SUPP 201600038 Appendix T PHA Report 01

Non-Recyclable
Plastic to Liquid Fuel

Processing Facility
Preliminary Hazard Analysis

For FOY Group Limited
8 November 2016

Doc. No.: J-000223-REP-PHA
Revision: B

Sydney Melbourne
Arriscar Pty Limited Level 26 Level 2 Riverside Quay
ACN 162 867 763 44 Market Street 1 Southbank Boulevard
www.arriscar.com.au Sydney NSW 2000 Southbank VIC 3006
T: +61 2 9089 8804 T: +61 3 9982 4535
Plastics to Liquid Fuel: Preliminary Hazard Analysis

Distribution List
From To
Name Organisation
(Issue) (Issue)
John Sneddon FOY Group Limited A B

Document History and Authorisation

Rev Date By Description Check Approved
A 2 Nov 2016 JPM Consultation draft PS -
B 8 Nov 2016 JPM Final draft PS PS

Arriscar Pty Limited, and its respective officers, employees or agents are individually and collectively referred to in this
clause as 'Arriscar'. Arriscar assumes no responsibility, and shall not be liable to any person, for any loss, damage or
expense caused by reliance on the information or advice in this document or howsoever provided, unless that person has
signed a contract with Arriscar for the provision of this information or advice and in that case any responsibility or liability
is exclusively on the terms and conditions set out in that contract.
© Arriscar Pty Ltd.

Summary
Overview
Arriscar Pty Ltd (Arriscar) was engaged by FOY Group Limited (FOY) to undertake a Preliminary
Hazard Analysis (PHA) of a proposed waste plastic to fuel facility at Hume in the Australian Capital
Territory (ACT).
This PHA has been undertaken in accordance with the guidance provided in HIPAP No. 6 - Hazard
Analysis (2011) [Ref. 2]. A quantitative assessment of the risk (including quantification of the
likelihood and consequences of identified failure scenarios) has been undertaken to demonstrate
compliance with the criteria published in HIPAP No. 4 - Risk Criteria for Land Use Safety Planning
(2011) [Ref. 1].
Findings
Based on the results of this QRA, the proposed development complies with the relevant land use
safety planning risk criteria for new industrial developments (As published in HIPAP No. 4), and is an
acceptable land use at this location.
Recommendations
A total of 11 recommendations were made during the HAZID workshop (Refer to Table 6).
1. Ensure the plastics store building is designed to the requirements set out in the building
assessment.
2. Ensure the feedstock management procedure adequately addresses the checks for PVC
and PET.
3. Consider suitable checks of people and vehicles before granting access to the site.
4. Ensure the Fire Safety Study considers the appropriate prevention/detection measures for
releases from the process.
5. Ensure vehicle access to site is restricted for over height vehicles to avoid contact with
structures.
6. Ensure the Fire Safety Study considers the firewater requirements for the site.
7. Ensure the tank farm bunding arrangement compiles with AS1940.
8. Ensure the storage tanks have adequate overfill protection.
9. Ensure the system provides adequate overfill protection of the product road tankers.
10. Ensure adequate drive away protection is provided.
11. Ensure the tank farm arrangement compiles with AS1596 for the LPG vessel and associated
pipework.
Furthermore, the following recommendation have been made:
12. Ensure that a hazardous area classification is undertaken as a part of the detailed design.
13. Consider undertaking a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Assessment as per IEC61508/61511 to
ensure that all process and operational hazards are adequately safeguarded against.
14. A Safety Management System should be developed, implemented and maintained for the
proposed facility. This should be consistent with Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory
Paper No. 9 - Safety Management.
Doc Number: J-000223-REP-PHA

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15. A comprehensive Hazard Audit of the proposed development should be undertaken
twelve months after the commencement of operations of the proposed development and
every three years thereafter. This Hazard Audit should comply with the Hazardous
Industry Planning Advisory Paper No. 5 - Hazard Audit Guidelines and be carried out by a
qualified person or team, independent of the development.


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Contents
Distribution List ..................................................................................................................... 2
Document History and Authorisation .................................................................................... 2
Summary ............................................................................................................................... 3
Notation ................................................................................................................................ 9
1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 10
1.1 Background ............................................................................................................ 10
1.2 Scope ...................................................................................................................... 11
1.2.1 Scope of Facilities Covered in the PHA ................................................................... 11
1.2.2 Scope of Analysis .................................................................................................... 11
1.3 Objectives .............................................................................................................. 12
2 Methodology ............................................................................................................. 13
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 13
2.2 Methodology Overview ......................................................................................... 14
2.2.1 Description of Facilities, Operations and Surroundings ......................................... 14
2.2.2 Hazard Identification and Register of Major Accident Events ............................... 14
2.2.3 Consequence Analysis ............................................................................................ 15
2.2.4 Impairment Criteria ................................................................................................ 15
2.2.5 Frequency and Likelihood Analysis ........................................................................ 17
2.2.6 Risk Analysis and Assessment ................................................................................ 18
2.3 Study Assumptions ................................................................................................. 18
2.4 Software Used ........................................................................................................ 18
2.5 Quantitative Risk Criteria ....................................................................................... 19
2.5.1 Individual Fatality Risk ........................................................................................... 19
2.5.2 Injury Risk ............................................................................................................... 19
2.5.3 Risk of Property Damage and Accident Propagation ............................................. 20
2.5.4 Societal Risk ........................................................................................................... 20
2.6 Risk to Biophysical Environment ............................................................................ 20
2.7 Qualitative Risk Criteria .......................................................................................... 21
3 Site Location and Land Uses ....................................................................................... 22

3.1 Site Location ........................................................................................................... 22
3.2 Zoning and Surrounding Land Uses ........................................................................ 22
4 Description of Facilities and Operations ..................................................................... 26

4.1 Overview ................................................................................................................ 26
4.2 Plastic Storage Area and Extruder .......................................................................... 28
4.3 Processing Area ...................................................................................................... 28
4.4 Tank Farm .............................................................................................................. 30
4.5 Tanker Loading Area .............................................................................................. 31
4.6 Staffing ................................................................................................................... 31
4.7 Security .................................................................................................................. 31
4.8 Proposed Prevention and Mitigation Control Measures ....................................... 32
4.8.1 Spill Prevention and Mitigation .............................................................................. 32
4.8.2 Fire Prevention, Detection and Mitigation ............................................................ 32
4.8.3 Safety Management System .................................................................................. 33
5 Hazard Identification ................................................................................................. 34

5.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 34
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5.2 Hazard Identification Word Diagram and MAE Register ........................................ 34
5.3 Hazardous Materials .............................................................................................. 35
5.3.1 Diesel ..................................................................................................................... 35
5.3.2 Petroleum (Unleaded) ............................................................................................ 35
5.3.3 Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) .............................................................................. 36
5.3.4 Methane ................................................................................................................. 36
5.4 Ignited Hazardous Events ....................................................................................... 36
5.4.1 Pool Fires ................................................................................................................ 36
5.4.2 Jet Fires .................................................................................................................. 37
5.4.3 LPG Fires ................................................................................................................. 37
5.4.4 Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) .............................................. 37
5.4.5 Hydrocarbon Vapour Cloud Explosions .................................................................. 37
5.4.6 Flash Fires ............................................................................................................... 38
5.4.7 Tank Fires ............................................................................................................... 38
5.4.8 Products of Combustion ........................................................................................ 38
5.5 Operational Hazardous Events ............................................................................... 38
5.5.1 Tank Overfill ........................................................................................................... 38
5.5.2 Road Tanker Overfill ............................................................................................... 38
5.5.3 Road Tanker Drive-Away ........................................................................................ 38
5.5.4 Air Ingress into Kiln ................................................................................................ 39
5.6 HAZID Recommendations ...................................................................................... 39
6 Consequence Analysis ................................................................................................ 40

6.1 Jet Fires .................................................................................................................. 40
6.2 Flammable Vapour Cloud Dispersion ..................................................................... 40
6.3 Pool Fires ................................................................................................................ 40
6.4 Vapour Cloud Explosion ......................................................................................... 40
6.5 BLEVE ..................................................................................................................... 40
7 Frequency and Likelihood Analysis ............................................................................. 42

7.1 General ................................................................................................................... 42
7.2 Failure Rate Data .................................................................................................... 42
7.3 Event Tree Analysis ................................................................................................ 42
7.4 Ignition Probability ................................................................................................. 43
8 Risk Analysis and Assessment .................................................................................... 44

8.1 Individual Fatality Risk ........................................................................................... 44
8.2 Risk of Property Damage and Accident Propagation (Exceeding 14 kPa) .............. 44
2
8.3 Risk of Property Damage and Accident Propagation (Exceeding 23 kW/m ) ......... 45
8.4 Risk of Injury (Exceeding 7 kPa) ............................................................................. 45
2
8.5 Risk of Injury (Exceeding 4.7 kW/m ) ..................................................................... 45
8.6 Societal Risk ........................................................................................................... 45
8.7 Risk to the Biophysical Environment ...................................................................... 46
9 Findings and Recommendations ................................................................................ 47

9.1 Findings .................................................................................................................. 47
9.2 Recommendations ................................................................................................. 47
10 References ................................................................................................................. 48
Appendix A Assumptions ........................................................................................... 50

A.1 Operational Data .................................................................................................... 51
A.2 Locational Data ...................................................................................................... 52

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A.3 QRA Methodology .................................................................................................. 57
A.4 Consequence Analysis ............................................................................................ 59
A.5 Vulnerability Parameters ....................................................................................... 68
A.6 Likelihood Analysis ................................................................................................. 72
Appendix B Isolatable Sections .................................................................................. 76

B.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 76
Appendix C Parts Count ............................................................................................. 78

C.1 Parts Count ............................................................................................................. 79
Appendix D Hazard Identification .............................................................................. 82

D.1 Hazard Identification Word Diagram ..................................................................... 83
Appendix E Consequence Analysis - Data and Results .............................................. 101

E.1 Pool Fire ............................................................................................................... 101
E.2 Jet Fire .................................................................................................................. 103
E.3 Flash Fire .............................................................................................................. 103
E.4 VCE ....................................................................................................................... 104
E.5 BLEVE ................................................................................................................... 105
E.6 Tank Top Fires ...................................................................................................... 105
Appendix F Likelihood Analysis - Data and Results .................................................. 106

F.1 Leak Frequency .................................................................................................... 106
F.2 Release Frequency ............................................................................................... 108
F.3 BLEVE Frequency .................................................................................................. 110
Appendix G Ignition Probabilities ............................................................................ 111

G.1 Immediate Ignition ............................................................................................... 111
G.2 Delayed Ignition ................................................................................................... 112

List of Figures
Figure 1 Overview of QRA Process ...................................................................................... 13
Figure 2 Indicative Societal Risk Criteria ............................................................................. 20
Figure 3 Location of Proposed Facility ................................................................................ 22
Figure 4 Land Use Zoning Map ........................................................................................... 23
Figure 5 Approximate Distance to Surrounding Land Uses ................................................ 25
Figure 6 Site Layout ............................................................................................................ 27
Figure 7 Process Flow Diagram ........................................................................................... 30
Figure 8 Example Event Tree for Continuous Release with Rainout [REF 13] ..................... 43
Figure 9 Individual Fatality Risk .......................................................................................... 44
Figure 10 Risk of Property Damage and Accident Propagation (Exceeding 23 kW/m2) ....... 45
Figure 11 Tolerance times to burn-injury level for varioius incident heat fluxes [Ref. 15] ... 70


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List of Tables
Table 1 Effects of Explosion Overpressure ........................................................................ 16
Table 2 Effects of Thermal Radiation ................................................................................. 16
Table 3 Individual Fatality Risk Criteria .............................................................................. 19
Table 4 MAE Register ......................................................................................................... 34
Table 5 Summary of Hazardous Materials in the Facility .................................................. 35
Table 6 HAZID Recommendations ..................................................................................... 39
Table 7 Probability of Wind Speed, Stability Class and Direction ...................................... 53
Table 8 Average Ambient Conditions for Proposed Site Location ..................................... 54
Table 9 Surface Roughness Length .................................................................................... 55
Table 10 Fraction of Residential Population Located Indoors and Outdoors ...................... 56
Table 11 Fraction of Residential Population Located Indoors and Outdoors (Ref: TNO) .... 56
Table 12 Probability of Fatality from Exposure to Peak Side-on Overpressure ................... 68
Table 13 Effects of Thermal Radiation ................................................................................. 69
Table 14 Isolatable Sections ................................................................................................ 76
Table 15 Parts Count ........................................................................................................... 79
Table 16 Heat Radiation from a Pool Fire .......................................................................... 101
Table 17 Heat Radiation from a Jet Fire ............................................................................ 103
Table 18 Flash Fire – Maximum Downwind Distance to LFL at 1m Elevation .................... 103
Table 19 BLEVE (Fireball)– Distance to Fatality ................................................................. 105
Table 20 Heat Radiation from a Tank Top Fire .................................................................. 105
Table 21 Flange, Valve and Instrument Leak Frequency ................................................... 106
Table 22 Piping Failure Frequency ..................................................................................... 106
Table 23 Pump, Compressor, Vessel, Fin-Fan, and Hose Leak Frequency ......................... 106
Table 24 Leak Frequency ................................................................................................... 107
Table 25 Leak Frequency ................................................................................................... 108
Table 26 OGP Total Ignition Probabilities .......................................................................... 111
Table 27 Delayed Ignition Probabilities ............................................................................. 112


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Notation
Abbreviation Description
ACT Australian Capital Territory
Arriscar Arriscar Pty Limited
BoM Bureau of Meteorology
DG Dangerous Good
DP&E NSW Department of Planning and Environment
EPA ACT Environment Protection Authority
ERPG Emergency Response Planning Guidelines
FMECA Failure Modes Effects Criticality Analysis
FOY FOY Group Limited
HAZID Hazard Identification
HAZOP Hazard and Operability
HIPAP Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper
HIWD Hazard Identification Word Diagram
IDLH Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health
LFL Lower Flammability Limit
LSIR Location-Specific Individual Risk
MAE Major Accident Event
NIOSH US National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
NSW New South Wales
PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment
SEPP State Environment Planning Policy
SMS Safety Management System
STEL Short-term exposure limit
t tonne
TNO Netherlands Organisation of Applied Scientific Research
tpa tonnes per annum
tpd tonnes per day
UK HSE United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive


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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Arriscar Pty Ltd (Arriscar) was engaged by FOY Group Limited (FOY) to undertake a Preliminary
Hazard Analysis (PHA) of a proposed waste plastic to fuel facility at Hume in the Australian Capital
Territory (ACT).
FOY proposes to construct a 200 tonne/day waste plastic to fuel facility. Construction and operation
of the facility will occur in 4 stages:
Stage 1
• Construction of site infra-structure and services (power, water, etc.).
• Construction of office, feedstock storage, tank farm and processing buildings.
• Installation of the first 50 tonne/day processing module.
Stage 2
• Installation of the 2nd 50 tonne/day module.
Stage 3
• Installation of the 3rd 50 tonne/day module.
• Expansion of the tank farm.
Stage 4
• Installation of the 4th 50 tonne/day module.
• Expansion of the workshop facility to accommodate module construction for overseas
parties.
The ACT Environment Protection Authority (EPA) has stipulated that the PHA should:
• Be undertaken in accordance with the NSW Government guideline: Hazardous Industry
Planning Advisory Paper (HIPAP) No. 6 - Hazard Analysis [Ref. 2].
• Be sufficiently comprehensive to enable a decision to be made as to whether risk levels
may preclude approval.
• Reference the NSW Government document guideline: Hazardous Industry Planning
Advisory Paper No. 4 - Risk Criteria for Land Use Safety Planning [Ref. 1].
• Cover a broad range of discreet failure scenarios. As outlined in HIPAP No. 6, the
assessment should consider the likelihood and consequence of each identified scenario.
• Consider and make recommendations covering hardware, operational and
organisational safeguards and make recommendations covering independent hazard
audits.
This PHA has been undertaken in accordance with the guidance provided in HIPAP No. 6 - Hazard
Analysis (2011) [Ref. 2]. A quantitative assessment of the risk (including quantification of the
likelihood and consequences of identified failure scenarios) has been undertaken to demonstrate
compliance with the criteria published in HIPAP No. 4 - Risk Criteria for Land Use Safety Planning
(2011) [Ref. 1]. Recommendations are included in Section 9.2.

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1.2 Scope
1.2.1 Scope of Facilities Covered in the PHA

As there are no existing facilities at this ‘greenfield’ site, the PHA only considers the hazards and
risks for the proposed development.
The facilities and operations involving hazardous materials (e.g. Petrol) included in the scope of the
PHA include:
• Plastic storage area and screw press densifier.
• Processing area.
• Tank farm with vertical storage tanks for diesel, petrol and rework product.
• Road tanker loading area.
The facility also includes:
• Offices and amenities;
• Workshop;
• Fire protection system;
• First flush system for storm water and other run-off (Designed to contain the first 15 mm
of any rain event with c. 150 m3 total storage); and
• Vehicle parking area.
1.2.2 Scope of Analysis

The study scope includes a quantitative analysis and assessment of off-site fatality, injury and
property damage risk, in accordance with the Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper (HIPAP)
guidelines [Ref. 2]. The quantitative risk assessment (QRA) does not include an assessment of the
following risks:
• Environmental risks on-site;
• Risk of property damage on-site; and
• Fatality or injury risks for personnel on-site.
An assessment of the risks associated with the off-site transport of Dangerous Goods (DGs) (i.e. Only
petrol for the proposed development) was also excluded from the scope of the PHA. This was
excluded on the basis that the proposed number of vehicle movements for DG Class 3, Packing
Group (PG) II materials (viz. approximately 14 per week or 730 per year) is less than the screening
criteria applied in NSW for undertaking a PHA (viz. > 45 per week or > 750 per year [Ref. 4, Table 2]).
The study scope includes a PHA of the proposed development for a single conservative throughput
case. This is based on the maximum throughput of 200 tonne/day for Stage 4. Throughput is an
important factor for the QRA as it determines the frequency of some operational failure scenarios.
The study scope includes determination and presentation of the off-site risk contours for all
proposed facilities and operations at the proposed site at Hume, ACT.


