o During the mediation conferences, Judge Arcangel was
present even though he was not asked to. Alleged that:
CANON 4: PROPRIETY
Marces, Sr. v Arcangel
Mendoza, J.
SHORT FACTS
 Judge Arcangel used his power and influence to “harass” the rival
family of his alleged mistress’ family
 SC found him guilty of improper conduct with regards to the
substantiated claims of his intervention in the issuance of alias
warrants and during the barangay mediation of the two families
 The fued between families worsened
VERY LONG GOSSIP-Y FACTS
 Judge Arcangel, while he was serving as Executive Judge of the
RTC in Davao City, is charged with serious misconduct, grave abuse
of authority, harassment, and immorality
 1985: Cañas spouses became neighbors with Marces
o The Cañases’ domestic helper sought Marces’ help for the
abuse she was receiving from her employers
o As incumbent Purok leader, Marces referred the matter to
the barangay authorities; and although the matter was
resolved, the relation of Marces and the Cañas family
became strained
 1990: Mrs. Cañas had a heated exchange with Mrs. Marces and the
latter’s daughter
o Triggered by a fight between the turkeys owned by the two
families
 The next day, Mrs. Cañas, boarded the same jeep as Marces to
have him arrested
o Basis of arrest: alias warrants of arrest issued by MTCC
Judge Sarabia in three criminal cases for violations of BP 22
o Marces was detained for a night without the knowledge of his
family which Mrs. Cañas allegedly boasted in the
neighborhood
 The day after, Marces explained to the Judge Sarabia that the
criminal cases against him in connection with the alias warrants had
long been amicably settled
o Judge Sarabia said that he did not know anything about the
cases and was only requested by Judge Arcangel to issue
the warrants
 Mrs. Cañas also filed a complaint with the Barangay Captain against
Marces’ wife and daughter (see bullet 4).
 disturbed the proceedings by walking in and out of
the Barangay Hall where the conferences were
being held;
 introduced himself as the Executive Judge of the
RTC of Davao City in an obvious attempt to
influence the Barangay Officials; and
 accompanied Mrs. Cañas and acted as the baby-
sitter of the latter’s daughter.
o In turn, Judge Arcangel alleged that Marces confronted him
with a death threat by means of a letter which purported to
have been sent by the NPA
o No amicable settlement was reached
o 1990: violent confrontation between families, Some of the
parties were injured as a result of hacking. Investigations
were conducted by the police during which, according to
complainant, he saw respondent Judge Arcangel talking
to the policemen.
o 1991: armed men in uniform arrived in two military vehicles
and arrested members of the complainant’s family and took
them to the Davao Metrodiscom Headquarters. The arrests
were made on orders of a certain Col. Nelson Estares.
Complainant alleges that the illegal issuance and service
of the “warrant” was effected by an influential person
such as Judge Arcangel
o 1991: Complainant avers that it was the Judge’s influence
which influenced the conduct of a preliminary
investigation for murder against him
o Subsequently, complainant’s son, Farley, was arrested. It is
alleged that respondent’s Toyota car followed arresting
policemen “as if to make sure that the evil plan” allegedly
“authored by Judge Arcangel is well followed and executed.
o It also is alleged that while the applications for bail bond of
complainant, his wife and Farley were being processed,
respondent Judge Arcangel arrived and questioned the
validity of the bond posted, telling the representative of the
bonding company, “Hindi puwede ito, who gave you the
authority to issue?” He then removed the receipts and
arrogantly left with the receipts. 

o Because of these events, complainant started asking why a
judge should have a special interest in his family’s feud with
the Cañas family. All he knew before was that the judge’s car
was often parked in front of the house of Mrs. Cañas,
especially when Mr. Cañas was away working overtime. 

 Judge Arcangel’s defenses and counterarguments:
o The complaints were not only false and malicious, they were
filed in anticipation of cases which the respondent intends to
file against Marces for slander and threats
o Re: warrants – It was Mrs. Deiarine and Mrs. Cañas who
obtained the warrast. He only requested Judge Sarabia to
issue them. Warrants were valid. The other warrants couldn’t
be served because of Marces’ connections.
o Re: disturbance of barangay conciliation – He only served
as baby-sitter of Mrs. Cañas’ daughter. Went to the hall to
file is own complaint against Mrs. Cañas and Lydia because
she shouted “KABIT, KABIT, KABIT SA ABOGADO”
(“PARAMOUR, PARAMOUR, PARAMOUR OF A LAWYER”)
and felt he was being alluded to.
o Re: hacking incident – denied involvement
o Re: illicit relations – Only a long-time family friend. According
to him, in 1989 he used to go to the Cañas residence on
request by Mrs. Cañas to mediate in the latter’s family
problem. After this was settled, he continued going there
because he and Mr. Cañas had business interests in the
manufacture of appliance protectors.
o Judge Arcangel avers that Marces is a fugitive who has a
string of criminal cases and is notorious in the community
 Matter was referred to the OCA
o Reply was later filed by Marces, claiming that:
 Judge Arcangel wrote the Administrator of the SSS,
pretending to be interested in purchasing an
acquired asset consisting of a house and lot, which
happens to be the residence of the complainant
 the management of the Philippine Airlines was
asked by a fictitious person to revive the criminal
cases against the complainant;
 Judge Arcangel together with a certain Fiscal
Dumlao, had been visiting witnesses to the
December 29, 1990 hacking incident
 the respondent judge filed an administrative case
with the Professional Regulations Commission
against Nikki Marces, daughter of the complainant
who had just passed the Nursing Board
Examinations
 respondent still visited the house of Mr. and Mrs.
Cañas.
o Court referred the case to Associate Justice Javellana of CA
but his sudden death had the case reassigned to Exec
Judge Marasigan
 Forwarded to SC, to Justice Purisima
 Justice Purisima’s recommendation: dismissal of charges except for
the intervention during the mediation conferences. Penalty:
admonished and sternly warned
 Court: The report fails to consider other serious allegations – the
issuance of the alias warrants and the arrest of the Marces family
o Judge Arcangel’s invervention has been proven by
substantial and convincing evidence, also admitted to by the
judge through a handwritten note
o There’s also a certification by the Clerk of Court which
proves he intervened for the issuance of the alias warrants
which he later gave to Mrs. Cañas instead of the warrant
officer
HELD: WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED with
WARNING that commission of similar acts of impropriety on his part in the
future will be dealt with more severely. All other charges are hereby
DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
ISSUE AND RATIO:
WON Judge Arcangel is guilty of improper conduct – YES
- The findings on his intervention during the issuance of the alias
warrants and barangay mediation was duly proven by testimony and
evidence. Court held that his actions were improper and censurable
o These acts of respondent judge must be viewed not as
single, isolated actuations but in their totality and in the
context of the enmity between the two feuding families.
o Respondent is, as we have so often said, the visible
representation of the law, the intermediary between
conflicting interests, and the embodiment of the people’s
sense of justice. Unless it was a case filed with his court, it
was improper for him to intervene in a dispute or
controversy.
- Violated the Code of Judicial Conduct by allowing himself to be
dragged into a purely private matter between feuding families
(see notes)
- Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety in all
activities.
- Canon 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics cautions judges “in
pending or prospective litigation before him [to] be scrupulously
careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to waken the
suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships
constitute an element in determining his judicial course.” It cannot be
overemphasized that “a judge’s official conduct should be free from
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon
 the bench and in the performance of official duties but also in
everyday life, should be beyond reproach.”
- But Court held that his misconduct does not warrant suspension from
service since there is no other charge against him and it is his first
administrative case. Furthermore, his service as judge was stated to
be exemplary.
- Bonus in the case: As the Book of Proverbs says, “A single
reprimand does more for a man of intelligence than a hundred lashes
for a fool.”
NOTES
The Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the
private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.
He should not suffer his conduct to create the impression that any
person can unduly influence him or enjoy his favor.
Anonymous Complaint vs Presiding Judge Exequil L. Dagala
Facts
Unnamed complainant wrote to report he had witnessed an argument
between his neighbors and Judge Dagala over ownership of the neighbor's
land and the trees planted thereon
- Dagala was shouting invectives and was brandishing an M-16 armalite rifle.
