Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CounterIntelligence
Avner Barnea
To cite this article: Avner Barnea (2018) Challenging the “Lone Wolf” Phenomenon in an Era of
Information Overload, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 31:2, 217-234,
DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2018.1417349
none defined
AVNER BARNEA
Dr. Avnea Barnea is a research fellow at the National Security Studies Center,
The School of Political Sciences, at the University of Haifa, and lecturer on
“Counter Intelligence in Democratic Societies” in the Department of
Political Science at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is the head of
the special program on competitive intelligence, corporate security,
cybersecurity, and crisis management in the MBA program at Netanya
Academic College, Netanya, Israel. Dr. Barnea is a former senior officer
with the Israeli Intelligence Community.
217
218 AVNER BARNEA
STUDYING COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
In 1949, in the United States, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) analyst
Sherman Kent introduced the triplicate framework within which to
consider the issue of intelligence as knowledge (information), activity
(measures to be taken), and organization (developing resources to enable
activities).4 Following Kent’s terms, counterintelligence is not just an
activity or organization but also knowledge and it is based on a solid
methodology. To Kent, the need is obvious for counterintelligence
information (knowledge) for use in taking counterintelligence measures
(activity) and for devoting resources to make these tasks happen
(organization).5
An early definition of counterintelligence developed in the U.S.
government in the 1950s states that counterintelligence is
1. The individual had previously been in contact with a terrorist organization, but at
the time of committing the attack, he was not part of this terrorist infrastructure.
An example of such individual would be someone returning to Europe from the
Middle East or a refugee who had arrived after having once fought for ISIS or
other Islamic organizations in Syria and Iraq.
2. The individual had been in contact with virtual operators via the Internet, usually
through social media platforms of Islamic groups.
3. The individual had had diverse virtual connections with extremist Islamic groups
and was influenced by them, but had not received direct instruction to execute an
attack.
4. The individual had acted without any contact with extreme Islamic networks and
without anyone’s guidance, but rather was incited by his own distinctive distress.
officials have tended to reply that they often rely on information released by
the intelligence agencies. They claim to have difficulty receiving focused
intelligence warnings, especially about the intentions of “lone wolves,”
despite the huge resources devoted to dealing with this challenge. Britain’s
security services have revealed that, in the UK alone, they were monitoring
over 3,000 people suspected of having intentions to commit terrorist
attacks.20 This large number has raised serious questions regarding the
extent and effectiveness of the preventive measures taken by the UK’s
intelligence community.
The difficulties seem to stem from the fact that after the process of filtering
suspicious information by the intelligence agencies, many potential terrorists
fit into a broad pattern of threatening behavior with dangerous personal
profiles, but the agencies have little or no ability to focus on specific
human targets. As a result, intelligence organizations are too often
helpless. Various security programs to identify potential terrorists such as
“Contest,” used by British intelligence,21 unfortunately feature more
“noises'” than “signals,” and do not provide quality preventive intelligence.
Post-mortem analyses conducted by Western intelligence agencies after
terrorist attacks have usually brought to light information about
superficial contacts that terrorists had had with various suspicious parties,
including extreme Islamist factions. Despite this awareness, the terrorists
usually do not give specific advance warnings of their intentions and leave
the security people to react to events instead of preventing them.
A year ago, ISIS uploaded a video to the Internet called “Message to the
Lone Wolves,” urging terrorists to declare their support for ISIS, but warned
them not to be in direct contact with its known members prior to making a
terrorist act for fear of premature exposure. Likewise, Omar Hussain, a
British citizen and a key operative of ISIS in Syria, praised the “Warrior
acting alone” in the West.22
stop publishing risky content, and also ask them to identify agitators and
potential terrorists.46 This does not seem practical, as Facebook alone has
more than one billion, 200 million members, and the amount of
information it passes through its servers is endless. To perform quality
surveillance is impossible, especially when those being radicalized have
learned to hide their intentions and stay “below the radar” for fear of being
monitored by counterterrorism organizations. Murphy’s demand to
monitor suspicious information on the social networks also seems to lessen
the protective responsibility of the FBI and other counterintelligence
organizations worldwide. Counterintelligence organizations must build new
capabilities; they should not lean on social media platforms to perform the
monitoring for them. In 2015 Andrew Parker, head of MI5,47
acknowledged that terrorists and radical elements were aware of the
capabilities of intelligence organizations for social network monitoring and
were using digital tools, such as encrypted messaging software (e.g.,
Telegram and WhatsApp). Radicalized Web surfers operate with extreme
caution by hiding words and using codes. The use of these tools, known as
“Remote Intimacy,” is quite simple and available on the Internet. In fact,
ISIS encourages their use48 to recruit and lead individuals to radicalize.
