G.R. No.

97239 May 12, 1993

INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) AND NESTOR B.
MICOSA, respondents.

Jimenez & Associates for petitioner.

Santos & Associates for private respondent.

NOCON, J.:

Posed for determination in this petition for certiorari is the question of whether a conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude is a ground for dismissal from employment and corollarily, whether a conviction of a crime of homicide
involves moral turpitude.

International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) is an international organization recognized by the Philippine government and
accorded privileges, rights and immunities normally granted to organizations of universal character. In 1977, it hired
private respondent Nestor B. Micosa as laborer, who thereby became bound by IRRI Employment Policy and Regulations,
the Miscellaneous Provisions of which states viz:

C. Conviction and Previous Separation

l. . . .

2. An employer who has been convicted of a (sic) criminal offense involving moral turpitude may be
dismissed from the service. 1

On February 6, 1967, Micosa stabbed to death one Reynaldo Ortega inside a beer house in Los Baños, Laguna.

On September 15, 1987, Micosa was accused of the crime of homicide. During the pendency of the criminal case, Micosa
voluntarily applied for inclusion in IRRI's Special Separation Program. However, on January 9, 1990, IRRI's Director
General, Klaus L. Lampe expressed deep regret that he had to disapprove Micosa's application for separation because of
IRRI's desire to retain the skills and talents that persons like him possess. 2

On January 23, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision fending Micosa guilty of homicide, but appreciating, however, in
his favor the presence of the mitigating circumstances of (a) incomplete self-defense and (b) voluntary surrender, plus the
total absence of any aggravating circumstance.

Subsequently, Micosa applied for suspension of his sentence under the Probation Law.

On February 8, 1990, IRRI's Director General personally wrote Micosa that his appointment as laborer was confirmed,
making him a regular core employee whose appointment was for an indefinite period and who "may not be terminated
except for justifiable causes as defined by the pertinent provisions of the Philippine Labor Code.3

On March 30, 1990, IRRI's Human Resource Development Head, J.K. Pascual wrote Micosa urging him to resign from
employment in view of his conviction in the case for homicide.

On April 4, 1990, the Laguna Parole and Probation Office No. II wrote IRRI informing the latter that said office found
Micosa's application for probation meritorious as he was evaluated "to possess desirable social antecedents in his life." 4
On April 6, 1990, Micosa informed J.K. Pascual that he had no intention of resigning from his job at IRRI.

On April 22, 1990, J. K. Pascual replied to Micosa's letter insisting that the crime for which he was convicted involves
moral turpitude and informing him that he is thereby charged of violating Section I-AA, Par VII, C-2 of the Institute's
Personnel Manual.

On April 27, 1990, Micosa explained to J.K. Pascual that the slaying of Reynaldo Ortega on February 6, 1987 arose out of
his act of defending himself from unlawful aggression; that his conviction did not involve moral turpitude and that he
opted not to appeal his conviction so that he could avail of the benefits of probation, which the trial court granted to him.

On May 7, 1990, Micosa sought the assistance of IRRI's Grievance Committee who recommended to the Director
General, his continued employment. However, on May 21, 1990, J.K. Pascual issued a notice to Micosa that the latter's
employment was to terminate effective May 25, 1990.

On May 29, 1990, Micosa filed a case for illegal dismissal.

On August 21, 1990, Labor Arbiter Numeriano D. Villena rendered judgment finding the termination of Micosa illegal
and ordering his reinstatement with full backwages from the date of his dismissal up to actual reinstatement. The
dispositive portion of the same is hereunder quoted:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the following orders are hereby entered:

1. Finding the termination of complainant's services illegal;

2. Ordering respondent International Rice Research Institute to reinstate complainant Nestor B. Micosa to
his former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges appurtenant, thereto immediately
upon receipt hereof;

3. Ordering respondent International Rice Research Institute to pay complainant Nestor B. Micosa his full
backwages computed from the date of his dismissal on May 25, 1990 up to actual reinstatement based on
his latest salary rate of P41,068.00 per month.

4. Ordering respondent International Rice Research Institute, to pay complainant's counsel the amount of
Five Thousand Pesos P5,000.00, representing his attorney's fees; and.

5. Dismissing the claim for damages for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 5

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission was basically in agreement with the findings and conclusions of the
Labor Arbiter. Hence, in a resolution dated January 31, 1991, it affirmed the appealed decision, the dispositive portion of
which states:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with modification deleting the award of attorney's
fees.

SO ORDERED. 6

Accordingly, petitioner filed this instant petition raising the following issues:

1. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION HAS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT IRRI HAD NO RIGHT NOR AUTHORITY TO PRESCRIBE ANY
OTHER CAUSE/S FOR DISMISSAL IF THE SAME IS NOT AMONG THOSE ENUMERATED IN
ARTICLE OF THE LABOR CODE.
 2. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT "THERE IS NO BASIS TO APPLY PETITIONER'S INSTITUTE
PERSONNEL MANUAL IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINANT ON THE SOLE GROUND THAT
HIS CONVICTION OF HOMICIDE CONSTITUTE MORAL TURPITUDE. 7

The basic premise of petitioner is that Micosa's conviction of the crime of homicide, which is a crime involving moral
turpitude, is a valid ground for his dismissal under the Miscellaneous Provisions of IRRI's Employment Policy
Regulations.

In addition to its claim that it has the prerogative to issue rules and regulations including those concerning employee
discipline and that its employees are bound by the aforesaid personnel manual, petitioner justifies its action as a legitimate
act of self-defense. It admits that Micosa's interests — in his employment and means of livelihood — are adversely
affected; that a convict should not be discriminated against in society and that he should be given the same opportunities
as those granted to other fellow citizens but claims that at times, one's right is deemed superior than that of another. In this
case, petitioner believes that it has a superior right to maintain a very high degree or standard not only to forestall any
internal problem hampering operations but also to prevent even the smallest possibility that said problems could occur
considering that it is an international organization with concomitant obligation to the host country to avoid creating
disturbance or give occasion for such disturbance.

It should be recalled, however, that Micosa was issued an appointment with an assurance from the IRRI's Director
General that as regular core employee he "may not be terminated except for justifiable causes as defined by the pertinent
provisions of the Philippine Labor Code." 8 Thus, IRRI could not remove him from his job if there existed no justifiable
cause as defined by the Labor Code.

Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes wherein an employer may terminate an employment. Verily,
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is not one of these justifiable causes. Neither may said ground be justified
under Article 282 (c) nor under 282 (d) by analogy. Fraud or willful breach by the employees of the trust reposed in him
by his employer or duly authorized representative under Article 282 (c) refers to any fault or culpability on the part of the
employee in the discharge of his duty rendering him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his
position. It cannot be gainsaid that the breach of trust must be related to the performance of the employee's function. 9 On
the other hand, the commission of a crime by the employee under Article 282 (d) refer to an offense against the person of
his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative. Analogous causes must have
an element similar to those found in the specific just cause enumerated under Article 282. Clearly lacking in the ground
invoked by petitioner is its relation to his work or to his employer.

In the case at bar, the commission of the crime of homicide was outside the perimeter of the IRRI complex, having been
committed in a restaurant after office hours and against a non-IRRI employee. Thus, the conviction of Micosa for
homicide was not work-related, his misdeed having no relation to his position as laborer and was not directed or
committed against IRRI or its authorized agent.

Besides, IRRI failed to show how the dismissal of Micosa would be in consideration of the safety and welfare of its
employees, its reputation and standing in the community and its special obligations to its host country. It did not present
evidence to show that Micosa possessed a tendency to kill without provocation or that he posed a clear and present danger
to the company and its personnel. On the contrary, the records reveal that Micosa's service record is unblemished. There is
no record whatsoever that he was involved in any incident similar to that which transpired on that fateful night of
February 6, 1987. In fact, even after his conviction, the IRRI's Director General expressed his confidence in him when he
disapproved his application for special separation in a letter dated January 8, 1990 and when he conveyed to him IRRI's
decision to promote him to the status of a regular core employee, with the commensurate increases in benefits in a letter
dated February 1990. Respondent IRRI derogates the letters' significance saying that they were mere pro-
forma communications which it had given to numerous other workers. But whether or not such letters were "form letters,
they expressed the message that were meant to be conveyed, i.e., that Micosa is fit for continued employment. In addition,
the employees at IRRI's Grievance Committee interceded favorably in behalf of Micosa when they recommended his
retention despite his conviction showing that the very employees which IRRI sought to protect did not believe that they
were placing their very own lives in danger with Micosa's retention.
Likewise, noteworthy is the fact that Micosa, although found guilty as charged, was also found worthy of probation. This
means that all the information regarding his character, antecedents, environment, as well as his mental and physical
condition were evaluated as required under Section 8 of the Probation Law and it was found that there existed no undue
risk that Micosa will commit another crime during his period of probation and that his being placed on probation would be
to the benefit of society as a whole.

In the face of all these, IRRI remained adamant and insisted on Micosa's termination. Certainly, said termination cannot
be upheld for it lacked not only a legal basis but factual basis as well.

Even under IRRI's Employment Policy and Regulations, the dismissal of Micosa's on the ground of his conviction for
homicide cannot be sustained. The miscellaneous provisions of said personnel manual mentions of conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude as a ground for dismissal. IRRI simply assumed that conviction of the crime of homicide is
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. We do not subscribe to this view.

Moral turpitude has been defined in Can v. Galing 10 citing In Re Basa 11 and Tak Ng v. Republic 12 as everything which is
done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties
which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals.

As to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to

determine. 13 Thus, the precipitate conclusion of IRRI that conviction of the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude is
unwarranted considering that the said crime which resulted from an act of incomplete self-defense from an unlawful
aggression by the victim has not been so classified as involving moral turpitude.

IRRI argues that the crime of homicide committed by Micosa involves moral turpitude as the killing of a man is
conclusively an act against justice and is immoral in itself not merely prohibited by law. It added that Micosa stabbed the
victim more than what was necessary to repel the attack.

IRRI failed to comprehend the significance of the facts in their totality. The facts on record show that Micosa was then
urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed
Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that it was
while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the
victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's
intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating
circumstances of self- defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance
demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust.

This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide may or may not
involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. 14 Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and
is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral
turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. 15 While . . . generally
but not always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, it, cannot always be
ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum,
since there are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve
moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. 16 It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and
indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are
reached.

In fine, there is nothing in this case to show any abuse of discretion by the National Labor Relations Commission in
affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding that Micosa was illegally dismissed. For certiorari to lie, there must be
capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with
centuries of both civil and common traditions. 17 The abuse of discretion must be grave and patent, and it must be shown
that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. 18

WHEREFORE, the petition, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 [G.R. No. 148326. November 15, 2001]

PABLO C. VILLABER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and REP. DOUGLAS R.

CAGAS, respondents.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

In this petition for certiorari, Pablo C. Villaber, petitioner, seeks the nullification of two Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA-01-058. The first one was issued by its Second Division on April 30,
2001, disqualifying him as a candidate for the position of Congressman in the First District of the Province of Davao del
Sur in the last May 14, 2001 elections, and cancelling his certificate of candidacy; and the second is the en
banc Resolution dated May 10, 2001 denying his motion for reconsideration.
Both petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for a congressional seat in the First
District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections. Villaber filed his certificate of candidacy for Congressman
on February 19, 2001,[1] while Cagas filed his on February 28, 2001.[2]
On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Commission On Elections
(COMELEC), Davao del Sur, a consolidated petition[3] to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latters certificate of
candidacy. Cagas alleged in the said consolidated petition that on March 2, 1990, Villaber was convicted by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 86-46197 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and was
sentenced to suffer one (1) year imprisonment. The check that bounced was in the sum of P100,000.00.[4] Cagas further
alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is
disqualified to run for any public office. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (Tenth Division), in its Decision dated April 23,
1992 in CA-G.R. CR No. 09017,[5] affirmed the RTC Decision. Undaunted, Villaber filed with this Court a petition for
review on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals Decision, docketed as G.R. No. 106709.However, in its
Resolution[6] of October 26, 1992, this Court (Third Division) dismissed the petition. On February 2, 1993, our Resolution
became final and executory.[7] Cagas also asserted that Villaber made a false material representation in his certificate of
candidacy that he is Eligible for the office I seek to be elected which false statement is a ground to deny due course or
cancel the said certificate pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
In his answer[8] to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered mainly that his conviction has not become final and
executory because the affirmed Decision was not remanded to the trial court for promulgation in his
presence.[9] Furthermore, even if the judgment of conviction was already final and executory, it cannot be the basis for his
disqualification since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude.
After the opposing parties submitted their respective position papers, the case was forwarded to the COMELEC,
Manila, for resolution.
On April 30, 2001, the COMELEC (Second Division), finding merit in Cagas petition, issued the challenged
Resolution[10] in SPA 01-058 declaring Villaber disqualified as a candidate for and from holding any elective public office
and canceling his certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC ruled that a conviction for violation of B.P Blg. 22 involves
moral turpitude following the ruling of this Court en banc in the administrative case of People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda.[11]
Villaber filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC en banc in a Resolution[12] dated May
10, 2001.
Hence, this petition.
The sole issue for our Resolution is whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude.
The COMELEC believes it is. In disqualifying petitioner Villaber from being a candidate for Congressman, the
COMELEC applied Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides:

Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has
been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to
be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent
authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his
service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis ours)

As to the meaning of moral turpitude, we have consistently adopted the definition in Blacks Law Dictionary as an act
of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.[13]
In In re Vinzon,[14] the term moral turpitude is considered as encompassing everything which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, or good morals.
We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections[15] that not every criminal act involves moral
turpitude, and that as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to determine. [16] We further
pronounced therein that:

in International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC (221 SCRA 760 [1993]), the Court admitted that it cannot always be
ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum
prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude, and there are crimes which
involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral
turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation
of the statute.(Emphasis ours)

We reiterate here our ruling in Dela Torre[17] that the determination of whether a crime involves moral turpitude is a
question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. In
effect, he admits all the elements of the crime for which he was convicted. At any rate, the question of whether or not the
crime involves moral turpitude can be resolved by analyzing its elements alone, as we did in Dela Torre which involves
the crime of fencing punishable by a special law.[18]
Petitioner was charged for violating B.P. Blg. 22 under the following Information:

That on or about February 13, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Efren D. Sawal to apply on account or for value Bank of Philippine
Islands (Plaza Cervantes, Manila) Check No. 958214 dated February 13, 1986 payable to Efren D. Sawal in the amount of
P100,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check, when presented for payment
within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds, and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Efren D. Sawal the amount of
said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said
notice. (Emphasis ours)

He was convicted for violating Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 which provides:

SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on
account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days
but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine
shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
court. (Emphasis ours).
 The elements of the offense under the above provision are:
1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value;
2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit
with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would
have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
stop payment.[19]
The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. In People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda[20] we held that a
conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imports deceit and certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a
person.[21] The effects of the issuance of a worthless check, as we held in the landmark case of Lozano vs.
Martinez,[22] through Justice Pedro L. Yap, transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public since the circulation of valueless commercial papers can very well pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest.[23]Thus, paraphrasing Blacks definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his
private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty,
justice, honesty or good morals.
Petitioner contends that this Courts pronouncement in People v. Atty. Fe Tuanda,[24] insofar as it states that
conviction under B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude, does not apply to him since he is not a lawyer.
This argument is erroneous.
In that case, the Court of Appeals affirmed Atty. Fe Tuandas conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and, in addition,
suspended her from the practice of law pursuant to Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Her
motion seeking the lifting of her suspension was denied by this Court on the ground that the said offense involves moral
turpitude. There we said in part:

We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorneys
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, under both of which she was bound to obey the laws of the
land. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does
not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral
character of a person convicted of such offense. x x x.[25] (Emphasis ours)

Clearly, in Tuanda, this Court did not make a distinction whether the offender is a lawyer or a non-lawyer. Nor did it
declare that such offense constitutes moral turpitude when committed by a member of the Bar but is not so when
committed by a non-member.
We cannot go along with petitioners contention that this Courts ruling in Tuanda has been abandoned or modified in
the recent case of Rosa Lim vs. People of the Philippines,[26] which reiterated the ruling in Vaca vs. Court of
Appeals.[27] In these two latter cases, the penalty of imprisonment imposed on the accused for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
was deleted by this Court. Only a fine was imposed.Petitioner insists that with the deletion of the prison sentence, the
offense no longer involves moral turpitude. We made no such pronouncement. This is what we said in Rosa Lim:

In Vaca v. Court of Appeals, we held that in determining the penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the
philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies. The philosophy is to redeem valuable human material,
and to prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of
the social order. There we deleted the prison sentence imposed on petitioners. We imposed on them only a fine double the
amount of the check issued. We considered the fact that petitioners brought the appeal, believing in good faith, that no
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was committed, otherwise, they would have simply accepted the judgment of the trial court and
applied for probation to evade prison term. We do the same here. We believe such would best serve the ends of criminal
justice.

In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent COMELEC in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
A.M. No. 04-7-373-RTC December 17, 2004

RE: REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE RTC, BRANCH 60, BARILI, CEBU

A.M. No. 04-7-374-RTC December 17, 2004

RE: VIOLATION OF JUDGE ILDEFONSO SUERTE, RTC, BRANCH 60, BARILI, CEBU, OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 36-2004 DATED MARCH 3, 2004

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In anticipation of the forthcoming compulsory retirement of respondent Judge Ildefonso B. Suerte on January 23, 2005
and in response to newspaper reports questioning the alleged highly irregular handling by the same respondent of the
murder case of Cedrick Devinadera, the self-confessed accessory in the killing of Alona Bacolod Ecleo, wife of Philippine
Benevolent Missionaries Association supreme leader Ruben Ecleo, Jr., Deputy Court Administrator Christopher Lock
recommended that a judicial audit be immediately conducted of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu. DCA
Lock likewise recommended that an investigation be conducted to determine compliance by Judge Suerte with this
Court’s Administrative Order (AO) No. 36-2004, which specifically provides:

As Assisting Judge, Judge Cañete shall act on all newly filed cases in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Barili,
Cebu, as well as all civil and criminal cases in said court where pre-trial has not been terminated as of the date of
the Administrative Order.

In a Memorandum dated June 4, 2004, the Honorable Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. directed DCA Lock to
immediately proceed to Cebu to conduct an inquiry into the matter and determine if Judge Suerte violated the aforecited
AO in relation to the Devinadera case, as well as to other cases which Judge Suerte heard, tried or decided after the
issuance of the AO. In the same Memorandum, the judicial audit team headed by Atty. Rullyn S. Garcia which was then
in Cebu was likewise instructed to include Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court in Barili, Cebu in their audit.

On July 9, 2004, the audit team submitted its report, which was summarized in this Court’s en banc Resolution dated
October 12, 2004, to wit:

A. On Judge Ildefonso Suerte:

(1) He failed to act or take further action on 170 cases despite the lapse of considerable length of time since they
were filed or since the last actions were taken thereon by the court, to wit:

Civil Cases Nos. SP-BAR-201, LRC-198, SP-BAR-192, LRC-188, SP-BAR-074, SP-BAR-174, SP-
BAR-135, SP-BAR-125, SP-BAR-124, SP-BAR-104, SCA-BAR-010, 013, 077, 109, 154, 170, BRL-
LRC-171, BRL-LRC 185, 189, 196, 198, 199, 200, 208, 209, 212, 212, 221, SP-BAR,-227, CEB-BAR-
227, SP-BAR-230, 230, 234, 239, 254, 270, 273, 275, 282, 286, 307, 314, 318, 319, 338, 342, 347, 359,
360, 361, 363. (51 in all)
 Criminal Cases Nos. 831-A, 209, 210, 249, 273, 276, 277, 311, 376, 380, 381, 401, 404, 411, 421, 427,
436, 437, 438, 439, 443, 464, 507, 508, 513, 518, 531, 532, 559, 566, 572, 580, 581, 594, 602, 613, 621,
650, 652, 656, 659, 665, 687, 689, 694, 707, 711, 714, 732, 737, 739, 754, 776, 783, 787, 795, 810, 819,
821, 823, 824, 828, 831, 833, 837, 838, 839, 847, 856, 861, 867, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 878,
879, 886, 900, 906, 907, 953, 903, 909, 910, 912, 913, 918, 919, 921, 922, 923, 925, 930, 937, 940, 941,
942, 943, 944, 945, 957, 959, 964, 966, 975, 987, 989, 997, 998, 1023, 1025, 1040, 1043, 1044, 1047.
(119 in all)

(2) He acted or took cognizance of the following cases in violation of Administrative Order No. 36-2004, dated
March 3, 2004:

Civil Cases Nos. 365, 366, 367, 372, 373, 374, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 386, 387, SP-
BAR-266.

Criminal Cases Nos. 1034, 1035, 1039.

(3) He failed to make a judicious assessment of the allegations contained in the petitions for declaration of nullity
of marriage and annulment of marriage, particularly with respect to the addresses of petitioners, to wit:

9.1 There are indications which tend to show that the parties in some cases are not really residents of the
places, which fall under the territorial jurisdiction of Branch 60, contrary to their claim or allegation in
their petition. The act of Branch 60 in taking cognizance thereof despite the doubtful claims of petitioner
as to their place of residence betrays its patent laxity in exercising its duty to make a judicious assessment
of the allegations contained in the petition. For instance.

9.1.1 In CEB-BAR-377, entitled Leyson, Jr. v. Bontuyan, the given address of the petitioner as alleged in
the petition is "c/o Virgilio Concepcion, Poblacion, Barili" while that of the respondent is "Hi-way 77,
Talamban, Cebu City." The use of the abbreviation "c/o" which means "care of," connotes that petitioner
is not an actual resident of said place; otherwise, there would be no more need for petitioner to identify
himself with someone else who is a known resident of Barili, Cebu in the matter of establishing his
address therein.

9.1.2 In CEB-BAR-380, entitled Mitchell v. Mitchell, the given address of the petitioner as alleged in the
petition was changed from "San Roque, Quiot Pardo, Cebu City" to "Brgy. Tapon, Dumanjug, Cebu," a
municipality which falls under the territorial jurisdiction of Branch 60. The change of address was
apparently effected to clothe Branch 60 with jurisdiction to try and decide the case.

9.1.3 In CEB-BAR-372, entitled Tabarno v. Tabarno, the given address of the petitioner as appearing in
the certificate of non-forum shopping, which is an integral part of the petition, was changed from "Tisa,
Cebu City" to "Barili, Cebu." Again the change of address was apparently effected as an after thought to
enable Branch 60 to exercise jurisdiction over the case.

9.1.4 In CEB-BAR-376, entitled Caray v. Baruel, the given address of petitioner as alleged in the petition
is "c/o Dionisia Baruel Kaindoy, Poblacion, Barili, Cebu," while that of the respondent is Surigao City.
Again, the use of the abbreviation "c/o" raises doubt as to the veracity of petitioner being a genuine
resident of the given address.

9.1.5 In CEB-BAR-373, entitled Ora v. Ora, the given address of the petitioner as alleged in the body of
the petition is "Poblacion, Dumanjug, Cebu." However, his address as indicated in the verification of the
petition is "Osmeña Blvd., Cebu City." The variance of the address of the petitioner as appearing in the
body of the petition and in the verification should have been looked into by Judge Suerte to determine
which of the two is correct. He apparently did not.
(4) He acted on certain cases with undue haste in violation of the Rule on Declaration of Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which was approved by the Court on March 4, 2003 in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-Honorable Supreme Court, resulting to the prejudice of respondents, to wit:

9.2.1 In CEB-BAR-278, entitled Suarez v. Montenegro, Judge Suerte, on May 6, 2004, allowed the ex
parte presentation of petitioner’s evidence, after having declared that respondent and counsel "failed to
appear despite notice" and submitted the case for decision.

Perusal of the records, however, revealed that the notice of hearing scheduled for May 6, 2004 was only
mailed to the respondent, "c/o Alma Borromeo, Langlad, Naga, Cebu," on May 3, 2004, or three (3) days
prior to the hearing. At the time the hearing was conducted on May 6, 2004, Branch 60 had not yet
received the return of said notice. The declaration, therefore, of Judge Suerte that respondent and counsel
"failed to appear despite notice" had no factual and legal bases.

9.2.2 In CEB-BAR-350, entitled Cuesta v. Yanoc, Judge Suerte submitted the case for decision less than
two months from its filing.

The case was filed on January 29, 2004. The summons was issued on the same day, and the same was
served upon the respondent through substituted service on February 3, 2004. On March 4, 2004, the Cebu
Provincial Prosecution Office filed its Investigation Report. On the same day, Judge Suerte allowed
petitioner to identify and mark her documentary exhibits to prove the jurisdictional facts of the case. The
case was then set for trial on March 12, 2004. On said date, or less than two (2) months from its filing, the
case was submitted for decision.

9.2.3 In CEB-BAR-293, entitled Gaviola v. Rivera, Judge Suerte declared in his Order of November 13,
2003 that respondent and counsel failed to appear "despite due notice" and submitted the case for decision
after allowing petitioner to present evidence ex parte. The records of the case are bereft of any proof that
respondent and his counsel were duly notified of the November 13, 2003 hearing.

The case was decided by Judge Suerte on January 13, 2004, or six (6) months since it was filed on July 4,
2003.

9.2.4 In CEB-BAR-348, entitled Regis v. Litijio, Judge Suerte decided the case less than four (4) months
from the time it was filed on January 28, 2004 on the petitioner’s deposition upon oral examination,
which was taken on February 19, 2004. The records do not show that respondent was duly notified of the
taking of said deposition.

9.2.5 In CEB-BAR-329, entitled Castro-Roa v. Roa, Judge Suerte exhibited extraordinary fervor in
deciding the case in a record time of sixty-seven (67) days from the time it was filed, and in
surreptitiously bestowing finality thereto twenty-three (23) days later by issuing an Entry of Final
Judgment himself.

