Memorial Filed On Behalf of Respondent

L E X O M N I A M O O T C O U R T C O M P E T I T I O N | TC 18
TC 18
LEX OMNIA
MOOT COURT COMPETITION
2017
IN THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF DELHI
UNDER SECTION 482 OF CrPC R/W ARTICLE 226 OF

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
JON TARGARYEN & SHAE TARGARYEN

v.
STATE OF DELHI
MEMORIAL SUBMITTED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF

STATE OF DELHI
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 03-07
 LEGISLATION
 CASES REFERRED
 BOOKS REFERRED
 LAW LEXICON AND DICTIONARIES
 LEGAL DATABASES
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 08-09
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 10
STATEMENT OF FACTS 11-12
ISSUES RAISED 13
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS 14-15
PLEADINGS 16-33
I. Whether Mr. Targaryen committed an offence u/s 30 of the Arms Act, 1959?
II. Whether the prosecution under section 30 of the Arms Act, 1959, impinged
upon Mr. Jon Targaryen‟s right under Article 19(1)(g) to carry on his
profession?
III. Whether a magistrate can direct registration of an FIR under Sections 153A,
153B and 295A, more particularly when sanction under section 196 of the
code of criminal procedure has not been obtained?
IV. Whether sections 295A, 153A and 153B are violative of rights under Article
19 of the Constitution?
PRAYER 34

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
LEGISLATION
1. The Arms Act, 1959.

2. The Arms Rule, 1962.
3. The Constitution of India, 1951.
4. The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
5. The Indian Penal Code, 1860.
CASES REFERRED
1. A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla, AIR 1976 SC 1207.

2. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27.
3. Abdul Rahman v. Emperor, AIR 1935 (Cal) 316.
4. Abdur Rahim v. State of Madras, (1961) II LLJ 213 Mad.
5. Ali Mia and Ors. v. Emperor, AIR 1927 Cal 296.
6. All Delhi Rickshaw Union v. Municipal Corporation, AIR 1987 SC 648.
7. Anwar v. State of J&K, AIR 1971 SC 337.
8. Arunachal v. Khudiram, (1994) Supp. (1) 615.
9. Baba Khalil Ahamed v. State of U.P., AIR 1960 All 715.
10. Baku Rao Patel v. The State, 1973 RLR 637.
11. Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1995 SC 1785.
12. Baragur Ramachandrappa v. State of Karnataka, 1998 Cr LJ 3639.
13. Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC
552.
14. Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 748.
15. Chintamanrao v. State of M.P., (1952) SCR 597.
16. Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (2010) 10 SCC 744.
17. Cooverjee v. Excise Commissioner, Ajmer, AIR 1954 SC 220.
18. Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors. v. Minister for the Civil Service, 1985 A.C.
374.
19. Damodar Ganesh & Ors. v. State, AIR 1951 Bom 459.
20. Darshan Singh Ram Kishan v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 2372.

21. Devata Prasad Singh Chaudhuri & Ors v. The Hon'ble The Chief Justice And Judges
of Patna High Court, AIR 1962 SC 201.
22. Devi Soren v. The State, AIR 1954 Pat. 254.
23. Director General, Directorate General of Doordarshan v. Anand Patwardhan, AIR
2006 SC 3346.
24. Food corporation of India v. M/s Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, (1993) 1 SCC 71.
25. Godawat Pan Masala Products(P.) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 7 SCC 68.
26. Gopal Vinayak Godse v. U.O.I & Ors, AIR 1971 Bom. 56.
27. Govt. of A.P. v. Smt. P. Laxmi Devi, AIR 2008 SC 1640.
28. Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 554.
29. Harakchand v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 1453.
30. Ibrahim v. R.T.A., (1935) SCR 290.
31. In re Kerela Education bill, 1957, AIR 1958 SC 956.
32. In Re Mallimoggala, (1937) 2 MLJ 862.
33. In re N. Patnaik, 1972 Cut LJ 1173.
34. In re Venkataramiah, AIR 1938 Mad. 130.
35. Indian Medical Association v. Union of India, (2011) 7 SCC 179.
36. J.P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 5 SCC 134.
37. Jamshed Ansari v. High Court Of Judicature At Allahabad, Civil Appeal NO. 6120
OF 2016.
38. Jayamala & Ors. v. State, 2013 Cr LJ 622.
39. K.P. Sugandh Limited & etc. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors., 2008 CriLJ 1830.
40. Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569.
41. Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955.
42. Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State Of Karnataka, (1995)1 SCC 574.
43. Kochuni K.K. v. State of Madras, AIR 1960 SC 1080.
44. Krishna Kumar v. State of J&K, AIR 1967 SC 1368.
45. L.I.C v. B.J. Bahadur, (1981) 1 SCC 315.
46. Lakshmi Khandsari v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 872.
47. M. Nagaraj and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (2006) 8 SCC 212.
48. M.J. Sivani And Ors v. State Of Karnataka And Ors, AIR 1995 SC 1770.
49. M.K. Gopalam & Anr. v. State of M.P., AIR 1954 SC 362.
50. M/s Shanti Vijay and Co. & Ors. v. Princess Fatima Fouzia & Ors., 1980 (1) SCR
459.

51. Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr & Ors., AIR 1971 SC 2486.
52. Mineral Development Co. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1960 SC 468.
53. Minerva Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789.
54. Mohammed Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar, (2010) 4 SCC 653.
55. Mohan v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 1.
56. Mohd. Hanif Kureshi v. State of Bihar, Air 1958 SC 731.
57. Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab SEB, (2010) 13 SCC 216.
58. Munshi Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1935 Oudh 347.
59. N. Veerbrahmam v. State of A.P., AIR 1959 AP 572.
60. Namit Sharma v. Union of India, (2013) 10 SCC 359.
61. Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas v. State of W.B., AIR 1959 SC 1118.
62. Narendra Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 430.
63. Pothumma v. State of Kerala, AIR 1978 SC 771.
64. Preston v. Ireland Revenue Commissioners, 1985 A.C. 835.
65. Pritam Nath v. State of Punjab, (2002) SCC (Cri) 1320.
66. Public Prosecutor v. P. Ramaswami, AIR 1964 Mad. 258.
67. R.R. Chari v. State of U.P., AIR 1951 SC 207.
68. Raj Narain v. State, AIR 1961 All 531.
69. Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P., (1957) SCR 860.
70. S. A. Venkataraman v. The State, AIR 1958 SC 107.
71. Saghir Ahmed v. State of U.P., (1955) 1 SCR 707.
72. Sakal Papers v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 305.
73. Salgolsem Indramani Singh & Ors v. State of Manipur, 1955 Cr LJ 184.
74. Sant Das Maheshwari v. Babu Ram Jodoun & Ors., AIR 1969 All 436.
75. Saudan Singh v. N.D.M.C., AIR 1989 SC 1988.
76. Shalibhadra Shah v. Swami Krishna Bharati, 1981 Cr LJ 113.
77. Sheikh Bishmillah vs State Of Madhya Pradesh And Ors., 1994 (0) MPLJ 224.
78. Sheikh Wajih Uddin v. The State, AIR 1963 All 335.
79. Shiv Ram Das v. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 Punj. 28.
80. Sivrajan v. Union of India, AIR 1959 SC 556.
81. State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas, AIR 1969 SC 634.
82. State of Karnataka & Anr. v. Pastor P. Raju (2006) 6 SCC 728.
83. State of Madras v. V.G. Row, (1952) SCR 597.
84. State of Maharashtra v. Himmatbhai, AIR 1970 SC 1157.