- Police were at the scene, although did nothing
- Neighbors took photos and video but were too afraid to file a complaint ->
wanted to arrange for a confidential transmittal of the evidence to the
Ombudsman
Complaint also recounted rumors of the judge's illegal involvement in illegal
drugs/fishing/gambling/logging, maintaining a private army, owning
highpowered firearms and having several mistresses
OMB indorsed to OCA, who directed persons to investigate
- Executive Judge of RTC: Cheif of Police could not confirm the firearm and
such incident was under an ongoing investigation -> Unless complainant
comes forward and substantiates the allegations, the complaints should be
dismissed.
- NBI: Judge Dagala is married, with no children, and lives separately from
his wife who works in the city treasury. He has sired children w/ 3 diff women,
one of which had appearred before the DENR re: confiscated hardwood
furniture. His court interpreter was recently arrested during a buy bust. He
allegedly owns a cock fighting pit which he had sold.
Judge Dagala: Admitted the marriage and separation in fact as well as the 3
children from diff women. Denied involvement in illegal logging, asserts it
was one of his women who managed a furniture business. Denied engaging
in drug activity and the connection with his court interpreter outside of being
such. Admits he had owned the cockpit but the same was sold.
OCA received a USB with a video recording of the incident.
OCA findings:
- Two of his children were born prior to his marriage with his wife, but the
third was while such marriage was subsisting (+ siring children with diff
women = disregards moral norms)
- That he already had a child was not disclosed in his Personal Data Sheet
filed w/ the JBC for his application to the judiciary -> (falsification/dishonesty)
- He openly carried high powered firearms during the altercation -> (gross
misconduct, against the law as RA 10591 only permits small arms to be
registered, moreover the judge is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of
any kind or caliber)
Issues and Ratio
W/N Judge Dagala could be disciplined through the anonymous letter. YES
SC has admin supervision over all courts and their personnel, includes
disciplinary powers
Rule 140, ROC: 3 ways: by SC motu proprio, through verified complaint, or
through anonymous complaint. Anonymous complaint should be supported
by public records of indubitable integrity.
W/N Due process was afforded to him. MOSTLY YES
Disciplinary case is and administrative proceeding -> administrative due
process is simply opportunity to explain ones side. In this case OCA informed
the judge on the investigation as well as provided the results of its
preliminary investigation (which allowed him to comment; note also: Judge
Dagala did not refute re the firearms nor question the veracity of the video).
[Dissent of J. Leonen said that OCA should have required the judge to
comment on the photos and videos. Court did not agree as the duty to
disprove was on Judge Dagala]
[J. Leonen also argues that "immorality as a ground was not porperly
pleaded." Court also disagrees as the allegations in the letter-complaint are
sufficient]
With re: PDS. Court finds that he was not sufficiently warned that he may be
charged with dishonestly as it was neither in the OCA indorsement nor the
letter-complaint.
W/N Judge Dagala committed acts amounting to gross misconduct. YES
Given the evidence presented (together with his non-denial of the firearms
issue) and that he has no license nor registration for any firearm (nor could
he even do so under RA 10591).
Misconduct, definition: An intentional wrongdoing or a deliberate violation of
a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government official.
Misconduct is considered grave where the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flargant disregard of established rules are present
W/N Judge Dagala is guilty of immorality. YES
The judge in his comment admitted "without any remorse" that he "was able
to impregnate" three different women. Court find him guilty of immorality, for
siring a child out of wedlock during the subsistence of his marriage.
New Canon of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to
avoid "impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities"
Doctrine of no dichotomy of morality in Castillo v Calanog, Jr:
"There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his
private morals"
[Leonen dissents that immorality ground could not be sufficiently proven
under our criminal law and that only the victims could file on immorality
ground and not a third party. Court disagrees. Criminal liability does not
preclude disciplinary action. Any citizen who knows a judge who commits
acts of immorality has a civic duty to be a complainant or witness against that
judge (note, see also the ROC mentioned earlier)]
[Leonen also argues and cautions that there is some stereotyping of victims
that is present in court considerations. Court responds that its disciplinary
procedure is gender neutral and the prohibition against immorality applies to
all judges regardless of gender or sexual orientation]
Dispositive
GUILTY of IMMORALITY and GROSS MISCONDUCT...
DISMISSED from the service with FORFEITURE of retirement and other
benefits except accrued leave credits. PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from
reemployment from any government agency or instrumentality...
CANON 5: EQUALITY
Tan vs Pacuribot
Per Curiam
Sherlita Tan: Complainant
Judge Rexel Pacuribot: Respondent
FACTS
 Consolidated complaints against Judge Pacuribot (RTC Gingoog
City), filed by Tan (Court Stenographer of RTC Gingoog) and
Johanna Villafranca (Clerk II of Gingoog City Parole and Probation
Office) for sexual harassment, by concerned citizens asking for
Pacuribot’s release for terrorizing and harassing the employees of
Gingoog Hall of Justice and for the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) to investigate the illicit relationship of Pacuribot and Sheryl
Gamulo (bore 2 children of Pacuribot).
 Pacuribot was suspended until further notice, and was directed to
comment on the complaints.
 Tan’s complaint:
a. October 2004, Tan was attending a wedding reception at
Cagayan de Oro City, when she received a call from the
Judge asking her when she would return to Gingoog.
b. The Judge offered to bring her from the reception to the
Agora bus terminal. She refused but the Judge ordered her
 to come out, saying that he had to sneak out of a Masonic
meeting just to see her.
c. Aware that the Judge has a tendency to humiliate anyone in
public when angry, she abruptly left the wedding and got in
his car. Instead of driving her to the bus terminal, the Judge
brought her to a motel. Being married, Tan repeatedly asked
the Judge to let her take a taxi to the bus station.
d. The Judge commands Tan to undress, and attempts to have
carnal knowledge with her. She yields because she is scared
of the gun he has on the headboard of the bed. The Judge
repeatedly tried to have carnal knowledge of Tan but there
was only slight penetration because he has an erection
problem.
e. When she tried to leave, he tells her that he will bring her to
the bus station. However, Tan was brought instead to the
Discovery Hotel and was left there while the Judge returned
to the Masonic meeting. Having no money to settle the bill,
she couldn’t leave. The Judge kept calling that night and
threatened her to watch out in the office if she would
disobey.
f. In the morning, the Judge arrived and attempted to have
carnal knowledge with her but his erection problem
prevailed. He eventually let her go. She did not return to the
RTC the next day as she still had kiss marks on her neck.
g. From then on, his advances on Ms. Tan continued. The
Judge would grab her blouse and mash her breasts, once in
the presence of his court aide who just pretended not to see
anything. Every time she would try to resist/avoid the Judge,
he would put her to shame before her officemates.
h. Later the Judge started renting a room in the house of Ms.
Tan, she initially refused but he persisted. While a boarder at
the house of Ms. Tan he made sexual advances on her
when her husband was out of town.
i. Because of the oppressive ways of the Judge, she suffered
from chronic fatigue and was hospitalized.
j. December 2005, Tan went to CDO to execute an affidavit-
complaint, and flew to Manila SC, to file an administrative
case. She later filed criminal charges of rape, acts of
lasciviousness, and sexual harassment against Judge in
Gingoog city.
 Villafranca’s complaint:
a. Villafranca is Clerk II at the Probation Office at Gingoog City.
The Judge started texting her asking her to dinner. Being
married with children and knowing the judge to be married,
Villafranca initially refused the Judge’s dinner invitations.
b. In one call, the Judge was fuming mad because of
Villafranca’s refusal to go out to dinner with him, saying,
“Why don’t you come with me? I AM A JUDGE!” Scared, she
accepted the dinner invitation.
c. The Judge asked Villafranca to choose a restaurant, while in
the car, the Judge took out his gun and put it in between him
and Villafranca.
d. Instead of bringing her to a restaurant, the Judge brought her
to a motel in Butuan City, and there proceeded to force
himself upon her. Again, the Judge was able to achieve only
slight penetration because of his erection problem. He forced
her to do oral sex on him instead.
e. The Judge later let her go but not before taking a picture of
her half-naked.
f. The Judge repeatedly called her, sent her texts, and
blackmailed her saying “Burikat, animal ka, yaway ka, imo
gibuhat….” Translated: You whore, you devil, don’t you dare!