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1.3 Objectives
The principal objective of the study was to perform a PHA for the proposed development, covering
the scope outlined in Section 1.2 and in accordance with the HIPAP No. 6 guidelines [Ref. 2]. This
included:
• Identification of the hazards for all hazardous substances proposed to be stored and
handled on site;
• Identification of all ‘Major Accident Events’ (MAEs) resulting in loss of containment, fire,
explosion and/or toxic releases from proposed site operations, and the appropriate and
relevant representative scenarios for each MAE;
• Quantification of the consequences of potential harmful effects for each representative
scenario, including the potential for impact on surrounding land uses;
• Quantification of the likelihood of occurrence of each representative scenario;
• Using assumptions that are appropriate and justified, with a focus on minimising
uncertainty and obtaining the ‘cautious best estimate’;
• Development of Location-Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) contours for off-site risks,
superimposed on facility plot plans, for comparison with the relevant criteria for risk
acceptability (viz. as per HIPAP No. 4); and,
• Estimation of societal risk for residential populations, for comparison with the indicative
criteria for risk acceptability (viz. as per HIPAP No. 4 and 10).


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2 METHODOLOGY
2.1 Introduction
This PHA involves the quantitative estimation of the consequences and likelihood of accidents and
the quantitative estimation and assessment of the risk of specific outcomes due to these accidents
(viz. a Quantitative Risk Assessment or QRA). For consequences to people, the most common risk
measure is ‘individual fatality risk’ (viz. The likelihood of fatality per year).
It is important to ensure that any estimates used in a PHA fall on the side of conservatism,
particularly where there is uncertainty in the underlying data and assumptions. This precautionary
approach uses ‘cautious best estimate’ values, which are conservative yet still realistic. This is
consistent with the Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper (HIPAP) No. 6 guidelines for
undertaking this type of assessment [Ref. 2].
Diagrammatically, the QRA process is as follows:
Figure 1 Overview of QRA Process

TASK 1
Kick-Off Meeting
TASK 2
Familiarisation, and
Data Collection.
(System Description)
TASK 4 TASK 3
Hazard Identification Background Data,
(Accident Case Collection and Analysis
Development)
TASK 5 TASK 6
Frequency Analysis Consequence Analysis
TASK 7
Risk Calculations
TASK 8 TASK 9 TASK 10

Risk Criteria Risk Assessment Iterative Calculations
TASK 11
Risk Mitigation
TASK 12
Report Production
and Results
Presentation


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2.2 Methodology Overview
The methodology for a QRA involves the following main steps:
1. System definition, in which information on the facility is collected and assimilated.
2. Hazard identification, in which site events and external events are identified which may
lead to potential adverse effects beyond the boundary of the site.
3. Consequence modelling, in which all the possible consequences of each event are
estimated.
4. Frequency estimation, in which the frequency (i.e. likelihood per year of occurrence) of
each of the accidental events is estimated, based on historical failure data.
5. Risk estimation, in which the frequencies and consequences of each event are combined
to determine levels of risk.
6. Risk assessment, in which the calculated risks are assessed against relevant risk criteria.
2.2.1 Description of Facilities, Operations and Surroundings

A description of the facility and the operations is an essential input to the PHA. It is used to identify
what can potentially go wrong at the proposed facility.
The location of the proposed facility and the surrounding areas are described to enable an
appropriate consideration of the potential impacts. This information is included in Section 3 for the
proposed facility.
The description included in the PHA report does not need to be exhaustive in detail, but should
identify the proposed operations, potentially hazardous materials and critical equipment and
proposed safety systems. This information is included in Section 4 for the proposed facility.
2.2.2 Hazard Identification and Register of Major Accident Events

The basis for any risk study is the identification of hazardous scenarios. Hazard identification (or
HAZID) is crucial, as a hazard that is not identified will not be modelled and assessed.
A hazard is something with the potential to cause harm (e.g. thermal radiation from a fire, physical
impact from a moving vehicle or dropped object, or exposure to stored energy etc.). As well as
identifying the hazards that exist, it is also important to identify how these hazards could be realised.
For example, the HAZID step for a QRA of a flammable liquids storage facility should identify
representative events that could result in a fire as these events may have the potential to cause
harm and/or property damage. These potentially hazard events are commonly described as ‘Major
Accident Events’ (or MAEs). In the context of the PHA, an MAE is an event with the potential to
cause: off-site fatality or injury; off-site property damage; or, long-term damage to the biophysical
environment (i.e. any outcome for which an acceptable risk criterion has been defined – Refer to
Section 2.5).
There is no single definitive method for hazard identification (HAZID); however, it should be
comprehensive and systematic to ensure critical hazards are not excluded from further analysis. A
desktop review of layout drawings, engineering documentation and a literature review provide
useful inputs. Examples of hazard identification techniques include simple checklists based on
historical incidents and earlier analyses, more detailed “what-if” style analyses and the most
detailed structured techniques such as a Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study and Failure Modes
and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA).

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For this PHA, the hazardous scenarios were identified based on a workshop (20 October 2016), and
a desktop review of layout drawings and engineering documentation.
A detailed list of MAEs was developed for the proposed facility. This QRA includes an estimate of
the consequences and likelihood of each of these scenarios and aggregates the results to estimate
the total risk generated by the facility and operation.
2.2.3 Consequence Analysis

The physical consequences of a release of potentially hazardous material (e.g. flammable gas,
flammable liquid, etc.) from a pipe, vessel, etc. are generally dependent on the: quantity released;
the rate of release; and, for fire and explosion events, when ignition occurs.
The quantity of release depends on the inventory, size of release (viz. assumed equivalent hole
diameter) and duration of release (how soon can the release be detected and isolated).
The release rate from a hole is assumed to be from a circular orifice of equivalent diameter. This is
the maximum flow-rate for a given hole area and is used because it can be calculated readily and
will produce the maximum release rate for a given hole area.
A release of liquid onto the ground may form a pool and/or accumulate in a bund/sump.
If the liquid is volatile, then a vapour cloud may form and disperse in the air. Similarly, a release of
gas (from pressurised equipment) may form a gas cloud and disperse in the air. The vapour / gas
dispersion rate depends on the wind speed and atmospheric stability conditions. The dispersion of
flammable or toxic gas / vapour is modelled to produce a concentration profile in three dimensions
(downwind, crosswind and elevation). For releases that are constant over time, this can be
represented by a set of contours of constant concentration (isopleths) on a plan drawing and/or
summarised in a tabular format.
If the vapour / gas is toxic, or an asphyxiant, then the potential may exist for injury or fatality if
exposed (typically via inhalation).
If the flammable gas-air mixture is ignited, then a flash fire or a vapour cloud explosion (VCE) may
occur. A VCE only occurs in a partially confined and/or congested area.
If the release is a flammable gas/vapour under pressure, ignition will produce a jet fire. A jet fire
generates heat radiation, which can be modelled using the surface emissivity of the flame to
produce contours of heat radiation levels.
Fires impinging on adjacent equipment may cause structural failures and incident escalation.
The consequence analysis for the Major Accident Events (MAEs) was carried out using the PHAST
software package for releases on land.
2.2.4 Impairment Criteria

Impairment criteria for injury have been developed for explosions, fires and toxic gas emissions.
Explosion
The potential for injury or property damage from an explosion is principally determined by the
explosion overpressure. However, projectiles are also a possibility in an explosion.
Injury could occur from direct exposure to the overpressure due to organ damage (e.g. ear drum
rupture or lung rupture) and/or by being knocked over / into a hard object (e.g. ground or a wall).
Impact by projectiles created by the explosion, or from collapse of buildings if located indoors, can
also lead to injury. The overpressure and / or projectiles can also cause property damage.

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The effects of exposure to explosion overpressure are summarised in Table 1 [Ref. 1].
Table 1 Effects of Explosion Overpressure
Overpressure
Effect/s
[kPa]
0.3 Loud noise.
1.0 Threshold for breakage of glass.
4.0 Minimal effect in the open.
Minor injury from window breakage in building.
7.0 Glass fragments fly with enough force to cause injury.
Probability of injury is 10%. No fatality.
Damage to internal partitions and joinery of conventional buildings, but can be
repaired.
14.0 1% chance of ear drum rupture.
House uninhabitable and badly cracked.
21.0 10% chance of ear drum rupture.
20% chance of fatality for a person within a conventional building.
Reinforced structures distort.
Storage tanks fail.
35.0 50% chance of fatality for a person within a conventional building and 15% chance of
fatality for a person in the open.
House uninhabitable.
Heavy machinery damaged.
Significant damage to plant.
70.0 100% chance of fatality for a person within a building or in the open.
100% loss of plant.

The impairment criteria adopted for the QRA are identified in Appendix A (Section A.5).
Fire
The potential for injury or property damage from a fire is determined by the intensity of the heat
radiation emitted by the fire and the duration of exposure to this heat radiation.
The effects of exposure to thermal radiation are summarised in Table 2 [Ref. 1].
Table 2 Effects of Thermal Radiation
Heat
Radiation Effect/s
2
[kW/m ]
1.2 Received from sun in summer at noon.
1.6 Minimum necessary to be felt as pain.
4.7 Pain in 15 to 20 seconds, 1st degree burns in 30 seconds.
Injury (second degree burns) to person who cannot escape or seek shelter after 30s
exposure.

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Heat
Radiation Effect/s
2
[kW/m ]
12.6 High chance of injury.
30% chance of fatality for extended exposure.
Melting of plastics (cable insulation).
Causes the temperature of wood to rise to a point where it can be ignited by a naked
flame after long exposure.
Thin steel with insulation on the side away from the fire may reach a thermal stress
level high enough to cause structural failure.
23.0 Fatality on continuous exposure.
10% chance of fatality on instantaneous exposure.
Spontaneous ignition of wood after long exposure.
Unprotected steel will reach thermal stress temperatures, which can cause failure.
Pressure vessel needs to be relieved or failure would occur.
35.0 25% chance of fatality on instantaneous exposure.
60.0 Fatality on instantaneous exposure.

The impairment criteria adopted for the QRA are identified in Appendix A (Section A.5).
The dangerous effects of flash fires are the direct contact with the flames and the heat radiated in
the combustion. The damage caused by heat radiation to exposed objects is normally ignored due
to the assumption that the short duration of the phenomenon (a few seconds) will not lead to
significant heat radiation doses [Ref. 5].
To estimate the magnitude of the flammable gas cloud, the furthest distance from the release
location with a concentration equal or above the lower flammability limit (LFL) is assessed using a
dispersion model.
For flash fires, it was assumed the probability of fatality was 100% at locations within the flammable
cloud footprint at the time of ignition. The probability of fatality outside the flammable cloud is zero.
Toxic Gas or Vapour
As there are no uniform specific criteria to cover all toxic effects, the impairment criteria selection
for toxic exposure requires a literature review of the available toxicity data.
For this PHA, no MAEs were identified with the potential for toxic exposure.
2.2.5 Frequency and Likelihood Analysis

Once the consequences of the various accident scenarios have been estimated, it is necessary to
estimate the likelihood of each scenario. In a QRA, the likelihood must be estimated in quantitative
terms (i.e. occurrences per year). Exponential notation (e.g. 5.0 x 10-6 per annum) is normally used
because the likelihood of a MAE is usually a low number (i.e. much less than 1 per annum).
The likelihood of each scenario is normally estimated from historical incident and failure data. This
is only possible because data on such incidents and failures has been collected by various
organisations over many years. Various databases and reference documents are now available that
provide this data.
When historical data is used to forecast the likelihood of a future event, it is important to ensure
any specific conditions that existed at the time of the historical event are taken into account. For
very low frequency events (i.e. where historical occurrences are very rare), it might not be possible
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to estimate the likelihood values directly from the historical data and other techniques such as fault
tree analysis may be required.
The frequency analysis data and results are summarised in Section 7 and Appendix F.
2.2.6 Risk Analysis and Assessment

Risk analysis and assessment are separate tasks although they are often undertaken at the same
time. Risk analysis involves combining the consequence and likelihood estimates for each scenario
and then summing the results across all the accident scenarios to generate a complete picture of
the risk. The risk assessment step involves comparing the risk results against risk criteria.
Location-specific individual risk (LSIR) contours are usually used to represent off-site risk for a land-
use safety QRA study. These iso-risk contours are superimposed on a plan view drawing of the site.
Example risk levels that are typically shown as iso-risk contours include 1 x 10-6 per annum (p.a.), 10
x 10-6 p.a. and 50 x 10-6 p.a.
The iso-risk contours show the estimated frequency of an event causing a specified level of harm at
a specified location, regardless of whether anyone is present at that location to suffer that harm.
Thus, individual iso-risk contour maps are generated by calculating individual risk at every
geographic location, assuming somebody will be present and unprotected at the given location
100% of the time (i.e. peak individual risk with no allowance for escape or occupancy).
The assessment of risk results involves comparing the results against risk criteria. In some cases,
this assessment may be a simple listing of each criterion together with a statement that the criterion
is met. In other, more complex cases, the risk criteria may not be met and additional risk mitigation
controls may be required to reduce the risk.
2.3 Study Assumptions

It is necessary to make numerous technical assumptions during a QRA. These assumptions typically
relate to specific data inputs (e.g. material properties, equipment failure rates, meteorological
conditions, etc.) and modelling assumptions (e.g. release orientations, impairment criteria, etc.).
The key assumptions adopted for the QRA are listed in the Assumptions Register (Refer to Appendix
A). Each assumption is numbered and detailed separately. The basis for each assumption is
explained together with its potential impact on the results of the QRA and the MAEs potentially
affected. Key references are also listed for each assumption, where relevant.
2.4 Software Used

The latest PHAST-Risk software package was used for the consequence modelling and generation of
the iso-risk contours.

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2.5 Quantitative Risk Criteria
2.5.1 Individual Fatality Risk

The individual fatality risk imposed by a proposed (or existing) industrial activity should be low
relative to the background risk. This forms the basis for the following individual fatality risk criteria
in HIPAP No. 4 [Ref. 1].
Table 3 Individual Fatality Risk Criteria
Risk Criterion [per
Land Use
million per year]
Hospitals, schools, child care facilities and old age housing 0.5
developments
Residential developments and places of continuous occupancy, such 1
as hotels and tourist resorts
Commercial developments, including offices, retail centres, 5
warehouses with showrooms, restaurants and entertainment centres
Sporting complexes and active open space areas 10
Industrial sites 50 *
* HIPAP No. 4 allows flexibility in the interpretation of this criterion. For example, ‘where an industrial site
involves only the occasional presence of people, such as in the case of a tank farm, a higher level of risk
may be acceptable’.
A fatality risk criterion of 1 x 10-6 p.a. (or 1 chance of fatality per million per year) applies for
residential area exposure because this risk is very low in relation to typical background risks.
2.5.2 Injury Risk

HIPAP No. 4 includes risk criteria for levels of effects that may cause injury to people but will not
necessarily cause fatality. Criteria are included in HIPAP No. 4 for potential injury caused by
exposure to heat radiation, explosion overpressure and toxic gas/ smoke/dust.
The injury risk criterion in HIPAP No. 4 for heat radiation is as follows:
• Incident heat flux radiation at residential and sensitive use areas should not exceed 4.7
kW/m2 at a frequency of more than 50 chances in a million per year.
The injury risk criterion in HIPAP No. 4 for explosion overpressure is as follows:
• Incident explosion overpressure at residential and sensitive use areas should not exceed
7 kPa at frequencies of more than 50 chances in a million per year.
The injury risk criteria in HIPAP No. 4 for toxic gas/ smoke/dust exposure are as follows:
• Toxic concentrations in residential and sensitive use areas should not exceed a level which
would be seriously injurious to sensitive members of the community following a relatively
short period of exposure at a maximum frequency of 10 in a million per year.
• Toxic concentrations in residential and sensitive use areas should not cause irritation to
eyes or throat, coughing or other acute physiological responses in sensitive members of
the community over a maximum frequency of 50 in a million per year.

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2.5.3 Risk of Property Damage and Accident Propagation
Heat radiation exceeding 23 kW/m2 may cause unprotected steel to suffer thermal stress that may
cause structural damage and an explosion overpressure of 14 kPa can cause damage to piping and
low pressure equipment. The criteria in HIPAP No. 4 for risk of damage to property and accident
propagation are as follows:
• Incident heat flux radiation at neighbouring potentially hazardous installations or at land
zoned to accommodate such installations should not exceed a risk of 50 in a million per
year for the 23 kW/m2 heat flux level.
• Incident explosion overpressure at neighbouring potentially hazardous installations, at
land zoned to accommodate such installations or at nearest public buildings should not
exceed a risk of 50 in a million per year for the 14 kPa explosion overpressure level.
2.5.4 Societal Risk

Societal risk criteria take account of the fact that society is particularly intolerant of accidents, which
though infrequent, have a potential to create multiple fatalities. Below the negligible line, provided
other individual criteria are met, societal risk is not considered significant. Above the intolerable
level, an activity is considered undesirable, even if individual risk criteria are met. Within the ‘As
Low As Reasonably Practicable’ (ALARP) region, the emphasis is on reducing risks as far as possible
towards the negligible line. Provided other quantitative and qualitative criteria of HIPAP No. 4 are
met, the risks from the activity would be considered tolerable in the ALARP region.
Figure 2 Indicative Societal Risk Criteria
2.6 Risk to Biophysical Environment

The following criteria are included in HIPAP No. 4 for assessing the risk to the biophysical
environment:
• Industrial developments should not be sited in proximity to sensitive natural
environmental areas where the effects (consequences) of the more likely accidental
emissions may threaten the long-term viability of the ecosystem or any species within it.

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• Industrial developments should not be sited in proximity to sensitive natural
environmental areas where the likelihood (probability) of impacts that may threaten the
long-term viability of the ecosystem or any species within it is not substantially lower
than the background level of threat to the ecosystem.
2.7 Qualitative Risk Criteria

Irrespective of the numerical value of any risk criteria level for risk assessment purposes, it is
essential that certain qualitative principles be adopted concerning the land use safety acceptability
of a proposed development or existing activity. The qualitative risk criteria outlined in HIPAP No. 4
encompass the following general principles:
• Avoidance of all ‘avoidable’ risks;
• Reduction, wherever practicable, of the risk from a major hazard, even where the
likelihood of exposure is low;
• Containment, wherever possible, within the site boundary of the effects (consequences)
of the more likely hazardous events; and,
• Recognition that if the risk from an existing installation is already high, further
development should not be permitted if it significantly increases that existing risk.


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3 SITE LOCATION AND LAND USES
3.1 Site Location
The proposed development site is at 36 Couranga Crescent (Block 11, Section 21) (Refer to Figure
3), approximately 11 km South of Canberra’s central business district and approximately 4 km West
of Lake Jerrabombera and the Lake Jerrabombera township.
Figure 3 Location of Proposed Facility
3.2 Zoning and Surrounding Land Uses

This site is in a General Industrial IZ1 zone of the Territory Plan (Refer to Figure 4).
The land surrounding the proposed site is mostly undeveloped, as follows:
• North – Hume industrial land (Currently undeveloped) and Monaro Highway (c. 350 m
from the northern boundary).
• East – Mixed use industrial properties including other waste processing and logistics
businesses.
• South – Cleared agricultural land. The area beyond the southern boundary across from
Tralee Street is being utilised as a stockpile of road material.
• West – Cleared agricultural land.