(5) He rendered a decision in another case for declaration of nullity of marriage based on what appears to be a
fabricated transcript of stenographic notes, thus:

In Civil Case No. CEB-BAR-250, entitled Santos v. Santos, which was filed on January 23, 2003, Judge Suerte
made it appear in his decision that plaintiff Rechel Taborda Santos testified in open court, when, from all
indications, no such testimony ever took place. The alleged testimony of the plaintiff, as recorded in the transcript
of stenographic notes (TSN) of the supposed proceedings in this case on August 14, 2003, was substantially
quoted in the decision, dated October 10, 2003, which declared the marriage between the plaintiff and defendant
null and void.

There are factors, however, that cast doubt upon the authenticity of the TSN in question. First, the name of the
stenographer who took down the stenographic notes of said proceedings does not appear in the TSN. This is
contrary to the common practice in all courts in the Philippines whereby the names of the court stenographers
who assisted in the proceedings are written on the first page of the TSN, along with the names of the presiding
judge, prosecutor and private counsels. Second, the court stenographers of Branch 60, namely: Ma. Lydia B.
Castro, Violeta Y. Causin, Estrellia A. Facturan and Corazon B. Labajo, issued a certification, dated June 9, 2004,
which was attested to by clerk of court Atty. Razonable, declaring that they did not prepare the TSN in
question. Third, 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Napoleon H. Alburo, the resident prosecutor of Branch 60,
issued a certification, dated June 11, 2004, declaring that while he appeared and attended the scheduled hearing on
all cases at Branch 60 on August 14, 2003, he denied having attended a hearing of this case on the
date. Fourth, this case was not among the cases listed in the calendar of cases for Thursday, August 14,
2003. Fifth, the TSN in question appears to have been prepared outside the premises of Branch 60, as it was
stamped "RECEIVED" by Ms. Manila, the clerk-in-charge of civil and criminal cases. Besides, Ms. Manila
admitted having received the TSN in question from someone who is not an employee of Branch 60, but she could
not recall who that person was.

(6) He proceeded with Criminal Case No. CEB-BRL-1039 (People vs. Devinadera) and decided the same despite
knowledge of the pendency of another case in RTC, Cebu City, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. CBU-
62308, which involves the same subject matter;

(7) In SP-BAR-266, entitled In the Matter of Settlement of the Intestate Estate of the Late Jose Stockli of Lambug,
Badian, Cebu, Judge Suerte ordered the appointment of a special administrator of the estate of the decedent one
day following the filing of the petition:

Atty. Edgar Gica, who claims to be the trusted counsel and confidant of Swiss national Josef Stockli, single and a
holder of a permanent resident Philippine visa, on June 1, 2004, filed a petition for issuance of letters of
administration and appointment of a special administrator of the properties, consisting of real properties, vehicles,
bank accounts and others, of the deceased Stockli. Atty. Gica claims that Stockli had no known heirs in the
Philippines and abroad except her full blood sister, Elizabeth Blatter who is residing in Isliberg, Switzerland.
Aside from the properties allegedly left by Stockli, Atty. Gica claims that the former had left unsettled liabilities.

On June 2, 2004, Judge Suerte issued an Order, declaring the prayer for the appointment of a special administrator
to be impressed with merit. Hence, Atty. Gica was appointed special administrator of the estate of Stockli to serve
with a bond of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).

On the same day, Atty. Gica posted a surety bond in the amount of P20,000.00 in compliance with the above-
mentioned order, through Intra Strate Assurance Corporation, whose address is listed in the court records as "Rm.
912, 9th Floor, Doña Narcisa Bldg., 8751 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City," The bond was duly approved by Judge
Suerte.

Still on the same day, Branch 60, through its clerk of court, Atty. Rhoda S. Apquero-Razonable issued the
appointment of Atty. Gica as special administrator of the estate of deceased Stockli.

Undoubtedly, the act of Judge Suerte in causing the issuance of the appointment of Atty. Gica as special
administrator of the estate of deceased Stockli one day after the filing of the petition constitutes a gross violation
of the procedural requirements of notice and hearing. Section 3, Rule 79, Rules of Court, provides that "(w)hen a
petition for letters of administration is filed in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place
for hearing the petition, and shall cause notice thereof to be given to the known heirs and creditors of the
decedent, and to any other persons believed to have an interest in the estate, in the manner provided in sections 3
and 4 of Rule 76." The court shall then cause notice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks
successively, previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation. The court shall also cause
copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for hearing to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited in the
post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of
residence be known.

Judge Suerte opted not to cause the issuance of notice of hearing, as he apparently relied on the allegation of Atty.
Gica that Stockli had no known heirs in the Philippines. He failed, however, to consider the fact that Stockli had
creditors, particularly his employees to whom he owed their salaries and wages, as well as the lessor of some of
the real properties in his possession prior to his death, who are entitled to notice and hearing pursuant to Section
3, Rule 79, Rules of Court.

The requirements of notice and hearing imply that the appointment of a special administrator cannot be made as a
matter of course. Section 1, Rule 80 of Rules of Court even provides that it is only when there is delay in granting
letters testamentary or of administration by any cause that the court may appoint a special administrator to take
possessions and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided. In the
instant case, no delay can be reasonably attributed in the manner of the issuance thereof barely two days old when
the appointment of the special administrator was made.

In ordering the appointment of a special administrator of the estate left by Stockli without the required
notice of hearing to its creditors and in violation of Section 1, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, Judge Suerte
had unequivocally demonstrated his willful disregard of procedural rules, which amounted to grave
misconduct.

Moreover, Judge Suerte, in taking cognizance of this case, which was filed on June 1, 2004, patently violated
Administrative Order No. 36-2004, which divested him of the authority to act on all newly filed cases where pre-
trial has not yet been terminated as of March 3, 2004. (Emphasis supplied.)

(8) In Criminal Case No. CEB-BRL-742 entitled People vs. Conag, for estafa, he ordered the dismissal of the case
twice on the same ground, with the first order of dismissal having been issued over one year before the second
order of dismissal was issued:

On March 4, 2004, accused Eddie Conag filed a motion to dismiss, attaching thereto the affidavit of desistance,
which was executed by private complainant Jorge Villafuerte on the same date.

On April 22, 2004, Judge Suerte issued an Order granting the motion to dismiss.

Interestingly, another Order of dismissal, dated February 26, 2003, is attached to the expediente of this case
stating, thus:

Before his Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by accused through counsel on the ground that private complainant
Jorge Villafuerte executed an affidavit of desistance.

Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED and the case against Eddie Conag is ordered DISMISSED.

It bears emphasis that there is only one affidavit of desistance, which was executed by the private complainant,
that is attached to the expediente, and that is the one he executed on March 4, 2004. Besides, it appears from the
records that accused did not file any other motion to dismiss than the one filed on March 4, 2004. There was,
therefore no legal and factual bases for the issuance of the February 26, 2003 Order of dismissal.

B. On Judge Rosabella M. Tormis of MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City:

14. Finally, in two criminal cases pending before Branch 60, namely: Crim. Case Nos. CEB-BRL-783 and 922,
entitled People vs. Mangyao, et al. and People vs. Aquino, respectively, Judge Rosabella M. Tormis of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, are (sic) shown to have inappropriately approved the bail
posted by the accused therein and ordered their release from detention.

Section 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure anticipates two situations where application for
bail may be filed. First, the application for bail must be filed in the court where the case is pending. In the absence
or unavailability of the judge thereof, the application for bail may be filed with another branch of the same court
within the province or city. Second, if the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where
the case is pending, bail may be filed with any Regional Trial Court of the place. If no judge thereof is available,
then with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal trial judge therein.
 Judge Tormis appears to have violated the above-mentioned Rules, particularly the second part, when she
approved the bail of the accused in the criminal case pending before Branch 60, which is located outside Cebu
City. The records of said cases are bereft of any showing of the unavailability of all RTC judges in Cebu City at
the time of approval of the bail. Considering that there are twenty-two (22) branches of the Regional Trial Court
in Cebu City, it was highly improbable that no one among the judges thereof was available at the time the accused
in said cases applied for bail.

C. On Clerk of Court Atty. Rhoda S. Paquero-Razonable:

12.1 Case folders are not systematically filed. Consequently, case folders of pending and active cases are
mixed with that of archived and terminated cases.

12.2 Case records, i.e., pleadings, orders, notices, documentary exhibits, and other documents pertaining
to a case, are not chronologically and immediately attached to the case folders. This causes the court to
lose track of the movements of the cases, and precludes it from immediately taking appropriate action on
certain matters necessitating court’s action, as evidenced by the big number of dormant cases therein.

12.3 There are instances when documents are inappropriately attached to the case folder or expediente.

12.3.1 A fabricated transcript of stenographic notes found its way into the expediente of Civil Case No.
CEB-BAR-250 (Pls. see No. 9.3)

12.3.2 Two Orders of Dismissal anchored on the same ground were issued more than one year apart from
each other in Crim. Case No. CEB-BRL-742, with the first Order having been attached to
the expediente after the second Order. As stated in No. 10.3, the first Order was without any legal and
factual bases.

13. Atty. Razonable likewise appears to have exceeded her authority in the matter of conducting ex-
parte hearing. In LRC No. 200, entitled Dela Cruz vs. Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu, where
she was directed to receive the evidence for the petitioner ex-parte, she did not only rule on the formal
offer of exhibits for the petitioner, as she also issued an order submitting the case for decision. The
actuation of Atty. Razonable was in clear violation of Section 9, Rule 30 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides that "(t)he clerk of court shall have no power to rule on objections to any
question or to the admission of exhibits, which objection shall be resolved by the court upon submission
of his report and transcripts within ten (10) days from termination of the hearing.

xxx

(En Banc Resolution dated October 12, 2004, pp. 1-8)

Via a Memorandum dated July 12, 2004, DCA Lock submitted his report to the Honorable Chief Justice. Pertinent
portions of said memorandum are hereunder reproduced, as follows:

With the assistance of the Judicial Audit Team headed by Atty. Rullyn S. Garcia, the undersigned gathered the
following information relative to the Devinadera case, to wit:

On 29 March 2004, Asst. Regional State Prosecutor Vicente T. Mañalac filed an information for Murder against
Cedric Q. Devinadera and "John Doe" before the RTC, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu. The Information stated that
accused Devinadera was detained at the NBI, Cebu City and that "no bail" was recommended for his temporary
liberty. Prosecutor Mañalac certified that after he conducted "an ex-parte examination of the evidence on record,
there is a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof." The filing of the Information was approved by then Provincial Prosecutor Cezar R. Tajanlangit, now
City Prosecutor of Cebu City.
Prosecutor Mañalac based his investigation solely on the Affidavit-Complaint dated 06 February 2004 of one
Jaime Bacolod who is claiming to be the first cousin of the victim, Alona Bacolod-Ecleo. Jaime Bacolod was
assisted and represented by a counsel de parte, Atty. Niel Nuñez. Said complaint in turn relied on the Sworn
Extra-Judicial Confession dated 19 December 2003 of Cedric Q. Devinadera, which was executed before the
CIDG in General Santos City with the assistance of counsel de parte Atty. Luis Salazar who formally entered his
appearance as counsel on 12 April 2004. On 23 April 2004, accused Devinadera was arraigned and pleaded
"GUILTY" to the lesser offense as an accessory to homicide. Judge Suerte then set the reading of his judgment on
07 May 2004. However, on the said date, accused Devinadera was re-arraigned because he changed his plea of
guilt from an accessory to homicide to an accessory to murder. Consequently, Judge Suerte issued his Judgment
finding accused Devinadera guilty and penalized him with an imprisonment of 4 years, 2 months, and 1 day of
prision correccional as minimum to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum.

On 19 May 2004, the surviving brothers of Alona Bacolod-Ecleo, namely: Ricky, Angelito and Josebel, all
surnamed Bacolod, filed a "Motion for Intervention and Motion for Reconsideration" alleging among others that
they are the real offended party. Nonetheless, Judge Suerte issued an order dated 25 May 2004 denying the said
motion on the ground of double jeopardy and that "the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or
served" by accused Devinadera under Section 7, Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. On the same day,
the surviving brothers filed a Motion praying for the setting of the hearing of the earlier motion on 27 May 2004.
It was on 08 June 2004 that the aforesaid motion was heard by Judge Suerte who did not resolve the same.
Instead, he pronounced publicly that by virtue of Deputy Court Administrator Lock’s order, Judge Cañete would
now handle the further proceedings of the case. Judge Cañete then set the hearing of the motion on 25 June 2004.

