FIRST DIVISION
Based on this, Larin, Pareño, Galban and petitioner
G.R. Nos. 108135-36 August 14, 2000
POTENCIANA M. EVANGELISTA, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,
(FIRST DIVISION),respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On September 30, 1999, we rendered a Decision in this case acquitting petitioner of
the charge of violation of then Section 268 (4) of the National Internal Revenue
Code1 but affirming her conviction for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3
(e),2 thus imposing on her an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment for six (6) years
and one month as minimum to twelve (12) years as maximum, and the penalty of
perpetual disqualification from public office.
The basic facts are briefly restated as follows:
On September 17, 1987, Tanduay Distillery, Inc. filed with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue an application for tax credit in the amount of P180,701,682.00, for allegedly
erroneous payments of ad valorem taxes from January 1, 1986 to August 31, 1987.
Tanduay claimed that it is a rectifier of alcohol and other spirits, which per previous
ruling of the BIR is only liable to pay specific taxes and not ad valorem taxes. Upon
receipt of the application, Aquilino Larin of the Specific Tax Office sent a memorandum
to the Revenue Accounting Division (RAD), headed by petitioner, requesting the said
office to check and verify whether the amounts claimed by Tanduay were actually paid
to the BIR as ad valorem taxes. Larin’s memorandum was received by the Revenue
Administrative Section (RAS), a subordinate office of the RAD. After making the
necessary verification, the RAS prepared a certification in the form of a 1st Indorsement
to the Specific Tax Office, dated September 25, 1987, which was signed by petitioner
as RAD chief.
The 1st Indorsement states that Tanduay made tax payments classified under Tax
Numeric Code (TNC) 3011-0001 totalling P102,519,100.00 and payments classified
under TNC 0000-0000 totalling P78,182,582.00. Meanwhile, Teodoro Pareño, head of
the Tax and Alcohol Division, certified to Justino Galban, Jr., Head of the Compounders,
Rectifiers and Repackers Section, that Tanduay was a rectifier not liable for ad valorem
tax. Pareño recommended to Larin that the application for tax credit be given due
course. Hence, Larin recommended that Tanduay’s claim be approved, on the basis of
which Deputy Commissioner Eufracio D. Santos signed Tax Credit Memo No. 5177 in
the amount of P180,701,682.00.
Sometime thereafter, a certain Ruperto Lim wrote a letter-complaint to then BIR
Commissioner Bienvenido Tan, Jr. alleging that the grant of Tax Credit Memo No. 5177
was irregular and anomalous.
Evangelista were charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 268 (4)
of the National Internal Revenue Code and of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Larin, Pareño and petitioner were later convicted of both
crimes, while Galban was acquitted inasmuch as his only participation in the processing
of Tanduay’s application was the preparation of the memorandum confirming that
Tanduay was a rectifier.
The three accused filed separate petitions for review. Pareño’s and Larin’s petitions
were consolidated and, in a decision dated April 17, 1996, both were acquitted by this
Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 14208 and 14209.3 In this petition, on the other hand, we
acquitted petitioner in Criminal Case No. 14208, for violation of Section 268 (4) of the
NIRC. However, we found petitioner guilty of gross negligence in issuing a certification
containing TNCs which she did not know the meaning of and which, in turn, became
the basis of the Bureau’s grant of Tanduay’s application for tax credit. Thus, we
affirmed petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 14209, i.e., for violation of Section
3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration,4 wherein she asserts that
there was nothing false in her certification inasmuch as she did not endorse therein
approval of the application for tax credit. Rather, her certification showed the contrary,
namely, that Tanduay was not entitled to the tax credit since there was no proof that
it paid ad valorem taxes. Petitioner also claims that she was neither afforded due
process nor informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. She was
found guilty of an offense different from that alleged in the information; consequently,
she was unable to properly defend herself from the crime for which she was convicted.
The Information against petitioner and her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 14209
alleges in fine that they caused undue injury to the Government and gave unwarranted
benefits to Tanduay when they endorsed approval of the claim for tax credit by
preparing, signing and submitting false memoranda, certification and/or official
communications stating that Tanduay paid ad valorem taxes when it was not liable for
such because its products are distilled spirits on which specific taxes are paid, by reason
of which false memoranda, certification and/or official communications the BIR
approved the application for tax credit, thus defrauding the Government of the sum of
P107,087,394.80, representing the difference between the amount claimed as tax
credit and the amount of ad valorem taxes paid by Tanduay to the BIR. 5 According to
petitioner, instead of convicting her of the acts described in the Information, she was
convicted of issuing the certification without identifying the kinds of tax for which the
TNCs stand and without indicating whether Tanduay was really entitled to tax credit or
not.
The Solicitor General filed his Comment6 wherein he joined petitioner’s cause and
prayed that the motion for reconsideration be granted. In hindsight, even the Solicitor
General’s comment on the petition consisted of a "Manifestation and Motion in lieu of
Comment,"7 where he recommended that petitioner be acquitted of the two charges
against her.
We find that the Motion for Reconsideration is well-taken.
After a careful re-examination of the records of this case, it would appear that the
certification made by petitioner in her 1st Indorsement was not favorable to Tanduay’s
application for tax credit. Far from it, petitioner’s certification meant that there were
no payments of ad valorem taxes by Tanduay in the records and hence, it was not
entitled to tax credit. In other words, the certification was against the grant of
Tanduay’s application for tax credit.
It has been established that the BIR adopted tax numeric codes (TNCs) to classify taxes
according to their kinds and rates, in order to facilitate the preparation of statistical
and other management reports, the improvement of revenue accounting and the
production of tax data essential to management planning and decision-making. These
codes include TNC No. 3011-0001 for specific tax on domestic distilled spirits, TNC No.
3023-2001 for ad valorem tax on compounded liquors, and TNC No. 0000-0000 for
unclassified taxes.
Petitioner’s 1st Indorsement dated September 25, 1987 lists down the confirmation
receipts covering tax payments by Tanduay for the period January 1, 1986 to August
31, 1987, during which Tanduay alleges that it made erroneous ad valorem tax
payments, classified according to TNC numbers. The tax payments therein are
described only as falling under TNC No. 3011-0001, i.e., specific tax, and TNC No.
0000-0000, i.e., unclassified taxes. There are no tax payments classified as falling
under TNC No. 3023-2001, the code for ad valorem taxes. The import of this, simply,
is that Tanduay did not make any ad valorem tax payments during the said period and
is, therefore, not entitled to any tax credit.
Further, petitioner contends that she was convicted of a supposed crime not punishable
by law.8 She was charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which states:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. --- In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(e)....Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, judicial or administrative functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of the offense are: (1) that the accused are public officers or private
persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officers commit the
prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their
public positions; (3) that they cause undue injury to any party, whether the
Government or a private party; (4) that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) that the public officers have
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.9
R.A. 3019, Section 3, paragraph (e), as amended, provides as one of its elements that
the public officer should have acted by causing any undue injury to any party, including
the Government, or by giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions. The use of the disjunctive term "or"
connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3, paragraph (e), or as aptly
held in Santiago,10 as two (2) different modes of committing the offense. This does not
however indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an
accused may be charged under either mode or under both.11
In the instant case, we find that petitioner, in issuing the certification, did not cause
any undue injury to the Government. She also did not give unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to Tanduay. Neither did petitioner display manifest partiality
to Tanduay nor act with evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Quite the
contrary, petitioner’s certification was against the interest of Tanduay. It did not
advocate the grant of its application for tax credit. The certification can even be read
as a recommendation of denial of the application.
Petitioner further argues that her conviction was merely based on her alleged failure
to identify with certainty in her certification the kinds of taxes paid by Tanduay and to
indicate what the TNCs stand for, which acts were different from those described in
the Information under which she was charged. This, she claims, violated her
constitutional right to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against her.
It is well-settled that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly
charged in the complaint or information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To convict him of an offense
other than that charged in the complaint or information would be a violation of this
constitutional right.12 In the case at bar, we find merit in petitioner’s contention that
the acts for which she was convicted are different from those alleged in the
Information. More importantly, as we have discussed above, petitioner’s act of issuing
the certification did not constitute corrupt practices as defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A.
3019.
Employees of the BIR were expected to know what the TNCs stand for.1âwphi1 If they
do not, there is a "Handbook of Tax Numeric Code of Revenue Sources" which they
can consult. With this, petitioner should not be required to describe in words the kinds
of tax for which each TNC used stands for. Precisely, the purpose of introducing the
use of tax numeric codes in the Bureau was to do away with these descriptive words,
in order to expedite and facilitate communications among the different divisions
therein. We find that petitioner’s omission to indicate what kind of taxes TNC Nos.
3011-0001 and 0000-0000 stand for was not a criminal act. Applicable here is the
familiar maxim in criminal law: Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege. There is no crime
where there is no law punishing it.

On the whole, therefore, we find that petitioner was not guilty of any criminal offense.
The prosecution’s evidence failed to establish that petitioner committed the acts
described in the Information which constitute corrupt practices. Her conviction must,
therefore, be set aside. For conviction must rest no less than on hard evidence showing
that the accused, with moral certainty, is guilty of the crime charged. Short of these
constitutional mandate and statutory safeguard --- that a person is presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved --- the Court is then left without discretion and is duty
bound to render a judgment of acquittal.13

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. This Court’s Decision

dated September 30, 1999 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ACQUITTED
of the charge against her.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34105 February 4, 1983
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TIMOTEO CABURAL, CIRIACO YANGYANG, BENJAMIN LASPONIA, and
LEONIDE CABUAL, accussed,TIMOTEO CABURAL and CIRIACO
YANGYANG, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Benjamin A. Gravino for private respondents.
Abdon A. Arriba counsel for defendant-appellants.
RELOVA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte,
dated June 4, 1970, convicting Timoteo Cabural of the crime of Robbery with Rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; and, convicting Leonide
Cabual, Benjamin Lasponia and Ciriaco Yangyang of the crime of Robbery and
sentencing each of them to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of
Prision Mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years of Prision Mayor, as maximum; to
indemnify the offended party in the sum of P9,435.50, without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency and to pay proportionately the costs of the proceedings.
The statement of facts in the brief filed by the People of the Philippines is as follows:
... [A]t about 2:00 o'clock in the morning of September 14, 1960, three masked men
entered the building of the Kim San Milling in Palao City of Iligan thru an opening of
the roof above the kitchen that was being repaired and forced themselves inside a
room where Pua Lim Pin Bebencio Palang, Sy Chua Tian and Siao Chou were sleeping
(tsn, pp. 78-82, May 31, 1965; tsn, pp. 141-148, June 13, 1961). The masked men, at
gunpoint, hogtied the four occupants of the room and commanding them to lie on the
floor, face down, were all covered with blankets (tsn, pp. 82-83, Ibid). The inmates of
the room heard That the cabinets were being ransacked (tsn, p. 82, Ibid). As this was
going on, one of the men approached Pua Lim Pin to ask him if he could open the safe
to which he answered in the negative as he was a mere employee of the firm (tsn, p.
83, May 31, 1961). An hour later, one of the men approached Sy Chua Tian (also See
Chou Kian tsn, p. 89, Ibid) and told him: 'now is 3:30, if by 4:00 the safe is not open
we will kill you.' (tsn, p. 94, Ibid.)
As this was going on, another episode was taking place inside the next room where
the maids were sleeping (tsn, p. 91, May 31, 1961). Restituta Biosano Panchita
Maghanoy and Agripina Maglangit have retired at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening
of September 13, 1960, after their chores were performed (tsn, p. 91, Ibid, tsn, p. 10,
May 7,1961; tsn, p. 13, May 29,1961; tsn, p. 25, Ibid). At about 2:00 o'clock the
following morning, they were awakened by two persons, one holding a pistol and the
other holding a hunting knife. Like the fate of the four inmates of the other room, the
maids were all hogtied, made to lie on the floor, face downward, and were all covered
with blankets (tsn, pp. 25-29, May 29, 1961).1äwphï1.ñët The two then left the room
(tsn, p. 29, Ibid). After two hours later, one of the two men re-appeared in the room
and after discovering that Agripina Maglangit had freed her hands, he showed anger
and remarked that he would separate her from the rest. With his pistol pointed at her,
he took her outside the building to a secluded place within the Kim San Compound
(tsn, pp. 30-33, Ibid.). Here, with her hands tied, she was made to lie down flat on the
ground face upwards. He then raised her skirt, tied down her panties, and had sexual
intercourse with her. She was unable to resist him and fight back because at the time
she had lost her strength not to mention the fact that she was deprived of the use of
her hands that were both tied together. The rape having been consummated, he pulled
her left arm so she could stand up. He then left her (tsn, pp. 33-35, Ibid.).
Agripina Maglangit recognized the features of the man that raped her. She Identified
her rapist to be the accused Timoteo Cabural (tsn, pp. 36-39, Ibid.).
At about four o'clock that morning (September 14, 1960) all the intruders must have
left because the four men that were hogtied in the other room noticed complete silence
They each struggled to free themselves which they succeeded. Maghanoy lost her Alosa
15-jewel watch costing her P65.00 (tsn, p. 22, May 29, 1961); Sy Chua Tian (See Chou
Kian lost his Omega automatic wrist watch valued in the amount of P385.00 that was
snatched from his wrist by one of the robbers, besides his wallet containing P264.00 in
paper currency (tsn, p. 85 and p. 95, May 31, 1961). After the robbers left, the inmates
discovered the cash and some personal belongings in the total amount of P9,435.50
were transported by the robbers (tsn, pp. 29-36, Oct. 23, 1961; tsn, pp. 120-125, June
13, 1961).
The accident having been reported, both the local police as well as the Philippine
Constabulary stationed in Iligan conducted their investigation. In the course of the
investigation, members of the Philippine Constabulary found a.30-caliber carbine with
4 magazines and a .45 caliber pistol well wrapped in a banca at the shore behind the
house of the accused Benjamin Lasponia This led to the investigation of Lasponia who
subsequently admitted the crime and pointed to his companions that night. On
September 18, 1960, Benjamin Lasponia signed a confession before Assistant Fiscal
Leonardo Magsalin, Exhibits B, B-1, B-2, and B3 at the PC headquarters in Iligan (pp.
1025-1028, Vol. III Rec.). He confessed to the last detail his participation in the crime.
On September 19, 1960, the accused Leonide Cabual subscribed to an affidavit before
the same Fiscal .Magsalin regarding his participation and that of -his co-accused in the
robbery of Kim San Milling in the early morning of September 14, 1960, Exhibits C, C-
1, C-2, C3 and C5 (pp. 1029-1034, Vol. III, Record (l). Ciriaco Yangyang followed. He
subscribed his confession before Special Counsel Dominador Padilla in the Office of the
City Fiscal of Iligan on September 26, 960, Exhibits H, H-1 and H2 (pp. 1036-1038, Vol.
III, Record, See complete testimony of Eustaquio Cabides, tsn, pp- 52-72, July 17,
1969).
On September 21, 1960, (1) Timoteo Cabural, alias Romeo alias Tiyoy (2) Benjamin
Three pairs of earrings with pearls................ 120.00
Lasponia; (3) Leonide Cabual alias Eddie; (4) Ciriaco Yangyang; (5) William Tate alias
Negro; (6) Fausto Dacera and, (7) Alfonso Caloy-on alias Pablo, were charged before
the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte of the crime of Robbery in Band with Four Chinese gold rings with stones of........
Rape, in an information filed by the City Fiscal of Iligan City. The crime charged was
allegedly committed as follows:
different colors................................................. 140.00
That on or about September 14, 1960 in the City of Iligan Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, in company with one Fred Ybañez
Sweepstakes tickets......................................... 45.00
alias Godofredo Camisic and one John Doe, who are still-at-large, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, and armed with deadly
weapons, all unlicensed, to wit: carbines, revolvers, tommy guns, garand rifles and One American gold Lady's ring.....................
knives, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and
by means of violence against and intimidation of persons, and with the use of force
upon things, to wit: by passing through an opening not intended for entrance or egress, with dark pink stone........................... 30.00
enter the main building and office of the Kim San Milling Company, an inhabited
building, and once inside, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, Four men's rings............................................... 32.00
steal, rob and carry away therefrom, the following personal properties, to wit:

Cashmoney......................................................... P5,972.00 One and a half dozens handkerchiefs.......... 34.50

Wrist watch 'Technos'...................................... 100.00 Lady's wrist watch.......................................... 30.00

Gold Ring............................................................ 20.00. Three ladies watches...................................... 69.00

Sunglasses......................................................... 30.00 One men's watch............................................. 60.00

Four pieces of golden bracelets...................... 1,400.00 One Chinese gold necklace........................... 58.00

Chinese gold ring with dark blue stone......... 90.00 One Lady's wrist watch.................................. 15.00

One gold ring with brilliant stone................... 400.00 One Chinese gold necklace........................... 58.00

One Chinese gold necklace with red stone... 150.00 One Men's wrist watch................................... 60.00

One pair of earrings Chinese gold with......... One Men's wrist watch 'Tugaris'................... 65.00

red stone....................................................... 60.00 Knife.................................................................. 12.00


One Men's wrist watch...................................
'Omega' Seamaster........................................... 385.00
with a total value of P9,435.50, belonging to the Kim San Milling Company, Bebencio
Palang, Agapito Tan, Restituta Boisano Panchita Maghanoy, Catalina Boisano Pua Lim
Pin and Sy Chua Tian to the damage and prejudice of the said owners in the said sum
of P9,435.50, Philippine currency; and that on the occasion or by reason of the said
robbery, the above-named accused except William Tate alias Negro, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one Agripina Maglangit, a woman,
by means of violence and intimidation and against her will.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 294 paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Republic Act No. 18 and Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by Republic Act No. 12, Section 3, with the following aggravating circumstances, to wit:
that the said offense was committed during night time and by a band; that it was
committed with the use of disguise; and that it was committed with the use of a motor
vehicle.
Upon arraignment, the defendants pleaded not guilty. However, during the course of
the trial, three (3) of the accused, namely: William Tate Fausto Dacera and Alfonso
Caloy-on were dropped on petition of the City Fiscal and trial proceeded against the
four (4) remaining accused, namely: Timoteo Cabural, alias Romeo Cabural; Benjamin
Lasponia, Leonide Cabual and Ciriaco Yangyang. As aforesaid, Cabural, Lasponia,
Cabual and Yangyang were convicted. Benjamin Lasponia did not appeal; however,
Cabural, Yangyang and Cabual did and claimed that the trial court erred:
I.
IN HOLDING THAT THE AFFIDAVITS OR EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF ACCUSED
BENJAMIN LASPONIA, LEONIDE CABUAL, AND CIRIACO YANGYANG WHICH WERE
NOT OBTAINED THROUGH FORCE, VIOLENCE, INTIMIDATIONS AND THREATS AND
SERIOUS MALTREATMENTS ARE ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE COULD
BE A LEGAL BASIS FOR THE CONVICTIONS OF ACCUSED.
II.
IN HOLDING THAT EVEN IF IN THE EXECUTION OF SAID AFFIDAVITS OF
CONFESSIONS BY THE THREE ACCUSED SOME PERSONAL INCONVENIENCE WERE
MADE BY THE PC SOLDIERS BUT BECAUSE THE CONTENTS OF SAID CONFESSIONS
ARE TRUE SAID EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS ARE ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE AND
COULD BE MADE A LEGAL, BASIS FOR THE CONVICTIONS OF ALL ACCUSED.
III.
IN HOLDING THAT THE THREE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS BY THREE ACCUSED
BEING INTERLOCKING CONFESSIONS IS ENOUGH AND SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
THEIR CONVICTIONS ON PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;
IV.
IN HOLDING THAT THE THREE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF THREE ACCUSED
INTERLOCKED WITH EACH OTHER EVEN IF INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE BECAUSE
OBTAINED THROUGH FORCE, VIOLENCE, INTIMIDATION, ETC. IS ENOUGH TO
SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION OF ACCUSED TIMOTEO CABURAL BECAUSE HE WAS
SUFFICIENTLY IdENTIFIED BY VICTIM AGRIPINA MAGLANGIT AS HER RAPIST;
V.
IN HOLDING THAT THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE FOR THE CONVICTIONS OF
ACCUSED REACHED THE LEGAL STANDARD OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
On October 14, 1971, this Court granted the motion of Leonide Cabual to withdraw his
appeal (p. 60, rollo).
Appellant Cabural declared that from 2:00 in the afternoon of September 13, 1960 to
3:00 in the early morning of September 14, 1960, he was playing mahjong with Virginia
Cruz Maruhom and one Gomer in the store of Ason in Maigo, Lanao del Norte which is
about 37 kilometers from Iligan City and would take about two (2) hours by us or about
one (1) hour by car to negotiate the distance between the two places; that he could
not have been present at complainant's place at 2:00 in the morning of September 14,
1960 when the robbery took place; that he was brought to the Philippine Constabulary
Headquarters in Iligan City by PC soldiers on September 15, 1960 and was subjected
to all kinds of torture; and that after he was severely maltreated, including the 7-Up
treatment and threatened with pistol, he was asked to sign an affidavit. Despite his
insistence that he was innocent he was induced to sign a statement after he was told:
"if you obey us you may get free" and that "if you confess we will protect you."
Ciriaco Yangyang also denied participation in the commission of the crime considering
that at that time he was in Barrio Mentering attending the counting of votes for the
muse of the barrio fiesta. He was reading the ballots cast for each candidate at the
microphone. It was only in the following morning of September 14, 1960 when he
returned to Maigo.
The Identity of appellant Timoteo Cabural as the rapist of Agripina Maglangit is
established in the testimony of the latter as follows:
Q After that man had told you that you would be separated from the rest, what
happened next, if any?
A I was brought outside.
Q What do you mean by 'outside?'
A I was brought outside of the office of the Kim San . A Yes, sir.

Q After you have been taken outside, what happened, if any? Q After he had that sexual intercourse with you, what happened next, if any?

A I was threatened and I was forced. A (As demonstrated by th witness, her left Arm was pulled to stand up)

Q How were you threatened? Q Were you able to stand up?

A He pointed to me his pistol and let me lie down. A Yes, sir.

Q This place where he threatened you and made you lie down outside, was this place Q After you have stood up, that man where, if any, did he go?
near to the place where you had slept?
A I did not notice where the man go but I went back to our room.
A It is very far but it is within the compound of the Kim San
Q Upon your arrival to your quarters, what, if any, did you do?
Q After he had threatened you and made you lie down, what, if any, did you do?
A I told my companions.
A He raised my skirt.
Q Who were they?
Q At the time he was raising your skirt, what was your position?
A They were Restituta Biosano, Pena Maglangit, Catalina Biosano
A I was lying down with face upward.
Q That man who had sexual intercourse with you, is he here now in the courtroom?
Q After he had raised your skirt, what happened next, if any?
A Yes, sir.
A When my skirt was raised and since I have no more strength because (as
demonstrated by the witness), her laps were numb, he took off my pantie. Q Will you please point him out?

Q How did your laps happen to be numb? A (Witness went down from the stand and went to the accused seated in the courtroom
and pointed to the accused Timoteo Cabural). (tsn. pp. 32-35, May 29, 1961 hearing)
A Because my laps were pushed so that I cannot move.
We agree with the lower court that Cabural alone was responsible for the rape on
Q What particular part of your body did he push to numbness? Agripina. There is no evidence that his co-appellant Yangyang and the other
malefactors made advances on her. Besides, the extra-judicial confessions of Lasponia
A My laps. (Exhibits B, B-1, B-2 and B3 Leonide Cabual (Exhibits C, C-1 to C-5 and Ciriaco
Q After he had taken off your pantie, what, if any, did he do? Yangyang (Exhibits H, H-1 and H-2) point to appellant Cabural as the mastermind and
the role each of them would play (as in fact they did) in the commission of the crime.
A I feel that he had what he wants. Their interlocking confessions indicate how they would go to the scene of the crime,
the manner by which they would enter into the premises of Kim San Milling Company
Q What do you mean by that? and, as aptly observed by the trial court, the details which only the participants could
amply give.
A To disgrace my honor.
Further, accused Cabual and Lasponia were sworn by Fiscal Leonardo Magsalin who
Q How did he disgrace your honor?
instructed the PC investigators to leave the room so that they (Cabual and Lasponia)
A He had sexual intercourse. would be able to speak their minds freely. Fiscal Magsalin testified that said accused
readily and without hesitation signed their respective extra-judicial confessions.
Q How long did he have that sexual intercourse with you?
Finally, We find no merit in the alibis interposed by appellants Cabural and Yangyang.
A I do not remember how long because of my fear. As pointed out by the Solicitor General in his brief:
Q Did he finish having sexual intercourse with you?
The fact that Cabural played mahjong with Virginia Cruz Maruhom and a certain Gomer
at the store of Ason in Barrio Maigo from 2:00 P.M. of September 13, 1960 to 3:00
A.M. of September 14, 1960 is no guarantee that he could not be at the scene of the
crime (Kim San Milling Company, situated in Palao a 37-kilometer stretch which could
be negotiated in one hour by car (tsn., p. 8, Sept. 20, 1966). Considering the
confessions of Lasponia, Cabual and Yangyang all pointing to Cabural as the one in
control of the vehicle utilized in the commission of the crime, the conclusion is not hard
to reach that his presence at the scene of the crime is much likelier than at Maigo.
Otherwise stated, appellants failed to show the plausibility and verity of their alibis and
the crime is aggravated by dwelling and nighttime.
As aforesaid, the trial court convicted Timoteo Cabural of the crime of robbery with
rape, which is penalized by Article 294(2) of the Revised Penal Code, by reclusion
temporal medium to reclusion perpetua. Effective August 15, 1975 (or subsequent to
this date), Presidential Decree No. 767 imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death "when the robbery accompanied with rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons.
In People vs. Perello, Jr., 111 SCRA 147, it was mentioned that "[t]he Chief Justice and
the herein ponente (Justice Ramon C. Aquino) are of the opinion that article 335 cannot
be applied to robbery with rape and that that offense should be penalized under article
294(2) in which case reclusion perpetua should be imposed. As the accused was
charged with a crime against property, he should not be convicted of a crime against
chastity, a private offense. (See People vs. Olden, L-27570-71, September 20, 1972,
47 SCRA 45)." However, also in the same case, "Justices Teehankee, Barredo and
Makasiar believe that article 335 should be applied to this case. (See People vs.
Carandang, L-310102, August 15, 1973, 52 SCRA 259, People vs. Mabag, L-38548, July
24, 1980, 98 SCRA 730; People vs. Arias, L-40531, January 27, 1981, 102 SCRA 303;
People vs. Boado, L- 44725, March 31, 1981, 103 SCRA 607; People vs. Canizares L-
32515, September 10, 1981; People vs. Pizarras L-35915, October 30, 1981).
The writer of this decision is of the opinion that in robbery with rape, the accused
should be penalized under Article 294(2) of the Revised Penal Code because it is a
crime against property and not a crime against chastity a private offense.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. With costs
against both appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, De Castro, Escolin, Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., accused Cabural should be sentenced to death under Art. 335, R. P.C.
Melencio-Herrera, J., I vote for the application of Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code
and. the imposition of the death penalty.
Plana, J., is on leave
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
My concurrence in the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Relova is full, entire, and
complete. Nonetheless, I wish to express my gratification that this Court by a decisive
vote 1 sustains the basic postulate in both civil law and common law jurisdictions,
expressed in the maximum Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege. It is undoubted,
therefore, that unless there be a radical change in the thinking of the Court, it is Article
294(2) not Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code that calls for application in the crime
of robbery with rape. 2 As noted in the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Aquino
in People v. Perello: 3 "Effective August 15, 1975 (or subsequent to this case)
Presidential Decree No. 767 imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death 'when
the robbery accompanied with rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or
by two or more persons.' That increased penalty cannot be retroactively applied to this
case. 4 As such offense of robbery was committed before that date, it is Article 294(2),
before its amendment, that supplies the governing rule. The applicable law then is clear
and explicit. It defined the offense and prescribed the penalty. The doctrine announced
in Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico 5 by Justice Moreland, in categorical language comes
to mind. Thus: "The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is
to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." 6 There is
relevance too to this excerpt from Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad
Company Credit Union Inc. v. Manila Railroad Company: 7 "The applicable provision of
Republic Act. No. 2023 quoted earlier, speaks for itself. There is no ambiguity. As thus
worded, it was so applied. Petitioner-appellant cannot therefore raise any valid
objection. For the lower court to view it otherwise would have been to alter the law.
That cannot be done by the judiciary. That is a function that properly appertains to the
legislative branch. 8
Nothing more appropriately appertains to the legislative branch than the definition of
a crime and the prescription of the penalty to be imposed. That is not a doctrine of
recent vintage. It is traceable to United States v. Wiltberger, 9 an 1820 America.
Supreme Court opinion. No less than the eminent Chief Justice Marshall spoke for the
Court. To quote his exact language: "The rule that penal laws are to be construed
strictly is perhaps not much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the
tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the
power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is
the legislature, not the court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its
punishment." 10 That ruling was followed in the Philippines in a 1906 decision, United
States v. Almond. 11
So it has been in the Philippines since then. It was the same Justice Moreland who
in United States v. Abad Santos 12 promulgated in 1917, gave expression to a variation
of such a fundamental postulate in this wise: "Criminal statutes are to be strictly
construed. No person should be brought within their terms who is not clearly within
them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by the
statute." 13 The same year, Justice Carson in United States v. Estapia 14 in rejecting the
contention that the application of a penal provision even if not covered by its terms
should be viewed by the judiciary as commendable, conducive as it is to the repression
of a reprehensible practice" pointed out: "To this it should be sufficient answer to say
that neither the executive nor the judicial authorities are authorized to impose fines
and prison sentences in cases wherein such fines and prison sentences are not clearly
authorized by law, and this without regard to the end sought to be attained by the
enforcement of such unauthorized penalties."15
It is to be admitted that from the standpoint of logic alone, there is much to be said
for the view that since rape under certain circumstances is penalized with death, it is
an affront to reason if robbery with rape carries with it a lesser penalty. The latter
offense is far more reprehensible, ergo it must be punished at least with equal if not
more severity. It is from that perspective that in People v. Carandang 16 while the
penalty imposed is that of reclusion perpetua there were two separate opinions one
from Justice Teehankee and the other from the late Chief Justice, then Justice, Castro.
They would apply Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Retired Chief Justice
Makalintal, now Speaker of the Batasan Pambansa, then Acting Chief Justice, concurred
in the separate opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro. Less than a year before,
however, in September of 1972, Carandang being a 1973 decision, he penned the
unanimous opinion in People v. Olden 17 affirming the joint judgment of a Court of First
Instance of Davao in two cases, one of which was robbery in band with multiple rape.
It was not the death sentence that was imposed but reclusion perpetua. 18 That case
is certainly later than People v. Obtinalia 19 decided in April of 1971, where, in a per
curiam opinion, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code was applied, although the offense
for which the accused were found guilty was robbery with rape. It is, therefore, re-
assuring that with the decision of this case, the uncertainty which has beclouded the
issue of the appropriate imposable penalty has been removed.
One last word. The maximum Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege has its roots in
history. It is in accordance with both centuries of civil law and common law tradition.
Moreover, it is an indispensable coronary to a regime of liberty enshrined in our
Constitution. It is of the essence then that while anti-social acts should be penalized,
there must be a clear definition of the punishable offense as well as the penalty that
may be imposed a penalty, to repeat, that can be fixed by the legislative body, and the
legislative body alone. So constitutionalism mandates, with its stress
on jurisdiction rather than guvernaculum.The judiciary as the dispenser of justice
through law must be aware of the limitation on its own power.
Such a concept calls for undiminished respect from the judiciary. For it is the
department by which the other branches are held to strict accountability. It sees to it,
in propriate cases of course, that they are held within the bounds of their authority.
Certainly, the judiciary is not devoid of discretion., It can, to paraphrase Cardozo, fill
in the gap and clear the ambiguities. To that extent. it is free but, to recall Cardozo
anew, it "is still not wholly free. [A judge] is no to innovate at pleasure. He is not a
knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own Ideal of beauty or of goodness. He
is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles." 20
Tersely stated, the judiciary administers justice according to law. This is by no means
to imply that in the case at hand, justice according to law is at war with the concept of
justice viewed from the layman's standpoint. The system of criminal law followed in
the Philippines, true to the ways of constitutionalism, has always leaned toward the
milder form of responsibility, whether as to the nature of the offense or the penalty to
be incurred by the wrongdoer. 21Where, as in this case, the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, such a principle is impressed with greater weight.
TEEHANKEE, J, concurring:
I concur with the judgment at bar which affirms the trial court's decision convicting the
accused-appellant Timoteo Cabural alone of the crime of robbery with rape and
imposing upon him the proper penalty of reclusion perpetua under Article 294, par. 2
of the the Revised Penal Code. The record and testimony of the victim of the rape show
quite clearly that Cabural alone was responsible for and committed the rape on the
victim, so that his companions were likewise properly sentenced for the crime of
robbery alone. There is, therefore, no room for the application of my separate opinions
in the cited cases of Perello, Carandang, Mabag etc., that where robbery with rape is
committed but the rape is qualified by the use of a deadly weapon or is committed by
two persons, either of these two actors is singled out by the amendatory Act, R.A.
4111, as supplying the controlling qualification and mandates he imposition of the
death penalty for the crime of qualified rape under Art. 335 of the Penal Code (and not
the lesser penalty of perpetua under Art. 294 for the complex crime of robbery with
rape).
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
My concurrence in the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Relova is full, entire, and
complete. Nonetheless, I wish to express my gratification that this Court by a decisive
vote 1 sustains the basic postulate in both civil law and common law jurisdictions,
expressed in the maximum Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege. It is undoubted,
therefore, that unless there be a radical change in the thinking of the Court, it is Article
294(2) not Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code that calls for application in the crime
of robbery with rape. 2 As noted in the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Aquino
in People v. Perello: 3 "Effective August 15, 1975 (or subsequent to this case)
Presidential Decree No. 767 imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death 'when
the robbery accompanied with rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or
by two or more persons.' That increased penalty cannot be retroactively applied to this
case. 4 As such offense of robbery was committed before that date, it is Article 294(2),
before its amendment, that supplies the governing rule. The applicable law then is clear
and explicit. It defined the offense and prescribed the penalty. The doctrine announced
in Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico 5 by Justice Moreland, in categorical language comes
to mind. Thus: "The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our judgment, is
to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them." 6 There is
relevance too to this excerpt from Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad
Company Credit Union Inc. v. Manila Railroad Company: 7 "The applicable provision of
Republic Act. No. 2023 quoted earlier, speaks for itself. 1äwphï1.ñët There is no
ambiguity. As thus worded, it was so applied. Petitioner-appellant cannot therefore
raise any valid objection. For the lower court to view it otherwise would have been to
alter the law. That cannot be done by the judiciary. That is a function that properly
appertains to the legislative branch. 8
Nothing more appropriately appertains to the legislative branch than the definition of
a crime and the prescription of the penalty to be imposed. That is not a doctrine of
recent vintage. It is traceable to United States v. Wiltberger, 9 an 1820 America.
Supreme Court opinion. No less than the eminent Chief Justice Marshall spoke for the
Court. To quote his exact language: "The rule that penal laws are to be construed
strictly is perhaps not much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the
tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the
power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is
the legislature, not the court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its
punishment." 10 That ruling was followed in the Philippines in a 1906 decision, United
States v. Almond. 11
So it has been in the Philippines since then. It was the same Justice Moreland who
in United States v. Abad Santos 12 promulgated in 1917, gave expression to a variation
of such a fundamental postulate in this wise: "Criminal statutes are to be strictly
construed. No person should be brought within their terms who is not clearly within
them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by the
statute." 13 The same year, Justice Carson in United States v. Estapia 14 in rejecting the
contention that the application of a penal provision even if not covered by its terms
should be viewed by the judiciary as commendable, conducive as it is to the repression
of a reprehensible practice" pointed out: "To this it should be sufficient answer to say
that neither the executive nor the judicial authorities are authorized to impose fines
and prison sentences in cases wherein such fines and prison sentences are not clearly
authorized by law, and this without regard to the end sought to be attained by the
enforcement of such unauthorized penalties."15
It is to be admitted that from the standpoint of logic alone, there is much to be said
for the view that since rape under certain circumstances is penalized with death, it is
an affront to reason if robbery with rape carries with it a lesser penalty. The latter
offense is far more reprehensible, ergo it must be punished at least with equal if not
more severity. It is from that perspective that in People v. Carandang 16 while the
penalty imposed is that of reclusion perpetua there were two separate opinions one
from Justice Teehankee and the other from the late Chief Justice, then Justice, Castro.
They would apply Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Retired Chief Justice
Makalintal, now Speaker of the Batasan Pambansa, then Acting Chief Justice, concurred
in the separate opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro. Less than a year before,
however, in September of 1972, Carandang being a 1973 decision, he penned the
unanimous opinion in People v. Olden 17 affirming the joint judgment of a Court of First
Instance of Davao in two cases, one of which was robbery in band with multiple rape.
It was not the death sentence that was imposed but reclusion perpetua. 18 That case
is certainly later than People v. Obtinalia 19 decided in April of 1971, where, in a per
curiam opinion, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code was applied, although the offense
for which the accused were found guilty was robbery with rape. It is, therefore, re-
assuring that with the decision of this case, the uncertainty which has beclouded the
issue of the appropriate imposable penalty has been removed.
One last word. The maximum Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege has its roots in
history. It is in accordance with both centuries of civil law and common law tradition.
Moreover, it is an indispensable coronary to a regime of liberty enshrined in our
Constitution. It is of the essence then that while anti-social acts should be penalized,
there must be a clear definition of the punishable offense as well as the penalty that
may be imposed a penalty, to repeat, that can be fixed by the legislative body, and the
legislative body alone. So constitutionalism mandates, with its stress
on jurisdiction rather than guvernaculum.The judiciary as the dispenser of justice
through law must be aware of the limitation on its own power.
Such a concept calls for undiminished respect from the judiciary. For it is the
department by which the other branches are held to strict accountability. It sees to it,
in propriate cases of course, that they are held within the bounds of their authority.
Certainly, the judiciary is not devoid of discretion., It can, to paraphrase Cardozo, fill
in the gap and clear the ambiguities. To that extent. it is free but, to recall Cardozo
anew, it "is still not wholly free. [A judge] is no to innovate at pleasure. He is not a
knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own Ideal of beauty or of goodness. He
is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles." 20
Tersely stated, the judiciary administers justice according to law. This is by no means
to imply that in the case at hand, justice according to law is at war with the concept of
justice viewed from the layman's standpoint. The system of criminal law followed in
the Philippines, true to the ways of constitutionalism, has always leaned toward the
milder form of responsibility, whether as to the nature of the offense or the penalty to
be incurred by the wrongdoer. 21Where, as in this case, the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, such a principle is impressed with greater weight.
TEEHANKEE, J, concurring:

I concur with the judgment at bar which affirms the trial court's decision convicting the
accused-appellant Timoteo Cabural alone of the crime of robbery with rape and
imposing upon him the proper penalty of reclusion perpetua under Article 294, par. 2
of the the Revised Penal Code. The record and testimony of the victim of the rape show
quite clearly that Cabural alone was responsible for and committed the rape on the
victim, so that his companions were likewise properly sentenced for the crime of
robbery alone. There is, therefore, no room for the application of my separate opinions
in the cited cases of Perello, Carandang, Mabag etc., that where robbery with rape is
committed but the rape is qualified by the use of a deadly weapon or is committed by
two persons, either of these two actors is singled out by the amendatory Act, R.A.
4111, as supplying the controlling qualification and mandates he imposition of the
death penalty for the crime of qualified rape under Art. 335 of the Penal Code (and not
the lesser penalty of perpetua under Art. 294 for the complex crime of robbery with
rape).

Footnotes
EN BANC The complaint alleged:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

[G.R. No. 9726. December 8, 1914. ] "That on the 25th day of September, 1913, the said Carson Taylor, being then and
there the acting editor and proprietor, manager, printer, and publisher in the city of
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CARSON TAYLOR, Defendant- Manila, Philippine Islands, of a certain daily bilingual newspaper, edited in the English
Appellant. and Spanish languages, and known as the ’Manila Daily Bulletin,’ a paper of large
circulation throughout the Philippine Islands, as well as in the United States and other
C. W O’Brien, for Appellant. countries in all of which both languages are spoken and written, having as such the
supervision and control of said newspaper, did then and there willfully, feloniously,
Solicitor-General Corpus, for Appellee. maliciously, and with intent to impeach the honesty, virtue, and reputation of one
Ramon Sotelo as member of the bar of the Philippine Islands and as a private individual,
SYLLABUS and to expose him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, compose, print, edit,
publish, and circulate and procure to be composed, printed, edited, published, and
1. LIBEL AND SLANDER; PUBLICATION; EDITOR, AUTHOR, PROPRIETOR, MANAGER. circulated in said newspaper’s issue of the above mentioned date, September 25, 1913,
— Section 6 of the Libel Law (Act No. 277) provides a punishment only for the "author, a certain false and malicious defamation and libel in the English language of and
editor, or proprietor," for the publication of a libel in a newspaper. In the present case concerning the said Ramon Sotelo, which reads as follows. :jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
no person was represented to be either the "author, the editor, or the proprietor" of
the newspaper in which the alleged libel was published. The proof shows that the "‘OWNERS FIRED BUILDING TO COLLECT INSURANCE. — CRIMINAL CHARGES
defendant was the "manager." There was not a word of proof showing that as FOLLOW CIVIL SUIT.
"manager" he was the author of the article published or the editor or the proprietor of
the newspaper. The "manager" of a newspaper may be the author of the articles "‘Conspiracy divulged in three sworn statements made by members of the party after
published or the editor or the publisher of the newspaper. His exact relation to the a family disagreement. Sensational statement sworn to. Mystery of Calle O’Donnell fire
newspaper or publication is a matter of proof. He can not avoid responsibility as the solved and papers served.
"author, editor, or proprietor" by using some other term or word, when, as a matter of
fact, he is the "author, editor, or proprietor." The "author, editor, or proprietor" of a "‘Conspiracy to defraud the insurance company.
newspaper or publication can not avoid responsibility by simply calling himself the
"manager" or "printer." He can not wear the toga of "author, editor, or proprietor" and "‘The building was fired to collect the amount of insurance.
hide his responsibility by giving himself some other name. While the terms "author,
editor, and proprietor" of a newspaper are terms well defined, the particular words "‘The movable furniture of value was removed before the fire.
"author, editor, or proprietor" are not material or important, further than they are
words which are intended to show the relation of the responsible party to the "‘The full amount of the insurance was collected, and the conspiracy was a success.
publication. That relation may as well exist under some other name or denomination.
"‘The above is the gist of the sworn statements of Vicente Sotelo and Eugenio Martin
in connection with the fire that destroyed house No. 2157 Calle O’Donnell on April 4.

DECISION "‘The case in question is a sensational one to say .he least, and the court is being
petitioned to set aside the ruling and cite the parties to show cause why they should
not be cited to answer charges of conspiracy to defraud.

"‘On April 4, 1913, the house located at 2157 Calle O’Donnell was destroyed by fire.
JOHNSON, J. :
The house was insured for P5,000, the contents for an additional P5,000, with the West
of Scotland Insurance Association, of which Lutz & Co. are the local agents, with an
additional P1,500 with Smith, Bell & Co.

This was an action for criminal libel. "‘The full amount of the insurance on the property was paid by the agents of the
insurance companies and the matter apparently dropped from the records.

"‘Then there was internal trouble and information began to leak out which resulted in
sensational statements to the effect that the destruction of the property had been an
act of incendiarism in order to collect the insurance. Then there was an investigation
started and it resulted in sworn statements of the three persons above mentioned.
"‘Notarial returns were made yesterday by the sheriff, based on the sworn statements
and the parties are cited to appear in court and show cause.
"‘The investigation also showed that the furniture, which was supposed to be in the
house at the time of the conflagration and which was paid for by the insurance agents,
sworn statements having been made that it was destroyed in the fire, was in a certain
house in Montalban, where it was identified upon the sworn statements of the above
mentioned. Implicated in the charges of conspiracy and fraud is the name of the
attorney for the plaintiff who made affidavit as to the burning of the house and against
whom criminal proceedings will be brought as well as against the original owners.
"‘Attorney Burke, who represents Lutz & Co. in the proceedings, was seen last night
and asked for a statement as to the case. Mr. Burke refused to talk on the case and
stated that when it came to trial it would be time enough to obtain the facts.
"‘The present action came before the court on a motion of Attorney Burke to set aside
the judgment, which, in the original case, gave the owners of the property judgment
for the amount of the insurance.
"‘Attorney Burke filed the sworn statements with the court and the notarial returns to
the same were made yesterday afternoon, the sworn statements as to the burning of
the house being in the hands of the sheriff.
"‘It was stated yesterday that a criminal action would follow the civil proceedings
instituted to recover the funds in the case entitled on the court records, Maria Mortera
de Eceiza and Manuel Eceiza versus the west of Scotland Association, Limited, No.
10191 on the court records.
"‘It might be stated also that Eugenio Martin was one of the plaintiffs in the recent suit
brought against Ex Governor W. Cameron Forbes for lumber supplied for his Boston
home.’
"That in this article is contained the following paragraph. to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘ . . .Implicated in the charges of conspiracy and fraud is the name of the attorney for
the plaintiff who made affidavit as to the burning of the house and against whom
criminal proceedings will be brought as well as against the original owners,’ by which
the said accused meant to refer and did refer to the said Ramon Sotelo, who then and
there was the attorney for the plaintiff in the case aforesaid, No. 10191 of the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila, and so was understood by the public who read the
same; that the statements and allegations made in said paragraph are wholly false and
untrue, thus impeaching the honesty, virtue and reputation of the said offended party
as a member of the bar of the Philippine Islands and as a private individual, and
exposing him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule. Contrary to law."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Upon said complaint the defendant was arrested, arraigned, plead not guilty, was tried,
found guilty of the crime charged, and sentenced by the Honorable George N. Hurd,
judge, to pay a fine of P200. From that sentence the defendant appealed to this court
and made the following assignment of error:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"First. The court erred in finding that the defendant was responsible for and guilty of
the alleged libel.
"Second. The court erred in finding that the defendant was the proprietor and publisher
of the ’Manila Daily Bulletin.’
"Third. The court erred in finding that the alleged libelous article was libelous per se.
"Fourth. The court erred in holding that the article was libelous, while finding that there
was no malice.
"Fifth. The court erred in finding that the alleged libelous article referred to attorney
Ramon Sotelo.
"Sixth. The court erred in finding that Ramon Sotelo was attorney for the plaintiffs in
case No. 10191, when the alleged libel was published."cralaw virtua1aw library
After a careful examination of the record and the arguments presented by the
appellant, we deem it necessary to discuss only the first and second assignments of
error.
In the Philippine Islands there exist no crimes such as are known in the United States
and England as common law crimes. No act constitutes a crime here unless it is made
so by law. Libel is made a crime here by Act No. 277 of the United States Philippine
Commission. Said Act (No. 277) not only defines the crime of libel and prescribes the
particular conditions necessary to constitute it, but it also names the persons who may
be guilty of such crime. In the present case the complaint alleges that the defendant
was, at the time of the publication of said alleged article "the acting editor, proprietor,
manager, printer, publisher, etc. etc. of a certain bilingual newspaper, etc., known as
the ’Manila Daily Bulletin,’ a paper of large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands,
as well as in the United States and other countries."cralaw virtua1aw library
It will be noted that the complaint charges the defendant as "the acting editor,
proprietor, manager, printer, and publisher." From an examination of said Act No. 277,
we find that section 6 provides that: "Every author, editor, or proprietor of any book,
newspaper, or serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any words
contained in any part of said book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if
he were the author of the same."cralaw virtua1aw library
By an examination of said article, with reference to the persons who may be liable for
the publication of a libel in a newspaper, we find that it only provides for the
punishment of "the author, editor, or proprietor." It would follow, therefore, that unless
the proof shows that the defendant in the present case is the "author, editor, or
proprietor" of the newspaper in which the libel was published, he can not be held
liable.
In the present case the Solicitor-General in his brief said that — "No person is
represented to be either the ’author, editor, or proprietor.’" That statement of the
Solicitor-General is fully sustained by the record. There is not a word of proof in the
record showing that the defendant was either the "author, the editor, or the
proprietor." The proof shows that the defendant was the "manager." He must,
therefore, be acquitted of the crime charged against him, unless it is shown by the
proof that he, as "manager" of the newspaper, was in some way directly responsible
for the writing, editing, or publishing of the matter contained in said alleged libelous
article. The prosecution presented the newspaper, the "Manila Daily Bulletin," for the
purpose of showing the relation which the defendant had to it. That was the only proof
presented by the prosecution to show the relation which the defendant had to the
publication of the libel in question. From an examination of the editorial page of said
exhibit, we find that it shows that the "Manila Daily Bulletin" is owned by the "Bulletin
Publishing Company," and that the defendant was its manager. There is not a word of
proof in the record which shows what relation the manager had to the publication of
said newspaper. We might, by a series of presumptions and assumptions, conclude
that the manager of a newspaper has some direct responsibility with its publication.
We believe, however, that such presumptions and assumptions, in the absence of a
single letter of proof relating thereto, would be unwarranted and unjustified. The
prosecuting attorney had an opportunity to present proof upon that question. Either
because he had no proof or because no such proof was obtainable, he presented none.
It certainly is not a difficult matter to ascertain who is the real person responsible for
the publication of a newspaper which is published daily and has a wide circulation in a
particular community. No question was asked the defendant concerning his particular
relation to the publication of the newspaper in question. We do not desire to be
understood in our conclusions here as holding that the "manager" or the "printer" may
not, under certain conditions and proper proof, be held to be the "author, editor, or
proprietor" of a newspaper. He may denominate himself as "manager" or "printer"
simply, and be at the same time the "author, editor, or proprietor" of the newspaper.
He can not avoid responsibility by using some other term or word, indicating his relation
to the newspaper or the publication, when, as a matter of fact, he is the "author, the
editor, or the proprietor" of the same. His real relation to the said publication is a matter
of proof. The Solicitor-General, in his brief, says that the defendant used the word
"manager" with the hope of evading legal responsibility, as the Libel Law places the
responsibility for publishing a libel, on "every author, editor, or proprietor of any book,
etc." Had the prosecuting attorney in the trial of the cause believed that the defendant,
even though he called himself the "manager" was, in fact, the "author, editor, or
proprietor" of said publication, he should have presented some proof supporting that
contention. Neither do we desire to be understood as holding that simply because a
person connected with the publication of a newspaper who calls himself the "manager"
or "printer" may not, in fact and at the same time, be the "author, editor, or proprietor."
The "author, editor, or proprietor" can not avoid responsibility for the writing and
publication of a libelous article, by simply calling himself the "manager" or the "printer"
of a newspaper. That, however, is a question of proof. The burden is upon the
prosecution to show that the defendant is, by whatever name he may call himself, in
truth and in fact, the "author, editor, or proprietor" of a newspaper. The courts cannot
assume, in the absence of proof, that one who called himself "manager" was in fact
the "author, editor, or proprietor." We might assume, perhaps, that the ’’manager" of
a newspaper plays an important part in the publication of the same by virtue of the
general signification of the word "manager." Men can not, however, be sentenced upon
the basis of a mere assumption. There must be some proof. The word "manage" has
been defined by Webster to mean "to have under control and direction; to conduct; to
guide; to administer; to treat; to handle." Webster defines "manager" to be "one who
manages; a conductor or director; as, the manager of a theater." A manager, as that
word is generally understood, we do not believe includes the idea of ownership.
Generally speaking it means one who is representing another as an agent. That being
true, his powers and duties and obligations are generally defined by contract. He may
have expressed as well as implied powers, but whatever his powers and duties are they
must be dependent upon the nature of the business and the terms of his contract.
There is no fixed rule which indicates particularly and definitely his duties, powers and
obligations. An examination into the character of the business and the contract of his
employment must be made for the purpose of ascertaining definitely what his duties
and obligations are. His exact relation is always a matter of proof. It is incumbent upon
the prosecution in a case like the present, to show that whatever title, name or
designation the defendant may bear, he was, in fact, the "author, the editor, or the
proprietor" of the newspaper. If he was in fact the "author, editor, or proprietor," he
can not escape responsibility by calling himself the "manager" or "printer." It is the
relation which he bears to the publication and not the name or title which he has
assumed, which is important in an investigation. He can not wear the toga of author
or editor and hide his responsibility by giving himself some other name. While the terms
"author, editor, and proprietor" of a newspaper are terms well defined, the particular
words "author, editor, or proprietor" are not material or important, further than that
they are words which are intended to show the relation of the responsible party to the
publication. That relation may as well exist under some other name or denomination.
For the foregoing reasons. therefore, there being no proof whatever in the record
showing that the defendant was the "author, the editor, or the proprietor" of the
newspaper in question, the sentence of the lower court must be reversed, the
complaint dismissed and the defendant discharged from the custody of the law, with
costs de officio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Moreland, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive
Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET
AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number
of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law.
The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so
when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they
were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case
on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these
decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1Specifically, they ask the following
questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are
not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction
between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means
complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official
Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the
motion was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and,
on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil
Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that
publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that
in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and
consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next
the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a
Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of
Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for the internal
administration of a government agency or for particular persons did not have to be
'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette;
and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was
not supported by eight members of this Court. 5
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take
effect one year after such publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the
original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so
hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity
and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example,
as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original
decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its
publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general
rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed
with altogether. The reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar as
it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the
legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a
result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because
they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on
prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before
they can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law,
which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to
have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of
the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the
legislative enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application,
for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that
do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular
individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization.
It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it
unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a
matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably
affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual,
or some of the people only, and t to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated
by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative
rules and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies
to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of
that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those
naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain
prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be
published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the
Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of
Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid
down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his
personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are
not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose
is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such
decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the
publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner,
incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree
undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos
administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information
on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically
for publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could be
made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his
vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without
indicating where it should be made. 11 It is therefore necessary for the present
membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down
a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the
Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly,
newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating,
the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication
is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment
has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to
such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not
yet been published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal
or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to
the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and
approved by the political departments of the government in accordance with the
prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under
Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett
and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such
publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as
possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility,
of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered
unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its
publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at
this time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for
an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again
an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and
available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain
democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority
emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to
review the work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights,
through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if
the acts of the legislature are concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by
a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the
naked blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately
upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on
another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and
Paras, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNAN, J., concurring:
While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of
the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious manner
by which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective thousands of
decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making power
which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and abused to satisfy the whims
and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in
those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of two presidential
decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different subject matters. In
point is the case of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19,
1980, one granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the then President's
nephew and the other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with
airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on
March 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and
Dennis George Still
The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may
be made effective seeks prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same
time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process and to
information on matters of public concern.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani
A. Cruz. At the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding
of what the Court is saying.
A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon
approval thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon
publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such
statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come into
effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of publication. For
so to interpret such statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle posed
by the due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown
to and unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a
common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes
at bottom a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations between
a government and its people.
At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the
Official Gazette, as distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of
general circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional
command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported
and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the
Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed
medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could,
without creating a constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute
providing, for instance, for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the country. Until such an amendatory statute is in fact
enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the
Official Gazette and not in any other medium.
Separate Opinions
FERNAN, J., concurring:
While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of
the defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious manner enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication effected in the
by which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective thousands of Official Gazette and not in any other medium.
decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making power
which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and abused to satisfy the whims Footnotes
and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in
those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of two presidential
decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different subject matters. In
point is the case of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19,
1980, one granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the then President's
nephew and the other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with
airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on
March 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and
Dennis George Still

The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may
be made effective seeks prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same
time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process and to
information on matters of public concern.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani
A. Cruz. At the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding
of what the Court is saying.

A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon
approval thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon
publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such
statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting literally to come into
effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need of publication. For
so to interpret such statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle posed
by the due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown
to and unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a
common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes
at bottom a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations between
a government and its people.

