Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
6 by dela Rosa was insufficient to support
I. PHILIPPINE LAND LAWS:
HISTORY AND APPLICATION
A. The General Rules
The bedrock of all Philippine land
laws is the Regalian Doctrine, which is
contained in Art. XII, Sec. 2 of the 1987
Constitution. It provides that all lands of
the public domain, except agricultural
lands, belong to the State and cannot be
alienated. The doctrine, which was first
enacted in the 1935 Constitution, was
adopted to preserve the State’s natural
resources and land in favor of Filipinos.
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
160 SCRA 228 (1988)
Facts: Jose dela Rosa sought to register a
parcel of land. The land was divided into 9
lots. Lots 1-5 were purchased from Balbalio
while Lots 6-9 were purchased from Alberto.
Both Balbalio and Alberto claim to have
acquired the lots by virtue of prescription.
The application was separately
opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc.,
Atok Big Wedge Corp. and the Bureau of
Forestry Development. Benguet and Atok
opposed on the ground of valid mining
claims, while the Bureau of Forestry
objected because the land sought to be
registered was covered by the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve, hence, not
subject to alienation.
The trial court denied the
application. The CA reversed TC, affirming
the surface rights of dela Rosa over the land
while reserving the sub-surface rights of
Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining
claims.
Held: Benguet and Atok have exclusive
rights to the property by virtue of their
respective mining claims.
Ratio:. While it is true that the property was
considered forest land, they were removed
from the public domain and had become
private properties from the perfection of the
mining claims of Benguet and Atok.
The evidence of open, continuous,
adverse and exclusive possession submitted
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1
claim of ownership. Even if it be assumed
that the predecessors-in-interest of dela
Rosa had really been in possession of the
property, their possession was not in the
concept of owner of the mining claim but of
the property as agricultural land, which it
was not.
The theory of the CA that the land is
classified as mineral underneath and
agricultural on the surface is erroneous. It is
a well-known principle that the owner of a
piece of land has rights not only to its
surface but also to everything underneath
and the airspace above it up to a reasonable
height (Art. 437, NCC). The rights over the
land are indivisible and the land itself cannot
be half agricultural and half mineral. The
rule is, once minerals are discovered in the
land, whatever the use to which it is being
devoted at the time, such use may be
discontinued by the State (the Regalian
doctrine reserves to the State all minerals
that may be found in public and even private
land) to enable it to extract the minerals
therein in the exercise of its sovereign
prerogative. The land is thus converted to
mineral land and may not be used by any
private property, including the registered
owner thereof, for any other purpose that will
impede the mining operations to be
undertaken therein.
SUNBEAM CONVENIENCE FOODS, INC.
VS. COURT OF APPEALS
181 SCRA 443 (1990)
Facts. Director of Lands issued sales
patent over two parcels of land in favor of
Sunbeam. After registration, the Register of
Deeds issued OCT. Subsequently, OCT
was cancelled and TCTs were issued in
favor of Coral Beach Dev’t Corp. The
Republic instituted before the CFI a civil
action for reversion as the land was
classified as forest land.
Trial court dismissed the complaint
on the theory that since the titles sought to
be cancelled emanated from the
administrative act of the Bureau of Lands
Director, the latter, not the courts, had
jurisdiction over the disposition of the land.
CA set aside the Order of Dismissal and
ordered presiding judge to receive the
answers of Sunbeam and Coral Beach in
the action for reversion.
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
Ratio: The Regalian doctrine subjects all
agricultural, timber and mineral lands to the
dominion of the State. Thus, before any
land may be declassified from the forest
group and converted into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes, there must be a positive act from
the government. Even rules on the
confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply
unless and until the land classified as forest
land is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain.
The mere fact that a title was issued
by the Director of Lands does not confer any
validity on such title if the property covered
by the title or patent is part of the public
forest.
Police Power
MINER’S ASSOCIATION VS FACTORAN
240 SCRA 100 (1995)
FACTS: The instant petition seeks a ruling
from this Court on the validity of two
Administrative Orders issued by the
Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources to carry out the
provisions of certain Executive Orders
promulgated by the President in the lawful
exercise of legislative powers.
Herein controversy was precipitated by
the change introduced by Article XII, Section
2 of the 1987 Constitution on the system of
exploration, development and utilization of
the country's natural resources. The options
open to the State are through direct
undertaking or by entering into co-
production, joint venture; or production-
sharing agreements, or by entering into
agreement with foreign-owned corporations
for large-scale exploration, development and
utilization.
Pursuant to Section 6 of Executive
Order No. 279, the DENR Secretary issued
on June 23, 1989 DENR Administrative
Order No. 57, series of 1989, captioned
"Guidelines of Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement under Executive Order No. 279
where all existing mining leases or
agreements which were granted after the
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2
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution except
small scale mining leases and those
pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry
resources covering an area of twenty (20)
hectares or less, shall be converted into
production-sharing agreements within
one (1) year from the effectivity of these
guidelines.
On November 20, 1980, the
Secretary of the DENR Administrative Order
No. 82, series of 1990, laying down the
"Procedural Guidelines on the Award of
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
(MPSA) through Negotiation." requiriing the
persons or entities to submit Letter of Intent
(LOIs) and Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSAs) within two (2) years
from the effectivity of DENR Administrative
Order No. 57 or until July 17, 1991. Failure
to do so within the prescribed period shall
cause the abandonment of mining, quarry
and sand and gravel claims
ISSUE: In this petition for certiorari,
petitioner Miners Association of the
Philippines, Inc. mainly contends that
respondent Secretary of DENR issued both
Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 in
excess of his rule-making power under
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279. On
the assumption that the questioned
administrative orders do not conform with
Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279,
petitioner contends that both orders violate
the non-impairment of contract provision
under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987
Constitution on the ground that
Administrative Order No. 57 unduly pre-
terminates existing mining leases and other
mining .
HELD: Well settled is the rule that
regardless of the reservation clause, mining
leases or agreements granted by the State,
such as those granted pursuant to Executive
Order No. 211 referred to in this petition, are
subject to alterations through a reasonable
exercise of the police power of the State.
The State, in the exercise of its police power
in this regard, may not be precluded by the
constitutional restriction on non-impairment
of contract from altering, modifying and
amending the mining leases or agreements
granted under Presidential Decree No. 463,
as amended, pursuant to Executive Order
No. 211. Police power, being coextensive
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
with the necessities of the case and the
demands of public interest, extends to all the
vital public needs. The passage of Executive
Order No. 279 which superseded Executive
Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the
DENR Secretary to carry into effect the
mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution
OPOSA VS FACTORAN
224 SCRA 792 (1993)
FACTS: The complaint was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit (minors and parents)
and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens
of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers,
and entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure
that is the country's virgin tropical
rainforests. Consequently, it is prayed for
that judgment be rendered ordering
defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to (1)
Cancel all existing timber license
agreements in the country; (2) Cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license
agreements."
HELD: All timber licenses may thus be
revoked or rescinded by executive action. It
is not a contract, property or a property right
protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution. It is only a license or privilege,
which can be validly withdrawn whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare
as in this case. Since timber licenses are not
contracts, the non-impairment clause, which
reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed." In
the second place, even if it is to be assumed
that the same are contracts, the instant case
does not involve a law or even an executive
issuance declaring the cancellation or
modification of existing timber licenses.
Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot
as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting
further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications,
the same cannot still be stigmatized as a
violation of the non-impairment clause. This
is because by its very nature and purpose,
such a law could have only been passed in
the exercise of the police power of the
state for the purpose of advancing the
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3
right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, promoting their health
and enhancing the general welfare. In other
words, the constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment of obligations of contract is
limited by the exercise of the police power of
the State, in the interest of public health,
safety, moral and general welfare. But
neither property rights nor contract rights are
absolute; for government cannot exist if the
citizen may at will use his property to the
detriment of his fellows, or exercise his
freedom of contract to work them harm.
Equally fundamental with the private right is
that of the public to regulate it in the
common interest.'" In court, the non-
impairment clause must yield to the
police power of the state
Social Justice
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. FUNTILAR
(142 SCRA 57)
FACTS: In 1972, Mariano Funtilar and the
Heirs of Felipe Rosete applied for the
registration of land in Mulanay, Quezon.
Such parcel originally belonged to one
Candida Fernandez whose ownership and
possession began sometime during her
lifetime and extended until she died in 1936.
Sometime in 1940, the land was forfeited in
favor of the Gov’t for failure to pay real
estate taxes but the same was redeemed in
1942 by one of the three children of
Candida. The land now in dispute was
adjudicated to petitioners-respondents, as
heirs of Fernandez. The Director Lands and
Dir. of Forest Dev’t filed an opposition
alleging that neither applicants nor their
predecessors-in-interest possessed
sufficient title to the land, not having
acquired the same under any of the
recognized Spanish titles under the Royal
Decree of Feb. 13, 1894; that neither have
they been in open, continuos, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the
land for at least 30 years immediately filing
the application; and that the land is a portion
of the public domain belonging to the
Republic.
The trial court rendered a decision
in favor of the applicants. On appeal, the
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
Intermediate appellate Court affirmed the
lower court’s decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON applicants-respondents have
met the requirements of possession for at
least 30 years immediately preceding the
filing of their application in 1972 as to entitle
them to registration
Held: Yes. The Court is satisfied from the
evidence that long before her death in 1936,
Candid Fernandez already possessed the
disputed property. This possession must be
tacked to the possession of her heirs,
through the administrator and later, to the
applicants-respondents who are her
grandchildren. It would also be absurd
under the circumstances that the
government would order the forfeiture of the
property if the property were a forestland.
As to petitioner’s allegation that the
land was unclassified public forest until
Sept. 15, 1953 when it was declared
alienable and disposable, the Court said that
the Regalian doctrine must be applied
together with the constitutional provisions on
social justice and land reform and must be
interpreted in a way as to avoid manifest
unfairness and injustice. A strict application
of the Heirs of Amunategui vs. Dir. Of
Forestry (applicant shoulders the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land
sought to be registered forms part of the
public domain) is warranted whenever a part
of the public domain is in danger of ruthless
exploitation, fraudulent titling, or other
questionable practices. But when an
application appears to enhance the very
reasons behind the enactment of act 496, as
amended or the land Reg. Act and CA 141
or the Public Land Act, then their provisions
should not be made to stand in the way of
their on implementation. The attempts of
humble people to have disposable lands
they have been tilling for generations titled in
their names should not only be viewed with
understanding but should, as a matter of
policy, be encouraged.
REPUBLIC VS. CA (201 SCRA 3)
Private respondents, the Parans,
are applicants for registration of a parcel of
land in La Trinidad, Benguet which they
claim to have acquired from their father
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4
Dayotao Paran and by actual, physical,
exclusive and open possession thereof
since time immemorial.. The Dir. of lands
filed an opposition, alleging among others,
that the land is part of the public domain.
The Office of the Provincial Fiscal likewise
opposed the registration, stating that the
land is within the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve covered by Proclamation No. 217
dated Feb. 16, 1929. The trial court found in
favor of the applicants. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal filed by the
Sol Gen. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON land is part of the Cordillera
Forest Reserve and hence not subject to
registration.
Ratio: The applicants are members of the
Ibaloi tribe whose application for registration
should be considered as falling under
Section 48 (c) of CA 141, said subsection
having been added by RA 3872 on June 18,
1964. Under the said section, members of
cultural minorities may apply for confirmation
of their title to lands of public domain,
whether disposable or not. They may
therefore apply for public lands although
such are legally forest lands or mineral
lands, so long as such lands are in fact
suitable for agriculture. However, PD 1073
effective January 25, 1977 amended Section
48 (c), making the said provision applicable
only to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain.
It is important to note that the
application of the Parans was filed in 1970
and the land registration court affirmed their
long-continued possession of the lands in
1974, that is, during the time when Section
48 (c) was in legal effect. Private
respondents’ imperfect title was perfected or
vested by the required period of possession
prior to the issuance of PD 1073 thus, their
right in respect of the land they had
possessed for 30 years could not be
divested by said PD. The Court stressed its
pronouncement in Dir. of Lands vs. Funtilar
that the Regalian doctrine must be applied
together with constitutional provisions on
social justice and land reform and must be
interpreted in a way as to avoid manifest
unfairness and injustice. The Declarations
of Real Property submitted by applicants
likewise indicated that the land had become
suitable to agriculture. Clearly, the
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds 5