Yet, the border dividing online content of religion and ideology and various
efforts to recruit terrorists or convince “lone wolves” to act is very
complicated. That someone being monitored expresses solidarity with
terrorist activities and ideology does not mean that he or she will act. In
fact, in most cases, the person probably will not act. Counterterrorism
thereby becomes much more challenging.
In the era of Facebook, Telegram, Twitter, WhatsApp, and other social
media and messaging applications, to discern the meaning of the
relationships among people and to identify networks of secret cells that
intend to act is very difficult. Would-be terrorists have changed their
methods of action and become very careful in using these open-source tools.
Counterintelligence would greatly benefit if ISIS activists who were
conducting the attacks could be identified in the social media. However,
many of the more recent attacks have been carried out by “lone wolves”
who are usually not connected to key recruiters and terrorist operatives or
to anyone. Obviously, once counterintelligence organizations succeed in
identifying an organized terrorism operator, their work is facilitated and the
variety of tools at their disposal that can be operated successfully can make
their work relatively easy. But, individual terrorists operate differently,
making many of the normal intelligence organizations’ efforts largely futile,
as they often act against suspects who actually do not cause harm.49
When the amount of information becomes enormous and continues to
expand exponentially, leading to an inability to focus on specific potential
terrorists and identify their intentions in time, the chances for success are
not high. A decade ago, a head of MI5 was interviewed about the reasons for
the failure in preventing the terrorist attacks of 2005 and 2007 in Britain. He
noted that “the security services suspect 1600 people of involvement in
terrorism,”50 making it impossible to focus on the few who eventually
carried out the attacks. British officials expressed the same sentiment after
the deadly terrorist attack on the British Parliament in London on
22 March 2017. The huge number of suspects, approximately 3000
individuals, were on the MI5 list of terrorist suspects in 2017,51 similar to
the number of targets revealed by the French internal intelligence agency
DGSI after the attack on the Champs-Elysées in April 2017,52 requires a
much broader intelligence attention than previously. It is a problem not
only of allocation of resources but of creating new capabilities to deal with
complex issues, such as tracking “lone wolves,” and working in the virtual
sphere with endless pieces of information.
REFERENCES
1
David Bartal, “What Are You so Afraid of?,” Haaretz Weekend Supplement,
17 March 2017, pp. 56–58.
2
Rukmini Callimachi, “How ISIS Built the Machinery of Terror Under Europe’s
Gaze,” The New York Times, 29 March 2016, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2016/03/29/world/europe/isis-attacks-paris-brussels.html?_r=1
3
According to Nassim Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly
Improbable (New York: Random House, 2010), a Black Swan is an event,
positive or negative, that is deemed improbable yet has massive consequences.
Taleb shows that Black Swan events explain almost everything about our
world, and yet we—especially the experts—are blind to them.
4
Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1949), p. ix.
5
Ibid., p. 3.
6
Report of the Commission on Governmental Security (Washington, DC, 1957),
pp. 48–49.
7
According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Intelligence Cycle is a
closed path consisting of stages including the issuance of requirements by
decisionmakers: planning and direction, collection, processing, analysis, and
dissemination of intelligence. Available at https://www.cia.gov/kids-page/
6–12th-grade/who-we-are-what-we-do/the-intelligence-cycle.htm
8
Roy Godson, Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Counter Intelligence
(New Brunswick, NJ: National Strategy Information Center, Transaction
Books, 1980, pp. 13–30.
9
According to the U.S. Department of State, the National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism, “Not only do we employ military power, we use diplomatic, financial,
intelligence, and law enforcement activities to protect the Homeland and extend
our defenses, disrupt terrorist operations, and deprive our enemies of what they
need to operate and survive,” available at https://2001–2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/
wh/71803.htm. Counter-terrorism incorporates the practice used by governments
that are based on intelligence to combat or prevent terrorism.
10
Daniel Byman, “The Intelligence War in Terrorism,” Intelligence and National
Security, Vol. 29, No. 6, 2014, pp. 837–865
11
Michelle Van Cleave, Counterintelligence and National Security (Washington,
DC: National Defense University Press, 2007).
12
Javier Argomaniz, Oldrich Bures, and Christian Kaunert, “A Decade of EU
Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence: A Critical Assessment,” Intelligence and
National Security, Vol. 30, Nos. 2–3, 2015, pp. 191–206.
13
Avner Barnea, “The Unique Nature of Humint,” in Amos Gilboa and Ephraim
Lapid, eds., Israel’s Silent Defender: An Insider Look at Sixty Years of Israeli
Intelligence (New York: Gefen Publishing House, 2012), pp. 207–216.
14
According to a research paper published in 2005, targeted killings and preemptive
arrests in Israel, which aimed to reduce the capacity of terror organizations to
commit attacks, actually sparks estimated recruitment to the terror stock that
increased rather than decreased the rate of suicide bombings. See Edward
Kaplan and Alex Mintz, “What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel?
