CLASS 12 POST REGISTRATION PETITIONS AND ACTIONS
Heirs of Pedro Pinote vs. Dulay, 187 SCRA 12 (1990)
Location : Lapu Lapu City, Cebu
FACTS:
● Francisco P. Otto, representing his mother Petra Pinote, filed in the CFI of Cebu
a verified petition for reconstitution of the original certificate of title to Lot 2381
of the Opon Cadastre
○ Lot was supposedly adjudicated to Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Pedro, and
Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote.
● The petition alleged that the original and owner's duplicate certificate of title,
were burned in the Opon municipal building during WWII.
● CFI set the case for hearing; notice and publication complied with.
● It does not appear, however, that notices were sent to each of the registered
co-owners — Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Pedro and Petronilo, all surnamed
Pinote, or their heirs, so that they could have been heard on the petition.
● Pursuant to the court's order, OCT was issued in the names of the alleged
brothers and sisters, Saturnino Pinote married to Maria Igot, Juana, Irineo, Petra
(not Pedro) and Petronilo, all surnamed Pinote.
● Atty. Porfirio Ellescas, counsel for the heirs of Pedro, Juana and Saturnino
Pinote, supposedly all deceased, filed a MR of the court's order, and sought re-
opening
○ BECAUSE Otto's main petition for reconstitution based on the
Municipal Index of Decrees, alleged that Lot 2381 was decreed in the
names of Irineo, Juana, Saturnino, Pedro, and Petronilo, all surnamed
Pinote,
○ the court's order of the reconstitution of the title in the names of
Saturnino, Juana, Irineo, Petra (instead of Pedro) and Petronilo, all
surnamed Pinote.
○ The heirs of Pedro Pinote claimed that they "learned of the error" only
on September 27, 1979 through their counsel, who made the inquiry
and obtained a copy of the court order.
● CFI denied MR since PETRA was also the name indicated in the order of
cadastral court in 1930.
● Heirs of the late Pedro Pinote filed their notice of appeal; court denied due
course to the appeal on the ground of tardiness as the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration, which the court declared to be pro forma, did not suspend the
finality of the court's June 7, 1979 order.
ISSUES: WON the petitioners' appeal is timely; YES
WON reconstitution proceedings should be reopened and the order of
reconstitution dated June 7, 1979 should be rectified or amended. YES
RULING:
● SC granted mandamus.
● Petitioners' appeal was not tardy.
● They discovered the assailed order dated June 7, 1979 on September 27,
1979, through Atty. Ellescas.
● They had up to October 27, 1979 to either file a motion for reconsideration
or appeal.
● They filed a motion for reconsideration on October 1, 1979 after only four
(4) days of the 30-day appeal period had elapsed, so, they had 26 days left
to appeal.
● The error adverted to in the MR is substantial for it affects the participation
and interest of Pedro Pinote (or his heirs) in Lot No. 2381, an interest that
appeared in the petition for reconstitution and in the notice of hearing
issued by the court, but which disappeared from the court's order.
● The court could not receive evidence proving that Petra Pinote, instead of
Pedro, is a registered co-owner of Lot 2381.
● The jurisdiction of the cadastral court is hedged in by the four walls of the
petition and the published notice of hearing which define the subject
matter of the petition.
● Experience has shown that this proceeding has many times been misused
as a means of divesting a property owner of the title to his property.
● The respondent court is ordered to reopen the proceeding for
reconstitution of the title with due notice to each of the registered co-
owners, the adjoining property owners, and others who are required by
law to be notified.
● They should be separately furnished by respondent Francisco P. Otto, at
their respective residential addresses, with copies of the petition and its
annexes.
● The petitioners herein should be allowed to intervene in the proceeding in
order that their or their predecessors' interest, if any, may be heard.
 ● Hence, this petition for mandamus and/or certiorari filed by the heirs of Pedro
Pinote .
Bunagan vs. CFI Cebu, 97 SCRA 72
This is a case (petition for certiorari) to annul and set aside the CFI Order of Cebu RECONSTITUTION OF A CERT. OF TITLE = RESTORATION OF AN INSTRUMENT LOST
directing the reconstitution of the original certificate of title in the name of "spouses OR DESTROYED → YES
Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong," and the order denying the motion to correct this
order and the original certificate of title issued pursuant to the order.
WHAT DID THE CFI RULE ON?
● Private respondents Ompad → CFI of Cebu: PETITION FOR THE
RECONSTITUTION of OCT covering Lot 1660 of the Opon Cadastre in the name
of "Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong, spouses," and
○ once reconstituted, to cancel the same and another one issued in the
name of "Filemon Ompad married, of legal age, and resident of Lapu-
lapu City; Manuel Ompad,widower, of legal age, and resident of Lapu-
lapu City; Arsenio Ompad, married, of legal age, and resident of Lapu-
lapu City; Napoleon Ompad, married, of legal age, and resident of
Lapu-lapu City; and Dionisia Icong, surviving spouse of Antonio Ompad,
of legal age and resident of Lapu-lapu City.
● The petition was opposed by petitioner Bunagan
○ Ground:
■ He is the owner of the lot in question
■ He bought it from Guadalupe Lumongsod and Perpetua Inso,
legitimate heirs of the late Antonio Ompad
■ Dionisia Icong is merely a trustee of the lot in behalf of
Antonio Ompad.
● Petitioners therein moved to dismiss the opposition
○ Ground:
■ Opposition constitute an adverse claim against the rights of
Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong which cannot be
entertained by the cadastral court.
● CADASTRAL COURT DECISION: It could not entertain the claim of the oppositor
which should be ventilated in an ordinary civil action, and gave due course to
the petition.
● CADASTRAL COURT ORDER: Reconstitution of the OCT
● OCT was issued in the name of "spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong."
● Petitioners: URGENT MOTION TO CORRECT THE ORDER OF CC + SUBSTITUTE as
registered "Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Incong" instead of "spouses Antonio
Ompad and Dionisia Icong"
○ Ground:
■ The evidence presented (plan and technical description and
ISSUE: WON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PETITIONERS ARE CORRECT/ WON THE
● There is merit in the petition. The reconstitution or reconstruction of a
certificate of title literally and within the meaning of Republic Act No. 26
denotes restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost
or destroyed in its original form and condition.
○ The purpose of the reconstitution of any document, book or
record is to have the same reproduced, after observing the
procedure prescribed by law, in the same form they were when
the loss or destruction occured.
○ If the certificate of title covering the lot was decreed in the form
of "Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong," as in this case, the
reconstituted certificate of title should likewise be in the name of
the owners as they appeared in the lost or destroyed certificate of
title sought to be reconstituted.
○ Any change that should be made in the ownership of the property
should be the subject of a separate suit.
● In the instant case, it appears that the petition filed is not merely for the
reconstitution of a lost or destroyed certificate of title. Dionisia Icong and
her children also wanted the correction of the name of the owners of the
lot from "Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong" to "spouses Antonio Ompad
and Dionisia Icong" which involves a material change in the certificate of
title, a change which, not being consented to by the herein petitioners
whose interests are affected thereby, cannot be authorized under the
summary proceedings for reconstitution prescribed in Republic Act No. 26.
○ A change of this nature raises an issue which should be ventilated
and decided in an ordinary civil action.
● The claim of Dionisia Icong that the change is authorized under Section 112
of the Land Registration Act is without merit.
○ The proceedings authorized in Section 112 could not be availed of
in view of the opposition of the herein petitioners, for such
proceedings apply only if there is unanimity among the parties or
there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any
party in interest.
● It would result that the respondent Court committed an error in re-
registering Lot 1660 of the Opon Cadastre in the name of "spouses A
Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong".
 the certificate of the Clerk of Court) the lot was adjudicated to Orders: modified in the sense that the petition for reconstitution is granted only
"Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong" during the cadastral insofar as it orders the reconstitution of the original certificate of title covering Lot
proceedings, and not to spouses Antonio Ompad and Dionisia 1660 of the Opon Cadastre in the name of "Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong" and
Icong. the Register of Deeds of Lapu-lapu City is hereby ordered to correct the name of the
● Dionisia Icong: OPPOSITION registered owners in Original Certificate of Title No. RO-0675 accordingly.
○ Claim:
■ the issuance of the certificate of title in the name of "spouses
Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong" is warranted under
Section 112 of the Land Registration Act which authorizes
alteration or amendment of the title upon proper petition.
● COURT ORDER: MOTION TO CORRECT ORDER DENIED
○ Considering that the court, sitting as a cadastral court, did not
entertain the claim of the oppositor which, according to then Judge
Jose N. Mendoza, 'may be ventilated in a separate civil action' this
Court, likewise, cannot entertain the Urgent Motion to Correct Order
● PETITIONERS → INSTANT RECOURSE TO ANNUL AND SET ASIDE THE SAID
ORDERS
○ Claiming that the orders have been issued in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Matas Adm. Matter RTJ-2-836, August 2, 1995, ISSUE:
247 SCRA 9
Location: Kapalong and Sto. Tomas, Davao
FACTS:
1. Judge Jesus Matas of Branch 2 and Eduardo Torres, the OIC Clerk of Court, were
accused of violating Sec 3(e) of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act
2. The complaint alleged:
a. That Judge Matas with a George Mercado concealed from J.K. Mercado Judge argue: the parcels of land subject are located in Kapalong, Davao del Norte.
and Sons Agricultural Enterprises knowledge of petition for the The so-called Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Davao del Norte, never legally existed as a
issuance of new owners duplicates of subject property
b. That the properties are owned by J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural
Enterprises, yet Judge Matas Ordered the posting of the petition for at
least 10 days prior to scheduled hearing on April 20, 1987 at the Office
of the Clerk of Court, the Municipal Hall, Barangay Hall or Barangay
School where the properties are located;
c. The Judge Mata ordered Station Commander, Davao to comply with
the posting however of the properties involved are situated in
Kapalong, Davao which was outside the Judge jurisdiction
d. That during the hearing although J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural
WON the respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance?(main)
WON Judge acted with gross and inexcusable negligence and gross ignorance of law
?
WON respondents conspired with George Mercado to conceal from J.K. Mercado
and Sons Agricultural Enterprises the pendency of the case?.
HELD:
municipality because it was carved out of Kapalong and created into a separate
municipality by then President Carlos P. Garcia and not by Congress
● According to Malaloan case, the Admin order and Circular did not per se
confer jurisdiction on the covered regional trial courts or its branches, such
that non-observance thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The
administrative order merely defines the limits of the administrative area
within which a branch of the court may exercise its authority pursuant to
the jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
● Section 2 of P.D. 1529 states: “that CFI shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
all applications for original registration of title to lands including
improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after
 Enterprises was not present, Judge Matas issued the issuance of new original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
owner's duplicate of titles to George Mercado. questions arising upon such applications or petitions.”
3. It is allege that owner's copy of the certificate of title that was alleged to have ● Section 109 states petitions for issuance of lost or stolen owner's duplicate
certificate of title. Clearly, petitions for replacement of lost duplicate
been lost or destroyed.
certificates, as in Miscellaneous Case No. 1626, are cognizable by the RTCs.
4. Justice Imperial decide: Judge acted w/o jurisdiction SINCE Sto Tomas Davao ● In addition, even if there was an error of impropriety of venue, this will not
within jurisdiction of Branch 4 under Admin No 7 not Branch 2 and Kaplong be pervasive to invalidate the proceedings, absent bad faith
within Branch 1 but should not be subj to gross negligence. Judge Matas acted
without jurisdiction, because he believed that he had jurisdiction over the four The second issue primarily revolves on the failure of the respondent Judge to
(4) properties, given one of the properties was located at Sto Tomas and require publication of the petition in the Official Gazette and notices to the
Kaplong and all the properties were included in one petition registered owners

