CHIU HAP CHIU, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, First Assistant Solicitor General E.
Umali and J. Domingo de Leon for oppositor-appellant.
Teodorico P. Labtic for petitioner-appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Chiu Hap Chiu seeks to change his name to Lo Hap Chiu in a petition filed before the
Court of First Instance of Davao. He testified that he was 30 years old, single, a
doctor of medicine, and a resident of Davao City; that the name given him at birth
was Lo Hap Chiu; that during his school days, or from elementary school to college,
he was called by his classmates as Lo Hap Chiu for which reason he desires to have
said name adopted instead of Chiu Hap Chiu to avoid confusion in the use of his
name; and that the name given him in his alien certificate of registration is Chiu Hap
Chiu.
After the reception of the evidence, the court a quo granted the petition. It found that
petitioner was born on February 1, 1930 at Kulagsu, Fuken, China; that he is a
Chinese citizen holding an alien certificate of residence; that he is a physician by
profession and has no criminal record; that he has paid all his taxes to the
government; that he desires to change his name from Chiu Hap Chiu to Lo Hap Chiu
for the reason that the latter is the name he used while studying in the school and
because his present name and surname are the same.
The government opposed the petition in view of its failure to find sufficient justification
for the change of name desired by petitioner.
This Court has already had occasion to express the view that the State has an
interest in the names borne by individuals and entitles for purpose of identification
and that a change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right. So that before a
person can be authorized to change the name given him either in his certificate of
birth or in the civil registry he must show proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be
denied (Ong Peng Oan vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-8035, November 29, 1957). The
following may be considered among others, as proper and reasonable causes that
may warrant the grant of a petition for change of name: (1) when the name is
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2)
when the request for change is a consequence of a change of status, such as when a
natural child is acknowledged or legitimized; and (3) when the change is necessary to
avoid confusion (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. I, p.
660).1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioner has not shown any proper or compelling reason that may justify the request
for change of name other than his desire to use the name Lo Hap Chin on the alleged
reason that that is the name given him in his birth certificate and in the schools he
attended, but his claim was not satisfactorily proven, for aside from his own testimony
and a photostatic copy of a certification issued in his favor as Doctor of Medicine by
the University of Santo Tomas wherein it appears that his name is Lo Hap Chiu, there
is nothing in the record to show that he used said name from grade school to college
for he failed to present any documentary evidence to prove it. The truth is that he was
registered in the Bureau of Immigration as Chiu Hap Chiu and in all the clearances
secured by him from said Bureau the name used therein was Chiu Hap Chiu thereby
indicating that he considered himself as such as regards the public. He has not
shown that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name, and as a
matter of fact he was referred to as Dr. Chiu Hap Chiu in his clearance from the Court
of First Instance of Davao. Since the State has an interest in the name borne by an
individual, especially an alien, and the latter's identity as a rule is established by the
name appearing in his alien certificate of registration, we find no plausible reason for
authorizing the change of name desired by petitioner.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside. No costs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MERLYN MERCADERA through her Attorney-in-Fact, EVELYN M.
OGA, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the December 9, 2008 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), in CA G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN, which affirmed the September
28, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 8 (RTC), in a
petition for correction of entries, docketed as Special Proceedings No. R-3427 (SP
No. R-3427), filed by respondent Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera) under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.
The Factual and Procedural Antecedents
On June 6, 2005, Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera), represented by her sister and duly
constituted Attorney-in-Fact, Evelyn M. Oga (Oga), sought the correction of her given
name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth - from Marilyn L.
Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Dipolog City pursuant to Republic Act No. 9048 (R.A. No. 9048).2
Under R.A. No. 9048, the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general, as the
case may be, is now authorized to effect the change of first name or nickname and
the correction of clerical or typographical errors in civil registry entries. "Under said
law, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged
with administrative officers. The law now excludes the change of first name from the
coverage of Rules 103 until and unless an administrative petition for change of name
is first filed and subsequently denied"3 and removes "correction or changing of
clerical errors in entries of the civil register from the ambit of Rule 108." Hence, what
is left for the scope of operation of the rules are substantial changes and corrections
in entries of the civil register.4
The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect the
correction unless a court order was obtained "because the Civil Registrar therein is
not yet equipped with a permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions
for corrections filed before their office as mandated by Republic Act 9048."5
Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For Correction of Some Entries as
Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before the Regional Trial
Court of Dipolog City (RTC). The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings No.
R-3427 (SP No. R-3427). Section 2 of Rule 108 reads:
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid grounds,
the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of
marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor;
and (o) changes of name. [Underscoring supplied]
Upon receipt of the petition for correction of entry, the RTC issued an order, dated
June 10, 2005, which reads:
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, notice is hereby given that the
hearing of said petition is set on JULY 26, 2005 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning, at the
Session Hall of Branch 8, this Court, Bulwagan ng Katarungan, Dipolog City, on
which date, time and place, anyone appearing to contest the petition shall state in
writing his grounds there[for], serving a copy thereof to the petitioner and likewise file
copies with this Court on or before the said date of hearing.
Let this order be published at the expense of petitioner once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper edited and published in Dipolog City and of
general circulation therein, the City of Dapitan and the province of Zamboanga del
Norte, and copies hereof be furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General of (sic)
134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village, Makati, Metro Manila, the City Civil Registrar of
Dipolog, and posted on the bulletin boards of the City Hall of Dipolog, the Provincial
Capitol Building, and of this Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for the Republic of
the Philippines and deputized the Office of the City Prosecutor to assist in the case
only on the very day of the hearing. This prompted the court to reset the hearing on
September 5, 2005. On said day, there being no opposition, counsel for Mercadera
moved for leave of court to present evidence ex parte. Without any objection from the
City Prosecutor, the trial court designated the branch clerk of court to receive
evidence for Mercadera.
On September 15, 2005, the testimony of Oga and several photocopies of
documents were formally offered and marked as evidence to prove that Mercadera
never used the name "Marilyn" in any of her public or private transactions. On
September 26, 2005, the RTC issued an order6 admitting Exhibits "A" to "I"7 and their
submarkings, as relevant to the resolution of the case.
The following facts were gathered from documentary evidence and the oral testimony
of Oga, as reported by the lower court:
Petitioner Merlyn M. Mercadera was born on August 19, 1970 at Dipolog City. She is
the daughter of spouses Tirso U. Mercadera and Norma C. Lacquiao. The fact of her
birth was reported to the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City on
September 8, 1970. It was recorded on page 68, book no. 9, in the Registry of Births
of said civil registry. In the certification of birth dated May 9, 2005 issued by the same
registry, her given name appears as Marilyn and not Merlyn (Exhibit "C").
On September 29, 1979, petitioner was baptized according to the rites and
ceremonies of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines. As reflected in her
certificate of baptism issued by said church, she was baptized by the name Merlyn L.
Mercadera (Exhibit "D").
In her elementary diploma issued by the Paaralang Sentral ng Estaka, Dipolog City;
her high school diploma issued by the Zamboanga del Norte School of Arts and
Trades, Dipolog City; and college diploma issued by the Silliman University,
Dumaguete City, where she earned the degree of Bachelor of Secondary Education,
uniformly show her name as Merlyn L. Mercadera (Exhibits "E", "F", and "G").
Presently, she is working in U.P. Mindanao, Buhangin, Davao City. Her certificate of
membership issued by the Government Service Insurance System also bears his
[sic] complete name as Merlyn Lacquiao Mercadera (Exhibit "H").
When she secured an authenticated copy of her certificate of live birth from the
National Statistics Office, she discovered that her given name as registered is Marilyn
and not Merlyn; hence, this petition.
In its September 28, 2005 Decision,8 the RTC granted Mercadera’s petition and
directed the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City to correct her name
appearing in her certificate of live birth, Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera, to MERLYN
Lacquiao Mercadera. Specifically, the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Office of the City Civil
Registrar of Dipolog City is hereby directed to correct the given name of petitioner
appearing in her certificate of live birth, from Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera to
MERLYN Lacquiao Mercadera.
In a four-page decision, the RTC ruled that the documentary evidence presented by
Mercadera sufficiently supported the circumstances alleged in her petition.
Considering that she had used "Merlyn" as her given name since childhood until she
discovered the discrepancy in her Certificate of Live Birth, the RTC was convinced
that the correction was justified.
The OSG timely interposed an appeal praying for the reversal and setting aside of
the RTC decision. It mainly anchored its appeal on the availment of Mercadera of the
remedy and procedure under Rule 108. In its Brief 9 filed with the CA, the OSG
argued that the lower court erred (1) in granting the prayer for change of name in a
petition for correction of entries; and (2) in admitting the photocopies of documentary
evidence and hearsay testimony of Oga.
For the OSG, the correction in the spelling of Mercadera’s given name might seem
innocuous enough to grant but "it is in truth a material correction as it would modify or
increase substantive rights."10 What the lower court actually allowed was a change of
Mercadera’s given name, which would have been proper had she filed a petition
under Rule 103 and proved any of the grounds therefor. The lower court, "may not
substitute one for the other for purposes of expediency."11 Further, because
Mercadera failed to invoke a specific ground recognized by the Rules, the lower
court’s order in effect allowed the change of one’s name in the civil registry without
basis.
The CA was not persuaded. In its December 9, 2008 Decision, 12 the appellate court
affirmed the questioned RTC Order in CA-G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN. The CA
assessed the controversy in this wise:
Appellant’s insistence that the petition should have been filed under Rule 103 and not
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is off the mark. This Court does not entertain any
doubt that the petition before the trial court was one for the correction on an entry in
petitioner’s Certificate of Live Birth and not one in which she sought to change her
name. In Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, the
High Court reiterated the distinction between the phrases "to correct" and "to
change." Said the High Court:
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from."
To change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or
with something that serves as a substitute. Article 412 of the New Civil Code does
not qualify as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected or distinguished on the
basis of the effect that the correction or change may be. Such entries include not only
those clerical in nature but also substantial errors. After all, the role of the Court
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is to ascertain the truths about the facts
recorded therein.
That appellee sought to correct an entry and not to change her name is patent to the
Court from the allegations in her petition, specifically, paragraphs 7 and 8 thereof—
xxxx
Anent the RTC’s error in admitting the photocopies of Mercadera’s documentary
evidence and in vesting probative value to Oga’s testimony, the CA cited the well-
established rule that "evidence not objected to may be admitted and may be validly
considered by the court in arriving at its judgment."13
On March 6, 2009, the OSG filed the present petition. On behalf of Mercadera, the
Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) filed its Comment14 on July 3, 2009. The OSG
declined to file a reply claiming that its petition already contained an exhaustive
discussion on the following assigned errors:15
I consequent results in the event of its grant x x x."23
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
GRANTING THE CHANGE IN RESPONDENT’S NAME UNDER RULE 103.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
CONSIDERING SECONDARY EVIDENCE.
Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or
surname, or both, pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code.16 This rule provides the
procedure for an independent special proceeding in court to establish the status of a
person involving his relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard
to, the rest of the community.17 In petitions for change of name, a person avails of a
remedy to alter the "designation by which he is known and called in the community in
which he lives and is best known."18 When granted, a person’s identity and
interactions are affected as he bears a new "label or appellation for the convenience
of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of, or dealing with
him."19 Judicial permission for a change of name aims to prevent fraud and to ensure
a record of the change by virtue of a court decree.
The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which requires publication of
the order issued by the court to afford the State and all other interested parties to
oppose the petition. When complied with, the decision binds not only the parties
impleaded but the whole world. As notice to all, publication serves to indefinitely bar
all who might make an objection. "It is the publication of such notice that brings in the
whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and
decide it."20
Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of one’s existing
family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one’s
legal capacity or civil status.21 However, "there could be instances where the change
applied for may be open to objection by parties who already bear the surname
desired by the applicant, not because he would thereby acquire certain family ties
with them but because the existence of such ties might be erroneously impressed on
the public mind."22 Hence, in requests for a change of name, "what is involved is not
a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation
of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced x x x mindful of the
Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or
cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil
Code.24 Entries in the civil register refer to "acts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons,"25 also as enumerated in Article 408 of the
same law.26 Before, only mistakes or errors of a harmless and innocuous nature in
the entries in the civil registry may be corrected under Rule 108 and substantial
errors affecting the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party are beyond the
ambit of the rule. In the abandoned case of Chua Wee v. Republic,27 this Court
declared that,
x x x if Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or
corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so
as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would
thereby become unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying substantive
rights, which changes are not authorized under Article 412 of the new Civil Code."
In the latter case of Wong v. Republic,28 however, Justice Vicente Abad Santos, in a
separate concurrence, opined that Article 412, which Rule 108 implements,
contemplates all kinds of issues and all types of procedures because "the provision
does not say that it applies only to non-controversial issues and that the procedure to
be used is summary in nature." In Republic v. Judge De la Cruz,29 the dissenting
opinion penned by Justice Pacifico De Castro echoed the same view:
It is not accurate to say that Rule 108 would be rendered unconstitutional if it would
allow the correction of more than mere harmless clerical error, as it would thereby
increase or modify substantive rights which the Constitution expressly forbids
because Article 412 of the Civil Code, the substantive law sought to be implemented
by Rule 108, allows only the correction of innocuous clerical errors not those affecting
the status of persons. As was stressed in the dissent on the aforesaid Wong Case,
Article 412 does not limit in its express terms nor by mere implication, the correction
authorized by it to that of mere clerical errors. x x x it would be reasonable and
justified to rule that Article 412 contemplates of correction of erroneous entry of
whatever nature, procedural safeguards having only to be provided for, as was the
manifest purpose of Rule 108.
x x x proceedings for the correction of erroneous entry should not be considered as
establishing one's status in a legal manner conclusively beyond dispute or
controversion, x x x the books making up the civil register and all documents relating
thereto x x x shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. Hence, the
status as corrected would not have a superior quality for evidentiary purpose.
Moreover, the correction should not imply a change of status but a mere rectification
of error to make the matter corrected speak for the truth. x x x
Finally in Republic v. Valencia,30 the above stated views were adopted by this Court
insofar as even substantial errors or matters in a civil registry may be corrected and
the true facts established, provided the parties aggrieved avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding. "If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct
the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the
court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of a
mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status
from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial
alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings
depending upon the nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil
status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed
out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and
wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented
and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the
contrary admitted x x x."31 "Where such a change is ordered, the Court will not be
establishing a substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an erroneous entry in
the civil registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
provides only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the
substantive law embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate the
Constitution."32
In the case at bench, the OSG posits that the conversion from "MARILYN" to
"MERLYN" is not a correction of an innocuous error but a material correction
tantamount to a change of name which entails a modification or increase in
substantive rights. For the OSG, this is a substantial error that requires compliance
with the procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule 108.
It appears from these arguments that there is, to some extent, confusion over the
scope and application of Rules 103 and Rule 108. Where a "change of name" will
necessarily be reflected by the corresponding correction in an entry, as in this case,
the functions of both rules are often muddled. While there is no clear-cut rule to
categorize petitions under either rule, this Court is of the opinion that a resort to the
basic distinctions between the two rules with respect to alterations in a person’s
registered name can effectively clear the seeming perplexity of the issue. Further, a
careful evaluation of circumstances alleged in the petition itself will serve as a
constructive guide to determine the propriety of the relief prayed for.
The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be
confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one’s name under Rule 103 can
be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for change
of name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that
the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess
the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be adversarial
proceedings.33
In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section
2, Rule 10834 also includes "changes of name," the correction of a patently
misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed
in one’s name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set
right under Rule 108.
This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the
correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary proceeding.
As explained above, Republic v. Valencia is the authority for allowing substantial
errors in other entries like citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be corrected using
Rule 108 provided there is an adversary proceeding. "After all, the role of the Court
under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein." 35
A serious scrutiny of this petition reveals a glaring lack of support to the OSG’s
assumption that Mercadera intended to change her name under Rule 103. All that the
petition propounded are swift arguments on the alleged procedural flaws of
Mercadera’s petition before the RTC. In the same vein, no concrete contention was
brought up to convince this Court that the dangers sought to be prevented by the
adversarial proceedings prescribed in Rule 103 are attendant in this case. Instead,
the RTC found the documents presented by Mercadera to have satisfactorily shown
that she had been known as MERLYN ever since, discounting the possibility that
confusion, or a modification of substantive rights might arise. Truth be told, not a
single oppositor appeared to contest the petition despite full compliance with the
publication requirement.
Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108
as it simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means
"to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to
replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that
serves as a substitute."36 From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly
prayed for the lower court "to remove the faults or error" from her registered given
name "MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the same to conform to the one she
grew up to, "MERLYN." It does not take a complex assessment of said petition to
learn of its intention to simply correct the clerical error in spelling. Mercadera even
attempted to avail of the remedy allowed by R.A. No. 9048 but she unfortunately
failed to enjoy the expediency which the law provides and was constrained to take
court action to obtain relief. Thus, the petition was clear in stating:
7. That as such, there is a need to correct her given name as appearing in
her Certificate of Live Birth from MARILYN to MERLYN to conform to her true
and correct given name that she had been using and had been known within
the community x x x.
8. That herein petitioner went to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Dipolog City and requested them to effect such correction in her Certificate of
Live Birth, however, the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City will not effect
such correction unless an order is obtained by herein petitioner from this
Honorable Court because the Local Civil Registrar therein is not yet
equipped with permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions
for corrections filed before their office as mandated by Republic Act 9048,
hence the filing of this petition. [Emphases supplied]
Indeed, there are decided cases involving mistakes similar to Mercadera’s case
which recognize the same a harmless error. In Yu v. Republic37 it was held that "to
change ‘Sincio’ to ‘Sencio’ which merely involves the substitution of the first vowel ‘i’
in the first name into the vowel ‘e’ amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error."
In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,38 it was held that the change of petitioner’s name from
"Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu" to "Emperatriz Labayo" was a mere innocuous
alteration wherein a summary proceeding was appropriate. In Republic v. Court of
Appeals, Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto, the correction involved the
substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d," so that what appears as "Midael" as
given name would read "Michael." In the latter case, this Court, with the agreement of
the Solicitor General, ruled that the error was plainly clerical, such that, "changing the
name of the child from ‘Midael C. Mazon’ to ‘Michael C. Mazon’ cannot possibly
cause any confusion, because both names can be read and pronounced with the
same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig)."39
In this case, the use of the letter "a" for the letter "e," and the deletion of the letter "i,"
so that what appears as "Marilyn" would read as "Merlyn" is patently a rectification of
a name that is clearly misspelled. The similarity between "Marilyn" and "Merlyn" may
well be the object of a mix- up that blemished Mercadera’s Certificate of Live Birth
until her adulthood, thus, her interest to correct the same.
The CA did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow was the
correction of her misspelled given name which she had been using ever since she
could remember.
It is worthy to note that the OSG’s reliance on Republic vs. Hernandez40 is flawed. In
that case, this Court said that "a change in a given name is a substantial matter" and
that it "cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding that would in effect
render it a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding." While this
Court stands true to the ruling in Hernandez, the said pronouncement therein was
stated in a different tenor and, thus, inapplicable to this case. Hernandez was
decided against an entirely different factual milieu. There was a petition for adoption
that must not have led to a corresponding change in the adoptee’s given name
because "it would be procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to
effect a change of name in the absence of a corresponding petition for the latter relief
at law." In the present case, the issue is the applicability of either Rule 103 or Rule
108 and the relief sought by Mercadera can in fact be granted under the latter. This
Court finds no attempt on the part of Mercadera to render the requirements under
Rule 103 illusory as in Hernandez.
Besides, granting that Rule 103 applies to this case and that compliance with the
procedural requirements under Rule 108 falls short of what is mandated, it still cannot
be denied that Mercadera complied with the requirement for an adversarial
proceeding before the lower court. The publication and posting of the notice of
hearing in a newspaper of general circulation and the notices sent to the OSG and
the Local Civil Registry are sufficient indicia of an adverse proceeding. The fact that
no one opposed the petition, including the OSG, did not deprive the court of its
jurisdiction to hear the same and did not make the proceeding less adversarial in
nature. Considering that the OSG did not oppose the petition and the motion to
present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now
complain that the proceedings in the lower court were procedurally defective. Indeed,
it has become unnecessary to further discuss the reasons why the CA correctly
affirmed the findings of the lower court especially in admitting and according
probative value to the evidence presented by Mercadera.
WHEREFORE, the December 9, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 00568-MIN is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO WONG, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner seeks to set aside the judgment of respondent Court of
Appeals 1 in affirmance of the decision of the court a quo 2 granting the petition filed
by herein private respondent Maximo Wong for the change of his name to Maximo
Alcala, Jr. which was his name prior to his adoption by Hoong Wong and Concepcion
Ty Wong.
The facts are undisputed. Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of
Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala. When he was but two and a half years
old and then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his sister Margaret Alcala, was then
nine years old, they were, with the consent of their natural parents 3 and by order of
the court in Special Case No. 593 4 issued on September 9, 1967, adopted by
spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos. Hoong
Wong, now deceased, was an insurance agent while Concepcion Ty Wong was a
high school teacher. They decided to adopt the children as they remained childless
after fifteen years of marriage. The couples showered their adopted children with
parental love and reared them as their own children.
Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, herein private respondent, by then married and
a junior Engineering student at Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, filed a petition
to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname
Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the same
suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing
in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien
nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering
his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire
to revert to his former surname.
As earlier stated, on July 2, 1986, the matter was resolved in favor of private
respondent, the trial court decreeing that, the jurisdictional requirements having been
fully complied with, petitioner's prayer to change his name from Maximo Wong to
Maximo Alcala, Jr. was granted. 5 On appeal to respondent court, and over the
opposition of petitioner Republic through the Solicitor General, the decision of the
court below was affirmed in full, hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The lone issue to be settled is whether or not the reasons given by private
respondent in his petition for change of name are valid, sufficient and proper to
warrant the granting of said petition.
The Solicitor General contends that private respondent's allegations of ridicule and/or
isolation from family and friends were unsubstantiated and cannot justify the petition
for change of name. He claims that for private respondent to cast aside the name of
his adoptive father is crass ingratitude to the memory of the latter and to his adoptive
mother who is still alive, despite her consent to the petition for change of name.
Further, the Solicitor General posits that the reversion of Maximo Wong to his old
name violates Articles 341 and 365 of the Civil Code, which requires an adopted child
to use the surname of the adopter, and would identify him with his parents by nature,
thus giving the impression that he has severed his relationship with his adoptive
parents. 6
In refutation, private respondent argues that he did as the law required, that is, upon
adoption he used the surname of the adopter. However, being already emancipated,
he can now decide what is best for and by himself. It is at this time that he realized
that the Chinese name he carries causes him undue ridicule and embarrassment and
affects his business and social life. In fact, his adoptive mother, being aware of his
predicament, gave her consent to the petition for change of name, albeit making it
clear that the same shall in no way affect the legal adoption, and even underwent the
rigors of trial to substantiate her sworn statement. If his adoptive mother does not
take offense nor feel any resentment, abhorrence or insecurity about his desire to
change his name, private respondent avers that there can be no possible prejudice
on her, much less the State. 7
We feel that we should preface our review of this case with a clear comprehension of
the legal significance of a person's name. For all practical and legal purposes, a
man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in the community in
which be lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words
by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or
appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him,
of in speaking of or dealing with him. 8 Names are used merely as one method of
indicating the identity of persons; they are descriptive of persons for identification,
since, the identity is the essential thing and it has frequently been held that, when
identity is certain, a variance in, or misspelling of, the name is immaterial. 9
The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name,
and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to
the individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The name
or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued
from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the
child; but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. 10
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to
protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain
respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or
immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by
judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore,
inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is
imprescriptible. 11
Title XIII, Book I of the Civil Code, in Articles 364 to 380, provides the substantive
rules which regulate the use of surnames. Considering the subject and personalities
involved in this present review, particular attention must be called to Article 365 which
mandates that "(a)n adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter," in
correlation with Article 341 on the effects of adoption, among which is to"(e)ntitle the
adopted person to use the adopter's surname." This same entitlement of an adopted
child is maintained in Article 39(3), Title II of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise
known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code. More recently, Executive Order No.
209, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, or the Family Code, echoes the same
statutory right of an adopted child to use the surname of the adopter. 12 Clearly, from
the very wordings of the law, it may be inferred that this use of the surname of the
adopter by the adopted child is both an obligation and a right.
Under Article 376 by the Civil Code, "(n)o person can change his name or surname
without judicial authority." The application for change of name thereunder involves a
special proceeding governed by and conducted under the strictures of Rule 103 of
the Rules of Court and one which involves substantial changes, with the declared
objective of such judicial proceedings being the prevention of fraud. The purpose of
the statutory procedure authorizing a change of personal name is simply to have,
wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the
statute, court to which application is made should normally make its decree recording A "Wong," sir.
such change of name. 13
Q Now, after you adopted the surname "Wong?" in
A change of name is a special proceeding to establish the status of a person your studies, what did you observe?
involving his relation with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the
rest of the community. It is a proceeding in rem 14 and, as such, strict compliance with A I observed that "Wong" as a surname
all jurisdictional requirements, particularly on publication, is essential in order to vest embarrassed me to my friends and when I go with
the court with jurisdiction thereover. 15 For this purpose, the only name that may be Chinese friends I cannot talk Chinese. I am living in
changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register. 16 Campo Muslim, a Muslim community but no one can
believe that I am Muslim. I have a little business of
To digress a little for purposes of clarification, the change of name contemplated Furniture but I have little (sic) customer because no
under Article 376 and reglementarily implemented by Rule 103 must not be confused one believes me that I am Muslim.
with and cannot be effected through the summary proceeding proposed in Article 412
of the some Code, as procedurally regulated by Rule 108 of the Rules, which refers Q You want to inform this Honorable Court that this
only to correction of clerical errors, such as those which are visible to the eye or family name you are using which is "Wong"
obvious to the understanding, or an error made by a clerk or transcriber, or a mistake embarrassed you from (sic) your friends and
in copying or writing, or some harmless or innocuous change, 17 and not those which relatives and also cause(d) damage to your
will involve substantial changes. 18 business?

Turning now to the case at bar, we are guided by the jurisprudential dictum that the A Yes sir.
State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for the purpose of
identification, and a change of name is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
xxx xxx xxx
discretion, to be exercised in the light of reasons adduced and the consequences that
will likely follow; 19 it is a privilege which may be granted only upon a showing of a
proper or reasonable cause or compelling reason therefor. 20 ATTY. DUMAMBA:

We find unacceptable the assertion of the Solicitor General that private respondent's Q Now, considering that according to you, you are
allegation of ridicule and embarrassment due to the use of his present surname is embarrassed because of the family name you are
unsubstantiated. using, your friends shy away from you and it is a
handicap in your business, what is your desire for
the Court to do in order to help you?
The testimony of private respondent in the lower court bears out the existence of
valid cause in his bid for change of name:
A Change my family name.
ATTY. DUMAMBA:
Q From "Wong" to what do you want your surname
changed?
Q Now, after adoption, when you went to school,
what did you use as your surname?
A "Alcala, Jr.", sir.
 xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q What is your purpose in changing your family
name from Maximo Wong to Maximo Alcala, Jr.?
A I feel embarrassed to my friends and also to my
relatives and as I said I have a little business of
furniture and only a few customers buying for the
fact that they don't believe I am Muslim.
Cross.
ATTY. SERO:
With the permission of the Honorable Court.
Q Your father's name is Maximo Alcala, Sr., is he
still alive?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what does your father say to this proposed
changed (sic) of your name, your family name to
your real family name given to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q They have no objection to it?
A No, sir.
Q Stated before this Honorable Court, the purpose
why you wanted to change your name from "Wong"
to "Alcala" is so that to avoid embarrassment
because you are a Muslim and your Muslim relatives
think that you are Chinese.
A Yes, sir.
Q Not for the purpose to hide anything or what not?
A No, sir. 21
The foregoing testimony of private respondent is materially corroborated by the
testimony of private respondent's adoptive mother:
Q Now, what did you observe to (sic) your son
Maximo Wong after you and your husband adopted
him?
A When I adopted him and he used the surname
"Wong" I observed that some of his relatives,
cousins and friends seem to shy away from him and
despise him in school that is why I agreed to change
his name. 22
We uphold these observations in the decision of respondent appellate court:
The purpose of the law an allowing of change of name as
contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is
to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and to
provide his best interest. (Calderon vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 721). In
granting or denying the petition for change of name, the question of
proper and reasonable cause is left to the discretion of the court. The
evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all
the best evidence available is required. (Uy vs. Republic, L-22712,
Nov. 25, 1965; Nacionales vs. Republic,
L-18067, April 29, 1966; both cases cited in 1 SCRA 843). In the
present case, We believe that the court a quo had exercised its
discretion judiciously when it granted the petition.
From the testimony of petitioner-appellee and of his adopter mother
Concepcion Ty-Wong, We discern that said appellee was prompted
to file the petition for change of name because of the embarrassment
and ridicule his family name "Wong" brings in his dealings with his
 relatives and friends, he being a Muslim Filipino and living in a
Muslim community. Another cause is his desire to improve his social
and business life. It has been held that in the absence of prejudice to
the state or any individual, a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name
to erase signs of a former alien nationality which only hamper(s)
social and business life, is a proper and reasonable cause for
change of name (Uy vs. Republic, L-22712, Nov. 25, 1965, Que
Liong Sian vs. Republic, L-23167, Aug. 17, 1967, 20 SCRA 1074).
Justice dictates that a person should be allowed to improve his social
standing as long as in doing so, he does not cause prejudice or
injury to the interest of the State or other persons (Calderon vs.
Republic, supra). Nothing whatsoever is shown in the record of this
case that such prejudice or injury to the interest of the state or of
other persons would result in the change of petitioner's name. 23
It bears stressing at this point that to justify a request for change of name, petitioner
must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefor but also that he will
be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 24Among the grounds for
change of name which have been held valid are: (a) When the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) When the change results
as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) When the change will avoid
confusion; 25 (d) Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name, unaware of her alien parentage; 26 (e) A sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudicing anybody; 27 and (f) When the surname causes embarrassment and there
is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that
the change of name would prejudice public interest. 28
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and
reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented
need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence
available. 29 Summarizing, in special proceedings for change of name, what is
involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a
judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in
support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with
the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts.
While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect
that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must nevertheless be
borne in mind that the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an
incident rather than the object of adoption proceedings. 30 The act of adoption fixes a
status, viz., that of parent and child. More technically, it is an act by which relations of
paternity and affiliation are recognized as legally existing between persons not so
related by nature. It has been defined as the taking into one's family of the child of
another as son or daughter and heir and conferring on it a title to the rights and
privileges of such. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to effect this new status
of relationship between the child and its adoptive parents, the change of name which
frequently accompanies adoption being more an incident than the object of the
proceeding. 31 The welfare of the child is the primary consideration in the
determination of an application for adoption. On this point, there is unanimous
agreement. 32
It is the usual effect of a decree of adoption to transfer from the natural parents to the
adoptive parents the custody of the child's person, the duty of obedience owing by
the child, and all other legal consequences and incidents of the natural relation, in the
same manner as if the child had been born of such adoptive parents in lawful
wedlock, subject, however, to such limitations and restrictions as may be by statute
imposed. 33 More specifically under the present state of our law, the Family Code,
superseding the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code on the matter, 34 relevantly provides in this wise with regard to the
issue involved in this case:
Art. 189. Adoption shall have the following effects:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be the
legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal
rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and
child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the
adopters; (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
The Solicitor General maintains the position that to sustain the change of name
would run counter to the behest of Article 365 of the Civil Code and the ruling
in Manuel vs. Republic 35 that "one should not be allowed to use a surname which
otherwise he is not permitted to employ under the law," and would set a bad example
to other persons who might also seek a change of their surnames on lame
excuses. 36
While we appreciate the Solicitor General's apprehensions and concern, we find the
same to be unfounded. We do not believe that by reverting to his old name, private
respondent would then be using a name which he is prohibited by law from using.
True, the law prescribes the surname that a person may employ; but the law does not
go so far as to unqualifiedly prohibit the use of any other surname, and only subjects
such recourse to the obtention of the requisite judicial sanction. What the law does
not prohibit, it permits.
If we were to follow the argument of the Solicitor General to its conclusion, then there
will never be any possibility or occasion for any person, regardless of status, to
change his name, in view of the supposed subsequent violation of the legal
imperative on the use of surnames in the event that the petition is granted. Rule 103
of the Rules of Court would then be rendered inutile. This could hardly have been the
intendment of the law.
A petition for change of name is a remedy allowed under our law only by way of
exception to the mandatory provisions of the Civil Code on the use of surnames. The
law fixes the surname that may be used by a person, at least inceptively, and it may
be changed only upon judicial permission granted in the exercise of sound discretion.
Section 1 of Rule 103, in specifying the parties who may avail of said remedy, uses
the generic term "persons" to signify all natural persons regardless of status. If a
legitimate person may, under certain judicially accepted exceptional circumstances,
petition the court for a change of name, we do not see any legal basis or logic in
discriminating against the availment of such a remedy by an adopted child. In other
words, Article 365 is not an exception, much less can it bar resort, to Rule 103.
We are of the view that the circumstances herein obtaining are within the ambit of the
established exceptions and find merit in private respondent's submission:
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court has its primordial purpose which
(State) is to give a person in opportunity to improve his personality
and provide his best interest (Calderon vs. Republic, 19 SCRA 721).
In the instant case, the court a quo found the petition of Maximo
Wong for change of name justifiable after due hearing, thus its
factual findings and appreciation of testimonies count heavily and
need not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons because
the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence as well
as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the
case (Baliwag Transit, Inc. vs. CA, 147 SCRA 82). Moreover, the trial
court could take judicial notice of other existing factors in the
community where herein respondent lives which it considers material
in its judicious determination of the case. . . .
Additionally, herein respondent is already of age and as such he can
decide what is best for him. His experience with regards (sic) his
social and business dealings is personal and it is only him (sic) who
can attest to the same. Finding his predicament's proper remedy is
solely through legal process, herein respondent accordingly filed a
petition pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court which was
granted by the Court a quo. 37
Besides, we have faith in the circumspection of our lower courts and that, in the
exercise of their discretion, said courts shall consider petitions for change of name
only on cogent and meritorious grounds as would justify the granting of such
applications. We do not expect our trial courts to cater or give in to the whim or
caprice of an applicant, aside from the fact that there is always the safeguard and
corrective interdiction of appellate review.
It is not fair to construe the desired reversion of private respondent to the use of the
name of his parents by nature as cross ingratitude. To go by the Solicitor General's
suggestion that private respondent should have his adoption revoked if he wants to
use the surname of his natural father would be to exact too clear a toll for making use
of an appropriate and valid remedy available under the law.
Herein private respondent, before he filed the petition for change of name, asked for
his adoptive mother's permission to do so:
Q Now, in filing this petition for change of surname,
you had talked with your adopted mother?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask permission from her whether she
wants you to change the surname?
A Yes, sir. 38
True enough, the above testimony of private respondent was confirmed by his
adoptive mother in this manner:
Q How are you related to Maximo Wong?
A My adopted son.
Q He is your adopted son, did your son talk to you
when he filed this petition for change of his
surname?
A Yes, he even tried to ask me and I said, alright if
you want to change.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, when you agreed to the filing of this petition
for change of name, did you reduce your consent in
writing?
A Yes, sir, I agreed also so that his business will
prosper because
he is already Alcila and not Wong because Wong
they said is Chinese. 39
As proof of her assent to the filing of said petition (her husband having already
passed away), Concepcion Ty Vda. de Wong executed an affidavit in Cotabato City
on May 27, 1985, with these textual declarations:
That I am the same and identical person, who is the surviving
adapted (sic) parent of Maximo Wong.
That I personally discovered it myself from the time my adapted (sic)
son Maximo used the surname of my late husband Wong, his
relatives and childhood friends shy away from him because he is
branded as a son of a chinese which is different from them whose
parents are muslim Filipinos;
That I pity my son who is often rediculed (sic) by his friends and
relatives because of his family name Wong, hence, in order not to
humper (sic) his social and business life in the future, I am voluntarily
and of my own free will without being forced, coerced, or intimidated
give (sic) my consent to his desire to change his desire to change his
surname without affecting however the legal adoption granted by the
Court on September 9, 1967, making him as one of my legal and
compulsory heir (sic).
That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of all the above
mentioned facts and for all legal intent (sic) and purposes. 40
There could be no other plausible reason for private respondent to first secure has
adoptive mother's consent before resorting to the questioned legal recourse other
than the parental respect and reverence which is owed by and to be expected of a
dutiful child. If private respondent was such an ingrate, as the Solicitor General would
have us believe, he would not have bothered to seek his adoptive mother's counsel.
In the same breath, had his adoptive mother regarded him as an ungrateful adoptee,
she would not have executed the affidavit above quoted, much less testify in his
behalf at the hearing of his petition.
Moreover, worthy of note is the fact that private respondent's adoptive mother
emphasized that she executed the above affidavit "without affecting the legal
adoption granted by the Court on September 9, 1967, making him as one of my legal
and compulsory heir(s)." This is incontrovertible proof that she never entertained any
misgivings or reservations with respect to her consent to his petition. This likewise
dispels any possible confusion as to private respondent's legal status or adoptive
paternity and his successional rights. Concordantly, we have heretofore held that a
change of name does not define or effect a change in one's existing family relations
or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity,
civil status or citizenship; what is altered is only the name. 41
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SEGUNDO M. ZOSA, Judge of the Court of Firt Instance of Samar,
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch I, and LEE KING SING, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Lope C. Quimbao for private respondent.
BIDIN, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines appealed from the order dated July 20, 1978 of the
former Court of First Instance of Samar granting the petition of respondent Lee King
Sing for change of his name to Antonio C. Lee and ordering the civil registrar of
Samar to enter in the civil registry record the said name.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On February 10, 1977, respondent Lee King Sing filed a petition with the CFI of
Samar for change of name. For clarity, the said petition docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 5634 is reproduced herein as follows:
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME , SPEC PROC. NO.
5634
LEE KING SING,
Petitioners
PETITION
COMES, the Petitioner through the undersigned counsel and to this
Honorable Court, most respectfully states:
1. That the petitioner is a bona fide resident of Catbalogan, Samar
for at least three years prior to the filing of this petition since his birth
on January 3, 1934 to the present continuously;
2. That the petitioner is a naturalized Filipino citizen per Certificate of
Naturalization No. 007217 (Pet No. 001844-A) issued by the Special
Committee on Naturalization on December 20,1976 pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1055, after taking his Oath of Allegiance on
December 15, 1976 and it is his desire to be known with a Filipino
name inasmuch as his associates, friends and all other persons with
which he is dealing are Filipinos and petitioner is known to them and
they call him Antonio or Tony;
3. That he desires that his present name be changed to ANTONIO
C. LEE. The Lee appearing in his present name is in fact his
surname but in the Chinese way of writing the name, the surname is
stated first; hence, his desire to have ANTONIO as his first name, C.
in the first letter of his mother' surname and LEE his present
surname which he desires to be written after his first name as it is
the Filipino way. The name he now asked for is ANTONIO C. LEE.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after due
publication and hearing, the Honorable Court issues an order
changing the name of the petitioner LEE KING SING to ANTONIO C.
LEE.
Catbalogan, Samar, February 10, 1977.
(SGD) LOPE C. QUIMBO
Counsel for the Petitioner (pp. 47-48, Rollo).
On February 15, 1917, the lower court issued an order setting the petition for hearing.
Said order was subsequently published in the Leyte Forum on February 22, March 1,
and March 3,1977.
On March 18, 1977, herein petitioner through the Solicitor General filed a motion to
dismiss the petition on the ground that the name sought to be adopted by respondent
and other names by which he is known are not indicated or included in the title of the
petition. On December 10, 1977, respondent filed an opposition to the motion to
dismiss. On March 8, 1978, the lower court denied the aforesaid motion.
After trial and hearing, the court a quo on July 20, 1978, as already stated, granted
the petition; hence, the instant appeal, petitioner raising a lone assignment of error:
THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF SAMAR ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE
PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL
DEFECT IN THE PETITION AND PUBLICATION OF THE NOTICE
OF HEARING. (p. 84, Rollo).
The proceeding for a change of name is a proceeding in rem. Jurisdiction to hear and
determine the petition for change of name is acquired after due publication of the
order containing certain data, among which is the name sought to be adopted, a
matter which should be indicated in the title of the petition [Pabellar vs. Republic, 70
SCRA 16 (1976); Gil Go vs. Republic, 77 SCRA 65 (1977)]
In a petition for change of name the title of the petition should include (1) the
applicant's real name, (2) his aliases or other names, if any, and (3) the name sought
to be adopted even if these data are found in the body of the petition. For the
Publication to be valid and effective, the published order should reproduce the title of
the petition containing the data already stated and should contain correct information
as to (1) the name or names of the applicant; (2) the cause for the changed name,
and (3) the new name asked for (Republic vs. Lee Wai Lam, 28 SCRA 1043 (1969)
Republic vs. Tanada, 42 SCRA 419 (1971); Republic vs. Reyes, 45 SCRA 570
(1972); Secan Kok vs. Republic, 52 SCRA 322 (1973).
In the present case, the petition itself, as well as the order published, carries the
following title "In Re: Petition for Change of Name Lee King Sing, Petitioner." It does
not contain the name (Antonio C. Lee) sought to be adopted and the names by which
petitioner was known to his friends and associates. The title should have read "In the
Matter of the Change of Name of Lee King Sing, otherwise known as Antonio or Tony
to Antonio C. Lee, Lee King Sing, Petitioner." The petition does not indicate in its title
or caption that herein respondent desires to change his name to Antonio C. Lee. The
published order setting his petition for hearing reproduced that defective title. The
failure to include the name sought to be adopted in the title of the petition nor in the
title or caption of the notices published in the newspapers renders the trial court
without jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition [Republic vs. Reyes, (supra)].
The reason for the rule requiring the inclusion of the name sought to be adopted by
and the other names or aliases of the applicant in the title of the petition or in the
caption of the published order is that the ordinary reader only glances fleetingly at the
caption of the published order or the title of the petition in a special proceeding. Only
if the caption or the title strikes him does he proceed to read the contents of the
order. And the probability is great that he does not at all notice the other names or
aliases of the applicant if these are mentioned only in the body of the order or
petition. The non-inclusion of all the names or aliases of the applicant in the caption
of the order or in the title of the petition defeats the very purpose of the required
publication (Go vs. Republic, (supra); Telmo vs. Republic, 73 SCRA 29 [1976]).
Considering that the title of the petition in this case and the order setting it for hearing
are defective as indicated above, the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
proceeding (Jesus Ng Yao Siong vs. Republic, 16 SCRA 483 [1966]); Go Chin Beng
vs. Republic, 46 SCRA 617 [1972]). Its dismissal is in order.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order under appeal is Reversed and the petition for
change of name is Denied. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PIO R. MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet
and PANG CHA QUEN representing the minor, MAY SIA alias MANMAN
HUANG, respondents.
Sinforoso Fangonil for private respondent.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the order dated February 12, 1969 of respondent
Judge Pio R. Marcos of the then Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court of
Baguio and Benguet, granting the petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court and authorizing "the name of the minor child May Sia alias Manman
Huang, also known as Mary Pang [to] be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz" (p. 12,
Rollo).
On March 30, 1968, a verified petition was filed by private respondent Pang Cha
Quen alleging that she is a citizen of Nationalist China, married to Alfredo De la Cruz,
a Filipino citizen; that she had resided in Baguio City since her birth on January 29,
1930; that by a previous marriage to Sia Bian alias Huang Tzeh Lik, a citizen of
Nationalist China, she gave birth to a daughter, May Sia alias Manman Huang on
January 28, 1958 in the City of Manila; that on January 12, 1959, she caused her
daughter to be registered as an alien under the name of Mary Pang, i.e., using the
maternal surname, because the child's father had abandoned them; that her
daughter has always used the name Mary Pang at home and in the Baguio Chinese
Patriotic School where she studies; that on August 16, 1966, petitioner Pang Cha
Quen married Alfredo De la Cruz; that as her daughter has grown to love and
recognize her stepfather, Alfredo De la Cruz, as her own father, she desires to adopt
and use his surname "De la Cruz" in addition to her name "Mary Pang" so that her
full name shall be Mary Pang De la Cruz; that Alfredo De la Cruz gave his conformity
to the petition by signing at the bottom of the pleading; that the petition was not made
for the purpose of concealing a crime as her ten-year old daughter has not committed
any, nor to evade the execution of a judgment as she has never been sued in court,
and the petition is not intended to cause damage or prejudice to any third person.
She prayed that her daughter be allowed to change her name from May Sia, alias
Manman Huang, to Mary Pang De la Cruz.
On April 4, 1968, respondent Judge issued an order setting the hearing of the petition
on September 16, 1968 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning and inviting all interested
persons to appear and show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted.
The order also directed that it be published at the expense of the petitioner in
the Baguio and Midland Courier, a newspaper of general circulation in Baguio City
and Mountain Province, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, the first
publication to be made as soon as possible. The order also commanded that the
Solicitor General and the City Attorney of Baguio be furnished copies of the order and
petition.
On September 16, 1968, when the petition was called for hearing, nobody opposed it.
Upon motion of petitioner's counsel, respondent Judge authorized the Clerk of Court
or his deputy to receive the evidence of the petitioner, Pang Cha Quen.
Finding the petition meritorious, respondent Judge issued an order on February 12,
1969 authorizing the name of the minor, May Sia alias Manman Huang, also known
as Mary Pang, to be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz.
The Government, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the Supreme Court on
the ground that the court's order is contrary to law.
In its petition f•r review, the Government raised two (2) issues namely: (1) whether
or not respondent Judge had acquired jurisdiction over the case; and (2) whether
respondent Judge erred in granting the petition although private respondent Pang
Cha Quen failed to adduce proper and reasonable cause for changing the name of
the minor "May Sia" alias Manman Huang."
On the first issue, the Government pointed out that the captions of the petition and of
the published order of the court did not include the name "Mary Pang" as one of the
names that the minor has allegedly been using, hence, the petition and the published
order contain a fatal jurisdictional defect.
The Government's contention is well-taken. Thus did we rule in the case of Jesus Ng
Yao Siong vs. Republic, 16 SCRA 483, 487-88:
Petitioner himself admits that he is known by all these names. This
gives rise to the necessity of including his aliases in the title of the
petition not only in the body thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
We accordingly hold that for a publication of a petition for a change
of name to be valid, the title thereof should include, first, his real
name, and second, his aliases, if any
In Republic vs. Zosa, G.R. No. 48762, September 12, 1988, this Court explained the
reason for the rule requiring the inclusion of the name sought to be adopted and the
other names or aliases of the applicant in the title of the petition, or in the caption of
the published order. It is that the ordinary reader only glances fleetingly at the caption
of the published order or the title of the petition in a special proceeding for a change
of name. Only if the caption or the title strikes him because one or all of the names
mentioned are familiar to him, does he proceed to read the contents of the order. The
probability is great that he will not notice the other names or aliases of the applicant if
they are mentioned only in the body of the order or petition.
In the case at bar, the caption of both the verified petition dated March 30,1968, and
the published order of the trial court dated April 4, 1968 read, thus:
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF THE MINOR MAY
SIA ALIAS MANMAN HUANG TO MARY PANG DE LA CRUZ,
PANG CHA QUEN, Petitioner. (P. 15, Rollo.)
The omission of her other alias-- "Mary Pang"-- in the captions of the court's order
and of the petition defeats the purpose of the publication. In view of that defect, the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject of the proceedings, i.e., the
various names and aliases of the petitioner which she wished to change to "Mary
Pang De la Cruz."
In Go Chin Beng vs. Republic, L-29574, August 18, 1972, we held that all aliases of
the applicant must be set forth in the title of the published petition, for the omission of
any of such aliases, would be fatal to the petition even if such other aliases are
mentioned in the body of the petition.
The second ground for the Government's appeal is the failure of the petitioner below,
Pang Cha Quen, to state a proper and reasonable cause for changing the
name/names of her daughter.
The following have been considered valid grounds for a change of name:
(1) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
(2) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
(3) when the change will avoid confusion (Haw Liong vs. Republic, L-21194, April
29,1966; Chill Hap Chin vs. Republic, L-20018, April 30, 1966; Republic vs. Tanada,
et al., L-31563, November 29, 1971; Alfon vs. Republic, I,51201, May 29, 1980);
(4) having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name,
unaware of his alien parentage (Josefina Ang Chay vs. Republic, L-28507, July 31,
1980); or
(5) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage all in
good faith and not to prejudice anybody (Uy vs. Republic, L-22712, November 29,
1965).
As may be gleaned from the petition filed in the lower court, the reasons offered for
changing the name of petitioner's daughter are: (1) that "her daughter grew up with,
and learned to love and recognize Alfredo de la Cruz as her own father" (p. 23,
Rollo); (2) to afford her daughter a feeling of security (pp. 23-24, Rollo); and (3) that
"Alfredo de la Cruz agrees to this petition, and has signified his conformity at the foot
of this pleading" (p. 24, Rollo).
Clearly, these are not valid reasons for a change of name. The general rule is that a
change of name should not be permitted if it will give a false impression of family
relationship to another where none actually exists (Laperal vs. Republic, L-18008,
October 30, 1962; Johnson vs. Republic, L-18284, April 30, 1963; Moore vs.
Republic, L-18407, June 26, 1963). In Padilla vs. Republic, 113 SCRA 789, we
specifically held that our laws do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the
surname of a person not their father, for to allow them to adopt the surname of their
mother's husband, who is not their father, can result in confusion of their paternity.
Another reason for disallowing the petition for change of name is that it was not filed
by the proper party. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, provide:
SECTION 1. Venue. — A person desiring to change his name shall
present the petition to the Court of First Instance of the province in
which he resides, or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court.
SEC. 2. Contents of petition.- A petition for change of name shall be
signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or
some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
 (a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province
where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date
of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is
sought;
(c) The name asked for
Clearly, the petition for change of name must be filed by the person desiring to
change his/her name, even if it may be signed and verified by some other person in
his behalf. In this case, however, the petition was filed by Pang Cha Quen not by May
Sia.
Hence, only May Sia herself, alias Manman Huang, alias Mary Pang, when she shall
have reached the age of majority, may file the petition to change her name. The
decision to change her name, the reason for the change, and the choice of a new
name and surname shall be hers alone to make. It must be her personal decision. No
one else may make it for her. The reason is obvious. When she grows up to
adulthood, she may not want to use her stepfather's surname, nor any of the aliases
chosen for her by her mother. In Moore vs. Republic, 8 SCRA 282, 284, we held:
Another factor to be reckoned with is the fact that the child
concerned is still a minor who for the present cannot fathom what
would be his feeling when he comes to a mature age. Any way, if the
time comes, he may decide the matter for himself and take such
action as our law may permit. For the present we deem the action
taken by petitioner premature.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the State has an interest in the name borne
by each individual for purposes of identification and the same should not be changed
for trivial reasons like the instant case (Ty vs. Republic L-18669, November 29,
1965). A change of name is a mere privilege and not a matter of right (Ong Peng Oan
vs. Republic, L-8035, November 29, 1957; Yu vs. Republic, L- 22040, November 29,
1965) and because the petition to change the name of the minor May Sia is not
supported by weighty reasons, the trial court erred in granting it.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the order appealed from is
hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANN BRIGITT LEONARDO as represented by her parents GLORIA LEONARDO and
EDDIE FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. TOMAS
AFRICA, et al., respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Being assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari is the Court of
Appeals Decision of March 11, 1996 and Resolution of May 27, 1996.
Petitioner Ann Brigitt Leonardo was on July 14, 1993 born in Manila to common-
law-spouses Eddie B. Fernandez and Gloria C. Leonardo.[1] In her birth certificate, her
given surname is that of her mother, Leonardo.[2]
As petitioners parents later wanted her to carry the surname of her father, the
latter executed an affidavit[3] of July 29, 1994 to this effect and wrote a letter[4] of August
1, 1994 to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila requesting for the change of petitioners
registered surname.
The Local Civil Registrar of Manila Lucena D. Dacuan denied the request of
petitioners parents on the ground that petitioner, being illegitimate, should carry her
mothers surname as provided under Article 176 of the Family Code[5] which took effect
on August 3, 1988.[6]Dacuan also cited Article 412 of the New Civil Code which
provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order.
Petitioners parents appealed the denial of their request for change of petitioners
surname to the Civil Registrar General, they citing, among others, the following
provision of Title XIII (Use of Surnames), Book I of the New Civil Code:
Article 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use
the surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child
shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Though conceding that the appeal had valid arguments, Civil Registrar General
Tomas P. Africa, by letter[7] of December 26, 1994, denied the appeal on the ground
that neither the Office of the Civil Registrar General nor any of the Civil Registry Offices
in the country is given the power or discretion to effect an administrative change of
entry in the civil register.
Petitioners parents thus sought before the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA) the review of the Civil Registrar Generals decision denying their
appeal. NEDA Director-General Cielito F. Habito, by letter[8] of March 21, 1995, replied,
however, that functionally, his office has no power or authority to review the decision
of the Civil Registrar General on matters pertaining to a local Civil Registry.
Undaunted, petitioners parents appealed to the Office of the President which, by
letter[9] of May 11, 1995, upheld the decision of the Civil Registrar General and the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila that the cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil
Registry must be brought directly before courts of law.
Petitioner, represented by her parents, thereupon filed before the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Review[10] under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court raising
the following issues:
1. Whether or not Article 176 of the Family Code be given a mandatory
application in case a child was born outside of wedlock even though
the putative father acknowledges said child as his and agrees and
allows his child to bear his surname [and]
2. Whether or not a judicial proceeding is required for the use of
[petitioners] surname.
By Decision[11] of March 11, 1996, the Court of Appeals held that Title XIII, Book I
of the New Civil Code on the Use of Surnames was not repealed by the Family Code,
citing its repealing clause or Article 254. It held, however, that the Local Civil Registrar
of Manila is not allowed to administratively correct the entry in the Civil Registry of the
City by deleting and changing petitioners family name LEONARDO to FERNANDEZ
upon the submission of an affidavit of her father recognizing her. It went on to declare
that petitioner could change her surname by judicial action pursuant to Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision having
been denied by Resolution[12] of May 27, 1996, the present petition raising the following
issue was filed:
IF PETITIONER, AS HELD IN THE 11 MARCH 1996 DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MAY USE HER NATURAL FATHERS
SURNAME, THE COROLLARY MATTER TO DETERMINE IN THIS CASE IS
WHETHER OR NOT RESORT TO RULE 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT
REQUIRING JUDICIAL PROCEEDING AND PUBLICATION, IS THE PROPER
ACTION TO BE TAKEN AS DIRECTED IN THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
TO ENABLE THE PETITIONER TO USE HER NATURAL FATHERS SURNAME.[13]
Ubi jus, ibi remedium.[14] When there is a right, there is a remedy. Conversely, if there
is no right, there is no remedy as every remedial right is based on a substantive right.
In the case at bar, the primary issue to be resolved before determining petitioners
available remedy under the facts of the case is whether an illegitimate child born after
the effectivity of the Family Code has the right to use her fathers surname. This Court
rules in the negative.
Article 176 of the Family Code reads:
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with
this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the
legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The rule applies even if petitioners father admits paternity. So Mossesgeld v.
Court of Appeals holds:[15]
Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that illegitimate children
shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. This is the rule regardless of
whether or not the father admits paternity.Consequently, the Local Civil Registrar
correctly refused to register the certificate of live birth of petitioners illegitimate child
using the surname of the alleged father, even with the latters consent . . . (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
 Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Article 176 of the Family Code
repealed Title XIII, Book I of the New Civil Code regarding the Use of Surnames. Article
254 of the Family Code reads:
Article 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I Republic Act 386,
otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17,
18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended and all laws,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and regulations, or parts
thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Thus this Court declared in Mossesgeld:
The Family Code has effectively repealed the provisions of Article 366 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines giving a natural child acknowledged by both parents the right
to use the surname of the father. The Family Code has limited the classification of
children to legitimate and illegitimate, thereby eliminating the category of
acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Since petitioner was born an illegitimate child after the Family Code took effect,
she has no right to use her fathers surname.
WHEREFORE, upon the ground discussed above, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner,
vs.
PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the
July 24, 2012 Decision1 and March 5, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406.
As culled from the records, the facts of this case are:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a
period of time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time
already married to someone else.3 Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born:
Andre Lewis (on February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October 13, 1999). 4 The
children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of
Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties’ relationship, however,
eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two children in
May 2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of
Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody,
Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC),
appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children. 5
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent
Antonio, ruling that "[t]he evidence at hand is overwhelming that the best interest of
the children can be promoted if they are under the sole parental authority and
physical custody of [respondent Antonio]."6 Thus, the court a quo decreed the
following:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby grants [Antonio’s]
prayer for recognition and the same is hereby judicially approved. x x x
Consequently, the Court forthwith issues the following Order granting the other reliefs
sought in the Petition, to wit:
a. Ordering the Office of the City Registrar of the City of Makati to cause the
entry of the name of [Antonio] as the father of the aforementioned minors in
their respective Certificate of Live Birth and causing the correction/change
and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in their Certificate of Live
Birth from Grande to Antonio;
 b. Granting [Antonio] the right to jointly exercise Parental Authority with
[Grande] over the persons of their minor children, Andre Lewis Grande and
Jerard Patrick Grande;
c. Granting [Antonio] primary right and immediate custody over the parties’
minor children Andre Lewis Grandre and Jerard Patrick Grande who shall
stay with [Antonio’s] residence in the Philippines from Monday until Friday
evening and to [Grande’s] custody from Saturday to Sunday evening;
d. Ordering [Grande] to immediately surrender the persons and custody of
minors Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande unto [Antonio] for the
days covered by the Order;
e. Ordering parties to cease and desist from bringing the aforenamed minors
outside of the country, without the written consent of the other and
permission from the court.
f. Ordering parties to give and share the support of the minor children Andre
Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande in the amount of ₱30,000 per
month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande].7(Emphasis
supplied.)
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was
denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated November 22, 20108 for being pro
forma and for lack of merit.
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part
of the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the
grant of sole custody to the mother over her illegitimate children.9 In resolving the
appeal, the appellate court modified in part the Decision of the RTC. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision
of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492
is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:
a. The Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil Registrar of
Makati City are DIRECTED to enter the surname Antonio as the surname of
Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis, in their respective certificates of live birth,
and record the same in the Register of Births;
b. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and
Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande
who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole custody of these
minor children;
c. [Antonio] shall have visitorial rights at least twice a week, and may only
take the children out upon the written consent of [Grande]; and
d. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor
children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of ₱30,000.00 per
month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In ruling thus, the appellate court ratiocinated that notwithstanding the father’s
recognition of his children, the mother cannot be deprived of her sole parental
custody over them absent the most compelling of reasons.10 Since respondent
Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed any act that adversely
affected the welfare of the children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors,
she cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over their children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the
recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in
conjunction with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels
the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO."11
As to the issue of support, the CA held that the grant is legally in order considering
that not only did Antonio express his willingness to give support, it is also a
consequence of his acknowledging the paternity of the minor children. 12Lastly, the
CA ruled that there is no reason to deprive respondent Antonio of his visitorial right
especially in view of the constitutionally inherent and natural right of parents over
their children.13
Not satisfied with the CA’s Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for
reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the
change of the minors’ surname to "Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner
came to this Court via the present petition. In it, she posits that Article 176 of the
Family Code––as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in
permissive language––may not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his
illegitimate children of his surname without the consent of their mother.
We find the present petition impressed with merit.
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his
illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation. Central to the core issue is
the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority
of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The
legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a
legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code
governing successional rights shall remain in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 925514 which now reads:
Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has
been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an
action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime
of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
(Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate
child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255
is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record
of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public document or
private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the
illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the
filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname
of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before
a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court15 is enough to establish
the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental
authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his children’s surname as
Antonio.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence,
respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the
mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is
shown to be unfit.
Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is there
a legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the surname to that of
respondent?
Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and
unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname
of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein
petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate
children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it
must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from
any interpretation.16 Respondent’s position that the court can order the minors to use
his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no
ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision
readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use
the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to
confer discretion17 upon the illegitimate children.
It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting
children are to be measured is their best interest. On the matter of children’s
surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the
father’s surname serves the best interest of the minor child. In Alfon v. Republic, 18 for
instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child to continue using the surname of
her mother rather than that of her legitimate father as it serves her best interest and
there is no legal obstacle to prevent her from using the surname of her mother to
which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon v. Republic,19 this Court, upholding the best
interest of the child concerned, even allowed the use of a surname different from the
surnames of the child’s father or mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a
child’s surname is second only to the rule requiring that the child be placed in the
best possible situation considering his circumstances.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,20 We gave due deference to the choice of an
illegitimate minor to use the surname of his mother as it would best serve his interest,
thus:
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a person’s name to
his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a
legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not be taken lightly as
to deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by the right to present evidence in
favor of or against such change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the
proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,
and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found
(and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of
Giovanni’s petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code,
Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father
while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will
erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best
interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have him join her in the
United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and
son. (Emphasis supplied.)
An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the
father’s surname upon his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255,21 which states:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public document is
executed by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a
separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private instrument, the child shall
use the surname of the father, provided the registration is supported by the following
documents:
xxxx
7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use the
surname of the father upon the submission of the accomplished AUSF [Affidavit of
Use of the Surname of the Father].
7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use
the surname of the father upon submission of a public document or a private
handwritten instrument supported by the documents listed in Rule 7.1.2.
7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is required if he/she has
reached the age of majority. The consent may be contained in a separate instrument
duly notarized.
xxxx
Rule 8. Effects of Recognition
8.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name of the child in the
Certificate of Live Birth. The Certificate of Live Birth shall be recorded in the Register
of Births.
xxxx
8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the Certificate of Live
Birth or in a separate public document or in a private handwritten document, the
public document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Live Birth and the
Register of Births as follows:
"The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original surname) to (new
surname) pursuant to RA 9255."
The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth and
Register of Births shall not be changed or deleted.
8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at the time of registration, the public
document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Legal Instruments. Proper
annotation shall be made in the Certificate of Live Birth and the Register of Births as
follows:
"Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). The surname of the child is hereby
changed from (original surname) on (date) pursuant to RA 9255." (Emphasis
supplied.)
Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot amend a
legislative act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong Corporation,22 We held:
After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative
enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the
law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in
the Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law cannot
be broadened by a mere administrative issuance — an administrative agency
certainly cannot amend an act of Congress.
Thus, We can disregard contemporaneous construction where there is no ambiguity
in law and/or the construction is clearly erroneous.23 What is more, this Court has the
constitutional prerogative and authority to strike down and declare as void the rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi- judicial bodies24 when found contrary to
statutes and/or the Constitution.25 Section 5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted provisions of the IRR of
RA 9255 insofar as it provides the mandatory use by illegitimate children of their
father’s surname upon the latter’s recognition of his paternity.
To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The
clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of
an illegitimate father’s surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are
given the choice on the surnames by which they will be known.
At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now aged
thirteen (13) and fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring their opposition to have
their names changed to "Antonio."26 However, since these letters were not offered
before and evaluated by the trial court, they do not provide any evidentiary weight to
sway this Court to rule for or against petitioner.27 A proper inquiry into, and evaluation
of the evidence of, the children's choice of surname by the trial court is necessary.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 24, 2012
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406 is MODIFIED, the
dispositive portion of which shall read:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly. the appealed Decision
of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492
is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:
a. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and
Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande
who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole custody of these
minor children;
 b. [Antonio] shall have visitation rights28 at least twice a week, and may only
take the children out upon the written consent of [Grande]:
c. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor
children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of ₱30,000.00 per
month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]; and
d. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri,
Cagayan for the sole purpose of determining the surname to be chosen by
the children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis.
Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General Administrative Order
No. 1, Series of 2004 are DISAPPROVED and hereby declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to set aside the Court of Appeals (CA)
decision2 dated January 13, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66128, which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23 of San Juan, Southern Leyte
dated September 14, 1999 granting a petition for change of name.
Respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote filed a petition for change of name of her ward
from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores on September 9, 1998. In Special
Proceeding No. R-481,3 Capote as Giovanni’s guardian ad litem averred:
xxx xxx xxx
1. [Respondent] is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, married, while minor
GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO, is also a Filipino citizen, sixteen (16) years old
and both are residents of San Juan, Southern Leyte where they can be
served with summons and other court processes;
2. [Respondent] was appointed guardian [ad litem] of minor Giovanni N.
Gallamaso by virtue of a court order in Special [Proc.] No. R-459, dated
[August 18, 1998] xxx xxx authorizing her to file in court a petition for change
of name of said minor in accordance with the desire of his mother [who is
residing and working abroad];
3. Both [respondent] and minor have permanently resided in San Juan,
Southern Leyte, Philippines for more than fifteen (15) years prior to the filing
of this instant petition, the former since 1970 while the latter since his birth [in
1982];
4. The minor was left under the care of [respondent] since he was yet nine
(9) years old up to the present;
5. Minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO is the illegitimate natural child of
Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. [He] was born on July 9,
1982 [,] prior to the effectivity of the New Family Code and as such, his
mother used the surname of the natural father despite the absence of
marriage between them; and [Giovanni] has been known by that name since
birth [as per his birth certificate registered at the Local Civil Register of San
Juan, Southern Leyte];
6. The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time [Giovanni] was born and
up to the present, failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on matters of
financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns. [Giovanni’s pleas] for
attention along that line [fell] on deaf ears xxx xxx xxx;
 7. [Giovanni] is now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he
desires to have his surname changed to that of his mother’s surname;
8. [Giovanni’s] mother might eventually petition [him] to join her in the United
States and [his] continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the surname of his
natural father, may complicate [his] status as natural child; and
9. The change of name [from] GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO to GIOVANNI
NADORES will be for the benefit of the minor.
xxx xxx xxx4
Respondent prayed for an order directing the local civil registrar to effect the change
of name on Giovanni’s birth certificate. Having found respondent’s petition sufficient
in form and substance, the trial court gave due course to the petition. 5 Publication of
the petition in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Southern Leyte
once a week for three consecutive weeks was likewise ordered.6 The trial court also
directed that the local civil registrar be notified and that the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) be sent a copy of the petition and order.7
Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of court to
present her evidence ex partebefore a court-appointed commissioner. The OSG,
acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court
granted the motion.
After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the
change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.8
From this decision, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an
appeal with a lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred in granting the petition
in a summary proceeding.
Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the CA
affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name.9
In this petition, the Republic contends that the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s
decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of
indispensable parties.10 Petitioner cites Republic of the Philippines v. Labrador11 and
claims that the purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely
affected by the child’s change of name should have been made respondents to make
the proceeding adversarial.12
We deny the petition.
"The subject of rights must have a fixed symbol for individualization which serves to
distinguish him from all others; this symbol is his name."13 Understandably, therefore,
no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.14 This is a
reasonable requirement for those seeking such change because a person’s name
necessarily affects his identity, interests and interactions. The State must be involved
in the process and decision to change the name of any of its citizens.
The Rules of Court provides the requirements and procedure for change of name.
Here, the appropriate remedy is covered by Rule 103,15 a separate and distinct
proceeding from Rule 108 on mere cancellation and correction of entries in the civil
registry (usually dealing only with innocuous or clerical errors thereon). 16
The issue of non-joinder of alleged indispensable parties in the action before the
court a quo is intertwined with the nature of the proceedings there. The point is
whether the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial.
Summary proceedings do not extensively address the issues of a case since the
reason for their conduct is expediency. This, according to petitioner, is not sufficient
to deal with substantial or contentious issues allegedly resulting from a change of
name, meaning, legitimacy as well as successional rights.17 Such issues are
ventilated only in adversarial proceedings wherein all interested parties are
impleaded and due process is observed.18
When Giovanni was born in 1982 (prior to the enactment and effectivity of the Family
Code of the Philippines),19 the pertinent provision of the Civil Code then as regards
his use of a surname, read:
Art. 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the
surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall
employ the surname of the recognizing parent. (emphasis ours)
Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mother’s surname from
birth. The records do not reveal any act or intention on the part of Giovanni’s putative
father to actually recognize him. Meanwhile, according to the Family Code which
repealed, among others, Article 366 of the Civil Code:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis ours)
Our ruling in the recent case of In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or
Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang20 is
enlightening:
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall
principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children
the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, while illegitimate children
shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in
which case they may bear the father’s surname.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the
father bears only a given name and his mother’ surname, and does not have a
middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him
as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private
handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother’s surname as his middle name
and his father’s surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child
or an acknowledged child.1awphi1.net21
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a person’s name to
his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a
legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not be taken lightly as
to deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by the right to present evidence in
favor of or against such change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the
proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,
and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found
(and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of
Giovanni’s petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code,
Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father
while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will
erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best
interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have him join her in the
United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and
son.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the cases cited by petitioner22 in support of its position
deal with cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, a proceeding
separate and distinct from the special proceedings for change of name. Those cases
deal with the application and interpretation of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court while
this case was correctly filed under Rule 103. Thus, the cases cited by petitioner are
irrelevant and have no bearing on respondent’s case. While the OSG is correct in its
stance that the proceedings for change of name should be adversarial, the OSG
cannot void the proceedings in the trial court on account of its own failure to
participate therein. As the CA correctly ruled:
The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an
adversarial proceeding. Unlike petitions for the cancellation or correction of clerical
errors in entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition for
change of name under Rule 103 cannot be decided through a summary proceeding.
There is no doubt that this petition does not fall under Rule 108 for it is not alleged
that the entry in the civil registry suffers from clerical or typographical errors. The
relief sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil registry,
although by granting the petition, the result is the same in that a corresponding
change in the entry is also required to reflect the change in name. In this regard,
[appellee] Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by
posting in a newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the petition. The
lower court also furnished the OSG a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one came
forward to oppose the petition including the OSG. The fact that no one opposed the
petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make
the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The lower court is still expected to exercise
its judgment to determine whether the petition is meritorious or not and not merely
accept as true the arguments propounded. Considering that the OSG neither
opposed the petition nor the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the
opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court
were not adversarial enough.23 (emphasis supplied)
A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to
the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.24 Respondent gave
notice of the petition through publication as required by the rules.25 With this, all
interested parties were deemed notified and the whole world considered bound by
the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due notice to the OSG by
serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding
adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as
represented by the OSG, were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the January 13, 2003 decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66128 AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR
CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN
CARULASAN WANG also known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be amended/corrected
as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA
LISA WANG, Petitioners,
vs.
CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B.
MOLO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.
Revelation 3:5
On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented
by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change
of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered
name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. 11458 CEB and raffled
to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57.
The RTC established the following facts:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents
Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other.
When his parents subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, ...they executed
a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian
Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang….
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time
because they will let him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei
Jasmine who was born in Singapore…. Since in Singapore middle names or the
maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a person’s name, they anticipate
that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current
registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be
asking whether they are brother and sister since they have different surnames.
Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore’s Mandarin language since they do not have
the letter "R" but if there is, they pronounce it as "L." It is for these reasons that the
name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang. 1
On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the petition. 2 The trial court
found that the reason given for the change of name sought in the petition—that is,
that petitioner Julian may be discriminated against when studies in Singapore
because of his middle name—did not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The
trial court ruled that the change sought is merely for the convenience of the child.
Since the State has an interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed
to suit the convenience of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code,
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother,
and there is no reason why this right should now be taken from petitioner Julian,
considering that he is still a minor. The trial court added that when petitioner Julian
reaches the age of majority, he could then decide whether he will change his name
by dropping his middle name.3
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but this was denied in a
resolution dated 20 May 2004.4The trial court maintained that the Singaporean
practice of not carrying a middle name does not justify the dropping of the middle
name of a legitimate Filipino child who intends to study there. The dropping of the
middle name would be tantamount to giving due recognition to or application of the
laws of Singapore instead of Philippine law which is controlling. That the change of
name would not prejudice public interest or would not be for a fraudulent purpose
would not suffice to grant the petition if the reason for the change of name is itself not
reasonable.5
Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45)6 arguing
that the trial court has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by
the Court, that is: whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is
contrary to Article 1747 of the Family Code. Petitioner contends that "[W]ith
globalization and mixed marriages, there is a need for the Supreme Court to rule on
the matter of dropping of family name for a child to adjust to his new environment, for
consistency and harmony among siblings, taking into consideration the "best interest
of the child."8 It is argued that convenience of the child is a valid reason for changing
the name as long as it will not prejudice the State and others. Petitioner points out
that the middle name "Carulasan" will cause him undue embarrassment and the
difficulty in writing or pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his social acceptance and
integration in the Singaporean community. Petitioner also alleges that it is error for
the trial court to have denied the petition for change of name until he had reached the
age of majority for him to decide the name to use, contrary to previous
cases9 decided by this Court that allowed a minor to petition for change of name.10
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the
petition. The OSG filed its Comment11 positing that the trial court correctly denied the
petition for change of name. The OSG argues that under Article 174 of the Family
Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of their father and
mother, and such right cannot be denied by the mere expedient of dropping the
same. According to the OSG, there is also no showing that the dropping of the middle
name "Carulasan" is in the best interest of petitioner, since mere convenience is not
sufficient to support a petition for change of name and/or cancellation of entry. 12 The
OSG also adds that the petitioner has not shown any compelling reason to justify the
change of name or the dropping of the middle name, for that matter. Petitioner’s
allegation that the continued use of the middle name may result in confusion and
difficulty is allegedly more imaginary than real. The OSG reiterates its argument
raised before the trial court that the dropping of the child’s middle name could only
trigger much deeper inquiries regarding the true parentage of petitioner. Hence, while
petitioner Julian has a sister named Jasmine Wei Wang, there is no confusion since
both use the surname of their father, Wang. Even assuming that it is customary in
Singapore to drop the middle name, it has also not been shown that the use of such
middle name is actually proscribed by Singaporean law.13
We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied.
The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State has an interest in the
names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a
change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be
authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil
registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which
may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied. 14
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be ‘proper and
reasonable cause’ for which the change is sought.15 To justify a request for change of
name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but
also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the
grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will
avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere
desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or
that the change of name would prejudice public interest.16
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and
reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented
need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available. What is
involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a
judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in
support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with
the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts. 17
The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of name, as it does not
simply seek to change the name of the minor petitioner and adopt another, but
instead seeks to drop the middle name altogether. Decided cases in this jurisdiction
involving petitions for change of name usually deal with requests for change of
surname. There are only a handful of cases involving requests for change of the
given name18 and none on requests for changing or dropping of the middle name.
Does the law allow one to drop the middle name from his registered name? We have
to answer in the negative.
A discussion on the legal significance of a person’s name is relevant at this point. We
quote, thus:
…For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he
is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is
defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from
other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the
convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with
him. Names are used merely as one method of indicating the identity of persons; they
are descriptive of persons for identification, since, the identity is the essential thing
and it has frequently been held that, when identity is certain, a variance in, or
misspelling of, the name is immaterial.
The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name or proper name,
and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to
the individual at birth or baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The name
or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued
from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the
child; but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to
protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain
respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or
immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by
judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore,
inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is
imprescriptible.19
This citation does not make any reference to middle names, but this does not mean
that middle names have no practical or legal significance. Middle names serve to
identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him
from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall
principally use the surname of the father.20 The Family Code gives legitimate children
the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother,21 while illegitimate
children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their
filiation, in which case they may bear the father’s surname.22
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the
father bears only a given name and his mother’s surname, and does not have a
middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him
as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private
handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother’s surname as his middle name
and his father’s surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child
or an acknowledged illegitimate child.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals
requires that the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered name of
a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or
proper name, a middle name, and a surname.
Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as
this would help him to adjust more easily to and integrate himself into Singaporean
society. In support, he cites Oshita v. Republic23 and Calderon v. Republic,24 which,
however, are not apropos both.
In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a Filipino mother, Buena
Bartolome, and a Japanese father, Kishimatsu Oshita, sought to change her name
from Antonina B. Oshita to Antonina Bartolome. The Court granted her petition based
on the following considerations: she had elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; her other siblings who had also elected Philippine citizenship
have been using their mother’s surname; she was embarrassed to bear a Japanese
surname there still being ill feeling against the Japanese due to the last World War;
and there was no showing that the change of name was motivated by a fraudulent
purpose or that it will prejudice public interest.
In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, an
illegitimate minor child acting through her mother who filed the petition in her behalf,
to change her name to Gertudes Josefina Calderon, taking the surname of her
stepfather, Romeo C. Calderon, her mother’s husband. The Court held that a petition
for change of name of an infant should be granted where to do is clearly for the best
interest of the child. The Court took into consideration the opportunity provided for the
minor petitioner to eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy which she would carry if she
continued to use the surname of her illegitimate father. The Court pronounced that
justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his
social standing as long as doing so he does not cause prejudice or injury to the
interests of the State or of other people.
Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic,25 in arguing that although Article 174 of the Family
Code gives the legitimate child the right to use the surnames of the father and the
mother, it is not mandatory such that the child could use only one family name, even
the family name of the mother. In Alfon, the petitioner therein, the legitimate daughter
of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon, sought to change her name from Maria
Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte (her name as registered in the Local Civil
Registry) to Estrella S. Alfon (the name she had been using since childhood, in her
school records and in her voter’s registration). The trial court denied her petition but
this Court overturned the denial, ruling that while Article 364 of the Civil Code states
that she, as a legitimate child, should principally use the surname of her father, there
is no legal obstacle for her to choose to use the surname of herm other to which she
is entitled. In addition, the Court found that there was ample justification to grant her
petition, i.e., to avoid confusion.
Weighing petitioner’s reason of convenience for the change of his name against the
standards set in the cases he cites to support his contention would show that his
justification is amorphous, to say the least, and could not warrant favorable action on
his petition.
had not used her registered name in her school records and voter’s registration
records; thus, denying the petition would only result to confusion.
Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change of name filed by a
mother in behalf of her illegitimate minor child. Petitioner cites this case to buttress
his argument that he does not have to reach the age of majority to petition for change
of name. However, it is manifest in Calderon that the Court, in granting the petition for
change of name, gave paramount consideration to the best interests of the minor
petitioner therein.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle
name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his
integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established.
That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does
not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete
name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which
his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his
name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of
majority.26 As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the
value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just
prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is
DENIED.