85. State of Mysore v. Henry Rodrigues & Anr., (1962) 2 Cr LJ 564.

86. State of U.P. v. Kaushaliya, AIR 1964 SC 416.
87. State v. Parmeshwaran Subramani, (2009) 9 SCC 724.
88. Suresh Chand Jain v. State of M.P. & Anr., (2001) 2 SCC 628.
89. Surinder v. State, AIR(1994)4 SCC 366
90. T.M.A Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481.
91. The Trustees of Safadar Hashmi Memorial trust v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2001 Cr LJ
3689(Del).
92. Tinsukhia Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, (1989) 3 SCC 709.
93. Virendra v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 896.
94. Virendra v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 896.
BOOKS REFERRED
1. V.N. Shukla, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (12th ed., 2013).

2. Dr. D.D. Basu, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, (8th ed.,
2007).
3. Dr. D.D. Basu, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, (8th ed., 2009).
4. P.M. Bakshi, THE CONSTITUION OF INDIA, (14th ed., 2017).
5. Dr. J.N. Pandey, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, (51st ed., 2014).
6. H.M. Seervai, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, (4th ed., 2010).
7. R.S. Bedi, , THE CONSTITUION OF INDIA, (10th ed., 2013).
8. Dr. S.C. Kashyap, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, (1st ed., 2008).
9. M.P. Jain, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, (7th ed., 2015).
10. A.N. Saha, CRIMINAL REFERENCE, (6th ed., 2009).
11. Dr. Sri Hari Singh Gaur, THE PENAL LAW OF INDIA, (11th ed., 2000).
12. Bholeshwar Nath, INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860, (3rd ed.,2007).
13. Princep‟s COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973,
(19th ed., 2008).
14. A.K. Nandi, S.R. Roy, S.P. Sen Gupta, NANDI CRIMINAL READY
REFERENCER, (7th ed., 2004).
15. Dr. M.C. Jain Kagzi, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, (6th ed., 2001).
16. Sarkar & Justice Khastgir, INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860, (2nd ed., 20014).
17. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, (34th ed., 2014).

18. R.V. Kelkar, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, (5th ed., 2008).

19. K.D. Gaur, TEXTBOOK ON INDIAN PENAL CODE, (5th ed., 2015).
20. S.N. Mishra, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973, (19th ed., 2015).
21. K.D. Gaur, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, (7th ed., 2014).
22. Malik‟s COMMENTARY ON ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES, (2nd ed., 2008).
LAW LEXICON AND DICTIONARIES
1. Bryan A. Garner, BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY, (2nd ed., 2004).

2. Justice R.P. Sethi, SUPREME COURT ON WORDS AND PHRASES, (2nd ed.,
2004).
3. P. Ramanatha Aiyar, LAW LEXICON, (3rd ed., 2005)
4. Webster‟s UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY, (1st ed., 1993).
LEGAL DATABASES
1. www.manupatra.com
2. www.indiancaselaws.org
3. www.indlaw.com
4. www.indiankanoon.org
5. www.judic.nic.in
6. www.lexisnexis.com
7. www.scconline.co.in
8. www.westlaw.com
IMPORTANT DEIFINITION:
1. The petitioner for the purpose of this memorandum in the first two issues shall stand
for „Mr. Jon Targaryen‟, in the later 2 issues shall stand for „Mrs Shae Targaryen‟.
2. The respondents for the purpose of this memorandum shall stand for the „State of
Delhi‟.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AIR All India Reporter
AP Andhra Pradesh
Art. Article
Bom. Bombay
Cal. Calcutta
CHN. Calcutta High Court Notes
CrLJ Criminal Law Journal
CrPC Criminal Procedure Code
Ed. Edition
HC High Court
Hon‟ble Honourable
ILR Indian Law Reporter
IPC Indian Penal Code
J. Justice
Ltd. Limited
MP Madhya Pradesh
NOC Notes Of Cases

Ors. Others
Pat. Patna
QB Queen‟s Bench
S. Section
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reporter
UP Uttar Pradesh
v. Versus
Vol. Volume

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Respondents humbly submits to the jurisdiction of this Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi as
invoked by the Petitioners.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1) That Mr. Jon Targaryen, who hails from Kolkata, India, is a renowned professional
shooter. He represented India ion Hunger Games 2012 and won several gold medals
for the country.
2) That Mr. Jon Targaryen is married to Shae Targaryen who is a journalist by
profession. Mrs Shae Targaryen regularly publishes political article on her blog
„Queen of Andals‟.
A. CASE CONCERNING CARTRIDGES
3) That being a professional shooter, Mr. Targaryen had an arms license which permitted
him to carry 500 live cartridges of all legal bores. The Master of Whisperers also
permitted him possession of 15,000 live cartridges.
4) That after the Hunger Games he was scheduled to return to Kolkata via Delhi from
Toronto. Mr. Jon Targaryen purchased 50 live cartridges at Toronto and the same was
carried by him to India. However his Arms license had no stipulation in relation to
carrying of cartridges on flights in India.
5) That the flight landed at Delhi. However the employees of the Airlines upon landing
at Delhi observed a flash strike. An alternative domestic flight was arranged for the
onward journey to Kolkata for the passengers. Just when Mr. Jon Targaryen was
about to board his onward flight to Kolkata, he was arrested for having in his check-in
baggage 50 live cartridges.
6) That he was accused of committing an offence under Section 30 of the Arms Act,
1959 and was summoned by the learned magistrate.
B. HATE INCITED BY MRS SHAE TARGRYEN
7) That Mrs Shae Targaryen on the day after the arrest of her husband published an
article highlighting the fact that her husband was arrested for an offence under section
30 of Arms Act, 1959.

