Notarial Law Violations
thereof, with the words "notary public"
Eligibility requirements to become a notary public
• Rule III SECTION 1. Qualifications. - A
notarial commission may be issued by an
Executive Judge to any qualified person
who submits a petition in accordance with
these Rules.
To be eligible for commissioning as notary public,
the petitioner:
(1) must be a citizen of the Philippines;
(2) must be over twenty-one (21) years of age;
(3) must be a resident in the Philippines for at least
one (1) year and maintains a regular place of work or
business in the city or province where the
commission is to be issued;
(4) must be a member of the Philippine Bar in good
standing with clearances from the Office of the Bar
Confidant of the Supreme Court and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines; and
(5) must not have been convicted in the first
instance of any crime involving moral turpitude.
Stationary office is required
• Rule II SEC. 11. Regular Place of Work or
Business. - The term "regular place of work
or business" refers to a stationary office in
the city or province wherein the notary
public renders legal and notarial services.
Seal of Notarial Office
• Rule 7 SEC. 2. Official Seal. - (a) Every
person commissioned as notary public shall
have a seal of office, to be procured at his
own expense, which shall not be possessed
or owned by any other person. It shall be of
metal, circular in shape, two inches in
diameter, and shall have the name of the
city or province and the word "Philippines"
and his own name on the margin and the
roll of attorney's number on the face
across the center. A mark, image or
impression of such seal shall be made
directly on the paper or parchment on
which the writing appears.
• (b) The official seal shall be affixed only at
the time the notarial act is performed and
shall be clearly impressed by the notary
public on every page of the instrument or
document notarized.
• (c) When not in use, the official seal shall be
kept safe and secure and shall be accessible
only to the notary public or the person duly
authorized by him.
• (d) Within five (5) days after the official seal
of a notary public is stolen, lost, damaged
or other otherwise rendered unserviceable
in affixing a legible image, the notary public,
after informing the appropriate law
enforcement agency, shall notify the
Executive Judge in writing, providing proper
receipt or acknowledgment, including
registered mail, and in the event of a crime
committed, provide a copy or entry number
of the appropriate police record. Upon
receipt of such notice, if found in order by
the Executive Judge, the latter shall order
the notary public to cause notice of such
loss or damage to be published, once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a
newspaper of general circulation in the city
or province where the notary public is
commissioned. Thereafter, the Executive
Judge shall issue to the notary public a new
Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a
Notarial Seal.
• (e) Within five (5) days after the death or
resignation of the notary public, or the
revocation or expiration of a notarial
commission, the official seal shall be
surrendered to the Executive Judge and
shall be destroyed or defaced in public
 during office hours. In the event that the
missing, lost or damaged seal is later found
or surrendered, it shall be delivered by the
notary public to the Executive Judge to be
disposed of in accordance with this section.
Failure to effect such surrender shall
constitute contempt of court. In the event
of death of the notary public, the person in
possession of the official seal shall have the
duty to surrender it to the Executive Judge.
Notice of Summary Hearing
• Rule III SEC. 5. Notice of Summary Hearing. -
(a) The notice of summary hearing shall be
published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the city or province where the
hearing shall be conducted and posted in a
conspicuous place in the offices of the
Executive Judge and of the Clerk of Court.
The cost of the publication shall be borne
by the petitioner. The notice may include
more than one petitioner.
What is an oath?
• Rule II SEC. 2. Affirmation or Oath. - The
term "Affirmation" or "Oath" refers to an
act in which an individual on a single
occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of
the contents of the instrument or document.
Jurat
Rule II SEC. 6. Jurat. - "Jurat" refers to an act in which
an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and
presents an instrument or document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence
of the notary; and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary
public as to such instrument or document.
• A jurat is, among others, an attestation that
the person
who presented the instrument or document to be
notarized is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity.
What is an acknowledgement?
• Acknowledgment refers to an act in which
an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and
presents an integrally complete instrument or
document;
(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary
public or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules; and
(c) represents to the notary public that the
signature on the instrument or document was
voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in
the instrument or document, declares that he has
executed the instrument or document as his free
and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a
particular representative capacity, that he has the
authority to sign in that capacity. (See Section 1,
Rule II of 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice) - Testate
Estate of the late Alipio Abada v. Abaja, G.R. No.
147145. January 31, 2005
Duplicate Original copy to be submitted to the COC
• Section 2 , Rule VI of the Notarial Rules ; (h)
A certified copy of each month's entries and
a duplicate original copy of any instrument
 acknowledged before the notary public B. Tambago, A.C. No. 5281, February 12,
shall, within the first ten (10) days of the 2008)
month following, be forwarded to the Clerk
of Court and shall be under the Notarized document
responsibility of such officer. If there is no
• Petitioner phrases this issue as to whether
entry to certify for the month, the notary
the will has to be “notarized.” A notarized
shall forward a statement to this effect in
document includes one that is subscribed
lieu of certified copies herein required.
and sworn under oath or one that contains
Only documents with acknowledge a jurat.– Testate Estate of the late Alipio
Abada v. Abaja, G.R. No. 147145. January
• It should be clarified, however, 31, 2005
that while Basilio had also failed to submit a
copy of the Joint Affidavit to the Clerk of Limitation of
Court of the RTC, and to retain a copy Notaries public ex-officio
thereof for his own records, the
• Notaries public ex-officio only in the
requirement therefor, as stated under
notarization of documents connected with
Section 2 (h), 19 Rule VI of the Notarial
the exercise of their official functions. They
Rules, applies only to instruments
may not undertake the preparation and
acknowledged before the notary public.
acknowledgment of documents which bear
Documents like the Joint Affidavit which
no relation to the performance of their
contain a jurat and not an acknowledgment
functions as judges. – Ellert v. Judge
are not required to be forwarded to the
Galapon, Jr., A.M No. MTJ-00-1294, July 31,
Clerk of Court. Hence, there should be no
2000
administrative infraction on this score.
Nevertheless, Basilio's aforediscussed Changes of Status of Notary
violations of the Notarial Rules are grave
enough to warrant sanctions from the • Rule X SECTION 1. Change of Name and
Court. – Atty. Bartolome v. Atty. Basilio, A.C. Address.
no. 10783, October 14, 2015
Within ten (10) days after the change of name of the
Purpose of acknowledgement in a notarial will notary public by court order or by marriage, or after
ceasing to maintain the regular place of work or
• An acknowledgment is the act of one who business, the notary public shall submit a signed
has executed a deed in going before some and dated notice of such fact to the Executive
competent officer or court and declaring it Judge.
to be his act or deed. It involves an extra
step undertaken whereby the signatory The notary public shall not notarize until:
actually declares to the notary public that
(a) he receives from the Executive Judge a
the same is his or her own free act and
confirmation of the new name of the notary public
deed. The acknowledgment in a notarial will
and/or change of regular place of work or business;
has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard
and
the testator’s wishes long after his demise
and (2) to assure that his estate is (b) a new seal bearing the new name has been
administered in the manner that he intends obtained.
it to be done. Manuel L. Lee v. Atty. Regino
 • The foregoing notwithstanding, until the
aforementioned steps have been
completed, the notary public may continue
to use the former name or regular place of
work or business in performing notarial
acts for three (3) months from the date of
the change, which may be extended once
for valid and just cause by the Executive
Judge for another period not exceeding
three (3) months.
Resignation as notary public
• Rule 10 SEC. 2. Resignation. - A notary
public may resign his commission by
personally submitting a written, dated and
signed formal notice to the Executive Judge
together with his notarial seal, notarial
register and records. Effective from the
date indicated in the notice, he shall
immediately cease to perform notarial acts.
In the event of his incapacity to personally
appear, the submission of the notice may
be performed by his duly authorized
representative.
Publication of Resignation
• SEC. 3. Publication of Resignation. - The
Executive Judge shall immediately order the
Clerk of Court to post in a conspicuous
place in the offices of the Executive Judge
and of the Clerk of Court the names of
notaries public who have resigned their
notarial commissions and the effective
dates of their resignation.
Notarial Certificate
• Rule II SEC. 8. Notarial Certificate. -
"Notarial Certificate" refers to the part of,
or attachment to, a notarized instrument or
document that is completed by the notary
public, bears the notary's signature and
seal, and states the facts attested to by the
notary public in a particular notarization as
provided for by these Rules.
Information required to
be indicated as part of a counsel’s signature
• Apart from the signature itself, additional
information is required to be indicated as
part of a counsel’s signature:
(1) Per Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a
counsel’s address must be stated;
(2) In Bar Matter No. 1132,40 this court required all
lawyers to indicate their Roll of Attorneys number;
(3) In Bar Matter No. 287,41 this court required the
inclusion of the “number and date of their official
receipt indicating payment of their annual
membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for the current year”; in lieu of this, a
lawyer may indicate his or her lifetime membership
number;
(4) In accordance with Section 139 of the Local
Government Code,42 a lawyer must indicate his
professional tax receipt number;
(5) Bar Matter No. 192243 required the inclusion of
a counsel’s Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
Exemption; and
(6) This court’s Resolution in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC44
required the inclusion of a counsel’s contact details.
– Uy v. Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III, A.C. No. 10525,
September 1, 2015
• The inclusion of a counsel’s Roll of
Attorneys number, professional tax receipt
number, and Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) receipt (or lifetime
membership) number is intended to
preserve and protect the integrity of legal
practice.
• They seek to ensure that only those who
have satisfied the requisites for legal
practice are able to engage in it.
• With the Roll of Attorneys number, parties
can readily verify if a person purporting to
 be a lawyer has, in fact, been admitted to
the Philippine bar.
Why CTC is not a valid form of identification
• It is apparent that a CTC, which bears no
photograph, is no longer a valid form of
identification for purposes of Notarization
of Legal Documents. No less than the
Supreme Court itself, when it revoked the
Notarial Commission of a member of the
Bar in Baylon v. Almo, reiterated this when
it said:
•
• “As a matter of fact, recognizing the
established unreliability of a community
tax certificate in proving the identity of a
person who wishes to have his document
notarized, we did not include it in the list of
competent evidence of identity that
notaries public should use in ascertaining
the identity of persons appearing before
them to have their documents notarized.”-
Amora, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192280,
January 25, 2011
• With the professional tax receipt number,
they can verify if the same person is
qualified to engage in a profession in the
place where he or she principally discharges
his or her functions.
• With the IBP receipt number, they can
ascertain if the same person remains in
good standing as a lawyer. These pieces of
information“protect the public from bogus
lawyers.”
• Paying professional taxes (and the receipt
that proves this payment) is likewise
compliance with a revenue mechanism that
has been statutorily devolved to local
government units.
• The inclusion of information regarding
compliance with (or exemption from)
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) seeks to ensure that legal practice is
reserve only for those who have complied
with the recognized mechanism for
“keep[ing] abreast with law and
jurisprudence, maintain[ing] the ethics of
the profession[,] and enhanc[ing] the
standards of the practice of law.”
• The inclusion of a counsel’s address and
contact details is designed to facilitate the
dispensation of justice. These pieces of
information aid in the service of court
processes, enhance compliance with the
requisites of due process, and facilitate
better representation of a client’s cause. -
Uy v. Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III, A.C. No.
10525, September 1, 2015
Copy Certification
Rule II SEC. 4. Copy Certification. - "Copy
Certification" refers to a notarial act in which a
notary public:
(a) is presented with an instrument or document
that is neither a vital record, a public record, nor
publicly recordable;
(b) copies or supervises the copying of the
instrument or document;
(c) compares the instrument or document with the
copy; and
(d) determines that the copy is accurate and
complete.
Copy certification is required by rule of evidence
• Rule 132 Section 25. What attestation of
copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must
state, in substance,:
• that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the
case may be.
 • The attestation must be under the official
seal of the attesting officer, if there be any,
or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal,
under the seal of such court.
Prima facie evidence of the execution
• Rule 132 Section 30. Proof of notarial
documents. — Every instrument duly
acknowledged or proved and certified as
provided by law, may be presented in
evidence without further proof, the
certificate of acknowledgment being prima
facie evidence of the execution of the
instrument or document involved.
Competent Evidence of Identity
• Rule II SEC. 12. Competent Evidence of
Identity. - The phrase "competent evidence
of identity" refers to the identification of an
individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document
issued by an official agency bearing the photograph
and signature of the individual; or
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness
not privy to the instrument, document or transaction
who is personally known to the notary public and
who personally knows the individual, or of two
credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the
instrument, document or transaction who each
personally knows the individual and shows to the
notary public documentary identification.
NO current identification document
issued by an official agency
• 1. the oath or affirmation of one credible
witness not privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who is personally
known to the notary public and who
personally knows the individual, or
• 2. the oath or affirmation of two credible
witnesses neither of whom is privy to the
instrument, document or transaction who
each personally knows the individual and
shows to the notary public documentary
identification.
The individual has no current identification
document issued by an official agency
• A third party can attest in behalf of the
individual under the following:
1. The credible witness is not privy to the
instrument, document or transaction.
2. The notary public personally knows the credible
witness.
3. The credible witness personally knows the
individual.
• The notary public personally knows the