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Figure 4 Land Use Zoning Map

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The General Industrial IZ1 zone includes the following permissible uses (subject to approval):
ancillary use hazardous industry public transport facility
bulk landscape supplies hazardous waste facility railway use
car park incineration facility recyclable materials collection
caretaker’s residence indoor recreation facility recycling facility
communications facility industrial trades scientific research establishment
COMMUNITY USE light industry service station
consolidation liquid fuel depot sign
craft workshop major road store
defence installation MAJOR UTILITY INSTALLATION subdivision
demolition minor road temporary use
development in a location and of minor use transport depot
a type identified in a precinct municipal depot varying a lease (where not
map as additional merit track prohibited, code track or impact
development offensive industry
track assessable)
parkland
emergency services facility pedestrian plaza warehouse
freight transport facility plant and equipment hire waste transfer station
general industry establishment

The General Industrial IZ1 zone includes the following prohibited uses:
agriculture farm tourism restaurant
airport funeral parlour retirement village
animal care facility group or organised camp sand and gravel extraction
animal husbandry home business secondary residence
aquatic recreation facility indoor entertainment facility serviced apartment
boarding house land fill site shop
bulky goods retailing land management facility single dwelling housing
caravan park/camping ground mining industry special dwelling
cemetery mobile home park stock/sale yard
civic administration multi-unit housing supportive housing
club nature conservation area tourist facility
COMMERCIAL NON-RETAIL COMMERCIAL USE varying a lease to add a use listed
ACCOMMODATION USE as “prohibited development” in
corrections facility outdoor recreation facility this development table
development in a location and of overnight camping area vehicle sales

a type identified in a precinct place of assembly veterinary hospital
map as additional prohibited
development plantation forestry woodlot
playing field zoological facility
drink establishment produce market
drive-in cinema residential care accommodation


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The proposed site is located approximately 11 km south of Canberra’s central business district and
approximately 4 km west of the Lake Jerrabomberra and Lake Jerrabomberra township.
The closest existing residential uses are individual rural residences located approximately 780 to 820
m to the north-west and south-east of the proposed site (Refer to Figure 5). The residential areas
of Chisolm and Gilmore are located approximately 1,150 m to the west and south-west of the
proposed site (Refer to Figure 5).
Lands adjoining the ACT-NSW border (Approximately 600 m to the south-east of the proposed site
- Refer to Figure 5) have been identified for future residential development under the Queanbeyan
Residential and Economic Strategy 2031 and are understood to be the subject of an active Planning
Proposal to rezone the land for residential development. This may also include more sensitive uses
(e.g. child care centres and schools) and open space uses (e.g. public parks).
A commercial (non-residential) development is located approximately 350 m to the west of the
proposed site (Refer to Figure 5).
Figure 5 Approximate Distance to Surrounding Land Uses
~ 820 m
~ 350 m
~ 780 m
~ 1,150 m ~ 600 m

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4 DESCRIPTION OF FACILITIES AND OPERATIONS
4.1 Overview
The proposed facilities and operations are relatively straightforward. Non-recyclable plastic (waste
polystyrene, polyethylene and polypropylene) will be delivered to the site by truck. This will be
unloaded from the truck and stored in a warehouse before being transferred to the processing area.
The hydrocarbons produced in the processing area (Petrol, diesel, etc.) will be stored in a tank farm
before being loaded into road tankers and delivered to customers.
The processing plant will operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Truck and tanker movements will
occur between the hours of 6.00 a.m. and 10.00 p.m. Monday to Friday and 8.00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.
on Saturdays and Sundays.
The main storage and processing facilities are described in more detail in Sections 4.2 - 4.5. Other
on-site facilities will include:
• An office, including amenities, will be in the Eastern part of the site (excluding the
driveway area). A car park will be located adjacent to the office area.
• A hardstand area containing the first flush system will be in the northeast corner of the
site. The first flush system has been designed to contain the first 15mm of rain of all hard
stand areas excluding areas covered by impervious roofing.
• The fire protection system will be in the south-east corner of the site. The fire protection
system has been designed to provide a deluge of 20 minutes for the main processing
area.
• A workshop facility for general site equipment maintenance and spares storage
requirements will be in the northeast of the main processing area.
The proposed site will be accessed using Couranga Crescent, as shown on the site plan (Refer to
Figure 6).
The site surface will consist of sealed concrete in the vehicle and processing areas, gravel in areas
between processing and vehicle access, and an area to the west of the site which will be reserved
as a grassed area.


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Figure 6 Site Layout

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4.2 Plastic Storage Area and Extruder

The plastic storage and densification areas will be located to the north of the processing shed on
the northern boundary.
These areas will be covered, bunded and protected by the site fire protection system.
4.3 Processing Area

The processing area, which houses most of the processing equipment will be in the centre of the
site. The main products will be diesel and petrol, with some liquefied petroleum range gas (LPG) to
be captured and consumed for heating during the process. The plastic will yield (by mass)
approximately 65% diesel, 20% petrol and 15% LPG.
The shed and processing units, which are open on four sides, will be protected by a fire protection
system. All processing areas will be on sealed concrete flooring with bunds to capture spills.
The waste non-recyclable plastic to fuel (pyrolysis) process is described below and shown in the
process flow diagram provided in Figure 7.
1. Feedstock delivery system. The densified plastic tablets will pass into an low oxygen gas purged
hopper and then through a double vapour lock consisting of a double slide gate and plug screw
arrangement to remove all air associated with the feed stock. This will ensure both a continuous
supply of feedstock to the processing plant and ensure air does not enter the catalytic reactor
(rotary kiln) with the plastic, as this could cause oxidation of the hydrocarbons.
2. Catalytic reactor. In the catalytic reactor, the feedstock and small quantities of activated
bauxite contacts the product oil/catalyst slurry and are rapidly heated to over 400 degrees
Celsius (oC). Activated bauxite was chosen as a catalyst due to its ability to assist in the
production of liquid hydrocarbons (diesel and petrol) and absorb impurities. The activated
bauxite will be stored in 20 kg bags in the workshop area. At any time, there will be less than 1
tonne stored on site (i.e., approximately one week’s supply). The process will consume 20 kg
of activated bauxite every 3 hours. The catalytic reactor consists of the following components:
• A large horizontal cylinder enclosing a smaller cylindrical vessel, the rotary kiln or
catalytic reactor. Hot gases produced by the cyclone combustor pass through the
interstitial space between the two vessels heating the feedstock, catalyst and hot oil.
• The depolymerisation reaction occurs in the catalytic reactor. The reactor houses a
rotary stirrer and is sealed at both ends. The melting plastic depolymerises into
hydrocarbon gases ranging from LPG to heavy wax. The majority of the gases
produced are in the liquid fuel range (petrol and diesel).
• Hot vapour ducts remove the gaseous hydrocarbons produced in the
depolymerisation reaction to the scrubber.
• The residual non-converted material comprising spent catalyst and char (carbon
black) are drawn off the catalytic reactor for disposal.
3. Packed column scrubber. Hot vapours from the catalytic reactor pass through a packed column
scrubber where they are cooled and washed free of particulates by the reflux diesel stream.
Solid particles, dust (including any residual metal dust) and heavier oils and waxes are removed
by the reflux diesel stream and fall back into the catalytic reactor to undergo further
depolymerisation.
4. Fractionation column. The vapours from the packed column scrubber pass then pass into a
conventional hydrocarbon fractionation column where diesel and petrol / LPG range
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hydrocarbons are separated. Reflux diesel (diesel that has been previously fractioned) is
pumped from the small tank at the bottom of the fractionation column to the packed column
scrubber through a flow control system.
5. Impurity Extraction System. The diesel phase passes to the impurity extraction system where
it is contacted in a counter flow liquid/liquid extraction column. This system removes such
impurities as Polyaromatic hydrocarbons, Sulphur compounds, colour compounds and
oxygenates.
6. Vacuum drying column. The diesel fraction that has had impurities removed may still contain
trace water. Water is removed by passing the diesel fraction through the vacuum drying tower.
The diesel fraction falls through tower packing while exposed to a high vacuum at a
temperature of approximately 110 degrees C, causing the water to boil off and be directed to
the primary condenser. The produced diesel is piped to the above ground diesel storage tanks.
7. Primary condenser. The lighter-end vapours flow from the fractionation tower to the primary
condenser, where petrol and water are condensed from the vapour stream. The petrol is a
finished product and is piped to the aboveground petrol storage tanks. Reflux petrol from the
storage tanks is pumped through a flow control mechanism to the top of the fractionation
column tower to assist in the fractionation process. The water fraction is directed to the
reboiler where it is reheated to remove trace petrol. Post this step it is pumped to the
wastewater treatment facility where it is treated before reuse as process water in the cooling
tower. In the unlikely event that there is an excess of water, FOY will discharge the excess water
to the sewer in accordance with the requirements of the trade waste permit.
8. Chilled vent condenser and compressor. Gas vapours (primarily LPG), which do not condense
in the primary condenser are ducted to the chilled vent condenser which is chilled utilising an
industry-standard cold glycol water system. Petrol is condensed from the vapours and piped to
the petrol storage tank. Non-condensable gases from the chilled vent condenser are
compressed and piped to the aboveground LPG storage vessel. Gases that do not condense in
the compression process are drawn off and piped to the cyclone combustor for use as fuel.
9. Cyclone combustor. The cyclone combustor produces the hot gases and heat required for the
depolymerisation process. The combustor uses LPG for start-up after which a mixture of LPG
and non-condensable gases provides fuel for the burner. Hot combustion gases flowing from
the cyclone combustor at over 1,100 oC for over 2 seconds are mixed with recycled flue gas and
enter the interstitial spaces between the catalytic reactor and outer cylinder at 900oC.
10. Heat recovery unit. Flue gases flowing from the interstitial spaces between the outer cylinder
and catalytic reactor pass through a heat recovery unit where heat energy is recovered to
reduce the plants fuel consumption lowering emissions to atmosphere. A small amount of the
flue gases are vented to atmosphere via a stack with a real-time monitoring module for air
pollutants.
11. Pyrolysis residue recovery system. Residual non-converted material (pyrolysis residue) exits
the catalytic reactor via vapour locks to a sealed metal cooling vessel where it cools naturally.
During cooling the vessel is subjected to a slight negative pressure by the fugitive vapour
collection system to ensure any remaining vapours are captured and thermally oxidised in the
cyclone combustor. The content of the non-converted material comprises filler materials (from
the plastic feedstock), char and admix.

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Figure 7 Process Flow Diagram
Vacuum dryer
Diesel
4.4 Tank Farm

The tank farm will be located to the south-west of the main processing area, 10 m inside the
southern boundary. The Stage 4 facility will include:
• 3 x 290 kl vertical diesel tanks
• 2 x 290 kl vertical petrol tanks
• 1 x 80 kl vertical rework tank
• 1 x 150 kl vertical diesel day tank
• 1 x 80 kl vertical marine diesel day tank
• 1 x 80 kl vertical Petrol day tank
• 1 x 27 kl vertical LPG tank
These tanks will be in a sealed concrete bund.

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The dimensions of tank farm bund are: 33.0 m x 10.0 m x 1.2 m. This equates to total retention
capacity of approximately 396 kilolitres. The Australian Standard AS1940–2004: The Storage and
Handling of Flammable and Combustible Liquids requires a bund capable of retaining at least 110%
of the volume of the largest container. The proposed bund can contain approximately 136% of the
largest tank (one of the 290 kilolitre diesel tanks) inside the bunded area and therefore complies
with AS1940-2004 and may contain some firefighting water / foam in the event of a fire.
4.5 Tanker Loading Area

A tanker loading area will be located on a hardstand surface directly east of the tank farm.
The road tankers can carry 28 tonnes of end-product for a single truck and 42.5 tonnes for a B-
double. Assuming the use of B-double tankers, this will equate to five road tankers (diesel or petrol)
being loaded per day for the Stage 4 development.
4.6 Staffing
The workforce at full plant capacity will include:
• One facility manager;
• Fourteen facility operators;
• One logistics manager;
• One plant engineer;
• Three logistics operators;
• One fitter;
• One engineer;
• Three maintenance staff;
• One lab supervisor;
• One lab technician;
• One admin assistant; and
• One accounts clerk.
4.7 Security
The site security system will include:
• Physical Barriers – The site will be fenced with a 1.8 m high chain mesh (cyclone) security
fence with triple barbed wire along the top;
• Signage;
• Shift security checks;
• Emergency action plans; and
• Background checks on employees prior to employment.

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4.8 Proposed Prevention and Mitigation Control Measures
4.8.1 Spill Prevention and Mitigation

Mitigation of the impacts of the spills and leakages will be managed through implementation of the
following measures:
• All liquid storage and handling floor areas will be constructed from sealed concrete
surfaces;
• Inspection of construction equipment to ensure it is in good order and leaks are unlikely
to occur;
• Supply and maintenance of suitable spill response kits at the site;
• Regular inspection of bund integrity. Where integrity issues are observed, bunds will be
repaired;
• Regular inspection and maintenance of the overfill protection valves;
• Review and revision (if necessary) of FOY’s existing emergency spill response procedures
(to be incorporated into the EMP);
• Training of all operators and truck drivers in appropriate spill response techniques and
provision of regular refresher training;
• Conducting tanker fuel load-out activities on the designated hardstand areas only and
maintaining the spill catch pit; and
• Regular inspection and maintenance of the first flush storm water system.
4.8.2 Fire Prevention, Detection and Mitigation

Mitigation measure to prevent fires or explosions in the facility include:
Prevention and Detection
• Intrinsic design of the main processing facility to prevent fuel sources contacting air.
• Plant operating policies and procedures.
• Adherence to electrical hazardous area zoning requirements.
• Weekly housekeeping reports (including checks of the deluge systems).
• No Smoking policy on site.
• Hot work permitting system.
• Perimeter sprinklers to prevent fires from outside entering the facility.
Fire Mitigation
• Fire hydrant system.
• Fire extinguishers located strategically throughout processing and feed preparation and
storage areas.
• Fully automatic plant deluge system including:
• Fire water storage tank (290,000 litres).
• Foam suppression system.
• Automated diesel fire pump (Capable of delivering 160 l/s at 800 kPa).
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• Back to base notification to local fire station.
• Staff and contractor fire-fighting training.
• Regular refreshers with local Fyshwick fire station.
4.8.3 Safety Management System

A Safety Management System will be developed for the operations at the proposed facility.


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5 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
5.1 Introduction
The major objective of the HAZID process was to identify the potential MAEs associated with the
proposed facility. A HAZID was carried out through a review of the PFDs, engineering documents
and available literature and through a consultative workshop with stakeholders.
The HAZID results are provided in full in Appendix D. From this, the MAEs were developed.
An MAE is an event with the potential to cause harm to people due to a release of hazardous
material, or to escalate the primary event to a larger event, thus affecting safety.
The basis for any risk study is the identification of hazardous scenarios. A QRA of a hazardous facility
consists of two categories of process hazards distinguished by their causes:
(a) “fabric failures”, i.e. loss of containment from process equipment, i.e. leaks from flanges,
piping, vessels etc., due to corrosion, impact etc.
(b) Operational overloads, i.e. process control system failures resulting in an abnormal situation
and associated instrumented protection system failure, resulting in loss of containment.
What the generic frequency database does not address is releases from the second category of
hazards not resulting in equipment damage, e.g. tank overfilling, over pressurisation causing a PSV
discharge to atmosphere, internal explosion in vessels due to chemical reaction hazards, loss of level
and high pressure fluids blow-by to low pressure systems etc.
The second category of hazards are normally addressed in a Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) or
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Analysis, and in studies associated with Safety Integrity Level (SIL)
assessments (which may use Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA)).
5.2 Hazard Identification Word Diagram and MAE Register

A Hazard Identification Word Diagram (HIWD) is commonly used as a starting point for identifying
the types of hazardous incidents that may theoretically occur. The HIWD is a useful tool for
systematic consideration of the way in which incidents may be initiated and how they might develop
to the point of inflicting harm on people, property or the biophysical environment. The HIWD in
Appendix D was developed based on the potentially hazardous materials present on site and the
range of operations involving these materials.
Not all the incidents included in the HIWD are relevant to this study and/or pose a significant
credible hazard. Based on the findings of the hazard identification, the following representative
MAEs were selected for the consequence analysis (Also refer to Appendix D).
Table 4 MAE Register
MAE Nos. Description
1 Release of Diesel in Process Area (Module 1, 2, 3 or 4)
2 Release of Gasoline in Process Area (Module 1, 2, 3 or 4)
3 Release of LPG in Process Area (Module 1, 2, 3 or 4)
4 Release of Seal Gas in Process Area (Module 1, 2, 3 or 4)
5 Release of Diesel in Tank Farm
6 Release of Gasoline in Tank Farm
7 Release of Rework Product in Tank Farm
8 Release of Marine Diesel in Tank Farm
9 Release of LPG in Tank Farm

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MAE Nos. Description
10 Release of Diesel during Tanker Loading
11 Release of Gasoline during Tanker Loading
12 Release of Diesel due to tank overfill
13 Release of Petrol due to tank overfill
14 Release of SLOPs due to tank overfill
15 Explosion in Depolymerisation Kiln (Due to air ingress)

5.3 Hazardous Materials

The identified hazardous materials within the refinery units are listed in Table 5.
Table 5 Summary of Hazardous Materials in the Facility
Hazardous
Unit Hazardous Property Consequence Type
Material
1 Diesel Combustible Pool fire, Jet fire*, Flash Fire*
2 Gasoline Flammable Pool fire, Jet fire*, VCE, Flash Fire
3 LPG Flammable Jet fire, Flash Fire, VCE
4 Seal Gas Flammable Jet fire, VCE
* Only applicable for processing area where material is present at elevated temperature.
5.3.1 Diesel
Diesel is a combustible hydrocarbon liquid. It consists of a range of straight chain petroleum
components with molecular weights around 130 – 330 g/mol. Modelling was based on the
following properties:
Liquid density (kg/m3) 835

Molecular weight (g/mol) 226.4
Boiling point (°C) 313
Heat of combustion (kJ/kg) -42,900
Heat of vaporisation (kJ/kg) 340
Liquid heat capacity (kJ/Kg.K) 2.0

5.3.2 Petroleum (Unleaded)

Petroleum (unleaded) properties were used to model the Gasoline product. Modelling was based
on the following properties:

Representative boiling point (°C) 130

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Ratio of specific heats 1.05
Vapour specific gravity 3.4

5.3.3 Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG)

The Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) produced by the facility was assumed to be predominantly
propane.
Propane is a flammable liquefied gas. Modelling was based on the following properties:
Liquid density (kg/m3) 590.02

Representative molecular weight (g/mol) 44.09
Representative boiling point (°C) -42.1
Heat of vaporisation (kJ/kg) 426.2

5.3.4 Methane
Methane is a colourless flammable gas. Modelling was based on the following properties:

Molecular weight (g/mol) 16.04
Boiling point (°C) -161.50

5.4 Ignited Hazardous Events

A loss of containment of hydrocarbon can result in various hazardous outcomes if ignited. The
following hazardous events can result in the event of an ignited release.
5.4.1 Pool Fires

Pool fires are caused by ignition of a flammable liquid pool. The pool size is dependent upon release
rate, spillage containment conditions and drainage. If no drainage is present, an equilibrium pool
fire diameter is reached when the burn rate of liquid equals the outflow rate from the release
source. The location of drains relative to the release source may limit the size of the liquid pool.
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The primary hazard associated with pool fires is thermal radiation. Smoke (carbon monoxide) and
toxic combustion products may also be present although this is not considered a significant hazard
at ground levels in open air.
5.4.2 Jet Fires

A jet fire results from the ignition of a high-pressure release of gas from a pipe or vessel. Due to the
high pressures involved and the exit velocity, the initial outflow rate of material may be significant.
However, the pressure will generally fall rapidly due to the depressuring effect, thus reducing the
impact of any jet fire.
Liquids such as gasoline may also present a jet fire hazard if the release size is small and the system
is under elevated temperature / pressure.
The primary hazards associated with jet fires are thermal radiation and potential for flame
impingement on adjoining inventory, resulting in escalation.
5.4.3 LPG Fires

Ignited releases of LPG would result in gas jet fires if the hole size is small (e.g. 5 mm and 20 mm
holes). This is a result of the liquid atomising and mixing with the flashing vapour. If the liquid
release is through a larger hole (50 mm) then the primary consequence will be a flash fire.
In the event of an LPG release and delayed ignition, a vapour could build up resulting in a flash fire
or vapour cloud explosion, depending on the degree of congestion.
Due to the risk of explosions associated with LPG fires, it is not normally the practice to extinguish
them. The normal practice is to limit the supply of fuel to the fire and cool surrounding areas to
prevent escalation.
The primary hazard associated with LPG fires is thermal radiation. LPG spray / jet fires would have
similar consequences as gas jet fires.
5.4.4 Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE)

BLEVE is a phenomenon experienced with liquefied flammable gases such as propane, which are
stored under pressure above their atmospheric boiling points. A BLEVE is caused by the rupture of
the vessel and rapid expansion and ignition of the contents.
A fire or high levels of thermal radiation impinging on a pressurised vessel or tank can weaken the
wall causing the vessel to rupture, allowing the boiling LPG at high pressure to vaporise, ignite and
expand into the atmosphere generating high explosive energy and a fireball. A BLEVE is described
as an ‘explosion’; however, the thermal radiation effect of the fireball is the primary hazard rather
than the overpressure and flying fragments from the vessel rupture.
To minimise the likelihood of a BLEVE, LPG vessels may be mounded or protected with a deluge
system or passive fire protective coating.
5.4.5 Hydrocarbon Vapour Cloud Explosions

If a release of gas from a pipe or vessel is not ignited immediately, then a gas cloud may develop.
Ignition of the gas cloud in an open area would result in a flash fire, followed by a jet fire if the leak
had not been isolated. If there is a sufficient mass of flammable vapour and a degree of
confinement, the flame front may accelerate turning the flash fire into a vapour cloud explosion.

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5.4.6 Flash Fires
Flash fires occur where ignition of a flammable cloud occurs in an open, uncongested area. The
major hazard from a flash fire is the effect of thermal radiation. It is usual to assume that any persons
caught within the flash fire or subjected to a given overpressure will be fatally injured. The extent
of the flash fire is taken as the volume of the gas cloud that is above the Lower Flammability Limit
(LFL).
5.4.7 Tank Fires

The potential exists for tank roof fires. In PhastRisk, tank roof fires were modelled as pool fires at
the height of the liquid surface.
5.4.8 Products of Combustion

Smoke and toxic gases may be generated from a fire. For relatively uncongested open air fires,
exposure to smoke was not considered a significant hazard as personnel will be evacuated and
firefighters wear protective equipment.
5.5 Operational Hazardous Events

The following hazardous events were identified as potential causes of an MAE at the facility:
• Tank overfill during product transfer to tank farm.
• Product road tanker over fill during tanker loading.
• Product road tanker drive-away during tanker loading.
• Air ingress into the kiln leading to explosive atmosphere within kiln.
These scenarios have been qualitatively discussed below; however, as the design is still in early
stages there was insufficient information available to undertake a quantitative assessment for these
scenarios. It is recommended that the operational hazards identified be further assessed in the FHA,
once the design has become more advanced.
5.5.1 Tank Overfill

The movement of product from the process modules and between tanks has the potential to result
in an overfill of the receival storage tank. This may result in a spill into the bund, with the potential
for a pool fire in the bund. The P&IDs used for this assessment do not show an independent high
level protective function to safeguard against an overfill. It is recommended that requirements for
independent overfill protection be assessed and considered in the detailed design.
5.5.2 Road Tanker Overfill

The filling of road tankers may result in an overfill scenario with spillage into the loading bay area.
It is recommended that the road tanker loading facilities be designed to prevent an overfill of the
road tanker.
5.5.3 Road Tanker Drive-Away

Drive-away during filling or while connected to the filling hoses of the loading bay may result in
significant equipment damage or loss of containment at the loading bay. The final design should
incorporate ‘good industry practice’ with respect to drive-away preventative and mitigative
measures.

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5.5.4 Air Ingress into Kiln
The depolymerisation kiln operates with a ‘minimal oxygen’ atmosphere to promote polymer
decomposition without the combustion of the hydrocarbon products of the process. Small levels of
oxygen ingress would result in the oxygen being consumed by the hydrocarbon in a combustion
reaction forming higher levels of soot in the process.
The only path for oxygen ingress into the depolymerisation kiln is through the plastics feed port. The
plastic is fed in a pelletised form through an auger creating a plug which will not allow air to ingress.
Furthermore, further downstream there are two slide gates in series to provide a lock between the
kiln and the augur. This is purged with ‘seal gas’, which is made up of the non-condensable gas
generated in the process.
The P&IDs indicate the system is fitted with oxygen analysers to detect air ingress into the system.
It is recommended that in the event of excess oxygen levels being detected in a Kiln that the module
be tripped into shutdown mode.
5.6 HAZID Recommendations

The following recommendations, as given in Table 6, were raised during the HAZID Workshop.
Table 6 HAZID Recommendations
Recommendations Responsibility Place(s) Used

1. Ensure the plastics store building is designed to the FOY Causes: 1.2.1.2
requirements set out in the building assessment.

2. Ensure the feedstock management procedure FOY Causes: 2.1.2.1

adequately addresses the checks for PVC and PET.

3. Consider suitable checks of people and vehicles before FOY Causes: 5.1.1.1
granting access to the site.

4. Ensure the Fire Safety Study considers the appropriate FOY Causes: 2.2.1.1, 2.2.1.2, 2.2.2.1,
prevention/detection measures for releases from the 2.2.2.2, 2.2.3.1, 2.2.3.2, 2.2.4.1,
process. 2.2.4.2, 2.2.5.1, 2.2.5.2, 3.3.1.1,
4.1.1.1, 4.1.1.2

5. Ensure vehicle access to site is restricted for over FOY Causes: 3.1.1.1, 3.2.1.1
height vehicles to avoid contact with structures.

6. Ensure the Fire Safety Study considers the firewater FOY Causes: 3.1.1.1, 3.2.1.1
requirements for the site.

7. Ensure the tank farm bunding arrangement compiles FOY Causes: 3.1.2.1, 3.2.2.1
with AS1940.

8. Ensure the storage tanks have adequate overfill FOY Causes: 3.1.2.3, 3.2.2.3
protection.

9. Ensure the system provides adequate overfill FOY Causes: 3.1.3.2, 3.1.3.3, 3.2.3.2,
protection of the product road tankers 3.2.3.3

10. Ensure adequate drive away protection is provided FOY Causes: 3.1.3.4, 3.2.3.4

11. Ensure the tank farm arrangement compiles with FOY

AS1596 for the LPG vessel and associated pipework


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6 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
6.1 Jet Fires
Jet fires were modelled as the frustum of a cone, using the Shell Thornton Research Centre model
in PhastRisk.
Based on the jet flame dimensions, the following observations may be made on potential
consequences of jet fires:
• Most of the estimated jet flame dimensions are small and will only have localised effects
within the boundary of the site.
• Jet fires at the LPG storage tank have the potential to cause flame impingement and a
BLEVE.
The calculated distances to various heat radiation fluxes are tabulated in Appendix E.2 for each of
the representative release scenarios.
6.2 Flammable Vapour Cloud Dispersion

The dispersion of LPG releases was modelled using the Unified Dispersion Model (UDM) in PHAST.
Distances to Lower Flammability Limit (LFL) concentration and the dimensions of the LFL isopleths
were calculated for various representative wind speed / weather stability classes. The mass of
flammable gas above the LFL concentration in the gas cloud was also calculated. Dispersion results
are provided in Appendix E.3.
The resulting fatalities were taken as 100% for the area that the fire covers, i.e. 100% for the area
of the cloud above the LFL concentration.
6.3 Pool Fires

In PHAST, the flame envelope for a pool fire is modelled as a cylinder, tilted in the direction of the
wind. A pool fire event occurs when a flammable liquid spill is ignited. The heat radiation from a
pool fire was modelled for a smoky hydrocarbon flame.
The calculated distances to various heat radiation fluxes are tabulated in Appendix E.1 for each of
the representative release scenarios.
6.4 Vapour Cloud Explosion

A Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) event involves the rapid combustion of a gas or vapour cloud. The
main effect of a VCE is to generate a shock or blast wave. The explosion generates an overpressure
that may cause injuries, fatalities and damage to equipment. Explosion consequences were
calculated using the TNO multi-energy model, which takes account of the extent of the flammable
cloud above the LFL concentration and the degree of congestion within the cloud.
The calculated distances to various overpressure levels are tabulated in Appendix E.4 for each of the
representative release scenarios.
6.5 BLEVE
A Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) may occur following impingement of a jet fire
on the unwetted surface of a vessel containing a liquefied gas such as propane. In this case, there
is usually time available for on-site personnel to evacuate.

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If impingement occurs below the liquid level in the tank, then the liquid acts as a heat sink and a
BLEVE is unlikely. However, if impingement occurs above the liquid level in the tank (which may
eventually occur as the inventory of liquid in the tank drops due to venting), a BLEVE can occur in a
matter of minutes.
The distances to various thermal radiation levels for a fireball from a BLEVE are listed in Appendix
E.5.

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7 FREQUENCY AND LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS
7.1 General
The likelihood of each representative release scenario was estimated using:
1. Generic historical frequency data – The base failure data (selected from various sources)
used for the QRA is listed in Appendix F.1
2. Parts count data (Refer to Appendix C – This includes pipe lengths, number of flanges and
valve etc., for the facility.
The estimated frequency (per annum) for each release scenario is reported in Appendix F.2. The
likelihood of each potentially hazardous outcome (i.e. jet fire, pool fire, etc.) was then estimated
using event tree analysis (Refer to Section 7.3) and representative ignition probabilities (Refer to
Section 7.4).
7.2 Failure Rate Data

The base failure frequency data used for the QRA is listed in Appendix F.1. This data includes:
• The likelihood (per item per year) of leaks from flanges, valves, and instrument piping.
• The likelihood (per m per year) of release from piping.
7.3 Event Tree Analysis

The likelihood of each potentially hazardous outcome (i.e. jet fire, pool fire, etc.) was estimated
using event tree analysis.
Each branch in the event tree was assigned a probability to determine the probability of a specific
outcome. The total probability for each branch must add up to 1.0 (e.g. if the probability of early
ignition = 0.1, then the probability that there is not early ignition = 1.0 – 0.1 = 0.9).
The outcome probability is the product of each probability for each branch leading to that event.
Therefore, this was multiplied by the likelihood (per year) of the representative release scenario to
determine the likelihood (per year) of each potentially hazardous outcome.
The two principal factors that dictate the potentially hazardous outcome/s for a release are:
• Whether there is early or delayed ignition; and
• The time taken for detection and shutdown to occur.
The following is an example of event tree that was used for the QRA.

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Figure 8 Example Event Tree for Continuous Release with Rainout [REF 13]
7.4 Ignition Probability

Early ignition of a release of flammable material is more likely to result in a pool or jet fire than a
flash fire, whereas delayed ignition is more likely to result in a flash fire, which may flash back to a
pool or jet fire. The ignition probability data used in this study is detailed in Appendix G.

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8 RISK ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT
8.1 Individual Fatality Risk
The land adjoining the proposed site is primarily zoned for industrial uses (Refer to Section 3.2);
however, some permissible uses (e.g. parkland, indoor recreational facility) may be ‘sporting
complexes and active open space areas’ land uses as categorised in HIPAP No. 4.
The cumulative individual fatality iso-risk contours for the proposed facility are shown on Figure 9.
The 10 x 10-6 p.a. and 50 x 10-6 p.a. iso-risk contours, which are the relevant risk criteria in HIPAP No.
4 for ‘sporting complexes and active open space areas’ and industrial land uses, are wholly contained
within the site boundary. Therefore, the proposed development complies with the individual
fatality risk criteria in HIPAP No. 4 for ‘sporting complexes and active open space areas’ and
industrial land uses.
The risk criteria in HIPAP No. 4 for sensitive, residential and commercial land uses (viz. 0.5 x 10-6 p.a.,
1 x 10-6 p.a. and 5 x 10-6 p.a.) are also complied with as the relevant iso-risk contours do not extend
to these land uses or to land zoned for these uses. This is primarily due to the large separation
distance between the facility and these land uses (Refer to Figure 5).
Figure 9 Individual Fatality Risk
---- 50 x 10-6 p.a.

---- 10 x 10-6 p.a.
---- 5 x 10-6 p.a.
---- 1 x 10-6 p.a.
---- 0.5 x 10-6 p.a.
8.2 Risk of Property Damage and Accident Propagation (Exceeding 14 kPa)

The risk criterion in HIPAP No. 4 for property damage and accident propagation (exceeding 14 kPa
overpressure) is 50 x 10-6 p.a. for neighbouring potentially hazardous installations (a sub-category
of industrial land use).
A risk level of 50 x 10-6 p.a. was not reached at any location on- or off-site. Therefore, the proposed
development complies with the relevant risk criterion in HIPAP No. 4.

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8.3 Risk of Property Damage and Accident Propagation (Exceeding 23 kW/m2)
The 50 x 10-6 p.a. cumulative iso-risk contour for property damage and accident propagation
(exceeding 23 kW/m2 thermal radiation) is shown on Figure 10. The 50 x 10-6 p.a. iso-risk contour,
which is the relevant risk criterion in HIPAP No. 4 for neighbouring potentially hazardous
installations (a sub-category of industrial land use), is wholly contained within the site boundary.
Therefore, the proposed development complies with the relevant risk criterion in HIPAP No. 4.
Figure 10 Risk of Property Damage and Accident Propagation (Exceeding 23 kW/m2) 0.00 0.06 0.12
km
---- 50 x 10-6 p.a.
8.4 Risk of Injury (Exceeding 7 kPa)

No credible MAEs were identified for the proposed facility with the potential to cause injury due to
overpressure (> 7 kPa) at a residential area. This is primarily due to the large separation distance
between the facility and the nearest residential land uses (Refer to Figure 5). Therefore, the
proposed development complies with the relevant risk criterion in HIPAP No. 4.
8.5 Risk of Injury (Exceeding 4.7 kW/m2)

No credible MAEs were identified for the proposed facility with the potential to cause injury due to
heat radiation (> 4.7 kW/m2) at a residential area. This is primarily due to the large separation
distance between the facility and the nearest residential land uses (Refer to Figure 5). Therefore,
the proposed development complies with the relevant risk criterion in HIPAP No. 4.
8.6 Societal Risk

No credible MAEs were identified for the proposed facility with the potential to cause fatality at a
residential area. This is primarily due to the large separation distance between the facility and the
nearest residential land uses (Refer to Figure 5). Therefore, the proposed development complies
with the relevant societal risk criteria in HIPAP No. 4.

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8.7 Risk to the Biophysical Environment
The following criteria are suggested in HIPAP No. 4 for assessing the risk to the biophysical
environment [Ref. 1]:
• Industrial developments should not be sited in proximity to sensitive natural environmental
areas where the effects (consequences) of the more likely accidental emissions may threaten the
long-term viability of the ecosystem or any species within it.
• Industrial developments should not be sited in proximity to sensitive natural environmental
areas where the likelihood (probability) of impacts that may threaten the long-term viability of
the ecosystem or any species within it is not substantially lower than the background level of
threat to the ecosystem.
Routine emissions from the site are excluded from the scope of the PHA and thus only accidental
events are considered.
The dangerous goods handled on the site (Refer to Section 5.3) include liquefied gases (e.g. LPG)
and fuels (e.g. Petrol and Diesel). The potential may exist for damage to the biophysical
environment if a release of fuel were to occur to a waterway (e.g. a result of loss of containment
on-site or from contaminated firefighting water). This is not the case with LPG, which would be
more likely to fully evaporate or be consumed in a fire.
The fuels will be stored in appropriately designed tanks with secondary containment systems. The
tanker loading bay will also be contained. Therefore, the likelihood of a release off-site will be low.
Even if a release was to occur, the fuels are not considered extremely toxic to the environment as
they do not bio-accumulate and are not extremely toxic to organisms in the environment. Although
localised damage (e.g. fish kills) could occur if these materials were to enter a waterway, a release
would not threaten the “long-term viability of the ecosystem or any species within it”. Therefore,
the proposed development will comply with the suggested risk criteria in HIPAP No. 4.

