The Diocese of Bacolod vs.

Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 205728 July 5, 2016
J.: LEONEN,

Facts:

First, respondents reiterate that the assailed notice and letter are not final orders by the
Commission on Elections En Banc in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, thus, not
subject to this Court’s review.4 Respondents contend that they merely implemented the law
when they issued the assailed notice and letter. These are reviewable not by this Court but by
the Commission on Elections pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution on its
power to decide “all questions affecting elections.”5 There are also remedies under Rule 34 of
the Commission on Elections Rules of Procedure on preliminary investigation for election
offenses. Respondents, thus, submit that petitioners violated the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

Second, respondents submit that the tarpaulin is election propaganda that the Commission on
Elections may regulate.7 The tarpaulin falls under the definition of election propaganda under
Section 1.4 of Commission on Elections Resolution No. 9615 for three reasons. First, it
“contains the names of the candidates and party-list groups who voted for or against the RH
Law.”8 Second, “the check mark on ‘Team Buhay’ and the cross mark on ‘Team Patay’ clearly
suggests that those belonging to ‘Team Buhay’ should be voted while those under ‘Team Patay’
should be rejected during the May 13, 2013 elections.”9 Lastly, petitioners posted the tarpaulin
on the cathedral’s facade to draw attention.10

Respondents argue that the “IBASURA RH Law” tarpaulin would have sufficed if opposition to
the law was petitioners’ only objective. They submit that petitioners “infused their political
speech with election propaganda which may be regulated by the COMELEC.”11 They further
submit that it is immaterial that the posting was not “in return for consideration” by any candidate
or political party since the definition of election propaganda does not specify by whom it is
posted.12 Respondents then discuss the history of the size limitation by mentioning all previous
laws providing for a 2’ by 3’ size limit for posters.13 According to respondents, petitioners raised
violation of freedom of expression and did not question the soundness of this size limitation.14
Petitioners even cut the tarpaulin in half, thus confirming that the tarpaulin is election
propaganda.

Issues:

Whether the petition be granted.

Held:

The urgency posed by the circumstances during respondents’ issuance of the assailed notice
and letter — the then issue on the RH Law as well as the then upcoming elections — also

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rendered compliance with the doctrine on exhaustion of administrative remedies as
unreasonable.

All these circumstances surrounding this case led to this Court’s pro hac vice ruling to allow due
course to the Petition.

The other arguments have also been considered and thoroughly addressed in our Decision.

This Court’s Decision discussed that the tarpaulin consists of satire of political parties that
“primarily advocates a stand on a social issue; only secondarily — even almost incidentally —
will cause the election or nonelection of a candidate.”34 It is not election propaganda as its
messages are different from the usual declarative messages of candidates. The tarpaulin is an
expression with political consequences, and “[t]his court’s construction of the guarantee of
freedom of expression has always been wary of censorship or subsequent punishment that
entails evaluation of the speaker’s viewpoint or the content of one’s speech.”35

We recognize that there can be a type of speech by private citizens amounting to election
paraphernalia that can be validly regulated.36 However, this is not the situation in this case. The
twin tarpaulins consist of a social advocacy, and the regulation, if applied in this case, fails the
reasonability test.37

Lastly, the regulation is content-based. The Decision discussed that “[t]he form of expression is
just as important as the information conveyed that it forms part of the expression[,]”38 and size
does matter.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY.

___________________________________________________________________________

Verceles, Jr. vs. Commission on Audit

GR No. 211553, September 13, 2016
BRION, J.:

Facts:

The Provincial Government of Catanduanes (the province), represented by then Governor

Leandro B. Verceles, Jr. (Verceles), engaged the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) to carry out the province's tree seedlings production project (the
project).[4] The province and PENRO entered into several Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) to
implement the project.[5]

On June 11, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP), through Resolution No. 067-2001,
gave blanket authority to the governor to enter into contracts on behalf of the province. [6] The SP
reaffirmed the authority given to the governor through Resolution Nos. 068-2001 and 069-

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2001.[7] On the same date, the SP also resolved to give the governor the power to realign,
revise, or modify items in the provincial budget.[8]

The cost of the project was allegedly paid out of the Economic Development Fund (EDF)
allocation in the provincial budget for calendar years (CY) 2001 and 2002.[9] The EDF is the
20% portion of the province's internal revenue allotment (IRA) required by law to be spent on
development projects.[10]

On October 12, 2001, the SP issued Resolution No. 104-A-2001,[12] which effectively revoked
the blanket authority given to the governor to enter into contracts on behalf of the Province. [13]

