Labor Relations Final Batch
company employees Jim Robert Afos (Afos) and Marciano
1) Roque vs Santa GR No. 208163
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 208163, April 20, 2015
ROQUE B. BENITEZ AND SANTA FE LABOR UNION-
FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS, Petitioners, v. SANTA
FE MOVING AND RELOCATION SERVICES/VEDIT
KURANGIL, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari1 which
seeks to annul the November 7, 2012 decision2 and July 10,
2013 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
126213.
The Antecedents
On February 8, 2011, petitioners Roque V. Benitez (Benitez)
and Santa Fe Labor Union (union) filed a complaint for unfair
labor practice and illegal dismissal, with money
claims,4 against respondents Santa Fe Moving and Relocation
Services (company) and its Managing Director, Vedit Kurangil
(Kurangil), an Australian citizen. The company is engaged in
providing relocation and moving services, including visa,
immigration and real estate services. Benitez (the union's
Vice-President at the time), was its former packing and
moving operator (crew leader) since June 2001.5
Benitez alleged that on December 20, 2010, the company
served him a memorandum6 advising him not to report for
work effective immediately, thereby terminating his
employment, supposedly on grounds of serious misconduct or
willful disobedience. He allegedly uttered abusive words
against Kurangil during the company's Christmas Party on
December 18, 2010. He bewailed that he was not given the
opportunity to defend himself.
Benitez claimed that during the party, he noticed that the
raffle committee members were putting back the names of
those who were already drawn, giving them more chances of
winning. He appealed to the committee to put a stop to what
they were doing, but they replied they would not "in the spirit
of Christmas." He denied having verbally abused Kurangil. He
presented the affidavits of co-employees Jhun Bulan,
Romualdo Elib, Carlos Morata and Raul Ramirez,7 attesting
that Benitez, who was with them at one table, did not commit
the offense which led to his dismissal.
Benitez argued that his dismissal constituted an unfair labor
practice as he was a union officer and that it was undertaken
to derail the conclusion of a collective bargaining agreement
with the company. He further argued that the penalty of
dismissal is disproportionate to his alleged offense,
considering that it was committed during a casual gathering
and had no connection to his work.
The company and Kurangil denied liability. They maintained
that the company has developed a world-renowned reputation
for unsurpassed customer service and quality in its line of
business. They averred that during the Christmas Party on
December 18, 2010, Benitez berated and maligned Kurangil
by throwing foul and offensive words at him, such as "putang
ina mo ka VK, gago ka!" Benitez's tirade, they added,
included the company and it officers. Moreover, the incident
happened in front of the company's employees, their families,
as well as company clients and guests.
The company confirmed Benitez's claim that the incident
involved the conduct of the Christmas raffle. However, they
differed on what triggered his unruly behavior. It alleged that
while the raffle was going on, Benitez climbed up the stage
and questioned the management's decision to allow
contractual employees to join the raffle. This resulted in only
80% of the employees winning raffle prizes. Benitez then
started hurling invectives and foul language while still on
stage, mostly directed at Kurangil.
The company further alleged that even when Benitez stormed
out of the stage, he kept on berating Kurangil, such that
people he passed by overheard him cursing Kurangil and the
company and that he even attempted to a throw a beer bottle
at Kurangil, but he was restrained by other employees.
The respondents presented in evidence the affidavits of
Kurangil,8 Reynaldo Delavin (Delavin),9 a company driver, and
Diana Claros Urmeneta10 (Urmeneta),11 a guest at the party.
Their statements were corroborated by the depositions12 of
Atienza, Jr. (Atienza). The two disputed the statements13 of
Bulan, Elib, Morata and Ramirez — witnesses for Benitez —
that they were seated together with Benitez at one table and
that he caused no disturbance during the Christmas Party.
Afos and Atienza stated that they were the ones who were
seated with Benitez, not Bulan, Elib, Morata and Ramirez who
were at a separate table with another group of employees.
Afos and Atienza added that Benitez's tirade started when the
raffle for the grand prize was being conducted. All of a
sudden, Benitez, who had not yet won a prize at that time,
stood up and proceeded to the stage, fuming mad and
complaining about the conduct of the raffle.14
The company required Benitez to explain in writing why he
should not be disciplined for serious misconduct and willful
disobedience of its lawful orders in connection with the
incident. Benitez failed to comply and neither did he show
remorse for what he did.
In view of Benitez's failure to explain his side, the company
issued a memorandum15 dated December 20, 2010 to Benitez
(signed by Kurangil), terminating his employment effective on
the same day, for clear violation of "Santa Fe Policy and
Procedure under Conduct and Behavior as well as Labor Code
of the Philippines under Art. 282 - Serious misconduct or
willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of
his employer x x x."
The Compulsory Arbitration Rulings
In her decision16 of September 14, 2011, Labor Arbiter Fatima
Jambaro-Franco (LA Franco) dismissed the complaint for lack
of merit. LA Franco found that Benitez, who was holding a
position of trust and confidence as packing and moving
operator, committed a serious misconduct at the company's
Christmas Party on December 18, 2010 by "hurling obscene,
insulting or offensive language against a superior,"17thereby
losing the trust and confidence of his employer.
Benitez and the union appealed, reiterating that his dismissal
is illegal. Moreover, they claimed, he was denied due process
as he was not given the opportunity to explain his side.
The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dismissed
the appeal, likewise for lack of merit, in its decision18 of March
15, 2012. It sustained LA Franco's finding that Benitez was
validly dismissed for serious misconduct. However, it noted
"that the respondents failed to comply with the two-notice
requirement as mandated by the Labor Code in validly
dismissing an employee."19 Accordingly, it affirmed LA
Franco's ruling with modification by awarding Benitez nominal
damages of P50,000.00 for the violation of his right to
procedural due process.
Benitez and the union moved for reconsideration, to no avail.
The NLRC denied the motion,20 prompting them to file a
petition for certiorari21 with the CA.
The CA Decision
In its decision22 under review, the CA found no grave abuse of
discretion in the NLRC's affirmation of LA Franco's ruling that
Benitez was validly dismissed. It stressed that "the findings of
the NLRC which adopted those of the Labor Arbiter were in
accord with the evidence on record."23 It dismissed the
petition and denied Benitez's subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
The Petition
Benitez and the union now ask the Court to reverse his
dismissal and order his reinstatement with full backwages,
grant his money claims, award him moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees, as well as litigation expenses. They
submit in the main that the CA committed grave and palpable
error in misappreciating the facts and applicable
jurisprudence in this case, especially the Samson v.
NLRC24ruling.
They contend that contrary to the appellate court's opinion,
Benitez was not liable for serious misconduct. They insist that
Benitez did not malign Kurangil, during the Christmas Party
and that if he indeed became unruly on that day, the
company guards should have restrained him and made a
report about it, but there was no such intervention from the
guards.
At any rate, they argue, Benitez should not have been
dismissed for the serious misconduct he allegedly committed
since it was not in connection with his work as moving and
relocation operator. Moreover, for misconduct to be serious, it
must be of such a grave and aggravated character and not
merely trivial and unimportant as the Court declared
in Samson which, they claim, has factual similarities with the
present case.
The Respondents' Case
In their Comment (on the Petition),25 the respondents pray
that the petition be dismissed and the assailed CA rulings
modified through a deletion of the award of nominal damages
to Benitez and the reinstatement of LA Franco's September
14, 2011 decision. In the alternative, they ask that the
nominal damages award be tempered.
They argue that the petitioners have not made out a case
showing that there are special and compelling reasons
requiring the exercise by this Court of its discretionary power
of judicial review. They submit that the petition virtually
raises the same arguments that had already been duly
resolved, based on evidence supporting Benitez's dismissal
for cause. Thus, the petition should be rejected outright for it
raises only questions of facts and not of law.
The Court's Ruling
The procedural question
Are the questions raised by the petitioners factual in nature,
or are they of law? The respondents contend that they are
questions of fact and are therefore not allowed in a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court. Thus, they ask for an outright dismissal of the
petition as the Court is not a trier of facts.26
The respondents' arguments failed to persuade us. The
labor arbiter, the NLRC and the CA uniformly ruled that there
is substantial evidence to warrant Benitez's dismissal for
serious misconduct. Although up to this stage of the
proceedings Benitez insists that he did not commit a serious
misconduct, he argues lengthily that the penalty of dismissal
is not commensurate to the offense as defined by law.
As we see matters, the question before us is what the law is
on the offense Benitez committed based on the facts of the
case, which we find to be clearly a question of law.27 It does
not involve the probative value of the evidence adduced,
which is a question of fact.28 We thus find no procedural
infirmity in the petition.
The substantive aspect of the case
Serious misconduct is a just cause for termination of
employment under the law.29 Article 282 of the Labor Code
provides: "An employer may terminate an employment
for any of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct
or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful
orders of his employer or representative in connection
with his work, x x x."
Benitez and his union stand firm on their position that he was
not liable for serious misconduct on account of his display of
unruly behavior during the company's Christmas Party on
December 18, 2010 for reasons earlier discussed. On the
other hand, the respondents maintain that he committed a
serious misconduct that warranted his dismissal.
We find the petition unmeritorious.
Despite his denial, there is substantial evidence that Benitez
maligned the company's managing director and the company
itself during their Christmas Party on December 18,
2010. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable
might conceivably opine otherwise.30
Benitez presented the affidavits31 of four company employees
— Bulan, Elib, Morata and Ramirez — who stated under oath
that Benitez was seated with them at one table and that he
did not cause any disturbance during the party. The
testimony of these four employees were belied by their co-
employees Afos and Atienza who executed a joint
affidavit,32 stating that Benitez was seated with them at a
different table and that they witnessed him going to the stage
where he lost his temper and verbally abused Kurangil in
connection with the conduct of the Christmas raffle.
Delavin,33 a company employee and guest
Urmeneta34 corroborated Kurangil's statement35 regarding
Benitez's outburst on the stage, particularly the invectives he
threw at him "Putang ina mo ka VK, gago ka." Urmeneta, for
instance, deposed that when Benitez left the stage angrily
and walked past her and others sitting at the table, she heard
him say "Putang-ina mo ka VK, gago ka.36
Benitez further contends that the company guards could have
noticed the incident and therefore could have stepped in to
maintain order, but nothing of this sort took place as there
was even no report from the guards regarding the incident.
Again, we find this argument unpersuasive. There was no
need for the guards to intervene because Benitez was
restrained by people near the stage and who escorted him
outside the premises where the party was going on as
attested to by Kurangil himself,37 as well as by Afos and
Atienza.38
Under the circumstances, we believe that Benitez's tirade
against Kurangil, the company and other company officers
indeed happened. Significantly, the Christmas Party was
attended not only by company officers and employees and
their families, but also by company clients and guests. With
such a big audience in front of him, we cannot imagine how
Benitez could get away with his claim that he did not malign
and disrespect Kurangil and the others.
The petitioners assert that even if Benitez committed the
offense for which he was charged, it was not a serious
misconduct that would warrant his dismissal under the law.
They cite Samson v. NLRC39 as authority for their submission
that "misconduct, however serious, must nevertheless be in
connection with the employee's work to constitute just cause
for his separation.40
They further cite the following excerpt in the Samson case:
xxxx
1. On or about 17 December 1993, during the Sales and
Marketing Christmas gathering, you made utterances of
obscene, insulting, and offensive words, referring to or
directed against SPC's Management Committee, in the
presence of several co-employees.
2. On that same occasion, and again in the presence of
several co-employees, you uttered obscene, insulting
and offensive words, and made malicious and lewd
gestures, all of which referred to or were directed
against Mr. Epitacio D. Titong, Jr., President and
General Manager of SPC.
3. Also on that occasion, you repeated your malicious
utterances and threatened to disrupt or otherwise
create violence during SPC's forthcoming National
Sales Conference, and enjoined your co- employees not
to prepare for the said conference.
4. Subsequently, on or about 3 January 1994, you
repeated your threats to some co-employees, advising
them to watch out for some disruptive actions to
happen during the National Sales Conference. (Emphasis
ours.)
xxxx
The petitioners submit that the C A misappreciated the facts
of Samson and the present case when it ruled that "[In the
case of Samson v. NLRC] x x x the alleged offensive words
were not uttered by petitioner in the presence of respondent
company's president and general manager. In contrast,
petitioner was with Mr. Kurangil when he uttered the foul
words in the presence of the employees, their families and
guests."41
We disagree. The CA committed no reversible error in not
applying the Samson ruling in this case. Samson's outburst
occurred during an informal Christmas gathering of company
sales officials and staff and his maligned superior was not
present during the gathering.
On the other hand, Benitez went up the stage and confronted
his superior with a verbal abuse. Also, the petitioners
cited Samson selectively and concealed its real thrust, thus:
The instant case should be distinguished from the
previous cases where we held that the use of insulting
and offensive language constituted gross misconduct
justifying an employee's dismissal. In De la Cruz vs.
NLRC, the dismissed employee shouted "saying ang
pagka-professional mo!" and "putang ina mo" at the
company physician when the latter refused to give him
a referral slip. In Autobus Workers' Union (AWU) v.
NLRC, the dismissed employee called his supervisor
"gago ka" and taunted the latter by saying "bakit
anong gusto mo tang ina mo." In these cases, the
dismissed employees personally subjected their
respective superiors to the foregoing verbal
abuses. The utter lack of respect for their superiors
was patent. In contrast, when petitioner was heard to
have uttered the alleged offensive words against
respondent company's president and general manager,
the latter was not around. (Emphases and underscoring
ours.)42
Further, it appears that in Samson, the company was
ambivalent for a while on what to do with Samson's offense
as it took several weeks after the last incident on January 3,
1994 before it asked him to explain. Moreover, the company
official maligned merely admonished Samson during a
meeting on January 4, 1994.
In contrast, the company acted swiftly and decisively in
Benitez's case, obviously and understandably, because of the
gravity and high visibility of his offense, which not only
constituted a frontal verbal, and nearly physical (the
attempted beer bottle throwing), assault against Kurangil.
Needless to say, Benitez's outburst also caused grave
embarrassment for the audience who witnessed the incident,
including company officials whom he likewise maligned, as
well as company clients and guests.
Under the foregoing circumstances, we are convinced - as
the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA had been - that
Benitez's offense constituted a serious misconduct as defined
by law. His display of insolent and disrespectful behavior, in
utter disregard of the time and place of its occurrence, had
very much to do with his work. He set a bad example as a
union officer and as a crew leader of a vital division of the
company. His actuations during the company's Christmas
Party on December 18, 2010, to our mind, could have had
negative repercussions for his employer had he been allowed
to stay on the job. His standing before those clients who
witnessed the incident and those who would hear of it would
surely be diminished, to the detriment of the company.
Finally, we agree with the NLRC ruling that the company
failed to observe the two-notice requirement in employee
dismissals as Benitez was dismissed on the same day that the
memorandum was served on him. The verbal directive for him
to explain why he should not be dismissed, assuming that
there was indeed such a directive, clearly was not in
compliance with the law. Nonetheless, considering the gravity
of Benitez's offense, we deem it reasonable to award him
P30,000.00 in nominal damages for violation of his right to
procedural due process.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED, with
modification. The award of nominal damages to Benitez is
reduced from P50,000.00 to P30,000.00. The complaint
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
2) St. Luke’s vs Ma. GR No. 212054 March 11, 2015
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 212054, March 11, 2015
ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Petitioner, v. MARIA
THERESA V. SANCHEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Decision2 dated November 21, 2013 and the
Resolution3 dated April 4, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 129108 which affirmed the Decision4 dated
November 19, 2012 and the Resolution5 dated January 14,
2013 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in
NLRC LAC No. 06-001858-12, declaring the dismissal of
respondent Maria Theresa V. Sanchez (Sanchez)
illegal.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Facts
On June 29, 2009, Sanchez was hired by petitioner St. Luke’s
Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC) as a Staff Nurse, and was
eventually assigned at SLMC, Quezon City’s Pediatric Unit
until her termination on July 6, 2011 for her purported
violation of SLMC’s Code of Discipline, particularly Section 1,
Rule 1 on Acts of Dishonesty, i.e., Robbery, Theft, Pilferage,
and Misappropriation of Funds. 6cralawred
Records reveal that at the end of her shift on May 29, 2011,
Sanchez passed through the SLMC Centralization
Entrance/Exit where she was subjected to the standard
inspection procedure by the security personnel. In the course
thereof, the Security Guard on-duty, Jaime Manzanade (SG
Manzanade), noticed a pouch in her bag and asked her to
open the same.7 When opened, said pouch contained the
following assortment of medical stocks which were
subsequently confiscated: (a) Syringe 10cl [4 pieces]; (b)
Syringe 5cl [3 pieces]; (c) Syringe 3cl [3 pieces]; (d)
Micropore [1 piece]; (e) Cotton Balls [1 pack]; (f) Neoflon
g26 [1 piece]; (g) Venofix 25 [2 pieces]; and (h) Gloves [4
pieces] (questioned items).8 Sanchez asked SG Manzanade if
she could just return the pouch inside the treatment room;
however, she was not allowed to do so.9 Instead, she was
brought to the SLMC In-House Security Department (IHSD)
where she was directed to write an Incident Report explaining
why she had the questioned items in her possession.10 She
complied11 with the directive and also submitted an undated
handwritten letter of apology12 (handwritten letter) which
reads as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
To In-House Security,
I am very sorry for bringing things from [SLMC] inside my
bag. Pasensya na po. Taos-puso po akong humihingi ng
tawad sa aking pagkakasala, Alam ko po na ako ay
nagkamali. Hindi ko po dapat dinala yung mga gamit sa
hospital. Hindi ko po alam kung [paano] ako magsisimulang
humingi ng patawad. Kahit alam kong bawal ay nagawa kong
makapag uwi ng gamit. Marami pang gamit dahil sa naipon
po. Paisa-isa nagagawa kong makakuha pag nakakalimutan
kong isoli. Hindi ko na po naiwan sa nurse station dahil naisip
kong magagamit ko rin po pag minsang nagkakaubusan ng
stocks at talagang may kailangan.
Humihingi po ako ng tawad sa aking ginawa. Isinakripisyo ko
ang hindi pagiging “toxic” sa pagkuha ng gamit para sa bagay
na alam kong mali. Inaamin ko na ako’y naging madamot,
pasuway at makasalanan. Inuna ko ang comfort ko keysa
gumawa ng tama. Manikluhod po akong humihingi ng tawad.
Sorry po. Sorry po. Sorry po talaga.13cralawlawlibrary
In a memorandum14 of even date, the IHSD, Customer Affairs
Division, through Duty Officer Hernani R. Janayon, apprised
SLMC of the incident, highlighting that Sanchez expressly
admitted that she intentionally brought out the questioned
items.
An initial investigation was also conducted by the SLMC
Division of Nursing15 which thereafter served Sanchez a notice
to explain.16cralawred
On May 31, 2011, Sanchez submitted an Incident Report
Addendum17 (May 31, 2011 letter), explaining that the
questioned items came from the medication drawers of
patients who had already been discharged, and, as similarly
practiced by the other staff members, she started saving
these items as excess stocks in her pouch, along with other
basic items that she uses during her shift.18 She then put the
pouch inside the lowest drawer of the bedside table in the
treatment room for use in immediate procedures in case
replenishment of stocks gets delayed. However, on the day of
the incident, she failed to return the pouch inside the
medication drawer upon getting her tri-colored pen and
calculator and, instead, placed it inside her bag. Eventually,
she forgot about the same as she got caught up in work, until
it was noticed by the guard on duty on her way out of SMLC’s
premises.
Consequently, Sanchez was placed under preventive
suspension effective June 3, 2011 until the conclusion of the
investigation by SLMC’s Employee and Labor Relations
Department (ELRD)19 which, thereafter, required her to
explain why she should not be terminated from service for
“acts of dishonesty” due to her possession of the questioned
items in violation of Section 1, Rule I of the SLMC Code of
Discipline.20 In response, she submitted a letter21 dated June
13, 2011, which merely reiterated her claims in her previous
May 31, 2011 letter. She likewise requested for a case
conference,22 which SLMC granted.23 After hearing her side,
SLMC, on July 4, 2011, informed Sanchez of its decision to
terminate her employment effective closing hours of July 6,
2011. 24 This prompted her to file a complaint for illegal
dismissal before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No.
07-11042-11.
In her position paper,25 Sanchez maintained her innocence,
claiming that she had no intention of bringing outside the
SLMC’s premises the questioned items since she merely
inadvertently left the pouch containing them in her bag as she
got caught up in work that day. She further asserted that she
could not be found guilty of pilferage since the questioned
items found in her possession were neither SLMC’s nor its
employees’ property. She also stressed the fact that SLMC did
not file any criminal charges against her. Anent her supposed
admission in her handwritten letter, she claimed that she was
unassisted by counsel when she executed the same and,
thus, was inadmissible for being unconstitutional.26cralawred
For its part,27 SLMC contended that Sanchez was validly
dismissed for just cause as she had committed theft in
violation of Section 1,28 Rule I of the SLMC Code of
Discipline,29 which punishes acts of dishonesty, i.e., robbery,
theft, pilferage, and misappropriation of funds, with
termination from service.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The LA Ruling
In a Decision30 dated May 27, 2012, the Labor Arbiter (LA)
ruled that Sanchez was validly dismissed31for intentionally
taking the property of SLMC’s clients for her own personal
benefit,32 which constitutes an act of dishonesty as provided
under SLMC’s Code of Discipline.
According to the LA, Sanchez’s act of theft was evinced by her
attempt to bring the questioned items that did not belong to
her out of SLMC’s premises; this was found to be analogous
to serious misconduct which is a just cause to dismiss
her.33 The fact that the items she took were neither SLMC’s
nor her co-employees’ property was not found by the LA to be
material since the SLMC Code of Discipline clearly provides
that acts of dishonesty committed to SLMC, its doctors, its
employees, as well as its customers, are punishable by a
penalty of termination from service.34 To this, the LA opined
that “[i]t is rather illogical to distinguish the persons with
whom the [said] acts may be committed as SLMC is also
answerable to the properties of its patients.”35 Moreover, the
LA observed that Sanchez was aware of SLMC’s strict policy
regarding the taking of hospital/medical items as evidenced
by her handwritten letter,36 but nonetheless committed the
said misconduct. Finally, the LA pointed out that SLMC’s non-
filing of a criminal case against Sanchez did not preclude a
determination of her serious misconduct, considering that the
filing of a criminal case is entirely separate and distinct from
the determination of just cause for termination of
employment.37cralawred
Aggrieved, Sanchez appealed38 to the
NLRC.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The NLRC Ruling
In a Decision39 dated November 19, 2012, the NLRC reversed
and set aside the LA ruling, and held that Sanchez was
illegally dismissed.
The NLRC declared that the alleged violation of Sanchez was a
unique case, considering that keeping excess hospital stocks
or “hoarding” was an admitted practice amongst nurses in the
Pediatric Unit which had been tolerated by SLMC management
for a long time.40 The NLRC held that while Sanchez
expressed remorse for her misconduct in her handwritten
letter, she manifested that she only “hoarded” the questioned
items for future use in case their medical supplies are
depleted, and not for her personal benefit.41 It further held
that SLMC failed to establish that Sanchez was motivated by
ill-will when she brought out the questioned items, noting: (a)
the testimony of SG Manzanade during the conference before
the ELRD of Sanchez’s demeanor when she was
apprehended, i.e., “[d]i naman siya masyado
nataranta,”42 and her consequent offer to return the
pouch;43 and (b) that the said pouch was not hidden
underneath the bag.44 Finally, the NLRC concluded that the
punishment of dismissal was too harsh and the one (1) month
preventive suspension already imposed on and served by
Sanchez was the appropriate penalty.45 Accordingly, the NLRC
ordered her reinstatement, and the payment of backwages,
other benefits, and attorney’s fees.46cralawred
Unconvinced, SLMC moved for reconsideration47 which was,
however, denied in a Resolution48 dated January 14, 2013.
Thus, it filed a petition for certiorari49 before the
CA.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The CA Ruling
In a Decision50 dated November 21, 2013, the CA upheld the
NLRC, ruling that the latter did not gravely abuse its
discretion in finding that Sanchez was illegally dismissed.
It ruled that Sanchez’s offense did not qualify as serious
misconduct, given that: (a) the questioned items found in her
possession were not SLMC property since said items were
paid for by discharged patients, thus discounting any material
or economic damage on SLMC’s part; (b) the retention of
excess medical supplies was an admitted practice amongst
nurses in the Pediatric Unit which was tolerated by SLMC; (c)
it was illogical for Sanchez to leave the pouch in her bag since
she would be subjected to a routine inspection; (d) Sanchez’s
lack of intention to bring out the pouch was manifested by her
composed demeanor upon apprehension and offer to return
the pouch to the treatment room; and (e) had SLMC honestly
believed that Sanchez committed theft or pilferage, it should
have filed the appropriate criminal case, but failed to do
so.51 Moreover, while the CA recognized that SLMC had the
management prerogative to discipline its erring employees, it,
however, declared that such right must be exercised
humanely. As such, SLMC should only impose penalties
commensurate with the degree of infraction. Considering that
there was no indication that Sanchez’s actions were
perpetrated for self-interest or for an unlawful objective, the
penalty of dismissal imposed on her was grossly oppressive
and disproportionate to her offense.52cralawred
Dissatisfied, SLMC sought for reconsideration,53 but was
denied in a Resolution54 dated April 4, 2014, hence, this
petition.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue to be resolved is whether or not Sanchez was
illegally dismissed by SLMC.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The right of an employer to regulate all aspects of
employment, aptly called “management prerogative,” gives
employers the freedom to regulate, according to their
discretion and best judgment, all aspects of employment,
including work assignment, working methods, processes to
be followed, working regulations, transfer of employees,
work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline,
dismissal and recall of workers.55 In this light, courts often
decline to interfere in legitimate business decisions of
employers. In fact, labor laws discourage interference in
employers’ judgment concerning the conduct of their
business.56cralawred
Among the employer’s management prerogatives is the right
to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary or
proper for the conduct of its business or concern, to provide
certain disciplinary measures to implement said rules and to
assure that the same would be complied with. At the same
time, the employee has the corollary duty to obey all
reasonable rules, orders, and instructions of the employer;
and willful or intentional disobedience thereto, as a general
rule, justifies termination of the contract of service and the
dismissal of the employee.57 Article 296 (formerly Article 282)
of the Labor Code provides:58cralawred
Article 296. Termination by Employer. - An employer may
terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or his
representative in connection with his
work;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x xcralawlawlibrary
Note that for an employee to be validly dismissed on this
ground, the employer’s orders, regulations, or instructions
must be: (1) reasonable and lawful, (2) sufficiently
known to the employee, and (3) in connection with the
duties which the employee has been engaged to
discharge.”59cralawred
Tested against the foregoing, the Court finds that Sanchez
was validly dismissed by SLMC for her willful disregard and
disobedience of Section 1, Rule I of the SLMC Code of
Discipline, which reasonably punishes acts of dishonesty, i.e.,
“theft, pilferage of hospital or co-employee property, x x x or
its attempt in any form or manner from the hospital, co-
employees, doctors, visitors, [and] customers (external and
internal)” with termination from employment.60 Such act is
obviously connected with Sanchez’s work, who, as a staff
nurse, is tasked with the proper stewardship of medical
supplies. Significantly, records show that Sanchez made a
categorical admission61 in her handwritten letter62 – i.e.,
“[k]ahit alam kong bawal ay nagawa kong [makapag-uwi] ng
gamit”63 – that despite her knowledge of its express
prohibition under the SLMC Code of Discipline, she still
knowingly brought out the subject medical items with her. It
is apt to clarify that SLMC cannot be faulted in construing the
taking of the questioned items as an act of dishonesty
(particularly, as theft, pilferage, or its attempt in any form or
manner) considering that the intent to gain may be
reasonably presumed from the furtive taking of useful
property appertaining to another.64 Note that Section 1, Rule
1 of the SLMC Code of Discipline is further supplemented by
the company policy requiring the turn-over of excess medical
supplies/items for proper handling65 and providing a
restriction on taking and bringing such items out of the SLMC
premises without the proper authorization or “pass” from the
official concerned,66 which Sanchez was equally aware
thereof.67 Nevertheless, Sanchez failed to turn-over the
questioned items and, instead, “hoarded” them, as
purportedly practiced by the other staff members in the
Pediatric Unit. As it is clear that the company policies subject
of this case are reasonable and lawful, sufficiently known to
the employee, and evidently connected with the latter’s work,
the Court concludes that SLMC dismissed Sanchez for a just
cause.
On a related point, the Court observes that there lies no
competent basis to support the common observation of the
NLRC and the CA that the retention of excess medical
supplies was a tolerated practice among the nurses at the
Pediatric Unit. While there were previous incidents of
“hoarding,” it appears that such acts were – in similar fashion
– furtively made and the items secretly kept, as any excess
items found in the concerned nurse’s possession would have
to be confiscated.68 Hence, the fact that no one was caught
and/or sanctioned for transgressing the prohibition therefor
does not mean that the so-called “hoarding” practice was
tolerated by SLMC. Besides, whatever maybe the justification
behind the violation of the company rules regarding excess
medical supplies is immaterial since it has been established
that an infraction was deliberately committed.69 Doubtless,
the deliberate disregard or disobedience of rules by the
employee cannot be countenanced as it may encourage him
or her to do even worse and will render a mockery of the
rules of discipline that employees are required to
observe.70cralawred
Finally, the Court finds it inconsequential that SLMC has not
suffered any actual damage. While damage aggravates the
charge, its absence does not mitigate nor negate the
employee’s liability.71 Neither is SLMC’s non-filing of the
appropriate criminal charges relevant to this analysis. An
employee’s guilt or innocence in a criminal case is not
determinative of the existence of a just or authorized cause
for his or her dismissal.72 It is well-settled that conviction in a
criminal case is not necessary to find just cause for
termination of employment,73 as in this case. Criminal and
labor cases involving an employee arising from the same
infraction are separate and distinct proceedings which should
not arrest any judgment from one to the other.
As it stands, the Court thus holds that the dismissal of
Sanchez was for a just cause, supported by substantial
evidence, and is therefore in order. By declaring otherwise,
bereft of any substantial bases, the NLRC issued a patently
and grossly erroneous ruling tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion, which, in turn, means that the CA erred when it
affirmed the same. In consequence, the grant of the present
petition is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
November 21, 2013 and the Resolution dated April 4, 2014 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129108
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Labor Arbiter’s Decision
dated May 27, 2012 in NLRC Case No. NCR 07-11042-11
finding respondent Maria Theresa V. Sanchez to have been
validly dismissed by petitioner St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc.
is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,
Bersamin, and Perez, JJ., concur.
3) Northwest vs Concepcion GR No 157633 Sept. 10, 2014
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 157633, September 10, 2014 ]
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. MA.
CONCEPCION M. DEL ROSARIO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Under review is the decision promulgated on June 21, 2002,[1] whereby
the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition for certiorarifiled by
Northwest Airlines, Inc. to assail on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction the adverse
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Antecedents
Petitioner Northwest Airlines, Inc. employed respondent Ma.
Concepcion M. Del Rosario on December 10, 1994 as one of its Manila-
based flight attendants. On May 18, 1998, Del Rosario was assigned at
the Business Class Section of Northwest Flight NW 26 bound for
Japan. During the boarding preparations, Kathleen Gamboa, another
flight attendant assigned at the First Class Section of Flight NW 26,
needed to borrow a wine bottle opener from her fellow attendants
because her wine bottle opener was dull. Vivien Francisco, Gamboa's
runner, went to the Business Class Section to borrow a wine bottle
opener from Del Rosario, but the latter remarked that any flight
attendant who could not bring a wine bottle opener had no business
working in the First Class Section. Upon hearing this, Aliza Ann
Escaño, another flight attendant, offered her wine bottle opener to
Francisco. Apparently, Gamboa overheard Del Rosario's remarks, and
later on verbally confronted her. Their confrontation escalated into a
heated argument. Escaño intervened but the two ignored her,
prompting her to rush outside the aircraft to get Maria Rosario D.
Morales, the Assistant Base Manager, to pacify them.
The parties differed on what happened thereafter. Del Rosario claimed
that only an animated discussion had transpired between her and
Gamboa, but Morales insisted that it was more than an animated
discussion, recalling that Del Rosario had even challenged Gamboa to a
brawl (sabunutan). Morales asserted that she had tried to pacify Del
Rosario and Gamboa, but the two did not stop; that because the two
were still arguing although the Business Class passengers were already
boarding, she ordered them out of the plane and transfer to another
nearby Northwest aircraft; that she inquired from them about what
had happened, and even asked if they were willing to fly on the
condition that they would have to stay away from each other during the
entire flight; that because Del Rosario was not willing to commit
herself to do so, she decided not to allow both of them on Flight NW
26, and furnished them a Notice of Removal from Service (effectively
informing Del Rosario of her dismissal from the service pending an
investigation of the fighting incident between her and Gamboa).
On May 19, 1998, Morales sent a letter to Del Rosario telling her that
Northwest would conduct an investigation of the incident involving her
and Gamboa. The investigation was held on May 28, 1998 before Atty.
Ceazar Veneracion III, Northwest's Legal Counsel and Head of its
Human Resources Department. All the parties attended the
investigation
On June 19, 1998, Del Rosario was informed of her termination from
the service. Northwest stated that based on the results of the
investigation, Del Rosario and Gamboa had engaged in a fight on board
the aircraft, even if there had been no actual physical contact between
them; and that because fighting was strictly prohibited by Northwest to
the point that fighting could entail dismissal from the service even if
committed for the first time, Northwest considered her dismissal from
the service justified and in accordance with the Rules of Conduct for
Employees, as follows:
Section 1, General
x x x. Rule infractions will be dealt with according to the seriousness of
the offense and violators will be subjected to appropriate disciplinary
action up to and including discharge. Some acts of misconduct, even if
committed for the first time, are so serious that, standing alone, they
justify immediate discharge. Some examples of these offenses are
violations of rules regarding theft, alcohol and drugs, insubordination,
dishonesty, fighting, falsification of records, sleeping on the job, failure
to cooperate or lying in a Company investigation, intentional
destruction or abuse of property, threatening, intimidating or
interfering with other employees, abuse of nonrevenue and reduced
rate travel privileges and unauthorized use of Company
communications systems. Rosario and Gamboa did not come within the definition of the
word fighting. [7]
x x x x
The CA disposed thusly:
Section 24 (c), Disturbing Others, which states that:

Harassing, threatening, intimidating, assaulting, fighting or provoking WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition
a fight or similar interference with other employees at any time, on or is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the decision of the NLRC dated January
off duty is prohibited." (Italics supplied) 11, 2000, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in
lieu of reinstatement, petitioner is ordered to pay private respondent
Del Rosario subsequently filed her complaint for illegal dismissal separation pay equivalent to one month's salary for every year of
against Northwest.[2] service plus full backwages without deduction or qualification, counted
from the date of dismissal until finality of this decision including other
benefits to which she is entitled under the law. Petitioner is likewise
Decision of the Labor Arbiter ordered to pay respondent Del Rosario attorney's fees consisting of five
(5%) per cent of the adjudged relief.
In her decision dated January 18, 1999,[3] Labor Arbiter Teresita D.
Castillon-Lora ruled in favor of Northwest, holding that the dismissal SO ORDERED. [8]
of Del Rosario had been justified and valid upon taking into account
that Northwest had been engaged in the airline business in which a
good public image had been demanded, and in which flight attendants Issues
had been expected to maintain an image of sweetness and amiability;
that fighting among its employees even in the form of heated The issues are the following, namely: (1) Was Del Rosario's dismissal
arguments or discussions were very contradictory to that expected from the service valid?; and (2) Were the monetary awards
image;[4] and that it could validly dismiss its employees like the appropriate?
respondent because it had been entitled to protect its business interests
by putting up an impeccable image to the public.
Ruling

Ruling of the NLRC The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the CA.

Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, and As provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code, an employer may
ruled in favor of Del Rosario, declaring that the incident between her terminate an employee for a just cause, to wit:
and Gamboa could not be considered as synonymous with fighting as
the activity prohibited by Northwest's Rules of Conduct; that based on
Black's Law Dictionary, fight referred to a hostile encounter, affray, or Art. 282. TERMINATION BY EMPLOYER
altercation; a physical or verbal struggle for victory, pugilistic combat;
that according to Bouvier's Law Dictionary, fighting did not necessarily An employer may terminate an employee for any of the following
imply that both parties should exchange blows, for it was sufficient that causes:
they voluntarily put their bodies in position with that intent;[5] and that
the incident between Del Rosario and Gamboa could not be held (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
similar to the fight that Northwest penalized under its Rules of lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his
Conduct. work;

The NLRC further ratiocinated as follows: (b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

Evident in the definition of fighting is the existence of an underlying
hostility between the parties which is so intense that there is an
imminent danger of a physical conflict (if there is none yet). In other
words, when we say two people are fighting, at the very least, they
should project a general appearance of wanting to physically strike
each other. Was this the image that appellant and FA Gamboa
projected when they were facing each other during the incident of May
18, 1998[?] We do not think so.
x x x Almost unanimously, the witnesses of NWA refer to the incident
as "arguing" or a "serious or animated discussion." An argument is an
effort to establish belief by a course of reasoning (Bouvier's Law
Dictionary). In ordinary parlance, arguing is merely talking or debating
about a certain issue. There are no underpinnings of animosity in the
discussion nor (sic) between the parties. These witnesses never saw any
hostility between the appellant and FA Gamboa. Neither did they see
these two ladies wanting to strike each other. What they saw were two
FAs engaged in an animated verbal exchange, arguing but not
fighting.[6]
The NLRC ordered the reinstatement of Del Rosario to her former
position without loss of seniority rights and with payment
of backwages, per diems, other lost income and benefits from June 19,
1998; as well as the payment of attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the
monetary award.
Decision of the CA
Aggrieved, Northwest elevated the adverse decision of the NLRC to the
CA on certiorari, averring that the NLRC thereby committed grave
abuse of discretion in reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter, and
submitting that Del Rosario's dismissal from the service had been for a
just cause, with the evidence presented against her being more than
sufficient to substantiate its position that there had really been
a fight between her and Gamboa; and that the NLRC likewise gravely
abused its discretion in ordering the reinstatement of Del Rosario and
the payment of her backwages and attorney's fees.
As stated, the CA sustained the NLRC through its decision promulgated
on June 21, 2002, observing that Northwest did not discharge its
burden to prove not merely reversible error but grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
NLRC; and that, indeed, the NLRC had correctly held that Del
Rosario's conduct did not constitute serious misconduct, because the
NLRC, in determining the usual, ordinary and commonly understood
meaning of the word fighting, had resorted to authoritative lexicons
that supported its conclusion that the exchange of words between Del
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him
by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the
person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his
duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Northwest argues that Del Rosario was dismissed on the grounds of
serious misconduct and willful disobedience. Misconduct refers to the
improper or wrong conduct that transgresses some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment.
But misconduct or improper behavior, to be a just cause for
termination of employment, must: (a) be serious; (b) relate to the
performance of the employee's duties; and (c) show that the employee
has become unfit to continue working for the employer.[9]
There is no doubt that the last two elements of misconduct were
present in the case of Del Rosario. The cause of her dismissal related to
the performance of her duties as a flight attendant, and she became
unfit to continue working for Northwest. Remaining to be determined
is, therefore, whether the misconduct was serious as to merit Del
Rosario's dismissal. In that respect, the fight between her and Gamboa
should be so serious that it entailed the termination of her employment
even if it was her first offense. Northwest insists that what transpired
on May 18, 1998 between her and Gamboa was obviously a form
of fight that it strictly prohibited, but Del Rosario disputes this by
contending that it was only an animated discussion between her and
Gamboa. She argues that as settled in American
jurisprudence fight pertained to combat or battle, like the hostile
encounter or engagement between opposing forces, suggesting
primarily the notion of a brawl or unpremeditated encounter, or of a
pugilistic combat;[10] while argument was a connected discourse based
upon reason, or a course of reasoning tending and intended to
establish a position and to induce belief.[11]
In several rulings where the meaning of fight was decisive, the Court
has observed that the term fight was considered to be different from
the term argument. In People v. Asto,[12] for instance, the Court
characterized fight as not just a merely verbal tussle but a physical
combat between two opposing parties, to wit:
Well into their second bottle of gin, at about eleven o'clock that
morning, Fernando Aquino and Peregrino had a verbal tussle.
Fernando Aquino declared that he was going to run for councilor of
Alcala, Pangasinan. Peregrino countered by saying: "If you will run for
that post, cousin, I will fight you." After a brief exchange of words,
Fernando Aquino, laughing, went to sit beside Abagat. As Aquino
continued with his mirth, Abagat stared at Peregrino with contempt.
xxx. A few minutes later, he heard a commotion in the plantation some
two hundred meters away. He claims to have seen several
people fighting each other with pieces of wood but did not go to the
field to check what was happening.[13] (Italics supplied.)
Similarly, in Pilares, Sr. v. People,[14] fight was held to be more than
just an exchange of words that usually succeeded the provocation by
either party, thus:
When the petitioner was about to hand over the bottles of beer to the
private complainant, the latter called him "coward" and dared him to
get out for a fight. Insulted, the petitioner went out of his store and
chased the private complainant. (Italics supplied.)
Based on the foregoing, the incident involving Del Rosario and
Gamboa could not be justly considered as akin to
the fight contemplated by Northwest. In the eyes of the NLRC, Del
Rosario and Gamboa were arguing but not fighting. The understanding
of fight as one that required physical combat was absent during the
incident of May 18, 1998. Moreover, the claim of Morales that Del
Rosario challenged Gamboa to a brawl (sabunutan) could not be given
credence by virtue of its being self-serving in favor of Northwest, and of
its being an apparent afterthought on the part of Morales during the
investigation of the incident, without Del Rosario having the
opportunity to contest Morales' statement. In that context, the
investigation then served only as Northwest's means to establish that
the grounds of a valid dismissal based on serious misconduct really
existed.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the incident was the kind
of fight prohibited by Northwest's Rules of Conduct, the same could
not be considered as of such seriousness as to warrant Del Rosario's
dismissal from the service. The gravity of the fight, which was not more
than a verbal argument between them, was not enough to tarnish or
diminish Northwest's public image.
Under the circumstances, therefore, the CA properly ruled that the
NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction by declaring Del Rosario's dismissal unjustified.
Northwest as the petitioner for certiorari must demonstrate grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the NLRC. Grave abuse of discretion, according to De los
Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company,[15] "must be grave,
which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board
evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge,
tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction." Alas, Northwest did not show how the NLRC could have
abused its discretion, let alone gravely, in ruling adversely against it.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on June 21, 2002; and ORDERS the petitioner
to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr.,* Leonardo-De Castro,** (Acting Chairperson), Perez,
and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
4) The Coffee vs Rolly GR No. 208908 March 11, 2015
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 208908, March 11, 2015
THE COFFEE BEAN AND TEA LEAF PHILIPPINES, INC.
AND WALDEN CHU, Petitioners, v. ROLLY P.
ARENAS, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this petition for review on certiorari1 the
challenge to the Court of Appeals’ (CA) decision2dated March
26, 2013 and resolution3 dated August 30, 2013 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 117822. These assailed CA rulings affirmed the
National Labor Relations Commission’s (NLRC) decision4 dated
August 13, 2010, which also affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s (LA)
February 28, 2010 decision.
The Antecedent Facts
On April 1, 2008, the Coffee Bean and Tea Leaf Philippines,
Inc. (CBTL) hired Rolly P. Arenas (Arenas) to work as a
“barista” at its Paseo Center Branch. His principal functions
included taking orders from customers and preparing their
ordered food and beverages.5 Upon signing the employment
contract,6Arenas was informed of CBTL’s existing employment
policies.
To ensure the quality of its crew’s services, CBTL regularly
employs a “mystery guest shopper” who poses as a customer,
for the purpose of covertly inspecting the baristas’ job
performance.7
In April 2009, a mystery guest shopper at the Paseo Center
Branch submitted a report stating that on March 30, 2009,
Arenas was seen eating non-CBTL products at CBTL’s al
fresco dining area while on duty. As a result, the counter was
left empty without anyone to take and prepare the customers’
orders.8
On another occasion, or on April 28, 2009, Katrina Basallo
(Basallo), the duty manager of CBTL, conducted a routine
inspection of the Paseo Center Branch. While inspecting the
store’s products, she noticed an iced tea bottle being chilled
inside the bin where the ice for the customers’ drinks is
stored; thus, she called the attention of the staff on duty.
When asked, Arenas muttered, “kaninong iced tea?” and
immediately picked the bottle and disposed it outside the
store.9
After inspection, Basallo prepared a store manager’s report
which listed Arenas’ recent infractions, as follows:
1. Leaving the counter unattended and eating chips in
an unauthorized area while on duty (March 30,
2009);
2. Reporting late for work on several occasions (April 1,
3 and 22); and
3. Placing an iced tea bottle in the ice bin despite
having knowledge of company policy prohibiting the
same (April 28, 2009).10
Based on the mystery guest shopper and duty manager’s
reports, Arenas was required to explain his alleged violations.
However, CBTL found Arenas’ written explanation
unsatisfactory, hence CBTL terminated his employment.11
Arenas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. After due
proceedings, the LA ruled in his favor, declaring that he had
been illegally dismissed. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the
LA’s decision.
CBTL filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
CA. CBTL insisted that Arenas’ infractions amounted to
serious misconduct or willful disobedience, gross and habitual
neglect of duties, and breach of trust and confidence. To
support these allegations, CBTL presented Arenas’
letter12 where he admitted his commission of the imputed
violations.
On March 26, 2013, the CA issued its decision dismissing the
petition. The CA ruled that Arenas’ offenses fell short of the
required legal standards to justify his dismissal; and that
these do not constitute serious misconduct or willful
disobedience, and gross negligence, to merit his termination
from service. The CA denied CBTL’s motion for
reconsideration opening the way for this present appeal via a
petition for review on certiorari.
The main issue before us is whether CBTL illegally dismissed
Arenas from employment.
The Petition
CBTL argues that under the terms and conditions of the
employment contract, Arenas agreed to abide and comply
with CBTL’s policies,
procedures, rules and regulations, as provided for under
CBTL’s table of offenses and penalties and/or employee
handbook.13 CBTL cites serious misconduct as the primary
reason for terminating Arenas’ employment. CBTL also
imputes dishonesty on the part of Arenas for not immediately
admitting that he indeed left his bottled iced tea inside the ice
bin.
Our Ruling
We DENY the petition.
As a rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, the CA does not assess and weigh each piece of
evidence introduced in the case. The CA only examines the
factual findings of the NLRC to determine whether its
conclusions are supported by substantial evidence, whose
absence points to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.14 In the case of Mercado v. AMA
Computer College,15 we emphasized that:
As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, the appellate court does not assess and
weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC based their conclusion. The query in this
proceeding is limited to the determination of whether or not
the NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision. x x
x16 [Italics supplied]
Our review of the records shows that the CA did not err in
affirming the LA and the NLRC’s rulings. No grave abuse of
discretion tainted these rulings, thus, the CA’s decision also
warrants this Court’s affirmation. The infractions which
Arenas committed do not justify the application of the severe
penalty of termination from service.
First, Arenas was found eating non-CBTL products inside the
store’s premises while on duty. Allegedly, he left the counter
unattended without anyone to entertain the incoming
customers. Second, he chilled his bottled iced tea inside the
ice bin, in violation of CBTL’s sanitation and hygiene policy.
CBTL argues that these violations constitute willful
disobedience, thus meriting dismissal from employment.
We disagree with CBTL.
For willful disobedience to be a valid cause for dismissal,
these two elements must concur: (1) the employee’s assailed
conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by
a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order
violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to
the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had
been engaged to discharge.17
Tested against these standards, it is clear that Arenas’ alleged
infractions do not amount to such a wrongful and perverse
attitude. Though Arenas may have admitted these
wrongdoings, these do not amount to a wanton disregard of
CBTL’s company policies. As Arenas mentioned in his written
explanation, he was on a scheduled break when he was
caught eating at CBTL’s al fresco dining area. During that
time, the other service crews were the one in charge of
manning the counter. Notably, CBTL’s employee handbook
imposes only the penalty of written warning for the offense
of eating non-CBTL products inside the store’s premises.
CBTL also imputes gross and habitual neglect of duty to
Arenas for coming in late in three separate instances.
Gross negligence implies a want or absence of, or failure to
exercise even a slight care or diligence, or the entire absence
of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences
without exerting any effort to avoid them.18 There is habitual
neglect if based on the circumstances, there is a repeated
failure to perform one’s duties for a period of time.19
In light of the foregoing criteria, we rule that Arenas’ three
counts of tardiness cannot be considered as gross and
habitual neglect of duty. The infrequency of his tardiness
already removes the character of habitualness. These late
attendances were also broadly spaced out, negating the
complete absence of care on Arenas’ part in the performance
of his duties. Even CBTL admitted in its notice to explain that
this violation does not merit yet a disciplinary action and is
only an aggravating circumstance to Arenas’ other
violations.20
To further justify Arenas’ dismissal, CBTL argues that he
committed serious misconduct when he lied about using the
ice bin as cooler for his bottled iced tea. Under CBTL’s
employee handbook, dishonesty, even at the first instance,
warrants the penalty of termination from service.21
For misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for
dismissal, (a) it must be serious; (b) it must relate to the
performance of the employee’s duties; and (c) it must show
that the employee has become unfit to continue
working for the employer.22
However, the facts on record reveal that there was no active
dishonesty on the part of Arenas. When questioned about
who placed the bottled iced tea inside the ice bin, his
immediate reaction was not to deny his mistake, but to
remove the bottle inside the bin and throw it outside. More
importantly, when he was asked to make a written
explanation of his action, he admitted that the bottled iced
tea was his.
Thus, even if there was an initial reticence on Arenas’ part,
his subsequent act of owing to his mistake only shows the
absence of a deliberate intent to lie or deceive his CBTL
superiors. On this score, we conclude that Arenas’ action did
not amount to serious misconduct.
Moreover, the imputed violations of Arenas, whether taken
singly or as a whole, do not necessitate the imposition of the
strict and harsh penalty of dismissal from service. The LA,
NLRC and the CA all consistently ruled that these offenses
are not grave enough to qualify as just causes for
dismissal. Factual findings of the labor tribunals
especially if affirmed by the CA must be given great
weight, and merit the Court’s respect.
As a final remark, we note that petitioner Walden Chu (Chu)
should not be held jointly and severally liable with CBTL for
Arenas’ adjudged monetary awards. The LA and the NLRC
ruled for their solidary liability but the CA failed to dispose
this issue in its decision.
A corporation is a juridical entity with a legal personality
separate and distinct from those acting for and in its behalf
and, in general, from the people comprising it.23 Thus, as a
general rule, an officer may not be held liable for the
corporation’s labor obligations unless he acted with evident
malice and/or bad faith in dismissing an employee.24
In the present case, there was no showing of any evident
malice or bad faith on Chu’s part as CBTL’s president. His
participation in Arenas’ termination was not even sufficiently
alleged and argued. Hence, he cannot be held solidarily liable
for CBTL’s liabilities to Arenas.
WHEREFORE, in light of these considerations, we
hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. The Court of
Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in its decision
of March 26, 2013 and its resolution of August 30, 2013 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 117822, except with respect to the liability of
petitioner Walden Chu. We thus absolve petitioner Walden
Chu from paying in his personal capacity the monetary
awards of respondent Rolly P. Arenas. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen,
JJ., concur.Joel vs LA Gr. No. 208890 Dec 8, 2014
5) FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 208890 December 8, 2014
JOEL N. MONTALLANA, Petitioner,
vs.
LA CONSOLACION COLLEGE MANILA, SR. IMELDA A. MORA,
and ALBERT D. MANALILI,* Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated
May 31, 2013 and the Resolution3 dated August 30, 2013 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 127988 which reversed and set
aside the Decision4 dated July 31, 2012 and the Resolution5 dated
October 16, 2012 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
in NLRC LAC No. 02-000556-12, finding petitioner Joel N. Montallana
(Montallana) to have been terminated from employment by respondent
La Consolacion College Manila (La Consolacion) for a just and legal
cause.
The Facts
Montallana was a faculty member ofLa Consolacion’s College of Arts
and Sciences.6
On January 16, 2009, Mrs. NerissaD. Del Fierro-Juan (Juan), the
Assistant Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences and the immediate
superior of Montallana, filed a formal administrative complaint 7 with La
Consolacion8against Montallana, charging him of: (a) oral defamation
(or slander); (b) disorderly conduct in the school premises; and (c)
discourteous/indecent behavior or using profane or obscene language
in addressing co-employees, superiors, or anybody within the school
premises.9
The said complaint arose from an incident that occurred in the faculty
room on January 12, 2009 while Dean’s Secretary Ann Ruiz (Ruiz) and
student assistant Kathlyn Saez (Saez) were numbering the lockers,
pursuant to a policy implemented by Juan.10 At that time, Montallana
was conversing with a co-faculty member, Dr. Beatriz V. Pabito
(Pabito), when the latter asked Ruiz and Saez what they were
doing.11 Upon learning of the reassignment of lockers of faculty
members through drawing of lots, Pabito commented, saying "para
naman tayong bata nyan,"12 to which Montallana followed suit and, in a
loud voice, remarked "oo nga naman para tayong mga grade one
nyan, anong kabubuhan ng grade one yan."13 Juan heard Montallana’s
remark and confronted him, resulting in a heated altercation that ended
with the latter walking out of the room while Juan was still talking to
him.14
After due investigation, La Consolacion’s fact-finding committee found
Montallana guilty of serious misconduct in making derogatory and
insulting remarks about his superior, aggravated by the fact that he
made such remarks in a loud voice so that Juan would hear
them.15 While noting that the foregoing may be considered as a just
cause for Montallana’s termination, the committee observed thatit was
his first offense and stressed on the reformative and redemptive facets
of the case.16 In fine, Montallana was only meted the penalty of
suspension without pay for a period of two (2) months and directed him
to submit a written public apology to Juan in a tenor satisfactory to her
and La Consolacion’s Human Resource Department (HRD). 17
In a letter18 dated April 22, 2009, Montallana sought reconsideration of
his suspension and explained that a written public apology was
inappropriate at that time in view of the pendency of a criminal
complaint19 for grave oral defamation filed by Juan against him before
the City Prosecutor’s Office. He mentioned that his issuance of a
written public apology while the criminal case was being heard might
incriminate himself, adding too that it was his lawyer who advised him
to invoke his right against self-incrimination.20
The request having been denied by La Consolacion’s President,
respondent Sr. Imelda A. Mora (Mora), in her letter21 dated May 12,
2009, Montallana filed a complaint for illegal suspension and unfair
labor practice, with prayer for payment of salaries during the period of
suspension, and moral and exemplary damages against respondents
La Consolacion and Mora before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR
Case No. 05-07667-09 (illegal suspension case).22
In a Decision23 dated April 15, 2010, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in
favor of Montallana, holding that his actions did not constitute serious
misconduct.24 Hence, Montallana’s suspension from employment was
declared illegal and respondents La Consolacion and Mora were
ordered to pay Montallana the amount of ₱48,000.00 as his salary
during the period of suspension.25
On appeal,26 however, the NLRC disagreed27 with the findings of the
LA and found Montallana’s acts to be constitutive of serious
misconduct and against the rule of honor and decency expected of any
teacher.28 While it found sufficient basis to impose the penalty of
termination, the NLRC nonetheless sustained the two (2)-month
suspension in deference to the school’s prerogative to discipline its
employees.29 Montallana moved for reconsideration30 but was denied
by the NLRC in a Decision31 dated February 7, 2011. Montallana no
longer elevated the matter to the CA and the NLRC’s decision became
final and executory on February 28, 2011.32
Thereafter, on June 1, 2011, La Consolacion, through its HRD
Director, respondent Albert D. Manalili (Manalili), directed Montallana
to explain in writing why he should not be dismissed for failure to
submit his written public apology which formed part of the disciplinary
sanction that was sustained with finality by the NLRC. 33
In a letter34 dated June 9, 2011, Montallana begged for La
Consolacion’s indulgence, explaining that he had no intention of
defying the directive to submit a written public apology and that his
inability to comply therewith was, to reiterate, only in view of the
pendency of the criminal case against him. He, nonetheless,
expressed his willingness to comply with the directive once the said
case was resolved with finality. Finding Montallana’s written
explanation unsatisfactory, Manalili terminated him from work on June
13, 2011.35
Asserting that his dismissal for failure to submit a written public
apology was unjustified and was, in fact, connected to his position as
an officer of La Consolacion’s newly formed and recognized Union,
Montallana filed a complaint36for illegal dismissal with money claims
against respondents La Consolacion, Mora, and Manalili
(respondents), docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 06-09263-11.
In respondents’ defense,37 they contended that since the directive to
apologize was part of the penalty imposed on Montallana, his refusal
and/or failure to comply merited further sanctions. 38 They denied
having dismissed Montallana for his union activities, pointing out that
even the Union President agreed to his suspension for his
misbehavior.39
The LA Ruling
In a Decision40 dated November 14, 2011, the LA dismissed
Montallana’s complaint, holding that his refusal to apologize – in light
of his chosen profession as a teacher and La Consolacion’s right to
maintain a certain standard of behavior among its faculty, who serve
as models for its students – was tantamount to serious misconduct
and, hence, warranted his termination.41 In this relation, the LA found
Montallana’s reason for refusing to apologize as invalid, observing
thatno evidence was adduced to establish the existence of the criminal
case mentioned in his letters of explanation, and that even if there was
one, the case was strictly between Montallana and Juan and not the
concern of the respondents.42
Aggrieved, Montallana filed an appeal43 before the NLRC.
The NLRC Ruling
In a Decision44 dated July 31, 2012, the NLRC reversed and set aside
the LA’s verdict, and thus, ordered respondents to reinstate Montallana
and to pay him backwages from the time he was illegally dismissed up
to his reinstatement.
It ruled that Montallana’s failure to submit a written public apology was
not an open defiance of respondents’ order since he even begged for
the latter’s indulgence, believing that the issuance of a letter of apology
would incriminate him in the on-going criminal case filed by Juan.45 To
this, the NLRC added that Montallana did not question his superiors’
orders as he, in fact, expressed his willingness to abide by the same,
but only at a later appropriate time.46 Further, the NLRC observed that
since Montallana had already been suspended from work without pay,
respondents should have accorded him more consideration and
compassion to his plight.47 Thus, it ruled Montallana’s dismissal to be
too severe a penalty and ordered respondents to reinstate him to his
former position without loss of seniority and to pay him backwages
from the time he was illegally dismissed up to his reinstatement.48
Respondents moved for reconsideration,49 asserting that the failure to
comply with their directive to apologize constituted insubordination
which is subject to disciplinary sanction under the school’s
Administrative Affairs Manual.50 They further manifested that the
criminal case filed against Montallana had already been dismissed in a
Resolution51 dated March 5, 2010 and dropped from the prosecutor’s
list of cases on July 2, 2010,52 or way before La Consolacion sent the
June1, 2011 directive to explain why he failed to comply with the
required written public apology. Consequently, it was pointed out that
Montallana was lying not only to respondents but also to the NLRC. 53
Montallana, in response, claimed to have acquired a copy of the
prosecutor’s March 5, 2010 Resolution only on September 11, 2012
and, in this regard, submitted his letter of apology to the NLRC.54
In a Resolution55 dated October 16, 2012,the NLRC found that
Montallana belatedly received the prosecutor’s March 5, 2010
Resolution only on September 11, 2012 and, hence, denied
respondents’ motion.56 This prompted the filing of a petition for
certiorari57 before the CA. The CA Ruling
In a Decision58 dated May 31, 2013, the CA gave due course to
respondents’ petition and eventually reversed and set aside the
NLRC’s Decision.
It found that Montallana deliberately refused to obey the directive of the
respondents to apologize and that the pendency of the criminal case
against him was not sufficient justification to excuse him from
compliance. It observed that the said directive was an integral part of
his punishment for serious misconduct, which had already been
sustained with finality by the NLRC in the illegal suspension
case.59 Further, the CA agreed with the LA that La Consolacion, as an
educational institution, has the right to maintain and expect a certain
standard of behavior from its faculty, as they serve as role models for
its students.60 All told, the CA was satisfied that Montallana’s
employment was terminated for a just and legal cause.61
Dissatisfied, Montallana moved for reconsideration62 which was denied
in a Resolution63 dated August 30, 2013, hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not
Montallana’s termination from work was lawful and justified.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
"Willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work" is one of the
just causes to terminate an employee under Article 296 (a) (formerly
Article 282 [a]) of the Labor Code.64 In order for this ground to be
properly invoked as a just cause for dismissal, the conduct must be
willful or intentional, willfulness being characterized bya wrongful and
perverse mental attitude.65 In Dongon v. Rapid Movers and Forwarders
Co., Inc.,66 "willfulness" was described as "attended by a wrongful and
perverse mental attitude rendering the employee’s act inconsistent with
proper subordination."67
It is well to stress that it is the employer who bears the burden of
proving, through substantial evidence, that the aforesaid just cause –
or any other authorized cause for that matter – forms the basis of the
employee’s dismissal from work.68 Failing in which, the dismissal
should be adjudged as illegal.
In the case at bar, respondents failed to prove, by substantial
evidence, that Montallana’s non-compliance with respondents’
directive to apologize was "willful or intentional." The Court finds itself
in complete agreement with the NLRC that the disobedience attributed
to Montallana could not be justly characterized as "willful" within the
contemplation of Article 296 of the Labor Code, in the sense above-
described.
As culled from the records, aside from the administrative complaint
filed by Juan against Montallana for his serious misconduct, the former
also filed a criminal complaint for grave oral defamation for the
utterances he made arising from the same incident before the Manila
City Prosecutor’s Office. In the honest belief that issuing a letter of
apology would incriminate him in the said criminal case – and upon the
advice of his own lawyer at that – Montallana wrote to respondents and
voluntarily communicated that he was willing to issue the required
apology, but only had to defer the same in view of his legal
predicament. As the Court sees it, the tenor of his letters, and the
circumstances under which they were taken, at the very least,
exhibited Montallana’s good faith indealing with respondents. This,
therefore, negates the theory that his failure to abide by respondents’
directive to apologize was attended by a "wrong and perverse mental
attitude rendering the employee’s act inconsistent with proper
subordination," which would warrant his termination from employment.
It beckons clarification that respondents’ submission of the
prosecutor’s March 5, 2010 Resolution to show that Juan’s criminal
complaint against Montallana was dismissed way earlier than their
June 1, 2011 directive to explain is not enough to show that the latter
took a willfully defiant attitude against a lawful order, considering that
no other evidence was presented to prove that the said Resolution had
already attained finality. In fact, as pointed out by the NLRC, it was
only on September 11, 2012 that Montallana was able to obtain a copy
of the prosecutor’s March 5, 2010 Resolution, or long after he had
already submitted his letter of explanation on June 9,
2011.69 Therefore, respondents’ assertion that Montallana had lied
tothem cannot be given any credence.
Besides, even on the assumption that there was willful disobedience,
still, the Court finds the penalty of dismissal too harsh.1âwphi1 It bears
to stress that not every case of insubordination or willful disobedience
by an employee reasonably deserves the penalty of dismissal. 70 The
penalty to be imposed on an erring employee must be commensurate
with the gravity of his offense.71 To the Court’s mind, the case of an
employee who is compelled to apologize for a previous infraction but
fails to do so is not one which would properly warrant his termination,
absentany proof that the refusal was made in brazen disrespect of his
employer. While there is no question that teachers are held to a
peculiar standard of behavior in view of their significant role in the
rearing of our youth, educational institutions are, in the meantime, held
against a legal standard imposed against all employers, among which,
is the reservation of the ultimate penalty of dismissal for serious
infractions enumerated as just causes under Article 296 of the Labor
Code. Unfortunately, respondents herein failed to prove the
seriousness of Montallana’s omission by the evidentiary benchmark of
substantial evidence. And to add, on a related note, while La
Consolacion’s Administrative Affairs Manual72 discloses that acts of
insubordination (particularly, that of refusing or neglecting to obey the
school’s lawful directive) are dismissible violations, they are only so if
imposed as a third sanction. In the same vein, records are bereft of
any showing that Montallana's failure to apologize was being punished
as such.
In fine, since respondents failed to prove, by substantial evidence, that
Montallana's dismissal was based on a just or authorized cause under
the Labor Code or was clearly warranted under La Consolacion's
Administrative Affairs Manual, the Court rules that the dismissal was
illegal. Consequently, the NLRC's identical ruling, which was
erroneously reversed by the CA on certiorari, must be reinstated with
the modification, however, in that the order for respondents Mora and
Manalili to pay Montallana backwages73 should be deleted. It is a rule
that personal liability of corporate directors, trustees or officers
attaches only when: (a) they assent to a patently unlawful act of the
corporation, or when they are guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in
directing its affairs, or when there is a conflict of interest resulting in
damages to the corporation, its stockholders or other persons; ( b) they
consent to the issuance of watered down stocks or when, having
knowledge of such issuance, do not forthwith file with the corporate
secretary their written objection; (c) they agree to hold themselves
personally and solidarily liable with the corporation; or (d) they are
made by specific provision of law personally answerable for their
corporate action.74None of these circumstances, in so far as Mora and
Manalili are concerned, were shown to be present in this case; hence,
there is no reason for them to be held liable for Montallana's
backwages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 31,
2013 and the Resolution dated August 30, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 127988 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated July 31, 2012 and the
Resolution dated October 16, 2012 of the National Labor Relations
Commission in NLRC LAC No. 02-000556-12, declaring petitioner Joel
N. Montallana (Montallana) to have been illegally dismissed, are
REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION deleting the order for
respondents Sr. Imelda A. Mora and Albert D. Manalili to pay
Montallana his backwages.