● He gave sufficient Notice. The certificate of title of the properties in

question on file with the Register of Deeds are existing, and it is the
owner's copy of the certificate of title that was alleged to have been lost or
destroyed.
● According to Sec 109 of P.D. 1529, governing reconstitution of a duplicate
certificate of title lost or destroyed, Consequently, it is sufficient that the
notice under Section 109 is sent to the Register of Deeds and to those
persons who are known to have, or appear to have, an interest in the
property as shown in the Memorandum of encumbrances at the back of
the original or transfer certificate of title on file in the office of the Register
of Deeds. From a legal standpoint, there are no other interested parties
who should be notified, except those above-mentioned since they are the
only ones who may be deemed to have a claim to the property involved.
A person dealing with registered property is not charged with notice of
encumbrances not annotated on the back of the title.
● The mere fact that said certification did not specifically mention that
posting was also made in the bulletin board of the Clerk of Court does not
rule out the posting thereon considering the presumption that official duty
has been done.
As to the third issue, NO
● Judge Matas merely declared as void the "lost" owners' duplicate copies
OCT and directed the issuance of new duplicate copies which, perforce,
remain in, the names of those appearing in the original copies of the OCT's
in the custody of the Register of Deeds. He did not order the issuance of
new ones in the name of George Mercado.
Ratio: All petitions or motions after original registration shall be filed and entitled in
the original case in which the decree of registration was entered.