third party.
The notary public does not personally knows the
third party [two witnesses]
1. The 2 credible witnesses are not privy to the
instrument, document or transaction.
2. The 2 credible witnesses each personally knows
the individual and
3. Shows to the notary public documentary
identification [of their real by showing current
identification document issued by an official agency].
“Signature witnessing"
• Rule II SEC. 14. Signature Witnessing. -The
term "signature witnessing" refers to a
notarial act in which an individual on a
single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and
presents an instrument or document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) signs the instrument or document in the
presence of the notary public.
Term
• Rule III SEC. 11. Jurisdiction and Term. - A
person commissioned as notary public may
perform notarial acts in any place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning
court for a period of two (2) years
commencing the first day of January of the
year in which the commissioning is made,
unless earlier revoked or the notary public
has resigned under these Rules and the
Rules of Court.
Rule III SEC. 7
Form of Notarial Commission
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ______________
This is to certify that (name of notary public) of
(regular place of work or business) in (city or
province) was on this (date) day of (month) two
thousand and (year) commissioned by the
undersigned as a notary public, within and for the
said jurisdiction, for a term ending the thirty-first
day of December (year).
_______________
Executive Judge
Use of thumb or other mark
• Rule IV SECTION 1. Powers. –
xxx
(b) A notary public is authorized to certify the
affixing of a signature by thumb or other mark on
an instrument or document presented for
notarization if:
(1)the thumb or other mark is affixed in the
presence of the notary public and of two (2)
disinterested and unaffected witnesses to the
instrument or document;
(2) both witnesses sign their own names in addition
to the thumb or other mark;
(3) the notary public writes below the thumb or
other mark: "Thumb or other mark affixed by (name
of signatory by mark) in the presence of (names and
addresses of witnesses) and undersigned notary
public"; and
(4) the notary public notarizes the signature by
thumb or other mark through an acknowledgment,
jurat, or signature witnessing.
Prohibited acts of a notary
• SEC. 2. Prohibitions. –
(a) A notary public shall not perform a notarial act
outside his regular place of work or business;
provided, however, that on certain exceptional
occasions or situations, a notarial act may be
performed at the request of the parties in the
following sites located within his territorial
jurisdiction:
(1) public offices, convention halls, and similar places
where oaths of office may be administered;
(2) public function areas in hotels and similar places
for the signing of instruments or documents
requiring notarization;
(3) hospitals and other medical institutions where a
party to an instrument or document is confined for
treatment; and
(4) any place where a party to an instrument or
document requiring notarization is under detention.
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial
act if the person involved as signatory to
the instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at
the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public
or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined
by these Rules.
When a notary public can sign on behalf of a person
• SECTION 1. Powers. –
xxx
(c) A notary public is authorized to sign on behalf of
a person who is physically unable to sign or make a
mark on an instrument or document if:
(1) the notary public is directed by the person unable
to sign or make a mark to sign on his behalf;
(2) the signature of the notary public is affixed in the
presence of two disinterested and unaffected
witnesses to the instrument or document;
(3) both witnesses sign their own names ;
(4) the notary public writes below his signature:
"Signature affixed by notary in presence of (names
and addresses of person and two [2] witnesses)";
and
(5) the notary public notarizes his signature by
acknowledgment or jurat.
Disqualified to perform notarial act
• . SEC. 3. Disqualifications. - A notary public
is disqualified from performing a notarial
act if he:
• (a) is a party to the instrument or document
that is to be notarized;
• (b) will receive, as a direct or indirect result,
any commission, fee, advantage, right, title,
interest, cash, property, or other
consideration, except as provided by these
Rules and by law; or
• (c) is a spouse, common-law partner,
ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity
or consanguinity of the principal within the
fourth civil degree.
No need to show any
Government issued I.D.
• In this case, Heneraline Brosas is a sister of
Atty. Revilla, Jr.’s wife; Herizalyn Brosas
Pedrosa is his wife’s sister-in-law; and Elmer
Alvarado is the live-in houseboy of the
Brosas family. Atty. Revilla, Jr. knows the
three affiants personally. Thus, he was
justified in no longer requiring them to
show valid identification cards.
• But Atty. Revilla, Jr. is not without fault for
failing to indicate such fact in the “jurat” of
the complaint-affidavit. No statement was
included therein that he knows the three
affiants personally. - Jandoquile v. Atty.
Revilla Jr., A.C. No. 9514, April 10, 2013
Disqualification Rule
• Let it be impressed that Atty. Revilla, Jr. was
clearly disqualified to notarize the
complaint-affidavit of his relatives within
the fourth civil degree of affinity. While he
has a valid defense as to the second charge,
it does not exempt him from liability for
violating the disqualification rule. -
Jandoquile v. Atty. Revilla Jr., A.C. No. 9514,
April 10, 2013
• If the notary public knows the affiants
personally, he need not require them to
show their valid identification cards. This
rule is supported by the definition of a
“jurat” under Section 6, Rule II of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice.
• A “jurat” refers to an act in which an
individual on a single occasion: (a) appears
in person before the notary public and
presents an instrument or document; (b) is
personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity; (c) signs
the instrument or document in the
presence of the notary; and (d) takes an
oath or affirmation before the notary
 public as to such instrument or document. -
Jandoquile v. Atty. Revilla Jr., A.C. No. 9514,
April 10, 2013
• [C]ompetent evidence of identity is not
required in cases where the affiant is
personally known to the Notary Public,
which is the case herein. - Amora, Jr. v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 192280, January 25,
2011
Must be signed in the
presence of the notary
• By respondent’s admission, the affidavit
was already signed by the purported affiant
at the time it was presented to him for
notarization. Respondent thus failed to
heed his duty as a notary public to demand
that the document for notarization be
signed in his presence. - Traya, Jr. v.
Atty.Villamor, A.C. No.4595. February 6,
2004
Prohibition to do a notarial act even if payment is
tendered
• Rule IV SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. - A
notary public shall not perform any notarial
act described in these Rules for any person
requesting such an act even if he tenders
the appropriate fee specified by these
Rules if:
• (a) the notary knows or has good reason to
believe that the notarial act or transaction
is unlawful or immoral;
• (b) the signatory shows a demeanor which
engenders in the mind of the notary public
reasonable doubt as to the former's
knowledge of the consequences of the
transaction requiring a notarial act; and
• (c) in the notary's judgment, the signatory is
not acting of his or her own free will.
Prohibition to do a notarial act
• Rule IV SEC. 5. False or Incomplete
Certificate. - A notary public shall not:
(a) execute a certificate containing information
known or believed by the notary to be false.
(b) affix an official signature or seal on a notarial
certificate that is incomplete.
Notary public should not notarize Improper
Instruments or Documents
• Rule IV SEC. 6. Improper Instruments or
Documents. - A notary public shall not
notarize:
(a) a blank or incomplete instrument or
document; or
(b) an instrument or document without
appropriate notarial certification.
Contents of the Concluding Part of the Notarial
Certificate
• Rule VIII SEC. 2. Contents of the Concluding
Part of the Notarial Certificate. - The
notarial certificate shall include the
following:
• (a) the name of the notary public as exactly
indicated in the commission;
• (b) the serial number of the commission of
the notary public;
• (c) the words "Notary Public" and the
province or city where the notary public is
commissioned, the expiration date of the
commission, the office address of the
notary public; and
• (d) the roll of attorney's number, the
professional tax receipt number and the
place and date of issuance thereof, and the
IBP membership number.
Schedule of fees
 • RRC 141 Sec. 12. Notaries. -- No notary
public shall charge or receive for any service
rendered by him any fee, remuneration or
compensation in excess of those expressly
prescribed in the following schedule:
(a) For protests of drafts, bills of exchange, or
promissory notes for non-acceptance or non-
payment, and for notice thereof, ONE HUNDRED
(P100.00) PESOS; chan robles virtual law library
(b) For the registration of such protest and filing or
safekeeping of the same, ONE HUNDRED (P100.00)
PESOS;
(c) For authenticating powers of attorney, ONE
HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS;
(d) For sworn statement concerning correctness of
any account or other document, ONE HUNDRED
(P100.00) PESOS;
(e) For each oath of affirmation, ONE HUNDRED
(P100.00) PESOS;
(f) For receiving evidence of indebtedness to be sent
outside, ONE HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS;
(g) For issuing a certified copy of all or part of his
notarial register or notarial records, for each page,
ONE HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS;
(h) For taking depositions, for each page, ONE
HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS; and
(i) For acknowledging other documents not
enumerated in this section, ONE HUNDRED
(P100.00) PESOS. (11a)
Purpose of physical presence
• The physical presence of the affiants
enables the notary public to verify the
genuineness of the signatures of the
acknowledging parties and to ascertain that
the document is the parties’ free act and
deed. – Angeles, et. al. v. Atty. Ibañez, A.C.
No. 7860 January 15, 2009
Interviewing the contracting parties does not make
the parties personally known to the notary public
• That the parties appeared before [notary
ex-officio] and that he interviewed them do
not make the parties personally known to
him. The parties are supposed to appear in
person to subscribe to their affidavits. To
personally know the parties, the notary
public must at least be acquainted with
them. Interviewing the contracting parties
does not make the parties personally
known to the notary public. – Tupal v.
Judge Rojo, A.M. No. MTJ–14–1842,
February 24, 2014
Acknowledgement and personal appearance
• As it were, the Notarial Law is silent as to
whether or not the parties to a conveying
instrument must be present before the
notary public at the same time when they
acknowledge its due execution. - Tan Tiong
Bio v. Atty. Renato L. Gonzalez, A.C. no.
6634, August 23, 2007
Personal knowledge of a false statement or
information
• Where admittedly the notary public has
personal knowledge of a false statement or
information contained in the instrument to
be notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or her
notarial seal on it, the Court must not
hesitate to discipline the notary public
accordingly as the circumstances of the case
may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and
sanctity of the notarization process may be
undermined and public confidence on
notarial documents diminished. Heirs of the
late Sps. Lucas and Francisca Villanueva v.
Atty. Salud P. Beradio, A.C. No. 6270,
January 22, 2007)
Personal appearance is required
• Hence, a notary public should not notarize a
document unless the persons who signed
 the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before
him to attest to the contents and truth of
what are stated therein.
• A notary public is duty-bound to require the
person executing a document:
1. to be personally present,
2. to swear before him that he is that person and
ask the latter if he has voluntarily and freely
executed the same. (Pantoja-Mumar v. Atty. Flores,
A.C. No. 5426, April 3, 2007)
Notarization is not a •
ministerial duty
• In this case, Atty. Gasmen claimed that
before the SPA and loan application were
notarized, the proceeds were already
released to NGC by AMWSLAI, thus,
dispensing with the need for notarization.
Moreover, he insisted that the notarization
of said documents was merely done on a
ministerial basis, with proper safeguards,
and that it cannot be expected of him to
require the personal appearance of every
loan applicant considering the hundreds of
loan applications brought to him for signing.
– FO Sappayani v. Atty. Gasmen, A.C. no.
7073, September 01, 2015
Notarization after the fact prohibited
• In this case, Atty. Gasmen claimed that
before the SPA and loan application were
notarized, the proceeds were already
released to NGC by AMWSLAI, thus,
dispensing with the need for notarization.
Moreover, he insisted that the notarization
of said documents was merely done on a
ministerial basis, with proper safeguards,
and that it cannot be expected of him to
require the personal appearance of every
loan applicant considering the hundreds of
loan applications brought to him for signing.
– Sappayani v. Atty. Gasmen, A.C. no. 7073,
September 01, 2015
No need for notary to retain a copy of the will
• On the issue of whether respondent was
under the legal obligation to furnish a copy
of the notarized will to the archives division,
Article 806 provides:
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator and the witness. The
notary public shall not be required to retain a copy
of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk
of Court. (emphasis supplied)
Respondent’s failure, inadvertent or not, to
file in the archives division a copy of the
notarized will was therefore not a cause for
disciplinary action. (Lee v. Atty. Tambago,
A.C. No. 5281, February 12, 2008)
A notary public cannot appear before himself
• Respondent also alleged that in signing for
and in behalf of his client Pagunsan and
Bofetiado, his signature was preceded by
the word "By" which suggests that he did
not in any manner make it appear that
those persons signed in his presence; aside
from the fact that his clients authorized him
to sign for and in their behalf, considering
the distance of their place of residence to
that of the respondent and the
reglementary period in filing said pleadings
he had to reckon with.
• “xxx having signed the Verification of the
pleading, he cannot swear that he
appeared before himself as Notary Public.”
– Villarin v. Atty. Sabate, Jr.,A.C. No. 3324
February 9, 2000
Terminating and Establishing attorney-client
relationship
Nature of attorney-client relationship
 An attorney-client relationship is said to
exist when a lawyer acquiesces or
voluntarily permits the consultation of a
person, who in respect to a business or
trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a
view of obtaining professional advice or
assistance.
 It is not essential that the client should have
employed the lawyer on any previous
occasion or that any retainer should have
been paid, promised or charged for; neither
is it material that the attorney consulted did
not afterward undertake the case about
which the consultation was had, for as long
as the advice and assistance of the attorney
is sought and received in matters pertinent
to his profession. - Virgo v. Atty. Amorin
A.C. No. 7861 [2009]
Can trigger a lawyer-client relationship
 A lawyer-client relationship was established
from the very first moment complainant
asked respondent for legal advise regarding
the former's business. To constitute
professional employment, it is not essential
that the client employed the attorney
professionally on any previous occasion.
 It is not necessary that any retainer be paid,
promised, or charged; neither is it material
that the attorney consulted did not
afterward handle the case for which his
service had been sought.- Hadjula v. Atty.
Madianda, A.C. No. 6711 July 3, 2007
Verbal agreement
 There is no gainsaying that a verbal
engagement is sufficient to create an
attorney-client relationship. - Urban Bank
Inc. vs. Atty. Pena, A.C. No. 4863 [2001]
Presumption
 The presumption in favor of the counsels
authority to appear in behalf of a client is a
strong one. A lawyer is not even required to
present a written authorization from the
client. In fact, the absence of a formal
notice of entry of appearance will not
invalidate the acts performed by the
