Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS)

The Analysis of Labour Movements in Latin America: Typologies and Theories

Author(s): Ian Roxborough
Source: Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Oct., 1981), pp. 81-95
Published by: Wiley on behalf of Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS)
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 The Analysis of LabourMovementsin
Latin America:Typologies and theories
IAN ROXBOROUGH
Departmentof Sociology, LSE
Institute of LatinAmericanStudies
Universityof London

This article addressesthe question of whetheran adequatetheory for explaining

the historical development of Latin Americanlabour movements is currently
available.The importance of the question derivesfrom the fact that empirical
studies of labour movements (however restrictedin time and space) must neces-
sarily refer (even if only implicitly) to some wider context in which the mono-
graphicstudy is situated. For most researchers,the primaryfocus of attention is
(correctly) the delimited case; the context and comparisonis usually(and incor-
rectly) taken as unproblematic.Thereis, therefore,a need to turn our attention,
everynow and again,explicitly to the largerpicture.
In recent yearsthere seems to have been somethingof a minorboom in studies
of the working class. For the first time, an impressivequantityof monographic
materialis becoming available.!One ratherironic result of this recent flurry of
activity has been to highlight the discrepancybetween general theories about
labour and our concrete knowledge. It is to this issue that the presentarticleis
addressed.
As an illustration of the present situation, it may be useful to begin with
some comments on a recent English-languagework on Latin Americanlabour
history, HobartSpalding'sOriginalLaborin LatinAmerica.2
Spaldingis an historianwith considerableknowledge of his area, who works
within a dependency framework.He has written the first detailed treatment of
Latin Americanlabour history from this perspective.This attempt to move be-
yond the narrowconfines and arbitrarycomparisonsset by monographicanalysis
is laudible, and there is a greatdeal that is of value in Spalding'saccount. As our
present concern is with Spalding'stheoretical framework,we will pass over the
detailed historiographicissues raised by his book, and immediately proceed to
examine the interpretativeschemawhich he uses to organizethe data.
Spalding claims to detect three 'stages' in the development of the labour
movement in Latin America. These he identifies as: (1) formative(2) expansive
and explosive (3) co-optive-repressive.3 The first question concernsthe analytical
power of these categories: what do they tell us? The answer, unfortunately,is
remarkablylittle. Let us examinethem in more detail.
The first phase simply states that things have a beginning.It is difficult to
imagine not being able to talk about a formativeperiod for any phenomenon.
This is not a useful conceptual (theoretical) category. It is just a statementthat

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82 BULLETINOF LATINAMERICANRESEARCH
an historianis going to start at the beginning.The second phase is a little less
tautological,in that it assertsthat the periodof growth(expansion)will be explo-
sive ratherthan smooth and tranquil.The third period is such a catch-allthat it
is hard to see what explanatoryor descriptivepower it has. Is there any labour
movement anytherethat cannot be describedin some sense as either being re-
pressed or being co-opted? Whatother alternativesare there? In sum, it seems
that Spaldinghas told us that labourmovementshavea beginning,a middle,and
a period of transitionfrom the beginningto the middle. This is true, but what
does it tell us? Sincethe first task of anyanalysisof the historyof LatinAmerican
movementsmust be to describethem in a meaningfulway this is not a trivial
point. Spalding'scategoriesaredevoidof substance,for a very good reason.
That quarrelsomehistorian, A.J. Hexter, once claimed that all historians
could be dividedinto 'lumpers'and 'splitters',those who sawa commonthread
in apparentlydiversephenomena,and those who saw majordifferencesamong
seemingly similarphenomena.4This is, of course, a dilemmawhich is intrinisic
to organizedknowledge.Put in other terms,the issue is, what amountof fuzzi-
ness around the edges of a paradigmis sufficient to warrantits abandonment?
Now, in terms of Latin Americanhistory, Spaldingis a 'lumper',seeinga single
commonpatternthroughoutthe continent.Onthisissue,Iam a 'splitter'.Against
Spalding'svariationson a singletheme, I see rathera varietyof distincthistorical
experiences.5(However,as will shortlybe apparent,this is by no meansan asser-
tion that each LatinAmericancountryis unique.)
The historicalexperienceof labourin a country like Peru is quite different
from Argentina;and both are profoundlydifferentfromChile,etc.; consequently
the elements of commonality can only be conceptualizedat the most general
level. If all LatinAmericancountriesareto be squeezedinto the Procrusteanbed
of a single, unitaryhistory, then the analytic categoriesmust be so broad as to
be virtuallymeaningless.This is, I think, the case with Spalding'sthreestagesof
development.The frameworkcould be fitted to virtuallyany labourmovement
anywherein the world. If it 'explains'everything,then it explainsnothing.Per-
haps this seems like using a sledgehammerto cracka nut. PerhapsSpaldingis a
strawman. Perhaps.But it mustbe bornein mindthat only Spaldinghaspresented
a fully developedtheory of the historicaldevelopmentof labourin LatinAmerica.
The fact that Spaldingis alone in this field is an indicator of the poverty of
theorizingin this area.
If Spalding'sthreestagesof developmentarerejectedasan explanatoryschema,
what alternativesremain?Most of the alternativetheories of Latin American
labourare either nondevelopmentalor country-specific.By non-developmental,
I mean those theories which simply state an opposition between LatinAmerica
and developed countries in terms of a static contrast.The explanationthen, is
the differencebetween labourin LatinAmericaand labourin developedcoun-
tries. The natureof this differenceis conceptualizedin a varietyof ways, most
usually in terms of the centralityof the role of the state in LatinAmerica.6It is
frequently assertedthat, in contrastto the liberalmodel of industrialrelations
which is held to prevailin the countriesof advancedcapitalism,in LatinAmerica
the state activelyintervenesin, and profoundlyshapes,labourrelations.That the
liberal model is largely a myth in terms of its applicabilityto WesternEurope
and the USA seemsto escapethese writers.7

