Models of Proximate and Ultimate
Causation in Psychology
Galen Alessi
B. F. Skinner saw behavior as a product of three levels of
evolution. J. R. Kantor and Gregory Bateson noted similar
relations. This article describes and applies basic evolu-
tionary concepts to each level: (a) phylogenic, (b) ontogenic,
and (c) cultural evolution. Each level is analyzed in terms
of (a) units of selection, (b) variety of units required for
the selection process, (c) selection pressures, (d) interac-
tions among levels, and(e) implications for understanding
and predicting behavior. Distinguishing between models
of proximate and ultimate causation, as in biology, may
help clarify research problems posed by, andfacilitate bet-
ter communication among, psychologists.
Structuralists and developmentalists tend to neglect selective
contingencies in their search for causal principles in organization
or growth. . . . The proper recognition of the selective action
of the environment will require a change in our conception of
the origin of behavior, a change perhaps as extensive as that of
our former conceptions of the origin of species. (Skinner, 1981,
p. 504)
Complex forms are often built by a much simpler (often a very
simple) system of generating factors. Parts are connected in in-
tricate ways through growth, and alteration of one may resound
through the entire organism and change it in a variety of un-
suspected ways. (Gould, 1980, p. 42)
B. F. Skinner (1981) proposed that human behavior could
be explained scientifically by a thorough knowledge of
three levels of selection by consequences: phylogenic, on-
togenic, and cultural. He noted, "Each of the three levels
of variation and selection has its own discipline—the first,
biology; the second, psychology; and the third, anthro-
pology" (p. 502). Phylogenic selection is familiar to us as
Darwin's natural selection, which describes the organic
evolution of species from ancestor populations. Ontogenic
selection refers to the development of behavior patterns
within an individual's repertoire during its own lifetime
through operant reinforcement. Cultural selection refers
to the development of various coordinated practices
within a clearly circumscribed verbal community. J. R.
Kantor (1959, p. 43) also described interbehavior as an
outcome of multilevel evolutionary processes.
The anthropologist Gregory Bateson similarly pro-
posed that human behavior could be understood natu-
ralistically through knowledge of what he called the three
"great stochastic processes," operating at the phylogenic,
ontogenic plus cultural, and ecosystem levels (Bateson,
November 1992 • American Psychologist
Copyright 1992 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0OO3-066X/92/$2.OO
Vol. 47. No. II. 1359-1370
Western Michigan University
1972, pp. 429-430; 1979, chap. 6). Although Skinner
and Bateson irreconcilably disagreed on many substantive
issues, their ideas may complement each other on this
broad theme.
How do the levels of selection by consequences work,
and why do they work in this way? Do the levels of se-
lection interact? What are implications for the life sci-
ences? Why do many psychologists (and others) resist this
model? Might an understanding of these issues engender
greater appreciation and cooperation among scientists and
practitioners across various scientific disciplines and sub-
specialties within disciplines? What follows addresses
these issues.
The three levels of selection can be compared and
contrasted within the broader framework of evolutionary
theory. The next sections describe key parts of the evo-
lutionary process and the manner in which causation is
used in explaining outcomes of that process. This frame-
work is then used to examine each of the levels of selection
by consequences.
Models of Proximate and Ultimate Causation
Modern biologists distinguish between two models of
causation for living systems: proximate and ultimate cau-
sation (cf. Mayr, 1985, 1988, chap. 2). "There is always
a proximate set of causes and an ultimate set of causes;
both have to be explained and interpreted for a complete
understanding of the given phenomenon" (1988, p. 28).
"There is much to suggest that the difference is, to a con-
siderable part, merely a matter of degree. Classical me-
chanics is, so to speak, at one end of the continuous spec-
trum, and biology is at the other" (1988, p. 35).
Proximate causation answers "how" questions. For
example, how do biological traits occur? It yields mi-
croexplanations to questions such as how DNA programs
are transformed into proteins and how cells, behaviors,
and organisms become distinguished by differing struc-
I would like to thank David Cowan, Arthur Falk, R. Wayne Fuqua,
Richard Malott, and Paul Mountjoy for their careful reading of the
rough draft of this article, their extensive constructive feedback on it,
and the extended discussions that ensued over the issues herein. I also
thank William S. Verplanck and the other anonymous journal reviewers
for their careful and probing evaluation. The article has benefited sub-
stantially from this interactive feedback and selection process, as they
helped me evolve what I wished to say. Any errors, however, remain my
responsibility.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Galen
Alessi, Department of Psychology, Western Michigan University, Kala-
mazoo, Ml 49008.
1359
tures such as wings, flippers, or arms. Proximate causation
is the domain of functional biology, and its causes are
independent of evolutionary contingencies.
Ultimate causation answers questions of why or
"How come?" For example, why does the DNA program
in bats call for wings located anatomically where in dol-
phins it calls for flippers and in humans it calls for arms?
Using an evolutionary model, it yields macroexplanations
to "How come?" questions by describing the processes
by which the traits (analyzed by the sciences of proximate
causation) evolved. This is a historically contingent evo-
lutionary process in which causes "have been incorpo-
rated into the system through many thousands of gen-
erations of natural selection" (Mayr, 1985, p. 28). Ulti-
mate causation is the domain of evolutionary biology.
Evolutionary Processes Produce Stochastic
Sequences
Sciences of ultimate causation study evolutionary pro-
cesses, the outcomes of which can be called stochastic.
"If a sequence of events combines a random component
with a selective process so that only certain outcomes of
the random are allowed to endure, that sequence is said
to be stochastic" (Bateson, 1979, p. 230). Key components
in the evolutionary process include (a) a source of internal
variety (random or systematic); (b) an external process
that selects those features that result in a new pattern of
optimization or adaptability; (c) causal independence of
Items a and b, at least for organic evolution; and (d) the
iteration of the process over a series of cycles. Internal
random or systematic variability diverges from, whereas
the selective process converges toward, a dynamic point
of ecological balance.
Because of the randomizing component, evolution-
ary stochastic processes are not amenable to specific or
exact predictions. Because of the systematic selection
component, they are amenable to generic or probabilistic
predictions within limits set by the randomization com-
ponent. Outcomes of such processes thus might be con-
sidered to be determined and explainable post hoc, but
only generically predictable a priori.
A property of evolutionary stochastic processes
called sensitive dependence on initial conditions allows
minor factors to have huge effects, given time (cf. Ma-
ruyama, 1963; see also "the butterfly effect," Gleick, 1987,
pp. 16-23). Over time, the evolutionary stream encoun-
ters many small nudges along the way. One tiny nudge
can create a condition that may be amplified over time
through the selective processes in a way that changes the
species fundamentally.
Avoiding Teleologic (Goal-Directed) Causes
A persistent difficulty with evolutionary theory has been
that of avoiding teleological causes, or the idea that evo-
lution aims toward some final goal, which would place
causes after their effects. Reasons seem like causes. Logical
sequences seem like causal sequences. Means-end rela-
tions seem like cause-effect relations (cf. Falk, 1981). A
solution to this dilemma was provided in the mid-20th
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century by cybernetics (root meaning "steersman"),
which in part studies how machines can be made to act
in ways that appear purposive (cf. Wiener, 1954).
