Professional Documents
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3d (2003)
theory of negligent activity. The jury returned a verdict negligent activity theory rather than a premises liability
in favor of Cantu, finding $72,000 worth of damages. theory. Liability for injury on business premises may
Wal–Mart filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding be found under either a premises condition theory or a
the verdict, and the trial judge reduced the damages negligent activity theory. See Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845
to $34,000, rendering a total judgment of $43, 950.55 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex.1992); Wal–Mart v. Bazan, 966
plus post-judgment interest. Wal–Mart now appeals this S.W.2d 745, 746 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
judgment, citing two issues. Cantu cross appeals in one Recovering under a negligent activity theory requires the
issue, complaining of the trial court's reduction of the plaintiff to have been injured by or as a contemporaneous
damages. result of the activity itself rather than by a condition
created by the activity. Keetch, 845 S.W.2d at 264; Bazan,
966 S.W.2d at 746. A premises liability claim, on the other
hand, is a claim that the premises itself is unsafe. Bazan,
BACKGROUND
966 S.W.2d at 746.
On July 17, 1998, Appellant Henry Cantu and a friend
entered a Sam's Club store as customers. Also shopping *2 Wal–Mart contends none of the allegedly negligent
at the store were Mr. and Mrs. Serna and their ten-year- activities asserted by Cantu actually caused injury to the
old son. The son removed a bicycle from the hook where appellee, thereby negating any claim of negligent activity.
it was hanging and began to ride the bicycle around the Cantu alleges that Wal–Mart was negligent in (1) failing
store. The boy rode the bicycle into Cantu's leg, injuring to tie the bikes down; (2) leaving the bikes within reach
him. Following the incident, Cantu found an assistant of children; (3) failing to implement procedures to keep
manager, Mr. Dovalina, who accompanied him to the children from riding bikes in the store; and (4) failing
sporting goods area and took statements from both the to stop the child in question from riding the bike. There
Sernas and Cantu. was no ongoing activity by any Wal–Mart employee at
the time of the injury. Although Cantu may have been
Cantu subsequently sued Wal–Mart under the theories injured by a condition created by Wal–Mart's alleged
of premises liability and negligent activity. The case was negligence, he was not injured directly by any of its
tried, and Cantu submitted the issue to the jury under activities. Therefore, the trial court erred in submitting the
the negligent activity theory rather than the theory of case to the jury under the theory of negligent activity. The
premises liability. The jury returned a verdict in favor issue should have been submitted as a premises liability
of Cantu, awarding $73,000 in damages. Wal–Mart filed cause of action.
a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and
the trial court reduced the amount of total damages to [2] The elements of a premises liability cause of action
$43, 950.55 plus post-judgment interest. Wal–Mart now were laid out in Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d
appeals, claiming the trial court erred in submitting the 292, 296 (Tex.1983). To be successful, a plaintiff raising
issue to the jury under the theory of negligent activity a premises liability claim must show that (1) the owner/
rather than premises liability, and under the theory of operator had actual or constructive knowledge of some
premises liability, the jury's finding of simple negligence condition on the premises; (2) the condition posed an
does not support a recovery by Cantu. Wal–Mart also unreasonable risk of harm; (3) the owner/ operator did
argues the trial court abused its discretion by including not exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the
a spoliation instruction in the jury charge. Cantu cross risk; and (4) the owner/ operator's failure to use such care
appeals, claiming the trial court erred in remitting the proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries. Id; Bazan, 966
jury's verdict as to future medical expenses. S.W.2d at 746.
Instead, the trial court instructed the jury on ordinary on his only viable claim, premises liability, and the court
must render judgment in favor of Wal–Mart. 952 S.W.2d
negligence. The charge defined both ordinary negligence
523, 529 (Tex.1997); Bazan, 966 S.W.2d at 747.
and ordinary care without referring to the duties of
owners or occupiers of premises. In addition, there is
Because we affirm Wal–Mart's first issue, we do not need
no instruction on unreasonable risk of harm or actual
to address its second issue or the cross-appeal issue raised
or constructive knowledge. Wal–Mart objected to the
by Cantu. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and
charge as submitted, arguing the case should be submitted
rendered in favor of Wal–Mart.
under a premises liability instruction and suggesting a
corrected version of the charge. The trial court did not
submit the instruction requested by Wal–Mart, and Cantu All Citations
permitted the negligence instruction to go to the jury
without objection. Under the rule set out in Clayton W. Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2003 WL 21156840
Williams, Jr., Inc. v. Olivo, Cantu has waived the findings
End of Document © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.