DeCrescenzo v. Scientology: Opposition To Motion For Stay

1 John P. Blumberg - State Bar No.
70200
BLUMBERG LAW CORPORATION
2 444 West Ocean Blvd., Suite 1500
Long Beach, California 90802
3 Tel No. (562) 437-0403; Fax No. (562) 432-0107
Advocates@BlumbergLaw.Com
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5 Attorney for Plaintiff
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8 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT
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11 LAURA ANN DeCRESCENZO, aka ) CASE NO: BC411018
LAURA A. DIECKMAN )
12 ) Assigned to Judge Mark Mooney
Plaintiff, ) Dept. 68
13 )
vs. ) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
14 ) AUTHORITIES AND DECLARATION
CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY ) OF JOHN P. BLUMBERG IN
15 INTERNATIONAL a corporate entity, ) OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STAY
RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER, ) PROCEEDINGS
16 previously sued herein as Doe 1, a )
California Corporation and DOES 2-20, ) Date: June 8, 2018
17 ) Time: 8:30 a.m.
Defendants. )
18 ) Complaint filed: April 2, 2009
) FSC: July 13, 2018
19 ___________________________________ ) Trial Date: August 13, 2018
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OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2
3 Table of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4
5 ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6
7 I. SUMMARY OF OPPOSITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
8
9 II. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THIS ACTION BEGUN IN 2009 . . . . . . . . 6
10
11 III. SYNOPSIS OF THE LAW ALLOWING A FEDERAL COURT TO
12 ENJOIN A CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN A STATE COURT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
13
14 IV. BECAUSE DEFENDANTS’ APPEAL HAS NO MERIT, IT
15 PROVIDES NO SUPPORT FOR STAYING THE PENDING TRIAL . . . . . . . . . . 12
16
17 V. THIS COURT IS BOUND BY THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . 13
18
19 VI. PLAINTIFF WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY PREJUDICED BY
20 FURTHER DELAYING THIS ACTION BEGUN IN 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
21
22 VII. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
23
24 DECLARATION OF JOHN P. BLUMBERG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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2
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 Cases
3 Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Esprit de Corp. (9th Cir. 1982) 682 F.2d 1267 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
4 Bailey v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. (10th Cir. 2005) 414 F.3d 1187 . . . . . . . .12 , 13, 16
5 Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine (9th Cir. 2005) 432 F.3d 939 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 12,13
6 Brown v. Wells Fargo, N.A. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1353 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7 Central Valley Hospitalists v. Dignity Health (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 203 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8 Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp. (1988) 486 U.S. 140 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9 City of West Hollywood v. Kihagi (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 739 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10 Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
11 Family Record Plan, Inc. v. Mitchell (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 235 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
12 Ferrari, Alvarez, Olsen & Ottoboni v. Home Ins. Co. (9th Cir. 1991) 940 F.2d 550 . . . . . . 15
13 Grewal v. Jammu (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
14 Laborers’ Internat. Union of North America v. El Dorado
Landscape Co. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 903 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
15
Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc. v. Victa (9th Cir. 1991) 936 F.2d 466 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
16
People v. Mitchell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 132 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
17
Sandpiper Village Condominium Ass’n., Inc. v. Louisiana-
18 Pacific Corp. (9th Cir. 2005) 428 F.3d 831 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 12, 13
19 Union Oil Co. of California v. Reconstruction Oil Co. (1943) 58 Cal.App.2d 30 . . . . . . . 11
20 Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp. (1977) 433 U.S. 623 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
21 Washington v. Trump (9th Cir. 2017) 847 F.3d 1151 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
22 Statutes
23 Government Code section 68607 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
24 28 U.S.C. § 1657 (All Writs Act) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
25 28 U 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (Full Faith and Credit Act) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
26 28 U.S.C. § 2883 (Anti-Injunction Act) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
27 Miscellanous
28 Federal Ninth Circuit Civil Appellate Practice (The Rutter Group 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3
1 ABSTRACT
2
3 Defendant, Church of Scientology International (CSI), actively litigated this case
4 in the Superior Court from 2012 through 2017. CSI stipulated to trial dates and
5 represented to the court that it was ready for trial. Shortly after assignment to “long
6 cause” and agreeing to specific dates for trial, CSI filed a federal court complaint to
7 prevent the case from going to trial. The federal court dismissed the action and CSI
8 appealed, triggering a process that can take years before final resolution. The issue is
9 whether CSI’s use of the federal system, after many years of voluntary participation in the
10 Superior Court, is a subterfuge whose purpose is to further delay plaintiff from her day in
11 court.
12
13 I.
14 SUMMARY OF OPPOSITION
15
16 In 2011, the Second District Court of Appeal ruled that if plaintiff could prove the
17 allegations of her second amended complaint, defendants would be equitably estopped
18 from their defense that the statute of limitations barred her action. Thereafter, CSI
19 actively litigated this case in the California court system – including substantial discovery,
20 two motions for summary judgment, numerous trips to the appellate courts (one of which
21 ended when the United States Supreme Court denied its petition for writ of certiorari),
22 stipulating to a trial date in Superior Court and satisfying final status conference
23 requirements of joint exhibit and witness lists, motions in limine and a trial brief.
24
25 Plaintiff responded to CSI’s latest federal action by successfully moving to dismiss
26 on the basis that the injunctive relief sought should be denied based on clear precedent.
27 CSI now seeks a stay in this action while its appeal to the Ninth Circuit is pending. This
28 opposition will address the factors that the court should weigh in deciding whether to stay
4
1 the action: (1) the likelihood that CSI will prevail on appeal, i.e., that the Ninth Circuit
2 will conclude the United States District Court abused its discretion, (2) the preclusive
3 effect of CSI’s election to litigate this matter in the California courts since the California
4 Court of Appeal’s 2011 opinion, including the representation to this Court that it was
5 ready for trial, before seeking federal court intervention, (3) the law of the case, i.e., that
6 the prior federal court order does not bind this court, (4) the appropriate avenue of
7 seeking a stay of this action from the Ninth Circuit where its appeal is pending, and (5)
8 the prejudice to plaintiff of delaying trial in this matter that began in 2009.
9
10 As detailed below, the gravamen of CSI’s pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit is
11 that the United States District Court (Judge George H. Wu presiding) abused its discretion
12 in not enjoining this action. CSI contends this action should be enjoined because the
13 California Court of Appeal erred in 2011 when it held that the 2009 order of the United
14 States District Court (Judge George H. King presiding) dismissing plaintiff’s federal
15 claim did not have any preclusive effect on her remanded state claims. The matter had
16 proceeded to the California Court of Appeal based on the following: After Judge King
17 had remanded plaintiff’s state claims, she filed a second amended complaint. CSI
18 demurred, contending in part that the matter should be dismissed due to the res judicata/
19 collateral estoppel effect of Judge King’s order. The honorable Ronald M. Sohigian,
20 judge of the Superior Court, rejected the argument but sustained the demurrer without
21 leave to amend on the ground that plaintiff’s second amended complaint failed to allege
22 sufficient facts to equitably estop CSI from asserting the statute of limitations as a
23 defense. Plaintiff appealed. On appeal, CSI argued that Judge Sohigian’s ruling should
24 be affirmed because the Superior Court was bound by Judge King’s decision. As
25 mentioned, the Court of Appeal disagreed, reversed and remanded the matter with
26 instruction to overrule the demurrer. CSI’s petition to the California Supreme Court for
27 review was denied.
28 ///
5
1 CSI then actively litigated the case in the Superior Court for the next six years,
2 including two unsuccessful motions for summary judgment (one of which asserted that
3 plaintiff could not prove the facts necessary to equitably estop CSI from asserting its
4 statute of limitations defense). CSI later stipulated to trial in the Superior Court,
5 announced ready for trial, and cooperated in the setting of a trial date. Shortly after, CSI
6 filed the above-described federal action that Judge Wu dismissed.
7
8 In short, CSI has already asked four tribunals to hold that Judge King’s 2009 order
9 precluded plaintiff from prosecuting her state claims: (1) this Court, (2) the Second
10 District Court of Appeal, (3) the California Supreme Court and (4) the United States
11 District Court. The decision by the Second District, as pertinent to this motion for a stay,
12 established the law of the case, i.e., that the 2009 federal court order does not bind the
13 state court. Not surprisingly, as discussed below in points III and IV, CSI does not have a
14 reasonable probability of prevailing on appeal. This militates against CSI’s motion for a
15 stay.
16
17 CSI could have petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari
18 when the California Supreme Court denied its petition for review. Instead, it actively
19 defended the action over the next six years in this Court and the California appellate
20 courts. (See point II below.) As part of its decision dismissing CSI’s complaint for
21 injunctive relief, the federal court noted: “It is also relevant, though not dispositive, that
22 [CSI] waited more than six years to seek an injunction in this Court based on the alleged
23 erroneous June 24, 2011 Court of Appeal’s decision.” (CSI’s Ex. K at p. 226.) CSI’s
24 election to actively defend the case in this Court over the past six years militates against
25 CSI’s motion for a stay.
26 ///
27 ///
28
6
1 Finally, plaintiff filed her complaint in 2009, seeking justice for defendants’
2 abuses that occurred from 1991, when she was 12-years-old, through 2004. After nine
3 years of litigation, plaintiff finally had a firm trial date. CSI seeks further delay during
4 the years that it will pursue a meritless appeal, undoubtedly to be followed by a request
5 for en banc hearing and then a petition for a writ of certiarari. CSI contends a stay will
6 not prejudice plaintiff. But the prejudice to plaintiff is best expressed by the well-known
7 axiom that justice delayed is justice denied. Further delaying this case will deny plaintiff
8 the justice she seeks.
9
10 II.
11 THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THIS ACTION BEGUN IN 2009
12
13 Plaintiff filed her complaint on April 5, 2009. (CSI’s Ex. I at p. 175, lines 6-10.)
14 She filed an amended complaint adding a new federal claim. (Id. at p. 176, lines 13-14
15 and CSI’s Ex. A.) Based on the federal claim, CSI removed the action to the United
16 States District Court. (CSI’s Ex. I at p. 176, lines 24-26; CSI’s Ex. B.) On November 5,
17 2009, Judge King dismissed the federal claim, refused CSI’s request to dismiss the
18 remaining causes of action, and remanded the state claims back to this Court. (CSI’s Ex.
19 I at p. 177, lines 8-14; CSI’s Ex. C.) CSI then demurred to the first amended complaint
20 on two grounds: (1) insufficient facts of equitable estoppel to assert the statute of
21 limitations defense were alleged and (2) the action was barred by the res judicata/
22 collateral estoppel effect of Judge King’s order. (CSI’s Ex. I at p. 177, lines 15-22.)
23 Judge Sohigian sustained the demurrer with leave to amend, thus impliedly rejecting the
24 argument that the action was barred by the res judicata effect of Judge King’s order. (Id.)
25 Plaintiff filed her second amended complaint on February 2, 2010. (CSI’s Ex. I at p. 177,
26 lines 23-24; CSI’s Ex. D.) CSI demurred on the same two grounds it had previously
27 asserted. (CSI’s Ex. I at p. 177, lines 7-10.) On March 18, 2010, Judge Sohigian
28 concluded that Judge King’s prior order did not have any preclusive effect but that the
7
1 second amended complaint still set forth insufficient facts justifying equitable estoppel
2 and sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. (CSI’s Ex. I at p. 178, lines 12-22;
3 CSI’s Ex. E.) Judgment of Dismissal was entered on June 9, 2010 and plaintiff appealed.
4 (CSI’s Ex. I at p. 178, lines 23-26.)
5
6 On appeal, CSI argued that the judgment should be affirmed, either on the basis of
7 the preclusive effect of the federal court’s order or that insufficient facts were pled for
8 equitable estoppel to apply. (¶2, Blumberg Dec.) The Court of Appeal disagreed,
9 reversed and remanded. (CSI’s Ex. I at p. 178, line 26 to p. 179, line 1; CSI’s Ex. F.) In
10 a unanimous opinion, the Court of Appeal held that if proven, the facts alleged in the
11 second amended complaint were sufficient to equitably estop CSI from asserting the
12 statute of limitations as a defense. (CSI’s Ex. F.) The Court of Appeal also concluded
13 that Judge King’s order had no preclusive effect. (Id.) CSI filed a petition for rehearing,
14 repeating its contention that Judge King’s order barred this action. (CSI’s Ex. I at p. 180,
15 lines 1-5.) The petition for rehearing was denied. (Id.) CSI then petitioned the
16 California Supreme Court for review, again contending that Judge King’s order barred the
17 prosecution of plaintiff’s state claims. (CSI’s Ex. I at p. 180, lines 6-9.). CSI’s petition
18 for review was denied on September 14, 2011. (Id.) CSI did not petition the United
19 States Supreme Court for review. (¶2, Blumberg Dec.)
20
21 On October 25, 2012, CSI moved for summary judgment on the basis that
22 plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statutes of limitations because the facts did not
23 support plaintiff’s equitable estoppel claims. (¶7, Blumberg Dec.) The motion was
24 denied. (Ibid.)
25
26 On February 8, 2013, DeCrescenzo moved to compel CSI to produce certain
27 documents. (¶8, Blumberg Dec.) CSI opposed the motion, contending that the
28 documents were protected from discovery by California’s penitent-clergy privilege and
8
1 the Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution. (Ibid.) The motion was
2 granted on March 6, 2013. (Ibid.) CSI petitioned the Court of Appeal for relief. (Ibid.)
3 The petition was summarily denied. (Ibid.) CSI’s petition to the California Supreme
4 Court for review was also summarily denied. (Ibid.) CSI then petitioned the United
5 States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari and sought a stay of the state court action
6 pending resolution of its petition. (Ibid.; Ex. “1” attached.) The United States Supreme
7 Court denied CSI’s application for a stay on June 16, 2013 and CSI’s petition for writ of
8 certiorari on October 7, 2013. (¶8, Blumberg Dec.; Ex. “1” attached.)
9
10 On October 27, 2015, CSI again moved for summary judgment, this time on the
11 ground that every cause of action of DeCrescenzo’s second amended complaint was
12 barred by the protections for freedom of religion found in the First Amendment to the
13 United States Constitution and Article I of the California Constitution. (¶9, Blumberg
14 Dec.) The motion was denied. (Ibid.) CSI petitioned the Court of Appeal for relief.
15 (Ibid.) When the petition was summarily denied, CSI petitioned California’s Supreme
16 Court for review. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition
17 for review on September 14, 2016. (Ibid.)
18
19 Throughout this time, CSI engaged in discovery, including taking numerous
20 depositions and serving multiple sets of interrogatories and requests to produce
21 documents. (¶s 3 to 5, Blumberg Dec.) And CSI brought five discovery-related motions.
22 (¶6, Blumberg Dec.)
23
24 On or about February 20, 2014, Judge Sohigian retired. (¶10, Blumberg Dec.) The
25 Court’s online docket reflects that on February 20, 2014, the case was reassigned to
26 another judge, followed by several other assignments and re-assignments until September
27 17, 2014, when the case was assigned to the Honorable Rolf M. Treu who then presided
28 over the case until February 11, 2016, when the case was assigned to the Honorable John
9
1 P. Doyle who heard and ruled on CSI’s second motion for summary judgment on April
2 27, 2016. (Ibid.) Judge Doyle presided over the case until May 18, 2016, when the case
3 was re-assigned to the Honorable Samantha P. Jessner. (Ibid.) On or about January 31,
4 2017, pursuant to stipulation, Judge Jessner set the trial to commence on October 2, 2017.
5 (Ibid.; Ex. “2”.) Thereafter, CSI represented to Judge Jessner that it was ready for trial,
6 executed a joint exhibit list, executed a joint witness list, and filed a trial brief and six
7 motions in limine and a ”statement re joint statement of the case”. (¶11, Blumberg Dec.)
8 Having been presented with all required “trial-ready” documents, Judge Jessner then
9 determined that the case should be “long cause” and the case was reassigned to this
10 department that set the trial date of August 13, 2018, after CSI participated without
11 objection in a trial setting conference. (¶12, Blumberg Dec.)
12
13 Nearly eleven months after CSI stipulated to a trial date, after CSI announced
14 ready for trial and filed joint exhibit and witness lists, a statment of the case, a trial brief
15 and six motions in limine, and one month after the current trial date was set, CSI returned
16 to the United States District Court seeking to enjoin plaintiff from further prosecution of
17 this action. (¶13, Blumberg Dec.; CSI’s Ex. I.) Plaintiff moved to dismiss. (¶13,
18 Blumberg Dec.; Ex. “3”.) CSI opposed the motion, contending that the California Court
19 of Appeal had gotten it wrong back in 2011 when it held that Judge King’s order had no
20 res judicata effect on plaintiff’s state claims. (CSI’s Ex. J.) In a 10-page reasoned
21 opinion, the United States District Court (Judge George H. Wu) granted the motion and
22 dismissed the action. (CSI’s Ex. K and Ex. L.) CSI has appealed Judge Wu’s decision to
23 the United States Courts of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit. (¶13, Blumberg Dec.; Ex. “4”.)
24 As discussed below in points III and IV, the appeal has no merit.
25 ///
26 ///
27 ///
28 ///
10
1 III.
2 SYNOPSIS OF THE LAW ALLOWING A FEDERAL COURT TO
3 ENJOIN A CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN A STATE COURT
4
5 As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, “inevitable friction between
6 the state and federal courts . . . ensues from the injunction of state judicial proceedings by
7 a federal court.” (Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp. (1977) 433 U.S. 623, 630-631, 97
8 S.Ct. 2882, 2887, 53 L.Ed.2d 1009.) Thus, federal court intervention in a state court
9 proceeding is barred in all but the narrowest circumstances. (Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Esprit
10 de Corp. (9th Cir. 1982) 682 F.2d 1267, 1271.) CSI contends that such a narrow
11 circumstance exists because (1) in 2009, the United States District Court dismissed
