THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 143276. July 20, 2004]

LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES VICENTE

BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS-BANAL, respondents.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of
19.3422 hectares of agricultural land situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-6296. A portion of the land consisting of
6.2330 hectares (5.4730 of which is planted to coconut and 0.7600 planted to palay)
was compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,[1] as amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
In accordance with the formula prescribed in DAR Administrative Order No. 6,
Series of 1992,[2] as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, [3] the
Land Bank of the Philippines[4] (Landbank), petitioner, made the following valuation of
the property:

Acquired property Area in hectares Value

Coconut land 5.4730 P148,675.19
Riceland 0.7600 25,243.36
==========
P173,918.55

Respondents rejected the above valuation. Thus, pursuant to Section 16(d) of R.A.
6657, as amended, a summary administrative proceeding was conducted before the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine the valuation of the
land. Eventually, the PARAD rendered its Decision affirming the Landbanks valuation.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, designated as a Special Agrarian
Court, a petition for determination of just compensation, docketed as Civil Case No.
6806. Impleaded as respondents were the DAR and the Landbank. Petitioners therein
prayed for a compensation of P100,000.00 per hectare for both coconut land and
riceland, or an aggregate amount of P623,000.00.
 During the pre-trial on September 23, 1998, the parties submitted to the RTC the
following admissions of facts: (1) the subject property is governed by the provisions of
R.A. 6657, as amended; (2) it was distributed to the farmers-beneficiaries; and (3) the
Landbank deposited the provisional compensation based on the valuation made by the
DAR.[5]
On the same day after the pre-trial, the court issued an Order dispensing with the
hearing and directing the parties to submit their respective memoranda.[6]
In its Decision dated February 5, 1999, the trial court computed the just
compensation for the coconut land at P657,137.00 and for the riceland at P46,000.00,
or a total of P703,137.00, which is beyond respondents valuation of P623,000.00. The
court further awarded compounded interest at P79,732.00 in cash. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners, the spouses Dr.

Vicente Banal and Leonidas Arenas-Banal, for the 5.4730 hectares of
coconut land the sum of SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN THOUSAND
ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN PESOS (P657,137.00) in cash and
in bonds in the proportion provided by law;

2. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners for the .7600 hectares
of riceland the sum of FORTY-SIX THOUSAND PESOS
(P46,000.00) in cash and in bonds in the proportion provided by law; and

3. Ordering respondent Landbank to pay the petitioners the sum of SEVENTY-

NINE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO PESOS
(P79,732.00) as the compounded interest in cash.

IT IS SO ORDERED. [7]

In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the facts
established in another case pending before it (Civil Case No. 6679, Luz Rodriguez vs.
DAR, et al.), using the following formula:

For the coconut land

1. Average Gross Production (AGP) x .70 x 9.70 (price per kilo of coconut) =
Net Income (NI)

2. NI / 6% = Price Per Hectare (PPH) (applying the capitalization formula

under Republic Act No. 3844 ) [8]
For the riceland

1. 2.5 x AGP x Government Support Price (GSP) = Land Value (LV) or PPH
(using the formula under Executive Order No. 228 ) [9]

2. AGP x 6% compounded annually for 26 years x GSP = Interest (pursuant to

DAR AO No. 13, Series of 1994)

Forthwith, the Landbank filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52163.
On March 20, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision[10] affirming in toto the
judgment of the trial court. The Landbanks motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied.[11]
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
sustaining the trial courts valuation of the land. As earlier mentioned, there was no trial
on the merits.
To begin with, under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 405 (1990), the Landbank is
charged primarily with the determination of the land valuation and compensation for all
private lands suitable for agriculture under the Voluntary Offer to Sell or Compulsory
Acquisition arrangement For its part, the DAR relies on the determination of the land
valuation and compensation by the Landbank.[12]
Based on the Landbanks valuation of the land, the DAR makes an offer to the
landowner.[13] If the landowner accepts the offer, the Landbank shall pay him the
purchase price of the land after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer and
surrenders the certificate of title in favor of the government.[14] In case the landowner
rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR adjudicator[15] conducts summary
administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the
landowner, the Landbank and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just
compensation for the land.[16] These functions by the DAR are in accordance with its
quasi-judicial powers under Section 50 of R.A. 6657, as amended, which provides:

SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).

x x x.
 A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the
matter to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court[17] for final determination of
just compensation.[18]
In the proceedings before the RTC, it is mandated to apply the Rules of Court[19] and,
on its own initiative or at the instance of any of the parties, appoint one or more
commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute,
including the valuation of properties, and to file a written report thereof x x x. [20] In
determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider several factors
enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended, thus:

Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In determining just compensation, the

cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual
use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the
assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
Government to the property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution on the said land, shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation.

These factors have been translated into a basic formula in DAR Administrative
Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series
of 1994, issued pursuant to the DARs rule-making power to carry out the object and
purposes of R.A. 6657, as amended.[21]
The formula stated in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended, is as follows:

LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)

LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration

The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant and
applicable.

A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula
shall be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

A.2 When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula
shall be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.3 When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the
formula shall be:
LV = MV x 2

Here, the RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and the fundamental
requirements in determining just compensation for the property. Firstly, it dispensed
with the hearing and merely ordered the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. Such action is grossly erroneous since the determination of just
compensation involves the examination of the following factors specified in Section 17
of R.A. 6657, as amended:

1. the cost of the acquisition of the land;

2. the current value of like properties;

3. its nature, actual use and income;

4. the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations;

5. the assessment made by government assessors;

6. the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers and by the government to the property; and

7. the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing

institution on the said land, if any.

Obviously, these factors involve factual matters which can be established only
during a hearing wherein the contending parties present their respective evidence. In
fact, to underscore the intricate nature of determining the valuation of the land, Section
58 of the same law even authorizes the Special Agrarian Courts to appoint
commissioners for such purpose.
Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents property
is P703,137.00, merely took judicial notice of the average production figures in
the Rodriguez case pending before it and applied the same to this case without
conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or consent of the parties, thus:

x x x. In the case x x x of the coconut portion of the land 5.4730 hectares, defendants
determined the average gross production per year at 506.95 kilos only, but in the
very recent case of Luz Rodriguez vs. DAR, et al., filed and decided by this court
in Civil Case No. 6679 also for just compensation for coconut lands and Riceland
situated at Basud, Camarines Norte wherein also the lands in the above-entitled case
are situated, the value fixed therein was 1,061.52 kilos per annum per hectare for
coconut land and the price per kilo is P8.82, but in the instant case the price per
kilo is P9.70. In the present case, we consider 506.95 kilos average gross production
per year per hectare to be very low considering that farm practice for coconut lands is
harvest every forty-five days. We cannot also comprehended why in
the Rodriguez case and in this case there is a great variance in average production per
year when in the two cases the lands are both coconut lands and in the same place of
Basud, Camarines Norte.We believe that it is more fair to adapt the 1,061.52 kilos per
hectare per year as average gross production. In the Rodriguez case, the defendants
fixed the average gross production of palay at 3,000 kilos or 60 cavans per year. The
court is also constrained to apply this yearly palay production in
the Rodriguez case to the case at bar.

xxxxxxxxx

As shown in the Memorandum of Landbank in this case, the area of the coconut land
taken under CARP is 5.4730 hectares. But as already noted, the average gross
production a year of 506.96 kilos per hectare fixed by Landbank is too low as
compared to the Rodriguez case which was 1,061 kilos when the coconut land in
both cases are in the same town of Basud, Camarines Norte, compelling this
court then to adapt 1,061 kilos as the average gross production a year of the
coconut land in this case. We have to apply also the price of P9.70 per kilo as this is
the value that Landbank fixed for this case.

The net income of the coconut land is equal to 70% of the gross income. So, the net
income of the coconut land is 1,061 x .70 x 9.70 equals P7,204.19 per
hectare. Applying the capitalization formula of R.A. 3844 to the net income
of P7,204.19 divided by 6%, the legal rate of interest, equals P120,069.00 per
hectare. Therefore, the just compensation for the 5.4730 hectares is P657,137.00.

The Riceland taken under Presidential Decree No. 27 as of October 21, 1972 has an
area of .7600 hectare. If in the Rodriguez case the Landbank fixed the average gross
production of 3000 kilos or 60 cavans of palay per year, then the .7600 hectare in this
case would be 46 cavans. The value of the riceland therefore in this case is 46 cavans
x 2.5 x P400.00 equals P46,000.00. [22]

PARC Resolution 94-24-1 of 25 October 1994, implemented by DAR AO 13, granted

interest on the compensation at 6% compounded annually. The compounded interest
on the 46 cavans for 26 years is 199.33 cavans. At P400.00 per cavan, the value of the
compounded interest is P79,732.00. (emphasis added)
[23]

Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are
pending in the same court or before the same judge. [24] They may only do so in the
absence of objection and with the knowledge of the opposing party, [25] which are not
obtaining here.
Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings
before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial
notice of a certain matter, thus:

SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the court, on its
own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial
notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.

After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own
initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow
the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the
case. (emphasis added)

The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.

Lastly, the RTC erred in applying the formula prescribed under Executive Order
(EO) No. 228[26] and R.A. No. 3844,[27] as amended, in determining the valuation of the
property; and in granting compounded interest pursuant to DAR Administrative Order
No. 13, Series of 1994.[28] It must be stressed that EO No. 228 covers private agricultural
lands primarily devoted to rice and corn, while R.A. 3844 governs agricultural
leasehold relation between the person who furnishes the landholding, either as owner,
civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who personally
cultivates the same.[29] Here, the land is planted to coconut and rice and does not involve
agricultural leasehold relation. What the trial court should have applied is the formula in
DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11
discussed earlier.
As regards the award of compounded interest, suffice it to state that DAR
Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994 does not apply to the subject land but to
those lands taken under Presidential Decree No. 27 [30] and Executive Order No. 228
whose owners have not been compensated. In this case, the property is covered by
R.A. 6657, as amended, and respondents have been paid the provisional compensation
thereof, as stipulated during the pre-trial.
While the determination of just compensation involves the exercise of judicial
discretion, however, such discretion must be discharged within the bounds of the
law. Here, the RTC wantonly disregarded R.A. 6657, as amended, and its implementing
rules and regulations. (DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No.11).
In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals and the RTC erred in determining the
valuation of the subject land. Thus, we deem it proper to remand this case to the RTC
for trial on the merits wherein the parties may present their respective evidence. In
determining the valuation of the subject property, the trial court shall consider the
factors provided under Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended, mentioned earlier. The
formula prescribed by the DAR in Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as
amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, shall be used in the
valuation of the land. Furthermore, upon its own initiative, or at the instance of any of
the parties, the trial court may appoint one or more commissioners to examine,
investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated March 20, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 52163 is REVERSED. Civil Case No.
6806 is REMANDED to the RTC, Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte, for trial on the
merits with dispatch. The trial judge is directed to observe strictly the procedures
specified above in determining the proper valuation of the subject property.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 100901-08. July 16, 1998]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JAILON

KULAIS, CARLOS FALCASANTOS @ Commander Falcasantos,
AWALON KAMLON HASSAN @ Commander Kamlon, MAJID
SAMSON @ Commander Bungi, JUMATIYA AMLANI DE
FALCASANTOS, NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, SALVADOR
MAMARIL y MENDOZA, HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH, JAINUDDIN
HASSAN y AHMAD, IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH, JALINA
HASSAN DE KAMMING, FREDDIE MANUEL @ Ajid and several
JOHN and JANE DOES, accused, JAILON KULAIS, appellant.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The trial courts erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness testimony in another
case, also pending before it, does not affect the conviction of the appellant, whose guilt
is proven beyond reasonable doubt by other clear, convincing and overwhelming
evidence, both testimonial and documentary. The Court takes this occasion also to
remind the bench and the bar that reclusion perpetua is not synonymous with life
imprisonment.

The Case

On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom (Crim. Case
Nos. 10060, 10061, 10062, 10063 and 10064) and three Informations for kidnapping
(Crim Case Nos. 10065, 10066 and 10067), all dated August 14, 1990, were
filed[1] before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City against Carlos Falcasantos,
Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Jalina Hassan de
Kamming,[2] Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan, Imam[3] Taruk Alah,
Freddie Manuel alias Ajid, and several John and Jane Does. The Informations for
kidnapping for ransom, which set forth identical allegations save for the names of the
victims, read as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being all private individuals, conspiring and confederating
together, mutually aiding and assisting one another, with threats to kill the
person of FELIX ROSARIO [in Criminal Case No. 10060] and for the purpose
[4]

of extorting ransom from the said Felix Rosario or his families or employer, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, KIDNAP the person of said
Felix Rosario, a male public officer of the City Government of Zamboanga,
[5]

who was then aboard a Cimarron vehicle with plate No. SBZ-976 which was
being ambushed by the herein accused at the highway of Sitio Tigbao Lisomo,
Zamboanga City, and brought said Felix Rosario to different mountainous
[6]

places of Zamboanga City and Zamboanga del Sur, where he was detained,
held hostage and deprived of his liberty until February 2, 1989, the day when
he was released only after payment of the ransom was made to herein
accused, to the damage and prejudice of said victim; there being present an
aggravating circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed with
the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.

The three Informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, likewise alleged identical facts and circumstances, except the names of the
victims:

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being all private
individuals, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting one
another, by means of threats and intimidation of person, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously KIDNAP, take and drag away and detain the person of
MONICO SAAVEDRA Y LIMEN [Criminal Case No. 10065][7] a male public officer of the
City Government of Zamboanga, against his will, there being present an aggravating
circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed with the aid of armed men or
persons who insure or afford impunity.

Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended, namely, Jailon Julais,
Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin,
Jainuddin Hassan, Imam Taruk Alah, Jalina Hassan and Freddie Manuel.[8]
On their arraignment on September 13, 1990, all the accused pleaded not
guilty. Joint trial on the merits ensued. On April 8, 1991, Judge Pelagio S. Mandi
rendered the assailed 36-page Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, above premises and discussion taken into consideration, this

Court renders its judgment, ordering and finding:

1. FREDDIE MANUEL, alias AJID and IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH [n]ot
[g]uilty of the eight charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping,
their guilt not having been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Their immediate release from the City Jail, Zamboanga City is ordered, unless
detained for some other offense besides these 8 cases (Crim. Cases Nos.
10060-10067).

2. JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, JAILON KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL

y MENDOZA and HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH [g]uilty as principals by
conspiracy in all these 8 cases for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for
[k]idnapping (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10067).

Their guilt is aggravated in that they committed the 8 offenses with the aid of
armed men who insured impunity. Therefore, the penalties imposed on them
shall be at their maximum period.

WHEREFORE, for the five charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom, and pursuant
to Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, five life imprisonments are imposed on
Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and
Kadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).

For kidnapping Mrs. Virginia San Agustin-Gara, a female and public officer
and pursuant to Art. 267, Revised Penal Code (par. 4.), another life
imprisonment is imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais,
Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Case No.
10066)

For kidnapping Monico Saavedra y Limen, and Calixto Francisco y Gaspar,

and their kidnapping not having lasted more than five days, pursuant to Art.
268, Revised Penal Code, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same
four accused - Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y
Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih - are sentenced to serve two (2) jail terms
ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum, to eighteen (18)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065 and
10067).

3. JAMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges

of [k]idnapping and she is acquitted of these charges. (Crim. Cases Nos.
10065, 10066 and 10067).

But Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is [g]uilty as accomplice in the five

charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom.

WHEREFORE, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is sentenced to serve five (5)

imprisonments, ranging from TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum
to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases
Nos. 10060-10064).

4. NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, 18 years old, and JALIHA HUSSIN

(charged as Jalina Hassan de Kamming), 15 years old, [n]ot [g]uilty in the
three charges for [k]idnapping and are, therefore, ACQUITTED of these three
charges. (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 & 10067).

But Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are found [g]uilty as
accomplices in the five charges for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom. Being minors,
they are entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which
lowers the penalty imposable on them by one degree.

WHEREFORE, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are sentenced

to serve five imprisonments ranging from SIX (6) YEARS of prision
correccional as minimum to TEN YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY OF prision
mayor as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).

Due to the removal of the suspension of sentences of youthful offenders

convicted of an offense punishable by death or life by Presidential Decree No.
1179 and Presidential Decree No. 1210 (of which [k]idnapping for [r]ansom is
such an offense) the sentences on Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha
Hussin de Kamming are NOT suspended but must be served by them.

Januddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin are
sentenced further to return the following personal effects taken on December
12, 1988, the day of the kidnapping, or their value in money, their liability
being solidary.

To Jessica Calunod:

One (1) Seiko wrist watch P 250.00

One Bracelet P 2,400.00

One Shoulder Bag P 200.00

Cash P 200.00

To Armado C. Bacarro:

One (1) wrist watch P 800.00

 One Necklace P 300.00

One Calculator P 295.00

Eyeglasses P 500.00

One Steel Tape P 250.00

To Edilberto S. Perez

One (1) Rayban P 1,000.00

One Wrist Watch P 1,800.00

Cash P 300.00

To Virginia San Agustin-Gara

One (1) Wrist Watch P 850.00

The benefit of Art. 29, Revised Penal Code, on preventive suspension, shall
be extended to those sentenced.

The cases against Majid Samson, alias Commander Bungi Awalon Kamlon
a.k.a. Commander Kamlon Carlos Falcasantos and several John Does and
Jane Does are ARCHIVED until their arrest.

Costs against the accused convicted.

SO ORDERED.[9]

On May 7, 1991, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan

de Kulais and Jaliha Hussin filed their joint Notice of Appeal.[10] In a letter dated February
6, 1997, the same appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their appeal because of
their application for amnesty. In our March 19, 1997 Resolution, we granted their
motion. Hence, only the appeal of Kulais remains for the consideration of this Court. [11]

The Facts
The Version of the Prosecution

The solicitor general summarized, in this wise, the facts as viewed by the People:
On December 12, 1988, a group of public officials from various government
agencies, organized themselves as a monitoring team to inspect government
projects in Zamboanga City. The group was composed of Virginia Gara, as
the head of the team; Armando Bacarro, representing the Commission on
Audit; Felix del Rosario, representing the non-government; Edilberto Perez,
representing the City Assessors Office; Jessica Calunod and Allan Basa of
the City Budget Office and Monico Saavedra, the driver from the City
Engineers Office. (p. 3, TSN, October 22, 1990.)

On that particular day, the group headed to the Lincomo Elementary School to
check on two of its classrooms. After inspecting the same, they proceeded to
the Talaga Footbridge. The group was not able to reach the place because on
their way, they were stopped by nine (9) armed men who pointed their guns at
them (p. 4, TSN, ibid.).

The group alighted from their Cimarron jeep where they were divested of their
personal belongings. They were then ordered to walk to the mountain by the
leader of the armed men who introduced himself as Commander Falcasantos
(p. 5, TSN, ibid.)

While the group was walking in the mountain, they encountered government
troops which caused their group to be divided. Finally, they were able to
regroup themselves. Commander Kamlon with his men joined the others. (pp.
7-8, TSN, ibid.).

The kidnappers held their captives for fifty-four (54) days in the forest. During
their captivity, the victims were able to recognize their captors who were at all
times armed with guns. The wives of the kidnappers performed the basic
chores like cooking. (pp.9-10. TSN, ibid.)

Commander Falcasantos also ordered their victims to sign the ransom notes
which demanded a ransom of P100.000.00 and P14,000.00 in exchange for
twenty (20) sets of uniform. (p.15, TSN, ibid.)

On February 3, 1989, at around 12:00 oclock noontime, the victims were

informed that they would be released. They started walking until around 7:00
o clock in the evening of that day. At around 12:00 o clock midnight, the
victims were released after Commander Falcasantos and Kamlon received
the ransom money. (p. 19, TSN, ibid.) The total amount paid
was P122,000.00. The same was reached after several negotiations between
Mayor Vitaliano Agan of Zamboanga City and the representatives of the
kidnappers. (pp. 2, 6, TSN, Nov. 11, 1990)
x x x.[12]

The prosecution presented fifteen witnesses, including some of the kidnap victims
themselves: Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro, Edilberto Perez, Virginia San Agustin-
Gara, Calixto Francisco, and Monico Saavedra.

The Version of the Defense

The facts of the case, according to the defense, are as follows:[13]

On May 28, 1990, at about 10:00 o clock in the morning, while weeding their
farm in Sinaburan, Zamboanga del Sur, accused-appellant Jumatiya Amlani
was picked up by soldiers and brought to a place where one army battalion
was stationed. Thereat, her five (5) co-accused, namely Salvador Mamaril,
Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassin, Imam Taruk Alah and Freddie Manuel were
already detained. In the afternoon of the same day, appellants spouses Jailon
Kulais and Norma Sahiddan were brought to the battalion station and likewise
detained thereat. On May 30, 1990, the eight (8) accused were transported to
Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City. Here on the same date, they were joined by
accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin.

At the time Amlani was picked up by the military, she had just escaped from
the captivity of Carlos Falcasantos and company who in 1988 kidnapped and
brought her to the mountains. Against their will, she stayed with Falcasantos
and his two wives for two months, during which she slept with Falcasantos as
aide of the wives and was made to cook food, wash clothes, fetch water and
run other errands for everybody. An armed guard was assigned to watch her,
so that, for sometime, she had to bear the ill-treatment of Falcasantos other
wives one of whom was armed. After about two months, while she was
cooking and Falcasantos and his two wives were bathing in the river, and
while her guard was not looking, she took her chance and made a successful
dash for freedom. (TSN, January 29, 1992, pp. 2-15)

Likewise a kidnap victim herself is accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin, who was

thirteen years old at the time (she was fifteen years old when the trial of the
instant cases commenced). She was kidnapped by Daing Kamming and
brought to the mountains where he slept with her. She stayed with him for less
than a month sleeping on forest ground and otherwise performing
housekeeping errands for Kamming and his men. She made good her escape
during an encounter between the group of Kamming and military troops. She
hid in the bushes and came out at Ligui-an where she took a bachelor bus in
going back to her mothers house at Pudos, Guiligan, Tungawan, Zamboanga
del Sur. One day, at around 2:00 o clock in the afternoon, while she was
harvesting palay at the neighboring village of Tigbalangao, military men
picked her up to Ticbanuang where there was an army battalion detachment.
From Ticbawuang, she was brought to Vitali, then to Metrodiscom,
Zamboanga City, where on her arrival, she met all the other accused for the
first time except Freddie Manuel. (Ibid., pp. 16-21)

Another female accused is appellant Norma Sahiddan, a native of Sinaburan,

Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. At about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of a
day in May, while she and her husband were in their farm, soldiers arrested
them. The soldiers did not tell them why they were being arrested, neither
were they shown any papers. The two of them were just made to board a six
by six truck. There were no other civilians in the truck. The truck brought the
spouses to the army battalion and placed them inside the building where there
were civilians and soldiers. Among the civilians present were her six co-
accused Hadjirul Plasin, Salvador Mamaril, Jaimuddin Hassan, Ima[m] Taruk
Alah, Freddie Manuel and Jumatiya Amlani. That night, the eight of them were
brought to Tictapul, Zamboanga City; then to Vitali; and, finally, to the
Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City where they stayed for six days and six nights.
On the seventh day, the accused were brought to the City Jail, Zamboanga
City. (TSN, January 30, 1991, pp. 6-11)

The husband of Norma Sahiddan is Jailon Kulais who, as heretofore narrated,

was arrested with his wife the day the soldiers came to their farm on May 28,
1990. He has shared with his wife the ordeals that followed in the wake of
their arrest and in the duration of their confinement up to the present. (TSN,
January 22, 1991 pp. 2-4).

The Trial Courts Ruling

The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for ransom
and one count of kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which offenses it imposed
upon him six terms of life imprisonment. It also found him guilty of two counts of slight
illegal detention for the kidnapping of Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. The trial
court ratiocinated as follows:

Principally, the issue here is one of credibility - both of the witnesses and their
version of what had happened on December 12, 1988, to February 3, 1989.
On this pivotal issue, the Court gives credence to [p]rosecution witnesses and
their testimonies. Prosecution evidence is positive, clear and convincing. No
taint of evil or dishonest motive was imputed or imputable to [p]rosecution
witnesses. To this Court, who saw all the witnesses testify, [p]rosecution
witnesses testified only because they were impelled by [a] sense of justice, of
duty and of truth.

Contrarily, [d]efense evidence is weak, uncorroborated and consisted only of

alibis. The individual testimonies of the nine accused dwel[t] principally on
what happened to each of them on May 27, 28 and 29, 1990. None of the
accused explained where he or she was on and from December 12, 1988, to
February 3, 1989, when [p]rosecution evidence show[ed] positively seven of
the nine accused were keeping the five or six hostages named by
[p]rosecution evidence.

The seven accused positively identified to have been present during the
course of the captivity of the five kidnap-victims-complainants are: (1)
Jumatiya Amlani; (2) Jaliha Hussin; (3) Norma Sahiddan; (4) Jailon Kulais; (5)
Hadjirul Plasin; (6) Salvador Mamaril and (7) Jainuddin Hassan.

The two accused not positively identified are: Freddie Manuel alias Ajid, and
Imam Taruk Alah. These two must, therefore, be declared acquitted based on
reasonable doubt.

The next important issue to be examined is: Are these seven accused guilty
as conspirators as charged in the eight Informations; or only as accomplices?
Prosecution evidence shows that the kidnapping group to which the seven
accused belonged had formed themselves into an armed band for the
purpose of kidnapping for ransom. This armed band had cut themselves off
from established communities, lived in the mountains and forests, moved from
place to place in order to hide their hostages. The wives of these armed band
moved along with their husbands, attending to their needs, giving them
material and moral support. These wives also attended to the needs of the
kidnap victims, sleeping with them or comforting them.

xxxxxxxxx

II) The guilt of Jainuddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul
Plasin. The Court holds these four men guilty as conspirators in the 8 cases of
kidnapping. Unlike the three women-accused, these male accused were
armed. They actively participated in keeping their hostages by fighting off the
military and CAFGUS, in transferring their hostages from place to place, and
in guarding the kidnap hostages. Salvador Mamaril and Jailon Kulais were
positively identified as among the nine armed men who had kidnapped the
eight kidnap victims on December 12, 1988.

The higher degree of participation found by the Court of the four accused is
supported by the rulings of our Supreme Court quoted below.

(1) The time-honored jurisprudence is that direct proof is not essential to

prove conspiracy. It may be shown by a number of infinite acts, conditions and
circumstances which may vary according to the purposes to be accomplished
and from which may logically be inferred that there was a common design,
understanding or agreement among the conspirators to commit the offense
charged. (People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil 64; People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.)

(2) The crime must, therefore, in view of the solidarity of the act and intent
which existed between the sixteen accused, be regarded as the act of the
band or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible for the
murder in question. (U.S. vs. Bundal, et. al. 3 Phil 89, 98.)

(3) When two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through
the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual
whose evil will actively contribute to the wrongdoing is in law responsible for the whole,
the same as though performed by himself alone. (People vs. Peralta, et. al. 25 SCRA
759, 772 (1968).)[14]

The Assigned Errors

The trial court is faulted with the following errors, viz:

I

The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a material testimony given
in another case by Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who allegedly was the team
leader of the government troops which allegedly captured the accused-
appellants in an encounter; thereby, depriving the accused-appellants
their right to cross-examine him.
II

On the assumption that Lt. Felicianos testimony could be validly taken

judicial notice of, the trial court, nevertheless, erred in not disregarding the
same for being highly improbable and contradictory.
III
 The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants Jumatiya Amlani,
Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan provided Carlos Falcasantos, et. al.,
with material and moral comfort, hence, are guilty as accomplices in all the
kidnapping for ransom cases.
IV

The trial court erred in denying to accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin and Norma
Sahiddan the benefits of suspension of sentence given to youth offenders
considering that they were minors at the time of the commission of the offense.[15]

As earlier noted, Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan had
withdrawn their appeal, and as such, the third and fourth assigned errors, which pertain
to them only, will no longer be dealt with. Only the following issues pertaining to
Appellant Jailon Kulais will be discussed: (1) judicial notice of other pending cases, (2)
sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, and (3) denial as a defense. In addition, the
Court will pass upon the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court.

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

First Issue:
Judicial Notice and Denial of Due Process

Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took
judicial notice of the testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano,
who was the team leader of the government troops that captured him and his purported
cohorts.[16] Because he was allegedly deprived of his right to cross-examine a material
witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he contends that the latters testimony
should not be used against him.[17]
True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence
presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the
same court, or have been heard and are actually pending before the same judge.[18] This
is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has the constitutional right to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial
notice of the testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding
the cases against the appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied due process.
His conviction was based mainly on the positive identification made by some of the
kidnap victims, namely, Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These
witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross-examinations conducted by appellants
counsel. At best, then, the trial courts mention of Lieutenant Felicianos testimony is a
decisional surplusage which neither affected the outcome of the case nor substantially
prejudiced Appellant Kulais.