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9 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
9.1 Findings
Based on the results of this QRA, the proposed development complies with the relevant land use
safety planning risk criteria for new industrial developments (As published in HIPAP No. 4), and is an
acceptable land use at this location.
9.2 Recommendations
A total of 11 recommendations were made during the HAZID workshop (Refer to Table 6).
1. Ensure the plastics store building is designed to the requirements set out in the building
assessment.
2. Ensure the feedstock management procedure adequately addresses the checks for PVC and
PET.
3. Consider suitable checks of people and vehicles before granting access to the site.
4. Ensure the Fire Safety Study considers the appropriate prevention/detection measures for
releases from the process.
5. Ensure vehicle access to site is restricted for over height vehicles to avoid contact with
structures.
6. Ensure the Fire Safety Study considers the firewater requirements for the site.
7. Ensure the tank farm bunding arrangement compiles with AS1940.
8. Ensure the storage tanks have adequate overfill protection.
9. Ensure the system provides adequate overfill protection of the product road tankers.
10. Ensure adequate drive away protection is provided.
11. Ensure the tank farm arrangement compiles with AS1596 for the LPG vessel and associated
pipework.
Furthermore, the following recommendation have been made:
12. Ensure that a hazardous area classification is undertaken as a part of the detailed design.
13. Consider undertaking a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Assessment as per IEC61508/61511 to
ensure that all process and operational hazards are adequately safeguarded against.
14. A Safety Management System should be developed, implemented and maintained for the
proposed facility. This should be consistent with Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory
Paper No. 9 - Safety Management.
15. A comprehensive Hazard Audit of the proposed development should be undertaken twelve
months after the commencement of operations of the proposed development and every
three years thereafter. This Hazard Audit should comply with the Hazardous Industry
Planning Advisory Paper No. 5 - Hazard Audit Guidelines and be carried out by a qualified
person or team, independent of the development.

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10 REFERENCES

1. Department of Planning and Environment, January 2011, Hazardous Industry Planning
Advisory Paper (HIPAP) 4: Risk Criteria for Land Use Safety Planning.
Advisory Paper (HIPAP) 6: Hazard Analysis.
Advisory Paper (HIPAP) 10: Land Use Safety Planning.
4. Department of Planning and Environment, January 2011, Hazardous and Offensive
Development Application Guidelines: Applying SEPP 33.
5. CCPS. Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis, American Institute of
Chemical Engineers, 3rd Edition. New York : Center for Chemical Process Safety, 1998.
6. TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory. GAME: development of guidance for the application of the
multi-energy method. 1998. CRR202/1998.
7. UK Health and Safety Executive. Failure Rate and Event Data for use within Risk Assessments
(28/06/2012). 2012.
8. International Association of Oil and Gas Producers. OGP Risk Assessment Data Directory -
Storage Incident Frequencies. 2010. Report No 434 – 3.
9. National Institute of Public Health and the Environment. Reference Manual Bevi Risk
Assessments. 2009.
10. International Association of Oil and Gas Producers. OGP Risk Assessment Data Directory -
Ignition Probabilities. 2010. Report No 434 - 6.1.
11. EPA Victoria. Construction of Input Meteorological Data Files for Ausplume. 2012. Guideline.
1459.
12. OGP Risk Assessment Data Directory - Storage Incident Frequencies. 2010. Report No 434 –
3.
13. Emerson, Worthington, Witlox et. al. MPACT Theory, Rev 12. DNV Software. s.l. : Det Norke
Veritas, 2010.
14. TNO, VROM, Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, 'Purple Book', CPR18E, 3rd
Edition.
15. CCPS Guidelines for Evaluation the Characteristics of Vapor Cloud Explosions, Flash Fire, and
BLEVEs, 1994.
Note: Refer to Appendices for additional referenced documents.


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Appendices


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Appendix A Assumptions

It is necessary to make numerous technical assumptions during a QRA. These assumptions typically
relate to specific data inputs (e.g. material properties, equipment failure rates, etc.) and modelling
assumptions (e.g. release orientations, impairment criteria, etc.).
To comply with the general principles outlined in Section 2.2 of HIPAP No. 6, all steps taken in the
QRA should be: “traceable and the information gathered as part of the analysis should be well
documented to permit an adequate technical review of the work to ensure reproducibility,
understanding of the assumptions made and valid interpretation of the results”. Therefore, details
of the key assumptions adopted for the QRA are provided in this Appendix.
Each assumption is numbered and detailed separately. The basis for each assumption is explained
together with its potential impact on the results of the QRA and the MAEs potentially affected. Key
references are also listed for each assumption, where relevant.
It is important that the assumptions be supported by:
• experimental data in the literature, where available;
• actual plant experience, where available;
• similar assumptions made by experts in the field and a consensus among risk analysts;
and
• engineering judgement of the analyst.
The main objectives are to minimise uncertainty in the risk estimate as far as is possible, and to
ensure that the assumptions result in a ‘conservative best estimate’ of the risk. Such an approach
is consistent with the following extract from Section 5 of HIPAP No. 6: “In the consequence analysis
and throughout the hazard analysis, the analyst must be conscious of the uncertainties associated
with the assumptions made. Assumptions should usually be made on a 'conservative best estimate'
basis. That is, wherever possible the assumptions should closely reflect reality. However, where there
is a substantial degree of uncertainty, assumptions should be made which err on the side of
conservatism.”

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A.1 Operational Data
Assumption No. 1: Plant Throughput

Subject: Operational Data
Assumption:
• The total throughput of plastic for the proposed development is 200 tpd.
Justification and Impact/s of Assumption:

• The throughput of plastic potentially affects the likelihood of each identified major
accident event (MAE). It was used, where relevant, to determine the utilisation (or
presence) factors for the QRA.
MAE/s Affected:
• All.
Reference/s:
• The proposed throughput for the facility was provided by FOY in EIS.
Assumption No. 2: Plant Design

Subject: Operational Data
Assumption:
• The 4 modules in the proposed facility will be designed as per the design of the BKV
facility.

• The P&IDs have been used as the basis for this PHA as the detailed design phase for the
project has not yet commenced.
MAE/s Affected:
• All.
Reference/s:
• The P&IDs as provided by FOY

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A.2 Locational Data
Assumption No. 3: Representative Wind Speeds, Wind Directions and Stability Classes
Subject: Locational Data
Assumption:
• The predominant wind directions are shown in Table 7.
• The probability distributions for each wind stability class – speed category (e.g. F2.5) are
shown in Table 7.
• Note: The wind direction in Table 7 is the direction the wind is blowing from.

• Hourly wind weather data (cloud cover, temperature, wind speed and direction)
collected by the Bureau of Meteorology at the Tuggeranong Automatic weather stations
from 2008 to 2014 was used as the basis of meteorological conditions for the study. This
raw data was rationalised in a form appropriate for vapour dispersion calculations
following the technique described in Ref. 11.
• In addition to Bureau of Meteorology data, information from GeoScience Australia was
used to identify sunset and sunrise times, and NASA JPL generated ephemerides used to
determine solar angle at the times of meteorological observations.
MAE/s Affected:
• All MAEs.
Reference/s:
• Tuggeranong Weather Data BOM.

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Table 7 Probability of Wind Speed, Stability Class and Direction
Wind
Stab.
Speed N NNE NE ENE E ESE SE SSE S SSW SW WSW W WNW NW NWW Total
Class
(m/s)
B 1.8 1.05% 0.52% 0.50% 0.46% 0.57% 0.36% 0.31% 0.26% 0.40% 0.36% 0.51% 0.58% 0.99% 0.98% 0.96% 0.85% 9.64%
D-High 7.5 0.37% 0.07% 0.52% 1.09% 0.99% 1.75% 2.45% 2.53% 1.93% 0.41% 0.54% 1.08% 1.59% 1.05% 0.49% 0.41% 17.28%
D-Med 3.9 2.71% 1.31% 2.86% 2.95% 3.38% 3.24% 3.21% 2.81% 3.84% 2.00% 3.35% 3.34% 3.55% 2.54% 2.72% 2.70% 46.52%
D-Low 0.8 1.68% 0.74% 0.87% 0.76% 0.85% 0.66% 0.69% 0.61% 1.37% 1.23% 1.71% 1.74% 2.32% 1.86% 2.12% 1.85% 21.06%
E 2.6 0.08% 0.06% 0.11% 0.10% 0.11% 0.09% 0.07% 0.04% 0.07% 0.07% 0.10% 0.10% 0.11% 0.07% 0.09% 0.13% 1.41%
F 0.7 0.35% 0.12% 0.18% 0.17% 0.18% 0.16% 0.12% 0.12% 0.25% 0.20% 0.30% 0.31% 0.47% 0.29% 0.41% 0.47% 4.10%
Total 6.23% 2.82% 5.04% 5.53% 6.08% 6.26% 6.85% 6.36% 7.87% 4.27% 6.51% 7.17% 9.02% 6.80% 6.79% 6.40% 100.00%


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Assumption No. 4: Ambient Conditions

Assumption:
• The average ambient temperature, humidity, atmospheric pressure and solar flux at the
proposed site location is listed in the following table.
Table 8 Average Ambient Conditions for Proposed Site Location
Parameter Value
Average Temperature (oC) 17.3
Average Humidity (%) 65.5

Atmospheric Pressure (kPa) 101.3
2
Average Solar Flux (kW/m ) 0.5


• Wind speed, temperature and humidity are used to calculate the thermal radiation at a
distance from pool and jet fires.
• Wind speed, temperature, humidity, wind direction and Pasquill stability affect the
dispersion calculations of a flammable gas cloud, and therefore the distance to LFL.
MAE/s Affected:
• All.
Reference/s:
• Tuggeranong Weather Data BOM.

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Assumption No. 5: Surface Roughness Parameter

Assumption:
• The roughness length for different surface types, as listed in the PHAST user manual, is
tabulated below.
Table 9 Surface Roughness Length
Roughness
Surface Type
Length (m)
Open water, at least 5 km 0.0002

Mud flats, snow, no vegetation, no obstacles 0.005
Open flat terrain, grass, few isolated objects 0.03
Low crops; occasional large obstacles , x/h > 20 0.1
High crops, scattered large obstacles, 15<x/h<20 0.25
Parkland, bushes, numerous obstacles, x/h<15 0.5
Regular large obstacle coverage (suburb, forest) 1
City centre with high- and low-rise buildings 3
• The terrain within c. 1 km of the proposed facility is predominantly open grassland with
some scattered large buildings within 1 km (Additional buildings are anticipated once
neighbouring sites are developed). Suburban areas are generally more than c. 1 km to
the west and southwest of the proposed facility. A roughness length of 0.25 was
assumed to be a representative conservative value for this location.

• The surface roughness affects the dispersion analysis. As the surface roughness
increases, a release of toxic gas will disperse more quickly with increasing distance from
the source. Therefore, it is necessary in PHAST-Risk to select a conservative surface
roughness length that is representative of the types of terrain and obstacles near the
proposed site.
MAE/s Affected:
• All MAEs.
Reference/s:
• PHAST user manual.

Page 55
Revision: B


Assumption No. 6: Fraction of Residential Population Located Indoors and Outdoors

Assumption:
• The fraction of the residential population assumed to be located indoors and outdoors
during the day and night is tabulated below.
Table 10 Fraction of Residential Population Located Indoors and Outdoors
Day Time Night Time

Location
(7am to 7pm) (7pm to 7am)
Indoor 0.70 0.95
Outdoor 0.30 0.05


• The fraction of the residential populated located indoors and outdoors will affect the
societal risk analysis, as the vulnerability to explosion, toxic gas exposure, etc. varies
depending on location.
• The default values recommended by the TNO (‘Purple Book’) are tabulated below. This
is based on European data, where more adverse environmental conditions (low
temperatures, rain, wind, etc.) are expected to increase the proportion of time spent
indoors. The fraction outdoors assumed for the QRA was increased to reflect Australian
conditions.
Table 11 Fraction of Residential Population Located Indoors and Outdoors (Ref: TNO)
Day Time Night Time

Location
(8am to 6:30pm) (6:30pm to 8am)
Indoor 0.93 0.99
Outdoor 0.07 0.01

MAE/s Affected:
• All (Note: This assumption is only applicable to the calculation of societal risk).
Reference/s:
• TNO, VROM, Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, 'Purple Book', CPR18E, 3rd
Edition.

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Revision: B


A.3 QRA Methodology
Assumption No. 7: Basis for Excluding an MAE from a Subsequent QRA Step
Subject: QRA Methodology
Assumption:
• An MAE was included in the QRA if: (1) the estimated frequency of occurrence was equal
to or greater than 10-8 per year; AND, (2) the probability of any potentially hazardous
impact (e.g. injury or fatality) was greater than or equal to 0.01 at any location beyond
the boundary of the proposed site.
• MAEs were not excluded if there was a potential for escalation, even when the direct
consequences were insufficient to cause a credible off-site risk.

• This assumption is consistent with the approach outlined in Section 3.1 of the TNO
'Purple Book'.
• Exclusion of scenarios with low likelihood and/or no credible off-site impact will not
affect the extent or magnitude of the off-site individual or societal risk. This is standard
practice for a land use safety study QRA, which is only concerned with off-site risk.
However, the on-site risk may be underestimated.
MAE/s Affected:
• All.
Reference/s:
Edition.

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Revision: B


Assumption No. 8: Loss of Containment Scenarios

Subject: QRA Methodology
Assumption:
• Two types of loss of containment (LOC) scenarios have been considered:
- “Fabric failures”, i.e. mechanical failures of flanges, fittings, process equipment,
storage equipment.
- Process system failure, e.g. exceedence of safe operating limits (pressure,
temperature, level), runaway reactions.

• Part of process system failures related LOCs are included in fabric failures databases.
Hence, treating these two separately and adding them may result in overestimation of
risk due to inadvertent double-counting. Detailed contributions of the various failure
modes are not available.
• To avoid this, the following rule set was adopted:
- If the process system failure results in LOC in the same plant section being
considered, it is treated as part of fabric failures, but analysed for risk contributors
for managing the risk.
- If the process system failure in one process unit results in LOC in another process
unit, then the process system failure contribution is included in the unit where the
release ultimately occurs.
MAE/s Affected:
• All.
Reference/s:


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Revision: B


A.4 Consequence Analysis
Assumption No. 9: Isolatable Sections

Subject: Consequence Analysis
Assumption:
• An isolatable section is defined as a section of process containing pieces of equipment
that are openly connected and contain one or more dangerous goods.
• The boundaries of an isolatable section are defined as an actuated valve, that can be
remotely actuated from the control room. These valves are either emergency shutdown
valves or control valves operated from the DCS. Other valves, such as non-return valves
or check valves, are not used in defining isolatable sections.
• The released inventory from an isolatable section is the quantity released until successful
isolation occurs, plus the quantity contained within the isolatable section.
• Control valves are used in defining the extents of isolatable sections. The inventory
contained within the isolatable section is assumed to be that associated with the
corresponding hazardous scenarios. Even though these valves cannot be relied upon for
tight shut off, they can reduce flows significantly and would be used in an emergency to
limit releases.

• Isolatable sections are defined to determine the amount of inventory associated with
identified hazardous scenarios. Actuated control values are adequate boundaries for
isolatable sections because they can be closed from the control room once a release has
been detected. Even though these valves cannot be relied upon for tight shut off, they
can reduce flows significantly and would be used in an emergency to limit releases.
• The probability of failure to isolate for the control valves would be higher than those for
the ESD valves, and this is taken into account in the event tree analysis (where
applicable).
MAE/s Affected:
• All.
Reference/s:
• The isolatable sections were defined using the P&IDs supplied by FOY.

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Revision: B


Assumption No. 10: Release Rates from Loss of Containment

Assumption:
• Releases have been modelled at a constant release rate. If the calculated release rate
higher than the process flow rate, the release rate is restricted to the process flow rate.

• For larger hole sizes, depressuring occurs and hence after initial high flow rate, the
release reduces to process flow rate, which lasts longer until inventory is isolated (flow
rate controlling). By selecting the process flow rate for these conditions, the initial impact
is underpredicted for larger hole sizes, but averages out for the duration of release.
• For smaller hole sizes, the release rate is lower than the flow rate and hence use of the
release rate is realistic (hole size controlling).
• Comparison of calculated flow rate at initial conditions and the process flow rate, and
selecting the lesser of the two for consequence calculations, as the initial release cannot
be sustained for the time it takes to isolate, and the isolated inventory starts
depressurising.
• Assumption based on mass balances.
MAE/s Affected:
• All events.
Reference/s:
• Assumption based on mass balances [CAN_IGE_EnergyMassBalance].

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Revision: B


Assumption No. 11: Process Stream Composition

Assumption:
• Hydrocarbon releases are modelled using representative materials based on the stream
mixture obtained from the Heat and Material balances.
- Gasoline is modelled as a 50:50 mixture of heptane and octane.
- Diesel is modelled as decane.
- LPG is modelled as propane.
- Kiln has been modelled as 65% Diesel, 20% Gasoline, and 15% LPG.

• Assumptions involving stream composition or material used affect the magnitude of the
consequences. Additionally, process streams containing numerous components may be
simplified for modelling purposes by choosing a representative component(s) to best
approximates the stream composition. Modelling a representative material over a
complex stream reduces complexity, limits the potential for inconsistencies and
ultimately has a negligible difference in results.
MAE/s Affected:
• All events.
Reference/s:
• Stream compositions received from FOY in H&M Balance [CAN_IGE_EnergyMassBalance]
and engineering judgement.

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Revision: B


Assumption No. 12: Pipe Lengths

Assumption:
• Most pipe lengths were determined by estimating the pipe path and calculating the pipe
length using a scaled plot plan.
• All pipework was assumed to run via the main unit pipe rack or inter-unit pipe racks
unless items were located close together, in which case, pipework was assumed to run
directly between the items.
• Changes in elevation were considered. Pipe racks were assumed to be 4 m above ground
level. First floor level was assumed to be at 5 m, second floor level at 10 m and so on.

• The pipe length influences:
- The release frequency associated with a scenario as frequency increases
proportionately with pipe length (release frequencies are subsequently used to
calculate the end event frequencies assigned in the event trees).
- The hold-up mass used to model a release for a given scenario as the hold-up mass
increase proportionately with pipe length. The larger the hold-up mass the greater
the release duration.
MAE/s Affected:
• All.
Reference/s:
• Site layout locating equipment items and P&IDs defining potential points of isolation for
each process unit.

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Revision: B


Assumption No. 13: Location of MAEs

Assumption:
• Each representative scenario was located on a scale plot plan within the PHAST-Risk
software.
• The locations of each event have been located as per the site layout given in Figure 6.

• It is standard practice in a QRA to select a representative location for each representative
scenario.
MAE/s Affected:
• All.
Reference/s:
• Site plan drawings.

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Revision: B


Assumption No. 14: Height for Calculation of Effects

Assumption:
• The effects of each potentially hazardous outcome were calculated at a height of 1.0 m
above ground level.

• There are no elevated, normally populated, areas surrounding the facility.
MAE/s Affected:
• All.
Reference/s:
Edition.

