Santiago v Rafanan, AC no 6252, October 5, 2004

Ulep v The legal clinic, 223 SCRA 378, July 4, 2012

3, April 10, 1985
Samonte v Galdula 363 Phil 369-376, Feb. 26,1999
Collantes v Atty. Renomeron, AC no 3056, August 16, 1991
Diana Ramos v Atty Imbang, AC no 6788, August 23,2007
In Re: Vicente bayani, AC no 5307, August 9 , 2000
Cuenca v CA, GR no 109870, December 1, 1995
Ali v Atty. Bubong, AC no 4018, March 8, 2005
Olazo v Tinga, Am no 10-5-7-SC-12/7/2010
Castaneda v Ago, GR no L-28546, July 30 1975
Huyssen v Atty. Guiterrez, AC no 6707, March 24, 2006
Basas v Atty. Icawat, AC no 4282, August 24, 2000
Rivera v Atty. Angeles, AC no 2519, August 29, 2000
Santos v Atty. Llamas, AC. No 4749, January 20, 2000

Canon 2: PROVIDE
EFFICIENT AND
CONVENIENT LEGAL
SERVICESNot to
Refuse to Give Legal
Advice
–
Rule 2.02
Prepared by: Michael
Joseph Nogoy, JD 1
CASE No. 24[A.C. No.
6252. October 5,
2004]JONAR
SANTIAGO,
complainant, vs.
ATTY. EDISON V.
RAFANAN,
respondent
PONENTE:
PANGANIBAN,
J.:
NOTE: I can’t pinpoint
where Rule 2.02 plays in

so this digest will be a bit

long since I’ll
tackle them all. But I do
have guesses about Rule
2.02 here. I hope they are
correct
NOTE 2:
I don’t know the p
recedent facts before all
of these happened. In
case theywill be asked,
just say the truth -
they’re not mentioned in
the case
Basta na langnagreklamo si
Santiago dito.

FACTS:

This is a disbarment case

filed by BJMP employee
Jonar Santiago against
Atty.Edison Rafanan.
Santiago, in his complaint,
alleged among others that
Rafanan, in
notarizingseveral
documents on different
dates
failed and/or refused to
:
o

Make the proper notation

regarding the cedula or
community taxcertificate
of the affiants (*one
making the affidavit);
o

Enter the details of the

notarized documents in
the notarial register;
o

Make and execute the

certification and enter his
PTR and IBP numbers
inthe documents he
notarized

Santiago also alleged that

Rafanan executed an
Affidavit in favor of his
clientand offered it as
evidence (Rafanan stood
as counsel and as witness
of hisclient) and Rafanan,
as alleged by Santiago,
waited for him together
with his
“men” and disarmed
Santiago and uttered
insulting words at him.

ATTY. RAFANAN’S
CONTENTIONS:

o
Admitted having
administered the oath to
the affiants whose
Affidavitswere attached
to the Complaint of
Santiago. But Rafanan
believed thatthe non-
notation of their
Residence Certificates in
the Affidavits
andCounter-Affidavits
were allowed because:
Notation of residence
certificates applied only
to
documentsacknowledged
by a notary public, and

Was not mandatory for

affidavits related to
cases pending
beforecourts and other
government offices (Side
comment: If they werenot
notarized and were used
for court proceedings, edi
hindi silanaging public
documents? Paano sila
magiging admissible
sacourt? Tenge lang yata
si Rafanan)
He also pointed out that
older practitioners in
Nueva Ecija also dowhat
he did
–
they do not indicate
affiant
s’ residence certi
ficateson documents they
notarized, or have entries
in the notarialregister for
these documents.
o
As to his alleged failure to
comply with Sec.3 Rule 112
of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure: as counsel to
the affiants, he had the
option notcomply or not
with the certification.
o

As to his alleged violation

of Rule 12.08 of CPR:
lawyers could testify on
behalf of their clients “on
substantial matters, in
cases where
[their]testimony is
essential to the ends of
justice.”

Santiago charged
Rafanan’s clients wit
h attempted
murder.Rafanan said that
since his clients were in
his house during the
alleged crime, that’s why
he said his testimony is
very essential.

He also contends that the

case filed by Santiago was
only to harassRafanan
since he is the counsel of
the parties who filed
cases against himbefore
the ombudsman (Brgy.
Capt. Ernesto Ramos and
BJMP)
ISSUES:

Whether or not Rafanan is

guilty in violating the
Notarial Law.
Whether or not a lawyer
(in this case, Rafanan) can
stand as witness in favor
of his clients.
HELDS:

Yes, he violated the

Notarial Law for not
making the proper
notation andentering the
details of the notarized
documents.

Yes, a lawyer can stand as

witness of a client.
2. Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, 223 SCRA 378 (1993)

FACTS: The petitioner contends that the advertisements reproduced by the respondents are
champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the
community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, to which as a member of the legal
profession, he is ashamed and offended by the following advertisements:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?

P560.00 for a valid marriage.

Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.

ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call:521-0767,

LEGAL 5217232,5222041

CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm

7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday
to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Force Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.,

LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy

CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251;

522-2041; 521-0767

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these
services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State
Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977. ISSUE:Whether
or not, the advertised services offered by the Legal Clinic, Inc., constitutes practice of law and whether
the same are in violation of the Code of Professional responsibility RULING: The advertisement of the
respondent is covered in the term practice of law as defined in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod. There
is a restricted concept and limited acceptance of paralegal services in the Philippines. It is allowed that
some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been permitted with a limited representation
in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and
extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefore. Canon 3 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. Canon 3.01 adds that he is not
supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Nor shall he pay or
give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for,
publicity to attract legal business (Canon 3.04). The Canons of Professional Ethics, before the adoption
of the CPR, had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional
employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be
published in connection with causes in which the lawyer have been engaged of concerning the manner
of the conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance the lawyer's position, and all
other like self-laudation. There are existing exceptions under the law on the rule prohibiting the
advertisement of a lawyer’s services. However, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the
advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees
charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, the court found and held that the same
definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the exceptions. The respondent’s defense
with the case of Bates vs. State Bar applies only when there is an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the
availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the
specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly whether in our former Canons
of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary
rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stand therein are "not applicable in any
state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state.” The Court Resolved to RESTRAIN
and ENJOIN The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any
advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of
this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction
proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein.

OR

In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to
Nogales was to move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the
services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic
because of the latter’s advertisements which contain the following:

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
8:30am – 6:00pm
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota
Res. & Special Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.
Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767
It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled “Rx for Legal Problems”
in Star Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is
composed of specialists that can take care of a client’s problem no matter how complicated
it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion situation. He said
that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are “specialists” in various fields, can take
care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal
problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counselors and attorneys.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in
the US which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides, the
advertisement is merely making known to the public the services that The Legal Clinic
offers.
ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such is
allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.
HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is not
allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered include
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are
undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being
offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals.
Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. The standards of the
legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot,
without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic
seem to promote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of
law which their experts can facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is
right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and
 to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. The Supreme Court also enumerated
the following as allowed forms of advertisement:

1. Advertisement in a reputable law list

2. Use of ordinary simple professional card
3. Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization

4.DACANAY

Dacanay v Baker mckenzle, 136 SCRA 349

In November 1979, Atty. Vicente Torres sent a letter to one Rosie Clurman, represented by
Atty. Adriano Dacanay, asking Clurman to release some shares to Torres’ client. The
letterhead contained the name “Baker & McKenzie”. Dacanay denied Clurman’s liability and
at the same time he asked why is Torres using the letterhead “Baker & McKenzie”, a foreign
partnership established in Chicago, Illinois. No reply was received so Dacanay filed an
administrative complaint enjoining Torres from using “Baker & McKenzie”.
Later, Torres said that he is an associate of the law firm Guerrero & Torres; that their law
firm is a member of Baker & McKenzie; that the said foreign firm has members in 30 cities
all over the world; that they associated with them in order to make a representation that they
can render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and
others engaged in foreign trade and investment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the use of a foreign law office name is allowed.
HELD: No. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the
Philippines. Such use of foreign law firm name is unethical therefore Torres and his law firm
are enjoined from using “Baker & McKenzie” in their practice of law.

COLLANTES

Collantes v. Renomeron

A.C. No. 3056. AUgust 16, 1991.

Per curiam

FACTS:

Complainant, house counsel for V&G, filed a

disbarment complaint against Atty. Vincent
Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for
the latter’s irregular actuations with regards to
the application of V&G for registration of 163 pro
forma. Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of
lots in its subdivision.

ISSUE:

WON respondent should be disbarred.

RULING:

Yes. The acts of dishonesty and oppression which

respondent committed as a public official have
demonstrated his unfitness to practice the high and
noble calling of the law.

OR

Fernando Collantes v. Viente Renomeron

200 SCRA 584

Facts: This complaint for disbarment is relative to the administrative case filed by
Atty. Collantes, house counsel for V& G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V&G), against Atty.
Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter’s irregular actuations with
regard to the application of V&G for registration of 163 pro forma Deed of Absolute Sale with
Assignment (in favor of GSIS) of lots in its subdivision.

Although V&G complied with the desired requirements, respondent suspended the registration
of the documents with certain “special conditions” between them, which was that V&G should
provide him with weekly round trip ticket from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket
money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent’s Quezon City house and lot by V&G
or GSIS representatives.

Eventually, respondent formally denied the registration of the documents. He himself elevated
the question on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio (of the
National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration-NLTDRA). The Administrator
then resolved in favor of the registrability of the documents. Despite the resolution of the
Administrator, the respondent still refused the registration thereof but demanded from the
parties interested the submission of additional requirements not adverted in his previous
denial.

Issues: (1) WON the respondent, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by the Court for his
malfeasance as a public official, and (2) WON the Code of Professional Responsibility applies
to government service in the discharge of official tasks.

Held: (1) Yes, a lawyer’s misconduct as a public official also constitutes a violation of his oath
as a lawyer. The lawyer’s oath imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money
or malice. The lawyer’s oath is a source of obligations and its violation is a ground for his
suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.

(2) Yes, the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to government service in the discharge
of their official tasks (Canon 6). The Code forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or delay any
man’s cause “for any corrupt motive or interest” (Rule 1.03).

In Re: Vicente Y. Bayani

A.C. No. 5307. August 9, 2000
Facts: Atty. Vicente Bayani was the lawyer for the appellant in a criminal case. He failed to
submit his proof of service in his appellant’s brief which subsequently caused the inability of the
appellee to file his own brief. The IBP was order to investigate on the matter and despite
repeated notices, Bayani failed to submit the proof of service and his answer to the IBP’s query.
Hence, this administrative complaint.
Held: GUILTY. Atty. Bayani’s failure to submit proof of service of appellant’s brief and his failure
to submit the required comment manifest willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the Supreme
Court, a clear violation of the canons of professional ethics. It appears that Atty. Bayani has fallen
short of the circumspection required of a member of the Bar. A counsel must always remember
that his actions or omissions are binding on his clients. A lawyer owes his client the exercise of
utmost prudence and capability in that representation. Further, lawyers are expected to be
acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure and anyone who deals with them has
the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a
whole-hearted fealty to his client’s cause. Having been remiss in his duty to the Court and to the
Bar, Atty. Bayani was suspended from the practice of law for 3 months and until the time he
complies with the Order of the Supreme Court to submit the required proof of service.

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 109870 December 1, 1995

EDILBERTO M. CUENCA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:

After his petition for review of the Court of Appeals' judgment1 affirming his conviction for violation of
the "Trust Receipts Law" (Presidential Decree No. 115) was denied by this Court in a Resolution
dated February 9, 1994,2petitioner filed on July 6, 1994 a pleading entitled "SUBSTITUTION OF
COUNSEL WITH MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL"3 setting forth, in
relation to the motion for new trial:

6. The Motion for New Trial shall be grounded on newly discovered evidence and
excusible (sic) negligence, and shall be supported by affidavits of:

(i) an officer of private complainant corporation who will exculpate

petitioner;

(ii) an admission against interest by a former officer of the owner of

Ultra Corporation (the Corporation that employed petitioner), which
actually exercised control over the affairs of Ultra; and

(iii) the petitioner wherein he will assert innocence for the first time
and explain why he was unable to do so earlier.

The Court in its July 27, 1994 Resolution,4 among other things, granted the substitution but
denied the motion for leave to file motion for new trial, "the petition having been already
denied on February 9, 1994."

Notwithstanding, petitioner on August 8, 1994 filed a "MOTION TO ADMIT ATTACHED MOTION

FOR NEW TRIAL",5 and a "MANIFESTATION AND SECOND MOTION TO ADMIT" on August 17,
1994.6 The Court thereafter required the Solicitor General to comment on said motion and
manifestation within ten (10) days from notice, in a Resolution dated September 7, 1994.7

In the Comment filed after three (3) extensions of time were given by the Court,8 the Solicitor
General himself recommends that petitioner be entitled to a new trial, proceeding from the same
impression that a certain Rodolfo Cuenca's (petitioner's brother) sworn statement is an admission
against interest which may ultimately exonerate petitioner from criminal liability. The full text of Mr.
Rodolfo Cuenca's "Affidavit"9 reads:

RODOLFO M. CUENCA, Filipino, of legal age, with the residence at Urdaneta

Village, Makati, Metro Manila, after being duly sworn and (sic) state that:

1. During the years 1967 until February 1983, I was the President and Chief
Executive Officer of Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines
(CDCP).
2. During that period, I controlled an effective majority of the voting shares of stock of
CDCP.

3. Sometime in 1974, upon my initiative, CDCP together with its affiliated companies,
organized a number of wholly-owned service corporations. One of these was Ultra
International Trading Corporation, whose purpose was to serve and supply the needs
of CDCP and its other subsidiaries with lower value goods and using Ultra's financial
resources.

4. The directors in Ultra Corporation were nominees of CDCP, and received the
instructions directly from me and or Mr. Pedro Valdez, Chairman of CDCP.

5. From Ultra's inception, my brother, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca was appointed

President and Chief Executive Officer. On March, 1979, I instructed Ultra through my
brother, Mr. Edilberto Cuenca to purchase for CDCP various steel materials. These
materials were received by CDCP and are covered by the trust receipts which are
the subject of this case.

6. In 1980, CDCP suffered cashflow problems, and consciously omitted payment to

Ultra for the delivery of the said steel materials. As a nominee of CDCP, Mr. Edilberto
M. Cuenca merely acted as agent for CDCP. As such, CDCP provided him with the
guarantees needed to persuade China Bank to issue the said trust receipts. On the
basis of such guarantees, along with informal assurances issued by CDCP to China
Bank that the transactions of Ultra were undertaken for and on behalf of CDCP and
CDCP Mining Corporation, Ultra was able to obtain credit facilities, among which
included the trust receipts subject of this case.

7. However, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca had no power to cause the payment of said
trust receipts because the common Treasurer and controller of both CDCP and Ultra,
Ms. Nora Vinluan, acted under my control and I did not allow her to make the
appropriate payments.

8. To my knowledge, CDCP has not paid Ultra the amounts corresponding to the
materials covered by the trust receipts subject of this case.

9. By the time final demand to pay on the trust receipts were (sic) served in 1984, Mr.
Edilberto Cuenca was no longer president of Ultra Corporation and could not have
possibly cause (sic) Ultra Corporation to pay.

10. I have executed this affidavit in order to accept personal responsibility for the
trust receipts subject of this case and to exculpate Mr. Edilberto Cuenca of the
criminal charges which he has asked this Honorable Court to review.

11. Accordingly, I also undertake to pay the civil obligations arising from the subject
trust receipts.

(Sgd.)

RODOLFO M.
CUENCA
 Affiant

And the Solicitor General had this to say:

Ordinarily, it is too late at this stage to ask for a new trial.

However, the sworn statement of Rodolfo Cuenca is a declaration against his own
interests under Section 38, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court and it casts doubt on
the culpability of his brother Edilberto Cuenca, the petitioner. Hence, the alleged
confession of guilt should be given a hard look by the Court.

The People is inclined to allow petitioner to establish the genuineness and due
execution of his brother's affidavit in the interest of justice and fair play.

Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, prosecutors

who represent the People of the Philippines in a criminal case are not duty bound to
seek conviction of the accused but to see that justice is done. Said Rule 6.01 of
Canon 6 states:

Canon 6 — These canons shall apply to lawyers in government

service in the discharge of their official tasks.

Rule 6.01 — The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public

prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is done. The
suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of
establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and
is cause for disciplinary action. (Emphasis supplied.)

The above duty is well founded on the instruction of the U.S. Supreme Court
in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) that prosecutors represent a
sovereign "whose obligation to govern impartially is compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done (Time to Rein in the Prosecution, by
Atty. Bruce Fein, published on p. 11, The Lawyers Review, July 31, 1994).
(Emphasis supplied.)10

Although in "Goduco v. CA" (14 SCRA 282 [1965]) decided some twenty (20) years ago, this Court
ruled that it is not authorized to entertain a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial predicated on
allegedly newly discovered evidence the rationale of which being:

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts, and cannot be
reviewed by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, in an appeal by certiorari to the
Supreme Court, the latter has no jurisdiction to entertain a motion for new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, for only questions of fact are involved therein.

the rule now appears to have been relaxed, if not abandoned, in subsequent cases like
"Helmuth, Jr. v. People"11 and "People v. Amparado".12

In both cases, the Court, opting to brush aside technicalities and despite the opposition of the
Solicitor General, granted new trial to the convicted accused concerned on the basis of proposed
testimonies or affidavits of persons which the Court considered as newly discovered and probably
sufficient evidence to reverse the judgment of conviction. Being similarly circumstanced, there is no
nagging reason why herein petitioner should be denied the same benefit. It becomes all the more
plausible under the circumstances considering that the "People" does not raise any objection to a
new trial, for which reason the Solicitor General ought to be specially commended for displaying
once again such statesmanlike gesture of impartiality. The Solicitor General's finest hour, indeed.

WHEREFORE, petitioner's Motion For New Trial is hereby GRANTED. Let the case be RE-OPENED
and REMANDED to the court of origin for reception of petitioner's evidence.

SO ORDERED.

