the
lawful right to eject the private respondents from the subject
parcel of land the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of
petitioner municipality would still not be legal if the petitioner
municipality really owns the land. The Judge did not require
petitioner municipality to deposit an amount equivalent to
the just compensation due the private respondents as
provided for under Presidential Decree 42. It is only after the
15 | A r t i c l e 6 9 4 t o A r t i c l e 7 0 7 - N U I S A N C E
deposit of the just compensation that petitioner municipality
would be entitled to a writ of possession.
4. G.R. No. 94759January 21, 1991
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC., petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NARCISO T. ATIENZA as Presiding
Judge, Bulacan, RTC, and HON. VICENTE CRUZ, Acting Mayor
and the MUNICIPALITY OF STA. MARIA,
BULACAN, respondents.
FACTS:
Technology Developers, a domestic private corporation
engaged in the manufacture and export of charcoal briquette,
received a letter from private respondent acting mayor Pablo
Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the operation of its plant
located at Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, until further order. The
letter likewise requested Plant Manager Mr. Armando Manese
to bring with him to the office of the mayor the following: a)
Building permit; b) Mayor's permit; c) Region III-Pollution of
Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and
of other document.
Technology Developers undertook to comply with the request
to produce the required documents. It sought to secure the
Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources
Anti-Pollution Permit although prior to the operation of the
plant, a Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installation
was issued to it. Petitioners also sent its representatives to the
office of the mayor to secure a mayor’s permit but were not
entertained.
Technology Developers undertook to comply with
respondent's request for the production of the required
documents. It commenced to secure "Region III-Department of
Environmental and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit,"
although among the permits previously secured prior to the
operation of petitioner's plant was a "Temporary Permit to
Operate Air Pollution Installation" issued by the then National
Pollution Control Commission (now Environmental
Management Bureau) and is now at a stage where the
Environmental Management Bureau is trying to determine the
correct kind of anti-pollution devise to be installed as part of
petitioner's request for the renewal of its permit.
Technology Developer's attention having been called to its lack
of mayor's permit, it sent its representatives to the office of
the mayor to secure the same but were not entertained.
Without previous and reasonable notice upon Technology
Developers, acting mayor Cruz ordered the Municipality's
station commander to padlock the premises of its plant, thus
effectively causing the stoppage of its operation.
Technology Developers then instituted an action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction against
the acting mayor with Bulacan RTC, alleging that the closure
order was issued in grave abuse of discretion.
The RTC found that the issuance of the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction was proper, ordering the acting mayor
to immediately revoke his closure order and allow Technology
Developers to resume its normal business operations until the
case has been adjudicated on the merits.
Upon MR, the Provincial Prosecutor presented evidence as to
the allegation that "Due to the manufacturing process and
nature of raw materials used, the fumes coming from the
factory may contain particulate matters which are hazardous
to the health of the people. As such, the company should cease
operating until such a time that the proper air pollution device
is installed and operational."
Reassessing the evidence, the RTC set aside its order granted
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The CA denied
Technology Developer's petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the acting mayor has the authority to order
the closure of the plant. – Yes
Whether or not the closure order was done with grave abuse
of discretion – No
HELD:
The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound judicial
discretion of the court and its action shall not be disturbed on
appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted in grave abuse of
its discretion. By the same token the court that issued such a
preliminary relief may recall or dissolve the writ as the
circumstances may warrant.
The following circumstances militate against the maintenance
of the writ of preliminary injunction sought by Technology
Developers:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that
the matter of determining whether there is a pollution of the
environment that requires control if not prohibition of the
operation of a business is essentially addressed to the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, it must be
recognized that the mayor has as much responsibility to
protect its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his
police power, he may deny the application for a permit to
operate a business or otherwise close the same unless
appropriate measures are taken to avoid injury to the health
of the residents of the community from the emissions in the
operation of the business.
2. The Acting Mayor called the attention of Technology
Developers to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant
so that it was ordered to stop its operation until further orders
and it was required to bring the following:
(1) Building permit;
(2) Mayor's permit; and
(3) Region III-Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Anti-Pollution permit.
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the
complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan.
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after
an investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in her report
observed that the fumes emitted by the plant goes directly to
the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device
has been installed.
5. Technology Developers failed to produce a building permit
from the municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead presented a
building permit issued by an official of Makati on March
6,1987.