Page 64
Revision: B


Assumption No. 15: Jet Fire Modelling

Assumption:
• Vessel jet fires have been limited in hole size to the diameter of the largest pipe nozzle
in the vessel. In the event of vessel rupture, the effective hole diameter for any resulting
jet fire will be the diameter of the largest associated pipe.

• These assumptions impact the consequence distances associated with the modelled jet
fire scenarios.
• Any larger hole would depressurise quickly into a vapour cloud. A fireball may result on
early ignition rather than a jet fire.
MAE/s Affected:
• All Jet Fire scenarios.
Reference/s:


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Revision: B


Assumption No. 16: Explosion Modelling

Assumption:
• Flammable mass was derived from flash fire modelling by considering the mass between
LFL and UFL.
• The TNO multi-energy model in PhastRisk 6.7 was selected for explosion modelling. Curve
number 6 or 7 was selected depending on the charge strength. For example, for
flammable gases in the C1 to C4 range, curve 7 was selected (higher charge strength due
to higher flame speed). For flammable liquid vapourising clouds, Curve 6 was selected
(lower flame speeds).
• Only overpressure effects have been considered. Projectiles and whole body
displacement have not been considered.

• These assumptions impact on the distances associated with the impact of flash fires and
explosion overpressure distances.
• Guidance for the use of TNO Multi-energy model (TNO Yellow Book).
MAE/s Affected:
• All.
Reference/s:
• Centre for Chemical Process Safety, Estimating the flammable mass of vapour clouds”,
American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 1999.
• TNO Yellow Book.

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Revision: B


Assumption No. 17: Assessment of Flammable Clouds

Assumption:
• For flash fires, the LFL isopleths were used for the hazard zone and not the ½ LFL
isopleths.

• Very little impact on the consequence analysis results, as the contribution to flashfire
from the cloud mass between ½ LFL and LFL is very small (1-2% of the total).
• The reasoning for using ½ LFL by some analysts is that the peak to mean concentration
within the gas cloud is approximately 2:1, and hence, while the average concentration is
½ LFL, there may be gas pockets within the cloud where the concentration can be LFL,
and hence ignition is possible. However, while the ½ LFL distance helps to assess the
probability of ignition (i.e. presence of ignition sources within the ½ LFL envelope), only
the cloud at or above LFL contributes to sustained combustion of cloud, and hence results
in a flash fire or vapour cloud explosion in areas of congestion.
• The ½ LFL approach is suitable if one is mapping ignition sources on a grid, against
flammable cloud isopleths. In this QRA, the ignition probability used is generic and
release rate dependent, not location dependent. Therefore, what contributes to the flash
fire impact (i.e. flammable gas concentration LFL and above) was used.
MAE/s Affected:
• All.
Reference/s:
• Lees’ Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Editor: S.Mannan, Edition 3, pp.16/174,
Butterworths Heinemann, 2005.

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A.5 Vulnerability Parameters
Assumption No. 18: Peak Side-on Overpressure

Subject: Vulnerability Parameters
Assumption:
• The probability of fatality from exposure to the peak side-on overpressure from an
explosion was assumed to be as shown in Table 12.
Table 12 Probability of Fatality from Exposure to Peak Side-on Overpressure
Overpressure (kPa) Indoor Outdoor Comments

7 0 0 Minor structural damage
14 0 0 Major structural damage
21 0.2 0 Reinforced structures distort
35 0.5 0.15 House demolished
70 1.0 1.0 Complete demolition
• Exposure to a peak side-on overpressure of 7 kPa (or greater) is potentially injurious for
an individual located outdoors.

• When calculating location-specific individual injury or fatality risk contours, all individuals
must be considered to be located outdoors for 100% of the time since this is the
underlying basis for the NSW DP&E’s individual risk criteria. Vulnerability parameters for
individuals located indoors are only applicable for the calculation of societal risk.
• The probability of fatality is higher for an individual located in a conventional building
than when outdoors due to the higher chance of harm from collapse of the structure.
• The NSW DP&E’s injury/damage risk criterion for explosion overpressure is as follows:
“Incident explosion overpressure at residential and sensitive use areas should not exceed
7 kPa at frequencies of more than 50 chances in a million per year”.
MAE/s Affected:
• All AN explosion events.
Reference/s:
• NSW Department of Planning and Infrastructure, Jan 2011, Hazardous Industry Planning
Advisory Paper (HIPAP) No. 6, Hazard Analysis.
• Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 3rd Edition, Oxford, 2005.
• VROM, Methods for the Determination of Possible Damage (TNO ‘Green Book’), CPR16E.

Page 68
Revision: B


Assumption No. 19: Thermal Exposure

Assumption:
• This study used the relationship between thermal radiation dose and fatality as described
in the probit Pr = -36.38+2.56ln (òQ4 / 3 dt), where Q is the heat flux (W/m2) and assuming
a maximum exposure time of 30 seconds.
The effects of exposure to thermal radiation are summarised below [Ref. 1].
Table 13 Effects of Thermal Radiation
Heat
Radiation Effect/s
2
[kW/m ]
1.2 Received from sun in summer at noon.
1.6 Minimum necessary to be felt as pain.
4.7 Pain in 15 to 20 seconds, 1st degree burns in 30 seconds.
Injury (second degree burns) to person who cannot escape or seek shelter after 30s
exposure.
12.6 High chance of injury.
30% chance of fatality for extended exposure.
Melting of plastics (cable insulation).
Causes the temperature of wood to rise to a point where it can be ignited by a naked
flame after long exposure.
Thin steel with insulation on the side away from the fire may reach a thermal stress
level high enough to cause structural failure.
23.0 Fatality on continuous exposure.
10% chance of fatality on instantaneous exposure.
Spontaneous ignition of wood after long exposure.
Unprotected steel will reach thermal stress temperatures, which can cause failure.
Pressure vessel needs to be relieved or failure would occur.
35.0 25% chance of fatality on instantaneous exposure.
60.0 Fatality on instantaneous exposure.
• The duration a fire ball of the LPG vessel is 9.8 sec. As a result, the injury level for thermal
radiation form a fireball was increased to 10 kW/m2 based on a 10 second exposure, as
per the following diagram from the CCPS [Ref. 15].


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Revision: B


Assumption No. 19: Thermal Exposure

Figure 11 Tolerance times to burn-injury level for varioius incident heat fluxes [Ref. 15]


MAE/s Affected:
• All MAEs.
Reference/s:
• Department of Planning and Environment, January 2011, Hazardous Industry Planning
Advisory Paper (HIPAP) 4: Risk Criteria for Land Use Safety Planning.
• CCPS Guidelines for Evaluation the Characteristics of Vapor Cloud Explosions, Flash Fire,
and BLEVEs, 1994.

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Revision: B


Assumption No. 20: Environmental Impact

Assumption:
• The potential environmental impact of hazardous scenarios was not quantified in the QRA.
• Does not affect the QRA results in terms of safety to people. Criteria in HIPAP No. 4 are
largely qualitative.
MAE/s Affected:
• All MAEs.
Reference/s:


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Revision: B


A.6 Likelihood Analysis
Assumption No. 21: Failure Items – Small Bore Fittings

Subject: Likelihood Analysis
Assumption:
• Full bore releases from small bore pipework were modelled as 20 mm holes.

• Impacts the size of the consequence associated with the complete fail of small bore fittings
where small bore fittings have a significant contribution to the frequency distribution
derived for the equipment involved in the identified hazardous scenarios.
• Instrument nozzles are generally ¾” in size. There may be some smaller bore nozzles (e.g.
12mm), however these are included in the 20mm sub-scenario. This makes the assessment
slightly conservative.
MAE/s Affected:
• All Isolatable Sections.
Reference/s:


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Revision: B


Assumption No. 22: Tertiary Failures from BLEVE Incidents

Assumption:
• Missile damage to equipment from a BLEVE incident (including tertiary escalation) has
not been included in the analysis.

• Does not affect QRA results as the BLEVE event itself accounts for significant escalation
impact. Tertiary effect would cause asset damage and more prolonged incident, but
those who survive the secondary incident would escape to safety by the time tertiary
effect takes over.
• Predicting the missile path (and momentum) resulting from a BLEVE incident is near
impossible given the current state of consequence analysis in the industry. It is
subsequently very difficult to predict tertiary failures. It is assumed that people would
have evacuated to designated muster areas in a fire event, and hence no personnel are
within the plant when escalation occurs (excluding those involved in firefighting efforts).
The safety of these personnel will be addressed in the emergency response plan.
MAE/s Affected:
• All fire and explosion events.
Reference/s:


Page 73
Revision: B


Assumption No. 23: Release Hole size distribution

Assumption:
• The following assumptions were made regarding release hole sizes:

Representative Hole
Size Range Comment
Size
Small dh ≤ 10 5 mm – 9mm Covers more sophisticated gaskets
mm and pump / compressor seals.
5 mm for spiral wound gaskets and 9
mm for others.
Medium 10 < dh ≤ 20 mm Covers small bore pipework
20 mm (instrument nozzles and 1”
pipework, valve glands)
Large 20 < dh ≤ 50 mm Covers piping (2” full bore, up to 2”
50mm from localised ruptures, impact, etc.)
Catastrophic dh > 50 Min (Full bore, limited to For pipes - Rupture
mm 150 mm)
Catastrophic dh > 50 Min (Largest nozzle size, For pressure vessels - Rupture
mm limited to 150 mm)
• In the above table, a “Catastrophic” release is assumed to represent the loss of the full
inventory from a vessel or tank rather than a sudden collapse.

• Determines the magnitude of resulting fires, and the associated duration of the events.
• Small leaks (spiral wound gaskets) can be modelled as 9 mm holes. However, pump seals,
valve glands, compressor seals etc. have been reported to have a hole size of 10-20 mm on
average. The frequency of this contribution is relatively high. Hence, adding these into 20 mm
holes would give conservative results. A 50 mm hole represents full bore pipe failures up to
50 mm, and rupture of larger pipes with up to an equivalent 50 mm diameter leak.
• Finally, large pipes full bore failures are restricted to a maximum of 150 mm. For most
inventories 50 mm is the maximum pipe size.
MAE/s Affected:
• All fire and explosion events.

Page 74
Revision: B


Assumption No. 23: Release Hole size distribution

Reference/s:
• Cox, A.W., Ang, M.L. and Lees F.P.: “Classification of Hazardous Locations”, IChemE, Rugby,
1990. UK.
• John Spouge, “New Generic Leak Frequencies for Process Equipment”, Process Safety
Progress, Vol.24, No.4, pp.249-257, 2004.
• Hazardous Installations Directorate, March 2007, HID Semi Permanent Circular, UK HSE.

Page 75
Revision: B


Appendix B Isolatable Sections
B.1 Introduction
The following isolatable sections have been carried forward into the QRA
Table 14 Isolatable Sections
H&M Press Temp
ID Release Case P&ID Material
Stream (kPag) (oC)
KL-1 [M1-4] Depolymerisation Kiln 1001 1001-0004 0.15 400 Diesel
Scrubber Vapour feed to
1003 1003-0002 0.15 300
KL-2 [M1-4] Fractionator Diesel
Fractionator FT1101 Light Ends
1002 1002-0002 10 120
FR-1 [M1-4] to condenser CD1201 Petrol
Petrol from TK201 to day tank
1002 1002-0009 600 30
GS-1 [M1-4] (at Module) Petrol
Petrol reflux to Fractionation
1002 1002-0009 600 30
GS-2 [M1-4] Tower FT1101 Petrol
GS-3 [M1-4] Petrol Treatment 1002 1002-0009 600 30 Petrol
Condensate from VC1501 to
1005/1002 10 40
GS-4 [M1-4] Petrol Water Separator Petrol
GS-5 [M1-4] Petrol from PWS1201 o TK1201 1002 1002-0008 10 30 Petrol
LPG-1 [M1-4] LPG Vapour Release 1004 1004-0002 500 12 LPG
Vapour from VC1501 to Light
1005/1002 10 30
LPG-2 [M1-4] Ends Condenser CD1201 LPG
Diesel from TK130 to
1003 1005-0005 50 80
DS-1 [M1-4] Fractionation Tower FT1101 Diesel
Diesel through DH1501,
1005/1003 1005-0004 100 120
DS-2 [M1-4] DT1501, and HE1501 (drying) Diesel
DS-3 [M1-4] Diesel to reboiler RB1201 1003/1002 1005-0005 50 80 Diesel
Diesel to reflux to Scrubber
1003/1002 1005-0005 50 80
DS-4 [M1-4] SR1101 Diesel
KL-3 Kiln Seal Gas 1002 - 50 50 Methane
TF_1 Diesel pipework at Tank Farm 1008 - 600 30 Diesel
TF_2 Petrol pipework at Tank Farm 1008 - 600 30 Petrol
TF_3 LPG Pipe work at Tank Farm 1008 - 600 30 LPG
TF_4 Slops pipework at Tank Farm 1008 - 600 30 Diesel
TF_5 290 Kl vertical diesel tank A 1008 Atmospheric Storage 25 Diesel
TF_6 290 Kl vertical diesel tank B 1008 Atmospheric Storage 25 Diesel
TF_7 290 Kl vertical diesel tank C 1008 Atmospheric Storage 25 Diesel
TF_8 290 Kl vertical Petrol Tank A 1008 Atmospheric Storage 25 Petrol
TF_9 290 Kl vertical Petrol Tank B 1008 Atmospheric Storage 25 Petrol
TF_10 80 Kl vertical rework Tank 1008 Atmospheric Storage 25 Diesel
TF_11 150 Kl vertical day Diesel Tank 1008 Atmospheric Storage 25 Diesel
80Kl vertical day marine Diesel
1008 Atmospheric Storage 25
TF_12 Tank Diesel
TF_13 80 Kl vertical day Petrol Tank 1008 Atmospheric Storage 25 Petrol
TF_14 LPG Tank 27Kl Vertical Tank 1008 Saturated Liquid 20 LPG
KL-3 [M1-4] Slops pipework at Kiln 1001 600 30 Diesel
LB_1 Diesel Tanker loading 1008 - 600 30 Petrol

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Revision: B


H&M Press Temp
ID Release Case P&ID Material
Stream (kPag) (oC)
LB_2 Petrol Tanker loading 1008 - 600 30 Diesel
UT_1 Fuel to boiler - 200 25 LPG


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Revision: B


Appendix C Parts Count

A parts count was undertaken based on the FOY P&IDs 2015 provided to determine the potential
number of leaks sources for the facility. It is noted that only the parts count for 1 Module is
presented here. The likelihood of release was assessed based on all 4 Modules in operation.

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Revision: B


C.1 Parts Count

Table 15 Parts Count
Pipe
No of
Diameter / Pipe No of No of
instrument No. Heat No No. Pressure Atmospheric
ID Scenario Drawing Tank Length flanges Valves
piping Exchangers Compressors Pumps Vessels Vessels
Diameter (m) assumed assumed
assumed
(mm)
KL-1 [M1-4] Depolymerisation Kiln 1001 5 5 9 1
Scrubber Vapour feed to
KL-2 [M1-4] 1003 50 5 4 3 1
Fractionator
Fractionator FT1101 Light

FR-1 [M1-4] 1002 50 5 4 1 1 1
Ends to condenser CD1201
Petrol from TK201 to day

GS-1 [M1-4] 1002 50 10 14 4 3 1 1
tank (at Module)
Petrol reflux to
GS-2 [M1-4] Fractionation Tower 1002 50 20 19 4 4 1
FT1101
GS-3 [M1-4] Petrol Treatment 1002 50 20 8 1 1
Condensate from VC1501
GS-4 [M1-4] 1005/1002 50 20 9 2 1 1
to Petrol Water Separator
Petrol from PWS1201 o
GS-5 [M1-4] 1002 50 10 3 1 1 1
TK1201
LPG-1 [M1-4] LPG Vapour Release 1004 50 15 12 2 3 1 1
Vapour from VC1501 to
LPG-2 [M1-4] Light Ends Condenser 1005/1002 50 20 8 2 1 1 1
CD1201

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Pipe
No of
assumed
(mm)
Diesel from TK130 to
DS-1 [M1-4] Fractionation Tower 1003 50 20 16 4 1 1 1
FT1101
Diesel through DH1501,
DS-2 [M1-4] DT1501, and HE1501 1005/1003 50 30 30 6 1 4 1 1
(drying)
DS-3 [M1-4] Diesel to reboiler RB1201 1003/1002 50 20 6 2 1 1
Diesel to reflux to
DS-4 [M1-4] 1003/1002 50 20 20 7 1
Scrubber SR1101
KL-3 Kiln Seal Gas 1002 50 50 20 6 2
Diesel pipework at Tank
TF_1 1008 100 50 32 12 4
Farm
Petrol pipework at Tank
TF_2 1008 100 50 22 8 2
Farm
LPG Pipeowork at Tank
TF_3 1008 50 50 12 4 2
Farm
Slops pipework at Tank
TF_4 1008 100 20 12 4 2
Farm
290 Kl vertical diesel tank
TF_5 1008 100 10 4 2 1 1
A
TF_6 1008 100 10 4 2 1 1
B
TF_7 1008 100 10 4 2 1 1
C
290 Kl vertical Petrol Tank
TF_8 1008 100 10 4 2 1 1
A

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Revision: B


Pipe
No of
assumed
(mm)
290 Kl vertical Petrol Tank
TF_9 1008 100 10 4 2 1 1
B
TF_10 80 Kl vertical rework Tank 1008 100 10 4 2 1 1
150 Kl vertical day Diesel
TF_11 1008 100 10 4 2 1 1
Tank
80Kl vertical day marine
TF_12 1008 100 10 4 2 1 1
Diesel Tank
80 Kl vertical day Petrol
TF_13 1008 100 10 4 2 1 1
Tank
LPG Tank 27Kl Vertical
TF_14 1008 50 10 1
Tank
KL-3 [M1-4] Slops pipework at Kiln 1001 50 30 17 5 1 1
LB_1 Diesel Tanker loading 1008 100 15 8 3
LB_2 Petrol Tanker loading 1008 100 15 8 3
UT_1 Fuel to boiler 0 25 10


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Revision: B


Appendix D Hazard Identification


Page 82
Revision: B


D.1 Hazard Identification Word Diagram

Processes: 1. Raw Material Handling
Nodes: 1. Transportation to site
Prevention Mitigation
Scenario Causes Consequence Recommendations Responsibility
Control Control
1. Spill of plastics in 1. MVA 1. Plastics fall to the road 1. Licensed Drivers 1. Clean up
transit