Systems of positive and negative feedback calibrated
the operation of a machine (e.g., guided missile) so that
it remained on a set flight path. Feedback compensated
for factors forcing the missile off the path. The machine,
however, had no purpose other than following its flight
path. The path itself was the means to the end, and the
cause of reaching that end lay merely in following the
path, not in attaining the goal. Part of the machine con-
tinuously sampled the output or effect of the means (stay-
ing on the flight path) and used deviations from the means
(deviation from flight path) as feedback, causing an effect
of reinstating the means (planned flight path). The goal
was attained not purposively but as a by-product of stay-
ing on the path. The ultimate causes of reaching the goal
were not in the future goal (target) but instead were
embedded as cause-effect sequences within the means
(path) leading to that goal (cf. Falk, 1981).
Cybernetic models could help explain complicated
behaviors of animals without invoking teleological causes
such as instincts, drives, intentions, and goal images.
Lewis Thomas (1974) described the complex mate seeking
behavior of a moth from a cybernetic rather than a te-
leological perspective:
[The female moth] releases a brief explosion of bombykol, a
single molecule of which will tremble the hairs of any male
within miles and send him driving upwind in a confusion of
ardor. But it is doubtful if he has an awareness of being caught
in an aerosol of chemical attractant. On the contrary, he probably
finds suddenly that it has become an excellent day, the weather
remarkably bracing, the time appropriate for a bit of exercise
of the old wings, a brisk turn upwind. En route, traveling the
gradient of bombykol, he notes the presence of other males,
heading in the same direction, all in a good mood, inclined to
race for the sheer sport of it. Then, when he reaches his destin-
ation, it may seem to him the most extraordinary of coinci-
dences, the greatest piece of luck: "Bless my soul, what have we
here!" (p. 18)
The male moth did not follow an instinct to find
female moths. He merely flew along the gradient of bom-
bykol. The female was not found purposively but as a by-
product of staying on the bombykol gradient. The ulti-
mate causes of reaching the female were not in the female
moth or reproduction but instead were embedded within
the cause-effect processes that kept the male moth's flight
path close to the bombykol gradient. The reasons for fol-
lowing the bombykol gradient were not the causes of fol-
lowing that gradient.
Applying cybernetic models by analogy to evolution
allows an explanation of the adaptiveness found in nature,
whereas it eliminates teleological (purposive) explana-
tions. There is one problem to resolve. There are no future
goal states in evolution, so there are no paths to future
goals and thus no physical feedback loops to keep organ-
isms on paths that reach ultimate goals (cf. Falk, 1981).
However, feedback systems do maintain and maxi-
mize the fitness of each organism within its current en-
November 1992 • American Psychologist
vironment (Falk, 1981). Were each generation to maintain
its fitness through these feedback systems, the unfolding
lineage would build its path into the future, step-by-step,
but without direction toward any future goal. Adaptive-
ness and purposiveness would become apparent to nn
observer only in hindsight.
The causes of adaptation lie not in future goal states
of adaptive fitness but lie embedded, generation by gen-
eration, within the evolutionary lineage of each organism.
Linkage with the future requires only survival today, and
feedback systems help maintain each generational link.
Organisms surviving pressures of natural selection be-
come feedback in the process. Evolution is a selective,
but not a negative feedback, process. Falk (1981) noted,
Evolution breathes new life into the idea of purposiveness.. . .
feedback mechanisms provide a conceptual bridge between
purposiveness and evolution.
All living organisms are negative feedback mechanisms or sys-
tems of such, and only living organisms are, with one class of
exceptions . . . artificial feedback mechanisms we ourselves
manufacture.
Negative feedback systems are selection anticipators.
Its setting—is the point on the scale correlated with the least
intense selectional pressure. . . . the condition of the system
least susceptible to certain selectional pressures.
The products of evolution are purposive, but the process is not.
Evolution is an accumulation over time of negative feedback
systems adapted to their physical environment and mutually
adapted to each other. But this accumulation results from the
fortuitous match-up of two causally independent sequences of
events that happen to lineages of organisms. One is a sequence
of heritable variations; the other is a sequence of selective pres-
sures that reduce some and increase others of these variations
by means of inheritance by later members of the lineage, (pp.
204-212)
The following sections compare or contrast phylo-
genic, ontogenic, and cultural evolution in terms of (a)
units of selection, (b) variety required to feed the selection
processes, (c) selective pressures, (d) how bookkeeping is
managed, (e) causation at each level, and (f) the special
problems posed by cultural selection.
Ultimate Causation Within Levels of
Selection
Phylogenic (Organic) Evolution
Phylogenic evolution is responsible for species' pheno-
types (and underlying genotypes). Variety among units
required to feed the selection process is provided by spe-
cies populations that are universally unique (i.e., vary
infinitely among themselves). Such variety results from
several independent processes (Mayr, 1988, p. 34). Genetic
mutation, crossing over of genes, chromosomal segrega-
tion in meiosis, gametic selection, mate selection, and
early survival of fertilized zygotes all blend together in a
November 1992 • American Psychologist
fortuitous conjunction of variety-generating processes (cf.
Falk, 1981). The outcomes of this infinitely complex mix
are determined yet only generically predictable.
Problems in physical survival provide the selective
pressure determining which population variants survive
to reproduce. Responses to selective pressures are nec-
essarily probabilistic. Selection outcomes can be predicted
generically by careful analysis of the ecology, but unpre-
dictable events contribute as well (e.g., death of population
members by diseases, accidents, or unlucky encounters
with predators and natural catastrophes such as floods,
fires, famines, or volcanic eruptions). Organisms are blind
to selection processes. Those located in the right place at
the right time and with the right phenotype fortuitously
survive and are said to be adaptive. One could also say
that they had only been tolerated in the past, with con-
tinued toleration an open question.
Phylogenic evolution can be seen as a historical
problem-solving process, reflected in the form of the cur-
rent phenotype. Each phenotype is distinct, reflecting the
unique historically contingent sequence of problems en-
countered by ancestors.
DNA may be said to be the bookkeeper for the prob-
lem-solving histories, preserving blueprints of forms that
have survived previous selection pressures. The cell nu-
cleus might be considered the bookcase, chromosomes
the books, genes the pages, and the four basic nucleotides
the "ciphers" (cf. Dawkins, 1989, chap. 3). Blueprints
for constructing "successful" phenotypes are passed
within germ cells to descendants. DNA provides plans
cells use to execute all the proximate causation sequences
necessary for building a successful phenotype. DNA is
not the cause, however, but is only the resulting set of
plans or codes, for building successful phenotypes. The
ultimate causes for what is encoded would be found
embedded in the evolutionary lineage of the organism.