SO ORDRED.
6) Dr. vs Colegio GR No. 189629
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189629 August 6, 2014
DR. PHYLIS C. RIO, Petitioner,
vs.
COLEGIO DE STA. ROSAMAKATI and/or SR. MARILYN B.
GUSTILO, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review filed under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 dated 21 May 2009 and
Resolution2 dated 18 September 2009 by the Honorable Court of
Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 89502 which ruled on the legality of
the dismissal of petitioner Dr. Phylis C. Rio (petitioner).
The Facts
Petitioner was hired by respondent Colegio De Sta. Rosa-Makati as a
part-time school physician in June 1993. Petitioner was required to
report for work for four (4) hours every week witha salary of
₱12,640.00 per month.
In February 2002 or after almost ten (10) years of service, petitioner
received a Contract of Appointment from Sr. Marilyn B. Gustilo
(respondent Gustilo), Directress/Principal, requiringpetitioner to
reportfrom Monday to Friday, from 8:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., with a salary
of ₱12,500.00 per month. Due to the substantial change in the work
schedule and decrease in her salary, petitioner declined the Contract
of Appointment.
On 24 June 2002, through a Memorandum from respondent Gustilo,
petitioner was informed of a new workschedule. The Memorandum
required petitioner to report daily during the work week, to wit:
Mondays, Wednesdays, Fridays from 8:00 a.m. to11:00 a.m.;
Tuesdays and Thursdays at 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.
In opposition, petitioner wrote respondent Gustilo a letter refusing the
unilateral change in her work schedule. In response, respondent
Gustilo revised the new work schedule to every Tuesdays from 7:00
a.m. to 11:00 a.m.
In a letter dated 30 July 2002, respondent Gustilo charged petitioner
and Mrs. Neneth Alonzo (Alonzo), the school nurse, of "grave
misconduct, dishonesty and/or gross neglect of duty detrimental not
only to the school but, principally, to the health and well-being of the
pupils based on the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and
Section 94 (a) and (b) and Article 282 (a), (b) and (c) of the
LaborCode." In the same letter, petitioner and Alonzo were
preventively suspended for a period of thirty (30) days, effective 30
July 2002.
Petitioner was made to answer for the following: (1) nine (9) students
have medical records for school years during which they were not in
the school yet, thus could not havebeen the subject of medical
examination/evaluation; (2) seventy-nine (79) students of several
classes/sections during certain school years were not given any
medical/health evaluation/examination; and (3) failure to conduct
medical/health examination on all students of several classes of
different grade levels for the school year 2001-2002.3
Petitioner denied the charges through a letter to respondent on 2
August 2002. On 9 August 2002 petitioner filed a complaint for
constructive dismissal and illegal suspension against respondents
Colegio de Sta. RosaMakati and Gustilo before the Labor Arbiter.
Respondent Gustilo would later file a criminal complaint for falsification
of private documents against petitioner before the Makati Prosecutors
Office on 6 February 2003.
To investigate the charges against petitioner, respondent Gustilo
created an investigation committee, which issued a Memorandum,
instructing petitioner to appearbefore it on 30 August 2002.
On 8 October 2002, upon the recommendation of the investigation
committee, the services of petitioner and Alonzo were terminated for
their grave misconduct, dishonesty and gross neglect of duty.4
The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
Upon the filing of the parties’ respective Position Papers, Labor Arbiter
Manuel Manansala ruled in favorof petitioner and Alonzo, declaring
that they were illegally dismissed. The pertinent portion of the
disposition reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring respondent Colegio de Sta. Rosa guilty of illegal
dismissal for the reasons above-discussed.
2. Directing respondent Colegio de Sta. Rosa to pay
complainants Dr. Phylis C.Rio the sum of ₱259,836.27 and
Neneth M. Alonzo the sum of ₱746,360.49 representing their
backwages and severance pay for the reasons
abovediscussed as computed by the Examination and
Computation Unit of this Arbitration Branch. x x x
3. Directing respondent Colegio deSta. Rosa to immediately
reinstate complainant Ma. Corazon P. Cruz to her former
position without loss of seniorityright with full backwages
from the time of her unjust dismissal up to the time of her
actual reinstatement. The initial backwages of complainant
Cruz is ₱281,655.77 x x x.
xxxx
6. Reminding individual respondent Sr. Marilyn Gustilo in her
capacity as Directress/Principal of respondent Colegio de
Sta. Rosa to be cautious inmatters involving dismissal and/or
termination from employment of the personnel of the school. 5
Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). Petitioner, however, filed an appeal only to correct the
computation of the award from ₱259,836.27 to ₱323,036.27. The
Ruling of the NLRC
On 10 January 2005, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter
and likewise denied petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration
on 7 April 2005.6 According to the NLRC, "[i]t must be stressed that
complainants Rio and Alonzo were tasked with responsibilities vital to
the health and safety of students. Their apparent lack of interest,
concern and system in performing these tasks could very well earn
dismissal from the service even if they had notpreempted the school by
filing charges prematurely."7
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorariwith the CA, which the
CA denied. According to the CA, assuming arguendo that petitioner’s
failure to conduct medical examinationson the scheduled dates were
due to disruptions of various school activities, it only shows that
petitioner is incapable of performing the tasks required of her.8
Our Ruling
Hence, this Petition for Review, which,while it presents the need to
look into the matter of petitioner’s dismissal, goes into the question of
whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
reversing the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, this being the issue in the maintaining and updating the medical records as she had not been
petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 before the CA. The ruling in performing her job actively conducting routine physical examination on
Mercado v. AMA Computer College-Parañaque City, Inc.9 citing the students as required of her.19 x x x
Protacio v. Laya Mananghaya & Co.10 is apropos: The CA went further, stating, "even assuming that petit10ner was
As a general rule, in certiorariproceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules telling the truth, the fact remains that she had been grossly inefficient
of Court, the appellate court does not assess and weigh the sufficiency and negligent for failing to provide a proper system of maintaining and
of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their updating the students' niedical records over the years of her
conclusion. The query in this proceeding islimited to the determination employment with respondent." Indeed, petitioner was grossly inefficient
of whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and negligent in performing her duties.
or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision. However, as WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
an exception, the appellate court may examine and measure the assailed Decision dated 21 May 2009 and Resolution dated 18
factual findings of the NLRC if the same are not supported by September 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89502 are
substantial evidence. The Court has not hesitated to affirm the AFFIRMED in toto.
appellate court’s reversals of the decisions of labor tribunals if they are SO ORDERED.
not supported by substantial evidence. [Underscoring supplied]
In Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation,11 We laid down the
7) Meralco vs NLRC 263 SCRA 531 OCto 24, 1996 [G.R. No.
manner of review of the decisions ofthe CA in labor cases, as follows:
In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA 114129. October 24, 1996]
decision, in contrast with the review for jurisdictional error that we
undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling RELATIONS COMMISSIONS and JEREMIAS G. CORTEZ,
for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same respondents.
context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; DECISION
we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
correctly determined the presence or absence ofgrave abuse of This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for temporary
discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether restraining order to set aside the Resolution of the First Division of the
the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated September 30,
words, we have to be keenly aware thatthe CA undertook a Rule 65 1993 (which reversed the Decision dated August 13, 1991 of the Labor
review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged Arbiter Cresencio R. Iniego), and its Order dated December 29,
before it. This is the approach that should be basic in a Rule45 review 1993 (which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration).
of a CA ruling in a labor case. In question form, the question to ask is: Private respondent Jeremias C. Cortez, Jr. was employed on
Did the CA correctly determine whether the NLRC committed grave probationary status by petitioner Manila Electric Company (Meralco)
abuse of discretion in ruling on the case? (Underscoring supplied) on September 15, 1975 as a lineman driver. Six months later, he was
Our discussion on the meaning of grave abuse of discretion in Yu v. regularized as a 3rd class lineman-driver assigned at petitioners North
Judge Reyes-Carpio12 citing Beluso v. Commission on Elections13 and Distribution Division. In 1977, and until the time of his dismissal, he
J.L. Bernardo Construction v. CA14 is instructive: worked as 1st class lineman-driver whose duties and responsibilities
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of among others, includes the maintenance of Meralcos distribution
a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of facilities (electric lines) by responding to customers complaints of
discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise power failure, interruptions, line trippings and other line troubles.
of judgment as is equivalent to lack ofjurisdiction." The abuse of Characteristics, however, of private respondents service with
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of petitioner is his perennial suspension from work, viz:
a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, Date of Memorandum Penalty Meted/Description
or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised a. May 25, 1977 - Suspension of five (5) working days
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." without pay for violation of Company
Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorariis restricted only to "truly Code on Employee Discipline, i.e.,
extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial drinking of alcoholic beverages during
body is wholly void." From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the working time xxx.
specialcivil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act b. March 28, 1984 - Suspension of three (3) working days
down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the without pay for failure or refusal to report
petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross. x to J.F. cotton Hospital [where petitioner
x x. maintains a medical clinic] as instructed
Petitioner failed to show that the NLRC exercised its judgment by a company physician, while on sick
capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically by reason of leave.
passion and hostility. Such a showing is neededfor a reversal of the
C. June 13, 1984 - Suspension of ten (10) working days
ruling of the CA here questioned.
without pay for unauthorized extension of
In fact, the antecedents of the letter dated 30 July 2002 show that
sick leave.
respondent Colegio de Sta. Rosa-Makati had enough reason to, as it
did, terminate the services of petitioner. d. June 5, 1987 - Suspension of three (3) working days
Based on Article 282 of the Labor Code,15 in relation to Section 94 of without pay for failure or refusal to report
the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, 16 petitioner was to J.F. Cotton Hospital [where petitioner
legally dismissed on the ground of gross inefficiency and maintains a medical clinic] as instructed
incompetence, and negligence in the keeping of school or student by a company physician, while on sick
records, or tampering with or falsification of records. leave.
As we already held, gross inefficiency is closely related to gross
neglect because both involve specific acts of omission resulting in [Private respondents failed to report for
damage to another.17 Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers work from Sept. 18, 1986 to Nov. 10,
to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or 1986].
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not e. December 16, 1988 - Preventive suspension for failure to
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious submit the required Medical Certificate
indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be within 48 hours from the first date of the
affected.18 As borne by the records, petitioner’s actions fall within the sick leave.
purview of the above-definitions. Petitioner failed to diligently perform
her duties. It was unrefuted that: (1) there were dates when a medical [Private respondent failed to report for
examination was supposed to have been conducted and yet the dates work from Nov. 28, 1988 to the time such
fell on weekends; (2) failure to conduct medical examination on all Memorandum was issued on December
students for two (2) to five (5) consecutive years; (3) lack of medical 16, 1988].
records on all students; and (4) students having medical records prior f. February 22, 1989 - After formal administrative
to their enrollment. investigation, suspension of five (5)
As her defense, petitioner maintains that the discrepancies were due to working days without pay for
the loss of the cabinet key, which was misplaced by Sr. Zenaida, the unauthorized absences on November 28,
personin-charge.1âwphi1 Because the cabinet, which contains the 1988 to December 2, 1988. Absences
official medical records, could not be opened, Alonzo had to record the from December 2, 1988. Absences
medical examinations temporarily. Due to pressure and time from December 9-19, 1988 were charged
constraints, Alonzo erroneously transferred the entries of the medical to private respondents vacation leave
examinations tothe official records. credits for the calendar year 1989.
However, petitioner waited for two (2) years to finally have the cabinet g. May 30, 1989 - Suspension of ten (10) working days
opened. As correctly found by the CA: without pay for unauthorized absences
x x x If petitioner had beenattentive to her work as she claims, this from May 17-19 1989, with warning that
cabinet could not have been left dormant for two years as she would penalty of dismissal will be imposed upon
have been regularly updating her records and checking on them. x x x commission of similar offense in the
Assuming that the cabinet was indeed locked, the fact that she did not future.1
bother to have it opened for two years only showed that she had no Due to his numerous infractions, private respondent was
need to use the files contained therein because she had not been administratively investigated for violation of Meralcos Code on
Employee Discipline, particularly his repeated and unabated absence
from work without prior notice his superior specifically from August 2
to September 19, 1989.
After such administrative investigation was conducted by
petitioner, it concluded that private respondent was found to have
grossly neglected his duties by not attending to his work as lineman
from Aug. 2, 1989 to September 19, 1989 without notice to his
superiors.
In a letter dated January 19, 1990, private respondent was
notified of the investigation result and consequent termination of his
services effective January 19, 1990, viz:
Mr. Jeremias C. Cortez, Jr.