Ali v Atty. Bubong, AC no 4018,

Page:of 7
Automatic Zoom

OMAR P. ALI,
complainant, vs
. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG,
respondent
.
A.C. No. 4018. March 8, 2005
FACTS
:
This is a verified petition for disbarment
filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found
guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City. It appears that this
disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by complainant against
respondent, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), complainant charged
respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT); and manipulating
the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law.
It appears from the records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of respondent. The initial inquiry by the LRA
was resolved in favor of respondent, absolved respondent of all the charges brought against him.
The case was then forwarded to the DOJ for review, then SoJ Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the
charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of documents, but held guilty of grave misconduct for his
imprudent issuance of TCT and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted
against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latter’s co-accused. As a result of this finding, former President FVR
issued AO No. 41 adopting
in toto
the conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon. Respondent questioned said
AO before this Court through a petition for
certiorari
,
mandamus
, and prohibition
claiming that the Office of the
President did not have the authority and jurisdiction to remove him from office and insisted that
respondents
violated the laws on security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the
administrator of the LRA committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his authority to resolve
the administrative complaint against him (herein respondent), but was dismissed for failure on the part of
petitioner to sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the
questioned order.
Respondent MR was denied with finality.
On the disbarment proceeding, complainant claims that it has become obvious that respondent had proven
himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an attorney
and that he poses a serious threat to the
integrity of the legal profession. Respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with his issuance of
TCT No. T-2821 in the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law
and jurisprudence support his
stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for land
registration on the basis only of the documents presented by the applicants. In the case of the Bauduli Datus,
nothing in the documents they presented to his office warranted suspicion, hence, he was duty-bound to issue
TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.
Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint for violation of the
Anti-Squatting Law and explains that his participation in said case was a result of the two subpoenas
duces
tecum
issued by the investigating prosecutor who required him to produce the various land titles involved in
said dispute. The IBP commenced the investigation of this disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996,
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez denied the order relative to the transfer of venue of this case and penalized
with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City. The finding of Grave Misconduct on the
part of respondent by the Office of the President was fully supported by evidence and as such carries a very
strong weight in considering the professional misconduct of respondent in the present case. The IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved, with modification, which pertained solely to the period of suspension from
the practice of law from a five-year suspension to a two-year suspension to be proper.
On 17 January 2003, respondent MR was denied as by that time, the matter had already been endorsed to this
Court.
ISSUE:
WON respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in the employ of the
government.
RULING:
We resolve this question in the affirmative. The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease
to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of
Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks. Thus, where a lawyer’s misconduct as a government official is of such nature
as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member
of the bar on such grounds.
Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not
be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however,
be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal profession.
In the case at bar, respondents grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President
and
subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his office
as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules governing land registration
for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the
functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads:
Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his
public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public
duties.
Respondents conduct manifestly undermined the people’s confidence in the public office he used to occupy
and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies
of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainants daughter, requesting for the withdrawal of
this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of this nature cannot be interrupted or
terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of
the complainant to prosecute the same.
As we have previously explained in the case of
Irene Rayos-Ombac v.
Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to
the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention
of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice.
WHEREFORE
, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby
DISBARRED
and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
JOVITO S. OLAZO,
Complainant, vs.
JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.),
Respondent.
A
.
M.
No. 10-5-7-SC
FACTS:
In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in
Barangay
Lower
Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig. The land was previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that
was
segregated and declared open for disposition pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476,
issued on January 7, 1986,
and Proclamation No. 172,
issued on October 16, 1987.
To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then Executive Secretary Catalino
Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a recommendation
on the applications to purchase the lands declared open for disposition. The Committee on Awards
was
headed by the Director of Lands and the respondent was one of the Committee members, in his
official
capacity as the Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the respondent’s district includes the
areas covered by the proclamations.
Violation of Rule 6.02:
In the complaint,
the complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as
Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainant’s
sales application because of his personal interest over the subject land when respondent exerted
undue
pressure and influence over the complainant’s father, Miguel P. Olazo,
for the latter to contest the
complainant’s sales application and claim the subject land for himself.
The respondent prevailed upon Miguel
Olazo to accept, on various dates, sums of money as payment of the latters alleged rights over the subject
land. The complainant further claimed that the respondent brokered the transfer of rights of the subject land
between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondent’s deceased wife.
As a result, complainant’s sales application was denied. The conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
and his sales application were subsequently given due course by the DENR.
Violation of Rule 6.03:
The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas
belonging to Manuel Olazo, the complainant’s brother.
The respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct
Manuel to convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the
respondent’s
promptings, the rights to the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. In addition, the complainant
alleged that the respondent met with Manuel for the purpose of nullifying the conveyance of rights over the
land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant claimed that the respondent wanted the rights over the
land transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the
Barangay
Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig.
The respondent in this
regard executed an Assurance where he stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez.
Violation of
Rule 1.01:
The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering
his knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119.
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a
bona fide
resident of the proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an
award. Thus, the approval of his sales application by the Committee on Awards amounted to a violation of the
objectives of Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119.
The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act (
R.A.
) No. 6713
since he engaged in the practice
of law, within the one-year prohibition period, when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.
In his Comment,
the respondent claimed that the present complaint is the third malicious charge filed against
him by the complainant. The first one was submitted before the Judicial and Bar Council when he
was
nominated as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; the second complaint is now pending
with the Office
of the Ombudsman, for alleged violation of Section 3(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
ISSUE:
WON respondent’s actions constitute a breach of the standard ethical conduct
first, while the respondent was
still an elective public official and a member of the Committee on Awards; and second, when he was no longer
a public official, but a private lawyer who represented a client before the office he was previously connected
with.
RULING:
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.
He may be disciplined by this Court as a
member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. After a careful
evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties and their respective pieces of evidence, we resolve to dismiss
the administrative complaint.
Accountability of a government lawyer in public office
The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
It imposes the
following restrictions in the conduct of a government lawyer:
A lawyer in the government service shall not use
his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public
duties.
The above provision
prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2)
advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public duties. We previously
held that the restriction
extends to all government lawyers
who use their public offices to promote their
private interests.
In
Huyssen v. Gutierrez
,
we defined promotion of private interest
to include
soliciting gifts or anything of
monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of
his or her office, or may be affected by the
functions of
his or her office.
In
Ali v. Bubong
,
we recognized that private interest is not limited to direct interest,
but extends to advancing the interest of relatives.
We also ruled that private interest interferes with public duty
when the respondent uses the office and
his or her knowledge of the intricacies of the law to benefit relatives.
In
Vitriolo v. Dasig
,
we found the act of the respondent (an official of the Commission on Higher Education) of
extorting money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office to be a serious breach of
Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
We reached the same conclusion in
Huyssen
, where we
found the respondent (an employee of the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, based on the evidence showing that he demanded money from the
complainant who had a pending application for visas
before his office. Similarly, in
Igoy v. Soriano
we found the
respondent (a Court Attorney of this Court) liable for violating Rule 6.02 of the Code of
Professional
Responsibility, after considering the evidence showing that he demanded and received money from
the
complainant who had a pending case before this Court.
Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence of any concrete proof that the
respondent abused his position as a Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the
manner defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
First
, the records do not clearly show if the complainant’s sales application was ever brought before the
Committee on Awards. Complainant filed a sales application in March 1990 before LMB.
By 1996, the
complainant’s sales application was pending before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the
DENR due to the conflicting claims of Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
The records show that it was only on August 2, 2000 that the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of
the DENR rendered its decision, or after the term of the respondent’s elective public office and
membership to the Committee on Awards, which expired in 1997.These circumstances do not show
that the respondent did in any way promote, advance or use his private interests in the discharge of his
official duties. Since the sales application was not brought before the Committee on Awards when the
respondent was still a member, no sufficient basis exists to conclude that he used his position to obtain
personal benefits.
We note in this regard that the denial of the complainant’s sales application over the
subject land was made by the DENR, not by the Committee on Awards.
Second
, the complainants allegation that the respondent orchestrated the efforts to get the subject land
does not specify how the orchestration was undertaken.
Third
, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant presented to support his
claim that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over his father, do not contain any
reference to the alleged pressure or force exerted by the respondent over Miguel Olazo. The
documents merely showed that the respondent helped Miguel Olazo in having his farm lots (covered by
the proclaimed areas) surveyed.
They also showed that the respondent merely acted as a witness in
the
Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated July 17, 1996.
In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation. The affidavit of Joseph
Jeffrey
Rodriguez further corroborated the respondents claim that the latters involvement was limited to being paid the
loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo. According to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and Miguel
Olazo agreed that a portion of the loan would be directly paid by Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez to the respondent
and the amount paid would be considered as part of the purchase price of the subject land.
It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary evidence, specifically the dates
when the sums of money were extended by the respondent on February 21, 1995, September 2, 1995 and
October 17, 1995, and the date when the Deed of Conveyance
[27]
over the subject land was executed or on
October 25, 1995, showed that the sums of money were extended prior to the transfer of rights over the
subject land. These pieces of evidence are consistent with the respondents allegation that Miguel
Olazo
decided to sell his rights over the subject land to pay the loans he obtained from the respondent and, also, to
finance his continuing medical treatment.
Private practice of law after separation from public office
As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law after his separation from
the government service, the complainant presented the
Sinumpaang Salaysay
, dated January 20, 2000, of
Manuel and the document entitled Assurance where the respondent legally represented Ramon Lee
and
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the foregoing pieces of evidence fail to persuade us to conclude that
there was a violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In
Cayetano v. Monsod
,
[28]
we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice
law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of
legal knowledge or skill.