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ANALYSISOF LABOURMOVEMENTSIN LATINAMERICA 83
There seem to be two important objections to such a global comparison.
Firstly, even if it were possibleto specify some modal patternapplicable,grosso
modo, to Latin America, and another modal pattern applicable to developed
countries, certain assumptionsabout the ranges of variationwould have to be
made before useful comparisonscould be drawn.Clearly,the notion of a modal
pattern implies a certain rangeof variationof empiricalcasesabout the mode. If
the two modes are relativelyclose to each other, and the rangesof variationare
large, then there will be a substantialoverlappingof cases. Conceivably,the
majorityof cases could fit either pattern.
Whentheorists develop modal patternsand ideal types they are, 'of course',
aware of such possible objections. But we are all awareof how easy it is to reify
such modal patternsand ignore the rangeof variation.This is particularlyeasy
to do with that half of the comparisonwhich is not our own particularconcern.
In this case, it is only too easy to use a model of industrialrelationsin advanced
capitalistcountrieswhich is a travestyof historicalreality. In the interestof high-
lightingthe role played by the state in industrialrelationsin LatinAmerica,the
very important role played by the state in industrialrelationsin Britain,France,
Germany,the USA, Italy, etc., etc., is practicallyignored.It may perhapsbe the
case that the state intervenes in different ways in industrialrelationsin Latin
America,but the contrastcannot be drawnso boldly.8
Secondly, these comparativeexercisesare almost invariablynon-dynamic,and
do not deal with the question of change over time. In so far as developmentis
treated in these comparativetypologies, it is almost invariablytreated as a uni-
linear progression from politicized forms of trade union bargainingtoward a
liberal model. The working class becomes more 'responsible'and'incorporated'
as developmentoccurs.
The most debatablepoint in Spalding'sargumentis his assertionthat all Latin
American labour movements go through these same three phases, and for the
same basic reasons. This is a familiartheme in LatinAmericanstudieswhich has
been accentuatedby the generalizedimpact of 'dependencytheories'. Spalding
argues that Latin American labour movements share common featureslargely
because of the homogenizingimpact of internationalvariables.However,he also
arguesthat two sets of 'internal'variables(the natureof the dominantclassesand
the structureof the working class) also affect the historicalpatternsof develop-
ment of Latin Americanlabour movements.9This point would seem confusing
since it is not clearif these two sets of factors arebroughtinto account as differ-
ences in Latin Americanlabour movements,or indeed quite what their explana-
tory status actually is. It seems that Spaldingis caught in a contradiction:if he
wants to say that Latin Americanlabourmovementsare basicallythe same then
this is best done by emphasizingdependency theory and givingexternalfactors
the central explanatory role. The two sets of internalfactorswould then be rele-
gated to a purely residual role of explaining what Spalding sees as essentially
minor differencesbetween various countries. But Spaldingis not at all clearon
this, and it is possibleto readwhat he is sayingas an assertionthat these internal
factors (which tend to differentiate LatinAmericancountries,one fromanother)
are importantexplanatoryvariables.If this is the case, then it seemsthatit would
be difficult to arguethat LatinAmericanlabourmovementsexperiencea similar
patternof development.

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84 BULLETINOF LATINAMERICANRESEARCH
The following comments are intended to show the lack of any sufficiently
sophisticatedconceptualframeworkfor describinglabourmovements.Fourvery
broad dichotomiesare availableto us: (1) reformversusrevolution(a reformist
labourmovementversusa revolutionarylabourmovement);(2) oligarchy/bureau-
cracy versus democracy/spontaneity(labour movementscontrolled by conser-
vativeleadersversuslabourmovementswhich areresponsiveto the militantrank
and file); (3) politicalversuseconomic ( labourmovementorientedtowardsthe
state versusa labourmovementorientedtowardswage bargainingwith employ-
ers); (4) co-opted versus independent(labourmovementswhich are supportive
of the regimeversuslabourmovementswhich adopt a criticalstancevis-a-visthe
regime).
The first dichotomy (reform versus revolution) seems pretty limited for
puposes of investigation.In so far as a labourmovementis institutionalized,it
must accept, howeverprovisionallyand critically,the status quo.10To that ex-
tent, it may be describedas reformist.This behaviourcan coexist with a verbal
commitmentto revolutionor with a verbalstatementof belief in the legitimacy
of the status quo. In neither case can we infer much about action from such
statements.
The second dichotomy, which is concernedwith the relationshipsbetween
union leadershipsand the rankand file indicateswhat I see as a centralissue, but
as usuallyformulatedthe dichotomyis too crudeto be useful.Weneeda typology
which is more complex than the black and white categorieswhich tend to crop
up in a lot of the literatureon labourmovementsin LatinAmerica.1The impor-
tance of this issue relatesto the predictabilityof certainkinds of institutional
arrangements.To the extent that a union leadershipmust be responsiveto the
wishes of the rank and file (or, alternatively,must take into account possible
challengesfrom rival leaderships),wage bargainingmust reflect movementsin
the economicvariablesas they affect that industry.12
The third dichotomy deservesa moreextended discussion.Since it was form-
alized by Payne in 1965, the notion of political bargaininghas enjoyed con-
siderablepopularity.13In brief, it is arguedthat because unemploymentis so
high (as comparedto the situationin Europeancountrieswhen they began to
industrialize)workerscannoteasilystrike,becausethey could be quicklyreplaced.
However,while the workersare weak vis-a-visthe employers,the employersare
weak vis-a-visthe state(sincemanufacturing is only a smallsectorof the economy),
and the state is weak vis-a-visorganizedurban opposition. This enables the
workersto threatenthe politicalstablilityof the regimeby demonstratingin the
streets. The state will then attemptto resolvethe conflict by puttingpressureon
the employers to settle on terms relatively favourableto the workers.14This
notion has been widely accepted. But despite its intuitive appeal, the Payne
model is open to challengeon a numberof grounds.The most obviouspoint is
that the state may not be responsiveto threatsof urbandisorderwhich thereby
reducesthe applicabilityof the model. The extent to which employersareweak
vis-a-visthe state will vary from situationto situation.Finally,whetherworkers
are weak vis-a-visemployers depends (as the model states, of course) on the
labour market in that industry. When entry is restricted(either by skill or by
institutionalbarriers),the bargainingpowerof labouris a factorto be contended
with.15These commentsare not meant to deny that the model has some utility;