Second Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

Appellant was positively identified by Calunod, as shown by the latters testimony:

CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q And how long were you in the custody of these persons?
A We stayed with them for fifty-four days.
Q And during those days did you come to know any of the persons who were with the group?
A We came to know almost all of them considering we stayed there for fifty-four days.
Q And can you please name to us some of them or how you know them?
A For example, aside from Commander Falcasantos and Commander Kamlon we came to
know first our foster parents, those who were assigned to give us some food.
Q You mean to say that the captors assigned you some men who will take care of you?
A Yes.
Q And to whom were you assigned?
A To lla Abdurasa.
Q And other than your foster [parents] or the parents whom you are assigned to, who else
did you come to know?
A Pagal and his wife; Tangkong and his wife Nana; the two (2) wives of Commander
Falcasantos - Mating and Janira - another brother in-law of Commander Kamlon,
Usman, the wife of Kamlon, Tira.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Now, you said that you were with these men for fifty-four days and you really came to
know them. Will you still be able to recognize these persons if you will see the[m] again?
A Yes, maam.
Q Now will you look around this Honorable Court and see if any of those you mentioned are
here?
A Yes, they are here.
Q Some of them are here?
A Some of them are here.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Where is Tangkong? What is he wearing?
 A White t-shirt with orange collar. (witness pointing.) He was one of those nine armed men
who took us from the highway.
RTC INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to a man sitting in court and when asked of his name, he gave his name
as JAILON KULAIS.
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q Aside from being with the armed men who stopped the vehicle and made you alight, what
else was he doing while you were in their captivity?
A He was the foster parent of Armando Bacarro and the husband of Nana.
COURT:
Q Who?
A Tangkong.
x x x x x x x x x[19]
Likewise clear and straightforward was Bacarros testimony pointing to appellant as
one of the culprits:
FISCAL CAJAYON:
xxxxxxxxx
Q And what happened then?
A Some of the armed men assigned who will be the host or who will be the one [to] g[i]ve
food to us.
Q [To] whom were you assigned?
A I was assigned to a certain Tangkong and [his] wife Nana.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Now, you said you were assigned to Tangkong and his wife. [D]o you remember how he
looks like?
A Yes.
Q Now, will you please look around this Court and tell us if that said Tangkong and his wife
are here?
A Yes, maam.
Q Could you please point this Tangkong to us?
A Witness pointed to a person in Court. [W]hen asked his name he identified [himself] as
Jailon Kulais.
Q Why did you say his name is Tangkong? Where did you get that name?
A Well, that is the name [by which he is] usually called in the camp.
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. FABIAN (counsel for accused Kulais)
Q When did you first meet Tangkong?
A That was on December 11, because I remember he was the one who took us.
Q When you were questioned by the fiscal a while ago, you stated that Mr. Mamaril was one
of those who stopped the bus and took you to the hill and you did not mention
Tangkong?
A I did not mention but I can remember his face.
xxxxxxxxx
Q And because Tangkong was always with you as your host even if he did not tell you that
he [was] one of those who stopped you, you would not recognize him?
A No, I can recognize him because he was the one who took my shoes.
COURT:
Q Who?
A Tangkong, your Honor.
x x x x x x x x x[20]
Also straightforward was Ernesto Perez candid narration:
FISCAL CAJAYON:
xxxxxxxxx
Q Who else?
A The last man.
Q Did you come to know his name?
A Only his nickname, Tangkong. (Witness pointed to a man in Court who identified himself
as Jailon Kulais.)
Q And what was Tangkong doing in the mountain?
A The same, guarding us.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. SAHAK
Q Engr. Perez, you stated that you were ambushed by nine armed men on your way from
[the] Licomo to [the] Talaga Foot Bridge. [W]hat do you mean by ambushed?
A I mean that they blocked our way and stopped.
Q They did not fire any shots?
A But they were pointing their guns at us.
Q And among the 9 armed men who held you on your way to [the] Talaga Footbridge, you
stated [that] one of them [was] Commander Falcasantos?
A Yes.
Q Could you also recognize anyone of the accused in that group?
 A Yes.
Q Will you please identify?
A That one, Tangkong. (The witness pointed to a man sitting in court who identified himself
as Jailon Kulais.)
xxxxxxxxx
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. FABIAN
Q You said Jailon Kulais was among those who guarded the camp?
FISCAL CAJAYON:
Your Honor, please, he does not know the name of Julais, he used the word Tangkong.
ATTY. FABIAN
Q You said Tangkong guarded you[. W]hat do you mean?
A He guarded us like prisoners[. A]fter guarding us they have their time two hours another
will be on duty guarding us.
Q Where did you meet Tangkong?
A He was one of the armed men who kidnapped us.
x x x x x x x x x[21]
It is evident from the foregoing testimonies of Calunod, Bacarro and Perez that
kidnapping or detention did take place: the five victims were held, against their will, for
fifty-three days from December 12, 1988 to February 2, 1989. It is also evident that
Appellant Kulais was a member of the group of armed men who staged the kidnapping,
and that he was one of those who guarded the victims during the entire period of their
captivity. His participation gives credence to the conclusion of the trial court that he was
a conspirator.

Kidnapping
for Ransom

That the kidnapping of the five was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom is
also apparent from the testimony of Calunod, who was quite emphatic in identifying the
accused and narrating the circumstances surrounding the writing of the ransom letters.
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q Now, you were in their captivity for 54 days and you said there were these meetings for
possible negotiation with the City Government. What do you mean by this? What were
you supposed to negotiate?
A Because they told us that they will be releasing us only after the terms. [22]
Q And what were the terms? Did you come to know the terms?
A I came to know the terms because I was the one ordered by Commander Falcasantos to
write the letter, the ransom letter.
Q At this point of time, you remember how many letters were you asked to write for your
ransom?
A I could not remember as to how many, but I can identify them.
Q Why will you able to identify the same?
A Because I was the one who wrote it.
Q And you are familiar, of course, with your penmanship?
A Yes.
Q Now we have here some letters which were turned over to us by the Honorable City Mayor
Vitaliano Agan. 1,2,3,4,5 - there are five letters all handwritten.
COURT:
Original?
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Original, your Honor.
Q And we would like you to go over these and say, tell us if any of these were the ones you
were asked to write.
A (Witness going over [letters])
This one - 2 pages. This one - 2 pages. No more.
Q Aside from the fact that you identified your penmanship in these letters, what else will
make you remember that these are really the ones you wrote while there?
A The signature is there.
Q There is a printed name here[,] Jessica Calunod.
A And over it is a signature.
Q That is your signature?
A Yes, maam.
Q How about in the other letter, did you sign it also?
A Yes, there is the other signature.
Q There are names - other names here - Eddie Perez, Allan Basa, Armando Bacarro, Felix
Rosario, Jojie Ortuoste and there are signatures above the same. Did you come up to
know who signed this one?
A Those whose signatures there were signed by the persons. [sic]
Q And we have here at the bottom, Commander Kamlon Hassan, and there is the signature
above the same. Did you come to know who signed it?
A [It was] Commander Kamlon Hassan who signed that.
 xxxxxxxxx
Q Jessica, I am going over this letter ... Could you please read to us the portion here which
says the terms? ...
A (Witness reading) Mao ilang gusto nga andamun na ninyo and kantidad nga P100,000
ug P14,000 baylo sa 20 sets nga uniforms sa Biyernes (Pebrero 3, 1989).[23]
xxxxxxxxx
INTERPRETER (Translation):
This is what they like you to prepare[:] the amount of P100,000.00 and P14,000.00 in
exchange [for] 20 sets of uniform on Friday, February 3, 1989.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Now you also earlier identified this other letter and this is dated January 21,
1988.[24] Now, could you please explain to us why it is dated January 21 1988 and
the other one Enero 31, 1989 or January 31, 1989?
A I did not realize that I placed 1989, 1988, but it was 1989.
Q January 21, 1989?
A Yes
xxxxxxxxx
Q Now, in this letter, were the terms also mentioned? Please go over this.
A (Going over the letter)
Yes, maam.
Q Could you please read it aloud to us?
A (Witness reading)
Gusto nila and P100,000.00 ng kapinan nu ug 20 sets nga completong uniformer (7
colors marine type wala nay labot ang sapatos), tunga medium ug tunga large size.[25]
xxxxxxxxx
INTERPRETER:
They like the P100,000.00 and an addition of 20 sets of complete uniform (7 colors,
marine-type not including the shoes), one half medium, one half large.
xxxxxxxxx
Q After having written these letters, did you come to know after [they were] signed by your
companions and all of you, do you know if these letters were sent? If you know only.
A I would like to make it clear. The first letter was ordered to me by Falcasantos to inform the
City Mayor that initial as P500,000.00, and when we were already - I was asked again to
write, we were ordered to affix our signature to serve as proof that all of us are
alive.[26] [sic]
Calunods testimony was substantially corroborated by both Armando Bacarro [27] and
Edilberto Perez.[28] The receipt of the ransom letters, the efforts made to raise and deliver
the ransom, and the release of the hostages upon payment of the money were testified
to by Zamboanga City Mayor Vitaliano Agan[29] and Teddy Mejia.[30]
The elements of kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code,[31] having been sufficiently proven, and the appellant, a private individual,
having been clearly identified by the kidnap victims, this Court thus affirms the trial
courts finding of appellants guilt on five counts of kidnapping for ransom.

Kidnapping of
Public Officers

Victims Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco were
members of the government monitoring team abducted by appellants group. The three
testified to the fact of kidnapping; however, they were not able to identify the
appellant. Even so, appellants identity as one of the kidnappers was sufficiently
established by Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, who were with Gara, Saavedra and
Francisco when the abduction occurred.
That Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were detained for only three hours [32] does not
matter. In People vs. Domasian,[33] the victim was similarly held for three hours, and was
released even before his parents received the ransom note. The accused therein
argued that they could not be held guilty of kidnapping as no enclosure was involved,
and that only grave coercion was committed, if at all.[34] Convicting appellants of
kidnapping or serious illegal detention under Art. 267 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, the
Court found that the victim, an eight-year-old boy, was deprived of his liberty when he
was restrained from going home. The Court justified the conviction by holding that the
offense consisted not only in placing a person in an enclosure, but also in detaining or
depriving him, in any manner, of his liberty.[35] Likewise, in People vs. Santos,[36] the Court
held that since the appellant was charged and convicted under Article 267, paragraph 4,
it was not the duration of the deprivation of liberty which was important, but the fact that
the victim, a minor, was locked up.
Thus, in the present case, the detention of Gara, Saavedra and Francisco for only a
few hours is immaterial. The clear fact is that the victims were public officers[37] -- Gara
was a fiscal analyst for the City of Zamboanga, Saavedra worked at the City Engineers
Office, and Francisco was a barangay councilman at the time the kidnapping
occurred. Appellant Kulais should be punished, therefore, under Article 267, paragraph
4 of the Revised Penal Code, and not Art. 268, as the trial court held.
The present case is different from People vs. Astorga,[38] which held that the crime
committed was not kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4, but only grave
coercion. The appellant in that case had tricked his seven-year-old victim into going with
him to a place he alone knew. His plans, however, were foiled, when a group of people
became suspicious and rescued the girl from him. The Court noted that the victims
testimony and the other pieces of evidence did not indicate that the appellant wanted to
detain her, or that he actually detained her.
 In the present case, the evidence presented by the prosecution indubitably
established that the victims were detained, albeit for a few hours. There is proof beyond
reasonable doubt that kidnapping took place, and that appellant was a member of the
armed group which abducted the victims.

Third Issue:
Denial and Alibi

The appellants bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face
of the prosecution witnesses positive identification of him. Jurisprudence gives greater
weight to the positive narration of prosecution witnesses than to the negative
testimonies of the defense.[39] Between positive and categorical testimony which has a
ring of truth to it on the one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former generally
prevails.[40] Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez testified in a clear,
straightforward and frank manner; and their testimonies were compatible on material
points. Moreover, no ill motive was attributed to the kidnap victims and none was found
by this Court.
We agree with the trial courts observation that the appellant did not meet the
charges against him head on. His testimony dwelt on what happened to him on the day
he was arrested and on subsequent days thereafter. Appellant did not explain where he
was during the questioned dates (December 12, 1988 to February 3, 1989); neither did
he rebut Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, when they identified him as one of their
kidnappers.

Reclusion Perpetua, Not Life Imprisonment

The trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant to six terms of life
imprisonment. The penalty for kidnapping with ransom, under the Revised Penal Code,
is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the crimes happened in 1988, when the capital
penalty was proscribed by the Constitution, the maximum penalty that could have been
imposed was reclusion perpetua. Life imprisonment is not synonymous with reclusion
perpetua. Unlike life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua carries with it accessory
penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code and has a definite extent or duration. Life
imprisonment is invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws,
while reclusion perpetua is prescribed in accordance with the Revised Penal Code.[41]
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Jailon Kulais as principal in five counts of
kidnapping for ransom and in three counts of kidnapping is AFFIRMED, but the penalty
imposed is hereby MODIFIED as follows: Appellant is sentenced to five terms
of reclusion perpetua, one for each of his five convictions for kidnapping for ransom;
and to three terms of reclusion perpetua, one each for the kidnapping of Public Officers
Virginia Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. Like the other accused who
withdrew their appeals, he is REQUIRED to return the personal effects, or their
monetary value, taken from the kidnap victims. Additionally, he is ORDERED to pay the
amount of P122,000 representing the ransom money paid to the kidnappers. Costs
against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,Jr., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 114776. February 2, 2000]

MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND

SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to
reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 29, 1993, in C.A. G.R. No.
CV 34476, as well as its Resolution dated February 28, 1994, which denied the motion
for reconsideration.

The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are as follows:

"Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein petitioner],

then Director of Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for
employment with defendant company [herein private respondent] through
its Area Manager in Manila.

On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview, defendant

wrote to plaintiff, offering a contract of employment as an expatriate B-707
captain for an original period of two (2) years commencing on January 21,
1978, Plaintiff accepted the offer and commenced working on January 20,
1979. After passing the six-month probation period, plaintiff's appointment
was confirmed effective July 21, 1979. (Annex "B", p. 30, Rollo).

On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year

contract to five (5) years effective January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984
subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the contract of
employment, which the latter accepted (Annex "C", p. 31, Rec.).

During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980, while in
command of a flight, committed a noise violation offense at the Zurich
Airport, for which plaintiff apologized. (Exh. "3", p. 307, Rec.).

Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident wherein the

tail of the aircraft scraped or touched the runway during landing. He was
suspended for a few days until he was investigated by a board headed by
Capt. Choy. He was reprimanded. Scjuris

On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-300

conversion training at Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at defendant's
expense. Having successfully completed and passed the training course,
plaintiff was cleared on April 7, 1981 for solo duty as captain of the Airbus
A-300 and subsequently appointed as captain of the A-300 fleet
commanding an Airbus A-300 in flights over Southeast Asia. (Annexes
"D", "E" and "F", pp. 34-38, Rec.).

Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting

measures. Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were
found in excess of the defendant's requirement (t.s.n., July 6, 1988. p. 11).
Consequently, defendant informed its expatriate pilots including plaintiff of
the situation and advised them to take advance leaves. (Exh. "15", p. 466,
Rec.).

Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant
decided to terminate its excess personnel (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It did
not, however, immediately terminate it's A-300 pilots. It reviewed their
qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17
excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve were found qualified. Unfortunately,
plaintiff was not one of the twelve. Jurissc

On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination

effective November 1, 1982 and that he will be paid three (3) months
salary in lieu of three months notice (Annex "I", pp. 41-42, Rec.). Because
he could not uproot his family on such short notice, plaintiff requested a
three-month notice to afford him time to exhaust all possible avenues for
reconsideration and retention. Defendant gave only two (2) months notice
and one (1) month salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).

Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal
before the Labor Arbiter. Defendant moved to dismiss on jurisdictional
grounds. Before said motion was resolved, the complaint was withdrawn.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case for damages due to illegal
termination of contract of services before the court a quo (Complaint, pp.
1-10, Rec.).

Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss

alleging inter alia: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case, and (2) that Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over
the instant case. Defendant contends that the complaint is for illegal
dismissal together with a money claim arising out of and in the course of
plaintiff's employment "thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who have
the jurisdiction pursuant to Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that, since
plaintiff was employed in Singapore, all other aspects of his employment
contract and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus, defendant
postulates that Singapore laws should apply and courts thereat shall have
jurisdiction. (pp. 50-69, Rec.). Misjuris
 In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1) where the
items demanded in a complaint are the natural consequences flowing from
a breach of an obligation and not labor benefits, the case is intrinsically a
civil dispute; (2) the case involves a question that is beyond the field of
specialization of labor arbiters; and (3) if the complaint is grounded not on
the employee's dismissal per se but on the manner of said dismissal and
the consequence thereof, the case falls under the jurisdiction of the civil
courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.)

On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to dismiss
(pp. 82-84, Ibid). The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. (p.
95 ibid)

On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the grounds
relied upon in its motion to dismiss and further arguing that plaintiff is
barred by laches, waiver, and estoppel from instituting the complaint and
that he has no cause of action. (pp. 102-115)"[1]

On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff. The
dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff

Menandro Laureano and against defendant Singapore Airlines Limited,
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amounts of -

SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate

of exchange at the time of payment, as and for unearned compensation
with legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid; Jjlex

SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate

of exchange at the time of payment; and the further amounts of
P67,500.00 as consequential damages with legal interest from the filing of
the complaint until fully paid;

P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and for

exemplary damages; and P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.

Costs against defendant.

SO ORDERED."[2]

Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the issues of
jurisdiction, validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.

On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court, thus,
 "...In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination
was filed by plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four
(4) years after the effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982.
Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET

ASIDE. The complaint is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED."[3] Newmiso

Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for reconsideration were denied.

Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:

1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH

PRESCRIBES IN TEN YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE OR ONE FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM AN INJURY TO
THE RIGHTS OF THE PLAINTIFF WHICH PRESCRIBES IN FOUR
YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE?

2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BE

RETRENCHED BY HIS EMPLOYER?

3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER

MERELY FAILS TO REALIZE THE EXPECTED PROFITS EVEN IF IT
WERE NOT, IN FACT, INCURRING LOSSES?

At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of

jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled
on the application of Philippine law, thus: Acctmis

"Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is
legal under the Singapore Laws because of the defendant's failure to
show which specific laws of Singapore Laws apply to this case. As
substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the Philippine Courts
do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. The defendant that
claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden
of proof. The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law
should be applied."[4]

Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal
before said court.[5] On this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred
defendant-appellant below from raising further the issue of jurisdiction.[6]

Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based on Article 1144 or on
Article 1146 of the Civil Code. According to him, his termination of employment effective
November 1, 1982, was based on an employment contract which is under Article 1144,
so his action should prescribe in 10 years as provided for in said article. Thus he claims
the ruling of the appellate court based on Article 1146 where prescription is only four (4)
years, is an error. The appellate court concluded that the action for illegal dismissal
originally filed before the Labor Arbiter on June 29, 1983, but which was withdrawn,
then filed again in 1987 before the Regional Trial Court, had already prescribed.

In our view, neither Article 1144[7] nor Article 1146[8] of the Civil Code is here pertinent.
What is applicable is Article 291 of the Labor Code, viz:

"Article 291. Money claims. - All money claims arising from employee-
employer relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed
within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise
they shall be forever barred.

x x x" Misact

What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been decided by
this Court. In illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in
Article 1144 of the Civil Code may not be invoked by petitioners, for the Civil Code is a
law of general application, while the prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor
Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW applicable to claims arising from employee-
employer relations.[9]

More recently in De Guzman. vs. Court of Appeals,[10] where the money claim was based
on a written contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court held:

"...The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application
only to 'money claims specifically recoverable under said Code' but covers
all money claims arising from an employee-employer relations"
(Citing Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 764 [1994];
and Uy v. National Labor Relations Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515
[1996]). ...

It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a special
law applicable to money claims arising from employer-employee relations;
thus, it necessarily prevails over Article 1144 of the Civil Code, a general
law. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that 'where two statutes are
of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed
therefore should prevail.' (Citing Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 157 SCRA 282, 294.) Generalia specialibus non derogant."[11]

In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that
petitioner's action for damages due to illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987
or more than four (4) years after the effective date of his dismissal on November 1,
1982 has already prescribed.
 "In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was
filed by plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4)
years after the effectivity date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982.
Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed."

We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but on Article 291 of the
Labor Code, which sets the prescription period at three (3) years and which governs
under this jurisdiction.

Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when he filed his
complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations
Commission. However, this claim deserves scant consideration; it has no legal leg to
stand on. In Olympia International, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we held that "although the
commencement of a civil action stops the running of the statute of prescription or
limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by plaintiff leaves the parties in
exactly the same position as though no action had been commenced at all." [12]

Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to retrenchment was
valid, the appellate court found that the employment contract of petitioner allowed for
pre-termination of employment. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it said, Sdjad

"It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between the parties.
From the moment the same is perfected, the parties are bound not only to
the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all
consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with
good faith, usage and law. Thus, when plaintiff-appellee accepted the offer
of employment, he was bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the
contract, among others, the right of mutual termination by giving three
months written notice or by payment of three months salary. Such
provision is clear and readily understandable, hence, there is no room for
interpretation."

xxx

Further, plaintiff-appellee's contention that he is not bound by the

provisions of the Agreement, as he is not a signatory thereto, deserves no
merit. It must be noted that when plaintiff-appellee's employment was
confirmed, he applied for membership with the Singapore Airlines Limited
(Pilots) Association, the signatory to the aforementioned Agreement. As
such, plaintiff-appellee is estopped from questioning the legality of the said
agreement or any proviso contained therein."[13]

Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent court's decision
is amply supported by evidence and it did not err in its findings, including the reason for
the retrenchment:
 "When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide recession of the
airline industry resulting in a slow down in the company's growth
particularly in the regional operation (Asian Area) where the Airbus 300
operates. It had no choice but to adopt cost cutting measures, such as
cutting down services, number of frequencies of flights, and reduction of
the number of flying points for the A-300 fleet (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, pp. 17-
18). As a result, defendant-appellant had to layoff A-300 pilots, including
plaintiff-appellee, which it found to be in excess of what is reasonably
needed."[14]

All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that
petitioner's termination from employment was for an authorized cause, for which he was
given ample notice and opportunity to be heard, by respondent company. No error nor
grave abuse of discretion, therefore, could be attributed to respondent appellate
court. Sppedsc

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of

Appeals in C.A. CV No. 34476 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G.
BALUA, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

THE CASE

This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
review the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No.
10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying
Section 44 of the Local Government Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2
February 2011 is being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco
(respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a U.S. passport.

FACTS

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado
applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition was issued in his favor.5

The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority
of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.6

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all
allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest
myself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of
America.
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and
belief.7

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte, which contains, among others, the following statements:

I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.

I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.

I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.

I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities.

I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.8

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.9

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that
he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April
2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of
Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel
record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No.
057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the
country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009,
arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.

Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010,
certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer
Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent
travel records:

DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 057782700

DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 05778270012

On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the respondent to
personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present
evidence ex-parte.

Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado
garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate
for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following
documents as evidence:14

1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated
03 April 2009;

2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio
Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time
resident of Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and continuously residing in his
family’s ancestral house in Kauswagan;

3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated
03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado
went to the United States in 1985 to work and returned to the Philippines in 2009;

4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office
of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from
January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and

5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has
been a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.

THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION

Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s
contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua
failed to present any evidence to support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not
conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under the Local
Government Code."17

In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim
that he is a Filipino citizen.18

We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A.
No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on
03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.

xxxx

Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to
renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to
run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained
use of a US passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and
renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined
as an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in
foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to
avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals.19

The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC

First Division reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s
proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby
ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991
take effect.20

The Motion for Reconsideration and

the Motion for Intervention

Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that
"the evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to
law."21 He raised the following contentions:22

1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence consisting of
his Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show that he has substantially
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;

2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American citizenship is
not tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any act to
swear allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;

3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his
Philippine passport, and that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;

4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and
the First Division’s treatment of the petition as one for disqualification constitutes grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23

5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the elections;

6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over
the case; and

7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which
should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and
who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and
filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to
Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division
correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government
Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s
candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who
obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.

Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion for
Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is
prohibited after a decision has already been rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling
undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final
adjudication of the case.

RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC

In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest even after the proclamation of the candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."

As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which
allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has
been rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be
prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of
the First Division allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code
to take effect.

The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for
disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law,24 having
been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.

However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted
Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:

First:

By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his
Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time,
April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.

xxxx

The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his
renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not
operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The First Division’s reliance in the case
of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The
petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino,
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of
citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their
original citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to
be its citizens. In the present case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen
who chose greener pastures by working abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in
the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the
mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at bar.

xxxx
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he
applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was
not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it about
three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the
respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the
respondent’s submission of a certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same for
his travels on the following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12,
2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was
because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use. As probably
pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent used whatever is within his control during that
time.25

In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of
foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.

"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in
this case. Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it
is assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily
denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his
Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his
American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation.
Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship."26

On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:

Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to
the United States. The latter’s continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges
of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to
his declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship. Respondent’s submission with
the twin requirements was obviously only for the purpose of complying with the requirements for
running for the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections.

Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of them
is lost during his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a
citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is
disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for
the mayoralty post cure the latter’s failure to comply with the qualification requirements regarding his
citizenship.

Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received the
highest number of votes does not validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for
disqualification was filed before election against a candidate but was adversely resolved against him
after election, his having obtained the highest number of votes did not make his election valid. His
ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it when
they ratified the Constitution and when they elected their representatives who enacted the law.27

THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for
public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed
as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc
for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now
seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public
office.

Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Division’s
disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the
Local Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the
succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."

There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as
the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.

The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.

The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.

A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.

The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is
applicable to this case.

OUR RULING

Intervention of a rival candidate in a

disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate
who garnered the second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the
disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is disqualified, the
votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be proclaimed as the
winner in the elections.

It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of
the certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC
En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.

The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Mercado v. Manzano28

clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:

That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification
against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If
for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision,
intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet
been no final judgment rendered.29

Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc
has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-
placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by
the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this
Court.

Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents
therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The
elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court has
ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed by
Balua against Arnado will attain finality.

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required
to qualify one to run for an elective position.

Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:

Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:

xxxx

(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.
x x x31

Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of
Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these
twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.

Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when
he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA,
and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By
taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the
time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual
citizen.

After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing
an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.

By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of
the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.32

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued
possession of a foreign citizenship.33

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign
citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his
certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was
solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby
rendering him eligible to run for public office.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the
date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both
countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United
States of America.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time,
only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign
citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which
granted the citizenship.

Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as
a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can
be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act
No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which
repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of
another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his
American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually
renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he
"divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States
of America."38

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest
Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing
himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a
dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself
as an American citizen by using his US passport.

This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid
for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.

Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a
positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by
virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the
certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.39 Dual
citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify
as a candidate for public office.

By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen
enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but
by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,40 he was not
qualified to run for a local elective position.

In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or
from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after
renouncing his American citizenship.

This Court has previously ruled that:

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the
time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once
any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. x x x.41

The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not
just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates
the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.

We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act of consistently
using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that
he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.
It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively
disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.

The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any
elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his
foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public
office.

Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not notified of
the issuance of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able to
obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months later.43

The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who sought
naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That
Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation does not make his use of a US
passport less of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of
representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this country.

The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of his
Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad."44 We
cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used
his Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not have used his US
passport on 24 November 2009.

Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he
renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US
passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of
Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his US
passport.

Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil
and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to
maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are
afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to
renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands
full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship,
has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from
becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.

We now resolve the next issue.

Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential
spring of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election
contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness once again put to the test to address
the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be
proclaimed as the winner in the elections.

The Facts of the case are as follows:

On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office
of municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were
opposing candidates for that office. Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the
election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to
the office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years required by Act No.
2045 having intervened.46

Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a
second re-election absent the four year interruption.

The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred
from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one
receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."47

This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the
effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in
the elections x x x with that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."