counsel in his clients name. LBP v.
Pamintuan Development Corp., G.R. No.
167886, October 25, 2005
Section 21, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court
 SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear.
 An attorney is presumed to be properly
authorized to represent any cause in which
he appears, and no written power of
attorney is required to authorize him to
appear in court for his client, but the
presiding judge may, on motion of either
party and on reasonable grounds therefor
being shown, require any attorney who
assumes the right to appear in a case to
produce or prove the authority under which
he appears, and to disclose, whenever
pertinent to any issue, the name of the
person who employed him, and may
thereupon make such order as justice
requires. An attorney wilfully appearing in
court for a person without being employed,
unless by leave of the court, may be
punished for contempt as an officer of the
court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions.
Court finds that no attorney-client relationship
exists
 The relationship of complainant and
[counsel] is mainly personal or business in
nature, and that whatever legal services
may have been rendered or given to them
by Atty. Amorin for free were only
incidental to said relationship. Noteworthy
 also is the fact that complainant was not
able to specify any act or transaction in
which [counsel] acted as her or her
husband's counsel. - Virgo v. Atty. Amorin
A.C. No. 7861 [2009]
 There are instances, however, when the
Court finds that no attorney-client
relationship exists between the parties,
such as when the relationship stemmed
from a personal transaction between them
rather than the practice of law of
respondent or when the legal acts done
were only incidental to their personal
transaction. - Virgo v. Atty. Amorin A.C. No.
7861 [2009]
Duty once a lawyer-client relationship exist
 Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, that “a lawyer shall serve his
client with competence and diligence.”
Non-payment of fees does not diminish a lawyer’s
duty
 Assuming the non-payment to be true, such
failure should not be a reason not to
inform the client of an important
development, or worse, to withhold vital
information from her. - Somosot v. Atty.
Lara A.C. No. 7024 [2009]
Remedy for deliberate refusal to pay
 It is but just and proper that if refusal to
pay just compensation ensues in any
transaction, the proper remedy is to
institute an action before the proper court
and such actuation of the respondent
herein did not constitute deceit,
malpractice or gross misconduct. - Urban
Bank Inc. vs. Atty. Pena, A.C. No. 4863
[2001]
 Rule 20.04 - A lawyer shall avoid
controversies with clients concerning his
compensation and shall resort to judicial
action only to prevent imposition, injustice
or fraud.
Implied duty to finish the case
 Among the fundamental rules of ethics is
the principle that an attorney who
undertakes an action impliedly stipulates
to carry it to its termination, that is, until
the case becomes final and executory. -
Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No.
7421 [2007]
 Among the fundamental rules of ethics is
the principle that an attorney who
undertakes to conduct an action impliedly
stipulates to carry it to its conclusion.-
Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155,
March 14, 2006
Terminating the attorney-client relation
 CLIENT: The rule in this jurisdiction is that a
client has the absolute right to terminate
the attorney-client relation at anytime with
or without cause.
 ATTORNEY: The right of an attorney to
withdraw or terminate the relation other
than for sufficient cause is, however,
considerably restricted. Xxx He is not at
liberty to abandon it without reasonable
cause. A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a
case before its final adjudication arises only
from the client’s written consent or from a
good cause. - Francisco v. Atty. Portugal,
A.C. No. 6155, March 14, 2006
CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS
SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON
NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
 Rule 22.01 - A lawyer may withdraw his
services in any of the following case:
(a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral
course of conduct in connection with the matter he
is handling; [see Rule 19.02]
(b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue
conduct violative of these canons and rules;
(c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will
not promote the best interest of the client;
(d) When the mental or physical condition of the
lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the
employment effectively;
(e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees
for the services or fails to comply with the retainer
agreement;
(f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public
office [see Rule 3.03]; and
(g) Other similar cases.
 Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public
office, he shall withdraw from the firm and
his name shall be dropped from the firm
name unless the law allows him to practice
law concurrently.
 Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or
imply that he is able to influence any
public official, tribunal or legislative body.
 Rule 19.02 - A lawyer who has received
information that his client has, in the
course of the representation, perpetrated
a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall
promptly call upon the client to rectify the
same, and failing which he shall terminate
the relationship with such client in
accordance with the Rules of Court.
Changing lawyer does not need the approval of the
Court
 [A client] may discharge his attorney at any
time with or without cause and thereafter
employ another lawyer who may then enter
his appearance. Thus, it has been held that
a client is free to change his counsel in a
pending case and thereafter retain another
lawyer to represent him. That manner of
changing a lawyer does not need the
consent of the lawyer to be dismissed. Nor
does it require approval of the court. - Atty.
Jalandoni v. Atty. Villarosa, AC 5303, June
15, 2006
Termination of services without the written
consent of client
 A lawyer who desires to retire from an
action without the written consent of his
client must file a petition for withdrawal in
court. He must serve a copy of his petition
upon his client and the adverse party - Atty.
Jalandoni v. Atty. Villarosa, AC 5303, June
15, 2006
A lawyer must see to it that a new lawyer is
recorded before terminating his services
 An attorney may only retire from a case
either by written consent of his client or by
permission of the court after due notice
and hearing, in which event the attorney
should see to it that the name of the new
lawyer is recorded in the case. - Atty.
Jalandoni v. Atty. Villarosa, AC 5303, June
15, 2006
Cessation of law practice is not a “good cause” to
withdraw
 Neither is the cessation of his law practice
an excuse for his failure to file the required
brief. Even if it were true that Atty. Briones
has stopped practicing law, he still could
not ignore the directives coming from the
Court. It does not appear from the records
of G.R. No. 130965 that Atty. Briones has
withdrawn his appearance. Unless he has
withdrawn his appearance in the case, the
Court would still consider him as counsel
for the accused-appellant and he is
expected to comply with all its orders and
directives. - In Re: Atty. David Briones, A.C.
No. 5486. August 15, 2001]
The only way to be relieved as counsel
  Thus, the only way to be relieved as counsel
is to have either the written conformity of
his client or an order from the court
relieving him of the duties of counsel, in
accordance with Rule 138, Section 26 of the
Rules of Court. - Balatbat v. Atty. Arias,
A.C. No. 1666, April 13, 2007
Duty of lawyer once he is discharged as counsel
 Rule 22.02 - A lawyer who withdraws or is
discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien,
immediately turn over all papers and
property to which the client is entitled, and
shall cooperative with his successor in the
orderly transfer of the matter, including all
information necessary for the proper
handling of the matter.
 The discharged attorney must likewise see
to it that the name of the new counsel is
properly recorded and the records
properly handed over. - Balatbat v. Atty.
Arias, A.C. No. 1666 [2007]
A simple turnover of the records does not end a
lawyer’s duty
 Contrary to respondent’s contention, his
professional relations as a lawyer with his
clients are not terminated by the simple
turnover of the records of the case to his
clients. - Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme,
A.C. No. 7421 [2007]
 xxx and shall cooperative with his
successor in the orderly transfer of the
matter, including all information necessary
for the proper handling of the matter. - Rule
22.02
Client refusal to give his consent is still subject to
Court’s discretion
 A lawyer may retire at any time from any
action or special proceeding with the
written consent of his client filed in court
and with a copy thereof served upon the
adverse party. Should the client refuse to
give his consent, the lawyer must file an
application with the court. The court, on
notice to the client and adverse party, shall
determine whether the lawyer ought to be
allowed to retire. The application for
withdrawal must be based on a good cause.
- Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No.
7421 [2007]
Consent to withdraw must be given by the litigant
 Respondent’s defense completely crumbles
in face of the fact that Salvador Ramirez is
not even a party in Civil Case No. 981 and,
hence, had no authority to withdraw the
records of the said case from respondent or
to terminate the latter’s services. -
Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No.
7421 [2007]
Pendency of petition for withdrawal does not
relieve lawyer of his duty
 The lawyer has no right to presume that his
petition for withdrawal will be granted by
the court. Until his withdrawal shall have
been approved, the lawyer remains counsel
of record who is expected by his clients, as
well as by the court, to do what the
interests of his clients require. He must still
appear before the court to protect the
interest of his clients by availing himself of
the proper remedy, for the attorney-client
relations are not terminated formally until
there is a withdrawal of record. - Venterez,
et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421 [2007]
A valid cause to withdraw must still be subject to
formalities of withdrawing as counsel
 Without a proper revocation of his
authority and withdrawal as counsel,
respondent remains counsel of record for
the complainants in Civil Case No. 981; and
whether he has a valid cause to withdraw
from the case, he cannot immediately do
so and leave his clients without
 representation. - Venterez, et. al. v. Atty.
Cosme, A.C. No. 7421 [2007]
Verbal substitution of counsel not allowed
 A verbal substitution of counsel, albeit
impliedly granted by respondent judge,
contravenes Section 26 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court which prescribes the
requirements for change of attorneys. Said
provision requires that the written consent
of the client should be filed in court and the
adverse party should be given written
notice of the substitution. As correctly
pointed out by the OCA, if her intention was
to obviate delay, then she should have
ordered the counsel of record, Atty. Nueva,
who was present during the hearing, to file
the required comment or opposition. -
Requirme, Jr. v. Judge Yuipco, A.M. No.
RTJ-98-1427. November 27, 2000
Death of a partner
 Petitioner's counsel was the law firm of
BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES and not
merely Atty. Crispin Baizas. Hence, the
death of the latter did not extinguish the
lawyer-client relationship between said
firm and petitioner.
 Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief, the
law firm should have re-assigned the case
to another associate or, it could have
withdrawn as counsel in the manner
provided by the Rules of Court so that the
petitioner could contract the services of a
new lawyer. - B.R. Sebastian Enterprises,
Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. L-41862 [1992]
Grounds to withdraw from a case before its final
adjudication
 A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case
before its final adjudication arises only
from the client’s written consent or from a
good cause. - Francisco v. Atty. Portugal,
A.C. No. 6155 [2006]
Written contract is not essential in establishing
lawyer-client relationship
 A written contract is not an essential
element in the employment of an attorney;
the contract may be express or implied. -
Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155
[2006]
Perceived insufficiency of remuneration not a
ground to diminish professional zeal
 Hence, even if respondent felt under-
compensated in the case he undertook to
defend, his obligation embodied in the
Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility still remains unwavering. The
zeal and the degree of fervor in handling
the case should neither diminish nor cease
just because of his perceived insufficiency
of remuneration. - Francisco v. Atty.
Portugal, A.C. No. 6155 [2006]
Close personal relationship will not bar a lawyer-
client relationship
 Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists
notwithstanding the close personal
relationship between the lawyer and the
complainant or the non-payment of the
former's fees. - Hadjula v. Atty. Madianda,
A.C. No. 6711 July 3, 2007
Heavy workload
 Standing alone, heavy workload is not
sufficient reason for the withdrawal of her
services. - Ceniza v. Atty. Rubia, A.C. No.
6166 [2009]
Lost of confidence
 Respondent's withdrawal was made on the
ground that "there no longer exist[ed] the
xxx confidence" between them and that
there had been "serious differences
between them relating to the manner of
 private prosecution.”- Orcino v. Atty.
Gaspar, A.C. No. 3773 September 24, 1997
“Hurt feelings” is not a valid ground to
automatically withdraw
 Complainant's words and actions may have
hurt respondent's feelings considering the
work he had put into the case. But her
words were uttered in a burst of passion.
And even at that moment, complainant did
not expressly terminate respondent's
services. She made this clear when she
refused to sign his "Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel.“ - Orcino v. Atty. Gaspar, A.C. No.
3773 September 24, 1997
Withdrawal must be granted
by the court
 Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent
was justified in terminating his services, he,
however, cannot just do so and leave
complainant in the cold unprotected. The
lawyer has no right to presume that his
petition for withdrawal will be granted by
the court. Until his withdrawal shall have
been approved, the lawyer remains
counsel of record who is expected by his
client as well as by the court to do what
the interests of his client require. He must
still appear on the date of hearing for the
attorney-client relation does not terminate
formally until there is a withdrawal of
record.- Orcino v. Atty. Gaspar, A.C. No.
3773 September 24, 1997
Lawyer’s responsibility
 CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS
CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
 Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect
a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
 Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the
client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time
to the client’s request for information.
Client should not file the Notice to Withdraw
 Certainly, respondent ought to know that
he was the one who should have filed the
Notice to Withdraw and not the accused. -
Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155
[2006]
Having an additional lawyer did not necessarily
mean conformity
 The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact
was not even to substitute for respondent
but to act as additional counsel. Mrs.
Jalandoni’s conformity to having an
additional lawyer did not necessarily mean
conformity to respondent’s desire to
withdraw as counsel. Respondent’s
speculations on the professional
relationship of Atty. Alminaza and Mrs.
Jalandoni find no support in the records of
this case.
 That Mrs. Jalandoni continued with Atty.
Alminaza’s professional engagement on her
behalf despite respondent’s withdrawal did
not absolve the latter of the consequences
of his unprofessional conduct. - Atty.
Jalandoni v. Atty. Villarosa, A.C. No. 5303
[2006]
Having an additional lawyer did not necessarily
mean conformity
 The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact
was not even to substitute for respondent
but to act as additional counsel. Mrs.
Jalandoni’s conformity to having an
additional lawyer did not necessarily mean
conformity to respondent’s desire to
withdraw as counsel. Respondent’s
speculations on the professional
relationship of Atty. Alminaza and Mrs.
 Jalandoni find no support in the records of
this case.