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ANALYSISOF LABOURMOVEMENTSIN LATINAMERICA 85
but to caution againsta global contrastbetween 'political' LatinAmericanlabour
movementsand 'economic' Europeanlabour movements. I think the contrastis
overdrawn.The validity of the Payne model is restrictedto earlyindustrialization
with regimeswhich are vulnerableto urban protest. Although this may cover
quite a broad spectrum of Latin Americanhistory, but it is by no means the
entire picture.'6 Crucially,the Payne model underplaysthe role of corporatist
labourrelationsinstitutions.
The final dichotomy (independentversus co-opted) presentsa problemsince
it lumps together all forms of unionism with some supportiverole with respect
to the state. It could reasonablybe arguedthat the apparentlysimilarcorporatist
regimes in Mexico and Brazil concealed entirely different roles for the union
movements in those countries.'7 In the independent/co-opteddichotomiesthe
termsof the dichotomy also conceal importantvariations.
If none of these commonly availableconceptualcategoriesare reallyadequate
for the task in hand,what would be a preferableapproach?Althoughthis article
does no more than search for an answer, one fact is clear. It is importantto get
away from the neo-Weberiantendency automaticallyto create ideal-types,that
is so easy to slide into. The debatesover populismare a good example of the ease
with which people adopt ideal-types.'8Thereificationof the supposeddichotomy
of the economy into a marginal pole and dynamic manufacturingsector is
another,19 while the modal patternmodel is the best exampleof all.2 Insteadof
rapidlybuildingup ideal types, or theoreticalmodels (if the notion of ideal-types
is offensive), it might be more useful to proceed more cautiously via attempts
to define variablesin isolation. It would then be an open question as to how the
variablesfitted togetherin realityto form concretemodels. I am arguingthat we
havemoved too directlyfrom empiricalreality and labelswith commoncurrency
to theoreticalconstructs.All too often we have taken terms such as "tradeunion
bureaucracy",charro,pelego, Vandorista,'businessunionism', and 'reformism',
and more or less uncriticallyincorporatedthem into our theoreticalframework.
Beforethey can be useful these sorts of concepts do requiremajorreworking.
The widely used Mexican term charrismomay serve as an example (though
similarcomments could be made about such terms as pelego, Vandorista,etc.).
Whilethere is no universallyaccepted definitionof the term, Alonso's comments
providea useful startingpoint:
Charrismois a particularform of tradeunion control which is characterizedby:
a) the use of the repressiveforces of the state to supporta tradeunion leadership;
b) the systematic use of violence; c) the permanentviolation of workers'union
rights; d) misuse and theft of trade union funds; e) dishonest dealingwith the
workers'interests;f) connivancebetween union leadersand the governmentand
capitalists;g) corruptionin all its forms.2'
There are many elements in this 'definition'. Perhapsthe most importantis
the penultimate criterion: anti-workingclass policies of the union leadership
which providesthe evaluativeconnotation.Charrismomerelymeansunion leader-
ship disapprovedof by the speaker. No serious attempt is made to specify in
what ways behaviour is anti-workingclass, or to clarify what would constitute
pro-workingclass politics (which would be, at the same time, possible). The
theory of workingclass behaviourwhich is implicitin this definitionsuggeststhat

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86 BULLETINOF LATINAMERICANRESEARCH
if the charro leadershipwere removed,the workerswould pursue 'authentic'
working-classpolitics, and it is only throughmanipulationand governmentsup-
port that the leadershipcontinuesin office. Thisis a manifestabsurdity.It ignores
the extent to which all union leadershipsmust operatewithinthe parametersof
the existingsystem.
The questionof corruptionis not unimportant.It indicatesboth a motive for
retainingoffice and a source of power. It also provides,perhaps,a motive for
'selling'a contractto an employer- acceptinga less favourablesettlementfor the
workersin returnfor a bribe. The extent to which such practicesoccurin Latin
Americais difficultto determine,but they cannotbe dismissedout of hand. The
use of state interventionto impose a particularleadershipin a trade union (as
occurredin the aftermathof the railwayworkers'strikesof 1958-9) is perhapsa
feature of Latin Americanunionismwhich does not occur elsewhere.This,per-
haps,might be the definingelement of charrismo.However,if we took the impo-
sition of a specificleadershipby the state as the hallmarkof charrismowe would
find that this practicewas relativelyinfrequent,both in Mexicoand elsewherein
LatinAmerica.In this caseperhapsthe use of violenceto repressinternalopposi-
tion within the union mightbe a better definingcharacteristicof charrismo.It is
certainlythe case throughoutthe world that many union leadershipshaveused
physicalviolenceagainstsectionsof their rankandfile,most frequentlyoccurring
in unionswhere corruptionhas been important.Nevertheless,it seemsunwiseto
take the occurrenceof violenceas a definingcharacteristicbecausemany unions
which we might wish to describeas oligarchicalare not characterizedby overt
violence. Leadershipswhich are not authentic exist for a varietyof reasonsand
seek to perpetuatethemselvesin office througha varietyof mechanismswhich
do not necessarilyrest on the use of violence.
One of the reasonswhy trade union leaderscontinue in office is that their
membershipsee them as deliveringthe goods. There can be little doubt that, in
many instances,unions are able to operate in the labourmarketto alter wages
and conditionsof work, at least in the short run. Thisis, however,largelyunex-
plored territory,with a dearthof concrete studies of the impact of unions on
wages in Latin America.Nevertheless,it would be unreasonableto supposethat
unions, and thereforeunion leaderships,are completelyirrelevantto thisprocess.
Whatemergesfrom this discussionis the need for a multidimensional approach
to the subject. Analystshave tended to work with ideal-typicalconstructs,pre-
senting a list of union types (often only two types), each of which is definedby
a clusterof variables.Thisarticlearguesthattheseideal-typesshouldbe unpacked,
and the constituentvariablestreated separately.Firstly, it seems usefulto treat
variablesrelatingto the internalgovernmentof unionsseparatelyfromvariables
which describethe relationshipsbetweenunionsandotheractorsandinstitutions.
(Therearesome problemshere, particularlywith the analysisof unionleadership,
since this is the principal point of contact between internal and external
variables.)Turningto union government,the simple dichotomy of oligarchyvs
democracyneeds to be redefined.In the structureof uniongovernment,an im-
portant question concernsthe intermediatestrata of union officers. To what
extent, and in what ways, do they act independentlyof the top leadership?Are
the shop-floorofficials primarilythe executiveagentsof top leaders,or arethey
primarilyresponsibleto the rank and file? Do they havetheir own independent