The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the cited cases are not at all SO ORDERED.
analogous to the case at bar. The instant case is clearly distinguishable from the
cases of Oshita and Alfon, where the petitioners were already of age when they filed
their petitions for change of name. Being of age, they are considered to have
exercised their discretion and judgment, fully knowing the effects of their decision to
change their surnames. It can also be unmistakably observed that the reason for the
grant of the petitions for change of name in these two cases was the presence of
reasonable or compelling grounds therefore. The Court, in Oshita, recognized the
tangible animosity most Filipinos had during that time against the Japanese as a
result of World War II, in addition to the fact of therein petitioner’s election of
Philippine citizenship. In Alfon, the Court granted the petition since the petitioner had HATIMA C. YASIN, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, HADJI HASAN S.
been known since childhood by a name different from her registered name and she CENTI, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT THIRD SHARI'A JUDICIAL
DISTRICT, Zamboanga City, respondent.
RESOLUTION
BIDIN, J.:
On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga
City a "Petition to resume the use of maiden name" (Sp. Proc. No. 06-3). The petition
reads:
1. That she is of legal age, a divorcee, a Muslin Filipino and a
resident of Suterville, Zamboanga City, Philippines, and is duly
represented in this act by her elder brother and attorney-in-fact,
HADJI HASAN S. CENTI by virtue of an instrument of a Special
Power of Attorney, original copy of which is hereto attached and
marked as Annex "A" hereof;
2. That she was formerly married to a certain Hadji Idris Yasin, also a
Muslim Filipino in accordance with Muslim rites and customs, and
who is now residing at Barangay Recodo, Zamboanga City, but
sometime on March 13, 1984, they were granted a decree of divorce
by the Mindanao Islamic Center Foundation, Inc., in accordance with
Islamic Law, the divorce rites was officiated by Ustadz Sharif Jain
Jali as evidenced by his Certification, dated march 13, 1984, copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex "B" to form an integral part
hereof;
3. That, thereafter the former husband Hadji Idris Yasin contracted
another marriage to another woman;
WHEREFORE, invoking the provisions of Article 143, par. 1(c) of
Presidential Decree No. 1083 in relation to Article 371 (2) of the New
Civil Code, and after due notice and hearing, it is most respectfully
prayed of this Honorable Court that petitioner be allowed to resume
the use of her maiden name Hatima Centi y Saul.
On July 4, 1990, the respondent court issued an order which reads as follows:
It patently appearing that the petition filed is not sufficient in form and
substance in accordance with Section 2(a) and 3, Rule 103, Rules of
Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the name sought to
be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which should
include all the names by which the petitioner has been known (Ng
Yao Siong v. Republic of the Philippines, L-20306, March 31, 1966,
16 SCRA [483]; Go v. Republic of the Philippines, L-31760, May 25,
1977; Pabellar v. Republic, L-27298, march 4, 1976), the pleading
must be rectified accordingly.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby ordered to effect the necessary
amendment of the petition within one (1) week from receipt hereof so
as to reflect the formal requirements adverted to. (Rollo, p. 9)
Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the
petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition
to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her
marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (P.D.
No. 1083), and after marriage of her former husband to another woman.
The motion was denied by the respondent court in an order dated August 10, 1990,
on the ground that the petition is substantially for change of name and that
compliance with the provisions of Rule 103, Rules of Court on change of name is
necessary if the petition is to be granted as it would result in the resumption of the
use of petitioner's maiden name and surname.
Hence, this petition alleging that respondent court erred in applying Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court to the instant case.
In his Comment dated June 14, 1991, the respondent court, among others, contends:
5. . . . (R)espondent court is of the honest opinion that the said
petition is substantially one for change of name, particularly of
 surname — Hatima C. Yasin to Hatima Centi y Saul, the latter being
her maiden name and surname. Her reasons: The (1) dissolution of
her marriage, and (2) her legal right to resume the use of her maiden
name and surname. In effect, if petition is granted, it will result in the
resumption of the use of her surname.
Moreover, the use of surnames is governed by law (Arts. 364-380,
Title XIII, New Civil Code). This is the substantive requirements. And
as to procedural requirements, no person can change his name
or surname without judicial authority (Art. 376, Civil Code of the
Philippines) (Emphasis supplied). Change of name under judicial
authorization is governed by Rule 103 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Under Sec. 1 of said rule: "a person desiring to change his name
shall present the petition to the Court of First Instance of the province
(now RTC) in which he resides, or in the City of Manila, to the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court." The State has an interest in
the names borne by individual and entities for purposes of
identification. A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of
right. Therefore, before a person can be authorized to change his
name (given him either in his birth certificate or civil registry), he
must show proper or compelling reason, which may justify such
change. Otherwise, the request should be denied (Ong Peng Oan v.
Republic, 102 Phil. 468) (See: Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines
Annotated, Vol. I, 8th Ed., 1978, pp. 739-740). (Rollo, pp. 46-47)
The basic issue to be resolved is: whether or not in the case of annulment of
marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and
the husband is married again to another woman and the former desires to resume
her maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition for change of name
and comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
Stated otherwise, the issue is: whether or not a petition for resumption of maiden
name and surname is also a petition for change of name.
The Court rules in the negative.
The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil
register (Chomi v. Local Civil Register of Manila, 99 Phil. 1004 [1956]; Ng Yao Siong
v. Republic, 16 SCRA 483 [1966]; Rendora v. Republic, 35 SCRA 262 [1970];
Pabellar v. Republic, 70 SCRA 16 [1976]).
While it is true that under Article 376 of the Civil Code, no person can change his
name or surname without judicial authority, nonetheless, the only name that may be
changed is the true and official name recorded in the Civil Register. Thus, this Court
in Ng Yao Siong v. Republic (16 SCRA 483 [1966]), held:
In a proceeding for a change of name the following question may
crop up: What is the name to be changed? By Article 408 of the Civil
Code a person's birth must be entered in the civil register. So it is,
that the civil register records his name. That name in the civil
register, for legal purposes, is his real name. And correctly so,
because the civil register is an official record of the civil status of
persons. A name given to a person in the church record or
elsewhere or by which he is known in the community — when at
variance with that entered in the civil register — is unofficial and
cannot be recognized as his real name.
We therefore rule that for the purposes of an application for change
of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code, the only name that may
be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register.
Petitioner's registered name is Hatima Centi Y. Saul. In the instant petition, petitioner
does not seek to change her registered maiden name but, instead, prays that she be
allowed to resume the use of her maiden name in view of the dissolution of her
marriage to Hadji Idris Yasin, by virtue of a decree of divorce granted in accordance
with Muslim law.
Divorce (talaq) is defined in PD 1086, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines, as follows:
Art. 45. Definition and forms. — Divorce is the formal dissolution of
the marriage bond in accordance with this Code to be granted only
after exhaustion of all possible means of reconciliation between the
spouses. It may be effected by:
(a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq);
 xxx xxx xxx
(c) Judicial decree ( faskh).
Divorce (talaq or faskh) severs the marriage bond. Thus, Article 54 of PD 1086
provides:
Art. 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq or faskh. — A talaq or faskh, as
soon as it become irrevocable, shall have the following effects:
(a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the
spouses may contract another marriage in
accordance with this Code;
The divorce becomes irrevocable after observance of a period of waiting called idda
(Art. 56, PD 1086) the duration of which is 3 monthly courses after termination of the
marriage by divorce (Art. 57[b], PD 1083). Under Article 187, PD 1083, the Civil Code
of the Philippines, the Rules of Court and other existing laws, insofar as they are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Code (the Code of Muslim Personal Laws),
shall be applied suppletorily.
Even under the Civil Code, the use of the husband's surname during the marriage
(Art. 370, Civil Code), after annulment of the marriage (Art. 371, Civil Code) and after
the death of the husband (Art. 373, Civil Code) is permissive and not obligatory
except in case of legal separation (Art. 372, Civil Code). Thus, Articles 370 and 371
of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's
surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she
is his wife, such as "Mrs."
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty
party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the
innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname.
However, she may choose to continue employing her former
husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
According to Tolentino:
. . . Under the present article of our Code, however, the word "may"
is used, indicating that the use of the husband's surname by the wife
is permissive rather than obligatory. We have no law which provides
that the wife shall change her name to that of the husband upon
marriage. This is in consonance with the principle that surnames
indicate descent. It seems, therefore, that a married woman may use
only her maiden name and surname. She has an option, but not a
duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways provided
by this Article. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, p. 724,
1983 ed.)
When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to
use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name
or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her
such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no
longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the
Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the
change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her
former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her (Tolentino, Civil Code,
p. 725, 1983 ed.; Art. 373, Civil Code). When petitioner married her husband, she did
not change her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure
judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage as no law
requires it.
In view of the foregoing considerations, We find the petition to resume the use of
maiden name filed by petitioner before the respondent court a superfluity and
unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her former husband is
already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in
accordance with Muslim laws.
Although there is no legal prohibition against obtaining a judicial confirmation of a
legal right, nevertheless, no law or rule provides for the procedure by which such
confirmation may be obtained. In view of such circumstances, the onerous
requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name should not be
applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced woman to resume her
maiden name and surname. In the absence of a specific rule or provision governing
such a proceeding, where sufficient facts have been alleged supported by competent
proof as annexes, which appear to be satisfactory to the court, such petition for
confirmation of change of civil status and/or to resume the use of maiden name must
be given due course and summarily granted as in fact it is a right conferred by law.
While the petition filed in the instant case leaves much to be desired in matters of
form and averment of concise statements of ultimate facts constituting the petitioner's
cause of action, nevertheless, giving it a most liberal construction, the petition
suffices to convey the petitioner's desire and prayer to resume her maiden surname
on grounds of her divorce from her former husband and subsequent marriage of the
latter to another woman.
The remand of this case to the trial court would only delay the final disposition of this
case and would not serve the public interest. We have consistently ruled that the
remand of the case to a lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary
if this Court can already resolve the dispute on the basis of the records before it
(Dimayuga v. PCIB, 200 SCRA 143 [1991]; Board of Liquidators v. Zulueta, 115
SCRA 548 [1982]: Quisumbing v. CA, 120 SCRA 703 [1983]).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the orders of respondent court dated
July 4, 1990 and August 10, 1990 are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner is authorized to
resume her maiden name and surname.
SO ORDERED.
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created
them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard
voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please
let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a
sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings;
one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man
"Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of
Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law
recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with
regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name
and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment
surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for
the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded
the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses
Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was
registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth
certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels,
thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the
United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and
breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on
January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok,
Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic
and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate
attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He
then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto"
to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal
Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive
weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No
opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and
his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant
portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of
making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked
for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-
assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a
woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to
be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any
way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be
caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary,
granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of
the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the
present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State,
through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and
ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the
Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from
"Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing
the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the
Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law
allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of
sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s
petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case
No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 9 Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth
certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of
name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of
making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he
became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes
of identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change
of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In
particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change
of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors
and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by
the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance
with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to
entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for
change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative
officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from
the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays
down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be
allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition
for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following
cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously
used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or
nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought
he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not
alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first
name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing
petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications
in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he
must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 20 In this
case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result
of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s
first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have
been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It
was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that
provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue
was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept.
More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not
prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the
Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue
and the court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil
Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without
a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048
in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of
such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the
need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to
substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. 23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms
shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in
the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or
typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous,
such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like,
which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can
be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the
change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis
supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a
mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: 24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor;
and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
include even those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of
the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of
sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from"
while to change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind
or with something that serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner
contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name
and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of
certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and
naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths)
and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations
of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil
interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts,
events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal
capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by
the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned
in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or
impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total
of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his
family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his
own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or
not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning
and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family
relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption,
emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a
person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil
Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall
be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and
its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the
physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the
declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the
registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt
from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not
later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance
at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following
facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names,
citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the
mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born;
and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as
they existed at the time of birth.29Thus, the sex of a person is determined at
birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the
genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her
birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and
ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex,"
"male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil
registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common
and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this
connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that
distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and
female."33Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young" 34 and male is "the
sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words
"male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have
undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute
which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that
sense unless the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of
the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it
cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through
surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be
included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the
change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal
basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn
the Ground of Equity governing the conferment of that privilege.

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no
harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public
policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but
petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However,
marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is
the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To
grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter
the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another
man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative
transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such
as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies
under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of
calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws
underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially
affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person
may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has
no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot
enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its
co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness,
contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The
Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit
neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at
least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks
involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the
courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 166676
decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the Petitioner,
law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty Present:
of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to
TINGA,
determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex
VELASCO, JR., and
reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in
BRION, JJ.
this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, Promulgated:
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and Respondent.
for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what September 12, 2008
grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall
be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his
 DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely
questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition
for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered
the following changes of entries in Cagandahans birth certificate: (1) the name Jennifer
Cagandahan changed to Jeff Cagandahan and (2) gender from female to male.
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate[2]before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was
registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she
developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess
both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to
have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound
where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that
her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast
or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as
well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that
her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male
and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3)
consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the
court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr.
Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of
the Philippines Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate
stating that respondents condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically
respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female
organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs female and male. He
testified that this condition is very rare, that respondents uterus is not fully developed
because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further
testified that respondents condition is permanent and recommended the change of
gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as
male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January 12,
2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown
that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately
presented to the Court very clear and convincing proofs for the
granting of his petition. It was medically proven that petitioners body
produces male hormones, and first his body as well as his action and
feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal
person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of
Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the following corrections in
the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the
prescribed fees:
 a) By changing the name from Jennifer The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-
Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and
compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local civil
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE. registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction of entries
under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondents petition before the court a
It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records, voters
quo did not implead the local civil registrar.[5]The OSG further contends respondents
registry, baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby
amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data. petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident
of the province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date
SO ORDERED.[3] of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.[6] The
OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth
certificate and respondents claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a
her a male.[7]
reversal of the abovementioned ruling.