16 E Jacinto Street
Malabon, Metro Manila
Dear Mr. Cortez:
Official findings of formal administrative investigation duly conducted by the
Companys Legal Services Department established the following:
1. You incurred unauthorized and unexcused absences from work
starting August 2, 1989 up to September 9, 1989. On September 20, 1989, you
were allowed to return to work but without prejudice to the outcome of an
administrative investigation. By your unauthorized and unexcused absences
from work, you have grossly violated Section 4, par. (e) of the Company Code
on Employee Discipline which prescribes (u)nauthorized and unexcused
absences from work which exceed five (5) consecutive working days
penalized therein with dismissal of the erring employees from the service and
employ of the Company.
xxxxxxxxx
The foregoing instances plus your series of violations of the sick leave policy
clearly show your gross and habitual neglect of duties and responsibilities in
the Company, a condition which is patently inimical to the interest of the
Company as a public utility vested vital public interest.
xxxxxxxxx
Based on the foregoing, and considering your series of violations of the
Company Code on Employees Discipline, Management is constrained to
dismiss you for causes from the service and employ of the Company, as you
are hereby so dismissed effective January 19, 1990, with forfeiture of all
rights and privileges.
. Code on Employee Discipline, not only once, but ten (10) times. On the first
On August 13, 1991, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision
dismissing the case for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter ratiocinated
thus:
When complainant therefore, in patent violation of respondents clear and
express rules intended to insure discipline and integrity among its employees,
deliberately, habitually, and without prior authorization, and despite warning,
did not report for work from August 1, 1989 to September 19, 1989,
complainant committed serious misconduct and gross neglect of duty. In
doing so, complainant can [be] validly dismissed. For as held by the Supreme
Court, dismissal for violation of the Companys Rules and Regulations is a
dismissal for cause. (Peter Paul v. C.I.R., G.R. No. L- 10130, September
1957; NMI v. NLU, 102 Phil 958).
xxxxxxxxx
Considering the above, we find the complainants dismissal from the service as
lawful exercise by respondent of its prerogative to discipline errant employee.
WHEREFORE, the instant case should be as it is hereby dismissed for lack of
merit.3
Aggrieved with the decision of the Labor Arbiter, private
respondent elevated his case on appeal to public respondent.
On September 30, 1993, the NLRC set aside the decision of the
Labor Arbiter and ordered petitioner to reinstate respondent with
backwages.4
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied.
Hence, this petition.
The crux of the present controversy is whether or not private
respondents dismissal from the service was illegal.
A perusal of the records shows that there is a divergence of
views between the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC regarding the validity
of the dismissal of respondent by petitioner. Although, it is a legal tenet
that factual findings of administrative bodies are entitled to great weight
and respect, we are constrained to take a second look at the facts
before us because of the diversity in the opinions of the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC.
Petitioner alleges that there was grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NLRC when it reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter on
the following grounds: (a) that petitioner admitted in its Position Paper
(Annex 12) that private respondent went into hiding as he was
engaged in a trouble with a neighbor and (b) that in the said decision,
the Labor Arbiter relied not so much on complainants absences from
August 1 to September 19, 1989 which was the subject of the
investigation, but on complainants previous infractions.
Article 283 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for
termination. Among such causes are the following:
a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful
orders of his employers or representatives in connection with his work.
b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties.
xxx xxx xxx.
This cause includes gross inefficiency, negligence and
carelessness. Such just causes is derived from the right of the
employer to select and engage his employees. For indeed, regulation
of manpower by the company clearly falls within the ambit of
management prerogative. This court had defined a valid exercise of
management prerogative as one which covers: hiring work
assignment, working methods, time, place and manner of work, tools
to be used, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working
regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of
workers, and the discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. Except as
provided for, or limited by, special laws, an employer is free to
regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of
employment.5
Moreover, this Court has upheld a companys management
prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good faith for the
advancement of the employers interest and not for the purpose of
defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special
laws or under valid agreements.6
In the case at bar, the service record of private respondent with
petitioner is perpetually characterized by unexplained absences and
unauthorized sick leave extensions. The nature of his job i.e. as a
lineman-driver requires his physical presence to minister to incessant
complaints often faulted with electricity. As aptly stated by the Solicitor
General:
Habitual absenteeism of an errant employee is not concordant with the public
service that petitioner has to assiduously provide. To have delayed power
failure in a certain district simply because a MERALCO employee assigned to
such area was absent and cannot immediately be replaced is a breach of public
service of the highest order. A deep sense of duty would, therefore, command
that private respondent should, at the very least, limit his absence for
justifiable reasons.7
The penchant of private respondent to continually incur
unauthorized absences and/or a violation of petitioners sick leave
policy finally rendered his dismissal as imminently proper. Private
respondent cannot expect compassion from this Court by totally
disregarding his numerous previous infractions and take into
considerations only the period covering August 2, 1989 to September
19, 1989. As ruled by this Court in the cases of Mendoza v. National
Labor Relation Commissions,8 and National Service Corporation v.
Leogardo, Jr.,9 it is the totality, not the compartmentalization, of such
company infractions that private respondents had consistently
committed which justified his penalty of dismissal.
As correctly observed by the Labor Arbiter:
In the case at bar, it was established that complainant violated respondents
occasion, complainant was simply warned. On the second time, he was
suspended for 5 days. With the hope of reforming the complainant, respondent
generously imposed penalties of suspension for his repeated unauthorized
absences and violations of sick leave policy which constitute violations of the
Code. On the ninth time, complainant was already warned that the penalty of
dismissal will be imposed for similar or equally serious violation (Annex 10).
In total disregard of respondents warning, complainant, for the
tenth time did not report for work without prior authority from
respondent; hence, unauthorized. Worse, in total disregard of his
duties as lineman, he did not report for work from August 1, 1989 to
September 19, 1989; thus, seriously affected (sic) respondents
operations as a public utility. This constitute[s] a violation of
respondents Code and gross neglect of duty and serious misconduct
under Article 283 of the labor Code.10
Habitual absenteeism should not and cannot be tolerated by
petitioner herein which is a public utility company engaged in the
business of distributing and selling electric energy within its franchise
areas and that the maintenance of Meralcos distribution facilities
(electric lines) by responding to customers complaints of power failure,
interruptions, line trippings and other line troubles is of paramount
importance to the consuming public.
Hence, an employees habitual absenteeism without leave, which
violated company rules and regulation is sufficient to justify termination
from the service.11
In reversing the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter, the
NLRC made the following findings, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
We perused the records of exact what transpired in the fateful August 1 to
September 19, 1989 where complainant failed to report for work, and found
out that no less than Annex 12 (to respondents position paper which is labeled
Administrative Investigation dated 14 October 1989) shows that during that
period, the complainant went into hiding as he was engaged in a trouble with a
neighbor.
With such admission by respondent, that is, therefore, no way with which the
complainant may be validly penalized for his absence during the period
August 1 to September 19, 1989.12
However, a meticulous perusal of Annex 12 readily shows that
the statement he went into hiding as he was engaged in trouble with a
neighbor was merely a defense adduced by respondent employee and
is tantamount to an alibi. The said defense only proved to be self-
serving as the same had not been fully substantiated by private
respondent by means of a document or an affidavit executed to attest
to the alleged incidents.
Furthermore, contrary to the findings of public respondent,
petitioner never admitted private respondents went into hiding as he
was engaged in a trouble with a neighbor. As found out by petitioner in
the course of its investigation:
Out of curiosity, we verified from the Barangay where [private
respondent resides to find out the nature of [the] cases he was
allegedly got (sic) involved. Records of Barangay Captain of Bgy.
Concepcion, Malabon, Metro Manila showed that Cortezs wife has a
pending complaint against a neighbor for physical injury the complaint
was filed on July 6, 1989.
xxx xxx xxx
 We are also not convinced that he went into hiding as we met
him at his known address at that time he said he was still beset with
problems.13
This report only bolstered the falsehood of private respondents
alibi hence, petitioner had no other recourse but to mete the penalty of
dismissal as an exercise of its management prerogative.
Private respondent herein cannot just rely on the social justice
provisions of the Constitution and appeal for compassion because he
is not entitled to it due to his serious and repeated company infractions
which eventually led to his dismissal.
Private respondents prolonged absence from August 2, 1989 to
September 19, 1989 was the crucial period in this particular
case. Subsequent investigation conducted by petitioner, however,
showed that private respondent was given the full opportunity of
defending himself, otherwise, petitioner could not have possibly known
of private respondents side of the story, viz:
Statement of Respondent
In his sworn statement, Cortez maintained his allegations contained in his
letters to his office explaining that his absence were inevitable due to the
family problems. He insisted that his wife and his children suffered from
LBM probably due to the floods at their place brought about by a
typhoon. Since they were not treated by a physician, he could not present a
medical certificate to the effect.
Cortez also intimated that he was engaged in trouble and averred that, for
security reasons, he went into hiding in a town in Cavite Province. He claimed
that in several occasions, he had informed his office about his problems and
requested the same that his absences be considered excused.14
Notice and hearing in termination cases does not connote full
adversarial proceedings as elucidated in numerous cases decide by
this court.15 The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain ones side.16 As held in the case of Manggagawa ng
Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas v. NLRC:17
xxx Actual adversarial proceedings becomes necessary only for clarification
or when there is a need to propound searching questions to unclear
witnesses. This is a procedural right which the employee must, however, ask
for it is not an inherent right, and summary proceedings may be
conducted. This is to correct the common but mistaken perception that
procedural due process entails lengthy oral arguments. Hearings in
administrative proceedings and before quasi-judicial agencies are neither
oratorical contest nor debating skirmishes where cross examination skills are
displayed. Non-verbal devices such as written explanations, affidavits,
positions papers or other pleadings can establish just as clearly and concisely
aggrieved parties predicament or defense. What is essential, is ample
opportunity to be heard, meaning, every kind of assistance that management
must accord the employee to prepare adequately for his defense.
In this case, private respondent was given the opportunity of a
hearing as he was able to present his defense to the charge against
him. Unfortunately, petitioner found such defense inexcusable. In other
words, the fact that private respondent was given the chance to air his
side of the story already suffices.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision rendered
by the National labor Relations Commissions is annulled and the
decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
8) Gregorio vs Se’lon GR No 196557 June 15,2016
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 196557, June 15, 2016
GREGORIO "TONGEE" BALAIS, JR., Petitioner, v. SE'LON
BY AIMEE, AMELITA REVILLA AND ALMA
BELARMINO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision2 dated
February 25, 2011 and Resolution3 dated April 19, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 114899
entitled "Se'lon by Aimee and/or Amelita Revilla and Alma
Belarmino v. NLRC and Gregorio "Tongee" Balais, Jr."
The instant petition stemmed from a complaint for illegal
dismissal, non-payment of 13th month pay, damages and
attorney's fees filed by Gregorio "Tongee" Balais, Jr. (Balais)
against Se'lon by Aimee, Amelita Revilla and Alma Belarmino
before the NLRC.
Balais narrated that he was Salon de Orient's senior hairstylist
and make-up artist from October 16, 2004 until November
26, 2007 when respondent Amelita Revilla (Revilla) took over
the business. Revilla, however, retained his services as senior
hairstylist and make-up artist. Under the new management,
Salon De Orient became Se'lon by Aimee and respondent
Alma Belarmino (Belarmino) was appointed as its salon
manager, who was in-charge of paying the employees' wages,
dismissing erring employees, and exercising control over
them. Balais, on the other hand, being the senior hairstylist
and make-up artist, allegedly had the discretion to choose
from among the junior hairstylist who should assist him in
servicing his clients, as customarily observed in beauty
salons. He worked during the 10am-7pm shift or 11am-8pm
shift, six (6) days a week with Sunday as his regular rest day
for a monthly salary of Php18,500.00 paid every two (2)
weeks. In June 2008, his salary was reduced to
Php15,000.00. Balais claimed that his working relationship
with respondents had been harmonious until the evening of
July 1, 2008 when Belarmino dismissed him without due
process, in the following manner:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Belarmino angrily shouted: "You get out of this Company! I
do not need you here at Se'lon by Aimee!"
Balais Jr., calmly replied: "Ibigay mo ang 13th month ko and
sweldo ko, at separation pay."
Belarmino angrily replied: "Maghabla ka kahit saan na korle
at haharapin kita."
Balais Jr. responded: "Maski ang Jollibee nagbibigay nang
13th month pay, sweldo and separation pay pag may
tinatanggal na empleyado!"
Belarmino retorted: "Eh di doon ka magtrabaho sa Jollibee
kasi doon nagbibigay sila nang 13th month pay, sweldo at
separation pay pag may tinatanggal na empleyado."
Balais felt humiliated as he was berated in front of his co-
workers. The next day, he did not report for work anymore
and instead filed the complaint before the NLRC.
For their part, respondents alleged that it was known to all
their employees that one of the salon's policies was for junior
stylists to take turns in assisting any of the senior stylists for
purposes of equalizing commissions. However, Belarmino was
told that Balais failed to comply with this policy as the latter
allegedly gave preference to only two (2) junior stylists,
disregarding the other two (2) junior stylists. When Belarmino
asked Balais for explanation, the latter allegedly snapped and
retorted that he would do whatever he wanted. Belarmino
reminded him of the salon's policy and his duty to comply
with it but petitioner allegedly insisted he would do as he
pleased and if they can no longer take it, they would have to
dismiss him. After the incident, Balais sued them and never
reported back to work.
Respondents insisted that Balais was not terminated from
employment but he instead abandoned his work. Respondents
explained that even assuming that he was indeed dismissed,
there was a valid ground therefor as his acts amounted to
serious misconduct against a superior and willful disobedience
to reasonable policy related to his work.