In the 19th century, Samuel Butler noted that "the
hen is an egg's way of making another egg." In the 20th
century, Dawkins (1989) elaborated Butler's theme in
proposing that organisms are DNA's way of replicating
DNA. Selective pressures posed by problems in survival,
however, act only indirectly on DNA, which is encapsu-
lated within the phenotype, which in turn interacts di-
rectly with the environment (cf. Brandon, 1985). Al-
though the organism's DNA may "benefit" ultimately, it
is the phenotype, not the genotype, that contacts and ne-
gotiates the selective pressures of the environment. DNA
itself evolves through this interactive process.
Phylogenic evolution of different species is a slow
process given complex organisms (e.g., reptiles and
mammals) whether one subscribes to the theory of phy-
letic gradualism or punctuated equilibrium (Ayala, 1985,
p. 71). Although speciation may require thousands of
generations, certain adjustments may occur faster than
expected when one well-developed physiological organ
takes on an adaptive function different from its original
one (Gould, 1980). Called preadaptation (or exaptation),
an example would be using already developed, thin sheets
of skin (for thermoregulating body temperature) for the
1361
 novel function of gliding from higher to lower locations
to escape predators. In this way, wings may evolve in a
population in far fewer generations than would have been
required without the opportunity for preadaptation made
possible by the existing thermoregulation organs.
Except for relatively simple genetic traits, within-
species adaptive changes for complex organisms require
hundreds of generations (Ayala, 1985). Limited devel-
opmental adaptive changes are possible, however, within
a lifetime, such as increases in strength in various muscle
groups, stretching parts of the body, skin tanning, or ac-
quiring specific immunities. As the environment (includ-
ing other species in the coevolution process) presents new
selection pressures, the selection "survival window" may
drift beyond the range of the phenotype. The species will
become extinct.
This problem could be overcome were there available
another process for adjusting within much less than one
lifetime to environmental changes. Because some envi-
ronmental changes are transitory, reversibility of this
complementary adjustive process would have special sur-
vival value. Organisms might move to different habitats,
perhaps avoiding predators and gaining new food sources.
This might also enable future novel adjustive changes in
genotype. Mayr (1985) noted, ". . . changes of behavior
very often function as pacemakers in evolution, by leading
organisms into new niches or environments, which exert
a new set of selection pressures and thus may lead to
major evolutionary changes" (p. 59).
Ontogenic Evolution
The second level of selection by consequences provides
a rapid and reversible complementary adjustive mecha-
nism. Ontogenic adaptation is responsible for the physical
and behavioral characteristics acquired by organisms
during their own life span. Susceptibility to physiological
adaptation and learning has been incorporated into the
phenotypes of species through organic evolution, as have
all other developmental and physiological processes (e.g.,
the respiratory, digestive, immune, and sensorimotor sys-
tems).
The behavioral units of ontogenic selection are op-
erants, referring to interrelations between classes of re-
sponses and given antecedent and consequent stimuli,
varying across settings. Selection by consequences is an
R-S (response first) rather than an S-R (stimulus first)
process (Skinner, 1966/1969):
Ontogenic contingencies remain ineffective until a response has
occurred. The rat must press the lever at least once "for other
reasons" before it presses it for "food." There is a similar lim-
itation in phylogenic contingencies.... It follows that the entire
repertoire of an individual or species must exist prior to onto-
genic and phylogenic selection, but only in the form of minimal
units. Both phylogenic and ontogenic contingencies "shape"
complex forms of behavior from relatively undifferentiated ma-
terial. Both process are favored if the organism shows an exten-
sive, undifferentiated repertoire, (pp. 175-176)
Biological factors (both physiological and develop-
mental) influence behavior. Discussing Watson's (1924/
1362
1970, p. 104) widely cited, rhetorically exaggerated claim
to be able to raise any healthy infant to become any type
of specialist, Skinner (1966/1969), wrote
Watson was not denying that a substantial part of behavior is
inherited. . . . Yet he is probably responsible for the persistent
myth of what has been called "behaviorism's counterfactual
dogma." And it is a myth. No reputable student of animal be-
havior has ever taken the position "that the animal comes into
the laboratory as a virtual tabula rasa, that species differences
are insignificant, and that all responses are about equally con-
ditionable to all stimuli." (pp. 172-173)
The initial sets of minimal units and conditions
needed to feed the ontogenic selection (learning) process
are a product of phylogenic (organic) evolution. Wider
varieties of (or differing) minimal units are proffered for
selection by certain species compared with others, by cer-
tain stages of development within a species compared with
others, and generally by healthy organisms compared with
impaired ones. Histories of learning may enhance or re-
strict the variety of minimal units potentially available
for selection at the present time. Current environmental
factors may enhance or restrict the variety of minimal
units potentially available for selection (e.g., motivative
conditions, space, and situational factors).
Given similar phylogenic selection pressures across
environments, ontogenic behavioral adaptation would
yield greater survival value for species requiring several
years to reach reproductive maturity (e.g., horses and hu-
mans) than for those that reach reproductive maturity
within several hours or days (e.g., mayfly and fruit fly).
The potential survival benefits of evolving the capabilities
for behavioral adjustment, of course, would be weighed
against any survival costs associated with evolving the
required phenotypic changes (e.g., enlarged brain).
Selection pressure for operant behavior is provided
by problems organisms encounter in maintaining rein-
forcing conditions and avoiding aversive ones, a process
that increases chances of reaching reproductive maturity.
The organism's current operant repertoire reflects this
history of problem solving. Each operant repertoire is
distinct, historically contingent on the unique series of
problems encountered during the organism's lifetime.
Operants that meet a given selection pressure are
said to be functional. Functional response classes include
all operants, regardless of form, that meet a given selection
pressure. Operants in one functional response class may
differ widely in form, yet all yield similar consequences.
Responses of similar form may differ in their conse-
quences and be grouped accordingly into separate operant
functional response classes.
Whereas DNA may be said to keep the record books
in phylogenic selection, there is no parallel process known
by which such bookkeeping is done in ontogenic selection.
It is reasonable to assume such a process. Skinner and
others suggested that basic research in neurophysiology
eventually may uncover it, and recent research in neural
networking may suggest a key. Such networks would be
seen not as ultimate causes but only as resulting neuro-
November 1992 • American Psychologist
chemical "codes" that mediate behavior-environment
relations (i.e., operants). The ultimate causes for what is
encoded would be found embedded in the reinforcement
history of the organism.
Similarities and differences in phylogenic and on-
togenic evolution. Phylogenic (organic) and ontogenic
(learning) evolution differ in that the latter enables ad-
justment to special circumstances within the organism's
lifetime, whereas the former does not. Characteristics of
current members of a species were tolerated because they
met the selective pressures of the environments of ances-
tors. Phylogenic selection thus necessarily lags the present
environment. Ontogenic selection complements this lag
by enabling organisms to adjust to present environments
as needed (i.e., to the extent that the current environment
differs from ancestors' environments in intolerable ways).