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ANALYSISOF LABOURMOVEMENTSIN LATINAMERICA 87
sourcesof power, or is all power derivativefrom the top leadership?
In additionto the question concerningthe extent to which the unionrankand
file can influence the selection of leaders and the policies pursued,there is the
issue of their perceptions and attitudes to the union government.Do the rank
and file accept the leadershipas legitimate?Do they think the leadershipis doing
a good job? Is the leadershippopularor not? These dimensionsof support for
the leadershipneed to be investigatedin their own right.It would be premature
to assume that a democraticallyelected leadershipwas popular, or that an oli-
garchicleadershipwas not. Indeed,one of the sourcesof oligarchicruleis a wide-
spreadbelief among the rank and file that the leadershipdoes deliverthe goods
and has a legitimaterightto representthe membership.
Until very recently, few studies of internaluniongovernmentin LatinAmerica
existed. The over-politicized conception of the natureof the labourmovement,
togetherwith a Michelianpessimismconcerningthe possibilitiesof union democ-
racy, suggestedthat empirical investigationwould be largely redundant.22The
received wisdom was that trade unions in Latin America were oligarchical
machines,run by self-servingleaders, be they populist, verbally'revolutionary',
or conservativebureaucrats.However, those few empirical studies which have
been publishedrecently suggestthis pictureto be overly simple.23
Although many, possibly most, unions in LatinAmericaare run by oligarical
cliques, there are, and alwayshave been, exceptions to this rule. In Brazil,in the
1950s and again in the 1970s, a number of unions, particularlyin the metal-
working industries, appear to have produced leadershipswhich were directly
responsibleto their constituents.24In Argentina,importantunions such as the
meatpackersfought bitterly (but ineffectively) to forestall the imposition of
Peronist keaders,25and within Peronism,militant currentshave often provided
the vehiclesfor oppositionalcurrentswithin unions. A similarsituationoccurs in
Mexico, where despite all the talk of charrismo,substantialelementsof democ-
racy exist in certainunions in the automobileindustry,in electricity, and in the
mining-metallurgical union.26Oppositionalcurrentsexist, or have existed in the
past, in other importantunions, with internalunion democracya salientfeature
of the labour movementsin Chile,Peruand Bolivia.The extent of union democ-
racy, and its perdurability,remain to be examined. That it exists (alongside
oligarchicalpractices) cannot be denied, while, as suggested above, studies of
union government need to move beyond the formal dichotomy of oligarchy-
democracy,towardsa more refinedtypology of formsof union government.
Up to now, we have concentratedour attention primarilyon the workingclass
and the labour movement, and the state and dominant classes have been men-
tioned only in passing.Yet many analystswould claim that, in the case of Latin
America,one should beginwith the state. The corporatistorganizationof labour
in Latin Americatestifies to, and derivesfrom, the preponderantrole played by
the state in these societies. Generallyspeaking,the strengthand omnipresenceof
the state vis-a-viscivil society is the starting point for any analysis of labour
movementsin Latin America. However,the balanceneeds redressingagainstthis
over-politicizedimage, since the state is not all. Moreover,it is easy to under-
estimate the direct impact of both the workingclassand industrialistson policy
formation and implementation.Even in the stronglycorporatistetatiste regimes,
the direct influence of these classes is often discernible.27Just as the corporatist

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88 BULLETINOF LATINAMERICANRESEARCH
aspectsof LatinAmericansocietiesareoften overstated,so alsoarethe corporatist
aspects of Europeanand North Americansocieties understated.To say this is
not to say that corporatismdoes not exist, but merely that it is neitherunique
to LatinAmericannor the key to the understandingof those societies.
It is not difficult to show how LatinAmericanstates,with varyingdegreesof
success,have attemptedto control labour relations.As importantis to attempt
to determinethe role playedby labourand capitalin this process.It is very easy
to see labouras a passiveor purelyreactiveforce. However,a somewhatdifferent
readingof the historical record is possible. As Skidmorehas noted in a recent
essay,28it is paradoxicalto claim that labouris essentiallypassivewhen it can
plausiblybe arguedthat manymajorpoliticalcrisesare due largelyto the action
of the labour movement.Perhapsit might be useful to enumeratea few illustra-
tive examples.Bolivia:Since the revolutionof 1952, the COB,and in particular
the tin miners,have been a majorpoliticalforce. The COBwas the leadingforce
in the governmentsof Paz Estenssoro,an importantforce in the Siles Suazo
administration,while the Barrientoscoup of 1964 was, in many aspects, a res-
ponse to the powerof the union movement.Later,underthe briefTorresregime,
the COBonce againparticipatedin a situationwhichhas been describedas dual
power. Brazil:Despite widespreadagreementamong academicsas to the weak-
ness of the Brazilianlabour movement,it was, as a result of the 'strikeof the
300,000' in Sao Paulo in 1953, largely responsiblefor Vargas'downfall the
following year.29Strike activity continued, with another massivestoppage in
1957, while duringthe Goulartpresidencystrikeswere a factor contributingto
the military interventionof 1964. Since 1977, the Brazilianlabour movement
has once again experiencedan upsurgeof militancy,viewed with considerable
concernin governmentalcircles.Chile:Mentionof the PopularUnitygovernment
is sufficientto note the importanceof organizedlabourin Chileanhistory.Per-
haps it should also be amphasizedthat the victoryof the PopularUnity in 1970
was not a bolt out of the blue;it wasthe culminationof decadesof work.Mexico:
Generallyregardedas a countrywherelabouris totally subservientto the govern-
ment, a brief look at the history of government-unionrelations suggeststhat
these have been more problematicthan is sometimesassumed.The generalpro-
governmentposture of the official labourmovementwas only securedas a result
of massivepurgesof the Left in 1948.30Evenso, oppositionto governmentpol-
icies continuedin a numberof importantunions, and flaredup dramaticallyin
the railwayworkers'strike on 1958-9. In the late 1970s, the governmentwith
some difficulty persuadedthe labour movementto acceptan incomespolicy, as
part of an anti-inflationarypolicy. Argentina:The history of Argentinasince
1943 has been the history of Peronism,and hence, of the tradeunions.Whenthe
Peronistshave been out of power,the labourmovementhas (at least until 1976)
been able to bring down government(as in the Cordobazoof 1969).31In power,
Peronismhas alwayshad to try to controla militantrankand file. As in Mexico,
dissidentunions have been ableto exert substantialpressureon the government.
These, of course, are the strongestcases.Similarargumentsmightbe difficult
to make for countriessuchas Ecuador,Venezuelaor Colombia.But it is not the
purpose of this article to arguethat the labour movementis a majorpolitical
force in all LatinAmericancountries,only that theoriesthat emphasizethe ele-
ment of control neglect an importantpart of the picture- continuingmilitancy

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ANALYSISOF LABOURMOVEMENTS
IN LATINAMERICA 89
in the more importantcountries.In a period when militarydictatorshipsdo their
best to confine union activity to narrowlimits, it is perhapssalutaryto stressthe
potential for conflict and destabilizationwhich is characteristicof organized
labour.On the other hand,it would be quite wrongto suggestuniversalmilitancy
and political combativity.Labourmovementsvaryconsiderablyin their political
behaviour,both over time, and from country to country, and thereforemust be
discussedin termsof the system of political partiesspecific to each country.
It may seem strangethat the notion of populismhas hardlybeen mentioned
in this article up to this point. The omission is deliberate.The term is used so
loosely, and in so many ways, that it generallybringswith it confusion rather
than enlightenment.Ratherthan enter a necessarilylengthy discussionabout the
possible meaningof the term, I will merely state how I intend to use it in this
article. My understandingof the term populismis that it refersto an ideology, or
element in an ideology, which assertsthat the principalconflict in society is be-
tween the people and the oligarchyor imperialism.32As such it is usuallycoun-
terposed to a vision of society as made up of classes.Movementsor governments
which espouse such an ideology may be referredto as populist, providingthat
this is taken as descriptiveof theirideologyalone,and carriesno otherimplication
such as a loose organizationalstructure,or a charismaticleader,or a mass (rather
than class) base, or a multi-classcoalition, etc. Given this definition, a great
many political movementsmake some sort of appealto the people, andthus have
populist elementsin their ideology.33In generalterms, I suspect that the analysis
of labour movements in terms of differences in their professedideologies and
beliefs is probablyof limited use in understandingtheir actualbehaviour.If this
is so, then the differentiation,in ideological terms, between populist and class-
consciouslabourmovementsis probablyof little utility.
Whatis more useful, perhaps,is a distinctionin terms of organizationalstruc-
ture and the classoriginsof the membership,which is, of course,what is implied
in some definitionsof populism.Unfortunately,the correlationbetweenideology
and organizationalstructureis usually asserted,ratherthan demonstrated,with
considerableslippagebetween the two. It is probablymore useful to examine
organizationalstructureseparately.This must be examinedin terms of real rela-
tionshipsbetween the component partsof the organizationalstructure.It cannot
be inferredfrom an organizationaldiagramor from a set of statutes. This said,
the significanceof organizationalstructureappearsto residein two sets of ques-
tions: (1) internal union government,which is discussedelsewherein this article,
and (2) size and compositionof bargainingunits.
The organizationof collective bargainingvarieswidely in LatinAmerica.Not
only are some countriesmuch more centralizedin this respectthan others, there
is also considerablevariationwithin certain countries. Disentanglingthe effects
of bargainingstructurefrom other variables,althoughcomplicated,canbe neglec-
ted only at the analyst'speril. Another closely relatedfactor which differentiates
labour movements is the state of the labour market.Grossomodo, it seems rea-
sonable to account for the greater bargainingstrength of unions in Chile and
Argentina,comparedwith other Latin Americancountries,in terms of the early
formation of more or less homogeneouslabourmarketswith relativelylow levels
of unemployment.34At a sectoral level, variousinsitutional controls over entry
into the labour force act to tighten labour markets in situations of apparent

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90 BULLETINOF LATINAMERICANRESEARCH
labour surplus. In some industries(mining, for example) collective contracts
sometimes contain clauses stipulatingthat sons of workersmust be given pre-
ference in hiring. Over time, this segmentationof labour marketsis likely to
produce cumulative effects, diminishing social mobility within the working
class and leadingto the crystallizationof privilegedstrata.This phenomenonhas
been much commentedon, particularlyin termsof the notion of a dichotomous
split between a labour aristocracyand a marginalizedmass.35But the existence
of sucha divisionin the labourforce cannotbe taken as given.Muchwill depend
on patternsof job tenure.For example,in Mexico,whereturnoverin the automo-
bile industry is very low and wages quite high, many firms are contractually
obliged to give preferencein hiringto sons of employees. In this situation,one
might expect the formationof a privilegedstratumof workers.However,in both
Braziland Argentina,where labourturnoverin the automobileindustryis high,
and wages are not exceptionallyhigh, one would not, therefore,expect the for-
mationof a privilegedstratum.36
One important set of factors in relationto labourmarketsis the processof
urbanization.Thereare significantdifferencesbetween LatinAmericancountries
in terms of the size of the urbansectorvis-a-visthe ruralsector, the rateof rural-
urbanmigration,the availabilityof employmentoutsidethe metropolis(regional
industrialor mining centres), etc. These factors affect not only the supply of
labour,but also the previousexperiencesof the labourforce.
Another differentiatingfactor is industrial development, not merely the
absolute size of the manufacturingsector, importantthoughthis is, but also the
structureand compositionof manufacturingand mining.Hereit is importantto
considersize distributionof enterprises,as well as theirgeographicaldistribution,
and the processof developmentof the leadingsectors. It has been arguedthat
patternsof changein industrialrelationsbegin in the export-orientedsectorsof
societieswhich areintegratedinto the internationaleconomy.37Thisis a plausible
and interestinghypothesis,though possibly a ratherrestrictiveone, and I would
suggesta broadernotion of leadingsectors,which mightat times, but need not,
coincide with the export sector. Industrieswill differ in terms of their political
importance,with the state more concernedin some than others about growth
and about labour relations.The state is likely to intervenein the settlementof
labourdisputesin those industrieswhere it has interests,althoughthis does not
necessarilymean it will intervenedirectly on behalf of the employers.It is not
difficult to envisagesituationsin which the state views the employersas an ob-
stacleto regularizedindustrialrelationsand economicgrowth.
Let us considerthe leadingsector industries(those which aredefinedby the
state as leading the growth process). These tend to be industriesexperiencing
fairly rapidexpansion,supportedby the state in termsof measuresfor an appro-
priategrowthenvironment.Suchleadingsectorindustriesare likely,if successful,
to retaineconomic predominancefor periodsof twentyto fortyyears.Thereafter
they are likely to enter a long period of slow decline. The textile industryin
many Latin Americancountriesprovidesa good exampleof this phenomenonin
the first half of the twentieth century though miningwould obviouslybe the
leadingsector in some countries.Wagesand workingconditionsin these leading
sectors will not necessarilybe higheror lower than in other industries.It may be
hypothesizedthat in the initial stages of these leadingsector industries,when