17
CASE NO.
9VENANCIO
CASTANEDA and
NICETAS
HENSON,
petitioners,
vs.
PASTOR D. AGO,
LOURDES YU
AGO andTHE
COURT OF
APPEALS,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-
28546 July 30,
1975CASTRO,
J.
FACTS
In 1955, the
petitioners
Venancio
Castañeda and
Nicetas Henson
filed a replevin
suit against Pastor
Agoin the Court of
First Instance of
Manila to recover
certain
machineries (civil
case 27251).

Ago failed
toredeem, and on
April 17, 1964 the
sheriff executed
the final deed of
sale in favor of
the
vendeesCastañeda
and Henson. Upon
their petition, the
Court of First
Instance of
Manila
issued a writ
ofpossession to
the
properties.Howeve
r, on May 2, 1964
Pastor Ago, now
joined by his wife,
Lourdes Yu Ago,
as his co-plaintiff,
filed acomplaint in
the Court of First
Instance of
Quezon City
 (civil case Q-
7986) to annul
the sheriff's
sale.The Court of
First Instance of
Quezon City
issued an
ex parte
writ of
preliminary
injunction
restrainingthe
petitioners, the
Register of Deeds
and the sheriff of
Quezon City, from
registering the
latter's finaldeed
of sale, from
cancelling the
respondents'
certificates of
title and issuing
new ones to
thepetitioners and
from carrying out
any writ of
possession.While
the battle on the
matter of the
lifting and
restoring of the
restraining order
was being fought
inthe Quezon City
court, the Agos
filed a petition
for certiorari and
prohibition with
this Court under
dateof May 26,
1966.

The Court found

no merit in the
petition and
dismissed it. The
Court of Appeals
alsodismissed the
petition. The
respondents then
appealed to this
Court. The Court
dismissed the
petition ina minute
resolution on
February 8, 1967.
The Ago spouses
repaired once
more to the Court
of Appealswhere
they filed another
petition for
certiorari
and prohibition
with preliminary
injunction.Failing
to obtain
reconsideration,
the petitioners
Castañeda and
Henson filed the
present petition
forreview of the
aforesaid decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not
the respondents
Agos, abetted by
their lawyer Jose
M. Luison, have
misused
legalremedies and
prostituted the
judicial process
to thwart the
satisfaction of
the judgment.
HELD
Yes. Despite the
pendency in the
trial court of the
complaint for the
annulment of the
sheriff's sale
(civilcase Q-
7986), elementary
justice demands
that the
petitioners, long
denied the fruits
of their victory
inthe replevin suit,
must now enjoy
them, for, the
respondents Agos,
abetted by their
lawyer Jose
M.Luison, have
misused legal
remedies and
prostituted
the judicial
process to thwart
the satisfaction
of the judgment,
to the extended
prejudice of
the petitioners.
The respondents,
with the
assistance of
counsel,maneuvere
d for fourteen
(14) years to
doggedly resist
execution of the
judgment thru
manifold tacticsin
and from one
court to another
(5 times in the
Supreme Court)
17
CASE NO.
9VENANCIO
CASTANEDA and
NICETAS
HENSON,
petitioners,
vs.
PASTOR D. AGO,
LOURDES YU
AGO andTHE
COURT OF
APPEALS,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-
28546 July 30,
1975CASTRO,
J.
FACTS
In 1955, the
petitioners
Venancio
Castañeda and
Nicetas Henson
filed a replevin
suit against Pastor
Agoin the Court of
First Instance of
Manila to recover
certain
machineries (civil
case 27251).