On February 4, 2003, the COA Audit Team Leader issued an Audit Observation
Memorandum (AOM), finding that Verceles should have sought prior authority from the SP
pursuant to Sections 22 (c)[14] and 465 (b) (1) (vi)[15] of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local
Government Code (LGC) before executing any MOA after the issuance of Resolution No. 104-
A-2001.[16]

Verceles filed his comments. The Audit Team Leader forwarded the AOM to the COA Regional
Office.[17] The Regional Office affirmed the AOM and issued Notices of Disallowance in the total
amount of P7,528,175.46.[18]

Verceles moved but failed to obtain reconsideration of the Notices of Disallowance. The Legal
and Adjudication Office also denied his appeal and motion for reconsideration. Verceles
elevated the case to the COA proper (national office) to challenge the disallowed payments. [19]

In his petition[20] before the COA, Verceles mainly argued that the payments for the project were
covered by appropriations under the EDF allocation of the provincial budget for CYs 2001 and
2002.[21] Verceles argued that the local chief executive need not secure express or specific
authorization from the SP as long as a budget for a contract is already appropriated. He claimed
that the first and third MOAs were funded by the EDF allocation in the CYs 2001 and 2002
budgets, and that, the second, fourth, and fifth MOAs were funded by valid augmentations from
other items also under the EDF allocation.

Issues:

The issue is whether the COA gravely abused its discretion when it disallowed the payments for
the questioned MOAs and held Verceles[53] liable for the amount disallowed.

Held:

Notwithstanding the number of arguments raised by the parties, the Court focuses its attention
on two concepts decisive in the resolution of the present case: (1) the authority of the governor
as the local chief executive to enter into contracts on behalf of the province; and (2) the power
of the governor to augment items in the provincial budget.

3|Page
Section 16 of the LGC, also known as the general welfare clause, empowers the local
government units (LGUs) to act for the benefit of their constituents. The LGUs exercise powers
that are: (1) expressly granted; (2) necessarily implied from the power that is expressly granted;
(3) necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance; and (4)
essential to the promotion of the general welfare of the inhabitants.[54]

As the chief executive of the province, the governor exercises powers and performs duties and
functions that the LGC and other pertinent laws provide.[55] These include the power to enter into
contracts on behalf of the province.

In support of their competing claims, it is notable that both Verceles and the COA invoke the
same provisions of the LGC: Section 22 (c)and Section 465 (b) (1) (vi).

Section 22 (c) of the LGC provides that "[u]nless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract
may be entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of the local government unit without
prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned."

Section 465 (b) (1) (vi) of the LGC, on the other hand, states that ". . . the Chief Executive . . .
[shall] [r]epresent the province in all its business transactions and sign in its behalf all bonds,
contracts, and obligations, and such other documents upon authority of the sangguniang
panlalawigan or pursuant to law or ordinance."

Verceles insists that the subject MOAs were duly authorized because they were covered by the
provincial annual budget for CYs 2001 and 2002. The COA refutes this claim on the grounds
that: (1) the ordinances did not specifically authorize Verceles to execute the MOAs with the
PENRO; and (2) the CY 2003 appropriation ordinance, which supposedly ratified the
augmentations made by Verceles in 2001 and 2002, could not have retroactive application.

___________________________________________________________________________

People vs. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division

G.R. Nos. 199151-56 July 25, 2016
J.: PERALTA,

Facts:

Sometime on December 28, 1994, a letter-complaint was filed by one Carmelita U. Ramirez
before the Office of the Ombudsman for the Military and other Law Enforcement Officers
(MOLEO) alleging, among others, that private respondents conspired and defrauded the
government in the amount of Eighty-Nine Million Pesos (P89M) through ghost deliveries.3 The
complaint prompted the MOLEO to immediately conduct a fact-finding investigation. It

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discovered that a similar fact-finding body within the Philippine Air Force, more particularly the
Office of the Inspector General (OTIG), found that based on the audit of the AFP’s Program and
Evaluation and Management Analysis Division (PEMRAD), Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Comptrollership OJ6, there were ghost deliveries of assorted supplies and materials at the
5th Fighter Wing Basa Air Base amounting to P24,430,029.00 and unaccounted supplies and
materials worth P42,592,257.