 That Mrs. Jalandoni continued with Atty.

Alminaza’s professional engagement on her
behalf despite respondent’s withdrawal did
not absolve the latter of the consequences
of his unprofessional conduct. - Atty.
Jalandoni v. Atty. Villarosa, A.C. No. 5303
[2006]

Acquisition of properties subject of litigation
Contingent fee arrangement does not violate
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code
• Hence, a contract between a lawyer and his
client stipulating a contingent fee is not
covered by said prohibition under because
the payment of said fee is not made during
the pendency of the litigation but only after
judgment has been rendered in the case
handled by the lawyer. In fact, under the
1988 Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer may have a lien over funds and
property of his client and may apply so
much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy
his lawful fees and disbursements. - Fabillo
and Tana v. IAC G.R. No. L-68838 [1991]
What is “a property [is] in litigation”?
• A property is in litigation if there is a
contest or litigation over it in court or when
it is subject of a judicial action. - Peña v.
Delos Santos, et. al., GR NO. 202223, March
02, 2016
• A thing is said to be in litigation not only if
there is some contest or litigation over it in
court, but also from the moment that it
becomes subject to the judicial action of the
judge. – Natividad Ariaga vda. De Gurrea,
et. Al. v. against Atty. Enrique Suplico , G.R.
No. 144320, April 26, 2006
Mortgage also falls under
Article 1491[5]
• Respondent Amonoy avers that at the time
of the execution of the mortgage on 20
January 1965, subject properties were no
longer "properties in litigation" since the
Project of Partition (as signed by the
intestate heirs) covering said properties was
approved by the lower Court as early as 12
January 1965.
• This argument must fail for the reason that
while the Project of Partition was approved
on 12 January 1965, it was only on 6 August
1969, and after all charges against the
estate had been paid, that the estate was
declared closed and terminated. In fact, by
his own admission, he had acted as counsel
from 1959 until 1968.
• Thus, at the time of the execution of the
mortgage contract, the Controverted
Parcels were still in litigation and a fiduciary
relationship of lawyer and client, which
Article 1491[5] precisely seeks to protect,
still existed between the parties. To state
that mortgages are not included within the
prohibition is to open the door to an
indirect circumvention of that statutory
injunction, acquisition of the property being
merely postponed till eventual foreclosure.
• Respondent asserts further that Article
1491[5] does not apply to judgment
creditors of which, he claims, he was one.
Under ordinary circumstances, the
argument of respondent could be
considered plausible. Unfortunately,
however, as heretofore explained, the
mortgage was executed in violation of
Article 1491[5] so that this Article has a
direct bearing on this case and respondent
cannot escape its provision. Having violated
the same, he cannot be considered in the
general run of a judgment creditor.
Fornilda, et. al. v. Branch 164, RTC Pasig,
G.R.No. L-72306 January 24, 1989
Limitations of contingent fee
• As long as the lawyer does not exert undue
influence on his client, that no fraud is
committed or imposition applied, or that
the compensation is clearly not excessive
as to amount to extortion, a contract for
contingent fee is valid and enforceable.
Moreover, contingent fees were impliedly
sanctioned by No. 13 of the Canons of
 Professional Ethics which governed lawyer-
client relationships when the contract of
services was entered into between the
Fabillo spouses and Murillo. - Fabillo and
Tana v. IAC G.R. No. L-68838 [1991]
Appearance of impropriety if judge purchase
property after litigation
• Finally, while it is true that respondent
Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article
1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by
purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was
in litigation in his court, it was, however,
improper for him to have acquired the
same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires
that: "A judge's official conduct should be
free from the appearance of impropriety,
and his personal behavior, not only upon
the bench and in the performance of
judicial duties, but also in his everyday life,
should be beyond reproach." And as aptly
observed by the Investigating Justice: "... it
was unwise and indiscreet on the part of
respondent to have purchased or acquired
a portion of a piece of property that was or
had been in litigation in his court and
caused it to be transferred to a corporation
of which he and his wife were ranking
officers at the time of such transfer. -
Macariola v. Asuncion, A.M. No. 133-J
[1982]
The property must be the very subject of litigation
for Article 1491 to apply
• It is true that Canon No. 10 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics prohibits the lawyer
from purchasing any interest in the
subject-matter of the litigation which he is
conducting, and Article 1491, paragraph 5,
of the New Civil Code prohibits him from
acquiring by purchase or assignment the
property and rights which may be the
object of any litigation in which he may take
part by virtue of his profession. But in those
cases where these provisions were applied,
the rights or properties purchased by the
lawyer were the very subject of the
litigation handled by him. - Guevara v.
Calalang, A.M. No. 681 [1982]
Levied property in satisfaction of damages can be
properly acquired by lawyer
• In the case at bar, the lot in which
respondent acquired rights by assignment
was not the subject of Civil Case No. 2171 in
which he approved (sic) as counsel for
Bernabe Flores and others. The said case
was purely one for damages and did not
involve the lot in question. The lot was
simply levied upon on execution after
judgment was rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs. Therefore Article 1491 of the
New Civil Code did not apply.
Consequently, respondent had not violated
the said provision of law. - Guevara v.
Calalang, A.M. No. 681 [1982]
• It was not professional misconduct or
unethical practice for the respondent to
acquire the rights and interests of his client
to the 439 square meter parcel of land
subject of the administrative charges
because the land was not involved in the
litigation he was handling. The land was
acquired by Bernabe Flores in an execution
sale conducted to satisfy the judgment
secured in the course of Civil Case No. 2171.
The case handled by the respondent was for
damages. - Guevara v. Calalang, A.M. No.
681 [1982]
Withdrawal of the amount deposited in order to
pay attorney’s fees violates Article 1491 of the NCC
• The withdrawal of the amount deposited in
order to pay attorney’s fees to petitioner’s
counsel, Atty. De Guzman, Jr., violates
Article 1491 of the Civil Code which forbids
lawyers from acquiring by assignment,
property and rights which are the object of
 any litigation in which they may take part
by virtue of their profession. Furthermore,
Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
provides that “the lawyer should not
purchase any interest in the subject matter
of the litigation which he is conducting.”
The assailed transaction falls within the
prohibition because the Deed assigning the
amount of P672,900.00 to Atty. De Guzman,
Jr., as part of his attorney’s fees was
executed during the pendency of this case
with the Court of Appeals. In his Motion to
Intervene, Atty. De Guzman, Jr., not only
asserted ownership over said amount, but
likewise prayed that the same be released
to him. - Pabugais v. Sahijwani G.R. No.
156846 [2004]
Even if litigant voluntarily assigned the amount
• That petitioner knowingly and voluntarily
assigned the subject amount to his counsel
did not remove their agreement within the
ambit of the prohibitory provisions. -
Pabugais v. Sahijwani G.R. No. 156846
[2004]
Assignment of property violates
Article 1491
• We agree with the Investigating
Commissioner's opinion that the prohibition
applies when the lawyer has not paid
money for it and the property was merely
assigned to him in consideration of legal
services rendered at a time when the
property is still the subject of a pending
case. - Ordonio v. Atty. Eduarte, A.M. No.
3216 [1992]
Prohibition still applies even if lessee is a separate
juridical person
• Thus, even if the parties designated as
lessees in the assailed lease contracts were
the "Heirs of Jose Villegas" and the
partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, and
respondent signed merely as an agent of
the latter, the Court rules that the lease
contracts are covered by the prohibition
against any acquisition or lease by a lawyer
of properties involved in litigation in which
he takes part. To rule otherwise would be
to lend a stamp of judicial approval on an
arrangement which, in effect, circumvents
that which is directly prohibited by law. For,
piercing through the legal fiction of
separate juridical personality, the Court
cannot ignore the obvious implication that
respondent as one of the heirs of Jose
Villegas and partner, later manager of, in
HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS stands to benefit
from the contractual relationship created
between his client Felix Leong and his
family partnership over properties
involved in the ongoing testate
proceedings. - Mananquil v. Atty. Villegas,
A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995
Mortgage contract included in the prohibition
• To state that mortgages are not included
within the prohibition is to open the door to
an indirect circumvention of that statutory
injunction, acquisition of the property
being merely postponed till eventual
foreclosure.
• Respondent asserts further that Article
1491[5] does not apply to judgment
creditors of which, he claims, he was one.
Under ordinary circumstances, the
argument of respondent could be
considered plausible. Unfortunately,
however, as heretofore explained, the
mortgage was executed in violation of
Article 1491[5] so that this Article has a
direct bearing on this case and respondent
cannot escape its provision. Having violated
the same, he cannot be considered in the
general run of a judgment creditor. -
Fornilda, et. al. v. RTC Branch 164, G.R.No.
L-72306 [1989]
Mere demand for delivery of the litigated property
does not
violate the rule

• In the instant case, there was no actual

acquisition of the property in litigation since
the respondent only made a written
demand for its delivery which the
complainant refused to comply. Mere
demand for delivery of the litigated
property does not cause the transfer of
ownership, hence, not a prohibited
transaction within the contemplation of
Article 1491. Even assuming arguendo that
such demand for delivery is unethical,
respondent's act does not fall within the
purview of Article 1491. - Ramos v. Atty.
Ngaseo, A.C. No. 6210 [2004]

Certiorari proceeding still bars purchase of property

under Article 1491

• In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty.