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 IN LATINAMERICA
ANALYSISOF LABOURMOVEMENTS 91
industrialconflict emergeson a large scale, the state is likely to intervenein dis-
putes between labour and management.Interventionwill not be an ad hoc man-
ner, but, to restructurelabourrelationsin the long term, it will institutionalizea
specific pattern of labour relations. The next step in the argumentis to assert
that this model will be diffused to the rest of the economy in a relativelyshort
time. This diffusionmay occur in two ways. Eitherthe workersin otherindustries
will take the leadingsector (correctlyor incorrectly)as a model of whatis possible
and effective, or the state will impose this pattern throughoutthe rest of the
economy by legal enactment.
As the leadingsector shifts over time from one industryto another,there will
be a break in the institutional pattern of classrelations.As a new leadingsector
emerges, the state will once again intervenein this sector to regulatethe pattern
of class conflict. The older patternwill almost certainlybe substantiallymodified
in the process, and labour organizationswill be restructured.This model asserts
that discontinuity, rather than continuity, will characterizeLatin Amercianla-
bour movements,which means that any attempt to find an originalmoment in
history when the pattern of labour relations was set, once and for all, will be
fruitless. This is worth emphasizingbecause some analystsseem to think that, at
least in severalkey countries, the patternof labourrelationswas definitivelyset
at some key juncturein the first half of this century,and that this somehow sets
and defines the essence of that country's labour movement.38Obviously,I dis-
agree fundamentallywith such a perspective.The point that is often made, that
the institutionalpatternsof the labourmovementwere profoundlyalteredin the
first decades of this century in severalcountries,is quite valid. But this did not
set industrial relations in an immutable mould. In particular,it could well be
arguedthat there were major shifts in the 1940s and 1950s in some of the more
industriallyadvancedcountries, such as Brazil,Mexico and Argentina.And most
analysts would accept that the late 1960s and 1970s saw widespreadattempts at
restructuringlabour relations as part of the process of internationalizationof
capital.
So far, the model has been presentedin an entirely formal way: discussion
of the patterns of institutionalized class conflict has been omitted. Which
form of labour relationsis adopted in the leading sector will depend partly on
the models availableto the state, andpartlyon the particularform of organization
of the working class in that industry. Whatis meant by the models availableis
that Latin Americanstates, by and large, drawtheir inspirationfrom the stock
of ideas and practicescurrentlyavailable.The obvious exampleis the influenceof
Italianfascismon the adoption of corporatistpracticesin severalLatinAmerican
countries in the 1930s, the form of working class organizationin the industry
relatesto the so-calledobjective factorsmentionedabove. It will be apparentthat
this model has little space for certaineconomicvariables:wages;economiccycles;
inflation; rate of profit; rate of capital accumulation;etc. These factors enter
into the model only in two ways:
(a) as backgroundfactors contributingto the development of a leading sector
and affecting the dimensionsand timing of industrialconflict in that sector;(b)
as factors which influence the volume and timing of conflict once an institutional
pattern has been established,but which do not directly determinewhich institu-
tional solution is adopted.

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92 BULLETINOF LATINAMERICANRESEARCH
Other factors,however,do play an importantrole in this model. Thesehave
to do with the degreeof homogeneityor heterogeneityof the work force in the
leadingsector and its relationswith the work force in other sectorsof the econ-
omy.3 It has been arguedthat work forcesvaryfrom industryto industry,with
the most well-known analysisalong these lines perhapsthe Kerr-Siegalhypo-
thesis.40In attemptingto accountfor what they believedto be the high levelsof
strike-pronenessin certainindustries(mining,lumber,etc.), Kerrand Siegalde-
veloped what they call the isolated mass hypothesis.Drawingdirectly on mass-
society theory (best exemplifiedby Komhauser),41 they postulatedthat isolated
and homogenouswork forceswere likely to develophigh levelsof solidarity,and
that this would be a factor disposingthem to high levels of collective conflict
with management.42Othertheoristshave talked about dual markets,or about a
supposedsplit in the subordinateclassesbetween a marginalmass and a labour
aristocracy.Whatall these distinctionshavein commonis some notion of heter-
ogeneity of the workingclass.JuanCarlosTorre,forexample,makeshomogeneity
one of the lynchpinsof his work, stressing,for example,the homogeneityof the
BuenosAiresworkingclassas comparedwith the Bazilianworkingclass.Hetero/-
homogeneityis clearly a useful notion, but it is often ratherimprecise.If we are
to talk of a workingclass, some kind of homogeneityis clearlyimpliedeitherin
terms of positionin the labourmarket,or in termsof life chances,or in termsof
sharedperceptions.
In discussionsabout homogeneity in terms of life chancesand experiences,
many writershave stressedthe existenceof a radicalcut withinthe workingclass
between a stable labour force in manufacturingand an unskilled,migrant,mar-
ginal labourforce in the rest of the economy. Some haveeven impliedthat resi-
dentialpatternsmirrorthis disjuncture,with the economicallymarginallivingin
favelasand the core industriallabourforce presumablylivingin some other form
of housing.As far as the housing questiongoes, however,a largebody of litera-
ture criticizes such a straightforwarddichotomy as far as housing is concerned
with the recognitionthat residentialneighbourhoodscontain varyingmixes of
occupationaltypes.43
Nevertheless,the occupationaldisjuncturecontinuesto be acceptedwidely. I
think we need to reconsiderthis matter carefully.This supposed disjuncture
within the Latin Americanworking class is based on assumptionsabout the
tenure of occupationalroles. Specifically,it is assumedthat once a workerhas a
job in modernmanufacturingindustry,he or she will keep it permanently,i.e.
that the rate of turnoverof the labourforce will be verylow. Thisis an empirical
question, which for instance may be true in Mexico. However,as mentioned
above, such fragmentaryevidence as there is for Argentinaand Brazilsuggests
that labourturnoverin the modernmanufacturingsectoris quite high,44though
it should be stressedjust how little we actuallyknowempiricallyaboutthe opera-
tion of labourmarketsin LatinAmerica.If it is assumedthat turnoverratesare
high, what does this imply for workingclasshomogeneity?Surelya highrate of
turnovermust increasethe homogeneityof experiencewithin the workingclass,
as people move betweenoccupationalroles.
The homogeneityof the workingclass has two importanteffects: within any
given industry or labour force, it increasesthe workers'capacity to organize
effectively againstthe employer.(I am not sayingthat homogeneityis the only,