12 plaintiff’s federal claim with prejudice and remanded her state court claims to this Court
13 and (2) the doctrine of res judicata/collateral estoppel precluded this Court from doing
14 anything but dismissing the case. But when the state appellate court has already
15 determined that the state court action is not barred by the res judicata/collateral estoppel
16 effect of the federal judgment, “the situation is drastically changed” because that decision
17 must be given full faith and credit. (Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine (9th Cir. 2005) 432
18 F.3d 939, 943.) Accordingly, even the state appellate court’s mistaken rejection of the
19 claim of the res judicata/collateral estoppel of a prior federal-court judgment does not
20 justify the highly intrusive remedy of a federal-court injunction. (Sandpiper Village
21 Condominium Ass’n., Inc. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. (9th Cir. 2005) 428 F.3d 831, 850;
22 Brother Records, supra, 432 F.3d 939, 943.) And even if the federal court is not
23 absolutely prohibited from enjoining the state-court litigation, the United States Supreme
24 Court has emphasized that “the fact that an injunction may issue does not mean that it
25 must issue.” (Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp. (1988) 486 U.S. 140, 151, 108 S.Ct. 1684,
26 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 127.) In that instance, whether to enjoin a state proceeding is
27 committed to the discretion of the district court. (Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc. v. Victa
28 (9th Cir. 1991) 936 F.2d 466, 468.) Thus, a district court acts “entirely within its
11
1 discretion” in dismissing a suit that seeks to enjoin a state-court proceeding when it
2 determined nothing precluded [appellant] from raising its defenses of res judicata in the
3 California courts. (Ibid.) Once so raised, the proper course is to “appeal through the state
4 court system and, if necessary, to petition the United States Supreme Court for review.”
5 (Sandpiper, supra, 428 F.2d 831, 850.) CSI did not do so.
6
7 Even if the state court never addressed the res judicata issue, comity concerns
8 require that injunctive relief must be promptly sought from the federal court. (Bailey v.
9 State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. (10th Cir. 2005) 414 F.3d 1187, 1190-1191: “[T]he district
10 court acted out of respect for the work already performed by the state court. . . . [¶]
11 Defendants occupied a significant amount of the state court’s time in litigation before
12 seeking relief from the federal system. Defendants continued litigating in the state court
13 for more than a year before returning to the federal system to request an injunction.” In
14 the case at bar, CSI continued to litigate in this Court for more than six years before
15 returning to the federal system to request an injunction.
16
17 IV.
18 BECAUSE DEFENDANTS’ APPEAL HAS NO MERIT, IT
19 PROVIDES NO SUPPORT FOR STAYING THE PENDING TRIAL
20
21 When Judge Wu granted DeCrescenzo’s motion to dismiss CSI’s complaint, he did
22 not abuse his discretion. Research disclosed that there is only case – Brother Records,
23 supra, 432 F.3d 939 – in which a federal court was requested to enjoin a state court action
24 after the appellate court of that state had held that a previous federal court order did not
25 have preclusive effect. As Judge Wu pointed out, “[t]his case bears striking resemblance
26 to Brother Records.” (CSI’s Ex. K at p. 226.) In Brother Records, the Ninth Circuit held
27 that the district court had not abused its discretion in refusing to enjoin a suit being
28 prosecuted in the Los Angeles County Superior Court because the California Court of
12
1 Appeal had held that the prior federal court order had no preclusive effect on the state
2 claims. And, citing Bailey, supra, 414 F.3d 1187, Judge Wu further pointed out that in
3 addition to the analogous facts presented in Brother Records that supported dismissal,
4 CSI had waited more than six years to seek the injunction based on the alleged erroneous
5 June 24, 2011 Court of Appeal decision. (CSI’s Ex. K at p. 226.)
6
7 CSI recognizes it must convince this Court that its appeal to the Ninth Circuit has
8 merit. CSI contends that Judge Wu abused his discretion in allowing this case to proceed
9 because he should have determined that the California Court of Appeal got it wrong in
10 2011, when it concluded that the prior federal court order had no preclusive effect on
11 plaintiff’s state claims. But as discussed above, the proper course is to “appeal through
12 the state court system and, if necessary, to petition the United States Supreme Court for
13 review.” (Sandpiper, supra, 428 F.2d 831, 850.) CSI petitioned the California Court of
14 Appeal for a rehearing on the issue and when the petition was denied, it petitioned the
15 California Supreme Court for review. It chose not to petition the United States Supreme
16 Court for review. Therefore, the California Court of Appeal decision must now be given
17 full faith and credit. (Brother Records, supra, 432 F.3d 939, 943.) Accordingly, even if
18 the California Court of Appeal mistakenly rejected CSI’s claim of res judicata – which
19 plaintiff disputes – the prior federal-court judgment does not justify the highly intrusive
20 remedy of a federal-court injunction. (Sandpiper Village Condominium, supra, 428 F.3d
21 831, 850; Brother Records, supra, 432 F.3d 939, 943.)
22
23 V.
24 THIS COURT IS BOUND BY THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE
25
26 “‘[F]inality is a cornerstone of both the res judicata and the law of the case
27 doctrines.” (People v. Mitchell (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 132, 155.) The “law of the case”
28 doctrine dictates that an appellate court’s holding on a rule of law that is necessary to the
13
1 appellate court’s opinion “is a final determination thereof, and, like the final judgment in
2 any other case, estops the parties thereto from afterwards questioning its correctness.”
3 (Union Oil Co. of California v. Reconstruction Oil Co. (1943) 58 Cal.App.2d 30, 35-36.
4 The “law of the case” doctrine holds that appellate rulings “must be adhered to
5 throughout the case’s subsequent progress in the trial court and on subsequent appeal.”
6 (City of West Hollywood v. Kihagi (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 739, 749.)
7
8 The Second District Court of Appeal made a specific finding on the issue of
9 equitable estoppel, i.e., that there was no preclusive - collateral estoppel effect of Judge
10 King’s order and that the California Superior Court was not bound by Judge King’s order
11 dismissing the federal cause of action, that the facts alleged in plaintiff’s second amended
12 complaint were sufficient to constitute equitable estoppel, and that the trial court should
13 determine whether the facts were true and if plaintiff acted reasonably in delaying her
14 filing of a complaint. These specific findings – as the law of the case – “must be adhered
15 to” by the trial court. (City of West Hollywood, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th 739, 749.) CSI is
16 not without a remedy: the Ninth Circuit has the power to stay this action pending CSI’s
17 appeal. (See Federal Ninth Circuit Civil Appellate Practice (The Rutter Group 2018) §
18 6:267, citing Washington v. Trump (9th Cir. 2017) 847 F.3d 1151, 1164. Because this
19 court is bound by the law of the case, CSI’s appropriate avenue to prevent this case from
20 going to trial is an order from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. This is not an unjust
21 burden; the Ninth Circuit, which is well versed in the interplay between the All Writs Act
22 (28 U.S.C. § 1657), the Anti-Injunction Act (28 U.S.C. § 2883) and the Full Faith and
23 Credit Act (28 U.S.C. § 1738) (and its own decision in the Brother Records case), is well
24 equipped to determine CSI’s probability of success.
25 ///
26 ///
27 ///
28 ///
14
1 VI
2 PLAINTIFF WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY PREJUDICED BY
3 FURTHER DELAYING THIS ACTION BEGUN IN 2009
4
5 “Justice denied is justice delayed” is the philosophical principle that underlies the
6 requirement that the judiciary manage its cases “from start to finish, for speedy
7 resolution.” (Laborers’ Internat. Union of North America v. El Dorado Landscape Co.
8 (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 993, 1007, citing Gov. Code, § 68607.) But what is beneficial to
9 society as a whole is not necessarily beneficial to defendants. Thus, it has become a
10 mantra of defendants that “Justice delayed is justice.” (Grewal v. Jammu (2011) 191
11 Cal.App.4th 977, 999.) It is of no surprise, therefore, that CSI ignores the prejudice that
12 plaintiff will have to endure if this matter – begun in 2009 – is stayed pending its appeal
13 to the Ninth Circuit. A stay pending a direct appeal of the trial court’s order “can be
14 ‘important.’ But it should not trump all else.” (Id. at p. 1003.) Appellate courts have
15 recognized that a defendant’s meritless appeal causes “an inordinate delay of the
16 plaintiff’s case.” (Central Valley Hospitalists v. Dignity Health (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th
17 203, 206; see also Brown v. Wells Fargo , N.A. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1354:
18 “Some appeals are filed to delay the inevitable.”) In such a case, “[t]he appeals process
19 becomes a way of delaying justice. As an old, fundamental and too often neglected
20 axiom has it, justice delayed is justice denied.” (Ferrari, Alvarez, Olsen & Ottoboni v.
21 Home Ins. Co. (9th Cir. 1991) 940 F.2d 550, 558 (Justice Noonan, dissenting).) In the
22 case at bar, the appeal is not a direct appeal of any of this Court’s orders; it is an appeal in
23 a different case.
24
25 “In the last analysis, the court must determine which party is the more likely to be
26 injured by the exercise of its discretion [in determining whether to stay this action
27 pending CSI’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit] and it must then be exercised in favor of that
28 ///
15
1 party.” (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 528, quoting Family
2 Record Plan, Inc. v. Mitchell (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 235, 242.) Plaintiff’s second
3 amended complaint alleges abuse at the hands of defendants from the age of 12 in 1991
4 until 2004. She commenced this action in 2009 and the litigation has been ongoing for
5 nine years. There has been no “speedy resolution” but at least there was finally a firm
6 trial date. CSI seeks further delay. It is well known that the passage of time can cause
7 evidence to be lost, memories to fade, and witnesses to disappear. (Adams v. Paul (1995)
8 11 Cal.4th 583, 592.) Further delay will not only work a personal injustice on plaintiff,
9 but it will jeopardize her ability to prove her case.
10
11 VII.
12 CONCLUSION
13
14 The question posed at the beginning of this opposition was whether defendants'
15 use of the federal system after many years of voluntary participation in the Superior Court
16 is a subterfuge whose purpose is to further delay plaintiff from her day in court. As
17 discussed above, it is improbable that the Ninth Circuit will find that Judge Wu abused
18 his discretion. The prevailing law is the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Brother Records,
19 supra, 432 F.2d 939. And litigating in state court for a far shorter time (one year vs. six
20 years) is a valid reason to deny a request that the federal court intervene. (Bailey, supra,
21 414 F.3d 1187, 1190-1191.) These facts appear to provide the answer regarding CSI’s
22 motivation in moving to stay this action pending final determination of its appeal in the
23 Ninth Circuit.
24
25 In determining whether to issue a stay, the court should consider whether it is
26 likely that CSI’s appeal will be successful. (See Continental Baking Co., supra, 68
27 Cal.2d 512, 528.) The trial court should not issue a stay “unless there is a reasonable
28 ///
16
1 probability that [CSI] will be successful in [its appeal]." (Ibid.) The applicable factors
2 weigh in favor of denying CSI's motion for a stay pending its appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
3
4 Dated: May 25, 2018 BLUMBERG LAW CORPORATION
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1 DECLARATION OF JOHN P. BLUMBERG
2
3 I, JOHN P. BLUMBERG, declare:
4
5 1. I have been licensed to practice law in California since 1976. I am a
6 member of the Blumberg Law Corporation, attorney of record for plaintiff in the above-
7 entitled matter and am the attorney responsible for this matter.
8
9 2. When the Los Angeles County Superior Court sustained defendants’
10 demurrers to plaintiff’s second amended complaint without leave to amend, she appealed
11 from the ensuing judgment of dismissal. On appeal, defendants filed a Respondents’
12 Brief on or about October 12, 2010 in the Court of Appeal of the State of California,
13 Second Appellate District, Division 3 in its case no. B224409, entitled Laura Ann
14 DeCrescenzo vs. Church of Scientology International, et al and they filed a Respondents’
15 Supplemental Post-Argument Brief on or about March 3, 2011 in the same matter. In
16 both briefs, defendants contended that the judgment of dismissal should be affirmed due
17 to the preclusive effect of the 2009 federal court order dismissing plaintiff’s federal claim
18 and remanding her state claims back to this Court. A copy of the 2009 federal court order
19 is exhibit C of the pending motion for a stay. After the Court of Appeal rendered its
20 opinion, defendants filed a petition for rehearing and when that was denied they filed a
21 petition for review with the California Supreme Court. When the petition for review was
22 denied, they did not file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme
23 Court.
24
25 3. After the California Court of Appeal rendered its opinion and review was
26 denied by the California Supreme Court, the Church of Scientology International (“CSI”)
27 engaged in discovery by taking depositions and propounding interrogatories, requests for
28
18
1 admissions and requests for production of documents. Additionally, CSI brought
2 discovery motions.
3
4 4. The depositions taken by CSI, the dates and pages of testimony were as
5 follows:
6
7 Laura Dieckman: 5/1/12 206 pp
11 Daniel Turner: 7/17/12 135 pp
12 Glenn Dieckman: 7/18/12 112 pp
13 Toddy Dieckman: 7/18/12 183 pp
14 Stephanie Bauer: 7/19/12 106 pp
15 Emily Dieckman: 7/19/12 112 pp
16 Stace Dieckman: 7/12/12 123 pp
17 Kelly Forrest: 7/20/12 66 pp
18 Christie Collbran: 2/14/14 200 pp
19 Astra Woodcraft: 3/9/17 74 pp
20 Nora Beth Crest: 3/10/17 60 pp
21 Robert Turner: 3/13/17 36 pp
22 Pamela Turner: 3/13/17 31 pp
23 Jeffrey Younggren 6/30/17 164 pp
24 Robert Levine 7/5/17 193 pp
25 Susan Bleecker 7/17/17 62 pp
26 Stephen A. Kent 7/19/17 332 pp
27 ///
28 ///
19
1 5. The written discovery propounded on Laura DeCrescenzo by CSI after the
2 decision of the Court of Appeal, including the type, number of requests/ admissions/
3 interrogatories, and dates were as follows:
4
5 Form Interrogatories, 13 requests: November 4, 2013
6 Special Interrogatories, 19 requests: November 26, 2013
7 Special Interrogatories, 1 request: December 15, 2016
8 Request for Production of Documents: December 15, 2016
9 Request for Admissions: December 16, 2016
10 Request for Production of Documents: December 16, 2016
11 Special Interrogatories, 6 requests: December 16, 2016
12 Form Interrogatories, 2 requests: December 16, 2016
13 Special Interrogatories, 72 requests: April 11, 2017
14
15 6. The discovery-related motions filed by CSI, including the types and dates
16 were as follows:
17
18 February 28, 2012: To Compel Deposition of Laura DeCrescenzo;
19 October 25, 2012: For Summary Judgment;
20 January 9, 2015: To Compel Production of Documents from Plaintiff's
21 Computer;
22 May 5, 2015: To Obtain Mental Exam of Plaintiff;
23 August 7, 2015: For Summary Judgment No. 2;
24 June 27, 2017: To Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories;
25 Sept. 25, 2017: To Compel Evidence from Plaintiff's Expert Stephen Kent or
26 to Exclude his Testimony;
27 Oct. 18, 2017: To Reopen Discovery for the Limited Purpose of Having
28 Motion Re Plaintiff's Expert Dr. Kent Heard.
20
1 7. On October 25, 2012, CSI moved for summary judgment on the basis that
2 plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statutes of limitations because the facts did not
3 support plaintiff’s equitable estoppel claims. The motion was denied.
4
5 8. On February 8, 2013, DeCrescenzo moved to compel CSI to produce
6 certain documents. CSI opposed the motion, contending that the documents were
7 protected from discovery by California’s penitent-clergy privilege and the Free Exercise
8 Clause of the United States Constitution. The motion was granted on March 6, 2013.
9 CSI petitioned the Court of Appeal for relief. The petition was summarily denied. See
10 Order of the California Court of Appeal in its case no. B247794. CSI then petitioned the
11 California’s Supreme Court for review. The petition for review was summarily denied on
12 May 15, 2003. See Order of the Supreme Court of California in its case no. S210314.
13 CSI then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari and sought
14 a stay of the state court action pending resolution of its petition. Attached as Exhibit “1”
15 collectively are (a) a copy of the United States Supreme Court docket search for Laura
16 DeCrescenzo evidencing that the only matters that have been filed therein have been the
17 above-described case no. 12-1495 and related case no. 12A-1247 and (b) the United
18 States Supreme Court dockets of those two matters evidencing that the request for a stay
19 was denied on June 26, 2013, and the Petition for Writ of Certiorari was denied on
20 October 7, 2013.
21
22 9. On October 27, 2015, CSI and defendant Religious Technology Center
23 moved for summary judgment on the ground that every cause of action of DeCrescenzo’s
24 second amended complaint was barred by the protections for freedom of religion found in
25 the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I of the California
26 Constitution. The motion was denied. CSI petitioned the Court of Appeal for relief. The
27 petition was summarily denied. See Order of the California Court of Appeal in its case
28 no. B275249, filed on July 13, 2016. CSI then petitioned the California Supreme Court
21
1 for review. The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition for review on
2 September 14, 2016. See Order of the California Supreme Court in its case no. S236174.
3
4 10. On or about February 20, 2014, the trial judge, Ronald M. Sohigian, retired.
5 The Court’s online docket reflects that on February 20, 2014, the case was reassigned to
6 another judge, followed by several other assignments and re-assignments until September
7 17, 2014, when the case was assigned to Hon. Rolf M. Treu who then presided over the
8 case until February 11, 2016, when the case was assigned to Hon. John P. Doyle who
9 heard and ruled on CSI’s second motion for summary judgment on April 27, 2016. Judge
10 Doyle presided over the case until May 18, 2016, when the case was re-assigned to Hon.
11 Samantha P. Jessner. On or about January 31, 2017, pursuant to stipulation, Judge
12 Jessner set the trial to commence on October 2, 2017. Attached as Exhibit “2” is a true
13 and correct copy of the stipulation.
14
15 11. On September 29, 2017, at the Final [Trial] Status Conference, CSI’s
16 attorneys appeared, announced that they were ready for trial, and presented Judge Jessner
17 with trial notebooks containing, among other things, a joint witness list, a joint exhibit
18 list, a “statement re joint statement of the case”, a trial brief, and six motions in limine,
19 specifically:
20
21 A. To exclude evidence or argument that certain religious beliefs and
22 practices of the Scientology religion justify the application of equitable estoppel;
23
24 B. To exclude evidence, documents, or testimony regarding wage-and-hour
25 damages because of the ministerial exception;
26
27 C. To exclude argument, evidence, documents or testimony regarding section 970
28 of the Labor Code as applicable to the recruitment of ministers;
22
1 D. To exclude testimony of plaintiff's expert Jeffrey Younggren;
2
3 E. To exclude evidence, documents, or testimony regarding unrelated lawsuits;
4
5 F. To exclude testimony of plaintiff's expert Stephen Kent.

6
7 12. Having been presented with all required "trial-ready" documents, Judge
8 Jessner determined that the case should be deemed to be "long cause" and reassigned to a
9 long-cause trial judge. On October 12, 2017, the case was re-assigned to this Department,
10 the Hon. Mark V. Mooney presiding, for trial. On November 15, 2017, at the trial setting
11 conference, the matter was set for trial on August 13, 2018, after CSI participated without
12 objection in a trial setting conference.
13
-
14 13. Nearly eleven months after CSI stipulated to a trial date, after CSI
15 announced ready for trial and filed joint exhibit and witness lists and six motions in
16 limine and one month after the current trial date was set, CSI returned to the United States
17 District Court seeking to enjoin plaintiff from further prosecution this action A copy of
18 plaintiff's motion to dismiss is attached as Exhibit "3". CSI has appealed. A copy of the
19 notice of appeal is attached as Exhibit "4".
20
21 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
22 foregoing is true and correct. Executed on . ay 25, 2018 at Long Beach, California.
23
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1/t:::J/t:U 10 uocKel ~earcn- ::,upreme \.oun or me unneo "'"'lies
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report. The format for Supreme Court docket numbers is "Term year-number" (e.g., 06-123; 07-12; 06-5001).
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Search for: · DeCrescenzo laura search iI

2 items found for your search: DeCrescenzo laura
Search Results:
i) Docket for 12A1247

Title: Church of Scientology International, Applicant v. Laura Ann DeCrescenzo, et al.
Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District Application (12A1247) for a stay pending disposition of the petition for a writ of certiorari Party name:
Laura Ann DeCrescenzo, et al.
~ Docket for 12-1495

Title: Church of Scientology International, Petitioner v. laura Ann DeCrescenzo, et al.
Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District Waiver of right of respondents uura Ann DeCrescenzo, et al. to respond filed. Party name: Laura Ann
DeCrescenzo, et al.
Ex. 1 - 01 1/1
1/.0:lii.O:U Ill "'earcn - "'upreme 1...oun or me unnea "tar""
No.12Al247
Title: Church of Scientology International, Applicant
v.
Laura Ann DeCrescenzo, et at.
Docketed: June 25, 2013
Linked with 12-1495
LowerCt: Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District
Case Nos.: (8247794)
---Date--- -------Proceedings and Orders---------------------

Jun 25 2013 Application (12Al247) for a stay pending disposition of the petition for q writ of certiorari, submitted to Justice Kennedy.
Jun 26 2013 Application (12Al247) denied by Justice Kennedy.
--Name--------------------- -------Address------------------ --Phone---

Attorneys for Petitioner:
Eric M. Lieberman Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman, P.C. (212) 254-1111
45 Broadway, Suite 1700
New York, NY 10006
Party name: Church of Scientology International
Attorneys for Respondents:
Kathryn Saldana Metzger Law Group
Counsel of Record 401 E. Ocean Blvd., Ste. 800
Long Beach, CA 90802
Party name: Laura Ann DeCrescenzo, et at.
Slndee M. Smolowitz Blumberg Law Corp.

Counsel of Record 444 W. Ocean Blvd., Ste. 1500
Robert E. Mangels 1900 Avenue of the Stars, 7th Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90067
httn~·/Auwu.1 Cl •nrornot'nl u-t nr\\,/eatarl"h !2c:nv?filonoma:lrln,..Lrotfiloc:/1 ?g1 ?.d7 htrn

Ex. 1 - 02 1/1
'1/l.~/l.UIIl ;:,earcn - ;:,upreme voun or me unneo ;:,tatAs
No.12-1495
Title: Church of Scientology International, Petitioner
v.
Laura Ann DeCrescenzo, et al.
linked with 12Al247
lowerCt: Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District
Case Nos.: (B247794)
Decision Date: April25, 2013
Discretionary Court
Decision Date: May 15,2013

Jun 24 2013 Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due July 26, 2013)
Jun 25 2013 Application (12Al247) for a stay pending disposition of the petition for a writ of certiorari, submitted to Justice Kennedy.
Jun 26 2013 Application (12A1247) denied by Justice Kennedy.
Jul3 2013 Waiver of right of respondents laura Ann DeCrescenzo, et al. to respond filed.
Jul17 2013 DISTRIBUTED for Conference of September 30,2013.
Jul26 2013 Motion for leave to file amici brief filed by National Council of Churches of Christ, et al. (Distributed)
Jul26 2013 Motion for leave to file amicus brief filed by Rutherford Institute. (Distributed)
Oct 72013 Motion for leave to file amicus brief filed by Rutherford Institute GRANTED.
Oct 7 2013 Motion for leave to file amici brief filed by National Council of Churches of Christ, et al. GRANTED.
Oct72013 Petition DENIED.

Eric M.lieberman Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman, P.C. (212) 254-1111
Counsel of Record 45 Broadway, Suite 1700
New York, NY 10006
elieberman@rbskl.com
Raphael Metzger 401 E. Ocean Blvd., Suite 800 (562)437 -4499
Counsel of Record long Beach, CA 90802
Party name: laura Ann DeCrescenzo, et al.
Other:
Jeremy Matz Bird Marella Boxer Wolpert Nessim Drooks & llncenberg 310-201-2100
1875 Century Park East, 23rd Floor
los Angeles, CA 90067-2561
jdm@birdmarella.com
Party name: National Council of Churches of Christ, et al.
John W. Whitehead The Rutherford Institute (434) 978-3888

1440 Sachem Place
Charlottesville, VA 22901
johnw@rutherford.org
Party name: Rutherford Institute
httnc·/1\atunal c:••nrotnAI"'f'\llrt nn\llco'!:arl"'h '!:ac:nv?filon2rno=lrln,-.t,.otfiloc:/1?_1 A OJ; htrn

Ex. 1 - 03 111
1/t:::tlt:U ID ;:,earcn - ;:,upreme l..OUrt 01 me un11ea ;:,talP"
No.12A1247
Title: Church of Scientology International, Applicant
v.
laura Ann DeCrescenzo, et al.
linked with 12-1495
lowerCt: Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District
Case Nos.: (B247794)

Jun 25 2013 Application (12A1247) for a stay pending disposition of the petition for a writ of certiorari, submitted to Justice Kennedy.
Jun 26 2013 Application {12A1247) denied by Justice Kennedy.