Arsenio Fer. Cabanting purchased the lot
after finality of judgment, there was still a
pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is
said to be in litigation not only if there is
some contest or litigation over it in court,
but also from the moment that it becomes
subject to the judicial action of the judge. -
Valencia v. Atty. Cabanting, A.M. No. 1302,
1391 and 1543 [1991]
Extrajudicial activities
of judges /justices
The previous “Canons of Judicial Ethics and the
Code of Judicial Conduct is a supplement to the
new Code
• “Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of
Judicial Conduct”, promulgated on 5
September 1989, shall take effect on 20
October 1989
• This “New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary” shall take effect on the
first day of June 2004
• This Code, which shall hereafter be referred
to as the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary, supersedes the
Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of
Judicial Conduct heretofore applied in the
Philippines to the extent that the provisions
or concepts therein are embodied in this
Code: Provided, however, that in case of
deficiency or absence of specific provisions
in this New Code, the Canons of Judicial
Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct shall
be applicable in a suppletory character.
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
New Code of Judicial Conduct [2004]
• Propriety and the appearance of propriety
are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge.
• SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.
• SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public
scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and
should do so freely and willingly. In
particular, judges shall conduct themselves
in a way that is consistent with the dignity
of the judicial office.
• SEC. 3. Judges shall, in their personal
relations with individual members of the
legal profession who practice regularly in
their court, avoid situations which might
reasonably give rise to the suspicion or
appearance of favoritism or partiality.
• SEC. 4. Judges shall not participate in the
determination of a case in which any
member of their family represents a litigant
or is associated in any manner with the
case.
• SEC. 5. Judges shall not allow the use of
their residence by a member of the legal
profession to receive clients of the latter or
of other members of the legal profession.
• SEC. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are
entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly, but in exercising
such rights, they shall always conduct
themselves in such a manner as to preserve
the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the
judiciary.
• SEC. 7. Judges shall inform themselves
about their personal fiduciary financial
interests and shall make reasonable efforts
to be informed about the financial interests
of members of their family.
• SEC. 8. Judges shall not use or lend the
prestige of the judicial office to advance
their private interests, or those of a
member of their family or of anyone else,
nor shall they convey or permit others to
convey the impression that anyone is in a
special position improperly to influence
them in the performance of judicial duties.
• SEC. 9. Confidential information acquired by
judges in their judicial capacity shall not be
 used or disclosed by for any other purpose
related to their judicial duties.
• SEC. 10. Subject to the proper performance
of judicial duties, judges may
• (a) Write, lecture, teach and participate in
activities concerning the law, the legal
system, the administration of justice or
related matters;
• (b) Appear at a public hearing before an
official body concerned with matters
relating to the law, the legal system, the
administration of justice or related matters;
• (c) Engage in other activities if such
activities do not detract from the dignity of
the judicial office or otherwise interfere
with the performance of judicial duties.
• SEC. 12. Judges may form or join
associations of judges or participate in
other organizations representing the
interests of judges.
• SEC. 13. Judges and members of their
families shall neither ask for, nor accept,
any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to
anything done or to be done or omitted to
be done by him or her in connection with
the performance of judicial duties.
• SEC. 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit
court staff or others subject to their
influence, direction or authority, to ask for,
or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in
relation to anything done or to be done or
omitted to be done in connection with their
duties or functions.
• SEC. 15. Subject to law and to any legal
requirements of public disclosure, judges
may receive a token gift, award or benefit
as appropriate to the occasion on which it
is made provided that such gift, award or
benefit might not reasonably be perceived
as intended to influence the judge in the
performance of judicial duties or otherwise
give rise to an appearance of partiality.
Private practice of law prohibited
• Rule 138 RRC Sec. 35. Certain attorneys not
to practice. - No judge or other official or
employee of the superior courts or of the
Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage
in private practice as a member of the bar
or give professional advice to clients.
• Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct states that: A judge shall not
engage in the private practice of law.
Unless prohibited by the Constitution or
law, a judge may engage in the practice of
any other profession provided that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with judicial functions.
Why a judge cannot practice law
• These provisions are based on public policy
for there is no question that the rights,
duties, privileges and functions of the office
of an attorney-at-law are inherently
incompatible with the high official
functions, duties, powers, discretion and
privileges of a judge.
• It also aims to ensure that judges give their
full time and attention to their judicial
duties, prevent them from extending
special favors to their own private interests
and assure the public of their impartiality
in the performance of their functions.
• These objectives are dictated by a sense of
moral decency and desire to promote the
public interest. - Ziga v. Judge Arejola, A.M.
No. MTJ-99-1203. June 10, 2003
Drafting complainant’s affidavit is practice of law
• Respondent acted as a lawyer for
complainant and her father-in-law when he
 drafted complainant’s affidavit which
became the basis of a complaint for estafa
filed against Heidi Navarra.
• By acting as counsel for complainant and
the latter’s father-in-law in a case filed in
his court, respondent compromised his
neutrality and independence. How could
he then be expected to decide with
objectivity and fairness the cases in which
he has acted as a lawyer for the plaintiff or
complainant?
• Respondent’s misconduct in this case is
further compounded by the fact that he
rendered the legal services in question
using government facilities during office
hours. - Biboso v. Judge Villanueva, A.M.
No. MTJ-01-1356. April 16, 2001
Instances when a judge canserving as executor,
administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary
• As a general rule, a judge is prohibited from
serving as executor, administrator, trustee,
guardian or other fiduciary. The only
exception is when the estate or trust
belongs to, or the ward is a member of his
immediate family, and only if his service as
executor, administrator, trustee, guardian
or fiduciary will not interfere with the
proper performance of his judicial duties.
• The Code has defined who may be
considered as members of his immediate
family and they are the spouse and
relatives within the second degree of
consanguinity. – Carual v. Brusola A.M. No.
RTJ-99-1500. October 20, 1999
“Judge’s family”
• Includes a judge’s:
1. spouse,
2. son,
3. daughter,
4. son-in-law,
5. daughter-in-law, and
6. any other relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the sixth civil degree, or
7. person who is a companion or employee of the
judge and who lives in the judge’s household.
Rendering legal opinion proscribed
• To escape our disciplining wrath,
respondent judge argues that the
"resolution" he issued was a mere
expression of his legal opinion and not a
judgment or order "which adjudicates and
settles rights and obligations of the parties."
He said that the petition for declaratory
relief, earlier quoted, is not a pleading, but
a mere letter-request for a legal opinion.
Hence, complainant Gozun was not entitled
to notice and hearing.
• Besides, even assuming arguendo that the
resolution was a mere legal opinion, still
respondent must know that rendering of
"legal opinions" is not the function of a
judge. The function of the court is limited
to adjudication of actual controversies
involving rights which are legally
demandable or enforceable. Unlike lawyers,
judges cannot render legal advice. Judges
are expressly prohibited from engaging in
the private practice of law or from giving
professional advice to clients. – Gozun v.
Judge Liangco A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136.
August 30, 2000
A judge who violates the judicial code of conduct
also violates the lawyer’s oath
• We ruled that because membership in the
bar is an integral qualification for
membership in the bench, the moral fitness
of a judge also reflects the latter’s moral
 fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys
the basic rules of judicial conduct also
violates the lawyer’s oath. - OCA v. Atty.
Liangco, A. C. No. 5355 [2011]
As attorney-in-fact in actual litigations
• Except for the initiatory pleading,
respondent Judge signed the pleadings
relative to the civil case and participated in
some of the hearings held relative thereto.
• The proscription against the private practice
of law, or just giving professional advice to
clients, by Judges is based on public policy.
• The prohibition applies equally well to the
appointment of and acceptance by judges
to the post of attorney-in-fact in actual
litigations, a fact which is also, by and large,
incompatible with the high office, functions,
prestige and privileges of a judge. It is of
no moment, albeit worse, that the case
where he accepts such designation as
attorney-in-fact is one that pends before his
own court. - Sps. Gragera v. Judge
Francisco, A. M. No. RTJ-02-1670. June 26,
2003
A.M. NO. 13-05-05-SC
RE: REVISION OF
RESTRICTIONS ON TEACHING HOURS OF
JUSTICES, JUDGES AND PERSONNEL OF THE
JUDICIARY
EN BANC RESOLUTION DATED 01 APRIL 2014
1. Teaching shall be allowed for not more than
ten (10) hours a week. On regular working
days (Monday through Friday), teaching
shall not be conducted earlier than 5:30
p.m.
2. An application for permission to teach if filed by a
judge shall be accompanied by a certification of the
Clerk of Court concerned regarding the condition of
the court docket showing:
(a) the number of pending cases; and
(b) the number of cases disposed of within a
three-month period prior to the start of the
semester in his or her respective sala.
An application for permission to teach filed by a
judge or justice shall require approval as follows:
a. If filed by a judge from a lower level court, it
shall be subject to the approval of the
executive judge concerned;
b. If filed by an executive judge, it shall be subject to
the approval of the Court Administrator;
c. If filed by an Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or the Court of Tax
Appeals, it shall be subject to the approval of the
presiding justice concerned;
d. If filed by the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or the Court of Tax
Appeals, it shall be subject to the approval of the
Chief Justice.
An application for permission to teach filed by
court personnel shall require approval as follows
a. If filed by court personnel from a lower level
court, it shall be subject to the approval of the
executive judge concerned;
b. If filed by court personnel from the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or the Court of Tax
Appeals, it shall be subject to the approval of the
presiding justice or the executive justice concerned,
as the case may be;
c. If filed by Supreme Court personnel belonging to a
chamber of an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court, it shall be subject to the approval of the
Associate Justice concerned, who will notify the
Chief Justice and the Office of Administrative
Services, Supreme Court, of this approval;
d. If filed by other Supreme Court personnel, it shall
be subject to the approval of the Chief Justice.
Disposition of applications
5. The approving authority may deny the application
or allow less than ten (10) hours of teaching a week,
depending on the applicant’s performance record.
6. At the end of every year, an approving authority
shall submit to the Chief Justice a report on the
applications submitted for the year and the
respective status of, or action taken on, each
application.
Failure to secure permit to teach.
• To justify his failure to obtain a permit from
the Supreme Court, he said that the
University of the East did not require him to
submit one.
• Respondent judge’s failure to accomplish
the Request for Permission to Teach form
prescribed in Circular No. 50-97, dated July
18, 1997 is inexcusable. It is a clear
violation of the judiciary rules and
regulations, indicating respondent judge’s
disregard of the authority of the Supreme
Court. For no matter how insignificant or
inconsequential the circular may seem to
respondent judge, he should have complied
with it. - Jabon v. Judge Sibanah E. Usman,
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1713 [2005]
Proper for judges to attend meetings of members
of the bar
• It is not necessary to the proper
performance of judicial duty that judges
should live in retirement or seclusion; it is
desirable that, so far as the reasonable
attention to the completion of their work
will permit, they continue to mingle in
social intercourse, and that they should not
discontinue their interests in or
appearance at meetings of members at the
bar.
• A judge should, however, in pending or
prospective litigation before him be
scrupulously careful to avoid such action as
may reasonably tend to waken the
suspicion that his social or business
relations or friendships constitute an
element in determining his judicial
course.’”- Abundo v. Judge Manio, Jr., A.M.
No. RTJ-98-1416. August 6, 1999
Judge eating lunch with counsel
• For respondent judge to eat lunch with
counsel is not wrong per se. The Canons,
however, provides that as much as possible
he should be scrupulously careful to avoid
any suspicion that his social or business or
friendly relationship is an element in
“determining his judicial course.”