The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast between the
two situations, thus:

Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or
irregularities in the elections is quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to
hold such an office. In the former case the court, after an examination of the ballots may find that
some other person than the candidate declared to have received a plurality by the board of
canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its
mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the
manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be
determined who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to
the correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and counting the ballots is before the
deciding power, and generally the only result can be that the election fails entirely. In the former, we
have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for
supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers)
obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the former
must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the
wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the
sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the one
case the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots; in the other, the
question is confined to the personal character and circumstances of a single individual.48 (Emphasis
supplied)

Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not, strictly
speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the
strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy."

The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."

A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is
without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained
the highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the
contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no
one had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in that
town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be
elected and to hold the office of municipal president."

The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be
proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled:

For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his
jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of the
municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said order and all subsequent proceedings
based thereon are null and void and of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on
respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some new and
additional issues, let judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.49

On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal basis to
stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another and
explaining the effects thereof. As an independent statement, it is even illogical.

Let us examine the statement:

"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate
when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."

What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another
candidate?

When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of
the legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from adjudging
another eligible candidate who received the next highest number of votes as the winner and
bestowing upon him that "wreath?"

An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express
legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of
material time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed
upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the
electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the
elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his
qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of
ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal
requirements of eligibility to run for public office.

The popular vote does not cure the

ineligibility of a candidate.

The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that
certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials,
those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not
qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the
electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate.
To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications
and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the
electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in
our republic.

This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when we
pronounced:

x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation
of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.

The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially
if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule
requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the
Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied)

This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC52 where the Court ruled
that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election
victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."53

We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be considered a sufficient
basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in
the candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to certificates of
candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws,
that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after
the elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-
ang v. COMELEC:

The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling.
We say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling
can be fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For
one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates
election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make an
informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.

The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC
which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being
rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section
78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due
course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins.
To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an
election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a
magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)

What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any
disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so
he can submit himself to the electorate and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?

It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that
its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not
democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the
electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an
open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.
1âw phi 1

Maquiling is not a second-placer as

he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.

With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the
highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.

We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void
COC cannot produce any legal effect.

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the
winner of an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still
respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the
sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate
candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and
disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who
turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does
not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be
eligible as candidates.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware
within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said
candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified
candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.

The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes
the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not
necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed
as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified
candidates.

That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no
moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the
filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado
failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15
June 2010, long after the elections and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not
involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was
both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual
citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of
the enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus
rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that
Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his
answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed
the winner.

To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification
which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of
Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves
Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule
on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC
En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL
ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE
MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10
May 2010 elections.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.

No pronouncement as to costs.
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 188314

Plaintiff-Appellee,

- versus

KHADDAFY JANJALANI,
GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Present:
Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD
a.k.a. Abu Khalil, GAPPAL CARPIO MORALES, J.,
BANNAH ASALI a.k.a. Maidan or Chairperson,
Negro, JAINAL SALI a.k.a. Abu BRION,
Solaiman, ROHMAT BERSAMIN,
ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Jackie or VILLARAMA, JR., and
Zaky, and other JOHN and JANE SERENO, JJ.
DOES,
Accused,

GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a.

Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD Promulgated:
a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and ROHMAT
ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Abu Jackie January 10, 2011
or Zaky,
Accused-Appellants.

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
SERENO, J.:

Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated 30 June 2008, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 05-476 and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005.
The latter Decision convicted the three accused-appellants namely, Gamal B.
Baharan a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim
a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky of the complex crime of multiple murder and multiple
frustrated murder, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death by lethal
injection. The CA modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua as required by
Republic Act No. 9346 (Act Abolishing the Imposition of Death Penalty).

Statement of Facts

The pertinent facts, as determined by the trial court, are as follows:

On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route,
from its Navotas bus terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue (EDSA). Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while they were
about to move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop, the bus conductor
noticed two men running after the bus. The two insisted on getting on the bus, so
the conductor obliged and let them in.

According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately became

wary of the two men, because, even if they got on the bus together, the two sat
away from each other one sat two seats behind the driver, while the other sat at the
back of the bus. At the time, there were only 15 passengers inside the bus. He also
noticed that the eyes of one of the men were reddish. When he approached the
person near the driver and asked him whether he was paying for two passengers,
the latter looked dumb struck by the question. He then stuttered and said he was
paying for two and gave PhP20. Andales grew more concerned when the other
man seated at the back also paid for both passengers. At this point, Andales said he
became more certain that the two were up to no good, and that there might be a
holdup.

Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept
on asking him if the bus was going to stop at Ayala Avenue. The witness also
noticed that the man at the back appeared to be slouching, with his legs stretched
out in front of him and his arms hanging out and hidden from view as if he was
tinkering with something. When Andales would get near the man, the latter would
glare at him. Andales admitted, however, that he did not report the suspicious
characters to the police.
 As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and
EDSA, the two men insisted on getting off the bus. According to Andales, the bus
driver initially did not want to let them off the bus, because a Makati ordinance
prohibited unloading anywhere except at designated bus stops. Eventually, the bus
driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to alight. The two immediately got
off the bus and ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after, Andales felt an
explosion. He then saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus
towards a nearby mall. After a while, he went back to where the bus was. He saw
their bus passengers either lying on the ground or looking traumatized. A few
hours after, he made a statement before the Makati Police Station narrating the
whole incident.

The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of

Justice, confirming that shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the Abu
Sayyaf Group Abu Solaiman announced over radio station DZBB that the group
had a Valentines Day gift for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the
bombing, he again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks.

As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News

Network an exclusive interview some time after the incident, confessing his
participation in the Valentines Day bombing incident. In another exclusive
interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the
bombing incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing
that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The
bus conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that
they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14
February.

Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B.

Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat
Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and other John and Jane Does were then
charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only Baharan,
Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused remain at-
large.

On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-
476), Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand,
upon arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-
477), accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty.
Rohmat pled not guilty to both charges. During the pretrial hearing, the parties
stipulated the following:
1.) The jurisdiction of this court over the offenses charged.

2.) That all three accused namely alias Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali
admitted knowing one another before February 14, 2005.

3.) All the same three accused likewise admitted that a bomb exploded in the
RRCG bus while the bus was plying the EDSA route fronting the MRT
terminal which is in front of the Makati Commercial Center.

4.) Accused Asali admitted knowing the other accused alias Rohmat whom
he claims taught him how to make explosive devices.

5.) The accused Trinidad also admitted knowing Rohmat before the February
14 bombing incident.

6.) The accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all admitted to causing the
bomb explosion inside the RRCG bus which left four people dead and
more or less forty persons injured.

7.) Both Baharan and Trinidad agreed to stipulate that within the period
March 20-24 each gave separate interviews to the ABS-CBN news
network admitting their participation in the commission of the said crimes,
subject of these cases.

8.) Accused Trinidad and Baharan also admitted to pleading guilty to these
crimes, because they were guilt-stricken after seeing a man carrying a
child in the first bus that they had entered.
9.) Accused Asali likewise admitted that in the middle of March 2005 he
gave a television news interview in which he admitted that he supplied the
explosive devices which resulted in this explosion inside the RRCG bus
and which resulted in the filing of these charges.

10.) Finally, accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted that they are
members of the Abu Sayyaf.[1]

In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused
Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to changing their not guilty pleas to the
charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled guilty to the
heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in their
pleas. Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan and Trinidad and
explained to them the consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged
the inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After the
Information was read to them, Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge
of multiple frustrated murder.[2]

After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that while
under training with the Abu Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat, a.k.a Abu Jackie or Zaky,
and two other persons taught him how to make bombs and explosives. The trainees
were told that they were to wage battles against the government in the city, and
that their first mission was to plant bombs in malls, the Light Railway Transit
(LRT), and other parts of Metro Manila.

As found by the trial court, Asali, after his training, was required by the Abu
Sayyaf leadership, specifically Abu Solaiman and Rohmat, to secure eight kilos of
TNT, a soldering gun, aluminum powder, a tester, and Christmas lights, all of
which he knew would be used to make a bomb. He then recalled that sometime in
November to December 2004, Trinidad asked him for a total of 4 kilos of TNT that
is, 2 kilos on two separate occasions. Rohmat allegedly called Asali to confirm that
Trinidad would get TNT from Asali and use it for their first mission. The TNT was
allegedly placed in two buses sometime in December 2004, but neither one of them
exploded.

Asali then testified that the night before the Valentines Day bombing,
Trinidad and Baharan got another two kilos of TNT from him. Late in the evening
of 14 February, he received a call from Abu Solaiman. The latter told Asali not to
leave home or go to crowded areas, since the TNT taken by Baharan and Trinidad
had already been exploded in Makati. Thirty minutes later, Trinidad called Asali,
repeating the warning of Abu Solaiman. The next day, Asali allegedly received a
call from accused Rohmat, congratulating the former on the success of the
mission.[3] According to Asali, Abu Zaky specifically said, Sa wakas nag success
din yung tinuro ko sayo.

Assignment of Errors

Accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:

I. The trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants

plea of guilt despite insufficiency of searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of
the said plea.
 II. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of
accused-appellants for the crimes charged had been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.[4]

First Assignment of Error

Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial court did not conduct
a searching inquiry after they had changed their plea from not guilty to guilty. The
transcript of stenographic notes during the 18 April 2005 re-arraignment before the
Makati Regional Trial Court is reproduced below:

COURT : Anyway, I think what we should have to do, considering the

stipulations that were agreed upon during the last hearing, is to
address this matter of pleas of not guilty entered for the
frustrated murder charges by the two accused, Mr. Trinidad
and Mr. Baharan, because if you will recall they entered pleas
of guilty to the multiple murder charges, but then earlier pleas
of not guilty for the frustrated multiple murder charges remain
[I]s that not inconsistent considering the stipulations that were
entered into during the initial pretrial of this case? [If] you will
recall, they admitted to have caused the bomb explosion that
led to the death of at least four people and injury of about forty
other persons and so under the circumstances, Atty Pea, have
you discussed this matter with your clients?

ATTY. PEA : Then we should be given enough time to talk with them. I havent
conferred with them about this with regard to the multiple
murder case.

COURT : Okay. So let us proceed now. Atty. Pea, can you assist the two accused
because if they are interested in withdrawing their [pleas], I
want to hear it from your lips.

ATTY. PEA : Yes, your Honor.

(At this juncture, Atty. Pea confers with the two accused, namely Trinidad and
Baharan)
I have talked to them, your Honor, and I have explained to them the consequence
of their pleas, your Honor, and that the plea of guilt to
the murder case and plea of not guilty to the frustrated multiple
murder actually are inconsistent with their pleas.

COURT : With matters that they stipulated upon?

 ATTY. PEA : Yes, your Honor. So, they are now, since they already plead guilt to
the murder case, then they are now changing their pleas, your
Honor, from not guilty to the one of guilt. They are now ready,
your Honor, for re-arraignment.

INTERPRETER: (Read again that portion [of the information] and translated it in
Filipino in a clearer way and asked both accused what their
pleas are).
Your Honor, both accused are entering separate pleas of guilt to the crime
charged.

COURT : All right. So after the information was re-read to the accused, they have
withdrawn their pleas of not guilty and changed it to the pleas
of guilty to the charge of frustrated murder. Thank you. Are
there any matters you need to address at pretrial now? If there
are none, then I will terminate pretrial and accommodate[5]

As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that all trial
judges must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for
while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra
solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully
the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.[6] Thus, trial
court judges are required to observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of
his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree
of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. (Emphasis
supplied)

The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-

arraignment. In People v. Galvez, the Court noted that since accused-appellant's
original plea was not guilty, the trial court should have exerted careful effort in
inquiring into why he changed his plea to guilty.[7] According to the Court:

The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a

case involving the death penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in order to leave
no room for doubt on the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood
the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.[8]
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed
satisfied in cases in which it was the defense counsel who explained the
consequences of a guilty plea to the accused, as it appears in this case. In People v.
Alborida, this Court found that there was still an improvident plea of guilty, even if
the accused had already signified in open court that his counsel had explained the
consequences of the guilty plea; that he understood the explanation of his counsel;
that the accused understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out to
him; and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or threatened.[9]

We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching

inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy
themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken
impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences
of their guilty plea.[10] This requirement is stringent and mandatory.[11]
Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-
arraignment was conducted or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt
against the accused. The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad
previously pled guilty to another charge multiple murder based on the same act
relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes that
prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two
other confessions of guilt one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive
television interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and the other
via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing
circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the searching
inquiry in this instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as
the accuseds plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment
under consideration.[12]

Second Assignment of Error

In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the requirement of

conducting a searching inquiry was not complied with, [t]he manner by which the
plea of guilt is madeloses much of great significance where the conviction can be
based on independent evidence proving the commission by the person accused of
the offense charged.[13] Thus, in People v. Nadera, the Court stated:

Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such
plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and
credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained,
because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on
evidence proving his commission of the offense charged.[14](Emphasis supplied.)
In their second assignment of error, accused-appellants assert that guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. They pointed out that the testimony of the
conductor was merely circumstantial, while that of Asali as to the conspiracy was
insufficient.

Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are concerned, the

evidence for the prosecution, in addition to that which can be drawn from the
stipulation of facts, primarily consisted of the testimonies of the bus conductor,
Elmer Andales, and of the accused-turned-state-witness, Asali. Andales positively
identified accused Baharan and Trinidad as the two men who had acted
suspiciously while inside the bus; who had insisted on getting off the bus in
violation of a Makati ordinance; and who had scampered away from the bus
moments before the bomb exploded. On the other hand, Asali testified that he had
given accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in
Makati City. The guilt of the accused Baharan and Trinidad was sufficiently
established by these corroborating testimonies, coupled with their respective
judicial admissions (pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial confessions (exclusive
television interviews, as they both stipulated during pretrial) that they were indeed
the perpetrators of the Valentines Day bombing.[15] Accordingly, the Court upholds
the findings of guilt made by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Anent accused Rohmat, the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the
testimony of accused-turned-state-witness Asali. Below is a reproduction of the
transcript of stenographic notes on the state prosecutors direct examination of
state-witness Asali during the 26 May 2005 trial:

Q : You stated that Zaky trained you and Trinidad. Under what circumstances did
he train you, Mr. Witness, to assemble those explosives, you
and Trinidad?

A : Abu Zaky, Abu Solaiman, Khadaffy Janjalani, the three of them, that Angelo
Trinidad and myself be the one to be trained to make an
explosive, sir.

Q : Mr. witness, how long that training, or how long did it take that training?

A : If I am not mistaken, we were thought to make bomb about one month and
two weeks.
 Q : Now, speaking of that mission, Mr. witness, while you were still in training at
Mr. Cararao, is there any mission that you undertook, if any,
with respect to that mission?

A : Our first mission was to plant a bomb in the malls, LRT, and other parts of
Metro Manila, sir.[16]

The witness then testified that he kept eight kilos of TNT for accused
Baharan and Trinidad.
Q : Now, going back to the bomb. Mr. witness, did you know what happened to
the 2 kilos of bomb that Trinidad and Tapay took from you
sometime in November 2004?

A : That was the explosive that he planted in the G-liner, which did not explode.

Q : How did you know, Mr. witness?

A : He was the one who told me, Mr. Angelo Trinidad, sir.

Q : What happened next, Mr. witness, when the bomb did not explode, as told to
you by Trinidad?

A : On December 29, Angelo Trinidad got 2 more kilos of TNT bombs.

Q : Did Trinidad tell you why he needed another amount of explosive on that
date, December 29, 2004? Will you kindly tell us the reason
why?

A : He told me that Abu Solaiman instructed me to get the TNT so that he could
detonate a bomb

Q : Were there any other person, besides Abu Solaiman, who called you up, with
respect to the taking of the explosives from you?

A : There is, sir Abu Zaky, sir, called up also.

Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you when he called you up?

A : He told me that this is your first mission.

Q : Please enlighten the Honorable Court. What is that mission you are referring
to?

A : That is the first mission where we can show our anger towards the Christians.

Q : The second time that he got a bomb from you, Mr. witness, do you know if
the bomb explode?

A : I did not know what happened to the next 2 kilos taken by Angelo Trinidad
from me until after I was caught, because I was told by the
policeman that interviewed me after I was arrested that the 2
kilos were planted in a bus, which also did not explode.

Q : So besides these two incidents, were there any other incidents that Angelo
Trinidad and Tapay get an explosive for you, Mr. witness?

A : If I am not mistaken, sir, on February 13, 2005 at 6:30 p.m.

Q : Who got from you the explosive Mr. witness?

A : Its Angelo Trinidad and Tapay, sir.

Q : How many explosives did they get from you, Mr. witness, at that time?

A : They got 2 kilos TNT bomb, sir.

Q : Did they tell you, Mr. witness, where are they going to use that explosive?

A : No, sir.

Q : Do you know, Mr. witness, what happened to the third batch of explosives,
which were taken from you by Trinidad and Tapay?

A : That is the bomb that exploded in Makati, sir.

Q : Why did you know, Mr. witness?

A : Because I was called in the evening of February 14 by Abu Solaiman. He told

me not to leave the house because the explosive that were
taken by Tapay and Angelo Trinidad exploded.
Q : Was there any other call during that time, Mr. Witness?

A : I was told by Angelo Trinidad not to leave the house because the explosive
that he took exploded already, sir.

Q : How sure were you, Mr. witness, at that time, that indeed, the bomb exploded
at Makati, beside the call of Abu Solaiman and Trinidad?

A : It was told by Abu Solaiman that the bombing in Makati should coincide with
the bombing in General Santos.

A : He told it to me, sir I cannot remember the date anymore, but I know it was
sometime in February 2005.

Q : Any other call, Mr. witness, from Abu Solaiman and Trinidad after the
bombing exploded in Makati, any other call?

A : There is, sir The call came from Abu Zaky.

Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you, Mr. witness?

A : He just greeted us congratulations, because we have a successful mission.

A : He told me that sa wakas, nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo.

Q : By the way, Mr. witness, I would just like to clarify this. You stated that Abu
Zaky called you up the following day, that was February 15,
and congratulating you for the success of the mission. My
question to you, Mr. witness, if you know what is the relation
of that mission, wherein you were congratulated by Abu Zaky,
to the mission, which have been indoctrinated to you, while
you were in Mt. Cararao, Mr. witness?

A : They are connected, sir.

Q : Connected in what sense, Mr. witness?

 A : Because when we were undergoing training, we were told that the Abu Sayyaf
should not wage war to the forest, but also wage our battles in
the city.

Q : Wage the battle against who, Mr. witness?

A : The government, sir.[17]

What can be culled from the testimony of Asali is that the Abu Sayyaf
Group was determined to sow terror in Metro Manila, so that they could show their
anger towards the Christians.[18] It can also be seen that Rohmat, together with
Janjalani and Abu Solaiman, had carefully planned the Valentines Day bombing
incident, months before it happened. Rohmat had trained Asali and Trinidad to
make bombs and explosives. While in training, Asali and others were told that their
mission was to plant bombs in malls, the LRT, and other parts of Metro
Manila. According to Asali, Rohmat called him on 29 December 2004 to confirm
that Trinidad would get two kilos of TNT from Asali, as they were about to
commence their first mission.[19] They made two separate attempts to bomb a bus
in Metro Manila, but to no avail. The day before the Valentines Day bombing,
Trinidad got another two kilos of TNT from Asali. On Valentines Day, the Abu
Sayyaf Group announced that they had a gift for the former President, Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo. On their third try, their plan finally succeeded. Right after the
bomb exploded, the Abu Sayyaf Group declared that there would be more
bombings in the future. Asali then received a call from Rohmat, praising the
former: Sa wakas nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo.[20]

In the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court upholds the finding of guilt
against Rohmat. Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

Art. 17. Principals. The following are considered principals:

1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act

2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which
it would not have been accomplished

Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second paragraph, or

the provision on principal by inducement. The instructions and training he had
given Asali on how to make bombs coupled with their careful planning and
persistent attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and Rohmats
confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as part of their
mission prove the finding that Rohmats co-inducement was the determining cause
of the commission of the crime.[21] Such command or advice [was] of such nature
that, without it, the crime would not have materialized.[22]

Further, the inducement was so influential in producing the criminal act that
without it, the act would not have been performed.[23] In People v. Sanchez, et al.,
the Court ruled that, notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the
crime scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of the criminal act or the
principal by inducement. Thus, because Mayor Sanchez was a co-principal and co-
conspirator, and because the act of one conspirator is the act of all, the mayor was
rendered liable for all the resulting crimes.[24] The same finding must be applied to
the case at bar.

The Court also affirms the finding of the existence of conspiracy involving
accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Rohmat. Conspiracy was clearly established from
the collective acts of the accused-appellants before, during and after the
commission of the crime. As correctly declared by the trial court in its Omnibus
Decision:

Asalis clear and categorical testimony, which remains unrebutted on its

major points, coupled with the judicial admissions freely and voluntarily given by
the two other accused, are sufficient to prove the existence of a conspiracy
hatched between and among the four accused, all members of the terrorist group
Abu Sayyaf, to wreak chaos and mayhem in the metropolis by indiscriminately
killing and injuring civilian victims by utilizing bombs and other similar
destructive explosive devices.

While said conspiracy involving the four malefactors has not been
expressly admitted by accused Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, and Rohmat, more
specifically with respect to the latters participation in the commission of the
crimes, nonetheless it has been established by virtue of the aforementioned
evidence, which established the existence of the conspiracy itself and the
indispensable participation of accused Rohmat in seeing to it that the conspirators
criminal design would be realized.

It is well-established that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the

accused, which clearly manifests a concurrence of wills, a common intent or
design to commit a crime (People v. Lenantud, 352 SCRA 544). Hence, where
acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a
common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose,
conspiracy is evident and all the perpetrators will be held liable as principals
(People v. Ellado, 353 SCRA 643).[25]
 In People v. Geronimo, the Court pronounced that it would be justified in
concluding that the defendants therein were engaged in a conspiracy when the
defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and the
other performing another part so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of
the same object; and their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact
concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted
action and concurrence of sentiments.[26]

Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec.

30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule, statements made
by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made during
the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in People v. Buntag, if
the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a
judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both
conspirators.[27] Thus, in People v. Palijon, the Court held the following:

[W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An

extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not
against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine
him. A judicial confession is admissible against the declarants co-accused since
the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former. Section 30, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and
not to testimony at trial where the party adversely affected has the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Mercenes admission implicating
his co-accused was given on the witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against
appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several accused are tried together for the same
offense, the testimony of a co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent
evidence against the latter.[28]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial

Court of Makati, as affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003]

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Sandiganbayan, Major

General Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth
Dimaano, respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (First Division)[1] dated 18 November 1991 and 25
March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037. The first Resolution dismissed petitioners Amended
Complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth
Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended
Complaint, or in the alternative, for the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First
Division) for further proceedings allowing petitioner to complete the presentation of its
evidence.

Antecedent Facts

Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA

Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 (EO No. 1)
creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). EO No. 1
primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1
vested the PCGG with the power (a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in
order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order and the power (h) to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of
this order. Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga,
created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active
service or retired.[2]
 Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged
unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas (Ramas). On 27
July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on
the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas. The relevant part of the Resolution reads:

III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:

Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located
at 15-Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City. He is also the owner of a house and lot
located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of 3,327 square meters.

The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly
at P700,000.00.

The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises
of Elizabeth Dimaano and were confiscated by elements of the PC Command of
Batangas were all covered by invoice receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO,
RSO Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items could not have been in the possession of
Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent Commanding General of the
Philippine Army.

Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding
team was also able to confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000
US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.

Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command,

Philippine Army, stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, disclosed that
Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent. That respondent usually goes and
stays and sleeps in the alleged house of Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas,
Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces and kisses
respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to the
residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attache cases filled with money and
owned by MGen Ramas.

Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible
means of income and is supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere
secretary.

Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military
equipment/items seized in her house on March 3, 1986 without the consent of
respondent, he being the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. It is also
impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that she owns the P2,870,000.00 and
$50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of income.

This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of
respondent. There was an intention to cover the existence of these money because
these are all ill-gotten and unexplained wealth.Were it not for the affidavits of the
members of the Military Security Unit assigned at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna,
the existence and ownership of these money would have never been known.

The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also submitted for scrutiny
and analysis by the Boards consultant. Although the amount of P2,870,000.00 and
$50,000 US Dollars were not included, still it was disclosed that respondent has an
unexplained wealth of P104,134. 60.

IV. CONCLUSION:

In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists against
respondent for ill-gotten and unexplained wealth in the amount of P2,974,134.00 and
$50,000 US Dollars.

V. RECOMMENDATION:

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted

and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the
Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property. [3]

Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act
No. 1379 (RA No. 1379) [4] against Ramas.
Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez
filed an Amended Complaint naming the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner),
represented by the PCGG, as plaintiff and Ramas as defendant. The Amended
Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano (Dimaano) as co-defendant.
The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army until 1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the
Military Security Unit, Philippine Army, assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas
from 1 January 1978 to February 1979. The Amended Complaint further alleged that
Ramas acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary
as an army officer and his other income from legitimately acquired property by taking
undue advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority and influence as
such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close
associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.[5]
 The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry,
found reasonable ground to believe that respondents have violated RA No. 1379. [6] The
Amended Complaint prayed for, among others, the forfeiture of respondents properties,
funds and equipment in favor of the State.
Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory
Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas contended that his
property consisted only of a residential house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City,
valued at P700,000, which was not out of proportion to his salary and other legitimate
income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash,
communications equipment and other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.
Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her
employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978 only,
Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and
land titles taken from her house by the Philippine Constabulary raiding team.
After termination of the pre-trial,[7] the court set the case for trial on the merits on 9-
11 November 1988.
On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the hearing due to its lack
of preparation for trial and the absence of witnesses and vital documents to support its
case. The court reset the hearing to 17 and 18 April 1989.
On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in order
to charge the delinquent properties with being subject to forfeiture as having been
unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x.[8]
Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with
petitioners presentation of evidence on the ground that the motion for leave to amend
complaint did not state when petitioner would file the amended complaint. The
Sandiganbayan further stated that the subject matter of the amended complaint was on
its face vague and not related to the existing complaint. The Sandiganbayan also held
that due to the time that the case had been pending in court, petitioner should proceed
to present its evidence.
After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a postponement of the
trial.
On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial, petitioner manifested its
inability to proceed to trial because of the absence of other witnesses or lack of further
evidence to present. Instead, petitioner reiterated its motion to amend the complaint to
conform to the evidence already presented or to change the averments to show that
Dimaano alone unlawfully acquired the monies or properties subject of the forfeiture.
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for over a
year mainly because of its many postponements. Moreover, petitioner would want the
case to revert to its preliminary stage when in fact the case had long been ready for
trial. The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioner to prepare for presentation of its additional
evidence, if any.
 During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its inability to present
further evidence. Giving petitioner one more chance to present further evidence or to
amend the complaint to conform to its evidence, the Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18
May 1990. The Sandiganbayan, however, hinted that the re-setting was without
prejudice to any action that private respondents might take under the circumstances.
However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to trial
because it had no further evidence to present. Again, in the interest of justice, the
Sandiganbayan granted petitioner 60 days within which to file an appropriate
pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however, warned petitioner that failure to act would
constrain the court to take drastic action.
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v.
Migrino.[9] The Court held in Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held without a
showing that they are subordinates of former President Marcos.
On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the dispositive
portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint,

without pronouncement as to costs. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack
of merit, but the confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and
land titles are ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.
The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon. Ombudsman,
who has primary jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such
appropriate action as the evidence warrants. This case is also referred to the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax
liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in connection herewith.

SO ORDERED.

On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration.

In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents filed a Joint
Comment/Opposition to which petitioner filed its Reply on 10 January 1992.
On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution denying the Motion
for Reconsideration.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:

(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the
Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan and Republic v.
[10]

Migrino which involve the same issues.

[11]

(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases

was conducted against Ramas and Dimaano.

(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case
against him.

(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
PETITIONERS EVIDENCE CANNOT MAKE A CASE FOR
FORFEITURE AND THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF
CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION OR RELATIONSHIP BY
CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY BY AND BETWEEN
RESPONDENT RAMAS AND RESPONDENT DIMAANO
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SUCH CONCLUSIONS
WERE CLEARLY UNFOUNDED AND PREMATURE, HAVING
BEEN RENDERED PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF THE
PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER.
B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE FILING
OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT, SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT IN LINE WITH THE
RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CRUZ, JR. v.
SANDIGANBAYAN, 194 SCRA 474 AND REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO,
189 SCRA 289, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:

1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and Republic v.