At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the
Official Gazette, as distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of
general circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional
command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported
and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section 35 of the
Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed
medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could,
without creating a constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute
providing, for instance, for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the country. Until such an amendatory statute is in fact
G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 187654
WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its
Board of Directors, Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision1promulgated on 29 April 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 97925.
THE FACTS
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved
parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and
Pasay City for a military reservation. The military reservation, then known as Fort
William McKinley, was later on renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).
On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued
Proclamation No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area
of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is now known
as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the administration of herein respondent
Military Shrine Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further
amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangaysLower Bicutan, Upper
Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it
open for disposition under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.
At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten
addendum, which reads:
"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2
The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the
Official Gazette3 on 3 February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.
Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued
Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as
published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation
of Proclamation No. 423 and declared the said lots open for disposition under the
provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.
Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued on the
same day.
Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort
Bonifacio including portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General
Fredelito Bautista issued General Order No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB),
primarily to prevent further unauthorized occupation and to cause the demolition of
illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.
On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig,
Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP), where it was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed for
the following: (1) the reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of
SWO-13-000-298 of Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable land
pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476; (2) the subdivision of the subject lot by the Director
of Lands; and (3) the Land Management Bureau’s facilitation of the distribution and
sale of the subject lot to its bona fide occupants.4
On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc.
(WBLOAI) filed a Petition-in-Intervention substantially praying for the same reliefs as
those prayed for by NMSMI with regard to the area the former then occupied covering
Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in Western Bicutan.5
Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution6 granting the Petition and
declaring the portions of land in question alienable and disposable, with Associate
Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General dissenting.7
The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral
part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the
President could not be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. Further,
considering that Proclamation
No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative powers, it
could not be amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment. Thus,
Proclamation No. 172 could not have superseded much less displaced Proclamation No.
2476, as the latter was issued on October 16, 1987 when President Aquino’s legislative
power had ceased.
In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina AguilarGeneral stressed that
pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code, publication is indispensable in every case.
Likewise, she held that when the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous so that
there is no occasion for the court to look into legislative intent, the law must be taken
as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction.8 Finally, she maintained that the
Commission had no authority to supply the addendum originally omitted in the
published version of Proclamation No. 2476, as to do so would be tantamount to
encroaching on the field of the legislature.
Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 which was denied by
the COSLAP in a Resolution dated 24 January 2007.10
MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP
Resolutions dated 1 September 2006 and 24 January 2007.
Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division rendered the assailed
Decision granting MSS-PVAO’s Petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Resolutions dated September 1, 2006 and January 24, 2007 issued by the Commission
on the Settlement of Land Problems in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the petitions of respondents in COSLAP Case No. 99-
434 are DISMISSED, for lack of merit, as discussed herein. Further, pending urgent
motions filed by respondents are likewise
DENIED. SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)
Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by filing their respective
Petitions for Review with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
THE ISSUES
Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:
I provides:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 DID NOT INCLUDE ANY PORTION OF
WESTERN BICUTAN AS THE HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY PRESIDENT MARCOS ON
THE SAID PROCLAMATION WAS NOT PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 172 LIKEWISE EXCLUDED THE PORTION OF LAND
OCCUPIED BY MEMBER OF HEREIN PETITIONER.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THAT THE HON. COSLAP HAS BROAD POWERS TO RECOMMEND TO
THE PRESIDENT >INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO RESOLVE EXPEDITIOUSLY VARIOUS
LAND CASES.14
On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS NOT DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE BY
VIRTUE OF PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 BECAUSE THE HANDWRITTEN ADDENDUM OF
PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS INCLUDING WESTERN BICUTAN IN
PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PUBLICATION.15
Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that the subject lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation
No. 2476 on the ground that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not
included in the publication of the said law.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.
Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject
lots), their claims were anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos to
Proclamation No. 2476. They allege that the former President intended to include all
Western Bicutan in the reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public
land when he made a notation just below the printed version of Proclamation No. 2476.
However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when
Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette.
The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable
lies in the determination of whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos
has the force and effect of law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take
effect one year after such publication.
Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect
to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise
provided" refers to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following
the completion of the law’s publication in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that
the requirement of publication may be dispensed with. The issue of the requirement of
publication was already settled in the landmark case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera,16 in which
we had the occasion to rule thus:
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example,
as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original
decision, is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its
publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general
rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed
with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as
it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely,
if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately
upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably
short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it
but simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only
of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures,
like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may
affect before they can begin to operate.
xxxx
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application,
for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that
do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular
individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization.
It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it
unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a
matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably
affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual,
or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated
by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
xxxx
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies
to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of
that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those
naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain
prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be
published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the
Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
xxxx
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by
the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of
such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the
publication requirement.1âwphi1 This is not even substantial compliance. This was the
manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a
presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by
the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose
information on this vital law.
xxxx
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by
a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the
naked blade is drawn. (Emphases supplied)
Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a
handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without
publication, the note never had any legal force and effect.
Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the
publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette
shall be prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not President Marcos
intended to include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put,
the courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the
words appearing in the law.17 This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law
when, evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano, 18 we ruled
that "under Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.' This
does not mean, however, that courts can create law. The courts exist for interpreting
the law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative of the principle of
separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret
the laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities becloud issues,
but it will not arrogate unto itself the task of legislating." The remedy sought in these
Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but another legislation that would amend the law
‘to include petitioners' lots in the reclassification.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated
29 April 2009 is AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, this Court's status quo order dated 17
June 2009 is hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all pending motions to cite respondent in
contempt is DENIED, having been rendered moot. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson
EN BANC
G.R. No. 448 September 20, 1901
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs.
PHILIP K. SWEET, defendant-appellant.
Theofilus B. Steele, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
LADD, J.:
The offense charged in the complaint is punishable under the Penal Code now in force
by arresto mayor and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas. (Art. 418.) By Act No. 136
of the United States Philippine Commission, section 56 (6), Courts of First Instance are
given original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which a penalty of more than six
months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars may be imposed." The
offense was therefore cognizable by the court below unless the fact that the appellant
was at the time of its alleged commission an employee of the United States military
authorities in the Philippine Islands, and the further fact that the person upon whom it
is alleged to have been committed was a prisoner of war in the custody of such
authorities, are sufficient to deprive it of jurisdiction. We must assume that both these
facts are true, as found, either upon sufficient evidence or upon the admissions of the
prosecuting attorney, by the court below.
Setting aside the claim that the appellant was "acting in the line of duty" at the time
the alleged offense was committed, which is not supported by the findings or by any
evidence which appears in the record, the contention that the court was without
jurisdiction, as we understand it, is reducible to two propositions: First, that an assault
committed by a soldier or military employee upon a prisoner of war is not an offense
under the Penal Code; and second, that if it is an offense under the Code, nevertheless
the military character sustained by the person charged with the offense at the time of
its commission exempts him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals.
As to the first proposition, it is true, as pointed out by counsel, that an assault of the
character charged in the complaint committed in time of war by a military person upon
a prisoner of war is punishable as an offense under the Spanish Code of Military Justice
(art. 232), and it is also true that under the provisions of the same Code (arts. 4, 5)
the military tribunals have, with certain exceptions which it is not material to state,
exclusive cognizance of all offenses, whether of a purely military nature or otherwise,
committed by military persons. But the fact that the acts charged in the complaint
would be punishable as an offense under the Spanish military legislation does not
render them any less an offense under the article of the Penal Code above cited. There
is nothing in the language of that article to indicate that it does not apply to all persons
within the territorial jurisdiction of the law. Under articles 4 and 5 of the Code of Military
Justice above cited a military person could not be brought to trial before a civil tribunal
for an assault upon a prisoner of war, but by the commission of that offense he incurred
a criminal responsibility for which he was amenable only to the military jurisdiction.
That criminal responsibility, however, arose from an infraction of the general penal
laws, although the same acts, viewed in another aspect, might also, if committed in
time of war, constitute an infraction of the military code. We are unable to see how
these provisions of the Spanish Military Code, no longer in force here and which indeed
never had any application to the Army of the United States, can in any possible view
have the effect claimed for them by counsel for the appellant.
The second question is, Does the fact that the alleged offense was committed by an
employee of the United States military authorities deprive the court of jurisdiction? We
have been cited to no provision in the legislation of Congress, and to none in the local
legislation, which has the effect of limiting, as respects employees of the United States
military establishment, the general jurisdiction conferred upon the Courts of First
Instance by Act No. 136 of the United States Philippine Commission above cited, and
we are not aware of the existence of any such provision. The case is therefore open to
the application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is
unaffected by the military or other special character of the person brought before them
for trial, a principle firmly established in the law of England and America and which
must, we think, prevail under any system of jurisprudence unless controlled by express
legislation to the contrary. (United States vs. Clark, 31 Fed. Rep., 710.) The appellant's
claim that the acts alleged to constitute the offense were performed by him in the
execution of the orders of his military superiors may, if true, be available by way of
defense upon the merits in the trial in the court below, but can not under this principle
affect the right of that court to take jurisdiction of the case.
Whether under a similar state of facts to that which appears in this case a court of one
of the United States would have jurisdiction to try the offender against the State laws
(see In re Fair, 100 Fed. Rep., 149), it is not necessary to consider. The present is not
a case where the courts of one government are attempting to exercise jurisdiction over
the military agents or employees of another and distinct government, because the court
asserting jurisdiction here derives its existence and powers from the same Government
under the authority of which the acts alleged to constitute the offense are claimed to
have been performed.
It may be proper to add that there is no actual conflict between the two jurisdictions
in the present case nor any claim of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunals.
On the contrary it appears from the findings of the court below that the complaint was
entered by order of the commanding general of the Division of the Philippines, a fact
not important, perhaps, as regards the technical question of jurisdiction, but which
relieves the case from any practical embarrassment which might result from a claim on
the part of the military tribunals to exclusive cognizance of the offense.
The order of the court below is affirmed with costs to the appellant.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 125865 January 28, 2000
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime
in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce
Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City
with two counts of grave oral defamation docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and
53171. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing
petitioner's bail at P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released him to the custody
of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of
protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is
covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between
the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB
(hereinafter Agreement) in the country. Based on the said protocol communication that
petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution
dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which
was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which
set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest
it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated
the case to this Court viaa petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity
under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal
cases were filed in court.1âwphi1.nêt
The petition is not impressed with merit.
First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the
DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain
person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts.
In receiving ex-parte the DFA's advice and in motu propio dismissing the two criminal
cases without notice to the prosecution, the latter's right to due process was violated.
It should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the
prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of
the alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be
presented at the proper time.1 At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation
of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.2
Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:
Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and
consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and
immunities:
a.) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official
capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.
the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the
acts was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioner's
case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been
given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to
present its controverting evidence, should it so desire.
Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the
name of official duty.3 The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official
functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done
with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. 4 It
appears that even the government's chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does not
support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.
Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent,
assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving
state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity
exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.5 As
already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty.
Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice
it to say that preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by
the MeTC such as the one at bar.6 Being purely a statutory right, preliminary
investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by law. 7 The rule on the
criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling
within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.8 Besides the absence of preliminary investigation
does not affect the court's jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information
or otherwise render it defective.9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44896 July 31, 1936
RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL V. MORAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondent.
Cardenas and Casal for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for respondent.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila, Philippine
Islands on June 11, 1934. He was subsequently charged in the Court of First Instance
of Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to the
jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both under the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below had no jurisdiction to try
him. His objection having been overruled, he filed this petition for a writ of prohibition
with a view to preventing the Court of First Instance of Manila from taking cognizance
of the criminal action filed against him.
In support of this petition counsel for the petitioner contend (1) That the Court of First
Instance of Manila is without jurisdiction to try the case filed against the petitioner for
the reason that under Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, the
Supreme Court of the United States has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and such jurisdiction excludes the
courts of the Philippines; and (2) that even under the Constitution of the Philippines
original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls, is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a consul
is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or minister, but is
subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which he is accredited. (Ex
parte Baiz, 135 U. S., 403; 34 Law. ed., 222.) A consul is not exempt from criminal
prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where he resides. (U. S. vs. Ravara,
2 Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388; Wheaton's International Law [2d ed.], 423.) The
substantial question raised in this case is one of jurisdiction.
1. We find no merit in the contention that Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of
the United States governs this case. We do not deem it necessary to discuss the
question whether the constitutional provision relied upon by the petitioner extended ex
propio vigore over the Philippines. Suffice it to say that the inauguration of the
Philippine Commonwealth on November 15, 1935, has brought about a fundamental
change in the political and legal status of the Philippines. On the date mentioned the
Constitution of the Philippines went into full force and effect. This Constitution is the
supreme law of the land. Not only the members of this court but all other officers,
legislative, executive and judicial, of the Government of the Commonwealth, are bound
by oath to support the Constitution. (Article XIII, section 2.) This court owes its own
existence to the great instrument, and derives all its powers therefrom. In the exercise
of its powers and jurisdiction, this court is bound by the provisions of the Constitution.
The Constitution provides that the original jurisdiction of this court "shall include all
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls." In deciding the
instant case this court cannot go beyond this constitutional provision.
2. It remains to consider whether the original jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court
by the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls, is exclusive. The Constitution does not define the jurisdiction of this court in
specific terms, but merely provides that "the Supreme Court shall have such original
and appellate jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of
the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution." It then goes on
to provide that the original jurisdiction of this court "shall include all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls."
In the light of the constitutional provisions above adverted to, the question arises
whether the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was exclusive.
The original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was derived from
section 17 of Act No. 136, which reads as follows: The Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus,
and quo warrantoin the cases and in the manner prescribed in the Code of Civil
Procedure, and to hear and determine the controversies thus brought before it, and in
other cases provided by law." Jurisdiction to issue writs of quo
warranto, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus was also conferred on
the Courts of First Instance by the Code of Civil Procedure. (Act No. 190, secs. 197,
217, 222, 226, and 525.) It results that the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised
by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the Courts of First
Instance. Inasmuch as this is the same original jurisdiction vested in this court by the
Constitution and made to include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls, it follows that the jurisdiction of this court over such cases is
not exclusive.
The conclusion we have reached upon this branch of the case finds support in the
pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Constitution of the
United States provides that the Supreme Court shall have "original jurisdiction" in all
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls. In construing this
constitutional provision, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the "original
jurisdiction thus conferred upon the Supreme Court by the Constitution was not
exclusive jurisdiction, and that such grant of original jurisdiction did not prevent
Congress from conferring original jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls on the
subordinate courts of the Union. (U. S. vs. Ravara, supra; Bors vs. Preston, 111 U. S.,
252; 28 Law. ed., 419.)
3. The laws in force in the Philippines prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth
conferred upon the Courts of the First Instance original jurisdiction in all criminal cases
to which a penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one
hundred dollars might be imposed. (Act No. 136, sec. 56.) Such jurisdiction included
the trial of criminal actions brought against consuls for, as we have already indicated,
consuls, not being entitled to the privileges and immunities of ambassadors or
ministers, are subject to the laws and regulations of the country where they reside. By
Article XV, section 2, of the Constitution, all laws of the Philippine Islands in force at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution were to continue in force until the
inauguration of the Commonwealth; thereafter, they were to remain operative, unless
inconsistent with the Constitution until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the
National Assembly. The original jurisdiction granted to the Courts of First Instance to
try criminal cases was not made exclusively by any, law in force prior to the
inauguration of the Commonwealth, and having reached the conclusion that the
jurisdiction conferred upon this court by the Constitution over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is not an exclusive jurisdiction, the
laws in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, granting the Courts of
First Instance jurisdiction in such cases, are not inconsistent with the Constitution, and
must be deemed to remain operative and in force, subject to the power of the National
Assembly to amend alter, modify, or repeal the same. (Asiatic P. Co. vs. Insular
Collector of Customs, U. S. Supreme Court [Law. ed.], Adv. Ops., vol. 80, No. 12, pp.
620, 623.)

We conclude, therefore, that the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try
the petitioner, an that the petition for a writ of prohibition must be denied. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 142396 February 11, 2003
KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Sometime in May 1986, an Information for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No.
6425, otherwise also known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," was filed against
petitioner Khosrow Minucher and one Abbas Torabian with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 151, of Pasig City. The criminal charge followed a "buy-bust operation"
conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in the house of Minucher, an Iranian
national, where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited drug, was said to have been seized.
The narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who would,
in due time, become one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. On 08 January
1988, Presiding Judge Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision acquitting the two accused.
On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case No. 88-45691 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 19, of Manila for damages on account of what he claimed to have
been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. The Manila RTC
detailed what it had found to be the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.
"The testimony of the plaintiff disclosed that he is an Iranian national. He came to the
Philippines to study in the University of the Philippines in 1974. In 1976, under the
regime of the Shah of Iran, he was appointed Labor Attaché for the Iranian Embassies
in Tokyo, Japan and Manila, Philippines. When the Shah of Iran was deposed by
Ayatollah Khomeini, plaintiff became a refugee of the United Nations and continued to
stay in the Philippines. He headed the Iranian National Resistance Movement in the
Philippines.
"He came to know the defendant on May 13, 1986, when the latter was brought to his
house and introduced to him by a certain Jose Iñigo, an informer of the Intelligence
Unit of the military. Jose Iñigo, on the other hand, was met by plaintiff at the office of
Atty. Crisanto Saruca, a lawyer for several Iranians whom plaintiff assisted as head of
the anti-Khomeini movement in the Philippines.
"During his first meeting with the defendant on May 13, 1986, upon the introduction
of Jose Iñigo, the defendant expressed his interest in buying caviar. As a matter of
fact, he bought two kilos of caviar from plaintiff and paid P10,000.00 for it. Selling
caviar, aside from that of Persian carpets, pistachio nuts and other Iranian products
was his business after the Khomeini government cut his pension of over $3,000.00 per
month. During their introduction in that meeting, the defendant gave the plaintiff his
calling card, which showed that he is working at the US Embassy in the Philippines, as
a special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, of the
United States, and gave his address as US Embassy, Manila. At the back of the card
appears a telephone number in defendant’s own handwriting, the number of which he
can also be contacted.
"It was also during this first meeting that plaintiff expressed his desire to obtain a US
Visa for his wife and the wife of a countryman named Abbas Torabian. The defendant
told him that he [could] help plaintiff for a fee of $2,000.00 per visa. Their conversation,
however, was more concentrated on politics, carpets and caviar. Thereafter, the
defendant promised to see plaintiff again.
"On May 19, 1986, the defendant called the plaintiff and invited the latter for dinner at
Mario's Restaurant at Makati. He wanted to buy 200 grams of caviar. Plaintiff brought
the merchandize but for the reason that the defendant was not yet there, he requested
the restaurant people to x x x place the same in the refrigerator. Defendant, however,
came and plaintiff gave him the caviar for which he was paid. Then their conversation
was again focused on politics and business.
"On May 26, 1986, defendant visited plaintiff again at the latter's residence for 18 years
at Kapitolyo, Pasig. The defendant wanted to buy a pair of carpets which plaintiff valued
at $27,900.00. After some haggling, they agreed at $24,000.00. For the reason that
defendant did not yet have the money, they agreed that defendant would come back
the next day. The following day, at 1:00 p.m., he came back with his $24,000.00, which
he gave to the plaintiff, and the latter, in turn, gave him the pair of carpets.1awphi1.nét
"At about 3:00 in the afternoon of May 27, 1986, the defendant came back again to
plaintiff's house and directly proceeded to the latter's bedroom, where the latter and
his countryman, Abbas Torabian, were playing chess. Plaintiff opened his safe in the
bedroom and obtained $2,000.00 from it, gave it to the defendant for the latter's fee
in obtaining a visa for plaintiff's wife. The defendant told him that he would be leaving
the Philippines very soon and requested him to come out of the house for a while so
that he can introduce him to his cousin waiting in a cab. Without much ado, and without
putting on his shirt as he was only in his pajama pants, he followed the defendant
where he saw a parked cab opposite the street. To his complete surprise, an American
jumped out of the cab with a drawn high-powered gun. He was in the company of
about 30 to 40 Filipino soldiers with 6 Americans, all armed. He was handcuffed and
after about 20 minutes in the street, he was brought inside the house by the defendant.
He was made to sit down while in handcuffs while the defendant was inside his
bedroom. The defendant came out of the bedroom and out from defendant's attaché
case, he took something and placed it on the table in front of the plaintiff. They also
took plaintiff's wife who was at that time at the boutique near his house and likewise
arrested Torabian, who was playing chess with him in the bedroom and both were
handcuffed together. Plaintiff was not told why he was being handcuffed and why the
privacy of his house, especially his bedroom was invaded by defendant. He was not
allowed to use the telephone. In fact, his telephone was unplugged. He asked for any
warrant, but the defendant told him to `shut up.’ He was nevertheless told that he
would be able to call for his lawyer who can defend him.
"The plaintiff took note of the fact that when the defendant invited him to come out to
meet his cousin, his safe was opened where he kept the $24,000.00 the defendant
paid for the carpets and another $8,000.00 which he also placed in the safe together
with a bracelet worth $15,000.00 and a pair of earrings worth $10,000.00. He also
discovered missing upon his release his 8 pieces hand-made Persian carpets, valued at
$65,000.00, a painting he bought for P30,000.00 together with his TV and betamax
sets. He claimed that when he was handcuffed, the defendant took his keys from his
wallet. There was, therefore, nothing left in his house.
"That his arrest as a heroin trafficker x x x had been well publicized throughout the
world, in various newspapers, particularly in Australia, America, Central Asia and in the
Philippines. He was identified in the papers as an international drug trafficker. x x x
In fact, the arrest of defendant and Torabian was likewise on television, not only in the
Philippines, but also in America and in Germany. His friends in said places informed
him that they saw him on TV with said news.
"After the arrest made on plaintiff and Torabian, they were brought to Camp Crame
handcuffed together, where they were detained for three days without food and
water."1
During the trial, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, filed a special appearance for
Scalzo and moved for extension of time to file an answer pending a supposed advice
from the United States Department of State and Department of Justice on the defenses
to be raised. The trial court granted the motion. On 27 October 1988, Scalzo filed
another special appearance to quash the summons on the ground that he, not being a
resident of the Philippines and the action being one in personam, was beyond the
processes of the court. The motion was denied by the court, in its order of 13 December
1988, holding that the filing by Scalzo of a motion for extension of time to file an answer
to the complaint was a voluntary appearance equivalent to service of summons which
could likewise be construed a waiver of the requirement of formal notice. Scalzo filed
a motion for reconsideration of the court order, contending that a motion for an
extension of time to file an answer was not a voluntary appearance equivalent to
service of summons since it did not seek an affirmative relief. Scalzo argued that in
cases involving the United States government, as well as its agencies and officials, a
motion for extension was peculiarly unavoidable due to the need (1) for both the
Department of State and the Department of Justice to agree on the defenses to be
raised and (2) to refer the case to a Philippine lawyer who would be expected to first
review the case. The court a quo denied the motion for reconsideration in its order of
15 October 1989.
Scalzo filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, there docketed CA-G.R. No.
17023, assailing the denial. In a decision, dated 06 October 1989, the appellate court
denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Scalzo then elevated the
incident in a petition for review on certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 91173, to this Court.
The petition, however, was denied for its failure to comply with SC Circular No. 1-88;
in any event, the Court added, Scalzo had failed to show that the appellate court was
in error in its questioned judgment.
Meanwhile, at the court a quo, an order, dated 09 February 1990, was issued (a)
declaring Scalzo in default for his failure to file a responsive pleading (answer) and (b)
setting the case for the reception of evidence. On 12 March 1990, Scalzo filed a motion
to set aside the order of default and to admit his answer to the complaint. Granting the
motion, the trial court set the case for pre-trial. In his answer, Scalzo denied the
material allegations of the complaint and raised the affirmative defenses (a) of
Minucher’s failure to state a cause of action in his complaint and (b) that Scalzo had
acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice. Scalzo
interposed a counterclaim of P100,000.00 to answer for attorneys' fees and expenses
of litigation.
Then, on 14 June 1990, after almost two years since the institution of the civil case,
Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent
of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic
immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note No. 414 of the United States
Embassy, dated 29 May 1990, addressed to the Department of Foreign Affairs of the
Philippines and a Certification, dated 11 June 1990, of Vice Consul Donna Woodward,
certifying that the note is a true and faithful copy of its original. In an order of 25 June
1990, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
On 27 July 1990, Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with this Court,
docketed G.R. No. 94257 and entitled "Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., vs. Hon. Wenceslao Polo,
et al.," asking that the complaint in Civil Case No. 88-45691 be ordered dismissed. The
case was referred to the Court of Appeals, there docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 22505, per
this Court’s resolution of 07 August 1990. On 31 October 1990, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision sustaining the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordering the
dismissal of the complaint against him. Minucher filed a petition for review with this
Court, docketed G.R. No. 97765 and entitled "Khosrow Minucher vs. the Honorable
Court of Appeals, et. al." (cited in 214 SCRA 242), appealing the judgment of the Court
of Appeals. In a decision, dated 24 September 1992, penned by Justice (now Chief
Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr., this Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and
remanded the case to the lower court for trial. The remand was ordered on the theses
(a) that the Court of Appeals erred in granting the motion to dismiss of Scalzo for lack
of jurisdiction over his person without even considering the issue of the authenticity of
Diplomatic Note No. 414 and (b) that the complaint contained sufficient allegations to
the effect that Scalzo committed the imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside
the scope of his official duties and, absent any evidence to the contrary, the issue on
Scalzo’s diplomatic immunity could not be taken up.
The Manila RTC thus continued with its hearings on the case. On 17 November 1995,
the trial court reached a decision; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered for the plaintiff, who successfully established his claim by sufficient evidence,
against the defendant in the manner following:
"`Adjudging defendant liable to plaintiff in actual and compensatory damages of
P520,000.00; moral damages in the sum of P10 million; exemplary damages in the sum
of P100,000.00; attorney's fees in the sum of P200,000.00 plus costs.
`The Clerk of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is ordered to take note of the lien of the
Court on this judgment to answer for the unpaid docket fees considering that the
plaintiff in this case instituted this action as a pauper litigant.’"2
While the trial court gave credence to the claim of Scalzo and the evidence presented
by him that he was a diplomatic agent entitled to immunity as such, it ruled that he,
nevertheless, should be held accountable for the acts complained of committed outside
his official duties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court and sustained the defense of Scalzo that he was sufficiently clothed with
diplomatic immunity during his term of duty and thereby immune from the criminal and
civil jurisdiction of the "Receiving State" pursuant to the terms of the Vienna
Convention.
Hence, this recourse by Minucher. The instant petition for review raises a two-fold
issue: (1) whether or not the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, following the
decision rendered by this Court in G.R. No. 97765, should have precluded the Court of
Appeals from resolving the appeal to it in an entirely different manner, and (2) whether
or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.
The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, or its kindred rule of res judicata, would
require 1) the finality of the prior judgment, 2) a valid jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties on the part of the court that renders it, 3) a judgment on the
merits, and 4) an identity of the parties, subject matter and causes of action. 3 Even
while one of the issues submitted in G.R. No. 97765 - "whether or not public respondent
Court of Appeals erred in ruling that private respondent Scalzo is a diplomat immune
from civil suit conformably with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations" - is
also a pivotal question raised in the instant petition, the ruling in G.R. No. 97765,
however, has not resolved that point with finality. Indeed, the Court there has made
this observation -
"It may be mentioned in this regard that private respondent himself, in his Pre-trial
Brief filed on 13 June 1990, unequivocally states that he would present documentary
evidence consisting of DEA records on his investigation and surveillance of plaintiff and
on his position and duties as DEA special agent in Manila. Having thus reserved his
right to present evidence in support of his position, which is the basis for the alleged
diplomatic immunity, the barren self-serving claim in the belated motion to dismiss
cannot be relied upon for a reasonable, intelligent and fair resolution of the issue of
diplomatic immunity."4
Scalzo contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which the
Philippines is a signatory, grants him absolute immunity from suit, describing his
functions as an agent of the United States Drugs Enforcement Agency as "conducting
surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers in the Philippines believed to be the
source of prohibited drugs being shipped to the U.S., (and) having ascertained the
target, (he then) would inform the Philippine narcotic agents (to) make the actual
arrest." Scalzo has submitted to the trial court a number of documents -
1. Exh. '2' - Diplomatic Note No. 414 dated 29 May 1990;
2. Exh. '1' - Certification of Vice Consul Donna K. Woodward dated 11 June 1990;
3. Exh. '5' - Diplomatic Note No. 757 dated 25 October 1991;
4. Exh. '6' - Diplomatic Note No. 791 dated 17 November 1992; and
5. Exh. '7' - Diplomatic Note No. 833 dated 21 October 1988.
6. Exh. '3' - 1st Indorsement of the Hon. Jorge R. Coquia, Legal Adviser, Department
of Foreign Affairs, dated 27 June 1990 forwarding Embassy Note No. 414 to the Clerk
of Court of RTC Manila, Branch 19 (the trial court);
7. Exh. '4' - Diplomatic Note No. 414, appended to the 1st Indorsement (Exh. '3'); and
8. Exh. '8' - Letter dated 18 November 1992 from the Office of the Protocol, Department
of Foreign Affairs, through Asst. Sec. Emmanuel Fernandez, addressed to the Chief
Justice of this Court.5
The documents, according to Scalzo, would show that: (1) the United States Embassy
accordingly advised the Executive Department of the Philippine Government that Scalzo
was a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic mission from his
arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his departure on 10 August 1988;
(2) that the United States Government was firm from the very beginning in asserting
the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo with respect to the case pursuant to the provisions
of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; and (3) that the United States
Embassy repeatedly urged the Department of Foreign Affairs to take appropriate action
to inform the trial court of Scalzo’s diplomatic immunity. The other documentary
exhibits were presented to indicate that: (1) the Philippine government itself, through
its Executive Department, recognizing and respecting the diplomatic status of Scalzo,
formally advised the "Judicial Department" of his diplomatic status and his entitlement
to all diplomatic privileges and immunities under the Vienna Convention; and (2) the
Department of Foreign Affairs itself authenticated Diplomatic Note No. 414. Scalzo
additionally presented Exhibits "9" to "13" consisting of his reports of investigation on
the surveillance and subsequent arrest of Minucher, the certification of the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice that Scalzo was
a special agent assigned to the Philippines at all times relevant to the complaint, and
the special power of attorney executed by him in favor of his previous counsel6 to show
(a) that the United States Embassy, affirmed by its Vice Consul, acknowledged Scalzo
to be a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic mission from his
arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his departure on 10 August 1988,
(b) that, on May 1986, with the cooperation of the Philippine law enforcement officials
and in the exercise of his functions as member of the mission, he investigated Minucher
for alleged trafficking in a prohibited drug, and (c) that the Philippine Department of
Foreign Affairs itself recognized that Scalzo during his tour of duty in the Philippines
(14 October 1985 up to 10 August 1988) was listed as being an Assistant Attaché of
the United States diplomatic mission and accredited with diplomatic status by the
Government of the Philippines. In his Exhibit 12, Scalzo described the functions of the
overseas office of the United States Drugs Enforcement Agency, i.e., (1) to provide
criminal investigative expertise and assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies on
narcotic and drug control programs upon the request of the host country, 2) to establish
and maintain liaison with the host country and counterpart foreign law enforcement
officials, and 3) to conduct complex criminal investigations involving international
criminal conspiracies which affect the interests of the United States.
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was a codification of centuries-old
customary law and, by the time of its ratification on 18 April 1961, its rules of law had
long become stable. Among the city states of ancient Greece, among the peoples of
the Mediterranean before the establishment of the Roman Empire, and among the
states of India, the person of the herald in time of war and the person of the diplomatic
envoy in time of peace were universally held sacrosanct.7 By the end of the 16th
century, when the earliest treatises on diplomatic law were published, the inviolability
of ambassadors was firmly established as a rule of customary international
law.8Traditionally, the exercise of diplomatic intercourse among states was undertaken
by the head of state himself, as being the preeminent embodiment of the state he
represented, and the foreign secretary, the official usually entrusted with the external
affairs of the state. Where a state would wish to have a more prominent diplomatic
presence in the receiving state, it would then send to the latter a diplomatic mission.
Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission
involve, by and large, the representation of the interests of the sending state and
promoting friendly relations with the receiving state.9
The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a)
ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state, 10 (b) envoys,11 ministers
or internuncios accredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges d' affairs12 accredited
to the ministers of foreign affairs.13 Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission"
are the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the technical and service staff.
Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff, excluding the
members of the administrative, technical and service staff of the mission, are accorded
diplomatic rank. Even while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides
for immunity to the members of diplomatic missions, it does so, nevertheless, with an
understanding that the same be restrictively applied. Only "diplomatic agents," under
the terms of the Convention, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil
and criminal suits. The Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of missions
or members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding the same privileges from
all others. It might bear stressing that even consuls, who represent their respective
states in concerns of commerce and navigation and perform certain administrative and
notarial duties, such as the issuance of passports and visas, authentication of
documents, and administration of oaths, do not ordinarily enjoy the traditional
diplomatic immunities and privileges accorded diplomats, mainly for the reason that
they are not charged with the duty of representing their states in political matters.
Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to
immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic
nature.
Scalzo asserted, particularly in his Exhibits "9" to "13," that he was an Assistant Attaché
of the United States diplomatic mission and was accredited as such by the Philippine
Government. An attaché belongs to a category of officers in the diplomatic
establishment who may be in charge of its cultural, press, administrative or financial
affairs. There could also be a class of attaches belonging to certain ministries or
departments of the government, other than the foreign ministry or department, who
are detailed by their respective ministries or departments with the embassies such as
the military, naval, air, commercial, agricultural, labor, science, and customs attaches,
or the like. Attaches assist a chief of mission in his duties and are administratively under
him, but their main function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and
developments in their respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their
own ministries or departments in the home government.14 These officials are not
generally regarded as members of the diplomatic mission, nor are they normally
designated as having diplomatic rank.
In an attempt to prove his diplomatic status, Scalzo presented Diplomatic Notes Nos.
414, 757 and 791, all issued post litem motam, respectively, on 29 May 1990, 25
October 1991 and 17 November 1992. The presentation did nothing much to alleviate
the Court's initial reservations in G.R. No. 97765, viz:
"While the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, the public respondent gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing Civil Case No. 88-45691 on the basis of an erroneous
assumption that simply because of the diplomatic note, the private respondent is
clothed with diplomatic immunity, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over
his person.
"x x x x x x x x x
"And now, to the core issue - the alleged diplomatic immunity of the private respondent.
Setting aside for the moment the issue of authenticity raised by the petitioner and the
doubts that surround such claim, in view of the fact that it took private respondent one
(1) year, eight (8) months and seventeen (17) days from the time his counsel filed on
12 September 1988 a Special Appearance and Motion asking for a first extension of
time to file the Answer because the Departments of State and Justice of the United
States of America were studying the case for the purpose of determining his defenses,
before he could secure the Diplomatic Note from the US Embassy in Manila, and even
granting for the sake of argument that such note is authentic, the complaint for
damages filed by petitioner cannot be peremptorily dismissed.
"x x x x x x x x x
"There is of course the claim of private respondent that the acts imputed to him were
done in his official capacity. Nothing supports this self-serving claim other than the so-
called Diplomatic Note. x x x. The public respondent then should have sustained the
trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. Verily, it should have been the most proper
and appropriate recourse. It should not have been overwhelmed by the self-serving
Diplomatic Note whose belated issuance is even suspect and whose authenticity has
not yet been proved. The undue haste with which respondent Court yielded to the
private respondent's claim is arbitrary."
A significant document would appear to be Exhibit No. 08, dated 08 November 1992,
issued by the Office of Protocol of the Department of Foreign Affairs and signed by
Emmanuel C. Fernandez, Assistant Secretary, certifying that "the records of the
Department (would) show that Mr. Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., during his term of office in
the Philippines (from 14 October 1985 up to 10 August 1988) was listed as an Assistant
Attaché of the United States diplomatic mission and was, therefore, accredited
diplomatic status by the Government of the Philippines." No certified true copy of such
"records," the supposed bases for the belated issuance, was presented in evidence.
Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the executive
branch of the government. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino,15 the Court has
recognized that, in such matters, the hands of the courts are virtually tied. Amidst
apprehensions of indiscriminate and incautious grant of immunity, designed to gain
exemption from the jurisdiction of courts, it should behoove the Philippine government,
specifically its Department of Foreign Affairs, to be most circumspect, that should
particularly be no less than compelling, in its post litem motam issuances. It might be
recalled that the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law of the
territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the
exercise of territorial jurisdiction.16 The government of the United States itself, which
Scalzo claims to be acting for, has formulated its standards for recognition of a
diplomatic agent. The State Department policy is to only concede diplomatic status to
a person who possesses an acknowledged diplomatic title and "performs duties of
diplomatic nature."17 Supplementary criteria for accreditation are the possession of a
valid diplomatic passport or, from States which do not issue such passports, a
diplomatic note formally representing the intention to assign the person to diplomatic
duties, the holding of a non-immigrant visa, being over twenty-one years of age, and
performing diplomatic functions on an essentially full-time basis.18 Diplomatic missions
are requested to provide the most accurate and descriptive job title to that which
currently applies to the duties performed. The Office of the Protocol would then assign
each individual to the appropriate functional category.19
But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it was
sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within the
country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur
Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions when he committed the acts
alleged in the complaint, the present controversy could then be resolved under the
related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit.
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a
long-standing rule of customary international law then closely identified with the
personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit20 and, with the emergence of
democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his
representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity.21 If the
acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent,
although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the
complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without
its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state
itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State,
in whose service he is, under the maxim - par in parem, non habet imperium - that all
states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. 22 The
implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require the
state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation
of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be
regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally
impleaded.23
In United States of America vs. Guinto,24 involving officers of the United States Air Force
and special officers of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators charged with the
duty of preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs, this Court
has ruled -
"While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits against the state
without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state
for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. x x x. It cannot
for a moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity
when they apprehended and later testified against the complainant. It follows that for
discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly
impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be
sued. x x x As they have acted on behalf of the government, and within the scope of
their authority, it is that government, and not the petitioners personally, [who were]
responsible for their acts."25
This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. Thus, Shauf vs. Court of
Appeals26 elaborates:
"It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as
such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. As was clearly
set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al.,
vs. Aligaen, et al. (33 SCRA 368): `Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by
its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the
State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been
invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against
the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has
been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director
of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates
or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional
act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against
the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its
consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be
used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
"x x x x x x x x x
against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his
official function or duties.
All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the
United States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government to
conduct activities in the country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic, is
entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur

"(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the
public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.
The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed
the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises
where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in
him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal
private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice
and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction."27

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit
but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the
sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic
courtesy between the two sovereigns. Guinto and Shauf both involve officers and
personnel of the United States, stationed within Philippine territory, under the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement. While evidence is wanting to show any similar agreement
between the governments of the Philippines and of the United States (for the latter to
send its agents and to conduct surveillance and related activities of suspected drug
dealers in the Philippines), the consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to
the activities of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned
from the facts heretofore elsewhere mentioned. The official exchanges of
communication between agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications
from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States
Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command
in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of
Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give
enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not
consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States
Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct
surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to
inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In
conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during
the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case
EN BANC (c) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the armed forces of
the United States against the security of the United States.
G.R. No. L-1988 February 24, 1948
2. The Philippines shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over all other offenses
JESUS MIQUIABAS, petitioner, committed outside the bases by any member of the armed forces of the United States.
vs.
COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILIPPINE-RYUKYUS COMMAND, UNITED 3. Whenever for special reasons the United States may desire not to exercise the
STATES ARMY, respondents. jurisdiction reserved to it in paragraphs 1 and 6 of this Article, the officer holding the
offender in custody shall so notify the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) of the city or
Lorenzo Sumulong and Esteban P. Garcia for petitioner. province in which the offense has been committed within ten days after his arrest, and
J. A. Wolfson for respondent. in such case the Philippines shall exercise jurisdiction.
MORAN, C.J.: 4. Whenever for special reasons the Philippines may desire not to exercise the
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Jesus Miquiabas against the jurisdiction reserved to it in paragraph 2 of this Article, the fiscal (prosecuting attorney)
Commanding General Philippine-Ryukyus Command, United States Army, who is of the city or province where the offense has been committed shall so notify the officer
alleged to have petitioner under custody and to have appointed a General Court-Martial holding the offender in custody within ten days after his arrest, and in such a case the
to try petitioner in connection with an offense over which the said court has no United States shall be free to exercise jurisdiction. If any offense falling under
jurisdiction. paragraph 2 of this article is committed by any member of the armed forces of the
United States.
Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States Army in the
Philippines, who has been charged with disposing in the Port of Manila Area of things (a) While engaged in the actual performance of a specific military duty, or
belonging to the United States Army, in violation of the 94th Article of War of the United (b) during a period of national emergency declared by either Government and the fiscal
States. He has been arrested for that reason and a General Court-Martial appointed by (prosecuting attorney) so finds from the evidence, he shall immediately notify the
respondent tried and found him guilty and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment. officer holding the offender in custody that the United States is free to exercise
This sentence, however, is not yet final for it is still subject to review. jurisdiction. In the event the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) finds that the offense was
It may be stated as a rule that the Philippines, being a sovereign nation, has jurisdiction not committed in the actual performance of a specific military duty, the offender's
over all offenses committed within its territory, but it may, by treaty or by agreement, commanding officer shall have the right to appeal from such finding to the Secretary
consent that the United States or any other foreign nation, shall exercise jurisdiction of Justice within ten days from the receipt of the decision of the fiscal and the decision
over certain offenses committed within certain portions of said territory. On March 11, of the Secretary of Justice shall be final.
1947, the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of 5. In all cases over which the Philippines exercises jurisdiction the custody of the
America, entered into an agreement concerning military bases, and Article XIII thereof accused, pending trial and final judgment, shall be entrusted without delay to the
is as follows: commanding officer of the nearest base, who shall acknowledge in writing that such
JURISDICTION accused has been delivered to him for custody pending trial in a competent court of
the Philippines and that he will be held ready to appear and will be produced before
1. The Philippines consents that the United States shall have the right to exercise said court when required by it. The commanding officer shall be furnished by the fiscal
jurisdiction over the following offenses: (prosecuting attorney) with a copy of the information against the accused upon the
filing of the original in the competent court.
(a) Any offense committed by any person within any base except where the offender
and offended parties are both Philippine citizens (not members of the armed forces of 6. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, it is naturally agreed that in time of war
the United States on active duty) or the offense is against the security of the the United States shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over any offenses
Philippines; which may be committed by members of the armed forces of the United States in the
Philippines.
(b) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the armed forces of
the United States in which the offended party is also a member of the armed forces of 7. The United States agrees that it will not grant asylum in any of the bases to any
the United States; and person fleeing from the lawful jurisdiction of the Philippines. Should such person be
found in any base, he will be surrendered on demand to the competent authorities of
the Philippines.
8. In every case in which jurisdiction over an offense is exercised by the United States,
the offended party may institute a separate civil action against the offender in the
proper court of the Philippines to enforce the civil liability which under the laws of the
Philippines may arise from the offense.
Under paragraph 1 (a), the General Court-Martial would have jurisdiction over the
criminal case against petitioner if the offense had been committed within a base. Under
paragraph 1 (b), if the offense had been committed outside a base, still the General
Court-Martial would have jurisdiction if the offense had been committed by a "member
of the armed forces of the United States" there being no question that the offended
party in this case is the United States. It is not necessary therefore, to consider whether
the offense is against "the security of the United States" under paragraph 1 ( c), or
whether petitioner committed it in "the actual performance of a specific military duty"
or in time of a declared "national emergency" under paragraph 4, or whether we are
still in a state of war under paragraph 6, for in all these instances the military
jurisdiction depends also upon whether the offender is a member of the armed forces
of the United States. We shall then determine in this case (1) whether the offense has
been committed within or without a base, and, in the second instance, (2) whether the
offender is or is not a member of the armed forces of the United States.
As to the first question, Article XXVI of the Agreement provides that "bases are those
area named in Annex A and Annex B and such additional areas as may be acquired for
military purposes pursuant to the terms of this Agreement." Among the areas specified
in Annexes A and B, there is none that has reference to the Port Area of Manila where
the offense has allegedly been committed. On the contrary, it appears in Annex A that
"army communications system" is included, but with "the deletion of all stations in the
Port of Manila Area."
Paragraph 2 of Article XXI is invoked by respondent. The whole article is as follows:
TEMPORARY INSTALLATIONS
1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall retain the right to occupy temporary
quarters and installations now existing outside the bases mentioned in Annex A and
Annex B, for such reasonable time, not exceeding two years, as may be necessary to
develop adequate facilities within the bases for the United States armed forces. If
circumstances require an extension of time, such a period will be fixed by mutual
agreement of the two Governments; but such extension shall not apply to the existing
temporary quarters and installations within the limits of the City of Manila and shall in
no case exceed a period of three years.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the Port of Manila
reservation with boundaries as of 1941 will be available for use to the United States
armed forces until such time as other arrangements can be made for the supply of the
bases by mutual agreement of the two Governments.
3. The terms of this agreement pertaining to bases shall be applicable to temporary
quarters and installations referred to in paragraph 1 of this article while they are so
occupied by the armed forces of the United States; provided, that offenses committed
within the temporary quarters and installations located within the present limits of the
City of Manila shall not be considered as offenses within the bases but shall be governed
by the provisions of Article XIII, paragraphs 2 and 4, except that the election not to
exercise the jurisdiction reserved to the Philippines shall be made by the Secretary of
Justice. It is agreed that the United States shall have full use and full control of all
these quarters and installations while they are occupied by the armed forces of the
United States, including the exercise of such measures as may be necessary to police
said quarters for the security of the personnel and property therein.
The subject matter of this article, as indicated by its heading, is "Temporary
Installations." Paragraph 1 refers to temporary quarters and installations existing
outside the bases specified in Annex A and Annex B, which may be retained by the
United States armed forces for such reasonable time as may be necessary not
exceeding two years in duration, extendible fro not more than three years, the
extension not being applicable to existing temporary quarters and installations within
the limits of the City of Manila.
Paragraph 2, of Article XXI, refers to the Port of Manila Reservation, which will be
available for use to the United States armed forces, also as a temporary quarters and
installations, its temporariness not being for a definite period of time, but "until such
time as other arrangements can be made for supply of the bases by mutual agreement
of the two Governments." There is in paragraph 2 absolutely nothing that may be
construed as placing the Port of Manila Reservation in the category of a permanent
base.
Paragraph 3, of Article XXI, provides "that offenses committed within the temporary
quarters and installations located within the present limits of the City of Manila shall
not be considered as offenses within the bases but shall be governed by the provisions
of Article XIII, paragraphs 2 and 4." Therefore, the offense at bar cannot be considered
as committed within, but without, a base, since it has been committed in the Port of
Manila Area, which is not one of the bases mentioned in Annexes A and B to the
Agreement, and is merely temporary quarters located within the present limits of the
City of Manila.
The next inquiry is whether or not the offender may be considered as a member of the
armed forces of the United States under Article XIII, paragraph 1 (b). As above stated,
petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States Army in the
Philippines. Under the terms of the Agreement, a civilian employee cannot be
considered as a member of the armed forces of the United States. Articles XI, XVI and
XVIII of the Agreement make mention of civilian employees separately from members
of the armed forces of the United States, which is a conclusive indication that under
said Agreement armed forces do not include civilian employees.
Respondent invokes Articles II of the Articles of War of the United States, which
enumerates, among the persons subject to military law, persons accompanying or
serving with the armies of the United States. But this case should be decided not under
the Articles of War, but under the terms of the Base Agreement between the United
States and the Philippines. And not because a person is subject to military law under
the Articles of War does he become, for that reason alone, a member of the armed
forces under the Base Agreement. And even under the Articles of War, the mere fact
that a civilian employee is in the service of the United States Army does not make him
a member of the armed forces of the United States. Otherwise, it would have been
necessary for said Article to enumerate civilian employees separately from members of
the armed forces of the United States.

Respondent maintains that petitioner has no cause of action because the Secretary of
Justice had not notified the officer holding the petitioner in custody whether or not the
Philippines desired to retain jurisdiction under Article XXI, paragraph 3, of the Military
Base Agreement. It is sufficient to state in this connection that in cases like the present
where the offender is a civilian employee and not a member of the Unites States armed
forces, no waiver can be made either by the prosecuting attorney of by the Secretary
of Justice, under paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article XIII in connection with paragraph 3 of
Article XXI, of the Agreement.

We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold, that the General Court-Martial appointed
by respondent has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for the offense allegedly committed
by him and, consequently, the judgment rendered by said court sentencing the
petitioner to 15 years' imprisonment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

It is ordered that petitioner be released immediately by respondent without prejudice

to any criminal action which may be instituted in the proper court of the Philippines.

Let a copy of this decision be sent immediately to the Honorable, Secretary of Justice.

Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ, concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5270 January 15, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.
Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
ELLIOTT, J.:
The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of section 1 of
Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the judgment entered
thereon appealed to this court, where under proper assignments of error he contends:
(1) that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court; (2) that under the evidence the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear and
determine the case; (3) that Act No. 55 as amended is in violation of certain provisions
of the Constitution of the United States, and void as applied to the facts of this case;
and (4) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.
The information alleges:
That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, the said H. N.
Bull was then and there master of a steam sailing vessel known as the
steamship Standard, which vessel was then and there engaged in carrying and
transporting cattle, carabaos, and other animals from a foreign port and city of Manila,
Philippine Islands; that the said accused H. N. Bull, while master of said vessel, as
aforesaid, on or about the 2d day of December, 1908, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the port and city of Manila,
aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and seventy-seven
(677) head of cattle and carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing said
animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said
animals, in this, to wit, that the said H. N. Bull, master, as aforesaid, did then and there
fail to provide stalls for said animals so in transit and suitable means for trying and
securing said animals in a proper manner, and did then and there cause some of said
animals to be tied by means of rings passed through their noses, and allow and permit
others to be transported loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel without being
tied or secured in stalls, and all without bedding; that by reason of the aforesaid neglect
and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals while so
in transit, the noses of some of said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals
were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded,
bruised, and killed.
All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission.
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that —
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting
cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to
another, or from any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry
with them, upon the vessels carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water
to provide for the suitable sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period
occupied by the vessel in passage from the port of shipment to the port of debarkation,
and shall cause such animals to be provided with adequate forage and fresh water at
least once in every twenty-four hours from the time that the animals are embarked to
the time of their final debarkation.
By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended by adding to
section 1 thereof the following:
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting
cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals from one port in the Philippine Islands to another,
or from any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable
means for securing such animals while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and
unnecessary suffering to the animals, and suitable and proper facilities for loading and
unloading cattle or other animals upon or from vessels upon which they are
transported, without cruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is hereby made unlawful to
load or unload cattle upon or from vessels by swinging them over the side by means
of ropes or chains attached to the thorns.
Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that —
Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who knowingly and
willfully fails to comply with the provisions of section one, shall, for every such failure,
be liable to pay a penalty of not less that one hundred dollars nor more that five
hundred dollars, United States money, for each offense. Prosecution under this Act
may be instituted in any Court of First Instance or any provost court organized in the
province or port in which such animals are disembarked.
1. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does not state that the
court was sitting at a port where the cattle were disembarked, or that the offense was
committed on board a vessel registered and licensed under the laws of the Philippine
Islands.
Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts of First
Instance or any provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals
are disembarked, and there is nothing inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136, which
provides generally for the organization of the courts of the Philippine Islands. Act No.
400 merely extends the general jurisdiction of the courts over certain offenses
committed on the high seas, or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of
the waters of the Philippine Islands on board a ship or water craft of any kind registered
or licensed in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with the laws thereof.
(U.S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep., 614.) This jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of
First Instance in any province into which such ship or water upon which the offense or
crime was committed shall come after the commission thereof. Had this offense been
committed upon a ship carrying a Philippine registry, there could have been no doubt
of the Jurisdiction of the court, because it is expressly conferred, and the Act is in
accordance with well recognized and established public law. But the Standard was a
Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not registered or licensed in the
Philippine Islands under the laws thereof. We have then the question whether the court
had jurisdiction over an offense of this character, committed on board a foreign ship
by the master thereof, when the neglect and omission which constitutes the offense
continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters of the United States.
No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed
on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she
came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the entrance to
Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became
applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana ed.), p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., sec
490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to
the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject through the proper political agency.
This offense was committed within territorial waters. From the line which determines
these waters the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles before she came to
anchor. During that part of her voyage the violation of the statue continued, and as far
as the jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions
may have existed while the vessel was on the high seas. The offense, assuming that it
originated at the port of departure in Formosa, was a continuing one, and every
element necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage across the territorial
waters. The completed forbidden act was done within American waters, and the court
therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the offense and the person of the
offender.
The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, but
the objection to the jurisdiction raises the further question whether that jurisdiction is
restricted by the fact of the nationality of the ship. Every. Every state has complete
control and jurisdiction over its territorial waters. According to strict legal right, even
public vessels may not enter the ports of a friendly power without permission, but it is
now conceded that in the absence of a prohibition such ports are considered as open
to the public ship of all friendly powers. The exemption of such vessels from local
jurisdiction while within such waters was not established until within comparatively
recent times. In 1794, Attorney-General Bradford, and in 1796 Attorney-General Lee,
rendered opinions to the effect that "the laws of nations invest the commander of a
foreign ship of war with no exemption from the jurisdiction of the country into which
he comes." (1, Op. U.S. Attys. Gen., 46, 87.) This theory was also supported by Lord
Stowell in an opinion given by him to the British Government as late as 1820. In the
leading case of the Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden (7 Cranch (U.S.), 116, 144),
Chief Justice Marshall said that the implied license under which such vessels enter a
friendly port may reasonably be construed as "containing exemption from the
jurisdiction of the sovereign within whose territory she claims the rights of hospitality."
The principle was accepted by the Geneva Arbitration Tribunal, which announced that
"the priviledge of exterritoriality accorded to vessels of war has been admitted in the
law of nations; not as an absolute right, but solely as a proceeding founded on the
principle of courtesy and mutual deference between nations."
(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55; Taylor, Int. Law,
sec. 256; Ortolan, Dip de la Mer, 2. C.X.)
Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come and go freely.
Local official exercise but little control over their actions, and offenses committed by
their crew are justiciable by their own officers acting under the laws to which they
primarily owe allegiance. This limitation upon the general principle of territorial
sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and convenience, and finds its justification
in the fact that experience shows that such vessels are generally careful to respect
local laws and regulation which are essential to the health, order, and well-being of the
port. But comity and convenience does not require the extension of the same degree
of exemption to merchant vessels. There are two well-defined theories as to extent of
the immunities ordinarily granted to them, According to the French theory and practice,
matters happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern the tranquillity of
the port or persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the court of the country
to which the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction
over crimes committed on board French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one
member of the crew against another. (See Bonfils, Le Droit Int. (quat. ed.), secs. 624-
628; Martens, Le Droit Int., tome 2, pp. 338, 339; Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, tit. 1, p.
292; Masse, Droit Int., tome 2, p. 63.) Such jurisdiction has never been admitted or
claim by Great Britain as a right, although she has frequently conceded it by treaties.
(Halleck, Int. Law (Baker's ed.), vol. 1, 231; British Territorial Waters Act, 1878.)
Writers who consider exterritoriality as a fact instead of a theory have sought to restrict
local jurisdiction, but Hall, who is doubtless the leading English authority, says that —
It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the territoriality of merchant
vessels that so soon as the latter enter the ports of a foreign state they become subject
to the local jurisdiction on all points in which the interests of the country are touched.
(Hall, Int. Law, p. 263.)
The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel
enters a foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the
local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented
to waive a portion of such jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore, Int.
Law Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean Gregory, Mich. Law Review, Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief
Justice Marshall, in the case of the Exchange, said that —
When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of trade, in would be obviously in
convinient and dangerous to society and would subject the laws to continual infraction
and the government to degradation if such individual merchants did not owe temporary
and local allegiance, and were not amendable to the jurisdiction of the country.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant vessels of
one country visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject themselves
to the laws which govern the ports they visit, so long as they remain; and this as well
in war as in peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S.,
520-525.)
Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed by article 13 of
the treaty of commerce and navigation between Sweden and Norway and the United
States, of July 4, 1827, which concedes to the consul, vice-consuls, or consular agents
of each country "The right to sit as judges and arbitrators in such differences as may
arise between the captains and crews of the vessels belonging to the nation whose
interests are committed to their charge, without the interference of the local
authorities, unless the conduct of the crews or of the captains should disturb the order
or tranquillity of the country." (Comp. of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 754.) This exception
applies to controversies between the members of the ship's company, and particularly
to disputes regarding wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 206, p. 318;
Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168 Mass., 188.) The order and tranquillity of the country are
affected by many events which do not amount to a riot or general public disturbance.
Thus an assault by one member of the crew upon another, committed upon the ship,
of which the public may have no knowledge whatever, is not by this treaty withdrawn
from the cognizance of the local authorities.
In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and Carolina engaged in a "quarrel"
on board the vessel in the port of Galveston, Texas. They were prosecuted before a
justice of the peace, but the United States district attorney was instructed by the
Government to take the necessary steps to have the proceedings dismissed, and the
aid of the governor of Texas was invoked with the view to "guard against a repetition
of similar proceedings." (Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish and
Norwegian charged, May 16, 1876; Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not appear that this
"quarrel" was of such a nature as to amount to a breach of the criminal laws of Texas,
but when in 1879 the mate for the Norwegian bark Livingston was prosecuted in the
courts of Philadelphia County for an assault and battery committed on board the ship
while lying in the port of Philadelphia, it was held that there was nothing in the treaty
which deprived the local courts of jurisdiction. (Commonwealth vs. Luckness, 14 Phila.
(Pa.), 363.) Representations were made through diplomatic channels to the State
Department, and on July 30, 1880, Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State, wrote to Count
Lewenhaupt, the Swedish and Norwegian minister, as follows:
I have the honor to state that I have given the matter careful consideration in
connection with the views and suggestion of your note and the provisions of the
thirteenth article of the treaty of 1827 between the United States and Sweden and
Norway. The stipulations contained in the last clause of that article . . . are those under
which it is contended by you that jurisdiction is conferred on the consular officers, not
only in regard to such differences of a civil nature growing out of the contract of
engagement of the seamen, but also as to disposing of controversies resulting from
personal violence involving offense for which the party may be held amenable under
the local criminal law.
This Government does not view the article in question as susceptible of such broad
interpretation. The jurisdiction conferred upon the consuls is conceived to be limited to
their right to sit as judges or abitrators in such differences as may arise between
captains and crews of the vessels, where such differences do not involve on the part
of the captain or crew a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country. When,
however, a complaint is made to a local magistrate, either by the captain or one or
more of the crew of the vessel, involving the disturbance of the order or tranquillity of
the country, it is competent for such magistrate to take cognizance of the matter in
furtherance of the local laws, and under such circumstances in the United States it
becomes a public duty which the judge or magistrate is not at liberty voluntarily to
forego. In all such cases it must necessarily be left to the local judicial authorities
whether the procedure shall take place in the United States or in Sweden to determine
if in fact there had been such disturbance of the local order and tranquillity, and if the
complaint is supported by such proof as results in the conviction of the party accused,
to visit upon the offenders such punishment as may be defined against the offense by
the municipal law of the place." (Moore, Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.)
The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over offenses
committed on board a merchant vessel by one member of the crew against another
which amount to a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, and a fair
and reasonable construction of the language requires un to hold that any violation of
criminal laws disturbs the order or traquillity of the country. The offense with which the
appellant is charged had nothing to so with any difference between the captain and
the crew. It was a violation by the master of the criminal law of the country into whose
port he came. We thus find that neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the
place of the commission of the offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or general
principle of public law, are the court of the Philippine Islands deprived of jurisdiction
over the offense charged in the information in this case.
It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not allege that
the animals were disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation which it is claimed
is essential to the jurisdiction of the court sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant
upon this issue would be to construe the language of the complaint very strictly against
the Government. The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to
constitute the completed offense, and a reasonable construction of the language of the
statute confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into which the animals are
bought. They are then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact
of their disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be
different if the disembarkation of the animals constituted a constitutional element in
the offense, but it does not.
It is also contended that the information is insufficient because it fails to allege that
the defendant knowingly and willfully failed to provide suitable means for securing said
animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering. The allegation
of the complaint that the act was committed willfully includes the allegation that it was
committed knowingly. As said in Woodhouse vs. Rio Grande R.R. Company (67 Texas,
416), "the word 'willfully' carries the idea, when used in connection with an act
forbidden by law, that the act must be done knowingly or intentionally; that, with
knowledge, the will consented to, designed, and directed the act." So in Wong vs. City
of Astoria (13 Oregon, 538), it was said: "The first one is that the complaint did not
show, in the words of the ordinance, that the appellant 'knowingly' did the act
complained of. This point, I think, was fully answered by the respondent's counsel —
that the words 'willfully' and 'knowingly' conveyed the same meaning. To 'willfully' do
an act implies that it was done by design — done for a certain purpose; and I think
that it would necessarily follow that it was 'knowingly' done." To the same effect
is Johnson vs. The People (94 Ill., 505), which seems to be on all fours with the present
case.
The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were knowingly done, but his
defense rests upon the assertion that "according to his experience, the system of
carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to
the life and comfort of the animals." It was conclusively proven that what was done
was done knowingly and intentionally.
In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58, paragraph 3, it is
only necessary to state the act or omission complained of as constituting a crime or
public offense in ordinary and concise language, without repitition. It need not
necessarily be in the words of the statute, but it must be in such form as to enable a
person of common understanding to know what is intended and the court to pronounce
judgment according to right. A complaint which complies with this requirement is good.
(U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep., 556.)
The Act, which is in the English language, impose upon the master of a vessel the duty
to "provide suitable means for securing such animals while in transit, so as to avoid all
cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the animals." The allegation of the complaint as
it reads in English is that the defendant willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully carried the
cattle "without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so
as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals in this . . . that by
reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means
for securing said animals were cruelty torn, and many of said animals were tossed
about upon the decks and hold of said vessels, and cruelty wounded, bruised, and
killed."
The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the information does
not charge him with failure to provide "sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words
used are "medios suficientes" and "medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the
original complaint was prepared in English, and that the word "suitable" is translatable
by the words "adecuado," "suficiente," and "conveniente," according to the context and
circumstances, we determine this point against the appellant, particularly in view of the
fact that the objection was not made in the court below, and that the evidence clearly
shows a failure to provide "suitable means for the protection of the animals."
2. The appellant's arguments against the constitutionality of Act No. 55 and the
amendment thereto seems to rest upon a fundamentally erroneous conception of the
constitutional law of these Islands. The statute penalizes acts and ommissions
incidental to the transportation of live stock between foreign ports and ports of the
Philippine Islands, and had a similar statute regulating commerce with its ports been
enacted by the legislature of one of the States of the Union, it would doubtless have
been in violation of Article I, section 3, of the Constitution of the United States.
(Stubbs vs. People (Colo.), 11 L. R. A., N. S., 1071.)
But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to the United States is
controlled by constitutional principles different from those which apply to States of the
Union. The importance of the question thus presented requires a statement of the
principles which govern those relations, and consideration of the nature and extent of
the legislative power of the Philippine Commission and the Legislature of the
Philippines. After much discussion and considerable diversity of opinion certain
applicable constitutional doctrines are established.
The Constitution confers upon the United States the express power to make war and
treaties, and it has the power possessed by all nations to acquire territory by conquest
or treaty. Territory thus acquired belongs to the United States, and to guard against
the possibility of the power of Congress to provide for its government being questioned,
the framers of the Constitution provided in express terms that Congress should have
the power "to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting territory
and other property belonging to the United States." (Art. IV, sec. 3, par. 3.) Upon the
acquisition of the territory by the United States, and until it is formally incorporated
into the Union, the duty of providing a government therefor devolves upon Congress.
It may govern the territory by its direct acts, or it may create a local government, and
delegate thereto the ordinary powers required for local government. (Binns vs. U. S.,
194 U. S., 486.) This has been the usual procedure. Congress has provided such
governments for territories which were within the Union, and for newly acquired
territory not yet incorporated therein. It has been customary to organize a government
with the ordinary separation of powers into executive, legislative, and judicial, and to
prescribe in an organic act certain general conditions in accordance with which the local
government should act. The organic act thus became the constitution of the
government of the territory which had not been formally incorporated into the Union,
and the validity of legislation enacted by the local legislature was determined by its
conformity with the requirements of such organic act. (National Bank vs. Yankton, 11
Otto (U. S.), 129.) To the legislative body of the local government Congress has
delegated that portion of legislative power which in its wisdom it deemed necessary for
the government of the territory, reserving, however, the right to annul the action of
the local legislature and itself legislate directly for the territory. This power has been
exercised during the entire period of the history of the United States. The right of
Congress to delegate such legislative power can no longer be seriously questioned.
(Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; U. S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370, 385.)
The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force operate within such
territory, although the liberality of Congress in legislating the Constitution into
contiguous territory tended to create an impression upon the minds of many people
that it went there by its own force. (Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 289.) In legislating
with reference to this territory, the power of Congress is limited only by those
prohibitions of the Constitution which go to the very root of its power to act at all,
irrespective of time or place. In all other respects it is plenary. (De Lima vs. Bidwell,
182 U. S., 1; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 244; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S., 197;
Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; Rassmussen vs. U. S., 197 U. S., 516.)
This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the whole history of the United
States, and legislation founded on the theory was enacted long prior to the acquisition
of the present Insular possessions. Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of 1878
provides that "The Constitution and all laws of the United States which are not locally
inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within all the organized territories,
and in every Territory hereafter organized, as elsewhere within the United States."
When Congress organized a civil government for the Philippines, it expressly provided
that this section of the Revised Statutes should not apply to the Philippine Islands.
(Sec. 1, Act of 1902.)
In providing for the government of the territory which was acquired by the United
States as a result of the war with Spain, the executive and legislative authorities have
consistently proceeded in conformity with the principles above state. The city of Manila
was surrendered to the United States on August 13, 1898, and the military commander
was directed to hold the city, bay, and harbor, pending the conclusion of a peace which
should determine the control, disposition, and government of the Islands. The duty
then devolved upon the American authorities to preserve peace and protect person and
property within the occupied territory. Provision therefor was made by proper orders,
and on August 26 General Merritt assumed the duties of military governor. The treaty
of peace was signed December 10, 1898. On the 22d of December, 1898, the President
announced that the destruction of the Spanish fleet and the surrender of the city had
practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of the
Spanish sovereignty therein, and that by the treaty of peace the future control,
disposition, and government of the Islands had been ceded to the United States. During
the periods of strict military occupation, before the treaty of peace was ratified, and
the interim thereafter, until Congress acted (Santiago vs. Noueral, 214 U.S., 260), the
territory was governed under the military authority of the President as commander in
chief. Long before Congress took any action, the President organized a civil government
which, however, had its legal justification, like the purely military government which it
gradually superseded, in the war power. The military power of the President embraced
legislative, executive personally, or through such military or civil agents as he chose to
select. As stated by Secretary Root in his report for 1901 —
The military power in exercise in a territory under military occupation includes
executive, legislative, and judicial authority. It not infrequently happens that in a single
order of a military commander can be found the exercise of all three of these different
powers — the exercise of the legislative powers by provisions prescribing a rule of
action; of judicial power by determination of right; and the executive power by the
enforcement of the rules prescribed and the rights determined.
President McKinley desired to transform military into civil government as rapidly as
conditions would permit. After full investigation, the organization of civil government
was initiated by the appointment of a commission to which civil authority was to be
gradually transferred. On September 1, 1900, the authority to exercise, subject to the
approval of the President. "that part of the military power of the President in the
Philippine Islands which is legislative in its character" was transferred from the military
government to the Commission, to be exercised under such rules and regulations as
should be prescribed by the Secretary of War, until such time as complete civil
government should be established, or congress otherwise provided. The legislative
power thus conferred upon the Commission was declared to include "the making of
rules and orders having the effect of law for the raising of revenue by taxes, customs
duties, and imposts; the appropriation and expenditure of public funds of the Islands;
the establishment of an educational system to secure an efficient civil service; the
organization and establishment of courts; the organization and establishment of
municipal and departmental government, and all other matters of a civil nature which
the military governor is now competent to provide by rules or orders of a legislative
character." This grant of legislative power to the Commission was to be exercised in
conformity with certain declared general principles, and subject to certain specific
restrictions for the protection of individual rights. The Commission were to bear in mind
that the government to be instituted was "not for our satisfaction or for the expression
of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of
the Philippine Island, and the measures adopted should be made to conforms to their
customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with
the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government."
The specific restrictions upon legislative power were found in the declarations that "no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense; that excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted; that
no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense or be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself; that the right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; that neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude shall exist except as a punishment for crime; that no bill of
attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed; that no law shall be passed abridging
the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably
assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances; that no law shall
be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,
and that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without
discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed."
To prevent any question as to the legality of these proceedings being raised, the
Spooner amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill passed March 2, 1901, provided
that "all military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands .
. . shall until otherwise provided by Congress be vested in such person and persons,
and shall be exercised in such manner, as the President of the United States shall
direct, for the establishment of civil government, and for maintaining and protecting
the inhabitants of said Islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and
religion." Thereafter, on July 4, 1901, the authority, which had been exercised
previously by the military governor, was transferred to that official. The government
thus created by virtue of the authority of the President as Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy continued to administer the affairs of the Islands under the direction
of the President until by the Act of July 1, 1902, Congress assumed control of the
situation by the enactment of a law which, in connection with the instructions of April
7, 1900, constitutes the organic law of the Philippine Islands.
The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substancial changes in the form of government which
the President had erected. Congress adopted the system which was in operation, and
approved the action of the President in organizing the government. Substantially all
the limitations which had been imposed on the legislative power by the President's
instructions were included in the law, Congress thus extending to the Islands by
legislative act nor the Constitution, but all its provisions for the protection of the rights
and privileges of individuals which were appropriate under the conditions. The action
of the President in creating the Commission with designated powers of government, in
creating the office of the Governor-General and Vice-Governor-General, and through
the Commission establishing certain executive departments, was expressly approved
and ratified. Subsequently the action of the President in imposing a tariff before and
after the ratification of the treaty of peace was also ratified and approved by Congress.
(Act of March 8, 1902; Act of July 1, 1902; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370;
Lincoln vs. U.S., 197 U.S., 419.) Until otherwise provided by law the Islands were to
continue to be governed "as thereby and herein provided." In the future the enacting
clause of all statutes should read "By authority of the United States" instead of "By the
authority of the President." In the course of time the legislative authority of the
Commission in all parts of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or non-Christian tribes
was to be transferred to a legislature consisting of two houses — the Philippine
Commission and the Philippine Assembly. The government of the Islands was thus
assumed by Congress under its power to govern newly acquired territory not
incorporated into the United States.
This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory, although its
form and organization somewhat resembles that of both. It stands outside of the
constitutional relation which unites the States and Territories into the Union. The
authority for its creation and maintenance is derived from the Constitution of the United
States, which, however, operates on the President and Congress, and not directly on
the Philippine Government. It is the creation of the United States, acting through the
President and Congress, both deriving power from the same source, but from different
parts thereof. For its powers and the limitations thereon the Government of the
Philippines looked to the orders of the President before Congress acted and the Acts of
Congress after it assumed control. Its organic laws are derived from the formally and
legally expressed will of the President and Congress, instead of the popular sovereign
constituency which lies upon any subject relating to the Philippines is primarily in
Congress, and when it exercise such power its act is from the viewpoint of the
Philippines the legal equivalent of an amendment of a constitution in the United States.
Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is a complete
governmental organism with executive, legislative, and judicial departments exercising
the functions commonly assigned to such departments. The separation of powers is as
complete as in most governments. In neither Federal nor State governments is this
separation such as is implied in the abstract statement of the doctrine. For instance, in
the Federal Government the Senate exercises executive powers, and the President to
some extent controls legislation through the veto power. In a State the veto power
enables him to exercise much control over legislation. The Governor-General, the head
of the executive department in the Philippine Government, is a member of the
Philippine Commission, but as executive he has no veto power. The President and
Congress framed the government on the model with which Americans are familiar, and
which has proven best adapted for the advancement of the public interests and the
protection of individual rights and priviliges.
In instituting this form of government of intention must have been to adopt the general
constitutional doctrined which are inherent in the system. Hence, under it the
Legislature must enact laws subject to the limitations of the organic laws, as Congress
must act under the national Constitution, and the States under the national and state
constitutions. The executive must execute such laws as are constitutionally enacted.
The judiciary, as in all governments operating under written constitutions, must
determine the validity of legislative enactments, as well as the legality of all private and
official acts. In performing these functions it acts with the same independence as the
Federal and State judiciaries in the United States. Under no other constitutional theory
could there be that government of laws and not of men which is essential for the
protection of rights under a free and orderly government.
Such being the constitutional theory of the Government of the Philippine Islands, it is
apparent that the courts must consider the question of the validity of an act of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, as a State court considers an act
of the State legislature. The Federal Government exercises such powers only as are
expressly or impliedly granted to it by the Constitution of the United States, while the
States exercise all powers which have not been granted to the central government.
The former operates under grants, the latter subject to restrictions. The validity of an
Act of Congress depends upon whether the Constitution of the United States contains
a grant of express or implied authority to enact it. An act of a State legislature is valid
unless the Federal or State constitution expressly or impliedly prohibits its enaction. An
Act of the legislative authority of the Philippines Government which has not been
expressly disapproved by Congress is valid unless its subject-matter has been covered
by congressional legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some provision of the
organic laws.
The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in general terms
subject to specific limitations. The general grant is not alone of power to legislate on
certain subjects, but to exercise the legislative power subject to the restrictions stated.
It is true that specific authority is conferred upon the Philippine Government relative to
certain subjects of legislation, and that Congress has itself legislated upon certain other
subjects. These, however, should be viewed simply as enactments on matters wherein
Congress was fully informed and ready to act, and not as implying any restriction upon
the local legislative authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty. Gen. of U. S., April
16, 1908.)
The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts of legislation by the
Government of the Philippine tends strongly to confirm the view that for purposes of
construction the Government of the Philippines should be regarded as one of general
instead of enumerated legislative powers. The situation was unusual. The new
government was to operate far from the source of its authority. To relieve Congress
from the necessity of legislating with reference to details, it was thought better to grant
general legislative power to the new government, subject to broad and easily
understood prohibitions, and reserve to Congress the power to annul its acts if they
met with disapproval. It was therefore provided "that all laws passed by the
Government of the Philippine Islands shall be reported to Congress, which hereby
reserves the power and authority to annul the same." (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902,
sec. 86.) This provision does not suspend the acts of the Legislature of the Philippines
until approved by Congress, or when approved, expressly or by acquiescence, make
them the laws of Congress. They are valid acts of the Government of the Philippine
Islands until annulled. (Miners Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How. (U. S.), 1.)
In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then ascertain whether the
Legislature has been expressly or implication forbidden to enact it. Section 3, Article
IV, of the Constitution of the United States operated only upon the States of the Union.
It has no application to the Government of the Philippine Islands. The power to regulate
foreign commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue of its power to govern the
territory belonging to the United States, it may regulate foreign commerce with such
territory. It may do this directly, or indirectly through a legislative body created by it,
to which its power in this respect if delegate. Congress has by direct legislation
determined the duties which shall be paid upon goods imported into the Philippines,
and it has expressly authorized the Government of the Philippines to provide for the
needs of commerce by improving harbors and navigable waters. A few other specific
provisions relating to foreign commerce may be found in the Acts of Congress, but its
general regulation is left to the Government of the Philippines, subject to the reserved
power of Congress to annul such legislation as does not meet with its approval. The
express limitations upon the power of the Commission and Legislature to legislate do
not affect the authority with respect to the regulation of commerce with foreign
countries. Act No. 55 was enacted before Congress took over the control of the Islands,
and this act was amended by Act No. 275 after the Spooner amendment of March 2,
1901, was passed. The military government, and the civil government instituted by the
President, had the power, whether it be called legislative or administrative, to regulate
commerce between foreign nations and the ports of the territory. (Cross vs. Harrison,
16 How. (U.S.), 164, 190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall. (U.S.), 73, 87.) This Act has
remained in force since its enactment without annulment or other action by Congress,
and must be presumed to have met with its approval. We are therefore satisfied that
the Commission had, and the Legislature now has, full constitutional power to enact
laws for the regulation of commerce between foreign countries and the ports of the
Philippine Islands, and that Act No. 55, as amended by Act No. 275, is valid.
3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the meaning of the
Act can not be left to the judgment of the master of the ship. It is a question which
must be determined by the court from the evidence. On December 2, 1908, the
defendant Bull brought into and disembarked in the port and city of Manila certain
cattle, which came from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable
means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary
suffering to said animals, contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The trial court found the following facts, all of
which are fully sustained by the evidence:
That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and master of the Norwegian steamer known
as the Standard, for a period of six months or thereabouts prior to the 2d day of
December, 1908, was engaged in the transportation of cattle and carabaos from Chines
and Japanese ports to and into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.
That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as such master and captain as
aforesaid, brought into the city of Manila, aboard said ship, a large number of cattle,
which ship was anchored, under the directions of the said defendant, behind the
breakwaters in front of the city of Manila, in Manila Bay, and within the jurisdiction of
this court; and that fifteen of said cattle then and there had broken legs and three
others of said cattle were dead, having broken legs; and also that said cattle were
transported and carried upon said ship as aforesaid by the defendant, upon the deck
and in the hold of said ship, without suitable precaution and care for the transportation
of said animals, and to avoid danger and risk to their lives and security; and further
that said cattle were so transported abroad said ship by the defendant and brought
into the said bay, and into the city of Manila, without any provisions being made
whatever upon said decks of said ship and in the hold thereof to maintain said cattle
in a suitable condition and position for such transportation.
That a suitable and practicable manner in which to transport cattle abroad steamship
coming into Manila Bay and unloading in the city of Manila is by way of individual stalls
for such cattle, providing partitions between the cattle and supports at the front sides,
and rear thereof, and cross-cleats upon the floor on which they stand and are
transported, of that in case of storms, which are common in this community at sea,
such cattle may be able to stand without slipping and pitching and falling, individually
or collectively, and to avoid the production of panics and hazard to the animals on
account or cattle were transported in this case. Captain Summerville of the
steamship Taming, a very intelligent and experienced seaman, has testified, as a
witness in behalf of the Government, and stated positively that since the introduction
in the ships with which he is acquainted of the stall system for the transportation of
animals and cattle he has suffered no loss whatever during the last year. The defendant
has testified, as a witness in his own behalf, that according to his experience the system
of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure
to the life and comfort of the animals, but this theory of the case is not maintainable,
either by the proofs or common reason. It can not be urged with logic that, for instance,
three hundred cattle supports for the feet and without stalls or any other protection for
them individually can safely and suitably carried in times of storm upon the decks and
in the holds of ships; such a theory is against the law of nature. One animal falling or
pitching, if he is untied or unprotected, might produce a serious panic and the
wounding of half the animals upon the ship if transported in the manner found in this
case.

The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty
pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The
sentence and judgment is affirmed. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), defendant-appellant.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
ARELLANO, C. J.:
The first complaint filed against the defendant, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
stated that he "carried, kept, possessed and had in his possession and control, 96
kilogrammes of opium," and that "he had been surprised in the act of selling 1,000
pesos worth prepared opium."
The defense presented a demurrer based on two grounds, the second of which was
the more than one crime was charged in the complaint. The demurrer was sustained,
as the court found that the complaint contained two charges, one, for the unlawful
possession of opium, and the other, for the unlawful sale of opium, and, consequence
of that ruling, it ordered that the fiscal should separated one charge from the other
and file a complaint for each violation; this, the fiscal did, and this cause concerns only
the unlawful possession of opium. It is registered as No. 375, in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and as No. 5887 on the general docket of this court.
The facts of the case are contained in the following finding of the trial court:
The evidence, it says, shows that between 11 and 12 o'clock a. m. on the present
month (stated as August 19, 1909), several persons, among them Messrs. Jacks and
Milliron, chief of the department of the port of Cebu and internal-revenue agent of
Cebu, respectively, went abroad the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo,
and found, first in a cabin near the saloon, one sack (Exhibit A) and afterwards in the
hold, another sack (Exhibit B). The sack referred to as Exhibit A contained 49 cans of
opium, and the other, Exhibit B, the larger sack, also contained several cans of the
same substance. The hold, in which the sack mentioned in Exhibit B was found, was
under the defendant's control, who moreover, freely and of his own will and accord
admitted that this sack, as well as the other referred to in Exhibit B and found in the
cabin, belonged to him. The said defendant also stated, freely and voluntarily, that he
had bought these sacks of opium, in Hongkong with the intention of selling them as
contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that, as his hold had already been searched
several times for opium, he ordered two other Chinamen to keep the sack. Exhibit A.
It is to be taken into account that the two sacks of opium, designated as Exhibits A and
B, properly constitute the corpus delicti. Moreover, another lot of four cans of opium,
marked, as Exhibit C, was the subject matter of investigation at the trial, and with
respect to which the chief of the department of the port of Cebu testified that they
were found in the part of the ship where the firemen habitually sleep, and that they
were delivered to the first officer of the ship to be returned to the said firemen after
the vessel should have left the Philippines, because the firemen and crew of foreign
vessels, pursuant to the instructions he had from the Manila custom-house, were
permitted to retain certain amounts of opium, always provided it should not be taken
shore.
And, finally, another can of opium, marked "Exhibit D," is also corpus delicti and
important as evidence in this cause. With regard to this the internal-revenue agent
testified as follows:itc-alf
FISCAL. What is it?
WITNESS. It is a can opium which was bought from the defendant by a secret-service
agent and taken to the office of the governor to prove that the accused had opium in
his possession to sell.
On motion by the defense, the court ruled that this answer might be stricken out
"because it refers to a sale." But, with respect to this answer, the chief of the
department of customs had already given this testimony, to wit:
FISCAL. Who asked you to search the vessel?
WITNESS. The internal-revenue agent came to my office and said that a party brought
him a sample of opium and that the same party knew that there was more opium on
board the steamer, and the agent asked that the vessel be searched.
The defense moved that this testimony be rejected, on the ground of its being hearsay
evidence, and the court only ordered that the part thereof "that there was more opium,
on board the vessel" be stricken out.
The defense, to abbreviate proceedings, admitted that the receptacles mentioned as
Exhibits A, B, and C, contained opium and were found on board the steamship Erroll,
a vessel of English nationality, and that it was true that the defendant stated that these
sacks of opium were his and that he had them in his possession.
According to the testimony of the internal-revenue agent, the defendant stated to him,
in the presence of the provincial fiscal, of a Chinese interpreter (who afterwards was
not needed, because the defendant spoke English), the warden of the jail, and four
guards, that the opium seized in the vessel had been bought by him in Hongkong, at
three pesos for each round can and five pesos for each one of the others, for the
purpose of selling it, as contraband, in Mexico and Puerto de Vera Cruz; that on the
15th the vessel arrived at Cebu, and on the same day he sold opium; that he had tried
to sell opium for P16 a can; that he had a contract to sell an amount of the value of
about P500; that the opium found in the room of the other two Chinamen prosecuted
in another cause, was his, and that he had left it in their stateroom to avoid its being
found in his room, which had already been searched many times; and that, according
to the defendant, the contents of the large sack was 80 cans of opium, and of the small
one, 49, and the total number, 129.

It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that it came
from Hongkong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports of Manila and
Cebu.

The defense moved for a dismissal of the case, on the grounds that the court had no
jurisdiction to try the same and the facts concerned therein did not constitute a crime.
The fiscal, at the conclusion of his argument, asked that the maximum penalty of the
law be imposed upon the defendant, in view of the considerable amount of opium
seized. The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been
committed within its district, on the wharf of Cebu.

The court sentenced the defendant to five years' imprisonment, to pay a fine of
P10,000, with additional subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, though not to
exceed one third of the principal penalty, and to the payment of the costs. It further
ordered the confiscation, in favor of the Insular Government, of the exhibits presented
in the case, and that, in the event of an appeal being taken or a bond given, or when
the sentenced should have been served, the defendant be not released from custody,
but turned over to the customs authorities for the purpose of the fulfillment of the
existing laws on immigration.

From this judgment, the defendant appealed to this court.lawphi1.net

The appeal having been heard, together with the allegations made therein by the
parties, it is found: That, although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in
these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a
general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such
vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not
apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the
present case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus
committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a
violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the
court established in that said place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the absence of
an agreement under an international treaty.

It is also found: That, even admitting that the quantity of the drug seized, the subject
matter of the present case, was considerable, it does not appear that, on such account,
the two penalties fixed by the law on the subject, should be imposed in the maximum
degree.

Therefore, reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six months and P1,000,
respectively, we affirm in all other respects the judgment appealed from, with the costs
of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.

Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13005 October 10, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH SING, defendant-appellant.
Antonio Sanz for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding the
defendant guilty of a violation of section 4 of Act No. 2381 (the Opium Law), and
sentencing him to two years imprisonment, to pay a fine of P300 or to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The following facts are fully proven: The defendant is a subject of China employed as
a fireman on the steamship Shun Chang. The Shun Chang is a foreign steamer which
arrived at the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage direct from the port of
Saigon. The defendant bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board
the steamship Shun Chang, and had them in his possession during the trip from Saigon
to Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, the
authorities on making a search found the eight cans of opium above mentioned hidden
in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine. The defendant confessed that
he was the owner of this opium, and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He did not
confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that it was his
intention to import the prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands. No other evidence
direct or indirect, to show that the intention of the accused was to import illegally this
opium into the Philippine Islands, was introduced.
Has the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands been proven?
Two decisions of this Court are cited in the judgment of the trial court, but with the
intimation that there exists inconsistently between the doctrines laid down in the two
cases. However, neither decision is directly a precedent on the facts before us.
In the case of United States vs. Look Chaw ([1910], 18 Phil., 573), in the opinion
handed down by the Chief Justice, it is found —
That, although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these
Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general
rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel
being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does no apply
when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present
case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an
open violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of the
penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the court
established in the said place itself has competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an
agreement under an international treaty.1awphil.net
A marked difference between the facts in the Look Chaw case and the facts in the
present instance is readily observable. In the Look Chaw case, the charge case the
illegal possession and sale of opium — in the present case the charge as illegal
importation of opium; in the Look Chaw case the foreign vessel was in transit — in the
present case the foreign vessel was not in transit; in the Look Chaw case the opium
was landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil — in the present case of United
States vs. Jose ([1916], 34 Phil., 840), the main point, and the one on which resolution
turned, was that in a prosecution based on the illegal importation of opium or other
prohibited drug, the Government must prove, or offer evidence sufficient to raise a
presumption, that the vessel from which the drug is discharged came into Philippine
waters from a foreign country with the drug on board. In the Jose case, the defendants
were acquitted because it was not proved that the opium was imported from a foreign
country; in the present case there is no question but what the opium came from Saigon
to Cebu. However, in the opinion in the Jose case, we find the following which may
be obiter dicta, but which at least is interesting as showing the view of the writer of
the opinion:
The importation was complete, to say the least, when the ship carrying it anchored in
Subic Bay. It was not necessary that the opium discharged or that it be taken from the
ship. It was sufficient that the opium was brought into the waters of the Philippine
Islands on a boat destined for a Philippine port and which subsequently anchored in a
port of the Philippine Islands with intent to discharge its cargo.
Resolving whatever doubt was exist as to the authority of the views just quoted, we
return to an examination of the applicable provisions of the law. It is to be noted that
section 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, "Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring any
prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands." "Import" and "bring" are synonymous
terms. The Federal Courts of the United States have held that the mere act of going
into a port, without breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of importation. (The Mary [U.
S.], 16 Fed. Cas., 932, 933.) And again, the importation is not the making entry of
goods at the custom house, but merely the bringing them into port; and the importation
is complete before entry of the Custom House. (U. S. vs. Lyman [U. S.], 26, Fed. Cas.,
1024, 1028; Perots vs. U. S., 19 Fed. Cas., 258.) As applied to the Opium Law, we
expressly hold that any person unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug into
the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is found under this person's control on
a vessel which has come direct from a foreign country and is within the jurisdictional
limits of the Philippine Islands. In such case, a person is guilty of illegal importation of
the drug unless contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise. Applied
to the facts herein, it would be absurb to think that the accused was merely carrying
opium back and forth between Saigon and Cebu for the mere pleasure of so doing. It
would likewise be impossible to conceive that the accused needed so large an amount
of opium for his personal use. No better explanation being possible, the logical
deduction is that the defendant intended this opium to be brought into the Philippine
Islands. We accordingly find that there was illegal importation of opium from a foreign
country into the Philippine Islands. To anticipate any possible misunderstanding, let it
be said that these statements do not relate to foreign vessels in transit, a situation not
present.

The defendant and appellant, having been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as
charged and the sentence of the trial court being within the limits provided by law, it
results that the judgment must be affirmed with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson, Araullo and Street, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the
information that initiated this case and in which the appellee is accused of having
illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality
while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of
the city.
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so held
and dismissed the case.
The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is
erroneous or not; and it will or will not be erroneous according as said court has or has
no jurisdiction over said offense.
The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime,
like the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our
jurisdiction waters. 1awph!l.net
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with
International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard
a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within
whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission affects the
peace and security of the territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial
principle and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated
under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within
territory they were committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this
jurisdiction, because at present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United
States on this matter are authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the
United States.
In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.],
116), Chief Justice Marshall said:
. . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously
inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual
infraction, and the government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not
owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the
country. . . .
In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:
. . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime
committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but
when she came within three miles of a line drawn from the headlands, which embrace
the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles
became applicable. (Wheaton, International Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note 105; Bonfils,
Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were
then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as
have been conceded by that sovereignty through the proper political agency. . . .
It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and
Wildenhus vs. Keeper of the Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was said that:
. . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorder which disturb only
the peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the
sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those which disturb the public peace may be
suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders punished by the proper authorities of the
local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to determine which of the two
jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs. Much will undoubtedly depend on the
attending circumstances of the particular case, but all must concede that felonious
homicide is a subject for the local jurisdiction, and that if the proper authorities are
proceeding with the case in the regular way the consul has no right to interfere to
prevent it.
Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:
Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands,
aboard a foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a general rule, constitute
a crime triable by the courts of the Islands, such vessels being considered as an
extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, the use
of which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed from the vessels upon Philippine soil; in
such a case an open violation of the laws of the land is committed with respect to
which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of
the crime, no court other than that established in the said place has jurisdiction of the
offense, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to
renouncing such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as
England is concerned, to which nation the ship where the crime in question was
committed belongs. Besides, in his work "Treaties, Conventions, etc.," volume 1, page
625, Malloy says the following:
There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and all the
territories of His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce. The
inhabitants of the two countries, respectively, shall have liberty freely and securely to
come with their ships and cargoes to all such places, ports and rivers, in the territories
aforesaid, to which other foreigners are permitted to come, to enter into the same, and
to remain and reside in any parts of the said territories, respectively; also to hire and
occupy houses and warehouses for the purposes of their commerce; and, generally,
the merchants and traders of each nation respectively shall enjoy the most complete
protection and security for their commerce, but subject always to the laws and statutes
of the two countries, respectively. (Art. 1, Commerce and Navigation Convention.)

We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was
held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our
Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects
entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being used
in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that our statute
contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance
of the public order.

But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant
ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such
drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the
purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.
Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:

. . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at anchor
in the port of Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are impotent to lay
hands on him, is simply subversive of public order. It requires no unusual stretch of
the imagination to conceive that a foreign ship may come into the port of Manila and
allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium on board.

The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to
costs. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain
Avery and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when
grostesque brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history
and romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy
in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as to
present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta,
another Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and
in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After
a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat
arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the
boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros
first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo,
attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too
horrible to the described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of
the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea
that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days
of hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the Moros finally arrived at
Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped
one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu,
Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First
Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de
officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged was not within
the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands,
and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the
Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had,
and a judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each
of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang
and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks
of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 924 rupees,
and to pay a one-half part of the costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de
officio. By a process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed
of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present.
Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and
done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as
is again done in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of
the case. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any
particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal
of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The
jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all
so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within
the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war,
are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the
first time is whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of
piracy are still in force. Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another
nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with
Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next
preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who
commit the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena
temporal to cadena perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the physical
injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and fifteen
and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in
Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving
themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code,
when Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national
territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who,
according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be
considered as such.
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating
to the effect of a transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-
known. The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The
municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United
States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force. As
a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure
good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character,
continue until by direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed.
(Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by
the Instructions of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the
Commanding General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and
immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws
of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and
provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as
they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or
superseded by the occupying belligerent; and practice they are not usually abrogated,
but are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals,
substantially as they were before the occupations. This enlightened practice is so far
as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. (Official Gazette, Preliminary
Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy
were meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation
to article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions
of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy
by the civil law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal
Code are similar in tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the
public law. This must necessarily be so, considering that the Penal Code finds its
inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power
to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses
against the law of nations. (U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting
on the statute books the necessary ancillary legislation, provided that whoever, on the
high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is
afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. (U.S.
Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers
of the Constitution and the members of Congress were content to let a definition of
piracy rest on its universal conception under the law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating
to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United
States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical
construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of
piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the
words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be
substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine
Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs.
Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code
a limited meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil
officers, but only public officers in the Government of the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as
follows:
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the
Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States,
shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with
the United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably
articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines.
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to
article 154. There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited
article as authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was
accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons
without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to
determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed.
In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance of
nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of
instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the
accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong
done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other
wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior
strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects
of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering,
therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of
instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to
impose capital punishment.