In view of the unjustified length of time miring the Office of the Ombudsman’s resolution of the
case, as well as the concomitant prejudice that the delay in this case has caused, it is
undeniable that respondent’s constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases
had been violated. As the institutional vanguard against corruption and bureaucracy, the Office
of the Ombudsman should create a system of accountability in order to ensure that cases
before it are resolved with reasonable dispatch and to equally expose those who are
responsible for its delays, as it ought to determine in this case.55

As to the reason advanced by the petitioner that in the year 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman
was in the midst of transferring to its new building in Agham Road, Quezon City, it must be
noted that the first Resolution was approved by then Ombudsman Desierto in 1998, while
transfer of office occurred in 2001. A period of three (3) years, from 1998 to 2001, is ample time
to review the case which started way back in 1994.

Petitioner also avers in its petition that there was the “inexplicable loss of the main folder” which
deterred the prosecution of the cases as mentioned in the MOLEO Memorandum dated July 7,
2005 recommending “thorough review and re-evaluation of the case.”56 It must be noted that as
early as January 12, 1999, the records were subjected to a re-evaluation by the MOLEO.57 Yet,
there was no showing or any statement that efforts were exerted to locate the alleged lost
folder.

Issues:

Whether there was a violation of the right of the private respondents to speedy disposition of
their cases.

Held:

The right to speedy disposition right is enshrined in Article III of the Constitution, which declares:
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. The constitutional right is not limited to the
accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or
administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. In this
accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious action from all officials who are tasked
with the administration of justice. This right, however, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.

5|Page
As pointed out by respondent Gadin in his Comment, the delay of fifteen (15) years in the filing
of the Informations impair his ability to adequately defend himself for the reason that the
witnesses who could testify on the processes and procedures in the PAF Finance Service Units
at the time the alleged offenses were committed may no longer be found or available.

Lastly, the contention is that the State cannot be bound by the mistakes committed by the public
officers involved in the review of the case and that the right of the State to prosecute erring
officers involved in this P89 Million-Peso Fiasco cannot be prejudiced. We should take note that
equally true is the constitutional right of the respondents to the speedy disposition of cases and
the constitutional mandate for the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints.65 The
Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases was intended to
stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in the administration of justice by our judicial
and quasi-judicial tribunals.66 The adjudication of cases must not only be done in an orderly
manner that is in accord with the established rules of procedure but must also be promptly
decided to better serve the ends of justice. Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders
the rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations inutile.67

All told, the criminal complaints were correctly dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay of
fifteen (15) years amounting to a transgression of the right to a speedy disposition of cases and
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion.

___________________________________________________________________________

Oyster Plaza Hotel vs. Melivo

G.R. No. 217455 October 5, 2016
J.: MENDOZA,

Facts:

On October 22, 2009, respondent Errol O. Melivo (Melivo) filed before the NLRC a Complaint4
for illegal dismissal with prayers for reinstatement and payment of backwages, holiday pay,
overtime pay, service incentive leave, and, 13th month pay against petitioners Oyster Plaza
Hotel (Oyster Plaza), Rolito Go (Go), and Jennifer Ampel (Ampel).

The Summons,5 dated October 26, 2009, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on
the petitioners thru registered mail. The said summons ordered the petitioners to appear before
the Labor Arbiter (LA) for mandatory conciliation/mediation conferences on November 23, 2009
and December 1, 2009. The registry return receipt,6 dated November 27, 2009, showed that the
summons and the copy of the complaint were duly served. The petitioners, however, failed to
appear during the scheduled conferences. Thereafter, the case was set for formal hearing on
January 14, 2010 and a notice of hearing7 was sent to the petitioners, requiring them to appear
before the LA and file their position paper, with a warning that failure to appear therein would be
construed as a waiver of the opportunity to be heard. The notice, however, was returned

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unserved as there was no one to receive the same.8 The formal hearing was, thus, reset to
February 17, 2010, and a notice of hearing9 was again sent to the petitioners, wherein they
were reminded to file their position paper. The registry return receipt10 showed that the said
notice was received by a certain Charlie Miraña (Miraña) on January 25, 2010. At the February
17, 2010 hearing, however, only Melivo appeared.

Issues:

Whether or not the petitioners were deprived of their right to due process of law as they were
not properly served with summons.

Held:

In quasi-judicial proceedings before the NLRC and its arbitration branch, procedural rules
governing service of summons are not strictly construed. Substantial compliance thereof is
sufficient. The constitutional requirement of due process with respect to service of summons
only exacts that the service of summons be such as may reasonably be expected to give the
notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules reasonably accomplishes that end, the
requirement of justice is answered, the traditional notion of fair play is satisfied, and due process
is served.