Connecting the Devinadera case to Administrative Order No. 36-2004 dated 03 March 2004, it is very clear that
the said case should NOT have been handled by Judge Suerte. A.O. No. 36-2004 specifically states that Judge
Leopoldo V. Cañete was designated as Assisting Judge of RTC, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu, to: "x x x act on all
newly filed cases in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu, as well as all civil and criminal cases in
said court where pre-trial has not been terminated as of the date of the Administrative Order". Since the
Devinadera case was filed on 29 March 2004, Judge Suerte should NOT have handled said case as he was already
relieved from taking cognizance of all the newly filed civil and criminal cases effective 03 March 2004.

xxx

In his sworn statement, Teodoro F. Saranillo, Utility Worker, RTC, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu, stated that on 10
March 2004, he officially received the copy of the subject A.O. as evidence by the Registry Return Receipt of the
post office. Judge Suerte received his personal copy of the subject A.O. on the same date.

Despite his knowledge and receipt, Judge Suerte ignored this mandatory order and continued to handle newly
filed cases. It was only after pre-selection of newly filed cases that he assigned the rest of the newly filed cases to
Judge Cañete.

In a sworn statement dated 07 June 2004, Judge Suerte admitted his knowledge and awareness of the subject A.O.
Specifically, he admitted that sometime 3rd week of March 2004, Atty. Razonable had shown him the copy of the
A.O. intended for the Office of the Clerk of Court. He also admitted that although the effective date of the subject
A.O. was 03 March 2004, he decided to implement the same on 15 March 2004 since it was the date when he
allegedly received the copy. He further admitted that he assigned to himself some of the newly filed cases in his
desire to speedily try cases since the assigned public prosecutor in his sala only comes once or twice a week.
Moreover, he has no pending case for decision and that he does not want to burden or overload Judge Cañete with
many cases.

Lastly, Judge Suerte admitted that he was aware of the existence of the parricide case against Ruben Ecleo
involving the same victim. Nonetheless, he still acted on the criminal charge for murder against Devinadera even
if there is no other evidence against him except the latter’s extra-judicial confession. He believes that Devinadera
had assumed responsibility for his admission of guilt and that he was not coerced or intimidated for doing so.
During the hearing on the Motion for Reconsideration on 08 June 2004, he divested himself from further handling
the Devinadera case in obedience to the Honorable Court’s order under the subject A.O. Thus, it is now Judge
Cañete who would continue to handle the subject case.
In addition to the foregoing statements, Judge Suerte submitted to Your Honor a separate letter dated 24 June
2004 explaining in detail the reason why he handled the Devinadera case. He alleged that his sala validly acquired
jurisdiction over the Devinadera case when the Office of the Public Prosecutor filed the criminal information with
the corresponding certification of Prosecutor Vicente Mañalac that a preliminary investigation was conducted. His
sala likewise acquired jurisdiction over the person of accused Devinadera when he voluntarily surrendered to the
police authorities and appeared in his sala during arraignment on 23 April 2004. Thus, the decision he rendered
was likewise valid as it was based on a plea of guilt after a plea bargaining agreement between the public
prosecutor and the accused and his counsel. He believes that the tenor of the subject A.O. "is more of a limitation
as what cases can be assigned to Judge Cañete x x x." as he honestly thought that the subject A.O. did not
prohibit him from handling other cases considering that he is the regular Presiding Judge of RTC, Barili. He did
not have the slightest intention of violating the said A.O. If at all, he may have just erred in his interpretation. It is
just his mere desire to speed up the disposition of criminal cases especially those involving detention prisoners.
To do so, he has to maximize the appearance of the public prosecutor. So he requested the public prosecutor to
appear in his sala in the morning and afternoon. He "then randomly pick five (5) criminal cases assignable to the
assisting judge to be additionally handled by me in the morning with the rest of the criminal cases to be taken up
by the assisting judge in the afternoon on the days when the public prosecutor is around. It was the Clerk of Court
who randomly picked the cases. This (sic.), it was only coincidental that I got the Devinadera case for
arraignment having been randomly picked by the Clerk of Court." He honestly believes that by doing so, he is
helping Judge Cañete in the speedy disposition of cases especially those with detention prisoners. In closing,
Judge Suerte sincerely apologized to the Honorable Court and to the Office of the Court Administrator and to the
judiciary as a whole for all the troubles, adverse comments and negative impressions that his wrong interpretation
and action might have caused. He maintained his good faith out of his desire to help a fellow judge and for the
speedy disposition of cases involving detention prisoners.

In a separate sworn statement dated 07 June 2004, Judge Cañete stated that he formally assumed his designation
as Assisting Judge in RTC, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu on 23 January 2004. When he received his copy of A.O. 36-
2004, he immediately noted its limitation and mandatory order that he would be handling newly filed cases and
those where pre-trial has not been terminated effective 03 March 2004. He believes that it is no longer necessary
to discuss the matter with Atty. Razonable and Judge Suerte as they both received copies of the A.O. He was not
aware that the said A.O. was not being followed to the letter until such time that the local newspapers came out
with the news regarding the Devinadera case. He opted not to discuss the matter with Judge Suerte as he "did not
want anymore to add to his problem because he was already being crucified in the papers."

Further verification and assessment of the records of the Devinadera case would show that there is more than
meets the eye than the simple issue of violation of A.O. 36-2004. It appears that there is a grand conspiracy in
this case in order to exculpate and acquit Ruben Ecleo in the parricide case pending before the RTC, Cebu City.
Procedural lapses were uncovered during the preliminary investigation and hearing proper of the subject case.

xxx

Judge Suerte committed a very patent error when during the arraignment on 23 April 2004, the accused was not
made to identify or authenticate in open court his extra-judicial confession. Likewise, Judge Suerte failed to
propound the mandatory clarificatory questions to the accused to determine whether he has personal knowledge of
the allegations contained in his extra-judicial confession and that he was not coerced, threatened or intimidated in
the execution of his confession. Judge Suerte merely relied on the presence of Devinadera’s counsel de
Parte, Atty. Luis Salazar. x x x.

During the plea bargaining agreement, Prosecutor Alburo’s participation was limited to his ceremonial appearance
for the state/government and mere physical presence since the TSN for the hearing on 23 April 2004 and 07 May
2004 did not indicate his substantial participation. The same is true with respect to the alleged private complainant
and his counsel. Even as to the supposed damages, which a typical aggrieved party may claim or waive were not
even discussed or taken up during the hearing. Apparently, the physical presence or appearance of the public and
private prosecutor as well as the private complainant was reduced to mere "spectators". Moreover, the offended
party who claimed to be the victim’s first cousin is not to be considered as the real "offended party" as defined
under the Rules of Court. Judge Suerte knew too well that the victim has still 3 surviving brothers and a spouse.
He cannot deny this fact as he himself admitted it in his sworn statement that he was aware of the parricide case
 against Ruben Ecleo. As against the alleged first cousin, it is the 3 surviving brothers or spouse who has the right
to give consent during the plea bargaining agreement. Moreover, they are also the only ones who can waive or
claim the damages from the accused.

Lastly, after the re-arraignment and plea bargaining agreement to a lesser offense of accessory to murder, Judge
Suerte issued a "pro-forma" decision simply indicating the plea of guilt of the accused and the imposition of the
corresponding penalty. x x x.

xxx

(Memorandum of DCA Christopher Lock to the Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., dated July 12, 2004, pp. 2-6,
8-9)

In the same en banc Resolution of October 12, 2004, this Court ordered the following:

On Judge Ildefonso B. Suerte:

1. SUSPENDED from the service, pending final resolution of herein administrative cases or until further orders
form the Court.

2. DIRECTED to show cause within fifteen (15) days from notice why he should not be dismissed from service
for the following acts:

(a) Failure to act or take further action on cases listed under paragraph A(1) of the October 12, 2004 en
banc Resolution,1 despite the lapse of a considerable length of time since they were filed or since the last
actions were taken thereon by the court;

(b) In taking cognizance of the cases under paragraph A(2) of the same resolution,2 in violation of AO
No. 36-2004, dated March 3, 2004;

(c) In failing to make judicious assessment of the allegations contained in the petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage and annulment of marriage, particularly with respect to the address of petitioners in
the cases listed under paragraph A(3)3 of the same resolution;

(d) In proceeding with undue haste in the trial of the cases listed in paragraph A(4)4 of the same
resolution, in violation of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages, approved by the Court on March 4, 2003 in A.M. No. 02-11-10-Honorable
Supreme Court, resulting to the prejudice of the respondents;

(e) In deciding Civil Case No. CEB-BAR-250 on the basis of what appears as a fabricated transcript of
stenographic notes;

(f) In proceeding with Criminal Case No. CEB-BRL-1039 (People vs. Devinadera) and in deciding the
same despite his knowledge of the pendency of another case in RTC, Cebu City, docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. CBU-62308, which involves the same subject matter as in the former case;

(g) In causing the appointment of a special administrator in SP-BAR-266, without notice and hearing, one
day after the filing of the Petition for Issuance of Letters Administration and Appointment of a Special
Administrator, in violation of Section 3, Rule 79, and Section 1, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court; and

(h) In issuing two Orders of Dismissal, to wit: dated February 26, 2003 and April 22, 2004, in Criminal
Case No. CEB-BRL-742, with the first order having no factual and legal bases.

On Judge Rosabella M. Tormis:

 1. DIRECTED to SHOW CAUSE within fifteen (15) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken
against her for approving the bail for the temporary liberty of the accused in Criminal Case Nos. CEB-BRL-783
and 922, entitled People vs. Mangyao, et al., and People vs. Aquino, respectively, pending before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu, in clear violation of Sec. 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.

On Clerk of Court Atty. Rhoda S. Paquero-Razonable:

Required to SHOW CAUSE why she should not be disciplinarily dealt with for her failure:

(a) to ensure an orderly and efficient record management system in the court and supervise the personnel under
her office to function effectively; and

(b) to strictly adhere to the provision of Section 9, Rule 30 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in the matter of the
reception of evidence assigned to her by the court in LRC No. 200 entitled Dela Cruz vs. Register of Deeds of the
Province of Cebu.

The records of the case reveal that despite the lapse of the period to file their answer or comment/explanation as required
in this Court’s October 12, 2004 en banc Resolution, as well as the extension which were sought by Judge Suerte and
Judge Tormis, none of the respondents filed any. Hence, the Court now considers the case submitted for resolution
without such answers or comments/explanations, the filing of which is hereby deemed waived.

The Court resolves the cases accordingly:

Judge Ildefonso B. Suerte is found guilty of gross misconduct in office, gross ignorance of the law, and incompetence
which merits his DISMISSAL.

The facts of the case against Judge Suerte remind us of the earlier case of Tabao vs. Judge Espina, G.R. No. RTJ-96, June
29, 1999, where the penalty of dismissal from service was imposed on Judge Espina for granting bail without a hearing in
Criminal Case No. 93-04-197, a case where the imposable penalty at that time was life imprisonment; and promulgating a
decision in said case before the defense had rested without giving the prosecution a chance to present rebuttal evidence.
The first charge was aggravated by his failure to file his comment thereon as directed by this Court. Says this Court
in Tabao:

"A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is
imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and [be] aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines.
He should strive for excellence, exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of
justice and the Rule of Law." (Conducto v. Monzon, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1147, 2 July 1998, 291 SCRA 619, citing
Estoya v. Abraham-Singson, 237 SCRA 1 1994, Aducayen v. Flores, 51 SCRA 78 [1973]; Ajeno v. Insierto, 71
SCRA 166 [1976]; Ubongen v. Mayo, 99 SCRA 30 [1980]; Libarios v. Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48 [1991]; Lim v.
Domagas, 227 SCRA 258 [1993]; Cuaresma v. Aguilar, 226 SCRA 73 [1993].)

Confronted with the undisputed findings of the Court’s judicial audit team which conducted the investigation from June 7-
11, 2004, the Court cannot help but doubt the integrity of respondent Judge Suerte.

Firstly, the Court finds respondent judge guilty of gross violations of the express directive embodied in Administrative
Order No. 36-2004 which divested him of all authority "… to act on all newly filed cases in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 60, Barili, Cebu, as well as all civil and criminal cases in said court where pre-trial has not been terminated as of
the date of the Administrative Order," i.e., effective March 3, 2004.

Included among those cases which, in the first place, should not have been taken cognizance of by said respondent are the
following because they were filed after the effectivity of AO No. 36-2004 on March 3, 2004, where, incidentally, the
Court’s judicial audit team further found gross irregularities:

A. Petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage and annulment of marriage.

1. Leyson, Jr. v. Bontuyan, CEB-BAR-377

The given address of the petitioner therein as alleged in the petition is "c/o Virgilio Concepcion, Poblacion, Barili", while
that of the respondent is "Hi-way 77, Talamban, Cebu City." This should have engendered suspicion on the part of Judge
Suerte that the parties did not reside within the territorial jurisdiction of Branch 60. Besides, the Court also agrees with the
observation of the judicial audit team that the use of the abbreviation "c/o" connotes that petitioner was not an actual
resident of said place. Respondent Judge Suerte should have, at the very least, required petitioner to show cause why the
petition should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

2. Mitchell v. Mitchell, CEB-BAR-380

The given address of the petitioner as alleged in the petition therein filed was changed from "San Roque, Quiot Pardo,
Cebu City" to "Brgy. Tapon, Dumanjug, Cebu," a municipality which falls under the territorial jurisdiction of Branch 60.
This generates doubt as to the veracity of the new address, which apparently was effected to clothe Branch 60 with
jurisdiction to try and decide the case.