Ago failed
toredeem, and on
April 17, 1964 the
sheriff executed
the final deed of
sale in favor of
the
vendeesCastañeda
and Henson. Upon
their petition, the
Court of First
Instance of
Manila
issued a writ
ofpossession to
the
properties.Howeve
r, on May 2, 1964
Pastor Ago, now
joined by his wife,
Lourdes Yu Ago,
as his co-plaintiff,
filed acomplaint in
the Court of First
Instance of
Quezon City
 (civil case Q-
7986) to annul
the sheriff's
sale.The Court of
First Instance of
Quezon City
issued an
ex parte
writ of
preliminary
injunction
restrainingthe
petitioners, the
Register of Deeds
and the sheriff of
Quezon City, from
registering the
latter's finaldeed
of sale, from
cancelling the
respondents'
certificates of
title and issuing
new ones to
thepetitioners and
from carrying out
any writ of
possession.While
the battle on the
matter of the
lifting and
restoring of the
restraining order
was being fought
inthe Quezon City
court, the Agos
filed a petition
for certiorari and
prohibition with
this Court under
dateof May 26,
1966.

The Court found

no merit in the
petition and
dismissed it. The
Court of Appeals
alsodismissed the
petition. The
respondents then
appealed to this
Court. The Court
dismissed the
petition ina minute
resolution on
February 8, 1967.
The Ago spouses
repaired once
more to the Court
of Appealswhere
they filed another
petition for
certiorari
and prohibition
with preliminary
injunction.Failing
to obtain
reconsideration,
the petitioners
Castañeda and
Henson filed the
present petition
forreview of the
aforesaid decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not
the respondents
Agos, abetted by
their lawyer Jose
M. Luison, have
misused
legalremedies and
prostituted the
judicial process
to thwart the
satisfaction of
the judgment.
HELD
Yes. Despite the
pendency in the
trial court of the
complaint for the
annulment of the
sheriff's sale
(civilcase Q-
7986), elementary
justice demands
that the
petitioners, long
denied the fruits
of their victory
inthe replevin suit,
must now enjoy
them, for, the
respondents Agos,
abetted by their
lawyer Jose
M.Luison, have
misused legal
remedies and
prostituted
the judicial
process to thwart
the satisfaction
of the judgment,
to the extended
prejudice of
the petitioners.
The respondents,
with the
assistance of
counsel,maneuvere
d for fourteen
(14) years to
doggedly resist
execution of the
judgment thru
manifold tacticsin
and from one
court to another
(5 times in the
Supreme Court)
18The Court
condemn the
attitude of the
respondents and
their counsel
who,far from
viewing courts as
sanctuaries for
those who seek
justice, have tried
to use them
tosubvert the
very ends of
justice.Forgetting
his sacred mission
as a sworn public
servant and his
exalted position
as an officer of
thecourt, Atty.
Luison has allowed
himself to become
an instigator of
controversy and a
predator of
conflictinstead of
a mediator for
concord and a
conciliator for
compromise, a
virtuoso of
technicality in
theconduct of
litigation instead
of a true exponent
of the primacy of
truth and moral
justice
Huyssen vs. Gutierrez

A.C. No. 6707, March 24, 2006

(Legal Ethics)

FACTS

Respondent Atty. Gutierrez, a Bureau of Immigration and Deportation officer, received

US$20,000 from complainant Huyssen. Accused of falsely representing that it was needed
in complainant’s application for visa and failing to return the same, respondent denied
misappropriating the said amount, claiming that he gave it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who
assisted complainant and children in their application for visa. He failed however to
substantiate such denial.

Atty. Gutierrez had many alibis on why the money could not immediately be returned to the
complainant, and promised her several times that he would repay her out of his personal
funds. He even issued personal post-dated checks on this, but which later bounced.
ISSUE

Whether or not respondent’s conduct violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and
merits the penalty of disbarment?

RULING

Yes, the respondent should be disbarred.

The defense of denial proferred by respondent is not convincing. It is settled that denial,
which is inherently a weak defense, to be believed must be buttressed by a strong evidence
of non-culpability. The evidence, respondent’s letters to the complainant, shows that he
made it appear that the US$20,000 was officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation. If this is true, how come only Petty Cash Vouchers were issued by
respondent to complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum and official receipts therefore
were never issued by the said Bureau? Also, why would respondent issue his personal
checks to cover the return of the money to complainant if said amount was really officially
deposited with the Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of respondent point to the
inescapable conclusion that respondent received the money from complainant and
appropriated the same for his personal use.

Lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task have more restrictions
than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned
in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.

Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking advantage of his
position with the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation,
makes it more reprehensible as it has caused damage to the reputation and integrity of said
office. It is submitted that respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which reads:
"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance
his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties."

Also, the act of issuing a bouncing check shows moral turpitude. Respondent's acts are
more despicable, for not only did he misappropriate the money of complainant; worse, he
had the gall to prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID and issued checks to cover up
his misdeeds.

Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble profession. It is a
special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically
and morally.

A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the
public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. More importantly,
possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment
of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of
such privilege.

As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the
strict demands and high standards of the legal profession. Section 27 Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for, among
other acts, gross misconduct in office.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered
to return the amount he received from the complainant with legal interest from his receipt of
the money until payment. The case shall be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for
criminal prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the
Department of Justice for appropriate administrative action.