Similarly, in this case, the summons and notices were served by registered mail at the
petitioners’ place of business. Thus, the person who received the same was presumed
authorized to do so. Consequently, the summons and notices were presumed to be duly served.
The burden of proving the irregularity in the service of summons and notices, if any, is on the
part of the petitioners. In this case, the petitioners clearly failed to discharge that burden.

Further, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is the absolute absence of the
opportunity to be heard; hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been
afforded the opportunity to present his side.31

The Court notes that even though the petitioners failed to participate in the proceedings before
the LA, they were able to argue their case before the NLRC. The petitioners, through their
pleadings, were able to argue their position and submit evidence in support of their position that
they did not receive the summons and notices from the LA; and that Melivo was not illegally
dismissed.

Evidently, the petitioners’ contention that they were denied due process is devoid of any merit.

7|Page
___________________________________________________________________________

Saturnino C. Ocampo, et al. v. Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez, et al.

G.R. No. 225973, 8 November 2016,

Peralta, J.:

Facts:

On August 7, 2016, Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a memorandum

to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo R. Visaya,
regarding the interment of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani
(LNMB), in compliance with the verbal order of President Duterte to fulfill his election campaign
promise to that effect. On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued the
corresponding directives to the Philippine Army Commanding General. Dissatisfied with the
foregoing issuance, various parties filed several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, essentially arguing that the decision to have the remains of former President
Marcos interred at the LNMB violated various laws; that Marcos is not entitled to be interred at
the LNMB; and that the Marcos family has already waived such burial.

Issues:

Did the issuance of the assailed memorandum and directive violate the Constitution, domestic
and international laws?

Held:

NO, the assailed memorandum and directive, being the President’s decision, to bury Marcos at
the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, domestic and international laws. 1987
Constitution Ocampo, et al. invoked Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II; Sec. 17 of
Art. VII, Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV; Sec. 1 of Art. XI; and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constitution.
While the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety should not be
interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely related to the Martial
Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB. Tañada v. Angara already ruled
that the provisions in Article II of the Constitution are not selfexecuting. The reasons for denying
a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles are sourced from
basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade “into the uncharted
ocean of social and economic policy making.” In the same vein, Sec. 1 of Art. XI of the
Constitution is not a self-executing provision. The Court also found the reliance on Sec. 3(2) of
Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constitution to be misplaced, with such provisions
bearing no direct or indirect prohibition to Marcos’ interment at the LNMB. The Court also found
no the legislative will not to pursue, at the moment, the establishment of a singular interment
place for the mortal remains of all Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes, and patriots.
Even if the Court treats R.A. No. 289 as relevant to the issue, still, Ocampo, et al.'s allegations
must fail. To apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the "decent and the brave"

8|Page
or "hero" would be violative of public policy as it will put into question the validity of the burial of
each and every mortal remains resting therein, and infringe upon the principle of separation of
powers since the allocation of plots at the LNMB is based on the grant of authority to the
President under existing laws and regulations. RA No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims
Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013) Ocampo, et al. also invoked RA 10368, modifiying
AFP Regulations G-161-375, which they interpreted as implicitly disqualifying Marcos’ burial at
the LNMB because the legislature, a co-equal branch of the government, has statutorily
declared his tyranny as a deposed dictator and has recognized the heroism and sacrifices of the
Human Rights Violations Victims (HRVVs). International Human Rights Laws Ocampo, et al.
argued that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB will violate the rights of the HRVVs to “full” and
“effective” reparation, provided under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, and the Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and
Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity. When the Filipinos regained
their democratic institutions after the successful People Power Revolution that culminated on
February 25, 1986, the three branches of the government have done their fair share to respect,
protect and fulfill the country's human rights obligations. The 1987 Constitution contains
provisions that promote and protect human rights and social justice. As to judicial remedies,
aside from the writs of habeas corpus, amparo, and habeas data, the Supreme Court
promulgated AO No. 25-2007, which provides rules on cases involving extra-judicial killings of
political ideologists and members of the media. On the part of the Executive Branch, it issued a
number of administrative and executive orders. Congress has passed several laws affecting
human rights. Contrary to Ocampo, et al.’s postulation, our nation's history will not be instantly
revised by a single resolve of President Duterte, acting through the Enriquez, et al., to bury
Marcos at the LNMB. Whether Ocampo, et al. admit it or not, the lessons of Martial Law are
already engraved, albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts and minds of the present generation
of Filipinos. As to the unborn, it must be said that the preservation and popularization of our
history is not the sole responsibility of the Chief Executive; it is a joint and collective endeavor of
every freedom-loving citizen of this country. violation of President Duterte’s mandate under Sec.
17, Art. VII of the Constitution to take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the
law. RA No. 289 (An Act Providing For the Construction of A National Pantheon for Presidents
of the Philippines, National Heroes and Patriots of the Country) Ocampo, et al. also invoked RA
289, which authorized the construction of a National Pantheon as the burial place of the mortal
remains of all the Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes and patriots, as well as a Board
on National Pantheon to implement the said law. Ocampo, et al. are mistaken. Both in their
pleadings and during the oral arguments, they miserably failed to provide legal and historical
bases as to their supposition that the LNMB and the National Pantheon are one and the same.
To date, the Congress has deemed it wise not to appropriate any funds for its construction or
the creation of the Board on National Pantheon. This is indicative of

