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Mika Ojakangas
1.
There are not many books by Agamben in which Plato does not figure. In The Man Without
Content (MC 52-64), Agamben discusses the Platonic discrepancy between politics and
poetry; in Stanzas, he examines Plato’s conceptions of love (S 115-21) and phantasm (S 73-
75); in Infancy and History (IH 73), Agamben takes up Plato’s concept of time (aion and
chronos), while in The End of the Poem (EP 17) he examines Plato’s criticism of tragedy
again. In Language and Death (LD 91-2), he gives an account of Socrates’ ‘demon’ and
Plato’s Idea (eidos) – though he investigates the latter more thoroughly in Potentialities (PO
27-38), in which he also shortly touches upon Plato’s doctrine of matter (khôra) (PO 218). In
the Idea of Prose (IP 120-3) and The Coming Community (CC 76-77), it is the Platonic Idea
again that is under scrutiny, albeit more implicitly than in Potentialities. In Homo Sacer (HS
fragment and the sophistic opposition between nomos and physis, whereas in The Sacrament
and Language (SL 29) he touches on Plato’s critique of oath. In The Signature of All Things
(ST 22-26), Agamben gives an account of Plato’s ‘paradigmatic’ method, while in Stasis
(STA 5-12) we find an analysis of Plato’s conception of civil war (stasis). In The Use of
Bodies, finally, Agamben returns to many of the above-mentioned Platonic subjects, to the
idea of the Idea in particular and thereby to the pre-suppositional structure of language (UB
115-133), but he also adds new Platonic themes not discussed in his previous books,
including an interpretation of the myth of Er (UB 249-262) narrated at the end of the Republic
and of the Nocturnal Council (UB 279) introduced at the end of the Laws. The list is not
exhaustive but it illustrates well the extent to which Plato is present in Agamben’s work from
light. In Homo Sacer (HS 30-38), in which Agamben analyses Plato’s criticism of Pindar’s
famous nomos basileus fragment and that of the sophistic distinction between nomos and
antidote to ‘the sovereign confusion of violence and law’ (HS 35) – despite the fact that
violence in the mode of legal penalty, including expulsion and even death penalty, is
recommended in Plato’s every major political work from the Republic via Statesman to the
Laws. In The Signature of all Things (ST 22-26), on the other hand, Agamben gives an
account of Plato’s concept of paradigm and his ‘paradigmatic’ method in a manner that gives
the impression that Agamben’s own ‘paradigmatic’ method is a mere replica of that of Plato.
In The Use of Bodies, furthermore, in the context of his interpretation of the myth of Er
(including the most extended citation of any author in Agamben’s entire oeuvre), the Platonic
soul (psykhê), arguably the most significant Platonic concept alongside the Idea, is
Form-of-life, the soul, is the infinite complement between life and mode of life,
what appears when they mutually neutralize on another and show the void that
united them. Zoè and bios – this is perhaps the lesson of the myth – are neither
246), stands the soul, which holds them indissolubly in contact and testifies for
to secure the salvation (sôtêria) of the city of Magnesia (Laws 968a) with unlimited (and one
could also say dictatorial) authority (Laws 968c) – is exalted as an example, not of sovereign
Plato had in mind something of the kind [destituent potential] when at the end
down the council’s activities until it has been established [prin a kosmethe] […]
One could easily extend the list of sympathetic ‘appropriations’ of Plato’s thought by
interpretations are not only very intriguing but sometimes also quite bewildering), but given
the limited space of this chapter, I restrict my analysis to the most pervasive Platonic theme
2.