3. Tabarno v. Tabarno, CEB-BAR-372

The given address of the petitioner as appearing in the certificate of non-forum shopping, which is an integral part of the
petition, was changed from "Tisa, Cebu City" to "Barili, Cebu." Again the change of address was apparently effected as an
after-thought to enable Branch 60 to exercise jurisdiction over the case.

4. Caray v. Baruel, CEB-BAR-376

The given address of petitioner as alleged in the petition is "c/o Dionisia Baruel Kaindoy, Poblacion, Barili, Cebu," while
that of the respondent is Surigao City. Again, the use of the abbreviation "c/o" raises doubt as to the veracity of petitioner
being a genuine resident of the given address.

5. Ora v. Ora, CEB-BAR-373

The given address of the petitioner as alleged in the body of the petition is "Poblacion, Dumanjug, Cebu." However, his
address as indicated in the verification of the petition is "Osmeña Blvd., Cebu City." The variance of the address of the
petitioner as appearing in the body of the petition and in the verification should have been looked into by respondent
Judge Suerte to determine which of the two is correct.

B. Special Proceedings:

In the Matter of Settlement of the Intestate Estate of the Late Jose Stockli of Lambug, Badian, Cebu, SP-BAR-266

In this particular case, respondent Judge Suerte ordered the appointment of a special administrator of the estate of the
decedent one day following the filing of the petition. Let alone the fact that respondent judge’s actuation constitutes gross
violation of AO 36-2004 because the petition was filed only on June 1, 2004, the same actuation is a blatant disregard of
the rules on notice and hearing as provided for in Section 3, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court. More than a mere ignorance of
the law, respondent conduct is even a willful and malevolent disregard of procedural rules, which amount to grave
misconduct.

C. Criminal Case

People vs. Devinadera, Crim. Case No. CEB-BRL-1039

The Information in this case was filed on March 29, 2004, which is after the effectivity of AO No. 36-2004. Respondent
Judge Suerte was clearly bereft of any authority to take cognizance of said case. Despite his awareness of AO No. 36-
2004 and, worse, despite knowledge on his part of the pendency of another case in RTC, Cebu City, docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. CBU-62308, which involves the same subject matter, respondent Judge Suerte convicted accused
Devinadera on the sole basis of a sworn extra-judicial confession and sentenced him accordingly.
We may add that Deputy Court Administrator Christopher Lock, in his Memorandum dated July 12, 2004 to the
Honorable Chief Justice, supra, noted several irregularities in the proceedings in the Devinadera case. For instance, the
personality of the private complainant who was a mere cousin of the deceased victim, was highly questionable in view of
the fact that victim, Alona Bacolod-Ecleo, was survived by her spouse, and three brothers in the persons of Ricky,
Angelito and Josebel, all surnamed Bacolod.

During the arraignment of accused Devinadera, respondent Judge Suerte did not have the supposed extra-judicial
confession identified or authenticated in open court. Respondent Judge Suerte also failed to propound the mandatory
clarificatory questions to determine the voluntariness as well as the veracity of the allegations in the extra-judicial
confession of the accused.

Secondly, the Court cannot avoid entertaining the suspicion that respondent Judge Suerte had personal interest in several
cases wherein he rendered judgment on record time, despite the fact that his docket was clogged with 170 cases which
remained dormant for a considerable length of time.

Ordinarily, there should be nothing wrong or illegal in deciding cases promptly and expeditiously. However, legality is
one thing; propriety is another. "A judge's performance is to be measured not only by its conformity to the law but to
propriety as well. He must avoid all appearance of partiality or interest. Such quality of detachment and disinterestedness
must be nourished in fact and in appearance." (Ignacio vs. Valenzuela, G.R. No. 2252, January 18, 1982)

In the Ignacio case, respondent judge therein held a hearing in Civil Case No. 7159-P despite being on vacation, while
cancelling the scheduled hearings of other cases. Respondent judge, therefore, in the Ignacio case opened himself to
suspicion that he was personally interested in the case before him. There, the Court found it fit to exhort:

As the Supreme Court held in Tan v. Gallardo, 73 SCRA 306, 315 (1976) 'judges should not only be impartial but
should also appear impartial ... [and] while judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they can
competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and behave in such a manner
that the parties before them should have confidence in their impartiality.' This ruling was reiterated in Fernandez
v. Presbitero, 79 SCRA 60 (1977), where a municipal judge was found guilty of grave misconduct, partiality, and
oppression and ordered to pay a fine equivalent to two months salary for conducting a preliminary investigation of
a criminal case at night and at the residence of a relative of the political opponent of the complainant's father, and
thereafter issuing a warrant of arrest against the complainant knowing that the next days were holidays when
government and private offices would be closed, thus precluding the timely filing of a bail bond.

Most glaring indication of personal interest by Judge Suerte is in the nullity of marriage case of Castro-Roa v. Roa, CEB-
BAR-329, which he decided on record time of sixty-seven days. This decision became final twenty three days later when
respondent Judge Suerte himself personally issued the Entry of Final Judgment.

Also obviously favored by Judge Suerte was Atty. Gica, who, in just one day after filing the petition for issuance of letters
of administration In re: Stockli, SP-BAR-266, supra, was appointed by Judge Suerte as special administrator of the estate
of the late Josef Stockli, a Swiss national, who allegedly died with no known heirs in the Philippines and abroad other
than his full blood sister, Elizabeth Blatter, who is residing in Isliberg, Switzerland, but had left unsettled liabilities.

The case of Regis v. Litijio, CEB-BAR-348, on the other hand, was decided by respondent Judge Suerte less than four (4)
months from the time it was filed on January 28, 2004 on the petitioner’s deposition upon oral examination, which was
taken on February 19, 2004. The records of this case, however, do not show that respondent therein was duly notified of
the taking of said deposition.

The case of Gaviola v. Rivera, CEB-BAR-293, was decided by Judge Suerte on January 13, 2004, or six (6) months from
the time it was filed on July 4, 2003. The Court notes an irregularity in this case when Judge Suerte declared in his Order
of November 13, 2003 that therein respondent and counsel failed to appear "despite due notice" and deemed the case
submitted for decision after allowing petitioner to present evidence ex parte. However, the records of that case are bereft
of any proof that respondent therein and his counsel had in fact been duly notified of the November 13, 2003 hearing.
The case of Cuesta v. Yanoc, CEB-BAR-350, was declared submitted for decision by the respondent judge less than two
months from its filing. This case was filed on January 29, 2004. The summons was issued on the same day, and served
upon the respondent through substituted service on February 3, 2004. On March 4, 2004, the Cebu Provincial Prosecution
Office filed its Investigation Report. On the same day, Judge Suerte allowed petitioner to identify and mark her
documentary exhibits to prove the jurisdictional facts of the case. The case was then set for trial on March 12, 2004. Yet,
surprisingly, the case was declared submitted for decision on that very same date, March 12, 2004.

The suspicion of the Court that Judge Suerte attached personal interest to the cases filed before his court is confirmed by
the sworn statement of no less than his own clerk of court. To quote from the Memorandum dated July 12, 2004, supra, of
DCA Lock to the Chief Justice:

In her sworn statement, Atty. Rhoda S. Paquera-Razonable, Clerk of Court VI, RTC, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu,
stated that she immediately informed Judges Suerte and Cañete about the A.O. upon her receipt thereof. And in
adherence to the said A.O., she placed all the case folders of the newly filed cases on Judge Cañete’s table. Later
on, she was informed by Judge Suerte that he would also handle newly filed cases. Thus, she was constrained to
bring instead all of the newly filed cases to Judge Suerte who chooses what case/s he would handle and what case
he would want to assign to Judge Cañete. Hence, Judge Suerte did not only assign himself the Devinadera case
but also the other newly filed civil, criminal and other cases.5

The special interest shown by Judge Suerte in several cases filed before him constitutes grave misconduct. This is
aggravated by the fact that such predilection for special cases demanding his special attention resulted in 170 other cases
remaining dormant for a considerable length of time, to the prejudice of the affected parties therein.

Thirdly, in the estafa case entitled People v. Conag, CEB-BRL-742, Judge Suerte twice ordered the dismissal of said case
on the same ground. What is highly irregular was that as early as February 26, 2003, the case was already dismissed on
the alleged ground that complainant therein executed an affidavit of desistance. This Court’s judicial audit team, however,
found that the affidavit of desistance which was supposedly the basis of the dismissal was executed only on March 4,
2004. Moreover, the record showed only one motion to dismiss dated March 4, 2004. Despite the order of dismissal of the
court more than a year prior to March 4, 2004, Judge Suerte issued another order dismissing the same case for the second
time, upon the same ground of desistance.

Besides, the Court finds grave misconduct on the part of respondent Judge Suerte for dismissing a criminal case, on the
ground of the supposed desistance of the private complainant, even without any motion to dismiss on the part of the
prosecution.

Lastly, in Civil Case No. CEB-BAR-250, entitled Santos vs. Santos, an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, Judge
Suerte rendered a decision based on fabricated transcript of stenographic notes. This definitely constitutes grave
misconduct which merits dismissal.

Respondent’s conduct in said case not only mocked the entire judicial institution, but likewise breached the sanctity of
judicial records, and ultimately the entire judicial process itself. The Court had consistently demanded respect from all
members of the bar, who, as officers of the court, have the duty to protect and uphold its dignity. It is worse when such
disrespect for the institution comes from a member of the bench no less. The natural instinct for the preservation of this
institution leaves no room for such a corrupt member who, despite being at the threshold of his years of service in the
Judiciary, shows very little, or maybe none at all, reverence and respect to the institution.

Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, MTCC Judge, Branch 4, Cebu City, is found guilty of gross violation of Section 17, Rule
114 for having approved the bail posted by the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. CEB-BRL-783 and 922, entitled People v.
Mangyao and People v. Aquino, respectively, pending before RTC Branch 60, Barili, Cebu. The records of those cases are
bereft of any showing of the unavailability of all RTC judges in Cebu City, whereat there are twenty-two branches of the
RTC.

This infraction merits disciplinary sanction to ensure that judges will be more circumspect before taking any specific
action in petitions to grant bail.
Atty. Rhoda S. Paquero-Razonable, Clerk of Court VI, RTC Branch 60, Barili, Cebu, is admonished to keep the
integrity of the records of the court by conscientiously and systematically filing pleadings, orders, notices documentary
exhibits, transcripts of stenographic notes, and other documents pertaining to a case, chronologically and immediately
attaching them to the case folders. Respondent clerk of court’s negligence in her duties contributed to the lack of
movement of 170 cases in the court’s docket.

As regards the conduct of ex-parte hearing by the same respondent in LRC Case No. 200, entitled Dela Cruz v. Register
of Deeds of the Province of Cebu, where she was directed to receive ex-parte the evidence for the petitioner, she
committed gross violation of the rules when she ruled on the formal offer of petitioner’s exhibits and issued an order
submitting the case for decision. Section 9, Rule 30 of the Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides:

The clerk of court shall have no power to rule on objections to any question or to the admission of exhibits, which
objections shall be resolved by the court upon submission of his report and transcripts within ten (10) days from
termination of the hearing.

Respondent clerk of court, is, therefore, also admonished to strictly adhere to the above-mentioned provisions of Section
9, Rule 30 in the matter of reception of evidence ex parte.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

1. Judge Ildefonso B. Suerte is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and
privileges, with prejudice to being reinstated in any branch of government service, including government-owned and
controlled agencies or corporations;

2. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis is hereby FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), with stern warning
that a repetition of the same act shall be dealt with more severely.

3. Clerk of Court VI Atty. Rhoda S. Paquero-Razonable is ADMONISHED to ensure an orderly and efficient record
system in the court and to supervise the personnel under her office to function more effectively, and to strictly adhere to
the provision of Section 9, Rule 30 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in the matter of the reception of evidence assigned to
her by the court, also with warning that a repetition of the same act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

IN RE: A.M. NO. 04-7-373-RTC [REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 60, BARILI, CEBU] AND A.M. NO. 04-7-374-RTC [VIOLATION OF JUDGE
ILDEFONSO SUERTE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 60, BARILI, CEBU OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDER NO. 36-2004 DATED MARCH 3, 2004], PROSECUTOR MARY ANN T. CASTRO-ROA, Respondent.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

This is an administrative case from the findings in the Judicial Audit conducted by the Supreme Court in Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 60, Barili, Cebu in the sal a of Judge Ildefonso Suerte. In the course of the audit, it was found that
respondent Prosecutor Mary Ann T. Castro-Roa (Castro-Roa) filed two separate petitions for annulment of marriage in
two different courts, one in the sala of Judge Ildefonso Suerte and the other in the sala of Judge Jesus dela Peña.1 Thus, in
an En Banc Resolution2 dated October 12, 2004, this Court ordered the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to look into
the fitness of Castro-Roa as a member of the bar in connection with her filing of two separate petitions for annulment of
marriage in two different trial courts.