requirements of Section 48 (c) were been held by individuals under a claim of

satisfied. private ownership, it will be presumed to
have been held in the same way from before
the Spanish conquest and never to have
Time Immemorial Possession been public land. If there is doubt or
ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to
Time immemorial possession is give the applicant the benefit of the doubt.
deemed to be part of the general rule and The older decrees and laws cited by
not an exception to the Regalian Doctrine. the counsel for plaintiff indicate clearly that
Land held under a concept of ownership the natives were recognized as owning
since immemorial is deemed to have been some lands, irrespective of any royal grant.
private and therefore never to have come In other words, Spain did not assume to
within the ambit of the Regalian Doctrine. convert all the native inhabitants of the Phils.
Into trespassers or even into tenants at will.
CARINO VS. INSULAR GOV’T
ANKRON VS. GOV’T OF THE PHIL.
(41 PHIL 935)
ISLANDS (40 PHIL 10)
FACTS: Plaintiff, an Igorot from Benguet,
FACTS: Petitioner sought to register a
filed application to Phil. Court of land
parcel of land which he brought from the
registration. For more than 50 years before
Moros, which the latter formerly occupied,
the Treaty of Paris in 1899, the plaintiff and
cultivated and planted under claim of
his ancestors had held the land as owners.
ownership for more than 44 years. The only
They had been recognized as owners by the
oppositor was the Director of Lands, alleging
Igorots. No document of title, however, was
that the land was property of the US under
issued from the Spanish crown. The
the control and administration of the Gov’t of
application was granted on 1904. On
the Phil. Islands. No proof whatsoever was
appeal to the CFI, on behalf of the Gov’t of
offered by the oppositor. The lower court
the Phils. and also of the US, the application
ordered and decreed that said parcel be
was dismissed. This was affirmed by the
registered in Ankron’s name subject
Supreme Court. Hence, this appeal.
however to the right of the government to
open a road thereon. From that decree, the
Issue: WON plaintiff owns the land
Dir. appealed to the Supreme Court.
Held: Yes. Benguet was inhabited by a
Issue: WON applicant proved his
tribe that never was brought under the civil
possession and occupation in accordance
or military government of the Spanish crown.
with the provisions of section 54 (6) of act
It seems probable, if not certain, that the
926
Spanish officials would not have granted to
anyone that province the registration to
Held: Yes. Under the said paragraph, the
which the plaintiff was entitled by Spanish
important requisites for registration are: (1)
laws, and which would have made his title
that the land shall be agricultural public land
beyond question good. Whatever may have
as defined by the Act of Congress of July 1,
been the technical position of Spain, it foes
1902; and (2) that the petitioner, by himself
not follow that, in the view of the United
or his predecessors-in-interest, shall have
States, he had lost all the rights and was a
been in the open, continuos possession and
mere trespasser when the present
occupation of the same under a bona fide
government seized his land. The argument
claim of ownership for a period of ten years
to that effect seems to amount to a denial of
next preceding the taking effect of the said
native titles throughout an important part of
Act.
Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies
In the present case the applicant
which the Spaniards would not have
proved and there was no effort to dispute
permitted and had not the power to enforce.
said proof, that the land in question was
It might, perhaps, be proper and
agricultural land and that he and his
sufficient to say that when, as far back as
predecessors in interest had occupied the
testimony or memory goes, the land has
same as owners in good faith for a period of