In modern renditions, Plato’s Ideas are usually understood as temporally and spatially
transcendent and unchanging models of immanent beings existing in time and space, which
are imperfect copies of the Ideas that constitute the essential foundation of reality. For
1
Interestingly, Agamben omits the part in which Plato asserts that the members of the
Council ‘must themselves ordain what authority they should possess’ from the sentence he
exists ‘beauty itself’, the Idea of beauty. And in order to attain true knowledge, one must
grasp the world of Ideas with one’s mind, but in contrast to the modern concept of idea, the
Platonic Ideas exist independently of minds. Sometimes Ideas are understood as perfect
different dialogues offers several incompatible definitions and oscillates between different
What then is Agamben’s interpretation of Plato’s Idea? One finds the most
thoroughgoing accounts of the Idea in his article ‘The Thing Itself’ published in 1984, and in
The Use of Bodies published thirty years later. These slightly different constructions, based
mainly on Agamben’s reading of the philosophical digression in Plato’s Seventh Letter and
section 511b of the Republic, show that his interpretation of the Idea is – to put it mildly –
quite different from other modern interpretations. It is true that there is nothing extraordinary
in Agamben’s identification of ‘the thing itself’ (to pragma auto) discussed in the Seventh
Letter with the Idea (auto is generally recognized as a technical expression of the Idea: circle
itself, beauty itself, and so on). However, by relocating the discourse on Ideas from the sphere
of ontology into that of linguistic signification, he takes a step that is not very often taken in
Plato scholarship:
One could say, with an apparent paradox, that the thing itself, while in some way
In order to grasp what kind of a thing the thing of language is, we must reconstruct the
sphere of language, arguing that the Greeks, Plato and Aristotle in particular, were well aware
of the complex relation between language and the world. They were aware of the fact that by
speaking of beings, beings are presupposed by language in language. Plato, Agamben writes,
was ‘perhaps the first to thematize the presuppositional power [il potere presupponente] of
language’ (UB 119). Similarly, ‘Aristotle frequently expresses with perfect awareness the
onto-logical interweaving of being and saying’ (UB 120). Thus ontology has been onto-logy
from the very outset of Western philosophy. According to Agamben, however, there is a
decisive difference between Plato and Aristotle as to how they deal with the fact – in
Agamben’s estimation what is at issue is precisely a fact – that beings are presupposed by
language, decomposing the thing itself into a being (on) about which something is said and a
is affirmed: being is divided into an ‘existentive being’ (un essere esistentivo) and a
‘predicative being’ (un essere predicativo), that is, into a presupposed subject (existence) on
the basis of which something is said and a predication that is said of it (essence) in which the
ineffable) (UB 115-18, 125; PO 36-7) – analogous to the way natural life (zoe), in the
political thought of Aristotle, is included in the political form of life (bios) in the mode of its
exclusion (HS 7-9). In contrast to this Aristotelian approach, Plato’s onto-logical paradigm is
‘completely different’ (UB 130). While Aristotle affirms the pre-suppositional power of
language – though in a sense, he also tries to surpass it (the separation of existence and
essence) by temporalizing being but without success (PO 36-7; UB 115-29) – Plato
overcomes it, freeing human speech from presuppositions: ‘The Platonic constitution of truth,
unlike the Aristotelian, never comes to a halt at a presupposition’ (PO 109; see also UB 130).
Both Aristotle and Plato were aware of the pre-suppositional power of language, but while
Aristotle located this power at the basis of his philosophy (UB 131), Plato, with his ‘non-
from philosophical discourse (PO 35, 77, 107; UB 130). Let us quote section 511b of the
Republic, cited in ‘The Thing Itself’ (PO 35) and The Use of Bodies (130), on which
Agamben’s interpretation is based and which he unconventionally translates (in this context
Then also understand the other subjection of the intelligible, I mean that which
[hapsamenos autes], it reverses itself and, keeping hold of what follows from it,
comes down to a conclusion without making use of anything visible at all but
only ideas themselves, moving from ideas to ideas and ending in ideas. (UB
The thing itself, the Idea, is this non-presupposed principle, a word freed from its shadow (a
The philosopher frees language from its shadow and, instead of taking hypotheses
for granted, seeks to ascend from these latter – namely, from denotative words –
toward the non-presupposed principle. The Idea is this word freed from its
shadow, which does not presuppose the arkhe as given but seeks to reach it as
For Agamben, in other words, Plato’s theory of Ideas is an attempt to philosophize without
supposing and hypothesizing, without subjectifying that about which one speaks – an attempt
to speak absolutely (PO 33). This also means that Agamben rejects the esoteric and mystical
readings of Plato inspired by the Seventh Letter (341 c-d), in which it is said that the thing
itself ‘does not at all admit of verbal expression’. Drawing attention to the immediately
following phrase ‘like other disciplines’, Agamben argues that the thing itself, although it
cannot be expressed in the same way as in other ‘disciplines’ (meaning name [onoma],
definition [logos], image [eidôlon], and knowledge [epistêmê]), it is not for that reason
simply unsayable (PO 31). It is, as Plato continues further on (344b-c), in a passage quoted
by Agamben (PO 30), only when the names, definitions, and sense-perceptions are ‘rubbed
against each other […] that wisdom [phronêsis] along with insight [nous] will commence to
cast its light in an effort at the very limits of human possibility’. Similarly, when Plato in this
same Letter (342e) speaks about the ‘weakness of language’ (in asserting something of
something else, a logos can only qualify this something else, not express its inherent being),
Agamben argues that it is precisely the recognition of this weakness that paves the way, not
for the rejection of language, but for the need to help speech so that in speech, ‘speech itself
does not remain presupposed but instead comes to speech’ (PO 35). The weakness of logos
does not consist in its inability to represent beings adequately but in the fact that – without
help – it can only represent them without being able to bring ‘sayability’ (dicibilità) to
expression.2 The Platonic theory of the Ideas is not a theory against logos but a theory the aim
of which is to help speech so that the sayability of the said does not remain presupposed
The thing itself is not a quid that might be sought as an extreme hypothesis
beyond all hypotheses, as a final and absolute subject beyond all subjects,
without relation to things […]. Thing itself is not a thing; it is the very sayability,
the very openness at issue in language, which, in language, we [but not Plato!]