• Knowing that Atty. Verano, Jr., is counsel of
the petitioner in an annulment case
pending before him, the respondent judge
should have thought twice about joining
counsel for lunch, especially in the
courtroom at that. – Pertierra v. Judge
Lerma, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1799. September
12, 2003
Political activities of judges
• Allowed : A judge is entitled to entertain
personal views on political questions.
• Prohibited: But to avoid suspicion of
political partisanship:
1. a judge shall not make political speeches, 2. a
judge shall not contribute to party funds
3. a judge shall not publicly endorse candidates for
political office or participate in other partisan
political activities. - Rule 5.10, Canon 5, of the Code
of Judicial Conduct
Engaging in partisan political activity
improper under Civil Service Law
• Pres. Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Law)
clearly states:
• Section 45. No officer or employee in the
Civil Service including members of the
 Armed Forces, shall engage directly or
indirectly in any partisan political activity
or take part in any election except to vote
nor shall be use his official authority or
influence to coerce the political activity of
any other person or body. Nothing herein
provided shall be understood to prevent
any officer or employee from expressing his
views on current political problems or
issues, or from mentioning the names of
candidates for public office whom he
supports: ...
Engaging in political activity
• Respondent started circulating
handbills/letters addressed to electoral
constituents in the second district of
Bulacan indicating his intention to run for a
congressional seat.
• For having held himself out as a
congressional candidate while still a
member of the Bench, Respondent took
advantage of his position to boost his
candidacy, demeaned the stature of his
office, and must be pronounced guilty of
gross misconduct. - Vistan v. Judge Nicolas
A.M. No. MTJ-87-79 [1991]
Filing of a certificate of candidacy
• When he was appointed as a judge, he took
an oath to uphold the law, yet in filing a
certificate of candidacy as a party-list
representative in the May 1998 elections
without giving up his judicial post, Judge
Limbona violated not only the law, but the
constitutional mandate that “no officer or
employee in the civil service shall engage
directly or indirectly, in any electioneering
or partisan political campaign.”
• The filing of a certificate of candidacy is a
partisan political activity as the candidate
thereby offers himself to the electorate for
an elective post. - Limbona v. Judge
Limbona, A.M. No. SCC-98-4 March 22,
2011
Limit of judge’s journalistic writing
• Complainant alleged that respondent used
his newspaper column to ventilate his
biases or personal anger at people or
institutions.
• Complainant believes that respondent
judge should not engage in active,
sensational, and free-for-all journalistic
writing because such act degrades the
judicial system and compromises his
impartiality as an administrator of justice.
• Respondent’s writing of active and vicious
editorials compromises his duties as judge
in the impartial administration of justice, for
his views printed on newspapers reflect on
his office as well as on the public officers
that he challenges.
• Not only does he act as its contributor or
columnist, he is also its publisher, editor
and legal adviser. Although the Code of
Judicial Conduct allows a judge to engage in
certain lawful activities, they should not
interfere with the performance of judicial
duties nor detract from the dignity of the
court. - Galang v. Judge Santos G.R. No.
MTJ-99-1197 [1999]
Judge cannot be appointed to executive position in
any enterprise
• Circular No. 6 dated April 10, 1987 strictly
enjoins all Judges, Clerks of Court and
Sheriffs not to accept the position of
director or any other position in any
electric cooperative or other enterprises,
or to resign immediately from such position
if they are already holding the same so as
not to prejudice the expeditious and proper
administration of justice.
 • In violation of this circular, Judge Estrada,
who was appointed to the judiciary on May
17, 1994, did not resign from the Board of
Directors of the Rural Bank of Labrador until
May 31, 1997. - Re: Inhibition of Judge
Bienvenido R. Estrada A.M. No. 98-1-32-
RTC July 29, 1998
Judge should not accept any position in any
business enterprise
• RULE 5.01 - A judge may engage in the
following activities provided that they do
not interfere with the performance of
judicial duties or detract from the dignity of
the court:
(d) serve as an officer, director, trustee, or non-legal
advisor of a non-profit or non-political educational,
religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization.
• RULE 5.03 - Subject to the provisions of the
proceeding rule, a judge may hold and
manage investments but should not serve
as officer, director, manager or advisor, or
employee of any business except as
director of a family business of the judge. -
Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of
Judicial Conduct
Not good for judges to engage in business
• Indeed, it is not good for judges to engage
in business except only to the extent
allowed by Rule 5.03 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which provides:
Subject to the provisions of the preceding rule, a
judge may hold and manage investments but should
not serve as an officer, director, manager, advisor, or
employee of any business except as director of a
family business of the judge.
- Berin and Alorro v. Judge Barte A.M. No. MTJ-
02-1443. July 31, 2002
Limits of financial and business dealings
• Refrain from financial and business dealings
that tend to:
1. reflect adversely on the court’s impartiality,
2. interfere with the proper performance of
judicial activities, or
3. increase involvement with lawyers or
persons likely to come before the court.
- Berin and Alorro v. Judge Barte A.M. No. MTJ-02-
1443. July 31, 2002 citing Rule 5.02 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct
Act of writing a letter to opposing counsel and
defending a right amounts to private practice of
law
• We also find merit in complainant's
contention that respondent's act of writing
to Atty. Cargullo and defending the right of
Andres Bo to possess the lot in dispute
amounts to private practice of law.
• The tenor of the letter shows that
respondent, as representative of Andres Bo,
was defending the latter's rights over the
disputed property. Respondent's act of
representing and defending the interest of
a private individual in the disputed property
constitutes private practice of law. It has
been ruled that "the practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases in court or
participation in court proceedings but also
includes preparation of pleadings or papers
in anticipation of a litigation, giving advice
to clients or persons needing the same, etc.
- Carual v. Brusola A.M. No. RTJ-99-1500.
October 20, 1999
As agent in the sale of the subject property
• By allowing himself to act as agent in the
sale of the subject property, respondent
judge has increased the possibility of his
disqualification to act as an impartial judge
 in the event that a dispute involving the
said contract of sale arises.
• Also, the possibility that the parties to the
sale might plead before his court is not
remote and his business dealings with them
might not only create suspicion as to his
fairness but also to his ability to render it in
a manner that is free from any suspicion as
to its fairness and impartiality and also as to
the judge’s integrity. - Rosauro v. Judge
Kallos A.M. No. RTJ-03-1796 February 10,
2006
Financial and business dealings
• Judge can engage in financial and business
dealings provide:
1. such will not reflect adversely on the court’s
impartiality.
2. will not interfere with the proper performance
of judicial activities.
3. will not increase involvement with lawyers or
persons likely to come before the court.
• A judge should so manage investments and
other financial interests as to minimize the
number of cases giving grounds for
disqualification. - Catbagan v. Judge Barte,
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1452. April 06, 2005
Sheer presence - as a member of the Judiciary -
would be sufficient suggestion of persuasion and
influence
• As a member of the bench, the respondent
judge should realize that his presence,
opinion and participation in any
proceeding could slant the evaluation and
resolution of the case in favor of (the) party
he identifies himself with. A judge need not
utter any word for his sheer presence - as a
member of the Judiciary - would be
sufficient suggestion of persuasion and
influence.
• In this case, the respondent judge's
presence and participation in the
proceedings were to the advantage of his
relatives, the heirs of Dr. Cosme T. Valdez,
Sr. That his efforts failed to influence the
DARAB, for the motion filed by the Valdez
heirs in DARAB Case No. 282-T-93 for
contempt was dismissed, has no relevance.
- Garcia, et. al. v. Judge Valdez, A.M. No.
MTJ-98-1156 [1998]
Giving moral support to a family member by
attending the hearing is improper
• Judge Dojillo admitted that he was present
during the mentioned hearings but
explained that he did not sit beside his
brother’s lawyer but in the area reserved
for the public; and that the main reason
why he was there was to observe how
election protests are conducted as he has
never conducted one. His other reason
was to give moral support to his brother. -
Vidal v. Judge Dojillo, Jr. A.M. No. MTJ-05-
1591 [2005]
Objection from complainant or counsel is
immaterial
• Although concern for family members is
deeply ingrained in the Filipino culture,
respondent, being a judge, should bear in
mind that he is also called upon to serve
the higher interest of preserving the
integrity of the entire judiciary.
• The fact that neither complainant nor his
counsel objected to the presence of
respondent during the hearing is
immaterial. - Vidal v. Judge Dojillo, Jr. A.M.
No. MTJ-05-1591 [2005]
Use of letterhead by a judge
• In other words, the respondent Judge’s
transgression was not per se in the use of
the letterhead, but in not being very careful
and discerning in considering the
 circumstances surrounding the use of his
letterhead and his title. - Ladignon v. Judge
Garong, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1712 [2008]
• Hence, respondent judge’s use of the court
heading outside of judicial business
warrants disciplinary action for violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct particularly
Section 1, Canon 4.
Use of ordinary bond papers and placing his official
station as return address
• The Judge’s claim that he used an ordinary
bond papers and placed thereon his official
station as return address is not totally
without merit.
• For, indeed, this is not an unusual practice
and it would be hypocritical to deny its
occurrence at all levels of the Judiciary. For
example, some members of the Judiciary
may use a social card with the letterhead
of their office to indicate their address as
well as their station within the judicial
hierarchy; some also use notepads bearing
their names, designation and station. -
Ladignon v. Judge Garong, A.M. No. MTJ-
08-1712 [2008]
Use of court’s stationery
• The Court also finds respondent Judge liable
for violating Rule 2.03 of the Code in using
official stationery for his correspondence
with complainant and the latter’s counsel
regarding Lot No. 1470. A court’s
stationery, with its official letterhead,
should only be used for official
correspondence. By using his sala’s
stationery other than for official purposes,
respondent Judge evidently used the
prestige of his office to benefit Guererro
(and himself) in violation of Rule 2.0322 of
the Code. - Rosauro v. Judge Kallos A.M.
No. RTJ-03-1796 February 10, 2006
• Respondent Judge should know that a
court’s letterhead should be used only for
official correspondence. - Oktubre v. Judge
Velasco A.M. No. MTJ 02-1444. July 22,
2004
Judge required tenants to pay at MTC
• Respondent Judge aggravates his liability
when, in his letters to the tenants, he
further required them to pay their rent at
the MTC Maasin, although he was then
staying at the Paler building.
• By these calculated steps, respondent Judge
in the words of Rule 2.03, clearly intended
to “use the prestige of his judicial office” to
advance the interest of his maternal co-
heirs. – Oktubre v. Judge Velasco A.M. No.
MTJ 02-1444. July 22, 2004
Social Networking activities
• The complainant likewise filed a
supplemental complaint dated April 14,
2008 where he alleged that the respondent
committed an act of impropriety when she
displayed her photographs in a social
networking website called "Friendster" and
posted her personal details as an RTC Judge,
allegedly for the purpose of finding a
compatible partner. She also posed with her
upper body barely covered by a shawl,
allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn
underneath except probably a brassiere..
• We are not unaware of the increasing
prevalence of social networking sites in the
Internet – a new medium through which
more and more Filipinos communicate with
each other. While judges are not prohibited
from becoming members of and from
taking part in social networking activities,
we remind them that they do not thereby
shed off their status as judges. They carry
with them in cyberspace the same ethical
responsibilities and duties that every judge
is expected to follow in his/her everyday
 activities. It is in this light that we judge the • We are not also unaware that the
respondent in the charge of impropriety respondent’s act of posting her photos
when she posted her pictures in a manner would seem harmless and inoffensive had
viewable by the public. this act been done by an ordinary member
of the public. As the visible personification
• Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New of law and justice, however, judges are held
Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a to higher standards of conduct and thus
judge from joining or maintaining an must accordingly comport themselves. -
account in a social networking site such as Lorenzana v. Judge Austria, A.M. No. RTJ-
Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New 09-2200 April 2, 2014 (formerly OCA I.P.I.
Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that No. 08-2834-RTJ)
judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to
freedom of expression. This right "includes
the freedom to hold opinions without
interference and impart information and
ideas through any media regardless of
frontiers." Joining a social networking site is
an exercise of one’s freedom of expression.
The respondent judge’s act of joining
Friendster is, therefore, per se not violative
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