The two processes are similar in that both disallow
transfer by genes of acquired developmental, physiolog-
ical, or behavioral changes (except for genetic mutations)
across generations: There is no Lamarckian genetic in-
heritance of acquired characteristics. Descendants might
be said to be protected from inheriting any somatic or
operant characteristics fortuitously acquired by ancestors.
A salamander that loses a foot to a snapping turtle will
continue to produce four-, rather than three-, footed off-
spring. "What has survival value for the individual may
be lethal for the population or the society" (Bateson, 1979,
p. 148). "What is good for the individual or culture may
have bad consequences for the species," and "what is good
for the species or culture may be bad for the individual,"
(Skinner, 1981, p. 504).
In phylogenic selection, the Weissmann barrier be-
tween body and germ plasm protects descendants from
genetic inheritance of characteristics acquired by ances-
tors. Although genes provide the templates that cells need
to build proteins and enzymes that transform proteins,
there is no known process by which body proteins can
similarly transform genes. This is the central dogma of
molecular biology (Mayr, 1985), although recent research
with messenger RNA may amend this canon. Any La-
marckian-like genetic inheritance of acquired character-
istics appears to occur at the population, rather than the
individual, level.
The absence of cultural processes prevents descen-
dants from inheriting operant behavior acquired by
ancestors at the level of ontogenic selection and devel-
opment. A Lamarckian-like transmission of acquired op-
erant relations appears to occur only at the cultural level
of selection.
Cultural Evolution
Through cultural evolution, the third level of selection
by consequences described by Skinner (1981), coordi-
nated systems of operant repertoires (e.g., mathematics,
language, science, and religion) are selected and incor-
porated into practices of social groups by social contin-
gencies of reinforcement (cf. Alessi, 1987, pp. 24-26).
Only species with interlocking sets of social reinforcement
contingencies (cf. Alessi, 1988, pp. 25-36) are susceptible
November 1992 • American Psychologist
to changes in practices through cultural selection. Two
modes of transmission are imitation and language. Imi-
tation depends on a social context (Skinner, 1981):
[Social behavior] is in easy reach of natural selection because
other members of a species are one of the most stable features
of the environment of a species. Innate social repertoires are
supplemented by imitation.. . . contingencies of reinforcement
which induce one organism to behave in a given way will often
affect another organism when it behaves in the same way. An
imitative repertoire which brings the imitator under the control
of new contingencies is therefore acquired, (pp. 501-502)
Only with humans, however, do such interlocking con-
tingencies of social reinforcement generate language con-
ventions maintained and passed on through the practices
of verbal communities (Skinner, 1957).
At the ontogenic level, chimpanzees may learn to
fish for termites by poking twigs into mound tunnels.
Sheep may learn to avoid electric fences. Japanese snow
monkeys may learn to enjoy in winter the tepid water of
pools warmed by volcanic heat. Such acquired practices
cannot be transmitted to offspring genetically at either
phylogenic or ontogenic levels. At the cultural level, such
practices have been acquired by imitation, not only by
immediate offspring but also by neighbors and their off-
spring. Cultural selection thus allows a Lamarckian-like
(but nongenetic) transfer of acquired behavioral charac-
teristics to genetic descendants as well as to nondescendant
members of the species (or even across species).
The units of analysis in cultural selection differ from
those in ontogenic selection (Glenn, 1988):
A science of behavior focuses on relations between the activities
of individual organisms and environmental events, while a sci-
ence of culture focuses on relations between recurring cultural
practices (i.e., interrelated behavior among individuals) and the
environments in which those practices occur, (p. 161)
The dimensions of the various cultural materialist entities are
always behavioral dimensions, (p. 163)
Toulmin (1972) called units of practice selection
transmits and also emphasized their overt behavioral or
communal aspects:
The characteristic transmit of a science consists—and necessarily
consists—in the communal or "public" aspect of its concepts.
The mental images and neurophysiological processes of indi-
vidual scientists may, in particular cases, acquire a conceptual
role, but they do not thereby become "concepts." (p. 158)
It is, thus, the procedures and techniques of a scientific discipline
which form its communal—and learnable—aspects, so defining
the representative set of concepts that are the collective "trans-
mit" of the science, (p. 161)
Variety required to feed cultural selection processes
is provided by imitation of practices within and across
groups, through sharing of practices by language (oral or
written) across epochs and among subgroups of the same
or different cultures, and by recombining various minimal
units to create novel practices to meet new problems
(Alessi, 1987). When effective practices can be neither
found nor borrowed, nor constructed from recombina-
tions of minimal units of known practices, science and
1363
research may generate the knowledge base (i.e., requisite
variety) from which new practice technologies can be
generated (e.g., medical technologies and synthetic
chemicals, dyes, fuels, rubber, and fibers).
Problems of population growth outracing the pop-
ulation-carrying capacity of the land provide selective
pressure for cultural evolution, which can be viewed as
a historical, social-group, problem-solving process (Har-
ris, 1979). As populations increase beyond the carrying
capacity of the available resources, social groups develop
practices either to increase carrying capacity (expand ter-
ritory, trade for goods, intensify productivity of land and
industry) or to limit population (infanticide, abortion,
birth control).
Societies face different problems, or similar problems
in different sequences, in maintaining functions (e.g.,
agriculture, irrigation, flood control, livestock production,
manufacturing, housing, health care, education, science,
defense, or transportation). The cumulative set of prac-
tices adopted over time to meet such problems defines
that society's culture. Each culture is distinct, reflecting
its unique history of problem solving, contingent on the
specific nature and order of problems encountered.
Although cultures may adopt different solutions to
similar problems, cultures are often subgrouped accord-
ing to common practices adopted to resolve similar prob-
lems. Cultural practices characteristic of "hydraulic so-
cieties" (Harris, 1977, pp. 233-247) evolved in response
to the series of problems faced in irrigating fields and
controlling seasonal floods in places with little steady
rainfall. Pork-eating taboos evolved in response to prob-
lems of deteriorating land conditions no longer able to
support efficient raising of pigs (cf. Harris, 1977). Prac-
tices protecting individual rights, freedoms, and dignity
(e.g., Magna Charta, U.S. Bill of Rights, and U.S. Con-
stitution's system of checks and balances) evolved in re-
sponse to problems of escaping or avoiding authoritarian
coercive control (cf. Skinner, 1971). Selection by conse-
quences provides naturalistic explanations of the origins
of practices such as the proscription against eating beef
in India, a country with severe food shortages (Harris,
1977):
The tabooing of beef was the cumulative result of the individual
decisions of millions and millions of individual farmers, some
of whom were better able than others to resist the temptation
of slaughtering their livestock because they strongly believed
that the life of a cow or an ox was a holy thing. Those who held
such beliefs were much more likely to hold onto their farms,
and to pass them on to their children, than those who believed
differently. . . . To this day, monsoon farmers who yield to
temptation and slaughter their cattle seal their doom. They can
never plow again even when the rains fall. They must sell their
farms and migrate to the cities. Only those who would starve
rather than eat an ox or cow can survive a season of scanty
rains, (pp. 221-222)
This latter example literally ties biological survival
to changes in cultural practices. As such, beef-eating ta-
boos should spread among the population no faster than
1364
genetic traits, taking perhaps hundreds of generations for
significant cultural change.