The Facts
Castro-Roa married Mr. Rocky Rommel D. Roa (Mr. Roa) on March 30, 1993 and had two children together.3 However,
on June 5, 2000, Castro-Roa filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage4(First Petition) on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code with RTC Branch 56 in Mandaue City, Cebu (RTC Branch
56).

In a Decision5 dated April 24, 2001 (RTC Decision), RTC Branch 56 granted the First Petition, and declared the marriage
between Castro-Roa and her husband null and void by reason of psychological incapacity.

The RTC Decision was, however, appealed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to the Court of Appeals (CA).
The OSG argued, among others, that the trial court erred in declaring the marriage null and void. In a Decision6 dated
October 22, 2003, the CA found certain irregularities in the trial proceedings, and declared the RTC Decision void. Thus,
the case was remanded to RTC Branch 56 in order to give Mr. Roa the opportunity to present his evidence.7 After the
remand of the First Petition to the RTC, Castro-Roa filed a Motion to Dismiss (First) Petition,8 on December 11, 2003.
She stated that she no longer wished to continue the trial because "the continuance of the trial would mean extra effort,
time and money x x x"9that would dwindle her income.

However, despite the pendency of Castro-Roa's Motion to Dismiss (First) Petition, she filed a Petition for Annulment of
Marriage10 (Second Petition) on November 20, 2003 with RTC Branch 60, Barili, Ccbu (RTC Branch 60). The Second
Petition was grounded on fraud through the concealment of drug addiction and habitual alcoholism under Article 45 (3) in
relation to Article 46 of the Family Code.11 In this Second Petition, Castro-Roa failed to mention the pendency of the First
Petition in the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.12ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

RTC Branch 60 rendered a Decision13 dated January 26, 2004 granting the Second Petition, and declaring the marriage
between Castro-Roa and her husband null and void. Castro-Roa's Motion to Dismiss the (First) Petition was granted by
RTC Branch 56 only on March 10, 2004.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Cases Filed

On August 10, 2004, a letter-complaint with joint affidavit was filed by Jake Yu and Nanak Yu before the Office of the
Ombudsman in Visayas (Ombudsman) charging Castro-Roa with Perjury and Falsification of Public Document and Grave
Misconduct.15 The charge of Grave Misconduct was based solely on the alleged perjury and falsification of public
document by Castro-Roa in connection with her failure to mention the pendency of the First Petition for nullity of
marriage in the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping portion of her Second Petition filed before RTC
Branch 60. For this charge, the Ombudsman found Castro-Roa guilty and meted her the penalty of suspension for three
months.16ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

For the charge of Perjury and Falsification of Public Document, the Ombudsman filed an Information17 in the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Barili, Cebu, which eventually dismissed the case, upon demurrer to evidence. Thus, the MTC
found Castro-Roa not guilty in an Order18 dated March 8, 2011.

Castro-Roa appealed the Ombudsman's finding of guilt in the administrative charge of Grave Misconduct with the CA.
The CA granted the appeal, and therefore dismissed the administrative case of Grave Misconduct against Castro-Roa in a
Decision19 dated November 29, 2013. The CA ruled that a final judgment of conviction in the criminal case of perjury was
needed before Castro-Roa can be proceeded against administratively. It also explained that the administrative charge of
grave misconduct was based solely on the alleged perjury committed, which was not work-related and not an
administrative offense per se. According to the CA, while a public officer may be suspended or dismissed for malfeasance
for a crime which is not related to the functions of the office, the officer may not be proceeded against administratively
based thereon until a final judgment of conviction is rendered by a court of justice.20Finally, the CA ruled that there was
no forum shopping because the two petitions filed by Castro-Roa involved different facts and different causes of
actions.21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

IBP Proceedings

Meanwhile, on October 26, 2006, the IBP, through Director for Bar Discipline, Rogelio A. Vinluan, ordered Castro-Roa
to comment on the En Banc Resolution directing the IBP to look into her fitness as a member of the Bar.22 Castro-Roa
filed her Comment23 on February 22, 2007, explaining that she believed that there was "no substantial irregularity when
she filed the second annulment of marriage with another court."24 She argued that the two petitions were rooted from two
distinct issues, one being psychological incapacity and the other, fraud.25 She also claimed that when the Second Petition
for annulment was filed, she had already abandoned her First Petition for declaration of nullity when she filed the Motion
to Dismiss (First) Petition in RTC Branch 56.26ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Alter due proceedings, the Board of Governors of the IBP (IBP Board) in a Resolution27 dated November 19, 2011,
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation28 dated February 1, 2011, finding Castro-Roa guilty of violating
Canon 1,29 Canon 10,30 Rule 1.02,31 Rule 7.03,32 Rule 10.01,33 Rule 10.0334 and Rule 12.0235 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The IBP Board recommended her suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year.36 The IBP
Board also ruled that there was forum shopping because the elements of litis pendentia are present. Pertinent portions of
the Report and Recommendation states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Clearly, the act committed by the respondent lawyer was a deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping which
is punishable administratively.

Furthermore, there is no showing on the records that she reported the filing of the second petition to RTC of Cebu Branch
56. In connection with the second petition, she failed to state the pendency of the first case in the certificate of [non-
forum] shopping.

Also, upon closer examination of the two actions, it shows that the respondent misled the courts in stating two different
residence addresses in order to suit the jurisdictional requirements of filing the petitions in two different courts., x x x By
evidently deceiving the second court, the respondent prosecutor violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and Rule 10.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility x x x.37cralawred
Thus, the issues for this Court's resolution are the following:

(1) Whether Castro-Roa committed forum shopping; and

(2) Whether such act deserves the penalty of suspension from the practice of law.

Court's Ruling

We agree with the ruling of the IBP Board.

Forum shopping is the act of a party who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other
court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in
another.38ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In determining whether forum shopping exists, the important factor to consider is the vexation caused to the courts and to
the party-litigant by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
different fora upon the same issue.39ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Castro-Roa argues that she could not have committed forum shopping because the two cases "involved two different set of
facts, two distinct issues, two separate grounds and were based on two different causes of action." She therefore claims
that there can be no conflicting decisions between the two cases filed.40ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

We disagree.

Forum shopping can be committed in three ways, namely: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and
with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on
the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (res judicata); or (3) filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground
for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).41ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

We find that Castro-Roa committed forum shopping of the third kind. Forum shopping can occur although the actions
seem to be different, when it can be seen that there is a splitting of a cause of action.42 In fact, and as will be shown below,
while the relief prayed for in the First Petition was to declare the marriage "null and void ab initio" and the relief in the
Second was for the marriage to be "annulled and voided," an examination of the records would reveal that Castro-Roa
alleged the same facts and circumstances in both petitions. This leads to the conclusion that the reliefs sought arc based on
the same cause of action and are founded on the same

In her First Petition, Castro-Roa alleged that three days from the time their marriage was celebrated, Mr. Roa "manifested
sadism wherein if he pleasures to have sex, [Castro-Roa] should abide even if against her will or else she would suffer
physical pain x x x as what x x x happened last April 2, 1993 x x x."43 She also alleged that aside from physical abuse, she
likewise suffered verbal abuse from her husband by "shouting words only barbaric and uncivilized person could
make."44 She also claimed that her husband failed "to provide love, respect and fidelity to [her] by having relations with
other women."45 She said that her husband showed "irresponsibility by spending his time in liquor drinking, gambling and
drug vices."46Finally, she stated that when he "abandoned the conjugal dwelling on October 4, 1997, he never spared the
children any amount for support."47 Castro-Roa argued that all of these acts are tantamount to psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential marital obligations.

In her testimony in the Second Petition, Castro-Roa alleged that she observed that her husband "is a kind of sadist."48 She
stated that on April 2, 1993, she received physical beatings when she refused sex with her husband as she was not feeling
well. She added that she constantly suffered physical and verbal abuse from him, calling her "names only barbaric and
uncivilized persons could make."49 She further alleged that her husband "foiled to provide love, respect and fidelity"50 and
had "relations with different women."51 She said that he showed irresponsibility through habitual alcoholism, gambling,
drug vices and womanizing, and that this behavior was attested by friends and neighbors to have existed before the
marriage.52 Castro-Roa said that she would not have married him if she knew of these
beforehand.53ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Considering the foregoing, we find that Castro-Roa was merely splitting her causes of action. A cause of action is defined
as the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by a party in violation of the primary rights of another.54 In both
petitions, Castro-Roa alleged the same facts and circumstances but still chose to invoke two different grounds to attain
essentially one judicial relief, which is the dissolution of her marriage. In Mallion v. Alcantara,55 we ruled that litigants
are provided with the options on the course of action to take in order to obtain judicial relief, and once an option has been
taken and a case is filed in court, the parties must ventilate all matters and relevant issues
therein.56ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

More, there is a possibility that a final judgment in one case would amount to res judicata in the other because the
elements of litis pendentia are present. In Quinsay v. Court of Appeals,57 we held that the elements of litis pendentia are:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity, with respect to the two preceding
particulars in the two cases, is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party
is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.58ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In this case, the first requisite is clearly present. The preceding discussion, where we established identity of facts, rights
asserted, and reliefs sought, satisfies the second requisite. Finally, judgment on any of the two petitions would amount
to res judicata in the other. The cause of action raised and adjudged in the First Petition would have been conclusive
between the two petitions, and therefore cannot be raised again in the Second Petition.

Section 47 (b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court embodies the concept of res judicata as "bar by prior judgment" or
"estoppel by verdict," which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim,
demand or cause of action.59 The pendency of both petitions would also create an absurd situation where the proceedings
in the Second Petition would be a useless endeavor should the First Petition be granted: the Second Petition cannot
anymore dissolve a marriage, which has already been dissolved in the First Petition.

Castro-Roa cannot argue that the two petitions would not result in conflicting decisions, if both were left to proceed until
their conclusion. The dissolution of a voidable marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code, and a void marriage under
Article 36 have different consequences in law.

Dissolved marriages under Article 45 are governed either by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of
gains, unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the
marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of properly or conjugal
partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could
be issued. This is not the case for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage is
governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.60 Particularly, Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code govern the
property relations of void marriages; while Articles 50 and 51 govern the property relations of voidable marriages under
Article 45.61ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Clearly, Castro-Roa committed forum shopping in this case. The fact that she moved to dismiss the First Petition will not
excuse her from committing forum shopping. As a lawyer, she should have been aware that the motion did not
automatically dismiss the First Petition until ordered by the court. Therefore, when she filed the Second Petition on
November 20, 2003 (before the court granted the motion to dismiss on March 10, 2004), she should have declared the
pendency of the First Petition in the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.

Castro-Roa cannot insist that she filed the Second Petition as a mother and not as a lawyer. On this, we have reminded
lawyers time and again that the practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. In Mendoza v. Deciembre,62 we
ruled that a lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed even in his private capacity for acts which tend to bring
reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public. There is no distinction as to whether
the transgression is committed in a lawyer's private life or in his professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his
personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.63ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

She may be acting as a mother seeking a peaceful family life for her children, but this does not excuse her from
compliance with the rules of the profession that she has chosen for herself to support her family. The profession of law
exacts the highest standards from its members and adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the
highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of legal profession are the conditions required for
remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.64 These principles remain
applicable to Castro-Roa in whatever capacity she filed the two petitions.

Also, Castro-Roa violated Rule 12.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that, "[a] lawyer shall not
file multiple actions arising from the same cause," and Rule 12.04 which states "[a] lawyer shall not unduly delay a case,
impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes." Lawyers should not trifle with judicial processes and
resort to forum shopping because they have the duty to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Filing multiple
actions contravenes such duty because it does not only clog the court dockets, but also takes the courts' time and resources
from other cases.

Premises considered, we adopt the ruling of the IBP Board but find it proper to modify the penalty in line with existing
jurisprudence.65 Thus, instead of one (1) year suspension from the practice of law, penalty is modified to six (6) months
suspension from the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XX-2011-220, dated November 19, 2011 is MODIFIED; Prosecutor Mary Ann T.
Castro-Roa is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months, effective upon the receipt of this Decision. She
is warned that a repetition of a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 A.C. No. 11246, June 14, 2016

ARNOLD PACAO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SINAMAR LIMOS, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before this Court is a verified complaint1 filed on November 4, 2011 by Arnold Pacao (complainant), seeking the
disbarment of Atty. Sinamar Limos (Atty. Limos) for conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar.