Republic vs. Tuastumban, G.R. No. 173210, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 600
Location: Cebu City
FACTS:
● Macaria Tuastumban filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the OCT covering Lot
No. 2179 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Estate under Patent No. 43619
○ Patent was in the name of the Heirs of Sofia San Lazo
○ Total area of 3,633 sqm.
● The OCT, which was allegedly in the possession of the Registry of Deeds Cebu,
was allegedly either lost or destroyed during the World War II
● Tuastumban anchored her petition on Sec. 2(d) of RA NO. 26
○ An OCT may be reconstituted ftrom an authenticated copy of the
decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which
an OCT may be issued
● RTC: found the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, and set the
hearing of the petition on March 29 2000
○ Directed the Branch Clerk of Court to publish a Notice of Hearing in the
OG and to send copies thereof to the owners of the adjoining
properties of Lot No. 2179, the SolGen, the Administrator of the LRA
and the RD of Cebu
● On the scheduled hearing, the Branch Clerk of Court announced 3 times in open
court to find out if there was any opposition
○ Since there was none, the court proceeded to receive Tuastumban’s
exhibits to establish jurisdictional facts:
■ Certification by CENRO: Lot No. 2179 was granted to the heirs
of Sofia Lazo via Patent No. 43619
■ Tuastumban claims that she bought the property from the
said owners who are also her relatives, as evidence by an
Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs with Waiver of Inheritance
Rights and Deed of Absolute Sale
● Claims that since the time of purchase, she has been
occupying and possessing the land and paying the
realty taxes thereon
■ Prayed for the reconstitution of the title covering the
property, since the title covering the property had either been
lost or destroyed during the World War II
● RTC: Ordered the RD of Cebu to reconstitute OCT No. 7129
ISSUE/S: WoN the documents presented iis sufficient basis for reconstitution of title
- NO
The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form
and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a
piece of land.
● Governing law: RA No. 26; Secs. 2 and 3 refer to sources of documents for
reconstitution
○ Sec. 2: documents for reconstitution of OCTs
○ Sec. 3 documents for reconstitution of TCTs
○ Almost identical, referring to documents from official sources
which recognize the ownership of the owner and his
predecessors-in-interest
● Republic v. IAC: "any other document" in Secs. 2 (f) and 3 (f) of RA 26 refers
to documents similar to those previously enumerated therein, that is,
those mentioned in Sections (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e).
● documents alluded to in Secs. 2 (f) and 3 (f) must be resorted to in the
absence of those preceding in order. If the petitioner for reconstitution
fails to show that he had, in fact, sought to secure such prior documents
and failed to find them, the presentation of the succeeding documents as
substitutionary evidence is proscribed
● Order of evidence to be presented for reconstitution:
○ (a) that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed;
○ (b) that the documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and
proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost or destroyed
certificate of title;
○ (c) that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or
had an interest therein;
○ (d) that the certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost
and destroyed; and
○ (e) that the description, area and boundaries of the property are
substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed
certificate of title.
● The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the
procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way
it has been when the loss or destruction occurred
● RA 26 presupposes that the property whose title is sought to be
reconstituted has already been brought under the provisions of the Torrens
System.
Resort to other documents in Sec. 2 (f) must be employed only when the
documents earlier referred to in Secs. 2 (a) to (e) do not avail.
● Respondent anchored her petition for reconstitution on Sec. 2 (d) of RA 26.
● Republic: Appeal with the CA; CA: granted and reversed the RTC judgment
○ No proper reconstitution can be done since Tuastumban did not utilize
the resources of reconstitution provided under Sec. 2, RA NO. 26 in the
order stated therein
○ Merely presented a Certification from the CENRO that a patent had
been issued over Lot No. 7129 in the name of Sofia Lazo
○ Tuastumban based her petition on the ff. Documents:
■ a) Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs with Waiver of Inheritance
Rights and Deed of Absolute Sale dated 19 July 1999;
■ (b) CENRO Certification dated 31 May 1999 that Lot No. 7129
is patented in the name of the Legal Heirs of Sofia Lazo;
■ (c) Register of Deeds Certi􀀼cation dated 31 May 1999 that no
certificate of title covering Lot No. 7129 was issued in the
name of the legal heirs of So􀀼a Lazo and that all
deeds/records were either burned or lost during the last
World War;
■ (d) Tax Declaration covering Lot No. 7129 in the name of
respondent;
■ (e) Blue Print of Advance Plan of Lot No. 7129;
■ (f) Technical Description of Lot No. 7129; 13 and
■ (g) Real Property Tax Clearance
○ CA held that the evidence offered by Tuastumban fall under Sec. 2(f) of
RA No. 26 which pertains to “any other document which, in the
judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting
the lost or destroyed certificate of title”
■ Resort to the sources under Sec. 2(f) is justified only when the
sources under Secs. 2(a) to (e) are unavailable.
○ Respondent had failed to lay basis to warrant consideration of sources
under Sec. 2(f)
■ No proof of loss of the best source for reconstitution, which is
the owner’s duplicate copy of the certificate of title; hence,
the evidence presented cannot be considered
● However, upon MR, the CA reversed itself and held that Tuastumban has
substantially complied with the requirements for reconstitution under RA 26
○ traced the ownership of Lot No. 7129 based on the records of the
Bureau of Lands, Friar Lands Division, now the CENRO of the DENR.
■ property was part of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate
● Respondent however failed to present an authenticated copy of the decree
of registration or patent pursuant to which the original certificate of title
was issued.
○ She relied on the CENRO certification which is however not the
authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent
required by law. The certification plainly states only that Lot No.
7129 is patented in the name of the Legal Heirs of Sofia Lazo.
○ It is not even a copy of the decree of registration or patent itself
but a mere certification of the issuance of such patent.
● Sec. 5, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, which Tuastumban uses
as basis for her argument that secondary evidence may be presented,
provides: when the original document has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part,
may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated
○ Order of presentation of evidence is existence, execution, loss,
contents
○ However, Tuastumban had not established the issuance or
existence of the certificate of title covering the subject property
nor of the other documents enumerated in Sedcs. 2(b) to (e) that
would prove the existence, execution, and content of the
certificate of title sought to be reconstituted
○ There is nothing in the evidence that would show that Lot No.
7129 had been registered in the name of the Legal Heirs of Sofia
Lazo and that the certificate of title in the name of said heirs over
said property had been issued
● The Extrajudicial Declaration of Heirs with Waiver of Inheritance Rights and
Deed of Absolute Sale does not indicate that the property was registered in
the name of the Legal Heirs of Sofia Lazo
○ Document identified and described Lot No. 7129 only through a
Tax Declaration No. 04276.
○ The CENRO certification merely certified that Sales Patent No.
43619 had been issued to the Heirs of Sofia Lazo on 21 July 1938.
■ It does not show that the sales patent was caused to be
filed with the Register of Deeds of the province where
the property is located and that a certificate of title had
been consequently issued, which should have been the
normal sequence of events under Section 12 of Act No.
1120 or the Friar Lands Act upon payment by Sofia Lazo
and her heirs of the final installment to the Government
● At best, respondent's evidence may prove only that Lot No. 7129 was
patented to Sofia Lazo and her heirs and that the same was later sold to
 covered by one mother title, OCT No. 188. Under Act No. 1120
or the Friar Lands Act, the whole estate was purchased by the
Government of the Philippines and portions thereof were sold
by installment to actual possessors.
■ One of the possessors was Sofia Lazo who was granted Sales
Patent, and led to the issuance by the Government of a Deed
of Conveyance
● Led to the issuance by the RD of a TCT in favor of the
Heirs of Lazo and not an OCT as claimed by
Tuastumban
○ Also noted that the blueprint of the plan and technical description of
Lot No. 2179 also indicated that the subject property had been applied
for for registration of title for which a Decree had been issued by the
Court
○ Government records as duly certified and reported by the CENRO and
the LRA uphold the prior existence of a certificate of title in favor of the
Heirs of Lazo
○ That since the RD had certified that no such copy of title exists in its
records, coupled with the fact that there were no private oppositors or
claimants to the petition for reconstitution, and the failure of
petitioner to present any evidence against Tuastumban, reconstitution
should issue
○ Arguments of Republic:
■ The authentication is mere hearsay:
● CENRO presented by respondent is insufficient