However, were rules for restraining beef consump-
tion developed by community leaders who recognized the
relation between immediate practices and remote out-
comes, cultural practices might spread much faster. Be-
cause the natural outcomes of following such rules are
so delayed, surviving to plant for another season is not
likely to directly reinforce such rule following (cf. Malott,
1988, 1989). Promulgated rules must induce more im-
mediate and unavoidable, and thus more effective, con-
sequences. Such rules often are couched within a mor-
alistic framework, are monitored by an omniscient book-
keeper, and induce guilt that can be avoided only by
obeying the rules. Rules provide the path (means of re-
straint) to the remote goal (ends of saving the farm).
Obeying rules relieves guilt. Remote goals are attained
not purposively but as a by-product of staying on the
moral high ground that automatically leads to remote
goals. The ultimate causes of restraint are not the remote
outcomes of saving farms but instead lie embedded within
the righteous path to the goal, along with the reinforcing
processes that keep farmers on that guiltless path (Malott,
1988). The reasons for following the rule are not the causes
of following that rule.
Rules also may be used to pass successful restraint
practices across generations. Through interlocking sets of
direct-acting social reinforcement contingencies, following
such rules (i.e., practices) may be enforced within the
verbal community, becoming maxims, proverbs, mores,
and eventually religious laws and taboos. Once framed
in terms of religious laws and taboos, these rules and
practices may be maintained in a self-sustaining process
(e.g., social reinforcement and guilt avoidance) long after
the initial conditions for adopting the rules have vanished.
Oral traditions, written texts, libraries, and data
banks perform the bookkeeping functions for the prob-
lem-solving histories in cultural evolution, in a way only
roughly analogous to the functions of DNA in phylogenic
evolution. Cultural records preserve prescriptions for
various successful problem-solving practices. Such rec-
ords are neither the practices themselves nor the causes
of them and are themselves a product of cultural practices.
The ultimate causes for what is recorded would be found
embedded in the evolutionary problem-solving history
of the culture.
The advent of textual verbal behavior allows one
person or culture to transmit behavior to another person
or culture at remote distances or across a span of many
generations, without the direct interpersonal contact re-
quired by imitation. The enormous cumulative impact
of the evolution of cultures has been described by Gould
(1980):
Thus Lamarckism, so far as we can judge, is false in the domain
it has always occupied—as a biological theory of genetic inher-
itance. Yet, by analogy only, it is the mode of "inheritance" for
another and very different kind of "evolution"—human cultural
evolution. Homo sapiens arose at least 50,000 years ago, and
we have not a shred of evidence for any genetic improvement
November 1992 • American Psychologist
since then. I suspect that the average Cro-Magnon, properly
trained, could have handled computers with the best of us . . .
(for all it's worth, they had slightly larger brains than we do).
All that we have accomplished, for better or worse, is a result
of cultural evolution. And we have done it at rates unmatched
by orders of magnitude in all the previous history of life. Geol-
ogists cannot measure a few hundred or a few thousand years
in the context of our planet's history. Yet, in this millimicro-
second, we have transformed the surface of our planet through
the influence of one unaltered biological invention—self-con-
sciousness. From perhaps one hundred thousand people with
axes to more than four billion with bombs, rocket ships, cities,
televisions, and computers—and all without substantial genetic
change, (p. 83)
Humans match chimpanzees as closely genetically
as zebras match horses. Modern humans predated the
point of cultural takeoff by over 100,000 years. The huge
canyon separating the behavioral practices of humans
from all other species was carved out by cultural evolution
within a brief 50,000 years.
Cultural evolution poses future problems (selection
pressures). Greater behavioral adaptability should yield
survival benefits for species, as long as the costs of evolving
the necessary changes do not outweigh the benefits ac-
crued. However, by overcoming the body-germ plasm
transmission barrier, cultural selection does not protect
descendants from "inheriting" the legacy of behavioral
practices acquired by ancestors. Lack of such protection
may present new problems, and thus new cultural selec-
tion pressures, for future generations. Not only can off-
spring and genetically unrelated neighbors acquire new
behavior rapidly, but one culture may adopt complex
repertoires developed within other cultures. One culture
may borrow another's medical treatment, industrial pro-
duction, or educational training practices.
Protection against faulty cultural selection. The po-
tential to acquire complex behavioral practices rapidly
and from almost any cultural source highlights the issue
of protecting present and future generations from ac-
quiring practices that may be nonadaptive within future
environments (Bateson, 1979, pp. 220-221). Social cus-
toms in many cultures prevent selection of potentially
harmful practices but may equally well prevent selection
of helpful ones. In early societies new practices could be
sanctioned (i.e., culturally selected) only by designated
authorities (e.g., chiefs, priests, or wise men). Selection
power often came from faith in or fear of authority or
from persuasion by use of highly developed rhetorical
abilities. Faith, fear, or rhetorical skills (cf. Billig, 1987)
often allowed adoption of practices harmful in the long
run or prevented adoption of helpful practices. Plato pro-
posed logic as a tool to separate rational aspects from
emotional aspects of rhetoric, thereby allowing clarifi-
cation of each domain's positive and negative contribution
to the process of persuasion. In the last two centuries, a
combination of logic and empiricism, melded into the
scientific method, has provided the most effective pro-
cesses for inoculation against acquiring nonadaptive (or
even toxic) technological practices within cultural selec-
tion (Brunvand, 1989; Gilovich, 1991; Spence, 1982).
November 1992 • American Psychologist
Organizations have been formed and journals pub-
lished (e.g., Skeptical Inquirer, the journal of the Com-
mittee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the
Paranormal in Buffalo, New York), that focus on pro-
tecting the public from various ineffective popular prac-
tices, beliefs, and folklore, by subjecting such claims to
scientific scrutiny. Scientific journals, editorial boards,
and professional societies attempt to select valid claims
and to protect members from the transmission of inef-
fective scientific practices (cf. Burnham, 1987; Postman,
1985; Toulmin, 1972, chaps. 3 and 4). Government agen-
cies attempt to protect citizens from ineffective medical
practices, devices, or medicines, as well as from receiving
services from unprepared professionals.
The methods mentioned above help protect individ-
uals from acquiring ineffective cultural practices. Psy-
chotherapy can be viewed as one of society's sanctioned
approaches to help eliminate ineffective practices once
acquired. Most models of therapy target the identification
and elimination of irrational or nonadaptive behaviors,
rules, values, thoughts, and feelings acquired by clients
either by direct contact with the environment or through
cultural practices of the family or larger social unit
wherein the client was reared.