• To restate the rule: in communicating and

socializing through social networks, judges
must bear in mind that what they
communicate – regardless of whether it is a
personal matter or part of his or her judicial
duties – creates and contributes to the
people’s opinion not just of the judge but of
the entire Judiciary of which he or she is a
part. This is especially true when the posts
the judge makes are viewable not only by
his or her family and close friends, but by
acquaintances and the general public.

• Thus, it may be acceptable for the

respondent to show a picture of herself in
the attire she wore to her family and close
friends, but when she made this picture
available for public consumption, she
placed herself in a situation where she, and
the status she holds as a judge, may be the
object of the public’s criticism and ridicule.
The nature of cyber communications,
particularly its speedy and wide-scale
character, renders this rule necessary.
Grounds for disciplinary proceedings against judges
and justices
Resolution to protect members of judiciary from
baseless complaints
• First of all, we deem it necessary to
determine the applicability of A.M. No. 03-
10-01-SC, a Resolution Prescribing
Measures to Protect Members of the
Judiciary from Baseless and Unfounded
Administrative Complaints, which took
effect on November 3, 2003.
• Recognizing the proliferation of unfounded
or malicious administrative or criminal
cases against members of the judiciary for
purposes of harassment, we issued said
Resolution, which provides:
• 2. If the complaint is
(a) filed within six months before the
compulsory retirement of a Justice or
Judge;
(b) for an alleged cause of action that occurred at
least a year before such filing; and
(c) shown prima facie that it is intended to harass
the respondent, it must forthwith be recommended
for dismissal.
• If such is not the case, the Office of the
Court Administrator must require the
respondent to file a comment within ten
(10) days from receipt of the complaint, and
submit to the Court a report and
recommendation not later than thirty (30)
days from receipt of the comment. The
Court shall act on the recommendation
before the date of compulsory retirement
of the respondent, or, if it is not possible to
do so, within six (6) months from such date
without prejudice to the release of the
retirement benefits less such amount as the
Court may order to be withheld, taking into
account the gravity of the cause of action
alleged in the complaint.
Power of the Supreme Court
• Article 8 Section 6. The Supreme Court shall
have administrative supervision over all
courts and the personnel thereof. –
Philippine Constitution 1987
• By virtue of this power, it is only the
Supreme Court that can oversee the judges'
and court personnel's compliance with all
laws, and take the proper administrative
action against them if they commit any
violation thereof. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power,
without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers. – Maceda v. Hon.
Ombudsman Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781.
April 22, 1993
Competence to review a judicial order or decision
belongs to the Court
• “No other entity or official of the
Government, not the prosecution or
investigation service of any other branch,
not any functionary thereof, has
competence to review a judicial order or
decision--whether final and executory or
not--and pronounce it erroneous so as to
lay the basis for a criminal or administrative
complaint for rendering an unjust judgment
or order. That prerogative belongs to the
courts alone.”- De Vera v. Pelayo, 335 SCRA
281(2000)
Powers, functions, and duties of the Office of the
Ombudsman
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any
public official or employee of the Government, or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
as well as of any government-owned or controlled
corporation with original charter, to perform and
expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop,
prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the
performance of duties.
xxx
Ombudsman Act of 1989 [R.A. 6770]
• Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as
the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:
• “Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. -
The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or
on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and,
in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it
may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases.”
xxx xxx
• “Section 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary
Authority, Exceptions.- The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary
authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies, including members of the Cabinet,
local government, government-owned or
controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, except over officials who may
be removed only by impeachment or over
Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
When criminal complaint against a Judge or other
court employee arises from their administrative
duties
• In fine, where a criminal complaint against a
Judge or other court employee arises from
their administrative duties, the
Ombudsman must defer action on said
complaint and refer the same to this Court
for determination whether said Judge or
court employee had acted within the scope
of their administrative duties. - Maceda v.
Hon. Ombudsman Vasquez, G.R. No.
102781. April 22, 1993
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman could
entertain a criminal complaint for the alleged
falsification of a judge's certification submitted to
the Supreme Court, and assuming that it can,
whether a referral should be made first to the
Supreme Court.
• Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer
the matter of petitioner's certificates of
service to this Court for determination of
whether said certificates reflected the true
status of his pending case load, as the Court
has the necessary records to make such a
determination.
• The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court,
as one of the three branches of
government, to submit its records, or to
allow its personnel to testify on this
matter, as suggested by public respondent
Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. - Maceda
v. Hon. Ombudsman Vasquez, G.R. No.
102781. April 22, 1993
Whether the Ombudsman may conduct an
investigation over the acts of a judge in the exercise
of his official functions alleged to be in violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the
absence of an administrative charge for the same
acts before the Supreme Court.
• Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or
investigate a criminal or administrative
 complaint before his office against
petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to
investigate public officers. The
Ombudsman must indorse the case to the
Supreme Court, for appropriate action. -
Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao, G.R. No. 124295, October 23,
2001
Whether the MTC can take cognizance of a
complaint of reckless imprudence against an
incumbent judge pending the resolution of an
administrative complaint arising from the same
facts
• On January 31, 2003, complainant filed a
letter complaint before the Ombudsman-
Vizayas, charging Judge Rodolfo B. Garcia,
then Presiding Judge of the MCTC,
Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental with
the crime of murder and the administrative
offenses of grave misconduct and abuse of
authority.
• The complaint arose from the death of
complaianant’s husband, on November 12,
2002, as a result of a vehicular mishap
between a Toyota Land Cruiser driven by
Judge Garcia and the motorcycle driven by
the deceased.
• The Graft Investigation Officer found the
existence of probable cause for the crime of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide
and recommended the filing of the
corresponding charges against Judge Garcia.
• Judge Garcia filed a Motion to Quash the
Information on the following grounds:xxx;
(2) that the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged and
over his person; and,xxx.
• Petitioner [judge] argues that respondents
violated this Court’s pronouncements in
Caoibes, Jr. v. Ombudsman, directing the
Ombudsman to refer all cases against
judges and court personnel filed before his
office to the Supreme Court; and, in Fuentes
v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao,
restricting not only the Ombudsman and
the prosecution arm of the government,
but also other official and functionary
thereof in initiating or investigating judges
and court personnel.
Held
• In the case at bar, the criminal case filed
against petitioner was in no way related to
the performance of his duties as a judge.
• From the foregoing, the filing of the
criminal charges against the petitioner
before the MCTC was warranted by the
above circumstances.
• To reiterate, the case filed against
petitioner before the MCTC is a criminal
case under its own jurisdiction as
prescribed by law and not an administrative
case. To be sure, trial courts retain
jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of
offenses committed by judges of the lower
courts. – Garcia v. Miro, G.R. No. 167409,
March 20, 2009
When to file administrative case against judges
• Now, the established doctrine and policy is
that disciplinary proceedings and criminal
actions against Judges are not
complementary or suppletory of, nor a
substitute for, these judicial remedies,
whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort
to and exhaustion of these judicial
remedies, as well as the entry of judgment
in the corresponding action or proceeding,
are pre-requisites for the taking of other
measures against the persons of the judges
concerned, whether of civil, administrative,
or criminal nature. It is only after the
available judicial remedies have been
exhausted and the appellate tribunals
 have spoken with finality, that the door to
an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or
administrative liability may be said to have
opened, or closed. - Bello III v. Judge Diaz,
AM-MTJ-00-1311. October 3, 2003
• Prosecution of the judge can be had only if
“there be a final declaration by a
competent court in some appropriate
proceeding of the manifestly unjust
character of the challenged judgment or
order, and also evidence of malice or bad
faith, ignorance of inexcusable negligence,
on the part of the judge in rendering said
judgment or order” or under the stringent
circumstances set out in Article 32 of the
Civil Code. – Bello III v. Judge Diaz, AM-
MTJ-00-1311. October 3, 2003
Anonymous complaint
• First, we clear the objection of respondent
judge that the letter-complaint should not
be given due course because it is only
anonymous. Section 1, Rule 140 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides that the
disciplinary proceedings against judges and
justices may be instituted under either of
three ways:
• 1. by the Supreme Court motu
proprio;
• 2. upon a verified complaint; or
• 3. upon an anonymous complaint,
supported by public records of indubitable
integrity.
• Re: Anonymous Complaint against Judge
Gedorio, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1955, May 25,
2007
Lack of verification is
only a formal defect
• As to the contention of respondent that the
Court should not have taken cognizance of
the complaint because the letter-complaint
was not verified, as required in Rule 139-B,
§1 of the Rules of Court on Disbarment and
Discipline of Attorneys, suffice it to say that
such constitutes only a formal defect and
does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court
over the subject matter of the complaint.
"The verification is merely a formal
requirement intended to secure an
assurance that matters which are alleged
are true and correct — the court may
simply order the correction of unverified
pleadings or act on it and waive strict
compliance with the rules in order that the
ends of justice may be served." (Fernandez
v. Atty. Novero Jr., A.C. No. 5394,
December 02, 2002)
Effect of retirement of respondent judge
• Respondent's retirement from office did not
render the present administrative case
moot and academic. Neither does it free
him from liability. (Lagcao v. Judge Gako,
A.M. RTJ-04-1840, August 2, 2007)
Death of respondent judge
• The dismissal of the administrative case
against Judge Butacan by reason of his
demise is in accordance with Bote v. Judge
Eduardo where the Court held that in view
of the death of Judge Escudero, for
humanitarian reasons, it is inappropriate to
impose any administrative liability of a
punitive nature; and declared the
administrative complaint against the
respondent Judge, dismissed, closed and
terminated. - RE: Application for
retirement/gratuity benefits xxx., A.M. No.
12535-ret., April 22, 2008
Judge also liable if court employee fraternized with
litigant
• Unfortunately, these standards were not
met by respondent Judge Alagar in this case
having tolerated unknowingly his
 employee to fraternize, receive or give
personal favors no matter how small, with
party litigants in a case pending before his
sala.
• Thus, while this Court finds the respondent
Judge to have acted with impartiality and
propriety in dealing with the complainants
in Criminal Case No. 4252 , we find fault on
his part in failing to supervise the conduct
and behavior of his court employee for the
latter’s improper use of his vehicle, to the
detriment of the court’s image. -
Balderama v. Judge Alagar, A.M. No. RTJ-
99-1449. January 18, 2002
Having lunch with counsel
• For respondent judge to eat lunch with
counsel is not wrong per se. The Canons,
however, provides that as much as possible
he should be scrupulously careful to avoid
any suspicion that his social or business or
friendly relationship is an element in
“determining his judicial course.” Knowing
that Atty. Verano, Jr., is counsel of the
petitioner in an annulment case pending
before him, the respondent judge should
have thought twice about joining counsel
for lunch, especially in the courtroom at
that. - Pertierra v. Judge Lerma, A.M. No.
RTJ-03-1799. September 12, 2003
Effect of reconciliation of the parties
• The subsequent reconciliation of the parties
to an administrative proceeding does not
strip the court of its jurisdiction to hear the
administrative case until its resolution.
Atonement, in administrative cases, merely
obliterates the personal injury of the parties
and does not extend to erase the offense
that may have been committed against the
public service. (Flores v. Judge Garcia, A.M.
No. MTJ-03-1499, October 6, 2008)
Conviction in a criminal case
• Evidence to support a conviction in a
criminal case is not necessary, and the
dismissal of the criminal case against the
respondent in an administrative case is not
a ground for the dismissal of the
administrative case.
• Conversely, conviction in the criminal case
will not automatically warrant a finding of
guilt in the administrative case. We
emphasize the well-settled rule that
criminal and civil cases are altogether
different from administrative matters, and
each must be disposed of according to the
facts and the law applicable to it. In other
words, the disposition in the first two will
not necessarily govern the third, and vice
versa. (Velasco v. Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles A.M. No. RTJ-05-1908, August 15,
2007)
Effect of resignation from office
• Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain
which was accepted by the Court without
prejudice does not render moot and
academic the instant administrative case.
The jurisdiction that the Court had at the
time of the filing of the administrative
complaint is not lost by the mere fact that
the respondent judge by his resignation and
its consequent acceptance – without
prejudice – by this Court, has ceased to be
in office during the pendency of this case.
The Court retains its authority to pronounce
the respondent official innocent or guilty of
the charges against him. A contrary rule
would be fraught with injustice and
pregnant with dreadful and dangerous
implications. (Non-disclosure before the JBC
of the administrative case filed against
Judge Jaime V. Quitain, JBC no. 013,
August 22, 2007)
Grounds for outright dismissal
 • Thus, in order for an administrative
complaint against a retiring judge or justice
to be dismissed outright, the following
requisites must concur:
(1) the complaint must have been filed within six
months from the compulsory retirement of the
judge or justice;
(2) the cause of action must have occurred at least a
year before such filing; and
(3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to
harass the respondent. (Miguel Colorado v. Judge
Ricardo M. Agapito, A.M. no. MTJ-06-1658, July 3,
2007)
Warning is not a penalty
• A warning, however, no matter how stern,
is not a penalty. - Rosauro M. Miranda v.
Judge Cesar A. Mangrobang, Sr., A.M. No.
RTJ-01-1665, November 29, 2001
Gross ignorance of the law
• To constitute gross ignorance of the law,
the subject decision, order or actuation of
the judge in the performance of his official
duties must not only be contrary to
existing law and jurisprudence but, most
importantly, he must be moved by bad
faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. In
the case before us, the administrative
complaint does not even allege that the
erroneous decision of respondent was thus
motivated. - Sps. Daracan v. Judge
Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447.
September 27, 2000
Rendering an unjust judgment
• Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is