8) That Mrs Shae Targaryen with intent of inciting hate mongering among communities
linked the incident of her husband‟s arrest with the fact that the government has
targeted her husband as he belongs to minority community. She also alleged the chief
minister to be on his way to organise genocide against minority community.
9) That immediately after the publication of the said statement Mrs Targaryen received
an email telling her to stop publishing such blogs.
10) That Mrs Targaryen filed a complaint and it was found that she herself was liable to
be charged u/s 153A, 153B and 295A of the IPC.
11) That the magistrate directed the police to register an FIR against Mrs Targaryen.
C. MATTER BEFORE THE COURT
12) Hence both Mr. & Mrs Targaryen filed this matter before the High Court which is
now listed for joint hearing.

ISSUES RAISED
ISSUE I
WHETHER MR. TARGARYEN COMMITTED AN OFFENCE U/S 30 OF THE

ARMS ACT, 1959?
ISSUE II
WHETHER THE PROSECUTION UNDER SECTION 30 OF THE ARMS ACT, 1959,

IMPINGED UPON MR. JON TARGARYEN’S RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 19(1)(G)
TO CARRY ON HIS PROFESSION?
ISSUE III
WHETHER A MAGISTRATE CAN DIRECT REGISTRATION OF AN FIR UNDER

SECTIONS 153A, 153B AND 295A, MORE PARTICULARLY WHEN SANCTION
UNDER SECTION 196 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE HAS NOT
BEEN OBTAINED?
ISSUE IV
WHETHER SECTIONS 295A, 153A AND 153B ARE VIOLATIVE OF RIGHTS

UNDER ARTICLE 19 OF THE CONSTITUTION?

SUMMARY OF PLAEDINGS
I. WHETHER MR. TARGARYEN COMMITTED AN OFFENCE U/S 30 OF THE

ARMS ACT, 1959?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon‟ble High Court that an offence u/s 30 of the Arms
Act, 1959, was committed by Mr. Jon Targaryen since [1.1] he violated the provisions of
licence and rules of Arms Act, 1959; [1.2] violated the provisions of the Bureau of Civil
Aviation Security; [1.3] violated the provisions of Aircraft Security Rules, 2003.
II. WHETHER THE PROSECUTION UNDER SECTION 30 OF THE ARMS ACT,

1959, IMPINGED UPON MR. JON TARGARYEN’S RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE
19(1)(G) TO CARRY ON HIS PROFESSION?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon‟ble Court that Mr. Jon Targaryen‟s right under Art.
19(1)(g) to carry on his profession was not violated since [2.1] prosecution u/s 30 of the
Arms Act, 1959, against Mr. Targaryen did not impinge upon his right under Art.
19(1)(g); [2.2] restrictions imposed on fundamental right is reasonable restriction within
Art. 19(6) and valid; [2.3] the Government has met the doctrine of legitimate expectation.
III. WHETHER A MAGISTRATE CAN DIRECT REGISTRATION OF AN FIR

UNDER SECTIONS 153A, 153B AND 295A, MORE PARTICULARLY WHEN
SANCTION UNDER SECTION 196 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE HAS NOT BEEN OBTAINED?
It is most respectfully submitted that a Magistrate can direct registration of an FIR u/s
153A, 153B & 295A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, without obtaining sanction u/s 196
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, since [3.1] the bar u/s 196 applies only to taking
cognizance and not against registration of case; [3.2] Mere technicality should be ignored.

IV. WHETHER SECTIONS 295A, 153A AND 153B ARE VIOLATIVE OF RIGHTS
It is humbly submitted that Section 295A, 153A and 153B are not violative of rights under
Article 19 of the Constitution since [4.1] The Court has to promote intentions of the
legislature; [4.2] Right under Article 19(1)(a) is subjected to reasonable restrictions under
Article 19(2); [4.3] Section 153A, 153B & 295A cannot be struck down as being
Redundant and Otiose; [4.4] Section 295A is a law imposing reasonable restriction and is
constitutionally valid; [4.5] Section 153A of IPC is law imposing reasonable restriction
and is constitutionally valid; [4.6] Section 153B of IPC is law imposing reasonable
restriction and is Constitutionally valid; [4.7] Indirect Limitation of Fundamental Rights
by Fundamental Duties.

PLEADINGS
1. WHETHER MR. TARGARYEN COMMITTED AN OFFENCE U/S 30 OF THE

ARMS ACT, 1959?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon‟ble High Court that an offence u/s 30 of the Arms
Act, 1959, was committed by Mr. Jon Targaryen since [1.1] he violated the provisions of
licence and rules of Arms Act, 1959; [1.2] violated the provisions of the Bureau of Civil
Aviation Security; [1.3] violated the provisions of Aircraft Security Rules, 2003.
1.1 Mr. Targaryen violated the provisions of licence and rules of Arms Act, 1959.
It is humbly submitted that section 30 of the Arms Act, 1959, lays down the punishment for
the contravention of the licence or rules and that an offence as such has been made out u/s
30 of the Arms Act, 1959, as the petitioner Mr. Targaryen violated the provisions of his
licence and the rules made thereunder.
Section 30 of the Arms Act states:
“Whoever contravenes any condition of a licence or any provision of this act or any rule
made there under, for which no punishment is provided elsewhere in this act shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to [six months] or with fine
which may extend to [two thousand] rupees or with both.”
Mr. Jon Targaryen had an arms licence that allowed him the possession of 500 live
cartridges of all legal bores1 at all times but it is maintained that he possessed a licence for
the possession of the same and not its transport. Further, the arms licence possessed by Mr.
Targaryen had no stipulation in relation to carrying of cartridges on flights in India.2
A licence shall not be granted for acquisition, possession or carrying of arms or ammunition
of categories I(b), I(c) and I(d) unless they have been imported into India with the sanction
1
Moot Proposition, ¶ 1.
2

of the Central Govt.3 Mr. Targaryen did not obtain any prior sanction of the Central Govt.
for bringing in Live Cartridges. Live Cartridges comes under the category of ammunition.4
Further, it is submitted that a licence in Form VIII may be granted to any bona fide
traveller, proceeding from the place of his arrival in India to his place of destination in
India, for the possession and carrying of Arms or Ammunition for the duration of the
Journey, by the licencing authority at the place of arrival.5
It is submitted that the licence possessed by Mr. Targaryen was one that he had obtained
under Form III of Schedule III provided in the Arms Rules, 1962, that licences the
acquisition, possession or carriage of arms and ammunition for Sport/Protection/Display
purpose.6
For the transport or carriage of arms or ammunition on a journey in or through any part of
India, a licence under Form VII of Schedule III needs to be possessed7, which Mr.
Targaryen failed to carry and thus his detention u/s 30 of the Arms Act is justified.
It is submitted that Mr. Targaryen must have obtained a Traveller‟s (Temporary) Licence
for the possession and carrying of Arms and Ammunition for the duration of his journey
from the “Port” or other place of his arrival in India to the place of his destination in India
under the Form VIII of Schedule III of Arms Rules, 1962, 8 and his failure to do so makes
him liable to be charged u/s 30 of the Arms Act, 1959, as he did not possess an appropriate
licence for the carriage of the cartridges on the flight and his act was against the provisions
of the licence which he possessed. In the instant case, Mr. Targaryen did not obtain any
such permission from the appropriate authority.
.
1.2 Mr. Targaryen violated the provisions of the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security.
It is humbly submitted that carriage of 50 live cartridges by Mr. Jon Targaryen on the
domestic flight from Delhi to Kolkata was illegal as it violated the provisions of the Bureau
of Civil Aviation Security.
3
Rule 8(a) of the Arms Rules, 1962.
4
Surinder v. State, (1994) 4 SCC 366.
5
Rule 17(1) of the Arms Rules, 1962.
6
Schedule III, Form III of the Arms Rules,1962.
7
Schedule III, Form VII of the Arms Rules,1962.
8
Schedule III, Form VIII of the Arms Rules,1962.