9|Page
___________________________________________________________________________

Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association

August 16, 2016 G.R. No. 189185.
J.: BERSAMIN,

Facts:

City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte approved the ordinance on February 9, 2007.3 The ordinance took
effect on March 23, 2007 after its publication in the newspaper Mindanao Pioneer.4 Pursuant to
Section 5 of the ordinance, the ban against aerial spraying would be strictly enforced three
months thereafter.

The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members,
namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation
(PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance,
and to seek the issuance of provisional reliefs through a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary injunction.5 They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the
unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal protection clause; amounted to the
confiscation of property without due process of law; and lacked publication pursuant] to Section
5116 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code). .

On May 8, 2007, the residents living within and adjacent to banana plantations in Davao City led
by Wilfredo Mosqueda,7 joined by other residents of Davao City,8 (Mosqueda, et al.) submitted
their Motion for Leave to Intervene and Opposition to the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction.9
The RTC granted their motion on June 4, 2007.10

Issues:

Whether or not the court of appeals ignored fundamental precepts and concepts of law which,
properly considered, necessarily lead to the conclusion that the davao ordinance is
constitutional and valid.

Held:

The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of protecting the public and
the environment against the harmful effects of aerial spraying, on one hand, and the imposition
of the ban against aerial spraying of all forms of substances, on the other. It ruled that the
maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone within and around the agricultural plantations under
Section 6 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 constituted taking of property without due process because
the landowners were thereby compelled to cede portions of their property without just
compensation; that the exercise of police power to require the buffer zone was invalid because
there was no finding that the 30-meter surrounding belt was obnoxious to the public welfare;

10 | P a g e
and that, accordingly, Ordinance No. 0309-07 was unconstitutional because of the absence of a
separability clause.

The respondents challenge Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 for being unreasonable and
oppressive in that it sets the effectivity of the ban at three months after publication of the
ordinance. They allege that three months will be inadequate time to shift from aerial to truck-
mounted boom spraying, and effectively deprives them of efficient means to combat the Black
Sigatoka disease.

The petitioners counter that the period is justified considering the urgency of protecting the
health of the residents.

We find for the respondents.

The impossibility of carrying out a shift to another mode of pesticide application within three
months can readily be appreciated given the vast area of the affected plantations and the
corresponding resources required therefor. To recall, even the RTC recognized the
impracticality of attaining a full shift to other modes of spraying within three months in view of
the costly financial and civil works required for the conversion. Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana
Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., 800 SCRA 313, G.R. No. 189185, G.R. No. 189305
August 16, 2016At issue in this petition is Section 24 of R.A. No. 8562, which directs that “[a]ll
parcels of land belonging to the government occupied by the [MLLSAT] and the [BCC] are
hereby declared to be the property of the [BPSC] and shall be titled under that name.” There is
no dispute that the Congress has expressly intended to entrust to BPSC the titles to the subject
lots. Being the sole beneficiary of Section 24 of R.A. No. 8562, BPSC is the real party-in-
interest, and is entitled to mandamus to enforce its right thereunder.

___________________________________________________________________________

Intellectual Property Association of the Philippines vs. Ochoa

G.R. No. 204605, July 19, 2016

BERSAMIN, J.:

Facts:

On August 7, 2016, Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a memorandum

to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo R. Visaya,
regarding the interment of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani
(LNMB), in compliance with the verbal order of President Duterte to fulfill his election campaign
promise to that effect. On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued the
corresponding directives to the Philippine Army Commanding General. Dissatisfied with the
foregoing issuance, various parties filed several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, essentially arguing that the decision to have the remains of former President

11 | P a g e
Marcos interred at the LNMB violated various laws; that Marcos is not entitled to be interred at
the LNMB; and that the Marcos family has already waived such burial.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the IP AP has locus standi to challenge the President's ratification of
the Madrid Protocol; and

2. Whether or not the President's ratification of the Madrid Protocol is valid and
constitutional;

Held:

1. The IPAP argues in its reply19 that it has the locus standi to file the present case by
virtue of its being an association whose members stand to be injured as a result of the
enforcement of the Madrid Protocol in the Philippines; that the injury pertains to the
acceptance and approval of applications submitted through the Madrid Protocol without
local representation as required by Section 125 of the IP Code;20 and that such will
diminish the rights granted by the IP Code to Intellectual Property Law practitioners like
the members of the IPAP.21

The argument of the IPAP is untenable.