Migrino, supra, are clearly not applicable to this case;

2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the complaint in

Civil Case No. 0037 was cured and/or waived by
respondents with the filing of their respective answers with
counterclaim; and

3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently improper

considering that they were filed after commencement of the
 presentation of the evidence of the petitioner and even
before the latter was allowed to formally offer its evidence
and rest its case;

C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

ARTICLES AND THINGS SUCH AS SUMS OF MONEY,
COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY AND LAND TITLES
CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE OF RESPONDENT DIMAANO
WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND THEREFORE EXCLUDED AS
EVIDENCE.[12]

The Courts Ruling

First Issue: PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents

This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this Court in Cruz,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[13] and Republic v. Migrino.[14]
The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to
investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for
unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.
We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.
The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and
corrupt practices of AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired. [15] The
PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the necessary recommendations to appropriate
government agencies on the action to be taken based on its findings. [16] The PCGG gave
this task to the AFP Board pursuant to the PCGGs power under Section 3 of EO No. 1
to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and to carry out
the purposes of this order. EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to wit:

SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in
regard to the following matters:

(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President

Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad,
including the takeover and sequestration of all business enterprises and
entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration,
directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their
public office and/ or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship.
 (b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President
may assign to the Commission from time to time.

x x x.
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth
and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories
mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have
accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former President Marcos by
being the latters immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking
undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence x x x;[17] or (2) AFP
personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns
their cases to the PCGG.[18]
Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas case to the
PCGG. Therefore, Ramas case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel
before the PCGG could exercise its jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas
was undoubtedly a subordinate of former President Marcos because of his position as
the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that Ramas position
enabled him to receive orders directly from his commander-in-chief, undeniably making
him a subordinate of former President Marcos.
We hold that Ramas was not a subordinate of former President Marcos in the sense
contemplated under EO No. 1 and its amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a
subordinate as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he
enjoyed close association with former President Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue
in this wise:

A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is
contemplated within the term subordinate. The Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express
the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here
and abroad.

EO No. 2 freezes all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President
Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates,
business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation.

Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis that is-

[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a

particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their
widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind
or class as those specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co, Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds
of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2ndEd., 203].

[T]he term subordinate as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a close
association with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate
family member, relative, and close associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative,
business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2.

xxx

It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official
or employee during the administration of former President Marcos. There must be a
prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue
of his close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.
(Emphasis supplied)

Ramas position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank
of Major General[19] does not suffice to make him a subordinate of former President
Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide
a prima facie showing that Ramas was a close associate of former President Marcos, in
the same manner that business associates, dummies, agents or nominees of former
President Marcos were close to him. Such close association is manifested either by
Ramas complicity with former President Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth
by the deposed President or by former President Marcos acquiescence in Ramas own
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.
This, the PCGG failed to do.
Petitioners attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does not convince
us. Petitioner argues that unlike in Migrino, the AFP Board Resolution in the instant
case states that the AFP Board conducted the investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A in relation to RA No. 1379. Petitioner asserts that there is a presumption
that the PCGG was acting within its jurisdiction of investigating crony-related cases of
graft and corruption and that Ramas was truly a subordinate of the former
President. However, the same AFP Board Resolution belies this contention. Although
the Resolution begins with such statement, it ends with the following recommendation:

V. RECOMMENDATION:

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted

and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the
Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property. [20]
Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private respondents
under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the result yielded a finding of violation of Republic
Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any relation to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This
absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its amendments proves fatal to petitioners case.
EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and limited purpose, and necessarily its
powers must be construed to address such specific and limited purpose.
Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended Complaint do not
show that the properties Ramas allegedly owned were accumulated by him in his
capacity as a subordinate of his commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely enumerated the
properties Ramas allegedly owned and suggested that these properties were
disproportionate to his salary and other legitimate income without showing that Ramas
amassed them because of his close association with former President
Marcos. Petitioner, in fact, admits that the AFP Board resolution does not contain a
finding that Ramas accumulated his wealth because of his close association with former
President Marcos, thus:

10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of the New Armed
Forces of the Philippines did not categorically find a prima facie evidence
showing that respondent Ramas unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his
close association or relation with former President Marcos and/or his wife, it is
submitted that such omission was not fatal. The resolution of the Anti-Graft Board
should be read in the context of the law creating the same and the objective of the
investigation which was, as stated in the above, pursuant to Republic Act Nos. 3019
and 1379 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a; (Emphasis supplied)
[21]

Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima facie showing
that the ill-gotten wealth was accumulated by a subordinate of former President Marcos
that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. EO No. 1[22] clearly premises the creation of the PCGG
on the urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Marcos,
his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. Therefore, to say
that such omission was not fatal is clearly contrary to the intent behind the creation of
the PCGG.
In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,[23] the Court outlined the cases that fall under the
jurisdiction of the PCGG pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2,[24] 14,[25] 14-A:[26]

A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1 in relation with
Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Executive Order No. 14, shows what the authority of the
respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute covers:

(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the recovery of ill-
gotten wealth under Republic Act No. 1379, accumulated by former
President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including
 the take-over or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities
owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or
through his nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public
office and/or using their powers, authority and influence,
connections or relationships; and

(b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses committed in the

acquisition of said ill-gotten wealth as contemplated under Section 2(a)
of Executive Order No. 1.

However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not
otherwise falling under the foregoing categories, require a previous authority of
the President for the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute in
accordance with Section 2 (b) of Executive Order No. 1. Otherwise, jurisdiction
over such cases is vested in the Ombudsman and other duly authorized
investigating agencies such as the provincial and city prosecutors, their
assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and his assistants and the state
prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied)

The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and
prosecute forfeiture petitions not falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments. The
preliminary investigation of unexplained wealth amassed on or before 25 February 1986
falls under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while the authority to file the
corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor General.[27] The Ombudsman Act
or Republic Act No. 6770 (RA No. 6770) vests in the Ombudsman the power to conduct
preliminary investigation and to file forfeiture proceedings involving unexplained wealth
amassed after 25 February 1986.[28]
After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still pursued this case
despite the absence of a prima facie finding that Ramas was a subordinate of former
President Marcos. The petition for forfeiture filed with the Sandiganbayan should be
dismissed for lack of authority by the PCGG to investigate respondents since there is
no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and its amendments apply to respondents. The
AFP Board Resolution and even the Amended Complaint state that there are violations
of RA Nos. 3019 and 1379. Thus, the PCGG should have recommended Ramas case
to the Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of
ordinary unexplained wealth and graft cases. As stated in Migrino:

[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the
prosecution of private respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the
PCGG must also be enjoined from proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any
action that may be taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates
that an agency of government be allowed to exercise only the powers granted to it.
 Petitioners argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing of
the forfeiture petition by submitting their respective Answers with counterclaim deserves
no merit as well.
Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction
to waive in the first place. The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial
powers never granted to it. PCGGs powers are specific and limited. Unless given
additional assignment by the President, PCGGs sole task is only to recover the ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies.[29] Without these elements, the
PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.
Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the PCGG to
investigate and prosecute their cases by filing their Motion to Dismiss as soon as they
learned of the pronouncement of the Court in Migrino. This case was decided on 30
August 1990, which explains why private respondents only filed their Motion to Dismiss
on 8 October 1990.Nevertheless, we have held that the parties may raise lack of
jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding.[30] Thus, we hold that there was no waiver of
jurisdiction in this case. Jurisdiction is vested by law and not by the parties to an
action.[31]
Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG
to conduct the preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman may still conduct the proper
preliminary investigation for violation of RA No. 1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor
General may file the forfeiture petition with the Sandiganbayan. [32] The right of the State
to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379 is not subject to prescription, laches or
estoppel.[33]

Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case

Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence

Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case
before completion of the presentation of petitioners evidence.
We disagree.
Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find
that petitioner has only itself to blame for non-completion of the presentation of its
evidence. First, this case has been pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan
dismissed it. Petitioner filed its Amended Complaint on 11
August 1987, and only began to present its evidence on 17 April 1989. Petitioner had
almost two years to prepare its evidence. However, despite this sufficient time,
petitioner still delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous
motions for postponements and extensions. Even before the date set for the
presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion for Leave to
Amend the Complaint.[34]The motion sought to charge the delinquent properties (which
comprise most of petitioners evidence) with being subject to forfeiture as having been
unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x.
 The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of petitioners
evidence since petitioner did not state when it would file the amended complaint. On 18
April 1989, the Sandiganbayan set the continuation of the presentation of evidence on
28-29 September and 9-11 October 1989, giving petitioner ample time to prepare its
evidence. Still, on 28 September 1989, petitioner manifested its inability to proceed with
the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan issued an Order expressing its
view on the matter, to wit:

The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the above events
because this case has been ready for trial for over a year and much of the delay hereon
has been due to the inability of the government to produce on scheduled dates for pre-
trial and for trial documents and witnesses, allegedly upon the failure of the military
to supply them for the preparation of the presentation of evidence thereon. Of equal
interest is the fact that this Court has been held to task in public about its alleged
failure to move cases such as this one beyond the preliminary stage, when, in view of
the developments such as those of today, this Court is now faced with a situation
where a case already in progress will revert back to the preliminary stage, despite a
five-month pause where appropriate action could have been undertaken by the
plaintiff Republic.[35]

On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was conducting a

preliminary investigation on the unexplained wealth of private respondents as mandated
by RA No. 1379.[36]The PCGG prayed for an additional four months to conduct the
preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan granted this request and scheduled the
presentation of evidence on 26-29 March 1990. However, on the scheduled date,
petitioner failed to inform the court of the result of the preliminary investigation the
PCGG supposedly conducted. Again, the Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until 18 May
1990 to continue with the presentation of its evidence and to inform the court of what
lies ahead insofar as the status of the case is concerned x x x.[37] Still on the date set,
petitioner failed to present its evidence. Finally, on 11 July 1990, petitioner filed its Re-
Amended Complaint.[38] The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that a case already
pending for years would revert to its preliminary stage if the court were to accept the
Re-Amended Complaint.
Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to blame for
failure to complete the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner
more than sufficient time to finish the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan
overlooked petitioners delays and yet petitioner ended the long-string of delays with the
filing of a Re-Amended Complaint, which would only prolong even more the disposition
of the case.
Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the
Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate
and prosecute the case against private respondents. This alone would have been
sufficient legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the forfeiture case against
private respondents.
 Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before
completion of the presentation of petitioners evidence.

Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties

confiscated from Dimaanos house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in
evidence. This issue bears a significant effect on petitioners case since these properties
comprise most of petitioners evidence against private respondents. Petitioner will not
have much evidence to support its case against private respondents if these properties
are inadmissible in evidence.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos residence a
search warrant captioned Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. Dimaano was
not present during the raid but Dimaanos cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team
seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt together with other items not included in
the search warrant. The raiding team seized these items: one baby armalite rifle with
two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45; communications
equipment, cash consisting of P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the
search and seizure on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA
revolution.[39]Petitioner argues that a revolutionary government was operative at that time
by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and Vice President
Laurel were taking power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people. [40] Petitioner
asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation of the 1973
Constitution which guaranteed private respondents exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search
applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights had already
reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the government
may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in
evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy
any constitutional right.
Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in
President Aquinos Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution
was done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution.[41] The resulting
government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or
legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as the de
jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the
Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual
and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary government following the
cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the
adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the protection accorded to
individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant)
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration) remained in effect during
the interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during
the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the
Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government
were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such
directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful
revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any
exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a
Bill of Rights during the interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate
Justice Reynato S. Puno:[42]

A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established

government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it or as a
sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually
effected with violence or at least some acts of violence. In Kelsen's book, General
Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which occurs whenever the legal order
of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not prescribed by
the first order itself.

It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more
popularly known as the people power revolution that the Filipino people tore
themselves away from an existing regime. This revolution also saw the unprecedented
rise to power of the Aquino government.

From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as an
inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical
reforms in their system of government or institutions by force or a general uprising
when the legal and constitutional methods of making such change have proved
inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable. It has been said that the locus of
positive law-making power lies with the people of the state and from there is derived
the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of
government without regard to the existing constitution.

xxx

It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the presidency was not due to
constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the
1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr.
Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can be said that the
organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government which was met by little resistance and her
control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers
of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the
Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where the legal system then in effect,
had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)

To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative
during the interregnum would render void all sequestration orders issued by the
Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG) before the adoption of the
Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even the
take-over of private property by mere executive issuance without judicial action, would
violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary
government bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration
orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the
interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered
companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the
Freedom Constitution.
In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential Commission on
Good Government,[43] petitioner Baseco, while conceding there was no Bill of Rights
during the interregnum, questioned the continued validity of the sequestration orders
upon adoption of the Freedom Constitution in view of the due process clause in its Bill
of Rights. The Court ruled that the Freedom Constitution, and later the 1987
Constitution, expressly recognized the validity of sequestration orders, thus:

If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing considerations as to the
validity and propriety of sequestration, freeze and takeover orders, it should be
dispelled by the fact that these particular remedies and the authority of the PCGG to
issue them have received constitutional approbation and sanction. As already
mentioned, the Provisional or Freedom Constitution recognizes the power and duty of
the President to enact measures to achieve the mandate of the people to . . . (r)ecover
ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and
protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets
or accounts. And as also already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution treats of, and ratifies the authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders
under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986.

The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution were fully
aware that the sequestration orders would clash with the Bill of Rights. Thus, the
framers of both constitutions had to include specific language recognizing the validity of
the sequestration orders. The following discourse by Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas
during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is instructive:

FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something schizophrenic about the

arguments in defense of the present amendment.
For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salongas lecture in the
Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, of which all of us have been given a
copy. On the one hand, he argues that everything the Commission is doing is
traditionally legal. This is repeated by Commissioner Romulo also. Minister
Salonga spends a major portion of his lecture developing that argument. On
the other hand, almost as an afterthought, he says that in the end what matters
are the results and not the legal niceties, thus suggesting that the PCGG
should be allowed to make some legal shortcuts, another word for niceties or
exceptions.
Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the CONCOM
for special protection? The answer is clear. What they are doing will not
stand the test of ordinary due process, hence they are asking for protection,
for exceptions. Grandes malos, grandes remedios, fine, as the saying stands,
but let us not say grandes malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not an
allowable extrapolation. Hence, we should not give the exceptions asked for,
and let me elaborate and give three reasons:
First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work of the
CONCOM is to hasten constitutional normalization. Very much at the heart of
the constitutional normalization is the full effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We
cannot, in one breath, ask for constitutional normalization and at the same
time ask for a temporary halt to the full functioning of what is at the heart of
constitutionalism. That would be hypocritical; that would be a repetition of
Marcosian protestation of due process and rule of law. The New Society word
for that is backsliding. It is tragic when we begin to backslide even before we
get there.
Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to become ingrained.
The committee report asks for extraordinary exceptions from the Bill of
Rights for six months after the convening of Congress, and Congress may
even extend this longer.
Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated become vice. What
the committee report is asking for is that we should allow the new government
to acquire the vice of disregarding the Bill of Rights.
Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The
practitioners of the vice begin to think that they have a vested right to its
practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to keep the franchise. That would
be an unhealthy way of consolidating the gains of a democratic revolution.
 Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not the legal niceties
is an argument that is very disturbing. When it comes from a staunch
Christian like Commissioner Salonga, a Minister, and repeated verbatim by
another staunch Christian like Commissioner Tingson, it becomes doubly
disturbing and even discombobulating. The argument makes the PCGG an
auctioneer, placing the Bill of Rights on the auction block. If the price is right,
the search and seizure clause will be sold. Open your Swiss bank account to
us and we will award you the search and seizure clause. You can keep it in
your private safe.
Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as hostage to the
hoarders of hidden wealth. The hoarders will release the hidden health if the
ransom price is paid and the ransom price is the Bill of Rights, specifically the
due process in the search and seizure clauses. So, there is something
positively revolving about either argument. The Bill of Rights is not for sale
to the highest bidder nor can it be used to ransom captive dollars. This nation
will survive and grow strong, only if it would become convinced of the values
enshrined in the Constitution of a price that is beyond monetary estimation.
For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional Commission is
to delete all of Section 8 of the committee report and allow the new
Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If Section 8 is deleted, the PCGG has
two options. First, it can pursue the Salonga and the Romulo argument that
what the PCGG has been doing has been completely within the pale of the
law. If sustained, the PCGG can go on and should be able to go on, even
without the support of Section 8. If not sustained, however, the PCGG has
only one honorable option, it must bow to the majesty of the Bill of Rights.
The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch Christians. Let me
conclude with what another Christian replied when asked to toy around with
the law. From his prison cell, Thomas More said, "I'll give the devil benefit of
law for my nations safety sake. I ask the Commission to give the devil benefit
of law for our nations sake. And we should delete Section 8.
Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)

Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the amendment

excepting sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Commission
still adopted the amendment as Section 26,[44] Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The
framers of the Constitution were fully aware that absent Section 26, sequestration
orders would not stand the test of due process under the Bill of Rights.
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during
the interregnum, absent a constitutional provision excepting sequestration orders from
such Bill of Rights, would clearly render all sequestration orders void during the
interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to
enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill
of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government,
assumed responsibility for the States good faith compliance with the Covenant to which
the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State
to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights[45] recognized in the present Covenant. Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant,
the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that [n]o one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article
17(2) that [n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Although the signatories
to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a
declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted
principles of international law and binding on the State. [46] Thus, the revolutionary
government was also obligated under international law to observe the rights [47] of
individuals under the Declaration.
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration
during the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated
all its obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the
issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of
customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of
the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary
government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it
repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary
government could not escape responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its
treaty obligations under international law.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that
the directives and orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher
municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such directives and orders void. The
Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution.[48] The Provisional Constitution served as a self-limitation by the
revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute powers entrusted to it by the
people.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and
orders issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not
exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives and
orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the
revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary
government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper
application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid
with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.
 However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the
warrant. As admitted by petitioners witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items not
included in the warrant, thus:

Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian

AJ AMORES

Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize only for weapons.
What else, aside from the weapons, were seized from the house of Miss
Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine currency and US dollars,
some jewelries, land titles, sir.
Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be seized from the house
of Elizabeth Dimaano. Do you know the reason why your team also seized
other properties not mentioned in said search warrant?
A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid, I was informed that
the reason why they also brought the other items not included in the search
warrant was because the money and other jewelries were contained in
attach cases and cartons with markings Sony Trinitron, and I think three (3)
vaults or steel safes. Believing that the attach cases and the steel safes
were containing firearms, they forced open these containers only to find out
that they contained money.

xxx

Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you know the reason why
your team seized this money instead of weapons?
A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers assisting him decided
to bring along also the money because at that time it was already dark and
they felt most secured if they will bring that because they might be
suspected also of taking money out of those items, your Honor.[49]

Cross-examination
Atty. Banaag

Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection with this case was
applied before the Municipal Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 1?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the search and seizure of
five (5) baby armalite rifles M-16 and five (5) boxes of ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.

xxx

AJ AMORES
 Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct surveillance in the
house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance together with the MSU
elements, your Honor.
Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in the house of Miss
Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the search warrant, any other
properties or contraband which could be found in the residence of Miss
Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some hidden items, for
instance, the communications equipment and money. However, I did not
include that in the application for search warrant considering that we have
not established concrete evidence about that. So when
Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had reason to believe that
only weapons were in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.[50]

xxx

Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with one armalite rifle M-
16 and how many ammunition?
A. Forty, sir.
Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the issuing Court, with the
fiscals office who charged Elizabeth Dimaano for Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what happened to that case?
A. I think it was dismissed, sir.
Q. In the fiscals office?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45 caliber pistol had a
Memorandum Receipt in the name of Felino Melegrito, is that not correct?
A. I think that was the reason, sir.
Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in the search warrant,
like for instance, jewelries. Why did you seize the jewelries?
A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his assistant to bring
along also the jewelries and other items, sir. I do not really know where it
was taken but they brought along also these articles. I do not really know
their reason for bringing the same, but I just learned that these were taken
because they might get lost if they will just leave this behind.

xxx
 Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they were not also included
in the search warrant?
A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that the money was
discovered to be contained in attach cases. These attach cases were
suspected to be containing pistols or other high powered firearms, but in the
course of the search the contents turned out to be money. So the team
leader also decided to take this considering that they believed that if they will
just leave the money behind, it might get lost also.
Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that were seized by your
raiding team, like Transfer Certificates of Title of lands?
A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that were opened.[51]
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not
include the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding
team confiscated.The search warrant did not particularly describe these items and the
raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis
to seize these items without showing that these items could be the subject of
warrantless search and seizure.[52] Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when
it seized these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are
contraband per se,[53] and they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom
the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful
owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as
basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold that these
items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil
Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this case to the Ombudsman for such
appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and referring this case to the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability
of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna,
JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result. I concur with Mr. Justice Vitug in his concurring
opinion.
Puno and Vitug, JJ., see separate opinion
Panganiban, J., in the result.
Quisumbing and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., on official leave.
Ynares-Santiago, J., in the result. I concur in the separate opinion of J. Reynato
Puno.
Tinga, J., separate opinion reserved.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015

MONICO LIGTAS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

"Bakit niya babawiin ang aking saka?" tanong ni Tata Selo. "Dinaya ko na ba siya sa partihan? Tinuso ko na
ba siya? Siya ang may-ari ng lupa at kasama lang niya ako. Hindi ba't kaya maraming nagagalit sa akin ay
dahil sa ayaw kong magpamigay ng kahit isang pinangko kung anihan?"

Hindi pa rin umaalis sa harap ng istaked si Tata Selo. Nakahawak pa rin siya sa rehas. Nakatingin siya sa
labas ngunit wala siyang sino mang tinitingnan.

"Binabawi po niya ang aking saka," sumbong ni Tata Selo. "Saan papo ako pupunta kung wala na akong
saka?"

Habang nakakapit sa rehas at nakatingin sa labas, sinasabi niyang lahat ay kinuha na sa kanila, lahat, ay!
ang lahat ay kinuha na sa kanila.

- "TataSelo" (1963) by Rogelio R. Sikat

The uncontested declaration of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board that Monico Ligtas
was a tenant negates a finding of theft beyond reasonable doubt. Tenants having rights to the harvest
cannot be deemed to have taken their own produce.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of
Appeals Decision2 dated March 16, 2010 and the Resolution3 dated February 2, 2012.4 The Court of Appeals
affirmed the Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court finding Monico Ligtas (Ligtas) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of theft.6

Ligtas was charged with the crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.7 The Information
provides:c hanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

That on or about the 29th day of June 2000 at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Municipality of Sogod,
Province of Southern Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent of gain, entered into the abaca plantation belonging to one Anecita Pacate, and once
inside the plantation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously harvested 1,000 kilos of abaca
fibers, valued at Php29,000.00 at Php29.00 per kilo, without the consent of said owner, Anecita Pacate, to
her damage and prejudice in the aforestated amount of Twenty Nine Thousand Pesos (Php29,000.00),
Philippine currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8 ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry

Ligtas pleaded not guilty.9

The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses during trial: Efren Cabero (Cabero), Modesto Cipres (Cipres),
Anecita Pacate, SPO2 Enrique Villaruel, and Ernesto Pacate.10

According to the prosecution witnesses, Anecita Pacate was the owner of an abaca plantation situated at
Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte. On June 29, 2000, Cabero, the plantation's
administrator, and several men, including Cipres, went to the plantation to harvest abaca upon Anecita
Pacate's instructions. At about 10:00 a.m., Cabero and his men were surprised to find Ligtas harvesting
abaca at the plantation. Ligtas was accompanied by three (3) unidentified men. Allegedly, Ligtas threatened
that there would be loss of life if they persisted in harvesting the abaca. Cabero reported the incident to
Anecita Pacate and the police.11

On July 2, 2000, Cabero and Cipres went back to the plantation and conducted a survey on the condition of
the plantation. They found that 1,000 kilos of abaca, valued at P28.00 per kilo, were harvested by Ligtas.12
On July 3, 2000, Ligtas and Anecita Pacate confronted each other before the Sogod Police Station.13Ligtas
admitted to harvesting the abaca but claimed that he was the plantation owner.14

The defense presented three (3) witnesses during trial: Ligtas; Pablo Palo, his neighbor; and Delia Ligtas,
his wife.15 According to Ligtas, he had been a tenant of Anecita Pacate and her late husband, Andres Pacate
since 1993.16 Andres Pacate installed him as tenant of the 1.5 to two hectares of land involved in the
criminal case.17

Ligtas allegedly "made his first harvest in 1997."18 He then gave Anecita Pacate her share to the
harvest.19 However, he could not remember the exact amount anymore.20 Previously, Ligtas and Pablo Palo
were workers in another land, around 15 hectares, owned by Anecita Pacate and Andres Pacate.21

Ligtas alleged that on June 28, 2000, Anecita Pacate sent workers to harvest abaca from the land he
cultivated. Ligtas prevented the men from harvesting the abaca since he was the rightful tenant of the
land.22

Furthermore, Ligtas denied harvesting abaca at the plantation on June 29, 2000. He claimed that he was
with Cabero and Cipres attending a barangay fiesta at Sitio Hubasan, San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte,
when the alleged harvesting happened.23

Meanwhile, Ligtas filed a Complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
of Sogod, Southern Leyte for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession on November 21, 2000.24 On January 22,
2002, the DARAB rendered the Decision25 ruling that Ligtas was a bona fide tenant of the land.26

While records are bereft as to when the DARAB Decision was formally offered as evidence before the trial
court, records are clear that the DARAB Decision was considered by both the trial court27 and Court of
Appeals28 and without any objection on the part of the People of the Philippines.29

In the Decision dated August 16, 2006, the Regional Trial Court held that "the prosecution was able to prove
the elements of theft[.]"30 Ligtas' "defense of tenancy was not supported by concrete and substantial
evidence nor was his claim of harvest sharing between him and [Anecita Pacate] duly corroborated by any
witness."31 His "defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification ... by prosecution witnesses."32

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Monico Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft, this
court hereby renders judgment, sentencing him:

1. To suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days as
minimum to eight (8) years and eight (8) months as maximum; cralawlaw lib rary

2. To indemnify the offende[d] party:

a. The amount of P29,000.00 for the value of the abaca stole[n]; c ralawlawl ibra ry

b. The amount of P5000.00 as moral damages; cralawlawlib ra ry

c. The amount of P10,000.00 as litigation expenses/attorney's fees; cralawlaw lib rary

3. To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.33
ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary

The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court.34 According to it, "the burden to prove the
existence of the tenancy relationship"35 belonged to Ligtas. He was not able to establish all the essential
elements of a tenancy agreement.36
The Court of Appeals declared that Ligtas' reliance on the DARAB Decision "declaring him as a bonafide
tenant of the . . . land is irrelevant in the case at bar":37

Jurisprudence is replete with cases declaring that "findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, or his authorized representative, in a given locality concerning the presence or absence of
a tenancy relationship between the contending parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and are not
binding upon the courts.["]38 ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

As to the ownership of the land, the Court of Appeals held that Ligtas had taken conflicting positions. While
he claimed to be a legitimate tenant, Ligtas also assailed Anecita Pacate's title over the land. Under Rule
131, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a tenant cannot deny the title of his or her landlord at the time of the
commencement of the tenancy relation.39

The Court of Appeals remained unconvinced as to Ligtas' allegations on ownership. "He claims that the
parcel of land owned by [Anecita Pacate] is different from the subject abaca land. However, such assertion
was based merely on the testimony of the municipal assessor, not an expert competent to identify parcels of
land."40

More importantly, the Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas committed theft by harvesting abaca from Anecita
Pacate's plantation.41 Ligtas had constructive possession of the subject of the theft without the owner's
consent.42 "The subject of the crime need not be carried away or actually taken out from the land in order to
consummate the crime of theft."43

Furthermore, Ligtas' argument that the abaca did not constitute as personal property under the meaning of
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code was erroneous.44 Following the definition of personal property, the
abaca hemp was "capable of appropriation [and] [could] be sold and carried away from one place to
another."45 The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that about 1,000 kilos of abaca were
already harvested.46 Hence, all the elements of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code were
sufficiently established by the prosecution.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Ligtas' defense of alibi could not excuse him from criminal liability.47 His alibi
was doubtfully established. "[W]here an accused's alibi is established only by himself, his relatives and
friends, his denial of culpability should be accorded the strictest scrutiny."48

Ligtas' attack on the credibility of the witnesses did not prosper.49 He failed to show that the case was
initiated only through Anecita Pacate's quest for revenge or to ensure that Ligtas would be evicted from the
land.50

The Court of Appeals dismissed Ligtas' appeal and affirmed the trial court's Decision finding Ligtas guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.51 The dispositive portion of
the Decision reads: chanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry

WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision dated . . . August 16,
2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Sogod, Southern Leyte, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. R-225, finding
accused-appellant Monico Ligtas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Theft under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.