6. While Technology Developers was able to present a
temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution
16 | A r t i c l e 6 9 4 t o A r t i c l e 7 0 7 - N U I S A N C E
Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was
good only up to May 25, 1988. Petitioner had not exerted any
effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install any
device to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the
health of the residents of the community.
All these factors justify the dissolution of the writ of
preliminary injunction by the trial court and the appellate
court correctly upheld the action of the lower court.
Petitioner takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its
huge investment in this dollar-earning industry. It must be
stressed however, that concomitant with the need to promote
investment and contribute to the growth of the economy is the
equally essential imperative of protecting the health, nay the
very lives of the people, from the deleterious effect of the
pollution of the environment.
5. G.R. No. L-41958 July 20, 1982
DONALD MEAD, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL A. ARGEL in his capacity as Presiding Judge in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXV and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
On March 11, 1975, Donald Mead (Mead) and a certain Isaac
Arivas were charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with a
violation of Section 9, in relation to Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 3931. The information alleged that Mead and Isaac Arivas
"willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drain or otherwise
dispose into the highway canal and./or cause, permit, suffer to
be drained or allow to seep into such waterway the industrial
and other waste matters discharged due to the operation of
the said Insular Oil Refinery Co. so managed and operated by
them, thereby causing pollution of such waterway with the
resulting damage and./or destruction to the arriving plants in
the vicinity and providing hazard, to health and property in the
same vicinity." The case was subsequently assigned to Branch
XXXV of the court of First Instance of Rizal (caloocan city)
presided over by Judge Argel. On August lI,1975, Mead filed a
motion to quash on the grounds that the trial court has no
jurisdiction and that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal has no legal
personality to file the above-quoted information. Lower
Court's Ruling: The motion to quash was denied by Judge Argel
in an Order dated September 5, 1975. Judge Argel in his Order
of November 10, 1965 also denied a Motion For
Reconsideration filed bv Mead.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Argel acted with grave abuse of discretion
when he denied the Motion to Quash and the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Mead and thus holding that the
Provincial Fiscal has the authority to file an information for a
violation of Republic Act No. 3931, entitled "An Act Creating a
National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission
(NWAPCC)."
RULING:
The Supreme Court annulled and set aside the questioned
Orders of Judge Argel and ruled in favor of Mead. Judge Argel
was ordered to dismiss Criminal Case No. 5984-75 for lack of
jurisdiction. The last paragraph of Sec. 8 of RA 3931 delineates
the authority to be exercised by NWAPCC and by the ordinary
courts in respect of preventing or remedying the pollution of
the waters or atmospheric air of the Philippines. The provision
excludes from the authority of NWAPCC only the
determination of and the filing of court actions involving
violations of the New Civil Code on nuisance. It is expressly
directed that on matters not related to nuisance 'no court
action shall be initiated until NWAPCC shall have finally ruled
thereon." This provision leaves little room for doubt that a
court action involving the determination of the existence of
pollution may not be initiated until and unless NWAPCC has so
determined the existence of what in the law is considered
pollution. The Provincial Fiscal of Rizal lacked the authority to
file the information charging Mead with a violation of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3931. There was no prior finding
or determination by NWAPCC that the act of Mead had caused
pollution in any water or atmospheric air of the Philippines. It
is not to be understood, however, that a fiscal or public
prosecutor may not file an information for a violation of the
said law at all. He may do so if NWAPCC had made a finding or
determination that the law or any of its orders had been
violated. In the criminal case presently considered, there had
been no prior determination by NWAPCC that the supposed
acts of the petitioner had caused pollution to any water of the
Philippines. The filing of the information for the violation of
Section 9 of the law is, therefore, premature and
unauthorized. Concommittantly, Judge Argel is without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense charged therein
ARTICLE 703
1. G.R. No. L-8191. February 27, 1956
DIOSDADO A. SITCHON, ET AL., Petitioners-Appellants, vs.
ALEJO AQUINO, in his capacity as City Engineer of the City of
Manila, Respondent-Appellee.
The duties vested in the district health officer in case of
nuisances may be placed upon other officers as may be
designated by special provision of law.
FACTS:
This decision stems from six (6) different suits.
All of the petitioners implead Aquino (the City Engineer of
Manila) as respondent so that he may be enjoined from
causing the demolition of their respective houses situated in
different areas along public streets in Manila inasmuch as
these constitute public nuisances. All of the petitioners
occupied the subject parcels of land initially entirely without
consent.