The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition
of the death penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped
on of the women), but is not unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice
Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726,
it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and
appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo,
who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until
dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the
Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang and
Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended
parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the costs of
both instances. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 123918 December 9, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AUGUSTO LORETO RINGOR, JR., accused-appellant.
PURISIMA, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision 1 dated November 13, 1995 of Branch 6 of the
Regional Trial Court in Baguio City, finding accused-appellant Augusto Loreto Ringor,
Jr. guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty
death in Criminal Case No. 13102-R, also guilty of illegal possession of firearms under
P.D. No. 1866 in Criminal Case No. 13100-R for and disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 13102, the Court Finds (sic) the accused Augusto Loreto Ringor
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 6, RA 7659, qualified by
Treachery and as further qualified by the use of an unlicensed firearm and hereby
sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of Death; to indemnify the heirs of
deceased Marcelino Florida, Jr., the sum of P50,000.00 for his death and the sum of
P100,000.00 as Moral damages for his death, both indemnification being without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
2. In Criminal Case No. 13100-R, the Court Finds (sic) accused Augusto Loreto Ringor
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 1 PD 1866 (Illegal
Possession of firearm and ammunitions) as charged in the Information and hereby
sentences him, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to an imprisonment ranging
from 17 years 4 months and 1 day as Minimum to 20 years as Maximum and to pay
the costs.
The subject gun, caliber .38 (Paltik) bearing Serial Number 853169 (Exh. A) being the
subject of the offense is hereby declared confiscated and forfeited in favor of the State.
The accused Augusto Loreto Ringor is entitled to be credited in the service of his
sentence four fifth (4/5) of his preventive imprisonment in accordance with Article 29
of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.2
Filed on June 28, 1994, the Informations against accused-appellant, alleges:
In Criminal Case No. 13102-R
That on or about the 23rd day of June, 1994, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then
armed with a Caliber 38 handgun paltick with Serial Number 853169 and with intent to
kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
MARCELINO BUSLAY FLORIDA, JR. thereby inflicting upon the latter hypovolemic shock
secondary to massive hemorrhage; multiple gunshot wounds of the liver, stomach,
small intestine and mesentric blood vessels, which injuries directly caused his death.
That the qualifying circumstance of TREACHERY attended the commission of the crime
when the accused suddenly attacked victim and shot him several times at the back,
with the use of a handgun, thus employing means, methods of forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
and in Criminal Case No. 13100-R
That on or about the 23rd day of June, 1994, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess and carry outside of his residence, a
firearm, Caliber .38 revolver (Paltik) bearing Serial Number 853169, without any legal
authority or permit from any government official or authority concerned, in violation of
the above cited provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
With the accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, entering a plea of Not Guilty upon
arraignment, a joint trial of the two cases ensued.
The inculpatory facts and circumstances sued upon are succinctly summarized in the
Appellee's Brief as follows:
On June 23, 1994, at around 6:00 P.M. (sic), Fely Batanes, a waitress at People's
Restaurant located at Kalantiao St., Baguio City, saw appellant Ringor and his two
companions enter the restaurant. (Tsn, December 8, 1994, p. 4). After seating
themselves, the group ordered a bottle of gin (ibid., p. 6). Minutes later, appellant
approached one of the tables where Florida, the restaurant's cook was drinking beer.
Without any warning, appellant pulled Florida's hair and poked a knife on the latter's
throat. Florida stood up and pleaded with appellant not to harm him ( ibid., p. 7).
Appellant relented and released his grip on Florida. Thereafter, he left the restaurant
together with his companions. However, a few minutes latter he was back (ibid, p. 8).
Appellant brandished a gun and menacingly entered the restaurant. Not encountering
any resistance, he thus proceeded to the kitchen where Florida worked (ibid). Stealthily
approaching Florida from behind, appellant fired six successive shots at Florida who fell
down (ibid., p. 9). His evil deed accomplished, appellant left the kitchen and fled (ibid).
Appellant was chased by a man who while running, shouted at onlookers that the
person he was running after was armed and had just killed somebody. Alerted, SPO2
Fernandez, who was then in the vicinity, went into action and nabbed appellant. He
frisked appellant and recovered from him a Paltik revolver, caliber. 38, with Serial
Number 853169 (Exh. A). He checked the revolver's cylinder and found six empty
cartridges (Exhs. T to T-6). He noted that it smelled of gunpowder. He and PO1 Ortega
turned over appellant and the confiscated firearm to the Investigation Division of the
Baguio Police and then executed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest (Exhibit O). On the same
night, Fely Batanes gave her sworn statement (Exhibit E) to the Baguio Police wherein
she positively identified appellant as the assailant.
xxx xxx xxx
NBI Forensic Chemist Ms. Carina Javier found both hands of appellant positive for
nitrates as stated in her Chemist Report No. C-94-22. She conducted a microscopic
chemical examination on the subject firearm and found that the gun was fired within
one week prior to June 27, 1994.
Elmer Nelson Piedad, Ballistician of the Firearm Investigation Division, NBI, Manila,
tested and concluded that the slugs recovered from the victim were fired from
appellant's firearm. Upon verification from the Firearms Explosive division, Camp
Crame, Quezon City, it was found that appellant is not a licensed firearm holder nor,
was the subject firearm duly registered with the said office (Exh. A). 5
The autopsy conducted by Dr. John Tinoyan on the cadaver of the deceased yielded a
Necropsy Report, which states:
POST MORTEM FINDINGS
Body of a male, 1.66 m. height, medium built, with complete rigor mortis, lividity well
developed on the dependent parts, cloudy cornea and dilated pupils with very pale
papebral conjunctive.
Gunshot wounds: GSW no. 1 measuring 10 x 10 mm. serrated edges, positive powder
burns located at the left mid clavicular line, posterior, 2 inches below the shoulder. It
was directed downward towards the mid-body, penetrating the skin. (sic) soft tissue,
middle 3rd of the 3rd rib, the upper and lower lobes of the left lung to the diaphragm,
through and through the stomach, lacerating the superior mesentric vessels,
perforating the small intestine then lodged at the superior surface of the urinary bladder
(slug was recovered marked no. 1)
GSW no. 2 measures 8 mm. diameter, positive powder burns, located on the right
shoulder near the s. joint posteriorly, penetrating the skin, soft tissue, then lodged at
the surface of the fractured surgical neck of the humorous (sic) (slug recovered).
Marked no. 2.
GSW no. 3 measures 8 mm. Diameter, positive powder burns, located on the right
shoulder posteriorly near the joint penetrating the skin, soft tissues, and the head of
the Humorous, (sic) then dislodged form the same entry point.
GSW no. 4 measures 8 x 10 mm, oval shaped, with abrasion superiorly located at the
anterior left parasternal line at the level of the 6th ICS. It was directed downward
towards the posterior of the body, penetrating the skin, soft tissue, the left lobe of the
liver with partial avulsion, then perforating the stomach through and though the
duodenum lumbar muscle then lodged underneath the skin, (1) paravertebral, level of
L3 (slug recovered marked no. 4).
CAUSE OF DEATH:
HYPOVOLEMIC SHOCK SECONDARY TO MASSIVE HEMORRHAGE; MULTIPLE
GUNSHOT WOUND(S) OF THE LIVER, STOMACH, SMALL INTESTINE AND MESENTRIC
BLOOD VESSELS. Multiple Gunshot Wound(s) of the body. 6
Accused-appellant admitted shooting the victim but theorized that he acted in self-
defense. As embodied in the Appellant's Brief, the defense version runs thus:
3.01 On June 23, 1994, at a little after five o'clock in the afternoon, appellant, together
with two (2) other companions, entered the People's Restaurant in Baguio City to order
drinks. They sat at a table next to another then occupied by Marcelino B. Florida, Jr.
(Florida) and a woman companion (TSN, Testimony of Augusto Loreto G. Ringor, Jr.,
May 4, 1995, pp. 3-6).
3. 02 Soon after receiving their orders, appellant's companion, Ramon Fernandez,
stood up and approached Florida to inquire about his (Fernandez') brother, Cesar.
Florida angrily responded to the query and said, "Putang ina ninyo! anong pakialam ko
diyan!"
3.03 A quarrel thereafter ensued between Fernandez and Florida prompting the
appellant to intervene and pacify Fernandez. When Fernandez drew out a gun from his
waist, appellant immediately seized the same directing his friend to leave the restaurant
before he started hurting other people with his gun. No sooner had Fernandez stepped
out, however, Florida, armed with a bolo, came charging in from the kitchen and
headed towards the appellant. (Ibid., pp. 6-7)
3.04 Surprised, appellant shot Florida with the gun he was holding just as the latter
was about to hit him with the bolo. Thereafter, appellant put the gun on the table and
walked out of the restaurant. Once already outside the restaurant, appellant's other
companion, Virgilio, followed him and handed to him the gun he (appellant) left at the
table. He then proceeded to surrender the gun and report the incident at the nearest
police station. (Ibid., pp. 8-9)
3.05 Before appellant could reach the police station, however, appellant was already
arrested by off-duty policeman who brought him back to the People's Restaurant.
Appellant was thereafter incarcerated at the Baguio City Police Station. (Ibid., pp. 10-
12) 7
On November 13, 1995, the trial court handed down decision under automatic review.
Accused-appellant contends that:
I after the incident, the body of the victim was found lying in the kitchen and not outside;
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT FOR SIMPLE ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER AN INDETERMINATE
SENTENCE OF 17 YEARS AND 1 DAY AS MINIMUM TO 20 YEARS AS MAXIMUM.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF MURDER.
III
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED TO DEATH ON
THE GROUNDS THAT: (i) THE CHARGE OF MURDER WAS NOT PROVED BY THE
PROSECUTION; AND (ii) ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT MURDER WAS COMMITTED BY
APPELLANT, THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY FOR THE OFFENSE IS RECLUSION
PERPETUA THERE BEING NO AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE TO RAISE THE PENALTY
TO DEATH. 8
Well-settled is the rule that in interposing self-defense, the offender admits authorship
of the killing. The onus probandi is thus shifted to him to prove the elements of self-
defense and that the killing was justified; 9 otherwise, having admitted the killing,
conviction is inescapable. Concomitantly, he must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence. 10
For self-defense to prosper, it must be established that: (1) there was unlawful
aggression by the victim; (2) that the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression was reasonable; and (3) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of person defending himself. 11
In the case at bar, accused-appellant failed to prove the element of unlawful
aggression. The allegation that the victim allegedly went out of the kitchen armed with
a bolo, and was about to hack him (accused-appellant) who was then at an almost
prone lying position on the table he was occupying, 12 is a self-serving and
unconvincing statement which did not anyway constitute the requisite quantum of
proof for unlawful aggression. Prosecution witness Fely Batanes, a waitress in the
restaurant where the shooting incident occurred, was firm in her declaration that the
victim was in the kitchen unarmed 13 when the accused-appellant shot him. The victim
had no weapon or bolo. He was neither threatening to attack nor in any manner
manifesting any aggressive act which could have imperiled accused-appellant's safety
and well-being.
No improper motive having been shown on the part of Fely Batanes to testify falsely
against accused-appellant or to implicate him in the commission of the crime, the logical
conclusion is that there was no such improper motive and her testimony is worthy of
full faith and credit. 14
What is more, the testimony of Fely Batanes is buttressed by the fact that immediately
thus weakening further the theory of accused-appellant that he shot the victim while
they were at the dining area. 15
Then too, the nature, location and number of gunshot wounds inflicted on the deceased
belie accused-appellant's theory of self-defense. 16 The deceased sustained three gun
shot wounds on the back and one in front. Dr. John Tinoyan, who conducted the
autopsy on the cadaver of the victim, testified that the gunshot wound on the frontal
portion of the victim's body showed a downward trajectory of the bullet on his chest,
penetrating the liver, perforating the stomach down to the small intestine, and then
lodged underneath the skin. 17 Verily, such finding negates the claim of accused-
appellant that he shot the victim while he was at an almost prone lying position and
the victim was standing in front of him about to strike with a bolo. If this were true,
the trajectory of the bullet should have been upward or better still, it should have been
at the level at which the gun was fired while he (accused-appellant) was in a prone
lying position.
Rather telling are the three gunshot wounds on the back of the victim, which wounds
showed traces of gunpowder which, according to Dr. Tinoyan, indicated that the
weapon used was at a distance of less than one meter. 18Evidently, accused-appellant
stealthily approached the victim from behind and fired at him six successive shots, four
of which hit him, to ensure his death. 19 If he shot the victim merely to defend himself,
there would have been no cause for accused-appellant to pump several bullets into the
body of the victim.
In light of the foregoing, the imputation of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
cannot be believed. Absent the element of unlawful aggression by the deceased, there
can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete. If there was no unlawful aggression,
there was nothing to prevent or repel and the second and third requisites of self-
defense would have no basis. 20
The Court a quo properly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of treachery which
qualified the crime to murder. It was clearly established that the accused-appellant
fired six successive shots on the victim, suddenly, without warning, and from behind,
giving the victim no chance to flee or to prepare for his defense or to put up the least
resistance to such sudden assault. There is treachery when the means, manner or
method of attack employed by the offender offered no risk to himself from any
defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might have taken. 21
All things studiedly considered and viewed in proper perspective, the mind of the Court
can rest easy on a finding that accused-appellant Augusto Loreto Ringor, Jr. is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and did not act in self-defense.
Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, prescribes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death for the crime of murder. When, as in this case, neither aggravating
nor mitigating circumstance is attendant, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua has
to be applied, 22 in accordance with Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
With respect to the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal possession of firearms
under P.D. No. 1866, it was held in the case of People vs.
Molina 23 and reiterated in the recent case of People vs. Ronaldo Valdez, 24 that in
cases where murder or homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm,
there can be no separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms under
P.D. No. 1866 in view of the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 8294.
Thereunder, the use of unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is simply considered
as an aggravating circumstance in the murder or homicide and no longer as a separate
offense. Furthermore, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms shall be imposed
provided that no other crime is committed. 25 In other words, where murder or
homicide was committed, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms is no longer
imposable since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance. 26
It bears stressing, however, that the dismissal of the present case for illegal possession
of firearm should not be misinterpreted to mean that there can no longer be any
prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of firearms. In general, all pending
cases involving illegal possession of firearms should continue to be prosecuted and
tried if no other crimes expressly provided in R. A. No. 8294 are involved (murder or
homicide, under Section 1, and rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup
d' etat, under Section 3). 27
Pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, where the new law is favorable to
the accused, it has to be applied retroactively. Thus, insofar as it spares accused-
appellant a separate conviction for illegal possession of firearms, Republic Act No. 8294
has to be given retroactive application in Criminal Case No. 13100-R.
On the matter of the aggravating circumstance of "use of unlicensed firearm" in the
commission of murder or homicide, the trial court erred in appreciating the same to
qualify to death the penalty for the murder committed by accused-appellant. It should
be noted that at the time accused-appellant perpetrated the offense, the unlicensed
character of a firearm used in taking the life of another was not yet an aggravating
circumstance in homicide or murder; to wit:
Neither is the second paragraph of Section 1 meant to punish homicide or murder with
death if either crime is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, i.e., to consider
such use merely as a qualifying circumstance and not as an offense. That could not
have been the intention of the lawmaker because the term "penalty" in the subject
provision is obviously meant to be the penalty for illegal possession of firearm and not
the penalty for for homicide or murder. We explicitly stated in Tac-an:
There is no law which renders the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating
circumstances in homicide or murder. Under an information charging homicide or
muder,the fact that the death weapon was an unlicensed firearm cannot be used to
increase the penalty of the second offense of homicide or murder to death (or reclusion
perpetua under 1987 Constitution). The essential point is that the unlicensed character
or condition of the instrument used in destroying human life or committing some other
crime, is not included on the inventory of aggravating circumstances set out in Article
14 of the Revised Penal Code.
A law may, of course, be enacted making the use of an unlicensed firearm as a
qualifying circumstance. 28 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, before R.A. No. 8294 (which took effect on July 6, 1997) made the use of
unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, the penalty
for the murder committed by accused-appellant on June 23, 1994 was not death, as
erroneously imposed by the trial court. There was yet no such aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm to raise the penalty for murder from reclusion
perpetua to death, at the time of commission of the crime.
The amendatory law making the "use of an unlicensed firearm" as an aggravating
circumstance in murder or homicide, cannot be applied here because the said provision
of R.A. No. 8294 is not favorable to accused-appellant, lest it becomes an ex post
facto law. 29
WHEREFORE, the decision in Criminal Case No. 13102-R is AFFIRMED with the
modification that accused-appellant Augusto Loreto Ringor, Jr. is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It is understood that the civil liabilities imposed
below are UPHELD.
Criminal Case No. 13100-R instituted pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1866 is
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J. and Panganiban, J., in the result.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30026 January 30, 1971
MARIO GUMABON, BLAS BAGOLBAGOL, GAUDENCIO AGAPITO, EPIFANIO
PADUA and PATERNO PALMARES, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondent.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A.
Torres and Solicitor Eduardo C. Abaya for respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
Habeas corpus, the great writ of liberty, is relied upon by petitioners, five in number,
for their release from imprisonment. Meted out life terms for the complex crime of
rebellion with murder and other crimes, they would invoke the People v.
Hernandez1 doctrine, negating the existence of such an offense, a ruling that
unfortunately for them was not handed down until after their convictions had become
final. Nor is this the first instance, a proceeding of this character was instituted, as
in Pomeroy v. Director of Prisons,2 likewise a petition for habeas corpus, a similar
question was presented. The answer given was in the negative. Petitioners plead for a
new look on the matter. They would premise their stand on the denial of equal
protection if their plea would not be granted. Moreover they did invoke the codal
provision that judicial decisions shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines,3 necessarily resulting in the conclusion that the Hernandez decision once
promulgated calls for a retroactive effect under the explicit mandate of the Revised
Penal Code as to penal laws having such character even if at the time of their
application a final sentence has been rendered "and the convict is serving the
same."4 These arguments carry considerable persuasion. Accordingly we find for
petitioners, without going so far as to overrule Pomeroy.
Petitioner Mario Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to
suffer reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
robbery, arson and kidnapping. Petitioners Gaudencio Agapito, Paterno Palmares and
Epifanio Padua, likewise pleaded guilty to the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder and other offenses, and were similarly made to suffer the same penalty in
decisions rendered, as to the first two, on March 8, 1954 and, as to the third, on
December 15, 1955. The last petitioner, Blas Bagolbagol, stood trial also for the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder and other offenses and on January 12,
1954 penalized with reclusion perpetua. Each of the petitioners has been since then
imprisoned by virtue of the above convictions. Each of them has served more than 13
years.5
Subsequently, in People v. Hernandez,6 as above noted, this Court ruled that the
information against the accused in that case for rebellion complexed with murder, arson
and robbery was not warranted under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, there
being no such complex offense.7 In the recently-decided case of People vs. Lava,8 we
expressly reaffirmed the ruling in the Hernandez case rejecting the plea of the Solicitor
General for the abandonment of such doctrine. It is the contention of each of the
petitioners that he has served, in the light of the above, more than the maximum
penalty that could have been imposed upon him. He is thus entitled to freedom, his
continued detention being illegal.9
The fear that the Pomeroy ruling stands as an obstacle to their release on a habeas
corpus proceeding prompted petitioners, as had been mentioned, to ask that it be
appraised anew and, if necessary, discarded. We can resolve the present petition
without doing so. The plea there made was unconvincing, there being a failure to
invoke the contentions now pressed vigorously by their counsel, Attorney Jose W.
Diokno, as to the existence of a denial of a constitutional right that would suffice to
raise a serious jurisdictional question and the retroactive effect to be given a judicial
decision favorable to one already sentenced to a final judgment under Art. 22 of the
Revised Penal Code. To repeat, these two grounds carry weight. We have to grant this
petition.
1. The fundamental issue, to repeat, is the availability of the writ of habeas corpus
under the circumstances disclosed. Its latitudinarian scope to assure that illegality of
restraint and detention be avoided is one of the truisms of the law. It is not known as
the writ of liberty for nothing. The writ imposes on judges the grave responsibility of
ascertaining whether there is any legal justification for a deprivation of physical
freedom. Unless there be such a showing, the confinement must thereby cease. If
there be a valid sentence it cannot, even for a moment, be extended beyond the period
provided for by law. Any deviation from the legal norms call for the termination of the
imprisonment.
Rightly then could Chafee refer to the writ as "the most important human rights
provision" in the fundamental law. 10Nor is such praise unique. Cooley spoke of it as
"one of the principal safeguards to personal liberty." 11 For Willoughby, it is "the
greatest of the safeguards erected by the civil law against arbitrary and illegal
imprisonment by whomsoever detention may be exercised or ordered." 12 Burdick
echoed a similar sentiment, referring to it as "one of the most important bulwarks of
liberty." 13 Fraenkel made it unanimous, for to him, "without it much else would be of
no avail." 14 Thereby the rule of law is assured.
A full awareness of the potentialities of the writ of habeas corpus in the defense of
liberty coupled with its limitations may be detected in the opinions of former Chief
Justices Arellano, 15 Avanceña, 16 Abad Santos, 17 Paras, 18Bengzon, 19 and the
present Chief Justice. 20 It fell to Justice Malcolm's lot, however to emphasize quite a
few times the breadth of its amplitude and of its reach. In Villavicencio v.
Lukban, 21 the remedy came in handy to challenge the validity of the order of the then
respondent Mayor of Manila who, for the best of reasons but without legal justification,
ordered the transportation of more than 150 inmates of houses of ill-repute to Davao.
After referring to the writ of habeas corpus as having been devised and existing "as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint" the opinion of
Justice Malcolm continued: "The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient." 22
The liberality with which the judiciary is to construe habeas corpus petitions even if
presented in pleadings on their face devoid of merit was demonstrated in Ganaway v.
Quilen, 23 where this Court, again through Justice Malcolm, stated: "As standing alone
the petition for habeas corpus was fatally defective in its allegations, this court, on its
motion, ordered before it the record of the lower court in the case entitled Thomas
Casey, et al. v. George Ganaway." 24 It is to Justice Malcolm likewise in Conde v.
Rivera, 25 to whom is traceable the doctrine, one that broadens the field of the
operation of the writ, that a disregard of the constitutional right to speedy trial ousts
the court of jurisdiction and entitles the accused if "restrained of his liberty, by habeas
corpus to obtain his
freedom." 26
So it is in the United States. An 1830 decision 27 of Chief Justice Marshall put the matter
thus: "The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ, known to the common law,
the great object of which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without
sufficient cause." Then there is this affirmation from an 1869 decision 28 of the then
Chief Justice Chase: "The great writ of habeas corpus has been for centuries esteemed
the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom." The passing of the years
has only served to confirm its primacy as a weapon on in the cause of liberty. Only the
other year, Justice Fortas spoke for the United States Supreme Court thus: "The writ
of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom
against arbitrary and lawless state action. ... The scope and flexibility of the writ — its
capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention — its ability to cut through barriers of
form and procedural mazes — have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by
courts and lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered
with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within
its reach are surfaced and corrected." 29 Justice Fortas explicitly made reference to
Blackstone, who spoke of it as "the great and efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal
confinement." Implicit in his just estimate of its pre-eminent role is his adoption of
Holmes' famous dissent in Frank v. Mangum: 30 "But habeas corpus cuts through all
forms and goes to the very tissue of the structure."
2. Where, however, the detention complained of finds its origin in what has been
judicially ordained, the range of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is considerably
narrowed. For if "the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order
of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment, or make the order," the writ does not lie. 31 That principle dates
back to 1902, 32 when this Court announced that habeas corpus was unavailing where
the person detained was in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court
or magistrate. This is understandable, as during the time the Philippines was under
American rule, there was necessarily an adherence to authoritative doctrines of
constitutional law there followed.
One such principle is the requirement that there be a finding of jurisdictional defect. As
summarized by Justice Bradley in Ex parte Siebold, an 1880 decision: "The only ground
on which this court, or any court, without some special statute authorizing it, will give
relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner under conviction and sentence of another court
is the want of jurisdiction in such court over the person or the cause, or some other
matter rendering its proceedings void." 33
There is the fundamental exception though, that must ever be kept in mind. Once a
deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the
judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy
to assail the legality of the detention. 34
3. Petitioners precisely assert a deprivation of a constitutional right, namely, the denial
of equal protection. According to their petition: "In the case at bar, the petitioners were
convicted by Courts of First Instance for the very same rebellion for which Hernandez,
Geronimo, and others were convicted. The law under which they were convicted is the
very same law under which the latter were convicted. It had not and has not been
changed. For the same crime, committed under the same law, how can we, in
conscience, allow petitioners to suffer life imprisonment, while others can suffer
only prision mayor?" 35
They would thus stress that, contrary to the mandate of equal protection, people
similarly situated were not similarly dealt with. What is required under this required
constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons
under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision:
"Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if
not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those
that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast
on some in the group equally binding on the rest." 36
The argument of petitioners thus possesses a persuasive ring. The continued
incarceration after the twelve-year period when such is the maximum length of
imprisonment in accordance with our controlling doctrine, when others similarly
convicted have been freed, is fraught with implications at war with equal protection.
That is not to give it life. On the contrary, it would render it nugatory. Otherwise, what
would happen is that for an identical offense, the only distinction lying in the finality of
the conviction of one being before the Hernandez ruling and the other after, a person
duly sentenced for the same crime would be made to suffer different penalties. Dizon and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Moreover, as noted in the petition before us, after our ruling in People v. Lava,
petitioners who were mere followers would be made to languish in jail for perhaps the Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.
rest of their natural lives when the leaders had been duly considered as having paid Castro and Makasiar, JJ., took no part.
their penalty to society, and freed. Such a deplorable result is to be avoided.

4. Petitioners likewise, as was made mention at the outset, would rely on Article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code which requires that penal judgment be given a retroactive
effect. In support of their contention, petitioners cite U.S. v. Macasaet, 37 U.S.
vs.Parrone, 38 U.S. v. Almencion, 39 People v. Moran, 40 and People v. Parel. 41 While
reference in the above provision is made not to judicial decisions but to legislative acts,
petitioners entertain the view that it would be merely an exaltation of the literal to deny
its application to a case like the present. Such a belief has a firmer foundation. As was
previously noted, the Civil Code provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the Constitution, as well as legislation, form part of our legal system. Petitioners would
even find support in the well-known dictum of Bishop Hoadley:

"Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he

who is truly the law-giver to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first
thought or spoke them." It is to be admitted that constitutional law scholars, notably
Frankfurter, 42 Powell, 43 and Thayer, 44 in discussing judicial review as well as the
jurist John Chipman Gray, were much impressed with the truth and the soundness of
the above observations. We do not have to go that far though. Enough for present
purposes that both the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code allow, if they do not call
for, a retroactive application.

It being undeniable that if the Hernandez ruling were to be given a retroactive effect
petitioners had served the full term for which they could have been legally committed,
is habeas corpus the appropriate remedy? The answer cannot be in doubt. As far back
as 1910 the prevailing doctrine was announced in Cruz v. Director of Prisons. 45Thus:
"The courts uniformly hold that where a sentence imposes punishment in excess of the
power of the court to impose, such sentence is void as to the excess, and some of the
courts hold that the sentence is void in toto; but the weight of authority sustains the
proposition that such a sentence is void only as to the excess imposed in case the parts
are separable, the rule being that the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on a
writ of habeas corpus unless he has served out so much of the sentence as was
valid." 46 There is a reiteration of such a principle in Director v. Director of
Prisons 47 where it was explicitly announced by this Court "that the only means of
giving retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the accused ... is the writ
of habeas corpus." 48 While the above decision speaks of a trial judge losing jurisdiction
over the case, insofar as the remedy of habeas corpus is concerned, the emphatic
affirmation that it is the only means of benefiting the accused by the retroactive
character of a favorable decision holds true. Petitioners clearly have thus successfully
sustained the burden of justifying their release.

WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is granted, and it is ordered that
petitioners be forthwith set at liberty.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 100210 April 1, 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, as Judge, RTC of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch
148 and ANTONIO A. TUJAN, respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
Is the Court of Appeals, in affirming the order of the Regional Trial Court, correct in
ruling that Subversion is the "main offense" in a charge of Illegal Possession of Firearm
and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion under P.D. No. 1866, as amended, and
that, therefore, the said charge should be quashed in view of a previous charge
of Subversion under R.A. No. 1700, as amended by P.D. No. 885, against the same
accused pending in another court?
Stated differently, is the accused charged with the same offense in both cases, which
would justify the dismissal of the second charge on the ground of double jeopardy?
This is the pith issue presented before us in this appeal by certiorari interposed by the
People under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeking a review of the decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals (Sixteenth Division) dated May 27, 1991, in CA-G.R. SP No. 24273,
entitled "THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, versus HON. OSCAR B.
PIMENTEL, as Judge, RTC of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 148 and ANTONIO A.
TUJAN, Respondents."
The record discloses the following antecedent facts:
As early as 1983, private respondent Antonio Tujan was charged with Subversion under
Republic Act No. 1700 (the Anti-Subversion Law), as amended, before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila (Branch 45), National Capital Region, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 64079.2 As a consequence thereof, a warrant for his arrest was issued on July 29,
1983,3 but it remained unserved as he could not be found.
Almost seven (7) years thereafter, or on June 5, 1990, Antonio Tujan was arrested on
the basis of the warrant of arrest in the subversion case.4 When arrested, an unlicensed
.38 caliber special revolver and six (6) rounds of live ammunition were found in his
possession.5
Consequently, on June 14, 1990, Antonio Tujan was charged with Illegal Possession of
Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion under Presidential Decree No.
1866, as amended, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 148), docketed
as Criminal Case No. 1789. The Information reads:
That on or about the 5th day of June, 1990, in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being a member of a communist party of the Philippines, and its front
organization, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, control and custody, in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with
the crime of subversion, a special edition ARMSCOR PHILS. caliber .38 special revolver
with Serial No. 1026387 and with six (6) live ammunitions, without first securing the
necessary license or permit thereof from competent government authority.6
The above Information recommended no bail for Antonio Tujan, which
recommendation was approved by the trial court in an Order dated June 19, 1990.7 The
same order also directed the continued detention of Antonio Tujan at MIG 15 of the
Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), Bago Bantay,
Quezon City, while his case is pending.
On June 26, 1990, Antonio Tujan, through counsel, filed a motion8 invoking his right
to a preliminary investigation pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Court and praying that his arraignment be held in abeyance until the preliminary
investigation is terminated.
However, on June 27, 1990, during the hearing of Antonio Tujan's motion for
preliminary investigation, his counsel withdrew the motion since he would file a motion
to quash the Information, for which reason counsel requested a period of twenty (20)
days to do so. This was granted by the trial court on that same day.9
On July 16, 1990, Antonio Tujan did file the motion to quash10 the Information in
Criminal Case No. 1789 on the ground that he "has been previously in jeopardy of
being convicted of the offense charged" in Criminal Case No. 64079 (for subversion) of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 45). The said ground is based on Sections 3
(h) and 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. In support of the motion,
Antonio Tujan contends that "common crimes such as illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition should actually be deemed absorbed in subversion,"11 citing the cases
of Misolas vs. Panga, et al. (G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 648)
and Enrile vs. Salazar, et al. (G.R. No. 92163, June 5, 1990, 186 SCRA 217). Antonio
Tujan then avers that "the present case is the twin prosecution" of "the earlier
subversion case" and, therefore, he "is entitled to invoke the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy."12
The petitioner opposed13 the motion to quash, arguing that Antonio Tujan does not
stand in jeopardy of being convicted a second time because: (a) he has not even been
arraigned in the subversion case, and (b) the offense charged against him in Criminal
Case No. 64079 is for Subversion, punishable under Republic Act No. 1700; while the
present case is for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of
Subversion, punishable under a different law (Presidential Decree No. 1866). Moreover,
petitioner contends that Antonio Tujan's reliance on the Misolas and Enrile cases "is
misplaced."14 Tujan merely relies on the dissenting opinions in the Misolas case. Also,
the Enrile case which involved a complex crime of rebellion with murder is inapplicable
to the instant case which is not a complex offense. Thus, the "absorption rule" as held
applicable in the Enrile ruling "has no room for application in the present case because
(illegal) possession of firearm and ammunition is not a necessary means of committing
the offense of subversion, nor is subversion a necessary means of committing the crime
of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition."15
The trial court, in an order dated October 12, 1990, granted the motion to quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 1789, the dispositive portion of the order reading:
WHEREFORE, the motion to quash the information is hereby GRANTED, but only in so
far as the accused may be placed in jeopardy or in danger of being convicted or
acquitted of the crime of Subversion and as a consequence the Information is hereby
quashed and the case dismissed without prejudice to the filing of Illegal Possession of
Firearm.
SO ORDERED.16
It is best to quote the disquisition of the respondent court in quashing the information
and dismissing the case:
xxx xxx xxx
In other words, the main offense the accused is being charged in this case is also
Subversion considering that the alleged Illegal Possession of the Firearm and
Ammunition is only in furtherance thereof.
Now, subversion being a continuing offense as has been previously held by the
Supreme Court, the fact that the accused has been previously charged of Subversion
before another court before the institution of this instant case is just a continuing
offense of his former charge or that his acts constituting subversion is a continuation
of the acts he committed before.
The court therefore cannot subscribe to the position taken by the prosecution that this
case is very different from the other case and that double jeopardy will attach in this
particular case.
This court agrees with the position taken by the defense that double jeopardy will
attach to the accusation of subversion, punishable now under Republic Act 1700, as
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court particularly Section 1 thereof, provides:
Time to move to quash — At anytime before entering his plea, the accused may move
to quash the complaint or information.(la)
In other words, there is no necessity that the accused should be arraigned first before
he can move to quash the information. It is before he pleads which the accused did in
this case.
On the other submissions by the prosecution, that the possession of firearms and
ammunitions is not a necessary means of committing the offense of subversion or vice
versa, then if the court follows such argument, there could be no offense of Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in furtherance of Subversion, for even the
prosecution admits also that in subversion which is an offense involving propaganda,
counter propaganda, a battle of the hearts and mind of the people does not need the
possession or use of firearms and ammunitions.
The prosecution even admits and to quote:
The defense of double jeopardy. while unquestionably available to the accused, had
not been clearly shown to be invokable(sic) at this point in time.
But the rule says otherwise as previously stated as provided for under Section 1 of Rule
117 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, if ever the accused is caught in possession of a firearm and ammunition which is
separate and distinct from the crime of subversion and is not a necessary ingredient
thereof and the court believed so, the prosecution will have to file another information
as they may wish. The court therefore has to grant the motion to quash on the
aforestated grounds, subject to Section 5 of Rule 117, considering that the only offense
to which the accused in this case may be placed in jeopardy is Subversion and not
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions.
The prosecution may file any information as warranted within ten (10) days from
receipt of this order otherwise the court will order the release of the accused, unless
he is in custody for some other offense.17(Emphasis ours)
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration18 was also denied in an order dated December
28, 1990.19
The petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a petition
for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 24273. However, the appellate court found
that the trial court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in quashing the questioned Information. In dismissing the
petition, the appellate court, in its decision dated May 27, 1991, basically reiterated the
aforequoted ruling of the trial court.
Petitioner now comes to this Court, claiming that: (1) the decision of the Court of
Appeals is not in accord with the law and applicable jurisprudence; and (2) it was
deprived of due process to prosecute and prove its case against private respondent
Antonio Tujan in Criminal Case No. 1789.
We agree with the petitioner.
The Court of Appeals considered as duplicitous the Information for violation of P.D. No.
1866 filed against private respondent Antonio Tujan. It ruled:
The foregoing information (for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in
Furtherance of Subversion) filed before the Makati court shows that the main case is
subversion considering that there is an allegation that the alleged illegal possession of
firearms was made "in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
subversion." Also, the information alleged likewise that the accused is a member of a
communist party of the Philippines and its front organization. Basically, the information
refers to the crime of Subversion qualified by Illegal Possession of Firearms. . . .20
The ruling of the Court of Appeals is erroneous.
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, under which Antonio Tujan is charged in
Criminal Case No. 1789 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 148), provides
as follows:
Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sales, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms
or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of
Firearms or Ammunition. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or posses any firearms, part of
firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in
the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearms, the penalty
of death shall be imposed.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with
the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the penalty of death shall be
imposed.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of
any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or
knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity
to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the
preceding paragraphs.
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any
licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor. (Emphasis ours)
The above-quoted provisions of P.D. No. 1866 are plain and simple. Under the first
paragraph of Section 1, the mere possession of an unlicensed firearm or ammunition
is the crime itself which carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua. The third paragraph of the same Section makes the use of said
firearm and ammunition "in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the
crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion" a circumstance
to increase the penalty to death. Thus, the allegation in the Information in Criminal
Case No. 1789 that the unlicensed firearm found in the possession of Antonio Tujan,
"a member of the communist party of the Philippines and its front organization," was
used "in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
subversion" does not charge him with the separate and distinct crime of Subversion in
the same Information, but simply describes the mode or manner by which the violation
of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 was committed21 so as to qualify the penalty to death.
There is, therefore, only one offense charged in the questioned information, that is, the
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, qualified by its being used in furtherance
of subversion.22 There is nothing in P.D. No. 1866, specifically Section 1 thereof, which
decrees categorically or by implication that the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or
subversion are the very acts that are being penalized. This is clear from the title of the
law itself which boldly indicates the specific acts penalized under it:
CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE,
DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR
EXPLOSIVES OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS,
AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN
VIOLATIONS THEREOFAND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES. (Emphasis ours)
On the other hand, the previous subversion charge against Antonio Tujan in Criminal
Case No. 64079, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 45), is based on a
different law, that is, Republic Act No. 1700, as amended. Section 3 thereof penalizes
any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt act affiliates with, becomes or
remains a member of a subversive association or organization . . ." Section 4 of said
law further penalizes "such member [of the Communist Party of the Philippines and/or
its successor or of any subversive association] (who) takes up arms against the
Government." Thus, in the present case, private respondent Antonio Tujan could be
charged either under P.D. No. 1866 or R.A. No. 1700,23 or both.
This leads us to the issue of whether or not private respondent Antonio Tujan was
placed in double jeopardy with the filing of the second Information for Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion.
We rule in the negative.
Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. (Emphasis ours)
Complementing the above constitutional provision, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Court states:
Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint
or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal
of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for
the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or
for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
xxx xxx xxx
The right of an accused against double jeopardy is a matter which he may raise in a
motion to quash to defeat a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The
pertinent provision of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on
any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted,
or acquitted of the offense charged. (2a) (Emphasis ours)
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure to the benefit of an
accused, the following requisites must have obtained in the first criminal action: (a) a
valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded
to the charge;24 and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.25
Suffice it to say that in the present case, private respondent's motion to quash filed in
the trial court did not actually raise the issue of double jeopardy simply because it had
not arisen yet. It is noteworthy that the private respondent has not even been arraigned
in the first criminal action for subversion. Besides, as earlier discussed, the two criminal
charges against private respondent are not of the same offense as required by Section
21, Article III of the Constitution.
It is clear from the foregoing, that the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is not
in accordance with the law and jurisprudence and thus should be reversed.
While we hold that both the subversion charge under R.A. No. 1700, as amended, and
the one for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in furtherance of subversion
under P.D. No. 1866, as amended, can co-exist, the subsequent enactment of Republic
Act No. 7636 on September 22, 1992, totally repealing R.A. No. 1700, as amended,
has substantially changed the complexion of the present case, inasmuch as the said
repealing law being favorable to the accused-private respondent, who is not a habitual
delinquent, should be given retroactive effect.26
Although this legal effect of R.A. No. 7636 on private-respondent's case has never been
raised as an issue by the parties — obviously because the said law came out only
several months after the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated
and while the present petition is pending with this Court — we should nonetheless fulfill
our duty as a court of justice by applying the law to whomsoever is benefited by it
regardless of whether or not the accused or any party has sought the application of
the beneficent provisions of the repealing law.27
That R.A. No. 7636 should apply retroactively to accused-private respondent is beyond
question. The repeal by said law of R.A. No. 1700, as amended, was categorical,
definite and absolute. There was no saving clause in the repeal. The legislative intent
of totally abrogating the old anti-subversion law is clear. Thus, it would be illogical for
the trial courts to try and sentence the accused-private respondent for an offense that
no longer exists.28
As early as 1935, we ruled in People vs. Tamayo:29
There is no question that at common law and in America a much more favorable
attitude towards the accused exists relative to statutes that have been repealed than
has been adopted here. Our rule is more in conformity with the Spanish doctrine, but
even in Spain, where the offense ceases to be criminal, prosecution cannot be had. (1
Pacheco Commentaries, 296) (Emphasis ours)
Where, as here, the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the act with was
penalized by a prior law ceases to be criminal under the new law, the previous offense
is obliterated.30 It is a recognized rule in this jurisdiction that a total repeal deprives
the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons charged with violation of
the old law prior to the repeal.31
With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of subversion against the accused-
private respondent has no more legal basis and should be dismissed.
As regards the other charge of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, qualified
by subversion, this charge should be amended to simple illegal possession of firearm
and ammunition since, as earlier discussed, subversion is no longer a crime.
Moreover, the offense of simple illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is now
bailable under Republic Act No. 8294 which was enacted on June 6, 1997. R.A. No.
8294 has amended Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, by eliminating the
provision in said P.D. that if the unlicensed firearm is used in furtherance of subversion,
the penalty of death shall he imposed.32 Under the new law (R.A. No. 8294), the
penalty prescribed for simple illegal possession of firearm (.38 caliber) is now reduced
to prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen
thousand pesos (P15,000.00).33 The reduced penalty of imprisonment — which is four
(4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years — entitles the accused-
private respondent to bail. Considering, however, that the accused-private respondent
has been detained since his arrest on June 5, 1990 up to the present (as far as our
record has shown), or more than seven (7) years now, his immediate release is in
order. This is so because even if he were convicted for illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition, the length of his detention while his case is pending has already exceeded
the penalty prescribed by the new law.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 27, 1991, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 24273, including the orders dated October 12, 1990 and December 28,
1990 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 148), National Capital Region, in
Criminal Case No. 1789, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The subversion charge against accused-private respondent Antonio A. Tujan in Criminal