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Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
more than forty years prior to the
commencement of the present action. No
question is raised nor discussed by the
appellant with reference to the right of the
Moros to acquire absolute ownership and
dominion of the land which they have
occupied openly, notoriously, peacefully and
adversely for a long period of years.
Whether the particular land is
agricultural, forestry or mineral is a question
to be settled in each particular case. The
mere fact that land is a manglar (mangrove
swamp) is not sufficient in itself to show that
it is agricultural, forestry or mineral. It may
belong to one or the other class.
Considering that it is a matter of public
knowledge that a majority of the public lands
in the Phils. are agricultural lands, the courts
have a right to presume, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case
the lands are agricultural lands.
ABAOAG VS. DIR. OF LANDS
(45 PHIL. 518)
FACTS: Petitioners are among those
Igorots who, in 1884, were given by the
gobernadorcillo and principalia of Sison,
Pangasinan, a tract of land in order that they
may cultivate the same and increase the
population of the said municipality. At the
time of delivery, said land was unoccupied
and unimproved public land. Said ‘Bagos’ or
Igorots entered upon said land, took
possession of it and have continued to live
upon the same and have cultivated it since
that date. In 1919, petitioner, et al.
presented a petition for registration with the
CFI of Pangasinan. Oppositors filed a
motion to dismiss upon the ground that
petitioners had not presented proof sufficient
to show that they are entitled to the
registration of the land. Said motion was
granted. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: WON dismissal of the case was
proper.
Held: No. No suggestion is made that the
gobernadorcillo and the principalia of the
town of Alava, now Sision, were not
authorized in 1884, as representatives of the
then existing Gov’t, to give and to deliver the
land in question to the petitioners and their
ancestors for the purposes for which the
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6
land was so given. Neither was it denied
that it was agricultural land. No pretension
is made that the land might not be registered
under the Torrens system had the petitioners
invoked the benefits of the public land law.
No contention is made on the part of
petitioners that they were ever given a title
to the land. Their contention is simply that
they were given the land; that they accepted
the same; that they lived upon the land, and
cultivated it, and improved it, and occupied it
to the exclusion of all others for a period of
about 39 years and that therefore they are
entitled to have the same registered under
the Torrens system; that they have occupied
and cultivated the same for a period
sufficient to give them title and to have the
same registered. This is like the case of
Carino vs. Insular Government.
In the Royal Cedula of October 15,
1754: ‘Where such possessors shall not be
able to produce title deeds, it shall be
sufficient if they shall show that ancient
possession as a valid title by prescription.’
To this, the Court added that every
presumption of ownership under the public
land laws is in favor of the one actually
occupying the land for many years, and
against the Government which seeks to
deprive him of it.
MANARPAAC VS. CABANATAN
(21 SCRA 743)
FACTS: Plaintiffs filed complaint against
defendants, alleging that they have been,
since time immemorial, in possession of two
parcels of land, which were fraudulently
included in the free patent application of
defendant. Cabanatan filed a motion to
dismiss. Such was granted by the lower
court holding that the free patent having
been issued on November 3, 1959 and the
first complaint was filed on December 7,
1960, the action for review of the decree,
was therefore filed more than one year after
the issuance of the patent. Hence, this
appeal.
Issue: WON dismissal was proper
Held: No. From the averment of facts in
the complaint, it clearly appears that
plaintiffs have been, since time immemorial
in possession as owners of the disputed
land, have declared the land for tax
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
purposes in the names of two of them and
have built their houses on the land, but that
through fraud and irregularity, defendant
succeeded in securing a certificate of title.
The foregoing recital of facts are sufficient
averment of ownership. Possession since
time immemorial, carries the presumption
that the land had never been part of the
public domain, or that it had been a private
property even before the Spanish conquest.
Whether this presumption should hold as a
fact or not, is a question appropriately
determinable only after the parties have
adduced, or at least, are given the
opportunity to adduce, their respective
evidence.
The complaint likewise states a
sufficient cause for action for recovery of
possession of the land. Settled is the rule
that the remedy of the landowner whose
property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another’s name is, after one
year from the date of the decree, not to set
aside the decree, but respecting the decree
as incontrovertible and no longer open to
review, to bring an ordinary action in the
ordinary court of justice for conveyance or, if
the property has passed into the hands of
innocent purchaser for value, for damages.
B. Exceptions to the General
Rules
Mining Claims
REAVIS V. FIANZA
40 PHIL 1017 (1909)
The Philippine Act of 1902 provides,
“That where such a person or association,
they and their grantors have held and
worked their claims for a period equal to the
time prescribed by the statute of limitations
of the Philippine Islands, evidence of such
possession and working of the claims for
such period shall be sufficient to establish a
right to a patent thereto under this Act, in the
absence of any adverse claim …” The
period of prescription is ten years.
Fianza and his Igorot ancestors had
been in possession of the land and had
been working their mining claims for more
than 10 years but this was before the
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7
enactment of the Phil. Act of 1902. Reavis,
an American, applied for a mining patent
over the same land during the effectivity of
this law.
Reavis argued that first, ownership of the
land surface does not automatically vest
ownership over the mining rights. Second,
mines can only be acquired in accordance
with government-prescribed regulations.
Therefore, Fianza had no legal rights to the
mines since there was no compliance with
the procedural requirements laid down in the
Phil. Act. of 1902. Furthermore, Fianza held
no patent.
The Supreme Court did not deal
squarely with the first argument. However,
the issue was somewhat more resolved in
its disposition of the second argument. It
was held that Fianza and his ancestors
have, through their possession of more than
10 years under Spanish Law and their
working of the mining claims within such
period, acquired ownership rights over the
questioned land and the mining claims. This
is notwithstanding the fact that no patent
was held or applied for by Fianza under the
provisions of the Phil. Act of 1902 since the
right to have a patent that will confer title is
also a right to have the thing.
MCDANIEL V. APACIBLE AND CUISIA
42 PHIL 749
On June 17, 1916, in accordance
with the Phil. Act of 1902, McDaniel located
3 petroleum placer mineral claims in
Tayabas. Notices of their location were
recorded in the office of the mining recorder.
Furthermore, there was continuous
possession and annual assessment work
over the said claims.
Act No. 2932 which was approved
on August 31, 1920 provided that “all public
lands containing petroleum or other mineral
oils and gas, on which no patent, at the date
this Act takes effect, has been issued, are
hereby withdrawn from sale and are
declared to be free and open to exploration,
location and lease…” On June 18, 1921, in
accordance with Act No. 2932, Cuisia
applied with the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources for a lease of a parcel of
petroleum land that included McDaniel’s 3
claims.
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
However, Actd No. 2932 further
provided that “parties having heretofore filed
claims for any mineral lands containing said
minerals, shall be given preference to lease
their respective claims, provided they file a
petition to that effect within 6 months from
the date of the approval of this Act.”
Therefore, all parties having mineral claims
prior to the approval of Act No. 2932 had
until Feb. 28, 1921 to file a petition with the
Government to lease the corresponding
public lands. Otherwise, their preference
over other applicants shall be forfeited.
McDaniel sought to prohibit the
Government from granting Cuisia’s lease
application mainly on the argument that Act
No. 2932 is unconstitutional since it deprives
him of his property without due process of
law.
The Supreme Court sustained
McDaniel’s argument. It held that a
perfected, valid appropriation of public
mineral lands operates as a withdrawal of
the tract from the body of the public domain,
and so long as such appropriation remains
valid and subsisting, the land covered
thereby is deemed private property. Such
perfected, valid and subsisting appropriation
shall be deemed to have taken place when
all the requirements of the law in making the
location of the mineral placer claims have
been complied with and the claims were
never abandoned or forfeited. This is
notwithstanding the fact that no patent has
been issued since the right to a patent vests
full equitable title with all the benefits,
immunities, and burdens of ownership.
Furthermore, the claim and the location is
perfected not only against 3rd persons but
also against the Government.
GOLD CREEK MINING CORP. V.
RODRIGUEZ
(66 PHIL 259)
On Jan. 1, 1929, Gold Creek Mining
Corp. located a mining claim in Benguet.
Notice of the location was recorded in the
office of the mining recorder. Furthermore,
there was continuous possession and
annual assessment work over the said
claim. Before Nov. 15, 1935, the date of
effectivity of the 1935 Const., Gold Creek
Mining applied with the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce for a patent.
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8
However, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce and the Director
of the Bureau of Mines refused to approve
the application on the ground that the
issuance of the patent amounted to an
alienation of natural resources which is
prohibited under the Constitution.
The Supreme Court held that the
patent must be issued. It is clear that the
1935 Constitution prohibits the alienation of
natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land. However, “natural
resources” only includes mineral lands of the
public domain and not mineral lands already
withdrawn from the public domain prior to
the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution.
Perfected, valid and subsisting mining
claims prior to the 1935 Const., whether or
not a patent has been issued therefor, are
included in the latter category. They are no
longer part of the public domain and
therefore, are beyond the constitutional
prohibition on the alienation of natural
resources.
STANDARD MINERAL PRODUCTS, INC.
V. CA
Deeunhong was a registered owner
of 120 hectares of land in Antipolo under a
transfer certificate of title. Standard Mineral
Products, Inc. undertook the prospecting
and locating of a mining claim in the said
land without first securing written permission
from Deeunhong. After locating a claim,
SMPI applied for a mining lease with the
Bureau of Mines over a portion of the land,
which was opposed by the registerd owner.
In a separate civil case for reversion
of the land to the State, it was found that the
land was essentially agricultural and not
mineral land.
The Supreme Court held that SMPI
is not entitled to the surface rights due to its
non-compliance with the Mining Act
provision which requires written permission
from the landowner prior to the prospecting
and locating of mineral claims. Such written
permission must also accompany the
application of a mining lease with the
Bureau of Mines.
Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect
Titles
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
SUSI V. RAZON AND DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, 48 PHIL 427 (1925)
Susi and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous,
adverse and public possession since time
immemorial in the concept of owner and for
value of a certain parcel of unregistered land
in Pampanga. On the other hand, Razon
was able to purchase the same parcel of
land from the Government for which an
original certificate of title was issued.
The Supreme Court held that Susi
was the absolute owner and that the sale to
Razon and the corresponding certificate of
title issued in her name is null and void.
Reiterating the doctrine laid down in Carino
v. Insular Govt., the Supreme Court held that
that there is a presumption juris et du jure
that all the necessary requirements have
been complied with when there had been
actual and physical possession, personally
or through predecessors, of an agricultural
land of the public domain openly,
continuously, exclusively, and publicly since
July 26, 1894 with a right to a certificate of
title to said land. Therefore, by operation of
law, Susi had already acquired not only a
right to a grant but a grant from the
Government much prior to the application of
Razon. The questioned land was already
private and was not part of the public
domain anymore . Therefore, the Director of
Lands no longer had any control or
jurisdiction over Razon’s application.
MERALCO V. CASTRO-BARTOLOME
114 SCRA 799 (1982)
A certain parcel of land was
possessed by Ramos since 1941. In 1947,
Ramos sold the land to the Piguing spouses.
IN 1976, the Piguing spouses sold the land
to MERALCO, a domestic corporation.
Subsequently, MERALCO applied for the
registration of the parcel of land which was
opposed by the Republic of the Philippines.
The trial court dismissed
MERALCO’S application on the ground that
it is not qualified to apply for registration
since the Public Land Act allows only Filipino
citizens or natural persons to apply for
judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles
to public land.
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9
MERALCO argued that first, the
questioned land was no longer public but
was now private land since its
predecessors-in-interest had possessed
such land in the concept of owner for more
than 30 years. Furthermore, it argued that it
invoked the provision of the Public Land Act
in behalf of the Piguing spouses who, as
Filipino citizens, could secure judicial
confirmation of their imperfect title to the
land.
The Supreme Scourt affirmed the
dismissal of MERALCO’s application. It held
that the questioned land was still public land
and shall remain so until a certificate of title
is issued to a Filipino citizen. Consequently,
MERALCO, being a juridical person, is
therefore disqualified to apply for registration
of such public land.
The doctrine enunciated in Susi v.
Razon and Director of Lands that “an open,
continuous, adverse and public possession
of a land of the public domain since time
immemorial by a private individual
personally and through his predecessors
confers an effective title on said possessor,
whereby the land ceases to be public,”
cannot be properly invoked by MERALCO
since its predecessors-in-interest had not
been in possession since time immemorial
or beyond the reach of memory, i.e. before
1880.
Citing Oh Cho, the Supreme Court
held that the immediate predecessors-in-
interest must apply for registration of the
land in order to secure a grant under the
Public Land Act. Without such registration,
the immediate predecessor-in-interest did
not have any vested right amounting to title
which was transmissible.
NOTE: This ruling was subsequently
overturned in the case of Director of
Lands v. IAC (Acme case).
DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. IAC & ACME
146 SCRA 509 (1986)
In the case, the Supreme Court held
that the ruling in the case of Meralco v.
Castro-Bartolome is no longer deemed to be
binding. Notwithstanding the prohibition in
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions against
private corporations holding lands of the
public domain except by lease not
exceeding 1000 hectares, still a private
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
corporation may institute confirmation
proceedings under Sec. 48(b) of the Public
Land Act if, at the time of institution of the
registration proceedings, the land was
already private land. On the other hand, if
the land was still part of the public domain,
then a private corporation cannot institute
such proceedings.
The correct rule is that alienable
public land held by a possessor, personally
or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period (30 years under
the Public Land Act, as amended) is
converted to private property by the mere
lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS &
PARAN
(AUGUST 21, 1991)
There is no question that a positive
act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the
Executive Department of the Government is
needed to declassify land which had been
classified as forestal and to convert it into
alienable or disposable lands for agricultural
or other purposes. In the case of Director of
Lands vs. Funtilar, the Court considered the
reports of the District Forester and the
District Land Officer as adequate proof that
the land applied for was no longer classified
as forestal.
We consider and so hold that once
a parcel of land Is shown to have been
included within a Forest Reservation duly
established by Executive Proclamation, as in
the instant case, a presumption arises that
the parcel of land continues to be part of
such Reservation until clear and convincing
evidence of subsequent withdrawal
therefrom or declassification is shown. A
simple, unsworn statement of a minor
functionary of the Bureau of a minor
functionary of the Bureau of Forest
Development is not, by itself, such evidence.
OH CHO V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
75 PHIL 890 (1946)
The applicant invokes the Land
Registration Act (Act. No. 496) or should it
not be applicable to the case, then he would
______________________________________________________________________________________
10
apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act
(C.A. 141)
The applicant failed to show that he
has title that may be confirmed under the
LRA. All lands that were not acquired from
the Government, either by purchase or by
grant, belong to the public domain. An
exception to the rule would be time
immemorial possession, which would justify
the presumption that the land had never
been public land. The applicant does not
come under the exception, for the earliest
possession of the lot by his first predecessor
in interest began in 1880.
As the applicant failed to show title
to the lot, the next question is whether he is
entitled to a decree of registration thereof
under the provisions of the Public Land Act
(C.A. 141). Under the provisions of the Act
invoked by the applicant, he is not entitled to
a decree of registration of the lot because he
is an alien.
The benefits provided in the Public
Land constitute a grant or concession by the
State. Before they could acquire any right,
the applicant’s immediate predecessor in
interest should comply with the condition
precedent, which is to apply for the
registration of the land of which they had
been in possession at least since July 26,
1894. This is the applicant’s immediate
predecessors in interest failed to do. They
did not have any vested right in the lot
amounting to title which was transmissible to
the applicant. The only right is their
possession of the lot which, tacked to that of
their predecessors in interest, may be
availed of by a qualified person but not by
the applicant, since he is disqualified.
Indigenous Peoples' Rights
PD 705
Forestry Reform Code
SECTION 52. Census of kaingineros,
squatters, cultural minorities and
other occupants and residents in
forest lands. — Henceforth, no person
shall enter into forest lands and
cultivate the same without lease or
permit.
A complete census of kaingineros,
squatters, cultural minorities and
other occupants and residents in
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds 11

forest lands with or without authority SECTION 2. The Autonomous Region

or permits from the government, is a corporate entity with jurisdiction
showing the extent of their respective in all matters devolved to it by the
occupation and resulting damage, or Constitution and this Organic Act as
impairment of forest resources, shall herein enumerated:
be conducted.
(1) Administrative organization;
The Bureau may call upon other (2) Creation of sources of
agencies of the government and revenues;
holders of license agreement, license, (3) Ancestral domain and natural
lease and permits over forest lands to resources;
participate in the census. (4) Personal, family and property
relations;
(5) Regional, urban and rural
RA 6657 planning development;
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (6) Economic, social, and tourism
development;
SECTION 9. Ancestral Lands. — For (7) Educational policies;
purposes of this Act, ancestral lands of (8) Preservation and development
each indigenous cultural community of the cultural heritage;
shall include, but not be limited to, (9) Powers, functions and
lands in the actual, continuous and responsibilities now being exercised
open possession and occupation of the by the departments of the National
community and its members: Government except:
Provided, That the Torrens Systems (a) Foreign affairs;
shall be respected. (b) National defense and security;
(c) Postal service;
The right of these communities to (d) Coinage, and fiscal and
their ancestral lands shall be monetary policies;
protected to ensure their economic, (e) Administration of justice;
social and cultural well-being. In line (f) Quarantine;
with the principles of self- (g) Customs and tariff;
determination and autonomy, the (h) Citizenship;
systems of land ownership, land use, (i) Naturalization, immigration
and the modes of settling land and deportation;
disputes of all these communities (j) General auditing, civil service
must be recognized and respected. and elections;
(k) Foreign trade;
Any provision of law to the contrary (l) Maritime, land and air
notwithstanding, the PARC may transportation and communications
suspend the implementation of this that affect areas outside the
Act with respect to ancestral lands for Autonomous Region; and
the purpose of identifying and (m) Patents, trademarks, trade
delineating such lands: Provided, That names, and copyrights; and
in the autonomous regions, the (10) Such other matters as may be
respective legislatures may enact their authorized by law for the promotion of
own laws on ancestral domain subject the general welfare of the people of
to the provisions of the Constitution the Region.
and the principles enunciated in this
Act and other national laws.
ARTICLE XI
RA 6734 ANCESTRAL DOMAIN, ANCESTRAL
Organic Act for Autonomous LANDS AND AGRARIAN REFORM
Region of Muslim Mindanao

______________________________________________________________________________________
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
SECTION 1. Subject to the
Constitution and national policies, the
Regional Government shall undertake
measures to protect the ancestral
domain and the ancestral lands of
indigenous cultural communities.
All lands and natural resources in the
Autonomous Region that have been
possessed or occupied by indigenous
cultural communities since time
immemorial, except when prevented
by war, force majeure, or other forms
of forcible usurpation, shall form part
of the ancestral domain. Such
ancestral domain shall include pasture
lands, worship areas, burial grounds,
forests and fields, mineral resources,
except: strategic minerals such as
uranium, coal, petroleum, and other
fossil fuels, mineral oils, and all
sources of potential energy; lakes,
rivers and lagoons; and national
reserves and marine parks, as well as
forest and watershed reservations.
Lands in the actual, open, notorious,
and uninterrupted possession and
occupation by an indigenous cultural
community for at least thirty (30)
years are ancestral lands.
SECTION 2. The constructive or
traditional possession of lands and
resources by an indigenous cultural
community may also be recognized
subject to judicial affirmation, the
petition for which shall be instituted
within a period of ten (10) years from
the effectivity of this Act. The
procedure for judicial affirmation of
imperfect titles under existing laws
shall, as far as practicable, apply to
the judicial affirmation of titles to
ancestral lands.
The foregoing provisions
notwithstanding, titles secured under
the Torrens system, and rights already
vested under the provisions of existing
laws shall be respected.
SECTION 3. As used in this Act, the
phrase "indigenous cultural
community" refers to Filipino citizens
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12
residing in the Autonomous Region
who are:
(1) Tribal peoples whose social,
cultural and economic conditions
distinguish them from other sectors of
the national community and whose
status is regulated wholly or partially
by their own customs or traditions or
by special laws or regulations; and
(2) Bangsa Moro people regarded
as indigenous on account of their
descent from the populations that
inhabited the country or a distinct
geographical area at the time of
conquest or colonization and who,
irrespective of their legal status,
retain some or all of their own
socioeconomic, cultural and political
institutions.
SECTION 4. The customary laws,
traditions, and practices of indigenous
cultural communities on land claims
and ownership and settlement of land
disputes shall be implemented and
enforced among the members of such
community.
SECTION 5. The Regional
Government shall require
corporations, companies and other
entities within the ancestral domain of
the indigenous cultural communities
whose operations adversely affect the
ecological balance to take the
necessary preventive measures and
safeguards in order to maintain such a
balance.
SECTION 6. Unless authorized by
the Regional Assembly, lands of the
ancestral domain titled to or owned by
an indigenous cultural community
shall not be disposed of to
nonmembers.
SECTION 7. No portion of the
ancestral domain shall be open to
resettlement by nonmembers of the
indigenous cultural communities.
SECTION 8. Subject to the
Constitution and national policies, the
Regional Assembly shall enact an
Agrarian Reform Law suitable to the
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
special circumstances prevailing in
the Autonomous Region.
ARTICLE XIII
ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
SECTION 1. Consistent with the
Constitution and national policies, the
Regional Government may enact
regional laws pertaining to the
national economy and patrimony
applicable and responsive to the needs
of the Region. However, nothing
herein shall be construed as to
authorize the Regional Government to
require lesser standards respecting
the protection, conservation and
enhancement of the natural resources
than those required by the National
Government.
SECTION 2. Except for strategic
minerals such as uranium, coal,
petroleum, and other fossil fuels,
mineral oils, all sources of potential
energy, as well as national reserves
and aquatic parks, forest and
watershed reservations as may be
delimited by national law, the control
and supervision over the exploration,
utilization and development of the
natural resources of the Autonomous
Region is hereby delegated to the
Regional Government in accordance
with the Constitution and national
laws.
The Regional Assembly shall have the
authority to grant franchises and
concessions but the Regional
Governor may, by regional law, be
authorized to grant leases, permits
and licenses: Provided, That, any
lease, permit, franchise or concession
shall cover an area not exceeding the
limits allowed by the Constitution and
shall subsist for a period not
exceeding twenty-five (25) years;
Provided, further, That existing leases,
permits, licenses, franchises and
concessions shall be respected until
their expiration unless legally
terminated as provided by law; and
Provided, finally, That when the
natural resources are located within
the ancestral domain, the permit,
______________________________________________________________________________________
13
license, franchise or concession, shall
be approved by the Regional Assembly
after consultation with the cultural
community concerned.
SECTION 3. The exploration,
development and utilization of natural
resources, except those enumerated in
the first paragraph of Section 2
hereof, shall be allowed to all Filipinos
and to private enterprises, including
corporations, associations,
cooperatives, and such other similar
collective organizations with at least
sixty percent (60%) of their capital
investment or capital stocks directly
controlled or owned by Filipinos who
are preferably residents of the Region.
SECTION 4. Small-scale mining shall
receive support from and be regulated
by the Regional Government,
considering ecological balance, the
safety and health and the interest of
the communities and the miners
where such operations are conducted.
SECTION 5. The Regional
Government may, in the interest of
regional welfare and security,
establish and operate pioneering
utilities. Upon payment of just
compensation, it may transfer the
ownership of such utilities to
cooperatives or other collective
organizations.
SECTION 6. The Regional
Government may, in times of regional
emergency declared by the President,
when the public interest so requires
and under reasonable terms and
safeguards prescribed by the Regional
Assembly, temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately-
owned public utility or business
affected with public interest.
SECTION 7. The Regional Assembly
shall enact laws for the just
compensation, rehabilitation,
relocation, and other similar measures
of inhabitants adversely affected in
the harnessing of natural and mineral
resources in the Region.
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds 14

SECTION 13. In the delivery of power

The Regional Assembly shall likewise services, priority shall be given to
provide for the rehabilitation of the provinces in the area of autonomy
areas affected by said harnessing of which do not have direct access to
natural and mineral resources in the such services.
Region.
SECTION 14. The Regional
SECTION 8. The Regional Government is hereby empowered to
Government shall actively and create pioneering firms and other
immediately pursue reforestation business entities needed to boost
measures to ensure that at least fifty economic development in the Region.
(50%) of the land surface of the
Autonomous Region shall be covered Agriculture, Fisheries and Aquatic
with trees, giving priority to land Resources
strips along eighteen percent (18%) in
slope or over by providing SECTION 15. The Regional
infrastructure, financial and technical Government shall recognize, promote
support to upland communities and protect the rights and welfare of
especially the Lumads or tribal farmers, farmworkers, fishermen and
peoples. fishworkers, as well as farmers, and
fishworkers' cooperatives and
SECTION 9. The Regional associations.
Government shall prohibit the use,
importation, deposit, disposal and SECTION 16. The Regional
dumping of toxic or hazardous Government shall encourage
substances within the Autonomous agricultural productivity and promote
Region. a diversified and organic farming
system.
SECTION 10. The Regional
Government shall adopt policies to SECTION 17. The Regional
promote profit sharing and broaden Government shall give top priority to
the base of ownership of business the conservation, protection,
enterprises. utilization and development of soil and
water resources for agricultural
SECTION 11. The Regional purposes.
Government shall provide incentives,
including tax holidays, for investors in SECTION 18. The Regional Assembly
businesses that will contribute to the shall enact on Aquatic and Fisheries
development of the Region. Code which shall enhance, develop,
conserve and protect marine and
It shall provide the same incentives to aquatic resources, and shall protect
all companies doing business in the the rights of subsistence fishermen to
Region which reinvest at least fifty the preferential use of communal
percent (50%) of their net profits marine and fishing resources,
therein, and to all cooperatives which including seaweeds. This protection
reinvest at least ten percent (10%) of shall extend to offshore fishing
their surplus into socially-oriented grounds, up to and including all
projects in the Region. waters twelve (12) nautical miles from
the coastline of the Autonomous
SECTION 12. The Regional Region but within the territorial
Government shall give priority to the waters of the Philippines, regardless
establishment of transportation and of depth, the seabed and the subsoil
communication facilities for the that are included between two (2)
economic development of the region. lines drawn perpendicular to the
general coastline from points where

______________________________________________________________________________________
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds 15

the boundary lines of the Autonomous the central monetary authority of the
Region touch the sea at low tide and a National Government.
third line parallel to the general
coastline. SECTION 23. Subject to national
policies, the Regional Government
Further, it shall provide support to shall regulate traditional barter trade
subsistence fishermen through and countertrade with neighboring
appropriate technology and research, countries.
adequate financial, production and
marketing assistance and other SECTION 24. The Regional
services. Government shall encourage,
promote, undertake and support the
Fishworkers shall also receive a just establishment of economic zones,
share from their labor in the industrial centers and ports in
utilization of marine and fishing strategic areas and growth centers of
resources. the Region to attract local and foreign
investments and business enterprises.
Science, technology and other
disciplines shall be developed and SECTION 25. The Regional
employed to protect and maintain Government shall undertake measures
aquatic and marine ecology. to promote consumer education and to
ensure that the rights, interests and
SECTION 19. The Regional Assembly welfare of the consumers are
may, by law, create a Bureau of protected.
Agriculture and Fisheries and define
its composition, powers and functions. SECTION 26. The Regional
Government shall promote the
Trade and Industry preferential use of labor and locally
produced goods and materials by
SECTION 20. The Regional adopting measures to increase their
Government recognizes the private competitiveness.
sector as the prime mover of trade,
commerce and industry. It shall SECTION 27. Subject to the
encourage and support Constitution and national policies, the
entrepreneurial capability in the Regional Government shall regulate
Region and shall recognize, promote and exercise authority over foreign
and protect cooperatives. investments within its jurisdiction in
accordance with its goals and
SECTION 21. The Regional priorities.
Government shall promote and protect
small and medium-scale cottage Tourism Development
industries by providing assistance
such as marketing opportunities, SECTION 28. The Regional
financial support, tax incentives, Government shall, with the assistance
appropriate and alternative of the National Government and the
technology and technical training to participation of the private sector,
produce semi-finished and finished develop tourism as a positive
products. instrument toward accelerated
regional development. Tourism
SECTION 22. The Regional development shall promote greater
Government shall give support and pride in and commitment to the
encouragement to the establishment nation: Provided, That the diverse
of banks in accordance with the cultural heritage, and moral and
principles of the Islamic banking spiritual values of the people in the
system, subject to the supervision by

______________________________________________________________________________________
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
Autonomous Region shall be primarily
considered and respected.
SECTION 29. The Regional Assembly
may, by law, create a Tourism office,
and shall define its composition,
powers and functions.
RA 7076
People's Small-Scale Mining Act
SECTION 7. Ancestral Lands. — No
ancestral land may be declared as a
people's small-scale mining area
without the prior consent of the
cultural communities concerned:
Provided, That, if ancestral lands are
declared as people's small-scale
mining areas, the members of the
cultural communities therein shall be
given priority in the awarding of
small-scale mining contracts.
RA 7586
National Integrated Protected
Areas System
Sec 4
d. "Indigenous cultural community"
refers to a group of people sharing
common bonds of language, customs,
traditions and other distinctive
cultural traits, and who have, since
time immemorial, occupied, possessed
and utilized a territory;
SECTION 13. Ancestral Lands and
Rights Over Them. — Ancestral lands
and customary rights and interest
arising shall be accorded due
recognition. The DENR shall prescribe
rules and regulations to govern
ancestral lands within protected
areas: Provided, That the DENR shall
have no power to evict indigenous
communities from their present
occupancy nor resettle them to
another area without their consent:
Provided, however, That all rules and
regulations, whether adversely
affecting said communities or not,
shall be subjected to notice and
hearing to be participated in by
______________________________________________________________________________________
16
members of concerned indigenous
community.
RA 7611
Palawan Strategic Environmental Plan
SECTION 11. Tribal Ancestral
Lands. — These areas, traditionally
occupied by cultural minorities,
comprise both land and sea areas.
These shall be treated in the same
graded system of control and
prohibition as in the others
abovementioned except for stronger
emphasis in cultural considerations.
The SEP, therefore, shall define a
special kind of zonation to fulfill the
material and cultural needs of the
tribes using consultative processes
and cultural mapping of the ancestral
lands.
RA 7942
Mining Act of 1995
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. —
As used in and for purposes of this
Act, the following terms, whether in
singular or plural, shall mean:
(a) "Ancestral lands" refers to all
lands exclusively and actually
possessed, occupied, or utilized by
indigenous cultural communities by
themselves or through their ancestors
in accordance with their customs and
traditions since time immemorial, and
as may be defined and delineated by
law.
SECTION 4. Ownership of Mineral
Resources. — Mineral resources are
owned by the State and the
exploration, development, utilization,
and processing thereof shall be under
its full control and supervision. The
State may directly undertake such
activities or it may enter into mineral
agreements with contractors.
SECTION 16. Opening of Ancestral
Lands for Mining Operations. — No
ancestral land shall be opened for
mining operations without the prior
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
consent of the indigenous cultural
community concerned.
SECTION 17. Royalty Payments for
Indigenous Cultural Communities. —
In the event of an agreement with an
indigenous cultural community
pursuant to the preceding section, the
royalty payment, upon utilization of
the minerals shall be agreed upon by
the parties. The said royalty shall
form part of a trust fund for the
socioeconomic well-being of the
indigenous cultural community.
SECTION 18. Areas Open to Mining
Operations. — Subject to any existing
rights or reservations and prior
agreements of all parties, all mineral
resources in public or private lands,
including timber or forestlands as
defined in existing laws, shall be open
to mineral agreements or financial or
technical assistance agreement
applications. Any conflict that may
arise under this provision shall be
heard and resolved by the panel of
arbitrators.
SECTION 19. Areas Closed to Mining
Applications. — Mineral agreement or
financial or technical assistance
agreement applications shall not be
allowed:
(a) In military and other
government reservations, except upon
prior written clearance by the
government agency concerned;
(b) Near or under public or private
buildings, cemeteries, archeological
and historic sites, bridges, highways,
waterways, railroads, reservoirs, dams
or other infrastructure projects, public
or private works including plantations
or valuable crops, except upon written
consent of the government agency or
private entity concerned;
(c) In areas covered by valid and
existing mining rights;
(d) In areas expressly prohibited
by law;
(e) In areas covered by small-scale
miners as defined by law unless with
prior consent of the small-scale
miners, in which case a royalty
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17
payment upon the utilization of
minerals shall be agreed upon by the
parties, said royalty forming a trust
fund for the socioeconomic
development of the community
concerned; and
(f) Old growth or virgin forests,
proclaimed watershed forest reserves,
wilderness areas, mangrove forests,
mossy forests, national parks,
provincial/municipal forests, parks,
greenbelts, game refuge and bird
sanctuaries as defined by law and in
areas expressly prohibited under the
National Integrated Protected Areas
System (NIPAS) under Republic Act
No. 7586, Department Administrative
Order No. 25, series of 1992 and other
laws.
RA 8425
Social Reform Agenda
SECTION 4. Adoption and
Integration of Social Reform Agenda
(SRA) in the National Anti-Poverty
Action Agenda. — The National Anti-
Poverty Action Agenda shall
principally include the core principles
and programs of the Social Reform
Agenda (SRA). The SRA shall have a
multi-dimensional approach to poverty
consisting of the following reforms:
(1) Social dimension access to
quality basic services. — These are
reforms which refer to equitable
control and access to social services
and facilities such as education,
health, housing, and other basic
services which enable the citizens to
meet their basic human needs and to
live decent lives;
(2) Economic dimension asset
reform and access to economic
opportunities. — Reforms which
address the existing inequities in the
ownership, distribution, management
and control over natural and man-
made resources from which they earn
a living or increase the fruits of their
labor;
(3) Ecological dimension
sustainable development of productive
resources. — Reforms which ensure
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds 18

the effective and sustainable ON LEGAL MYTHS AND INDIGENOUS

utilization of the natural and PEOPLES: RE-EXAMINING CARINO VS.
ecological resource base, thus INSULAR GOVERNMENT
assuring greater social acceptability (MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN)
and increased participation of the
basic sectors in environmental and Concept of Ownership
natural resources conservation, There is nothing necessary or
management and development; natural in ownership, as it is understood
(4) Governance dimension now under our Phil. Legal System. The
democratizing the decision-making concept of property and ownership arise
and management processes. — and take shape not because of any
Reforms which enable the basic physical or material attribute of the thing
sectors to effectively participate in being owned. Rather, these concepts
decision-making and management are reflections of human associations in
processes that affect their rights, relation to things. In other words,
interests and welfare. specific cultures create their own set of
property relationships. Under the Civil
Code, one is said to own a piece of land
The SRA shall focus on the following
when he exercise, to the exclusion of all
sector-specific flagship programs: others, the right to use, enjoy its fruits
(1) For farmers and landless rural and alienate or dispose of it in any
workers — agricultural development; manner not prohibited by law. Among
(2) For the fisherfolk — fisheries the indigenous, unwesternized or
and aquatic resources conservation, unHispanized Phil. Population, there is no
management and development; such concept of individual and exclusive
(3) For the indigenous peoples and ownership of land. Ownership more
indigenous communities — respect, accurately applies to the tribal right to
protection and management of the use the land or territorial control.
ancestral domains; Ownership is tantamount to work. At
(4) For workers in the informal best, people consider themselves as
sector — workers' welfare and 'secondary owners' or stewards of the
protection; land, since beings of the spirit world are
(5) For the urban poor — considered as the true and primary or
socialized housing; and reciprocal owners of the land. There is
(6) For members of other also the concept of trusteeship since not
only the present generation but also the
disadvantaged groups such as the
future ones possess the right to the land.
women, children, youth, persons with
disabilities, the elderly, and victims of
natural and man-made calamities —
the Comprehensive Integrated
Delivery of Social Services (CIDSS).
Additionally, to support the sectoral
flagship programs, the following
cross-sectoral flagships shall likewise
be instituted:
(1) Institution-building and
effective participation in governance;
(2) Livelihood programs;
(3) Expansion of micro-
credit/microfinance services and
capability building; and
(4) Infrastructure buildup and
development.

______________________________________________________________________________________
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
The ‘Relevance’ of Legal Issues:
Carino Revisited
In a paper written by the
Cordillera Studies Program, they point
out that the Ibaloi, where Carino
belonged, had no concept of exclusive or
alienable ownership. Ownership, as we
understand it, was only a relatively new
development and which by custom
applied only to pasture land. The court
focused only on the issue whether
plaintiff owned the land, without focusing
on the kind of property tenure Carino
had with respect to the land. The law,
which the judge was implementing, was
simply not equipped to assist him
discover this important point.
The ruling in Carino is so broad
that when used indiscriminately as the
sole ground to recognize and protect
ancestral domains it will work a
contradiction. At the same time that it
provides an avenue to protect ‘native
titles,’ it opens floodgates for
enterprising lowlanders to take
advantage of the uplander’s legal
ignorance. Their land become as
alienable as any other property as
conceived by the national legal system.
The Attempt to entrench Carino as a
statutory doctrine
The subsequent attempt at
statutory articulation – like the Public
Land Act, Sec. 48 (c) of CA 141 and RA
3872 – only worsened the situation.
They seem to build up on the Carino
doctrine. The truth is that its concept is
totally different. First, unlike Carino, the
provisions do not require possession by
individuals under a claim of private
ownership for ‘as far back as testimony
or memory goes.’ A mere thirty years
possession is sufficient. Second, Carino
establishes the precedent that the native
tittle is ‘presumed never to have been
public.’ Sec. 48 of CA 141 starts from
the presumption that the land is initially
part of the public domain. Like Carino
however, the concept of ownership
remains. The prevailing rule is that the
lapse of 30 years adverse possession is
enough to vest title ipso facto. Judicial
confirmation is only a formality.
These rights however, can work
against indigenous peoples. First, the
recognition of his ‘native title’ has served
to make his land alienable in every sense
______________________________________________________________________________________
19
provided by the national legal system.
Its disposition is not confined only to
members of his kin or of his village.
Ironically, while reiterating ‘native’ right
to ancestral land, the decisions make it
possible for a private corporation to
acquire the land from the indigenous
holder – just what happened in the case
of Acme. Second, the awareness of the
rights provided by the outsider’s laws
will definitely be a tempting opportunity
for a member of a community to treat
land, not as something that sustains life
that should be revered, but as a
commodity that could be sold for profit.
The Bias against indigenous concept
of ownership
Other laws applicable to
indigenous cultural communities reveal a
similar bias against indigenous concept
of ownership the constitution
notwithstanding. The concept of private
right as defined in the Revised Forestry
Code excludes orchards and forests since
they are ‘plantations of forest and trees
of economic value.’ The Kalinga,
however, would ‘own’ the residential
area, the sacred shrine, the burial
grounds and possibly the rice terraces.
Likewise, a large part of the ancestral
domain is expressly excluded by the
provision which reads: ‘No land of the
public domain 18% in slope or over shall
be classified as alienable and
disposable…’ It is obvious that in Gran
Cordillera, which is so mountainous,
virtually all populated areas under this
provision are inalienable and
indisposable, such that the land cannot
be owned by the inhabitants thereof.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES (MARVIC LEONEN)
On October 29, 1997, the
President signed into law Republic Act
No. 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997.
Formally, the law is the legislature’s
interpretation of some key provisions of
the Constitution directly relating to
indigenous peoples – particularly Sec.
22, Article II and Sec. 5, Article XII. IPRA
implements these provisions in the
following ways:
Civil and Political Rights
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
Foremost in the law is its
recognition of the right to on-
discrimination of indigenous peoples
(IPs). Discrimination against the
‘cultural minority,’ as shown in the cases
of People vs. Cayat and Rubi vs.
Provincial Board are not only archaic but
also outlawed. IPs are entitled to the
same rights and privileges as citizens
and should not be discriminated against
in a any form of employment and should
receive more appropriate forms of basic
services. The new law even goes further
to ensure the rights of women, children
and civilians in situations of armed
conflict. There is also recognition of IPs
right to self-governance. Likewise, the
new law defines more precisely the
concept of customary law, which will be
used not only to arrive at an amicable
settlement but also to process it in an
acceptable manner – that is, the
offended party may opt to use the
customary processes rather than have
the offender prosecuted in the courts of
law.
Social and Cultural Rights
IPRA requires that the
educational system should become
relevant to the needs of children and
young people as well as provide them
with cultural opportunities. Cultural
diversity is recognized. The rights to
religion as well as to cultural sites and
ceremonies are guaranteed. It is now
unlawful to excavate archaeological sites
in order to obtain materials of cultural
value as well as deface or destroy
artifacts.
Recognizing Right and Tenure
to Natural Resources
IPRA supplements the private
vested rights recognized by the
Constitution by the operation of Carnino,
through rights acquired under the Public
Land Act and other similar laws. It also
creates by law other sources as well as a
different concept of ownership. By
legislative fiat, ancestral domains and
ancestral lands are now legitimate ways
of acquiring ownership. Unlike emphasis
on individual and corporate holders in
the Civil Code, IPRA emphasizes ‘private
but community’ property nature of
ancestral domains. Aside from not being
______________________________________________________________________________________
20
a proper subject of sale or any other
mode of disposition, ancestral domain
holders may claim ownership over the
resources within their territory, develop
the land and natural resources, stay in
the territory, have the rights against
involuntary displacement, regulate the
entry of migrants, have rights to safe
and clean air and water, claim parts of
reservations and use customary law to
resolve their conflicts. These rights
however need to be qualified by the ff.
provisions: 1) Sec. 56: Existing Property
Rights Regimes; 2) Sec. 57: Granting
only priority rights to members of
indigenous cultural communities; and 3)
Sec. 58: Allows the use of ancestral
domains as critical watersheds,
mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries,
wilderness, protected areas when
deemed appropriate and with the full
participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned.
Creating a National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples
This will act as a mechanism to
coordinate implementation of the law as
well as a final authority that has
jurisdiction to issue Certificates of
Ancestral Domains/Land Titles.
THE POLICY CONTEXT
This includes the direct action
taken by the communities themselves to
ward off encroachments into their
territory and threatening their existence,
as assisted/organized by various POs and
NGOs. There are also various responses
from post EDSA governments which
reveal the extent of advocacy for
indigenous peoples rights. Lastly, there
is the pressure from international funding
institutions like the World Bank and the
Asian Development Bank. Funding for
projects had a lot to do with the
changing attitude of the government
relinquishing control over large portions
of the public domain and recognizing
rights of upland migrants.
THE DANGERS
IPRA is not the solution to the
various problems of IPs. Being a national
law, it is too general to address the
diversity of the indigenous communities.
The premise of national law is that it can
meet local problems with generalized
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
solutions. The premise of cultural
diversity is able to find creative and
unique approaches to the issues as they
define them. The law can also be
diversionary. It can involve peoples and
communities into concerns and activities
which may far be removed from those
which might better address their
concerns – bureaucratisation. Lastly, the
present language and the new concept
of IPRA encourage litigation. Even those
situations where the law prescribes
customary law will require some form of
litigation to determine for instance
whether a particular form is customary,
to whom it will apply, etc. Normally, it is
the party that has the most resources
that has the greater possibility of getting
a better judgment. Bsid4es, courts of
law provide a culture that is radically
different from that of the indigenous
community.
THE POTENTIALS
Our own experience has shown
that the laws even when they find their
way to hegemony, is not a monolith that
could not be challenged. It adjusts to
political advocacy. They also provide for
the condition for change. The use of law
in many situations of IPs therefore should
be marginal. Important but marginal
nonetheless. Advocates need to be more
strategic – to understand the long term
needs and aspirations of the community
as the latter defines them. The
challenge for advocates is to know when
to use the law, not so much to maintain
the status quo, but to gain leverage for a
more just and fundamental change. Its
potential lies not in what it really
contains, but in how we decide and when
to use it.
How is IPRA different from Carino?
(1) Carino does not distinguish between
ancestral land and ancestral domain.
IPRA does, however.
(2) Carino refers only to land. IPRA
refers to land as well as the natural
resources above and below it.
(3) IPRA is applicable only to indigenous
peoples. Carino applies to all
persons who can prove that their
______________________________________________________________________________________
21
predecessors-in-interest occupied
lands since time immemorial.
II. LAND CLASSIFICATION
 Requires a positive act from the
government
REPUBLIC v. IMPERIAL
February 11, 1999
Exclusive prerogative of the Executive
Department through the Office of the
President, more specifically, the Director
of the Land Management Bureau. The
decision of the Director, when approved
by the DENR Secretary, as to questions of
fact, is conclusive upon the courts.
Lands of the public domain are classified
into 4 categories:
(1) Agricultural land
(2) Forest or timber land
(3) Mineral land
(4) National parks
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE XII
National Economy and Patrimony
Section 3. Lands of the public
domain are classified into agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks. Agricultural lands of
the public domain may be further
classified by law according to the uses
which they may be devoted. Alienable
lands of the public domain shall be
limited to agricultural lands. Private
corporations or associations may not
hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, for a period
not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-
five years, and not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area. Citizens of
the Philippines may lease not more
than five hundred hectares, or acquire
not more than twelve hectares thereof
by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds 22