It is submitted that even though the carriage of ammunitions by Mr. Targaryen was well
within the permissible limits of the BCAS Rules, the rules even state that there must be a
legal declaration about the carriage of the same at the time of check-in. The declaration may
be oral or written.
Since Mr. Targaryen failed to make the declaration at the time of check-in for the domestic
flight from Delhi to Kolkata, it is hereby maintained that he violated provision of the
BCAS.
1.3 Violation of the other provisions for the Aircraft Security.
It is submitted that, Aircraft Security Rules, 2003, provides for the prohibition to carry
weapons or explosive.-
(1)No person shall enter aerodrome or the aircraft with any arm, ammunition or explosive;
Provided that the provisions of this sub-rule shall not be applicable (i) to the Aviation
Security Group, Armed forces and police personnel required to carry their arms or
ammunition in connection with the performance of their duties.
Therefore, in light of above contentions, it is submitted that Mr. Targaryen is liable to be

prosecuted under Section 30 of the Arms Act, 1962.

2. WHETHER THE PROSECUTION UNDER SECTION 30 OF THE ARMS ACT,

1959, IMPINGED UPON MR. JON TARGARYEN’S RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE
19(1)(G) TO CARRY ON HIS PROFESSION?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon‟ble Court that Mr. Jon Targaryen‟s right under Art.
19(1)(g) to carry on his profession was not violated since [2.1] prosecution u/s 30 of the
Arms Act, 1959, against Mr. Targaryen did not impinge upon his right under Art. 19(1)(g);
[2.2] restrictions imposed on fundamental right is reasonable restriction within Art. 19(6)
and valid; [2.3] the Government has met the doctrine of legitimate expectation.
2.1. Prosecution u/s 30 of the Arms Act, 1959, against Mr. Targaryen did not impinge upon
his right under Art. 19(1)(g).
It is submitted that Mr. Jon Targaryen has violated the rules relating to license, since his
license did not permit him to carry cartridges on flights in India.9 A prosecution u/s 30 of
the Arms Act, 1959, was taken up against him.10 The prosecution was taken up to co-
ordinate the rights of the citizen with the necessity of maintaining law and order and
avoiding fifth column activities in the country.11
The right to carry on profession by Mr. Targaryen is subject to Arms Act, 1959, and other
associated laws. Where the right to carry on any profession is created by a statute, the
exercise of that right is subject to terms and condition imposed by the statute, and no
fundamental right is infringed by such terms and conditions.12
The right under Art. 19(1)(g) is not sufficiently broad to encompass activities which are
inherently pernicious or dangerous to society. This are considered res extra commercium
and there is no fundamental right in their trade or business. 13 The right does not entitle
citizens to carryon trade or business in activities which are criminal and in articles or goods
9
10
11
Object & Reason of Arms Act, 1959.
12
Devata Prasad Singh Chaudhuri & Ors v. The Hon'ble The Chief Justice And Judges of Patna High Court,
AIR 1962 SC 201.
13
Narendra Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 430; Cooverjee v. Excise Commissioner, Ajmer, AIR 1954
SC 220; Godawat Pan Masala Products(P.) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 7 SCC 68.

which are obnoxious and injurious to health, safety and welfare of the general public, i.e.
res extra commercium, (outside commerce). There cannot be business in crime.14
The legislature can very well put on restrictions on the time, place or manner in which trade
and business are allowed.15 The state is allowed to regulate the requirements and
qualifications for carrying on a trade or profession. Generally it may also place the carrying
on of trades, businesses and profession under licensing condition, provided that the
conditions are reasonable and the process of granting or refusing license is not arbitrary. 16
2.2. Restrictions imposed on fundamental right is reasonable restriction within Art. 19(6)
and valid.
It is humbly submitted that freedom under Art. 19(1)(g) means that every citizen has the
right to choose his own employment or to take up any trade or calling subject only to the
limits as may be imposed by the State in the interest of public welfare, and the other
grounds mentioned in Art. 19(6).17 The expression „reasonable restriction‟ seeks to strike a
balance between the freedom guaranteed by any of the sub-clause in Cl.(1) of Art. 19 and
the social control permitted by any of Cl. (2) to Cl. (6).18 In order to be reasonable the
restriction must have a reasonable relation to the object which the legislation seeks to
achieve, and must not go in excess of that object.19
Liberty is the right of doing an act which the law permits.20 Liberty is confined and
controlled by law as it is regulated freedom. It is not an abstract or absolute freedom. The
safeguard of liberty is in the good sense of the people and in the system of representative
and responsible Govt. which has been evolved. Liberty is itself the gift of law and may by
law be forfeited or abridged.21
Reasonableness of a restriction has to be determined in an objective manner and from the

stand point of the interests of the general public and not from the point of view of the
persons upon whom the restrictions are imposed or upon abstract considerations.22 In
14
K.P. Sugandh Limited & etc. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors., 2008 CriLJ 1830; Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v.
State Of Karnataka, (1995)1 SCC 574.
15
Krishna Kumar v. State of J&K, AIR 1967 SC 1368; Ibrahim v. R.T.A., (1935) SCR 290.
16
Mineral Development Co. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1960 SC 468.
17
Saghir Ahmed v. State of U.P., (1955) 1 SCR 707; Saudan Singh v. N.D.M.C., AIR 1989 SC 1988.
18
Pothumma v. State of Kerala, AIR 1978 SC 771.
19
Chintamanrao v. State of M.P., (1952) SCR 597.
20
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569.
21
A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla, AIR 1976 SC 1207.
22
Mohd. Hanif Kureshi v. State of Bihar, Air 1958 SC 731.