The Facts

Sometime in March 2008, complainant's wife Mariadel Pacao, former vault custodian of BHF Pawnshop (BHF) branch in
Mandaluyong City, was charged with qualified theft by BHF. At the preliminary investigation, Atty. Limos appeared as
counsel for BHF. Thereafter, the case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong
City.2ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

To buy peace, the complainant initiated negotiation with BHF, through Atty. Limos, for a possible settlement. A meeting
was then arranged between the complainant and Atty. Limos, where the latter represented that she was duly authorized by
BHF. After a series of negotiations, Atty. Limos relayed that BHF is demanding the sum of P530,000.00 to be paid in full
or by installments. Further negotiation led to an agreement whereby the complainant would pay an initial amount of
P200,000.00 to be entrusted to Atty. Limos, who will then deliver to the complainant a signed affidavit of desistance, a
compromise agreement, and a joint motion to approve compromise agreement for filing with the
court.3ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On October 29, 2009, the complainant gave the initial amount of P200,000.00 to Atty. Limos, who in turn, signed an
Acknowledgment Receipt4 recognizing her undertakings as counsel of BHF. However, Atty. Limos failed to meet the
terms of their agreement. Notwithstanding such failure, Atty. Limos still sought to get from the complainant the next
installment amount of their purported agreement, but the latter refused.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Thereafter, in June 2010, the complainant met BHF's representative, Camille Bonifacio, who informed him that Atty.
Limos was no longer BHF's counsel and was not authorized to negotiate any settlement nor receive any money in behalf
of BHF. The complainant also learned that BHF did not receive the P200,000.00 initial payment that he gave to Atty.
Limos.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

This prompted the complainant to send a demand letter7 to Atty. Limos to return the P200,000.00 initial settlement
payment, but the latter failed and refused to do so.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The complainant then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Limos before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) -
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). The IBP-CBD required Atty. Limos to file an answer but she did not file any
responsive pleading.9 A mandatory conference was then set on March 1 and 29, 2012, and April 19, 2012, but Atty. Limos
failed to attend. Thereafter, the IBP-CBD ordered the parties to submit their position paper, but once again, Atty. Limos
did not bother to submit her position paper.

On May 5, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of Atty. Limos.10 The Investigating
Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove that Atty. Limos committed fraud and practiced deceit on the
complainant to the latter's prejudice by concealing or omitting to disclose the material fact that she no longer had the
authority to negotiate and conclude a settlement for and on behalf of BHF, nor was authorized to receive the P200,000.00
from the complainant. Atty. Limos was likewise ordered to return to the complainant the full amount of P200,000.00 with
interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of her receipt of the said amount to the date of her return of
the full amount.11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In a Resolution12 dated April 19, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating
Commissioner's report and recommendation.
On March 8, 2016, the IBP transmitted the notice of the resolution and the case records to the Court for final action
pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.13 As per verification of the Court, neither party has filed a motion for
reconsideration or a petition for review thereafter.

The Issue

Whether or not the instant disbarment complaint constitutes a sufficient basis to disbar Atty. Limos from the practice of
law?14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Ruling of the Court

To begin with, the Court notes that this is not the first time that Atty. Limos is facing an administrative case, for she had
already been twice suspended from the practice of law, by this Court, for three months each in Villaflores v. Atty.
Limos15 and Wilkie v. Atty. Limos.16 In Villaflores, Atty. Limos received attorney's fees of P20,000.00 plus miscellaneous
expenses of P2,000.00, but she failed to perform her undertaking with her client; thus she was found guilty of gross
negligence and dereliction of duty. Likewise, in Wilkie, Atty. Limos was held administratively liable for her deceitful and
dishonest conduct when she obtained a loan of P250,000.00 from her client and issued two postdated checks in the latter's
favor to pay the said loan despite knowledge of insufficiency of funds to cover the same. In both cases, the Court, gave
Atty. Limos a warning that repetition of the same or similar acts by her will merit a more severe penalty.

Once again, for the third time, Atty. Limos is facing an administrative case before this Court for receiving the amount of
P200,000.00 from the complainant purportedly for a possible amicable settlement with her client BHF. However, Atty.
Limos was no longer BHF's counsel and was not authorize to negotiate and conclude a settlement for and on behalf of
BHF nor was she authorized to receive any money in behalf of BHF. Her blunder is compounded by the fact that she did
not turn over the money to BHF, nor did she return the same to the complainant, despite due demand. Furthermore, she
even tried to get the next installment knowing fully well that she was not authorized to enter into settlement negotiations
with the complainant as her engagement as counsel of BHF had already ceased.

The fact that this is Atty. Limos' third transgression exacerbates her offense. The foregoing factual antecedents
demonstrate her propensity to employ deceit and misrepresentation. It is not too farfetched for this Court to conclude that
from the very beginning, Atty. Limos had planned to employ deceit on the complainant to get hold of a sum of money.
Such a conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the Bar.

Atty. Limos' case is further highlighted by her lack of regard for the charges brought against her. Similar with Wilkie,
despite due notice, Atty. Limos did not bother to answer the complaint against her. She also failed to file her mandatory
conference brief and her verified position paper. Worse, Atty. Limos did not even enter appearance either personally or by
counsel, and she failed to appear at the scheduled date of the mandatory conferences which she was duly
notified.17ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

By her failure to present convincing evidence, or any evidence for that matter, to justify her actions, Atty. Limos failed to
demonstrate that she still possessed the integrity and morality demanded of a member of the Bar. Her seeming
indifference to the complaint brought against her was made obvious by her unreasonable absence from the proceedings
before the IBP. Her disobedience to the IBP is, in fact, a gross and blatant disrespect for the authority of the Court.

Despite her two prior suspensions, still, Atty. Limos is once again demonstrating to this Court that not only is she unfit to
stay in the legal profession for her deceitful conduct but is also remiss in following the dictates of the Court, which has
supervision over her. Atty. Limos' unwarranted obstinacy is a great insolence to the Court which cannot be tolerated.

The present case comes clearly under the grounds given in Section 27,18 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
Court, however, does not hesitate to impose the penalty of disbarment when the guilty party has become a repeat offender.
Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of Atty. Limos' prior misconduct which grossly degrades
the legal profession, the imposition of the ultimate penalty of disbarment is warranted.

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon Atty. Limos, the Court is aware that the power to disbar is one to be exercised
with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as a
legal professional and as an officer of the Court.19 However, Atty. Limos' recalcitrant attitude and unwillingness to heed
with the Court's warning, which is deemed to be an affront to the Court's authority over members of the Bar, warrant an
utmost disciplinary sanction from this Court. Her repeated desecration of her ethical commitments proved herself to be
unfit to remain in the legal profession. Worse, she remains apathetic to the need to reform herself.

"[T]he practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they possess, and
continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions."20 "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the
laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them
underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office, and sets a pernicious
example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic."21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Indeed, Atty. Limos has disgraced the legal profession. The facts and evidence obtaining in this case definitely establish
her failure to live up to her duties as a lawyer in accordance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby making her unworthy to continue as a member
of the bar.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sinamar Limos, having violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
committing grave misconduct and willful insubordination, is DISBARRED and her name ordered STRICKEN OFF the
Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the records of Atty. Sinamar Limos. Further, let other copies be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all
the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
 RULE 138

Attorneys and Admission to Bar

Section 1. Who may practice law. — Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted
as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. — Every applicant for admission as a member of the
bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and resident of the
Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the United States of America. — Citizens of the United States of
America who, before July 4, 1946, were duly licensed members of the Philippine Bar, in active practice in the courts of
the Philippines and in good and regular standing as such may, upon satisfactory proof of those facts before the Supreme
Court, be allowed to continue such practice after taking the following oath of office:

I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do

solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice,
and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of may knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other jurisdictions. — Applicants for admission who, being Filipino citizens,
are enrolled attorneys in good standing in the Supreme Court of the United States or in any circuit court of appeals or
district court therein, or in the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States, and who can show by
satisfactory certificates that they have practiced at least five years in any of said courts, that such practice began before
July 4, 1946, and that they have never been suspended or disbarred, may, in the discretion of the Court, be admitted
without examination.

Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. — All applicants for admission other than those referred to in the
two preceding section shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied
law for four years, and successfully completed all prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved
and recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate, accompanied by a certificate from the
university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and further evidence may be required by the court.

No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has satisfactorily completed the following courses in a
law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law,
public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal
ethics.

Section 6. Pre-Law. — No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a
certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and
satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the
completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or
sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish,
history and economics.

Section 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications. — All applicants for admission shall file with the clerk of the Supreme
Court the evidence required by section 2 of this rule at least fifteen (15) days before the beginning of the examination. If
 not embraced within section 3 and 4 of this rule they shall also file within the same period the affidavit and certificate
required by section 5, and if embraced within sections 3 and 4 they shall exhibit a license evidencing the fact of their
admission to practice, satisfactory evidence that the same has not been revoked, and certificates as to their professional
standing. Applicants shall also file at the same time their own affidavits as to their age, residence, and citizenship.

Section 8. Notice of Applications. — Notice of applications for admission shall be published by the clerk of the Supreme
Court in newspapers published in Pilipino, English and Spanish, for at least ten (10) days before the beginning of the
examination.

Section 9. Examination; subjects. — Applicants, not otherwise provided for in sections 3 and 4 of this rule, shall be
subjected to examinations in the following subjects: Civil Law; Labor and Social Legislation; Mercantile Law; Criminal
Law; Political Law (Constitutional Law, Public Corporations, and Public Officers); International Law (Private and
Public); Taxation; Remedial Law (Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence); Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises (in Pleadings and Conveyancing).

Section 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in writing. — Persons taking the examination shall not bring
papers, books or notes into the examination rooms. The questions shall be the same for all examinees and a copy thereof,
in English or Spanish, shall be given to each examinee. Examinees shall answer the questions personally without help
from anyone.

Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his penmanship is so poor that it will be difficult to read his
answers without much loss of time., the Supreme Court may allow such examinee to use a typewriter in answering the
questions. Only noiseless typewriters shall be allowed to be used.

The committee of bar examiner shall take such precautions as are necessary to prevent the substitution of papers or
commission of other frauds. Examinees shall not place their names on the examination papers. No oral examination shall
be given.

Section 11. Annual examination. — Examinations for admission to the bar of the Philippines shall take place annually in
the City of Manila. They shall be held in four days to be disignated by the chairman of the committee on bar examiners.
The subjects shall be distributed as follows: First day: Political and International Law (morning) and Labor and Social
Legislation (afternoon); Second day: Civil Law (morning) and Taxation (afternoon); Third day: Mercantile Law
(morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth day: Remedial Law (morning) and legal Ethics and Practical Exercises
(afternoon).

Section 12. Committee of examiners. — Examinations shall be conducted by a committee of bar examiners to be
appointed by the Supreme Court. This committee shall be composed of a Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall act as
chairman, and who shall be designated by the court to serve for one year, and eight members of the bar of the Philippines,
who shall hold office for a period of one year. The names of the members of this committee shall be published in each
volume of the official reports.

Section 13. Disciplinary measures. — No candidate shall endeavor to influence any member of the committee, and during
examination the candidates shall not communicate with each other nor shall they give or receive any assistance. The
candidate who violates this provisions, or any other provision of this rule, shall be barred from the examination, and the
same to count as a failure against him, and further disciplinary action, including permanent disqualification, may be taken
in the discretion of the court.

Section 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully,
he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subjects. In
determining the average, the subjects in the examination shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 15 per
cent; Labor and Social Legislation, 10 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law; 10 per cent: Political and
International Law, 15 per cent; Taxation, 10 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5
per cent.
Section 15. Report of the committee; filing of examination papers. — Not later than February 15th after the examination,
or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, the committee shall file its report on the result of such examination. The
examination papers and notes of the committee shall be filed with the clerk and may there be examined by the parties in
interest, after the court has approved the report.

Section 16. Failing candidates to take review course. — Candidates who have failed the bar examinations for three times
shall be disqualified from taking another examination unless they show the satisfaction of the court that they have enrolled
in and passed regular fourth year review classes as well as attended a pre-bar review course in a recognized law school.

The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the candidates under this rule shall certify under oath that the
candidates have regularly attended classes and passed the subjects under the same conditions as ordinary students and the
ratings obtained by them in the particular subject.

Section 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — An applicant who has passed the required examination, or has
been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the
corresponding oath of office.

Section 18. Certificate. — The supreme Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a member of the bar for all the
courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon its records, and that a certificate of such
record be given to him by the clerk of court, which certificate shall be his authority to practice.

Section 19. Attorney's roll. — The clerk of the Supreme Court shall kept a roll of all attorneys admitted to practice, which
roll shall be signed by the person admitted when he receives his certificate.

Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:

(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of
the Philippines.

(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;

(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as
he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.

(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent with
truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact
or law;

(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to
accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and
approval;

(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a
party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged;

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's
cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;

(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed;

(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion
as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the end that no person may be
deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.
 Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear. — an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause
in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the
presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who
assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever
pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires.
An attorneys wilfully appear in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished
for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.

Section 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal. — An attorney who appears de
parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his client on appeal, unless he files a
formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court.

Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. — Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any
agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But
they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's
claim but the full amount in cash.

Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from
his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of
the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound
by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base
its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.

Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. — When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his
client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his
official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.

Section 26. Change of attorneys. — An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the
written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the
consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be
allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the
court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the advance party.

A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the contract between client and
attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to
recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the contract. However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the
court, intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon
all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case
wherein his services had been retained by the client.

Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Section 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The Court of Appeals or a
Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section,
and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the
premises.
Section 29. Upon suspension by the Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further proceedings in Supreme Court.
— Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Court of First Instance shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme
Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon
the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full investigation of the facts involved
and make such order revoking or extending the suspension, or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts
warrant.

Section 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. — No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the
practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to
produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to
appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte.

Section 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. — A court may assign an attorney to render professional aid free of charge to
any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that
the services of counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty
of the attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused therefrom by the court for sufficient cause
shown.

Section 32. Compensation for attorneys de oficio. — Subject to availability of funds as may be provided by the law the
court may, in its discretion, order an attorney employed as counsel de oficio to be compensates in such sum as the court
may fix in accordance with section 24 of this rule. Whenever such compensation is allowed, it shall be not less than thirty
pesos (P30) in any case, nor more than the following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50) in light felonies; (2) One hundred
pesos (P100) in less grave felonies; (3) Two hundred pesos (P200) in grave felonies other than capital offenses; (4) Five
Hundred pesos (P500) in capital offenses.

Section 33. Standing in court of person authorized to appear for Government. — Any official or other person appointed
or designated in accordance with law to appear for the Government of the Philippines shall have all the rights of a duly
authorized member of the bar to appear in any case in which said government has an interest direct or indirect.

Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose, or with the aid an attorney. In any other court,
a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a
duly authorized member of the bar.

Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. — No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the
Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to
clients.

Section 36. Amicus Curiae. — Experienced and impartial attorneys may be invited by the Court to appear as amici
curiae to help in the disposition of issues submitted to it.

Section 37. Attorneys' liens. — An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his client which
have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid,
and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for
the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his
client, from and after the time when he shall have the caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the
records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have the caused written notice thereof
to be delivered to his client and to the adverse paty; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and
executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.

The Lawphil Project - A

 A.C. No. 8330, March 16, 2015
TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRINA DE VERA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
For resolution is an administrative complaint for disbarment or suspension filed by complainant Teresita B. Enriquez
against Atty. Trina De Vera. We resolve whether Atty. Trina De Vera committed serious misconduct and should be held
administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor of several post-dated checks.

Teresita B. Enriquez (Teresita) filed her Complaint-Affidavit1 on June 26, 2009 before this court. The Complaint prayed
for Atty. Trina De Vera's (Atty. De Vera) disbarment or suspension in relation to the latter's issuance of worthless checks
and non-payment of a loan.2cralawred

According to Teresita, she is a businesswoman involved in building cell site towers. She is acquainted with Atty. De Vera
through the business by subcontracting the cell site acquisition to Atty. De Vera.3cralawred

Sometime in April 2006, Atty. De Vera borrowed P500,000.00 from Teresita with interest of P20,000.00 per month until
fully paid.4 Hbwever, Teresita did not have the full amount. Atty. De Vera persuaded her to borrow the amount from a
common friend, Mary Jane D. Luzon (Mary Jane), by mortgaging her property located in Lucena City.5 Atty. De Vera
issued IBank6 Check No. 310571 post-dated July 31, 2006 for P500,000.00. Atty. De Vera also issued at least two more
checks to cover the interest agreed upon.7cralawred

Teresita alleges that in June 2006, Atty. De Vera obtained another loan from Teresita's sister in the amount of
P100,000.00. Teresita guaranteed the loan. Atty.De Vera issued IBank Check No. 317689 post-dated July 14, 2006 for
P100,000.00 to Teresita. Teresita claimed that she paid her sister the amount borrowed by Atty. De Vera.8cralawred

Upon maturity of the checks, Teresita presented the checks for payment. However, the checks "bounced" for being drawn
against insufficient funds. Teresita attempted to encash the checks for a second time. However, the checks were
dishonored because the account was closed.9cralawred

Teresita demanded payment from Atty. De Vera. However, she failed to settle her obligations, prompting Teresita to file
complaints against Atty. De Vera for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of
the Revised Penal Code.10cralawred

The Quezon City Prosecutor's Office issued the Resolution dated March 4, 2008 finding probable cause for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. On the same day, an Information for
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. Subsequently, a warrant of arrest was issued by the trial court.11cralawred

In her administrative complaint, Teresita prays that Atty. De Vera be disbarred or suspended for violation of her oath
under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.12cralawred

On July 29, 2009, this court required Atty. De Vera to comment on the Complaint.13cralawred

Atty. De Vera filed her Answer14 dated June 24, 2010. She presented her version of the facts.
According to Atty. De Vera, in February 2006, Teresita awarded a Site Acquisition and Permitting Project to Atty. De
Vera's group. The project involved twenty-nine (29) Globe' Telecom sites across Northern and Southern
Luzon.15cralawred

Atty. De Vera alleges that Teresita could not pay the required 15% downpayment per site. Thus, they agreed that Atty. De
Vera would advance the costs for mobilization and survey, while Teresita would cover the costs for application of
building permits. Teresita, thus, owed her P195,000.00 per site.16cralawred

Teresita had not paid Atty. De Vera the downpayment by March 2006.17 At that time, Teresita had to deliver at least five
(5) cell sites to Globe Telecom.18 However, Teresita did not have the funds required for the application of building
permits that costs around P10,000.00 for each cell site.19cralawred

Teresita was constrained to borrow P500,000.00 from Mary Jane. Subsequently, Teresita approached Atty. De Vera and
asked that the latter lend Teresita checks to guaranty the loan. The main reason Teresita gave was that she had been
frequently arguing with her husband regarding the loan.20cralawred

Atty. De Vera denies the P100,000.00 loan from Teresita's sister.21 She only lent Teresita another check as "additional
guaranty for the five sites[.]"22cralawred

Atty. De Vera argues that the checks were not drawn, issued, and delivered to Teresita for value. The checks were not
meant to be deposited.23cralawred

Furthermore, Atty. De Vera claims that the present administrative case is baseless. She points out that the proceedings
before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office were under reinvestigation since she' did not have the opportunity to answer
the criminal complaint.24cralawred

Moreover, "nowhere in both the affidavit-complaint for Estafa/BP 22 and the administrative complaint was there any
proof that . . . [Atty. De Vera] had in any manner breached her oath as a lawyer [or] abused her position against the
interests of the complainant."25cralawred

Atty. De Vera alleges that she was the one who was abused.26 In addition, "[a] 11 the bare allegations that [Atty. De
Vera] was the one who enticed [Teresita] to mortgage her property and that the checks issued by [Atty. De Vera] will be
honored upon maturity do not constitute deceitful conduct on the part of [Atty. De Vera]."27cralawred

On August 25, 2010, this court noted Atty. De Vera's Answer and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for "investigation, report and recommendation or decision within ninety (90) days from receipt of [the]
records[.]"28cralawred

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines scheduled mandatory conferences where the
parties defined the issues, stipulated on facts, and marked exhibits.29 Upon the termination of the mandatory conferences,
the parties were "directed to submit their respective verified position papers within a period of thirty (30) days from
receipt of the Order."30.

Both parties failed to file their position papers.31cralawred

The Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines found Atty.
De Vera administratively liable for serious misconduct and recommended the penalty of suspension for one (1) year from
the practice of law.32 The Investigating Commissioner ruled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Respondent's assertion that the checks she issued to complainant were not security for the loans she obtained but mere
guaranty checks and not for deposit deserves no credence; it is contrary to the ordinary experience.

...

. . . [T]he pieces of evidenc[e] on reco[r]d substantially shows [sic] that indeed respondent incurred monetary obligations
from complainant, and she issued postdated checks to 'the latter as security for the payment of the loans.

Assuming . . . that respondent's version of facts were [sic] true, she is still guilty of serious misconduct.

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing . . . worthless check[s]; that is, a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay
his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless
checks. . . . A check issued as an evidence of debt — though not intended to be presented for payment — has the same
effect as an ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.

As a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law, especially B.P. Blg. 22. By issuing checks in violation of the
provisions of the law, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct.

...

[A] lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice in connection with his profession, but also for gross misconduct
outside of his professional capacity[.]33 (Citation omitted)cralawlawlibrary

In issuing the worthless checks, Atty. De Vera did not only violate the law, but she also broke her oath as a lawyer and
transgressed the Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility.34 The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty.
De Vera violated the following provisions:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Cannon [sic] 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and
legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of
the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.35cralawlawlibrary

The dispositive portion of the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation36

reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct and it is recommended that she be
suspended for a period of one (1) year from the practice of law.37cralawred
cralawlawlibrary

In the Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-61238 dated May 11, 2013, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors resolved to adopt the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules
and considering that Respondent violated the B.P. 22 by issuing a worthless check, the Attorney's Oath and Canon 1, Rule
1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Trina De Vera is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one (1) year.39 (Emphasis in the original)cralawlawlibrary

Teresita filed the Partial Motion for Reconsideration40 dated September 17, 2013 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Board of Governors' Resolution. Atty. De Vera filed the Motion for Reconsideration41 dated September 21, 2013.

In the Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-24142 dated May 3, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors denied the parties' respective motions:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to DENY respective Motions for Reconsideration of Complainant and Respondent, there being no cogent
reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and the resolution .subject of the motion, they being a mere reiteration
of the matters which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Moreover, respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration was filed out of time pursuant to his Motion for Extension of Time which is a prohibited pleading under
Rule 139-B of the Rules and resorted to by lawyers at times to delay proceeding. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-612
dated May 11, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED.43 (Emphasis in the original)
cralawlawlibrary

The main issue is whether Atty. De Vera committed serious misconduct and should be held administratively liable for the
issuance and dishonor of worthless checks in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

After considering the parties' arguments and the records of this case, we resolve to adopt and approve the
recommendations of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors.

Atty. De Vera tries to free herself from liability by arguing that she did not incur the loans alleged by Teresita, and the
checks were issued merely as a guaranty and not as payment for the loan. She also raises the prematurity of the
administrative complaint in view of the pendency of the criminal proceedings considering that "the allegations of deceitful
conduct [are] intimately intertwined with the criminal acts complained of."44cralawred

This is not a case of first impression. This court has ruled that the lawyer's act of issuing worthless checks, punishable
under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, constitutes serious misconduct.

In De Jesus v. Collado,45 this court found respondent lawyer guilty of serious misconduct for issuing post-dated checks
that were dishonored upon presentment for payment:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In the case at bar, no conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has as yet been obtained against respondent Collado.. We do
not, however, believe that conviction of the criminal charges raised against her is essential, so far as either the
administrative or civil service case or the disbarment charge against her is concerned. Since she had admitted issuing the
checks when she did not have enough money in her bank account to cover the total amount thereof, it cannot be gainsaid
that the acts with which she was charged would constitute a crime penalized by B.P. Blg. 22. We consider that issuance of
checks in violation of the provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 constitutes serious misconduct on the part of a member of the Bar.46
(Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)cralawlawlibrary

Misconduct involves "wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment";47 it is serious or gross when it is
flagrant.48cralawred

We recently reiterated the purpose and nature of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in relation to an administrative case against a
member of the bar:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate
public checking account users. The gravamen of the offense defined and punished by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 . . . is the
act of making and issuing a worthless check, or any check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting
it in circulation; the law is designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing
checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public
order to be abated.

...

Being a lawyer, [respondent] was well aware of the objectives and coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. If he did not, he
was nonetheless presumed to know them, for. the law was penal in character and application. His issuance of the
unfunded check involved herein knowingly violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and exhibited his indifference towards the
pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest and public order. He thereby swept aside his Lawyer's Oath that
enjoined him to support the Constitution and obey the laws.49 (Citations omitted)cralawlawlibrary

A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a public or private
capacity.50 The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
....
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY- AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
....
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
cralawlawlibrary

The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. De Vera incurred monetary obligations from Teresita. Atty. De Vera
admitted issuing the checks to Teresita. She refused to answer for her liabilities by denying the existence of the loan and
claiming that the checks were mere "show checks."51 However, she failed to present evidence to prove those allegations.

The Decision52 wherein the trial court found Teresita civilly liable to Mary Jane for P540,000.00,53 and on which Atty.
De Vera relies upon, is not sufficient evidence to hold that there was no separate transaction between Teresita and Atty.
De Vera. The Decision involved the post-dated checks issued by Teresita to Mary Jane only.54 Mary Jane merely claimed
that she had no personal knowledge of any transaction between Teresita and Atty. De Vera.55cralawred
The Investigating Commissioner correctly pointed out that Atty. De Vera's allegation of "lending" her checks to Teresita
is contrary to ordinary human experience. As a lawyer, Atty. De Vera is presumed to know the consequences of her acts.
She issued several post-dated checks for value that were dishonored upon presentation for payment.

Membership in the bar requires a high degree of fidelity to the laws whether in a private or professional capacity. "Any
transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public's
faith in the Legal Profession as a whole."56 A lawyer "may be removed or otherwise disciplined 'not only for malpractice
and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which showed
him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer to him.'"57cralawred

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Trina De Vera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. Let a copy of
this Resolution be entered in Atty. De Vera's personal record with the Office of the Bar Confidant, and a copy be served to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary