Ekavi Athanassopoulou

Greece-Israel. The evolution of the Bilateral

Relationship and Future Challenges

In international relations like in human affairs very

few developments happen overnight.
They are rather the outcome of processes
that some times take a long time to evolve.
Certainly the bilateral relationship between
Greece and Israel is a good example of this.
Indeed, the current flurry of diplomatic activity
is yet another stage in the rapprochement between the
two states that has been gradually taking place during
the last 20 years when Athens decided to move closer
to Israel.

Hence, the purpose of this presentation is to examine

the evolution of the bilateral relationship over the
least two decades but first let’s go a little further back

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to the period following the establishment of the state
of Israel.

Bilateral Relations Between 1949-the mid 1990s

Greece, like Turkey, recognized the state of Israel in

the late 1949 but its own recognition was only de
facto. So, diplomatic representation between the two
states stayed at the level of chargé d’ affaires and not
of an ambassador.

Bilateral relations during the Cold war period (unlike

Turkish-Israeli relations) remained underdeveloped
and cold. However, and contrary to general belief
Athens was not hostile towards Israel.

4 main reasons accounted for Greece’s detached

policy towards Israel.

1. Greek governments feared repercussions for the

Greek minorities in the Arab countries.

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2. Athens wished to enlist Arab support over the
Cyprus issue.

3. After the early 1970s there was hope that good

relations with the Arab countries would amount to
economic benefits for Greece. In this regard Greece
was thinking alike many other European countries.

4. As from the 1980s PASOK the Greek ruling party

at the time, had an important anti-American, pro-
Palestinian (and pro-Third-World in general)
constituency to pander to.

Andreas Papandreou, the charismatic Greek Prime

Minister, adopted a strong pro-PLO stand and used
(for domestic consumption), harsh rhetoric against
Israel.

(All was not just rhetoric; in his private conversations

Papandreou called Israel the illegal child of American
imperialism, according to members of his milieu).

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Nonetheless, as in so many aspects of Papandreou’s
foreign policy domestic rhetoric and/or private
feelings did not translate into real policy. So, after the
first year and a half in power Papandreou realized
that it was in Greece’s interest not to alienate the
American- Jewish lobby and to work with the
Economic Community (EC), (Greece became a
member in 1981), which urged the Greek government
to normalize relations with Israel.

Thereafter he showed interest in improving bilateral

relations, though these efforts were kept at low key.
This policy climaxed in early 1988 with the decision of
the Greek government to upgrade diplomatic
relations with the state of Israel.

The reasons for this shift can essentially be explained

by Greece’s obligations stemming from its
membership of EC. (There was also Greek interest in
a joint with the EC initiative at finding a solution to
the Middle East conflict).

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However, the recognition finally took place only in
1990 under the newly elected conservative
government of New Democracy (and it was then that
representation was upgraded to ambassadorial level)
Greece was the last European Community member
state to offer de jure recognition to the state of Israel.

Thereafter Greece seemed to be ready to go further in

its relations with Israel. The reasons behind this
change of policy were:

1. The beginning of the peace process between Israel

and the Arabs which legitimized the state of Israel in
the region made it easier for the Greek government to
fend off domestic and Arab negative reactions.

2. The belief in the early 1990s, among Foreign

Ministry circles in Athens and Nicosia, that it was
time to seek out the support of the American-Jewish
lobby over the 30-year-old Cyprus problem.
Apparently this was a key motivating factor.

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The most significant step in this new direction was
taken in 1994 by the PASOK government of Andreas
Papandreou, which signed a military accord, with
Yitzhak Rabin's government similar to the one that
Israel signed with Turkey two years later in 1996.

The Israeli-Greek agreement called for joint air

manoeuvres as well as joint naval exercises, rescue
operations and defence procurement co-operation.

However this agreement did not materialize at the

time due to pressures on Papandreou by President
Assad of Syria and negative reaction within the
PASOK party members.

So, it is accurate to say that the peace process had a

positive influence on the bilateral relationship but it
did not bring about a significant change in Greece’s
policy towards Israel. However, another regional
strategic development did. That was the strategic
relationship between Turkey and Israel which caused
serious concern among Greek ruling circles.

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Greece’s negative reaction to the Turkey-Israel
strategic relationship

When early in 1996 news of strategic co-operation

between Turkey and Israel saw the light of publicity
Athens reacted very strongly. The Greek government
feared that a strategic relationship between Israel and
Turkey - Greece's perennial adversary - might
eventually upset the balance of power in the region
and consequently have negative implications for
Greece's security.

To Greek political and military circles the Turkish-

Israeli partnership was empowering Turkey and
strengthened its regional military presence. In their
strategic calculus, if Turkey felt more secure along its
eastern border (due to its strategic co-operation with
Israel), it might resort to aggressive tactics against
Greece to further its demands in the Aegean.

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The Greek government felt uneasy also for another
reason. Turkey's military purchases from Israel
introduced an element of unpredictability to the
military balance between the two countries, which the
United States (Greece's and Turkey's major arms
supplier) traditionally maintained in the Aegean.

On top of all that Ankara's relationship with Israel

raised reasonable fears in Athens that it would boost
Turkey’s regional strategic importance for the US
and that would result in the American-Jewish lobby's
support in Washington for Turkey, on issues that
affected Greece's interests.

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Israel’s reaction to Greece’s reaction

Greece's (and Cyprus's) negative reaction, blown out

of proportion by the press, took the Israeli Ministry
of Foreign Affairs by surprise. When Israeli officials
had been considering relations with Turkey they did
not factor in the reaction of Turkey's adversaries in
the Eastern Mediterranean.

Once their strong reaction registered with the

ministry its officials dismissed Greece's objections to
the Israeli-Turkish co-operation as unreasonable,
arguing that the partnership had no aggressive intent
and Israel clearly had no interest in facilitating
Turkey’s policies towards Greece (or Cyprus).

Nonetheless, most Foreign Ministry officials agreed

that it was in the interest of Israel not to embitter
Greece (and Cyprus), on the basis of the following:

1. Alienating Greece (and Cyrpus) would be against

the fundamental line of Israeli foreign policy,

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 which advocated good relations with every
country.
2. Greece was a member of the European Union
(EU), with which Jerusalem was interested in
advancing relations. Furthermore EU financial
assistance was considered essential for the
consolidation of peace in the region.
3. Greece (like Cyprus), constituted an important
air-route to Europe.

In short it was concluded that Turkey was an

important player in the Middle East from the
perspective of Israel’s regional interests, but Greece
was a player in the Eastern Mediterranean, which
should not be ignored, and also a link for Israel to
Europe. Therefore, it was thought important that
relations with Athens did not turn sour.

The stronger advocates of the need for Israel not to

place all its eggs in the Turkish basket maintained
that it was too early to assume that Turkey would be,

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also in the long run, more important to Israel than
Greece.

They argued that: Turkey faced risks of domestic

instability; the potential for future growth of the
influence of political Islam in Turkey (something that
might make Ankara reverse its course of relations
with Israel) should not be underestimated; in case of
a reversal of bilateral relations Israel might find its
military know-how transferred to an enemy country
by Turkey; it was far from clear that Turkey’s future
economic performance would allow it to carry on
with its weapons modernization programme (and
therefore with major purchaces of Israeli military
technology);

In brief by the very late 1990s Israeli foreign policy

making bodies appeared to have reached a solid
consensus. There was a general agreement that the
relationship with Turkey was of strategic importance

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to Israel (within the Middle Eastern context) and
therefore, Turkey weighed more than Greece on
Jerusalem’s scales. Nonetheless, there was also
unanimity that the broader regional picture should be
taken into consideration, so Israel should make an
effort to cultivate relations with Greece (and Cyprus).

Hence, Jerusalem wished to promote co-operation

with Greece in all fields but was not really after a
strategic partnership with Greece (perhaps because it
knew that Greece would not be receptive). Its
promotion of bilateral relations effort in Athens
focused on trade and economic co-operation,
particularly with Greek defence industries in the
hope of some lucrative business deals. At the same
time Jerusalem was careful not to displease Turkey,

The Greek responce to the diplomatic openings of

Israel.