Case No. 64079 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 45, is hereby DISMISSED.

The other Information for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in furtherance
of subversion against the same accused in Criminal Case No. 1789 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 148, is DEEMED AMENDED to Simple Illegal Possession of
Firearm and Ammunition. The accused-appellant is hereby ordered RELEASED
IMMEDIATELY from detention for the reason stated above, unless he is being detained
for any other offense.

This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2873 February 28, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUGENIO GARCIA Y MADRIGAL, defendant-appellant.
Dominador A. Alafriz for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Rafael P. Cañiza for
appellee.
TUASON, J.:
The sole question presented on this appeal is whether the appellant, being 17 years of
age at the time of at the time of the commission of the crime, was entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of article 68, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal
Code. The lower court, ignoring defendant's minority, sentenced him to an
indeterminate penalty of from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional to 8
years of prision mayor for the crime of robbery of which he was found guilty. He was
also sentenced to pay the offended party, jointly and severally with the other accused,
the sum of P85 as indemnity.
Republic Act No. 47, which amended article 80 of the Revised Penal Code by reducing
from 18 to 16 the age below which accused have to "be committed to the custody or
care of a public or private, benevolent or charitable institution," instead of being
convicted and sentenced to prison, has given rise to the controversy. The Solicitor
General believes that the amendment by implication has also amended paragraph 2 of
article 68 of the Revised Pena Code, which provides that when the offender is over
fifteen and under eighteen years age, "The penalty next lower than that prescribed by
law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period."
There are well recognized rules of statutory construction which are against the
Government's contention.
One of these rules is that all parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so
that effect may be given to each and every part thereof, and that conflicting intention
in the same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded, unless forced upon the
court by an unambiguous language. (59 C. J., 999.)
This rule applies in the construction of a statute and its amendment, both being read
together as whole. "An amended act is ordinarily to be construed as if the original
statute has been repealed, and a new and independent act in the amended form had
been adopted in its stead; or, as frequently stated by the courts, so far as regards any
action after the adoption of the amendment, as if the statute had been originally
enacted in its amended form the amendment becomes a part of the original statute as
if it had always been contained therein, unless such amendment involves the
abrogation of contractual relations between the state and others. Where an
amendment leaves certain portions of the original act unchanged, such portions are
continued in force, with the same meaning and effect they had before the amendment.
So where an amendatory act provides that an existing statute shall be amended to
read as recited in the amendatory act, such portions of the existing law as are retained,
either literally or substantially, are regarded as a continuation of the existing law, and
not as a new enactment." (59 C. J., 1096, 1097.)
We find no irreconcilable conflict between article 68, paragraph 2, as it nowstands and
article 80 as amended. There is no incompatibility between granting accused of the
ages of 15 to 18 a privileged mitigating circumstance and fixing at 16 the maximum
age of persons who are to be placed in a reformatory institution. In other words, there
is no inconsistency between sending defendants of certain ages to prison and giving
them a penalty lower than the imposable one on adults under the same or similar
circumstances. Let it be remember that the privilege of article 68, supra, is not by its
nature inherent in age but purely statutory and conventional, and that this privilege is
granted adult offenders under given conditions.
At least there is no clear intention on the part of the Congress to amend article 68.
Indeed the rational presumption is that if there had been such an intention the
lawmakers should have said so expressly, instead of leaving the change to inference.
One other rule of interpretation that quarrels with the theory of implied repeal or
amendment is that penal law is to be construed, in case of doubt, strictly against the
state. "Criminal and penal statutes must be strictly construed, that is, they cannot be
enlarged or extended by intendment, implication, or by any equitable considerations.
In other words, the language cannot be enlarged beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms in order to carry into effect the general purpose for which the statute was
enacted. Only those persons, offenses, and penalties, clearly included, beyond any
reasonable doubt, will be considered within the statute's operation. They must come
clearly within both the spirit and the letter of the statute, and where there is any
reasonable doubt, it must be resolved in favor of the person accused of violating the
statute; that is, all questions in doubt will be resolved in favor of those from whom the
penalty is sought." (Statutory Construction, Crawford, pp. 460-462.)
The offense charged in the information of which the appellant was found guilty is
punishable under article 294, case No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
section 6 of Republic Act No. 18, with prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its medium period. The penalty one degree lower than this is arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. There being
no modifying circumstance, the appropriate penalty in the present case is from 6
months and 1 day of arresto mayor to 2 years and 4 months ofprision
correccional. Being entitled to an indeterminate penalty as provided in section 1 of Act
No. L-4103 as amended, the accused should be, and he is hereby sentenced to
imprisonment of not less than 4 months of arresto mayor and not more than 2 years
and 4 months of prision correccional. In all other respect the appealed judgment is
affirmed. The appellant will pay the costs of this appeal.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres,
JJ., concur.
RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
April 12, 1950
TUASON, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of our decision.
The main theme of the Solicitor General's argument is that articles 13 (2) and 68 (2)
of the Revised Penal code "complement each other;" that "the application of article 68
takes place only when the court has to render judgment and impose a penalty upon a
minor who has been proceeded against in accordance with article 80 and who had
misbehaved or is found incorrigible," and that "article 80 must be applied first before
article 68 can come into operation, and the court can not apply the latter article in total
disregard of the former." In short, as we infer from this line of reasoning, what article
80 does not touch, article 68 can not touch.
We do not think the premise and conclusion of the motion are correct. There seems to
be a confusion of ideas.
It may do us well to make brief review of the legislation, past and present, relative to
juvenile offenders and dissect and analyze its various provisions and the differences
between them and the role assigned to each. .
Article 68 of the Revised Penal code provides:.
Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age . — When the
offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the
provisions of the paragraph next to the last of article 80 of this Code, the following
rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from
liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a
discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than
that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of the penalty next lower than
that prescribed by law shall be imposed but always in the proper period.
Sub-paragraph 1 and 2 of the foregoing article are a reproduction of article 85 of the
Spanish Penal Code.
Into the Revised Penal Code, the Juvenile Delinquency Act was incorporated. It has
become in the new code article 80, the first paragraph of which provides that
"whenever a minor under 18 years of age, of either sex, be accused of a crime, the
court . . . shall commit such minor to the custody or care of a public or private,
benevolent or charitable, institution, etc." And in the paragraph immediately preceding
the last, it is further provided that "In case the minor fails to behave properly or to
comply with the regulation of the institution to which he has been committed, or with
the conditions imposed upon him when he was committed to the care of a responsible
person, or in case he should be found incorrigible or his continued stay in such
institution should be inadvisable, he shall be returned to the court in order that the
same may render the judgment corresponding to the crime committed by him."
The latest legislation on the subject was Republic Act No. 47, which amended article
80 of the Revised Penal Code so as to reduce to below 16 the age of minors coming
within its purview.
A close examination of articles 68 and 80 will disclose that article 68, according to its
main paragraph, is to lay off and watch while the minor is in the hands of a charitable
institution or person mentioned in article 80 trying to reform him or her. This has to be
so because article 68 is a rule for the application of penalties, and there is no penalty
when there is no judgment when the delinquent is in Welfareville or other place of
similar character or entrusted to the care of a private person. However, if and when
the minor turns out to be hopeless or incorrigible, he is returned to the proper court
and the court passes sentence on him or her. In other words, article 80 withdraws, as
it were, and sub-paragraph 1 and 2, as the case maybe, of article 68 takes control.
From this it will be seen that article 68 is not dependent on article 80, nor do these
articles complement each other if by complement is meant that they are two mutually
completing parts so that article 68 could not stand without article 80. It is more
appropriate to say that article 68 merely adjusts itself to article 80 but is, in all other
respects, self-sufficient and independent of the latter. Parts of one system of penology
and working in coordination with each other, they pursue different ends. It is to be
noticed that article 68 falls under section 2 of Chapter IV entitled "Application of
Penalties," while article 80 comes under section 1 of Chapter V entitled "Execution and
Service of Penalties." Two different subjects, these.
It will also be seen that article 68, sub-paragraphs 1 and 2, and article 80 of the Revised
Penal Code do not function at the same time and are designed for different purposes.
Each has its assigned, separate sphere of action without in any way intermingling with
the other. When article 80 operates, article 68 keeps out of the way; article 68 steps
in when article 80 steps out.
While a minor is in the process of being reformed he is, in a manner of speaking, in an
intermediate or indeterminate state, neither in prison nor free. Through repentance
and by observing good conduct, he is rewarded with freedom, released upon reaching
the age of majority or before, but if he shows no promise of turning a new leaf, Bilibid
claims him.
It is the minors so situated; it is selection of two should be committed to are formatory
school or to the custody of a private person with which article 80 has to do, and no
more. Article 80 does not concern itself with what should be done with minors when
they are consigned to jail because of misbehavior; much less is it concerned over
minors who, after the passage of Republic Act No. 47, are condemned to prison without
having been under the custody of a benevolent institution or private person like youths
between 16 and 18. On the other hand, article 68 is intended for minors who are sent
to jail, a matter foreign to the province of article 80.
To press the argument further, article 85 of the original Penal Code conferred upon
minors under 18 the right to a penalty. Then came the Juvenile Delinquency Act giving
additional concession to juvenile delinquents. When, later, Republic Act No. 47
amended article 80 so as to eliminate from its beneficent provisions minor of the age
of 16 or over and under 18, the logical effect of the amendment can no other than to
correspondingly reduce the age of minors regarding whom the suspensory inhibition
on article 68 is to be confined. Only to the extent and within the limits that article 80
applies is article 68 bound to defer to that article. Where article 80 does not apply
article 68 is supreme. When article 80 says that it will deal only with minors below 16,
it relinquishes authority over minors above that age in favor of article 68. When and if
article 80 should by amendment further reduce the age to 15, to that extent the
operation of article 68 will be correspondingly enlarged.
In fact, if Republic Act No. 47, instead of limiting the operation of article 80 to minors
under 16, had totally abolished the scheme of juvenile reformation, sub-paragraphs 1
and 2 of article 68 of the Revised Penal Code would, in our opinion, remain intact, with
the only difference that, as before, they would have full sway, unhampered by any
consideration of suspended judgment. The predecessor of article 68 was in the original
Penal Code since that code was put in force in Spain in 1870 and in the Philippines in
1884, long before the idea embodied in article 80 was conceived. Before the Revised
Penal Code went into effect, article 85 of the old Penal Code and the Juvenile
Delinquency Act worked in the manner herein set forth although there was not any
express provision coordinating their operation. It can safely be said that the main
paragraph of article 68 was inserted merely to explain in clear and express terms when
it should stand aloof and when it should play its role. The Revised Penal Code merely
states the obvious as befits a scientific system of law.
In conclusion, when Republic Act No. 47 amended article 80 of the Revised Penal Code
by reducing the age of persons who may be placed on probation under that article, the
amendment did not change in any form or manner the degree of punishment that
should be meted out to those who are to be committed to jail or how they are to
treated. After the minor is turned over to the court for sentence, article 80 ceases to
have any interest in him or her. In saying that the 16-and 18-year old should no longer
be given a trial or placed on probation in a reformatory institution but should go straight
to prison upon conviction, Republic Act No. 47 does not, by implication or otherwise,
connote that such minors should also be deprived of a reduced penalty. In no standard
of statutory construction is there support for the proposition that the mitigating
circumstance which minors between 16 and 18 enjoyed before Republic Act No. 47
came into being, notwithstanding the fact that they had shown evidence of
incorrigibility, should be denied them now for no other reason than that the right to be
committed to a reformatory school has been taken away from them; now that they are
confined in jail without having committed any fault other than the crime for which they
were prosecuted in the first instance.
Let it be remembered that by virtue of the amendment minors between 16 and 18 do
not now come under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of article 80.
Of course, the effect of a law amendment would different if the amendatory law had
absorbed the law which it had amended. In that case, the original law become part
and parcel of the new law, with the result that if the amendatory law be later repealed,
both that law and the law which it had superseded or amended would be considered
abrogated. There was no law of its own force could survive. But, as we have indicated,
article 68 as well as its predecessor is an independent provision and has not been
merged with article 80 or any other article of the Revised Penal code. It is an
independent provision inoperative only during the suspension of the sentence but
possessing all the vigor which article 85 of Spanish Code had, when the minors are
sentenced to jail.
In the decision sought to be reconsidered, we emphasize the rule of statutory
construction to the effect that all parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled
so that effect may be given to each and every part thereof, and that conflicting
intentions in the same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded, unless forced
upon the court by an unambiguous language. (59 C. J., 999.) The motion for
reconsideration has not pointed to any conflict, and we can not find any, between the
retention of the privileged or special mitigating circumstance in favor of minors below
18 and over 16 and the fact that such minors are not entitled to the benefits of article
80 under any circumstances. The motion for reconsideration is conspicuous for its
silence on any incongruity or absurdity that might result from our ruling on the scope
and extent of Republic Act No. 47.
The sole consideration that might commend itself in favor of the Government's position
is the general welfare. For the good of society it may have been better if Republic Act
No. 47 had amended articles 13 and 68 also by correspondingly reducing the age of
accused minors entitled to a mitigating circumstance by reason of age. But it is write
to say that we are not authorized to insert into a law what we think should be in it or
to supply what we think the legislature would have supplied if its attention had been
called to the omission. This is specially true in penal legislation which, as we have
repeatedly stressed in our decision, has to be construed strictly. But there is not even
room for construction in this case. The preamble or explanatory note to Republic Act
No. 47 can not be used as basis for giving it an meaning not apparent on its face. A
preamble or explanatory not is resorted to only for clarification in cases of doubt. There
is no ambiguity in Republic Act No. 47.
The motion and the request to set it for oral argument are denied.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-38725 October 31, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO MANABA, defendant-appellant.
Jose Ma. Cavanna for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of Judge Eulalio Garcia in this Court of First Instance
of Oriental Negros in criminal case No. 1827 dated November 15, 1932, finding the
defendant guilty of rape and sentencing him to suffer seventeen years and four months
of reclusion temporal, and the accessory penalties of the law, to indemnify the offended
party, Celestina Adapon, in the amount of P500, to maintain the offspring, if any, at P5
a month until said offspring should become of age, and to pay the costs.
The defendant appealed to this court, and his attorney de oficio now makes the
following assignments of error:
1. El juzgado a quo erro al no estimar en favor del acusado apelante la defensa
de double jeopardy o legal jeopardy que ha interpuesto.
2. El Juzgado a quo erro al no declarar insuficientes las pruebas de identificacion del
acusado apelante.
3. El Juzgado a quo tambien erro al pasar por alto las incoherencias de los testigos de
la acusacion y al no declarar que no se ha establecido fuera de toda duda la
responsabilidad del apelante.
4. El Juzgado a quo erro al condenar al acusado apelante por el delito de violacion y al
no acceder a su mocion de nueva vista.
It appears that on May 10, 1932, the chief of police of Dumaguete subscribed and
swore to a criminal complaint wherein he charged Pedro Manaba with the crime of
rape, committed on the person of Celestina Adapon. This complaint was filed with the
justice of the peace of Dumaguete on June 1, 1932 and in due course the case reached
the Court of First Instance. The accused was tried and convicted, but on motion of the
attorney for the defendant the judgment was set aside and the case dismissed on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or the
subject matter of the action, because the complaint had not been filed by the offended
party, but by the chief of police (criminal case No. 1801).
On August 17, 1932, the offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging
the defendant with the crime of rape. This complaint was filed in the Court of First
Instance (criminal case No. 1872), but was referred to the justice of the peace of
Dumaguete for preliminary investigation. The defendant waived his right to the
preliminary investigation, but asked for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that he had previously been placed in jeopardy for the same offense. This motion was
denied by the justice of the peace, and the case was remanded to the Court of First
Instance, where the provincial fiscal in an information charged the defendant with
having committed the crime of rape as follows:1awphil.net
Que en o hacia la noche del dia 9 de mayo de 1932, en el Municipio de Dumaguete,
Provincia de Negros Oriental, Islas Filipinas, y dentro de la jurisdiccion de este Juzgado.
el referido acusado Pedro Manaba, aprovechandose de la oscuridad de la noche y
mediante fuerza, violencia e intimidacion, voluntaria, ilegal y criminalmente yacio y
tuvo acceso carnal con una niña llamada Celestina Adapon, contra la voluntad de esta.
El acusado Pedro Manaba ya ha sido convicto por Juzgado competente y en sentencia
firme por este mismo delito de violacion.
Hecho cometido con infraccion de la ley.
The defendant renewed his motion for dismissal in the case on the ground of double
jeopardy, but his motion was denied; and upon the termination of the trial the
defendant was found guilty and sentenced as hereinabove stated.
Whether the defendant was placed in jeopardy for the second time or not when he was
tried in the present case depends on whether or not he was tried on a valid complaint
in the first case. The offense in question was committed on May 9, 1932, or subsequent
to the date when the Revised Penal Code became effective.
The third paragraph of the article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, which relates to the
prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness reads as follows:
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly
pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be.
The Spanish text of this paragraph is as follows:
Tampoco puede procederse por causa de estupro, rapto, violacion o abusos
deshonestos, sino en virtud de denuncia de la parte agraviada, o de sus padres, o
abuelos o tutor, ni despues de haberse otorgado al ofensor, perdon expreso por dicha
partes, segun los casos.
It will be observed that the Spanish equivalent of the word "filed" is not found in the
Spanish text, which is controlling, as it was the Spanish text of the Revised Penal Code
that was approved by the Legislature.
The first complaint filed against the defendant was signed and sworn to by the chief of
police of Dumaguete. As it was not the complaint of the offended party, it was not a
valid complaint in accordance with the law. The judgment of the court was therefore
void for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, and the defendant was never in
jeopardy.

It might be observed in this connection that the judgment was set aside and the case
dismissed on the motion of defendant's attorney, who subsequently set up the plea of
double jeopardy in the present case.

The other assignments of error relate to the sufficiency of the evidence, which in our
opinion fully sustains the findings of the trial judge.

The recommendation of the Solicitor-General is erroneous in several respects, chiefly

due to the fact that it is based on the decision of July 30, 1932 that was set aside, and
not on the decision now under consideration. The accused should not be ordered to
acknowledge the offspring, if should there be any, because the record shows that the
accused is a married man.

It appears that the lower court should have taken into consideration the aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity. The defendant is therefore sentenced to suffer seventeen
years, four months, and one day of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the offended
party, Celestina Adapon, in the sum of P500, and to support the offspring, if any. As
thus modified, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of both instances
against the appellant.

Street, Abad Santos, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 138962 October 4, 2002
PRESCILLA TUATES and ANDRES DE LA PAZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN, as Presiding Judge, Branch 96, RTC Quezon City,
People of the Philippines and I.C. Construction, Inc., respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to annul the following: (1) Decision dated April 30, 1999 and Resolution dated
June 9, 1999, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46845;1 (2) Decision
dated September 10, 1997 and the Order dated January 28, 1998 issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 96) in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-97-70428
and Q-97-70429;2 and (3) Decision dated December 16, 1996 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City (Branch 38) in Criminal Cases Nos. 38-0130 and 38-0131.3
The facts are as follows:
Convicted by the MTC-Quezon City (Branch 38) of the crime of Violation of Presidential
Decree No. 772 or the Anti-Squatting Law, petitioners Prescilla Tuates and Andres de
la Paz, appealed to the RTC of Quezon City (Branch 96). Their conviction was affirmed
in toto by the RTC in its decision dated September 10, 1997. Pending resolution of their
motion for reconsideration, however, Republic Act No. 8368, "An Act Repealing
Presidential Decree No. 772, entitled ‘Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar Acts’" was
enacted.
In its Order, dated January 28, 1998, the RTC ruled that only petitioners’ criminal
convictions were extinguished by R.A. 8368, and the civil aspect, i.e., the removal of
petitioners’ illegally constructed house and improvements, shall remain executory
against them.4
On a petition for review, the Court of Appeals sustained the ruling of the RTC and
denied due course to the petition per its Decision, dated April 30, 1999.5 Petitioners’
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA in its Resolution dated June
9, 1999.6
Hence, the present recourse taken by petitioners, raising the following issues:
"1. That petitioners, being charged with Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, the
express repeal of said decree absolves the petitioners of any criminal or civil liability;
"2. That public respondent erred in holding that ‘the civil aspect of the judgment
rendered x x x shall be executory against the accused; and
"3. That the Honorable Court of Appeals, in affirming the Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (Branch 96), dated June 9, 1999, grossly erred in ignoring
applicable laws and jurisprudence."7
Petitioners argue that the repeal of P.D. 772 by R.A. 8368 carries with it the extinction
of both the criminal and civil aspects of the crime. Private respondent, however, insists
that public respondents were correct in ruling that only the criminal liability was
absolved and the civil liability remains inasmuch as it was not extinguished in
accordance with Article 113 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
"ART. 113. Obligation to satisfy civil liability. -- Except in case of extinction of his civil
liability as provided in the next preceding article, the offender shall continue to be
obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime committed by him,
notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of
liberty or other rights, or has not been required to serve the same by reason of
amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence or any other reason."
In its Motion to Deny Due Course, private respondent also argues that the petition
should now be denied as its title to the land subject of this case has already been
adjudged in its favor. 8
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondents,
agrees with petitioners that both the criminal and civil liability were rendered extinct
with the repeal of P.D. 772, and recommended that the assailed issuances be reversed
and set aside.
We find the petition to be meritorious.
Republic Act No. 8368, otherwise known as the "Anti-Squatting Law Repeal Act of
1997," provides:
"SECTION 1. Title. -- This Act shall be known as the ‘Anti-Squatting Law Repeal Act of
1997.’
"SEC. 2. Repeal. -- Presidential Decree No. 772, entitled ‘Penalizing Squatting and Other
Similar Acts’ is hereby repealed.
"SEC. 3. Effect on Pending Cases. -- All pending cases under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 772 shall be dismissed upon the effectivity of this Act.
"SEC. 4. Effect on Republic Act No. 7279. -- Nothing herein shall be construed to nullify,
eliminate or diminish in any way Section 27 of Republic Act No. 7279 or any of its
provisions relative to sanctions against professional squatters and squatting syndicates.
"SEC. 5. Effectivity. -- This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days after its publication in
two (2) newspapers of national circulation.
"Approved, October 27, 1997."9
The repeal of P.D. No. 772 under Section 2 of R.A. No. 8368 is explicit, categorical,
definite and absolute. As such, the act that was penalized by P.D. 772, i.e., squatting,
ceases to be criminal under R.A. 8368, and the previous offense is obliterated. 10
In the same vein, the absolute repeal of P.D. 772 has the effect of depriving a court of
its authority to punish a person charged with violation of the old law prior to its repeal.
This is because an unqualified repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act of
rendering legal what had been previously declared as illegal, such that the offense no
longer exists and it is as if the person who committed it never did so.11 Specially so, as
in the present case where it is unconditionally stated in Section 3 of R.A. No. 8368 that:
"(A)ll pending cases under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 772 shall be
dismissed upon the effectivity of this Act."12 Obviously, it was the clear intent of the
law to decriminalize or do away with the crime of squatting. Hence, there being no
criminal liability, there is likewise no civil liability because the latter is rooted in the
former. Where an act or omission is not a crime, no person can be held liable for such
act or omission. There being no delict, logically, civil liability ex delicto is out of the
question. 13
Considering that prosecution for criminal as well as civil liability under P.D. 772 has
been rendered nugatory with the passage of R.A. 8368, both criminal and civil aspects
of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-97-70428 and Q-97-70429 in the RTC as well as Criminal
Cases Nos. 38-0130 and 38-0131 in the MTC filed against petitioners should be
dismissed.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition for review to be with merit, the Decision dated April
30, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46845, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered modifying the Decision dated September 10,
1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 96) in Criminal Cases No. Q-
97-70428 and Q-97-70429 and the Decision dated December 16, 1996 issued by the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 38), to the effect that the dismissal of
the aforementioned criminal cases likewise include the dismissal of the civil aspects
thereof, without prejudice to the filing of civil and/or criminal actions under the
prevailing laws.
No costs.