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ANALYSISOF LABOURMOVEMENTIN LATINAMERICA 93
or indeed, the most important factor in determiningworkerresistance,nor am I
saying that there will be no worker resistancewhen the labour force is hetero-
genous.) Secondly,within the workingclassas a whole, the degreeof homogeneity
will be one of the factors makingfor a rapidtransmissionof the lessonsof indus-
trial conflict in the leading sector to the rest of the economy. (Again,I am not
sayingthat homogeneityis the only factor involvedhere.)
To summarizethe precedingargument:any adequateanalysisof LatinAmerican
labour movementsmust beginwith a multivariateapproach.In this articleI have
attempted to discuss some of the factors which account for variationsamong
labourmovementsin LatinAmerica,factorssuchas type of internaluniongovern-
ment, the degreeof integrationof the labourmarket,the degreeof homogeneity
of the workingclass,rates of labourturnover,differingformsof corporatism,etc.
Clearly,the list of variablesis a long one,and many combinationscould be devised
to createtypologies. I have refrainedfrom suggestingsuchtypologiesherebecause
I wish to stress the complexity and variability,both in time and space, of Latin
Americanlabour movements.Whilethe elaborationof ideal-typesis a necessary
part of intellectual enquiry, it should not lead to prematurecodification and
oversimplification.At this stage, we are a long way from even being able ade-
quately to describeLatinAmericanlabourmovements,let alone explain them.

NOTES
1. This is particularlythe case with Braziland Mexico,and to some extent Argentinaand
Peru.To give an illustration:UNAMand SigloXXI are currentlypublishinga 17-volume
collection on the history of the Mexicanworkingclass. This articleis not intendedas a
systematicsurveyof the literature;ratherthe aim is to illustrateselectivelywhat I believe
to be generaltheoreticalproblemsin the areaof labourhistory.
2. Hobart A. Spalding(1977), OrganizedLabor in LatinAmerica,New York University
Press,(New York).
3. Ibid. p. 282 andp. ix.
4. A. J. Hexter(1979), OnHistorians,Collins(London),p. 242.
5. At a broaderlevel, the differencebetween 'lumpers'and 'splitters'is exemplifiedby
James Malloy (1977), 'LatinAmerica,the modal pattern'.In: J. Malloy(ed.) Authori-
tarianismand Corporatismin LatinAmerica,Universityof PittsburghPress(Pittsburgh),
versus the multiplepath analysisof F. H. Cardosoand E. Faletto (1979), Dependency
and Developmentin LatinAmerica,Universityof CaliforniaPress(Berkeley).
6. I would include as examples of this perspectiveL. MartinsRodrigues(1974), Trabal-
hadores Sindicatose Industrializacao,Brasilience(Sao Paulo), K. P. Erickson(1977),
The BrazilianCorporativeStateand WorkingClassPolitics,Universityof CaliforniaPress
(Berkeley);H. Wiarda(1978), 'CorporativeOriginsof the Iberianand Latin American
Labor Relations Systems', Studies in ComparativeInternationalDevelopment,vol. 13,
No. 1.
7. The analysisof the role of the state, and of corporatistinstitution, in the USA and
WesternEurope is hardly a novelty. Workswhich deal with this include, inter alia,
A. Shonfield (1965), Modern Capitalism,Oxford UniversityPress(London), N. Harris
(1972), Competitionand the CorporateSociety, Methuen(London),C. Crouch(1979),
ThePoliticsof IndustrialRelations,Fontana(London).
8. Thatis, the contrastis not between stateinterventionandits absence,but betweentypes
of state intervention.
9. Spalding(1977), p. 282.
10. Cf. R. Hyman(1975), IndustrialRelations,Macmillan(London).