On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar
The issues raised by petitioner are:
of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition,
CONSIDERING THAT: the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in
I.
the course of the proceedings,[8] respondent is actually a male person and hence his
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF
birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender, [9] change of sex or
COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,
gender is allowed under Rule 108,[10] and respondent substantially complied with the
II. requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.[11]
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW
CHANGE OF SEX OR GENDER IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
WHILE RESPONDENTS MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL
ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A MALE.[4]

Rule 103
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the CHANGE OF NAME
correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender,
SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall
from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her present the petition to the Regional Trial Court of the province in which
name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court].
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall be
signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some
other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the
province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years
prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is
sought;
(c) The name asked for.
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form and
substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition,
shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that
a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a
week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general
circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The
date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an
election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the
notice.
SEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the hearing
and oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial
or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.
SEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date
fixed in the order that such order has been published as directed and
that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if proper
and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the
petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the
prayer of the petition.
SEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in
connection with this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of the
municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated, who
shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and
valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be
cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization;
(k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to
the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court
shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same,
and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named
in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction
is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or
from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition
thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings
is brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also
 grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the
parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition
or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In
either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the
civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance
with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondents petition did not
implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and
all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be
made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is an
indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case can be
had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings,
the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the
rules.[13] The corresponding petition should also implead as respondents the civil
registrar and all other persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that
would be affected thereby.[14] Respondent, however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of
the Rules of Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote
their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
the matters brought before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance with Rule
108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal
issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil
Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by
Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The
correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative
proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.
Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register.[18]
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change
of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which
the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.[19]
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil
Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status
of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from
the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments
of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation;
(15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil
Code include even those that occur after birth.[20]
 Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or
inappropriate appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this
condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX
chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral
opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female;
(2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries,
uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear
male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at
puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the
twentieth century, medicine adopted the term intersexuality to apply to human beings
who cannot be classified as either male or female.[22] The term is now of widespread
use.According to Wikipedia, intersexuality is the state of a living thing
a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex
characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism
with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes.
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most
societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or
female gender role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical science in Western societies,
some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia
surgically modified to resemble either male or female genitals. [24] More commonly,
an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a disorder which is almost always
recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication
in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or
female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of
the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright
denial. It has been suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a
no-mans land for those individuals who are neither truly male nor truly female. [25] The
current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified
either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances
when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is
no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based
on medical testimony and scientific development
showing the respondent to be other thanfemale, then a change in the
subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
of
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently
and categorically female nor consistently and categorically male)
composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondents
body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result,
respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the
individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks
of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his
body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant
biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases
of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at
maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken
unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he
has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. [28] The trial
treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, [26] to force his body into the courts grant of respondents change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of
categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondents
taken its due course in respondents development to reveal more fully his male change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents
characteristics. change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth
certificate from female to male.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The Decision
much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna,
tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will
the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit SO ORDERED.
the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human
species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersexanatomy. To him
belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should
belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his
sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
incompetent[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as
a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under
the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents position and his
personal judgment of being a male. RE: FINAL REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED AT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BR. 67, PANIQUI, TARLAC.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and
DECISION
(2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we
respect respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is TINGA, J.:
already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals
with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique This administrative matter arose from the judicial audit and physical inventory of
cases conducted on 20-24 June 2005 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paniqui,
circumstances in this case.
Tarlac, Branch 67, then presided by Judge Cesar M. Sotero who compulsorily retired
on 23 February 2006.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that
a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in
As of audit date, the RTC had a total caseload of 523 cases consisting of 309
criminal cases and 214 civil cases, including 33 unaccounted LRC cases. The Audit
Team made the following observations:
In the conduct of the audit, the Team used the case numbers in the Docket Books
from January 2003 up to [the] present as reference in the inventory of cases. Entries
in the docket books are insufficient especially in the special proceedings cases which
merely indicate the title of the case and the date the case was filed and the word
"decided."
During the audit, it was observed by the Team that there was no special proceeding
case records presented. Upon inquiry, Clerk of Court Paulino Saguyod averred that
mostly [sic] of these cases are for Petitions for Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry and mostly [sic] are already decided and there are only few pending.
Considering that the docket books have insufficient entries, the Team Leader used as
reference the case numbers filed from January 2003 up to [the] present. During the
random sampling of records, the same cannot be produced as the records were
already bundled. x x x
COC Saguyod gave the team four (4) [folder] copies of decisions in the special
proceedings cases. Initial findings reveal that the date of filing indicated in the docket
books and the date of decision was so near that it will be highly improbable that the
required publication will be complied with. Hence, the Team demanded for [sic] the
production of 608 case records of special proceeding[s] cases.
In the copies of decisions presented, common in the second paragraph of the pro-
forma decisions, are statements that "finding the petition to be sufficient in form and
substance, the same was set for hearing on x x x. On said date and time, the petition
was announced in open court. Nobody interposed any objection. Accordingly, the
counsel for petitioner presented documentary evidence to prove jurisdictional facts
([Exh.] "A" and series). Thereafter, he moved and was allowed to adduce further
evidence before the Clerk of Court and at [sic] the presence of the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor who appeared in behalf of the State." However, during the
course of the audit it was observed by the Team that almost all of the petitions are
pro-forma and notarized by COC Saguyod as ex-officio notary public. There are even
unsigned, unverified and not notarized petitions granted by the Court. Further, almost
all of them have no hearings conducted that it will be improbable if not possible that
the court orders be published in a newspaper of general circulation as required by the
Rules of Court. The docketing of cases was not also in sequence as to its date of
filing (Annex "A").
Moreover, there are eighty-six (86) petitions [where] the date of filing were
simultaneous or ahead of the date of [the] alleged hearing/decision (Annex "B") and
fifty-eight (58) petitions [were] found to have either no [c]ourt action or no further
action for a considerable length of time (Annex "C"). Also, nine (9) petitions have
similar docket numbers and three (3) cases with the same docket number (Annex
"D") while one hundred seventy-nine (179) cases [sic] records were not presented to
the Team (Annex "E").
Further, in the reconciliation of the Semestral Docket Inventory for the period July-
December 2004 of Land Registration Cases, thirty-three (33) case records are
unaccounted [for] x x x.
The Team also observed that there is no Certificate of Arraignment attached to [the]
criminal case records. Minutes of the Hearing have no summary of what transpired
during the hearing of the case. Docket books for criminal and civil cases are [sic] not
updated. [The] [d]ocket book for special proceedings cases merely indicated the title
of the case and the date it was filed with [a] notation "decided." There is no docket
book shown for land registration cases.
Anent Election Protest No. 001-04, the Court in its order dated 04 June 2004 directed
the protestant to make an initial deposit of [P]500.00 per ballot box (61 ballot boxes)
as compensation for the revisors within five (5) days from notice. There was no
receipt attached to the records of the case. COC Saguyod explained that the receipt
was with the protestant and that the same was not per official receipt and not
deposited to [sic] the Fiduciary Account as the same will be paid to the revisors. He
claimed that he will also render an accounting of the expenses incurred at the end of
the hearing.
Likewise noted are the payments made in SP Nos. 1032 and 1033, both undocketed
petitions, [having] the same Official Receipts Numbers which when compared with
the original receipts[,] referred to other cases and/or transactions x x x. 1
In view of its observation, the Audit Team recommended in its Memorandum dated
11 July 20052 that Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Paulino I. Saguyod be directed to
explain the following within ten (10) days from notice:
 (a) why 375 petitions for change of name and/or correction of entries in the
civil registry were granted without the required hearing and publication, in
gross violation of the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules on Civil Procedure;
(b) why the dates of filing of 86 other petitions were either the same as or
ahead of the date of the alleged hearing/decision;
(c) why 70 petitions had no court action after their filing or no further
action/setting for a considerable length of time after the last order/incident of
the case;
(d) why nine (9) petitions had similar docket numbers and three (3) other
cases had the same docket number; and
(e) why the records of 179 special proceedings and those of 33 land
registration case were not presented to the Audit Team.3
It was also recommended that Clerk of Court Saguyod be required to: (a) explain why
the initial deposit of ₱500.00 per ballot box for 61 ballot boxes made by the protestant
in Election Protest No. 001-04 pursuant to the order of 4 June 2004 was not remitted
to the Fiduciary Fund Account; and (b) explain the discrepancy in the official receipts
representing the payment of filing fees for Spec. Proc. Nos. 1028, 1029 and 1030
which appeared as payment for Spec. Proc. Nos. 1032 and 1033.4
Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod jointly filed an Explanation dated 1 August
2005,5 giving the following reasons for their actions:
(a) As to the petitions for correction of entry/ies without hearing and publication —
Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod explained that almost all of these petitions
may be covered by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048 6 which authorizes city or municipal
civil registrars to correct clerical or typographical errors in an entry and/or change the
first name or nickname in the civil registry without need for a judicial order. The
petitions were filed before the trial court because there was no incumbent Local Civil
Registrar and the OIC-Civil Registrar could not act on these petitions under R.A. No.
9048. Since R.A. No. 9048 allows corrections of entries without hearing and
publication for as long as the necessary documents are submitted, the trial court
considered the same procedure as applicable to the petitions for correction of entries
filed before it. The Clerk of Court still held ex parte hearings to receive the evidence.
In resolving these petitions which are summary and non-adversarial in nature, the
trial court adopted the procedure in civil cases where the defendant is declared in
default and the court renders judgment based on the pleadings filed by plaintiff and
grants such relief as may be warranted, following Sec. 3, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules
of Court. The trial court adopted this procedure to expedite the resolution of said
petitions to afford the court more time to devote to the resolution of criminal and civil
cases that required more attention.
(b) As to the 86 petitions that were resolved on the same date as the date of filing or
date of hearing —
These petitions were for correction of entry/ies and involved innocuous errors that
may be subject of administrative corrections under R.A. No. 9048. The trial court
resolved these petitions with dispatch to accommodate the petitioners’ need to have
their civil registry documents immediately corrected to conform with their passport
applications, applications to take board examinations and petitions to travel abroad.
The petitioners discovered the errors after they submitted the required documents
and yet they were given a limited period to secure the correction of the erroneous
entries. If the corrected documents were not submitted on time, the applications of
the petitioners would be denied and the denials would mean lost opportunities,
particularly for the applicants for overseas contract work and applicants to take board
examinations. Judge Sotero was more lenient in such instances since in his view no
substantial prejudice would ensue. In any event, he resolved to adopt, henceforth, a
stricter policy in cases where no publication is required, by imposing a ten (10) day
period for posting of the petition after its filing and seeing to it that the petition is set
for hearing only after it is so posted.
(c) As to the 70 petitions where no court action was taken for a considerable length of
time after filing —
Some are petitions for adoption awaiting the submission of the Home Study and
Child Study Reports by the social welfare officers assigned to the cases. The initial
hearing cannot proceed without the reports being submitted to the court.
Others are petitions for correction of entry/ies where the petitioners have not yet
submitted the required supporting documents. They will be either dismissed for lack
of interest in due time or resolved within the next thirty (30) days.
The rest are petitions for judicial reconstitution of title which are still pending because
the reports and recommendation of the Land Registration Authority have not yet been
submitted to the court.
(d) As to the petitions with similar/same docket numbers —
According to the docket clerk, Mr. Ruben A. Gigante, the nine (9) petitions with
similar docket numbers were either cancelled or withdrawn by petitioner/s (they bear
the notation "no action taken").
As to the three (3) cases with the same docket number, Mr. Gigante admitted that he
failed to enter the first filed petition in the docket book, and that he accepted for filing
the succeeding petitions but assigned the same case number without indicating a
letter after the number to distinguish the second and third petitions from the first.
It was admitted that the irregularity was the offshoot of inefficiency in the docketing
system. To avoid similar incidents, the Clerk-in-Charge of Civil Cases was assigned
to take charge of the docket in special proceedings and land registration cases in
place of Mr. Gigante who is only a utility clerk.
(e) As to un-audited records of 179 special proceedings and 33 land registration
cases —
Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod reported that as of the time of the
submission of the explanation, the records of 124 special proceedings and 10 land
registration cases had been accounted for. Thereupon, they requested another 15
days to retrieve the remaining records which they believe were soaked in floodwater
in 2004.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its Memorandum dated 8 May
2006,7 deemed the explanation bereft of merit or deserving of scant consideration.
The OCA noted that the petitions for change of name and/or correction of entries in
the civil registry are special proceedings governed either by Rules 103 or 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Sec. 3, Rule 103 specifically provides when the order for
hearing of such petitions shall be issued and what the order should contain, thus:
SEC. 3. Order for hearing.—If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the
court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for
the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the
hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of
general circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date
set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election or within four
(4) months after the last publication of the notice.
Sec. 4, Rule 108 similarly requires the issuance of an order of hearing and the
publication of the order in petitions for correction of entries in the civil registry, thus:
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication.—Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
notice thereof to be given to the person named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
The OCA maintained that the provisions of the Rules of Court on publication of the
order of hearing should have been strictly observed as publication is a jurisdictional
requirement. Hence, the OCA remarked, it is appalling that Judge Sotero and Clerk
of Court Saguyod favorably acted on the petitions even though they were only pro-
forma and notarized by Saguyod as an ex officio notary public and still others were
unsigned, unverified or unnotarized. Some 86 petitions were found to bear dates of
filing which are the same as or ahead of the date of the alleged hearing/decision,
clearly belying the claim of Judge Sotero that hearings on these petitions were
conducted or that they were referred to the Clerk of Court for presentation of
evidence ex parte. Said practices, according to the OCA, constitute a mockery of
established procedure under the Rules of Court, especially since nothing in R.A. No.
9048 or its Implementing Rules and Regulations would justify the procedure that
Judge Sotero and Clerk of Court Saguyod adopted.
The OCA observed that what R.A. No. 9048 mandates is the administrative
proceeding for change of name/correction of entry in the civil registry which has no
application to a petition for change of name or correction of entry filed in court. Thus,
the OCA went on to say, Judge Sotero’s ratiocination for adopting the procedure
under R.A. No. 9048 or for treating the petitions in the same manner as ordinary
cases where the defendant is declared in default displays a deplorable lack of grasp
or total ignorance of the Rules of Civil Procedure, notwithstanding his claim that he
did so for the purpose of expediting the resolution of the petitions.
As to the fifty-six (56) petitions where no action was taken by Judge Sotero for almost
one year, the OCA found him to be decidedly remiss in the performance of his duties
and responsibilities. As court manager, it was incumbent upon Judge Sotero to adopt
a system of record management since the prompt disposition of the court’s business
is attained only through proper and efficient court management, the OCA added.
The OCA recommended that Judge Sotero be fined for gross ignorance of the law
and gross inefficiency in the amount of ₱100,000.00, to be deducted from his
retirement benefits, and that the amount of ₱50,000.00 be withheld from such
benefits pending the outcome of the financial audit. 8
As to Clerk of Court Saguyod, the OCA recommended that he be directed to submit a
report of the actions taken on the civil and criminal cases then pending before the
RTC which Judge Sotero was directed to either decide with dispatch or immediately
act upon. Saguyod complied with the submission of his Report dated 22 September
2006 which was in turn referred to the OCA for further action.9
After careful consideration of the findings and recommendations of the OCA, the
Court agrees that indeed Judge Sotero is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Articles37610 and 41211 of the New Civil Code are the substantive laws covering the
alteration or correction of entries in the civil registry. Civil registry records are public
documents and are accepted as prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein,12 which is why prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9048, changes or
corrections thereof could be made only upon judicial authorization. Rules 103 and
108 of the Revised Rules of Court provide the procedure for such alterations in the
civil registry.
The procedure for change of name under Rule 103 is a proceeding in rem and as
such strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements, particularly on publication,
is essential in order to vest the court with jurisdiction.13 The reason for this is that a
change of name is a matter of public interest.14
Petitions for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are governed by
Rule 108. This rule covers petitions for corrections of clerical errors of a harmless or
innocuous nature, as well as petitions which seek to effect substantial changes or
corrections in entries for as long as all the procedural requirements in said rule are
followed. In Republic v. Bautista,15 citing Republic v. Valencia,16 it was declared that
the proceedings under Rule 108 may either be summary or adversarial in nature. If
the correction sought to be made in the civil registry is clerical, the procedure to be
adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial and the procedure to be adopted is
adversarial.17 The procedure under Rule 108 becomes the appropriate adversarial
proceeding to effect substantial changes in the registry only if the procedural
requirements therein are complied with.18
R.A. No. 9048, enacted in 2001, substantially amended Articles 376 and 412 of the
New Civil Code, to wit:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First
Name or Nickname.—No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first
name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and its implementing rules and regulations.
Thus, under this new law, clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname may be corrected or effected by the concerned city or municipal registrar or
consul general, without need of any judicial order.
At first glance, the seeming effect of the amendment is to remove from the ambit of
Rule 108 the correction of clerical or typographical errors or change of entries in the
civil register and to make Rule 108 apply only to substantial changes and corrections
to entries in the civil register. Hence, we clarified in Republic v. Benemerito19that the
obvious effect of R.A. No. 9048 is merely to make possible the administrative
correction of clerical or typographical errors in entries and the administrative change
of first name or nickname in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the correction of
substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings.
Hence, the question that now arises is whether trial courts still have jurisdiction
over petitions for correction of clerical errors and change of first name and nickname
in the civil registry. Assuming that the trial courts retain such authority, the corollary
question is whether the summary procedure prescribed in R.A. No. 9048 should be
adopted in cases filed before the courts, or should the adversarial proceeding under
Rule 108 be followed.
The answers to these queries are central to the resolution of the case at bar, as they
determine whether Judge Sotero had indeed acted with gross ignorance of the law or
whether his liability, if any, can be tempered as he acted in good faith on a doubtful
question of law.
A review of the deliberations on R.A. No. 9048 clearly shows that it was enacted to
give the people an option to have the erroneous entries in their civil records corrected
via an administrative proceeding before the local civil registrar that is less expensive
and more expeditious. In his sponsorship speech at the Senate, the main proponent
mentioned in particular that the judicial process under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules
of Court for the correction of clerical errors is tedious and expensive. To address the
problem, it was proposed that Article 412 of the Civil Code be amended by providing,
by way of an exception thereto, that clerical or typographical errors be corrected by
the city or municipal civil registrar. The sponsor specified that the errors that may be
corrected under the proposal are only those "committed in the performance of clerical
work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is
harmless and innocuous, such as a misspelled name or place of birth which is visible
to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only
by reference to
other existing records," and that "in no case may the correction involve the change of
nationality, age, status or gender of a person."20 Further debate led to the proposal to
include change of first name or nickname which was approved. However, such
change of first name or nickname would only be allowed if based on some
reasonable ground such as when the name to be changed is ridiculous. 21
Subsequent deliberations revolved around specific provisions of the bill. Thus, under
the bill, any person who wants an entry corrected needs only to file a verified petition
supported by certain documents with the local civil registry office of the city or
municipality where the records sought to be corrected are kept and, in case the
petitioner has already migrated to another place, the petition may be filed with the
local civil registrar where he resides. Publication of the petition for correction of entry
is dispensed with and in lieu of publication, the petition needs only to be posted in a
conspicuous place in the office of the local civil registrar for ten (10) consecutive
working days. However, regarding petitions for change of first name, the petition has
to be published once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation, with the petitioner also submitting a certification that he has no
pending case or prior criminal record. The local civil registrar is mandated to decide
the petition not later than five (5) working days after the prescribed posting period.
The decision of the local registrar is subject to the automatic review of the Civil
Registrar General who shall act within ten (10) working days from receipt of the
decision. If the Civil Registrar General finds that the correction is not clerical or
typographical in nature or that it affects the civil status of the person, he shall set
aside the decision and advise the petitioner to file the necessary petition with the
RTC in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court.
The authority or jurisdiction of the trial courts over petitions for correction of entries
and change of first name or nickname was never taken up at the deliberations. In
contrast, it is quite clear from the deliberations that the local civil registrar is given the
authority to act on such petitions filed before his office, yet there was nary a mention
or even insinuation that such petitions can no longer be filed with the regular courts.
In fact, it was clarified that the grounds upon which the administrative process before
the local civil registrar may be availed of are limited under the law; hence, outside of
such limited grounds, the judicial process should be availed of. Indeed, there was no
intent on the part of the lawmakers to remove the authority of the trial courts to make
judicial corrections of entries in the civil registry. It can thus be concluded that the
local civil registrar has primary, not exclusive, jurisdiction over such petitions for
correction of clerical errors and change of first name or nickname, with R.A. No. 9048
prescribing the procedure that the petitioner and local civil registrar should follow.
Since R.A. No. 9048 refers specifically to the administrative summary proceeding
before the local civil registrar it would be inappropriate to apply the same procedure
to petitions for the correction of entries in the civil registry before the courts. The
promulgation of rules of procedure for courts of justice is the exclusive domain of the
Supreme Court.22 Moreover, as observed by the OCA, there is nothing in R.A. No.
9048 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations that warrants the adoption of the
procedure set therein for petitions before the courts even for the purpose of
expediting the resolution of said petitions.
Thus, there should be recourse to the procedure prescribed for the courts as if R.A.
No. 9048 were not enacted at all. In other words, the procedure provided in the
Revised Rules of Court for such petitions remains binding and should be followed by
the courts. The procedural requirements laid down in Rules 103 and 108 still have to
be complied with. In the case at hand, Judge Sotero should have applied the
procedure prescribed in Rules 103 and 108 in resolving the petitions before him, not
the procedure prescribed in R.A. No. 9048 or the procedure provided in Section 3,
Rule 9 which applies in civil cases where the defendant is declared in default.
Under Rule 103, the petition for change of name should be signed and verified by the
person desiring a change of name, and set forth compliance with the residency
requirement, the cause for which the change of name is sought, and the new name
asked for. The court, after finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance,
shall issue an order reciting the purpose of the petition and fixing the date and place
for the hearing of the petition, and direct the publication of the order before the
hearing at least once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province. Any interested person may appear at the hearing
and oppose the petition, with the Solicitor General or city fiscal appearing on behalf of
the Government. The court shall grant the petition only when satisfactory proof has
been presented in open court that the order had been published as directed, the
allegations in the petition are true, and proper and reasonable causes appear for
changing the name of the petitioner.23
Rule 108 requires publication of the verified petition for cancellation or correction of
entry once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province; and that the civil registrar and all persons who claim any
interest and who would be affected by the petition be made parties to the proceeding
and be allowed to file their opposition to the said cancellation or correction within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition or from the last date of publication. It is
only after a hearing that the court may either dismiss or grant the petition. 24 Whether
the proceeding under this rule is summary or adversarial, depending on the type of
errors to be corrected, the procedural requirements under this rule still need to be
complied with, the nature of the proceeding becoming adversarial only when any
opposition to the petition is filed and actively prosecuted.
Petitions for change of name and correction of entries in the civil registry are
actions in rem, the decision on the petition being binding not only on the parties
thereto but on the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. Publication gives notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its
object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort
against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that
brings in the whole world as a party to the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to
hear and decide it.25
In the case at bar, the more than 300 cases for correction of entries filed before the
RTC of Paniqui and decided by Judge Sotero do not fall within the purview of R.A.
No. 9048. In other words, not all of said petitions pertain to the change of first name
or nickname or the correction of typographical errors in the entries of the registry.
Some of said petitions involve substantial changes in the registry such as change of
age, sex, status, and nationality, and even of middle names and surnames of the
petitioners. Judge Sotero’s conduct in acting on the petitions, without full compliance
with the procedural requirements under Rules 103 and 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court, is appalling. He explained that since R.A. No. 9048 allows corrections of
entries without need of hearing and publication for as long as the necessary
documents are submitted, the same procedure under R.A. No. 9048 is applicable to
the petitions filed before the court. The explanation does not impress. The records of
the cases show that Judge Sotero did not comply with the administrative procedure
under the said law. Thus, while R.A. No. 9048 requires that the petition for correction
of entries be posted in a conspicuous place for ten (10) consecutive days, the
records show that some of the petitions were decided less than ten (10) days from
the date of filing. Clearly then, there was no way that the 10-day posting requirement
could have been accomplished. The petitions for change of name were also granted
even without publication of the order of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation.
Observance of the procedure under R.A. No. 9048 does not excuse Judge Sotero’s
blunders.1âwphi1 It appears though that he could have acted under the false
impression that the petitions could be filed only with the local civil registrar and not
with the courts. Verily, he claims that he resolved the petitions with dispatch in order
to accommodate the need of the petitioners to have their civil registry documents
corrected with immediacy and that he was more lenient since no substantial prejudice
would ensue. His misapprehension affords him no justification or extenuation.
Moreover, his concern and compassion for the petitioners are misplaced. As a
member of the bench, he should be equipped with the basic knowledge of rules of
procedure, including Rules 103 and 108, which govern the disposition of the
petitions. Judge Sotero’s actuations clearly exposed a deplorable deficiency in his
grasp of the basic principles of law and rudimentary rules of procedure, for which he
should be held administratively liable.
As an advocate of justice and a visible representation of the law, a judge is expected
to be proficient in the interpretation and application of our laws. Competence and
diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.26 When the law is
sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it, and anything less
than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. In short, when the law is
so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 27
Judge Sotero’s ignorance of the law is aggravated by his gross inefficiency in failing
to take prompt action on some of the petitions for almost one year. Proper and
efficient court management is ultimately the judge’s responsibility since he is the
administrator of the court. Canon 3, Rule 3.0828 and Rule 3.09,29 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct30requires judges to manage their dockets in such manner that the
work of their courts is accomplished with reasonable dispatch. 31 Inefficiency implies
negligence, incompetence, ignorance and carelessness. There is inexcusable FRANCLER P. ONDE, Petitioner,
inefficiency on the part of a judge when he fails to observe vs.
THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRATION OF LAS PIÑAS
in the performance of his duties that degree of diligence, prudence, and CITY, Respondent.
circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of any public service. When
the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law RESOLUTION
or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and
undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of authority. 32

Gross ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge under Section 8 of A.M.
No. 01-8-10-SC, amending Rule 140 of the Rules of Court on the Discipline of
Justices and Judges, which took effect on October 1, 2001. It is penalized either by
dismissal from service, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of more than
₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00. The serious infractions would have
required the imposition of dismissal as penalty had respondent judge not retired. So,
instead, we now impose a fine in the maximum, i.e., ₱40,000.00, as the infractions
which correspond to the sheer number of the petitions decided by Judge Sotero all in
disregard of basic rules of procedure, are treated as aggravating circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent retired Judge Cesar M. Sotero of the
Regional Trial Court of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67, GUILTY of gross ignorance of the
law and FINES him in the
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Orders 1 dated October 7, 2010
and March 1, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 201, Las Piñas City, in
Special Proceedings Case No. 10-0043. The RTC dismissed the case filed by
petitioner Francler P. Onde for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth.
The antecedent facts follow:
Petitioner filed a petition2 for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before
the R TC and named respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pifias City
as sole respondent. Petitioner alleged that he is the illegitimate child of his parents
Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde DC Pakingan, but his birth certificate stated that his
parents were married. His birth certificate also stated that his mother's first name is
Tely and that his first name is Franc Ler. He prayed that the following entries on his
birth certificate be corrected as follows:

amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (₱40,000.00) to be deducted from the One Entry From To
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) withheld from him pursuant to the Court’s
Resolution dated 27 March 2007. The remainder of the withheld amount is ordered 1) Date and place of marriage of his parents December 23, 1983 - Bicol Not Married
released to him. 2) First name of his mother Tely Matilde

SO ORDERED. 3) His first name Franc Ler Francler

In its Order dated October 7, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for correction of
entries on the ground thatit is insufficient in form and substance. It ruled that the
proceedings must be adversarial since the first correction is substantial in nature and
would affect petitioner’s status as a legitimate child. It was further held that the
correction in the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil
registrar under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048, entitled An Act Authorizing the City or
Municipal Civil Registrar or the ConsulGeneral to Correct a Clerical or Typographical
Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Registrar
Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for this Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In its Order dated March 1, 2011,the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, as it found no proof that petitioner’s parents were not married on
December 23, 1983.
Essentially, the petition raises fourissues: (1) whether the RTC erred in ruling that the
correction on the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil
registrar under R.A. No. 9048; (2) whether the RTC erred in ruling that correcting the
entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23,
1983 in Bicol to "not married" is substantial in nature requiring adversarial
proceedings; (3) whether the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for correction of
entries; and (4) whether the RTC erred in ruling that there is no proof that petitioner’s
parents were not married on December 23, 1983.
Petitioner argues that Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court allows a substantial correction of
entries in the civil registry, stating that in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City,3 the case cited by the RTC, we have actually ruled that substantial changes in
the civil registry are now allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. He likewise
adds that proof that his parents were not married will be presented during the trial,
not during the filing of the petition for correction of entries.
In its comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the RTC
correctly dismissed the petition for correction of entries. It points out that the first
names of petitioner and his mother can be corrected thru administrative proceedings
under R.A. No. 9048. Such correction of the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that
his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is a
substantial correction affecting his legitimacy. Hence, it must be dealt with in
adversarial proceedings where all interested parties are impleaded.
We deny the petition.
On the first issue, we agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner and his
mother as appearing in his birth certificate can be corrected by the city civil registrar
under R.A. No. 9048. We note that petitioner no longer contested the RTC’s ruling on
this point.4 Indeed, under Section 15 of R.A. No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors
on entries in a civil register can be corrected and changes of first name can be done
by the concerned city civil registrar without need of a judicial order. Aforesaid Section
1, as amended by R.A. No. 10172, now reads: SECTION 1. Authority to Correct
Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in
a civil register shall be changed or correctedwithout a judicial order, except for
clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname, the day and
month in the dateof birth or sex of a person where it is patently clear that there was a
clerical or typographical error or mistake in the entry, which can be corrected or
changed by the concerned city or municipalcivil registraror consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In Silverio v. Republic,6 we held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with administrative
officers. The intent and effect of said law is to exclude the change of first name from
the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. The remedy and
the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature,
not judicial. In Republic v. Cagandahan,7 we said that under R.A.No. 9048, the
correction of clerical or typographical errors can now be made through administrative
proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. The law removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules ofCourt the correction of clerical or typographical
errors. Thus petitioner can avail of this administrative remedy for the correction of his
and his mother’s first name.
On the second issue, we also agree with the RTC in ruling that correcting the entry
on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in
Bicol to "not married" is a substantial correction requiring adversarial proceedings.
Said correction is substantial as it will affect his legitimacy and convert him from a
legitimate child to an illegitimate one. In Republic v. Uy, 8 we held that corrections of
entries in the civil register including those on citizenship, legitimacyof paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage,involve substantial alterations. Substantial errors in
a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties
aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversaryproceedings. 9
On the third issue, we likewise affirm the RTC in dismissing the petition for correction
of entries. As mentioned, petitioner no longer contested the RTC ruling that the
correction he sought on his and his mother’s first name can be done by the city civil
registrar. Under the circumstances, we are constrained to deny his prayer that the
petition for correction of entries before the RTC bereinstated since the same petition
includes the correction he sought on his and his mother’s first name.
We clarify, however, that the RTC’s dismissal is without prejudice. As we said,
petitioner can avail ofthe administrative remedy for the correction of his and his
mother’s first name.1âwphi1 He can also file a new petition before the RTC to correct
the alleged erroneous entry on his birth certificate that his parents were married on
December 23, 1983 in Bicol. This substantial correction is allowed under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court. As we reiterated in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City:10
proceedings under Rule 108 adversary. In Republic v. Uy,12 we have similarly ruled
that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with
the requirements of the Rules of Court is mandated. Thus, in his new petition,
petitioner should at least implead his father and mother as parties since the
substantial correction he is seeking will also affect them.
In view of the foregoing discussion, it is no longer necessary to dwell on the last issue
as petitioner will have his opportunity to prove his claim that his parents were not
married on December 23, 1983 when he files the new petition for the purpose.

x x x This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valenciawhere we held that even substantial WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Orders dated October 7, 2010
errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule and March 1, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 201, Las Pifias City, in Special
108 [of the Rules of Court]provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail Proceedings Case No. 10-0043. The dismissal ordered by the Regional Trial Court is,
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. x x x however, declared to be without prejudice.

xxxx No pronouncement as to costs.