Nonetheless, the IPAP also emphasizes that the paramount public interest involved
has transcendental importance because its petition asserts that the Executive
Department has overstepped the bounds of its authority by thereby cutting into
another branch's functions and responsibilities.27 The assertion of the IPAP may be
valid on this score. There is little question that the issues raised herein against the
implementation of the Madrid Protocol are of transcendental importance.
Accordingly, we recognize IPAP's locus standi to bring the present challenge.
Indeed, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude towards locus standi whenever the
issue presented for consideration has transcendental significance to the people, or
whenever the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public.

2. Before going further, we have to distinguish between treaties and international

agreements, which require the Senate's concurrence, on one hand, and executive agreements,
which may be validly entered into without the Senate's concurrence. Executive Order No. 459,
Series of 1997,30 notes the following definitions, to wit:

Sec. 2. Definition of Terms.

a. International agreement - shall refer to a contract or understanding,

regardless of nomenclature, entered into between the Philippines and another
government in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied
in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments.

12 | P a g e
 b. Treaties - international agreements entered into by the Philippines which
require legislative concurrence after executive ratification. This term may include
compacts like conventions, declarations, covenants and acts.

c. Executive Agreements - similar to treaties except that they do not require

legislative concurrence.

The Court has highlighted the difference between treaties and executive agreements
in Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading,31 thusly:

International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and

those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the
form of treaties. But international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying
out well-established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of
a more or less temporary nature usually take the form of executive agreements.

In the Philippines, the DFA, by virtue of Section 9, Executive Order No. 459,32 is initially
given the power to determine whether an agreement is to be treated as a treaty or as an
executive agreement. To determine the issue of whether DFA Secretary Del Rosario
gravely abused his discretion in making his determination relative to the Madrid
Protocol, we review the jurisprudence on the nature of executive agreements, as well as
the subject matters to be covered by executive agreements.

In view of the expression of state policy having been made by the Congress itself, the
IPAP is plainly mistaken in asserting that "there was no Congressional act that
authorized the accession of the Philippines to the Madrid Protocol."34

Accordingly, DFA Secretary Del Rosario’s determination and treatment of the Madrid
Protocol as an executive agreement; being in apparent contemplation of the express
state policies on intellectual property as well as within his power under Executive Order
No. 459, are upheld. We observe at this point that there are no hard and fast rules on
the propriety of entering into a treaty or an executive agreement on a given subject as an
instrument of international relations. The primary consideration in the choice of the form
of agreement is the parties' intent and desire to craft their international agreement in the
form they so wish to further their respective interests. The matter of form takes a back
seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or
an executive agreement; inasmuch as all the parties; regardless of the form, become
obliged to comply conformably with the time-honored principle of pacta sunt
servanda.35The principle binds the parties to perform in good faith their parts in the
agreements.36

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___________________________________________________________________________

Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)

July 12, 2016 G.R. No. 213847.
J.: BERSAMIN,

Facts:

The People argue that the decision is inconsonant with deeply-embedded constitutional
principles on the right to bail; that the express and unambiguous intent of the 1987 Constitution
is to place persons accused of crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua on a different plane,
and make their availment of bail a matter of judicial discretion, not a matter of right, only upon a
showing that evidence of their guilt is not strong; and that the Court should have proceeded
from the general proposition that the petitioner had no right to bail because he does not stand
on equal footing with those accused of less grave crimes.

The People contend that the grant of provisional liberty to a person charged with a grave crime
cannot be predicated solely on the assurance that he will appear in court, but should also
consider whether he will endanger other important interests of the State, the probability of him
repeating the crime committed, and how his temporary liberty can affect the prosecution of his
case; that the petitioner’s fragile state of health does not present a compelling justification for his
admission to bail; that age and health considerations are relevant only in fixing the amount of
bail; and that even so, his age and health condition were never raised or litigated in the
Sandiganbayan because he had merely filed thereat a Motion to Fix Bail and did not thereby
actually apply for bail.