because Sec. 2 (d) of RA 26 explicitly requires an
authenticated copy of the decree of registration or
patent pursuant to which the original certificate of
title was issued.
● What must be presented is an authenticated copy of
the decree or registration patent and not a mere
certification that the patent has been issued.
● respondent, during her testimony, made no mention
of the owner's duplicate copy of the alleged lost
certificate of title, which is the best source for
reconstitution.
● Neither was there executed any affidavit of loss
respondent.
● Respondent contends that ownership over the property has passed from
the Government to the Heirs of Sofia Lazo by virtue of the Sales Patent, in
accordance with Act No. 1120
○ However, respondent failed to prove that an original certificate of
title or transfer certificate of title actually existed. Lot No. 7129
may have actually been registered and the certificate of title
thereto may have actually been issued, but the fact remains that
this was not proven by the evidence presented in this case.
○ There is also possibility that the property had never been
registered and that the certificate of title never issued.
■ In that case, respondent's remedy may be another
proceeding probably for the registration of title to Lot No.
7129 and not for reconstitution.
■ reconstitution presupposes the existence of an original
certificate of title which was lost or destroyed, if there is
no such original certificate of title, there is actually
nothing to reconstitute
On the contention that fair play dictates that petitioner should have raised its
objections to the petition during the hearings in the RTC:
● The fact that no opposition is filed by a private party or by the Republic of
the Philippines will not relieve respondent, as petitioner in the petition for
reconstitution, of his burden of proving not only the loss or destruction of
the title sought to be reconstituted but also that at the time the said title
was lost or destroyed, he or his predecessor-in-interest was the registered
owner thereof
● not estopped from assailing the decision granting the petition, if, on the
basis of the law and the evidence on record, such petition has no merit.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The
Amended Decision dated 23 June 2006 of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and its Decision dated 20 February 2006 is REINSTATED.
 attesting to the circumstances of the loss of said
owner's duplicate copy
■ assails the Certi􀀼cation by the Register of Deeds of Cebu.
● The Certification, it is claimed, belies the fact that a
certificate of title covering the subject property was
issued prior to its loss since said Certification simply
states that "according to the records of this of􀀼ce . . .
no certificate of title covering Lot No. 7129, Flr-133,
Talisay-Minglanilla Estate, Cebu, was issued in the
name of and/or as claimed to be owned by the Legal
Heirs of Sofia Lazo" and that "all deeds/records were
either burned or lost during the last World War
Zafra vs. Caballes, G.R. No. L-5040, Sept. 29, 1953, 93 Phil 875
Location: Cebu
FACTS:
● Appeal from order of CFI-Cebu dismissing Zafra’s MR of a certificate of title filed
in a cadastral proceeding
● The original case was a motion for the reconstitution of the original certificate
of title No. 1728 of lot No. 6100 of the cadastral measurement of Cebu. The
application alleges that the said lot No. 6100 was registered in the name of the
spouses Macario Salaver and Faustina Caballes; that both the original and the
duplicate of the title certificate of that lot had been lost during the war; and
that on November 6, 1935, said spouses sold the aforementioned lot in favor of
the late Narciso Elder, husband of the applicant. As a remedy, it is requested to
order the reconstitution of the title certificate in question on behalf of the
applicant Basilisa Zafra and her husband Narciso Elder.
● Faustina Caballes, the late Macario Salaver, presented an opposition to the
alleged request, among other things, that she and her late husband never sold
or sold the lot in question in favor of the spouses Narciso Anciano and Basilisa
Zafra or in favor of any other person; that she and her late husband have always
been in possession of the said lot until the latter's death, and after said death
she continued in said possession until the present; that until today she
continues paying the territorial contributions of the same one; and that alleged
alleged sale in the fraudulent.
● CFI: It is unnecessary to view the motion in its merits. In the first place, because
W/N the CFI correctly denied the motion for reconstitution of title (YES)
● Reconstitution or reconstruction of a certificate of title within the meaning
of RA No. 26 denotes the restoration of the instrument which is supposed
to have been lost or destroyed in its original form and condition
● Zafra’s motion was not to restore a lost registered certificate of title, but to
re-register and issue a new certificate in the names of herself and her
deceased husband in lieu of the one originally registered in the names of
Macario Salaver and Faustina Caballes
● Indications that supposed lost Cts were not lost:
○ Zafra and her husbands' deed of sale and which was presented
only on January 29, 1947, in the office of the register of deeds,
carries at the bottom thereof over the register of deeds' signature,
the annotation "that this instrument has been duly registered,
proper memorandum thereof made on original certificate of title
No. 1798 and on its owner's duplicate," which seems to contradict
the allegation that these documents had perished. It was the
number of the registration book that was left in blank in the
registrar's note or memorandum, indicating that it was that book
only which was probably missing.
● Under section 195 of the Revised Administrative Code and section 8,
paragraph 3, of the "Regulations for the Uniformity of Register of Deeds," it
is the duty of the register of deeds "to enter and issue new certificates and
duplicate certificates of title" to the transferees upon the presentation and
entry of deeds of conveyance. Why the movant had to come to court for
the issuance of a new certificate of title has not been explained.
● These matters should have been ventilated in an ordinary action for land
registration (wrong remedy)
 you can not reconstitute a title certificate of a land in favor of a person other
than the registered owner; and, secondly, there being a controversy must be
raised and resolved in an ordinary action on property and not by means of a
mere motion filed in a cadastral file.
Republic vs. IAC and Kiram, G.R. No. 68303, Jan. 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 62.
Subject Property: 3 undivided lots
Location: Titipon, Panamao, Sulun| Title: Sultan Jamalul Kiram
Remedy: Reconstitution of Title
FACTS:
● The private respondent is the niece of Sultan Kiram.
● She claims that the OCT to the subject property was destroyed in a fire that
gutted the Register of Deeds of Sulu on Feb 1974, and that the owner's copy
was lost in the same way
● October 18, 1979: She went to CFI Sulu (now RTC), praying for reconstitution
● The CFI ruled in her favor. This was affirmed on appeal; reasons:
○ The sheriff's return of service
○ Certificate of publication of the application in the OG
○ Survey plans and technical descriptions of the properties
○ Tax declarations on the properties
○ Private respondent presented copies of the supporting laws, namely:
■ Act 3430 - "An Act to Provide for the Reservation of Certain
lands of the public domain on the Island of Sulu, the usufruct
thereof to be granted to the Sultan of Sulu and his heirs
■ >Proc. 1530 - "reserving for resettlement purposes certain
parcels of land situated in x x x Sulu, under the administration
and disposition of the DAR
● The Republic is now appealing before the SC
● Prayer: Dismissal of the application; grounds:
○ lack of proper publication
○ Absence of proof that OCT was in force and in effect at the time of the
alleged loss
○ Failure to comply with RA 26
● *Note: Did not interspose an opposition to the application before the Trial
Court
ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic is precluded from objecting to the application if
it failed to interspose an opposition to the application
RULING: NO
RATIO: Regardless of the OSG's failure to interspose an opposition, the court must
nonetheless convince itself that the petitioner (in the application)'s evidence is
substantial enough to warrant reconstitution.
In this case, there was no sufficient evidence to warrant reconstitution, because:
1) The notice requirements were not complied with.
● The notices of hearing were not posted on the main entrancesof provincial
and municipal halls pursuant to Sec. 13 of RA 26
● The notice requirement is jurisdictional
● Publication in the OG is insufficient
● Because an application for judicial reconstitution partakes of a land
registration proceeding, the notice requirements must follow the letter of
the law
2) The petitioner in the application proceedings (herein private respondent) did not
adduce sufficient evidence based on documentary sources acceptable in RA 26 Sec.
2(f) to substantiate her application for reconstitution.
● RA 26 Sec. 2(f) is an exclusive listing.
● When the list refers to "any other document", it refers to documents that
are similar to those listed, i.e. sources that evidence title or transactions
affecting title to property.
● The statutes invoked were not those documentary pieces of evidence
contemplated by the law
● There must be a showing, through the documentary pieces of evidence,
that Kiram's predecessor-in-interest (Sultan) availed himself of the land
grants conferred by the statutes presented.
Republic vs. IAC and Susukan, G.R. No. 71835, April 30, 1991, 196 SCRA 422 Issues:
Location: SULU
1. Whether or not the act of the Provincial Fiscal of Sulu in signing the
compromise agreement, without first securing the approval of the Solicitor
FACTS:
General, is binding upon the petition.