Eric M. Lieberman Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman, P.C. {212) 254-1111
New York, NY 10006
Kathryn Saldana Metzger Law Group
Counsel of Record 401 E. Ocean Blvd., Ste. BOO
Sindee M. Smolowitz Blumberg Law Corp.

Counsel of Record 444 W. Ocean Blvd., Ste. 1500
long Beach, CA 90802
Robert E. Mangels 1900 Avenue of the Stars, 7th Floor

los Angeles, CA 90067
Ex. 1 - 04 111
John P. Blumberg (70200)
2 444 West Ocean Blvd., Suite 1500
Long Beach, California 90802
3 Telephone: 562.437.0403
Facsimile: 562.432.0107
4
METZGER LAW GROUP Gherri Fl. Ctut!Jf, G<ecuiiv~J Ulfir.:or/Ck:rl<
5 Raphael Metzger (116020)
401 E. Ocean Blvd., Suite 800 By Lr.Jrorm /llblno, DcpiJty
6 . Long Beach, California 90802-4966
Telephone: 562.437.4499
7 Facsimile: 562.436.1561
8 Attorneys for Plaintiff Laura Am1 DeCrescenzo
9 KENDALL BRILL & KELLY LLP

Bert H. Deixler (70614)
10 10100 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 1725
Los Angeles, California 90067
11 Telephone: 310.556.2700
Facsimile: 310.556.2705
12
JEFFER.• MANGELS, BUTLER & MITCHELL, LLP
13 Robert E. Mangels (48291)
1900 A venue of the Stars, Seventh Floor
14 Los Angeles, California 90067
Telephone: 310.203.8080
15 Facsimile: 310.203.0567
16 Attorneys for Defendants
17 SlJPl~RIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

18 COUNTY Oil' LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT
19
LAURA ANN DeCRESCENZO, Case No. BC411018
20
Plaintiff, Assigned for All Purposes to the Hon.
21 Samantha Jessner, Dept. 31
v.
22 JOINT STIPULATION SETTING TRIAL
CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY DATE ANI> J>ISCOVERY DEADLINES
23 INTERNATIONAL, a corporate entity, AND EXTENSION OF FIVE- YEAR
RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER, RULE; [1~~] ORDER ./t/y/......-
24 previously sued herein as Doe No. 1, a
California Corporation, and DOES 2-20, Judge: Hon. Samantha Jessner
25 Dept.: 31
Defendants.
26 Action Filed: April 2, 2009
Trial Date: None .set
2711-------------------------·-----~
28
Kendall Brill
g, Kelly LLP
111 IUO !""' Mwurn lllvcl.
s~.irc:- IH'i
30061 ~ .]
lc.' All'll!f,.J. (A QOC&7
JOINT STIPULATION ANi> (P"ROPOSED) ORDER SET11NG TRIAL DATE
Ex. 2 - 01
1 The parties hereto, by and through their counsel of record STIPULATE as follows:
2 1) The trial date, final status conference date, and all statutory and discovery cut-off dates
3 in this matter have been vacated since October 23, 2015;
4 2) The Court ordered on January 13,2012 and again on November 13,2014 that the trial
5 be bifurcated and that there be an initial bench trial to the Cout1 on the sole issue of whether the
6 doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes Defendants from assel1ing the defense of the statute of
7 limitations, prior to trial on the merits. Plaintiff objected to the bifurcation and believes the
8 decision should be made by the trial judge who ultimately hears the case;
9 3) At status conferences held before the Com1 on July 21, 2016, September 22, 2016, and
10 January 19, 2017, the Court indicated that the trial in this matter (including the first phase of the
11 bifurcated trial) would be assigned to a "long cause" judge of this Court;
12 4) The parties wish to efficiently prepare for the trial;
13 5) Following a suggestion of the Court, the parties agree that the matter will proceed most
14 efficiently if the Court sets a nominal "trial date." Because the matter will he assigned to a long-
15 cause judge, the "trial date" set by the Com1 is not expected to be the date on which the trial
16 actually commences, but rather:
17 (a) the trial date for purposes of setting pre-trial deadlines as governed by the Code of
18 Civil Procedure, including without limitation the "cut-off" dates for fact and expet1 discovery;
19 (b) the date on which the parties must submit to the Supervising Judge of the Civil
20 Division lhe "Long Cause Trial Package" mandated by the local rules of this Court;
21 6) The parties believe an appropriate nominal trial date is October 2, 2017. That date is
22 requested due to the factual and expert discovery anticipated in advance of the trial;
23 7) The "five year rule" (CCP § 583.31 0) has been previously extended by stipulation and
24 is further extended to the date the trial or any part thereof actually commences.
25
26 IT IS SO STIPULATED.
27
28
Kendall Brill
& Kelly LLP 300615.1
lOIOO \.11\\d Mun1Cd SlviJ.
C.uilf 172')
\UJ AI1.1}1:1C'), (A 'JOQ!;)
JOINT STIPULATION SETTING TRIAL DATE
I Ex. 2 - 02
KENDALL BRILL & KELLY LLP
By:
Nicholas F. Damn
Attorneys for Defendant Church of Scientology
International
JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER & MITCHELL LLP
By:
Matthew D. Hinks
Attorneys for Defendant Religious Technology
Center
By:
Attorneys for Plaintiff Laura Ann DeCrescenzo
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Kendall Brill 300615· 1
& Kelly LLP
10100 \An'.t fAM<rJ alv,
Suol~ 1)~, JOINT STIPULATION SETTTNG TRIAL DATE
""~ A•lllt'tts. '-•\ !JOOGJ
2
Ex. 2 - 03
p{J!&.Q:~] ORDER
(
2 The Comt, having considered the stipulation of the parties, and for good cause shown,
3 hereby ORDERS:
4 The trial date in this matter shall be October 2, 2017. This trial date is set on the fD .
5 understanding that:
1.:- ,P
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. ~ ea.,"'-""'""~ c:)v. TT uu~ I ••
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6 (a);the case wtll be asstgned for both phases oftnal to a long-cause JUdge ofthts Court,
7 and trial will not be held in this judicial department;
8 (b) the October 2, 2017 tJ'ial date is set for purposes of pre-trial deadlines as governed by
9 the Code of Civil Proce<_hu·e, including without limitation deadlines for fact and expert discovery;
Au bus1- -2tl ::101 -=1- ( 1?- 3c -1 ~) ·
10 (c) ~ili~P ~,.tl~H7'is the date on which the parties must submit to the Supervising Judge
11 of the Civil Division the "Long Cause Trial Package" mandated by the local rules of this Court for
12 the first-phase trial;
13 (d) the trial in this matter may not actually begin on October 2, 2017, but rather wi II
14 commence as appropriate after assignment to a long-cause judge; and

/'r pYe-VI ovtS
15 (e~f.'i;re Court ordered on January 13,2012 and again on November 13, 2014 that the trial
16 be bifurcated and that there be an initial bench trial to the Court on the sole issue ofwhether the
17 doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes Defendants fTom asserting the defense of the statute of
18 limitations, prior to trial on the merits. Plaintiff objected to the bifurcation and believes the
19 decision should be made by the trial judge who ultimately hears the case.
20 Based on the agreement of the parties that the time within which this case must be brought
21 to trial under CCP §§ 583.310, 583.330 (i.e., the "five year rule") is extended to the date the trial
22 or any part thereof actually commences, the five year 1ule should not prevent this matter from
23 . to tna
proceed mg · 1 accor d'mg to th'ts sc11edu1e. ?-/113.[ Sja/uJ· C6wje1 iJII. tt' tO
24 IT IS SO ORDERED. ;aM -FiJI<_. 9- ;);).-I/ a.---"f- Y; .:!£) ,4-n-''/

25
26 Dated: 'F,¢..~.!.LANTI:jj\ P. JESSNER
l-Ion. Samantha Jessner
27 Judge of the Superior Court
28
Kendall Brill
& Kelly LLP 300615.1
I01UU}a•l\;t Monita Olvd.
'Suo~• l:ll~ [PROPOSED] ORDER SETTING TRIAL DATE
Ex. 2 - 04
1.(15 AI\9Git\, f.A g00&7
I
Case :17-cv-09158-GW-SK Document 13 Filed 02/20/18 Page 1 of 3 Page ID #:44
1 John P. Blumberg- State Bar No. 70200

Ave Buchwald - State Bar No. 70305
2 BLUMBERG LAW CORPORATION
444 West Ocean Blvd., Suite 1500
3 Long Beach, California 90802
Tel No. (562) 437-0403; Fax No. (562) 432-0107
4 .blumber a)Biumber Law.com
a uc wa a) urn erg aw.com
5
6 Attorney for Defendant
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERN DIVISION
10
11 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY CASE NO: 2:17-cv-09158-GW-SK
INTERNATIONAL,
12 NOTICE OF MOTION AND
Plaintiff, MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
13 FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
vs. UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE
14 GRANTED [FRCP 12(b)(6)]
LAURA ANN DeCRESCENZO aka
15 LAURA A. DIECKMAN, [Memorandum of Points and
Authorities, Request (or Judicial
16 Defendant. Notice and Proposed Order
concurrently filed herein]
17
Date: March 22,2018
18 Time: 8:30a.m.
Courtroom: 9D
19
Action Filed: December 21, 2017
20 Trial Date: None
Judge: Hon. George H. Wu
21
Mag. Judge: Hon. Steve Kim
22
23
24
25
26
27
28 1
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAlLURE TO
STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED [FRCP
12(b)(6)]
Ex. 3 - 01
Case :17-cv-09158-GW-SK Document 13 Filed 02/20/18 Page 2 of 3 Page ID #:45
To plaintiff CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL and to its

2 attorneys of record:
3
4 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on March 22, 2018, at 8:30 a.m., or as soon
5 thereafter as the matter may be heard in the above-entitled court, located at 350
6 West 1st Street, Los Angeles, California 90012, defendant LAURA ANN
7 DeCRESCENZO aka LAURA A. DIECKMAN will move the court to dismiss the
8 action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure section 12(b)(6) because
9 plaintiffs complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, i.e., it
10 fails to allege a cognizable legal theory as more particularly discussed in the
11 concurrently-filed Memorandum of Points and Authorities.
12
13 The motion will be based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the
14 concurrently filed Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the concurrently filed
15 Request to Take Judicial Notice and the complaint and papers filed herein.
16
17 This motion is made following the conference of counsel pursuant to Local

18 Rule 7-3 which took place on January 29, 2018.
19
20 Dated: February 20, 2018 s/ John P. Blumberg

21 JOHN P. BLUMBERG
22
23 slAve Buchwald
24 AVE BUCHWALD
25
26
27
28 2
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
12(b)(6)]
Ex. 3 - 02
J Case :17-cv-09158-GW-SK Document 13 Filed 02/20/18 Page 3 of 3 Page 10 #:46
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2
3 I 1 the undersigned declare that I am over the age of 18 and am not a [arty to
this actwn. I am in the City of Long Beach, Califorma; my business address is
4 Blumbe!:g Law Corporation at 444 West Ocean Boulevard, Suite 1500, Long
Beach, California 90802.
5
6 On the date below, I served a copy ofthe foregoing document entitled:
7 NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED
8 [FRCP 12(b)(6)]
9 on the interested parties in said case as follows:
10 Served Electronically
Via the Court's CM/ECF System
ll
12 Counsel for the Plaintiff :
13
Eric M. Lieberman, Esq.
14 Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman, LLP
15 New York, NY 10006
Telephone: (212) 254-1111
16 Facsimile: (212) 674-4614
I7 Email: elieberman@rbskl.com
18 Bert H. Dexler, Esq.
Kendall Brill & Kelly, LLP
20 Telephone: (310) 556-2700
Facsimile: (310) 556-2705
21
Email: bdeixler@kbkfinn.com
22
23 I declare under penalty ofpe1jury under the laws of the United States of
America that the foregoing is true and correct. I declare that I am employed in the
24 office of a member of the Bar of this Court, at whose direction the service was
made. This declaration is executed in Pasadena, California on February 20, 2018.
25
Kelly Lasorsa Is! Kelly Lasorsa
26
(Type or Print Name) (Signature of Declarant)
27
28 3
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
12(b)(6)] Ex. 3 - 03
Case 2 17-c~'-09158-GW-SK Document 13-1 Filed 02/20/18 Page 1 of 29 Page ID #:47
6 Attorney for Defendant

7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERN DIVISION
10
11 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY CASE NO: 2:17-cv-09158-GW-SK
INTERNATIONAL,
12 DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff, OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
13 IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
vs. DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
14 STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH
LAURA ANN DeCRESCENZO aka RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED
15 LAURA A. DIECKMAN, [FRCP 12(b)(6)]
16 Defendant. fNotice of Motion and Motion,
"Request J9r Judicial Notice and
17 Proposed Order concurrently filed
herein] ·
18
Date: March 22, 2018
19 Time: 8:30a.m.
Courtroom: 9D
20
Action Filed: December 21, 20 17
21 Trial Date: None
22
23
______________________ l Judge:
Mag. Judge:
Hon. George H. Wu
Hon. Steve Kim
24
25
26
27
28
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

Ex. 3 - 04
Case 2 17-cv-09158-GW-SK Document 13-1 Filed 02/20/18 Page 2 of 29 Page ID #:48
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2
3 Table of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4
5 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ..................... 7

6
7 I. ABSTRACT ................................................... 7
8
9 11. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND .................. 7
10
11 III. MOTION TO DISMISS: LEGAL STANDARD AND
12 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE .............................. 10
13
14 IV. THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION ............................... 13
15
16 v. THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT ................................... 13
17
18 VI. THE RELITIGATION EXCEPTION TO THE
19 ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT ...................................... 15
20
21 A. The Court Is Not Empowered to Enjoin the Pending
22 State Action Because of the Preclusive Effect of the
23 California Court of Appeal's Final Decision ................... 15
24
B. If the Court is Empowered to Enjoin the Pending
25
State Court Action, It Nevertheless Should Refrain
26
From Doing So and Grant the Motion to Dismiss ............... 21
27
28 VII. LEAVE TO AMEND SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED ................ 27
2
Ex. 3 - 05
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2
3 United States Supreme Court Cases