judging the reasonableness of a restriction the Court must look at it not only from the point
of view if the citizen but also the problem before the legislature and the object sought to be
achieved by the law.23 In other words, a law cannot be said to be unreasonable merely
because, in a given case it operates harsh.24 The effect of law is another test of
reasonableness.25
In adjudging validity of a restriction, the Courts have necessarily to approach it from the
point of view of furthering the social interest which is the purpose of the legislation. For the
same reason corresponding laws of other countries, made under different conditions cannot
be referred to for the purpose of determining the reasonableness of our laws.26
The Supreme Court through various cases over a long period of time has out effort to
formulate a guideline through which reasonableness of any particular act can be judged.27
The crux of the guidelines is as follows.
A. Restriction can be imposed only by or under the authority of law. Restrictions cannot be
imposed by the executive action without legal authority.28
B. The restriction must be „reasonable‟.29
C. Restriction must be related to the purpose specifically mentioned in these clauses.30
Drawing inference from the instant case, all of the above mentioned points are in
consonance with the argument of no violation of right under Art. 19(1)(g). Firstly, the
restriction was imposed under the authority of law i.e., sec. 30 of the Arms Act, 1959.31
Secondly, the restriction is reasonable because Mr. Targaryen is being made answerable to
his crimes u/s 30 of the Arms Act and not being disqualified from practicing as a
professional shooter. Lastly, the restriction is in the interest of general public which is
specifically inscribed in Art. 19(6).
The state has in the interest of the public, the right to lay down reasonable conditions
subject to which a business may be carried on,32 and if power is conferred by the Legislature
23
Pothumma v. State of Kerala, AIR 1978 SC 771.
24
State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas, AIR 1969 SC 634.
25
Kochuni K.K. v. State of Madras, AIR 1960 SC 1080.
26
Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 554.
27
Kashyap, S.C., CONSTITUIONAL LAW OF INDIA, Vol. 1,(2008), Pg. 212-213.
28
Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 748.
29
Virendra v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 896; Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P., (1957) SCR 860.
30
Sakal Papers v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 305.
31
32
All Delhi Rickshaw Union v. Municipal Corporation, AIR 1987 SC 648.

upon an administrative authority to proceed to grant or refuse or monitor the license, not in
an arbitrary manner but in a quasi-judicial manner, having regard to the conditions laid
down by the Legislature, and in accordance with the principles of natural justice,33 the
restriction cannot be said to be unreasonable.
2.3. The Government has met the doctrine of legitimate expectation.
The doctrine of legitimate expectation has been explained in Food corporation of India v.
M/s Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries,34 as under:
“The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by
itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may
render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a
Legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non- arbitrariness, a necessary
concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring
due consideration a fair decision making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant
is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the
question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant's perception but in
larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh what
would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision
of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non-
arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of legitimate expectation gets
assimilated in the rule of law and operates in our legal system in this manner and to this
extent.”
In the case of Council of Civil Service Unions & Others v. Minister for the Civil Service35,
the House of Lords indicated the extent to which the legitimate expectation interfaces with
exercise of discretionary power. The impugned action was upheld as reasonable, made on
due consideration of all relevant factors including the legitimate expectation of the
applicant, wherein the considerations of national security were found to outweigh that
which otherwise would have been the reasonable expectation of the applicant.
33
Mineral Development Co. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1960 SC 468.
34
(1993) 1 SCC 71. See also, M/s Shanti Vijay and Co. & Ors. v. Princess Fatima Fouzia & Ors., 1980 (1) SCR
459; Preston v. Ireland Revenue Commissioners, 1985 A.C. 835; Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors. v.
Minister for the Civil Service, 1985 A.C. 374.
35
1985 A.C. 374 (H.L.)

In the instant case the act of the Govt. is in accordance with the legitimate expectation and
within the public interest at large.
It is humbly submitted by the respondents in the instant matter, that the Govt. merely
complied with the statutory provisions of Arms Act, 1959, and did not put any unreasonable
restriction on Mr. Jon Targaryen‟s right to profession under Art. 19(1)(g). He was
prosecuted u/s 30 of the Arms Act, 1959, because he violated laws made thereunder relating
to license.
Therefore, in the light of above contentions, it is humbly submitted that Mr. Jon
Targaryen‟s right under Art. 19(1)(g) to carry on his profession was not violated.

3. WHETHER A MAGISTRATE CAN DIRECT REGISTRATION OF AN FIR

UNDER SECTIONS 153A, 153B AND 295A, MORE PARTICULARLY WHEN
SANCTION UNDER SECTION 196 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
HAS NOT BEEN OBTAINED?
It is most respectfully submitted that a Magistrate can direct registration of an FIR u/s
153A, 153B & 295A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, without obtaining sanction u/s 196 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, since [3.1] the bar u/s 196 applies only to taking
cognizance and not against registration of case; [3.2] Mere technicality should be ignored.
3.1. The bar u/s 196 applies only to taking cognizance and not against registration of case.
Section 196 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, makes it mandatory to acquire prior
sanction of the Central Govt. or State Govt. before taking cognizance of offence committed
u/s 153A & 295A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and prior sanction of the Central Govt. or
State Govt. or District Magistrate before taking cognizance of offence committed u/s 153B
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.36
The word “cognizance” was used in the Code to indicate a point when a Magistrate or a
Judge first takes judicial notice of an offence and that it is a different thing from the
initiation of proceedings.37 Taking cognizance does not involve any formal action or intend
action of any kind but occurs as soon as a magistrate as such applies his mind to the
suspected commission of an offence.38 Before it can be said that any Magistrate has taken
cognizance of any offence, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of
petition but must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way.39
For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to
direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all registration
of FIR involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the
36
S. A. Venkataraman v. The State, AIR 1958 SC 107; Shalibhadra Shah v. Swami Krishna Bharati, 1981 Cr LJ
113.
37
Pritam Nath v. State of Punjab, (2002) SCC (Cri) 1320.
38
R.R. Chari v. State of U.P., AIR 1951 SC 207; Darshan Singh Ram Kishan v. State of Maharashtra, AIR
1971 SC 2372.
39
Narayandas Bhagwandas Madhavdas v. State of W.B., AIR 1959 SC 1118.