Susukan filed with the CFI of Sulu a petition for reconstitution of the destroyed TCT no. 2. Whether or not there is substantial evidence to support the decision of
566 covering Lot No. 133-B with an area of 1,614,074 square meters. respondent Intermediate Appellate Court, which affirmed the decision of the
trial court granting the petition for reconstitution of T.C.T. No. 566 of the
The Respondents allege that: Registry of Deeds of Sulu.

● Moro Indulang(grandfather of Susukan) and Maharajah Sacandal are the Held:

registered owners of Lot No. 133-B.
1. IT IS BINDING.
● Susukan along with his father and other relatives as well as the heirs of Sacandal
possess and occupy the said lot. Petitioner(Republic) alleges that:
● Original copy of the certificate of title was lost and destroyed by fire
● But the owner's duplicate copy remained in the possession of Susukan. ● The alleged owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 566, attached to the petition
- Petition was set for initial hearing and pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. for reconstitution filed with the trial court, is not a reliable evidence.
● The records of this case show that there was no evidence whatsoever
26, the order was published in the Official Gazette and likewise posted in the required
presented by any of the parties to prove that the original of TCT No. 566
places.
was validly issued and still existing as of February 8, 1974 when it was
allegedly destroyed.
- The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the provincial fiscal to ● But even assuming that the 2 documents were adduced in evidence, still
represent the same. they are not sufficient basis for the reconstitution of TCT No. 566.
There is no merit in the petition.
Given that the provincial fiscal is authorized to appear in this case:
In order to forestall, if not eliminate entirely, anomalous or irregular reconstitution
● He should also be furnished notices of hearings, orders, resolutions, decisions of lost or destroyed land certificates of title the Land Registration Commission (now
and other processes. Land Registration Administration) adopted LRC Circular No. 35.
● However, as the Solicitor General retains supervision and control of the
The power or authority of the provincial fiscal by himself and not merely in
representation in this case and has to approve withdrawal of the case, non- representation of the Solicitor General, to appear for and protect the interests of
appeal, or other actions which appear to compromise the interests of the the government in reconstitution cases is expressly provided for in the
Government, only notices of orders, resolutions, and decisions served on him aforementioned circular:
will bind the party represented.
The heirs of Moro Dayang Sitti Fatima, the third registered owner of the subject lot, filed “2. All petitions for reconstitution shall be directly filed in duplicate with the clerk of
an opposition to the petition for reconstitution. They allege that: court of the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the property is
situated serving copies thereof and its annexes to the following:
a. The Registrar of Deeds concerned

● Owner's duplicate copy in the possession of Susukan is not the real or genuine
copy of the certificate of title because the same was copied from a tampered b. The Director of Lands

one which erased the name of Mora Dayang Sitti Fatima
The oppositors presented the following:
● a certification from the Bureau of Lands dated June 8, 1983 (Annex A) to the
effect that Lot 133-B with an area of more or less 164. 7853 is a decreed
property registered in the names of Maharajah Sacandal, Moro Indulang and
Mora Dayang Sitti Fatima;
● a decision in Civil Case No. 457 for recovery of possession concerning said Lot
133-B, dated June 21, 1963, showing that Maharajah Sacandal, Moro Indulang
and Mora Dayang Sitti Fatima were the registered owners and which also
decided once and for all the respective shares of each and everyone of their
heirs.
The oppositors prayed that the reconstitution be held in abeyance until the authentic
copy of the decree covering said lot is secured from the land registration office in Manila.
Both parties agreed to enter into a compromise agreement so long as the name of Mora In addition to that:
Dayang Sitti Fatima be included as one of the registered owners of the said lot.
The lower court granted the petition for reconstitution.
The Solicitor General interposed an appeal before the IAC.
The appellate court rendered a decision affirming in toto the findings of the lower court.
c. The Solicitor General

d. The corresponding Provincial or City Fiscal.”
“7. Notices of hearings shall also be given to the Registrar of Deeds of the place
where the property is located, the Administrator of the NALTDRA (now Land
Registration Administration) and the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city
where the land is located who shall appear for and protect the interests of the
government in court on the basis of the report and recommendations of the
Administrator of the NALTDRA (now LRA) and the Registrar of Deeds concerned
which are required to be submitted to the Court.”
We therefore file that the act of provincial fiscal in signing the compromise
agreement was in accordance with his duty to appear for and protect the interests
of the government in court in petitions for reconstitution.
- Besides, the absence of any opposition on the part of the government to
the petition for reconstitution despite having been duly served copies of the
petition and its annexes through the Registrar of Deeds, Director of Lands,
Solicitor General and the Provincial Fiscal shows that the government has no
contrary evidence with which to contest and frustrate the petition.
- No interest of the government was prejudiced by such judgment.
2. THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
Sec. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources
hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b) The co-owner's mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds
or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the Registry of Deeds,
containing the description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof,
showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or
destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued;