4
5 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) .... 10, 11
6 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotice Eng_'rs,
398 U.S. 281,90 S.Ct. 1739,26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970) ............ 14, 16,22
7
Brown v. Felson, 442 U.S. 127, 99 S.Ct. 2205, 60 L.Ed.2d 767 (1979) ......... 18
8
Chick Kam Chao v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 108 S.Ct. 1684,
9 100 L.Ed.2d 127 (1988) ................................... 14, 15,21
10 Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518,
106 S.Ct. 768,88 L.Ed.2d 877 (1986) ......... 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25,26
11
Smith v Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 131 S.Ct. 2368,180 L.Ed.2d 341 ........ 15, 16
12
Venda Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623,
13 97 S.Ct. 2881, 53 L.Ed.2d 1009 ................................... 13
14
Ninth Circuit Cases
15
16 Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Esprit de Corp., 682 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir.1982) ........... 14
17 Am west Mortgage Corp. v. Grady, 925 F .2d 1162 (9th Cir.1991) .............. 15
18 Bechtel Petroleum, Inc. v. Webster, 796 F.2d 252 (9th Cir.I986) ........... 14, 15
19 Bennett v. Medtronic, 285 F.3d 801 (9th Cir.2002) ......................... 14
20 Blalock Eddy Ranch v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 982 F.2d 371 (9th Cir.1992) ... 15, 21
21 Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d449 (9th Cir.1994) ............................. 11
22 Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 432 F.3d 939
(9th Cir.2005) .................................. 16, 17, 18, 19, 20,24
23
Calffornia v. Randstron, 284 F.3d 969 (9'h Cir.2002) ........................ 13
24
Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern California
25 Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242 (9th Cir.1990) ..................... 27
26 Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir.2002) ............. 11
27 Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542 (9th Cir.1990) .. 11
28 Hartmann v. Cal. Dep 't ofCorr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir.2013) ...... 27
3
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMlSS
Ex. 3 - 06
Case 2 17-cv-09158-GW-SK Document 13-1 Filed 02/20/18 Page 4 of 29 Page 10 #:50
Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854 (9 1h Cir.2002) ............................. 11

2 In re Gilead Scis Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir.2008) ................... 11
3 Lee v. City ofLos Angeles, 250 F.3d 668 (9th Cir.2001) ..................... 11
4 Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730 (9th Cir.l987) ............................. 14
5 Manufactured Home Inc. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp.,
428 F.3d 831 (9th Cir.2005) .................................... 11, 12
6
Mendiondo v. Centinela Hasp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir.2008) ........ 10
7
Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc. v. Victa, 936 F.2d 466 (9th Cir.1991) ........ 14, 21
8
Negrete v. Allianz Lffe Ins. Co., 523 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir.2008) ............. 12, 14
9
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir.1997) ............ 12, 15
10
Sandpiper Village Condominium Ass 'n., Inc. v.
II Louisiana-Pac(fic Corp., 428 F.3d 831 (9th Cir.2005) ....... 13, 22, 23, 24, 25
12 Sprewel v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979 (9th Cir.2001) ............... 11
13 United States v. Cote, 51 F.3d 178 (9th Cir.l995) .......................... 18
14 United States v. Ritchie, 342 (9th Cir.2003) ............................... 11
I5 Zhang v. Dept. ofLabor & Immigration, 331 F.3d 1117 (9t" Cir.2003) ......... 27
I6
17 Other Circuit Cases

18
I9 Bailey v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 414 F.3d 1187 (10 111 Cir.2005) ..... 25,26
20 Burr & Forman v. Blair, 470 F.3d 1019 (11th Cir.2006) ..................... 13
21 CFE Group, LLC v. Firstmerit Bank, NA., 809 F.3d 346 (t" Cir.2015) ......... 26
22 First Alabama Bank of Montgomery1 N.A. v. Parsons
Steel, Inc., 825 F.2d 147 5 ( ll t' Cir.1987) ........................... 17
23
Ramsden v. AgriBank, FSB, 214 F.3d 865 (7th Cir.2000) ......... 17, 23, 24, 25,26
24
Southern California Petroleum Corp. v. Harper,
25 273 F.2d 715 (5 1h Cir.l960) ....................................... 14
26 Thompson v. Illinois Dept. ofProf Reg., 300 F.3d 750 (7 1h Cir.2002) .......... 11
27 Ill
28 Ill
4
Ex. 3 - 07
Miscellaneous Cases
2
3 Adams v. Trimble No. S-11-01360, 2012 WL 260160

(E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2007) ........................................ 12
4
Baltazar v. Yates, No. EDCV 04-00274, 2010 WL 2195979
5 (C.D.Cal. April 28, 201 0) ....................................... 20
6 Blatty v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc., No. CV 10-06611,
2011 WL 1327379 at *7 (C.D.Cal. April21, 2011) .................... 21
7
Chase v. County of San Bernardino, No. EDCV 12-1082,
8 2012 WL 1285 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 20 12) ............................ 12
9 Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. RamseJ!, No. S-07-0819,
2007 WL 2225797 (E.D.Cal.July 31, 2007) ....................... 12, 25
10
Hernandez v. Gonzalez, 504 F.Supp.2d 825, 836 (C.D.Ca1.2007) ............. 18
11
Kag West, LLC v. Malone, No. 15-cv-03827,
12 2016 WL 3951651 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2016) ...................... 21,25
13 Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 667 F.Supp. 1332 (C.D.Cal.l987) ............. 20
14 Paralyzed Victims ofAm. v. McPherson, No. C 06-4670,
2008 WL 418'3981 at *5 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 8, 2008) .................... 11
15
16 California Cases
17
Border Business Park, Inc. v. City_ of San Diego
18 142 Cal.App.4th 1538,49 Cal.Rptr.3d259, 280 ................... 20,21
19 City of West Hollywoodv. Kihagi, 16 Cal.App.5th 739,749,
224 Cal.Rptr.3d 577, 583 (2017) .................................. 18
20
People v. Mitchell, 81 Cal.App.4th 132, 155,96 Cal.Rptr.2d 401,417 (2000) .... 18
21
Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co., 41 Cal.3d 903,
22 226 Cal.Rptr. 558 ( 1986) ....................................... 20
23 Sandoval v. Super. Ct., 140 Cal.App.3d 932 (1983) ......................... 19
24 Schultz v. Fulton Associates, Nos. B197266, 2007 WL 3334334,
(Cal. Ct. App. 2nd Dist. Nov. 9, 2007) (unpublished) .................. 20
25
South Sutter, LLC v. LJ Sutter Partners, L.P.,
26 193 Cai.App.4th 634, 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 301 (20 11) .................... 20
27 Union Oil Co. of California v. Reconstruction Oil Co.,
58 Cal.App.2d 30, 35-36, 135 P.2d 621, 624 (1943) ................... 18
28
5
Ex. 3 - 08
Federal Statutes
2
3 28 U.S.C. § 1657 (All Writs Act) ...................................... 13
4 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (Full Faith & Credit) .................................. 16
5 28 U.S.C. § 2883 (Anti-Injunction Act) .................................. 13
6
7 Federal Rules
8
9 F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) .................................................... 10
10 Fed. R. Evid. 201 ................................................... 11
11
12 Mise
13
14 Restatement (Second) of Judgments,§ 13 .......................... 19, 20,21
15 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice
and Procedure§ 4405, p. 82 (2d ed.2002) .......................... 15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
6
Ex. 3 - 09
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

2
3 I. ABSTRACT
4
5 Defendant Laura DeCrescenzo ("DeCrescenzo") filed an action in state

6 court alleging a federal claim and numerous state claims. Plaintiff Church of
7 Scientology International ("CSI") removed the action to the district court. In
8 2009, the district court dismissed the federal claim and remanded the state law
9 claims. Now that trial has been set to begin on August 13,2018, CSI seeks to
10 enjoin DeCrescenzo from further prosecuting her state court action, arguing that
11 there is preclusive effect of the district court's prior order dismissing the federal
12 claim based on the statute of limitations. But in 2011, the California Court of
13 Appeal ruled that the district court's order did not have preclusive effect.
14 Thereafter, CSI continued to actively defend the action in the state court, including
15 seeking appellate relief from state court orders (a) denying its two motions for
16 summary judgment and (b) compelling its production of documents. Based on
17 these circumstances, and the Ninth Circuit's limitations on the res judicata effect
18 of a dismissal based on the statute of limitations, the court should grant
19 DeCrescenzo's motion and dismiss the action.
20
21 II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
22
23 On April2, 2009, DeCrescenzo filed an action in the Los Angeles County

24 Superior Court. Compl. ~ 6. She filed a First Amended Complaint on May 19,
25 2009, alleging a federal forced labor and human trafficking claim under 15 U.S.C.
26 § 1589 and numerous state law claims. Compl. ~s 6 and 8. Based on the federal
27 claim, CSI removed the action to this Court. Compl. ~10. CSI then moved to
28 dismiss the federal and all state claims. Compl. ~11; EC,F No. 5 in cv-09-03984.
7
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO Ex.
DISMISS
3 - 010
On November 5, 2009, the District Court dismissed the federal claim without
2 leave to amend and remanded the action back to the Los Angeles Superior Court.
3 Compl. ~s 12 and 13; ECF No. 27 in cv-09-03984, Ex. A. The Court held that the
4 federal claim was time-barred under the applicable federal statute of limitations
5 because under the facts alleged, equitable tolling and equitable estoppel were
6 inapplicable as a matter of law. !d. The court granted the motion to dismiss the
7 federal claim without leave to amend, but "decline[d] to entertain the remaining
8 state law claims" and remanded them back to the Los Angeles County Superior
9 Court. !d. In other words, the District Court left it to the Los Angeles County
10 Superior Court to determine whether DeCrescenzo should be given leave to amend
ll her state law claims to state further facts in support her contention that CSI was
12 equitably estopped from asserting its statute of limitations defense and, if she did
13 so, whether such facts were sufficient under California law. DeCrescenzo did not
14 appeal the District Court's order. Compl. ~ 13.
15
16 When the case returned to the Los Angeles County Superior Court, CSI
17 demurred to the remaining claims on the grounds that they were time-barred and
18 that DeCrescenzo was collaterally estopped from prosecuting them by the District
19 Court's order. Compl. ~ 14. The Superior Court sustained the demurrer on the
20 first ground with leave to amend and did not comment on CSI's collateral estoppel
21 argument. !d.
22
23 On February 2, 2010, DeCrescenzo filed a second amended complaint,
24 adding Religious Technology Center ("RTC") as a defendant. Compl. ,115; Ex. B.
25 CSI and RTC separately demurred on the same two grounds. Compl. ~ 16; Ex. C;
26 Ex. D. The Superior Court sustained CSI's demurrer on March 18,2010 and
27 RTC's demurrer on April30, 2010; both without leave to amend. Ex. C; Ex. D.
28 On April30, 2010, the court explained that it rejected CSI and RTC's collateral
8
Ex. 3 - 011
estoppel argument but sustained the demurrers on the ground that they were time-
2 barred. Compl. ,-r 17 DeCrescenzo appealed. Compl. ,-rs 17 and 18.
3
4 On appeal, CSI argued in part that the judgment should be affirmed on the
5 basis of the preclusive effect of the federal_court's order. Ex. E: Respondents'
6 Brief; Ex. F: Respondents' Supplemental Post-Argument. The California Court of
7 Appeal disagreed, concluding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel was not
8 applicable. Compl. ,-r 19; Ex. G: Opinion. CSI petitioned for rehearing,
9 contending in part that the doctrine did apply. Compl. ,-r 22. The opinion was
10 slightly modified, but the petition for rehearing was denied. Compl. ,-r 22; Ex. H;
11 Order Modifying Opinion and Denying Rehearing. CSI then petitioned the
12 California Supreme Court to review the matter, again contending that the doctrine
13 of collateral estoppel applied. Compl. ,-r 23; Ex. I: Petition for Review; Docket:
14 Ex. J. The petition was denied on September 14, 2011. Ex. J; Ex. K. (CSI
15 mistakenly alleges that the petition was denied on May 15, 2013. Compl. ,-r23.)
16 CSI did not petition the United States Supreme Court for n~view. Dockets of
17 United States Supreme Court for Laura DeCrescenzo: Ex. U.
18
19 On October 25,2012, CSI and RTC jointly moved for summary judgment
20 on the basis that DeCrescenzo's claims were barred by the statutes of limitations.
21 Ex. L. The motion was denied. Ex. M.
22
23 On February 8, 2013, DeCrescenzo moved to compel CSI to produce certain

24 documents. Ex. N. CSI opposed the motion, contending that the documents were
25 protected from discovety by California's penitent-clergy privilege and the Free
26 Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution. Ex. 0. The motion was
27 granted on March 6, 2013. Ex. P. CSI petitioned the Court of Appeal for relief.
28 Ex. Q. The petition was summarily denied. Ex. R. CSI's petition to California's
9
Ex. 3 - 012
Case 2: 7-cv-09158-GW-SK Document 13-1 Filed 02/20/18 Page 10 of 29 Page ID #:56
Supreme Court for review was also summarily denied. Ex. S; Ex. T. CSI then
2 petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari and sought a
3 stay of the state court action pending resolution of its petition. Ex. U; Ex. V. The
4 United States Supreme Court denied CSI's application for a stay on June 16, 2013
5 and CSI' s petition for writ of certiorari on October 7, 2013. ~x. V.
6
7 On October 27, 2015, CSI and RTC jointly moved for summary judgment
8 on the ground that every cause of action of DeCrescenzo's second amended
9 complaint was barred by the protections for freedom of religion found in the First
10 Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I of the California
11 Constitution. Compl. ~ 24; Ex. W. The motion was denied. Ex. X. CSI
12 petitioned the Court of Appeal for relief. Ex. Y; Ex. Z. When the petition was
13 summarily denied, CSI petitioned California's Supreme Court for review. Ex.
14 AA; Ex. BB. The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition for
15 review on September 14, 2016. Ex. CC; Ex. DD.
16
17 Now that trial has been scheduled for August 13, 2018, CSI returns to this
18 court to enjoin further proceedings in the state court. Compl. ~s 25 and 26.
19
20 III. MOTION TO DISMISS: LEGAL STANDARD AND
21 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
22
23 Dismissal under F.R.C.P 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint lacks a