However, all of them subsequently paid concession fees or
damages for the use of the land with the agreement that such
payment and consent shall be without prejudice to an order to
vacate.
The time came when the City Engineer demanded that
petitioners vacate the occupied streets. Unheeded, he
threatened to demolish the houses.
Petitioners contend that by virtue of Articles 700 and 702, the
power to remove public nuisances is vested in the District
Health Officer, not in the City Engineer.
ART. 700. — “The district health officer shall take care that
one or all of the remedies against a public nuisance are
availed of.”
ART. 702. — “The district health officer shall determine
whether or not abatement, without judicial proceedings, is
the best remedy against a public nuisance.”
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ISSUES:
1. Is there a public nuisance? - YES
2. Does the City Engineer have authority to cause the
abatement of the nuisance? - YES
HELD:
1. There is a public nuisance. This case falls on art. 694 Section
4, classifying as a nuisance the obstruction of free passage of
any public highway or street.
It is public because it affects a community or neighborhood.
The constructions in fact constitute nuisances per se,
obstructing at all times the streets.
Republic Act No. 386, reading:
ART. 694. — “A nuisance is any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or anything
else which:
“(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others;
“(2) Annoys or offends the senses;
“(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality;
“(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any
public highway or street, or any body of water;
“(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.”
ART. 695. — “Nuisance is either public or private. A public
nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any
considerable number of persons, although the extent of the
annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be
unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not included in the
foregoing definition.” (Italics supplied.)
2. Section 31 of Republic Act No. 409, the Revised Charter of
the City of Manila, specifically places upon the city engineer
the duty, among others, “to have charge of the care of streets,
canals and esteros ; “prevent the encroachment of private
buildings on the streets and public places”; “have supervision
of all private docks, wharves, piers and other property
bordering on the harbor, rivers, esteros and waterways and
issue permits for the construction, repair and removal of the
same and enforce all ordinances relating to the same “have the
care and custody of all sources of water supply”; “cause
buildings dangerous to the public to be torn down”; and to
“order the removal of buildings and structures erected in
violation of the ordinances”.
Obviously, articles 700 and 702 of Republic Act No. 386, should
yield to said section 31 of Republic Act No. 409, not only
because the former preceded the latter, but, also, because said
section 31 of Republic Act No. 409 is a special provision
specifically designed for the City of Manila, whereas said
Articles 700 and 702 of the Civil Code are general provisions
applicable throughout the Philippines.
Moreover, section 1122 of the Revised Ordinance of the City
of Manila (No. 1600) explicitly authorizes the action sought to
be taken by Respondent herein, by providing:
“Whenever the owner or person responsible for any
unauthorized obstruction shall, after official notice from the
proper department, refuse or neglect to remove the same
within a reasonable time, such obstruction shall be deemed a
public nuisance, and the city engineer is authorized to remove
the same at the owner’s expense.”
As such, the summary removal of these may be authorized by
statute or ordinance. Aquino, as City Engineer, is vested with
authority to effect the abatement of the nuisances through
demolition. By virtue of the Revised Charter of Manila, such
duty, among others, was placed upon him. Articles 700 and
702 must yield to this provision not only because it is later
law but also because of the principle that special provisions
prevail over general ones.
Moreover, an ordinance authorized the action sought to be
taken by respondent.
2. G.R. NO. 148339 : February 23, 2005
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., Petitioner, v. JAC
LINER, INC., Respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent, JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating buses
which ply various routes to and from Lucena City, assailed, via
a petition for prohibition and injunction 1 against the City of
Lucena, its Mayor, and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, City
Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 as unconstitutional.
City Ordinance 1631 grants franchise to the Lucena
Grand Central Terminal, Inc. to construct, finance, establish,
operate and maintain common bus - jeepney terminal facility
in the City of Lucena. City Ordinance 1778, on the other hand,
strips out all the temporary terminals in the City of Lucena the
right to operate which as a result favors only the Lucena
Grand Central Terminal, Inc.
The ordinances were aimed to alleviate and solve the traffic
congestion problems of Lucena City.
The Regional Trial Court of Lucena declared City Ordinance
1631 as a valid exercise of police power while declaring City
Ordinance 1778 as null and void for being invalid.
Petitioner Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. was allowed to
intervene and filed its Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied.