SO ORDERED.52 ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary

Ligtas filed a Motion for Reconsideration,53 which the Court of Appeals denied on February 2, 2012.54

II

On April 4, 2012, Ligtas filed this Petition assailing the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution.55 This court
required People of the Philippines to file its Comment on the Petition within 10 days from notice.56

The issues for consideration of this court are:

First, whether questions of fact may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court;cralawlawl ibra ry

Second, whether the DARAB Decision, finding petitioner Monico Ligtas as tenant of the land owned by
private complainant Anecita Pacate and located at Sitio Lamak, Barangay San Juan, Sogod, Southern Leyte
is conclusive or can be taken judicial notice of in a criminal case for theft; and

Third, whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it upheld the conviction of petitioner
Monico Ligtas for theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Petition is meritorious.

III

Petitioner argues that the findings of fact of both the trial court and Court of Appeals must be revisited for
being "conclusions without citation of specific evidence on record and premised on the supposed absence of
evidence on the claim of petitioner [as] tenant."57

Only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review under Rule 4558 of the Rules of Court.59 Factual
findings of the Regional Trial Court are conclusive and binding on this court when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.60 This court has differentiated between a question of law and question of fact: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib rary

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists
when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration
of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of
specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the
probability of the situation.61 (Emphasis supplied) ChanRob les Vi rtualaw lib rary

Petitioner admits that the Petition raises substantially factual issues that are beyond the scope of the Rule
he seeks redress from.62 However, there are exceptions to the rule that only questions of law should be the
subject of a petition for review under Rule 45: c hanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures, (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible, (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion, (4) when
the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts, (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting, (6) when in
making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions
of both the appellant and the appellee, (7) when the CA's findings are contrary to those by the trial
court, (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based,
(9) when the acts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondent, (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record, or (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.63 (Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted)C hanRobles Vi rt uala wlibra ry

This court has held before that a re-examination of the facts of the case is justified "when certain material
facts and circumstances had been overlooked by the trial court which, if taken into account, would alter the
result of the case in that they would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the
accused to acquittal."64

The issue of tenancy, in that whether a person is an agricultural tenant or not, is generally a question of
fact.65 To be precise, however, the existence of a tenancy relationship is a legal conclusion based on facts
presented corresponding to the statutory elements of tenancy.66

The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in its assailed Decision when it held that all the essential
elements of the crime of theft were duly proven by the prosecution despite petitioner having been
pronounced a bona fide tenant of the land from which he allegedly stole.67 A review of the records of the
case is, thus, proper to arrive at a just and equitable resolution.

IV

Petitioner claims that private complainant's filing of criminal charges was motivated by ill will and
revenge.68 The charges were designed to remove petitioner from the land he has legitimately occupied as
tenant.69 Telling is the fact that petitioner filed his Complaint before the DARAB on November 21, 2000,
while the Information for Theft was filed on December 8, 2000.70
Petitioner argues that he has sufficiently established his status as private complainant's tenant.71 The DARAB
Decision is entitled to respect, even finality, as the Department of Agrarian Reform is the administrative
agency vested with primary jurisdiction and has acquired expertise on matters relating to tenancy
relationship.72

The findings of the DARAB were also supported by substantial evidence.73 To require petitioner to prove
tenancy relationship through evidence other than the DARAB Decision and the testimonies of the witnesses
is absurd and goes beyond the required quantum of evidence, which is substantial evidence.74

Also, according to petitioner, the DARAB Decision has attained finality since private complainant did not file
an appeal. The DARAB's finding as to the parties' tenancy relationship constitutes as res judicata.75

On the other hand, respondent argues that the Court of Appeals correctly disregarded the DARAB
Decision.76 The trial court could not have taken judicial notice of the DARAB Decision: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

While the DARAB . . . ruled that petitioner is a bonafide tenant of Pacate, courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when such cases have been tried or are
pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are
actually pending before the same judge.77(Citation omitted) ChanRoble sVi rt ualawlib ra ry

Moreover, according to respondent, petitioner invokes conflicting defenses: that there is a legitimate
tenancy relationship between him and private complainant and that he did not take the abaca
hemp.78Nevertheless, respondent maintains that petitioner failed to prove all the essential elements of a
tenancy relationship between him and private complainant.79 Private complainant did not consent to the
alleged tenancy relationship.80 Petitioner also failed to provide evidence as to any sharing of harvest
between the parties.81

We hold that a DARAB decision on the existence of a tenancy relationship is conclusive and binding on courts
if supported by substantial evidence.

Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on criminal proceedings. This court has ruled in
a number of cases that: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry

It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative cases are independent from
criminal actions for the same act or omission. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an
administrative prosecution, or vice versa. One thing is administrative liability; quite another thing is the
criminal liability for the same act.

....

Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the
sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not
necessarily be binding on the other. Notably, the evidence presented in the administrative case may not
necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal cases.82 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)ChanRoble sVirtualawli bra ry

However, this case does not involve an administrative charge stemming from the same set of facts involved
in a criminal proceeding. This is not a case where one act results in both criminal and administrative liability.
DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000 involves a determination of whether there exists a tenancy relationship
between petitioner and private complainant, while Criminal Case No. R-225 involves determination of
whether petitioner committed theft. However, the tenancy relationship is a factor in determining whether all
the elements of theft were proven by the prosecution.

In its Decision dated January 22, 2002, the DARAB found: chanRob lesvi rtual Lawl ibra ry

All the necessary requisites in order to establish tenancy relationship as required in the above-quoted
Supreme Court ruling, has been established by the evidence submitted by plaintiff; And these evidences
were not controverted by any evidence submitted by the respondent.

In fine, this board found plaintiff a bonafide tenant of the land in question and as such is entitled to a
security of tenure, in which case he shall not be dispossessed of his holdings by the landowner except for
any of the causes provided by law and only after the same has been proved before, and the dispossession is
authorized by the Court and in the judgment that is final and executory[.]83 (Citations omitted) ChanRobles Vi rt ualawlib ra ry
The dispositive portion of the DARAB Decision provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises being considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding Monico Ligtas a bonafide
tenant of the land subject in this case and well described in paragraph three (3) in the complaint, and
ordering as follows, to wit:

1. The respondent and all other persons acting for and in her behalf to maintain plaintiff in the
peaceful possession of the land in dispute; cra lawlawlib rary

2. The MARO of Sogod, Southern Leyte, and concurrently the cluster Manager of Sogod Bay DAR
Cluster to call the parties and assist them in the execution of a leasehold contract covering the land
in dispute, and for the parties to respect and obey such call of the said MARO in compliance with the
legal mandate.

3. Ordering the respondent to pay plaintiff the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos
representing the expenses incurred by plaintiff in vindicating his right and other actual expenses
incurred in this litigation.

Other relief sought are hereby ordered dismissed for lack of evidence.

No cost.

SO DECIDED.84 ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

Private complainant did not appeal the DARAB's findings.

Findings of fact of administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers are entitled to
respect if supported by substantial evidence.85 This court is not tasked to weigh again "the evidence
submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own judgment [as to] the sufficiency of
evidence."86

The DARAB is the quasi-judicial tribunal that has the primary jurisdiction to determine whether there is a
tenancy relationship between adverse parties.87 This court has held that "judicial determinations [of the a
DARAB] have the same binding effect as judgments and orders of a regular judicial body."88 Disputes under
the jurisdiction of the DARAB include controversies relating to: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.89 ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry

In Salazar v. De Leon,90 this court upheld the Department of Agrarian Reform's primary jurisdiction over
agrarian disputes, which includes the relationship between landowners and tenants.91 The DARAB Decision is
conclusive and binding on courts when supported by substantial evidence.92 This court ruled that
administrative res judicata exists in that case: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry

Significantly, respondent did not appeal the Decision dated 17 November 1995 of the DARAB in DARAB Case
# II-380-ISA'94; consequently, the same has attained finality and constitutes res judicata on the issue of
petitioner's status as a tenant of respondent.

Res judicata is a concept applied in the review of lower court decisions in accordance with the hierarchy of
courts. But jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res judicata: "The rule which forbids
the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial
and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their
jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers. It has been declared that
whenever final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the
citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari , such final adjudication may
be pleaded as res judicata." To be sure, early jurisprudence was already mindful that the doctrine of res
judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually understood as courts
without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof; and that the more equitable attitude is to allow
extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been
conferred.93 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) Cha nRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

In Encinas v. Agustin, Jr.,94 this court clarified that res judicata applies only to decisions rendered by
agencies in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to purely administrative proceedings: c hanRoblesv irtual Lawlib rary

The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers. Administrative powers here refer to those
purely administrative in nature, as opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial
character.

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking and evaluating evidence; (b)
determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by
the facts proved. The exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves a determination, with respect to the
matter in controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of the contending parties
are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of the respective rights and obligations of
the parties.95 (Citations omitted) ChanRobles Vi rt ualawlib ra ry

We find it necessary to clarify the two concepts of res judicata: bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness of
judgment. In Social Security Commission v. Rizal Poultry and Livestock Association, Inc., et al.,96 this court
discussed and differentiated the two concepts of res judicata: chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry

Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of
the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).

There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the
second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In
this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.

But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the
first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and
not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of
judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved
in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their
privies, whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.

Thus, if a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their
privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated
in the first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue.

The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the
decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3)
the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first
and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Should identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a "bar by
prior judgment" would apply. If as between the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not
identical causes of action, then res judicata as "conclusiveness of judgment" applies.97 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)ChanRobles Vi rt ualawlib ra ry

In Martillano v. Court of Appeals,98 the DARAB Decision finding for the existence of a tenancy relationship
between the parties was declared by this court as conclusive on the parties.99 As in this case, the DARAB
Decision100 in Martillano attained finality when the landowner did not appeal the Decision.101 This court ruled
that the doctrine of res judicata applies: cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

Under the afore-cited sections of RA 6657, the Department of Agrarian Reform is empowered, through its
adjudicating arm the regional and provincial adjudication boards, to resolve agrarian disputes and
controversies on all matters pertaining to the implementation of the agrarian law. Section 51 thereof
provides that the decision of the DARAB attains finality after the lapse of fifteen (15) days and no appeal
was interposed therefrom by any of the parties.

In the instant case, the determination of the DARAB in DARAB Case No. 062-Bul '89, there being no appeal
interposed therefrom, attained finality. Accordingly, the matter regarding the status of Martillano as a tenant
farmer and the validity of the CLT and Emancipation Patents issued in his favor are settled and no longer
open to doubt and controversy.

....

We recall that DARAB Case 062-Bul '89 was for the cancellation of petitioner's CLT and Emancipation
patents. The same effect is sought with the institution of DARAB Case No. 512-Bul '94, which is an action to
withdraw and/or cancel administratively the CLT and Emancipation Patents issued to petitioner. Considering
that DARAB Case 062-Bul '89 has attained finality prior to the filing of DARAB Case No. 512-Bul '94, no
strenuous legal interpretation is necessary to understand that the issues raised in the prior case, i.e., DARAB
Case No. 062-Bul '89, which have been resolved with finality, may not be litigated anew.

The instant case is complicated by the failure of the complainant to include Martillano as party-defendant in
the case before the adjudication board and the DARAB, although he was finally impleaded on appeal before
the Court of Appeals.

The belated inclusion of Martillano as respondent in the petition will not affect the applicability of the
doctrine of bar by prior judgment. What is decisive is that the issues which have already been litigated in a
final and executory judgment precludes, by the principle of bar by prior judgment, an aspect of the doctrine
of res judicata, and even under the doctrine of "law of the case," the re-litigation of the same issue in
another action. It is well established that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties
and those in privity with them. The dictum therein laid down became the law of the case and what was once
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision, continues to be binding between the same
parties as long as the facts on which the decision was predicated, continue to be the facts of the case before
the court. Hence, the binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be resurrected anew
since said issue had already been resolved and finally laid to rest, if not by the principle of res judicata, at
least by conclusiveness of judgment.102 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) ChanRobles Vi rt ualawlib ra ry

In Co v. People, et al.,103 this court held that "the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment also applies in
criminal cases."104 Petitioner in that case was charged with the violation of Republic Act No. 1161, as
amended, for the alleged non-remittance of Social Security System contributions.105 This court upheld the
findings of the National Labor Relations Commission in a separate case, which declared the absence of an
employer-employee relationship and had attained finality.106 This court held that: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

The reasons for establishing the principle of "collusiveness of judgment" are founded on sound public policy.
... It is allowable to reason back from a judgment to the basis on which it stands, upon the obvious principle
that where a conclusion is indisputable, and could have been drawn only from certain premises, the
premises are equally indisputable with the conclusion. When a fact has been once determined in the course
of a judicial proceeding, and a final judgment has been rendered in accordance therewith, it cannot be again
litigated between the same parties without virtually impeaching the correctness of the former decision,
which, from motives of public policy, the law does not permit to be done.

Res judicata has two concepts. The first is bar by prior judgment under Rule 39, Section 47 (b), and the
second is conclusiveness of judgment under Rule 39, Section 47 (c). Both concepts are founded on the
principle of estoppel, and are based on the salutary public policy against unnecessary multiplicity of suits.
Like the splitting of causes of action, res judicata is in pursuance of such policy. Matters settled by a Court's
final judgment should not be litigated upon or invoked again. Relitigation of issues already settled merely
burdens the Courts and the taxpayers, creates uneasiness and confusion, and wastes valuable time and
energy that could be devoted to worthier cases.107 (Citations omitted) ChanRoble sVirtualawl ibra ry

In VHJ Construction and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,108 this court ruled that tenancy
relationship must be duly proven: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

[A] tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove this allegation. The principal
factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual
relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal
relationship.109 (Citation omitted)
ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

The DARAB, in DARAB Case No. VIII-319-SL-2000, held that all the essential elements of a tenancy
relationship were proven by petitioner.110 It found that there was substantial evidence to support petitioner's
claim as tenant of the land.111 In rendering the Decision, the DARAB examined pleadings and affidavits of
both petitioner and private complainant.112 It was convinced by petitioner's evidence, which consisted of
sworn statements of petitioner's witnesses that petitioner was installed as tenant by Andres Pacate
sometime in 1993.113 Petitioner and Andres Pacate had an agreement to share the produce after
harvest.114 However, Andres Pacate had died before the first harvest.115 Petitioner then gave the landowner's
share to private complainant, and had done so every harvest until he was disturbed in his cultivation of the
land on June 29, 2000.116

We emphasize that after filing her Answer before the DARAB, private complainant failed to heed the Notices
sent to her and refused to attend the scheduled hearings.117 The DARAB even quoted in its Decision the
reason offered by private complainant's counsel in his Motion to Withdraw as counsel: cha nRoblesvi rtua lLaw lib rary

That as early as the preliminary hearings of the case, the respondent has already shown her intention not to
participate the proceedings of the case for reasons known only to her; cralawlawl ibra ry

That despite the advi[c]e of the undersigned, respondent stood pat with her decision not to participate in the
proceedings of the case; cra lawlawlib rary

That in view of this predicament, the undersigned can do nothing except to withdraw as he is now
withdrawing as counsel for the respondent of the above-entitled casef.]118 ChanRoble sVirtualawl ibra ry

It is true that trial courts are not mandated to take judicial notice of decisions of other courts or even
records of other cases that have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.119 In
declaring that the DARAB's findings on the tenancy relationship between petitioner and private complainant
are immaterial to the criminal case for theft, the Court of Appeals120 relied on Rollo, et al. v. Leal Realty
Centrum Co., Inc., et al.121

In Rollo, petitioners, who were farmers of a 21-hectare agricultural land in Tarlac that was principally
devoted to sugar and rice and who claim the rights of their predecessors-in-interest, filed separate
Complaints before the Provincial Adjudication Board of Region III in Tarlac, Tarlac. They claimed that when
the registered owner of the land, Josefina Roxas Omaña, sold the land to respondents, respondents were
aware of the tenancy relationship between petitioners and Josefina Roxas Omaña.122

Respondents offered a compensation package to petitioners in exchange for the renunciation of their
tenancy rights under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. However, they failed to comply with their
obligations under the terms of the compensation package.123 Petitioners then filed a series of Complaints
before the DARAB. The cases were consolidated and resolved by the Provincial Adjudicator.124

The Provincial Adjudicator ruled, among other things, that "there was no tenancy relationship [that] existed
between the parties."125 He found that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest were mere hired
laborers, not tenants. Tenancy cannot be presumed from respondents' offer of a compensation package.126

On appeal, the DARAB reversed the Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator. It found that there was an implied
tenancy between the parties. Petitioners were deemed tenants of the land for more than 30 years. They
were entitled to security of tenure.127

The Court of Appeals reversed the DARAB Decision and reinstated the Provincial Adjudicator's Decision. It
held that there was no substantial evidence to prove that all the requisites of tenancy relationship existed.
However, despite the lack of tenancy relationship, the compensation package agreement must be upheld.128

This court affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision.129 It held that petitioners failed to overcome the burden of
proving the existence of a tenancy relationship:chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

At the outset, the parties do not appear to be the landowner and the tenants. While it appears that there
was personal cultivation by petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest of the subject landholding, what
was established was that petitioners' claim of tenancy was founded on the self-serving testimony of
petitioner Rodolfo Rollo that his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the landholding for more
than 30 years and had engaged in a "50-50" sharing scheme with JOSEFINA and JOSEFINA's grandmother,
the previous owner thereof. Self-serving statements in pleadings are inadequate; proof must be adduced.
Such claims do not suffice absent concrete evidence to support them. The burden rests on the shoulders of
petitioners to prove their affirmative allegation of tenancy, which burden they failed to discharge with
substantial evidence. Such a juridical tie must be aptly shown. Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of
the issue has the burden of proof, and from the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. The
same rule applies to administrative cases. In fact, if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of
proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim,
the respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense....

Neither was it shown to the satisfaction of this Court that there existed a sharing of harvests in the context
of a tenancy relationship between petitioners and/or their predecessors-in-interest and JOSEFINA.
Jurisprudence is illuminating to the effect that to prove such sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other
evidence must be presented. None was shown. No receipts were presented as testaments to the claimed
sharing of harvests. The only evidence submitted to establish the purported sharing of harvests was the
testimony of petitioner Rodolfo Rollo. The sharing arrangement cannot be deemed to have existed on the
basis alone of petitioner Rodolfo Rollo's claim. It is self-serving and is without evidentiary value. Self-serving
statements are deemed inadequate; competent proof must be adduced. If at all, the fact alone of sharing is
not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship.

We also sustain the conclusion reached by the Provincial Adjudicator and the Court of Appeals that the
testimony of Araceli Pascua, an employee of the DAR in Victoria, Tarlac, that the subject landholding was
tenanted cannot overcome substantial evidence to the contrary. To prove the alleged tenancy no reliance
may be made upon the said public officer's testimony. What cannot be ignored is the precedent ruling of this
Court that the findings of or certifications issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized
representative, in a given locality concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relationship between the
contending parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and are not binding upon the courts. This ruling
holds with greater effect in the instant case in light of the fact that petitioners, as herein shown, were not
able to prove the presence of all the indispensable elements of tenancy.130 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)ChanRoble sVirtualawli bra ry

Thus, in Rollo, this court did not categorically hold that the DARAB's findings were merely provisional and,
thus, not binding on courts. What was deemed as a preliminary determination of tenancy was the testimony
of the Department of Agrarian Reform employee stating that the land involved was tenanted. Further, the
tribunals had conflicting findings on whether petitioners were bona fide tenants.

In this case, records are bereft as to whether private complainant appealed the DARAB Decision. Thus, it is
presumed that the Decision has long lapsed into finality.131 It is also established that private complainant
participated in the initial stages of the DARAB proceedings.132 Therefore, the issue of the existence of a
tenancy relationship is final as between the parties. We cannot collaterally review the DARAB's findings at
this stage. The existence of the final Decision that tenancy exists creates serious doubts as to the guilt of
the accused.

VI

According to petitioner, the elements of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code were not
established since he was a bona fide tenant of the land.133 The DARAB's recognition of petitioner as a
legitimate tenant necessarily "implie[d] that he ha[d] the authority to harvest the abaca hemp from [private
complainant's land]."134 This shows that petitioner had no criminal intent.

As to the existence of another element of theft—that the taking was done without the consent of the
owner—petitioner argues that this, too, was negated by his status as private complainant's tenant: chanRoblesvi rtual Lawl ibra ry

The purported lack of consent on the part of the private complainant as alleged by the prosecution, is
misplaced. In fact, it was even improper for Anecita Pacate to stop or prevent petitioner from harvesting the
produce of the landholding because as tenant, petitioner is entitled to security of tenure. This right entitled
him to continue working on his landholding until the leasehold relation is terminated or until his eviction is
authorized by the DARAB in a judgment that is final and executory.135 (Citation omitted) ChanRoble sVi rt ualawlib ra ry

Petitioner argues that the constitutional presumption of innocence must be upheld: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib rary

Well-settled is the rule that where "inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction." In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as driven snow.
Rather, we are declaring his innocence because the prosecution's evidence failed to show his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. For that is what the basic law requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to overcome the
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, then his "acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to
the fundamental law."136 (Citations omitted) ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the findings of the trial court finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of theft.

Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides: cha nRoblesvi rt ual Lawlib rary
ARTICLE. 308. Who are Liable for Theft. — Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but
without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of
another without the latter's consent.

Theft is likewise committed by:

1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or
to its owner;cra lawlawlib rary

2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make
use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and

3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which
belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall
gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products.

The essential elements of theft are: (1) taking of personal property; (2) the property taken belongs to
another; (3) the taking was done without the owner's consent; (4) there was intent to gain; and (5) the
taking was done without violence against or intimidation of the person or force upon things.137

Tenants have been defined as: chanRoblesvi rtua lLaw lib rary

persons who — in themselves and with the aid available from within their immediate farm households —
cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of
production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the
landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or money or both under the leasehold tenancy
system.138 (Citation omitted) ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

Under this definition, a tenant is entitled to the products of the land he or she cultivates. The landowner's
share in the produce depends on the agreement between the parties. Hence, the harvesting done by the
tenant is with the landowner's consent.

The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between petitioner and private
complainant negates the existence of the element that the taking was done without the owner's consent.
The DARAB Decision implies that petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest the abaca. The prosecution,
therefore, failed to establish all the elements of theft.

In Pit-og v. People,139 this court acquitted petitioner of theft of sugarcane and banana crops on the basis of
reasonable doubt.140 The prosecution failed to prove lack of criminal intent on petitioner's part.141 It failed to
clearly identify "the person who, as a result of a criminal act, without his knowledge and consent, was
wrongfully deprived of a thing belonging to him."142 There were doubts as to whether the plants taken by
petitioner were indeed planted on private complainant's lot when petitioner had planted her own plants
adjacent to it.143 Thus, it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that the property belonged to private
complainant. This court found that petitioner "took the sugarcane and bananas believing them to be her
own. That being the case, she could not have had a criminal intent."144

In this case, petitioner harvested the abaca, believing that he was entitled to the produce as a legitimate
tenant cultivating the land owned by private complainant. Personal property may have been taken, but it is
with the consent of the owner.

No less than the Constitution provides that the accused shall be presumed innocent of the crime until proven
guilty.145 "[I]t is better to acquit ten guilty individuals than to convict one innocent person."146Thus, courts
must consider "[e]very circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence[.]"147 Equally settled is that
"[w]here the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is consistent with guilt, and the other with
innocence, the accused must be given the benefit of doubt and should be acquitted."148

In view of petitioner's acquittal based on reasonable doubt, we find it unnecessary to discuss further the
other errors raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated March 16, 2010 and the
Resolution dated February 2, 2012 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Monico Ligtas
is ACQUITTED of the crime of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. If detained, he is ordered
immediately RELEASED, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause. Any amount paid by way of a
bailbond is ordered RETURNED.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry

 SECOND DIVISION

JUNIE MALLILLIN Y. LOPEZ, G.R. No. 172953

Petitioner,

Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BRION, JJ.
Respondent.
Promulgated:

April 30, 2008

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot by its

lonesome overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. Evidence of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and nothing else can eclipse the hypothesis of
guiltlessness. And this burden is met not by bestowing distrust on the innocence of
the accused but by obliterating all doubts as to his culpability.
 In this Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, Junie Malillin y Lopez (petitioner) assails the Decision[2] of the Court of
Appeals dated 27 January 2006 as well as its Resolution[3] dated 30 May 2006
denying his motion for reconsideration. The challenged decision has affirmed the
Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon City, Branch
52[5] which found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as shabu, a prohibited drug.

The antecedent facts follow.

On the strength of a warrant[6] of search and seizure issued by the RTC

of Sorsogon City, Branch 52, a team of five police officers raided the residence of
petitioner in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City on 4 February 2003. The team was
headed by P/Insp. Catalino Bolanos (Bolanos), with PO3 Roberto Esternon
(Esternon), SPO1 Pedro Docot, SPO1 Danilo Lasala and SPO2
Romeo Gallinera (Gallinera) as members. The searchconducted in the presence
of barangay kagawad

Delfin Licup as well as petitioner himself, his wife Sheila and his mother,
Normaallegedly yielded two (2) plastic sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic
sachets containing residual morsels of the said substance.

Accordingly, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11,[7] Article

II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as The Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, in a criminal information whose inculpatory portion reads:

That on or about the 4th day of February 2003, at about 8:45 in the
morning in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control two (2) plastic sachets of methamphetamine
hydrochloride [or] shabu with an aggregate weight of 0.0743 gram, and four
empty sachets containing shabu residue, without having been previously
authorized by law to possess the same.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
 Petitioner entered a negative plea.[9] At the ensuing trial, the prosecution
presented Bolanos, Arroyo and Esternon as witnesses.

Taking the witness stand, Bolanos, the leader of the raiding team, testified
on the circumstances surrounding the search as follows: that he and his men were
allowed entry into the house by petitioner after the latter was shown the search
warrant; that upon entering the premises, he ordered Esternon
and barangay kagawad Licup, whose assistance had previously been requested in
executing the warrant, to conduct the search; that the rest of the police team
positioned themselves outside the house to make sure that nobody flees; that he
was observing the conduct of the search from about a meter away; that the search
conducted inside the bedroom of petitioner yielded five empty plastic sachets with
suspected shabu residue contained in a denim bag and kept in one of the cabinets,
and two plastic sachets containing shabu which fell off from one of the pillows
searched by Esternona discovery that was made in the presence of petitioner. [10] On
cross examination, Bolanos admitted that during the search, he was explaining its
progress to petitioners mother, Norma, but that at the same time his eyes were
fixed on the search being conducted by Esternon.[11]

Esternon testified that the denim bag containing the empty plastic sachets
was found behind the door of the bedroom and not inside the cabinet; that he then
found the two filled sachets under a pillow on the bed and forthwith called
on Gallinera to have the items recorded and marked.[12] On cross, he admitted that
it was he alone who conducted the search because Bolanos was standing behind
him in the living room portion of the house and that petitioner handed to him the
things to be searched, which included the pillow in which the two sachets
of shabu were kept;[13] that he brought the seized items to the Balogo Police Station
for a true inventory, then to the trial court[14] and thereafter to the laboratory.[15]

Supt. Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), the forensic chemist who administered the
examination on the seized items, was presented as an expert witness to identify the
items submitted to the laboratory. She revealed that the two filled sachets were
positive of shabu and that of the five empty sachets, four were positive of
containing residue of the same substance.[16] She further admitted that all seven
sachets were delivered to the laboratory by Esternon in the afternoon of the same
day that the warrant was executed except that it was not she but rather a certain
Mrs. Ofelia Garcia who received the items from Esternon at the laboratory.[17]

The evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the search and
seizure conducted by the police operatives. Petitioner testified that Esternon began
the search of the bedroom with Licup and petitioner himself inside. However, it
was momentarily interrupted when one of the police officers declared
to Bolanos that petitioners wife, Sheila, was tucking something inside her
underwear. Forthwith, a lady officer arrived to conduct the search of Sheilas body
inside the same bedroom. At that point, everyone except Esternon was asked to
step out of the room. So, it was in his presence that Sheila was searched by
the lady officer. Petitioner was then asked by a police officer to buy

cigarettes at a nearby store and when he returned from the errand, he was told that
nothing was found on Sheilas body.[18] Sheila was ordered to transfer to the other
bedroom together with her children.[19]

Petitioner asserted that on his return from the errand, he was summoned by
Esternon to the bedroom and once inside, the officer closed the door and asked him
to lift the mattress on the bed. And as he was doing as told, Esternon stopped him
and ordered him to lift the portion of the headboard. In that instant, Esternon
showed him sachet of shabuwhich according to him came from a pillow on the
bed.[20] Petitioners account in its entirety was corroborated in its material respects
by Norma, barangay kagawad Licup and Sheila in their testimonies. Norma and
Sheila positively declared that petitioner was not in the house for the entire
duration of the search because at one point he was sent by Esternon to the store to
buy cigarettes while Sheila was being searched by the lady officer. [21] Licup for his
part testified on the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the plastic
sachets. He recounted that after the five empty sachets were found, he went out of
the bedroom and into the living room and after about three minutes, Esternon, who
was left inside the bedroom, exclaimed that he had just found two filled sachets.[22]
 On 20 June 2004 the trial court rendered its Decision declaring petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. Petitioner was condemned
to prison for twelve years (12) and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and to pay a
fine of P300,000.00.[23] The trial court reasoned that the fact that shabu was found
in the house of petitioner was prima facie evidence of
petitioners animus possidendi sufficient to convict him of the charge inasmuch as
things which a person possesses or over which he exercises acts of ownership are
presumptively owned by him. It also noted petitioners failure to ascribe ill motives
to the police officers to fabricate charges against him.[24]

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.[25] In his Appeal

Brief[26] filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner called the attention of the court
to certain irregularities in the manner by which the search of his house was
conducted. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) advanced that on
the contrary, the prosecution evidence sufficed for petitioners conviction and that
the defense never advanced any proof to show that the members of the raiding
team was improperly motivated to hurl false charges against him and hence the
presumption that they had regularly performed their duties should prevail.[27]

On 27 January 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision

affirming the judgment of the trial court but modifying the prison sentence to an
indeterminate term of twelve (12) years as minimum to seventeen (17) years as
maximum.[28] Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the
appellate court.[29] Hence, the instant petition which raises substantially the same
issues.