The question of language has been at the heart of Agamben’s philosophy from the outset: the
human being is a being whose proper dwelling-place is in language (for us, there is no object
outside language), but insofar as we remain caught by language without seeing language
itself (without being able to say the sayability), we remain alien to our authentic nature –
separated from what is constitutive of us. Therefore, the task of the coming philosophy,
according to Agamben, is to bring language, which mediates all things and all knowledge,
into language, to mediate the immediate: ‘To restore the thing itself to its place in language
2
In Language and Death (LD 91), Agamben identifies Socrates’ daimon (daimonion) with
the unsayable, that is, with the mute voice of conscience that has haunted Western
metaphysics as that which is inclusively excluded from speech (logos) so that speech can
emerge. From this perspective, Agamben’s interpretation of Plato’s theory of Ideas depicts
bringing language into language, to mediate the immediate. The Platonic Idea, which in
Agamben’s estimation remained undefined by Plato (WA 1), is the taking place of this
Agamben’s view, however, the Western philosophical tradition from Aristotle onwards has
either ignored the Idea, replacing it with the first substance (the presupposition of all
presuppositions) (Aristotle), or misunderstood it, identifying the Idea with the ineffable and
discover the pre-suppositional power of language and, with the help of the theory of Ideas, to
render this power inoperative and to efface the ineffable from philosophical discourse. The
coming philosophy is thus also the come-back of a philosophy, the philosophy of Plato.
3.
As already noted, Agamben’s interpretations of Plato’s Idea are not absolutely identical. In
‘The Thing Itself’ and in Idea of Prose (1985), Agamben underlines the coincidence of the
sensible and the Idea in the immediacy of language. In Idea of Prose he formulates the
thought as follows:
What is reached here [in the Idea], that is, is something still sensible (from this
comes the term idea, which indicates a vision, an idein). But not some sensible
3
In ‘The Passion of Facticity’ (PO 194), Agamben points out that in the Heideggerian Dasein
existence and essence are as inseparable as on and poion are in Plato’s ‘soul’. In The Use of
Bodies (UB 144-5), however, Agamben asserts that even Heidegger remained bound up with
the thing no longer separated from its intelligibility, but in the midst of it, is the
In The Use of Bodies, Agamben recapitulates what he had written earlier, but at one point the
emphasis is a bit different inasmuch as he also pays attention to the verb ‘to touch’ (toccare /
haptetai) that occurs twice in the passage from the Republic (511b) I quoted above. While in
his previous interpretation Agamben had stressed that in the Idea the sensible is not
represented but exposed in language without sensible referent, now, in The Use of Bodies, the
Idea is defined as a (self-signifying) word in which the thing itself and language itself are in
contact with each other (just like the soul between zoè and bios in Agamben’s interpretation
of the myth of Er) – united only by a void of signification and representation: ‘The idea is
word that does not denote but “touches”. That is to say, as happens in contact, it manifests the
thing and at the same time also itself.” (UB 131) The idea of ‘contact’ may appear enigmatic
homology. The touch entails neither fusion nor representation: it exposes the thing (‘body’) to
the exteriority of the touched but in this exposing the thing (‘body’) is also exposed to itself.4
We may still wonder how a word can touch itself but perhaps it is not only Agamben’s genius
but also his ability to philosophize at the limits of understandability that has made him one of
4
See Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus (Fordham University Press, 2008).