24 cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.
25 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hasp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9 1h Cir.2008).
26 When deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court must generally
27 accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
28 664, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). However, "courts are not bound to
10
Ex. 3 - 013
Case 2: 7-cv-09158-GW-SK Document 13-1 Filed 02/20/18 Page 11 of 29 Page 10 #:57
accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Iqbal, 556 U.S.
2 at 678.
3
4 "The court does not usually consider any material beyond the pleadings for
5 a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896
6 F.2d 1542, 1555, n. 19 (9th Cir.l990). But the court can consider material referred
7 to in the complaint and material subject to judicial notice. Lee v. City of Los
8 Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-689 (9th Cir.2001); Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449,
9 454 (9 1h Cir.l994) (overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa
10 Clara, 1119, 1127 (9th Cir.2002). Such material "trumps" any contradictory
11 allegations of the complaint. Thompson v. Illinois Dept. ofProf Reg., 300 F.3d
12 750, 754 (7th Cir.2002); see also In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049,
13 1055 (9'h Cir.2008); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9 1h Cir.
14 2001). A court's consideration of such material does not convert the motion to
15 dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d
16 903, 908 (9'h Cir.2003).
17
18 The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable
19 dispute because it ... can be accurately and readily determined from sources
20 whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned." Fed. R. Evict. 20l(b)(2).
21 Generally, a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record. Lee v. City
22 of Los Angeles, 250 F .3d 668, 689. In addition, judicial notice is appropriate for
23 information obtained from government websites. See Paralyzed Victims ofAm. v.
24 McPherson, No. C 06-4670, 2008 WL 4183981 at *5 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 8, 2008). In
25 a preclusion context, such as the case at bar, the federal court takes judicial notice
26 of court documents such as an opinion by the California Court of Appeal and the
27 briefs filed in that proceeding. Manufactured Home Cmtys. Inc. v. City of San
28 Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1037 (9th Cir.2005); see also Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d
11
Ex. 3 - 014
854, 866 (9th Cir.2002); Chase v. County of San Bernardino, No. EDCV 12-1082,
2 2012 WL 12850677 at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2012); Adams v. Trimble, No. S-11-
3 01360,2012 WL 260160 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2012). In the case at bar, all of
4 the exhibits covered by DeCrescenzo's request for judicial notice are court
5 documents of one type or another. As such, the accuracy of their contents cannot
6 be reasonably questioned. In addition, the materials are "helpful for examining the
7 claims litigated in the state court." Manufactured Home Cmtys. Inc:. 420 F.3d at
8 103 7. Thus, the Court should take judicial notice of these state proceedings.
9 Regardless of whether judicial notice of the documents is taken, due to the specific
10 allegations of the complaint, "there is no factual inquiry that would bar reaching
11 the merits of [DeCrescenzo's] Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
12 Procedure 12(b)(6)." Chase at *3.
13
14 By its complaint, CSI seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. CSI seeks this
15 Court's review of the decision by the California Court of Appeal that this Court's
16 prior order remanding DeCrescenzo's action to the Los Angeles County Superior
17 Court had no preclusive effect on her state claims and to enjoin DeCrescenzo from
18 further prosecuting that action, now set for trial. The requested relief is
19 tantamount to enjoining the state court proceeding. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins.
20 Co., 121 F.3d 1372, 1377 (9th Cir.1997); Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co., 523 F.3d
21 1091, 1098 (9th Cir.2008). Thus, a motion to dismiss is an appropriate procedural
22 method by which a district court can resolve an action such as that brought by CSI.
23 See, e.g., Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Ramsey, No. S-07-0819, 2007 WL
24 2225797 (E.D.Cal.July 31, 2007) at * 1: "Defendants ... move to dismiss plaintiff
25 Connecticut General Life Insurance Company's claim for declaratory and relief.
26 Connecticut General seeks to enjoin the Ramseys from proceeding with a
27 California state court action . . . . For the following reasons, the court
28 DISMISSES Connecticut General's action." (Footnotes omitted.)
12
DISMISS
3 - 015
IV. THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION

2
3 CSI is seeking to enjoin DeCrescenzo from further prosecuting her state
4 court action under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1657. The Act provides that
5 federal courts "may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
6 respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
7 Although, by its terms, the All Writs Act refers only to "writs," it codifies the
8 long-recognized powers of courts of equity to effectuate their decrees by
9 injunction. Burr & Forman v. Blair, 470 F.3d 1019, 1026 (11' 11 Cir.2006). Thus,
10 the court has subject matter jurisdiction under the All Writs Act. California v.
11 Randstron, 284 F.3d 969, 974 (9'h Cir.2002).
12
13 V. THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT
14
15 "The All Writs Act is limited by the Anti-Injunction Act, which prevents a
16 federal court from enjoining the 'proceedings in a State court except as authorized
17 by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
18 effectuate its judgments.' 28 U.S.C. § 2883." Sandpiper Village Condominium
19 Ass 'n., Inc. v. Louisiana-Pac~fic Corp., 428 F .3d 831, 842 (9'h Cir.2005). "The
20 Act, which has existed in some form since 1793 ... is a necessary concomitant of
21 the Framers' decision to authorize, and Congress' decision to implement, a dual
22 system of federal and state courts. It represents Congress' considered judgment as
23 to how to balance the tensions inherent in such a system. Prevention of frequent
24 federal court intervention is important to make the dual system work effectively.
25 By generally barring such intervention, the Act forestalls 'the inevitable friction
26 between the state and federal courts that ensues from the injunction of state
27 judicial proceedings by a federal court.' Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433
28 U.S. 623,630-631,97 S.Ct. 2881,2887,53 L.Ed.2d 1009 (1977) (plurality
13
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TOEx.
DISMISS
3 - 016
opinion). Due in no small part to the fundamental constitutional independence of

2 the States, Congress adopted a general policy under which state proceedings
3 'should normally be allowed to continue unimpaired by intervention of the lower
4 federal courts, with relief from error, if any, through the state appellate courts and
5 ultimately this Court.' Atlantic Coast LineR. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers, 398
6 U.S. 281, 287, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 1743, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970)." Chick Kam Choo v.
7 Exxon Corp., 486, U.S. 140, 146, 108 S.Ct. 1684, 1689, 100 L.Ed.2d 127 (1988).
8
9 Because the Anti-Injunction Act is designed to prevent friction between

10 federal and state courts, federal intervention is barred in all but the narrowest
ll circumstances. See Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Esprit de Corp., 682 F .2d 1267, 12 71 (9 1h
12 Cir.1982); Bennett v. Medtronic, 285 F.3d 801, 805 (9th Cir.2002). Accordingly,
13 the limited three exceptions of the Anti-Injunction Act will not be enlarged by
14 loose statutory construction. Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 287, 90 S.Ct. 1739,
15 1743, 26 L.Ed.2d 234. Rather, any doubts as to the propriety of a federal
16 injunction against state court proceedings must be resolved in favor of permitting
17 the state court to proceed. ld., at 297, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 26 "L.Ed.2d 234. Thus, an
18 injunction will be upheld only on "a strong and unequivocal showing" that such
19 relief is necessary. Bechtel Petroleum, Inc. v. Webster, 796 F.2d 252, 253-54 (9 1h
20 Cir.l986) quoting Judge Wisdom in Southern California Petroleum Corp. v.
21 Harper, 273 F.2d 715,719 (5th Cir.1960). In other words, the Anti-Injunction Act
22 establishes "the general rule that courts in the United States shall not enjoin
23 proceedings in state courts." Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc. v. Victa, 936 F.2d
24 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1991 ). "Unless one of the three statut01y exceptions applies, a
25 federal injunction restraining prosecution of a state court is absolutely prohibited."
26 Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 739-40 (9th Cir.l987). Whether an injunction is
27 absolutely prohibited under the Anti-Injunction Act is a question of law. Negrete,
28 523 F.3d 1091, 1096;_Quackenbush, 121 F.3d at 1377. Furthermore, "the fact that
14
Ex. 3 - 017
an injunction may issue does not mean that it must issue." Chick Kam Choo, 466
2 U.S. 140, 151, 108 S.Ct. 1684, 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 127; see also Quackenbush, 121
3 F.3d at 1377; BlalockEddy-Ranch v. MCJ-TelecomncCtitp:.-;982 F.2d 371,375
4 (9th Cir.l992). In that instance, whether to enjoin a state proceeding is committed
5 to the sound discretion of the district court. Bechtel Petroleum, Inc:.. at 253.
6
7 VI. THE RELITIGATION EXCEPTION TO THE

8 ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT
9
10 A. The Court Is Not Empowered to Enjoin the Ongoing State Action

11 Because of the Preclusive Effect of the California Court of Appeal's Final
12 Decision.
13
14 CSI contends that the third exception to the Anti-Injunctive Act, which
15 permits a federal court to enjoin state proceedings when necessary to protect or
16 effectuate its judgments, applies. Compl. ~ 33. "This third exception to the Anti-
17 Injunction Act is commonly referred as the relitigation exception." Amwest
18 Mortgage Corp. v. Grady, 925 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir.1991); see also v Bayer
19 Corp., 564 U.S. 299,306, 131 S.Ct. 2368,2375, 180 L.Ed2d 341. "It is founded
20 in the well-recognized concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel." Chick
21 Kam Choo, 486 U.S., at 147, 108 S.Ct. 1684. But the relitigation exception
22 permits a federal court to enjoin a state proceeding "only in rare cases." Smith, at
23 302, 131 S.Ct. 2368. "After all, a court does not usually 'get to dictate to other
24 courts the preclusion consequences of its own judgment.' 18 C. Wright, A. Miller,
25 & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4405, p. 82 (2d ed. 2002) ....
26 Deciding whether and how prior litigation has preclusive effect is usually the
27 bailiwick of the second court (here, the one in [California]). So issuing an
28 injunction under the relitigation exception is resorting to heavy artillery. For that
15
DISMISS
3 - 018
reason, every benefit of the doubt goes toward the state court, see Atlantic Coast
2 Line, 398 U.S., at 287, 297, 90 S.Ct. 1739; an injunction can issue only if
3 preclusion is clear beyond peradventure." Smith, 564 U.S., at 307, 131 S.Ct. 2368.
4
5 And, when the state court (here California) has already ruled that the state
6 action is not barred by the res judicata effect of the federal judgment, "the situation
7 is drastically changed." Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 432 F.3d 939, 943 (9 1h
8 Cir.2005, citing Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 524, 106
9 S.Ct. 768, 88 L.Ed.2d 877 ( 1986). The state ruling itself may be binding on the
lO federal court under the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738. That Act
11 provides that state court proceedings 'shall have the same full faith and credit in
12 every court within the United States ... as they have by law and usage in the
13 courts of such State ... from which they are taken.' 28 U.S.C. § 1738." Brother
14 Records, at 943. As the Supreme Court reasoned: "[T]he Anti-Injunction Act and
15 the Full Faith and Credit Act can be construed consistently, simply by limiting the
16 re1itigation exception of the Anti-Injunction Act to those situations in which the
17 state court has not yet ruled on the merits of the res judicata issue. Once the state
18 court has finally rejected a claim of res judicata, then the Full Faith and Credit Act
19 becomes applicable and federal courts must turn to state law to determine the
20 preclusive effect of the state court's decision." Parsons, 474 U.S., at 525, 106
21 S.Ct. 768. Even the state court's mistaken rejection of the claim of res judicata
22 "does not justify the highly intrusive remedy of a federal-court injunction against
23 the enforcement of the state-court judgment." Parsons, at 525, 106 S.Ct. 768.
24
25 The next question, then, is whether in ruling, the state appellate court "has
26 finally rejected [the] claimofresjudicata." Parsons, 474 U.S. 518, 525; see also
27 Brother Records, 432 F.3d 939, 943. If so, the district court is required to follow
28 it and thus dismiss the action. ld. at 944. The issue has arisen when the state trial
16
DISMISS
3 - 019
case 2: 7-cv-09158-GW-SK Document 13-1 Filed 02/20/18 Page 17 of 29 Page ID #:63
court has denied a motion for summary judgment, ruling that the federal action has
2 no preclusive effect. In First Alabama Bank of Montgomery, N.A. v. Parsons
3 Steel, Inc., 825 F.2d 1475 (11th Cir.l987), the Eleventh Circuit held that under the
4 law of Alabama, the issue was whether the ruling became the law of the case. !d.,
5 at 1480. Because Alabama equates finality for purposes of issue preclusion with
6 appealability, and the trial court's ruling denying the motion for summary
7 judgment was not appealable, it did not become the law of the case and, therefore,
8 was not final for purposes of issue preclusion. /d. Accordingly, the district court
9 was empowered to exercise its discretion and determine whether to issue the
10 injunction. See also Ramsden v. AgriBank, 214 F.3d 865, 869 (7th Cir.2000)
1I holding under Wisconsin law, an order denying a motion for summary judgment
12 did not bar the district court from exercising discretion.
13
14 But the issue at bar, as exemplified by this case, is whether the state
15 appellate court's conclusion that the previous federal order does not have
16 preclusive effect sufficiently "final" when the matter is remanded back to the· trial
17 court for further proceedings. This situation has arisen once, coincidentally in the
18 Ninth Circuit. In Brother Records, 432 F.3d 939, Jardine was sued by Brother
19 Records, Inc. (''BRI") in federal court for trademark infringement. Jardine brought
20 an action against BRI in the California Superior Court. BRI brought a motion for
21 summary judgment in federal court, which the district court partially granted, and
22 then demurred in the superior court on the ground that res judicata barred the
23 claims. The superior court sustained the demurrer and Jardine appealed. The
24 California Court of Appeal reversed on the ground that Jardine's claims were not
25 barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel. BRI then moved to enjoin the state
26 court proceeding under the All Writs Act. The United Stated District Court for the
27 Central District of California, the Honorable Harry Hupp, judge presiding, held
28 that it had the power to enjoin the state court action; and exercised its discretion
17
DISMISS
3 - 020
by denying the motion. The Ninth Circuit noted that it did not have to answer to
2 the question of whether the Court of Appeal's res judicata ruling was sufficiently
3 final under California law: "If the Court of Appeal's decision is final and
4 preclusive under state law, then the district court was required to follow it and thus
5 acted properly in denying the injunction. See Parsons, 474 U.S. at 525, 106 S.Ct.
6 768. Even if the decision is not final and preclusive, we conclude that the district
7 court did not abuse its discretion in giving it effect." Brother Records at 944.
8
9 In dicta, the Ninth Circuit indicated that the issue should be resolved under
10 res judicata principles. Brother Records, 432 F.3d 939, 943-944. The Ninth
11 Circuit made no mention of the law of the case doctrine. But "[t]he doctrine is
12 closely related to res judicata, or claim preclusion, which 'ensures the finality of
13 decisions .... 'Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131, 99 S.Ct. 2205, 60 L.Ed.2d 767
14 (1979)." Hernandez v. Gonzalez, 504 F.Supp.2d 825, 836 (C.D.Cal.2007).
15 '" [F]inality is a cornerstone of both the res judicata and the law of the case
16 doctrines." People v. Mitchell, 81 Cal.App.4th 132, 155,96 Cal.Rptr.2d 401,417
17 (2000); see also Union Oil Co. of California v. Reconstruction Oil Co., 58
18 Cal.App.2d 30, 35-36, 135 P.2d 621, 624 (1943): the "law of the case" doctrine
19 dictates that an appellate court's holding on a rule oflaw that is necessary to the
20 appellate court's opinion "is a final determination thereof, and, like the final
21 judgment in any other case, estops the parties thereto from afterwards questioning
22 its correctness." "To promote finality, the 'law of the case' doctrine holds that 'the
23 decision of an appellate court on a legal issue must be followed in all subsequent
24 proceedings in the same case.' United States v. Cote, 51 F.3d 178, 181 (9 111
25 Cir.1995) .... " Hernandez, at 836; see also City of West Hollywood v. Kihagi, 16
26 Cal.App.5th 739, 749, 224 Cal.Rptr.3d 577, 583 (2017): appellate rulings "must
27 be adhered to throughout the case's subsequent progress in the trial court and on
28 subsequent appeal." Therefore, under the law of the case doctrine, the California
18
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMlSS
Ex. 3 - 021
Court of Appeal's holding that DeCrescenzo's state claims are not precluded by
2 this district court's previous ruling dismissing her federal claim is sufficiently final
3 and preclusive to be given full faith and credit, thus prohibiting this court from
4 entertaining whether an injunction should issue. See Parsons, 474 U.S. at 525,
5 106 S.Ct. 768. The same results when applying the doctrine of res judicata as
6 indicated in Brother Records, 432 F.3d·939, 943.
7
8 In Brother Records, 432 F.3d 939, 943, the Ninth Circuit indicated that it "is
9 not entirely clear" under California law whether the Court of Appeal's opinion is
10 sufficiently final and preclusive. ld., at 943. The court noted that some California
11 cases have held that a judgment is final when it terminates the litigation between
12 the parties, while other cases, such as Sandoval v. Super. Ct., 140 Cal.App.3d 932,
13 190 Cal.Rptr. 29 (1983), have followed the Restatement (Second) of Judgments§
14 13 that for issue preclusion purposes, "final judgment" includes any prior
15 adjudication in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be
16 accorded conclusive effect. Under the Restatement (Second) Judgments§ 13, the
17 decision is final for purpose of issue preclusion if (a) the parties were fully heard
18 and (b) the trial court's decision was either subject to appeal or was in fact
19 reviewed on appeal. Sandoval at 936, 190 Cal.Rptr. 29. In the case at bar, the
20 preclusive effect of the district court's order dismissing DeCrescenzo's federal
21 claim and remanding the remaining claims back to the Superior Court was fully
22 litigated. The parties were fully heard and the California Court of Appeal
23 rendered a reasoned opinion. Thus, if California follows Sandoval and the
24 Restatement (Second) Judgments § 13, then the effect is the same as applying the
25 law of the case doctrine, i.e., the court is not empowered to exercise its discretion.
26
27 Since Brother Records was decided, a series of cases indicate that

28 California follows the Sandoval analysis, i.e., the Restatement (Second)
19
DISMISS
3 - 022
Judgments §I 3. In Border Business Park, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 142

2 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1564, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 259, 280 (2006), the California Court of
3 Appeal adopted Sandoval and Restatement (Second) Judgments, § 13: "[F]or
4 purposes of issue preclusion, as opposed to res judicata, "'final judgment"
5 includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to
6 be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect.' (Rest.2d, § 13, italics added;
7 see ... Sandoval ... 140 Cal.App.3d 932,936, 190 Cal.Rptr. 29.)" The court
8 then stated that whether a prior adjudication of an issue was "sufficiently firm" is
9 based on the factors listed in Restatement (Second) Judgments § 13, again citing
10 Sandoval. Border Business Park at 1565, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 259.
I1
12 The California Court of Appeal revisited the issue and applied the
13 Restatement in Schultz v. Fulton Associates, Nos. B197266, B197270, 2007 WL
14 3334334, (Cal. Ct. App. 2"d Dist. Nov. 9, 2007) (unpublished) I In doing so, it
15 stated at *3: "The Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal have followed the view of
16 the Restatement Second of Judgment. ( ... Producers Daily Delivery Co. v. Sentry
17 Ins. Co. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 903, 911 [226 Cal.Rptr. 558, 562]; Border Business
18 Park, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1564 .... " In
19 Producers Dairy Delivery Co., the California Supreme Court stated at p. 911, 226
20 Cal.Rptr. at 562: "[W]e agree with the analysis set forth in Sandoval . .. (relying
21 on Rest.2d Judgment,§ 13.)" And in South Sutter, LLC v. LJ Sutter Partners, L.P.,
22 193 Cal.App.4th 634, 663, 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 301,324 (2011), the Court of Appeal
23
24
1. "Unpublished opinions from the California courts do not have formal
25 precedential effect and are not binding on this Court. See Morris v. Parke, Davis
26 & Co., 667 F.Supp. 1332, 1347, fn. 12 (C.D. Cal. 1987)." Baltazar v. Yates, No.
EDCV 04-00274,2010 WL 2195979 at fn. 8 (C.D.Cal. April28, 2010). While
27 California Rule of Court 8.115 provides that an unpublished case may not be cited
28 except in certain circumstances not applicable here, the rule is not binding on this
federal court. !d.
20
DISMISS
3 - 023
cited Border Business Park on this point as precedent. This Com1 did likewise in
2 Blatty v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc., No. CV 10-06611, 2011 WL
3 13217379 at *7 (C.D.Cal. April21, 2011). Accordingly, it is now settled that
4 California follows§ 13 of the Restatement Second of Judgments. As explained
5 above, under that analysis, the California Court of Appeal's decision that this
6 Court's order dismissing DeCrescenzo's federal cause of action and remanding the
7 state claims back to the Los Angeles County Superior Court did not have any
8 preclusive effect is deemed to be final because the parties had the opportunity to
9 be heard and the appellate court supported its decision with a reasoned opinion.
10 These factors are undisputable. Thus, the Court of Appeal's opinion should be
11 deemed final. Consequently, this Court is not empowered to enjoin the ongoing
12 state court proceeding.
13
14 B. If the Court is Empowered To Enjoin the Pending State Court Action, It
15 Nevertheless Should Refrain From Doing So and Grant the Motion to Dismiss.
16
17 As mentioned above, "the fact that an injunction may issue under the Anti-
18 Injunction Act does not mean that it must issue." Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at
19 151, 108 S.Ct. 1684; see also Quakenbush, 121 F.3d at 1377; Blalock, 982 F.2d at
20 375; Merle, 936 F.2d at 486. Stated differently, "it is within this Court's
21 discretion to refrain from issuing the requested injunction." Kag West, LLC v.
22 Malone, No. 15-cv-03827, 2016 WL 3951651 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 20 16) at *2. As
23 discussed below, the Court should refrain from issuing an injunction based on
24 concerns of comity and federalism, strengthened by CSI's seven-year delay, CSI's
25 failure to seek review by the United States Supreme Court, and the conclusion that
26 the California Court of Appeal got it right.
27 Ill
28 Ill
21
DISMISS
3 - 024
In Sandpiper, 428 F.3d 831, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court's
2 order enjoining the defendant's further prosecution of a state court action. Owners
3 of structures on which Inner-Seal Siding had been installed brought a class action
4 against the manufacturer, Louisiana-Pacific Corporation ("L-P"), in the District
5 Court for the District of Oregon. The suit settled and the district court approved
6 and adopted the settlement agreement and entered an order and final judgment.
7 Lester, a Minnesota corporation, purchased Inner-Seal Siding which it
8 incorporated into buildings that it constructed and sold to its customers. As a
9 distributor, Lester was not a class member and was not a party to the settlement
10 agreement. However, class member claims against Lester were released by the
1J settlement. Lester sued L-P in Minnesota state court. L-P's motion for summary
12 judgment was denied on the basis that the res judicata effect of the settlement
13 agreement and federal court order barred Lester's suit, the matter was tried and a
14 jury rendered a verdict in Lester's favor. L-P then immediately filed a motion in
15 the Oregon federal district court to enjoin the state court from entering judgment.
16 The federal court issued the injunction. Lester appealed. The Ninth Circuit
17 reversed for two reasons. First, Lester was not collaterally estopped from
18 prosecuting L-P because "Lester was not named as a party to the class action and
19 was not a member of the nationwide class." !d. at 848. Second, "[t]he district
20 court's invocation of the relitigation exception was improper for the additional
21 reason that any potential for relitigation of covered claims was addressed [in the
22 Minnesota state court action]. ... The proper recourse for L-P was to appeal
23 through the state court system and, if necessary, to petition the Unites States
24 Supreme Court for review. See Parsons ... 474 U.S. 518,525-26, 106 S.Ct. 768.
25 .. ; Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 296, 90 S.Ct. 1739.... '[L]ower courts
26 possess no power whatsoever to sit in direct review of state court decisions.'
27 Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 296, 90 S.Ct. 1739. Indeed, 'the highly intrusive
28 Ill
22
Ex. 3 - 025
remedy of a federal-court injunction against the enforcement of [a] state court

2 judgment' is not justified even where a state court mistakenly rejects the res
3 judicata effect of a prior federal judgment. Parsons, 474 U.S. at 525, 106 S.Ct.
4 768 ...." !d. at 850.
5
6 In his concurring opinion, Judge Silverman agreed that the district court had
7 abused its discretion because the interests of comity outweighed potential
8 relitigation: "When Lester sued L-P in Minnesota state court, L-P immediately
9 could have moved for an injunction in the district court. Instead, it asserted res
10 judicata in the state court. ... em Then things went sour for L-P. The jury
11 awarded $13.2 million .... L-P [then] ran to district court and sought to enjoin the
12 state court proceeding. At that point, however, it was too late. In my view, once
13 L-P raised its res judicata defense in state court and that court ruled on it, the
14 interests of comity outweighed the district court's perceived need to prevent
15 possible relitigation of its judgment." Sandpiper at 853-54. Judge Silverman
16 continued: "Ramsden v. AgriBank, 214 F.3d 865 (7 1" Cir.2000), dealt with a
17 similar issue: the propriety of enjoining state court proceedings where the state
18 court mles that a prior federal judgment does not bar the claim at issue, but state
19 law would not give preclusive effect to that ruling .... Agribank ... obtained an
20 injunction that barred the state court from further considering any issues between
21 the parties .... [~] The Seventh Circuit vacated the injunction .... [I]n light of
22 the comity concerns in Parsons, the Seventh Circuit held that:
23
24 'Once a state court considers a res judicata defense and rules that
25 a prior federal judgment does not actually bar a claim, the affront of
26 federal court intervention stripping the state court of power to continue
27 is greatly magnified. After such a ruling, the interests in preventing
28 possible relitigation are therefore generally outweighed by the
23
DISMISS
3 - 026
heightened comity concerns except in the most extraordinary

2 circumstances.' !d. at 870-871" Sandpiper at 854-55.
3
4 Two months later, the Ninth Circuit decided Brother Records, 432 F.3d 939.
5 As discussed above, in that case, the California Court of Appeal - rather than the
6 trial court- held that the federal court's order did not have preclusive effect and
7 remanded the matter back to the trial court for further proceedings. The defendant
8 then filed suit in federal court and moved for an injunction. The district court
9 denied the motion. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed:
10
11 "Even if the decision [of the California Court of Appeal] is not final and
12 preclusive, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
13 discretion in giving it effect. Absent a preclusive final judgment, the
14 district court could still determine 'the propriety of a federal-court
15 injunction under the general principles of equity, comity, and federalism
16 .... ' Parsons, 474 U.S. at 526, 106 S.Ct. 768. The Court of Appeal's
17 decision on res judicata was sufficiently definitive that all three of these
18 principles are satisfied by according great weight to that state court's
19 ruling .... We agree with the Seventh Circuit's observation that once
20 the state court has considered and decided the state court issue, 'the
21 affront of federal court intervention stripping the state court of power to
22 continue is greatly magnified.' Ramsden v. AgriBank, FCB, 214 F.3d
23 865, 870 (7 111 Cir.2000). By adhering to the state court's decision, the
24 district court furthered the purpose of Parsons and the Anti-Injunction
25 Act., which is to 'prevent friction between federal and state courts by
26 barring federal intervention in all but the narrowest of circumstances.'
27 Sandpiper ... 428 F.3d [at] 842 .... " Brother Records, 432 F.3d at 944.
28 ///
24
DISMISS
3 - 027
The affront of federal court intervention stripping the state court of power in
2 the case at bar is similarly magnified. Not only did the trial court find CSI's res
3 judicata defense to be inapplicable, so did the Court of Appeal in a reasoned
4 opinion. CSI then sought a rehearing by the Court of Appeal on that basis and
5 when that was denied filed a petition for review with the California Supreme
6 Court that was also denied. It then ignored the holding in Sandpiper that its
7 remedy was to petition the United States Supreme Court for review because the
8 district court's discretion is necessarily restricted to "prevent the relitigation
9 exception from simply being turned into a vehicle for seeking appellate review of
10 a state court decision in federal court." Ramsden, 214 F.3d 865, 872.
ll
12 Similarly, in Merle, 936 F.2d 466, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
13 court's dismissal of appellant's suit to enjoin the respondent's state court
14 proceeding. The court held: "In considering whether to exercise their power to
15 enjoin state court proceedings under the relitigation exception of the Anti-
16 Injunctive Act, district courts must be guided by 'general principles of equity,
17 comity, and federalism.' Parsons ... 474 U.S. 518, 526, 106 S.Ct. 768, 773, 88
18 L.Ed.2d 8 77. . . . In applying these principles, the district court acted entirely
19 within its discretion when it determined that because nothing prevented Merle
20 Norman from raising its defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel in the
21 California courts, it would not issue an injunction." Merle, at 468; see also Kag
22 West, LLC, 2016 WL 3951651 denying motion to enjoin; Connecticut General
23 L(fe Ins. Co., 2007 WL 2225797 granting motion to dismiss.
24
25 Equity principles also weigh in favor of dismissing the action. Thus, delay
26 in seeking the injunction can be a ground for a district court refraining from
27 enjoining a state court action. In Bailey v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 414 F.3d
28 1187 ( 101h Cir.2005), the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of
25
DISMISS
3 - 028
defendants' request to enjoin a state court action based on delay: "[T]he district
2 court acted out of respect for the work already performed by the state court. ... [~]
3 Defendants occupied a significant amount of the state court's time in litigation