In its Comment,[30] the OSG bids to establish that the raiding team had
regularly performed its duties in the conduct of the search.[31] It points to
petitioners incredulous claim that he was framed up by Esternon on the ground that
the discovery of the two filled sachets was made in his and Licups presence. It
likewise notes that petitioners bare denial cannot defeat the positive assertions of
the prosecution and that the same does not suffice to overcome the prima
facie existence of animus possidendi.

This argument, however, hardly holds up to what is revealed by the records.

 Prefatorily, although the trial courts findings of fact are entitled to great
weight and will not be disturbed on appeal, this rule does not apply where facts of
weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied in a
case under appeal.[32] In the case at bar, several circumstances obtain which, if
properly appreciated, would warrant a conclusion different from that arrived at by
the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the

elemental act of possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral
certainty, together with the fact that the same is not authorized by law. The
dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact
of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction.[33] Essential therefore in these
cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. [34] Be
that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in
a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More
than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance illegally possessed in the
first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be
established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding
of guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures
that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.[35]

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires

that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. [36] It would
include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was
picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person
who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition
in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next
link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to
ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.[37]

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it
is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes
indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is
not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is
critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness.[38] The same
standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration,
tampering, contamination[39] and even substitution and exchange.[40] In other
words, the exhibits level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or
tamperingwithout regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise notdictates
the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.

Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an

exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical
characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to
people in their daily lives.[41] Graham vs. State[42] positively acknowledged this
danger. In that case where a substance later analyzed as heroinwas handled by two
police officers prior to examination who however did not testify in court on the
condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in their possessionwas
excluded from the prosecution evidence, the court pointing out that the white
powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking
powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the
continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the
possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its
composition, testimony of the state as to the laboratorys findings is inadmissible.[43]

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily

identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their
composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the
likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody
over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of
substances from other casesby accident or otherwisein which similar evidence was
seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in
authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases
involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting
standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if
only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with
another or been contaminated or tampered with.
 A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant doubts as to
the identity of the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner. Of the people
who came into direct contact with the seized objects, only Esternon and Arroyo
testified for the specific purpose of establishing the identity of the
evidence. Gallinera, to whom Esternon supposedly handed over the confiscated
sachets for recording and marking, as well as Garcia, the person to whom Esternon
directly handed over the seized items for chemical analysis at the crime laboratory,
were not presented in court to establish the circumstances under which they
handled the subject items. Any reasonable mind might then ask the question: Are
the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner the very same objects
laboratory tested and offered in court as evidence?

The prosecutions evidence is incomplete to provide an affirmative answer.

Considering that it was Gallinera who recorded and marked the seized items, his
testimony in court is crucial to affirm whether the exhibits were the same items
handed over to him by Esternon at the place of seizure and acknowledge the
initials marked thereon as his own.The same is true of Garcia who could have, but
nevertheless failed, to testify on the circumstances under which she received the
items from Esternon, what she did with them during the time they were in her
possession until before she delivered the same to Arroyo for analysis.

The prosecution was thus unsuccessful in discharging its burden of

establishing the identity of the seized items because it failed to offer not only the
testimony of Gallineraand Garcia but also any sufficient explanation for such
failure. In effect, there is no reasonable guaranty as to the integrity of the exhibits
inasmuch as it failed to rule out the possibility of substitution of the exhibits, which
cannot but inure to its own detriment. This holds true not only with respect to the
two filled sachets but also to the five sachets allegedly containing morsels
of shabu.

Also, contrary to what has been consistently claimed by the prosecution that
the search and seizure was conducted in a regular manner and must be presumed to
be so, the records disclose a series of irregularities committed by the police officers
from the commencement of the search of petitioners house until the submission of
the seized items to the laboratory for analysis. The Court takes note of
the unrebutted testimony of petitioner, corroborated by that of his wife, that prior
to the discovery of the two filled sachets petitioner was sent out of his house to buy
cigarettes at a nearby store. Equally telling is the testimony of Bolanos that he
posted some of the members of the raiding team at the door of petitioners house in
order to forestall the likelihood of petitioner fleeing the scene. By no stretch of
logic can it be conclusively explained why petitioner was sent out of his house on
an errand when in the first place the police officers were in fact apprehensive that
he would flee to evade arrest. This fact assumes prime importance because the two
filled sachets were allegedly discovered by Esternon immediately after petitioner
returned to his house from the errand, such that he was not able to witness the
conduct of the search during the brief but crucial interlude that he was away.

It is also strange that, as claimed by Esternon, it was petitioner himself who

handed to him the items to be searched including the pillow from which the two
filled sachets allegedly fell. Indeed, it is contrary to ordinary human behavior that
petitioner would hand over the said pillow to Esternon knowing fully well that
illegal drugs are concealed therein. In the same breath, the manner by which the
search of Sheilas body was brought up by a member of the raiding team also raises
serious doubts as to the necessity thereof.The declaration of one of the police
officers that he saw Sheila tuck something in her underwear certainly diverted the
attention of the members of petitioners household away from the search being
conducted by Esternon prior to the discovery of the two filled sachets. Lest it be
omitted, the Court likewise takes note of Esternons suspicious presence in the
bedroom while Sheila was being searched by a lady officer. The confluence of
these circumstances by any objective standard of behavior contradicts the
prosecutions claim of regularity in the exercise of duty.

Moreover, Section 21[44] of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A.

No. 9165 clearly outlines the post-seizure procedure in taking custody of seized
drugs. In a language too plain to require a different construction, it mandates that
the officer acquiring initial custody of drugs under a search warrant must conduct
the photographing and the physical inventory of the item at the place where the
warrant has been served. Esternon deviated from this procedure. It was elicited
from him that at the close of the search of petitioners house, he brought the seized
items immediately to the police station for the alleged purpose of making a true
inventory thereof, but there appears to be no reason why a true inventory could not
be made in petitioners house when in fact the apprehending team was able to
record and mark the seized items and there and then prepare a seizure
receipt therefor. Lest it be forgotten, the raiding team has had enough opportunity
to cause the issuance of the warrant which means that it has had as much time to
prepare for its implementation. While the final proviso in Section 21 of the rules
would appear to excuse non-compliance therewith, the same cannot benefit the
prosecution as it failed to offer any acceptable justification for Esternons course of
action.

Likewise, Esternons failure to deliver the seized items to the court

demonstrates a departure from the directive in the search warrant that the items
seized be immediately delivered to the trial court with a true and verified inventory
of the same,[45] as required by Rule 126, Section 12[46] of the Rules of
Court. People v. Go[47] characterized this requirement as mandatory in order to
preclude the substitution of or tampering with said items by interested
parties.[48] Thus, as a reasonable safeguard, People vs. Del Castillo[49] declared that
the approval by the court which issued the search warrant is necessary before
police officers can retain the property seized and without it, they would have no
authority to retain possession thereof and more so to deliver the same to another
agency.[50] Mere tolerance by the trial court of a contrary practice does not make
the practice right because it is violative of the mandatory requirements of the law
and it thereby defeats the very purpose for the enactment.[51]

Given the foregoing deviations of police officer Esternon from the standard
and normal procedure in the implementation of the warrant and in taking post-
seizure custody of the evidence, the blind reliance by the trial court and the Court
of Appeals on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is
manifestly misplaced. The presumption of regularity is merely just thata mere
presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the
evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.[52]Suffice it to say that this
presumption cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails
if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.[53] In the present case the lack
of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from petitioner,
coupled with the irregularity in the manner by which the same were placed under
police custody before offered in court, strongly militates a finding of guilt.
 In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that
the burden of proving the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must
rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
The rule is invariable whatever may

be the reputation of the accused, for the law presumes his innocence unless and
until the contrary is shown.[54] In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as to
culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes
a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27

January 2006 affirming with modification the judgment of conviction of the
Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City, Branch 52, and its Resolution dated 30
May 2006 denying reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Junie Malillin y Lopez is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt
and is accordingly ordered immediately released from custody unless he is being
lawfully held for another offense.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this

Decision and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days
from receipt.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 179029

Appellee,
Present:

- versus - CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
BERSAMIN,

ABAD, and
FELIMON VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
PAGADUAN yTAMAYO,
Appellant. Promulgated:

August 12, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.

No. 01597 which affirmed in toto the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 27, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, in Criminal Case No. 4600, finding
appellant Felimon Pagaduan y Tamayo (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of illegal sale of shabu, under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165
or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

BACKGROUND FACTS
The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 under an Information that states:

That on or about December 27, 2003 at about 4:30 oclock (sic) in the
afternoon, in the Municipality of Solano, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade, dispense, deliver
and give away 0.01 gram, more or less, of methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu), a dangerous drug, as contained in a heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
to PO3 Peter C. Almarez, a member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) who posed as a buyer of shabu in the amount of P200.00, to the damage
and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

The appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial on the merits, thereafter,
followed.

The evidence for the prosecution reveals the following facts.

After having received information that the appellant was selling illegal drugs
in Nueva Vizcaya, Captain Jaime de Vera called, on his cellular phone, PO3 Peter
Almarez and SPO1 Domingo Balido who were both in Santiago City and informed
them of a planned buy-bust operation. They agreed to meet at the SSS Building
near LMN Hotel in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.[4] On their arrival there, Captain
de Vera conducted a briefing and designated PO3 Almarez as the poseur buyer.
Thereafter, Captain de Vera introduced PO3 Almarez to the police informant
(tipster),[5] and gave him (PO3 Almarez) two P100 bills (Exhibits D and E) which
the latter marked with his initials.[6]

After this briefing, the buy-bust team went to Bintawan Road, Solano,
Nueva Vizcaya to conduct the entrapment operation.[7] PO3 Almarez and the
informant rode a tricycle, while Captain de Vera and SPO1 Balido followed on
board a tinted van.[8] The buy-bust team arrived at the target area at around 4:30
p.m., and saw the appellant already waiting for the informant. The informant
approached the appellant and introduced PO3 Almarez to him as a buyer. PO3
Almarez told the appellant that he needed shabuworth P200, and inquired from
him (appellant) if he had a stock. The appellant replied in the affirmative, and then
handed one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance to PO3 Almarez. PO3 Almarez, in turn, gave the two pre-marked P100
bills to the appellant.[9] Immediately after, PO3 Almarez made the pre-arranged
signal to his companions, who then approached the appellant. Captain de Vera took
the marked money from the appellants right pocket, and then arrested him. [10] PO3
Almarez, for his part, marked the sachet with his initials.[11] Thereafter, the buy-
bust team brought the appellant to the Diadi Police Station for investigation.[12]

At the police station, Captain de Vera prepared a request for laboratory

examination (Exh. C).[13] The appellant was transferred to the Diadi Municipal Jail
where he was detained.[14] Two days later, or on December 29, 2003, PO3 Almarez
transmitted the letter-request, for laboratory examination, and the seized plastic
sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory, where they were received by PO2 Fernando
Dulnuan.[15] Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Alfredo Quintero, the Forensic Chemist
of the PNP Crime Laboratory, conducted an examination on the specimen
submitted, and found it to be positive for the presence of shabu (Exh. B).[16]

On the hearing of August 13, 2004, the prosecution offered the following as
exhibits:

Exhibit A the shabu confiscated from the appellant

Exhibit B the report by the PNP Crime Laboratory

Exhibit C the request for laboratory examination

Exhibits D and E the buy-bust money

Exhibit F - the request for laboratory examination received by Forensic

Chemist Quintero

The defense presented a different version of the events, summarized as

follows:

At around 4:30 p.m. of December 27, 2003, Jojo Jose came to the appellants
house and informed him that Captain de Vera was inviting him to be an asset. The
appellant and Jojo boarded a tricycle and proceeded to the SSS Building where
Captain de Vera was waiting for them.[17] As the tricycle approached the Methodist
Church along Bintawan Road, Jojo dropped his slippers and ordered the driver to
stop. Immediately after, a van stopped in front of the tricycle; Captain de Vera
alighted from the van and handcuffed the appellant. Captain de Vera brought the
appellant inside the van, frisked him, and took P200 from his
pocket.[18] Afterwards, Captain de Vera took the appellant to the SSS Building,
where he (Captain de Vera) and the building manager drank coffee. Captain de
Vera then brought the appellant to the Diadi Municipal Jail where he was detained
for almost two days.[19]

On the morning of December 29, 2003, the appellant was transferred to the
Provincial Jail. He signed a document without the assistance of a lawyer after
being told that it would result in his immediate release.[20]
The RTC, in its decision[21] of August 16, 2005, convicted the appellant of
the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment.
The RTC likewise ordered the appellant to pay a P500,000.00 fine.

The appellant appealed to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01597. The
CA, in its decision[22] dated May 22, 2007, affirmed the RTC decision.
The CA found unmeritorious the appellants defense of instigation, and held
that the appellant was apprehended as a result of a legitimate entrapment operation.
It explained that in inducement or instigation, an innocent person is lured by a
public officer or private detective to commit a crime. In the case at bar, the buy-
bust operation was planned only after the police had received information that the
appellant was selling shabu.

The CA also held that the failure of the police to conduct a prior surveillance on
the appellant was not fatal to the prosecutions case. It reasoned out that the police
are given wide discretion to select effective means to apprehend drug dealers. A
prior surveillance is, therefore, not necessary, especially when the police are
already accompanied by their informant.

The CA further ruled that the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove an
unbroken chain of custody of the shabu. It explained that PO3 Almarez sealed the
plastic sachet seized from the appellant, marked it with his initials, and transmitted
it to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. PSI Quintero conducted a
qualitative examination and found the specimen positive for the presence
of shabu. According to the CA, the prosecution was able to prove that the
substance seized was the same specimen submitted to the laboratory and presented
in court, notwithstanding that this specimen was turned over to the crime
laboratory only after two days.

In his brief,[23] the appellant claims that the lower courts erred in convicting him of
the crime charged despite the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He harps on the fact that the police did not conduct a prior
surveillance on him before conducting the buy-bust operation.

The appellant further contends that the prosecution failed to show an

unbroken chain of custody in the handling of the seized drug. He claims that there
was no evidence to show when the markings were done. Moreover, a period of two
days had elapsed from the time the shabu was confiscated to the time it was
forwarded to the crime laboratory for examination.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with the argument that
the chain of custody of the shabu was sufficiently established. It explained that
the shabu was turned over by the police officers to the PNP Crime Laboratory,
where it was found by the forensic chemist to be positive for the presence
of shabu. The OSG likewise claimed that the appellant failed to rebut the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by the police. The
OSG further added that a prior surveillance is not indispensable to a prosecution
for illegal sale of drugs.[24]

THE COURTS RULING

After due consideration, we resolve to acquit the appellant for the prosecutions
failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution
failed to show that the police complied with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act.
The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act: A Brief Background

R.A. No. 9165 was enacted in 2002 to pursue the States policy to safeguard
the integrity of its territory and the well-being of its citizenry particularly the
youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs on their physical and mental
well-being, and to defend the same against acts or omissions detrimental to their
development and preservation.

R.A. No. 9165 repealed and superseded R.A. No. 6425, known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. Realizing that dangerous drugs are one of the most serious
social ills of the society at present, Congress saw the need to further enhance the
efficacy of the law against dangerous drugs. The new law thus mandates the
government to pursue an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the
trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and other similar substances through an
integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti-drug abuse
policies, programs and projects.[25]

Illegal Sale of Drugs under Section 5

vis--vis the Inventory and Photograph
Requirement under Section 21

In a prosecution for illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of R.A.

No. 9165, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor. All these require evidence that the sale
transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti,
i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually
been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction.[26] To
remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug,
evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is
the same illegal drug actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the
prosecution for possession or for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails.[27]

The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in

Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
 Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
This is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, which reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of
the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided,
that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where
the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office
of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]

Strict compliance with the prescribed procedure is required because of the

illegal drug's unique characteristic rendering it indistinct, not readily identifiable,
and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or
otherwise.[28] The records of the present case are bereft of evidence showing that
the buy-bust team followed the outlined procedure despite its mandatory terms.
The deficiency is patent from the following exchanges at the trial:
PROSECUTOR [EMERSON TURINGAN]:

Q: After you handed this buy-bust money to the accused, what happened
next?

[PO3 ALMAREZ:]

A: When the shabu was already with me and I gave him the money[,] I
signaled the two, Captain Jaime de Vera and SPO1 Balido, sir.

xxxx

Q: After you gave that signal, what happened?

A: Then they approached us and helped me in arresting Felimon

Pagaduan, sir.
 Q: After Pagaduan was arrested, what happened next?

A: After arresting Pagaduan[,] we brought him directly in Diadi Police

Station, sir.

Q: What happened when you brought the accused to the Police Station in
Diadi?

A: When we were already in Diadi Police Station, we first put him in jail
in the Municipal Jail of Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya, sir.

Q: What did you do with the shabu?

A: The request for laboratory examination was prepared and was

brought to the Crime Lab. of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, sir.

xxxx

Q: After making the request, what did you do next[,] if any[,] Mr.
Witness?

A: After submission of the request to the Crime Lab.[,] we prepared

our joint affidavit for submission of the case to the Court,
sir.[29]

From the foregoing exchanges during trial, it is evident that the apprehending
team, upon confiscation of the drug, immediately brought the appellant and the
seized items to the police station, and, once there, made the request for laboratory
examination. No physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were taken
in the presence of the accused or his counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice, and an elective official. PO3 Almarez, on cross-
examination, was unsure and could not give a categorical answer when asked
whether he issued a receipt for the shabu confiscated from the appellant.[30] At any
rate, no such receipt or certificate of inventory appears in the records.

In several cases, we have emphasized the importance of compliance with the

prescribed procedure in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs. We have
repeatedly declared that the deviation from the standard procedure dismally
compromises the integrity of the evidence. In People v. Morales,[31] we acquitted
the accused for failure of the buy-bust team to photograph and inventory the seized
items, without giving any justifiable ground for the non-observance of the required
procedures. People v. Garcia[32]likewise resulted in an acquittal because
no physical inventory was ever made, and no photograph of the seized items was
taken under the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing
rules. In Bondad, Jr. v. People,[33] we also acquitted the accused for the failure of
the police to conduct an inventory and to photograph the seized items, without
justifiable grounds.

We had the same rulings in People v. Gutierrez,[34] People v.

Denoman,[35] People v. Partoza,[36] People v. Robles,[37] and People v. dela
Cruz,[38] where we emphasized the importance of complying with the required
mandatory procedures under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

We recognize that the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of

R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible under field conditions; the police
operates under varied conditions, and cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of
the procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence. For this reason, the last
sentence of the implementing rules provides that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items[.] Thus, noncompliance with the strict directive of Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecutions case; police procedures in the
handling of confiscated evidence may still have some lapses, as in the present
case. These lapses, however, must be recognized and explained in terms of
their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved.[39]

In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to offer any explanation to
justify the failure of the police to conduct the required physical inventory and
photograph of the seized drugs. The apprehending team failed to show why an
inventory and photograph of the seized evidence had not been made either in the
place of seizure and arrest or at the nearest police station (as required by the
Implementing Rules in case of warrantless arrests). We emphasize that for the
saving clause to apply, it is important that the prosecution explain the reasons
behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized
evidence had been preserved.[40] In other words, the justifiable ground for
noncompliance must be proven as a fact. The court cannot presume what
these grounds are or that they even exist.[41]

The Chain of Custody Requirement

Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be

observed in establishing the corpus delicti - the body of the crime whose core is the
confiscated illicit drug. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be
established. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in buy-bust
operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed.[42]

Blacks Law Dictionary explains chain of custody in this wise:

In evidence, the one who offers real evidence, such as the narcotics in a
trial of drug case, must account for the custody of the evidence from the moment
in which it reaches his custody until the moment in which it is offered in
evidence, and such evidence goes to weight not to admissibility of evidence. Com.
V. White, 353 Mass. 409, 232 N.E.2d 335.

Likewise, Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of

2002 which implements R.A. No. 9165 defines chain of custody as follows:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include
the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized
item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition[.]

In Malillin v. People,[43] the Court explained that the chain of custody rule
requires that there be testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the
object seized was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that
every person who touched it would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition
in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link
in the chain.

In the present case, the prosecutions evidence failed to establish the chain
that would have shown that the shabu presented in court was the very same
specimen seized from the appellant.
The first link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the heat-sealed
plastic sachet from the appellant. PO3 Almarez mentioned on cross-examination
that he placed his initials on the confiscated sachet after apprehending the
appellant. Notably, this testimony constituted the totality of the prosecutions
evidence on the marking of the seized evidence. PO3 Almarezs testimony,
however, lacked specifics on how he marked the sachet and who witnessed the
marking. In People v. Sanchez, we ruled that the marking of the seized items
to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually
the ones offered in evidence should be done (1) in the presence of the
apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation. In the present case,
nothing in the records gives us an insight on the manner and circumstances that
attended the marking of the confiscated sachet. Whether the marking had been done
in the presence of the appellant is not at all clear from the evidence that merely
mentioned that the evidence had been marked after the appellants apprehension.

The second link in the chain of custody is its turnover from the apprehending
team to the police station. PO3 Almarez testified that the appellant was brought to
the Diadi Police Station after his arrest. However, he failed to identify the person
who had control and possession of the seized drug at the time of its transportation
to the police station. In the absence of clear evidence, we cannot presume that PO3
Almarez, as the poseur buyer, handled the seized sachet to the exclusion of others -
during its transfer from the place of arrest and confiscation to the police
station. The prosecution likewise failed to present evidence pertaining to the
identity of the duty desk officer who received the plastic sachet
containing shabu from the buy-bust team. This is particularly significant since the
seized specimen was turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory only after two
days. It was not, therefore, clear who had temporary custody of the seized
items during this significant intervening period of time. Although the records show
that the request for laboratory examination of the seized plastic sachet was prepared
by Captain de Vera, the evidence does not show that he was the official who
received the marked plastic sachet from the buy-bust team.

As for the subsequent links in the chain of custody, the records show that the
seized specimen was forwarded by PO3 Almarez to the PNP Crime Laboratory on
December 29, 2003, where it was received by PO2 Dulnuan, and later examined by
PSI Quintero. However, the person from whom PO3 Almarez received the seized
illegal drug for transfer to the crime laboratory was not identified. As earlier
discussed, the identity of the duty desk officer who received the shabu, as well as
the person who had temporary custody of the seized items for two days, had not
been established.

The procedural lapses mentioned above show the glaring gaps in the chain of
custody, creating a reasonable doubt whether the drugs confiscated from the
appellant were the same drugs that were brought to the crime laboratory for
chemical analysis, and eventually offered in court as evidence. In the absence of
concrete evidence on the illegal drugs bought and sold, the body of the crime
the corpus delicti has not been adequately proven.[44] In effect, the prosecution
failed to fully prove the elements of the crime charged, creating reasonable doubt
on the appellants criminal liability.

Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Official Duties

In sustaining the appellants conviction, the CA relied on the evidentiary

presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. This presumption,
it must be emphasized, is not conclusive.[45] It cannot, by itself, overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence. Any taint of irregularity affects the whole
performance and should make the presumption unavailable. In the present case, the
failure of the apprehending team to comply with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of this Act effectively
negates this presumption. As we explained in Malillin v. People:[46]
The presumption of regularity is merely just that - a mere presumption disputable
by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded
as binding truth. Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot preponderate over
the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. In the present case the lack of conclusive identification of the
 illegal drugs allegedly seized from petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in the
manner by which the same were placed under police custody before offered in
court, strongly militates a finding of guilt.

We are not unmindful of the pernicious effects of drugs in our society; they
are lingering maladies that destroy families and relationships, and engender
crimes. The Court is one with all the agencies concerned in pursuing an intensive
and unrelenting campaign against this social dilemma. Regardless of how much we
want to curb this menace, we cannot disregard the protection provided by the
Constitution, most particularly the presumption of innocence bestowed on the
appellant. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to
produce moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those
who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome this constitutional presumption.
If the prosecution has not proved, in the first place, all the elements of the crime
charged, which in this case is the corpus delicti, then the appellant deserves no less
than an acquittal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby REVERSE and SET

ASIDE the May 22, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 01597.Appellant Felimon Pagaduan y Tamayo is hereby ACQUITTED for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention unless he is confined for another lawful
cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of

Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director of the
Bureau of Corrections is directed to report the action he has taken to this Court
within five days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013

NARCISO SALAS, Petitioners, v.ANNABELLE MATUSALEM, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision1dated July 18, 2006 and Resolution2 dated October 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 64379.

The factual antecedents:

On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint for Support/Damages against Narciso
Salas (petitioner) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofCabanatuan City (Civil Case No. 2124-AF).

Respondent claimed that petitioner is. the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas who was born on
December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her as she was then only 24 years
old, making her believe that he is a widower. Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent stayed and
shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost of caesarian operation and hospital
confinement. However, when respondent refused the offer of petitioner’s family to take the child from her,
petitioner abandoned respondent and her child and left them to the mercy of relatives and friends.
Respondent further alleged that she attempted suicide due to depression but still petitioner refused to
support her and their child.

Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly support in the amount of P20,000.00, as well
as actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

Petitioner filed his answer4 with special and affirmative defenses and counterclaims. He described
respondent as a woman of loose morals, having borne her first child also out of wedlock when she went to
work in Italy. Jobless upon her return to the country, respondent spent time riding on petitioner’s jeepney
which was then being utilized by a female real estate agent named Felicisima de Guzman. Respondent had
seduced a senior police officer in San Isidro and her charge of sexual abuse against said police officer was
later withdrawn in exchange for the quashing of drug charges against respondent’s brother-in-law who was
then detained at the municipal jail. It was at that time respondent introduced herself to petitioner whom she
pleaded for charity as she was pregnant with another child. Petitioner denied paternity of the child Christian
Paulo; he was motivated by no other reason except genuine altruism when he agreed to shoulder the
expenses for the delivery of said child, unaware of respondent’s chicanery and deceit designed to
“scandalize” him in exchange for financial favor.

At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo testified. Petitioner was declared to have waived his
right to present evidence and the case was considered submitted for decision based on respondent’s
evidence.