2. Service Supplier
Controls

3. Vehicle
inspections

2. Human Error - load not 1. Plastics fall to the road 1. Service Supplier 1. Clean up
secured Controls

2. Licensed Drivers

3. Vehicle
inspections

2. Truck fire 1. Fire on truck 1. Potential fire of plastic 1. Vehicle 1. Extinguishe

cargo inspections rs on site

2. Licensed Drivers

3. Service Supplier
Controls


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Revision: B


Processes: 1. Raw Material Handling
Nodes: 2. On site movements
Control Control
1. Fire in Plastics store 1. Local ignition sources 1. Fire in plastic s store 1. Ignition control
on site

2. Hazardous Area
Classification

3. PTW System

4. General House
keeping

5. Electrical
testing/ Tags

2. Fire escalation from 1. Fire in plastic s store 1. Hazardous Area 1. Ensure the plastics FOY
adjoining plant Classification store building is

designed to the

2. Ignition control
requirements set out
on site
in the building
3. Plastic store is assessment
within a

building and not

directly exposed
to a fire in the
plant


Page 84
Revision: B


Processes: 2. Plastics Processing

Nodes: 1. Plastic feed
Control Control
1. Air ingress into kiln 1. Failure of seal gates 1. Potential for oxygen 1. Auger makes a
increase in the kiln plug of plastic

sealing the

system from air

2. Potential for flammable 2. Oxygen will

mixture to form in the kiln combust
immediately

with HC

2. Contaminated feed 1. Excess PVC 1. PVC creates HCL in the 1. Feed stock 2. Ensure the feedstock FOY
kiln with potential for quality management

higher corrosion rates agreement with procedure adequately

supplier addresses the checks

for PVC and PET

2. Onsite feed
stock
monitoring and
rejection of
contaminated
feedstock

2. Excess PET 1. High LPG yield resulting in 1. Feed stock

low desired product yield quality

agreement with

supplier

2. PET catalyst (Antimini 2. Onsite feed

Dioxide) ends up in char stock
monitoring and

rejection of

Page 85
Revision: B



Control Control
contaminated
feedstock


Nodes: 2. CRM
Control Control
1. Release from Kiln 1. Flange/Fitting failure 1. Release of HC vapour to 1. Material 1. HAC 4. Ensure the Fire Safety FOY
atmosphere selection and Study considers the

design to appropriate

relevant prevention/detection
standards measures for releases
from the process

2. Planned 2. Ignition
Maintenance

2. Potential for flash fire 1. Firewater

Program with
Deluge

weekly/monthly
system
checks (1month
per year
allocated for
each module)

2. Corrosion 1. Release of HC vapour to 1. Material 1. Ignition 4. Ensure the Fire Safety FOY


from the process

2. Potential for flash fire 1. HAC

Page 86
Revision: B



Control Control
2. Planned 2. Firewater
Maintenance Deluge
Program with system
weekly/monthly

checks (1month
per year
allocated for
each module)

2. Release from Scrubber 1. Flange/Fitting failure 1. Release of HC vapour to 1. Material 1. HAC 4. Ensure the Fire Safety FOY


from the process

Maintenance

2. Potential for flash fire 1. Firewater

Program with
Deluge

weekly/monthly
system
checks (1month
per year
allocated for
each module)



from the process

2. Potential for flash fire 1. HAC

Page 87
Revision: B



Control Control
Maintenance Deluge
Program with system
weekly/monthly

checks (1month
per year
allocated for
each module)

3. Release from 1. Flange/Fitting failure 1. Release of HC vapour to 1. Material 1. HAC 4. Ensure the Fire Safety FOY
fractionator atmosphere selection and Study considers the


from the process

Maintenance

2. Potential for flash fire or 1. Firewater

Program with
VCE Deluge
weekly/monthly
system

checks (1month
3. Potential for liquid release per year 1. Firewater

and pool fire allocated for Deluge
each module) system

2. Bunding
around
Modules




Page 88
Revision: B



Control Control
from the process

2. Potential for flash fire or 2. Planned 1. Firewater
VCE Maintenance Deluge

Program with system

weekly/monthly

3. Potential for liquid release 1. Bunding

checks (1month
and pool fire around
per year
Modules

allocated for
each module) 2. Firewater

Deluge

system

4. Release from Diesel 1. Flange/Fitting failure 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Material 1. Firewater 4. Ensure the Fire Safety FOY
Processing and pool fire selection and Deluge Study considers the

design to system appropriate



from the process

2. Planned 2. Bunding
Maintenance around
Program with Modules
weekly/monthly

checks (1month
per year
allocated for
each module)

2. Corrosion 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Material 1. Bunding 4. Ensure the Fire Safety FOY
and pool fire selection and around Study considers the

design to Modules appropriate


Page 89
Revision: B



Control Control
from the process

Maintenance Deluge
Program with system
weekly/monthly

checks (1month
per year
allocated for
each module)

5. Release from Petrol 1. Flange/Fitting failure 1. Release of LPG to 1. Material 1. HAC 4. Ensure the Fire Safety FOY
Processing atmosphere selection and Study considers the


from the process

Maintenance


Program with
VCE Deluge
weekly/monthly
system

checks (1month

each module) system

2. Bunding
around
Modules

2. Corrosion 1. Material 1. HAC 4. Ensure the Fire Safety FOY

selection and Study considers the


Page 90
Revision: B



Control Control
1. Release of LPG to design to appropriate
atmosphere relevant prevention/detection


from the process

Maintenance


Program with
VCE Deluge
weekly/monthly
system

checks (1month
3. Potential for liquid release per year 1. Bunding

and pool fire allocated for around
each module) Modules

2. Firewater
Deluge
system

Processes: 3. Liquid Storage

Nodes: 1. Diesel Store
Control Control
1. Release of Diesel from 1. Vehicle impact with pipe 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Pipe bridge 1. HAC 5. Ensure vehicle access FOY
pipework bridge and pool fire design to site is restricted for

over height vehicles

to avoid contact with

structures

2. Ignition 6. Ensure the Fire Safety FOY

Control Study considers the


Page 91
Revision: B



Control Control
2. On-site Traffic 3. Firewater firewater
Management System on requirements for the
Plan Site site

2. Flange Fitting Failures 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Material 1. Ignition

and pool fire selection and Control

design to

relevant
standards

2. Preventative 2. HAC
maintain

3. Firewater
System on
Site

2. Release of Diesel from 1. Vehicle impact with tank 1. Potential for liquid release 1. On-site Traffic 1. HAC 7. Ensure the tank farm FOY
storage tanks and pool fire Management bunding arrangement

Plan compiles with AS1940

2. Pipe bridge 2. Ignition

design Control

3. Bollards around 3. Firewater

the storage System on
vessel bund Site

4. Tank farm is
bunded

2. Flange Fitting Failures 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Preventative 1. Firewater

and pool fire maintenance System on

Site


Page 92
Revision: B



Control Control
2. Material 2. Ignition
selection and Control
design to

3. HAC
relevant
standards

3. Tank overfill 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Level control 1. Firewater 8. Ensure the storage
and pool fire system System on tanks have adequate

Site overfill protection

2. Ignition
Control

3. HAC

3. Release of Diesel 1. Vehicle impact with tank 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Pipe bridge
during tanker fill and pool fire design

2. On-site Traffic
Management
Plan

2. Flange Fitting Failures 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Preventative 9. Ensure the system FOY
and pool fire maintenance provides adequate

overfill protection of

2. Material
the product road
selection and
tankers
design to
relevant
standards

3. Overfill of tank road 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Procedures 9. Ensure the system FOY
tanker and pool fire provides adequate



Page 93
Revision: B



Control Control
the product road
tankers

4. Tanker drive away 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Procedures 10 Ensure adequate FOY
and pool fire . drive away

protection is

provided


Nodes: 2. Petrol Store
Control Control
1. Release of Petrol from 1. Vehicle impact with pipe 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Pipe bridge 1. HAC 5. Ensure vehicle access FOY
pipework bridge and pool fire design to site is restricted for

over height vehicles

to avoid contact with

structures

2. On-site Traffic 2. Ignition 6. Ensure the Fire Safety FOY

Management Control Study considers the
Plan firewater

3. Firewater
requirements for the

System on
site
Site
2. Flange Fitting Failures 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Material 1. Ignition

and pool fire selection and Control

design to

relevant
standards


Page 94
Revision: B



Control Control
2. Preventative 2. HAC
Maintenance

3. Firewater
System on
Site

2. Release of Petrol from 1. Vehicle impact with tank 1. Potential for liquid release 1. On-site Traffic 1. HAC 7. Ensure the tank farm FOY
storage tanks and pool fire Management bunding arrangement

Plan compiles with AS1940

2. Pipe bridge 2. Ignition

design Control

3. Bollards around 3. Firewater

the storage System on
vessel bund Site

4. Tank farm is
bunded

2. Flange Fitting Failures 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Preventative 1. Firewater

and pool fire Maintenance System on

Site

2. Material 2. Ignition
selection and Control
design to

3. HAC
relevant
standards

3. Tank overfill 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Level control 1. Firewater 8. Ensure the storage
and pool fire system System on tanks have adequate

Site overfill protection


Page 95
Revision: B



Control Control
2. Ignition
Control

3. HAC

3. Release of Petrol 1. Vehicle impact with tank 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Pipe bridge
during tanker fill and pool fire design

2. On-site Traffic
Management
Plan

2. Flange Fitting Failures 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Preventative 9. Ensure the system FOY
and pool fire Maintenance provides adequate


2. Material
the product road
selection and
tankers
design to
relevant
standards

3. Overfill of tank road 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Procedures 9. Ensure the system FOY
tanker and pool fire provides adequate


the product road

tankers

4. Tanker drive away 1. Potential for liquid release 1. Procedures 10 Ensure adequate FOY
and pool fire . drive away

protection is

provided


Page 96
Revision: B



Control Control
Nodes: 3. LPG Store

Control Control
1. Release from LPG 1. Flange/Fitting failure 1. Release of LPG to 1. Material 1. HAC 4. Ensure the Fire Safety FOY
vessels atmosphere selection and Study considers the


from the process

Maintenance


Program with
VCE Deluge
weekly/monthly
system

checks (1month

each module) system

2. Bunding
around
Modules

2. Overfilling of vessel 1. Release of LPG to 1. HAC

atmosphere

2. Ignition


VCE Deluge
system

Processes: 4. LPGs

Page 97
Revision: B



Control Control
Nodes: 1. Processing
Control Control
1. Release from LPG 1. Flange/Fitting failure 1. Release of LPG to 1. Material 1. HAC 4. Ensure the Fire Safety FOY
Processing atmosphere selection and Study considers the


from the process

Maintenance


Program with
VCE Deluge
weekly/monthly
system

checks (1month

each module) system

2. Bunding
around
Modules

2. Corrosion 1. Release of LPG to 1. Material 1. HAC 4. Ensure the Fire Safety FOY


from the process

2. Ignition

Page 98
Revision: B



Control Control
2. Potential for flash fire or 2. Planned 1. Firewater
VCE Maintenance Deluge
Program with system

weekly/monthly

3. Potential for liquid release 1. Bunding

checks (1month
and pool fire around
per year
Modules

allocated for
each module) 2. Firewater

Deluge

system


Page 99
Revision: B


Processes: 5. General
Nodes: 1. Sabotage
Control Control
1. Intentional Miss 1. Incompatibly material 1. Potential for fire or 1. CCTV 3. Consider suitable FOY
use/Terrorism brought on site (i.e. explosion checks of people and

2. Motion sensors
fertiliser) vehicles before

on the
granting access to the

perimeter
site
3. perimeter fence

with cyclone
barbwire

4. perimeter
lighting

5. Police Checks
for all staff

6. Car parking is
offsite

7. Contractor
management


Page 100
Revision: B


Appendix E Consequence Analysis - Data and Results

E.1 Pool Fire

Table 16 Heat Radiation from a Pool Fire
Downwind Distance [m] to Heat Radiation
2
ID Hole Size [mm] Pool Diameter [m] [kW/m ]
4.7 12.6 23 35
9 15.96 39.5 21.7 11.8 10

GS-1 [M1-4] 20 15.96 39.5 21.7 11.8 10
50 15.96 39.5 21.7 11.8 10
9 15.96 39.5 21.7 11.8 10
GS-2 [M1-4] 20 15.96 39.5 21.7 11.8 10
50 15.96 39.5 21.7 11.8 10
9 15.96 39.5 21.7 11.8 10
GS-3 [M1-4] 20 15.96 39.5 21.7 11.8 10
50 15.96 39.5 21.7 11.8 10
9 15.96 32.3 13.5 10.6 9.3
GS-4 [M1-4] 20 15.96 32.3 13.5 10.6 9.3
50 15.96 32.3 13.5 10.6 9.3
9 15.96 32.3 13.5 10.6 9.3
GS-5 [M1-4] 20 15.96 32.3 13.5 10.6 9.3
50 15.96 32.3 13.5 10.6 9.3
9 14.7 35.4 21.9 11.8 9.4
DS-1 [M1-4] 20 14.7 35.4 21.9 11.8 9.4
50 14.7 35.4 21.9 11.8 9.4
9 15.96 36.8 21.6 11.8 10
DS-2 [M1-4] 20 15.96 36.8 21.6 11.8 10
50 15.96 36.8 21.6 11.8 10
9 14.7 35.4 21.9 11.8 9.4
DS-3 [M1-4] 20 14.7 35.4 21.9 11.8 9.4
50 14.7 35.4 21.9 11.8 9.4
9 14.7 35.4 21.9 11.8 9.4
DS-4 [M1-4] 20 14.7 35.4 21.9 11.8 9.4
50 14.7 35.4 21.9 11.8 9.4
9 15.96 36.8 21.6 11.8 10
TF_1 20 15.96 36.8 21.6 11.8 10
50 15.96 36.8 21.6 11.8 10
9 15.96 39.5 21.7 11.8 10
TF_2
20 15.96 39.5 21.7 11.8 10

Page 101
Revision: B


Downwind Distance [m] to Heat Radiation
2
ID Hole Size [mm] Pool Diameter [m] [kW/m ]
4.7 12.6 23 35
50 15.96 39.5 21.7 11.8 10
9 15.96 39.5 21.7 11.8 10
TF_4 20 15.96 39.5 21.7 11.8 10
50 15.96 39.5 21.7 11.8 10
9 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
TF_5 20 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
50 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
9 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
TF_6 20 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
50 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
9 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
TF_7 20 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
50 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
9 17.9 41.5 21.3 11.9 N.R.
TF_8 20 21.1 44.6 20.9 12.6 N.R.
50 21.1 44.6 20.9 12.6 N.R.
9 17.9 41.5 21.3 11.9 N.R.
TF_9 20 21.1 44.6 20.9 12.6 N.R.
50 21.1 44.6 20.9 12.6 N.R.
9 17.9 41.5 21.3 11.9 N.R.
TF_10 20 21.1 44.6 20.9 12.6 N.R.
50 21.1 44.6 20.9 12.6 N.R.
9 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
TF_11 20 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
50 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
9 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
TF_12 20 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
50 21.1 41.8 20.9 11.6 N.R.
9 17.9 41.5 21.3 11.9 N.R.
TF_13 20 21.1 44.6 20.9 12.6 N.R.
50 21.1 44.6 20.9 12.6 N.R.
9 11.3 31.1 21.2 12.2 8.1
LB_1 20 11.3 31.1 21.2 12.2 8.1
50 11.3 31.1 21.2 12.2 8.1
9 11.3 33.6 22.2 12.1 8.1
LB_2 20 11.3 33.6 22.2 12.1 8.1
50 11.3 33.6 22.2 12.1 8.1
*N.R denotes level not reached

Page 102
Revision: B


E.2 Jet Fire
Table 17 Heat Radiation from a Jet Fire
Hole Release Flame Downwind Distance [m] to Heat Radiation

2
ID Size Rate Length [kW/m ]
[mm] [kg/s] [m] 4.7 12.6 23 35
9 0.001 1.2 N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R.

KL-1 [M1-4] 20 0.005 2.4 N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R.
50 0.03 5.1 6.1 N.R. N.R. N.R.
9 0.001 1.4 N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R.
KL-2 [M1-4] 20 0.0054 2.6 N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R.
50 0.034 5.7 6.7 N.R. N.R. N.R.
9 0.01 2.7 2.3 N.R. N.R. N.R.
FR-1 [M1-4] 20 0.05 5.4 3.6 3.5 N.R. N.R.
50 0.32 11.2 6.2 6.1 6.1 6.0
9 0.0091 1.7 1.2 1.2 N.R. N.R.
KL-3 20 0.45 3.5 2.1 1.9 1.3 N.R.
50 2.8 8.3 4.7 4.2 3.8 3.6
9 1.2 12.3 23.4 19.3 17.3 16.2
TF_3 20 5.9 24.6 49.6 39.8 35.7 33.3
50 36.7 54.4 114 91.1 81.2 75.7
9 1.2 12.3 23.4 19.3 17.3 16.2
TF_14 20 5.8 24.6 49.6 39.8 35.7 33.3
50 36.2 54.4 114 91.1 81.2 75.7
9 0.11 4.5 2.52 2.25 2.14 1.38
UT_1 20 0.54 9.5 5.4 4.6 4.2 4.1
50 3.3 21.6 18.5 11.6 10.1 8.9

E.3 Flash Fire

Table 18 Flash Fire – Maximum Downwind Distance to LFL at 1m Elevation
Stability Class – Wind Speed

Hole
ID Size F0.7 D0.8 D3.9 D7.5 B1.8 E2.6
(mm) Maximum Downwind Distance [m] to LFL Concentration at 1 m
Elevation
9 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5
KL-1 [M1-4] 20 1.1 1.2 1 0.8 1 1
50 2.2 2.2 1.9 1.6 2 1.9
KL-2 [M1-4] 9 0.8 0.8 0.7 1 0.7 0.7

Page 103
Revision: B


Stability Class – Wind Speed

Hole
ID Size F0.7 D0.8 D3.9 D7.5 B1.8 E2.6
(mm) Maximum Downwind Distance [m] to LFL Concentration at 1 m
Elevation
20 1.4 1.5 1 1 1.3 1.2
50 2.8 2.9 1.1 1 2.5 2.3
9 5.5 6.4 4.9 4.4 5.2 4.9
FR-1 [M1-4] 20 11.3 13.1 9.5 8.5 10.2 9.4
50 24.5 31.2 20.0 17.8 21.7 19.7
9 2.4 4.6 4.6 4.1 4.8 4.4
KL-3 20 4.1 8.5 9.2 8.5 9.2 8.3
50 8.5 11.1 19.5 19.2 18.6 16.6
9 12.6 12.4 9.6 7.9 10.9 10.7
TF_3 20 35.4 45.7 32.1 29.1 33.2 33.5
50 76.6 74.3 83.0 91.9 82.3 79.5
9 12.6 12.4 9.6 7.9 10.9 10.7
TF_14 20 35.4 45.7 32.1 29.1 33.2 33.5
50 76.6 74.3 83.0 91.9 82.3 79.5
9 16.9 14.7 13.1 11.9 14.0 13.1
UT_1 20 32.7 30.4 26.2 23.9 29.4 26.8
50 41.6 52.8 52.2 52.4 51.1 45.3

E.4 VCE
The TNO Multi Energy ‘3D Obstructed’ model was used within PhastRisk 6.7. The model utilises the
UDM dispersion model and the Cartesian grid to determine the overpressure effects from a given
release point when the flammable cloud reaches an obstructed region. As such, distances to
overpressure have not been tabulated as PhastRisk 6.7 does not produce these results when utilising
the 3D Obstructed region model.