commission of the cognizable offence in a book kept by the officer-in-charge of the police
station as indicated in section 154 of the Code.40
In the case of State of Karnataka & Anr. v. Pastor P. Raju41, the Apex Court in regards to
sec. 196 observed that „the opening words of the Section are "No Court shall take
cognizance" and consequently the bar created by the provision is against taking of
cognizance by the Court. There is no bar against registration of a criminal case or
investigation by the police agency or submission of a report by the police on completion of
investigation, as contemplated by Section 173 CrPC. If a criminal case is registered,
investigation of the offence is done and the police submits a report as a result of such
investigation before a Magistrate without the previous sanction of the Central Government
or of the State Government or of the District Magistrate, there will be no violation
of Section 196 CrPC and no illegality of any kind would be committed.‟
In the instant matter, neither any police report had been submitted nor did the Magistrate
order remanding Mrs Shae Targaryen to judicial custody. The Magistrate had merely passed
an order for registration of FIR which in no case amounts to taking cognizance of the case.
3.2. Mere technicality should be ignored.
It is humbly submitted that where sanction is obtained after initiation of proceedings but
before conviction, the defect being only a technical and in absence of prejudice to the
accused the trial will not be illegal.42 If the sanction is obtained after the arrest of the
accused and after the examination of some prosecution witnesses but before the framing of
charge, the requirements of this sec. are fulfilled.43 When a case has been initiated and has
ended in conviction, it is obvious that there never was any innocent person to be protected
from prosecution, the want of sanction becomes irrelevant.44In other words Sec. 196 was
designed to safeguard persons from frivolous accusations, not as a loophole of escape for
persons committing an offence.45
40
Suresh Chand Jain v. State of M.P. & Anr., (2001) 2 SCC 628.
41
(2006) 6 SCC 728.
42
Abdul Rahman v. Emperor, AIR 1935 (Cal) 316.
43
Ali Mia And Ors. v. Emperor, AIR 1927 Cal 296
44
In re Venkataramiah, AIR 1938 Mad. 130.
45
In Re Mallimoggala, (1937) 2 MLJ 862.

In fact, the lacuna, if any, relating to sanction can be remedied in the course of the trial.46
Unless prejudice has been caused to the accused, due to irregularity in the grant of sanction,
the trial of the accused will not be vitiated.47
Therefore, in the light of above contentions, it is humbly submitted that the Magistrate can
direct registration of an FIR u/s 153A, 153B & 295A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860,
without obtaining sanction u/s 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as the sec. only
bars the taking of cognizance of the offence.
46
M.K. Gopalam & Anr. v. State of M.P., AIR 1954 SC 362.
47
In re N. Patnaik, 1972 Cut LJ 1173.

4. WHETHER SECTIONS 295A, 153A AND 153B ARE VIOLATIVE OF RIGHTS

It is humbly submitted that Section 295A, 153A and 153B are not violative of rights under
Article 19 of the Constitution since [4.1] The Court has to promote intentions of the
legislature; [4.2] Right under Article 19(1)(a) is subjected to reasonable restrictions under
Article 19(2); [4.3] Section 153A, 153B & 295A cannot be struck down as being Redundant
and Otiose; [4.4] Section 295A is a law imposing reasonable restriction and is
constitutionally valid; [4.5] Section 153A of IPC is law imposing reasonable restriction and
is constitutionally valid; [4.6] Section 153B of IPC is law imposing reasonable restriction
and is Constitutionally valid; [4.7] Indirect Limitation of Fundamental Rights by
Fundamental Duties.
4.1. The Court has to promote intention of the legislature.
It is most respectfully submitted that the presumption while dealing with constitutional
validity of any provision must be in favour of it being valid. 48 It is presumed that the
intention of the legislature is always true.49 It is the obligation of the Court to promote
intention of legislature.50 Language employed in the statute is a determinative factor of the
legislative intent.51 The rule of presumption of constitutionality of laws is that when any law
is under judicial review, it is for the person challenging its constitutionality to establish its
unconstitutionality.52 The burden is on the Plaintiff to establish the invalidity of legal
provision to such a degree to leave no reasonable doubt.53 The Apex Court in the case of
Govt. of A.P. v. Smt. P. Laxmi Devi54, held that invalidating legislation is a grave step and
should never be taken lightly.
48
Namit Sharma v. Union of India, (2013) 10 SCC 359.
49
Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (2010) 10 SCC 744.
50
Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur v. Punjab SEB, (2010) 13 SCC 216.
51
Mohammed Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar, (2010) 4 SCC 653; J.P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 5
SCC 134; State v. Parmeshwaran Subramani (2009) 9 SCC 724.
52
Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr & Ors., AIR 1971 SC 2486.
53
Ibid 1.
54
AIR 2008 SC 1640.

4.2. Right under Article 19(1)(a) is subjected to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2).
It is most respectfully submitted that in India, the well-recognized limitations on the rights
embodied in Art. 19(1)(a) to (g) are expressly incorporated in Art. 19(2) to (6). The rights
represent the claims of the individual, the limitation protect the claims of other individuals
and the claims of society or the State.55 There cannot be any such thing as absolute or
uncontrolled liberty wholly freed from restrain for that would lead to anarchy and
disorder.56 Art. 19 of the constitution gives a list of individual liberties and prescribes in the
various clauses the restraints that may be placed upon them by law so that they may not be
in conflict with public welfare or general morality.57 The restriction must have the quality of
reasonableness.58
In applying the test of reasonableness (which is the most crucial consideration), the broad
criterion is whether the law strikes a proper balance between social control on the one hand
and the rights of the individual on the other hand.59 Therefore, the Court must take into
account factors like nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying
purpose of the restriction imposed, evil sought to be remedied by the law, its extent and
urgency, how far the restriction is or is not proportionate to the evil and the prevailing
conditions at that time.60
In Narendra Kumar v. Union of India61, It was held by the Apex Court it is reasonable to
think that the makers of the Constitution considered the word „restriction‟ to be sufficiently
wide to save laws „inconsistent‟ with Art. 19(1), or „taking away the rights‟ conferred by
the Article, provided this inconsistency or taking away was reasonable in the interest of the
different matters mentioned in the clause.
The words „reasonable restriction‟ corresponds to societal norms of decency, e.g. respect of
rights or reputation of others, protection of national security or of public order, or of public
health or morals etc.62 In short, in judging the reasonableness of a restriction, the court must
look at it not only from the point of view of the citizen, but also the problem before the
55
M. Nagaraj and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (2006) 8 SCC 212.
56
Abdur Rahim v. State of Madras, (1961) II LLJ 213 Mad; Raj Narain v. State, AIR 1961 All 531; Damodar
Ganesh & Ors. v. State, AIR 1951 Bom 459.
57
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27.
58
Virendra v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 896; Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P., (1957) SCR 860; Lakshmi
Khandsari v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 872.
59
M.J. Sivani And Ors v. State Of Karnataka And Ors, AIR 1995 SC 1770; Jamshed Ansari v. High Court Of
Judicature At Allahabad, Civil Appeal NO. 6120 OF 2016.
60
State of Madras v. V.G. Row, (1952) SCR 597; Harakchand v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 1453; State of
Maharashtra v. Himmatbhai, AIR 1970 SC 1157.
61
AIR 1960 SC 430.
62
Director General, Directorate General of Doordarshan v. Anand Patwardhan, AIR 2006 SC 3346.