Respondent testified that she first met petitioner at the house of his “kumadre” Felicisima de Guzman at
Bgy. Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. During their subsequent meeting, petitioner told her he is already a
widower and he has no more companion in life because his children are all grown-up. She also learned that
petitioner owns a rice mill, a construction business and a housing subdivision (petitioner offered her a job at
their family-owned Ma. Cristina Village). Petitioner at the time already knows that she is a single mother as
she had a child by her former boyfriend in Italy. He then brought her to a motel, promising that he will take
care of her and marry her. She believed him and yielded to his advances, with the thought that she and her
child will have a better life. Thereafter, they saw each other weekly and petitioner gave her money for her
child. When she became pregnant with petitioner’s child, it was only then she learned that he is in fact not a
widower. She wanted to abort the baby but petitioner opposed it because he wanted to have another child.5
On the fourth month of her pregnancy, petitioner rented an apartment where she stayed with a housemaid;
he also provided for all their expenses. She gave birth to their child on December 28, 1994 at the Good
Samaritan Hospital in Cabanatuan City. Before delivery, petitioner even walked her at the hospital room and
massaged her stomach, saying he had not done this to his wife. She filled out the form for the child’s birth
certificate and wrote all the information supplied by petitioner himself. It was also petitioner who paid the
hospital bills and drove her baby home. He was excited and happy to have a son at his advanced age who is
his “look-alike,” and this was witnessed by other boarders, visitors and Grace Murillo, the owner of the
apartment unit petitioner rented. However, on the 18th day after the baby’s birth, petitioner went to Baguio
City for a medical check-up. He confessed to her daughter and eventually his wife was also informed about
his having sired an illegitimate child. His family then decided to adopt the baby and just give respondent
money so she can go abroad. When she refused this offer, petitioner stopped seeing her and sending money
to her. She and her baby survived through the help of relatives and friends. Depressed, she tried to commit
suicide by drug overdose and was brought to the hospital by Murillo who paid the bill. Murillo sought the
help of the Cabanatuan City Police Station which set their meeting with petitioner. However, it was only
petitioner’s wife who showed up and she was very mad, uttering unsavory words against respondent.6

Murillo corroborated respondent’s testimony as to the payment by petitioner of apartment rental, his weekly
visits to respondent and financial support to her, his presence during and after delivery of respondent’s
baby, respondent’s attempted suicide through sleeping pills overdose and hospitalization for which she paid
the bill, her complaint before the police authorities and meeting with petitioner’s wife at the headquarters.7

On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision8 in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of
which reads: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant as follows:

1. Ordering the defendant to give as monthly support of TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS for the
child Christian Paulo through the mother;

2. Directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 by way of litigation expenses;
and

3. To pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.9

Petitioner appealed to the CA arguing that: (1) the trial court decided the case without affording him the
right to introduce evidence on his defense; and (2) the trial court erred in finding that petitioner is the
putative father of Christian Paulo and ordering him to give monthly support.

By Decision dated July 18, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal. The appellate court found no reason
to disturb the trial court’s exercise of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for postponement on April 17,
1998, the scheduled hearing for the initial presentation of defendant’s evidence, and the motion for
reconsideration of the said order denying the motion for postponement and submitting the case for decision.

On the paternity issue, the CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling that respondent satisfactorily established the
illegitimate filiation of her son Christian Paulo, and consequently no error was committed by the trial court in
granting respondent’s prayer for support. The appellate court thus held: chanRoblesv irtual Lawlib rary

Christian Paulo, in instant case, does not enjoy the benefit of a record of birth in the civil registry which
bears acknowledgment signed by Narciso Salas. He cannot claim open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child.

It had been established by plaintiff’s evidence, however, that during her pregnancy, Annabelle was provided
by Narciso Salas with an apartment at a rental of P1,500.00 which he paid for (TSN, October 6, 1995, p.
18). Narciso provided her with a household help with a salary of P1,500.00 a month (TSN, October 6, 1995,
ibid). He also provided her a monthly food allowance of P1,500.00 (Ibid, p. 18). Narciso was with Annabelle
at the hospital while the latter was in labor, “walking” her around and massaging her belly (Ibid, p. 11).
Narciso brought home Christian Paulo to the rented apartment after Annabelle’s discharge from the hospital.
People living in the same apartment units were witnesses to Narciso’s delight to father a son at his age
which was his “look alike”. It was only after the 18th day when Annabelle refused to give him Christian Paulo
that Narciso withdrew his support to him and his mother.

Said testimony of Annabelle aside from having been corroborated by Grace Murillo, the owner of the
apartment which Narciso rented, was never rebutted on record. Narciso did not present any evidence, verbal
or documentary, to repudiate plaintiff’s evidence.

In the cases of Lim vs. CA (270 SCRA 1) and Rodriguez vs. CA (245 SCRA 150), the Supreme Court made it
clear that Article 172 of the Family Code is an adaptation of Article 283 of the Civil Code. Said legal provision
provides that the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child x x “3) when the child has in his
favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father”.

In fact, in Ilano vs. CA (230 SCRA 242, 258-259), it was held that–

“The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically covers all the other cases in
the preceding paragraphs. ‘Any other evidence or proof’ that the defendant is the father is broad enough to
render unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for
compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet [the] requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still
be enough under the last paragraph. This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided
in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate filiation.”
As a necessary consequence of the finding that Christian Paulo is the son of defendant Narciso Salas, he is
entitled to support from the latter (Ilano vs. CA, supra).

It “shall be demandable from the time the person who has the right to recover the same needs it for
maintenance x x.” (Art. 203, Family Code of the Philippines).10

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.

Hence, this petition submitting the following arguments: ch anRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

1. THE VENUE OF THE CASE WAS IMPROPERLY LAID BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
CABANATUAN CITY CONSIDERING THAT BOTH PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT ARE ACTUAL RESIDENTS OF
BRGY. MALAPIT, SAN ISIDRO, NUEVA ECIJA.

2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PRONOUNCING THAT PETITIONER WAS AFFORDED THE
FULL MEASURE OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND IN UPHOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID
NOT GRAVELY ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
DECIDED THE INSTANT CASE WITHOUT AFFORDING PETITIONER THE RIGHT TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE IN
HIS DEFENSE.

3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FILIATION OF CHRISTIAN PAULO
WAS DULY ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 175 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 172 OF THE FAMILY CODE
AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AND THEREFORE ENTITLED TO SUPPORT FROM THE PETITIONER.11

We grant the petition.

It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for the convenience of the
plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the principle that choosing the venue of an action
is not left to a plaintiff’s caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.12

In personal actions such as the instant case, the Rules give the plaintiff the option of choosing where to file
his complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them resides, or (2) where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found.13 The plaintiff or the defendant must be
residents of the place where the action has been instituted at the time the action is commenced.14

However, petitioner raised the issue of improper venue for the first time in the Answer itself and no prior
motion to dismiss based on such ground was filed. Under the Rules of Court before the 1997 amendments,
an objection to an improper venue must be made before a responsive pleading is filed. Otherwise, it will be
deemed waived.15 Not having been timely raised, petitioner’s objection on venue is therefore deemed
waived.

As to the denial of the motion for postponement filed by his counsel for the resetting of the initial
presentation of defense evidence on April 17, 1998, we find that it was not the first time petitioner’s motion
for postponement was denied by the trial court.

Records disclosed that after the termination of the testimony of respondent’s last witness on November 29,
1996, the trial court as prayed for by the parties, set the continuation of hearing for the reception of
evidence for the defendant (petitioner) on January 27, February 3, and February 10, 1997. In the Order
dated December 17, 1996, petitioner was advised to be ready with his evidence at those hearing dates
earlier scheduled. At the hearing on January 27, 1997, petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Rolando S. Bala,
requested for the cancellation of the February 3 and 10, 1997 hearings in order to give him time to prepare
for his defense, which request was granted by the trial court which thus reset the hearing dates to March 3,
14 and 17, 1997. On March 3, 1997, upon oral manifestation by Atty. Bala and without objection from
respondent’s counsel, Atty. Feliciano Wycoco, the trial court again reset the hearing to March 14 and 17,
1997. With the non-appearance of both petitioner and Atty. Bala on March 14, 1997, the trial court upon
oral manifestation by Atty. Wycoco declared their absence as a waiver of their right to present evidence and
accordingly deemed the case submitted for decision.16

On July 4, 1997, Atty. Bala withdrew as counsel for petitioner and Atty. Rafael E. Villarosa filed his
appearance as his new counsel on July 21, 1997. On the same date he filed entry of appearance, Atty.
Villarosa filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 14, 1997 Order pleading for liberality and
magnanimity of the trial court, without offering any explanation for Atty. Bala’s failure to appear for the
initial presentation of their evidence. The trial court thereupon reconsidered its March 14, 1997 Order,
finding it better to give petitioner a chance to present his evidence. On August 26, 1997, Atty. Villarosa
received a notice of hearing for the presentation of their evidence scheduled on September 22, 1997. On
August 29, 1997, the trial court received his motion requesting that the said hearing be re-set to October
10, 1997 for the reason that he had requested the postponement of a hearing in another case which was
incidentally scheduled on September 22, 23 and 24, 1997. As prayed for, the trial court reset the hearing to
October 10, 1997. On said date, however, the hearing was again moved to December 15, 1997. On
February 16, 1998, the trial court itself reset the hearing to April 17, 1998 since it was unclear whether Atty.
Wycoco received a copy of the motion.17

On April 17, 1998, petitioner and his counsel failed to appear but the trial court received on April 16, 1998
an urgent motion to cancel hearing filed by Atty. Villarosa. The reason given by the latter was the scheduled
hearing on the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction in another case under the April 8, 1998 Order
issued by the RTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 36 in Civil Case No. 1946. But as clearly stated in the said
order, it was the plaintiffs therein who requested the postponement of the hearing and it behoved Atty.
Villarosa to inform the RTC of Gapan that he had a previous commitment considering that the April 17, 1998
hearing was scheduled as early as February 16, 1998. Acting on the motion for postponement, the trial
court denied for the second time petitioner’s motion for postponement. Even at the hearing of their motion
for reconsideration of the April 17, 1998 Order on September 21, 1998, Atty. Villarosa failed to appear and
instead filed another motion for postponement. The trial court thus ordered that the case be submitted for
decision stressing that the case had long been pending and that petitioner and his counsel have been given
opportunities to present their evidence. It likewise denied a second motion for reconsideration filed by Atty.
Villarosa, who arrived late during the hearing thereof on December 4, 1998.18

A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right, but a request addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. Parties asking for postponement have absolutely no right to assume that their
motions would be granted. Thus, they must be prepared on the day of the hearing.19 Indeed, an order
declaring a party to have waived the right to present evidence for performing dilatory actions upholds the
trial court’s duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed on the part
of one party.20

Atty. Villarosa’s plea for liberality was correctly rejected by the trial court in view of his own negligence in
failing to ensure there will be no conflict in his trial schedules. As we held in Tiomico v. Court of
Appeals21:chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

Motions for postponement are generally frowned upon by Courts if there is evidence of bad faith, malice or
inexcusable negligence on the part of the movant. The inadvertence of the defense counsel in failing to take
note of the trial dates and in belatedly informing the trial court of any conflict in his schedules of trial or
court appearances, constitutes inexcusable negligence. It should be borne in mind that a client is bound by
his counsel’s conduct, negligence and mistakes in handling the case.22

With our finding that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the motion for
postponement filed by petitioner’s counsel, petitioner’s contention that he was deprived of his day in court
must likewise fail. The essence of due process is that a party is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. Where a party was afforded an
opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due
process. If the opportunity is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the
constitutional guarantee.23

We now proceed to the main issue of whether the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that respondent’s
evidence sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of petitioner.

Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states: cha nR oblesvi rtual Lawl ibra ry

The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (Underscoring supplied.)

Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth24 (Exhibit “A-1”) of Christian Paulo Salas in which the
name of petitioner appears as his father but which is not signed by him. Admittedly, it was only respondent
who filled up the entries and signed the said document though she claims it was petitioner who supplied the
information she wrote therein.

We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the
certificate.25 Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother,
doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity.26 Neither can such birth certificate
be taken as a recognition in a public instrument27 and it has no probative value to establish filiation to the
alleged father.28

As to the Baptismal Certificate29 (Exhibit “B”) of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as the
father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only
serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not
necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child’s paternity.30

The rest of respondent’s documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and letters, hospital bill and
photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented apartment unit.

Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are inconclusive evidence to
prove paternity.31 Exhibits “E” and “F”32 showing petitioner and respondent inside the rented apartment
unit thus have scant evidentiary value. The Statement of Account33 (Exhibit “C”) from the Good Samaritan
General Hospital where respondent herself was indicated as the payee is likewise incompetent to prove that
petitioner is the father of her child notwithstanding petitioner’s admission in his answer that he shouldered
the expenses in the delivery of respondent’s child as an act of charity.
As to the handwritten notes34 (Exhibits “D” to “D-13”) of petitioner and respondent showing their exchange
of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation
to petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no statement of admission by petitioner
that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do not qualify under Article
172 (2) vis-à- vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation
an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.35

Petitioner’s reliance on our ruling in Lim v. Court of Appeals36 is misplaced. In the said case, the
handwritten letters of petitioner contained a clear admission that he is the father of private respondent’s
daughter and were signed by him. The Court therein considered the totality of evidence which established
beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was indeed the father of private respondent’s daughter. On the
other hand, in Ilano v. Court of Appeals,37 the Court sustained the appellate court’s finding that private
respondent’s evidence to establish her filiation with and paternity of petitioner was overwhelming,
particularly the latter’s public acknowledgment of his amorous relationship with private respondent’s
mother, and private respondent as his own child through acts and words, her testimonial evidence to that
effect was fully supported by documentary evidence. The Court thus ruled that respondent had adduced
sufficient proof of continuous possession of status of a spurious child.

Here, while the CA held that Christian Paulo Salas could not claim open and continuous possession of status
of an illegitimate child, it nevertheless considered the testimonial evidence sufficient proof to establish his
filiation to petitioner.

An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by “any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws,” like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which
his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.38Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondent’s evidence insufficient to establish that
petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo.

The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the birth of Christian Paulo, petitioner’s
financial support while respondent lived in Murillo’s apartment and his regular visits to her at the said
apartment, though replete with details, do not approximate the “overwhelming evidence, documentary and
testimonial” presented in Ilano. In that case, we sustained the appellate court’s ruling anchored on the
following factual findings by the appellate court which was quoted at length in the ponencia: chanRoblesv irtual Lawlib rary

It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of Merceditas (sic) at the Manila Sanitarium and
Hospital. Prior to the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal examination accompanied by Artemio (TSN, p.
33, 5/17/74). After delivery, they went home to their residence at EDSA in a car owned and driven by
Artemio himself (id. p. 36).

Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of “Ilano” since birth without any objection on the part of Artemio, the
fact that since Merceditas (sic) had her discernment she had always known and called Artemio as her
“Daddy” (TSN, pp. 28-29, 10/18/74); the fact that each time Artemio was at home, he would play with
Merceditas (sic), take her for a ride or restaurants to eat, and sometimes sleeping with Merceditas (sic) (id.
p. 34) and does all what a father should do for his child — bringing home goodies, candies, toys and
whatever he can bring her which a child enjoys which Artemio gives to Merceditas (sic) (TSN, pp. 38-39,
5/17/74) are positive evidence that Merceditas (sic) is the child of Artemio and recognized by Artemio as
such. Special attention is called to Exh. “E-7” where Artemio was telling Leoncia the need for a “frog test” to
know the status of Leoncia.

Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) was sometimes in the form
of cash personally delivered to her by Artemio, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (Exhs. “E-2” and “E-3”, and “D-
6”), or thru Merceditas (sic) herself (TSN, p. 40, 5/17/74) and sometimes in the form of a check as the
Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532 (Exh. “G”) and the signature appearing therein which was
identified by Leoncia as that of Artemio because Artemio often gives her checks and Artemio would write the
check at home and saw Artemio sign the check (TSN, p. 49, 7/18/73). Both Artemio and Nilda admitted that
the check and signature were those of Artemio (TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77; TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78).
During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, Artemio has shown concern as
the father of Merceditas (sic). When Merceditas (sic) was in Grade 1 at the St. Joseph Parochial School,
Artemio signed the Report Card of Merceditas (sic) (Exh. “H”) for the fourth and fifth grading period(s) (Exh.
“H-1” and “H-2”) as the parent of Merceditas (sic). Those signatures of Artemio [were] both identified by
Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) because Artemio signed Exh. “H-1” and “H-2” at their residence in the presence
of Leoncia, Merceditas (sic) and of Elynia (TSN, p. 57, 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28, 10/1/73). x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite[,] Artemio gave Leoncia his picture with
the following dedication: “To Nene, with best regards, Temiong”. (Exh. “I”). (pp. 19-20, Appellant’s Brief)

The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the totality of the evidence
indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The entry in the Certificate of Live Birth that
Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as married does not mean that Leoncia is not appellee’s
daughter. This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself in order to avoid
embarrassment.39

In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by themselves are not competent proof of
paternity and the totality of respondent’s evidence failed to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner.

Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and
filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to
the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by
clear and convincing evidence.40

Finally, we note the Manifestation and Motion41 filed by petitioner’s counsel informing this Court that
petitioner had died on May 6, 2010.

The action for support having been filed in the trial court when petitioner was still alive, it is not barred
under Article 175 (2)42 of the Family Code. We have also held that the death of the putative father is not a
bar to the action commenced during his lifetime by one claiming to be his illegitimate child.43 The rule on
substitution of parties provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, thus applies.

SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. – Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such
death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives.
Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based
on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted
within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.

If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to
appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time to
procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if
defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 18, 2006 and
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 209588 February 18, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ERIC ROSAURO y BONGCAWIL, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

For the consideration of the Court is an appeal of the Decision1 dated 19 June 2013 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00552- MIN, which affirmed the Judgment2 dated 24
November 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 25 in Criminal
Case No. 2004-856, finding accused-appellant Eric Rosauro y Bongcawil (accused-appellant) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu under Sec. 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
(R.A. No. 9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and ordering him to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00.

In an Amended Information dated 21 February 2005,3 accused-appellant was charged with violation
of Sec. 5, Art. II of R. A. No. 9165, to wit:

That on the 3rd day of July, 2004at about 5:30 o’clock in the afternoon, more or less, at Purok 3,
Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Villanueva, Province of Misamis Oriental, Republic of the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
authorized by law to possess and to sell any dangerous drugs, knowingly, willfully and feloniously,
did then and there, sell and convey to a third person, who acted as a decoy in a buy bust operation,
one (1) sachet of shabu, containing 0.04 grams (sic) of shabu, which when examined gave
POSITIVE result to test for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), a dangerous
drug.4

Upon re-arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.5 Thereafter, pre-
trial and trial on the merits ensued.

Based on the records, the prosecution’s version of the facts is as follows:

On October 13, 2002, on the basis of unconfirmed reports that accused-appellant Eric Rosauro
(Rosauro for brevity) was selling and distributing drugs, the Provincial Drug Enforcement Unit of
Misamis Oriental conducted a test-buy operation in the Municipality of Villanueva, Misamis Oriental
using a confidential agent. The confidential agent bought shabu from Rosauro at Purok 2, Barangay
Katipunan, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental. The substance bought from Rosauro was examined by the
PNP crime laboratory and yielded a positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (commonly
known as shabu).

On July 3, 2004, the police authorities received information that again drugs were being distributed
at Purok 3, Barangay Poblacion, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental. Thus, at 5:30 o’clock in the afternoon,
the Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Unit (PAID-SOTU) elements led by SPO4
Lorenzo Larot and PO3 Juancho Dizon positioned themselves in the house of their confidential
agent.

There, the PAID-SOTU elements saw Rosauro negotiate with the confidential agent. In exchange for
the one (1) sachet of shabu given by Rosauro to the confidential agent, the latter gave him a marked
100-peso bill with serial number YZ7 12579.

After the transaction, Larot and Dizon came out of their hiding place and arrested Rosauro.
Thereafter, the confidential agent handed the sachet to Larot, who taped it, mark edit with the
marking "Exhibit A", and placed it inside his pocket. He also took pictures of Rosauro and the drugs.
In the police station, he prepared a Certificate of Inventory and a Request for Laboratory
Examination. Both the drugs and Rosauro were then turned over to the Crime laboratory.

On the basis of the request made by Larot, Police Chief Inspector Ma. Leocy Mag-abo, the Forensic
Chemical Officer of PNP Crime Laboratory conducted a laboratory examination on the contents of
the sachet, on accused-appellant, and the marked money. The examination of the seized item
yielded positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu); while the accused-appellant and
the marked money tested positive for the presence of ultra-violet fluorescent powder.6

For his part, accused-appellant claims that he was merely a victim of instigation:

Accused-appellant Rosauro, on the other hand, tells a different tale. He testified that on July 3, 2004,
the police asset went to his house four (4) times and convinced him to do an errand for him. Rosauro
refused to buy shabu as he did not know where to buy one. It was the confidential informant who told
him to buy the prohibited drug from a certain "Kael" and to deliver it to the former’s house.It was also
the informant who gave the money to Rosauro to buy the shabu. But Rosauro was not able to meet
or buy directly from Kael because it was a young man who got and handed to him the shabu on the
road. When Rosauro went to the house of the confidential informant as instructed, he was arrested
by SPO4 Larot and Dizon. The sachet of shabu was not even recovered from him but from the
confidential informant.7

Finding the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant, the
RTC rendered a judgment of conviction, viz.:

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, this Court hereby renders Judgment finding accused ERIC
ROSAURO y BONGCAWIL, "guilty" beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
information for selling and delivering a sachet of shabu to the poseur buyer a Violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. 9165 and imposes a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand (PhP 500,000.00) Pesos and to pay the cost.

The accused ERIC B. ROSAURO who has undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in
the service of his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which he has
undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by
the same disciplinary rule imposed upon convicted prisoners, except those disqualified by law.

The sachet of shabu, Exh. "A" is confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government to be destroyed
in accordance with law.8

Accused-appellant appealed before the CA, assigning a lone error:

 I

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHEN

HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.9

After a review of the records, the CA affirmed the RTC Judgment. The appellate court ruled that
what transpired in the case at bar was an entrapment and not an instigation;10 that all the elements of
illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs were duly proven;11 that the non-presentation of the
confidential agent in court is not fatal;12 that the inconsistencies in the testimony of the lone witness
of the prosecution do not affect the result of the case;13 and that the apprehending team was able to
preserve the integrity of the subject drug and that the prosecution was able to present the required
unbroken chain in the custody of the subject drug.14 Thus, the CA held:

WHEREFORE, the Judgment dated November 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25,
Cagayan de Oro City in Criminal Case No. 2004-856 is hereby AFFIRMED.15

Accused-appellant is now before the Court seeking a review of his conviction.

After a thorough review of the records, however, we dismiss the appeal.

It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is no showing that the trial court overlooked or
misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion, the Court will not disturb
the trial court’s assessment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses since the RTC was in a
better position to assess and weigh the evidence presented during trial. Settled too is the rule that
the factual findings of the appellate court sustaining those of the trial court are binding on this Court,
unless there is a clear showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or
palpable error.16

The RTC and the CA both found the arrest of accused-appellant to be the result of a legitimate
entrapment procedure, and we find nothing in the records as to warrant a contrary finding. In People
v. Bartolome,17 we had the occasion to discuss the legitimacy of a "decoy solicitation," to wit:

It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed
in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose
the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting its
commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the office is one habitually
committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct.

As here, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant utilized by the police merely
furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. The police received an intelligence report that appellant
has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs. They duly acted on it by utilizing an informant to effect a
drug transaction with appellant. There was no showing that the informant induced the appellant to
sell illegal drugs to him.
1âwphi 1

Similarly, the presentation of an informant as witness is not regarded as indispensable to the

success of a prosecution of a drug-dealing accused. As a rule, the informant is not presented in
court for security reasons, in view of the need to protect the informant from the retaliation of the
culprit arrested through his efforts. Thereby, the confidentiality of the informant’s identity is protected
in deference to his invaluable services to law enforcement. Only when the testimony of the informant
is considered absolutely essential in obtaining the conviction of the culprit should the need to protect
his security be disregarded.18 In the present case, as the buy-bust operation was duly witnessed by
the Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Unit (PAID-SOTU) elements led by SPO4
Lorenzo Larot (SPO4 Larot) and PO3 Juancho Dizon, their testimonies can take the place of that of
the confidential informant.

As to whether accused-appellant’s guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt, we rule in the
affirmative.

In a catena of cases, this Court laid down the essential elements to be duly established for a
successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs, like
shabu, under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller,
the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment
therefor. Briefly, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked
money by the seller successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction. What is material, therefore,
is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti.19

Verily, all the elements for a conviction of illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs were proven
by the prosecution: the identity of accused-appellant as the seller, and that of the confidential
informant as poseur-buyer were established, as well as the exchange of the sachet of shabu and the
marked money. It was also ascertained that the seized item was positive for shabu, a dangerous
drug, and that the same item was properly identified in open court by SPO4 Larot. Moreover, the
₱100.00 bill with serial number YZ712579, or the subject marked money, as well as the living body
of the accused-appellant revealed a positive result for ultraviolet fluorescent powder.

Accused-appellant avers that the prosecution was not able to prove the corpus delicti, and that the
statutory safeguards provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not followed.

Indeed, as we held in People v. Torres,20 equally important in every prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous or prohibited drugs is the presentation of evidence of the seized drug as the corpus
delicti. The identity of the prohibited drug must be proved with moral certainty. It must also be
established with the same degree of certitude that the substance bought or seized during the buy-
bust operation is the same item offered in court as exhibit. In this regard, paragraph 1, Section 21,
Article II of R. A. No. 9165 (the chain of custody rule) provides for safeguards for the protection of
the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized, to wit:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof.

However, this Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody should ideally be
perfect, in reality it is "almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain." The most important
factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be
used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Hence, the prosecution’s failure to submit in
evidence the physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs as required under Article 21 of
R. A. No. 9165, will not render the accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized from him
inadmissible.21

The chain of custody is not established solely by compliance with the prescribed physical inventory
and photographing of the seized drugs in the presence of the enumerated persons. The
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R. A. No. 9165 on the handling and disposition of seized
dangerous drugs states:

x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items.22 (Italics, emphasis, undescoring omitted)

In the case at bar, after the sale was consummated, the confidential informant gave the seized item
to SPO4 Larot who placed tape on the sachet and marked it "Exhibit A." Upon reaching the police
station, SPO4 Larot executed the Certificate of Inventory, as well as the request for laboratory
examination. The request, the specimen, as well as the marked money and accused-appellant were
then brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. They were received. by SPO2 Ricardo
Maisog, the Receiving Clerk of the PNP Crime Laboratory Office, who then forwarded them to Police
Inspector Ma. Leocy Jabonillo Mag-abo, the Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime
Laboratory.23 Moreover, the seized item was duly identified by SPO4 Larot in open court as the same
item seized from accused-appellant.

Accused-appellant's guilt having been established, we likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the
RTC and the CA. Under the law, the offense of illegal sale of shabu carries with it the penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten
Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00), regardless of the quantity and purity of the substance.24 Thus, the
RTC and CA were within bounds when they imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 203984 June 18, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal from the January 1 7, 2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 04069, affirming in toto the July 23, 2009 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City, Branch 127, finding accused-appellant Medario Calantiao y Dimalanta (Calantiao)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

On November 13, 2003, Calantiao was charged before the RTC of violation of Section 11, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165 in an Information,3 the pertinent portion of which reads: That on or about
the 11th day of November, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two (2)
bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops with a total weight of 997 .9 grams, knowing the same to be a
dangerous drug.

The facts, as synthesized by the RTC and adopted by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION

On November 13, 2003[,] at around 5:30 x x x in the afternoon, while PO1 NELSON MARIANO and
PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ were on duty, a certain EDWIN LOJERA arrived at their office and asked
for police assistance regarding a shooting incident. Per report of the latter, it appears that while
driving a towing truck and traversing along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City, he had a traffic dispute
(gitgitan) with a white taxi cab prompting him to follow said vehicle until they reached along 8th
Avenue Street corner C-3 Road, Caloocan City. Thereat, the passengers of said taxi cab, one of
them was accused Calantiao, alighted and fired their guns. Surprised, Lojera could not do anything
but continued his driving until he reached a police station nearby where he reported the incident.

The police officers on duty then were PO1 NELSON MARIANO and PO3 EDUARDO RAMIREZ.
PO1 Mariano testified that they immediately responded to said complaint by proceeding to 5th
Avenue corner 8th Street, Caloocan City where they found the white taxi. While approaching said
vehicle, two armed men alighted therefrom, fired their guns towards them (police officers) and ran
away. PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased them but they were subdued. PO1 Mariano
recovered from Calantiao a black bag containing two (2) bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops and a
magazine of super 38 stainless with ammos, while PO3 Ramirez recovered from Calantiao’s
companion [a] .38 revolver.
The suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over to SPO3 PABLO TEMENA, police
investigator at Bagong Barrio Police Station for investigation. Thereat, PO1 Mariano marked the
bricks of marijuana contained in a black bag with his initials, "NM". Thereafter, said specimen were
forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. The result of the examination
conducted by P/SINSP. JESSSE DELA ROSA revealed that the same was positive for marijuana, a
dangerous drug.