Page 104
Revision: B


E.5 BLEVE
Table 19 BLEVE (Fireball)– Distance to Fatality
Stability Surface Distance to Fatality

Fireball Fireball Lift-
Failure Case Class – Fireball Emissive
Radius off Height
Description Wind Duration (sec) Power
(m) (m) 0.05% 10.35% 56.8%
2
Speed (kW/m )
27kL LPG Bullet BLEVE F 0.7 68.5 9.8 137 229 196 119 62
27kL LPG Bullet BLEVE D 0.8 68.5 9.8 137 231 196 119 62
27kL LPG Bullet BLEVE B 1.8 68.5 9.8 137 247 198 121 66
27kL LPG Bullet BLEVE E 2.6 68.5 9.8 137 233 196 119 63
E.6 Tank Top Fires

Table 20 Heat Radiation from a Tank Top Fire
Pool Downwind Distance [m] to Heat Radiation

2
ID Tank Diameter [kW/m ] at Ground Level
[m] 4.7 12.6 23 35
TF_5 290 Kl vertical diesel tank A 5 16.9 N.R. N.R. N.R.
TF_6 290 Kl vertical diesel tank B 5 16.9 N.R. N.R. N.R.
TF_7 290 Kl vertical diesel tank C 5 16.9 N.R. N.R. N.R.
TF_8 290 Kl vertical Petrol Tank A 5 18.7 N.R. N.R. N.R.
TF_9 290 Kl vertical Petrol Tank B 5 18.7 N.R. N.R. N.R.
TF_10 80 Kl vertical rework Tank 3 N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R.
TF_11 150 Kl vertical day Diesel Tank 4 N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R.
80Kl vertical day marine Diesel
TF_12 3 N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R.
Tank
TF_13 80 Kl vertical day Petrol Tank 3 N.R. N.R. N.R. N.R.

Page 105
Revision: B


Appendix F Likelihood Analysis - Data and Results

F.1 Leak Frequency

Table 21 Flange, Valve and Instrument Leak Frequency
20 mm Leak from
9 mm Flange Leak 9 mm Valve Leak
Instrument Piping
(per flange per yr) (per valve per yr)
(per section per yr)
1.82E-04 2.00E-04 1.00E-04

Table 22 Piping Failure Frequency
Piping Failure Frequency (per m per year)

D <= 4" 4"< D <= 8” 8" < D <= 12" 12" < D <= 16" D >16"
1.26E-05 2.69E-06 1.92E-06 3.21E-06 1.07E-06

Table 23 Pump, Compressor, Vessel, Fin-Fan, and Hose Leak Frequency
Equivalent Leak Size

Equipment Item Leak Frequency (per item-year)
Diameter (mm)
Pump 9 3.00E-03
Reciprocating compressor 9 1.70E-02
Pressure Vessel 9 2.00E-05
20 1.00E-05
50 1.00E-05
catastrophic 2.00E-06
Fin Fan heat exchanger 20 1.20E-05
50 7.00E-06
catastrophic 6.00E-06
Hose and Coupling1 9 6.00E-06 per operation

20 0.40E-06 per operation
50 0.2E-06 per operation

1
Taken from UK HSE Failure Rate and Event Data for use within Risk Assessments (28/06/2012), failure frequency for components in
“Multi safety system facilities”.
Page 106
Revision: B


Table 24 Leak Frequency
Hole Size Range (mm) 1 to 3 3 to 10 10 to 50 50 to 150 >150 Source

Representative Hole Size (mm) 2 5 25 100 Rupture
-1 -1
Piping =<50mm OD (m .yr ) 5.50E-05 1.80E-05 7.00E-06 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 OGP
Piping, 50mm < OD =<150mm (m-
2.60E-05 8.50E-06 2.70E-06 6.00E-07 0.00E+00 OGP
1.yr-1)
Spiral Wound Gasket =<50mm OD
0.00E+00 1.00E-07 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 UK HSE
(yr-1)
Spiral Wound Gasket 50mm < OD
0.00E+00 1.00E-07 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 UK HSE
=<150mm (yr-1)
Manual Valve =<50mm (yr-1) 2.00E-05 7.70E-06 4.90E-06 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 OGP
Manual Valve 50mm < OD
3.10E-05 1.20E-05 4.70E-06 2.40E-06 0.00E+00 OGP
=<150mm (yr-1)
Actuated Valve =<50mm OD (yr-
2.40E-04 7.30E-05 3.00E-05 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 OGP
1)
Instrument Fitting (yr-1) 2.73E-04 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 OGP
Process Pressure Vessel, Nozzles
3.90E-04 2.00E-04 1.00E-04 5.10E-05 0.00E+00 OGP
=<150mm (yr-1)
Reciprocating Pumps, flange
2.10E-03 1.20E-03 7.40E-04 5.00E-04 0.00E+00 OGP
=<150mm OD (yr-1)
Reciprocating Compressors,
2.40E-02 8.00E-03 2.60E-03 8.80E-04 0.00E+00 OGP
flange =<150mm OD (yr-1)
Air Heat Exchanger, Largest
1.00E-03 4.90E-04 2.40E-04 1.10E-04 0.00E+00 OGP
Nozzle =< 150mm (yr-1)
Filters, Nozzle =<150 (yr-1) 1.30E-03 5.10E-04 1.90E-04 5.50E-05 0.00E+00 OGP
Pressure Storage, largest nozzle
2.30E-05 1.20E-05 7.10E-06 4.30E-06 4.70E-07 OGP
=<150mm (yr-1)


Page 107
Revision: B


F.2 Release Frequency

It is noted that only the release frequency for 1 Module is presented here. The likelihood of release
was assessed based on all 4 Modules in operation
Table 25 Leak Frequency

Total Frequencies (p.a.)
ID Scenario
9mm 20mm 50mm
KL-1 [M1-4] Depolymerisation Kiln 0.001361 0.00059 2.5E-06
KL-2 [M1-4] Scrubber Vapour feed to Fractionator 0.00048 0.00021 1.25E-05
FR-1 [M1-4] Fractionator FT1101 Light Ends to condenser CD1201 0.0002 0.00009 2.25E-05
GS-1 [M1-4] Petrol from TK201 to day tank (at Module) 0.003871 0.000205 0.000005
GS-2 [M1-4] Petrol reflux to Fractionation Tower FT1101 0.004042 0.00028 0.00001
GS-3 [M1-4] Petrol Treatment 0.000161 0.00003 0.00002
GS-4 [M1-4] Condensate from VC1501 to Petrol Water Separator 0.003261 0.00003 0.00002
GS-5 [M1-4] Petrol from PWS1201 o TK1201 0.00027 0.000075 0.000005
LPG-1 [M1-4] LPG Vapour Release 0.017701 0.00022 1.75E-05
LPG-2 [M1-4] Vapour from VC1501 to Light Ends Condenser CD1201 0.003411 0.000095 0.00002
DS-1 [M1-4] Diesel from TK130 to Fractionation Tower FT1101 0.003612 0.000095 0.00002
DS-2 [M1-4] Diesel through DH1501, DT1501, and HE1501 (drying) 0.003913 0.000145 0.000065
DS-3 [M1-4] Diesel to reboiler RB1201 0.000411 0.000095 0.00002
DS-4 [M1-4] Diesel to reflux to Scrubber SR1101 0.003742 0.00002 0.00001

KL-3 Kiln Seal Gas 0.001002 0.00018 0.000025
TF_1 Diesel pipework at Tank Farm 0.001903 0.00031 0.000025
TF_2 Petrol pipework at Tank Farm 0.001202 0.00018 0.000025
TF_3 LPG Pipe work at Tank Farm 0.000801 0.00018 0.000025
TF_4 Slops pipework at Tank Farm 0.000741 0.00015 0.00001
TF_5 290 Kl vertical diesel tank A 0.00037 0.000075 0.000005

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Total Frequencies (p.a.)
ID Scenario
9mm 20mm 50mm
TF_6 290 Kl vertical diesel tank B 0.00037 0.000075 0.000005
TF_7 290 Kl vertical diesel tank C 0.00037 0.000075 0.000005
TF_8 290 Kl vertical Petrol Tank A 0.00037 0.000075 0.000005
TF_9 290 Kl vertical Petrol Tank B 0.00037 0.000075 0.000005
TF_10 80 Kl vertical rework Tank 0.00037 0.000075 0.000005
TF_11 150 Kl vertical day Diesel Tank 0.00037 0.000075 0.000005
TF_12 80Kl vertical day marine Diesel Tank 0.00037 0.000075 0.000005
TF_13 80 Kl vertical day Petrol Tank 0.00037 0.000075 0.000005
TF_14 LPG Tank 27Kl Vertical Tank 0.00004 0.00002 0.000015
KL-3 [M1-4] Slops pipework at Kiln 0.003712 0.000095 0.000015
LB_1 Diesel Tanker loading 0.000331 0.000015 7.5E-06

LB_2 Petrol Tanker loading 0.000331 0.000015 7.5E-06
UT_1 Fuel to boiler 0.00002 0.00001 0.000005

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F.3 BLEVE Frequency
The BLEVE frequency for the 27kL LPG Bullet has been calculated as 1.19E-6 p.a. This has been
derived based on those scenarios which may result in flame jet flame impingement or pool fire
engulfment of the LPG vessel.

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Appendix G Ignition Probabilities
Ignition probabilities were obtained from the OGP Risk Assessment Data Directory – Ignition
Probabilities [Ref 8], cases as applicable to the facility. The following Scenarios where selected as
being the most appropriate given the materials released, size and location of the facility.
• Scenario 5 – Small Plant Gas
• Scenario 7 – Small Plant Liquid Bund
• Scenario 13 – Tank Liquid
• Scenario 15 – LPG Storage
• Scenario 30 – Tank Liquid Diesel Fuel
G.1 Immediate Ignition

Total ignition probabilities (sum of immediate and delayed ignition) are detailed in Table 18.
Immediate ignition was assumed to be 0.001 in all cases.
Table 26 OGP Total Ignition Probabilities
Total Ignition Probability
Release Rate
(kg/sec) Scenario Scenario Scenario Scenario Scenario
5 7 13 15 30
0.1 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.2 0.0013 0.0013 0.0011 0.001 0.001
0.5 0.0019 0.0018 0.0012 0.0011 0.001
1 0.0025 0.0024 0.0012 0.0012 0.001
2 0.0074 0.0042 0.0016 0.0026 0.0011
5 0.0204 0.0088 0.0024 0.0073 0.0011
10 0.0339 0.013 0.0037 0.0162 0.0014
20 0.0564 0.013 0.0068 0.0359 0.0021
50 0.1107 0.013 0.015 0.1026 0.0024
100 0.1842 0.013 0.015 0.227 0.0024
200 0.3065 0.013 0.015 0.3555 0.0024
500 0.6 0.013 0.015 0.6434 0.0024
1000 0.6 0.013 0.015 1 0.0024

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G.2 Delayed Ignition

Table 27 Delayed Ignition Probabilities
Release Rate (sec) Delayed Ignition Probability

ID Scenario
9mm 20mm 50mm 9mm 20mm 50mm OGP Scenario
KL-1 [M1-4] Depolymerisation Kiln 0.001 0.005 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 Scenario 5
KL-2 [M1-4] Scrubber Vapour feed to Fractionator 0.001 0.0054 0.034 0.00 0.00 0.00 Scenario 5
FR-1 [M1-4] Fractionator FT1101 Light Ends to condenser CD1201 0.01 0.05 0.32 0 0 0.00055 Scenario 7
GS-1 [M1-4] Petrol from TK201 to day tank (at Module) 1.2 6.1 38.3 0.0008 0.0078 0.012 Scenario 7
GS-2 [M1-4] Petrol reflux to Fractionation Tower FT1101 1.2 6.1 38.3 0.0008 0.0078 0.012 Scenario 7
GS-3 [M1-4] Petrol Treatment 1.2 6.1 38.3 0.0008 0.0078 0.012 Scenario 7
GS-4 [M1-4] Condensate from VC1501 to Petrol Water Separator 1.2 6.1 38.3 0.0008 0.0078 0.012 Scenario 7
GS-5 [M1-4] Petrol from PWS1201 o TK1201 1.2 6.1 38.3 0.0008 0.0078 0.012 Scenario 7
LPG-1 [M1-4] LPG Vapour Release 0.0091 0.45 2.8 0 0.0009 0.0064 Scenario 5
LPG-2 [M1-4] Vapour from VC1501 to Light Ends Condenser CD1201 1.1 5.1 32 0.0015 0.0194 0.08255 Scenario 5
DS-1 [M1-4] Diesel from TK130 to Fractionation Tower FT1101 0.52 2.5 16 0.0008 0.0055 0.012 Scenario 7
DS-2 [M1-4] Diesel through DH1501, DT1501, and HE1501 (drying) 0.59 2.9 18.3 0.0008 0.0055 0.012 Scenario 7
DS-3 [M1-4] Diesel to reboiler RB1201 0.59 2.9 18.3 0.0008 0.0055 0.012 Scenario 7
DS-4 [M1-4] Diesel to reflux to Scrubber SR1101 0.59 2.9 18.3 0.0008 0.0055 0.012 Scenario 7
KL-3 Kiln Seal Gas 0.0091 0.45 2.8 0 0.0009 0.0064 Scenario 5
TF_1 Diesel pipework at Tank Farm 1.2 6 37.4 0.0008 0.0078 0.012 Scenario 7
TF_2 Petrol pipework at Tank Farm 1.2 5.8 36.3 0.0008 0.0078 0.012 Scenario 7
TF_3 LPG Pipe work at Tank Farm 1.2 5.9 36.7 0.0002 0.0063 0.06825 Scenario 15
TF_4 Slops pipework at Tank Farm 1.2 6 37.4 0.0008 0.0078 0.012 Scenario 7
TF_5 290 Kl vertical diesel tank A 0.42 2.1 12.8 0 0.0001 0.0004 Scenario 30
TF_6 290 Kl vertical diesel tank B 0.42 2.1 12.8 0 0.0001 0.0004 Scenario 30
TF_7 290 Kl vertical diesel tank C 0.42 2.1 12.8 0 0.0001 0.0004 Scenario 30

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Release Rate (sec) Delayed Ignition Probability
ID Scenario
9mm 20mm 50mm 9mm 20mm 50mm OGP Scenario
TF_8 290 Kl vertical Petrol Tank A 0.397 1.96 12.2 0.0002 0.0006 0.0027 Scenario 13
TF_9 290 Kl vertical Petrol Tank B 0.397 1.96 12.2 0.0002 0.0006 0.0027 Scenario 13
TF_10 80 Kl vertical rework Tank 0.397 1.96 12.2 0.0002 0.0006 0.0027 Scenario 13
TF_11 150 Kl vertical day Diesel Tank 0.42 2.1 12.8 0 0.0001 0.0004 Scenario 30
TF_12 80Kl vertical day marine Diesel Tank 0.42 2.1 12.8 0 0.0001 0.0004 Scenario 30
TF_13 80 Kl vertical day Petrol Tank 0.397 1.96 12.2 0.0002 0.0006 0.0027 Scenario 13
TF_14 LPG Tank 27Kl Vertical Tank 1.2 5.8 36.2 0.0002 0.0063 0.06825 Scenario 15
KL-3 [M1-4] Slops pipework at Kiln 1.2 6 37.4 0.0008 0.0078 0.012 Scenario 7
LB_1 Diesel Tanker loading 1.2 6 37.4 0.0008 0.0078 0.012 Scenario 7
LB_2 Petrol Tanker loading 1.2 5.8 36.3 0.0008 0.0078 0.012 Scenario 7
UT_1 Fuel to boiler 0.11 0.54 3.3 0 0.0009 0.0064 Scenario 5

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SUPP 201600038 Appendix T PHA Report 01

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Plastic to Liquid Fuel

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Document History and Authorisation

Doc Number: J-000223-REP-PHA

Doc Number: J-000223-REP-PHA

Document History and Authorisation .................................................................................... 2

3 Site Location and Land Uses ....................................................................................... 22

4 Description of Facilities and Operations ..................................................................... 26

5 Hazard Identification ................................................................................................. 34

6 Consequence Analysis ................................................................................................ 40

7 Frequency and Likelihood Analysis ............................................................................. 42

8 Risk Analysis and Assessment .................................................................................... 44

9 Findings and Recommendations ................................................................................ 47

Appendix A Assumptions ........................................................................................... 50

Doc Number: J-000223-REP-PHA

Appendix B Isolatable Sections .................................................................................. 76

Appendix C Parts Count ............................................................................................. 78

Appendix D Hazard Identification .............................................................................. 82

Appendix E Consequence Analysis - Data and Results .............................................. 101

Appendix F Likelihood Analysis - Data and Results .................................................. 106

Appendix G Ignition Probabilities ............................................................................ 111

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1.2.1 Scope of Facilities Covered in the PHA

1.2.2 Scope of Analysis

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TASK 8 TASK 9 TASK 10

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2.2.1 Description of Facilities, Operations and Surroundings

2.2.2 Hazard Identification and Register of Major Accident Events

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2.2.3 Consequence Analysis

2.2.4 Impairment Criteria

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2.2.5 Frequency and Likelihood Analysis

2.2.6 Risk Analysis and Assessment

2.3 Study Assumptions

2.4 Software Used

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2.5.1 Individual Fatality Risk

2.5.2 Injury Risk

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2.5.4 Societal Risk

2.6 Risk to Biophysical Environment

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2.7 Qualitative Risk Criteria

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3.2 Zoning and Surrounding Land Uses

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development in a location and of overnight camping area vehicle sales

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4.2 Plastic Storage Area and Extruder

4.3 Processing Area

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4.4 Tank Farm