On February 11, 2009, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
Decision4 holding respondents liable for illegal dismissal. It
gave credence and weight to Balais' version that he was
dismissed without cause and notice for merely defending his
decision to avail of the services of some selected junior stylist
of his choice.
Aggrieved, respondents appealed the decision before the
NLRC.
On February 19, 2010, the NLRC affirmed in toto the findings
of the Labor Arbiter, declaring petitioner to be illegally
dismissed.5 It ratiocinated that Se'lon by Aimee failed to
prove that the act of petitioner amounted to gross
insubordination. Other than respondents' bare denial of illegal
dismissal, the same was unsubstantiated by a clear and
convincing evidence. The NLRC further pointed out that
respondents failed to produce a copy of the supposed salon
policy on the rule of rotation of junior stylists, thus, the
veracity of the allegation of insubordination against Balais
failed to convince.
Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the same was
denied in a Resolution dated April 22, 2010.
Thus, before the Court of Appeals, respondents filed a Petition
for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
seeking to annul or modify the Resolutions of the NLRC.
On February 25, 2011, the Court of Appeals granted the
petition and reversed and set aside the NLRC Decision and
rendered a Decision6 sustaining petitioner's dismissal as valid
and required respondents to pay Balais his accrued
13th month pay and unpaid salaries.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was denied in a
Resolution dated April 19, 2011. Thus, the instant petition for
review on certiorari raising the following
issues:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE BY DECLARING THE PETITIONER
AS VALIDLY DISMISSED WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DEPARTED FROM
THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS AND CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE
LABOR ARBITER AND NLRC.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We find merit in the petition.
The Court's jurisdiction in cases brought before it from the CA
via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is generally limited to
reviewing errors of law. The Court is not the proper venue to
consider a factual issue as it is not a trier of facts. This rule,
however, is not ironclad and a departure therefrom may be
warranted where the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to
the findings and conclusions of the NLRC and the LA, as in
this case. In this regard, there is therefore a need to review
the records to determine which of them should be preferred
as more conformable to evidentiary facts.8 In the instant
case, the conflict between the NLRC's and the CA's factual
findings as shown in the records of this case prompts the
Court to evaluate such findings anew.
Whether there was a valid dismissal.
The principle echoed and re-echoed in our jurisprudence is
that the onus of proving that the employee was dismissed for
a just cause rests on the employer, and the latter's failure to
discharge that burden would result in a finding that the
dismissal is unjustified.9chanrobleslaw
In the instant case, a perusal of the records would show that
both parties presented their own versions of stories, not
necessarily contradicting but nonetheless lacking in some
material points.
Balais alleged that he was illegally dismissed as his dismissal
was allegedly made verbally and without due process of law.
Yet, Balais failed to explain what possibly prompted said
termination or even the likely motive for the same. He
nevertheless submitted the Affidavits of Gemma
Guerero10 and Marie Gina A. Toralde,11 to prove his allegation.
Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that there was no
illegal dismissal as it was Balais himself who did not report to
work, thus, he abandoned his work.
Interestingly, however, both parties never denied that there
was an altercation between them. Without admitting that he
violated the salon policy of rotation of the junior stylists,
Balais maintained that said policy runs counter with
customary salon practice which allows senior hairstylists to
choose their preferred junior stylist to assist them. For their
part, supplemental to their claim of abandonment,
respondents averred that assuming that Balais was
dismissed, they insisted that there was a valid ground
therefor as he was disrespectful and insubordinate due to his
failure to comply with the salon's policy.
Noteworthy is the fact that respondents never denied that the
incident narrated by Balais actually happened. In Solas v.
Power & Telephone Supply Phils., Inc.,12 this silence
constitutes an admission that fortifies the truth of the
employee's narration. While respondents were evasive on the
complete details of how the reported incident of termination
transpired, they never categorically denied that said incident
happened or the fact that Belarmino uttered: "get out of this
company! I do not need you here." Belarmino attempted to
sidestep the fact that she actually said it, yet, raised the
defense that assuming she had indeed verbally terminated
Balais, she was justified in doing so because of the disrespect
shown to her.
Under the rules of evidence, if an allegation is not specifically
denied or the denial is a negative pregnant, the allegation is
deemed admitted.13 In fine, the fact that respondents are
even raising their own justification for the alleged verbal
dismissal means that the said verbal dismissal actually
transpired. If in the first place, said incident of verbal
dismissal truly never happened, there is nothing to assume
anymore or to justify. The fact that Belarmino was offering
justification for her action, it follows that indeed said incident
of verbally dismissing Balais on-the-spot actually happened.
Putting two versions of the story together, considering that
none of the parties categorically deny that an altercation
erupted between them which resulted in the dismissal of
Balais, and the tenor of Belarmino's statements leaving no
room for interpreting it other than a verbal dismissal, we are
inclined to believe that there was indeed a dismissal.
This being the case, having established that there was
dismissal, it becomes axiomatic that respondents prove that
the dismissal was valid.
Respondents averred that there was abandonment as Balais
failed to report back to work the following day after the
incident.
In this regard, this Court finds that respondents failed to
establish that Balais abandoned his work. To constitute
abandonment, two elements must concur: (a) the failure to
report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason,
and (b) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship, with the second element as the more
determinative factor and being manifested by some overt
acts.14 Mere absence is not sufficient. The employer has the
burden of proof to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal of
the employee to resume his employment without any
intention of returning. Respondents, other than their bare
allegation of abandonment, failed to prove that these two
elements were met. It cannot be said that Balais failed to
report back to work without justifiable reason as in fact he
was told that he was no longer wanted in the salon.
Moreover, we likewise note the high improbability of
petitioner intentionally abandoning his work, taking into
consideration his length of service, i.e., 18 years of service
with the salon, ft does not make sense for an employee who
had worked for his employer for 18 years would just abandon
his work and forego whatever benefits he may be entitled,
unless he was made to believe or was told that he was
already terminated.
Respondents cannot discharge the burden of proving a valid
dismissal by merely alleging that they did not dismiss Balais;
neither can they escape liability by claiming that Balais
abandoned his work. When there is no showing of a clear,
valid and legal cause for the termination of employment, the
law considers it a case of illegal dismissal.
Thus, respondents, presumably thinking that their claim of
abandonment holds no water, it likewise manifested that
assuming Balais was indeed terminated, there was a valid
ground therefor because of his insubordination.
We disagree.
Willful disobedience of the employer's lawful orders, as a just
cause for the dismissal of an employee, envisages the
concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employee's
assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the
willfulness being characterized by a "wrongful and perverse
attitude;" and (2) the order violated must have been
reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must
pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to
discharge.15chanrobleslaw
It must be likewise stressed anew that the burden of proving
the insubordination as a just and valid cause for dismissing an
employee rests on the employer and his failure to do so shall
result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified.
In this case, the salon policy of rotating the junior stylists who
will assist the senior stylist appears to be reasonable, lawful,
made known to petitioner and pertained to his duty as senior
hairstylist of respondent. However, if we will look at Balais'
explanation for his alleged disobedience thereto, it likewise
appears to be reasonable and lawful, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
x x x x
The duty of the Senior Stylist has the overall function in
seeing to it that the service accorded to the client is excellent,
thus, he has the right to refuse service of a junior stylist
whom he thinks that such junior stylist cannot give equal or
over and above the service that he can give to the client, thus
his refusal to obey the respondent does not constitute a just
cause for the treatment given by respondent to herein
respondent (sic).
xxxx
The fact alone that Balais failed to comply with the salon
policy does not establish that his conduct in failing to comply
with the salon's policy had been willful, or characterized by a
wrongful and perverse attitude. Balais' justification maybe
adverse to that of the salon's policy but it was neither willful
nor characterized by a perverse attitude. We take note that
the alleged non-compliance with the salon policy was brought
to the attention of Balais for the first time only during the said
incident. There was no showing of prior warnings as to his
non-compliance. While respondents wield a wide latitude of
discretion in the promulgation of policies, rules and
regulations on work-related activities of its employees, these
must, however, be fair and reasonable at all times, and the
corresponding sanctions for violations thereof, when
prescribed, must be commensurate thereto as well as to the
degree of the infraction. Given that Balais' preference on who
will assist him is based on the junior stylists' competence, the
same should have been properly taken into account in the
imposition of the appropriate penalty for violation of the
rotation policy. Suspension would have sufficed to caution
him and other employees who may be wont to violate the
same policy.
In adjudging that the dismissal was grounded on a just and
valid cause, the totality of infractions or the number of
violations committed during the period of employment shall
be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed upon
an erring employee.16 Let it not be forgotten that what is at
stake is the means of livelihood, the name, and the reputation
of the employee. To countenance an arbitrary exercise of the
management's prerogative to terminate an employee is to
negate the employee's constitutional right to security of
tenure.
Whether the dismissal was effected with due process of law.
Under Article 211(b) of the Labor Code, the employer must
send the employee who is about to be terminated, a written
notice stating the cause/s for termination and must give the
employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
Article 277 of the Labor Code provides, inter
alia:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(a) x x x backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of
tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal
except for a just and authorized cause and notice under
Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the
worker whose employment is sought to be terminated
a written notice containing a statement of causes for
termination and shall afford the latter ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistance of his representative if he so desires in
accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated
pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and
Employment. x x x
In particular, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code
states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 2. Standards of due process: requirements of notice. - In
all cases of termination of employment, the following
standards of due process shall be substantially
observed:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. For termination of employment based on just causes as
defined in Article 282 of the Code:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying
the ground or grounds for termination, and giving to
said employee reasonable opportunity within which to
explain his side;
(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee
concerned, with the assistance of counsel if the
employee so desires, is given opportunity to respond to
the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence
presented against him; and
(c) A written notice of termination served on the
employee indicating that upon due consideration of all
the circumstances, grounds have been established to
justify his termination.
Thus, to effect the dismissal of an employee, the law requires
not only that there be just and valid cause as provided under
Article 282 of the Labor Code. It likewise enjoins the
employer to afford the employee the opportunity to be heard
and to defend himself. On the latter aspect, the employer is
mandated to furnish the employee with two (2) written
notices: (a) a written notice containing a statement of the
cause for the termination to afford the employee ample
opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the
assistance of his representative, if he so desires; (b) if the
employer decides to terminate the services of the employee,
the employer must notify him in writing of the decision to
dismiss him, stating clearly the reason therefor.
Here, a perusal of the records revealed that, indeed,
Belarmino's manner of verbally dismissing Balais on-the-spot
fell short of the two-notice requirement. There was no
showing of prior warnings on Balais' alleged non-compliance
with the salon policy. There was no written notice informing
him of his dismissal as in fact the dismissal was done verbally
and on-the-spot. Respondents failed to furnish Balais the
written notice apprising him of the charges against him, as
prescribed by the Labor Code. There was no attempt to serve
a notice of dismissal on Balais. Consequently, he was denied
due process of law accorded in dismissals.
Reliefs of Illegally Dismissed Employees
Having established that Balais was illegally dismissed, the
Court now determines the reliefs that he is entitled to and
their extent. Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, "an
illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement as a
matter of right." Aside from the instances provided under
Articles 28317and 28418 of the Labor Code, separation pay is,
however, granted when reinstatement is no longer feasible
because of strained relations between the employer and the
employee. In cases of illegal dismissal, the accepted doctrine
is that separation pay is available in lieu of reinstatement
when the latter recourse is no longer practical or in the best
interest of the parties.19chanrobleslaw
However, other than the strained relationship between the
parties, it appears that respondent salon had already ceased
operation of its business, thus, reinstatement is no longer
feasible. Consequently, the Court awards separation pay to
the petitioner equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year
of service, with a fraction of at least six (6) months
considered as one (1) whole year, from the time of her illegal
dismissal up to the finality of this judgment, as an alternative
to reinstatement.20chanrobleslaw
Also, employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled to full
monetary equivalent, computed from the time their actual
compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their
actual reinstatement but if reinstatement is no longer
possible, the backwages shall be computed from the time of
their illegal termination up to the finality of the decision.
Accordingly, the petitioner is entitled to an award of full
backwages from the time he was illegally dismissed up to the
finality of this decision.21chanrobleslaw
Balais is likewise entitled to attorney's fees in the amount of
10% of the total monetary award pursuant to Article 11122 of
the Labor Code. It is settled that where an employee was
forced to litigate and, thus, incur expenses to protect his
rights and interest, the award of attorney's fees is legally and
morally justifiable. Finally, legal interest shall be imposed on
the monetary awards herein granted at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully
paid.23chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the petition
is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 25, 2011 and the Resolution dated
April 19, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 114899 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The respondents are hereby declared GUILTY OF ILLEGAL DISMISSAL AND
ARE hereby ORDERED to pay the petitioner, Gregorio Balais, Jr., the
following:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(a) separation pay in lieu of actual reinstatement equivalent to one (1) month pay
for every year of service, with a fraction of at least six (6) months considered as
one (1) whole year from the time of his dismissal up to the finality of this
Decision;
(b) full backwages from the time of his illegal dismissal up to the finality of this
Decision; and
(c) attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award.
The monetary awards herein granted shall earn legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annumfrom the date of the finality of this Decision until fully
paid. The case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the computation of
petitioner's monetary award.
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Perez, and Reyes, JJ., concur.