Scientific selection practices, unfortunately, have not
evolved sufficiently to ensure that all the preceding cul-
tural selection practices for technology are themselves
effective in the long run. Short-term solutions or ineffec-
tive practices today create new problems that will provide
selective pressures for future cultural practices.
Proximate Causation Within the Levels
of Selection
Proximate causation answers "how" questions by apply-
ing the knowledge of the physical sciences to the facts
found within the historical narratives of ultimate cau-
sation. At the phylogenic (organic) level of evolution, mo-
lecular and functional biology have developed detailed
knowledge of proximate causes. Much less is known about
proximate causation at the ontogenic (learning) and cul-
tural levels of selection. "The physical basis of natural
selection is now fairly clear; the corresponding basis of
operant conditioning, and hence of the evolution of cul-
tures, has yet to be discovered" (Skinner, 1981, p. 503).
Although Skinner and others have noted that a description
of the physical bases underlying conditioning will be
needed to complete our understanding of ontogenic se-
lection, such descriptions will not change the vast amount
of knowledge accumulated by the experimental analysis
of behavior on the functional relations involved in learn-
ing and conditioning. Many effective practices have been
developed in education, industry, and applied psychology
based on a knowledge of functional relations. This section
will briefly compare the implications of developing bio-
logical technologies for treatment of behavior problems
derived from a knowledge of proximate causation with
behavioral technologies for treatment derived from a
knowledge of ultimate causes (i.e., functional relations
knowledge of learning).
1365
 At the phylogenic level, functional biology traces how
cells translate DNA programs into growth processes re-
sulting in the requisite body proteins, chemicals, traits,
behaviors, and organs. Much of medicine can be viewed
as applied functional biology, aimed at maintaining or
repairing the complex web of negative feedback systems
sustaining the human body. Applied biological technol-
ogies are built on models of proximate, rather than ul-
timate, causation because biological problems involve
individuals rather than lineages of populations. Technol-
ogies based on models of ultimate causation (selection by
consequences) would yield little benefit to individuals
facing immediate medical problems. Such models would
apply when problems are defined in terms of lineages of
populations (e.g., developing new strains of seed or live-
stock).
Effective biological treatments for behavior prob-
lems, however, have been developed even without a
knowledge of proximate causes. "What is enormously
difficult to comprehend is the contrast between the action
of a drug on a simple neuron, which causes it either to
fire or not to fire, and the wide diversity of central nervous
system effects, including subtle changes in mood and be-
havior which the same drug will induce. . . . at the mo-
lecular level, an explanation of the action of a drug is
often possible; at the cellular level, an explanation is
sometimes possible; but at a behavioral level, our igno-
rance is abysmal" (Cooper, Bloom, & Roth, 1991, p. 4).
Research confirms that different chemicals have dif-
ferential effects on categorically defined behavior disorders
(e.g., anxiolytics treat anxiety more effectively than they
do depression; antidepressants treat depression more ef-
fectively than they do anxiety). Biological research, how-
ever, cannot explain (nor would have predicted) the find-
ings that for different people such properties of medication
as form, size, and color also differentially affect medical
outcomes. Given the same dose of active medication, tab-
lets may be more effective than capsules; larger pills may
be more effective than smaller ones. Green tablets may
show better results when treating anxiety; yellow tablets
may show better results when treating depression (cf.
Meichenbaum & Turk, 1987, pp. 51-52). Although re-
search in functional biology may eventually identify how
chemical ingredients work their effects, behavioral re-
search will be needed to identify how form, size, and
color work their complementary medical effects (cf. Frank
& Frank, 1991; Kirsch, 1990).
At the ontogenic level, less pressure exists to develop
applied behavior technologies based on knowledge of
proximate causes, because selection by consequences
works rapidly within an individual's lifetime. Behavioral
technologies thus generally are based on knowledge of
ultimate causation, involving populations of response
units rather than lineages of populations.
Although working from different models of causa-
tion, biological and behavioral treatments of similar ef-
fectiveness have been developed for problems such as
depression, anxiety, and attention deficit disorder. Med-
ication-based biological treatments might yield faster ini-
1366
tial effects but might also yield more medical side-effects
and be more prone to relapse after treatment. Behavioral
treatments might take longer to show initial effects (by
strengthening more appropriate behaviors and weakening
less effective ones) but would yield fewer medical side
effects and be less prone to relapse after treatment. Often
the two models of treatment may interact in a synergistic
and complementary way. Medications may temporarily
channel, restrict, or enhance the variety of minimal re-
sponse units emitted by an individual, thus facilitating
the selection processes of behavioral technologies. Med-
ications may directly influence the motivative effects of
certain reinforcing stimuli in the person's environment
(e.g., antidepressants and depo provera) and thus indi-
rectly influence the effectiveness of relevant environmental
discriminative and conditioned stimuli.
Functional Relations Knowledge in Ontogenic
Learning
Over the past 50 years, behavioral research has identified
many basic principles and functional relations underlying
the ontogenic selection of behavior. Because of the rapidity
of selection at the ontogenic level, practical applications
have been feasible without identifying the physical bases
(proximate causes) underlying these functional relations.
The next section will describe briefly some of these basic
functional relations, as a bridge to explore parallel analog
relations that may underlie cultural selection. Only hu-
mans appear to be susceptible to both analog and direct-
acting conditioning processes.
Functional Relations in Respondent Conditioning
In respondent conditioning, the range of stimuli that may
enter conditioning relations has been constrained (chan-
neled) to various extents in different species through phy-
logenic evolution. Some stimuli have prepotency over
others. Temporal pairing of stimuli is important but not
essential to effective conditioning. Some kinds of stimuli
enter into conditioning relations (as CSs) even when pre-
sented well before the unconditioned stimulus (US),
whereas other kinds of stimuli paired in the same exper-
iment with the US do not become CSs (cf. Rescorla,
1988).
Within phenotypic constraints, functional relations
for respondent conditioning involve pairing a novel stim-
ulus with a US. This transforms the organism so that the
novel stimulus acquires behavioral functions of the con-
ditioned stimulus. It is now called a CS. In this way, phe-
notypically influenced (and stereotypic) environment-
response relations may be transferred to a wide range of
environmental stimuli unanticipated in phylogenic evo-
lution. Only stereotypic, phenotypically channeled rela-
tions are available through respondent conditioning. Ac-
quiring novel ranges of responses is a function of another
process—operant conditioning.
Functional Relations in Operant Conditioning
Functional relations for operant conditioning involve the
immediate occurrence of consequences for selected classes
November 1992 • American Psychologist
of responses over others, such that in the future, in similar
situations, similar responses will be more likely. If re-
sponses from these classes yield similar consequences in
similar situations in the future, similar responses will be
even more likely to occur, and so on. In time, in a given
situation, responses within a given range of variety (i.e.,
response "population" or class) that more effectively
maintain reinforcing (or avoid aversive) conditions are
strengthened within the repertoire, as less effective ones
are weakened.