This will be the last time you will ignore me in my call
otherwise, you will pay for it.
g. The Judge ordered her to send him amorous text messages,
letters, and cards and she didn’t know why. She later
realized it would be his defense if she later filed a case
against him. The Judge threatened to show his picture of her
to her family and destroy her reputation if she did not
cooperate.
h. She initially filed for transfer to CDO but it was denied
because of the amount of work pending. When it was finally
granted, she was able to tell her husband what happened
and filed the administrative case against the Judge.
 Pacuribot’s defense:
a. Denied all the rape allegations and sexual harassment
charges.
b. Averred that the administrative and criminal cases were part
of a grand plot hatched by Ronnie Waniwan, a radio
 commentator who had pending cases in his sala, and who
wanted to oust him from office.
c. That Tan is an inefficient stenographer and she wants to get
even with him because of the bad performance reviews.
d. That Villafranca is in love with him; she’s too smart and well-
connected to allow herself to be raped.
 Findings of Justice Dy-Liaco Flores:
a. On the anonymous letters about his illegitimate children – no
supporting evidence to sustain.
b. On the rape and sexual harassments – proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
c. Recommended dismissal from service with forfeiture of
retirement benefits except accrued leave credits.
ISSUE with HOLDING
Whether Judge Pacuribot should be held administratively liable for
grave misconduct and immorality - YES
 The Court has repeatedly reminded members of the Judiciary to so
conduct themselves as to be beyond reproach and suspicion, and to
be free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal
behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties but also in
their everyday lives.
a. Rule 1.01 – A Judge should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence.
b. Rule 2.00 – A Judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities.
c. Rule 2.01 – A Judge should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the Judiciary.
 Judge Pacuribot miserably failed to measure up to these exacting
standards. He behaved in a manner unbecoming a judge and model
of moral uprightness. He betrayed the people’s high expectations
and diminished the esteem in which they hold the Judiciary in
general.
 In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of
proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint.
Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
In the cases at bar, the complainants Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca
were able to adequately substantiate their allegations.
 Certainly, no judge has a right to solicit sexual favors from any court
employee, even from a woman of loose morals. Judge Pacuribot’s
conduct indubitably bears the marks of impropriety and immorality.
His severely abusive and outrageous acts, which are an affront to
women, unmistakably constitute sexual harassment because they
necessarily result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment
for the employees.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Judge Pacuribot is dismissed, ordered to cease and desist from rendering
any order or decision, and required to show cause why he should not be
disbarred.
GUANZON vs. RUFON
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2038. | October 19, 2007
Petitioners:
● Attys. GUANZON and MONTESINO of the Gender Watch Coalition
● Assistant City Prosecutor SARIL-TOLEDANO, Bacolod City
● Atty. DEL CASTILLO-CALDIT
Respondent:
● RTC Judge ANASTACIO RUFON, Bacolod City
FACTS
● In a hearing, respondent Judge Rufon, inside the court with so many
people present, said to the client of Atty. Guanzon: “next time you
see your husband, open your arms and legs.”
o She felt humiliated and insulted and was glad that the
hearing did not proceed because the respondent was not
present.
● Respondent's defense:
● Refuted the foregoing allegations, complete with transcript of
stenographic notes
● But, in denying the charges leveled against him, he admitted
his use of “frank language” in court when exhorting litigants
to settle their differences and his resort to “strong and
colorful” words whenever he has had a drink or two, albeit
after office hours.
● Complainants filed an administrative complaint against respondent
Judge for:
● Violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rule on
Gender-Fair Language;
● Use of foul, or obscene and discriminatory language;
● Discrimination against women lawyers and litigants; and
● Unethical conduct
 ● SC referred to CA for investigation, report and recommendation
● CA recommended the REPRIMAND of respondent alongside
a stern admonition that he should take care to act with
utmost temperance, sensitivity and circumspection in the
discharge of his functions
ISSUE AND HELD
● WoN respondent is administratively liable for the violations
charged against him (YES)
o SC sustained the finding of the CA that respondent judge
uttered in open court intemperate and obscene language
injurious to the sensitivity and feelings of complainants who
are all women.
o Judicial decorum requires a magistrate to be at all times
temperate in his language, refraining from inflammatory or
excessive rhetoric or from resorting “to language of
vilification.”
o Must live up to the high standards demanded by Section 6,
Canon 6 of the NCJC:
● “SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum
in all proceedings before the court and be patient,
dignified and courteous in relation to litigants,
witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge
deals in an official capacity. x x x”
o Although respondent judge may attribute his intemperate
language to human frailty, his noble position in the bench
nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and
out of the court and always be temperate, patient and
courteous both in conduct and in language.
DISPOSITIVE
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge Anastacio C. Rufon is found guilty of
vulgar and unbecoming conduct and is FINED in the amount of P5,000.00,
with a warning that a repetition of a similar offense in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.
NOTES
● Procedural Facts (just in case ma'am asks)
o In the first hearing in the CA, only complainant Guanzon and
respondent judge appeared.
o Parties found it quite difficult and expensive to attend
subsequent hearings because of the distance between
Bacolod and Manila
o In view of the parties’ failure to attend the proceedings
Justice Salvador resolved the case on the bases of the
pleadings and documents filed by the parties.
CANON 6: COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
CASTRO v MALAZO
Makalintal, J.
G.R. No.L-22587. – April 28, 1969
FACTS
● July 11, 1972: Romeo TIbay filed a complaint for reliquidation,
leasehold, and fixing of rental damages with the Court of Agrarian
Relations against Felicidad Castro and Enriqueta Salcedo-Cruz
(Tibay Case)
 Alleged that he was a tenant or agricultural lessee of the
landholding
 Prayed that Castro be restrained from dispossessing him of
his tenancy
● Aug. 14, 1972: Feldicidad Castro and Bonifacio Castro instituted a
case against Tibay, Cruz and Salcedo-Cruz before the Court of
Agrarian Relations (Castro Case)
 Alleged that they were lessees of Francisca Quinto, the
deceased mother of Salcedo-Cruz
 Alleged that Tibay had forcibly entered the premises
 Prayed for reinstatement as tenants or lessees of the
landholding, and for fixing of rental and damages
● Sept. 9, 1975: Both cases were deemed submitted for decision
● Jan. 29, 1976: Felicidad Castro addressed a letter to the SC
 Complained and charged Judge Arturo Malazo with delay in
deciding the Castro Case
● Feb. 12, 1976: The letter was referred to Judge Malazo for comment
● Feb. 26, 1976: In his 2nd Indorsement, Judge Malazo submits that:
 The information in the Castro Case had been decided on
Sept. 15, 1975
 However, the decision in the Castro Case was not
immediately released because he wanted said decision to be
released simultaneously with the decision in the Tibay Case
said cases are closely interrelated
● Feb. 26, 1976: The decisions for the Castro Case and the Tibay
Case were promulgated (170 days after the cases were submitted for
decision)
● March 24, 1976: Felicidad Castro replied to the comment of Judge
Malazo by filing a letter with the SC
 Stated that she did not find acceptable Malazo’s reason for
not releasing the decision in the Castro Case immediately
  Stated that she allegedly “suffered damage” because Judge
Malazo did not decide the Castro Case for more than one
year since the conclusion of the trial
 Pleaded the Court to address the situation and to help her
● Oct. 7, 1977: The case was referred to Justice Agrava of the CA for
investigation, report, and recommendation
● Aug. 9, 1978: Justice Agrava submitted her Report and
Recommendation to the SC
 She recommended that Judge Malazo need not be found
culpable for not definitely resolving the Castro case within
thirty (30) days after its submission for decision on
September 9, 1975 because:
1) The complaint, in a way, is penal in nature: and all
presumptions should be in favor of respondent
 The complaint in this case is on the allegation that
the Castro Case was not decided within the time
provided for in Section 151 of RA 3844
2) In the purely technical sense, the Castro case was
already decided on September 15, 1975 since the
decision in the said case was prepared and signed on
said date
 Not beyond the 30-day limit since the Castro Case
was deemed submitted for decision on Sept. 9,
1975
3) There was justification for respondent's desire to
release the decision in the Castro case simultaneously
with the decision in the Tibay case
 Since there was a close relationship between
the cases, there could have been a finding in
the Tibay Case which could call for a
modification in the decision in the Castro Case
4) It should be considered that respondent judge had
been made to bear an overload of cases
ISSUES/HELD/RATIO:
1. W/N Judge Malazo should be exonerated – NO
● While the records support the claim of respondent that he signed the
decision on Sept. 15, 1975, Judge Malazo still deliberately deferred
the promulgation of the Castro Case
 Judge Malazo did not file the decision of the Castro Case
with the Clerk of Court until Feb. 26, 1976
o Filing with the Clerk of Court is the ESSENTIAL ACT
that constitutes rendition of the decision and gives it
validity and binding effect
o Once filed with the Clerk of Court, the judge can no
longer change, alter, revise, or modify his decision
 It is the filing of the decision with the Clerk of Court and NOT
the date of the signing of the decision or the promulgation
thereof that constitutes the rendition of the decision (Ago v
CA; People v Soria)
● Judge Malazo clearly violated Sec. 151 of The Agricultural Land
Reform Code, which provides that:
Sec. 151. Judge's Certification as to Work Completed - The judges of the
Courts of Agrarian Relations shall certify at the end of each month that all
petitions and motions in all cases pending decision or resolution for a period
of thirty days from submission by the parties have been determined and
decided before the date of the making of the certificate. No leave shall be
granted and no salary shall be paid without such certificate.
 The Castro Case was declared submitted together with the
Tibay Case for decision on Sept. 9, 1975
o The decisions for both cases was rendered only on
Feb. 26, 1976 or 170 days after the case was
submitted for decision  way beyond the 30-day
period prescribed by the statute
● It is the SWORN DUTY of members of the Judiciary to administer
justice without UNDUE DELAY under the time-honored principle that
justice delayed is justice denied
 The present clogged condition of the courts’ docket in all
levels of our judicial system cannot be cleared unless each
and every judge comply faithfully with the mandate of the law
 Sec. 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 explicitly commands the
ff.:
o “District judges, judges-at-large, cadastral judges,
judges of municipal courts, and justices of the peace
shall certify (…) that all special proceedings,
applications, petitions, motions, and all civil and
criminal cases which have been under submission for
decision or determination for a period of ninety days or
more have been determined and decided on or before
the date of making the certificate, and no leave shall be
granted and no salary shall be paid without such
certificate. (…)”
● A clogged docket CANNOT excuse the delay in the promulgation of
the decision in the Castro Case
 Judge Malazo already made and signed said decision as
early as September 15, 1975
o 6 days after the case was submitted for decision
 All that he had to do was to file the signed decision with the
Clerk of Court
o The act of filing the signed decision with the Clerk of
Court is merely a ministerial act
 ● The claim that the Castro Case and Tibay Case are closely
interrelated CANNOT excuse Judge Malazo for failing to do a
ministerial act
 His justification for the delay is belied by his own admission
that although the two cases were closely interrelated with
each other, the cause of action in one case is different from
the other
 Assuming arguendo that the cases were closely interrelated,
it DOES NOT MATTER that the resolution of their common
issues in one case would divulge the resolution of said
issues in the other case
o The decision may be appealed by the losing party
anyway
● To absolve Judge Malazo because he actually decided the Castro
case within the 30- day period, although he filed the same with the
Clerk of Court 170 days after the case was submitted for decision,
would:
 Render useless and impotent the injunction of the statute
o The Agricultural Land Reform Code, The Judiciary Act
of 1948
 Allow the Court to place obstacles to the speedy pace of
justice which this Court has always exhorted
o The Court has always taken to task respondent judges
for failure to act with dispatch on the cases assigned to
their respective salas
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for having failed to comply with the
provisions of Section 151, Republic Act No. 3844, the Agricultural Land
Reform Code. He is admonished and enjoined to comply strictly with the law
and a repetition of the offense may be dealt with more severely.
OCA v Judge Floro
486 SCRA 66
FACTS
 Atty. Florentino Floro applied for judgeship twice, but his psychological
findings for both applications deemed him psychologically unfit for the
position.
o 1995: Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship.
 A pre-requisite psychological evaluation on him then by the
Supreme Court Clinic Services (SC Clinic) revealed “(e)vidence
of ego disintegration” and “developing psychotic process.”
 Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his application.
o 1998: Floro applied again for judgeship.
 The required psychological evaluation exposed problems with
self-esteem, mood swings, confusion, social/interpersonal
deficits, paranoid ideations, suspiciousness, and perceptual
distortions.
 Because of his impressive academic Because of his impressive
academic background, however, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)
allowed Atty. Floro to seek a second opinion from private practitioners.
o The second opinion appeared favorable.
o Atty. Floro was appointed Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of
Branch 73, Malabon City, on 4 November 1998.
 Upon Judge Floro’s personal request, an audit on his sala was
conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) from 2 to 3
March 1999.
 After conducting the audit, the audit team submitted a
report/memorandum to Chief Justice Hilario Davide:
o requesting the report to be treated as an administrative complaint
against Judge Floro
o recommending Judge Floro be subjected to an appropriate
psychological or mental examination
o recommending that Judge Floro be placed under preventive
suspension for the duration of the investigation against him
 Specifically, there were 13 acts and omissions charged against Judge
Floro:
1. The act of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory
statements regarding qualifications and for announcing in open
court during court session his qualification in violation of Canon 2,
Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct;
2. For allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters;
3. For rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule
36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedures;
4. For his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he declares that he
is pro-accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of
Judicial Conduct;
5. For appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98
pending before Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in
violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Canons of 
 Judicial Conduct which
prohibits a judge from engaging in the private practice of law;
6. For appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the
Supreme Court and without filing the corresponding applications for
leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing;
7. For proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on
Recognizance filed by the accused without the presence of the trial
prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of examination of
the custodian of the accused;
 8. For using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and
eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated
homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by
persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the
settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor;
9. For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial
prosecutor, ordering the mental and physical examination of the
accused based on the ground that the accused is “mahina ang pick-
up”;
10. For issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which
he issued in open court in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for
frustrated homicide;
11. For violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when
he openly criticized the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice
system;
12. For the use of highly improper and intemperate language during
court proceedings;
13. For violation of Circular No. 13 dated 1 July 1987.
o IMPORTANT NOTE: These 13 acts and omissions are
attributed by the investigation team to the fact that
Judge Floro is mentally ill. See issue #13 (item J, Under
issue I in the following section) specifically.
ISSUES / HOLDING / RATIO
I. WN the 13 charges against Judge Floro warrant dismissal? : NO
A. Re: circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements
regarding qualifications AND for announcing in open court during
court session his qualifications in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02,
Canons of Judicial Conduct  The Court finds that Judge Floro
is guilty of simple misconduct.
1. Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no
uncertain terms that “a judge should not seek publicity for
personal vainglory.”
a. A parallel proscription, this time for lawyers in general, is
found in Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility: “a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of
any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified,
self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services.”
b. This means that lawyers and judges alike, being limited by
the exacting standards of their profession, cannot debase
the same by acting as if ordinary merchants hawking their
wares.
2. “Misconduct” is defined as wrong or improper conduct while
“gross” connotes something “out of all measure; beyond
allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful.”
a. For serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act
complained of should be corrupt or inspired by an intention
to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-known
legal rules.
3. With the foregoing as yardstick, we find the act of Judge Floro
in circulating calling cards containing self- laudatory statements
constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule
2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it appears that Judge
Floro was not motivated by any corrupt motive but, from what
we can see from the evidence, a persistent and unquenchable
thirst for recognition.
a. Concededly, the need for recognition is an all too human
flaw and judges do not cease to be human upon donning
the judicial robe. Considering, however, the proscription
against judges seeking publicity for personal vainglory,
they are held to a higher standard as they must act within
the confines of the code they swore to observe.