The foregoing testimony of PO1 MARIANO was corroborated by PO3 RAMIREZ who testified that
he personally saw those bricks of marijuana confiscated from the accused. He confirmed that he
was with PO1 Mariano when they apprehended said accused and his companion and testified that
while PO1 Mariano recovered from the accused a black bag containing marijuana, on his part, he
confiscated from accused’s companion a .38 revolver.

MR. CRISENDO AMANSEC, the driver of the taxi where the suspects boarded was also presented
in open court and testified as to what he knows about the incident. He confirmed that on that date,
two (2) persons boarded on his taxi and upon reaching C-3 Road, they alighted and fired three (3)
shots and ran away.

Aside from the oral testimonies of the witnesses, the prosecution also offered the following
documentary evidence to boost their charge against the accused:

Exh. "A" – Request for Laboratory Examination dated November 12, 2003

Exh. "B" – Physical Sciences Report No. D-1423-03 dated November 12, 2003

Exh. "C-1" – Picture of First brick of marijuana fruiting tops

Exh. "C-2" – Picture of Second brick of marijuana fruiting tops

Exh. "D" – Referral Slip dated November 12, 2003

Exh. "E" – Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay dated November 12, 2003 of PO3 Eduardo
Ramirez and PO1 Nelson Mariano

Exh. "E-1" – Their respective signatures

Exh. "F" – Sinumpaang Salaysay of Crisendo Amansec (Erroneously marked as Exh. "E")

EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENSE

The accused offered a different version of the story. According to his testimony, this instant case
originated from a traffic mishap where the taxi he and his companion Rommel Reyes were riding
almost collided with another car. Reyes then opened the window and made a "fuck you" sign against
the persons on board of that car. That prompted the latter to chase them and when they were caught
in a traffic jam, PO1 Nelson Mariano, one of the persons on board of that other car alighted and
kicked their taxi. Calantiao and Reyes alighted and PO1 Mariano slapped the latter and uttered,
"Putang ina mo bakit mo ako pinakyu hindi mo ba ako kilala?" Said police officer poked his gun
again[st] Reyes and when Calantiao tried to grab it, the gun fired. Calantiao and Reyes were then
handcuffed and were brought to the police station. Thereat, they were subjected to body frisking and
their wallets and money were taken. PO1 Mariano then prepared some documents and informed
them that they will be charged for drugs. A newspaper containing marijuana was shown to them and
said police officer told them that it would be sufficient evidence against them. They were detained
and subjected to medical examination before they were submitted for inquest at the prosecutor’s
office.4

Ruling of the RTC

On July 23, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision giving credence to the prosecution’s case. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused MEDARIO

CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the offense of Violation
of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165, for illegally possessing997.9 grams of marijuana fruiting tops.
Henceforth, this Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00).5

In convicting Calantiao, the RTC held that the illegal drug seized was admissible in evidence as it
was discovered during a body search after Calantiao was caught in flagrante delicto of possessing a
gun and firing at the police officers. Moreover, the RTC found all the elements of the offense to have
been duly established by the prosecution.6

Aggrieved, Calantiao appealed7 his conviction to the Court of Appeals, assigning the following errors:

THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 11, ARTICLE II,
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE ALLEGEDLY
SEIZED ITEMS ARE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.

II

THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICERS’ PATENT NON-COMPLIANCE WITHTHE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS.

III

THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE THE PROPER CHAIN OF
CUSTODY OF THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS.8

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals found no reason to overturn Calantiao’s conviction. It found that there was
sufficient reason to justify a warrantless arrest, as the police officers were acting on a legitimate
complaint and had a reasonable suspicion that the persons identified at the scene were the
perpetrators of the offense. Likewise, the Court of Appeals held that the search and subsequent
seizure of the marijuana in question was lawful and valid, being incidental to a lawful arrest.9 Finding
that all the elements of the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs to be present and duly
proven,10 the Court of Appeals, on January 17, 2012, promulgated its Decision, affirming in toto the
RTC’s ruling.
Undaunted, Calantiao is now before this Court praying for an acquittal, adding the following
arguments in support of his position:

First, the plain view doctrine is not an exception to a search incident to a valid warrantless arrest.

xxxx

Second, Calantiao did not waive the inadmissibility of the seized items.

xxxx

Finally, the seized items’ custodial chain is broken.11

In essence, Calantiao is questioning the admissibility of the marijuana found in his possession, as
evidence against him on the grounds of either it was discovered via an illegal search, or because its
custodial chain was broken.

Ruling of this Court

This Court finds no merit in Calantiao’s arguments.

Search and Seizure of

Marijuana valid

This Court cannot subscribe to Calantiao’s contention that the marijuana in his possession cannot be
admitted as evidence against him because it was illegally discovered and seized, not having been
within the apprehending officers’ "plain view."12

Searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Section 13.Search incident to lawful arrest.– A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of
an offense without a search warrant.

The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is "to protect the
arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed
weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach."13 It is therefore a
reasonable exercise of the State’s police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the injury that may
be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed
by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of the
evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee.

In People v. Valeroso,14 this Court had the occasion to reiterate the permissible reach of a valid
warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, viz:

When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in
order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.
Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition,
it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the
arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to
conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area
within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous
weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The
phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who
is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the
person arrested. (Citations omitted.)

In Valeroso, however, the Court held that the evidence searched and seized from him could not be
used against him because they were discovered in a room, different from where he was being
detained, and was in a locked cabinet. Thus, the area searched could not be considered as one
within his immediate control that he could take any weapon or destroy any evidence against him.15

In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiao’s possession and within his
immediate control. He could have easily taken any weapon from the bag or dumped it to destroy the
evidence inside it. As the black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiao’s possession, it was
within the permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly conduct a warrantless
search.

Calantiao’s argument that the marijuana cannot be used as evidence against him because its
discovery was in violation of the Plain View Doctrine, is misplaced.

The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspect’s person and premises under his
immediate control. This is so because "[o]bjects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to
be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence."16 "The
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused,
but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object x x x. [It] serves to supplement
the prior justification – whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to
lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed
against the accused – and permits the warrantless seizure."17

The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiao’s situation because the police officers
purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently come across the
black bag, which was in Calantiao’s possession; they deliberately opened it, as part of the search
incident to Calantiao’s lawful arrest.

Inventory and Chain of

Custody of Evidence

Calantiao claims that even if the search and seizure were validly effected, the marijuana is still
inadmissible as evidence against him for failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the rules
on chain of custody, as the item was marked at the police station.18

The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9165 provide as follows:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]

Its Implementing Rules and Regulations state:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.] (Emphasis supplied.)

This Court has held that the failure to strictly comply with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, such as immediately marking seized drugs, will not automatically impair the integrity of chain
of custody because what is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.19

Section 21 and its IRR do not even mention "marking." What they require are (1) physical inventory,
and (2) taking of photographs. As this Court held in People v. Ocfemia20:

What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of
"marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon
apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and photography when these activities
are undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of
custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items – to truly ensure that they are the same
items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence – should be done (1) in
the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.

The prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana from the time the
police officers confiscated it, to the time it was turned over to the investigating officer, up to the time
it was brought to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination.21 This Court has no reason to
overrule the RTC and the Court of Appeals, which both found the chain of custody of the seized
drugs to have not been broken so as to render the marijuana seized from Calantiao inadmissible in
evidence.

Furthermore, unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of the evidence,
the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved will remain. The burden of
showing the foregoing to overcome the presumption that the police officers handled the seized drugs
with regularity, and that they properly discharged their duties is on Calantiao. Unfortunately,
Calantiao failed to discharge such burden.22

It is worthy to note that these arguments were only raised by Calantiao on his appeal. He himself
admits this.23 His theory, from the very beginning, was that he did not do it, and that he was being
framed for having offended the police officers. Simply put, his defense tactic was one of denial and
frame-up. However, those defenses have always been frowned upon by the Court, to wit:

The defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it
can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of
Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with
strong and convincing evidence. In the cases before us, appellant failed to present sufficient
evidence in support of his claims. Aside from his self-serving assertions, no plausible proof was
presented to bolster his allegations.24

Hence, as Calantiao failed to show clear and convincing evidence that the apprehending officers
were stirred by illicit motive or failed to properly perform their duties, their testimonies deserve full
faith and credit.25

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the January 17, 2012 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04069.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 199689 March 12, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
HERMANOS CONSTANTINO, JR. y BINAYUG, a.k.a. "JOJIT," Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This appeal challenges the Decision1 dated July 29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 03353, affirming the Decision2 dated April 15, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (R TC),
Branch 5 of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, in Criminal Case No. 10516, which found accused-appellant
Hermanos Constantino, Jr. y Binayug, a.k.a. "Jojit" (Constantino), guilty of the crime of illegal sale of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu, under Article II, Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Information3 filed before the R TC charged Constantino, as follows:

That on January 20, 2005, in the City of Tuguegarao, Province of Cagayan and within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law and without permit to
sell, transport, deliver and distribute dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, transport, distribute and deliver two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets
containing 0.14 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu", a
dangerous drug to a member of the PNP, Tuguegarao City who acted as a poseur-buyer; that after
receiving the two (2) plastic sachets, the poseur-buyer simultaneously handed to the accused the
marked money consisting of one (1) piece of FIVE HUNDRED PESO BILL (₱500.00) with Serial No.
Q₱278070 and five (5) pieces of ONE HUNDRED PESO BILL with Serial Nos. SM989053,
PS724429, XM484584, BB048002, and EK6900025 or a total of ₱1,000.00 and this led to the
apprehension of the accused and the confiscation of the dangerous drug together with the buy-bust
money by the said apprehending law enforcers of the Tuguegarao City Police Station who formed
the buy bust team in coordination with the PDEA.

When arraigned on July 8, 2005, Constantino pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.4 Thereafter,
pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued.

Evidence for the prosecution presented the following version of events:

On January 20, 2005, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Mariano
Rodriguez (Rodriquez), the Chief of Police of Tuguegarao City, received a report from a confidential
informant (CI) that a certain Jojit was selling illegal drugs in the said city. P/Supt.

Rodriguez immediately formed a buy-bust group composed of Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Noel
Taguiam (Taguiam), SPO2 Alexander Tamang (Tamang), SPO1 Arthur Blaquera (Blaquera), Police
Officer (PO) 3 Edwin Hernandez (Hernandez), and PO3 Rolando Domingo (Domingo). PO3
Domingo was designated as the poseur-buyer. The buy-bust money, consisting of one ₱500.00 bill
and five ₱100.00 bills, were dusted with fluorescent powder and their respective serial numbers
were recorded in the police blotter.5

Around 8:00 in the evening of the same day, the team proceeded to Reynovilla St., Caritan Centro,
Tuguegarao City, the place where, according to the CI, Jojit was selling shabu. PO3 Domingo
positioned himself beside a street light while the rest of the team hid behind a nearby concrete
fence. After waiting for about 45 minutes, Constantino arrived on board a tricycle. PO3 Domingo
recognized Constantino as the Jojit described by the CI. PO3 Domingo approached Constantino and
asked him if he was Jojit. When Constantino replied in the affirmative, PO3 Domingo next asked,
"Mayroon ka bang stuff?" ("Do you have stuff?") In response, Constantino inquired of PO3 Domingo
how much he wanted to buy. PO3 Domingo said he wanted to buy ₱1,000.00 worth of shabu,
simultaneously handing over the buy-bust money to Constantino, who, in turn, handed two plastic
sachets to PO3 Domingo. Thereupon, PO3 Domingo turned his cap backwards, the pre-arranged
signal for the consummated sale. Upon seeing the signal, the other members of the buy-bust team
approached the scene at once and arrested Constantino, from whom SPO2 Taguiam recovered the
buy-bust money.6

Thereafter, Constantino was brought to the police station where the recovered drugs and money
were turned over to the investigator, SPO2 Tamang.7 The recovered drugs were then marked with
the initials "A-1" and "A-2." The incident was recorded in the police blotter with an inventory of the
recovered drugs and money.8

Later that evening, at around ten o’clock, P/Supt. Rodriguez and SPO2 Tamang submitted to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Services, Camp Marcelo Adduru, Tuguegarao
City, a request for laboratory examination of two plastic sachets with white crystalline substance
marked as "A-1" and "A-2" to determine the presence of dangerous drugs;9 as well as both hands of
Constantino, one piece ₱500.00 bill, and five pieces ₱100.00 bills, to determine the presence of the
ultra violet powder.10 Per Chemistry Report No. D-08-200511 and Physical Identification Report No.
PI-04-2005,12 prepared by Police Senior Inspector (P/SInsp.) Mayra Matote Madria,13 Forensic
Chemist, the contents of the two plastic sachets tested positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride;
while the other specimens tested positive for the presence of bright-yellow ultraviolet fluorescent
powder.

Constantino denied the accusation against him and asserted that he was merely framed-up.

According to Constantino, at around 8:00 in the evening on January 20, 2005, he was enjoying a
joyride with his friend, Jeff Abarriao, on the latter’s motorcycle, within the vicinity of Caritan Centro.
After 30 minutes, Constantino decided to go home. While walking along Reyno or Reynovilla St., two
vehicles suddenly stopped, one in front and the other behind him. Five men, all in civilian clothes,
alighted from the two vehicles. Two of the men held Constantino’s hands, while another poked a gun
at him, asking him where he came from and ordering him to bring out the shabu. Constantino
answered that he did not know what the men were talking about. The men then forced Constantino
into one of the vehicles. Inside the vehicle, one of the men frisked and searched Constantino, and
told him that he was being arrested for selling shabu. The men, who were now apparently police
officers, brought Constantino to the Tuguegarao City Police Station. At the police station, the police
officers took Constantino’s cellphone and wallet. Also at the police station, one of the arresting police
officers brought out two pieces of plastic sachets and money and turned it over to one of his
companions. At around 9:30 in the evening, the police officers brought Constantino to the PNP
Crime Laboratory, but nothing happened because he heard that the person who was supposed to
conduct the examination was not around, so, Constantino was brought back to the police station.14
The following day, January 21, 2005, the police officers again brought Constantino to the PNP Crime
Laboratory. Along the way, one of the police escorts forced Constantino to hold a certain amount of
money. Constantino tried to resist but he could not really do anything because he was handcuffed.
After his examination, Constantino was detained and was told that he was suspected of selling
shabu.

The RTC promulgated its Decision on April 15, 2008, finding Constantino guilty as charged. The trial
court rejected the arguments of the defense, thus:

1. The Prosecution failed to give a detailed account of the arrangement with the accused for the
purchase of the shabu.

The Court’s response: The testimony of PO3 Domingo was detailed enough, corroborated by other
witnesses. It is the defense that has failed to show in what crucial detail the prosecution’s account is
wanting.

2. The police officers categorically admitted that they did not personally know the accused until they
were at the alleged place of transaction.

The Court’s response: Substantive law does not require this; the rules of evidence do not. Did they
know he was Jojit? Yes, from the description given the informant. Domingo asked whether he was
Jojit. He answered "Yes".

3. The arresting officers failed to comply with the requirements of Article II, Section 21 of R.A. 9165
that requires that an inventory be taken and that photographs be taken of the items seized.

The Court’s comment: The Police Blotter Entry No. 0270 enumerates the items seized. This, the
Court holds to be substantial compliance. Even assuming, without admitting, that not all the
requirements may not have been complied with, these omissions do not operate to exclude the
evidence nor to cause suppression thereof. They are directory, not mandatory provisions.

4. The chain of custody was not established with certainty.

The Court’s comment: The chain is not difficult to trace, and has been established by evidence, thus:

a. Exhibit "B": The police blotter recording that on 20 January 2005 at 2100 hours,
mentioning the two sachets of shabu which according to the blotter the accused admitted he
handed over to Domingo; Domingo had testified that the markings A-1 NBT and A-2 NBT
were placed on the sachets by Investigator Alexander Tamang;

b. Exhibit "F": Dated January 20, 2005, a request to the PNP Crime Lab Services for the
examination of "two plastic sachet (sic) with white crystalline substance marked A1 and A2";

c. Exhibit "D": Chemistry Report No. D-08-2005 completed 21 January 2005 reporting a
qualitative examination of the contents of two heat-sealed sachets marked as A1 NBT and
A2 NBT and identifying the substance as "Methamphetamine Hydrochloride".

5. There was no prior coordination with PDEA.

The Court’s response: None was needed. Exhibit "H" clearly evidences that SPO1 Blaquera was
authorized to conduct anti-drug operations. Domingo also answered the question about coordination
with PDEA when he testified: "During that time 3 representatives of the Intelligence Operatives were
deputized in the PDEA in the persons of Noel Taguiam, Arthur Blaquera and the Chief of Police."

Hermanos testified in his behalf and his testimony can be reduced to the following story:

1 He went on a joy-ride that night with his friend aboard a motorcycle;

2 Tiring, he alighted and started to walk along Reyno Villa Street;

3 He was accosted by police officers who, at the time, he did not know to be police officers;

4 They took him to the police station and produced the sachets;

5 Next day, while on the way to the Crime Lab, they forced him to hold marked bills, although
he was cuffed.

All told, it is a story that is meant to endeavor to explain the circumstances around the accused’s
arrest and apprehension. For one thing, it is self-serving; for another, we are not told any reason why
the police officers should have wanted to apprehend him – a supposedly guiltless man; third, the
Court never heard the testimony of his friend with whom he was supposed to have had a joy-ride
that night. In sum, his story does not convince this Court.15(Citations omitted.)

The RTC imposed the following sentence upon Constantino:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Sec. 5,
Art. II of R.A. 9165 and sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of
₱500,000.00.16

Maintaining his innocence, Constantino appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that:

1. The trial court gravely erred in giving full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses despite the patent irregularities in the conduct of the buy-bust operation.

2. The trial court gravely erred in convicting accused-appellant despite the prosecution’s
failure to establish that chain of custody of the drug specimens allegedly confiscated from the
accused-appellant.

3. The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite the prosecution’s
failure to establish the identity of the prohibited drugs constituting the corpus delicti of the
offense.

In its Decision dated July 29, 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the judgment of conviction
of the RTC against Constantino. The appellate court held that Constantino’s defense of frame-up
was not worthy of credence as his version of the incident was not at all corroborated.

Constantino was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu to PO3 Domingo, who acted as the
poseur-buyer, therefore, he was legally arrested without a warrant. The appellate court also found
that the chain of custody of the shabu had been preserved from the time said drugs were
confiscated from Constantino to the time the same drugs were delivered to the crime laboratory and
thereafter retrieved and presented as evidence before the trial court. Lastly, the appellate court
stressed that between the positive and categorical declarations of the prosecution witnesses, on one
hand, and the unsubstantial denial or negative statements of the appellant, on the other hand, the
former generally prevails; and that negative averments, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, deserve no weight in law, especially vis-a-vis the time-tested presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty on the part of the apprehending officers.

In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 5, dated 15
April 2008, in Criminal Case No. 10516, is AFFIRMED.17

Consequently, Constantino comes before this Court seeking the reversal of his conviction by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals.

In his Supplemental Brief, Constantino contests his conviction, averring inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly, on the circumstances of the marking of the
two plastic sachets containing shabu allegedly confiscated from him. Different people claim to have
made the marking "NBT" on the two plastic sachets and gave various explanations as to what the
initials "NBT" stand for. In short, Constantino argues that the prosecution failed to establish a crucial
link in the chain of custody of the shabu in this case.

The appeal is impressed with merit.

Admittedly, denial is an inherently weak defense, consistently viewed with disfavor by the courts,
being a self-serving negative evidence. In view, however, of the constitutional presumption that an
accused is innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt, the burden lies on the
prosecution to overcome such presumption by presenting the required quantum of evidence. In so
doing, the prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the
defense.18

In a prosecution for the sale of a dangerous drug, the following elements must be proven: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor. Simply put, "[in] prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what is
material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti as evidence."19 And in the prosecution of these offenses, the primary
consideration is to ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs and other related articles
have been preserved from the time they were confiscated from the accused until their presentation
as evidence in court.20

Article II, Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 lays down the procedure to be followed in the
seizure and custody of dangerous drugs:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof[.]

Article II, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165
describes in more detail how the foregoing procedure is to be applied:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]

While police officers are enjoined to strictly comply with the procedure prescribed by law, the IRR
also explicitly excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds, but only if the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items have been properly preserved by the apprehending officers.
The integrity and evidentiary value of seized items are properly preserved for as long as the chain of
custody of the same are duly established.

Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, series of 2002,21 defines "chain of
custody" as follows:

Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall
include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the
date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in
court as evidence, and the final disposition.

In Mallillin v. People,22 the Court discussed how the chain of custody of seized items is established:

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. (Citations omitted.)

Thus, the following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the
seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turn over of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer; third, the turn over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turn over and submission of the marked
illegal drugs seized from the forensic chemist to the court.23

After a careful scrutiny of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the Court finds glaring
inconsistencies affecting the integrity of the shabu purportedly confiscated from Constantino. The
inconsistent testimonies of PO3 Domingo, PO3 Hernandez, and P/SInsp. Tulauan as to who, when,
and where the two plastic sachets of shabu were marked lead the Court to question whether the two
plastic sachets of shabu identified in court were the very same ones confiscated from Constantino.
The doubtful markings already broke the chain of custody of the seized shabu at a very early stage.

To recall, the first crucial link in the chain of custody is seizure and marking of the illegal drug. In this
case, PO3 Domingo, as poseur-buyer, received two plastic sachets of shabu from Constantino in
exchange for ₱1,000. However, PO3 Domingo himself did not put any markings on the two plastic
sachets of shabu. Instead, upon arrival of the buy-bust team with Constantino at the police station,
PO3 Domingo turned over the two plastic sachets of shabu to the investigator, SPO2 Tamang, who
was also a member of the buy-bust team. PO3 Domingo testified that it was SPO2 Tamang who put
the marking "NBT" on the said sachets of shabu. Below are the excerpts from PO3 Domingo’s
testimony:

Q If that plastic sachets which was sold to you by Hermanos Constantino is shown to you will you be
able to identify the same?

A Yes, ma’am.

Q How were you able to identify the plastic sachets?

A There is an initials (sic), ma’am.

Q What initials are you referring to?

A A-1 initial NBT and A-2 initial NBT.

Q Who placed those initials in the plastic sachets?

A The Investigator, ma’am.

Q And who is the investigator?

A Alexander Tamang, ma’am.

Q Where did he place those initials?

A In the police station after the apprehension, ma’am.24 (Emphasis supplied.)

However, PO3 Hernandez, another member of the buy-bust team, categorically pointed to SPO2
Taguiam, also a member of the buy-bust team, as the one who put the marking "NBT" on the plastic
sachets upon the team’s return to the police station, thus:

PROS. NICOLAS:

Q During the buy bust operation you stated that the accused handed to the poseur buyer in the
person of PO3 Rolando Domingo two plastic sachets containing as you claimed methamphetamine
hydrochloride, have you seen these plastic sachets at that time when they handed to PO3 Rolando
Domingo?

A Yes, sir.

Q If these two plastic sachets will be shown to you again today will you be able to tell that these two
plastic sachets were the same plastic sachets that were handed by the accused to PO3 Rolando
Domingo?

A Yes, sir.

Q I am showing to you these two plastic sachets kindly tell us if these are the plastic sachets that
were handed to PO3 Rolando Domingo?

A These are the ones, sir.

Q Why do you say that these are the two plastic sachets handed by the accused?

A Because I was there and I saw the accused handed the two plastic sachets to PO3 Rolando
Domingo, sir.

Q Why do you know that these are the same plastic sachets?

A These are the ones, sir.

Q Mr. Witness, there are markings on these two plastic sachets, do you know whose markings are
these?

xxxx

A It was Noel B. Taguiam, sir.

The witness is pointing to the marking NBT partly hidden.

COURT:

Q Who is Noel B. Taguiam?

A A member of the buy bust team also, sir.

PROS. NICOLAS:
Q You stated this NBT was placed by one Noel B. Taguiam, why do you know that he was the one
who placed this?

A Because I was present during that time when he placed his initial, sir.

Q Do you know when this Noel B. Taguiam placed those initials on those two plastic sachets?

A After we conducted the buy bust operation, sir.

Q How soon Noel B. Taguiam placed those initials after the conduct of the buy bust operation?

A After a few hours, sir.

Q Where did he place those initials?

A In our office, sir.25 (Emphasis supplied.)

To complicate things even further, P/SInsp Tulauan,26 the Forensic Chemist, also declared before the
trial court that the marking "NBT" on the two plastic sachets of shabu were made by SPO3 Nelson B.
Tamaray (Tamaray), the duty officer who received the specimens at the crime laboratory. P/SInsp.
Tulauan testified:

PROS. ISRAEL:

Q When you received these two specimens Madam Witness, will you please tell us the physical
appearance of these items when you received the same?

A They were heat-sealed and with markings "A-1" and "A-2," your Honor.

B And will you please point to us these markings "A-1" and "A-2" when you received these items
Madam Witness?

A This is the markings "A-1" and "A-2," Ma’am.

INTERPRETER:

The witness is pointing to the markings "A-1" and "A-2" with the use of a black pentel pen.

PROS. ISRAEL:

Q There is another marking in this plastic sachet Madam Witness marked as NBT, what is this
marking all about?

A That is the marking of SPO3 Nelson B. Tamaray, Ma’am.

Q Is he authorized to make the necessary marking which was requested to be examined Madam
Witness?

A Yes, Ma’am because he is the one who received the specimen from the one who deliver it, Ma’am.
Q In this second plastic sachet Madam Witness which you identified earlier, that there is a marking
"A-1," there is another marking NBT, what is this marking all about Madam Witness?

A That is the marking of SPO3 Nelson B. Tamaray, Ma’am.27 (Emphases supplied.)

On cross-examination, P/SInsp. Tulauan confirmed her previous declaration that SPO3 Tamaray
had claimed making the marking on the sachets of shabu:

Atty. Aquino

Madam Witness, with respect to that marking made which are "A1" and "A-2", they are not your
markings, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q And with respect also to that NBT marked and placed in that exhibit which you have earlier
identified, you did not see this duty officer placed his markings thereon, is it not?

A Yes sir but I asked him who placed that marking and he said that he was the one who placed the
initial NBT, sir.28

The Court already emphasized in People v. Zakaria29 the importance of marking the seized item right
after seizure:

Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs or other related
items immediately after they are seized from the accused, for the marking upon seizure is the
starting point in the custodial link that succeeding handlers of the evidence will use as reference
point. Moreover, the value of marking of the evidence is to separate the marked evidence from the
corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time of seizure from the accused until
disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting" or contamination of
evidence. A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial custody imperils the integrity of the chain of
custody that the law requires. (Citation omitted.)
1âw phi 1

Herein, the prosecution is completely silent as to why PO3 Domingo, the poseur-buyer, despite
having immediate custody of the two plastic sachets of shabu purchased from Constantino, failed to
immediately mark the seized drugs before turning over the custody of the same to another police
officer. This lapse in procedure opened the door for confusion and doubt as to the identity of the
drugs actually seized from Constantino during the buy-bust and the ones presented before the trial
court, especially considering that three different people, during the interval, supposedly received and
marked the same. To clarify the matter, the prosecution could have presented as witness either
SPO2 Tamang or SPO2 Taguiam to directly validate the marking in court, but unfortunately, the
prosecution chose to dispense with the testimonies of both officers. This omission diminished the
importance of the markings as the reference point for the subsequent handling of the evidence. As a
consequence, an objective person could now justifiably suspect the shabu ultimately presented as
evidence in court to be planted or contaminated.30

The failure of the prosecution to establish the evidence’s chain of custody is fatal to its case as the
Court can no longer consider or even safely assume that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated dangerous drug were properly preserved.31
In light of the foregoing, Constantino is acquitted of the crime charged, not because the Court
accords credence to his defense of frame-up, but because the prosecution failed to discharge its
burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03353, affirming the Decision dated April 15, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 5 of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, in Criminal Case No. 10516, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant Hermanos Constantino, Jr. y Binayug, a.k.a. "Jojit," is ACQUITTED for failure of
the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and is ORDERED to be immediately
released from detention unless he is confined for another lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.