Tahanan Dev. Corp. vs. CA, G.R. No. 55771, Nov. 15, 1982, 203 Phil 652
Location:
FACTS:
● Petitioner Tahanan Development Corporation, hereinafter referred to as
TAHANAN, claiming grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent
Judge, further seeks the setting aside of the decision rendered by the latter in
Reconstitution Case No. 504-P, Land Registration Case No. 9368.
● The records of the case show that on October 5, 1977, private respondent
hereinafter referred to as the Pascuals, claiming as intestate heirs of Manuela
Aquial who died on January 26, 1967, filed a petition for judicial reconstitution
of lost certificate of title under Republic Act No. 26 docketed as Reconstitution
Case No. 504-P, Land Registration Case No. 9368 in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, alleging that:
○ xxx 2. Manuela Aquial, the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, while
yet single and up to the time she got married, was the registered
owner of those contiguous lands, Lots 2 and 4 as shown in Plan xxx;
○ petitioners, by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest
(e) A document, on file in the Registry of Deeds by which the property, the
description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered,
or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been
registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper
basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
● In this case, Susukan presented the owner’s duplicate certificate of title.
● However, on the basis of the absence of the name of one of the registered
owners, said oppositors presented two other documents, namely the
certificate from the Bureau of Lands and a copy of the decision of the
lower court to prove ownership of all registered owners.
● These dcouments readily fall under Section 3 (f) of Republic Act No. 26.
● These are sufficient and proper bases for reconstituting the burned or
destroyed original certificate of title.
● The duty of the court is to issue the order of reconstitution. This duty is
mandatory. The law does not give the court discretion to deny the
reconstitution if all the basic requirements have been complied with.
Issue: WON the court has jurisdiction to try the case – No
● The Pascuals are duty-bound to know who are their actual adjacent
boundary owners on all sides and directions of their Property. They are
charged with the obligation to inquire who their neighbors are in actual
possession and occupancy not only of portions of their own property but
also of land adjacent thereto. This duty or obligation cannot be ignored or
simply brushed aside where the location or the properties involved is a
prime site for land development, expansion, suitable for residential,
commercial and industrial purposes and where every square inch of real
estate becomes a valuable and profitable investment.
● It is of public knowledge in the community of Paranaque that "Tahanan
Village" is a privately-owned and occupied residential subdivision, plainly
visible to the general public by reason of the perimeter fence or wan
separating it from adjacent estates, the roads and streets therein and
leading thereto, the numerous home constructions and buildings going on,
the visible electrical, lighting and water supply installations, the presence
of private security guards thereat and the numerous signs and billboards
advertising the estate as a housing development owned and/or managed
by petitioner Tahanan.
● The Notice of Hearing directed that copies thereof be posted only in the
bulletin board of the Court of First Instance of Pasay City and no more,
 Manuela Aquial have been and still are in the actual, public, exclusive,
adverse, continuous and peaceful occupation of the afore-described
lands;
○ The said certificate was destroyed in the last World War II;
○ there is no record of any sales patent, sales certificate or any land grant
over said lands to any person or entity; Aquial died without debts
● The Notice of Hearing was issued by the Court and was published in Official
Gazette in November 14, 21, and 28 1977. In the same date, copies of the notice
were served to the Office of the Solicitor General and on November 9, 1977, to
his Commissioner of Land Registration.
● The Director of Lands filed on April 14 1978 an Opposition to the petition on the
following grounds:
○ (1) The same petitioners had previously filed a similar petition for
reconstitution of the alleged lost original certificate of title docketed as
Reconstitution Case No 77 which has been dismissed with prejudice,
and thus precluded the petitioners from filing based on res judicata;
○ (2) Original Certificate of Title were registered and issued in favor of
Eugenio Tuason et al.;
○ (3) No original certficate of title had or has been issued to Aquial xxx;
○ (9) not all the jurisdictional facts of the instant case have been
established and therefore, this Honorable Court has not acquired
jurisdiction to hear and resolve the case under Republic Act No. 26, for
the reason that petitioners thru counsel have failed to serve notice of
the petition in this case to the owners of the adjoining properties.
● A decision was rendered granting the said petition of Pascuals. Tahanan then
filed a Motion for Intervention which was denominated as “Petition to Set
Aside Decision and Re-Open Proceedings” which was denied. Hence, Tahanan
filed a Motion for Reconsideration which, again, was denied. Tahanan filed an
appeal to the Court of Appeals which thereby upheld the ruling of the Court a
quo.
whereas the law specifically require that the notice of the petition shall be
posted on the main entrance of the municipality or city on which the land
is situated, at the provincial building and at the municipal building at least
30 days prior to the date of hearing. In the instant case as certified to by
Deputy Sheriff Arsenio C. de Guzman, the Notice of Hearing was posted on
the bulletin board of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch
located at the Hall of Justice, City Hall Building, Pasay City.
● Evidently, the Notice of Hearing was not posted at the main entrance of
the provincial-building in Pasig, Rizal; it was not posted at the main
entrance of the municipal building of Muntinlupa where the land is now
comprised in Barrio Cupang, or at least in the municipal building of
Paranaque where Barrio San Dionisio was then embraced.
WON the Intervention of Tahanan is proper – Yes
● The Court has allowed the intervention of adjacent owners even during the
pendency of the appeal from the decision granting reconstitution, the
appeal then in the Supreme Court, in the paramount interest of justice and
as an exception to Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner
Tahanan having sought to intervene in the court below and alleging
material and substantial interest in the property to which title is sought to
be reconstituted, in its Motion To Set Aside Decision and Re-Open
Proceedings duly verified and attaching therewith xerox copies of its
transfer certificates of title of its properties adjoining and even overlapped
by that of the Pascuals to the extent of some 9 hectares in area, the trial
court ought to have admitted said motion.
● There is grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court when it
denied Tahanan's Petition To Set Aside Decision and Re-Open Proceedings.
● While said petition is not captioned "Motion for Intervention" the
allegations of the petition clearly and succinctly aver Tahanan's legal
interest in the matter in litigation, which interest is substantial and
material, involving as it does the boundaries, possession and ownership of
about 9 hectares of land covered by certificates of title registered under
the Torrens System in Tahanan's name and issued from the mother title
"Original Certificate of Title No. 6567 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
issued pursuant to Decree No. 515888, Land Registration Case No. 776
dated September 18, 1930. Aside from arbitrarily refusing to admit
Tahanan's intervention sought in the trial court below, We find also grave
abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge in not considering
Tahanan as an indispensable party to the proceedings, it having been
shown positively that it has such an interest in the controversy or subject
matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in its absence, without
injuring or affecting such interest  Petition is Granted
Manotok vs. Barque, G.R. No. 162335, Dec. 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 468 (2008) ISSUE: WON CA was empowered to direct the annulment of the Manotok title
Location: through petition for reconstitution of title filed by the Heirs?

HELD: NO
Subject land: Lot No. 823 of the Piedad Estate located in Rizal
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, also known as the Property Registration
Decree, provides that [a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack
FACTS: A fire destroyed portions of the QC City Hall including the records stored in the [and] cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
Office of the RD of QC. accordance with law.[38] Clearly, the cancellation of the Manotok title cannot arise
incidentally from the administrative proceeding for reconstitution of the Barque
The Heirs of Barque filed a petition for reconstitution of the original TCT. The Barque title title even if the evidence from that proceeding revealed the Manotok title as fake.
issued in the name of Homer barque. They alleged that the title was among the records Nor could it have emerged incidentally in the appellate review of the LRAs
administrative proceeding.
destroyed by the 1988 fire. The Heirs submitted copies of the alleged owners duplicate
of the Barque title, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and a Plan FLS 3168-D Under Rep. Act No. 26 as amended by Rep. Act No. 6732, administrative
covering the property. reconstitution of titles is permitted where the certificates of titles have been lost
due to flood, fire and other force majeure. The petitioner in such a case is required
Learning of the Barques petition, Severino M. Manotok IV, et al. (the Manotoks) filed to execute an affidavit, containing the following averments
their opposition thereto. The Manotoks claimed that the lot covered by the Barque title (3) That the certificate of title is not the subject of litigation or investigation,
formed part of the land covered by their reconstituted title TCT No. RT-22481 They administrative or judicial, regarding its genuineness or due execution or issuance;
further alleged that the Barque title was spurious.
The administrative reconstitution of Torrens titles is intended for non- controversial
cases, or especially where the subject property is not covered by an existing title
Officer of the LRA: denied the petition of the Heirs stating that it appears to duplicate the in favor of a person other than the applicant. Such an implication is consonant with
lots of the Manotoks and the submitted plan is a spurious document. MR Denied. Heirs the rule that the reconstitution proceedings are not the venue for confirmation or
appealed to the LRA. LRA reversed. Manotoks appealed to CA. CA affirmed LRA decision adjudication of title, but merely a means by which a previously adjudicated title
and held that Manotoks title was spurious. whose original has been lost or destroyed may be reissued to its owner.