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94 OFLATINAMERICAN
BULLETIN RESEARCH
11. WhatI havein mindhereis the differencebetweena formtwo-orthree-party democracy
and plebicitariandemocracy,and the differencebetween bureaucraticoligarchiesand
mafia-likeunion bosses.Cf. the discussionin J. Edelsteinand M. Warner(1975), Com-
parativeUnionDemocracy,AlienandUnwin(London).
12.It is sometimesasserted,often on the basisof somekindof Fei-Ranis,'developmentwith
unlimitedsuppliesof labour'model, that the economicbehaviourof trade unions in
LatinAmericahas no discernibleeffectson wages.Thisis, I think,an open question.The
sameappliesto the possibleeffect of the stateof the economyon wages.
13.JamesPayne(1965), LabourandPoliticsin Peru,YaleUniversityPress(New York).
Payne'smodel has been pickedup by interalia, K. Erickson(1977), TheBrazilianCor-
porative State and WorkingClassPolitics, Universityof CaliforniaPress(Berkeley);
M. Urrutia(1969), TheDevelopmentof the ColombianLaborMovement, YaleUniversity
Press (New Haven);S. Sigaland J. C. Torre'Unareflexi6nen torno a los movimientos
laboralesen AmericaLarina'.In: R. Katzmanand J. L. Reyna(eds.) (1979), Fuerzade
rabajoy MovimientosLaboralesen AmericaLatina,Colegiode Mexico(Mexico).
14. See also L. MartinsRodrigues(1974).
15. By institutionalrestrictionson labour marketentry,I havein mind, for example,the
provisionin Mexicanlabourlaw that job applicantsin a unionizedplantbe proposedby
the tradeunion.
16. The Payne model may also have some utility for earlyperiodsof industrialization in
someEuropeancountries.
17. The distinctionbetween intergrativeand exclusionaryforms of corporatismis now
widely accepted.Cf. the importantarticleby R. B. Collierand D. Collier(1979), 'In-
ducementsvs. Constraints:Disaggregating Corporatism', APSR,vol. 73, No. 4.
i8. Thereis a considerabledebateon the meaningof the term.Oneof the cleareststatements
of the standardnotion of populismis NicosMouzelis(1978), 'IdeologyandClassPolitics:
a critiqueof Eresto Laclau',New Left Review,No. 112. ThatI disagreefundamentally
with this conception of populismwill be apparentfrom the discussionin my book,
I. Roxborough(1979), Theoriesof Underdevelopment, Macmillan(London).I have
searchedin vain OctavioIanni(1972), La Formaciondel EstadoPopulistaen America
Latina,ERA (Mexico),for a definitionof the term.It is not clearwhetherIanniis refer-
ring to an ideology,a movement,a state, or merelyeverythingthat happenedin Latin
Americaafter1930.
19. This will be discussedin more detailbelow. A typical expositionof this dichotomyis
A. Quijano(1974), 'The MarginalPole of the Economy and the Marginalized Labour
Force',Economyand Society,vol. 3, No. 4.
20. Malloy(1977).
21. A. Alonso(1972), El MovimientoFerrocarrilero en Mexico,ERA(Mexico),p. 98.
22. R. Michels(1962), PoliticalParties,Collier(New York). Michelsarguedthat a number
of factors would predisposetrade unions towardsoligarchy.This thesis was basically
accepted by S. M. Lipset et al (1956), Union Democracy,Doubleday(New York).
EdelsteinandWarner,op cit., presenta ratherdifferentpicture.
23. H. Handelman(1979), 'Unionization,Ideology,and PoliticalParticipationwithin the
MexicanWorkingClass'.In: M. Seligsonand J. Booth (eds.) PoliticalParticipationin
LatinAmerica,vol. 2, Holmesand Meier(New York);H. Handelman(1977), 'Oligarchy
and Democracyin Two MexicanLabourUnions',ILRR, vol. 30, No. 2; J. C. Torre
(1974), 'LaDemocraciaSindicalen la Argentina',DesarrolloEconomico,vol. 14, No. 55;
S. Gomez Tagle (1980), Insurgenciay Democraciaen los SindicatosElectrecistas,El
Colegiode Mexico(Mexico).
24.T. Harding(1973), 'The PoliticalHistoryof OrganizedLaborin Brazil',Ph.D. Thesis,
StanfordUniversity.
25.C. Berquist(1979), 'Bourgeoisficationand Proletarianiz7tion in the Semi-Periphery:
WorkingClassPoliticsin ArgentinaandChileCompared',unpublishedMS.
26. M. ThompsonandI. Roxborough(forthcoming),'Corporatism andUnionDemocracyin
Mexico'. In: K. Coleman(ed.), The Politics of Laborin Latin America,Holmesand
Meier(New York).
27. See, for example,in the Braziliancase, Eli Diniz (1978), Empresario,EstadoE Capital-
ismo No Brasil,Paz e Terra(Rio de Janeiro);L. WerneckVianna(1977), Liberalismoe
Sindicatono Brasil,Paze Terra(Rio de Janeiro).

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ANALYSISOF LABOURMOVEMENTIN LATINAMERICA 95
28. T. Skidmore(1979), 'Workersand Soldiers:UrbanLaborMovementsandElite Responses
in TwentiethCenturyLatin America'.In: V. Bernhard(ed.) Elites,MassesandModern-
izationin LatinAmerica1850-1930, Universityof TexasPress(Austin).
29. Ibid;J. A. Moises(1978), Grevede Massae CrisePolitica,Polis (Sao Paulo).
30. L. Medina(1979), Civilismoy Moderizacion del Autoritarismo,vol. 20 of Historiade la
RevolucionMexicana,El Colegiode Mexico(Mexico).
31. F. Delich (1970), Crisesy ProtestaSocial, B. A. Signos;B. Balveet al (1973), Luchade
Calles,Luchade Clases,B.A. RosaBlindada.
32. This is, in many respects,similarto the positionadvancedby E. Laclau(1977), Politics
and Ideologyin MarxistTheory,NLR (London).
33. This is preciselyLaclau'spoint. Giventhe omnipresenceof populist strains,it is hardly
worthwhiletalkingabout movementswhich areexclusivelypopulistin supposedopposi-
tion to movementswhichareuntaintedby populistideologicalthemes.
34.S. Sigaland J. C. Torre (1979), 'Una reflexion en tono a los movimientoslaboralesen
AmericaLatina'.In: R. Katzmanand J. L. Reyna(eds.),Fuerzade Trabajo y Movimientos
Laboralesen AmericaLatina,El Colegiode Mexico(Mexico).
35.Quijano, op. cit.; R. Trajtenberg(1978), Transnacionales y Fuerzade Trabajoen la
Periferia,ILET(Mexico).
36.J. Nun (1979), 'LaindustriaautomotrizArgentina',RevistaMexicanade Sociologia,vol.
XL, no. 1, J. Humphrey,'Operariosda industriaautomobilisticano Brasil',Estudos
Cebrap.no. 23.
37.J. Cronin(1979), IndustrialConflictin Moder Britain,CroomHelm(London).
38.For example, Skidmore(1979); P. de Shazo (1979), 'The ValparaisoMaritimeStrikeof
1903', JLAS,vol. II, no. 1.
39.For analyseswhichuse a homogeneity/heterogeneity dichotomy,seeinteralia,J. C. Torre
(1979), 'El movimientosindicalen la Argentina',mimeo;E. Jelin (1977), 'Orientaciones
y ideologiasobrerasen AmericaLatina'.In: R. Katzmanand J. L. Reyna(eds.), Fuerza
de Trabajoy MovimientosLaboralesen AmericaLatina,El Colegiode Mexico(Mexico);
B. Fausto(1977), TrabalhoUrbanoe ConflitoSocial,DIFEL(Sao Paulo).
40.C. Kerrand A. Siegal(1954), The Inter-industryPropensityto Strike'.In:A. Kornhauser
et al (eds.), IndustrialConflict,McGraw-Hill
(New York).
41.W. Kornhauser(1959), ThePoliticsof MassSociety, FreePress(New York).
42.Despite some attractivefeaturesof this theory it has been stronglycriticizedon empirical
as well as theoreticalgrounds.See P. Edwards(1977),'A Critiqueof the Kerr-SiegalHypo-
thesis',SociologicalReview,vol. 25, no. 3.
43.BryanRoberts(1978), Citiesof Peasants,EdwardArnold(London).
44.Cf. n. 36.

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