Teodulfo B. Basas vs. Atty. Miguel I. Icawat

A.C. No. 4282. August 24, 2000
Facts: Atty. Miguel Icawat was the lawyer for Teodulfo Basas and some other laborers in their
complaint against their employer. The NLRC rendered an adverse decision. Basas and his fellow
workers, however, insisted that they appeal the decision. Atty. Icawat, however, failed to file the
required memorandum of appeal. Basas filed an administrative complaint, also alleging that Atty.
Icawat issued a receipt for an amount less than that which they had paid him.
Held: GUILTY. Respondent’s failure to file the memorandum of appeal required by the NLRC Rules
of Procedure reveals his poor grasp of labor law. Respondent practically admitted that he did not
file the memorandum. His failure to file the memorandum clearly prejudiced the interests of his
clients. Respondent manifestly fell short of the diligence required of his profession, in violation of
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that a lawyer shall serve his
client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 further provides that a lawyer shall not neglect
a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable. For his failure to issue the proper receipt for the money he received from his clients,
respondent also violated Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a
lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. The
Court fined Atty. Icawat in the amount of PhP 500, with a warning that a repetition of the same
offense or a similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely.

eodoro R. Rivera vs. Atty. Sergio Angeles

A.C. No. 2519. August 29, 2000
Facts: Atty. Sergio Angeles was the legal counsel of Teodoro Rivera and 2 others in a civil case.
Rivera and his 2 co-plaintiffs received a favorable decision. Atty. Angeles received almost PhP
50,000 from one of the defendants in the case as partial fulfillment of the judgement against the
latter. Atty. Angeles, however, never told his clients of the amount he had received and never
remitted the same to him, leaving them to discover such fact on their own. Rivera and his co-
plaintiffs filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Angeles.
Held: GUILTY. Atty. Angeles was not disbarred but the Court ruled that his act amounted to
serious misconduct. The Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity and good moral
character as part of a lawyer’s equipment in the practice of his profession. For it cannot be
denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a
member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. The Court is not oblivious of the right of a
lawyer to be paid for the legal services he has extended to his client but such right should not be
exercised whimsically by appropriating to himself the money intended for his clients. There should
never be an instance where the victor in litigation loses everything he won to the fees of his own
lawyer. For deceit in dealing with his client, Atty. Angeles was suspended from the practice of law
for 1 year.

Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. vs. Attys. Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon
A.C. No. 4690. August 29, 2000
Facts: Attys. Antonio Llorente and Ligaya Salayon were election officers of the COMELEC and held
the position of Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively for the Pasig City Board of Candidates.
The respondents helped conduct and oversee the 1995 elections. Then Senatorial candidate
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. alleged that the respondents tampered with the votes received by them by
either adding more votes for particular candidates in their Statement of Votes (SoV) or reducing
the number of votes of particular candidates in their SoV. Pimentel filed an administrative
complaint for their disbarment. Respondents argued that the discrepancies were due to honest
mistake, oversight and fatigue. Respondents also argued that the IBP Board of Governors had
already exonerated them from any offense and that the motion for reconsideration filed by
Pimentel was not filed in time.
Held: GUILTY. Respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended the
canvassing of the Pasig City election returns. The only explanation they could offer for such
irregularities is that the same could be due to honest mistake, human error, and/or fatigue on the
part of the members of the canvassing committees who prepared the SoVs. There is a limit, we
believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, in the
performance of official duty. The sheer magnitude of the error renders the defense of honest
mistake or oversight due to fatigue, as incredible and simply unacceptable. Indeed, what is
involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per precinct as
reflected in the election returns and the subsequent entry of the erroneous figures in one or two
SoVs but a systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the expense of
the petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election returns. A lawyer who holds
a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the
discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if the misconduct also constitutes a
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer’s oath or is of such character as
to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual may
be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct. Here, by certifying as true and correct
the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates
that a lawyer shall not engage in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” By express
provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the government service. In addition,
they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to “do no falsehood.” The Court found the
respondents guilty of misconduct and fined them PhP 10,000 each and issued a stern warning that
similar conduct in the future will be severely punished.

Santos v Atty. Llamas

Santos vs Llamas Case Digest

Soliman M. Santos, Jr. v. Atty. Francisco R. Llamas

A.C. No. 4749. January 20, 2000

Facts: Complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues. It appears that
Atty. Llamas, who for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP OR Nos.
and data in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated “IBP Rizal 259060” but he has been using this
for at least 3 years already. On the other hand, respondent, who is now of age, averred that he is
only engaged in a “limited” practice of law and under RA 7432, as a senior citizen, he is exempted
from payment of income taxes and included in this exemption is the payment of membership dues.

Held: GUILTY. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues
and default thereof for six months shall warrant suspension of membership and if nonpayment
covers a period of 1-year, default shall be a ground for removal of the delinquent’s name from the
Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not respondent is only engaged in “limited” practice
of law. Moreover, the exemption invoked by respondent does not include exemption from payment of
membership or association dues.

In addition, by indicating “IBP Rizal 259060” in his pleadings and thereby misprepresenting to the
public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chpater, respondent is guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01
which provides that: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
nor mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Lawyer was suspended for 1 year or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.