Insights from a Terror Stock Model,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 28,
2005, pp. 225–235.
15
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr, “The Myth of Lone-Wolf
Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, 26 July 2016, available at https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/western-europe/2016-07-26/myth-lone-wolf-terrorism
16
Gili Cohen, “Eizencott: Out of 101 Knives Attacks We Did Not Have Even One
Warning,” Haaretz, 18 January 2016, available at http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/
politics/1.2824704 (Hebrew).
17
Avner Barnea, “The Assassination of a Prime Minister: The Intelligence Failure
that Failed to Prevent the Murder of Yitzhak Rabin,” The International
Journal of Intelligence, Security and Public Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2017,
pp. 23–43.
18
Jacob Siegel, “Lone Wolves, Terrorist Runts, and the Stray Dogs of ISIS,” The
Daily Beast, 24 October 2014, available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2014/10/24/in-canada-the-stray-dogs-of-isis.html
19
Sean Larkin, “The Age of Transparency,” Foreign Affairs, May/June,
2016, available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2016-04-18/age-
transparency
20
Robin Simox, “British Counterterrorism Policy After Westminster,” Foreign
Affairs, 28 March 2017, available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
united-kingdom/2017-03-28/british-counterterrorism-policy-after-westminster
21
“Contest": A dedicated program by the British Intelligence for the Suppression
of Terror, which began operation in 2013, available at https://www.gov.uk/
government/collections/contest
22
Leda Reynolds, “ISIS Recruiter Uses PET CAT to Entice Youngsters to Join
Terror Group,” Express, 21 December 2015, available at http://www.express.
co.uk/news/world/628560/Islamic-State-recruiter-uses-pet-cat-entice-youngsters-
terror-group
23
Aharon Yariv, “The Function of Intelligence in Combating Terror, ” in Zvi Ofer
and Avi Kober, eds., Intelligence and National Security (Tel Aviv: Maarachot,
1987, in Hebrew), pp. 335–346.
24
Andreas Golovin, “Fundamental Elements of the Counterintelligence
Discipline,” Intelligence and Counterintelligence Studies (Hauppauge, NY: Nova
Science Publishers, 2009), pp. 1–69.
25
Avner Barnea, “The Unique Nature of Humint.”
26
Glenn Greenwald, No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U.S.
Surveillance State (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2014).
27
Glenn Greenwald, “Members of Congress Denied Access to Basic Information
about NSA,” The Guardian, 4 August 2013, available at https://www.
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/04/congress-nsa-denied-access. See also
Thomas Eddlem, “The NSA Domestic Surveillance Lie,” The New American 22
September 2013, available at https://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/politics/
item/16580-the-nsa-domestic-surveillance-lie
28
Michelle Flournoy and Adam Klein, “What Europe Got Wrong About the
NSA,” Foreign Affairs, 2 August 2016.
29
Philip Klerks, “The Network Paradigm Applied to Criminal Organizations:
Theoretical Nitpicking or a Relevant Doctrine for Investigators? Recent
Developments in the Netherlands,” Connections, No. 24, 2001, pp. 53–65.
30
Kenneth E. Clow and Karen E. James, Essentials of Marketing Research: Putting
Research into Practice (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2013), pp 145–146.
31
Avner Barnea, “Link Analysis as a Tool for Competitive Intelligence,”
Competitive Intelligence Magazine, July–August 2005.
32
John Picarelli, “Transnational Threat Indications and Warning: The Utility of
Network Analysis,” AAAI Technical Report FS-98–01, U.S. National Security
Council, 1998, available at http://www.aaai.org/Papers/Symposia/Fall/1998/FS-
98–01/FS98-01-016.
33
The 9/11 Commission Report Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States, Executive Summary, 22 July 2004, available at
https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/911comm-execsumm.pdf
34
Paul Schoemaker and George Day, “How to Make Sense of Weak Signals,” MIT
Sloan Management Review (Spring 2009).
35
Antonio Badia and Mehmed Kantardiz, “Link Analysis Tools for Intelligence
and Counterterrorism,” Proceeding, ISI'05 Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE
International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics, University of
Louisville, Louisville, KY, 2005, available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/
viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.93.8703&rep=rep1&type=pdf
36
Rukmini Callimachi, “How ISIS Built the Machinery of Terror Under Europe’s
Gaze.”
37
Mark Townsend, “Leak Reveals Official Story of London Bombings,” The
Guardian, 9 April 2006, available at https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2006/apr/
09/july7.uksecurity
38
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr, “The Myth of Lone-Wolf
Terrorism.”
39
Martin Harrysson, Estelle Metayer, and Hugo Sarrazin, “How Social Intelligence
can Guide Decisions,” McKinsey Quarterly, November 2012, available at http://
www.mckinsey.com/industries/high-tech/our-insights/how-social-intelligence-can-
guide-decisions
40
John Bohannon, “How to Attack the Islamic State Online,” Science, 17 June
2016, Vol. 352, No. 6292, pp. 1380.