4. As to the charge that Judge Floro, through his branch clerk of
court, had been announcing in open court his qualifications, we
find that this is likewise violative of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct as it smacks of unnecessary publicity.
a. Judges should not use the courtroom as platform for
announcing their qualifications especially to an audience
of lawyers and litigants who very well might interpret such
publicity as a sign of insecurity. Verily, the public looks
upon judges as the bastion of justice—confident,
competent and true. And to discover that this is not so, as
the judge appears so unsure of his capabilities that he has
to court the litigants and their lawyers’ approval, definitely
erodes public confidence in the judiciary.
b. As it is not disputed, however, that these announcements
went on for only a week, Judge Floro is guilty of simple
misconduct only.
B. Re: Charge of allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters
 This charge must fail.
1. This charge must fail as there is nothing inherently improper or
deplorable in Judge Floro having allowed another person to
use his folding bed for short periods of time during office hours
and while there is no one else in the room.
a. The situation would have been different if there had been
any allegation of misuse or abuse of government funds
and/or facilities.
 2. Be that as it may, it does not augur well for a new judge to
allow such familiarity from his aide as this becomes fodder for
gossip as what had apparently happened in this case. Judge
Floro should have been aware of and attuned to the
sensibilities of his staff who were understandably
uncomfortable with the uncommon arrangement of a judge
allowing his aide easy access to his folding bed.
C. Re: Charge of rendering resolutions without written orders in
violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedure and Re:
Charge of proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on
Recognizance filed by the accused without the presence of the trial
prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of examination of
the custodian of the accused  Judge Floro acted in gross
ignorance of the law.
1. In fine, we perceive three fundamental errors in Judge Floro’s
handling of probation cases.
a. First, he ordered the release on recognizance of the
accused without the presence of the prosecutor thus
depriving the latter of any opportunity to oppose said
release.
b. Second, Judge Floro ordered the release without first
requiring the probation officer to render a case study and
investigation report on the accused. Finally, the order
granting the release of the accused on recognizance was
not reduced into writing.
2. It would seem from the foregoing that the release of the
accused on recognizance, as well as his eventual probation,
was already a done deal even before the hearing on his
application as Judge Floro took up the cudgels for the accused
by instructing his staff to draft the application for probation.
a. Judge Floro, as a matter of policy, had been approving
applications for release on recognizance hastily and
without observing the requirements of the law for said
purpose.
b. Verily, we having nothing against courts leaning backward
in favor of the accused; in fact, this is a salutary endeavor,
but only when the situation so warrants. In herein case,
however, we cannot countenance what Judge Floro did as
“the unsolicited fervor to release the accused significantly
deprived the prosecution and the private complainants of
their right to due process.”
3. Judge Floro’s insistence that orders made in open court need
not be reduced in writing constitutes gross ignorance of the
law. Likewise, his failure to follow the basic rules on probation,
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
a. Verily, one of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to
understand the law fully and uphold it conscientiously.
i. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to
his office to know and simply apply it for anything
less is constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.
b. True, not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the
law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant
administrative sanctions. To hold otherwise “would be
nothing short of harassing judges to take the fantastic and
impossible oath of rendering infallible judgments.”
i. This rule, however, admits of an exception as “good
faith in situations of fallible discretion inheres only
within the parameters of tolerable judgment and
does not apply where the issues are so simple and
the applicable legal principle evident and as to be
beyond permissible margins of error.”
ii. Thus, even if a judge acted in good faith but his
ignorance is so gross, he should be held
administratively liable.
D. Re: Charge of partiality in criminal cases where he declared that he
is pro-accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of
Judicial Conduct  Judge Floro is liable for violation of Canon 2,
Rule 2.01.
1. Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: “A judge
should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”
a. This means that a judge whose duty is to apply the law
and dispense justice “should not only be impartial,
independent and honest but should be believed and
perceived to be impartial, independent and honest” as
well.
i. Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and the
PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused, opened himself
up to suspicion regarding his impartiality.
b. Prudence and judicial restraint dictate that a judge should
reserve personal views and predilections to himself so as
not to stir up suspicions of bias and unfairness.
i. Irresponsible speech or improper conduct of a judge
erodes public confidence in the judiciary.
ii. “His language, both written and spoken, must be
guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be
misconstrued.”
E. Re: Charge of issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from
that which he issued in open court in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN,
for frustrated homicide.  There is no basis for the charge of
dishonesty.
 1. In herein case, what was involved was an interlocutory order
made in open court—ostensibly a judicial approval of a
compromise agreement—which was amended or revised by
removing the stamp of judicial approval, the written order
merely stating that Judge Floro was reserving its ruling
regarding the manifestations of the parties to enter into a
compromise agreement after the public prosecutor shall have
submitted its comments thereto.
2. Considering then that it was well within the discretion of Judge
Floro to revise his oral order per the Echaus rulingi and
factoring in his explanation for resorting to such an
amendment, we find no basis for the charge of dishonesty.
F. Re: Charge of using his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually
dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the
guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the
private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even
without the presence of the trial prosecutor  This must fail for
lack of basis.
1. The controversial settlement never came to pass.
G. Re: Charge for motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial
prosecutor, ordering the mental and physical examination of the
accused based on the ground that the accused is “mahina ang pick-
up”  Judge Floro acted within his authority.
1. We cannot fault Judge Floro for suspending the arraignment
motu proprio and “over the strong objection of the trial
prosecutor.”
a. The scheduled arraignment took place in February 1999
when the applicable rule was still Section 12(a) of Rule
116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 12. Suspension of arraignment.—The arraignment
shall be suspended, if at the time thereof: (a) The accused
appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition
which effectively renders him unable to fully understand
the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In
such case, the court shall order his mental examination
and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
2. The above-cited rule does not require that the suspension be
made pursuant to a motion filed by the accused unlike Section
11(a), Rule 116 of the present 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure which decrees that the suspension be made “upon
motion by the proper party.”
3. Thus, it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to order
the suspension of the arraignment motu proprio based on his
own assessment of the situation. In fact, jurisprudence imposes
upon the Judge the duty to suspend the proceedings if it is
found that the accused, even with the aid of counsel, cannot
make a proper defense.
H. Re: Charge of appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-
M-98 pending before Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos,
Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Code of Judicial Conduct
which prohibits a judge from engaging in the private practice of law

 and Re: Charge of appearing in personal cases without prior
authority from the Supreme Court and without filing the
corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the scheduled
dates of hearing  Judge Floro is guilty of unbecoming conduct
only.
1. Well ensconced is the rule that judges are prohibited from
engaging in the private practice of law.
a. Section 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court unequivocally
states that: “No judge or other official or employee of
superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General,
shall engage in private practice as member of the bar or
give professional advice to client.
b. Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, on
the other hand, provides that: “A judge shall not engage in
the private practice of law.”
2. Based on the above rationale, it becomes quite evident that
what is envisioned by “private practice” is more than an isolated
court appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.
a. In herein case, save for the “Motion for Entry of
Judgment,” it does not appear from the records that Judge
Floro filed other pleadings or appeared in any other court
proceedings in connection with his personal cases.
3. It is safe to conclude, therefore, that Judge Floro’s act of filing
the motion for entry of judgment is but an isolated case and
does not in any wise constitute private practice of law.
a. Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that Judge Floro is
obviously not lawyering for any person in this case as he
himself is the petitioner.
4. Be that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be guilty of
unauthorized practice of law as defined, he is guilty of
unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading wherein he
indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73,
Malabon City and for appending to the pleading a copy of his
oath with a picture of his oath-taking.
a. The only logical explanation we can reach for such acts is
that Judge Floro was obviously trying to influence or put
pressure on a fellow judge by emphasizing that he himself
is a judge and is thus in the right.
 b. Verily, Canon 2, Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
mandates that a “judge shall refrain from influencing in any
manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before
another court or administrative agency.”
i. By doing what he did, Judge Floro, to say the least,
put a fellow judge in a very awkward position.
5. As to the charge that Judge Floro has been attending the
hearing of his personal cases without leave of absence, the
OCA has failed to substantiate its claim.
I. Re: Charge of openly criticizing the Rules of Court and the
Philippine justice system and Re: Charge of use of highly improper
and intemperate language during court proceedings  Judge Floro
is guilty of unbecoming conduct.