In fact, in People v. Leachon, Jr.14 we implicitly recognized the unconditional repeal of SO ORDERED.
P.D. 772 by R.A. 8368 when we ordered the dismissal of the petition filed in said case, Bellosillo, Acting C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
without any qualification whatsoever, because of the enactment of R.A. 8368, viz.: Mendoza, J., on official leave.
"But the foregoing antecedent facts and proceedings notwithstanding, the petition
cannot now prosper because on October 27, 1997, Republic Act No. 8368, entitled ‘An
Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772 Entitled ‘Penalizing Squatting and Other
Similar Acts’ was "enacted. Section 3 of the said Act provides that ‘all pending cases
under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 772 shall be dismissed upon the
effectivity of this Act.’"15

This is not to say, however, that people now have the unbridled license to illegally
occupy lands they do not own. R.A. No. 836816 was unanimously approved by the
members of the Senate of the Philippines present on its third reading.17 The legislature
considered it a major piece of legislation on the country’s anti-poverty program18 as it
sought to confront the perennial problem of poverty at its root, abolish an otherwise
inutile and oppressive law, and pave the way for a genuine urban housing and land
reform program. Senate records reveal that it is the manifest intent of the authors of
R.A. 8368 to decriminalize squatting but does not encourage or protect acts of
squatting on somebody else’s land.19 The law is not intended to compromise the
property rights of legitimate landowners.20Recourse may be had in cases of violation
of their property rights, such as those provided for in Republic Act No. 7279 or the
Urban Development and Housing Act, penalizing professional squatters and squatting
syndicates as defined therein, who commit nefarious and illegal activities21; the Revised
Penal Code providing for criminal prosecution in cases of Trespass to
Property,22 Occupation of Real Property or Usurpation of Real Rights in Property,23 and
similar violations, and, cases for Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer under the Rules
of Court,24as well as civil liability for Damages under the Civil Code.
G.R. No. 125359 September 4, 2001
ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO and HECTOR T. RIVERA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GUILLERMO L. LOJA, SR., PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 26, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Assailed in this petition is the consolidated decision rendered on May 23, 1996, by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 and CA-G.R. SP No. 35719. CA-G.R. SP No.
35928 had affirmed the order dated September 6, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court,
Manila, Branch 26, insofar as it denied petitioners’ respective Motions to Quash the
Informations in twenty-five (25) criminal cases for violation of Central Bank Circular
No. 960. Therein included were informations involving: (a) consolidated Criminal Cases
Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883 filed against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Roberto S.
Benedicto, and Hector T. Rivera; (b) consolidated Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101884 to
91-101892 filed against Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto; and (c) Criminal Cases Nos. 92-
101959 to 92-101969 also against Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto. Note, however, that the
Court of Appeals already dismissed Criminal Case No. 91-101884.
The factual antecedents of the instant petition are as follows:
On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Messrs. Benedicto and Rivera were
indicted for violation of Section 10 of Circular No. 9601 relation to Section 342 of the
Central Bank Act (Republic Act No. 265, as amended) in five Informations filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-
101883, the charge sheets alleged that the trio failed to submit reports of their foreign
exchange earnings from abroad and/or failed to register with the Foreign Exchange
Department of the Central Bank within the period mandated by Circular No. 960. Said
Circular prohibited natural and juridical persons from maintaining foreign exchange
accounts abroad without prior authorization from the Central Bank.3 It also required all
residents of the Philippines who habitually earned or received foreign currencies from
invisibles, either locally or abroad, to report such earnings or receipts to the Central
Bank. Violations of the Circular were punishable as a criminal offense under Section 34
of the Central Bank Act.
That same day, nine additional Informations charging Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto with
the same offense, but involving different accounts, were filed with the Manila RTC,
which docketed these as Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101884 to 91-101892. The accusatory
portion of the charge sheet in Criminal Case No. 91-101888 reads:
That from September 1, 1983 up to 1987, both dates inclusive, and for sometime
thereafter, both accused, conspiring and confederating with each other and with the
late President Ferdinand E. Marcos, all residents of Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fail to submit reports in the prescribed form and/or register with the Foreign
Exchange Department of the Central Bank within 90 days from October 21, 1983 as
required of them being residents habitually/customarily earning, acquiring or receiving
foreign exchange from whatever source or from invisibles locally or from abroad,
despite the fact they actually earned interests regularly every six (6) months for the
first two years and then quarterly thereafter for their investment of $50-million, later
reduced to $25-million in December 1985, in Philippine-issued dollar denominated
treasury notes with floating rates and in bearer form, in the name of Bank Hofmann,
AG, Zuring, Switzerland, for the benefit of Avertina Foundation, their front organization
established for economic advancement purposes with secret foreign exchange account
Category (Rubric) C.A.R. No. 211925-02 in Swiss Credit Bank (also known as SKA) in
Zurich, Switzerland, which earned, acquired or received for the accused Imelda
Romualdez Marcos and her late husband an interest of $2,267,892 as of December 16,
1985 which was remitted to Bank Hofmann, AG, through Citibank, New York, United
States of America, for the credit of said Avertina account on December 19, 1985, aside
from the redemption of $25 million (one-half of the original $50-M) as of December 16,
1985 and outwardly remitted from the Philippines in the amounts of $7,495,297.49 and
$17,489,062.50 on December 18, 1985 for further investment outside the Philippine
without first complying with the Central Bank reporting/registering
requirements.1âwphi1.nêt
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The other charge sheets were similarly worded except the days of the commission of
the offenses, the name(s) of the alleged dummy or dummies, the amounts in the
foreign exchange accounts maintained, and the names of the foreign banks where such
accounts were held by the accused.
On January 3, 1992, eleven more Informations accusing Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto of
the same offense, again in relation to different accounts, were filed with the same
court, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969. The Informations
were similarly worded as the earlier indictments, save for the details as to the dates of
the violations of Circular No. 960, the identities of the dummies used, the balances and
sources of the earnings, and the names of the foreign banks where these accounts
were maintained.
All of the aforementioned criminal cases were consolidated before Branch 26 of the
said trial court.
On the same day that Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969 were filed, the
Central Bank issued Circular No. 13185 which revised the rules governing non-trade
foreign exchange transactions. It took effect on January 20, 1992.
On August 24, 1992, the Central Bank, pursuant to the government’s policy of further
liberalizing foreign exchange transactions, came out with Circular No. 1356,6 which
amended Circular No. 1318. Circular No. 1353 deleted the requirement of prior Central
Bank approval for foreign exchange-funded expenditures obtained from the banking
system.
Both of the aforementioned circulars, however, contained a saving clause, excepting
from their coverage pending criminal actions involving violations of Circular No. 960
and, in the case of Circular No. 1353, violations of both Circular No. 960 and Circular
No. 1318.
On September 19, 1993, the government allowed petitioners Benedicto and Rivera to
return to the Philippines, on condition that they face the various criminal charges
instituted against them, including the dollar-salting cases. Petitioners posted bail in the
latter cases.
On February 28, 1994, petitioners Benedicto and Rivera were arraigned. Both pleaded
not guilty to the charges of violating Central Bank Circular No. 960. Mrs. Marcos had
earlier entered a similar plea during her arraignment for the same offense on February
12, 1992.
On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved to quash all the Informations filed against them
in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883; 91-101884 to 91-101892, and 91-
101959 to 91-101969. Their motion was grounded on lack of jurisdiction, forum
shopping, extinction of criminal liability with the repeal of Circular No. 960, prescription,
exemption from the Central Bank’s reporting requirement, and the grant of absolute
immunity as a result of a compromise agreement entered into with the government.
On September 6, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners’ motion. A similar motion filed
on May 23, 1994 by Mrs. Marcos seeking to dismiss the dollar-salting cases against her
due to the repeal of Circular No. 960 had earlier been denied by the trial court in its
order dated June 9, 1994. Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
trial court likewise denied this motion on October 18, 1994.
On November 21, 1994, petitioners moved for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration. The trial court, in its order of November 23, 1994, denied petitioners’
motion and set the consolidated cases for trial on January 5, 1995.
Two separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition, with similar prayers for temporary
restraining orders and/or writs of preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
35719 and CA-G.R. SP No. 35928, were respectively filed by Mrs. Marcos and
petitioners with the Court of Appeals. Finding that both cases involved violations of
Central Bank Circular No. 960, the appellate court consolidated the two cases.
On May 23, 1996, the Court of Appeals disposed of the consolidated cases as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge in
denying petitioners’ respective Motions to Quash, except that with respect to Criminal
Case No. 91-101884, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
assailed September 6, 1994 Order, in so far as it denied the Motion to Quash Criminal
Case No. 91-101884 is hereby nullified and set aside, and said case is hereby dismissed.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.7
Dissatisfied with the said decision of the court a quo, except with respect to the portion
ordering the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 91-101884, petitioners filed the instant
petition, attributing the following errors to the appellate court:
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE INFORMATIONS/CASES FILED
AGAINST PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS ARE QUASHABLE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING
GROUNDS:
(A) LACK OF JURISDICTION/FORUM SHOPPING/NO VALID PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
(B) EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
1) REPEAL OF CB CIRCULAR NO. 960 BY CB CIRCULAR NO. 153;
2) REPEAL OF R.A. 265 BY R.A. 76538
(C) PRESCRIPTION
(D) EXEMPTION FROM CB REPORTING REQUIREMENT
GRANT OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY.9
Simply stated, the issues for our resolution are:
(1) Did the Court of Appeals err in denying the Motion to Quash for lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the trial court, forum shopping by the prosecution, and absence of a
valid preliminary investigation?
(2) Did the repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Republic Act No. 265 by Circular
No. 1353 and Republic Act No. 7653 respectively, extinguish the criminal liability of
petitioners?
(3) Had the criminal cases in violation of Circular No. 960 already prescribed?
(4) Were petitioners exempted from the application and coverage of Circular No. 960?
(5) Were petitioners’ alleged violations of Circular No. 960 covered by the absolute
immunity granted in the Compromise Agreement of November 3, 1990?
On the first issue, petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. They
aver that the dollar-salting charges filed against them were violations of the Anti-Graft
Law or Republic Act No. 3019, and the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over their cases.
Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by
the law in force at the time the action is instituted.10 The 25 cases were filed in 1991-
92. The applicable law on jurisdiction then was Presidential Decree 1601.11 Under P.D.
No. 1606, offenses punishable by imprisonment of not more than six years fall within
the jurisdiction of the regular trial courts, not the Sandiganbayan.12
In the instant case, all the Informations are for violations of Circular No. 960 in relation
to Section 34 of the Central Bank Act and not, as petitioners insist, for transgressions
of Republic Act No. 3019. Pursuant to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, violations of
Circular No. 960 are punishable by imprisonment of not more than five years and a fine
of not more than P20,000.00. Since under P.D. No. 1606 the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction to try criminal cases where the imposable penalty is less than six years of
imprisonment, the cases against petitioners for violations of Circular No. 960 are,
therefore cognizable by the trial court. No error may thus be charged to the Court of
Appeals when it held that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction to hear and try the dollar-
salting cases.
Still on the first issue, petitioners next contend that the filing of the cases for violations
of Circular No. 960 before the RTC of Manila Constitutes forum shopping. Petitioners
argue that the prosecution, in an attempt to seek a favorable verdict from more than
one tribunal, filed separate cases involving virtually the same offenses before the
regular trial courts and the Sandiganbayan. They fault the prosecution with splitting
the cases. Petitioners maintain that while the RTC cases refer only to the failure to
report interest earnings on Treasury Notes, the Sandiganbayan cases seek to penalize
the act of receiving the same interest earnings on Treasury Notes in violation of the
Anti-Graft Law’s provisions on prohibited transactions. Petitioners aver that the
violation of Circular No. 960 is but an element of the offense of prohibited transactions
punished under Republic Act No. 3019 and should, thus, be deemed absorbed by the
prohibited transactions cases pending before the Sandiganbayan.
For the charge of forum shopping to prosper, there must exist between an action
pending in one court and another action pending in one court and another action before
another court: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars
is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party
is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.13 Here, we find
that the single act of receiving unreported interest earnings on Treasury Notes held
abroad constitutes an offense against two or more distinct and unrelated laws, Circular
No. 960 and R.A. 3019. Said laws define distinct offenses, penalize different acts, and
can be applied independently.14 Hence, no fault lies at the prosecution’s door for having
instituted separate cases before separate tribunals involving the same subject matter.
With respect to the RTC cases, the receipt of the interest earnings violate Circular No.
960 in relation to Republic Act No. 265 because the same was unreported to the Central
Bank. The act to be penalized here is the failure to report the interest earnings from
the foreign exchange accounts to the proper authority. As to the anti-graft cases before
the Sandiganbayan involving the same interest earnings from the same foreign
exchange accounts, the receipt of the interest earnings transgresses Republic Act No.
3019 because the act of receiving such interest is a prohibited transaction prejudicial
to the government. What the State seeks to punish in these anti-graft cases is
the prohibited receipt of the interest earnings. In sum, there is no identity of offenses
charged, and prosecution under one law is not an obstacle to a prosecution under the
other law. There is no forum shopping.
Finally, on the first issue, petitioners contend that the preliminary investigation by the
Department of Justice was invalid and in violation of their rights to due process.
Petitioners argue that government’s ban on their travel effectively prevented them from
returning home and personally appearing at the preliminary investigation. Benedicto
and Rivera further point out that the joint preliminary investigation by the Department
of Justice, resulted to the charges in one set of cases before the Sandiganbayan for
violations of Republic Act No. 3019 and another set before the RTC for violation of
Circular No. 960.
Preliminary investigation is not part of the due process guaranteed by the
Constitution.15 It is an inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent
is probably guilty thereof.16 Instead, the right to a preliminary investigation is personal.
It is afforded to the accused by statute, and can be waived, either expressly or by
implication.17 The waiver extends to any irregularity in the preliminary investigation,
where one was conducted.
The petition in the present case contains the following admissions:
1. Allowed to return to the Philippines on September 19, 1993 … on the condition that
he face the criminal charges pending in courts, petitioner-appellant Benedicto, joined
by his co-petitioner Rivera, lost no time in attending to the pending criminal charges
by posting bail in the above-mentioned cases.
2. Not having been afforded a real opportunity of attending the preliminary
investigation because of their forced absence from the Philippines then, petitioners-
appellants invoked their right to due process thru motions for preliminary investigation
… Upon denial of their demands for preliminary investigation, the petitioners intended
to elevate the matter to the Honorable Court of Appeals and actually caused the filing
of a petition for certiorari/prohibition sometime before their arraignment but
immediately caused the withdrawal thereof … in view of the prosecution’s willingness
to go to pre-trial wherein petitioner would be allowed access to the records of
preliminary investigation which they could use for purposes of filing a motion to quash
if warranted.
3. Thus, instead of remanding the Informations to the Department of Justice …
respondent Judge set the case for pre-trial in order to afford all the accused access to
the records of prosecution…
xxx
5. On the basis of disclosures at the pre-trial, the petitioners-appellants Benedicto and
Rivera moved for the quashing of the informations/cases…18
The foregoing admissions lead us to conclude that petitioners have expressly waived
their right to question any supposed irregularity in the preliminary investigation or to
ask for a new preliminary investigation. Petitioners, in the above excerpts from this
petition, admit posting bail immediately following their return to the country, entered
their respective pleas to the charges, and filed various motions and pleadings. By so
doing, without simultaneously demanding a proper preliminary investigation, they have
waived any and all irregularities in the conduct of a preliminary investigation.19 The trial
court did not err in denying the motion to quash the informations on the ground of
want of or improperly conducted preliminary investigation. The absence of a
preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash the information.20
On the second issue, petitioners contend that they are being prosecuted for acts
punishable under laws that have already been repealed. They point to the express
repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 by Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 as well as the
express repeal of Republic Act No. 265 by Republic Act No. 7653. Petitioners, relying
on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code,21 contend that repeal has the effect of
extinguishing the right to prosecute or punish the offense committed under the old
laws.22
As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving a court of its
authority to punish a person charged with violation of the old law prior to its
repeal.23 This is because an unqualified repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative
act of rendering legal what had been previously declared as illegal, such that the
offense no longer exists and it is as if the person who committed it never did so. There
are, however, exceptions to the rule. One is the inclusion of a saving clause in the
repealing statute that provides that the repeal shall have no effect on pending
actions.24 Another exception is where the repealing act reenacts the former statute and
punishes the act previously penalized under the old law. In such instance, the act
committed before the reenactment continues to be an offense in the statute books and
pending cases are not affected, regardless of whether the new penalty to be imposed
is more favorable to the accused.25
In the instant case, it must be noted that despite the repeal of Circular No. 960, Circular
No. 1353 retained the same reportorial requirement for residents receiving earnings or
profits from non-trade foreign exchange transactions.26Second, even the most cursory
glance at the repealing circulars, Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 shows that both contain
a saving clause, expressly providing that the repeal of Circular No. 960 shall have no
effect on pending actions for violation of the latter Circular.27 A saving clause operates
to except from the effect of the repealing law what would otherwise be lost under the
new law.28 In the present case, the respective saving clauses of Circular Nos. 1318 and
1353 clearly manifest the intent to reserve the right of the State to prosecute and
punish offenses for violations of the repealed Circular No. 960, where the cases are
either pending or under investigation.
Petitioners, however, insist that the repeal of Republic Act No. 265, particularly Section
34,29 by Republic Act No. 7653, removed the applicability of any special sanction for
violations of any non-trade foreign exchange transactions previously penalized by
Circular No. 960. Petitioners posit that a comparison of the two provisions shows that
Section 3630 of Republic Act No. 7653 neither retained nor reinstated Section 34 of
Republic Act No. 265. Since, in creating the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Congress did
not include in its charter a clause providing for the application of Section 34 of Republic
Act No. 265 to pending cases, petitioners’ pending dollar-salting cases are now bereft
of statutory penalty, the saving clause in Circular No. 1353 notwithstanding. In other
words, absent a provision in Republic Act No. 7653 expressly reviving the applicability
of any penal sanction for the repealed mandatory foreign exchange reporting
regulations formerly required under Circular No. 960, violations of aforesaid repealed
Circular can no longer be prosecuted criminally.
A comparison of the old Central Bank Act and the new Bangko Sentral’s charter
repealing the former show that in consonance with the general objective of the old law
and the new law "to maintain internal and external monetary stability in the Philippines
and preserve the international value of the peso,"31 both the repealed law and the
repealing statute contain a penal cause which sought to penalize in general, violations
of the law as well as orders, instructions, rules, or regulations issued by the Monetary
Board. In the case of the Bangko Sentral, the scope of the penal clause was expanded
to include violations of "other pertinent banking laws enforced or implemented by
the Bangko Sentral." In the instant case, the acts of petitioners sought to be penalized
are violations of rules and regulations issued by the Monetary Board. These acts are
proscribed and penalized in the penal clause of the repealed law and this proviso for
proscription and penalty was reenacted in the repealing law. We find, therefore, that
while Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 was repealed, it was nonetheless,
simultaneously reenacted in Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653. Where a clause or
provision or a statute for the matter is simultaneously repealed and reenacted, there is
no effect, upon the rights and liabilities which have accrued under the original statute,
since the reenactment, in effect "neutralizes" the repeal and continues the law in force
without interruption.32 The rule applies to penal laws and statutes with penal
provisions. Thus, the repeal of a penal law or provision, under which a person is
charged with violation thereof and its simultaneous reenactment penalizing the same
act done by him under the old law, will neither preclude the accused’s prosecution nor
deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear and try his case. 33 As pointed out earlier,
the act penalized before the reenactment continues to remain an offense and pending
cases are unaffected. Therefore, the repeal of Republic Act No. 265 by Republic Act
No. 7653 did not extinguish the criminal liability of petitioners for transgressions of
Circular No. 960 and cannot, under the circumstances of this case, be made a basis for
quashing the indictments against petitioners.
Petitioners, however, point out that Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653, in reenacting
Section 34 of the old Central Act, increased the penalty for violations of rules and
regulations issued by the Monetary Board. They claim that such increase in the penalty
would give Republic Act No. 7653 an ex post facto application, violating the Bill of
Rights.34
Is Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653 and ex post facto legislation?
An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage
of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2)
aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed; (3) changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less
or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the
offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights, and remedies only, in effect imposes
penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and (6)
deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty.35
The test whether a penal law runs afoul of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution
is: Does the law sought to be applied retroactively take "from an accused any right that
was regarded at the time of the adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection
of life and liberty and which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense
charged against him."36
The crucial words in the test are "vital for the protection of life and liberty."37 We find,
however, the test inapplicable to the penal clause of Republic Act No. 7653. Penal laws
and laws which, while not penal in nature, nonetheless have provisions defining
offenses and prescribing penalties for their violation operate prospectively.38 Penal laws
cannot be given retroactive effect, except when they are favorable to the
accused.39 Nowhere in Republic Act No. 7653, and in particular Section 36, is there any
indication that the increased penalties provided therein were intended to operate
retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.
On the third issue, petitioners ask us to note that the dollar interest earnings subject
of the criminal cases instituted against them were remitted to foreign banks on various
dates between 1983 to 1987. They maintain that given the considerable lapse of time
from the dates of the commission of the offenses to the institution of the criminal
actions in 1991 and 1992, the State’s right to prosecute them for said offenses has
already prescribed. Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals erred in computing the
prescriptive period from February 1986. Petitioners theorize that since the remittances
were made through the Central Bank as a regulatory authority, the dates of the alleged
violations are known, and prescription should thus be counted from these dates.
In ruling that the dollar-salting cases against petitioners have not yet prescribed, the
court a quo quoted with approval the trial court’s finding that:
[T]he alleged violations of law were discovered only after the EDSA Revolution in 1986
when the dictatorship was toppled down. The date of the discovery of the offense,
therefore, should be the basis in computing the prescriptive period. Since (the) offenses
charged are punishable by imprisonment of not more than five (5) years, they prescribe
in eight (8) years. Thus, only a little more than four (4) years had elapsed from the
date of discovery in 1986 when the cases were filed in 1991.40
The offenses for which petitioners are charged are penalized by Section 34 of Republic
Act No. 265 "by a fine of not more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and by
imprisonment of not more than five years." Pursuant to Act No. 3326, which mandates
the periods of prescription for violations of special laws, the prescriptive period for
violations of Circular No. 960 is eight (8) years.41 The period shall commence "to run
from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment."42 In the instant case, the indictments against
petitioners charged them with having conspired with the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos in transgressing Circular No. 960. Petitioners’ contention that the dates of the
commission of the alleged violations were known and prescription should be counted
from these dates must be viewed in the context of the political realities then prevailing.
Petitioners, as close associates of Mrs. Marcos, were not only protected from
investigation by their influence and connections, but also by the power and authority
of a Chief Executive exercising strong-arm rule. This Court has taken judicial notice of
the fact that Mr. Marcos, his family, relations, and close associates "resorted to all sorts
of clever schemes and manipulations to disguise and hide their illicit acquisitions."43 In
the instant case, prescription cannot, therefore, be made to run from the dates of the
commission of those offenses were not known as of those dates. It was only after the
EDSA Revolution of February, 1986, that the recovery of ill-gotten wealth became a
highly prioritized state policy,44 pursuant to the explicit command of the Provisional
Constitution.45 To ascertain the relevant facts to recover "ill-gotten properties amassed
by the leaders and supporters of the (Marcos) regime"46 various government agencies
were tasked by the Aquino administration to investigate, and as the evidence on hand
may reveal, file and prosecute the proper cases. Applying the presumption "that official
duty has been regularly performed",47 we are more inclined to believe that the
violations for which petitioners are charged were discovered only during the post-
February 1986 investigations and the tolling of the prescriptive period should be
counted from the dates of discovery of their commission. The criminal actions against
petitioners, which gave rise to the instant case, were filed in 1991 and 1992, or well
within the eight-year prescriptive period counted from February 1986.
The fourth issue involves petitioners’ claim that they incurred no criminal liability for
violations of Circular No. 960 since they were exempted from its coverage.
Petitioners postulate that since the purchases of treasury notes were done through the
Central Bank’s Securities Servicing Department and payments of the interest were
coursed through its Securities Servicing Department/Foreign Exchange Department,
their filing of reports would be surplusage, since the requisite information were already
with the Central Bank. Furthermore, they contend that the foreign currency investment
accounts in the Swiss banks were subject to absolute confidentiality as provided for by
Republic Act No. 6426,48 as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1035, 1246, and
1453, and fell outside the ambit of the reporting requirements imposed by Circular No.
960. Petitioners further rely on the exemption from reporting provided for in Section
10(q),49 Circular No. 960, and the confidentiality granted to Swiss bank accounts by
the laws of Switzerland.
Petitioners correctly point out that Section 10(q) of Circular No. 960 exempts from the
reporting requirement foreign currency eligible for deposit under the Philippine Foreign
Exchange Currency Deposit System, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6426, as amended.
But, in order to avail of the aforesaid exemption, petitioners must show that they fall
within its scope. Petitioners must satisfy the requirements for eligibility imposed by
Section 2, Republic Act No. 6426.50 Not only do we find the record bare of any proof
to support petitioners’ claim of falling within the coverage of Republic Act No. 6426, we
likewise find from a reading of Section 2 of the Foreign Currency Deposit Act that said
law is inapplicable to the foreign currency accounts in question. Section 2, Republic Act
No. 6426 speaks of "deposit with such Philippine banks in good standing, as may…be
designated by the Central Bank for the purpose." 51 The criminal cases filed against
petitioners for violation of Circular No. 960 involve foreign currency accounts
maintained in foreign banks, not Philippine banks. By invoking the confidentiality
guarantees provided for by Swiss banking laws, petitioners admit such reports made.
The rule is that exceptions are strictly construed and apply only so far as their language
fairly warrants, with all doubts being resolved in favor of the general proviso rather
than the exception.52 Hence, petitioners may not claim exemption under Section 10(q).
With respect to the banking laws of Switzerland cited by petitioners, the rule is that
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.53 Laws of foreign
jurisdictions must be alleged and proved.54 Petitioners failed to prove the Swiss law
relied upon, either by: (1) an official publication thereof; or (2) a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied by a
certification from the secretary of the Philippine embassy or legation in such country
or by the Philippine consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent stationed in
such country, or by any other authorized officer in the Philippine foreign service
assigned to said country that such officer has custody. 55 Absent such evidence, this
Court cannot take judicial cognizance of the foreign law invoked by Benedicto and
Rivera.
Anent the fifth issue, petitioners insist that the government granted them absolute
immunity under the Compromise Agreement they entered into with the government on
November 3, 1990. Petitioners cite our decision in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 226
SCRA 314 (1993), upholding the validity of the said Agreement and directing the
various government agencies to be consistent with it. Benedicto and Rivera now insist
that the absolute immunity from criminal investigation or prosecution granted to
petitioner Benedicto, his family, as well as to officers and employees of firms owned or
controlled by Benedicto under the aforesaid Agreement covers the suits filed for
violations of Circular No. 960, which gave rise to the present case.
The pertinent provisions of the Compromise Agreement read:
WHEREAS, this Compromise Agreement covers the remaining claims and the cases of
the Philippine Government against Roberto S. Benedicto including his associates and
nominees, namely, Julita C. Benedicto, Hector T. Rivera, x x x
WHEREAS, specifically these claims are the subject matter of the following
cases (stress supplied):
1. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 9
2. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 24
3. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 34
4. Tanodbayan (Phil-Asia)
5. PCGG I.S. No. 1.
xxx
WHEREAS, following the termination of the United States and Swiss cases, and also
without admitting the merits of their respective claims and counterclaims presently
involved in uncertain, protracted and expensive litigation, the Republic of the
Philippines, solely motivated by the desire for the immediate accomplishment of its
recovery mission and Mr. Benedicto being interested to lead a peaceful and normal
pursuit of his endeavors, the parties have decided to withdraw and/or dismiss their
mutual claims and counterclaims under the cases pending in the Philippines, earlier
referred to (underscoring supplied);
xxx
II. Lifting of Sequestrations, Extension of Absolute Immunity and Recognition of the
Freedom to Travel
a) The Government hereby lifts the sequestrations over the assets listed in Annex "C"
hereof, the same being within the capacity of Mr. Benedicto to acquire from the exercise
of his profession and conduct of business, as well as all the haciendas listed in his name
in Negro Occidental, all of which were inherited by him or acquired with income from
his inheritance…and all the other sequestered assets that belong to Benedicto and his
corporation/nominees which are not listed in Annex "A" as ceded or to be ceded to the
Government.
Provided, however, (that) any asset(s) not otherwise settled or covered by this
Compromise Agreement, hereinafter found and clearly established with finality by
proper competent court as being held by Mr. Roberto S. Benedicto in trust for the family
of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, shall be returned or surrendered to the Government
for appropriate custody and disposition.
b) The Government hereby extends absolute immunity, as authorized under the
pertinent provisions of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, to Benedicto, the
members of his family, officers and employees of his corporations above mentioned,
who are included in past, present and future cases and investigations of the Philippine
Government, such that there shall be no criminal investigation or prosecution against
said persons for acts (or) omissions committed prior to February 25, 1986, that may
be alleged to have violated any laws, including but not limited to Republic Act No. 3019,
in relation to the acquisition of any asset treated, mentioned or included in this
Agreement.lawphil.net
x x x56
In construing contracts, it is important to ascertain the intent of the parties by looking
at the words employed to project their intention. In the instant case, the parties clearly
listed and limited the applicability of the Compromise Agreement to the cases listed or
identified therein. We have ruled in another case involving the same Compromise
Agreement that:
[T]he subject matters of the disputed compromise agreement are Sandiganbayan Civil
Case No. 0009, Civil Case No. 00234, Civil Case No. 0034, the Phil-Asia case before the
Tanodbayan and PCGG I.S. No. 1. The cases arose from complaints for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages against former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, members of his family, and alleged cronies, one of whom was respondent
Roberto S. Benedicto.57
On final matter. During the pendency of this petition, counsel for petitioner Roberto S.
Benedicto gave formal notice to the Court that said petitioner died on May 15, 2000.
The death of an accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon.66
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed consolidated Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 and CA G.R. SP
No. 35719, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the charges against deceased
petitioner, Roberto S. Benedicto, particularly in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-
101883, 91-101884 to 101892, and 92-101959 to 92-101969, pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, are ordered dropped and that any criminal
as well as civil liability ex delicto that might be attributable to him in the aforesaid cases
are declared extinguished by reason of his death on May 15, 2000.lawphil.net No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Nowhere is there a mention of the criminal cases filed against petitioners for violations
of Circular No. 960. Conformably with Article 1370 of the Civil Code, 58 the Agreement
relied upon by petitioners should include only cases specifically mentioned therein.
Applying the parol evidence rule,59 where the parties have reduced their agreement
into writing, the contents of the writing constitute the sole repository of the terms of
the agreement between the parties.60 Whatever is not found in the text of the
Agreement should thus be construed as waived and abandoned. 61 Scrutiny of the
Compromise Agreement will reveal that it does not include all cases filed by the
government against Benedicto, his family, and associates.

Additionally, the immunity covers only "criminal investigation or prosecution against

said persons for acts (or) omissions committed prior to February 25, 1986 that may be
alleged to have violated any penal laws, including but not limited to Republic Act No.
3019, in relation to the acquisition of any asset treated, mentioned, or included in this
Agreement."62 It is only when the criminal investigation or case involves the acquisition
of any ill-gotten wealth "treated mentioned, or included in this Agreement" 63 that
petitioners may invoke immunity. The record is bereft of any showing that the interest
earnings from foreign exchange deposits in banks abroad, which is the subject matter
of the present case, are "treated, mentioned, or included" in the Compromise
Agreement. The phraseology of the grant of absolute immunity in the Agreement
precludes us from applying the same to the criminal charges faced by petitioners for
violations of Circular No. 960. A contract cannot be construed to include matters distinct
from those with respect to which the parties intended to contract.64

In sum, we find that no reversible error of law may be attributed to the Court of Appeals
in upholding the orders of the trial court denying petitioners’ Motion to Quash the
Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, 91-101884 to 91-101892,
and 92-101959 to 92-101969. In our view, none of the grounds provided for in the
Rules of Court65 upon which petitioners rely, finds applications in this case.