4 before seeking relief from the federal system. Defendants continued litigating in
5 the state court for more than a year before returning to the federal system to
6 request an injunction. This amount of time is not insignificant. See Ramsden, 214
7 F.3d at 868 ('Because the relitigation exception bears on the delicate relationship
8 between state and federal courts, strict timing requirements cabin its
9 invocation.')." Bailey at 1190-1191. Similarly in the case at bar, if CSI wanted to
10 seek an injunction, it should have returned to this Court much earlier than it did.
11
12 CSI litigated the action in the state trial and appellate courts for eight years.
13 CSI raised its preclusion defense in the state court and lost there. After the Court
14 of Appeal held the defense was unavailing, CSI petitioned for rehearing and when
15 the petition was denied, it petitioned the California Supreme Court for review.
16 When its petition for review was denied in 2011, CSI was required to seek review
17 by the Supreme Court of the United States. See CFE Group, LLC v. Firstmerit
18 Bank, N.A., 809 F.3d 346,352-53 (7 1h Cir.2015) citing Ramsden, 214 F.3d at 872
19 quoting Parsons, 474 U.S. at 525, 106 S.Ct. 768: "Challenges to the correctness of
20 a state court's determination as to the conclusive effect of a federal judgment must
21 be pursued by way of appeal through the state-court system and certiorari from
22 this Court." CSI's delay dwarfs that of the defendants in Bailey, 414 F.3d I 187.
23
24 Even the state court's mistaken rejection of the claim of res judicata
25 "does not justify the highly intrusive remedy of a federal-court injunction against
26 the enforcement of the state-court judgment." Parsons, at 525, 106 S.Ct. 768.
27 Nevertheless, the California courts did not err in their determination that the
28 doctrine of res judicata does not bar DeCrescenzo's state court claims. In its
26
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TOEx. 3 - 029
DISMISS
appellate briefs, CSI relied on and cited cases for the proposition that federal law
2 determines the preclusive effect of a prior federal court judgment and that a
3 dismissal based on the statute of limitations is a judgment on the merits. (See Ex.
4 E; Ex. F and Ex. 1.) But CSI ignored two applicable exceptions: "A dismissal on
5 statute of limitations grounds generally does not bar a subsequent action in a
6 different forum when the limitations period in the second forum is longer than the
7 first, and has not yet expired .... [~] Additionally, ... res judicata should not
8 apply to a previous dismissal that was based on the statute of limitations if the
9 effect of the bar would be unfair.... " Zhang v. Dept. of Labor & Immigration,
10 331 F.3d 1117, 1118-19 (9' 11 Cir.2003). The California Court of Appeal impliedly
11 found either or both of these exceptions apply because it limited the federal court's
12 ruling to the federal claim and held that the state claims were not barred by the
13 applicable California statutes of limitations if DeCrescenzo proved the facts she
14 alleged in her second amended complaint.
15
16 For the reasons discussed, the Court should refrain from enjoining
I7 DeCrescenzo's state court action.
18
19 VII. LEAVE TO AMEND SHOULD NOT GRANTED
20
21 "A district court may deny leave to amend when amendment would be
22 futile." Hartmann v. Cal. Dep 't ofCorr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1129-30 (9' 11
23 Cir.2013). Leave to amend need not be given when "the pleading could not
24 possibly be cured by the allegations of other facts." Cook, Perkiss and Lie he, Inc.
25 v. Northern California Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9'" Cir.l990.)
26 Ill
27 Ill
28 Ill
27
Ex. 3 - 030
That is the case at bar. Thus, leave to amend should not be given. The motion
2 should be granted and the matter dismissed.
3
4 Dated: February 20, 2018 sl John P. Blumberg
5 JOHN P. BLUMBERG
6
7 s/ Ave Buchwald
8 AVE BUCHWALD
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
28
DISMISS
3 - 031
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2
3 I 2 the undersigned declare that I am over the age of 18 and am not a [arty to
this action. I am in the City of Long Beach, Californta; my business address is
4 Blumbe~g Law Corporation at 444 West Ocean Boulevard, Suite 1500, Long
Beach, California 90802.
5
6 On the date below, I served a copy of the foregoing document entitled:

7 DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A
8 CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTI~D [FRCP 12(b)(6)]
9 on the interested parties in said case as follows:
10 Served Electronically
Via the Court's CM/ECF System
11
12 Counsel for the Plaintiff :
13
Eric M. Lieberman, Esq.
14 Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman, LLP
61 Broadway!. ~uite 1800
15 New York, Nr 10006
Telephone: (212) 254-1111
16 Facsimile: (212) 674-4614
I7 Email: elieberman@rbskl.com
18 Bet1 H. Dexler, Esq.
Kendall Brill & Kelly, LLP
20 Telephone: (31 0) 556-2700
Facsimile: (31 0) 556-2705
21
Email: bdeixler@kbkfirm.com
22
23 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of
America that the foregoing is true and correct. I declare that I am employed in the
24 office of a member of the Bar of this Court, at whose direction the service was
made. This declaration is executed in Pasadena, California on February 20, 2018.
25
Kelly Lasorsa Is/ Kellv Lasorsa
26
(Type or Print Name) (Signature of Declarant)
27
28
29
DISMISS
3 - 032
Case 2:17-cv-09158-GW-SK Document 38 Filed 05/14/18 Page 1 of 13 Page ID #:2556
Name Eric M. Lieberman (PHV)~ Bert H. Deixler (SBN 70614)

Address I 0 I 00 Santa Monica Blvd. Suite 1725
City, State. Zip Los Angeles, CA 90067
Phone 310.556.2700
Fax 310.556.2705
E-Mail bdeixlerrii)kbkfirm.com
D FPD D Appointed D CJA D Pro Per IJCRetained
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CASE NUMBER:
Church of Scientology International
Case No. 2:17-cv-09158-GW-SK
PLAINTIFF(S),
v.
Laura Ann DeCrescenzo, aka Laura A. Dieckman
NOTICE OF APPEAL
DEFENDANT(S).
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that _ _ ____:::C::..:..h:..:::u;:.:rc::..:..:hc...::o::..:..f..:::S~cl:..::.e.:..:.nt:::.:::o~lo::.z::gl.Ly....:.l!.!:nt~e!.!.rn:..:::a.:..:.tio~n'-!::a:;:...l____ hereby appeals to

Name ofAppellant
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from:
Criminal Matter Civil Matter
0 Conviction only [F.R.Cr.P. 32U)(l)(A)] ~ Order (specify):

0 Conviction and Sentence
0 Sentence Only (18 U.S.C. 3742) Dkt No. 35 (05/03/20 18)
0 Pursuant to F.R.Cr.P. 32(j)(2) ~Judgment (specify):
0 Interlocutory Appeals
0 Sentence imposed: Dkt No. 37 (05/09/20 18)
0 Other (specify):
D Bail status:
Imposed or Filed o n - - - - - - - - - · Entered on the docket in this action on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
A copy of said judgment or order is attached hereto.
May 14,2018 s/ Bert H. Deixler

Date Signature
0 Appellant/ProSe IKI Counsel for Appellant 0 Deputy Clerk
Note: The Notice of Appeal shall contain the names of all parties to the judgment or order and the names and addresses of the
attorneys for each paftY. Also, if not electronically filed in a criminal case, the Clerk shall be furnished a sufficient number
of copies of the Notice of Appeal to permit prompt compliance with the service requirements ofFRAP 3(d).
A-2 (01/07) NOTICE OF APPEAL

Ex. 4 - 01
1 PROOF OF SERVICE BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY
2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA
3 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
4 I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California.
5 I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is
444 West Ocean Blvd., Suite 1500, Long Beach, California 90802.
6
On May 25, 2018, I served the foregoing document described as:
7
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES AND
8 DECLARATION OF JOHN P. BLUMBERG IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
9
on interested parties in this action by placing a true copy thereof in sealed envelopes
10 addressed as follows:
11
Bert H. Deixler, Esq. Defendant Church of Scientology
12 Kendall Brill & Kelly, LLP International
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 1725
13 Los Angeles, CA 90067 (310) 556-2700
(310) 556-2705 fax
14 Robert Mangels, Esq. Defendant Religious Technology Center
Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Mitchell
15 1900 Avenue of the Stars, 7th Floor (310) 203-8080
Los Angeles, CA 90067-4308 (310) 203-0567 fax
16
17 BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY:
18 I enclosed the document in envelopes provided by an overnight delivery carrier
and addressed to the persons at the addresses above. I placed the envelopes for collection
19 and overnight delivery at a regularly utilized drop box of the overnight delivery carrier.
20 Executed on May 25, 2018, at Long Beach, California.
21 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that the
foregoing is true and correct.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
24

DeCrescenzo v. Scientology: Opposition To Motion For Stay

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DeCrescenzo v. Scientology: Opposition To Motion For Stay

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1 John P. Blumberg - State Bar No.

5 F. To exclude testimony of plaintiff's expert Stephen Kent.

Orders of the Court

Granted/Noted Cases List

Search for: · DeCrescenzo laura search iI

i) Docket for 12A1247

~ Docket for 12-1495

---Date--- -------Proceedings and Orders---------------------

--Name--------------------- -------Address------------------ --Phone---

Slndee M. Smolowitz Blumberg Law Corp.

Robert E. Mangels 1900 Avenue of the Stars, 7th Floor

httn~·/Auwu.1 Cl •nrornot'nl u-t nr\\,/eatarl"h !2c:nv?filonoma:lrln,..Lrotfiloc:/1 ?g1 ?.d7 htrn

---Date--- -------Proceedings and Orders---------------------

--Name--------------------- -------Address------------------ --Phone---

John W. Whitehead The Rutherford Institute (434) 978-3888

httnc·/1\atunal c:••nrotnAI"'f'\llrt nn\llco'!:arl"'h '!:ac:nv?filon2rno=lrln,-.t,.otfiloc:/1?_1 A OJ; htrn

---Date--- -------Proceedings and Orders---------------------

--Name--------------------- -------Address------------------ --Phone---

Sindee M. Smolowitz Blumberg Law Corp.

Robert E. Mangels 1900 Avenue of the Stars, 7th Floor

9 KENDALL BRILL & KELLY LLP

16 Attorneys for Defendants

17 SlJPl~RIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

3 in this matter have been vacated since October 23, 2015;

11 bifurcated trial) would be assigned to a "long cause" judge of this Court;

12 4) The parties wish to efficiently prepare for the trial;

16 actually commences, but rather:

JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER & MITCHELL LLP

BLUMBERG LAW CORPORATION

Attorneys for Plaintiff Laura Ann DeCrescenzo

7 and trial will not be held in this judicial department;

14 commence as appropriate after assignment to a long-cause judge; and

24 IT IS SO ORDERED. ;aM -FiJI<_. 9- ;);).-I/ a.---"f- Y; .:!£) ,4-n-''/

1 John P. Blumberg- State Bar No. 70200

To plaintiff CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL and to its

17 This motion is made following the conference of counsel pursuant to Local

20 Dated: February 20, 2018 s/ John P. Blumberg

6 Attorney for Defendant

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

5 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ..................... 7

3 United States Supreme Court Cases

Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854 (9 1h Cir.2002) ............................. 11

17 Other Circuit Cases

3 Adams v. Trimble No. S-11-01360, 2012 WL 260160

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

5 Defendant Laura DeCrescenzo ("DeCrescenzo") filed an action in state

23 On April2, 2009, DeCrescenzo filed an action in the Los Angeles County

23 On February 8, 2013, DeCrescenzo moved to compel CSI to produce certain

23 Dismissal under F.R.C.P 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint lacks a

IV. THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION

opinion). Due in no small part to the fundamental constitutional independence of

9 Because the Anti-Injunction Act is designed to prevent friction between

7 VI. THE RELITIGATION EXCEPTION TO THE

10 A. The Court Is Not Empowered to Enjoin the Ongoing State Action

27 Since Brother Records was decided, a series of cases indicate that

Judgments §I 3. In Border Business Park, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 142

remedy of a federal-court injunction against the enforcement of [a] state court

heightened comity concerns except in the most extraordinary

3 Defendants occupied a significant amount of the state court's time in litigation

6 On the date below, I served a copy of the foregoing document entitled:

Name Eric M. Lieberman (PHV)~ Bert H. Deixler (SBN 70614)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that _ _ ____:::C::..:..h:..:::u;:.:rc::..:..:hc...::o::..:..f..:::S~cl:..::.e.:..:.nt:::.:::o~lo::.z::gl.Ly....:.l!.!:nt~e!.!.rn:..:::a.:..:.tio~n'-!::a:;:...l____ hereby appeals to

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that _ _ :::C::..:..h:..:::u;:.:rc::..:..:hc...::o::..:..f..:::S~cl:..::.e.:..:.nt:::.:::o~lo::.z::gl.Ly....:.l!.!:nt~e!.!.rn:..:::a.:..:.tio~n'-!::a:;:...l hereby appeals to