Operant conditioning requires an intact phenotype
that through phylogenic evolution has become physio-
logically susceptible to reinforcement by selected stimuli
(i.e., primary reinforcers). The phenotype has also evolved
phylogenically such that pairing a primary reinforcer with
certain kinds of novel stimuli transforms the organism
in a way to enable the novel stimuli to acquire some of
the behavioral functions of the primary reinforcer. The
novel stimulus would then be called a secondary (or
learned) reinforcer. Furthermore, the phenotype of the
organism has evolved such that certain environmental
events may enhance or reduce the effects of available
reinforcing stimuli. Called establishing operations (Mi-
chael, 1982, 1983, 1988; Vollmer & Iwata, 1991), these
events include various aspects of deprivation and satiation.
For example, eating salty pretzels transforms the organ-
isms to increase the function of water as a reinforcing
stimulus; conversely, drinking a large glass of water will
quickly reduce the reinforcing effectiveness of water in
that situation.
Through operant conditioning, a wide range of be-
haviors (e.g., typing words) can be strengthened in an
organism's repertoire by a wide variety of reinforcing
stimuli (e.g., learned reinforcers such as praise, status,
and money) unanticipated by phylogenic evolution.
Through respondent conditioning, environment-response
relations acquired through phylogenic evolution can come
under the control of a wide variety of unanticipated stim-
uli in the current environment (e.g., conditioned stimuli
such as bell sounds, visual objects, colors, or smells).
Analog Conditioning and Verbal Function-
Altering Relations
Less scientific knowledge is available about the cultural
level of selection by consequences. It is not clear where
ontogenic development ends and cultural development
begins. It is clear, however, that verbal behavior plays a
crucial role. Analogs to any stimulus function described
above for respondent and operant conditioning can also
be induced by verbal means, without need for direct con-
ditioning once language has been acquired through on-
togenic contingencies.
Pavlov first proposed that verbal behavior could be
analyzed as a "second-signal system" of conditioning
(Pickenhain, 1970). Second-signal systems are based on
semantic rather than physical similarities among stimuli.
Thus a trained dog also sits when his master, instead of the word
"place," calls "brace," "race," "case," or similar words provided
the intonation is the same. In animals, only the character of the
November 1992 • American Psychologist
immediate, acoustic stimulus determines the actual reaction.
But the situation is different in m a n . . . . a conditioned reaction
elaborated to a special word in man is not evoked by an acous-
tically similar word but by a word identical or similar in its
semantic content. (Pickenhain, 1970, p. 127)
Skinner (1957) called this thematic stimulus control. A
variety of verbal stimuli may be linked thematically
through use of autoclitic frames (cf. Alessi, 1987).
Analog Respondent Conditioning
Novel stimuli can acquire functional transformations of
the behavioral properties of unconditioned stimuli with-
out direct pairing. Consider an experiment (cf. Staats,
1975, chaps. 4 & 5; Pickenhain, 1970, pp. 127-129) in
which a human subject is presented with a series of slide-
projected images, each containing one of several black-
and-white typed words (e.g., red, blue, yellow, green,
brown). Nothing happens with the presentations of any
word except blue. Whenever blue is presented, a mild
shock is delivered to the subject's hand. The subject's
galvanic skin resistance (GSR) is measured. Soon de-
creased GSR is noted when the typed word blue appears
on the screen but not when the other words appear. This
can be explained as respondent conditioning: The pre-
viously neutral stimulus (i.e., the word blue) has been
paired with the unconditioned stimulus (i.e., mild shock),
and as a result the word stimulus blue has acquired some
functional transformation of the stimulating properties
of the mild shock.
Now the experimenter intersperses a nonsense word
among the slides—glipglap. For several sessions no GSR
response occurs when this is presented. But after the ses-
sion one day, the experimenter tells the subject, "Glipglap
is the Urdu word for blue." The next day, when glipglap
is presented, the GSR response occurs. After several days,
the experimenter tells the subject, "I made a mistake.
Glipglap is really the Urdu word for red." In the next
session, no GSR response occurs when glipglap is pre-
sented.
Although we might say that glipglap functions as a
CS, it is not one by what we know from laboratory re-
search. Glipglap has not been paired with the US (nor
with a CS in a second-order conditioning procedure),
which research tells us is necessary for such conditioning.
Somehow glipglap was transformed from a behaviorally
neutral stimulus to a potent one through verbal processes
not well understood. Some might consider this an ex-
ample of stimulus equivalence (cf. Sidman, 1971, 1986),
but little is understood about this (well-replicated) process.
Although we could say that glipglap functioned like a CS,
it clearly did not become so by any process known to
basic laboratory research. We might call it an analog CS
(cf. Malott, 1989).
When glipglap was redefined as red, immediately it
lost its conditioned properties. We might say it had been
"extinguished," but again no process of extinction was
used that has been produced in the laboratory. Research
tells us that extinction requires the CS to be repeatedly
presented without the US, and clearly this was not done.
1367
 To distinguish ontogenic from cultural selection lev-
els, we might say that properties of glipglap had been
functionally transformed into an analog CS through ver-
bal analog conditioning operations and extinguished
through verbal analog extinguishing operations. Little
behavioral research has shed light on these analog oper-
ations.
Analog Conditioned Reinforcers
Novel stimuli also can acquire some transformation of
the behavioral properties of primary reinforcers through
verbal analog conditioning, without direct stimulus pair-
ing. For example, a class of preschool children who have
been receiving M&M's candies for good school work
might be shown pieces of cut up yellow construction paper
and told, "These pieces of yellow paper are what big kids
work for" (cf. Engelmann. 1975, pp. 98-100). Many chil-
dren in the group immediately refuse M&Ms, and work
extra hard, but accept only pieces of yellow paper as their
rewards.
We might say that the pieces of yellow paper act as
"learned reinforcers." Laboratory research tells us that
neutral stimuli become reinforcers only through direct
pairings with primary reinforcers (or other "learned" re-
inforcers). Yellow paper was not paired with any rein-
forcer and certainly not with the primary (M&M's) re-
inforcers. Yellow paper acquired reinforcing properties
even more powerful than the primary M&M reinforcers,
as demonstrated by the children's refusal to accept
M&Ms, demanding instead pieces of yellow paper. (For
the sake of this example, assume that the children had
not been satiated with M&Ms just before the session).
Nor could yellow paper be a primary reinforcer. Yellow
paper acts like a reinforcer but cannot be a reinforcer
from what we know from laboratory research. We might
call it an analog reinforcer. The functions of yellow paper
were somehow transformed by the teacher's verbal be-
havior through analog conditioning processes about which
we know much less than we are sometimes willing to
admit.
Analog Discriminative Stimuli
Novel stimuli also can acquire some transformation of
the behavioral properties of discriminative stimuli
through verbal analog conditioning processes. A person
might be told, "The next time you are here, when the
green light comes on, enter." The next week the person
is again there, and unlike last week, this time when the
green light comes on, he or she enters. We might say that
the green light is a discriminative stimulus. Laboratory
research tells us that discriminative stimuli are established
only through a series of trials in which reinforcement is
made available in their presence and not in their absence
(i.e., differential reinforcement). The green light in this
situation clearly did not acquire its function through dif-
ferential reinforcement, and the directions given the week
before are far too removed from the response of entering
the room to have stimulus control. The green light appears
to act like a discriminative stimulus but cannot be ac-
1368
cording to what we know from laboratory research (cf.