1. The denials of Judge Floro are insufficient to discredit the
straightforward and candid declarations of Atty. Dizon
especially in the light of confirming proofs from Judge Floro
himself.
a. The Court finds the version of Atty. Dizon more credible
because subject utterances are consistent with Judge
Floro’s claims of intellectual superiority for having
graduated with several honors from the Ateneo School of
Law and having placed 13th in the bar examinations.
2. Moreover, his utterances against the judicial system on account
of his perception of injustice in the disposition of his brother’s
case are not far removed from his reactions to what he
perceived were injustices committed against him by the OCA
and by the persons who were either in charge of the cases
against him or had some sort of participation therein.
3. Consequently, although there is no direct proof that Judge
Floro said what he is claimed to have said, nonetheless,
evidence that he sees himself as intellectually superior as well
as evidence of his habit of crying foul when things do not go his
way, show that it is more likely that he actually criticized the
Rules of Court and the judicial system and is thus guilty of
unbecoming conduct.
J. Re: Charge of violating Circular No. 13-87 dated 1 July 1987ii 
Judge Floro should undergo a psychiatric or mental
examination.
1. Circular No. 13 (Guidelines in the Administration of Justice)
dated July 1, 1987 provides that trial of cases should be
conducted efficiently and expeditiously.
a. Judges should plan the course and direction of trials so
that waste of time is avoided.
b. Moreover, a judge should avoid being queer in his
behavior, appearance and movements. He must always
keep in mind that he is the visible representative of the
law.
2. Judge Floro, Jr.’s claims that he is endowed with psychic
powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to people,
that he is the angel of death and that he has unseen “little
friends” are manifestations of his psychological instability
and therefore casts doubt on his capacity to carry out the
functions and responsibilities of a judge.
a. Hence, it is best to subject Judge Floro, Jr. once again to
psychiatric or mental examination to ascertain his fitness
to remain in the judiciary.
II. WN Judge Floro should be relieved of his position as RTC judge
due to his mental condition? : YES
A. Supreme Court Clinic’s Report
1. Francianina G. Sanchez, Clinical Psychologist and Chief
Judicial Staff Officer reported that “(o)ver all data strongly
suggest a delusional disorder with movement in the paranoid
direction.”
2. Dr. Celeste Vista, for her part, stated that:
a. Based on the clinical data gathered, it appears that Judge
Floro is basically a cautious, and suspicious individual with
a compulsion to analyze and observe motives in his milieu.
Despite his status, cognitive assets and impressive
educational background, his current functioning is gauged
along the LOW AVERAGE intelligence.
b. He can function and apply his skills in everyday and
routine situations. However, his test protocol is
characterized by disabling indicators. There is impairment
in reality testing which is an indicator of a psychotic
process. He is unable to make an objective assessment
and judgment of his milieu. Hence, he is apt to
misconstrue signals from his environment resulting to
perceptual distortions, disturbed associations, and lapses
in judgment. Such that, cultural beliefs in dwarfs, psychic
and paranormal phenomena and divine gifts of healing
have become incorporated in a delusional (false and
unshakable beliefs) system, that it has interfered and
tainted his occupational and social functioning. Hence, he
is found to be unfit in performing his court duties as a
judge.
B. Judge Floro’s Private Psychiatrists’ Reports: [A summary, the
transcripts were long.] The written reports of private doctors
submitted by Judge Floro as a defense maintained that Judge Floro
was fit to sit as RTC Judge. However, this was contradicted also by
the same doctors on cross-examination.
C. OCA Summary of the medical report and subsequent
recommendations
1. It is weird for respondent Judge to state in one of his
pleadings in this case that President Estrada would not
finish his term as President. It is unusual and queer of him
to state in his calling card that he is a graduate of Ateneo
de Manila, second honors, bar topnotcher with a grade of
87.55% and include in his address the name Colonel
Reynaldo Cabauatan who was involved in a coup d’etat
attempt. So is it strange of him to make use of his alleged
psychic powers in writing decisions in the cases assigned
to his court. It is improper and grandiose of him to express
superiority over other judges in the course of hearings he
is conducting and for him to say that he is very successful
over many other applicants for the position he has been
appointed. It is abnormal for a Judge to distribute self-
serving propaganda. One who distributes such self-
serving propaganda is odd, queer, amusing, irresponsible
and abnormal.
2. A judge suffering from delusion or hallucination is unfit to
be one. So is he who gets into a trance while presiding at
the hearing of a case in court. One need not be a doctor of
medicine, a psychiatrist and a psychologist to determine
and conclude that a person in such circumstances is
mentally unfit or insane and should not be allowed to
continue discharging the duties and functions of a judge.
a. The life, liberty and property of the litigants in the court
presided by such judge are in his hands. Hence, it is
imperative that he is free from doubt as to his mental
capacity and condition to continue discharging the
functions of his office.
D. Supreme Court Recommendations
1. We are in agreement with the OCA that Judge Floro cannot
remain as RTC Judge because of the findings of mental
impairment that renders him unfit to perform the functions of his
office. We hasten to add, however, that neither the OCA nor
this Court is qualified to conclude that Judge Floro is
“insane” as, in fact, the psychologists and psychiatrists on
his case have never said so.
a. When Justice Ramirez recommended that Judge Floro be
dismissed from the service due to “insanity,” he was
apparently using the term in its loose sense. Insanity is a
general layman’s term, a catch-all word referring to various
mental disorders.
2. Courts exist to promote justice; thus aiding to secure the
contentment and happiness of the people. An honorable,
competent and independent judiciary exists to administer
justice in order to promote the stability of government, and the
well-being of the people.
a. Carrying much of the weight in this daunting task of
administering justice are our front liners, the judges who
preside over courts of law and in whose hands are
entrusted the destinies of individuals and institutions.
i. As it has been said, courts will only succeed in their
tasks if the judges presiding over them are truly
honorable men, competent and independent.
b. There is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but an
honorable man. And, in fact, in our disposition of the 13
charges against him, we have not found him guilty of gross
misconduct or acts or corruption. However, the findings of
psychosis by the mental health professionals assigned to
his case indicate gross deficiency in competence and
independence.
3. Lest we be misconstrued, we do not denigrate such belief
systemiii. However, such beliefs, especially since Judge Floro
acted on them, are so at odds with the critical and impartial
thinking required of a judge under our judicial system.
a. Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no
place in a judiciary duty bound to apply only positive law
and, in its absence, equitable rules and principles in
resolving controversies.
b. State Prosecutors v. Muro: “What is required on the part
of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does
not mean that judges can resolve specific disputes entirely
as they please. There are both implicit and explicit limits
on the way judges perform their role.”
i. Judge Floro does not meet such requirement of
objectivity and his competence for judicial tasks
leaves much to be desirediv.
ii. Judge Floro’s belief system, as well as his
actuations in the eight months that he served as
RTC judge, indubitably shows his inability to function
with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
4. In fine, Judge Floro lacks the judicial temperament and the
fundamental requirements of competence and objectivity
expected of all judges. He cannot thus be allowed to
continue as judge for to do so might result in a serious
challenge to the existence of a critical and impartial
judiciary.
JUDGMENT
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that by reason of insanity
which renders him incapable and unfit to perform the duties and functions of
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon,
Metro Manila, Branch 73, respondent Florentino V. Floro, Jr. be REMOVED
and DISMISSED from such office.”
1. FINE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. in the total amount of FORTY
THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS for seven of the 13 charges
against him in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460; 
 was to be assigned to the MCTC.
2. RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his functions as Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon City and consider him
SEPARATED from the service due to a medically disabling condition
of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of his
office, effective immediately; 
 parents
3. As a matter of equity, AWARD Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. back
salaries, allowances and other economic benefits corresponding to
three (3) years;
DICTA
[Not important, but I’m gonna drop it here anyway because it was nice and
surprisingly sensitive of the Court to say this. Push for mental health
awareness!]
 Consequently, while Judge Floro may be dysfunctional as a judge
because of the sensitive nature of said position, he may still be
successful in other areas of endeavor.