both a criminal and an administrative
charge. As a crime, it is punished under Art.
204 of the Revised Penal Code the elements
of which are:
(a) the offender is a judge;
(b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him
for decision;
(c) the judgment is unjust; and
(d) the judge knows that his judgment is unjust.
• The gist of the offense therefore is that an
unjust judgment be rendered maliciously or
in bad faith, that is, knowing it to be unjust.
- Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No.
RTJ-99-1447. September 27, 2000
There is no liability at all for a mere error
• An unjust judgment is one which is contrary
to law or is not supported by evidence or
both. The source of an unjust judgment may
be error or ill-will. There is no liability at all
for a mere error. It is well-settled that a
judicial officer, when required to exercise
his judgment or discretion, is not liable
criminally for any error which he commits,
provided he acts in good faith.
• Bad faith is therefore the ground of
liability. If in rendering judgment the judge
fully knew that the same was unjust in the
sense aforesaid, then he acted maliciously
and must have been actuated and prevailed
upon by hatred, envy, revenge, greed or
some other similar motive. - Sps. Daracan
v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447.
September 27, 2000
• Mere error therefore in the interpretation
or application of the law does not
constitute the crime. - Sps. Daracan v.
Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447.
September 27, 2000
When good faith will not be applied
• We need not belabor jurisprudence to
accommodate respondent’s argument
which in effect posits that not every judicial
error bespeaks ignorance of the law and
that, if committed in good faith, does not
 warrant administrative sanction. So we
have ruled and so we have acted, but only
in cases within the parameters of tolerable
judgment.
• Where, however, the issues are so simple
and the facts so evident as to be beyond
permissible margins of error, to still err
thereon amounts to ignorance of the law
which, hopefully, was not merely feigned to
subserve an unworthy purpose. – Sps.
Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-
99-1447. September 27, 2000
Complaint for gross ignorance of the law is
impermissible if case is appealed
• The main issue for our resolution is whether
the instant administrative complaint for
gross ignorance of the law is permissible in
light of the filing by complainants of a
notice of appeal and a petition for
certiorari assailing respondent judge’s
decision and his order of execution.
• In the present case, the complainants filed
this administrative case against respondent
judge while their appeal and petition for
certiorari challenging his decision and
order were still pending with the RTC.
Following our settled pronouncements
cited above, the instant complaint is
impermissible. – Camacho v. Judge
Gatdula, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1252.
December 17, 2002
Period to decide or resolve the case submitted for
decision
• The 90-day period to decide or resolve the
case submitted for decision, fixed no less by
the Constitution, is a mandatory
requirement. Hence, non-compliance
thereof shall subject the erring judge to
administrative sanction as this Court may
deem appropriate.
• It is only in certain meritorious cases, i.e.,
those involving difficult questions of law or
complex issues or when the judge is
burdened by heavy caseloads, that a longer
period to decide may be allowed but only
upon proper application made with the
Supreme Court by the concerned judge.- Dr.
Seares v. Judge Salazar, A.M. No. MTJ-98-
1160 November 22, 2000
Judge attended the hearing of his brother
• Judge Dojillo “sat beside the counsel of his
brother” and “actively coached, aided,
assisted, and guided said counsel by now
and then saying something, handing piece
of writing, reminding, and or stopping the
counsel from manifesting something to the
court, and other similar acts.”
• Respondent, in his defense, stated that he
attended the hearing of his brother’s
election protest case just to give moral
support and, in the process, also observe
how election protest proceedings are
conducted. Although concern for family
members is deeply ingrained in the Filipino
culture, respondent, being a judge, should
bear in mind that he is also called upon to
serve the higher interest of preserving the
integrity of the entire judiciary. Canon 2 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a
judge to avoid not only impropriety but also
the mere appearance of impropriety in all
activities. - Vidal v. Judge Dojillo, Jr., A.M.
No. MTJ-05-1591. July 14, 2005
Judge is a heckler
• The regular session of a municipal council
was interrupted by a heckler in the
audience hurling various accusatory
remarks and insults at the council members.
The heckler is a judge, the incident, the
subject of this case.
• All told, Judge Malanyaon did not dispute
the facts as laid down by the complainants
 and the latter’s witnesses. He justified his
behavior though as the fulminations of a
righteously outraged citizen which
according to him should be segregated
from his function as a judge.
• Judge Malanyaon deserves to be taken to
task for his outrageous behavior as it clearly
violates the Code of Judicial Conduct. –
Hon. Decena v. Judge Malanyaon AM No.
RTJ-02-1669. April 14, 2004
No dichotomy of personality
• Thus, the Court has to dismiss outright
Judge Malanyaon’s suggestion that his
actions be evaluated as one of a taxpayer
or ordinary citizen and not as that of a
judge.
• In fact, his utterances were not made under
a cloak of anonymity, for the members of
the council, as well as some of the people in
the gallery knew very well that he was a
judge. It is highly probable that his
invectives took on a greater imperative on
the listeners precisely because he was a
judge, with all the authority attendant to
the office. -Hon. Decena v. Judge
Malanyaon AM No. RTJ-02-1669, April 14,
2004
Comment on Certiorari filed by public respondent
judge in behalf of private respondent
• Further, respondent judge, in signing and
filing a comment with the court on behalf
of one of the parties, engaged in the
private practice of law.
• Under Section 35, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court, and Rule 5.07 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, judges are prohibited from
engaging in the private practice of law.
• In filing such comment, respondent judge
violated the provision in the Revised Rules
of Court which provides:
“Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court
where the petition is pending, the public
respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or
comment to the petition or any pleading therein. If
either party elevates the case to a higher court, the
public respondents shall be included therein as
nominal parties. However, unless otherwise
specifically directed, they shall not appear or
participate in the proceedings therein. - Tuzon v.
Judge Cloribel-Purugganan, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1662
[2001]
Can the members of the Supreme Court be
removed from office only by impeachment?
• Justice Reyes maintains that Members of
the Court may be removed from office only
by impeachment. Since removal from office
is a disciplinary or administrative sanction,
it follows that there is no manner by which
a Justice of this Court may be disciplined for
acts done during his incumbency.
Considering that the power to impeach a
Justice of this Court is lodged in the
legislative branch of the government, the
Court is without authority to proceed
against and discipline its former Member.
He added that what constitutes
impeachable offenses is a purely political
question which the Constitution has left to
the sound discretion of the legislature, and
that the misconduct of leakage is not one of
the impeachable offenses. - In Re: Undated
Letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo, Petitioner in
Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, G.R.
No.179120A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC : August 11,
2009
• When Justice Reyes compulsorily retired
upon reaching the mandatory age of 70,
his perceived mantle of protection and
immunity, that the mode of his removal
from office can be done only through
impeachment, no longer exists. His duties
and responsibilities as a Justice having
ceased by reason of his retirement, he is
reverted to the status of a lawyer and,
 consequently, can be subjected to
appropriate sanctions for administrative
offenses, particularly, an act of misconduct.
The fact that the Investigating Committee,
created per Resolution dated December
10, 2008 of the Court, commenced the
investigation during the incumbency of
Justice Reyes is of no moment, as he was
then not yet a respondent in an
administrative matter against him. - In Re:
Undated Letter of Mr. Biraogo, Petitioner
in Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong,
G.R. No.179120 A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC :
August 11, 2009
Res ipsa loquitor
• Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the
Court may impose its authority upon erring
judges whose actuations, on their face,
would show gross incompetence, ignorance
of the law or misconduct. - Atty. Macalintal
v. Judge The, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1375.
October 16, 1997]
• In several cases, the Court has disciplined
lawyers without further inquiry or resort to
any formal investigation where the facts on
record sufficiently provided the basis for
the determination of their administrative
liability. – Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-
Buffe, A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC, August 19,
2009
• Court disbarred a lawyer without need of
any further investigation after considering
his actions based on records showing his
unethical misconduct. - In re: Complaint
against Atty. Asoy, Adm. Case No. 2655
July 9, 1987
• A trial-type hearing is not de riqueur. - In re:
Complaint against Atty. Asoy, Adm. Case
No. 2655 July 9, 1987
Quantum of evidence
• It is likewise a settled rule in administrative
proceedings that the burden of proving the
allegations in the complaint with
substantial evidence falls on the
complainant. - Bautista v. Justice
Abdulwahid A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J
[2006]
Quantum of evidence required for removal of judge
from office
• Jurisprudence dictates –
“The ground for the removal of a judicial officer
should be established beyond reasonable doubt.
Such is the rule where the charges on which the
removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful
neglect, corruption or incompetence. The general
rules with regard to admissibility of evidence in
criminal trials apply. - Jabon v. Judge Sibanah E.
Usman, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1713 [2005]
Acts of a collegial court
• It is also imperative to state that the
Resolution dated May 31, 2004 was not
rendered by Justice Abdulwahid alone, in
his individual capacity. The Court of Appeals
is a collegiate court whose members reach
their conclusions in consultation and
accordingly render their collective judgment
after due deliberation. Thus, we have held
that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground
that a collective decision is "unjust" cannot
prosper. Consequently, the filing of charges
against a single member of a division of
the appellate court is inappropriate. -
Bautista v. Justice Abdulwahid A.M. OCA
IPI No. 06-97-CA-J [2006]
• The act of a single member, though he may
be its head, done without the participation
of the others, cannot be considered the act
of the collegial body itself. – ASP Jamsani-
Rodriguez v. Justice Ong, et, al. A.M. No.
08-19-SB-J August 24, 2010
“Rendering knowingly unjust judgment" does not
apply to a collegial court
• Respondents should know that the
provisions of Article 204 of the Revised
Penal Code as to "rendering knowingly
unjust judgment" refer to an individual
judge who does so "in any case submitted
to him for decision" and even then, it is not
the prosecutor who would pass judgment
on the "unjustness" of the decision
rendered by him but the proper appellate
court with jurisdiction to review the same,
either the Court of Appeals and/or the
Supreme Court. Respondents should
likewise know that said penal article has no
application to the members of a collegiate
court such as this Court or its Divisions who
reach their conclusions in consultation and
accordingly render their collective judgment
after due deliberation. It also follows,
consequently, that a charge of violation of
the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act on
the ground that such a collective decision
is "unjust" cannot prosper. - Bautista v.
Justice Abdulwahid A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-
97-CA-J [2006]
Judge's conviction by the RTC does not necessarily
warrant her suspension
• The mere existence of pending criminal
charges against the respondent-lawyer
cannot be a ground for disbarment or
suspension of the latter. To hold otherwise
would open the door to harassment of
attorneys through the mere filing of
numerous criminal cases against them.
• By parity of reasoning, the fact of
respondent's conviction by the RTC does
not necessarily warrant her suspension.
We agree with respondent's argument that
since her conviction of the crime of child
abuse is currently on appeal before the CA,
the same has not yet attained finality. As
such, she still enjoys the constitutional
presumption of innocence. - Re: Conviction
of Judge Angeles A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC
January 31, 2008
Existence of a presumption indicating the guilt of
the accused does not in itself destroy the
constitutional presumption of innocence
• It must be remembered that the existence
of a presumption indicating the guilt of the
accused does not in itself destroy the
constitutional presumption of innocence
unless the inculpating presumption,
together with all the evidence, or the lack of
any evidence or explanation, proves the
accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Until the accused's guilt is shown in this
manner, the presumption of innocence
continues. - Re: Conviction of Judge
Angeles A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC January 31,
2008
Preventive suspension not applicable to judges
• Based on the foregoing disquisition, the
Court is of the resolve that, while it is true
that preventive suspension pendente lite
does not violate the right of the accused to
be presumed innocent as the same is not a
penalty, the rules on preventive
suspension of judges, not having been
expressly included in the Rules of Court,
are amorphous at best. – Re: Conviction of
Judge Angeles A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC
January 31, 2008
Preventive suspension for erring lawyer
• Rule 139-B Sec. 15. Suspension of attorneys
by Supreme Court. - After receipt of
respondent's answer or lapse of the period
therefor, the Supreme Court, motu proprio,
or at the instance of the IBP Board of
Governors upon the recommendation of the
Investigator, may suspend an attorney
from the practice of his profession for any
of the causes specified in Rule 138, Section
27, during the pendency of the
 investigation until such suspension is lifted certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the
by the Supreme Court. Constitution. Precisely the same situation
exists in respect of the Ombudsman and his
Collegial court needs to deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Article
act as one body XI [2], Id.), a majority of the members of the
Commission on Elections (Article IX [C] [1]
• Respondent Justices contend that they
[1] in relation to Article XI [2], id.), and the
preserved the collegiality of the Fourth
members of the Commission on audit who
Division despite their having separately
are not certified public accountants (Article
conducted hearings, considering that the
XI [D] [1] [1], id.), all of whom are
three of them were in the same venue and
constitutionally required to be members of
were acting within hearing and
the Philippine Bar. – Cuenco v. Hon.
communicating distance of one another.
Marcelo B. Fernan, A.M. No. 3135 February
• The information and evidence upon which 17, 1988
the Fourth Division would base any
decisions or other judicial actions in the
cases tried before it must be made directly
available to each and every one of its
members during the proceedings. This
necessitates the equal and full participation
of each member in the trial and
adjudication of their cases. It is simply not
enough, therefore, that the three
members of the Fourth Division were
within hearing and communicating
distance of one another at the hearings in
question, as they explained in hindsight,
because even in those circumstances not all
of them sat together in session. - ASP
Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justice Ong, et, al.
A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J August 24, 2010

• There is another reason why the complaint

for disbarment here must be dismissed.
Members of the Supreme Court must,
under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution,
be members of the Philippine Bar and may
be removed from office only by
impeachment (Article XI [2], Constitution).
To grant a complaint for disbarment of a
Member of the Court during the Member's
incumbency, would in effect be to
circumvent and hence to ran afoul of the
constitutional mandate that Members of
the Court may be removed from office only
by impeachment for and conviction of