It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not SO ORDERED.
merely clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status
of the marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of
their son, Charles Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed
under Rule 108in accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valenciaprovided that
the appropriate procedural requirements are complied with. x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)

We also stress that a petition seeking a substantial correction of an entry in a civil

register must implead as parties to the proceedings not only the local civil registrar, FE CAYAO-LASAM, G.R. No. 159132
as petitioner did in the dismissed petition for correction of entries, but also all persons Petitioner,
who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the correction. This is Present:
required by Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is Chairperson,
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would - versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.) CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
In Eleosida,11 we cited Section 3, and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the Rules of REYES, JJ.
Court, as the procedural requirements laid down by the Court to make the SPOUSES CLARO and
 EDITHA RAMOLETE, Promulgated:
Respondents.* December 18, 2008
x---------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed by Dr. Fe Cayao-Lasam (petitioner) seeking to annul the Decision[1] dated July 4, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 62206.
The antecedent facts:
On July 28, 1994, respondent, three months pregnant Editha Ramolete (Editha) was
brought to the Lorma Medical Center (LMC) in San Fernando, La Union due to vaginal
bleeding. Upon advice of petitioner relayed via telephone, Editha was admitted to the LMC on the
same day.A pelvic sonogram[2] was then conducted on Editha revealing the fetus weak cardiac
pulsation.[3] The following day, Edithas repeat pelvic sonogram[4] showed that aside from the fetus
weak cardiac pulsation, no fetal movement was also appreciated. Due to persistent and profuse
vaginal bleeding, petitioner advised Editha to undergo a Dilatation and Curettage Procedure
(D&C) or raspa.
On July 30, 1994, petitioner performed the D&C procedure. Editha was discharged from
the hospital the following day.
On September 16, 1994, Editha was once again brought at the LMC, as she was suffering from
vomiting and severe abdominal pains. Editha was attended by Dr. Beatriz de la Cruz, Dr. Victor
B. Mayo and Dr. Juan V. Komiya. Dr. Mayo allegedly informed Editha that there was a dead fetus
in the latters womb. After, Editha underwent laparotomy,[5] she was found to have a massive intra-
abdominal hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus.Thus, Editha had to undergo a procedure for
hysterectomy[6] and as a result, she has no more chance to bear a child.
On November 7, 1994, Editha and her husband Claro Ramolete (respondents) filed a
Complaint[7] for Gross Negligence and Malpractice against petitioner before the Professional
Regulations Commission (PRC).
Respondents alleged that Edithas hysterectomy was caused by petitioners unmitigated
negligence and professional incompetence in conducting the D&C procedure and the petitioners
failure to remove the fetus inside Edithas womb.[8] Among the alleged acts of negligence
were: first, petitioners failure to check up, visit or administer medication on Editha during her first
day of confinement at the LMC;[9] second, petitioner recommended that a D&C procedure be
performed on Editha without conducting any internal examination prior to the procedure;[10]third,
petitioner immediately suggested a D&C procedure instead of closely monitoring the state of
pregnancy of Editha.[11]
In her Answer,[12] petitioner denied the allegations of negligence and incompetence with the
following explanations: upon Edithas confirmation that she would seek admission at the LMC,
petitioner immediately called the hospital to anticipate the arrival of Editha and ordered through
the telephone the medicines Editha needed to take, which the nurses carried out; petitioner
visited Editha on the morning of July 28, 1994 during her rounds; on July 29, 1994, she performed
an internal examination on Editha and she discovered that the latters cervix was already open,
thus, petitioner discussed the possible D&C procedure, should the bleeding become more
profuse; on July 30 1994, she conducted another internal examination on Editha, which revealed
 the fetus was located. Obstetricians will assume that the pregnancy is within
that the latters cervix was still open; Editha persistently complained of her vaginal bleeding and the uterus unless so specified by the Sonologist who conducted the ultra-
her passing out of some meaty mass in the process of urination and bowel movement; thus, sound. Respondent (Dr. Lasam) cannot be faulted if she was not able to
determine that complainant Editha is having an ectopic pregnancy
petitioner advised Editha to undergo D&C procedure which the respondents consented to; interstitial. The D&C conducted on Editha is necessary considering that her
petitioner was very vocal in the operating room about not being able to see an abortus;[13] taking cervix is already open and so as to stop the profuse bleeding. Simple curettage
cannot remove a fetus if the patient is having an ectopic pregnancy,
the words of Editha to mean that she was passing out some meaty mass and clotted blood, she since ectopicpregnancy is pregnancy conceived outside the uterus and
assumed that the abortus must have been expelled in the process of bleeding; it was Editha who curettage is done only within the uterus. Therefore, a more extensive operation
needed in this case of pregnancy in order to remove the fetus.[15]
insisted that she wanted to be discharged; petitioner agreed, but she advised Editha to return for
check-up on August 5, 1994, which the latter failed to do.
Feeling aggrieved, respondents went to the PRC on appeal. On November 22, 2000,
Petitioner contended that it was Edithas gross negligence and/or omission in insisting to be
the PRC rendered a Decision[16] reversing the findings of the Board and revoking petitioners
discharged on July 31, 1994 against doctors advice and her unjustified failure to return for check-
authority or license to practice her profession as a physician.[17]
up as directed by petitioner that contributed to her life-threatening condition on September 16,
Petitioner brought the matter to the CA in a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the
1994; that Edithas hysterectomy was brought about by her very abnormal pregnancy known
Rules of Court. Petitioner also dubbed her petition as one for certiorari[18] under Rule 65 of the
as placenta increta, which was an extremely rare and very unusual case of abdominal placental
Rules of Court.
implantation. Petitioner argued that whether or not a D&C procedure was done by her or any
other doctor, there would be no difference at all because at any stage of gestation before term,
In the Decision dated July 4, 2003, the CA held that the Petition for Review under Rule
the uterus would rupture just the same.
43 of the Rules of Court was an improper remedy, as the enumeration of the quasi-
judicial agencies in Rule 43 is exclusive.[19] PRC is not among the quasi-judicial bodies whose
On March 4, 1999, the Board of Medicine (the Board) of the PRC rendered a
judgment or final orders are subject of a petition for review to the CA, thus, the petition for review
Decision,[14] exonerating petitioner from the charges filed against her. The Board held:
of the PRC Decision, filed at the CA, was improper. The CA further held that should the petition

Based on the findings of the doctors who conducted the laparotomy on Editha, be treated as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the same would still be dismissed for being
hers is a case of Ectopic Pregnancy Interstitial. This type of ectopicpregnancy improper and premature. Citing Section 26[20] of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2382 or the Medical Act
is one that is being protected by the uterine muscles and manifestations may
take later than four (4) months and only attributes to two percent (2%) of 1959, the CA held that the plain, speedy and adequate remedy under the ordinary course of
of ectopic pregnancy cases. law which petitioner should have availed herself of was to appeal to the Office of the President.[21]
When complainant Editha was admitted at Lorma Medical Center on July 28,
1994 due to vaginal bleeding, an ultra-sound was performed upon her and the
result of the Sonogram Test reveals a morbid fetus but did not specify where

Hence, herein petition, assailing the decision of the CA on the following
grounds:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A
QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE PROFESSIONAL
REGULATION[S] COMMISSION (PRC) WAS EXCLUDED
AMONG THE QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES CONTEMPLATED
UNDER RULE 43 OF THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE;
2. EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT PRC WAS
EXCLUDED FROM THE PURVIEW OF RULE 43 OF THE RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, THE PETITIONER WAS NOT
PRECLUDED FROM FILING A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
WHERE THE DECISION WAS ALSO ISSUED IN EXCESS OF OR
WITHOUT JURISDICTION, OR WHERE THE DECISION WAS A
PATENT NULLITY;
3. HEREIN RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES ARE NOT
ALLOWED BY LAW TO APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF THE
BOARD OF MEDICINE TO THE PROFESSIONAL
REGULATION[S] COMMISSION;
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING FOR IMPROPER FORUM
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW/PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
WITHOUT GOING OVER THE MERITS OF THE GROUNDS
RELIED UPON BY THE PETITIONER;
5. PRCS GRAVE OMISSION TO AFFORD HEREIN
PETITONER A CHANCE TO BE HEARD ON APPEAL IS A CLEAR
VIOLATION OF HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS AND HAS THE EFFECT OF RENDERING THE
JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID;
6. COROLLARY TO THE FOURTH ASSIGNED
ERROR, PRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN ACCEPTING AND
CONSIDERING THE MEMORANDUM ON APPEAL WITHOUT
PROOF OF SERVICE TO HEREIN PETITIONER, AND IN
VIOLATION OF ART. IV, SEC. 35 OF THE RULES AND
REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE REGULATION AND
PRACTICE OF PROFESSIONALS;
7. PRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN REVOKING PETITIONERS LICENSE TO
PRACTICE MEDICINE WITHOUT AN EXPERT TESTIMONY TO
SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSION AS TO THE CAUSE OF
RESPONDENT EDITHAT [SIC] RAMOLETES INJURY;
8. PRC COMMITTED AN EVEN GRAVER ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE FINDING OF
THE BOARD OF MEDICINE, WHICH HAD THE NECESSARY
COMPETENCE AND EXPERTISE TO ESTABLISH THE CAUSE
OF RESPONDENT EDITHAS INJURY, AS WELL AS THE
TESTIMONY OF THE EXPERT WITNESS AUGUSTO MANALO,
M.D. ;[AND]
9. PRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
MAKING CONCLUSIONS OF FACTS THAT WERE NOT ONLY
UNSUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE BUT WERE ACTUALLY
CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE ON RECORD.[22]
The Court will first deal with the procedural issues.
Petitioner claims that the law does not allow complainants to appeal to the PRC from the decision
of the Board. She invokes Article IV, Section 35 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the
Regulation and Practice of Professionals, which provides:
Sec. 35. The respondent may appeal the decision of the Board within
thirty days from receipt thereof to the Commission whose decision shall be
final. Complainant, when allowed by law, may interpose an appeal from the
Decision of the Board within the same period. (Emphasis supplied)
 Petitioner asserts that a careful reading of the above law indicates that while the
respondent, as a matter of right, may appeal the Decision of the Board to the Commission, the
complainant may interpose an appeal from the decision of the Board only when so allowed by
law.[23]Petitioner cited Section 26 of Republic Act No. 2382 or The Medical Act of 1959, to wit:
Section 26. Appeal from judgment. The decision of the Board of Medical
Examiners (now Medical Board) shall automatically become final thirty days
after the date of its promulgation unless the respondent, during the same
period, has appealed to the Commissioner of Civil Service (now Professional
Regulations Commission) and later to the Office of the President of
the Philippines. If the final decision is not satisfactory, the respondent may ask
for a review of the case, or may file in court a petition for certiorari.
Petitioner posits that the reason why the Medical Act of 1959 allows only the respondent
in an administrative case to file an appeal with the Commission while the complainant is not
allowed to do so is double jeopardy. Petitioner is of the belief that the revocation of license to
practice a profession is penal in nature.[24]
The Court does not agree.
For one, the principle of double jeopardy finds no application in administrative cases. Double
jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after
arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted
or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of
the accused.[25] These elements were not present in the proceedings before the Board of
Medicine, as the proceedings involved in the instant case were administrative and not criminal in
nature. The Court has already held that double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases.[26]
Moreover, Section 35 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of
Professionals cited by petitioner was subsequently amended to read:
Sec. 35. The complainant/respondent may appeal the order, the resolution or
the decision of the Board within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof to the
Commission whose decision shall be final and executory. Interlocutory order
shall not be appealable to the Commission. (Amended by Res. 174, Series of
1990).[27] (Emphasis supplied)
Whatever doubt was created by the previous provision was settled with said
amendment. It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due
process, but a mere statutory privilege that may be exercised only in the manner
prescribed by law.[28] In this case, the clear intent of the amendment is to render the
right to appeal from a decision of the Board available to both complainants and
respondents.
Such conclusion is bolstered by the fact that in 2006, the PRC issued Resolution
No. 06-342(A), or the New Rules of Procedure in Administrative Investigations in the Professional
Regulations Commission and the Professional Regulatory Boards, which provides for the method
of appeal, to wit:
Sec. 1. Appeal; Period Non-Extendible.- The decision, order or resolution of the
Board shall be final and executory after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the decision, order or resolution without an appeal being perfected or
taken by either the respondent or the complainant. A party aggrieved by the
decision, order or resolution may file a notice of appeal from the decision, order
or resolution of the Board to the Commission within fifteen (15) days from
receipt thereof, and serving upon the adverse party a notice of appeal together
with the appellants brief or memorandum on appeal, and paying the appeal
and legal research fees. x x x[29]
 The above-stated provision does not qualify whether only the complainant or respondent
may file an appeal; rather, the new rules provide that a party aggrieved may file a notice of Indeed, the PRC is not expressly mentioned as one of the agencies which are expressly
appeal. Thus, either the complainant or the respondent who has been aggrieved by the decision, enumerated under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. However, its absence from the
order or resolution of the Board may appeal to the Commission. It is an elementary rule that when enumeration does not, by this fact alone, imply its exclusion from the coverage of said Rule.[35] The
the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no need, in the absence of legislative Rule expressly provides that it should be applied to appeals from awards, judgments final orders
intent to the contrary, for any interpretation.[30] Words and phrases used in the statute should be or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. The
given their plain, ordinary, and common usage or meaning.[31] phrase among these agencies confirms that the enumeration made in the Rule is not exclusive
to the agencies therein listed.[36]
Petitioner also submits that appeals from the decisions of the PRC should be with the
CA, as Rule 43[32] of the Rules of Court was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a Specifically, the Court, in Yang v. Court of Appeals,[37] ruled
uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.[33] Petitioner further contends that that Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129[38] conferred upon the CA exclusive appellate jurisdiction
a quasi-judicial body is not excluded from the purview of Rule 43 just because it is not mentioned over appeals from decisions of the PRC. The Court held:
therein.[34] The law has since been changed, however, at least in the matter of
the particular court to which appeals from the Commission should be
taken. On August 14, 1981, Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 became effective
On this point, the Court agrees with the petitioner. and in its Section 29, conferred on the Court of Appeals exclusive appellate
Sec. 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides: jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
Section 1. Scope. - This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments commissions except those falling under the appellate jurisdiction of the
or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals, and from awards, judgments, final Supreme Court. x x x. In virtue of BP 129, appeals from the Professional
orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the Regulations Commission are now exclusively cognizable by the Court of
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Appeals.[39] (Emphasis supplied)
Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and
Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority,
Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Clearly, the enactment of B.P. Blg. 129, the precursor of the present Rules of Civil
Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration,
Procedure,[40] lodged with the CA such jurisdiction over the appeals of decisions made by the
Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission,
Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government PRC.
Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission,
Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Anent the substantive merits of the case, petitioner questions the PRC decision for being without
Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration an expert testimony to support its conclusion and to establish the cause
Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.(Emphasis supplied)
of Edithas injury. Petitioner avers that in cases of medical malpractice, expert testimony is
necessary to support the conclusion as to the cause of the injury.[41]
Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of a physician
or surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily
employed by the profession generally, under similar conditions, and in like surrounding
circumstances.[42] In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that the
physician or surgeon either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or
surgeon would not have done, and that the failure or action caused injury to the patient.[43]
There are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate
causation.[44]
A physician-patient relationship was created when Editha employed the services of the
petitioner. As Edithas physician, petitioner was duty-bound to use at least the same level of care
that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same
circumstances.[45] The breach of these professional duties of skill and care, or their improper
performance by a physician surgeon, whereby the patient is injured in body or in health,
constitutes actionable malpractice.[46] As to this aspect of medical malpractice, the determination
of the reasonable level of care and the breach thereof, expert testimony is essential.[47] Further,
inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in
the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary
to support the conclusion as to causation.[48]
In the present case, respondents did not present any expert testimony to support their claim that
petitioner failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have
done.
Petitioner, on the other hand, presented the testimony of Dr. Augusto M. Manalo, who
was clearly an expert on the subject.
Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special knowledge
of the subject matter about which he or she is to testify, either by the study of recognized authorities
on the subject or by practical experience.[49]
Dr. Manalo specializes in gynecology and obstetrics, authored and co-authored various
publications on the subject, and is a professor at the University of the Philippines.[50] According to
him, his diagnosis of Edithas case was Ectopic Pregnancy Interstitial (also referred to
as Cornual), Ruptured.[51] In stating that the D&C procedure was not the proximate cause of the
rupture of Edithas uterus resulting in her hysterectomy, Dr. Manalo testified as follows:
Atty. Hidalgo:
Q: Doctor, we want to be clarified on this matter. The complainant had testified
here that the D&C was the proximate cause of the rupture of the
uterus. The condition which she found herself in on the second
admission. Will you please tell us whether that is true or not?
A: Yah, I do not think so for two reasons. One, as I have said earlier, the
instrument cannot reach the site of the pregnancy, for it to further push
the pregnancy outside the uterus. And, No. 2, I was thinking a while
ago about another reason- well, why I dont think so, because it is the
triggering factor for the rupture, it could havethe rupture could have
occurred much earlier, right after the D&C or a few days after the
D&C.
Q: In this particular case, doctor, the rupture occurred to have happened
minutes prior to the hysterectomy or right upon admission
on September 15, 1994which is about 1 months after the patient was
discharged, after the D&C was conducted. Would you tell us whether
there is any relation at all of the D&C and the rupture in this particular
instance?
 A: I dont think so for the two reasons that I have just mentioned- that it would
not be possible for the instrument to reach the site of pregnancy. And,
No. 2, if it is because of the D&C that rupture could have occurred
earlier.[52] (Emphases supplied)
Clearly, from the testimony of the expert witness and the reasons given by him, it is
evident that the D&C procedure was not the proximate cause of the rupture of Edithas uterus.
During his cross-examination, Dr. Manalo testified on how he would have
addressed Edithas condition should he be placed in a similar circumstance as the petitioner. He
stated:
Atty. Ragonton:
Q: Doctor, as a practicing OB-Gyne, when do you consider that you have done
a good, correct and ideal dilatation and curettage procedure?
A: Well, if the patient recovers. If the patient gets well. Because even after the
procedure, even after the procedure you may feel that you have
scraped everything, the patient stops bleeding, she feels well, I think
you should still have some reservations, and wait a little more time.
Q: If you were the OB-Gyne who performed the procedure on
patient Editha Ramolete, would it be your standard practice to check
the fetal parts or fetal tissues that were allegedly removed?
A: From what I have removed, yes. But in this particular case, I think it was
assumed that it was part of the meaty mass which was expelled at
the time she was urinating and flushed in the toilet. So theres no way.
Q: There was [sic] some portions of the fetal parts that were removed?
A: No, it was described as scanty scraping if I remember it rightscanty.
Q: And you would not mind checking those scant or those little parts that were
removed?
A: Well, the fact that it was described means, I assume that it was
checked, no. It was described as scanty and the color also, I think was
described.Because it would be very unusual, even improbable that it
would not be examined, because when you scrape, the specimens
are right there before your eyes. Its in front of you. You can touch it. In
fact, some of them will stick to the instrument and therefore to peel it
off from the instrument, you have to touch them. So, automatically
they are examined closely.
Q: As a matter of fact, doctor, you also give telephone orders to your patients
through telephone?
A: Yes, yes, we do that, especially here in Manila because you know,
sometimes a doctor can also be tied-up somewhere and if you have
to wait until he arrive at a certain place before you give the order, then
it would be a lot of time wasted. Because if you know your patient, if
you have handled your patient, some of the symptoms you can
interpret that comes with practice. And, I see no reason for not
allowing telephone orders unless it is the first time that you will be
encountering the patient. That you have no idea what the problem is.
Q: But, doctor, do you discharge patients without seeing them?
A: Sometimes yes, depending on how familiar I am with the patient. We are on
the question of telephone orders. I am not saying that that is the idle
[sic] thing to do, but I think the reality of present day practice somehow
justifies telephone orders. I have patients whom I have justified and
then all of a sudden, late in the afternoon or late in the evening, would
suddenly call they have decided that they will go home inasmuch as
they anticipated that I will discharge them the following day. So, I just
call and ask our resident on duty or the nurse to allow them to go
because I have seen that patient and I think I have full grasp of her
problems. So, thats when I make this telephone orders. And, of
course before giving that order I ask about how she
feels.[53] (Emphases supplied)
From the foregoing testimony, it is clear that the D&C procedure was conducted in
accordance with the standard practice, with the same level of care that any reasonably competent
doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances, and that there was nothing
irregular in the way the petitioner dealt with Editha.
Medical malpractice, in our jurisdiction, is often brought as a civil action for damages
under Article 2176[54] of the Civil Code. The defenses in an action for damages, provided for under
Article 2179 of the Civil Code are:

Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence
was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being
the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred.[55] An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act,
whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial
part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or damage was
either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission.[56]
In the present case, the Court notes the findings of the Board of Medicine:
When complainant was discharged on July 31, 1994, herein respondent
advised her to return on August 4, 1994 or four (4) days after the D&C. This
advise was clear in complainants Discharge Sheet. However, complainant
failed to do so. This being the case, the chain of continuity as required in order
that the doctrine of proximate cause can be validly invoked was
interrupted. Had she returned, the respondent could have examined her
thoroughly.[57] x x x (Emphases supplied)
Also, in the testimony of Dr. Manalo, he stated further that assuming that there was in
fact a misdiagnosis, the same would have been rectified if Editha followed the petitioners order to
return for a check-up on August 4, 1994. Dr. Manalo stated:
Granting that the obstetrician-gynecologist has been misled (justifiably) up to
thus point that there would have been ample opportunity to rectify the
misdiagnosis, had the patient returned, as instructed for her follow-up
evaluation. It was one and a half months later that the patient sought
consultation with another doctor. The continued growth of
an ectopic pregnancy, until its eventual rupture, is a dynamic process. Much
change in physical findings could be expected in 1 months, including the
emergence of suggestive ones.[58]
It is undisputed that Editha did not return for a follow-up evaluation, in defiance of the
petitioners advise. Editha omitted the diligence required by the circumstances which could have
avoided the injury. The omission in not returning for a follow-up evaluation played a substantial
part in bringing about Edithas own injury. Had Editha returned, petitioner could have conducted
the proper medical tests and procedure necessary to determine Edithas health condition and
applied the corresponding treatment which could have prevented the rupture of Edithas uterus.
The D&C procedure having been conducted in accordance with the standard medical practice, it
is clear that Edithas omission was the proximate cause of her own injury and not merely a
contributory negligence on her part.
Contributory negligence is the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the
part of the person injured, which, concurring with the defendants negligence, is the proximate
cause of the injury.[59] Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured
party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident.[60] Where the immediate cause of an
accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiffs own act, which contributed to the principal occurrence
as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover damages for the injury.[61] Again, based on
the evidence presented in the present case under review, in which no negligence can be
attributed to the petitioner, the immediate cause of the accident resulting in Edithas injury was her
own omission when she did not return for a follow-up check up, in defiance of petitioners
orders. The immediate cause of Edithas injury was her own act; thus, she cannot recover
damages from the injury.
Lastly, petitioner asserts that her right to due process was violated because she was never
informed by either respondents or by the PRC that an appeal was pending before the
PRC.[62] Petitioner claims that a verification with the records section of the PRC revealed that
on April 15, 1999, respondents filed a Memorandum on Appeal before the PRC, which did not
attach the actual registry receipt but was merely indicated therein.[63]
Respondents, on the other hand avers that if the original registry receipt was not attached to the
Memorandum on Appeal, PRC would not have entertained the appeal or accepted such pleading
for lack of notice or proof of service on the other party.[64] Also, the registry receipt could not be
appended to the copy furnished to petitioners former counsel, because the registry receipt was
already appended to the original copy of the Memorandum of Appeal filed with PRC.[65]
It is a well-settled rule that when service of notice is an issue, the rule is that the person alleging
that the notice was served must prove the fact of service. The burden of proving notice rests upon
the party asserting its existence.[66] In the present case, respondents did not present any proof that
petitioner was served a copy of the Memorandum on Appeal. Thus, respondents were not able
to satisfy the burden of proving that they had in fact informed the petitioner of the appeal
proceedings before the PRC.
In EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[67] in
which the National Labor Relations Commission failed to order the private respondent to furnish
the petitioner a copy of the Appeal Memorandum, the Court held that said failure deprived the
petitioner of procedural due process guaranteed by the Constitution, which could have served as
basis for the nullification of the proceedings in the appeal. The same holds true in the case at
bar. The Court finds that the failure of the respondents to furnish the petitioner a copy of the
Memorandum of Appeal submitted to the PRC constitutes a violation of due process. Thus, the
proceedings before the PRC were null and void.
All told, doctors are protected by a special rule of law. They are not guarantors of care.
They are not insurers against mishaps or unusual consequences[68] specially so if the patient
herself did not exercise the proper diligence required to avoid the injury.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 4, 2003 in CA-GR SP No. 62206 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Board of Medicine dated March 4, 1999 exonerating petitioner
is AFFIRMED.No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother and natural guardian, Armi A.
Alba, and ARMI A. ALBA, in her personal capacity, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ROSENDO C. HERRERA, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 are the February 27, 2004 decision2 and the
May 14, 2004 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61883, which
dismissed petitioner’s original action for annulment of judgment4of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 37, and denied the motion for reconsideration, respectively.
The antecedent facts show that on October 21, 1996, private respondent Rosendo C.
Herrera filed a petition5 for cancellation of the following entries in the birth certificate
of "Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.", to wit: (1) the surname "Herrera" as appended to the
name of said child; (2) the reference to private respondent as the father of Rosendo
Alba Herrera, Jr.; and (3) the alleged marriage of private respondent to the child’s
mother, Armi A. Alba (Armi) on August 4, 1982 in Mandaluyong City. He claimed that
the challenged entries are false and that it was only sometime in September 1996
that he learned of the existence of said birth certificate.
Private respondent alleged that he married only once, i.e., on June 28, 1965 with
Ezperanza C. Santos and never contracted marriage with Armi nor fathered Rosendo
Alba Herrera, Jr. In support thereof, he presented certifications from the Civil
Registrar of Mandaluyong City6 and the National Statistics Office,7 both stating that
they have no record of marriage between private respondent and Armi.
On November 12, 1996, private respondent filed an amended petition,8 impleading
Armi and "all the persons who have or claim any interest in th[e] petition."9
On November 27, 1996, the trial court issued an Order setting the petition for hearing
on January 24, 1997, and directed the publication and service of said order to Armi at
her address appearing in the birth certificate which is No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita,
Manila, and to the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila and the Solicitor General. The
full text of the order, reads:
In a verified Amended Petition for Correction of Entry, the Petitioner prays, inter alia,
that the following entries appearing in the subject Certificate of Live Birth be deleted:
1. All informations having reference to him as the father of the child mentioned
therein;
2. The surname "Herrera" appended to the child’s name;
3. His alleged marriage with the natural mother of the child.
Finding the Petition to be sufficient in form and substance, let the Petition be set for
hearing on January 24, 1997 at nine o’clock in the morning before this Branch at
Rooms 447-449, Fourth Floor, Manila City Hall. All interested parties are hereby
notified of the said hearing and are ordered to show cause why the Petition should
not be granted.
Let a copy of this Order be published at the expense of the Petitioner, once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of
Manila, and raffled pursuant to P.D. 1079.
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of the City of Manila with copies of the Petition and of this Order.
Let the same be likewise furnished the Private Respondent Armi Alba Herrera at the
address indicated in the subject Certificate of Live Birth.
SO ORDERED.10
On January 13, 1997, before the scheduled January 24, 1997 hearing, the trial court
issued an Amended Order11with substantially the same contents, except that the
hearing was re-scheduled to February 26, 1997. A copy of said Amended Order was
published in "Today", a newspaper of general circulation in Manila in its January 20,
27, and February 3, 1997 issues. Copies thereof were also sent to Armi at No. 418
Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, on January 17, 1997, the Local Civil Registrar of Manila
and the Solicitor General.
At the scheduled hearing on February 26, 1997, the counsel from the Office of the
Solicitor General appeared but filed no opposition to the petition. Armi, on the other
hand was not present. The return of the notice sent to her had the following notation:
This is to certify that on January 17, 1997, the undersigned [process server]
personally served a copy of the Amended Order in Sp. Proc. No. 96-80512 dated
January 13, 1997 to the private respondent, Armi Alba Herrera at … 418 Arquiza St.,
Ermita, Manila, but failed and unavailing for reason that (sic), private respondent is
no longer residing at said given address.12
On April 1, 1997, the court a quo rendered a decision which became final and
executory on June 2, 1997.13 The dispositive portion thereof, states:
ACCORDINGLY, and pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, judgment
is hereby rendered ordering the correction of the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth
of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr., in such a way that the entry under the name of the
child, the surname Herrera, Jr.[,] is ordered deleted, and the child shall be known as
ROSENDO ALBA; and that the entry under the date and place of marriage, the date
August 4, 1982, Mandaluyong, MM is likewise ordered deleted or cancelled.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila for proper
correction and entry.
SO ORDERED.14
Private respondent filed a motion15 for amendment of the decretal portion of the
decision to include the cancellation of all entries having reference to him as the father
of petitioner minor. This was granted in the August 11, 1997 order of the trial court as
follows:
ACCORDINGLY, and pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, judgment
is hereby rendered ordering the correction of the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth
of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr., in such a way that the entries under the name of the
child, the surname Herrera, Jr., and the name of the father Rosendo Caparas
Herrera are ordered deleted, and the child shall be known as ROSENDO ALBA; and
the entry under the date and place of marriage, the date August 4, 1982,
Mandaluyong, MM is likewise ordered deleted or cancelled.
SO ORDERED.16
On November 24, 2000, Armi and petitioner minor filed a petition for annulment of
judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction over their person. She allegedly came to know of the decision of the trial
court only on February 26, 1998, when San Beda College, where her son was
enrolled as a high school student, was furnished by private respondent with a copy of
a court order directing the change of petitioner minor’s surname from Herrera to Alba.
Armi averred that private respondent was aware that her address is at Unit 302 Plaza
Towers Condominium, 1175 Lorenzo Guerrero St., Ermita, Manila, because such
was her residence when she and private respondent cohabited as husband and wife
from 1982 to 1988; and her abode when petitioner minor was born on March 8, 1985.
Even after their separation, private respondent continued to give support to their son
until 1998; and that Unit 302 was conveyed to her by private respondent on June 14,
1991 as part of his support to petitioner minor. According to Armi, her address i.e.,
No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, as appearing in the birth certificate of their son,
was entered in said certificate through the erroneous information given by her sister,
Corazon Espiritu. She stressed that private respondent knew all along that No. 418
Arquiza St., is the residence of her sister and that he deliberately caused the service
of notice therein to prevent her from opposing the petition.
In his answer, private respondent denied paternity of petitioner minor and his
purported cohabitation with Armi. He branded the allegations of the latter as "false
statements coming from a polluted source."17
On February 27, 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition holding, among
others, that petitioner failed to prove that private respondent employed fraud and
purposely deprived them of their day in court. It further held that as an illegitimate
child, petitioner minor should bear the surname of his mother.18 Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, the instant petition.
Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, judgments
may be annulled on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud. 19
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and
her minor child depends on the nature of private respondent’s action, that is, in
personam, in rem or quasi in rem. An action in personam is lodged against a person
based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead
of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its
object is to subject that person’s interest in a property to a corresponding lien or
obligation.20
Hence, petitions directed against the "thing" itself or the res,21 which concerns the
status of a person,22 like a petition for adoption,23 annulment of marriage,24 or
correction of entries in the birth certificate,25 as in the instant case, are actions in rem.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary
for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction
on the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over
the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution
of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made
effective.26 The service of summons or notice to the defendant is not for the purpose
of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process
requirements.27
In the case at bar, the filing with the trial court of the petition for cancellation vested
the latter jurisdiction over the res. Substantial corrections or cancellations of entries in
civil registry records affecting the status or legitimacy of a person may be effected
through the institution of a petition under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, with
the proper Regional Trial Court.28 Being a proceeding in rem, acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is therefore not required in the present case.
It is enough that the trial court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The service of the order at No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila and the publication
thereof in a newspaper of general circulation in Manila, sufficiently complied with the
requirement of due process, the essence of which is an opportunity to be heard. Said
address appeared in the birth certificate of petitioner minor as the residence of Armi.
Considering that the Certificate of Birth bears her signature, the entries appearing
therein are presumed to have been entered with her approval. Moreover, the
publication of the order is a notice to all indispensable parties, including Armi and
petitioner minor, which binds the whole world to the judgment that may be rendered
in the petition. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication.29 The absence of personal service of the order to Armi was therefore
cured by the trial court’s compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice
by publication, thus:
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
In Barco v. Court of Appeals, the trial court granted a petition for correction/change of
entries in a minor’s birth certificate to reflect the name of the minor’s real father as
well as to effect the corresponding change of her surname. In seeking to annul said
decision, the other children of the alleged father claimed that they are indispensable
parties to the petition for correction, hence, the failure to implead them is a ground to
annul the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals denied the petition which
was sustained by this Court on the ground, inter alia, that while petitioner is indeed
an indispensable party, the failure to implead her was cured by the publication of the
order of hearing. Thus –
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her
interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial determination that
June was the daughter of Armando would affect her ward’s share in the estate of her
father. It cannot be established whether Nadina knew of Mary Joy’s existence at the
time she filed the petition for correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to
whether a petitioner under Rule 108 would know of all the parties whose interests
may be affected by the granting of a petition. For example, a petitioner cannot be
presumed to be aware of all the legitimate or illegitimate offsprings of his/her spouse
or paramour. The fact that Nadina amended her petition to implead Francisco and
Gustilo indicates earnest effort on her part to comply with Section 3 as quoted above.
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appeals
correctly pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance with Section 4, Rule
108, which requires notice by publication, thus:
Section 4. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to
the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the
subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even
parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108, but were
inadvertently left out. The Court of Appeals correctly noted:
The publication being ordered was in compliance with, and borne out by the Order of
January 7, 1985. The actual publication of the September 22, 1983 Order, conferred
jurisdiction upon the respondent court to try and decide the case. While "nobody
appeared to oppose the instant petition" during the December 6, 1984 hearing, that
did not divest the court from its jurisdiction over the case and of its authority to
continue trying the case. For, the rule is well-settled, that jurisdiction, once acquired
continues until termination of the case.
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not
against a person. The decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but
the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication.
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar
indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right
sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole
world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide
it.30
Furthermore, extrinsic fraud, which was private respondent’s alleged concealment of
Armi’s present address, was not proven. Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a
fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case,
whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case
by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. Here, Armi contended
that private respondent is aware of her present address because they lived together
as husband and wife in the condominium unit from 1982 to 1988 and because private
respondent continued to give support to their son until 1998. To prove her claim, she
presented (1) private respondent’s title over the condominium unit; (2) receipts
allegedly issued to private respondent for payment of homeowner’s or association
dues; (2) a photocopy of a January 14, 1991 deed of sale of the subject unit in favor
of Armi; and (3) the subsequent title issued to the latter. However, these documents
only tend to prove private respondent’s previous ownership of the unit and the
subsequent transfer thereof to Armi, but not the claimed live-in relationship of the
parties. Neither does the sale prove that the conveyance of the unit was part of
private respondent’s support to petitioner minor. Indeed, intimate relationships and
family relations cannot be inferred from what appears to be an ordinary business
transaction.
Although the January 14, 1991 deed of sale31 stated that Armi resides at 1175 L.
Guerrero St., Ermita, Manila, the same is not sufficient to prove that private
respondent has knowledge of Armi’s address because the former objected to the
offer of the deed for being a mere photocopy.32 The counsel for petitioners even
admitted that they do not have the original of the deed and that per certification of the
Clerk of Court, the Notary Public who notarized the deed of sale did not submit a
copy of the notarized document as required by the rules.33 The deed cannot thus be
the basis of ascribing knowledge of Armi’s address to private respondent inasmuch
as the authenticity thereof was neither admitted by private respondent nor proven by
petitioners.
While Armi presented the alleged love letters/notes from private respondent, they
were only attached as annexes to the petition and not formally offered as evidence
before the Court of Appeals. More importantly, said letters/notes do not have
probative value because they were mere photocopies and never proven to be an
authentic writing of private respondent. In the same vein, the affidavits 34 of Armi and
her sister, Corazon Espiritu, are of no evidentiary weight. The basic rule of evidence
is that unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify on
their affidavits, such affidavits must be rejected for being hearsay. Stated differently,
the declarants of written statements pertaining to disputed facts must be presented at
the trial for cross-examination.35 Inasmuch as Armi and her sister were not presented
before the Court of Appeals to affirm the veracity of their affidavits, the same are
considered hearsay and without probative value.
Ei incumbit probotio qui dicit, non qui negat. He who asserts, not he who denies,
must prove.36 Armi’s claim that private respondent is aware of her present address is
anchored on the assertion of a live-in relationship and support to her son. Since the
evidence presented by Armi is not sufficient to prove the purported cohabitation and
support, it follows that private respondent’s knowledge of Armi’s address was
likewise not proven. Thus, private respondent could not have deliberately concealed
from the court that which was not shown to be known to him. The Court of Appeals
therefore correctly dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of
failure to establish extrinsic fraud.
The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals in an
action to annul a judgment of a Regional Trial Court is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, where only
questions of law may be raised. The resort of petitioner to the instant civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 is therefore erroneous. The special civil action
of certiorari will not be allowed as a substitute for failure to timely file a petition for
review under Rule 45, which should be instituted within 15 days 37 from receipt of the
assailed decision or resolution. The wrong choice of remedy thus provides another
reason to dismiss this petition.38
Finally, petitioner failed to establish the merits of her petition to annul the trial court’s
decision. In an action for annulment of judgment, the petitioner must convince the
court that something may indeed be achieved should the assailed decision be
annulled.39 Under Article 17640 of the Family Code as amended by Republic Act (RA)
No. 9255, which took effect on March 19, 2004, illegitimate children shall use the
surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case
they may bear the father’s surname. In Wang v. Cebu Civil Registrar,41 it was held
that an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father, bears only a
given name and his mother’s surname. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate
child identifies him as such. It is only when said child is recognized that he may use
his father’s surname, reflecting his status as an acknowledged illegitimate child.
In the present case, it is clear from the allegations of Armi that petitioner minor is an
illegitimate child because she was never married to private respondent. Considering
that the latter strongly asserts that he is not the father of petitioner minor, the latter is
therefore an unrecognized illegitimate child. As such, he must bear the surname of
his mother.
In sum, the substantive and procedural aspects of the instant controversy do not
warrant the annulment of the trial court’s decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The February 27, 2004 decision and the
May 14, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61883 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
CARLITO I. KHO, MICHAEL KHO, MERCY NONA KHO-FORTUN, HEDDY MOIRA
KHO-SERRANO, KEVIN DOGMOC KHO (Minor), and KELLY DOGMOC KHO
(Minor), respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Challenged via petition for review on certiorari is the October 27, 2005 Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 78124 which affirmed the September 4,
2002 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City, Branch 5 granting
the prayer of respondents Carlito I. Kho (Carlito), Michael Kho, Mercy Nona Kho-
Fortun, and Heddy Moira Kho-Serrano for the correction of entries in their birth
certificates as well as those of Carlito’s minor children Kevin and Kelly Dogmoc Kho.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and Heddy
Moira filed before the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for correction of entries in
the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes in their respective birth certificates.
Carlito also asked the court in behalf of his minor children, Kevin and Kelly, to order
the correction of some entries in their birth certificates.
In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate of the
citizenship of his mother to "Filipino" instead of "Chinese," as well as the deletion of
the word "married" opposite the phrase "Date of marriage of parents" because his
parents, Juan Kho and Epifania Inchoco (Epifania), were allegedly not legally
married.
The same request to delete the "married" status of their parents from their respective
birth certificates was made by Carlito’s siblings Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy
Moira.
With respect to the birth certificates of Carlito’s children, he prayed that the date of
his and his wife’s marriage be corrected from April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the
date appearing in their marriage certificate.
The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was impleaded as respondent.
On April 23, 2001, Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition3 in which it was additionally
prayed that Carlito’s second name of "John" be deleted from his record of birth; and
that the name and citizenship of Carlito’s father in his (Carlito’s) marriage certificate
be corrected from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and "Filipino" to "Chinese," respectively.
As required, the petition was published for three consecutive weeks 4 in Mindanao
Daily Patrol-CARAGA, a newspaper of general circulation, after which it was set for
hearing on August 9, 2001.
In a letter of June 18, 2001 addressed to the trial court, the city civil registrar 5 stated
her observations and suggestions to the proposed corrections in the birth records of
Carlito and his siblings but interposed no objections to the other amendments.
On the scheduled hearing of the petition on August 9, 2001, only the counsel for
respondents appeared as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) had yet to enter
its appearance for the city civil registrar. The trial court thus reset the hearing to
October 9, 2001.6 On September 14, 2001,7 the OSG entered its appearance with an
authorization to the city prosecutor of Butuan City to appear in the case and render
assistance to it (the OSG).
On January 31, 2002, respondents presented documentary evidence showing
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the petition. They also presented
testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies of Carlito and his mother, Epifania.
During the same hearing, an additional correction in the birth certificates of Carlito’s
children was requested to the effect that the first name of their mother be rectified
from "Maribel" to "Marivel."
By Decision8 of September 4, 2002, the trial court directed the local civil registrar of
Butuan City to correct the entries in the record of birth of Carlito, as follows: (1)
change the citizenship of his mother from "Chinese" to "Filipino"; (2) delete "John"
from his name; and (3) delete the word "married" opposite the date of marriage of his
parents. The last correction was ordered to be effected likewise in the birth
certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.
Additionally, the trial court ordered the correction of the birth certificates of the minor
children of Carlito to reflect the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel Dogmoc
(Marivel) as January 21, 2000, instead of April 27, 1989, and the name "Maribel" as
"Marivel."
With respect to the marriage certificate of Carlito and Marivel, the corrections ordered
pertained to the alteration of the name of Carlito’s father from "John Kho" to "Juan
Kho" and the latter’s citizenship from "Filipino" to "Chinese."
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the CA, faulting
the trial court in granting the petition for correction of entries in the subject documents
despite the failure of respondents to implead the minors’ mother, Marivel, as an
indispensable party and to offer sufficient evidence to warrant the corrections with
regard to the questioned "married" status of Carlito and his siblings’ parents, and the
latter’s citizenship.
Petitioner also faulted the trial court for ordering the change of the name "Carlito
John Kho" to "Carlito Kho" for non-compliance with jurisdictional requirements for a
change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
By the assailed Decision of October 27, 2005, the CA denied petitioner’s appeal and
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The CA found that Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which outlines the proper
procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, was observed in
the case.
Regarding Carlito’s minor children Kevin and Kelly, the appellate court held that the
correction of their mother’s first name from "Maribel" to "Marivel" was made to rectify
an innocuous error.
As for the change in the date of the marriage of Carlito and Marivel, albeit the CA
conceded that it is a substantial alteration, it held that the date would not affect the
minors’ filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" considering that at the time of their
respective births in 1991 and 1993, their father Carlito’s first marriage was still
subsisting as it had been annulled only in 1999.
In light of Carlito’s legal impediment to marry Marivel at the time they were born, their
children Kevin and Kelly were illegitimate. It followed, the CA went on to state, that
Marivel was not an indispensable party to the case, the minors having been
represented by their father as required under Section 5 of Rule 39 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Further, the CA ruled that although Carlito failed to observe the requirements of Rule
103 of the Rules of Court, he had complied nonetheless with the jurisdictional
requirements for correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court. The petition for correction of entry in Carlito’s birth record, it noted, falls
under letter "o" of the enumeration under Section 2 of Rule 108.
In the present petition, petitioner contends that since the changes sought by
respondents were substantial in nature, they could only be granted through an
adversarial proceeding in which indispensable parties, such as Marivel and
respondents’ parents, should have been notified or impleaded.
Petitioner further contends that the jurisdictional requirements to change Carlito’s
name under Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court were not satisfied because
the Amended Petition failed to allege Carlito’s prior three-year bona fide residence in
Butuan City, and that the title of the petition did not state Carlito’s aliases and his true
name as "Carlito John I. Kho." Petitioner concludes that the same jurisdictional
defects attached to the change of name of Carlito’s father.
The petition fails.
It can not be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the citizenship
of Carlito’s mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and delete the "married"
status of Carlito’s parents in his and his siblings’ respective birth certificates, as well
as change the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel involves the correction of not
just clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature.10 Rather, the changes entail
substantial and controversial amendments.
For the change involving the nationality of Carlito’s mother as reflected in his birth
certificate is a grave and important matter that has a bearing and effect on the
citizenship and nationality not only of the parents, but also of the offspring.11
Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlito’s and his siblings’ parents were
"married" alters their filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate," with significant
implications on their successional and other rights.
Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary proceeding.
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic12 explains the raison d etre:
x x x. The philosophy behind this requirement lies in the fact that the books making
up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be prima facie evidence
of the facts therein contained. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or
changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action
wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the
door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might
be detrimental and far reaching. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In Republic v. Valencia,13 however, this Court ruled, and has since repeatedly ruled,
that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed
under Rule 108.14
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of
clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or
citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief
cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a
right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the
appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the
parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding.
xxxx
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black’s Law Dictionary
defines "adversary proceeding["] as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte
application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other
party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. x x x 15(Emphasis, italics
and underscoring supplied)
The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known as "An Act
Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a
Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname
in the Civil Register Without Need of Judicial Order," has been considered to lend
legislative affirmation to the judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the
civil status of persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing
of a petition under Rule 108.16
Thus, this Court in Republic v. Benemerito17 observed that the obvious effect of
Republic Act No. 9048 is to make possible the administrative correction of clerical or
typographical errors or change of first name or nickname in entries in the civil
register, leaving to Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes in the civil registry
in appropriate adversarial proceedings.
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the
appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections to the
entries of the civil register is satisfied.18 The pertinent provisions of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court read:
SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil registrar is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by
an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such
notice, file his opposition thereto. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
There is no dispute that the trial court’s Order19 setting the petition for hearing and
directing any person or entity having interest in the petition to oppose it was
posted20 as well as published for the required period; that notices of hearings were
duly served on the Solicitor General, the city prosecutor of Butuan and the local civil
registrar; and that trial was conducted on January 31, 2002 during which the public
prosecutor, acting in behalf of the OSG, actively participated by cross-examining
Carlito and Epifania.
What surfaces as an issue is whether the failure to implead Marivel and Carlito’s
parents rendered the trial short of the required adversary proceeding and the trial
court’s judgment void.
A similar issue was earlier raised in Barco v. Court of Appeals.21 That case stemmed
from a petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of a minor, June
Salvacion Maravilla, to reflect the name of her real father (Armando Gustilo) and to
correspondingly change her surname. The petition was granted by the trial court.
Barco, whose minor daughter was allegedly fathered also by Gustilo, however,
sought to annul the trial court’s decision, claiming that she should have been made a
party to the petition for correction. Failure to implead her deprived the RTC of
jurisdiction, she contended.
In dismissing Barco’s petition, this Court held that the publication of the order of
hearing under Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to implead an indispensable
party.
The essential requisite for allowing substantial corrections of entries in the civil
registry is that the true facts be established in an appropriate adversarial proceeding.
This is embodied in Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Section 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
xxxx
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her
interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial determination that
June was the daughter of Armando would affect her ward’s share in the estate of her
father. x x x.
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appeals
correctly pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance with Section 4, Rule
108, which requires notice by publication x x x.
xxxx
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the
subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even
parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108, but were
inadvertently left out. x x x
xxxx
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not
against a person. The decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but
the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication.
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar
indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right
sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole
world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide
it.22
Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to rule on whether Marivel or
respondents’ parents should have been impleaded as parties to the proceeding. It
may not be amiss to mention, however, that during the hearing on January 31, 2002,
the city prosecutor who was acting as representative of the OSG did not raise any
objection to the non-inclusion of Marivel and Carlito’s parents as parties to the
proceeding.
Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that Marivel was unaware of the
proceedings to correct the entries in her children’s birth certificates, especially since
the notices, orders and decision of the trial court eHe were all sent to the
residence23 she shared with Carlito and the children.
It is also well to remember that the role of the court in hearing a petition to correct
certain entries in the civil registry is to ascertain the truth about the facts recorded
therein.24
With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel, their certificate of
marriage25 shows that indeed they were married on January 21, 2000, not on April
27, 1989. Explaining the error, Carlito declared that the date "April 27, 1989" was
supplied by his helper, adding that he was not married to Marivel at the time his sons
were born because his previous marriage was annulled only in 1999.26 Given the
evidence presented by respondents, the CA observed that the minors were
illegitimate at birth, hence, the correction would bring about no change at all in the
nature of their filiation.
With respect to Carlito’s mother, it bears noting that she declared at the witness
stand that she was not married to Juan Kho who died in 1959.27 Again, that testimony
was not challenged by the city prosecutor.
The documentary evidence supporting the deletion from Carlito’s and his siblings’
birth certificates of the entry "Married" opposite the date of marriage of their parents,
moreover, consisted of a certification issued on November 24, 1973 by St. Joseph
(Butuan City) Parish priest Eugene van Vught stating that Juan Kho and Epifania had
been living together as common law couple since 1935 but have never contracted
marriage legally.28
A certification from the office of the city registrar, which was appended to
respondents’ Amended Petition, likewise stated that it has no record of marriage
between Juan Kho and Epifania.29 Under the circumstances, the deletion of the word
"Married" opposite the "date of marriage of parents" is warranted.
With respect to the correction in Carlito’s birth certificate of his name from "Carlito
John" to "Carlito," the same was properly granted under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the cancellation or correction of entries
involving changes of name falls under letter "o" of the following provision of Section 2
of Rule 108:30
Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a)
births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separation; (e) judgments of annulment of
marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and
(o) changes ofname. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs petitions for
change of name) were not complied with, observance of the provisions of Rule 108
suffices to effect the correction sought for.
More importantly, Carlito’s official transcript of record from the Urious College in
Butuan City,31 certificate of eligibility from the Civil Service Commission,32 and voter
registration record33 satisfactorily show that he has been known by his first name
only. No prejudice is thus likely to arise from the dropping of the second name.
The correction of the mother’s citizenship from Chinese to Filipino as appearing in
Carlito’s birth record was also proper. Of note is the fact that during the cross
examination by the city prosecutor of Epifania, he did not deem fit to question her
citizenship. Such failure to oppose the correction prayed for, which certainly was not
respondents’ fault, does not in any way change the adversarial nature of the
proceedings.
Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of Carlito’s siblings uniformly
stated the citizenship of Epifania as "Filipino." To disallow the correction in Carlito’s
birth record of his mother’s citizenship would perpetuate an inconsistency in the natal
circumstances of the siblings who are unquestionably born of the same mother and DECISION
father.

Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course, is the correction of the name
of Carlito’s wife from "Maribel" to "Marivel." The mistake is clearly clerical or
typographical, which is not only visible to the eyes, but is also obvious to the
VITUG, J.:
understanding34 considering that the name reflected in the marriage certificate of
Carlito and his wife is "Marivel."
The petition before the Court is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 62777, promulgated on 29 January 2001, which has affirmed the
Apropos is Yu v. Republic35 which held that changing the appellant’s Christian name decision of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija, Branch 31, in Special
of "Sincio" to "Sencio" amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error. The change
Proclamation No. 307-G, granting respondent's petition for correction of entry in the
of name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo was also held to
Certificate of Live Birth of Joven Lee S. Benemerito, born on 01 June 1990, by
be a mere innocuous alteration, which can be granted through a summary
changing the name of his father appearing therein from Peter Laurente Benemerito to
proceeding.36The same ruling holds true with respect to the correction in Carlito’s
Petronio L. Benemerito, and the date of marriage of the minor’s parents from 01
marriage certificate of his father’s name from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho." Except in September 1989 to 25 January 1998.
said marriage certificate, the name "Juan Kho" was uniformly entered in the birth
certificates of Carlito and of his siblings.37
On 29 February 1998, respondent Petronio L. Benemerito, filed a verified petition
before the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija asking for the correction of certain
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
entries in the record of birth of his son, Joven Lee Benemerito, on file with the Local
AFFIRMED. Civil Registrar of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. The entries sought to be corrected included -

SO ORDERED.
(a) a change of the father's name from Peter Laurente Benemerito to
Petronio L. Benemerito; and

(b) the date of marriage of Joven Lee’s parents, Edna V. Sicat and Petronio
L. Benemerito appearing therein from 01 September 1989 to 25 January
1998.