Lastly, the People observe that the decision specially accommodated the petitioner, and thus
accorded him preferential treatment that is not ordinarily enjoyed by persons similarly situated.

Issues:

Whether or not Senator Enrile be granted for bail.

Held:

The Court has taken into consideration other circumstances, such as his advanced age and
poor health, his past and present disposition of respect for the legal processes, the length of his
public service, and his individual public and private reputation.7 There was really no reasonable
way for the Court to deny bail to him simply because his situation of being 92 years of age when
he was first charged for the very serious crime in court was quite unique and very rare. To
ignore his advanced age and unstable health condition in order to deny his right to bail on the
basis alone of the judicial discretion to deny bail would be probably unjust. To equate his
situation with that of the other accused indicted for a similarly serious offense would be
inherently wrong when other conditions significantly differentiating his situation from that of the
latter’s unquestionably existed.

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Admission to bail always involves the risk that the accused will take flight.14 This is the reason
precisely why the probability or the improbability of flight is an important factor to be taken into
consideration in granting or denying bail, even in capital cases. The exception to the
fundamental right to bail should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of the probability of
evasion of prosecution. Apparently, an accused’s official and social standing and his other
personal circumstances are considered and appreciated as tending to render his flight
improbable.15

The petitioner has proven with more than sufficient evidence that he would not be a flight risk.
For one, his advanced age and fragile state of health have minimized the likelihood that he
would make himself scarce and escape from the jurisdiction of our courts. The testimony of Dr.
Jose C. Gonzales, Director of the Philippine General Hospital, showed that the petitioner was a
geriatric patient suffering from various medical conditions,16 which, singly or collectively, could
pose significant risks to his life. The medical findings and opinions have been uncontested by
the Prosecution even in their present Motion for Reconsideration.

___________________________________________________________________________

Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bataan vs. Garcia, Jr.

October 5, 2016 G.R. No. 174964.
J.: REYES,

Facts:

Lot Nos. 2193 and 2194 of the Bataan Cadastre, containing 1,222 square meters and 10,598
sq. m., respectively, were registered in the name of the Province of Bataan. Both lots were
embraced in Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. N-182, and occupied by the Bataan
Community Colleges (BCC) and the Medina Lacson de Leon School of Arts and Trades
(MLLSAT), both State-run schools.3

On February 26, 1998, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8562,
authored by Congressman Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. (Cong. Garcia), converting the MLLSAT into a
polytechnic college, to be known as the Bataan Polytechnic State College (BPSC), and
integrating thereto the BCC.4 Section 24 of R.A. No. 8562 provides that:

All parcels of land belonging to the government occupied by the Medina Lacson de Leon School
of Arts and Trades and the Bataan Community Colleges are hereby declared to be the property
of the Bataan Polytechnic State College and shall be titled under that name: Provided, That
should the State College cease to exist or be abolished or should such parcels of land
aforementioned be no longer needed by the State College, the same shall revert to the Province
of Bataan.

The Governor and the petitioner appealed to the CA alleging that the subject lots were the
patrimonial properties of the Province of Bataan, and as such they cannot be taken by the

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National Government without due process of law and without just compensation. They also
pointed out that certain loan obligations of the Province of Bataan to the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) were secured with a mortgage on the lots; and since the mortgage lien was
duly annotated on its title, OCT No. N-182, the writ of mandamus violated the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution. The Governor and the petitioner reiterated that the respondents had
no legal standing since they were not the real parties-in-interest.9

In the Decision10 dated February 7, 2006, the CA affirmed the RTC.

The CA rejected the claim that the subject lots were the patrimonial properties of the Province of
Bataan, declaring that the petitioner failed to provide proof that the Province of Bataan acquired
them with its own private or corporate funds, and for this reason the lots must be presumed to
belong to the State, citing Salas, et al. v. Hon. Jarencio, et al.11 Concerning the mortgage to the
LBP, the appellate court agreed with the RTC that the consent of the LBP to the transfer of title
to BPSC must be obtained, and the mortgage lien must be carried over to the new title. The CA
also held that BPSC is a real party-in-interest on the basis of Section 24 of R.A. No. 8562, and
was correctly impleaded as a co-petitioner. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was
denied in the CA Resolution12 dated September 20, 2006; hence, this petition. Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Bataan vs. Garcia, Jr., 804 SCRA 629, G.R. No. 174964 October 5, 2016

Issues:

Whether Or Not A Writ Of Mandamus May Be Issued Against The Petitioner To Compel The
Transfer Of The Subject Properties Without Due Process Of Law And Without Just
Compensation