Michael, 1982). We might call it an analog discriminative
stimulus.
There thus appear to be two processes for creating
CSs within the respondent paradigm, and for creating
conditioned reinforcing and discriminative stimuli within
the operant paradigm. Stimulus functions can be altered
either (a) by direct-acting contingencies (based on basic
principles derived from laboratory research on respondent
and operant conditioning) or (b) by the indirect-acting
analog verbal transformation processes, once language
has been acquired. Schlinger and Blakely (1987) proposed
that verbal behavior that alters the functions of various
conditioned stimuli, reinforcers, and discriminative
stimuli be called "function altering verbal stimuli."
Verbal behavior can also alter repertoires by speci-
fying various contingencies of reinforcement operating in
remote settings (Malott, 1984, 1988; Michael, 1986) or
by proffering rules to follow in future situations (Hayes,
1989; Malott, 1984, 1988; Skinner, 1969). Blakely and
Schlinger (1987) proposed that we term these "contin-
gency specifying verbal stimuli." Furthermore, research
indicates that when verbal instructions do not accurately
describe reinforcement contingencies, the subjects' be-
havior often conforms to the verbal instructions rather
than the direct-acting reinforcement contingencies (cf.
Catania, Shimoff, & Matthews, 1989; Galizio, 1979;
Lowe, Beasty & Bentall, 1983). Verbal behavior might
insulate us from influence by direct-acting reinforcement
contingencies operating in our environments. Such in-
sulation might be adaptive for some situations but not
others.
Implications of Verbal Analog Conditioning of
Behavioral Functions
Verbal behavior can transform behavioral functions of
the various CS elements, as well as generate new response
combinations. Therapists can modify how clients behave
in natural settings by means of verbal analog conditioning
and reconditioning within the artificial therapy setting.
Teachers, parents, and others likewise alter various stim-
ulus functions indirectly through verbal analog condi-
tioning processes.
Analog verbal conditioning models might facilitate
analyses of seemingly puzzling phenomena observed in
therapy, thus leading to refined practices. For example,
the empirically demonstrated, rapid effects of therapeutic
interventions such as reframing and paradoxical directives
(Ascher, 1989; Chamberlain & Baldwin, 1988, p. 156;
Dowd & Trutt, 1988; Kolko & Milan, 1983; Watzlawick,
Weakland, & Fisch, 1974, chaps. 6-8) might be due to
verbal analog conditioning processes (triggered by the
carefully crafted reframe or paradoxical message) that
rapidly and simultaneously alter the functions of numer-
ous reinforcing, discriminative, and conditioned stimuli
operating within the client's natural environment (Alessi,
1989, pp. 269-270). Certain hypnotic, placebo, and "ex-
pectancy" effects (Kirsch, 1990) also might be analyzed
within this context. If so, more effective interventions may
November 1992 • American Psychologist
be planned by selecting key stimuli from the problem
situation, changing their stimulus values by inserting them
within the proper autoclitic frame for the occasion and
then delivering the newly constructed frame within the
therapeutic directive given to the client.
Conclusions
Skinner (1966/1969, 1981) and Bateson (1972, 1979)
both proposed adoption of a selection-feedback model
when studying behavior to complement the more mech-
anistic models of proximate causation. Both saw human
behavior as a natural outcome of interrelated, historically
contingent, stochastic evolutionary processes occurring
at different levels of selection: phylogenic, ontogenic, and
cultural. Bateson added a fourth level, the evolution of
the ecosystem, which acts as a kind of organic protective
skin enveloping the other levels.
Phylogenic evolution adjusted our phenotypes to
meet demands faced by our ancestors. Ontogenic evo-
lution continually adjusts our behavior to meet changes
in current conditions. Cultural evolution, however, will
modify for better or worse the future conditions per se to
which our descendants must adjust. Cultural evolution
allows passage of acquired repertoires for making nuclear
weapons along with those for improved medical care. Ul-
timately, either may prove lethal to the ecosystem.
More important, cultural evolution may enable us
to bridge the causal independence in phylogenic evolution
between the (a) variety-generating and (b) selective pres-
sure components of the evolutionary stochastic process.
If evolution, as we know it, requires independent relations
between these two components (at least for organic evo-
lution), linking them causally through cultural practice
may deal a fatal blow to the process itself.
Resistance to adopting selection by consequences
within psychology and anthropology appears to have
arisen in part because of the prior successes in the physical
sciences using the mechanistic models of proximate cau-
sation. The stochastic variation-selection models of ul-
timate causation were overlooked until the past century.
For life sciences such as biology, psychology, and anthro-
pology, both models are needed. Neither model is
"harder" nor "softer" than the other. They merely study
natural phenomena with differing inherent properties
(mechanistic vs. stochastic) and address different kinds
of questions ("how" vs. "why" or "how come?"). The
dualism proposed by Descartes to separate mind from
matter, and thus life sciences from physical sciences, might
be recast in terms of the nondualistic distinction between
the mechanistic models of proximate causation and the
stochastic models of ultimate causation (cf. Bateson,
1979). Psychology's attraction to the models of proximate
causation has been diagnosed as "physics envy" (Leahey,
1991, p. 27).
If evolutionary processes are both determined and
unpredictable, what difference could humans possibly
make? Karl Popper (1982) wrote, "I find it crucially im-
portant to distinguish between the determined past and
the open future" (p. 48). Marvin Harris (1977) noted,
November 1992 • American Psychologist
"That a blind form of determinism has ruled the past
does not mean that it must rule the future" (p. xiii).
Because we are by nature interactive participants in
the "three great stochastic processes" (Bateson, 1979),
we necessarily affect our futures: wittingly or unwittingly,
willingly or unwillingly, for better or worse. As for timing
and circumstances, Harris (1977) noted that "some mo-
ments are probably more 'open' than others," (p. 291).
Furthermore, the property of stochastic processes called
sensitive dependence on initial conditions enables small
changes ultimately to have huge effects. By understanding
better the multiple evolutionary processes in which we
are embedded, humans are in a unique position among
species to become a nonblind part of the evolutionary
processes leading into our (potentially multiple) futures.
Human cultural practices thus become another dimension
merging with the "fortuitous conjunction of circum-
stances" (Falk, 1981, p. 214) turning the evolutionary
kaleidoscope.
Although we may face a determined future, for hu-
mans it can be open to other than a blind determinism.
Current cultural practices can become part of the prob-
lems, or part of the solutions, in our own (and the eco-
system's) futures. "Men will never become originating
centers of control, because their behavior will itself be
controlled, but their role as mediators may be extended
without limit" (Skinner, 1957, p. 460).
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