Lucena Grand Terminal then elevated it to the Court of
Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the
challenged orders of the trial court.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA,
Lucena Grand Terminal now comes to the Court via petition for
review to assail the Decision and Resolution of the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the bus terminals are nuisances that
can be validly abated via an ordinance, without judicial
proceedings. – NO.
RULING:
Bus terminals are not public nuisances as petitioner argues.
For their operation is a legitimate business which, by itself,
cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of property, health,
or comfort of the community.
But even assuming that terminals are nuisances due to their
alleged indirect effects upon the flow of traffic, at most they
are nuisance per accidens, not per se.
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Unless a thing is nuisance per se, however, it may not be
abated via an ordinance, without judicial proceedings, as was
done in the case at bar.
As for petitioner's claim that the challenged ordinances have
actually been proven effective in easing traffic congestion:
Whether an ordinance is effective is an issue different from
whether it is reasonably necessary. It is its reasonableness, not
its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the
constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness,
then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they
happen to be effective.
The Court is not unaware of the resolutions of various
barangays in Lucena City supporting the establishment of a
common terminal, and similar expressions of support from the
private sector, copies of which were submitted to this Court by
petitioner. The weight of popular opinion, however, must be
balanced with that of an individual's rights.
There is no question that not even the strongest moral
conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a
few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an
individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person
invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution
is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who
would deny him that right.
3. G.R. No. L-17760 October 31, 1962
RAMCAR, INC., Petitioner, vs. EUSEBIO S. MILLAR, ET AL.,
Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ramcar Inc., operates and maintains an auto repair
and body building shop at No. 1241 (formerly No. 1377)
General Luna Street, Ermita, Manila, while the seven private
respondents reside near or around the shop. Respondents
brought an action before the Court of First Instance of Manila
to abate the said establishment as a nuisance. That Court, after
trial, dismissed the complaint, and not satisfied with the
decision, the plaintiffs (respondents now) appealed the case to
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the trial
court's decision and entered judgment against Ramcar, Inc.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby
reversed and another one rendered declaring that the
operation and maintenance of the establishment of the
defendant corporation at No. 1241 (formerly No. 1377)
General Luna St., Ermita, Manila, is a public nuisance and
violates the provisions of Zonification Ordinance No. 2830, as
amended by Ordinance No. 2906, of the City of Manila;
ordering the defendants-appellees to remove the said
establishment and all buildings and structures built therein
within 30 days from the finality of this judgment; and,
condemning defendant-appellee Ramcar, Inc., to pay
plaintiffs-appellants the sum of P10,000.00 as special damages
and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, without costs in this
instance".
ISSUE:
whether the business of Ramcar, Inc. is a residential or a
commercial zone.
The Court of Appeals, found that the place is a commercial
zone, as the business would not be permitted in a residential
zone.
A body building shop is not within the purview of "garage",
which designates a shop for storing, repairing and servicing
motor vehicles, being merely a modern substitute for the
ancient livery stable.
It is clear that the business of Ramcar, Inc. is not a mere garage
or automobile repair and painting shop, much less, a gasoline
service station, within the contemplation of Section 5 of the
City Ordinances. Besides the usual services of vehicle storage,
of supplying gas, and of making repairs, the shop also
assembles and rebuilds car and truck bodies which require
more than ordinary labor and skill and involves the use of tools
and machinery with the concomitant noise created by the use
of those tools and machines.
In fact, it has been held in Uy Chao vs. Aguilar, G.R. No. L-
9069, 28 March 1958, that to repair presupposes decay,
dilapidation, injury, or partial destruction of the repaired
element, i.e., broken or damaged parts of a structural whole
to their original condition. Clearly, the term can not apply to
the building or remodeling of bodies or structures.
The award of damages arising from a nuisance authorized,
said Code provides:
ART. 697. The abatement of a nuisance does not
preclude the right of any person injured to recover
damages for its past existence.;
and, in the general provisions on Damages, the same Code
states:
ART. 2196. The rules under this Title are without
prejudice to special provisions on damages
formulated elsewhere in this Code.
However, the business of the petitioner is not a nuisance per
se. It is only on account of its location that it is a public
nuisance. To abate it, it is not necessary, as the appealed
decision decrees, to remove all building an structures built in
the place where it is presently located as these, or parts
thereof, may be utilized for pursuit that are not forbidden by
law or ordinance.
4. ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner’s application for accreditation as a sectoral party in
the party-list system rooted this case. This is a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated
November 11, 2009 (the First Assailed Resolution) and
December 16, 2009 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP
No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The
case has its roots in the COMELEC’s refusal to accredit Ang
Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No.
7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Petitioner
is an organization composed of men and women who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered
individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first
applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The
application for accreditation was denied on the ground that
the organization had no substantial membership base. On
August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition for
registration with the COMELEC.
19 | A r t i c l e 6 9 4 t o A r t i c l e 7 0 7 - N U I S A N C E
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s
evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the
Petition on moral grounds that ANG LADLAD apparently
advocates sexual immorality.
The COMELEC held that ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695
of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as ‘Any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or anything
else which (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency or
morality and It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code:
The contracting parties may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code
provides that ‘Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy’ are inexistent and void from the beginning. Finally to
safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, penalizes immoral doctrines,
obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows.
That Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not
only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not
being truthful when it said that it "or any of its
nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed
to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the
elections." Furthermore, should this Commission grant the
petition, we will be exposing our youth to an environment that
does not conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman
Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in
one article that "older practicing homosexuals are a threat to
the youth." As an agency of the government, ours too is the
State’s avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the
Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual
degradation.
The COMELEC further states that party-list system is not a tool
to advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood
persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system is a
tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized
individuals whose interests are also the nation’s – only that
their interests have not been brought to the attention of the
nation because of their under representation. Until the time
comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual
orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the
nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list
system will remain just that.
Thus, even if society’s understanding, tolerance, and
acceptance of LGBT’s is elevated, there can be no denying that
Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will
remain either male or female protected by the
same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of
prision mayor upon "Those who shall publicly expound or
proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals." It
penalizes "immoral doctrines, obscene publications and
exhibition and indecent shows." "Ang Ladlad" apparently falls
under these legal provisions. This is clear from its Petition’s
paragraph 6F: "Consensual partnerships or relationships by
gays and lesbians who are already of age’ It is further indicated
in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: ‘In 2007,
Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were
estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code
defines "nuisance" as any act, omission x x x or anything else x
x x which shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality x x
x." These are all unlawful.10 On January 4, 2010, Petitioner
now prays that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and
direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad’s application for
accreditation.
ISSUE:
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on
moral and legal grounds.
RULING:
YES. The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented
sectors is not exclusive". The crucial element is not whether a
sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. Ang
Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the
legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from
COMELEC’s moral objection and the belated allegation of
nonexistence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever
found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as
a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA
7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The
difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlad’s morality, or
lack thereof.
The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily
secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds.
"Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may
influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may
be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms."
Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in
formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies
and morals would require conformity to what some might
regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers
would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of
conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled
religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if
government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would
tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly
disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that
would not support the policy. As a result, government will not
provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make
it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-
class citizens.
Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular,
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests. Nonetheless, we recall that the
Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct.
Evidently, therefore, these "generally accepted public morals"
have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought
to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the
youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its
position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system
would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric
of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is
wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning
morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that
the government will and should continue to restrict behaviour
considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot
countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of
intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or
another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal
reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is
robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of
morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.
20 | A r t i c l e 6 9 4 t o A r t i c l e 7 0 7 - N U I S A N C E
COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal
and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article
694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as "any act, omission,
establishment, condition of property, or anything else which
shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality," the
remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised
Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or
abatement without judicial proceedings.32 A violation of
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand,
requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere
allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere
blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the
institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial
determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not
a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The
denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial
public interest. Respondent’s blanket justifications give rise to
the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets
homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any
particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective
targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.
No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or
expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed,
even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the
COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here – that
is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority – is not a
legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational
basis review under the equal protection clause. The
COMELEC’s differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that
Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation
that would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state
interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored
group.
COMELEC’s act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals
insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply
that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and
homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly
fail. We disagree with the OSG’s position that homosexuals are
a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection
clause. We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a
separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We
have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is
simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner
itself has merely demanded that it be recognized under the
same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the
COMELEC made "an unwarranted and impermissible
classification not justified by the circumstances of the case.
They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other
hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with
equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the
same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships.