Held:

Section 3, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a writ of mandamus shall
issue where a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty, to command the respondent to do the act
required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner. Herein petitioner has argued that the
mandamus applicants are not entitled thereto because they are not real parties-in-interest. It is a
rule reechoed in a long line of cases that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest, meaning “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”

At issue in this petition is Section 24 of R.A. No. 8562, which directs that “[a]ll parcels of land
belonging to the government occupied by the [MLLSAT] and the [BCC] are hereby declared to
be the property of the [BPSC] and shall be titled under that name.” There is no dispute that the
Congress has expressly intended to entrust to BPSC the titles to the subject lots. Being the sole
beneficiary of Section 24 of R.A. No. 8562, BPSC is the real party-in-interest, and is entitled to
mandamus to enforce its right thereunder.

___________________________________________________________________________

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 Agdao Landless Residents Association, Inc. vs. Maramion
G.R. Nos. 188642 & October 17, 2016 189425.
J.: JARDELEZA,
Facts:

Dakudao & Sons, Inc. (Dakudao) executed six Deeds of Donation8 in favor of ALRAI covering
46 titled lots (donated lots).9 One Deed of Donation10 prohibits ALRAI, as donee, from
partitioning or distributing individual certificates of title of the donated lots to its members, within
a period of five years from execution, unless a written authority is secured from Dakudao. 11 A
violation of the prohibition will render the donation void, and title to and possession of the
donated lot will revert to Dakudao.12 The other five Deeds of Donation do not provide for the
five-year restriction.

Respondents filed a Complaint15 against petitioners. Respondents alleged that petitioners

expelled them as members of ALRAI, and that petitioners are abusing their powers as
officers.16 Respondents further alleged that petitioners were engaged in the following
anomalous and illegal acts: (1) requiring ALRAI's members to pay exorbitant arrear fees when
ALRAI's By-Laws only set membership dues at P1.00 per month;17 (2) partially distributing the
lands donated by Dakudao to some officers of ALRAI and to some non-members in violation of
the Deeds of Donation;18 (3) illegally expelling them as members of ALRAI without due
process;19 and (4) being unable to show the books of accounts of ALRAI.20 They also alleged
that Loy (who bought one of the donated lots from Alcantara) was a buyer in bad faith, having
been aware of the status of the land when she bought it.

Both Loy and petitioners filed separate appeals with the CA. Loy's appeal was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 01858;35 while petitioners' appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 1861.36 In its
Resolution37 dated October 19, 2007, the CA ordered the consolidation of the appeals.

However, the CA nullified the transfers made to Javonillo and Armentano because these
transfers violated Section 6 of Article IV of the ALRAI Constitution. Section 6 prohibits directors
from receiving any compensation, except for per diems, for their services to ALRAI. 47 The CA
upheld the validity of the transfers to Dela Cruz and Alcantara48 because the ALRAI Constitution
does not prohibit the same. The CA held that as a consequence, the subsequent transfer of the
lot covered by TCT No. T-41366 to Loy from Alcantara was also valid.49chanrobleslaw

Both parties filed separate motions for reconsideration with the CA but these were denied in a
Resolution50 dated June 19, 2009.

Thus, the parties filed separate petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court with this Court. In a Resolution51 dated September 30, 2009, we resolved to consolidate
the petitions considering they assail the same CA Decision and Resolution dated November 24,

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2008 and June 19, 2009, respectively. The petitions also involve the same parties and raise
interrelated issues.

Issues:

Whether respondents should be reinstated as members of ALRAI

Held:

Clearly, members proved to be in arrears in the payment of monthly dues, contributions, or

assessments shall only be automatically suspended; while members who shall be absent from
any meeting without any justifiable cause shall only be liable for a fine. Nowhere in the ALRAI
Constitution does it say that the foregoing actions shall cause the automatic termination of
membership. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that “respondents’ expulsion constitutes an
infringement of their constitutional right to due process of law and is not in accord with the
principles established in Article 19 of the Civil Code, x x x.”

There being no valid termination of respondents’ membership in ALRAI, respondents remain as

its existing members. It follows that as members, respondents are entitled to inspect the records
and books of accounts of ALRAI subject to Section 1, Article VII of ALRAI’s Constitution, and
they can demand the accounting of its funds in accordance with Section 6, Article V of the
ALRAI Constitution. In addition, Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code also sanction the
right of respondents to inspect the records and books of accounts of ALRAI and demand the
accounting of its funds.

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