If a petition for administrative reconstitution is filed with the LRA, and it appears
from the official records that the subject property is already covered by an existing
Torrens title in the name of another person, there is nothing further the LRA can do
but to dismiss the petition. The dismissal of such petition is subject to judicial
review, but the only relevant inquiry in such appellate proceeding is on whether or
not there is a previously existing title covering that property.

Neither the LRA nor the Court of Appeals at that point may inquire into the validity
of the title or the competing claims over the property. The only remedy is an action
before the RTC for the cancellation of the existing title, whether by the competing
claimant or by the OSG on behalf of the Republic.

The Barques offered no credible explanation for the discrepancy between the
subdivision plan it relies on and the record provided by the DENR (bilge nalang
sumulpot is DENR sa decision through a motion for intervention perf its not that
imp). They also do not contradict the finding of the National Archives that there is
 no copy in its files of the deed of sale allegedly executed between Setosta (Homer
acquired it daw from Setosta) and Barque.

These discrepancies highlight the error of the LRA and the Court of Appeals in
acknowledging the right of the Barques to seek reconstitution of their purported
Barque title. Even assuming that the petition for reconstitution should not have
been dismissed due to the Manotok title, it is apparent that the Barques claim of
ownership is exceedingly weak.

CA decision and LRA Resolutions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Case REMANDED to
CA.

Barcelona vs. Barcelona, G.R. No. L-9014, Oct. 31, 1956, 100 Phil 251 ISSUE:
Location: Laguna WON the renunciation of the inheritance in favor of Hilarion Barcelona by his
sister Simeona Barcelona in her own behalf and by Aniceto San Gabriel brother-in-
law of the deceased, on behalf of his supposed minor children (now herein
FACTS:
appellants Quirico San Gabriel and Teodora San Gabriel) constitutes a conveyance
 A certain Leoncia Barcelona was the lawful wife of one Canuto Sanchez. The of prperty
couple acquired out of their common funds:
o two parcels of land (four hectares now dedicated to palay, and located NOTE: Said renunciation may be regarded as in the nature of a partition of ½ of the
in the barrio of Puypuy Bay, Laguna) and conjugal properties left by Leoncia Barcelona among her heirs, namely Hilarion and
o some jewels valued at P2,000. Simeona.
 Leoncia died. Hilarion Barcelona, a brother of the deceased, instituted Special
HELD:
Proceedingsin the CFI the issuance of letters of administrationof the properties
1. RENUNCIATION OF INHERITANCE, EQUIVALENT TO PARTITION. — The
of Leoncia, the records of which were destroyed during the last war. renunciation made by one heir in favor of another heir may be regarded as in
 Consequently, the surviving spouse, Canuto Sanchez, was appointed the nature of a partition among the heirs.
administrator of the estate. As he could not afford to pay all the claims against 2. STATUTE OF FRAUDS IN APPLICABLE --
the estate, Hilarion Barcelona, the eldest brother of the deceased paid all the Partition among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not
total indebtedness in the sum of P1,070. exactly a conveyance of the contract takes it out of the operation of the property
from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right to
 Canuto Sanchez sold his share in the conjugal properties to Hilarion Barcelona.
property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the
Subsequently, Simeona Barcelona and Aniceto San Gabriel renounced their inheritance.
corresponding share in the intestate estate in favor of Hilarion Barcelona for
having shouldered the claims against the estate. In Hernandez, et al., v. Andal:
 Consequently, Hilarion Barcelona commenced to possess OCEAN and under  Statute of Frauds as per Rule 123, section 21 ROC, has been uniformly
claim of title, adverse to all other claimants and exclusive of any other right and interpreted to be applicable to executory and not to completed or
executed contracts, and that performance of the contract takes it out of
against the whole world for more than ten years, that portion of the estate
the operation of the Statute of Frauds; and that in this jurisdiction, on
ceded to him by his co-heirs, paying the corresponding real taxes form 1940 to grounds of equity, where no rights of creditors are involved, it is
1953. competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an oral agreement for
 However, Simeona Barcelona, Quirico San Gabriel and Teodora San Gabriel filed distribution of the estate among themselves.
the present action, claiming:
 o that in the settlement of the parties in the aforementioned Special
Proceedings, Canuto Sanchez, because of inability or unwillingness to
meet to total indebtedness of the estate of his deceased wife, agreed
to transfer, as in the fact he did transfer, as a sort of compromise and
settlement to Hilarion and his co-heirs, the entire two parcels of land in
question;
o That they all agreed that he was to take the possession and cultivation
of the lands until after he would have been reimbursed of his
expenses, in which even partition of the land was to be made;
o that,plaintiff demanded the partition of the properties on the ground
that probably appellee had already recovered his expenses out of the
produce, but defendant told them that he had not recovered them yet
though he promise to give them palay,cwhich he did, when he told
plaintiffs that they did not have anymore share in the lands in
litigation.
 Petitioners also invoked statue of frauds (conveyance of property must be in
writing)
 Answer; defendant Hilarion àhe purchased the share of Canuto Sanchez
consisting of one-half of the estate and that is his co-heirs renounced to the
other half in his favor because of their inability to reimburse him of their share
in the expenses of the litigation.
Hernandez vs. Andal, G.R. No. L-273, March 29, 1947, 78 Phil 196
Location: Lot No. 120073 of the Batangas cadastral survey.
FACTS:
● Brother and sisters:
○ plaintiff, Cresencia Hernandez,
 It is of general knowledge that in the provinces, specially in the barrios,
when a person dies leaving small parcels of land not included in the
Torrens System of registration, either through ignorance of the law or in
order to avoid expenses in the way of legal services, notarial fees, and fees
of registration, the heirs merely come together, make a list of the
properties included in the estate, pay off small debts and sums advanced
by some of the heirs, specially for expenses incurred during the last illness
of the decedent and for his funeral, and then proceed to assign to each one
his share of the estate, even taking into account the last instructions and
wishes of the decedent.
 So far, this practice has been found to be not only convenient and
inexpensive, but even advisable, and is accepted by the people, and we
find no good reason for disturbing said practice. Now, when valuable
properties, specially those covered by certificates of title, are involved in
the partition, perhaps strict compliance with the law may be advisable,
even necessary.
 Hence. the oral partition or renunciation of inheritance by Simeona
Barcelona = valid and binding upon her. Not so with respect to Quirico
and Teodora
3. RENUNCIATION MADE BY AN ASCENDANT IN BEHALF OF MINOR CHILDREN
EFFECT OF. — The ascendant who was not duly appointed judicial guardian by
the court, could not validly make the renunciations or consent to the partition
on behalf of his minor children; and if the children were no longer minors, but
did not take part in it, then they cannot be bound by said partition or
renunciation.
4. PRESCRIPTION; REGISTERED LAND NOT SUBJECT THERETO; PRESCRIPTION
UNAVAILING BOTH AGAINST REGISTERED OWNER AND HEREDITARY
SUCCESSORS. — A property registered under the provisions of Act 496 is not
subject to prescription. Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered
owner but also against his hereditary successors because the latter merely step
into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are merely the
continuation of the personality of their predecessor in interest
ISSUE: WON an agreement of partition is required to be in writing under the
statute of frauds.
Enforceable when completely or partly performed.
● On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds,
courts of equity have enforced ORAL PARTITION when it has been
 ○ intervenors, Maria and Aquilina Hernandez, and Pedro and Basilia
Hernandez who are not parties here,
○ acquired in common from their father a parcel of land of which he
died seized.
● The intervenors purport that a combined shares in the larger parcel were
allotted to them in a verbal partition alleged to have been made among the five
brother and sisters.
○ The intervenors sold 1800 square meters of this parcel to Zacarias
Andal, the defendant, and Andal's wife
○ in consideration of P860.
Plaintiff Hernandez
● After the sale, the plaintiff attempted to repurchase the land sold to Andal.
○ She offered P150 as price of repurchase, this being, according to that
complaint, the amount Andal had paid,
○ but Andal, it is alleged, refused to part with the property.
● The plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint. She alleged
○ that when the cause was called for trial on March 8,
■ she willing repurchase her sister's share from Andal for P860
and
■ reimburse Andal for his expense;
○ that Andal asked for continuance until the 29th stating that he had
made other expenses;
○ that on the 29th she brought P860 to repurchase the land in question
■ but the case was again postponed because the plaintiff's
sisters had intervened; and
○ that meanwhile, on the 26th, Andal resold the land fictitiously to the
vendors for P970.
● It results that on the date last mentioned -
○ Andal executed a deed of sale for P970 in favor of the intervenors,
■ an amount which included Andal's expenses as well as the
normal sale price.
○ The document of repurchase gave as reason for the transaction,
○ it had been agreed that in the event trouble should arise, the sellers
should return to the buyer what they had received and pay the latter
his expenses.
Defendant Andal
completely or partly performed.
● The Rules of Court and the law has been uniformly interpreted in a long
line of cases to be applicable to executory and not to completed or
executed contracts.
● The performance of the contract takes it out of the operation of the
statute.
● The statute of frauds does not declare the contracts therein enumerate
void and of no legal effect, but only makes ineffective the action for
specific performance.
Rule 74, section 1, of the Rules of Court on a parol partition:
"If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the
minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without
securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they
see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds,
and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If
there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire
estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. It shall
be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for
letters of administration within two years after the death of the decedent."
● As a general proposition, transactions, so far as they affect the parties, are
required to be reduced to writing either as a condition of jural validity or as
a means of providing evidence to prove the transactions.
● Written form exacted by the statute of frauds, for example, "is for
evidential purposes only."
● The Civil Code, too requires the accomplishment of acts or contracts in a
public instrument, not in order to validate the act or contract but only to
insure its efficacy so that after the existence of the acts or contracts has
been admitted.
WON it is the writing the that confers legal validity upon the agreement?
NO.
● Where the law intends a writing or other formality be the essential
requisite to the validity of the transaction, it says so in clear and
unequivocal terms.
● Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no such express or clear declaration that the
required public instrument is to be constitutive of a contract of partition or
 ● The defendant filed his answer alleging -
○ that Maria and Aquilina Hernandez had sold him their respective
portions of the inherited land for P860,
○ that he had no objection to disposing of those portions in favor of the
plaintiff for P860 plus the expenses he had incurred in the execution of
the deed of sale amounting to P50,
○ but that he was unwilling to accept P150, which was all the plaintiff
offered him besides his expenses.
Intervenor Hernandez et.al.
● Alleged that there had been a partition among them and their brother and
sisters "with the share of each delineated and marked, and after partition and
delineation everyone took exclusive, separate and independent possession of
his portion in the partition."
● Charged the plaintiff with bad faith -
● in that "it was upon her request for chance that the sale to the
defendant, about to take place last November, was delayed till January
of this year when she finally informed the intervenors that they could
sell to the defendant, or could pay only P150 and could not raise the
amount of P860 offered by the defendant."
● Cresencia Hernandez; the plaintiff, was the only witness to testify on her own
behalf.
○ She reiterated the allegations in her two complaints.
● Zacarias Andal said that he was in possession of the land in question until he
returned it to the intervenors.
○ He declared that the plaintiff offered to repurchase the land from him
long after he had bought it, that is when she was about to file her
action.
○ He stated that after he came with the document sale he showed it to
the plaintiff: that was on the 23d of January.
○ He was able to do this because he lived near Cresencia and passed by
her house on his way home Candelaria.
○ He said that Cresencia Hernandez upon being shown the document
merely exclaimed, "Oh, so you already have a document."
○ When asked whether the land described in the complaint of the herein
plaintiff has been the object of partition among the co-owners Pedro,
Basilia, Cresencia, Maria and Aquilina surnamed Hernandez,"
an inherent element of its effectiveness as between the parties.
● There is no apparent reason, in adopting this rule, to make the efficacy of a
partition as between the parties dependent on the execution of a public
instrument and its registration.
● For this court to prescribe what is to be a binding agreement between co-
heirs in the settlement of their private affairs which in no way affect the
rights of third parties would be to transcend its rule-making power.
The execution and registration of a notarized instrument are made essential
elements to validity to protect innocent third parties.
● The interests of innocent third parties eliminated, the rule loses its
character as one of procedure and practice and invades the realm of
substantive law.
Section 596 of Act No. 190 (precursor of Section 1 of Rule): heirs may apportion and
divided the estate among themselves as they may see fit by agreement duly
executed in writing by all of them, adds the words "and not otherwise."
● The new rule of the words "and not otherwise" imports the casting away
from the prescribed public document of its jural character which the
document enjoyed in the former code.
Verbal contracts may be effective between the parties.
● The civil law looks upon the role of public instruments ill acts and contracts
with greater liberality with a view to better adaptation to human frailties
and idiosyncrasies.
● In their blind faith in friends and relatives, in their lack of experience and
foresight, and in their ignorance, men, in spite of laws, will make and
continue to make verbal contracts.
● The advantages of an air-tight policy concerning such contracts fall far
short of compensating for the resulting damage, injustice, inconveniences
and confusion.
Tunga Chui vs. Que Bentec (2 Phil., 561): When the essential requisites for the
existence of a contract are present, the contract is binding upon the parties, and,
although required to be in writing by article 1280 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff can
maintain an action on the verbal agreement without first bringing an action under
article 1279 to compel the execution of a written instrument.
 ■ counsel for the plaintiff objected on the ground that the best
evidence was the document of partition, and the, objection
was sustained.
● Counsel for the defendant and intervenors announced that he had witnesses
ready to prove that a parol partition among the five brother and sisters had
been made, mentioning the names of six such witnesses.
○ Counsel for the plaintiff again objected asserting that -
○ "under the Rules of Court agreement affecting real estate may not be
proved except by means of writing subscribed by the person against
whom the proof is offered."
● The court handed down its decision declaring that the resale of the land by
Zacarias Andal in favor of Maria and Aquilina Fernandez was illegal and in bad
faith.
○ However, did not seem to have found as a fact the allegation that the
resale was simulated.
---
PROCEDURAL ISSUE
Some incongruities in the judgment of the lower court:
The evidence on parol partition tendered by the defendant and intervenors was ruled
out and they specifically complain of this conclusion as error.
● The judgment would have Andal execute a deed of resale in favor of the plaintiff
and receive from her the price of repurchase.
○ Although Zacarias Andal is no longer interested in the case, as far as
the land is concerned, and
○ even though the intervenors have become again the absolute owners
and are now in full possession of the property,
○ while Andal has already gotten his money back.
● The judgment is silent as to the intervenors with reference to the execution of
the deed of sale or the receipt of the sale price.
● The lower court made no finding and expressed no opinion as to whether the
offer of P150 instead of P860, not to mention Andal's expenses, by the plaintiff
as price of repurchase was sufficient compliance with article 1067 of the Civil
Code on which the court rested the plaintiff's cause of action.
Defendant and Intervenors:
● The findings, conclusions and judgment in the appealed decision are not
assigned as errors and that for this reason the appeal should be dismissed.
No considerations of public policy enter into a partition of hereditary estate
among coheirs greater than those involved in a contract between strangers which
operates to create, transmit, modify or extinguish property rights in land.
● When the transaction is between co-heirs, there is no change of ownership
but simply a designation and segregation of that part which belongs to
each heir.
● If it is between strangers, the creation, transmission, modification or
extinction of real rights may be lawfully effected by parol agreement
notwithstanding the requirement that it be put in writing.
The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice, and this means notice
to others.
● The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and
registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same
time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims.
AN ORAL PARTITION BY THE HEIRS IS VALID IF NO CREDITORS ARE AFFECTED
● The intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed
formalities does not come into play when, as in this case, there are no
creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected.
● No rights of creditors being involved, it is competent for the heirs of an
estate to enter an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan
different from those provided by law.
DISPOSITIVE:
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the court of origin for further
proceeding and a new decision not incompatible with this decision, with costs of
this appeal against the appellee.
 ● A completed oral partition may be enforced,
● Their evidence should be allowed,
● and if allowed and it establishes their allegation, the plaintiff's cause of action
vanishes.