 Putting all of the above in perspective, it could very well be that
Judge Floro’s current administrative and medical problems are not
totally of his making. He was duly appointed to judgeship and his
mental problems, for now, appear to render him unfit with the
delicate task of dispensing justice not because of any acts of
corruption and debasement on his part but clearly due to a medically
disabling condition.
 Finally, if Judge Floro’s mental impairment is secondary to genetics
and/or adverse environmental factors (and, unfortunately, such
essential information is not available), we cannot condemn people for
their faulty genes and/or adverse environment—factors they have no
control over.
Gamboa-Roces v Perez
AM No. MTJ-16-1887 9 Jan 2017
Mendoza, J.
Facts:
Trinidad Gamboa-Roces charged Judge Ranhel Perez, Presiding Judge of
MCTC in Negros Occidental with gross ignorance of the law for failure to
render judgment in an ejectment case within the reglementary period
prescribed by law
 Trinidad said she was one of the plaintiffs in a civil case for unlawful
retainer and damages, which was referred back to the MCTC. The
schedule for the preliminary conference was reset because a new judge
 When Judge Perez was appointed, her counsel filed 2 separate motions
for his inhibition as Trinidad had been involved in a legal confrontation
with him
o The legal confrontation happened when Perez was representing his
 Judge Perez denied the motion, so the civil cases were submitted for
resolution on 21 Nov 2014
 On 8 Dec 2015, no decision had been rendered yet, so Trinidad prayed
Judge Perez be found guilty of gross ignorance for failure to timely
render judgment in the cases
o He failed to decide the cases in violation of the 30-day reglementary
period within which to decide an ejectment case
 Judge Perez apologized for the delay, saying it was inadvertent and not
meant to prejudice the plaintiffs. He asked doe compassion and
understanding, citing his inexperience as a newly-appointed judge
o He explained that he finished the draft of the decision on 1 Dec
2014, but he wanted a “perfect decision” so he didn’t forward it to his
Clerk of Court
o However, he got distracted with other matters in the office and only
remembered it when he was preparing the monthly report for Dec
2014
o He claimed reproducing the printed draft would be expensive
considering the number of defendants in the case, and he didn’t
have internet connection in his office so he failed to give the soft
copy. He also said his computer at home was being serviced for
maintenance
o When he discovered in Aug 2015 that the decision wasn’t attached
to the records of the cases, he could no longer locate the printed
draft decision so he drafted the decision again
o Reproducing the copies for the parties took a long time as they were
using a dot matrix printer, so the decision dated 17 Aug 2015 was
only received on 8 Dec 2015
 The OCA recommended Perez be found guilty of undue delay in
rendering a decision or order and be admonished to be more mindful in
the performance of his duties, with a stern warning that a repetition of a
similar infraction would be dealt with more severely
W/N Perez should be found guilty
Yes, he should be found guilty and fined P10k.
  The explanations he gave are flimsy, and his claim of inexperience
isn’t persuasive as it is his duty to resolve the cases within the period
mandated by the law
 His excuses only show his lack of diligence in discharging his
administrative responsibilities and professional competence in court
management
 A judge is expected to keep his own listing of cases and note the
status of each so they may be acted upon accordingly and without
delay.
 In the cases of Saceda v Judge Gestopa Jr and Petallar v Judge
Pullos, the judges were fined P10k for undue delay in rendering a
decision
Judge Perez is guilty of due delay and ordered to pay a fine of P10k
with a stern warning that repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with
more severely.
Marcos v Cabrera-Faller
A.M No. RTJ-16-2472
Per Curiam
January 24, 2017
This case contains an administrative complaint filed by retired judge
Martonino Marcos against judge Cabrera-Faller for ignorance of the law,
misconduct, violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act, and for
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment/order in a case surrounding
the death of his grandchild – Marc Andrei Marcos.
Facts
1. Death of Marc Marcos during the initiation rites of Lex Leonum
Fraternity in the Veluz Farm, Dasmarinas
2. Office of the City Prosecutor recommended the prosecution of
several members of Lex Leonum for Violation of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8049, (Anti-Hazing Law )
3. Information was filed against certain members of the fraternity
4. Finding probable cause to sustain the prosecution of the accused,
Judge Cabrera-Faller issued a warrant of arrest and, at the same
time, the archiving of the entire record of the case until the arrest
of the accused. (june 3)
5. Judge Cabrera-Faller, then recalled of the warrants of arrest of
the three accused which she claimed were issued inadvertently.
(June 13)
6. ultimately dismissed the case against all of them for lack of
probable cause.
Administrative Case Filed
Marcos alleges that;
1. Actuations of the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller clearly demonstrate her
incompetence and gross ignorance of the law and jurisprudence
a. When she issued the Order dated June 3, 2013, she certified that
she personally evaluated the resolution of the prosecutor
b. She subsequently held that the warrant of arrest was inadvertently
issued - does this mean that she did not personally evaluate the
records?
c. A judge who issues a warrant of arrest INADVERTENTLY has
no place in the judiciary because such actuation clearly shows her
incompetence and gross ignorance of both substantive and
procedural laws.
2. Demonstrated her incompetence and/ or gross ignorance of the law
when she lifted and set aside the warrant of arrest and dismissing the
case against all the accused.
a. As she ruled that Marcelo’s (the recruiter and “angel” for Andrei
during his rites statement
i. “failed to show that the accused conspired to inflict fatal injuries
on Marc Andrei. She found the statements of the prosecution
witnesses, Marcelo Cabansag (Cabansag) and Jan Marcel V.
Ragaza (Ragaza) either untruthful, immaterial and incompetent
or brimming with flip flopping testimonies. She brushed aside the
admission of the accused that initiation rites were indeed
conducted on July 29, 2012 and that they were allegedly present
in the different stages of the initiation rites, and simply believed
the version of the accused that it was Marcelo, the recruiter and
"angel'' of Marc Andrei, who inflicted the fatal blows on him,
causing his death.”
ii. The statement of Cornelio Marcelo was corroborated by the
statements of Manuel Adrian Cabansag and Jan Marcel V.
Ragasa and the fact of hazing, by the testimonies of Rene
Andaya and Roger Atienza, farm overseers at the Veluz Farm
iii. rulings of the Hon. Perla V. Cabrera-Faller are based solely on
her own conjectures - without conducting hearings and without
waiting for any comment from the public and private prosecutors.
Issues
WN Judge Cabrera-Faller is guilty for gross ignorance of the law and should
be dismissed from service – YES
A. On the immediate archiving of Criminal Case
a. archiving of cases is a generally acceptable measure designed to
shelve cases but is done only where no immediate action is
expected
b. When Judge Cabrera-Faller issued the warrants, she also archived
the case. She, however, did not cite any ground in A.C. No. 7-A-92
for the suspension of the proceedings.
c. she opted to completely ignore the law or the regulations.
B. On the recall of the warrants of arrest that were allegedly issued
inadvertently
a. "when the inefficiency springs from failure to consider so basic
and elemental a rule, law or principle in the discharge of duties,
the judge is either insufferably incompetent and undeserving of
the position she holds or is too vicious that the oversight or
omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse
of judicial authority."
b. failed to explain why she issued the warrants inadvertently. She
merely wrote that the warrants of arrest were "inadvertently issued"
C. On the hasty dismissal of Criminal Case
a. if the information is valid on its face and there is no showing of
manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of
the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for "want of
evidence,"
b. Judge Cabrera-Faller dismissed Criminal Case No. 11862-13
without taking into consideration the earlier resolution of the OCP
and failed to evaluate the evidence in support thereof, which
sustained a finding of probable cause against the accused.
c. perusal of the records would show that the OCP resolution was
based on the Sinumpaang Salaysay and the Karagdagang
Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Marcelo.
D. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to
simply apply it; anything less than that would be constitutive
of gross ignorance of the law.
a. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.
b. ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of
injustice.
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge, punishable by
dismissal from service, suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of
more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00
GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and for violating Rule 1.01 and Rule
3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Court imposes the
penalty of DISMISSAL from the service, with FORFEITURE of retirement
benefits, except leave credits, and with prejudice to reemployment in any
branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned
and controlled corporations.