41
Catherine Caruso, “Can a Social-Media Algorithm Predict a Terror Attack?,”
MIT Technology Review, 16 June 2016, available at https://www.
technologyreview.com/s/601700/can-a-social-media-algorithm-predict-a-terror-
attack/
42
Jonathan Ferziger and Peter Waldman, “How Do Israel’s Tech Firms Do
Business in Saudi Arabia? Very Quietly,” BloombergBusinessweek, February
2017, available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-02-02/how-
do-israel-s-tech-firms-do-business-in-saudi-arabia-very-quietly
43
Tal Shalev, “The ISA Director Assesses that More Terrorist Attacks Will Be on
Passover,” Haaretz, 20 March 2017, available at http://news.walla.co.il/item/
3050008
44
Amos Harel, “Israel Arrested 400 of Palestinians Suspected of Planning Attacks
after Monitoring Social Networks,” Haaretz, 16 April 2017.
45
An article published in Israel by Or Hirshoga and Hagar Shizaf, “Targeted
Killings: The New System to Confront Individuals’ Terror Has Been Exposed,”
Haaretz, 26 May 2017, available at http://www.haaretz.co.il/magazine/.
premium-1.4124379, states that most Israeli monitoring of the social media
against terrorism is done in occupied Judea and Samaria, which are under a
military regime. The majority of the suspected terrorists who are arrested are
held in prison for a long time without being brought to justice. This situation
raises striking questions as to the real effectiveness of these information systems
tools.
46
Nehama Doek, “There Is a Need to Kill the Head of ISIS as We Did to Bin
Laden,” Yediot Ahronoth, 29 July 2016.
47
“MI5 Boss Warns of Technology Terror Risk,” BBC, 17 September 2015,
available at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-34276525
48
Thomas Tracey, “ISIS has Mastered Social Media Recruiting ‘Lone Wolf’
Terrorist,” Daily News, New York, 17 September 2015, available at http://
www.nydailynews.com/new-york/isis-recruiting-lone-wolf-terrorists-target-times-
square-bratton-article-1.1941687
49
Some 20,000 potential terrorists were listed in MI5’s databases in 2017, while only
3,000 of them belong to the short list of extremely suspected terrorists. This may
indicate that the British intelligence community has a serious problem in focusing
on the “right” targets. Retrieved from http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-
4968869,00.html
50
Catherine Mayer, “Outnumbered: A London Trial Reveals Why Some Terrorists
Will Always Slip Through the Net,” Time, 14 May 2005, p. 25.
51
John Edwards, “A Former MI5 Agent Tells Us Why It’s So Easy for Terror
Suspects Like Khalid Masood to Move Around Without Being Arrested,”
Business Insider, 23 March 2017, available at http://uk.businessinsider.com/mi5-
agent-surveillance-of-islamic-terrorist-suspects-2017-3
52
Adam Nossiter, “Attack on Champs-Élysées Injects More Uncertainty into
French Vote,” The New York Times, 21 April 2017, available at https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/04/21/world/europe/paris-champs-elysees-gunman.html?_r=0.
There are contrary opinions about whether Karim Cheurfi, the gunman killed
after he shot a policeman on the Champs-Elysées, Paris, in April 2017, was a
Lone Wolf. He had a long criminal record and spent more than a decade in
prison for the attempted murder of two policemen. Since, in February 2017, he
was already under investigation for terrorism by the French intelligence agency
DGSI he could have been stopped in time. This attack was more of an
intelligence failure.
53
Claire Adidia, David Laitin, and Marie-Anne Valfort, “The Wrong Way to Stop
Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, 1 February 2017, available at https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-02-01/wrong-way-stop-terrorism
54
Glenn Greenwald, No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U.S.
Surveillance State. These conclusions are the result of the information received
from Snowden, a U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) intelligence officer,
who plainly described the tremendous technological efforts in which the United
Stated and Britain had invested in seeking to thwart terrorism.
55
Daniel Byman, “How to Hunt a Lone Wolf: Countering Terrorists Who Act on
Their Own,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2017, available at https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-02-13/how-hunt-lone-wolf
56
According to the European Union’s new General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR), all Internet companies that collect personal information on the
framework of their activity (e.g., Google, Facebook, cyber companies) will be
prohibited from maintaining personal information about European citizens,
and any of the limited personal information that will be stored in Europe will
be subject to European restrictions. In order to obtain personal information,
security authorities in each country will have to request specific information
about suspects. This will mark a great change to the current situation, in which
information is available only to the intelligence organizations in the United
States because the leading global companies of social media and the Internet
are based in the U.S. For further details see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
General_Data_Protection_Regulation