A superficial analysis of the case will show that on the validity of the alleged partition
hangs the result of the entire litigation, and on that validity depends in turn the
competence of the excluded evidence.

Rules must be liberally construed:

● If the appellants' assignment of error be not considered a direct challenge to
the decision of the court below, it would be contrary to the liberal spirit which
pervades the Rules of Court.
● The first injunction of the new Rules is that they "shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."
● While an assignment of error which is required by law or rule of court has been
held essential to appellate review,- and only those assigned will be considered,
○ there are a number of cases which appear to accord to the appellate
court a broad discretionary power to waive lack of proper assignment
of errors and consider errors not assigned.
● An unassigned error closely related to an error properly assigned, or upon which
the determination of the question raised by the error properly assigned is
dependent, will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the
failure to assign it as error."
● At the least, the assignment of error, viewed in this light, authorizes us to
examine and pass upon the decision of the court below.

Maglucot-aw vs. Maglucot 329 SCRA 78 (2000) Issue:

Location: Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental
● Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of Lot No. 1639-D
(subject lot). Subsequently, Leopoldo and Severo, both surnamed Maglucot,
rented portions of subject lot in 1964 and 1969, respectively, and each paying
rentals therefor. Said respondents built houses on their corresponding leased
lots. They paid the rental amount of P100.00 per annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma,
who represented the heirs of Roberto Maglucot, petitioners predecessor-in-
WON there has been a valid oral partition. [YES]
Held: Yes.
 The records of the case show that sometime in 1946 there was a prior oral
agreement to tentatively partition Lot No. 1639.
 By virtue of this agreement, the original co-owners occupied specific
portions of Lot No. 1639.
 It was only in 1952 when the petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639 was filed
 interest.
● In December 1992, however, said respondents stopped paying rentals claiming
ownership over the subject lot. Petitioners thus filed the complaint a quo.
● After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. The RTC
found the existence of tax declarations in the names of Hermogenes Olis and
Pascual Olis (purported owners of Lot Nos. 1639-A and 1639-B, respectively) as
indubitable proof that there was a subdivision of Lot No. 1639. It likewise found
that Tomas Maglucot, respondents predecessor-in-interest, took active part in
the partition as it was he, in fact, who commenced the action for partition.
● The court a quo cited Article 1431 of the Civil Code which states that "[t]hrough
estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person
relying thereon." Applying said provision of law, it held that while there was no
court order showing that Lot No. 1639 was partitioned, its absence could not be
used by Tomas Maglucot, or respondents as his successors-in-interest, to deny
the existence of an approved partition against the other co-owners who claim
that there was one. Said court, likewise, ruled that the tax declarations over the
houses of respondents, expressly stating that the same are constructed on the
lots of Roberto Maglucot, constitute a conclusive admission by them of the
ownership of the subject lot by the latter.
● Petitioners maintain that Lot No. 1639 was mutually partitioned and physically
subdivided among the co-owners and that majority of them participated in the
actual execution of the subdivision.
● Further, the co-owners accepted their designated shares in 1946 as averred by
Tomas Maglucot in his petition for partition.
● Petitioners opine that in 1952, Tomas Maglucot himself initiated a court
proceeding for a formal subdivision of Lot No. 1639.
○ In said petition, he averred that only Hermogenes Olis and the heirs of
Pascual Olis were not agreeable to the partition.
○ Further contend that respondents admitted in their tax declarations
covering their respective houses that they are "constructed on the land
of Roberto Maglucot.”
○ Simply put, petitioners vigorously assert that respondents are
estopped from claiming to be co-owners of the subject lot in view of
the mutual agreement in 1946, judicial confirmation in 1952, and
respondents acquiescence because they themselves exclusively
exercised ownership over the subj.lot from 1952 up to the present.
because two of the co-owners, namely Hermogenes Olis and heirs of
Pascual Olis, refused to have said lot subdivided and have separate
certificates of title.
 Significantly, after the 1952 proceedings, the parties in this case by
themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-interest occupied specific
portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch plan.
 Such possession remained up until this case arose, or about forty (40) years
later.
 From its order in 1952, it can be gleaned that the CFI took notice of the
tentative subdivision plan by oral partition of the parties therein.
 Further, it appears that said court was aware that the parties therein
actually took possession of the portions in accordance with the
sketch/subdivision plan.
 It has been previously held that a co-owner, who, though not a party to a
partition accepts the partition allotted to him, and holds and conveys the
same in severalty, will not be subsequently permitted to avoid partition.
 It follows that a party to a partition is also barred from avoiding partition
when he has received and held a portion of the subdivided land especially
in this case where respondents have enjoyed ownership rights over their
share for a long time.
 Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and
who took possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped to
question title to portion allotted to another party.
 A person cannot claim both under and against the same instrument.
o The records show that respondents were paying rent for the use
of a portion of Lot No. 1639-D.
o Had they been of the belief that they were co-owners of the entire
Lot No. 1639 they would not have paid rent.
o The payment of rentals by respondents reveals that they are mere
lessees.
o As such, the possession of respondents over Lot No. 1639-D is that
of a holder and not in the concept of an owner. One who
possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior
right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be
right or wrong.
o Since the possession of respondents were found to be that of
lessors of petitioners, it goes without saying that the latter were in
 ● Respondents posit three points in support of their position. First, they
emphasize that petitioners failed to show that the interested parties were
apprised or notified of the tentative subdivision contained in the sketch and
that the CFI subsequently confirmed the same. Second, they point to the fact
that petitioners were unable to show any court approval of any partition. Third,
they maintain that Lot No. 1639 remain undivided since to date, OCT No. 6275 is
still an existing and perfectly valid title, containing no annotation of any
encumbrance or partition whatsoever.
---
The legal consequences of the order of partition in 1952 having been discussed
separately, we now deal with oral partition in1946. Given that the oral partition was
initially tentative, the actual possession of specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in
accordance with the oral partition and the continuation of such possession for a very
long period indicate the permanency and ratification of such oral partition. The validity
of an oral partition is already well-settled.
Philippine Savings Bank vs. Judge Lantin and Candido Ramos 124 SCRA 476 (1983)
Location: Sampaloc, Manila
Petition for review of the decision of CFI Manila presided over by respondent Judge
Lantin, in Civil Case entitled Candido Ramos v. Philippine Savings Bank.
FACTS:
● The duplex-apartment house was built for the Spouses Tabiglan by private
respondent Candido Ramos, a duly licensed architect and building contractor, at
a total cost of P32,927.00.
● The spouses paid private respondent the sum of P7,139.00 only. Hence, the
latter used his own money, P25,788.50 in all, to finish the construction of the
duplex-apartment.
● Spouses Tabligan obtained from petitioner Philippine Savings Bank three (3)
loans , the purpose of which was to complete the construction of the duplex-
apartment.
● Spouses executed in favor of the petitioner three (3) promissory notes and
three (3) deeds of real estate mortgages over the property.
possession of Lot No. 1639-D in the concept of an owner from
1952 up to the time the present
o It must be noted that there was a prior oral partition in 1946.
Although the oral agreement was merely tentative, the facts
subsequent thereto all point to the confirmation of said oral
partition.
o By virtue of that agreement, the parties took possession of specific
portions of the subject lot.
o The action for partition was instituted because some of the co-
owners refused to have separate titles issued in lieu of the original
title.
 In 1952, an order for partition was issued by the cadastral court.
o There is no evidence that there has been any change in the
possession of the parties.
o The only significant fact subsequent to the issuance of the order of
partition in 1952 is that respondents rented portions of Lot No.
1639-D.
o It would be safe to conclude, therefore ,that the oral partition as
well as the order of partition in 1952 were the bases for the
finding of actual partition among the parties.
ISSUE: WoN Candido Ramos has the right to claim his share - NO
HELD: NO
The proceedings in the CFI do not partake of the nature of the insolvency
proceedings or settlement of a decedent’s estate.
● The action filed by Ramos was only to collect the unpaid cost of the
construction of the duplex apartment. It is far from being a general
liquidation of the estate of the Tabligan spouses.
● Insolvency proceedings and settlement of a decedent’s estate are both
proceedings in rem which are binding against the whole world.
● Although the lower court found that "there were no known creditors other
than the plaintiff and the defendant herein", this can not be conclusive.
● It will not bar other creditors in the event they show up and present their
claims against the petitioner bank.
● A purchaser in good faith and for value takes registered land free from liens
and encumbrances other than statutory liens and those recorded in the
Certificate of Title.
● At the time the deeds of real estate mortgage in favor of the petitioner
bank were constituted, the transfer certificate of title of the spouses
 ● Petitioner registered the deed of real estate mortgage with the Register of Tabligan was free from any recorded lien and encumbrances, so that the
Deeds of Manila. only registered liens in the title were deeds in favor of the petitioner.
● The spouses failed to pay their monthly amortizations. As a result thereof, the ● Prescinding from the foregoing, the private respondent’s claim must
remain subordinate to the petitioner bank’s title over the property
petitioner bank foreclosed the mortgages.
evidenced by TCT No. 101864.
● Bank registered the certificate of sale issued in its favor and consequently
consolidated its ownership over the property in question.
ARCHITECT’s CASE
● Ramos filed an action against the spouses to collect the unpaid cost of the
construction.
● Ramos succeeded in obtaining the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment,
and pursuant thereto, had the property in question attached.
● Notice of adverse claim was annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate.
● Decision was rendered in favor of the private respondent ; writ of execution was
accordingly issued but was returned unsatisfied.
● Private respondent addressed a letter to the petitioner for the delivery to him
of his pro-rata share in the value of the duplex-apartment in accordance with
Article 2242(PREFERENCE OF LIENS) of the Civil Code. Ramos won.
Petitioner argues that for Article 2242 of the Civil Code to apply, there must have been
an insolvency proceeding.
● Both the petitioner bank and private respondent Ramos rely on the case of De
Barreto v. Villanueva
● Under the De Barreto decision, the full application of Articles 2242 and 2249
demands that there must first be some proceeding where the claims of all the
preferred creditors may be bindingly adjudicated, such as insolvency, the
settlement of a decedent’s estate under Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, or other
liquidation proceedings of similar import.