Re: Anonymous Complaints against Hon. Dinah Evangeline Bandong,
Former Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Lucena City,
Quezon Province
A.M. No. RTJ-17-2507 | October 9, 2017
Topic: Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 6 – Competence and Diligence
Facts:
- Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received 2 letter complaints (1
from an anonymous sender and another under the pseudonym Shirley
Gomez) narrating the difficulties encountered by the employees and
litigants appearing before the RTC of Lucena City, Branch 59 because of
Presiding Judge Dinah Evangeline Bandong
o OCA received a 3rd letter-complaint this time against Criminal
Case Clerk in Charge Eduardo Febrer and Court Interpreter
Francisco Mendioro.
o These difficulties include (among others)
 Her alleged predisposition to keep favorite employees;
 Her alleged public admission of ineptitude when conducting
trials and hearings and/or propensity to compel litigants and
lawyers to conciliate;
 Her alleged failure to conduct trials and hearings;
 Her alleged undue insistence for an immediate dispatch of her
checks;
 Proclivity to delegate her decision-making duty to her court
personnel;
- OCA indorsed the 3 letter-complaints to the Executive Judge of RTC
Lucena, Judge Eloida De Leon-Diaz, for investigation
- During the investigation, Court approved Judge Bandong’s application for
optional retirement.
o Her retirement benefits were withheld pending resolution of the 2
letters-complaints and 2 administrative complaints against her.
- After her investigation, Judge De Leon-Diaz recommended the dismissal
of charges against Febrer and Mendioro but found Judge Bandong liable
for administrative charges for gross ignorance of the law, incompetence,
and conduct unbecoming of a member of the bench
- Based on Judge De Leon - Diaz’s report, statements from court
personnel and OCA’s separate investigation, OCA found:
o Most of the charges against Judge Bandong could not be proven
by substantial evidence, which is the quantum of evidence needed
in administrative cases.
o However, substantial evidence exists for the ff charges:
 Her habit of watching TV programs during court trials and
hearings;
  Her predeliction to delegate mediation of cases to court
personnel;
 Her designation of Process Server Atienza to perform the
functions and duties appertaining to Clerk III Febrer.
Issue & Ratio
WoN Judge Bandong is liable for the 3 charges found against her? 
YES
Watching TV programs during court trials and hearings
- Act: Watching Korean telenovelas during office hours thereby causing
delay in the conduct of hearings.
- Evidence: Judge De Leon-Diaz witnessed it firsthand and confirmed by
Bandong's staff
- Liable for Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
o any conduct that is detrimental or derogatory or naturally or
probably bringing about a wrong result; it refers to acts or
omissions that violate the norm of public accountability and
diminish - or tend to diminish - the people's faith in the Judiciary
- Decision-making is the primordial duty of a member of the [bench]. In the
case of trial courts, the conduct of hearings is unquestionably an
important component of their decision process and, conversely, all other
official tasks must give way thereto.
- For a judge to allow an activity, and an unofficial one at that, to take
precedence over the conduct of hearings violates Sections 1, 2 and 7 of
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
o SECTION 1. The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over
all other activities.
o SECTION 2. Judges shall devote their professional activity to
judicial duties, which include not only the performance of judicial
functions and responsibilities in court and the making of decisions,
but also other tasks relevant to the judicial office or the court's
operations.
o SEC. 7. Judges shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the
diligent discharge of judicial duties.
- Watching telenovelas dissipates away Judge Bandong's precious time in
the office, which has an adverse effect on the prompt administration of
justice and counter-productive to the due performance of judicial duties.
Delegating mediation of cases to court personnel
- Act: Judge Bandong instructed Court Stenographer Parfan to facilitate
the mediation of parties in a frustrated homicide case to enter into
monetary settlement in order to terminate the case.
- Evidence: sworn statements of Abella and de Ocampo (parties to the
case) and handwritten receipt by Parfan
- Liable for grave misconduct
o Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior.
The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to
disregard established rules, which must be established by
substantial evidence.
- To decongest court dockets and enhance access to justice, the Court
through A.M. No. 01-10-05-SC-PHILJA approved the institutionalization
of mediation in the Philippines through court-annexed mediation.
o Mediation cases must be referred to the Philippine Mediation
Center (PMC) which shall assist the parties in selecting a duly
accredited mediator
o There are cases which cannot be referred to mediation
- In this case, Judge Bandong violated A.M. No. 01-10-05-SCPHILJA as
o Frustrated homicide is not a mediatable case
o Entrusted the case to Parfan who is not a trained or accredited
mediator
- Judge Bandong could not feign ignorance of A.M. No. 01-10-05-SC-
PHILJA since the Philippine Judicial Academy frequently conducts
seminars for nationwide regarding this
- Judge Bandong knowingly made the wrongful referral due to her
indolence
Delegation of Duties Clerk III Febrer to Process Server Atienza
- Act: Judge Bandong assigned some of the duties of Febrer to Atienza
because he (Febrer) could not accomplish it alone and Atienza’s work
load was so light that he could attend to his other businesses and serve
as President of the Process Servers Association of PH during office
hours
- Evidence: sworn statements of Febrer and Atienza
- Violated Supreme Court circulars, rules and directives
o 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court: while court personnel
may perform other duties the presiding judge may assign from
time to time, said additional duties must be directly related to, and
must not significantly vary from, the court personnel's job
description.
o Section 7, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel:
court personnel shall not be required to perform any work or duty
outside the scope of their assigned job description.
- There is a significant difference between the duties of
o Clerk III - basically clerical in nature and require one to be always
in the office to assist the clerk of court in maintaining the integrity
of the docket books of the court
 o Process Server - serve court processes (subpoenas, summons,
court orders and notices) which requires one to be mostly in the
field
- It is incongruent to assign a Process Server with duties pertaining to a
Clerk since the same would tie down the former to the office to the
detriment of his own work.
- While Judge Bandong might have had the best intention in wanting to
lighten the workload of Febrer, her act adversely affected another
important aspect of court management - prompt service of court
processes.

Judgement: guilty of grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best

interest of the service, and violation of supreme court rules, directives and
circular are appreciated as aggravating circumstances; Fined 40k to be
deducted from retirement benefits

i
Rule on the matter: “x x x [N]o judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical
existence until and unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the
Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation, and that indeed,
even after promulgation, it does not bind the parties until and unless notice thereof is duly served
on them by any of the modes prescribed by law. This is so even if the order or judgment has in
fact been orally pronounced in the presence of the parties, or a draft thereof drawn up and
signed and/or copy thereof somehow read or acquired by any party. In truth, even after
promulgation (i.e., filing with the clerk of court), and even after service on the parties of notice of
an order or judgment, the Court rendering it indisputably has plenary power to recall and
amend or revise it in substance or form on motion of any party or even motu proprio,
provided that in the case of a final order or judgment, the same has not attained finality.”
(Emphasis supplied)
ii
Note: Circular No. 13-87, by itself, does not define nor punish an offense but, as its title would
suggest, it merely sets the guidelines in the administration of justice following the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution.
iii
Context: Moreover, Judge Floro himself admitted that he believes in “psychic visions,” of
foreseeing the future because of his power in “psychic phenomenon.” He believes in “duwendes”
and of a covenant with his “dwarf friends Luis, Armand and Angel.” He believes that he can write
while on trance and that he had been seen by several people to have been in two places at the
same time. He has likened himself to the “angel of death” who an inflict pains on people,
especially upon those he perceived as corrupt officials of the RTCs of Malabon. He took to
wearing blue robes during court sessions, switching only to black on Fridays. His own witness
testified that Judge Floro explained that he wore black from head to foot on Fridays to recharge
his psychic powers. Finally, Judge Floro conducted healing sessions in his chambers during his
break time. All these things validate the findings of the Supreme Court Clinic about Judge Floro’s
uncommon beliefs and that such beliefs have spilled over to action.
iv
As reported by the Supreme Court Clinic: “Despite his impressive academic background and
achievements, he has lapses in judgment and may have problems with decision-making. His
character traits such as suspiciousness and seclusiveness and preoccupation with paranormal
and psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his role as a lawyer, may cloud his judgment,
and hamper his primary role as a judge in dispensing justice.