The Greek government for most of the time between

1997-1999 did not have a comprehensive policy

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or an action strategy regarding Greece’s relations
with Israel. In essence Athens appeared more
interested to dwell on the relative power advantage
that Ankara seemed to have gained rather than to
think of possible ways to minimise it. Therefore its
responses to Jerusalem’s openings were reflexive and
unfocused and initiatives that were floating in the air
were not seen through.

The lack of a clear-cut policy was partly due to

inertia, a perennial problem within the Greek
bureaucracy and partly to the opposition of a number
of PASOK parliamentarians and cabinet members to
ties with Israel, for the sake of solidarity with the
Palestinians and the Arabs in general. This position
was reinforced by a general perception in governing
circles that Greece had nothing to gain by promoting
ties with Israel since Jerusalem saw its relations with
Turkey as a zero-sum game.

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Against this background in Athens and Jerusalem it
was not surprising that it took some time before
Greek-Israeli relations made true progress.

The arguments in favour of promoting Greece’s

relations with Israel.

However, gradually the argument that Greece could

prevent Turkey-Israel relations to grow deeper
by seeking closer relations with Israel
found supporters within government circles
and among senior Foreign Ministry Officials
also because it resonated with
the broader foreign policy goals of the Simitis
governement. These in brief were:
1. A more rational and pragmatic foreign policy.
2. Greece’s full alignment with its EU partners also in
foreign policy matters, as part of the determined
effort to fully integrate the country with the EU.

Against that background the idea that Greece should

promote relations with Israel started growing among

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Foreign Ministry circles. The various arguments put
forward in favour of promoting ties with Israel could
be summarized as follows: Greece could gain:

1. By counterbalancing the special relationship

between Israel and Turkey.
2. By off-setting some of the Turkish influence on the
American-Jewish lobby in Washington in relation to
the Cyprus issue and Greece's problems with Turkey.
3. By receiving from Israel advanced military
technology and expertise.

In the very late 1990s the view that moving closer to

Israel could be beneficial to Greek national interests
matured and seemed to prevail at a decision-making
level both in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Ministry of Defence, spurring foreign policy
makers to formulate an active policy towards Israel.

The new approach towards Israel was largely

facilitated by the election in 1999 of Ehud Barak

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as the new Israeli Prime Minister and the general
belief that he was ready to take bold steps in the
direction of peace.

In anticipation of a new regional reality conducive to

co-operation, the Greek government began
entertaining the thought that it could become a bridge
between Israel and the European Union through its
participation in regional development projects.
Athens also wished to ensure that it would not
be left out of any security deliberations for the
regions in order to make sure that a regional security
regime would also address the need for a solution on
Cyprus.

So, in Oct 1999, during the visit to Israel of the Greek

Minister of Defence Akis Tsohadzopoulos the two
countries resurrected their 1994 security agreement
after seven years of uncertain relations.

Still for a while the reflexes of the Greek government

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towards Israel remained ambivalent. Before long,
however, it emerged that the Greek governemnt
was not opportunistic but serious in turning its
interest in upgrading relations with Jerusalem
into a policy goal.

By the end of the decade, unlike in the mid-1990s,

Athens was prepared to risk upsetting the Arabs.
Gradually it appeared less inclined to pay heed to
Arab sensitivities, or to domestic anti-Israel/pro-
Palestinian pressures.

In spring 2000 the President of Greece,

Kostantinos Stefanopoulos, paid an official visit to
Israel (the first ever by a Greek head of state).
Stefanopoulos’ visit was very important in the context
of Greece-Israel relations. It was the culmination of
the dynamic process that had been taking place
within the Greek government and manifested that it
had reached a turning point in its policy towards
Israel; something that Jerusalem noticed with
satisfaction.