Legislature and the object which is sought to be achieved by the law.63 Where the law is
intended to protect Social welfare, the court must see the prevailing social values,64 and the
circumstances obtaining at the time when the restriction is sought to be imposed.65 On
Scrutiny, if the court finds, that the law has not overstepped the constitutional limitations,
the court will have to uphold the law, whether it likes the law or not.66
4.3. Section 153A, 153B & 295A cannot be struck down as being Redundant and Otiose.
Redundancy means the fault of introducing superfluous matter into a legal instrument. 67 Ut
res magis valeat quam periat is a well settled principle of interpretation.68 It implies that the
courts should strongly lean against any construction which tends to reduce a statute to a
futility hence, the construction given by the court should further the object of incorporation
of that provision, should be read harmoniously and should not render another provision
redundant.69 Court should not impute redundancy or tautology to the Parliament.70
Construction that leaves without effect any part of the language of the statute will normally
be rejected.71 Besides this settled legal position vis-à-vis redundancy, it is submitted that the
power of the legislature to make laws is plenary.72 In light of this, it is submitted that first
the court does not have the power to strike down a law as redundant and secondly in any
case, Sec. 295A, 153A & 153B is not redundant or otiose.
4.4. Section 295A is a law imposing reasonable restriction and is constitutionally valid.
Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, penalises deliberate and malicious acts
intended to outrage religious feelings of any class, by insulting its religion or religious
beliefs.73 It does not penalise every act of insult but penalises only deliberate acts, so that
even by any expression insult is in fact caused, the expression is not an offence if the insult
63
Pothumma v. State of Kerela, AIR 1978 SC 771.
64
Sivrajan v. Union of India, AIR 1959 SC 556.
65
State of U.P. v. Kaushaliya, AIR 1964 SC 416.
66
Anwar v. State of J&K, AIR 1971 SC 337; Arunachal v. Khudiram, (1994) Supp. (1) 615.
67
Henry Campbell Black, BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY 1009 (Bryan A. Garner, 9 th Ed., 2009).
68
Tinsukhia Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, (1989) 3 SCC 709.
69
T.M.A Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481; Indian Medical Association v. Union of
India, (2011) 7 SCC 179.
70
Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552.
71
L.I.C v. B.J. Bahadur, (1981) 1 SCC 315.
72
A.B. Kafaltiya, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 214 (2008).
73
Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

offered is unwilling or unintended.74 There would be deliberate and malicious intention if a

person does anything which has a tinge of intention of outraging the religious feelings. 75
Section 295A is not violative of Art. 19(1)(a) of the constitution.76 This section is well
within the protection of Cl. (2) of Art. 19 of the constitution and its validity is beyond
question.77
In Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P.78, it was observed in relation to sec. 295A that section
only punishes the aggravated form of insult to religion when it is perpetrated with the
deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of class of citizens.
The calculated tendency of this aggravated form of insult is to clearly disrupt the public
order and the section, which penalises such activities, is well within the protection of Cl. (2)
of Art. 19 of constitution, as being a law imposing reasonable restriction on the exercise of
the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(a). Having regard to
the ingredients of the offence created by the impugned section, there cannot be any
possibility of this law being applied for the purposes not sanction by the Constitution. The
SC therefore upheld the validity of this section.
4.5. Section 153A of IPC is law imposing reasonable restriction and is constitutionally
valid.
Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, punishes activities promoting enmity
between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language,
etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony.79 The object of sec. 153A is to
prevent breaches of public tranquillity which might result from excited feelings of enmity
between classes of people.80 Insofar as the offence u/s 153A is concerned, it is only where
the written and spoken words have the tendency or intention of creating public disorder or
disturbance of law and order or affect public tranquillity that the law needs to step in and
prevent such activity.81 Acts which promotes such feelings or attempt to promote such
74
Jayamala & Ors. v. State, 2013 Cr LJ 622; Baba Khalil Ahamed v. State of U.P., AIR 1960 All 715; Shiv
Ram Das v. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 Punj. 28.
75
Public Prosecutor v. P. Ramaswami, AIR 1964 Mad. 258; Sant Das Maheshwari v. Babu Ram Jodoun &
Ors., AIR 1969 All 436.
76
Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P., (1957) SCR 860; N. Veerbrahmam v. State of A.P., AIR 1959 AP 572; State
of Mysore v. Henry Rodrigues & Anr., (1962) 2 Cr LJ 564; Public Prosecutor v. P. Ramaswami, AIR 1964
Mad. 258; Sant Das Maheshwari v. Babu Ram Jodoun & Ors., AIR 1969 All 436.
77
Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P., (1957) SCR 860.
78
(1957) SCR 860; See also Baragur Ramachandrappa v. State of Karnataka, 1998 Cr LJ 3639.
79
Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
80
The Trustees of Safadar Hashmi Memorial trust v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2001 Cr LJ 3689(Del).
81
Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1995 SC 1785.

feelings undoubtedly affect public order in its wide meaning, though there may be no
immediate incitement to violence.82 The test of punishment is whether the speech was
violent and whether there was any intention to excite people.83
Section 153A is constitutionally valid. It is not violative of Art. 19(1)(a) of Constitution,

and is saved by Art. 19(2) of the Constitution.84 Referring to sec. 153A, the court in
Salgolsem Indramani Singh & Ors v. State of Manipur85, observed that, A careful perusal
of Article 19(2) of the Constitution makes it clear that reasonable restriction on freedom of
speech and expression can be imposed in the interest of the security of the State and so it is
to be considered whether if by mere spoken or written words or signs or visible
representation or otherwise disaffection towards the Government is brought about or
attempted to be brought about, any restriction can be placed under Clause (2) of Article 19
of the Constitution.
In Gopal Vinayak Godse v. U.O.I.86, it was held that, the challenge to the constitutionality
of Section 153A on the ground that it violates the guarantee of free speech and expression
must be rejected because the Section seeks to punish only (a) such acts which have the
tendency to promote enmity or hatred between different classes or (b) such acts which are
prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different classes and which have the
tendency to disturb public tranquillity. These acts are clearly calculated to disturb public
order and so the limitations imposed by Section 153A are in the interests of public
order. Article 19(2) would therefore save Section 153A as being within the scope of
permissible legislative restrictions on the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a).
The limitations imposed by sec. 153A are in interest of public order. 87 Art. 19(2) would
therefore, save sec 153A as within the scope of permissible legislative restriction on the
fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(a) hence it is not unconstitutional.
82
Devi Soren v. The State, AIR 1954 Pat. 254.
83
Munshi Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1935 Oudh 347.
84
Devi Soren v. The State, AIR 1954 Pat. 254; Salgolsem Indramani Singh & Ors. v. State of Manipur, 1955 Cr
LJ 184; Gopal Vinayak Godse v. U.O.I & Ors, AIR 1971 Bom. 56; Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR
1962 SC 955.
85
1955 Cr LJ 184.
86
AIR 1971 Bom. 56.
87
Baku Rao Patel v. The State, 1973 RLR 637