On 02 March 1998, a notice of hearing was issued by the trial court directing that the
notice be published for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR, GUIMBA, circulation. The order was published in "Pulso ng Bayan," a newspaper of general
NUEVA ECIJA, petitioners, circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks, i.e., on 05, 12 and 19 March 1998.
vs.
PETRONIO L. BENEMERITO, respondent. Respondent testified that he and Edna V. Sicat were married on 25 January 1998.
Prior to their marriage, they had been living together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage and during the cohabitation, a son, Joven Lee Benemerito, was
born to them. According to respondent, he was surprised to later discover that his
name was erroneously recorded in the birth certificate of his son as Peter Laurente
Benemerito instead of his correct name Petronio Laurente Benemerito, and that the
date of his marriage with Edna V. Sicat appearing in the birth certificate of Joven Lee
as 01 September 1989 instead of 25 January 1998.
On 20 April 1998, the trial court rendered a decision granting the petition filed by
respondent. The Republic appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, contending
that the petition should not have been granted since indispensable parties
themselves were not notified of the proceedings and that substantial changes, such
as the date of marriage of parents, name of the father, or filiation of the child and
whether legitimate or illegitimate, could only be threshed out in adversarial
proceedings.
On 29 January 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision stating
that -
"In the present case, the opportunity to contest the petition was afforded to
all concerned parties through the publication of the petition in `Pulso ng
Bayan,’ a newspaper of general circulation (Records, pp. 17, 20, and 23).
Copies of the Order dated March 2, 1998 were furnished to the Office of the
Solicitor General, the National Census and Statistics Office, the Provincial
Prosecutor, and the Office of the Local Registrar of Guimba, Nueva Ecija
(Records, p. 10). The Public Prosecutor appeared for the State but did not
interpose any objection to the petition (Rollo, p. 43). Decidedly, what the trial
court conducted amounted to an adversarial proceeding.
"The correction of the spelling of petitioner's name from Peter Laurente
Benemerito to Petronio Laurente Benemerito is an innocuous alteration.
"The change of the date of marriage from September 1, 1989 to reflect the
actual date of marriage as January 25, 1998, is likewise innocuous. Contrary
to the argument of the appellant, its legal effect is merely to change the
status of the child from legitimate to legitimated not illegitimate, as the child is
the natural child of both his parents who were not incapacitated to marry
each other at the time of the child's birth."1
In the instant petition, the Republic asserts that the changes sought by respondent
are substantial and not innocuous as so held by the Court of Appeals. Claiming that
an adversarial proceeding is essential to fully ventilate the allegations of the petition,
the Republic argues that indispensable parties, including the wife of the respondent
or the grandparents of the child, should have themselves been notified or been made
parties to the proceedings to shed light on the supposed discrepancies or errors
found in the birth certificate of Joven Lee Benemerito.
There is merit in the petition.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Article 412 of the Civil Code, states the
procedure by which an entry in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected. The
proceeding there contemplated may generally be used only to correct clerical,
spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error
is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by
a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, 2 or a harmless change such
as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the
occupation of the parent.3 On the other hand, substantial or contentious alterations
may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are
impleaded and due process is properly observed. 4
The "corrections" sought to be made by respondent in the birth certificate of Joven
Lee could hardly qualify as just clerical errors. In order to effect the desired changes,
it would be essential to establish that Peter Laurente Benemerito, the person named
as being the father of Joven Lee, and Petronio L. Benemerito, herein respondent,
refer to the same person. The intended correction of the date of marriage of the
parents of Joven Lee from 01 September 1989, appearing in his certificate of birth, to
25 January 1998, would, in effect, change the status of the child, Joven Lee, born on
01 June 1990 at a time when he and his wife were not as yet legally married, from
being the legitimate son of Peter Laurente Benemerito to being instead the
legitimated child of Petronio L. Benemerito and a certain Peter Laurente Benemerito.
The changes in the entry in the Certificate of Live Birth of Joven Lee S. Benemerito,
which can possibly affect successional and other rights of persons related to either or
both respondent and his wife, as well as that of Joven Lee himself, are simply too
substantial to be dealt with in summary, instead of the regular adversarial,
proceedings, where all interested parties are impleaded, or at least notified, and
allowed to be heard before the proposed changes in the birth certificate are effected.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides that interested parties may avail themselves
of the appropriate adversarial proceeding to correct substantial errors and to
establish the true facts in the civil registry. A case does not amount to an adversarial
proceeding simply because an opportunity to contest the petition is afforded by the
publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation. The corresponding
petition should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons
who may have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby. 5
Apparently, the proceedings conducted by the trial court in the instant case fell much
too short of the requirements. Nowhere in the records would it appear that all
possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings.
Parenthetically, the recent enactment of Republic Act 9048, otherwise also known as
"An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to
Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or
Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need of Judicial Order," only empowers the
City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to correct clerical or
typographical errors and to allow a change in the first name or nickname in an entry
in the civil registry without further need of a judicial order. The obvious effect of
Republic Act 9048 is merely to make possible the administrative correction of clerical
or typographical errors or change of first name or nickname in entries in the civil
register, leaving to Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes in the civil registry
in appropriate adversarial proceedings.6
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without
prejudice on the part of respondent to initiate the appropriate adversarial proceedings
such as may be minded. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MARCELO LEE, ALBINA LEE-YOUNG, MARIANO LEE, PABLO LEE, HELEN LEE,
CATALINO K. LEE, EUSEBIO LEE, EMMA LEE, and TIU CHUAN, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION and HON. JAIME T.
HAMOY, in their capacities as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court of
Manila and Branch 130, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, respectively and RITA
K. LEE, LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG in their personal capacities and ROSA K. LEE-
VANDERLEK, MELODY K. LEE-CHIN, LUCIA K. LEE TEK SHENG, JULIAN K. LEE,
HENRY K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, VICTORIANO K. LEE, NATIVIDAD K. LEE-
MIGUEL, and THOMAS K. LEE, represented by RITA K. LEE, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, seeks the reversal of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated October 28, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP NO.
317862 . The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals upheld the Orders issued by
respondents Judges Hon. Lorenzo B. Veneracion3 and Hon. Jaime T. Hamoy4 taking
cognizance of two (2) separate petitions filed by private respondents before their
respective salas for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth
of petitioners pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the same man but begotten
of two (2) different mothers. One set, the private respondents herein, are the children
of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng. The other set, the
petitioners herein, are allegedly children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu
Chuan.
Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng, Rosa K. Lee-Vanderlek, Melody K. Lee-Chin,
Lucia K. Lee Tek Sheng-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Henry K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Victoriano
K. Lee, Natividad K. Lee-Miguel and Thomas K. Lee (hereinafter referred to as
private respondents) filed two (2) separate petitions for the cancellation and/or
correction of entries in the records of birth of Marcelo Lee, Albina Lee-Young,
Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen Lee, Catalino K. Lee, Eusebio Lee, and Emma Lee
(hereinafter referred to as petitioners). On December 2, 1992, the petition against all
petitioners, with the exception of Emma Lee, was filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila and docketed as SP. PROC. NO. 92-636925 and later assigned to
Branch 47 presided over by respondent Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion. On February
3, 1993, a similar petition against Emma Lee was filed before the RTC of Kalookan
and docketed as SP. PROC. NO. C-16746 and assigned to the sala of respondent
Judge Jaime T. Hamoy of Branch 130.
Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous entries in all
pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name
of "Keh Shiok Cheng" as their mother, and by substituting the same with the name
"Tiu Chuan", who is allegedly the petitioners' true birth mother.
The private respondents alleged in their petitions before the trial courts that they are
the legitimate children of spouses Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng who were
legally married in China sometime in 1931. Except for Rita K. Lee who was born and
raised in China, private respondents herein were all born and raised in the
Philippines.
Sometime in October, 1948, Lee Tek Sheng, facilitated the arrival in the Philippines
from China of a young girl named Tiu Chuan. She was introduced by Lee Tek Sheng
to his family as their new housemaid but far from becoming their housemaid, Tiu
Chuan immediately became Lee Tek Sheng's mistress. As a result of their illicit
relations, Tiu Chuan gave birth to petitioners.
Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan gave
birth to each of the petitioners, their common father, Lee Tek Sheng, falsified the
entries in the records of birth of petitioners by making it appear that petitioners'
mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.
Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who gave maternal care and guidance
to the petitioners. They all lived in the same compound Keh Shiok Cheng and private
respondents were residing in. All was well, therefore, before private respondents'
discovery of the dishonesty and fraud perpetrated by their father, Lee Tek Sheng.
The tides turned after Keh Shiok Cheng's demise on May 9, 1989. Lee Tek Sheng
insisted that the names of all his children, including those of petitioners', be included
in the obituary notice of Keh Shiok Cheng's death that was to be published in the
newspapers. It was this seemingly irrational act that piqued private respondents'
curiosity, if not suspicion.7
Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to conduct an investigation into the matter. After investigation and
verification of all pertinent records, the NBI prepared a report that pointed out, among
others, the false entries in the records of birth of petitioners, specifically the following.
1. As per Birth Certificate MARCELO LEE (Annex F-1), their father, LEE TEK
SHENG made it appear that he is the 12th child of Mrs. KEH SHIOK
CHENG, but upon investigation, it was found out that her Hospital Records,
the mother who gave birth to MARCELO LEE had given birth for the 1st time,
as per diagnosis of the attending physician, Dr. R. LIM, it was "GRAVIDA I,
PARA I" which means "first pregnancy, first live birth delivery" (refer to:
MASTER PATIENT'S RECORDS SUMMARY — Annex I). Also, the age of
the mother when she gave birth to MARCELO LEE as per record was only
17 years old, when in fact and in truth, KEH SHIOK CHENG's age was then
already 38 years old. The address used by their father in the Master Patient
record was also the same as the Birth Certificate of MARCELO LEE (2425
Rizal Avenue, Manila). The name of MARCELO LEE was recorded under
Hospital No. 221768, page 73.
2. As per Birth Certificate of ALBINA LEE (Annex F-2), it was made to appear
that ALBINA LEE was the third child which is without any rationality, because
the 3rd child of KEH SHIOK CHENG is MELODY LEE TEK SHENG (Annex
E-2). Note also, that the age of the mother as per Hospital Records jump
(sic) from 17 to 22 years old, but the only age gap of MARCELO LEE and
ALBINA LEE is only 2 years.
3. As per Birth Certificate of MARIANO LEE (Annex F-3), it was made to
appear that MARIANO LEE was the 5th child, but the truth is, KEH SHIOK
CHENG's 5th child is LUCIA LEE TEK SHENG (Annex E-4). As per Hospital
Record, the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG was only 23 years old, while the
actual age of KEH SHIOK CHENG, was then already 40 years old.
4. As per Birth Certificate of PABLO LEE (Annex F-4), it was made to appear
that PABLO LEE was the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG which is
impossible to be true, considering the fact that KEH SHIOK CHENG have
stopped conceiving after her 11th child. Also as per Hospital Record, the age
of the mother was omitted in the records. If PABLO LEE is the 16th child of
KEH SHIOK CHENG, it would only mean that she have (sic) given birth to
her first born child at the age of 8 to 9 years, which is impossible to be true.
Based on the birth record of MARIANO LEE in 1953, the recorded age of
KEH SHIOK CHENG was 23 years old. Two years after PABLO LEE was
born in 1955, the difference is only 2 years, so it is impossible for PABLO
LEE to be the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, as it will only mean that she
have (sic) given birth at that impossible age.
 5. As per Birth Certificate of HELEN LEE (Annex F-5), it was made to appear
that she is the 6th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, but as per Birth Certificate of
JULIAN LEE (Annex E-5), he is the true 6th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG.
Per Hospital Record, KEH SHIOK CHENG is only 28 years old, while KEH
SHIOK CHENG'S true age at that time was 45 years old.
6. EMMA LEE has no record in the hospital because, as per complainant's
allegation, she was born at their house, and was later admitted at Chinese
General Hospital.
7. As per Birth Certificate of CATALINO LEE (Annex F-7), it was made to
appear that he is the 14th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, and that the age of
KEH SHIOK CHENG a.k.a. Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG, jumped from 28 years
old at the birth of HELEN LEE on 23 August 1957 to 38 years old at the birth
of CATALINO LEE on 22 April 1959.
8. As per Birth Certificate of EUSEBIO LEE, the alleged last son of KEH
SHIOK CHENG, the age of the mother is 48 years old. However, as per
Hospital Record, the age of Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG, then was only 39 years
old. Considering the fact, that at the time of MARCELO's birth on 11 May
1950. KEH SHIOK CHENG's age is 38 years old and at the time of
EUSEBIO's birth, she is already 48 years old, it is already impossible that
she could have given birth to 8 children in a span of only 10 years at her age.
As per diagnosis, the alleged mother registered on EUSEBIO's birth indicate
that she had undergone CEASARIAN SECTION, which Dr. RITA K. LEE said
is not true.
In view of the foregoing facts, the NBI concluded that:
10. In conclusion, as per Chinese General Hospital Patients
Records, it is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is
certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman,
most probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and analysis by
these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG, is in a quandary in fixing the age of
KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with his grand design of
making his 8 children as their own legitimate children, consequently
elevating the status of his 2nd family and secure their future. The
doctor lamented that this complaint would not have been necessary
had not the father and his 2nd family kept on insisting that the 8
children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK CHENG.8
It was this report that prompted private respondents to file the petitions for
cancellation and/or correction of entries in petitioners' records of birth with the lower
courts.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions — SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692
and SP. PROC. NO. C-1674 — on the grounds that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is
improper where the ultimate objective is to assail the legitimacy and filiation of
petitioners; (2) the petition, which is essentially an action to impugn legitimacy was
filed prematurely; and (3) the action to impugn has already prescribed.9
On February 12, 1993, respondent Judge Veneracion denied the motion to dismiss
SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 for failure of the herein petitioners (defendants in the lower
court) to appear at the hearing of the said motion.10 Then on February 17, 1993,
Judge Veneracion issued an Order, the pertinent portion of which, reads as follows:
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the same is
hereby given due course. Let this petition be set for hearing on March 29,
1993 at 8:30 in the morning before this Court located at the 5th Floor of the
City Hall of Manila.
Notice is hereby given that anyone who has any objection to the petition
should file on or before the date of hearing his opposition thereto with a
statement of the grounds therefor.
Let a copy of this Order be published, at the expense of the petitioners, once
a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines.
Let copies of the verified petition with its annexes and of this Order be served
upon the Office of the Solicitor General, and the respondents, and be posted
on the Bulletin Board of this Court, also at the expense of the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.11
On the other hand, respondent Judge Hamoy issued an Order dated April 15, 1993
taking cognizance of SP. PROC. No. C-1674, to wit:
It appearing from the documentary evidence presented and marked by the
petitioners that the Order of the Court setting the case for hearing was
published in "Media Update" once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks,
that is on February 20, 27, and March 6, 1993 as evidenced by the Affidavit
of Publication and the clippings attached to the affidavit, and by the copies of
the "Media Update" published on the aforementioned dates; further, copy of
the order setting the case for hearing together with copy of the petition had
been served upon the Solicitor General, City Prosecutor of Kalookan City,
Civil Registrar of Kalookan City and the private respondents, the Court holds
that the petitioners have complied with the jurisdictional requirements for the
Court to take cognizance of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioners' attempts at seeking a reconsideration of the above-mentioned orders of
Judge Veneracion and Judge Hamoy failed, hence their recourse to the Court of
Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for the Issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Petitioners
averred that respondents judges had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders allowing the petitions for
the cancellation and/or correction of entries in petitioners' records of birth to prosper
in the lower courts.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the petitioners raised the following
arguments: (1) Rule 108 is inappropriate for impugning the legitimacy and filiation of
children; (2) Respondents judges are sanctioning a collateral attack against the
filiation and legitimacy of children; (3) Respondents judges are allowing private
respondents to impugn the legitimacy and filiation of their siblings despite the fact
that their undisputed common father is still alive; (4) Respondents judges are
entertaining petitions which are already time-barred; and (5) The petitions below are
part of a forum-shopping spree.13
Finding no merit in petitioners' arguments, the Court of Appeals dismissed their
petition in a Decision dated October 28, 1994.14 Petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration of the said decision was also denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated December 19, 1994.15
Hence, this petition.
1. Petitioners contend that resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is
improper since private respondents seek to have the entry for the name of
petitioners' mother changed from "Keh Shiok Cheng" to "Tiu Chuan" who is a
completely different person. What private respondents therefore seek is not merely a
correction in name but a declaration that petitioners were not born of Lee Tek
Sheng's legitimate wife, Keh Shiok Cheng, but of his mistress, Tiu Chuan, in effect a
"bastardization of petitioners."16 Petitioners thus label private respondents' suits
before the lower courts as a collateral attack against their legitimacy in the guise of a
Rule 108 proceeding.
Debunking petitioners' above contention, the Court of Appeals observed:
xxx xxx xxx
As correctly pointed out by the private respondents in their comment . . . , the
proceedings are simply aimed at establishing a particular fact, status and/or
right. Stated differently, the thrust of said proceedings was to establish the
factual truth regarding the occurrence of certain events which created or
affected the status of persons and/or otherwise deprived said persons of
rights.17
xxx xxx xxx
It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a
particular fact.18 The petitions filed by private respondents for the correction of entries
in the petitioners' records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or
biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and
given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners'
contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn
legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children
of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter's children.
There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok
Cheng and petitioners.19
Further sanctioning private respondents' resort to Rule 108, the Court of Appeals
adverted to our ruling in the leading case of Republic vs. Valencia20 where we
affirmed the decision of Branch XI of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu
City ordering the correction in the nationality and civil status of petitioner's minor
children as stated in their records of birth from "Chinese" to "Filipino", and "legitimate"
to "illegitimate", respectively. Although recognizing that the changes or corrections
sought to be effected are not mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature,
this Court, sitting en banc, held therein that even substantial errors in a civil register
may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the
error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.21 In the said case,
we also laid down the rule that a proceeding for correction and/or cancellation of
entries in the civil register under Rule 108 ceases to be summary in nature and takes
on the characteristics of an appropriate adversary proceeding when all the procedural
requirements under Rule 108 are complied with. Thus we held:
"Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts
have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been
given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the
evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or
proceeding is 'appropriate.'
The pertinent sections of rule 108 provide:
'SECTION 3. Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry
in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceeding.'
'SECTION 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of the
petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the
hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be
given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.'
'SECTION 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person
having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.'
"Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning
the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are — (1) the civil
registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the
court to — (1) issue an order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the
petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: — (1) the
civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any interest under the
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.
"If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for
correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and
conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be
described as "summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition to
the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person having or
claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected
and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become
adversary proceedings."22 (Emphasis supplied.)
To the mind of the Court of Appeals, the proceedings taken in both petitions for
cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of petitioners in the
lower courts are appropriate adversary proceedings.
We agree. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:
In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of
birth was filed by private respondents and pursuant to the order of the RTC-
Manila, dated February 17, 1993, a copy of the order setting the case for
hearing was ordered published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. In the RTC-
Kalookan, there was an actual publication of the order setting the case for
hearing in "Media Update" once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. In
both cases notices of the orders were ordered served upon the Solicitor
General, the Civil Registrars of Manila and Kalookan and upon the
petitioners herein. Both orders set the case for hearing and directed the Civil
 Registrars and the other respondents in the case below to file their
oppositions to the said petitions. A motion to dismiss was consequently filed
by herein petitioners Marcelo, Mariano, Pablo, Helen, Catalino and Eusebio,
all surnamed Lee, and Albina Lee-Young in the RTC-Manila, and an
opposition was filed by Emma Lee in the RTC-Kalookan.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the petitions filed by the private
respondents in the courts below by way of a special proceeding cancellation
and/or correction of entries in the civil registers with the requisite parties,
notices and publications could very well be regarded as that proper suit or
appropriate action.23 (Emphasis supplied.)
The petitioners assert, however, that making the proceedings adversarial does not
give trial courts the license to go beyond the ambit of Rule 108 which is limited to
those corrections contemplated by Article 412 of the New Civil Code or mere clerical
errors of a harmless or innocuous nature.24 The petitioners point to the case
of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic,25 which is of a later date than Republic vs.
Valencia,26 where this Court reverted to the doctrine laid down in earlier
cases,27 starting with Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic,28 prohibiting the extension of the
application of Rule 108 beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections.
Petitioners contend that as held in Go, et al. vs. Civil Registrar,29 allowing substantial
changes under Rule 108 would render the said rule unconstitutional as the same
would have the effect of increasing or modifying substantive rights.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that in the cited case of Labayo-Rowe vs.
Republic,30 the reason we declared null and void the portion of the lower court's order
directing the change of Labayo-Rowe's civil status and the filiation of one of her
children as appearing in the latter's record of birth, is not because Rule 108 was
inappropriate to effect such changes, but because Labayo-Rowe's petition before the
lower court failed to implead all indispensable parties to the case.
We explained in this wise:
"x x x An appropriate proceeding is required wherein all the indispensable
parties should be made parties to the case as required under Section 3, Rule
108 of the Revised Rules of Court.
"In the case before Us, since only the Office of the Solicitor General was
notified through the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, representing the Republic
of the Philippines as the only respondent, the proceedings taken, which is
summary in nature, is short of what is required in cases where substantial
alterations are sought. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other
indispensable parties should have been made respondents. They include not
only the declared father of the child but the child as well, together with the
paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely
affected thereby. All other persons who may be affected by the change
should be notified or represented x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
"The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be
substantially impaired if her status would be changed from 'legitimate' to
'illegitimate'. Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and
embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she
will bear thereafter. The fact that the notice of hearing of the petition was
published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was
served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken.
Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated
by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13,
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which directs that such rules 'shall not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.' If Rule 108 were to be
extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors
which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to
comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without observing
the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule would thereby
become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase or modify
substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the
Civil Code."31 (italics supplied).
Far from petitioners' theory, this Court's ruling in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic32 does
not exclude recourse to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to effect substantial
changes or corrections in entries of the civil register. The only requisite is that the
proceedings under Rule 108 be an appropriate adversary proceeding as contra-
distinguished from a summary proceeding. Thus:
"If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or correction of entries in
the civil register] is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to
 the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary
procedure, issue an order for the correction of a mistake. However, as
repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial
alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary
proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved. Changes
which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in
character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the
nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be
affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted
to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted x
x x."33(Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing may be
dispensed with, and the remedy granted upon mere application or motion. But this is
not always the case, as when the statute expressly provides. 34 Hence, a special
proceeding is not always summary. One only has to take a look at the procedure
outlined in Rule 108 to see that what is contemplated therein is not a summary
proceeding per se. Rule 108 requires publication of the petition three (3) times, i.e.,
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec.4). The Rule also requires
inclusion as parties of all persons who claim any interest which would be affected by
the cancellation or correction (Sec. 3). The civil registrar and any person in interest
are also required to file their opposition, if any, within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice (Sec. 5). Last, but not
the least, although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after
hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
same (Sec. 7).
Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia,35 that Rule
108, when all the procedural requirements thereunder are followed, is the appropriate
adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the
civil register.
It must be conceded, however, that even after Republic vs. Valencia36 there
continues to be a seesawing of opinion on the issue of whether or not substantial
corrections in entries of the civil register may be effected by means of Rule 108 in
relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. The more recent cases of Leonor vs.
Court of Appeals37and Republic vs. Labrador38 do seem to signal a reversion to the
Ty Kong Tin ruling which delimited the scope of application of Article 412 to clerical or
typographical errors in entries of the civil register.
In Republic vs. Labrador, the Court held that Rule 108 cannot be used to modify,
alter or increase substantive rights, such as those involving the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child. We ruled thus:
"This issue has been resolved in Leonor vs. Court of Appeals. In that case,
Respondent Mauricio Leonor filed a petition before the trial court seeking the
cancellation of the registration of his marriage to Petitioner Virginia Leonor.
He alleged, among others, the nullity of their legal vows arising from the
"non-observance of the legal requirements for a valid marriage." In
debunking the trial court's ruling granting such petition, the Court held as
follows:
'On its face, the Rule would appear to authorize the cancellation of
any entry regarding "marriages" in the civil registry for any reason by
the mere filing of a verified petition for the purpose. However, it is not
as simple as it looks. Doctrinally, the only errors that can be
canceled or corrected under this Rule are typographical or clerical
errors, not material or substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a
marriage. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding; error made by a clerk or a transcriber;
a mistake in copying or writing (Black vs. Republic, L-10869, Nov.
28, 1958); or some harmless and innocuous change such as a
correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of
the occupation of the parent (Ansalada vs. Republic, L-10226, Feb.
14, 1958).'
'Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil
status of petitioner and her children from legitimate to illegitimate, the
same cannot be granted except only in an adversarial x x x .'
'Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure under Rule 108,
and for that matter under Article 412 of the Civil Code cannot be
used by Mauricio to change his and Virginia's civil status from
married to single and of their three children from legitimate to
illegitimate x x x '
"Thus, where the effect of a correction of an entry in a civil registry will
change the status of a person from "legitimate to "illegitimate," as in Sarah
Zita's case, the same cannot be granted in summary proceedings."39
It is, therefore, high time that we put an end to the confusion sown by
pronouncements seemingly in conflict with each other, and perhaps, in the process,
stem the continuing influx of cases raising the same substantial issue.
The basis for the pronouncement that extending the scope of Rule 108 to substantial
corrections is unconstitutional is embodied in the early case of Ty Kong Tin vs.
Republic40 that first delineated the extent or scope of the matters that may be
changed or corrected pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. The Supreme
Court ruled in this case that:
"x x x After a mature deliberation, the opinion was reached that what was
contemplated therein are mere corrections of mistakes that are clerical in
nature and not those that may affect the civil status or the nationality or
citizenship of the persons involved. If the purpose of the petition is merely a
clerical error then the court may issue an order in order that the error or
mistake may be corrected. If it refers to a substantial change, which affects
the status or citizenship of a party, the matter should be threshed out in a
proper action depending upon the nature of the issue involved. Such action
can be found at random in our substantive and remedial laws the
implementation of which will naturally depend upon the factors and
circumstances that might arise affecting the interested parties. This opinion is
predicated upon the theory that the procedure contemplated in article 412 is
summary in nature which cannot cover cases involving controversial
issues."41
This doctrine was taken a step further in the case of Chua Wee, et al. vs.
Republic42 where the Court said that:
"From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950 until the
promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court on January 1, 1964, there was
no law nor rule of court prescribing the procedure to secure judicial
authorization to effect the desired innocuous rectifications or alterations in
the civil register pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of
the Revised Rules of Court now provides for such a procedure which should
be limited solely to the implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on
the matter of correcting entries in the civil register. Rule 108, like all the other
provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court
pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13 of Art. VIII of the
Constitution, which directs that such rules of court 'shall not diminish or
increase or modify substantive rights.' If Rule 108 were to be extended
beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are
visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend
substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby
become unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying substantive
rights, which changes are not authorized under Article 412 of the New Civil
Code."43 (Italics supplied).
We venture to say now that the above pronouncements proceed from a wrong
premise, that is, the interpretation that Article 412 pertains only to clerical errors of a
harmless or innocuous nature, effectively excluding from its domain, and the scope of
its implementing rule, substantial changes that may affect nationality, status, filiation
and the like. Why the limited scope of Article 412? Unfortunately, Ty Kong Tin does
not satisfactorily answer this question except to opine that the procedure
contemplated in Article 412 is summary in nature and cannot, therefore, cover cases
involving controversial issues. Subsequent cases have merely echoed the Ty Kong
Tin doctrine without, however, shedding light on the matter.
The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412 contemplates a summary
procedure.
First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows:
"No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial
order."
It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed except to say that
the corrections or changes must be effected by judicial order. As such, it cannot be
gleaned therefrom that the procedure contemplated for obtaining such judicial order
is summary in nature.
Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both the terms "corrected" and
"changed". In its ordinary sense, to correct means to make or set right"; "to remove
the faults or errors from"44 while to change means "to replace something with
something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute".45 The
provision neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor does
it distinguish on the basis of the effect that the correction or change may have.
Hence, it is proper to conclude that all entries in the civil register may be changed or
corrected under Article 412. What are the entries in the civil register? We need not go
further than Articles 407 and 408 of the same title to find the answer.
"Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register."
"Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor;
and (16) changes of name."
It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered by the preceding provisions
include not only status but also nationality. Therefore, the Ty Kong Tin
pronouncement that Article 412 does not contemplate matters that may affect civil
status, nationality or citizenship is erroneous. This interpretation has the effect of
isolating Article 412 from the rest of the articles in Title XVI, Book I of the New Civil
Code, in clear contravention of the rule of statutory construction that a statute must
always be construed as a whole such that the particular meaning to be attached to
any word or phrase is ascertained from the context and the nature of the subject
treated.46
Thirdly, Republic Act No. 904847 which was passed by Congress on February 8, 2001
substantially amended Article 412 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
"SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and
Change of First Name or Nickname. — No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations."
The above law speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil
register are now to be corrected and changed without need of a judicial order and by
the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general. The obvious effect is to remove
from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in entries of the
civil register. Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial
changes and corrections in entries of the civil register. This is precisely the opposite
of what Ty Kong Tin and other cases of its genre had said, perhaps another
indication that it was not sound doctrine after all.
It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is Congress' response to the
confusion wrought by the failure to delineate as to what exactly is that so-
called summary procedure for changes or corrections of a harmless or innocuous
nature as distinguished from that appropriate adversary proceeding for changes or
corrections of a substantial kind. For we must admit that though we have constantly
referred to an appropriate adversary proceeding, we have failed to categorically state
just what that procedure is. Republic Act No. 9048 now embodies that summary
procedure while Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary proceeding. Be that as it may,
the case at bar cannot be decided on the basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which has
prospective application. Hence, the necessity for the preceding treatise.
II. The petitioners contend that the private respondents have no cause of action to
bring the cases below as Article 171 of the Family Code allows the heirs of the father
to bring an action to impugn the legitimacy of his children only after his death.48
Article 171 provides:
"The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the
period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:
"(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for
bringing this action;
"(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted
therefrom; or
"(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband."
Petitioner's contention is without merit.
In the recent case of Babiera vs. Catotal,49 we upheld the decision of the Court of
Appeals that affirmed the judgment of the RTC of Lanao del Norte declaring the birth
certificate of one Teofista Guinto as null and void ab initio, and ordering the Local
Civil Registrar of Iligan City to cancel the same from the Registry of Live Births. We
ruled therein that private respondent Presentacion Catotal, child of spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, had the requisite standing to initiate an action to
cancel the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera, another alleged child of the same
spouses because she is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.50
We likewise held therein that:
"x x x Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A
close reading of the provision shows that it applies to instances in which the
father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision, however,
presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The
present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to
petitioner. In other words, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioner is
an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the
latter's child at all x x x. ''51
Similarly, we ruled in Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals52 that:
"Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171
of the Family Code to the case at bench cannot be sustained. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
"A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not
be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these
articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a
child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn
the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him
to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300
days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological
or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in
case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake,
fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171
reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which
the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the
legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when
it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench
is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner is
not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was
not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is
apropos, viz:
'Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art.
170 of the Family Code] is not well taken. This legal provision refers
to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case
because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but
an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as
legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that
petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the
deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being
neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor
a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal
heir of the deceased. "'53
III. Petitioners claim that private respondents' cause of action had already prescribed
as more than five (5) years had lapsed between the registration of the latest birth
among the petitioners in 1960 and the filing of the actions in December of 1992 and
February of 1993.54
We disagree. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, inasmuch as no law
or rule specifically prescribes a fixed time for filing the special proceeding under Rule
108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code, it is the following provision of the
New Civil Code that applies:
"Art. 1149. other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other
laws must be brought within five years from the time the right of action
accrues."
The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of
three (3) elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of the
defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff. It is only when the last element occurs
or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen. 55
It is indubitable that private respondents have a cause of action. The last element of
their cause of action, that is, the act of their father in falsifying the entries in
petitioners' birth records, occurred more than thirty (30) years ago. Strictly speaking,
it was upon this occurrence that private respondents' right of action or right to sue
accrued. However, we must take into account the fact that it was only sometime in
1989 that private respondents discovered that they in fact had a cause of action
against petitioners who continue to use said falsified birth records.
Hence, it would result in manifest injustice if we were to deprive private respondents
of their right to establish the truth about a fact, in this case, petitioners' true mother,
and their real status, simply because they had discovered the dishonesty perpetrated
upon them by their common father at a much later date. This is especially true in the
case of private respondents who, as their father's legitimate children, did not have
any reason to suspect that he would commit such deception against them and
deprive them of their sole right to inherit from their mother's (Keh Shiok Cheng's)
estate. It was only sometime in 1989 that private respondents' suspicions were
aroused and confirmed. From that time until 1992 and 1993, less than five (5) years
had lapsed.
Petitioners would have us reckon the five-year prescriptive period from the date of
the registration of the last birth among the petitioners-siblings in 1960, and not from
the date private respondents had discovered the false entries in petitioners' birth
records in 1989. Petitioners base their position on the fact that birth records are
public documents, hence, the period of prescription for the right of action available to
the private respondents started to run from the time of the registration of their birth
certificates in the Civil Registry.
We cannot agree with petitioners' thinking on that point.
It is true that the books making up the Civil Register and all documents relating
thereto are public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein
contained.56 Petitioners liken their birth records to land titles, public documents that
serve as notice to the whole world. Unfortunately for the petitioners, this analogy
does not hold water. Unlike a title to a parcel of land, a person's parentage cannot be
acquired by prescription. One is either born of a particular mother or not. It is that
simple.
IV. Finally, petitioners accuse private respondents of forum shopping. They
enumerate the other actions filed by private respondents against them prior to the
filing of their Rule 108 petitions in the lower courts, as follows:
(1) A criminal complaint for falsification of entries in the birth certificates filed
against their father as principal and against defendants as alleged
accessories;
(2) A petition for the cancellation of the naturalization certificate of their
father, Lee Tek Sheng; and
(3) A petition for partition of Keh Shiok Cheng's estate. 57
According to the petitioners, all the three (3) actions above-mentioned, as well as the
Rule 108 petitions, subject of the case before us, raise the common issue of whether
petitioners are the natural children of Keh Shiok Cheng or Tiu Chuan. They contend
that in all these cases, the judge or hearing officer would have to resolve this issue in
order to determine whether or not to grant the relief prayed for.58
Forum shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending there is identity of
parties, rights or causes of action and reliefs sought.59 Even a cursory examination of
the pleadings filed by private respondents in their various cases against petitioners
would reveal that at the very least there is no identity of rights or causes of action and
reliefs prayed for. The present case has its roots in two (2) petitions filed under Rule
108, the purpose of which is to correct and/or cancel certain entries in petitioners'
birth records. Suffice it to state, the cause of action in these Rule 108 petitions and
the relief sought therefrom are very different from those in the criminal complaint
against petitioners and their father which has for its cause of action, the commission
of a crime as defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, and which seeks
the punishment of the accused; or the action for the cancellation of Lee Tek Sheng
naturalization certificate which has for its cause of action the commission by Lee Tek
Sheng of an immoral act, and his ultimate deportation for its object; or for that matter,
the action for partition of Keh Shiok Cheng's estate which has for its cause of action
the private respondents' right under the New Civil Code to inherit from their mother's
estate.
We therefore concur in the finding of the Court of Appeals that there is no forum
shopping to speak of in the concept that this is described and contemplated in
Circular No. 28-91 of the Supreme Court. HCISED
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals dated October 28, 1994 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T.
BRAZA, Petitioners,
vs.
THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
minor PATRICK ALVIN TITULAR BRAZA, represented by LEON TITULAR, CECILIA
TITULAR and LUCILLE C. TITULAR,Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo), also
known as "Pablito Sicad Braza," were married1 on January 4, 1978. The union bore
Ma. Cristina’s co-petitioners Paolo Josef2 and Janelle Ann3 on May 8, 1978 and June
7, 1983, respectively, and Gian Carlo4 on June 4, 1980.
Pablo died5 on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java,
Indonesia.
During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines,
respondent Lucille Titular (Lucille) began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick
Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina thereupon made
inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick's birth certificate6 from the Local
Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental with the following entries:
Name of Child : PATRICK ALVIN CELESTIAL TITULAR
Date of Birth : 01 January 1996
Mother : Lucille Celestial Titular
Father : Pablito S. Braza
Date Received at the January 13, 1997
Local Civil Registrar :
Annotation : "Late Registration"
Annotation/Remarks : "Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito Braza
on January 13, 1997"
Remarks : Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of
parents on April 22, 1998 at Manila. Henceforth,
the child shall be known as Patrick Alvin Titular
Braza (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy7 of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and
Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-petitioners to file on
December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental a petition8 to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local
Civil Register.
Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage
between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid
and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1)
the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation,
the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name
"Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians
of the minor Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and
filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his
birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and
Pablo as bigamous.
On Patrick’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court, by Order 9 of
September 6, 2007, dismissed the petition without prejudice, it holding that in a
special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family
court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage
of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be
subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary
adversarial action.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order 10 of November
29, 2007, they filed the present petition for review.
Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and
questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar.
Citing Cariño v. Cariño,11 Lee v. Court of Appeals12 and Republic v. Kho,13 they
contend that even substantial errors, such as those sought to be corrected in the
present case, can be the subject of a petition under Rule 108.14
The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code15 charts the
procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The
proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical,
spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error
is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by
a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as
a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation
of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in
adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due
process is properly observed.16
The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners
seek to nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is
bigamous and impugn Patrick’s filiation in connection with which they ask the court to
order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.
Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of
Patrick’s birth records17 and that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto.
Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the
declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn
Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 17118 of the
Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as
expressly provided in said Code.1avvphi1
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and
filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party,
and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.
Petitioners’ reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.
Cariño v. Cariño was an action filed by a second wife against the first wife for the
return of one-half of the death benefits received by the first after the death of the
husband. Since the second wife contracted marriage with the husband while the
latter’s marriage to the first wife was still subsisting, the Court ruled on the validity of
the two marriages, it being essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled
to the death benefits.
In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the contention that the
petitions filed by the therein petitioners before the lower courts were actions to
impugn legitimacy, the prayer was not to declare that the petitioners are illegitimate
children of Keh Shiok Cheng as stated in their records of birth but to establish that
they are not the latter’s children, hence, there was nothing to impugn as there was no
blood relation at all between
the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the cancellation
of the name of Keh Shiok Cheng as the petitioners’ mother and the substitution
thereof with "Tiu Chuan" who is their biological mother. Thus, the collateral attack
was allowed and the petition deemed as adversarial proceeding contemplated under
Rule 108.
In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the correction of the
entries in their respective birth records to reflect that they were illegitimate and that
their citizenship is "Filipino," not Chinese, because their parents were never legally
married. Again, considering that the changes sought to be made were substantial
and not merely innocuous, the Court, finding the proceedings under Rule 108 to be
adversarial in nature, upheld the lower court’s grant of the petition.
It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are vastly different from those
obtaining in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-MAGPAYO (A.K.A. JULIAN EDWARD
EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG), Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng
Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique
Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live birth 1 shows,
contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.
Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on
July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change
his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. The petition, docketed
as SPP No. Q-0863058, was entitled "IN RE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF
NAME OF JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO TO JULIAN
EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG."
In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National
Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in [its]
National Indices of Marriage."2 Respondent also submitted his academic records
from elementary up to college3 showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and
the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname.4 In the
1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of
Quezon City’s 3rd District using the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG."5
On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC,6 respondent amended his petition by
alleging therein compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under Section
2, Rule 103] of the Rules of Court.7
The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published in
the newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6, 2008, November
7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008.8 And a copy of the notice was furnished the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was
entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex
parte.9
By Decision of January 8, 2009,10 the trial court granted respondent’s petition and
directed the Civil Registrar of Makati City to:
1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item 24 for "DATE AND PLACE OF
MARRIAGE OF PARTIES" [in herein respondent’s Certificate of live Birth];
2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for the Last Name of the
[respondent] to "COSETENG";
3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space for Middle Name of the
[respondent]; and
4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for FATHER
of the [respondent]… (emphasis and underscoring supplied; capitalization in
the original)
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it
was denied by the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009,11 hence, it, thru the OSG,
lodged the present petition for review to the Court on pure question of law.
The Republic assails the decision in this wise:
I. . . . THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME…INVOLVES THE CHANGE
OF [RESPONDENT’S] CIVIL STATUS FROM LEGITIMATE TO
 ILLEGITIMATE AND, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE MADE THROUGH
APPROPRIATE ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDINGS…
II. THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT
DIRECTED THE DELETION OF THE NAME OF RESPONDENT’S FATHER
FROM HIS BIRTH CERTIFICATE.12 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and place of
marriage of respondent’s parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing
his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a
person must be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding. 13
The Republic adds that by ordering the deletion of respondent’s parents’ date of
marriage and the name of respondent’s father from the entries in respondent’s birth
certificate,14 the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, such order not being in accord
with respondent’s prayer reading:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that the
Honorable Court issue an order allowing the change of name of petitioner from
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO to JULIAN EDWARD
EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG, and that the Honorable Court order the
Local Civil Registrar and all other relevant government agencies to reflect the said
change of name in their records.
Petitioner prays for other reliefs deemed proper under the premises.15 (underscoring
supplied)
Respondent counters that the proceeding before the trial court was adversarial in
nature. He cites the serving of copies of the petition and its annexes upon the Civil
Registrar of Makati, the Civil Registrar General, and the OSG; the posting of copies
of the notice of hearing in at least four public places at least ten days before the
hearing; the delegation to the OSG by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to appear
on behalf of the Republic; the publication of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of
general circulation for three consecutive weeks; and the fact that no oppositors
appeared on the scheduled hearing.16
The petition is impressed with merit.
A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using
valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable
or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d)
when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino
name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino
name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing
that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of
name would prejudice public interest.17Respondent’s reason for changing his name
cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however.
The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the
Philippines.18 In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use
the name that she had been known since childhood in order to avoid confusion.
Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use the surname of
her mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court
held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mother’s surname, adding that the
avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present
case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy.
The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal
status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of
illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication.
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic19 categorically holds that "changes which may affect the
civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial
alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings . . ."
Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. It reads:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the [RTC] of the province where the corresponding civil registry
is located.
xxxx
SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. –Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province. (emphasis, italics and underscoring
supplied)
Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be
filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected – that
of Makati in the present case, and "all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby" should be made parties to the proceeding.
As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where
his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned
title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil
registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto.
Respondent nevertheless cites Republic v. Capote20 in support of his claim that his
change of name was effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.
Republic v. Belmonte,21 illuminates, however:
The procedure recited in Rule 103] regarding change of name and in Rule
108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other for the sole
purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise would render nugatory the provisions of
the Rules of Court allowing the change of one’s name or the correction of entries in
the civil registry only upon meritorious grounds. . . . (emphasis, capitalization and
underscoring supplied)
Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of these two
statutory remedies, respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently complied with Rule
108. For, as reflected above, aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil
registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the case.
Republic v. Labrador22 mandates that "a petition for a substantial correction or
change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar,
as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interestthat would be
affected thereby." It cannot be gainsaid that change of status of a child in relation to
his parents is a substantial correction or change of entry in the civil registry.
Labayo-Rowe23 highlights the necessity of impleading indispensable parties in a
petition which involves substantial and controversial alterations. In that case, the
therein petitioner Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe (Emperatriz) filed a petition for the
correction of entries in the birth certificates of her children, Vicente Miclat, Jr. and
Victoria Miclat, in the Civil Registry of San Fernando, Pampanga. Emperatriz alleged
that her name appearing in the birth certificates is Beatriz, which is her nickname, but
her full name is Emperatriz; and her civil status appearing in the birth certificate of her
daughter Victoria as "married" on "1953 Bulan" are erroneous because she was not
married to Vicente Miclat who was the one who furnished the data in said birth
certificate.
The trial court found merit in Emperatriz’s petition and accordingly directed the local
civil registrar to change her name appearing in her children’s birth certificates from
Beatriz to Emperatriz; and to correct her civil status in Victoria’s birth certificate from
"married" to "single" and the date and place of marriage to "no marriage."
On petition before this Court after the Court of Appeals found that the order of the
trial court involved a question of law, the Court nullified the trial court’s order directing
the change of Emperatriz’ civil status and the filiation of her child Victoria in light of
the following observations:
x x x x Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable
parties should have been made respondents. They include not only the declared
father of the child but the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if
any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other persons
who may be affected by the change should be notified or represented. The truth is
best ascertained under an adversary system of justice.
The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially
impaired if her status would be changed from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." Moreover,
she would be exposed to humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of
an illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter. The fact that the notice of hearing
of the petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof
was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. Rule
108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of
the 1973 Constitution, which directs that such rules "shall not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights." If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or
harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to
the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations
concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage,
without observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule would
thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase or modify
substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil
Code.24 (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
As for the requirement of notice and publication, Rule 108 provides:
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.—Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall
also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in
a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such
notice, file his opposition thereto. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A reading of these related provisions readily shows that Rule 108 clearly
mandates two sets of notices to different "potential oppositors." The first notice is that
given to the "persons named in the petition" and the second (which is through
publication) is that given to other persons who are not named in the petition but
nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That
two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by
the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for two periods (for the
two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an opposition (15 days from
notice or from the last date of publication).
This is the overriding principle laid down in Barco v. Court of Appeals. 25 In that case,
Nadina Maravilla (Nadina) filed a petition for correction of entries in the birth
certificate of her daughter June from June Salvacion Maravilla to June Salvacion
"Gustilo," Armando Gustilo being, according to Nadina, her daughter’s real father.
Gustilo in fact filed before the trial court a "CONSTANCIA" wherein he acknowledged
June as his daughter. The trial court granted the petition.
After Gustilo died, his son Jose Vicente Gustilo filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for annulment of the Order of the trial court granting the change of June’s
family name to Gustilo.
Milagros Barco (Barco), natural guardian of her minor daughter Mary Joy Ann
Gustilo, filed before the appellate court a motion for intervention, alleging that Mary
Joy had a legal interest in the annulment of the trial court’s Order as Mary Joy was,
by Barco’s claim, also fathered by Gustilo.
The appellate court dismissed the petition for annulment and complaint-in-
intervention.
On appeal by Barco, this Court ruled that she should have been impleaded in
Nadina’s petition for correction of entries of the birth certificate of Mary Joy. But since
a petitioner, like Nadina, is not expected to exhaustively identify all the affected
parties, the subsequent publication of the notice cured the omission of Barco as a
party to the case. Thus the Court explained:
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule
108.1awphi1 Her interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial
determination that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her ward’s share
in the estate of her father. It cannot be established whether Nadina knew of Mary
Joy’s existence at the time she filed the petition for correction. Indeed, doubt may
always be cast as to whether a petitioner under Rule 108 would know of all the
parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. For example, a
petitioner cannot be presumed to be aware of all the legitimate or illegitimate
offsprings of his/her spouse or paramour. x x x x.
xxxx
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the
subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even
parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108 but were
inadvertently left out. x x x x.26 (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Meanwhile, in Republic v. Kho,27 Carlito Kho (Carlito) and his siblings named the civil legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with
registrar as the sole respondent in the petition they filed for the correction of entries in the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.
their respective birth certificates in the civil registry of Butuan City, and correction of
entries in the birth certificates of Carlito’s minor children. Carlito and his siblings WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, GRANTED. The
requested the correction in their birth certificates of the citizenship of their mother January 8, 2009 Decision of Branch 77 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in
Epifania to "Filipino," instead of "Chinese," and the deletion of the word "married" SP Proc. No. Q-0863058 is NULLIFIED.
opposite the phrase "Date of marriage of parents" because their parents ─ Juan and
Epifania ─ were not married. And Carlito requested the correction in the birth SO ORDERED.
certificates of their children of his and his wife’s date of marriage to reflect the actual
date of their marriage as appearing in their marriage certificate. In the course of the
hearing of the petition, Carlito also sought the correction of the name of his wife from
Maribel to "Marivel."

