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Phenomenologyof the Event:
WaitingandSurprise1
FRANQOISE DASTUR
that is, to the birth of the object which consciousness constitutes as its op-
posite.
Husserlcannot remainon the level of a static phenomenologywhich could
only account for the alreadyconstituted object, for what is empiricallygiven.
Very early on he feels compelled to develop a genetic phenomenology whose
task is to elucidate the process at the origin of the opposition of subject and
object. The entire phenomenology of temporalitythat Husserldevelops in his
Lessonsin 1905 can be considered as a phenomenology of the advent of the
subject to itself. For what is at stake in these Lessonsis to bring to light what
Husserlcalls "whatis ultimately and trulyabsolute"(Husserl 1962, 216): this
enigmatic intimacy of consciousness and time at the origin of the double
constitution of worldand subject.Such a taskis paradoxical.It meansallowing
the appearanceof the conditions of all appearingand bringing to light the
processof "the segregationof the 'within' and the 'without"'(Merleau-Ponty
1968, 118) which Merleau-Pontysays is "never finished"(jamaischosefaite)
( 1968, 237), but, on the contrary,alwaysin becoming. Husserltries in his Les-
sons to reconstitute "afterthe event," with the help of such concepts as pro-
tention, retention, and original impression,the movement of the temporal-
ization which remains in itself invisible. In this regardhe remains in close
proximity to Kant, who had alwaysaffirmedthe invisibility of time and who
defined schematizm,the process by which consciousness constitutes the ob-
ject, as "an art concealed in the depths of human soul" (Kant 1933, 183).
The phenomenology of the becoming of subject and world can therefore
only be a phenomenology of the inapparent (Phanomenologie des Unschein-
baren),to quote one of Heidegger'sexpressionsfrom his last seminar in 1973
(Heidegger 1977, 137). But in his structureof eventuality this inappearance
or invisibility of time does not referto a level transcendingperception.On the
contrary,it refersto the genesis of perception itself. The limit that phenom-
enology encountershere is not external but internal. It can only be discovered
in and by the phenomenological attitude. For such an invisibility is not, as
Merleau-Pontyrightly underlines,an absolute invisibility,but the invisibility
of thisworld. It is the dimension of invisibility which is implied in the visible
itself and which can therefore only be discovered within the visible (1968,
225). This is the reason why, in his unfinished last book The Visibleand the
Invisible(1968), Merleau-Pontysketches the outlines of an "ontology from
within" (Merleau-Ponty1968, 225), of an "endo-ontology"(226) which con-
stitutes the true achievement of his Phenomenology of Perception(1962).
But is such a phenomenology of becoming, which identifies itself with an
ontology which remainsinternal to phenomenality,and which pretendsto let
the dynamic characterof phenomenality appear,alreadyin itself a phenom-
enology of the event? Forit is possibleto think the coming of time, its advenire,
its coming up to us, without properlythinking its suddenrise, its coming out of
182 Hypatia
NOTES
REFERENCES