4.6. Section 153B of IPC is law imposing reasonable restriction and is constitutionally
valid.
Section 153B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, punishes imputations, assertions, prejudicial
to national integration.88 This section supplements the existing provision like sections 153A
& 295A.89 Our country is inhabited by persons belonging to different religions, castes and
classes. Our Constitution is based upon the principle that we must all sink or swim together
and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not in division. The
preamble of the Constitution solemnly declares the resolve to secure to its citizens fraternity
and unity of the nation.90 The use of the words "in the interest of" makes the ambit of the
protection very wide and any provision which has been enacted in the interest of public
order would be valid. If people were permitted to freely attempt to commit or commit acts
promoting feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of the citizens of India, the
result would be public disorder.91 Sec. 153B being a law imposing reasonable restriction in
the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the state and public order,
falls well within the ambit of Art. 19(2) and is constitutionally valid.
4.7. Indirect Limitation on Fundamental Rights by Fundamental Duty.
By reason of Fundamental Duties inserted by Article 51-A, nobody should, in exercise of

freedom of speech and expression, do any of the following acts92:
a) To disparage the Constitution its ideals and institutions, the National Flag and the
National Anthem;
b) To undermine the Sovereignty, Unity and Integrity of India;
c) To disrupt the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people;
d) To insult the rich heritage of our Composite culture.
Though this duties are not self executory and the constitution itself does not sanction any
punishment for their violation, it is clear that once they have incorporated in the
constitution, Courts shall have to lead the Duties along with the Rights to make a
88
Sec. 153B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
89
Hari Singh Gour, Penal Law of India, 11th Ed., vol. II, p.1464 to 1466.
90
Sheikh Wajih Uddin v. The State, AIR 1963 All 335.
91
Ibid 40.
92
The other limitation imposed by the 42th amendment act, 1976.

harmonious interpretation of both.93 Where the constitutionality of an Act is challenged the

court may look at Article 51-A to uphold it.94
In the instant case, the author Mrs Targaryen would have been quite justified in pointing out
what according to her is the injustice in the prosecution started against her husband Mr.
Targaryen u/s 30 of the Arms Act, 1959. But it was totally unnecessary for the purpose of
the article to comment that House Baratheon is rounding up people belonging to the
minority community and having them arrested. The statement that the government is
organising genocide was totally un-called for. The remarks made by the author of the article
are totally irrelevant for the purpose she had in mind. There being no justification or
relevancy for these remarks it can be safely inferred that they were made with deliberate and
malicious intention to outrage the feeling of the majority House Baratheon.
Therefore in light of above contentions, it is humbly submitted that Sections 295A, 153A
and 153B are intra vires to the rights under Article 19 as they are well within protection of
reasonable restrictions provided under Article 19(2) of the Constitution.
93
Minerva Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789; In re Kerela Education bill, 1957, AIR 1958 SC 956;
Sheikh Bishmillah vs State Of Madhya Pradesh And Ors., 1994 (0) MPLJ 224.
94
Mohan v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 1.

PRAYER
IN THE LIGHT OF THE ISSUES RAISED, ARGUMENTS ADVANCED AND

AUTHORITIES CITED, THE COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS HUMBLY PRAYS THAT
THE HON‟BLE HIGH COURT BE PLEASED:
A. TO HOLD THAT MR. JON TARGARYEN HAS COMMITTED AN OFFENCE

UNDER SECTION 30 OF ARMS ACT, 1959.
B. TO DECLARE THAT PROSECUTION UNDER SECTION 30 OF THE ARMS
ACT, 1959, DID NOT IMPINGE UPON MR. JON TARGARYEN‟S RIGHT
UNDER ARTICLE 19(1)(G).
C. TO DECLARE THAT A MAGISTRATE CAN DIRECT REGISTRATION OF
AN FIR UNDER SECTIONS 153A, 153B AND 295A, WHEN SANCTION
UNDER SECTION 196 OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE HAS
NOT BEEN OBTAINED.
D. TO UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF SECTION 153A,
153B & 295A OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860.
AND/OR
PASS ANY ORDER THAT THIS HON‟BLE COURT MAY DEEM FIT IN THE
INTEREST OF JUSTICE, EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE.
AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE COUNSELS FOR
THE RESPONDENTS AS IN DUTY BOUND
SHALL EVER PRAY.
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENTS

Memorial Filed On Behalf of Respondent

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Memorial Filed On Behalf of Respondent

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L E X O M N I A M O O T C O U R T C O M P E T I T I O N | TC 18

IN THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

UNDER SECTION 482 OF CrPC R/W ARTICLE 226 OF

JON TARGARYEN & SHAE TARGARYEN

MEMORIAL SUBMITTED ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 1

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 03-07

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 08-09

STATEMENT OF FACTS 11-12

SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS 14-15

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 2

1. The Arms Act, 1959.

1. A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla, AIR 1976 SC 1207.

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85. State of Mysore v. Henry Rodrigues & Anr., (1962) 2 Cr LJ 564.

1. V.N. Shukla, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (12th ed., 2013).

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 6

18. R.V. Kelkar, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, (5th ed., 2008).

LAW LEXICON AND DICTIONARIES

1. Bryan A. Garner, BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY, (2nd ed., 2004).

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 7

AIR All India Reporter

CHN. Calcutta High Court Notes

CrLJ Criminal Law Journal

CrPC Criminal Procedure Code

ILR Indian Law Reporter

IPC Indian Penal Code

NOC Notes Of Cases

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 8

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCR Supreme Court Reporter

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A. CASE CONCERNING CARTRIDGES

B. HATE INCITED BY MRS SHAE TARGRYEN

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C. MATTER BEFORE THE COURT

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WHETHER MR. TARGARYEN COMMITTED AN OFFENCE U/S 30 OF THE

WHETHER THE PROSECUTION UNDER SECTION 30 OF THE ARMS ACT, 1959,

WHETHER A MAGISTRATE CAN DIRECT REGISTRATION OF AN FIR UNDER

WHETHER SECTIONS 295A, 153A AND 153B ARE VIOLATIVE OF RIGHTS

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 13

I. WHETHER MR. TARGARYEN COMMITTED AN OFFENCE U/S 30 OF THE

II. WHETHER THE PROSECUTION UNDER SECTION 30 OF THE ARMS ACT,

III. WHETHER A MAGISTRATE CAN DIRECT REGISTRATION OF AN FIR

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 14

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1. WHETHER MR. TARGARYEN COMMITTED AN OFFENCE U/S 30 OF THE

Section 30 of the Arms Act states:

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1.3 Violation of the other provisions for the Aircraft Security.

Therefore, in light of above contentions, it is submitted that Mr. Targaryen is liable to be

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 18

2. WHETHER THE PROSECUTION UNDER SECTION 30 OF THE ARMS ACT,

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 19

Reasonableness of a restriction has to be determined in an objective manner and from the

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 20

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