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Clearly the PASOK government at the end of the
1990s had come to the firm conclusion that good
relations with Israel served important Greek national
interests. In the words of a 2000 Gr For Min
memorandum “Israel and its security play a central
role in shaping the US policy in the Eastern
Mediterranean and consequently regarding Cyprus
and Greek-Turkish relations. Any solutions
whatsoever to the problems in the region will by
necessity take this factor seriously into consideration.
[Therefore] improvement to our relations with Israel
[…] are required”.

However, the above did not mean that the goal of

promoting a closer relationship with Israel was about
to dominate Athens’s relations with the Middle East.
The Greek government wished to maintain Greece's
traditional ties with the Arabs - the Foreign Ministry
memorandum also talked about the need to reactivate
ties with the Arab world - and not to close open doors
in the region, in the pursuit of ties with Jerusalem.

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(As indeed similarly Israel was not willing to
compromise aspects of its relationship with Turkey
for the sake of relations with Greece).

Many reasons accounted for that:

1. The Greeks still needed Arab support regarding
Cyprus.
2. Old (pro-Arab) forces continued to be at work
inside the Greek government in parallel with the new
forces (in favour of relations with Israel)
3. There was a strong pro-Palestinian bias among the
Greek public (even Foreign Ministry officials who
supported the idea of moving closer to Israel had pro-
Palestinian reflexes).

So, essentially Athens hoped that it would be possible

to move closer to Israel without causing serious
damage to its traditional links with the Arabs.
To this end it expected to somewhat dilute the
negative impressions created among the Arabs by
using the argument of conformity with the EU policy
towards Israel.

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The approach described above was also taken by the
Kostas Karamanlis government that came to power
in 2004.

Some reflections

To start with the most striking thing about the change

in Greek policy towards Israel that took place in the
late 1990s was that it proved to be sustainable (to
Jerusalem’s surprise). The first big test was presented
by the second intifada crisis (began in October 2000),
and the extremely harsh anti-Israel stance
subsequently adopted by the Greek media.
Apparently (George Papandreou) then the Greek
Minister of Foreign Affairs in his conversations with
the Israeli ambassador to Athens sharply criticized
the harsh military reprisals of the Israeli government
against the Palestinians. However, the Greek
government made no public statements against Israel
to similar effect.

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More recently the stance of the Greek government
following the flotilla events proved once more that
that the bilateral relationship could withstand even
international crises because Greece remains steadfast
in its decision to maintain good relations with Israel.

The key behind understanding the resolve of Athens

is the simple fact that there is consensus between the
two major Greek political parties as far as the policy
towards Israel is concerned.

Another point that needs to be made is the following.

By the end of the 1990s Athens believed that
a balanced policy towards both the Arabs and Israel
would help it best serve its interests in the new
international environment. However, despite the
bettering of relations the bilateral relationship
until recently remained underdeveloped and lacked
dynamism.

What were the main reasons for that?

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2. Building ties with Jerusalem for all its importance
did not become a primary goal of Greece’s foreign
policy.

At the same time Jerusalem itself was cautious

regarding its relationship with Greece in case it upset
Ankara.
2. The Greek governments shied away from trying to
educate public opinion to understand and support
this new hard-boiled realist approach regarding
relations with Israel.

Here it is worth remembering Henry Kissinger who

wrote that the acid test of a policy is its ability to
obtain domestic support. This has two aspects: the
problem of legitimising a policy within the
governmental apparatus and that of harmonising it
with the national experience.

In other words, the ability of any government to

pursue long-range foreign policy objectives in a

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coherent consistent manner depends on the existence
of ‘policy legitimacy’.

Therefore, the Greek governments needs to convince

the Greek media, and the interested public that the
new policy towards Israel is desirable and its
objectives feasible. Until this happens the elevation of
the bilateral relationship to a mutually more
satisfactory level will be very hard to achieve.

This presentation draws upon the following papers,

Ekavi Athanassopoulou, ‘Responding to A Challenge: Greece’s New Policy Towards

Israel’, Journal of Southeast Europe and Black Sea Studies, Vol.2, no.3, (2002).

Ekavi Athanassopoulou, Greek Foreign Policy and the Middle East; from possibility
to fulfilment? Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies Vol. 34 No. 2 (2010).

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