They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view. However,
as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes
using the religious or moral views of one part of the
community to exclude from consideration the values of other
members of the community. Petition is hereby granted.
5. G.R. No. L-58058 January 30, 1982
SANTIAGO MENDOZA, CARMEN URBANO, MANUELA
URBANO, RENATO DE GUZMAN, RAQUEL DE GUZMAN,
ROSETTE DE GUZMAN, and ROMEO DE
GUZMAN, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY and ANGELITO
LAZARO, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners, are occupants of certain portions of the Tatalon
estate in Quezon City. they all claim ownership of their
occupied lands: Santiago Mendoza acquired from the
DEUDORS, as evidenced by an agreement; Carmen Urbano and
Manuela Urbano by virtue of a contract and denominated
Deed of Transfer of Rights to, interests in and possession of
a residential lot, and; Renato, Raquel, Rosette, and Romeo, all
surnamed de Guzman which duly inherited from their father
Serafin de Guzman.
On August 3, 1959, Republic Act No. 2616, took effect -
authorized "the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate jointly
owned by the J.M. Tuason and Company, Inc., Gregorio Araneta and
Company, Inc., and Florencio Deudor, etal.," for subdivision into small
lots and its resale al cost to the bona fide occupants thereof.
Land Tenure Administration (LTA) was directed to institute the proceeding
for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate. Before the
complaint for eminent domain could be filed, the J.M. Tuason
and Company, Inc., claiming to be the owner of the Tatalon
Estate which was sought to be condemned, filed an action for
prohibition with preliminary injunction against the LTA, praying that
Republic Act No. 2616 be declared unconstitutional which was
denied. On September 15, 1978, the trial court recognized the
Compromise Agreement made by the Republic of
the Philippines, now represented by the National Housing
Authority (NHA), and the J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. On June 11,
1978, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential
Decree No. 1472, authorizing NHA to summarily eject any and
all squatters from government resettlement projects without
the necessity of a judicial order. Thereafter, on May 8, 1980, the President
of the Philippines declared the entire Metropolitan Manila Area
as an Urban Land Reform Zone, issued Proclamation No. 1967,
proclaiming 244 sites in Metropolitan Manila, including the Tatalon
Estate, described as "Areas for Priority Development and Urban Land
Reform Zones. On January 27, 1981, NHA wrote Manuela
Urbano, informing her that her request for inclusion in the list
of Tatalon Estate beneficiaries could not be favorably considered, for being
an absentee structure owner, and demanding that she demolish her
structure built on the Tatalon Estate and vacate the premises within 15 days
from receipt thereof, otherwise, NHA would summarily demolish
her structure after the expiration of the period without further
notice.
ISSUE:
WON PD No. 1472 is illegal and unconstitutional as it would
deprive the petitioners of their property without due process
of law.
RULING:
NO. Based upon the premise that petitioners are owners of the
lots occupied by them for having acquired them from
DEUDORS, is completely false, since the property occupied by
them belong to the Republic of the Philippines after the
expropriation proceedings made pursuant to Republic Act No.
2616, the administration and control of which had been
entrusted to respondent NHA under Presidential Decree No.
21 | A r t i c l e 6 9 4 t o A r t i c l e 7 0 7 - N U I S A N C E

1261, issued on December 12, 1977. As a matter of fact, the

petitioners Manuela Urbano, Carmen Urbano, Renato de
Guzman, and Romeo de Guzman had admitted the title of the
Government over said lots when they applied for inclusion in
the list of "Tatalon Estate beneficiaries. Besides, the land is
registered in the name of the Government and its title thereto
had become indefeasible. The petitioners, having actual
knowledge of the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate, as they
should have vindicated their claim of ownership to the land
claimed by them in the expropriation proceedings.

P.D. No. 1472 does not violate the constitutional due process
clause since it requires proper notice of ejectment to the
squatter or illegal occupant concerned either by personal
service or by posting the same in the lot or door of the
apartment as the case may be at least 10 days before his
scheduled ejectment from the premises, which has been
amply complied with in the case of the petitioners. Here,
notices of ejectment were served upon the petitioners after it
had been determined that they are not "Tatalon Estate
beneficiaries" and, consequently, squatters on the land
occupied by them. As squatters, they are a public nuisance
which can be abated even without judicial
proceedings. Petition is hereby dismissed.