The Khos’ mother Epifania took the witness stand where she declared that she was
not married to Juan who died before the filing of the Khos’ petition.
PLATON AND LIBRADA G.R. No. 140305
CERUILA,
The trial court granted the petition.
Petitioners, Present:
On the issue of whether the failure to implead Marivel and the Khos’ parents - versus - PUNO, Chairman,
rendered the trial of the petition short of the required adversary proceedings and the AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
trial court’s judgment void, this Court held that when all the procedural requirements ROSILYN DELANTAR, CALLEJO, SR.,
under Rule 108 are followed, the publication of the notice of hearing cures the failure represented by her guardian, TINGA, and
to implead an indispensable party. In so ruling, the Court noted that the affected DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
parties were already notified of the proceedings in the case since the petitioner- WELFARE and
siblings Khos were the ones who initiated the petition respecting their prayer for DEVELOPMENT, Promulgated:
correction of their citizenship, and Carlito respecting the actual date of his marriage to Respondent.
his wife; and, with respect to the Khos’ petition for change of their civil status from December 9, 2005
legitimate to illegitimate, their mother Epifania herself took the witness stand x------------------------------------------------x
declaring that she was not married to their father.
DECISION
What is clear then in Barco and Kho is the mandatory directive under Section 3 of
Rule 108 to implead the civil registrar and the parties who would naturally and legally AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
be affected by the grant of a petition for correction or cancellation of entries. Non-
impleading, however, as party-respondent of one who is inadvertently left out or is Petitioners-spouses Platon Ceruila and Librada D. Ceruila (Ceruilas) filed an action
not established to be known by the petitioner to be affected by the grant of the
petition or actually participates in the proceeding is notified through publication. with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 97-818932,
for the annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate of Maria Rosilyn Telin
IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register Delantar (Rosilyn), the child-victim in the rape case involving Romeo Jaloslos.[1] The
involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship, RTC granted the Ceruilas petition in its decision dated April 11, 1997[2] which was
nullified, however, by the Court of Appeals (CA) on June 10, 1999.[3] The CA denied e. The status of Maria Rosilyn as a
legitimate child as the same (sic) is actually not legitimate;
petitioners motion for reconsideration.[4] Hence the present petition. f. The date of actual birth of Marial (sic)
Rosilyn, since the known father merely made it appear that
The antecedents are as follows: she was born at the time the informations for the birth
certificate were supplied by him to the civil registrar or (sic)
proper recording;
Sometime in 1996, Rosilyn complained against her father, Simplicio Delantar g. The name of the physician who
(Simplicio) for child abuse, particularly prostitution. Simplicio was incarcerated at the allegedly attended at the time of birth of Maria Rosilyn, being
a fictitious Dr. Santos.[6]
Pasay City Jail starting August 22, 1996 which prompted the filing of a petition for
involuntary commitment of Rosilyn in favor of the Department of Social Welfare and
On February 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for hearing on March
Development (DSWD), as the whereabouts of the mother, Librada Ceruila, was
19, 1997 and directed the publication of said order once a week for three consecutive
unknown. The petition was granted by the RTC of Pasay City, Branch 119
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. The Order also stated that any person
on November 9, 1996 and Simplicios motion to vacate said judgment was denied by
who is interested in the petition may interpose his/her comment or opposition thereto
said court on January 20, 1997.[5]
on or before the scheduled hearing.[7]

On February 3, 1997, the Ceruilas filed a petition before the RTC of Manila, entitled IN
Summons was sent to the Civil Register of Manila. [8] However, no representative
THE MATTER OF CANCELLATION AND ANNULMENT OF THE BIRTH
appeared during the scheduled hearing.[9]
CERTIFICATE OF MARIA ROSILYN TELIN DELANTAR, praying that the birth
certificate of Rosilyn be canceled and declared null and void for the reasons that said
On April 11, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision granting the petition of the Ceruilas
birth certificate was made an instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and therefore
as follows:
invalid and spurious, and it falsified all material entries therein, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a. The name of her mother which should 1. DECLARING the certificate of live birth of the Minor Maria
not be petitioner Librada A. Telin; Rosilyn Telin Delantar as registered under the Local Civil Registry No.
b. The signature of informant referring to 85-27325 of the office of the City Civil Registrar of Manila as null and
Librada T. Delantar being a forgery; void ab initio: and
c. The name of Simplicio Delantar as the
biological father, considering that, as already mentioned, he 2. ORDERING the City Civil Registrar of Manila and the
is merely the foster father and co-guardian in fact of Maria National Statistics Office, Manila, to expunge from their respective
Rosilyn and the name of the natural father in (sic) unknown; marriage registers the entry of the birth of said minor and such other
d. The date of marriage of the supposed documents pertaining thereto, if any.
parents, since the parents reflected in said certificate were
(sic) actually full blood brother and sister and therefore Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Office of the City Civil
marriage between the two is virtually impossible; Registrar of Manila and the National Statistics Office for record
purposes.

SO ORDERED.[10]
The RTC explained in its Decision thus:
During the initial trial, the petition was read aloud in open court to find
out if there is any opposition thereto. There being none, the petitioners
counsel, Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga, then established the
jurisdictional requirements (Exhibits A to E).[11] Thereafter, petitioner
husband Platon Ceruila was placed on the stand as the lone witness
for the petitioner and after he completed his testimony, Atty.
Paderanga formally offered his evidence and rested his case.
The evidence on record reveals the following:
On May 11, 1985, a child was born at the Dr. Jose Fabella Memorial
Hospital in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The name of the child was entered in
her birth certificate as Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar (Exhibit I). In the
said birth certificate the name of the childs mother appear as Librada
A. Telin (Entry No. 6) while that of her father as Simplicio R. Delantar
(Entry No. 9). The birth certificate likewise shows that the parents of
the child, Simplicio R. Delantar and Librada A. Telin, were married
on February 14, 1977 in Manila (Entry No. 12). Likewise, in Entry No.
21 of the same document, it is made to appear that the mother of the
child was 27 years old when the child was born and that she was
attended in her delivery thereof by Dr. Santos (Entry No. 13). The birth
certificate was signed by one Librada T. delos Santos as the informant
and mother of the child with her given address
as 2165 P. Burgos St., Pasay City (Entry No. 14). This is the very
certificate of live birth that is being seriously impugned by the herein
petitioners.
In support of their petition, the petitioners submitted the baptismal
certificates of Simplicio Delantar (Exhibit J) and Librada Delantar
(Exhibit K) to prove that they are full blood brother and sister and could
not have been possible for them to have sired Rosilyn (sic). In the said
baptismal certificates, the names of the parents of Simplicio and
Librada are similarly entered as Juan Delantar and Carila Telen
(Exhibit J-1 and K-1). The Court is inclined to concur with the
observation of the petitioner that it is highly unlikely that the alleged
parents of Rosilyn would commit an incestuous act and proclaim to
the whole world that they are the parents of the herein minor. The court
has also observed that in the baptismal certificate of Librada Delantar,
it is entered therein that she was born on January 8, 1940 in Tubod,
Manglanilla, Cebu (Exhibit K-2). Such being the case, then Librada
must have been 45 years of age at the time of the birth of Rosilyn in
stark contrast to her age appearing in Entry No. 27 (sic) of the birth
certificate of the latter which shows that Librada was 27 years old at
the time of her delivery. The presentation of the baptismal certificate
of Librada Delantar as secondary evidence of her birth certificate was
resorted to after the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Minglanilla,
Cebu gave a certification to the effect that the records of birth on file
with the office for the period January, 1940 to April, 1945 were all
destroyed by WORLD WAR II (Exhibit L). And going for the jugular, so
to speak, the signature of the person named Librada T. delos Santos
in the birth certificate (Exhibit I) purporting to be that of the petitioner
wife and the signature of the latter appearing in the verification of the
petitioner (sic) (Exhibit A-6) are so strikingly dissimilar that they could
not have but proceeded from two different hands. For it does not
require the trained eye of an expert calligrapher to discern such
discrepancy in the writing style.
In fine, there being an abundance of evidence to support the
petitioners claim that the birth certificate is indeed a falsified
document, the Court is left with no other alternative but to grant the
relief prayed for in the petition. To let the birth certificate reamin (sic)
as it is would adversely affect the rights and interests of the herein
petitioners.[12]
On July 15, 1997, Rosilyn, represented by her legal guardian, the DSWD, filed, with
the CA, a petition for the annulment of judgment in the petition for cancellation of entry
of her birth certificate.[13] She claimed that she and her guardian were not notified of
the petition and the subsequent judgment and learned about the same only from the
news on May 16, 1997.[14] She argued that the RTC decision was issued without
jurisdiction and in violation of her right to due process; that the Judge did not have
authority to declare her to be illegitimate; and that mere correction of entries, not
cancellation of the entire certificate, is the appropriate remedy. [15]
Rosilyn further argued that: granting, without admitting that Librada is not her mother,
still it was erroneous to cancel or annul her entire birth certificate; Librada is not an
interested party concerning the issue of whether Simplicio is the father, the date of
actual birth, and the name of the physician who attended to the birth; [16] Libradas
allegations are also contradicted by (a) the Records Based on Cord Dressing Room
Book dated April 13-May 29, 1985, issued by Emelita H. Avinante, Head of the Medical
Records Section and Admitting Unit of the Fabella Hospital, which is attached to the
petition for annulment as Annex E and which states that Maria Rosilyn Delantar was
born on May 11, 1985 at the Fabella Hospital and that her parents are Librada Telin
and Simplicio Delantar;[17] and (b) the admission of Simplicio in his Motion to Vacate
Judgment[18] in Sp. Proc. No. 96-419[19] regarding the custody of Rosilyn, which is
attached to the petition to annul as Annex F, where he stated that he, as the rightful
parent of Rosilyn, should not be deprived of his parental authority.[20]
On June 10, 1999, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition
is GRANTED.
Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING NULL and VOID the
decision of the respondent Regional Trial Court dated April 11, 1997 in
Special Proceedings No. 97-81893.
With costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.[21]
The CA reasoned that:
As shown in the caption of the petition in Special Proceedings No. 97-
81893 entitled In the Matter of Cancellation and Annulment of the Birth
Certificate of Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar, herein petitioner Rosilyn
Delantar represented by her legal guardian, DSWD, was not made a
party-respondent therein,contrary to the mandatory provision of
Section 3 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
In the said Special Proceeding No. 97-81893, petitioners therein,
Platon Ceruila and Librada D. Ceruila, sought not only a cancellation
or correction of an entry in the birth certificate of Rosilyn Telin Delantar
but in effect sought to annul, cancel or expunge from the Civil Register
the subject birth certificate. With more reasons, therefore, that all
parties, particularly Rosilyn Telin Delantar, or thru her legal guardian,
the DSWD, whose birth certificate was sought to be annulled or
cancelled from the Civil Register must not only be notified but must be
made a party in the said petition.
Petitioner and her guardian are undoubtedly persons who have
interest which would be affected by the petition for the obvious reason
that it is the entry of her birth which is being sought to be annulled and
cancelled.
In a similar case, the Supreme Court ruled that corrections of
substantial entries in the certificate other than mere clerical errors,
should be passed upon in an appropriate adversary proceedings with
all the persons interested are made parties therein Republic
vs. Valencia (141 SCRA 462; 468-469; 470-474).
The proceedings undertaken in said Special Proceedings No. 97-
81893 is indeed wanting of the required notice to all the parties having
claim or interest which would be affected thereby, and of the
adversarial proceedings, as disclosed in the decision dated April 11,
1997
With the foregoing disquisitions, We find that the decision dated April
11, 1997 null and void for want of jurisdiction over the person of herein
petitioner Rosilyn Delantar and the DSWD as her legal guardian and
 all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by
the said decision. Also, the said decision dated April 11, 1997 is
considered null and void for lack of due process there being no
adversarial proceedings (was) conducted by the public respondent
Regional Trial Court.
And, even if the same judgment had already become final and
executory, and had in fact been executed, as in the instant case, still
the execution thereof produces no legal effects. [22]
The CA denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners. [23] Hence, the present
petition raising the following issues:
I RTC setting the case for hearing once a week for three consecutive weeks in a
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE
DECISION RENDERED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA BRANCH 38 DATED APRIL 11, 1997 IN SPEC.
PROCEEDING NO. 97-81893 ENTITLED: IN THE MATTER OF
CANCELLATION AND ANNULMENT OF THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE
OF MARIA ROSILYN TELIN DELANTAR
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SHOULD HAVE EXERCISED ITS PEREMPTORY POWER TO
DECLARE THE SUBJECT BIRTH CERTIFICATE NULL AND VOID
AB INITIO.[24]
As to the first issue, petitioners argue that: since the falsification of the entries
in the birth certificate of Rosilyn renders the same void ab initio, the case should be
liberally construed as an ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of falsified
documents based on Article 5 of the Civil Code[25] and Section 15, Rule 6 of the Rules
of Court[26] and not as a special proceeding; petitioners were only constrained to utilize
the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on the Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry since Article 5 of the Civil Code provides no procedure for
the nullification of void documents which happens to be a birth certificate in this case;
since the present case involves an ordinary civil action, the cases relied upon by the
CA which are applicable only to special proceedings should not be applied herein; the
civil registrar, which is an indispensable party, was duly served summons by mail;
respondent, meanwhile, is not an indispensable party and granting that she is, she was
deemed duly impleaded as her name was clearly stated in the caption of the case;
respondents location could not be determined as she was reported to have ran away
from the custody of Simplicio, thus the publication of the petition and the order of the
newspaper of general circulation should be considered substantial notice and the
requirements of due process deemed substantially complied with; there was no
adversarial proceeding in court because the parties were declared in general default
thus, just like an ordinary civil case, the court should receive evidence ex parte.[27]
As to the second issue, petitioners claim that: the CA should have exercised its
peremptory power to declare the birth certificate of Rosilyn as null and void ab
initio following the doctrine that where an instrument is void ab initio for being contrary
to law, no amount of technicalities could correct its inherent nullity; otherwise, there will
be multiplicity of actions as the parties will have to file cases anew to annul respondents
birth certificate.[28]
They then pray that the CA decision dated June 10, 1999 be reversed and that the
RTC judgment dated April 11, 1997 be reinstated.[29]
Anent the first issue, the Solicitor General, for the respondent, contends that: since the
petitioners chose to file a petition under Rule 108 they cannot in the present action turn
around and claim that their case is not a special proceeding; in any case, due process
was not complied with rendering the proceedings a quo annullable; petitioners sought
to establish Librada Ceruilas status, i.e., whether or not she is the mother of
respondent, thus, the action falls within the ambit of Sec. 3(c), Rule 1 of the Rules of
Considering however the substance of the issues raised herein, we shall treat the
Court;[30]petitioners did not allege that they are bringing the suit to enforce or protect
their right or to prevent or redress a wrong, for their case to be categorized as an present petition, as it claims, to be a petition for review on certiorari.[34]
ordinary civil action; Art. 5 of the Civil Code which is being invoked by petitioners is a
general provision, while entries of record of birth in the civil register are governed by
Is the petition for annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate of Rosilyn an
Republic Act No. 3753 (Civil Registry Law) as amended, and Presidential Decree No.
651; since the law provides for a remedy when an entry in a record found in the civil ordinary civil action or a special proceeding? Considering that the petition, based on
registry is erroneous or falsified, petitioners cannot, by their mere allegation, transport
its allegations, does not question the fact of birth of Rosilyn, all matters assailing the
their case from the realm of the rules on special proceedings for the correction of entry
to that of an ordinary civil case for annulment of a falsified document; in Republic vs. truthfulness of any entry in the birth certificate properly, including the date of birth, fall
Valencia,[31] it was held that the parties who must be made parties to a proceeding under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court which governs cancellation or correction of entries
concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are the civil
in the Civil Registry. Thus, the petition filed by the Ceruilas, alleging material entries in
registrar and all persons who have or who are claiming interests who would be affected
thereby; respondent, being a person whose interests would be adversely affected by the certificate as having been falsified, is properly considered as a special proceeding
the petition, is an indispensable party to the case; publication cannot be substituted for
pursuant to Section 3(c), Rule 1 and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
notice; respondent cannot be declared in default since she was not properly notified. [32]

Anent the second issue, respondent contends that the CA has no authority to rule on
the merits of the case since in a petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction, its authority is limited to ruling on whether or not the petitioner was
denied due process of law; that if the CA were to rule on the merits of the case, it would
have deprived respondent of due process; and that in any case, respondents record of
birth is not void as Librada was only able to prove that she is not the mother of
respondent.[33]
Preliminarily, this Court notes that while the petition states that it is one for
Did the Ceruilas comply with the requirements of Rule 108? We answer in the negative.
Sec. 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that:
SEC. 3. Parties. --- When cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.

review on certiorari, it claimed at the same time that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, which is properly a ground for a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 and not for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Indeed, not only the civil registrar but also all persons who have or claim any interest
which would be affected by a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of
an entry in the civil register must be made parties thereto.[35] As enunciated in Republic
vs. Benemerito,[36] unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the
proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the
requirements of the rules.[37]
Here, it is clear that no party could be more interested in the cancellation of Rosilyns
birth certificate than Rosilyn herself. Her filiation, legitimacy, and date of birth are at
stake.
Petitioners claim that even though Rosilyn was never made a party to the
proceeding, it is enough that her name was included in the caption of the petition. Such
reasoning is without merit.
As we pronounced in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic[38] where the mother sought changes
in the entries of her two childrens birth certificates:
since only the Office of the Solicitor General was notified through the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal, representing the Republic of the
Philippines as the only respondent, the proceedings taken, which is
summary in nature, is short of what is required in cases where
substantial alterations are sought. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor
General, all other indispensable parties should have been made
respondents. They include not only the declared father of the child but
the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as
their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other
persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or
represented . . ..[39] (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, only the Civil Registrar of Manila was served summons, who,
however, did not participate in the proceedings. This alone is clearly not sufficient to
comply with the requirements laid down by the rules.
Petitioners further claim that the lack of summons on Rosilyn was cured by the
publication of the order of the trial court setting the case for hearing for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.
We do not agree. Summons must still be served, not for the purpose of vesting the
courts with jurisdiction, but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due
process.[40] This is but proper, to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect
her interest if she so chooses.
Indeed, there were instances when we ruled that even though an interested party was
not impleaded in the petition, such defect was cured by compliance with Sec. 4, Rule
108 on publication. In said cases, however, earnest efforts were made by the
petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties.[41]
Such is not the case at bar. Rosilyn was never made a party at all to the proceedings
seeking the cancellation of her birth certificate. Neither did petitioners make any effort
to summon the Solicitor General.
It does not take much to deduce the real motive of petitioners in seeking the
cancellation of Rosilyns birth certificate and in not making her, her guardian, the
DSWD, and the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, parties to
the petition. Rosilyn was involved in the rape case against Romeo Jalosjos, where her
father, as appearing in the birth certificate, was said to have pimped her into
prostitution. In the criminal case, the defense contended that the birth certificate of
Rosilyn should not have been considered by the trial court to prove Rosilyns age and
thus find basis for statutory rape, as said birth certificate has been cancelled by the
RTC of Manila, Branch 38, in the special proceeding antecedent to this petition. Their
efforts in this regard, however, were thwarted when the CA overturned Branch 38s
decision, and the Court, in G.R. Nos. 132875-76[42] considered other evidence as proof
of Rosilyns age at the time of the commission of the crime.
 There is also no merit in the contention of petitioners that because of the false
entries in the birth certificate of Rosilyn, the same is void ab initio, hence should be
nullified under Art. 5 of the Civil Code, or should be nullified by the CA in exercise of
its peremptory power to declare null and void the said certificate.
The function of a petition for annulment of judgment, under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court, is not to replace the trial courts decision sought to be annulled. The
action under Sections 1, 2 and 7 of said Rule, to wit:
Section. 1. Coverage. --- This Rule shall govern the annulment by the
Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil
actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are
no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
Sec. 2. Grounds for annulment. --- The annulment may be based only
on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could
have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
Sec. 7. Effect of judgment. --- A judgment of annulment shall set aside
the questioned judgment or final order or resolution and render the
same null and void, without prejudice to the original action being refiled
in the proper court. However, where the judgment or final order or
resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the court may
on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for
new trial had been granted therein.
is merely for the annulment of the RTC Decision on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack
of jurisdiction, nothing more. The Rules do not allow the CA to resolve the merits of the
petition for the amendment and cancellation of the birth certificate of Rosilyn or to
substitute its own findings thereon.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,
vs.
DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
are the Court of Appeals (CA)1Decision2 dated February 18, 2011 and
Resolution3 dated July 27, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN. The assailed
decision dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines and,
consequently, affirmed in toto the June 28, 2004 Order 4 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 27, Gingoog City in Special Proceedings No. 230-2004 granting the
Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by respondent Dr.
Norma S. Lugsanay Uy; while the assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On March 8, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate
of Live Birth.5 Impleaded as respondent is the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City.
She alleged that she was born on February 8, 1952 and is the illegitimate daughter of
Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay6 Her Certificate of Live Birth7 shows that her full name
is "Anita Sy" when in fact she is allegedly known to her family and friends as "Norma
S. Lugsanay." She further claimed that her school records, Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine Certificate,8 and passport9 bear the name
"Norma S. Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is an illegitimate child considering
that her parents were never married, so she had to follow the surname of her
mother.10 She also contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all
her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos.11
Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City to effect the corrections on her name and
citizenship which was supposedly granted.12 However, the National Statistics Office
(NSO) records did not bear such changes. Hence, the petition before the RTC.
On May 13, 2004, the RTC issued an Order13
finding the petition to be sufficient in
form and substance and setting the case for hearing, with the directive that the said
Order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Gingoog and
the Province of Misamis Oriental at least once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks at the expense of respondent, and that the order and petition be furnished the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the City Prosecutor’s Office for their
information and guidance.14 Pursuant to the RTC Order, respondent complied with
the publication requirement.
On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. THE
CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF GINGOOG CITY, or any person acting in his behalf is
directed and ordered to effect the correction or change of the entries in the Certificate
of Live Birth of petitioner’s name and citizenship so that the entries would be:
a) As to petitioner’s name :
First Name : NORMA
Middle Name : SY
Last Name : LUGSANAY
b) As to petitioner’s nationality/citizenship :
: FILIPINO
SO ORDERED.15
The RTC concluded that respondent’s petition would neither prejudice the
government nor any third party. It also held that the names "Norma Sy Lugsanay"
and "Anita Sy" refer to one and the same person, especially since the Local Civil
Registrar of Gingoog City has effected the correction. Considering that respondent
has continuously used and has been known since childhood as "Norma Sy
Lugsanay" and as a Filipino citizen, the RTC granted the petition to avoid
confusion.16
On February 18, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held that
respondent’s failure to implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the
publication of the Order setting the case for hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of the notice to the
Local Civil Registrar, the OSG and the City Prosecutor’s Office.17 As to whether the
petition is a collateral attack on respondent’s filiation, the CA ruled in favor of
respondent, considering that her parents were not legally married and that her
siblings’ birth certificates uniformly state that their surname is Lugsanay and their
citizenship is Filipino.18 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated July 27, 2011.
Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the petition is dismissible for
failure to implead indispensable parties.
Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid grounds,
the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b)
marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of
marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o)
changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such
notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceeding is brought may
make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction
for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an
order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified
copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall
annotate the same in his record.19
In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate,
particularly those pertaining to her first name, surname and citizenship. She sought
the correction allegedly to reflect the name which she has been known for since
childhood, including her legal documents such as passport and school and
professional records. She likewise relied on the birth certificates of her full blood
siblings who bear the surname "Lugsanay" instead of "Sy" and citizenship of
"Filipino" instead of "Chinese." The changes, however, are obviously not mere
clerical as they touch on respondent’s filiation and citizenship. In changing her
surname from "Sy" (which is the surname of her father) to "Lugsanay" (which is the
surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes her status from legitimate to
illegitimate; and in changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the same affects
her rights and obligations in this country. Clearly, the changes are substantial.
It has been settled in a number of cases starting with Republic v. Valencia 20 that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established
provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding.21 The pronouncement of the Court in that case is illuminating:
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of
clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or
citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief
cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a
right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the
appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the
parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding. x x x
What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black’s Law Dictionary
defines "adversary proceeding" as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte
application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other
party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption
proceeding.22
In sustaining the RTC decision, the CA relied on the Court’s conclusion in Republic v.
Kho,23 Alba v. Court of Appeals,24 and Barco v. Court of Appeals,25 that the failure to
implead indispensable parties was cured by the publication of the notice of hearing
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. In Republic v.
Kho,26 petitioner therein appealed the RTC decision granting the petition for
correction of entries despite respondents’ failure to implead the minor’s mother as an
indispensable party. The Court, however, did not strictly apply the provisions of Rule
108, because it opined that it was highly improbable that the mother was unaware of
the proceedings to correct the entries in her children’s birth certificates especially
since the notices, orders and decision of the trial court were all sent to the residence
she shared with them.27
In Alba v. Court of Appeals,28 the Court found nothing wrong with the trial court’s
decision granting the petition for correction of entries filed by respondent although the
proceedings was not actually known by petitioner. In that case, petitioner’s mother
and guardian was impleaded in the petition for correction of entries, and notices were
sent to her address appearing in the subject birth certificate. However, the notice was
returned unserved, because apparently she no longer lived there. Thus, when she
allegedly learned of the granting of the petition, she sought the annulment of
judgment which the Court denied. Considering that the petition for correction of
entries is a proceeding in rem, the Court held that acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner is, therefore, not required and the absence of personal
service was cured by the trial court’s compliance with Rule 108 which requires notice
by publication.29
In Barco v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court addressed the question of whether the court
acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and all other indispensable parties to the petition
for correction of entries despite the failure to implead them in said case. While
recognizing that petitioner was indeed an indispensable party, the failure to implead
her was cured by compliance with Section 4 of Rule 108 which requires notice by
publication. In so ruling, the Court pointed out that the petitioner in a petition for
correction cannot be presumed to be aware of all the parties whose interests may be
affected by the granting of a petition. It emphasized that the petitioner therein exerted
earnest effort to comply with the provisions of Rule 108. Thus, the publication of the
notice of hearing was considered to have cured the failure to implead indispensable
parties.
In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded
as respondent in the petition below. This, notwithstanding, the RTC granted her
petition and allowed the correction sought by respondent, which decision was
affirmed in toto by the CA.
We do not agree with the RTC and the CA.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue involved in this
case. Aside from Kho, Alba and Barco, the Court has addressed the same in
Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo,31 Ceruila v. Delantar,32 and Labayo-Rowe v.
Republic.33
In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo,34 claiming that his parents were never legally
married, respondent therein filed a petition to change his name from "Julian Edward
Emerson Coseteng Magpayo," the name appearing in his birth certificate to "Julian
Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng." The notice setting the petition for hearing
was published and there being no opposition thereto, the trial court issued an order of
general default and eventually granted respondent’s petition deleting the entry on the
date and place of marriage of parties; correcting his surname from "Magpayo" to
"Coseteng"; deleting the entry "Coseteng" for middle name; and deleting the entry
"Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for his father. The Republic of the
Philippines, through the OSG, assailed the RTC decision on the grounds that the
corrections made on respondent’s birth certificate had the effect of changing the civil
status from legitimate to illegitimate and must only be effected through an appropriate
adversary proceeding. The Court nullified the RTC decision for respondent’s failure to
comply strictly with the procedure laid down in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Aside
from the wrong remedy availed of by respondent as he filed a petition for Change of
Name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, assuming that he filed a petition under
Rule 108 which is the appropriate remedy, the petition still failed because of improper
venue and failure to implead the Civil Registrar of Makati City and all affected parties
as respondents in the case.
In Ceruila v. Delantar,35 the Ceruilas filed a petition for the cancellation and
annulment of the birth certificate of respondent on the ground that the same was
made as an instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and, therefore, invalid and
spurious, and it falsified all material entries therein. The RTC issued an order setting
the case for hearing with a directive that the same be published and that any person
who is interested in the petition may interpose his comment or opposition on or
before the scheduled hearing. Summons was likewise sent to the Civil Register of
Manila. After which, the trial court granted the petition and nullified respondent’s birth
certificate. Few months after, respondent filed a petition for the annulment of
judgment claiming that she and her guardian were not notified of the petition and the
trial court’s decision, hence, the latter was issued without jurisdiction and in violation
of her right to due process. The Court annulled the trial court’s decision for failure to
comply with the requirements of Rule 108, especially the non-impleading of
respondent herself whose birth certificate was nullified.1âwphi1
In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,36 petitioner filed a petition for the correction of entries in
the birth certificates of her children, specifically to change her name from Beatriz V.
Labayu/Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo, her civil status from "married" to
"single," and the date and place of marriage from "1953-Bulan" to "No marriage." The
Court modified the trial court’s decision by nullifying the portion thereof which directs
the change of petitioner’s civil status as well as the filiation of her child, because it
was the OSG only that was made respondent and the proceedings taken was
summary in nature which is short of what is required in cases where substantial
alterations are sought.
Respondent’s birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a
Chinese citizen and a legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the
petition, however, she seeks the correction of her first name and surname, her status
from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." 2004 granting the Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by
Thus, respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil respondent Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy, is NULLIFIED.
Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are
affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make. SO ORDERED.

The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general
circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of
the proceedings taken.37 A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential
oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and another given to other
persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered
interested or affected parties.38 Summons must, therefore, be served not for the
purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of
fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect
his interest if he so chooses.39

While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify
the affected or interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of
hearing, earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible
interested parties.40 Such failure was likewise excused where the interested parties
themselves initiated the corrections proceedings;41 when there is no actual or
presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties;42 or when a party is
inadvertently left out.43

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial
alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 ofthe
Rules of Court is mandated.44 If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or
changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate action
wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the
door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might
be detrimental and far reaching.45

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of

Appeals Decision dated February 18, 2011 and Resolution dated July 27, 20011 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN, are SET ASIDE. Consequently, the June 28, 2004
Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, in Spl. Proc. No. 230-