Taking into account the disposition or concession under this

requirements of conservation, ecology, Act.
and development, and subject to the
requirements of agrarian reform, the SEC. 58. Any tract of land of the
Congress shall determine, by law, the public domain which, being neither
size of lands of the public domain timber nor mineral land, is intended to
which may be acquired, developed, be used for residential purposes or for
held, or leased and the conditions commercial, industrial, or other
therefor. productive purposes other than
agricultural, and is open to disposition
Section 4. The Congress shall, as or concession, shall be disposed of
soon as possible, determine by law the under the pro-visions of this chapter
specific limits of forest lands and and not otherwise.
national parks, marking clearly their
boundaries on the ground. Thereafter, SEC. 59. The lands disposable
such forest lands and national parks under this title shall be classified as
shall be conserved and may not be follows:
increased nor diminished, except by (a) Lands reclaimed by the
law. The Congress shall provide, for Government by dredging, filing, or
such period as it may determine, other means;
measures to prohibit logging in (b) Foreshore; (may be disposed of
endangered forests and watershed only by lease – Imperial v. CA; Feb. 11,
areas. 1999)
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered
with water bordering upon the shores
A. Classes of Lands or banks of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of
Public Agricultural Lands the foregoing classes.

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 141* Rules on the Disposition and

AN ACT TO AMEND AND COMPILE Exploitation of Agricultural Lands of
THE LAWS RELATIVE TO LANDS OF the Public Domain:
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN  Qualified individual:
 may acquire a maximum of 12
SEC. 6. The President, upon the hectares
recommendation of the Secretary of  may lease a maximum of 500
Agriculture and Commerce, shall from hectares
time to time classify the lands of the
 Private corporations or associations:
public domain into —
(a) Alienable or disposable,  may not acquire
(b) Timber, and  may lease a maximum of 1,000
(c) Mineral lands, hectares for a period of 25 years,
and may at any time and in a like renewable for another 25 years
manner transfer such lands from one  Aliens:
class to another, for the purposes of  cannot acquire nor lease
their administration and disposition.
Rules on the Disposition and
SEC. 7. For the purposes of the Exploitation of Private Lands (lands of
administration and disposition of private ownership):
alien-able or disposable public lands,
 Filipino citizens:
the President, upon recommendation
by the Secretary of Agriculture and  may acquire
Commerce, shall from time to time  may lease
declare what lands are open to  Filipino corporations or associations:
 may acquire

______________________________________________________________________________________
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds 23

 may lease classifies the public lands in the Philippine

 Aliens: Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural
 cannot acquire, but may lease lands, and all public lands that are not
timber or mineral lands are necessarily
 however, the lease must agricultural public lands, whether they are
not be to such an extent used as nipa swamps, manglares
that the lessor is virtually [mangroves], fisheries or ordinary farm
deprived of all rights of lands.
ownership and is almost
tantamount to an alienation ANKRON V. GOVERNMENT
of property 40 PHIL. 10 (1919)
 exceptions:
a. hereditary succession The Torrens system does not
b. former natural-born Filipino provide for registration of public forestry and
citizens mineral lands. Under certain conditions,
i.
urban land = 5,000 m2 public agricultural lands may be registered.
ii.
rural land = 3 hectares (Sec. 54, Act No. 926.)
Considering that it is a matter of
public knowledge that a majority of the lands
MONTANO V. INSULAR GOVERNMENT in the Philippine Islands are agricultural
12 PHIL. 572 lands, the courts have a right to presume, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, that
in each case the lands are agricultural lands.
Lands under the ebb and flow of the
The mere fact that a tract of land has trees
tide, being reserved for public uses of
upon it or has mineral wealth within it, is not
navigation and fishery and subject to
in itself sufficient to declare that one is
Congressional regulation, are not
forestry land and the other mineral land.
understood as included in the term "public
There must be some proof of the extent and
lands" when used in general laws
present or future value of the forestry and of
authorizing private appropriation thereof as
the mineral. The proof must show that it is
homesteads or otherwise. Swamps and
more valuable for the forestry or the
marshes not available for the purpose of
minerals which it contains than it is for
navigation or public uses may be subjected
agricultural purposes.
to private appropriation although covered by
Whether the particular land is
the tides.
agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a
Of this character are the manglar or
question to be settled in each particular
mangrove swamps of the Philippine Islands
case, unless the Bureau of Forestry has,
in which grow aquatic trees cultivated and in
under the authority conferred upon it, prior to
common use for domestic or commercial
the intervention of private interests, set
purposes. Such manglares when converted
by man into fisheries and used as such for
aside for forestry or mineral purposes the
the statutory period are the subject of private
particular land in question.
ownership.
HEIRS OF AMUNATEGUI V. DIRECTOR
126 SCRA 69
JOCSON V. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
39 PHIL. 560
A forested area classified as forest
land of the public domain does not lose such
That manglares are not forestry
classification simply because loggers or
lands, within the meaning of the words
settlers may have stripped it of its forest
"timber lands" in the Act of Congress, has
cover. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
been definitely decided by this court in the
mountains or in out of the way places.
case of Montano vs. Insular Government.
Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees,
Whatever may have been the meaning of
nipa palms, and other tress growing in
the term "forestry" under the Spanish law,
brackish or sea water may also be classified
the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902,

______________________________________________________________________________________
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the
land actually looks like. Unless and until the
land classified as "forest" is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it
may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
Possession of forest lands, no matter
how long, cannot ripen into private
ownership. A positive act of Government is
needed to declassify land which is classified
as forest and to convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes.
REPUBLIC V. DE PORKAN
151 SCRA 88
It is the exclusive prerogative of the
Executive Department of the Government to
classify public lands. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the
land actually looks like. Since the disputed
tract of public land is neither timber nor
mineral lands, the same is alienable or open
to disposition as public agricultural lands,
under Section 11, C.A. 141 thru homestead
settlement or free patent.
Where the possession of a public land
dates back to the time of the Spanish
colonial period, such possession of the said
tract of public land has attained the
character and duration prescribed by law as
the equivalent of an express grant from the
Government. The mandate of the law itself
is that the possessors "shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title"
and by legal fiction, the land ceases to be
public and thus becomes private land. Title
over the land has vested on the possessor
so as to segregate the land from the mass of
the public domain. It is not necessary that a
certificate of title should be issued in order
that said grant may be sustained by the
courts, an application therefor being
sufficient.
When a homesteader has complied with
all the terms and conditions which entitle
him to a patent for a particular tract of public
land, he acquires a vested interest therein,
and is to be regarded as the equitable owner
______________________________________________________________________________________
24
thereof, and once the right to a patent has
become vested in a purchaser of public
lands, it is equivalent to a patent actually
issued. From that point the land ceases to
be part of the public domain and becomes
private. The Director of Lands is divested of
control and possession when homestead
applications are approved and recorded.
Forest Lands
May 19, 1975
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 705
FORESTRY REFORM CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Sec. 15. Topography. - No land of
the public domain eighteen per cent
(18%) in slope or over shall be
classified as alienable and disposable,
nor any forest land fifty per cent
(50%) in slope or over, as grazing
land.
Lands eighteen per cent (18%)
in slope or over which have already
been declared as alienable and
disposable shall be reverted to the
classification of forest lands by the
Department Head, to form part of the
forest reserves, unless they are
already covered by existing titles or
approved public land application, or
actually occupied openly, continuously,
adversely and publicly for a period of
not less than thirty (30) years as of the
effectivity of this Code, where the
occupant is qualified for a free patent
under the Public Land Act: Provided,
That said lands, which are not yet part
of a well-established communities,
shall be kept in a vegetative condition
sufficient to prevent erosion and
adverse effects on the lowlands and
streams: Provided, further, That when
public interest so requires, steps shall
be taken to expropriate, cancel
defective titles, reject public land
application, or eject occupants
thereof.
Sec. 16. Areas needed for forest
purposes. - The following lands, even
if they are below eighteen per cent
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds 25

(18%) in slope, are needed for forest

purposes, and may not, therefore, be Mineral Lands
classified as alienable and disposable
land, to wit: REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942
1) Areas less than 250 hectares Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
which are far from, or are not
contiguous with, any certified Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. - As
alienable and disposable land; used in and for purposes of this Act,
2) Isolated patches of forest of at the following terms, whether in
least five (5) hectares with rocky singular or plural, shall mean:
terrain, or which protect a spring for
communal use; (aa) "Minerals" refers to all
3) Areas which have already been naturally occurring inorganic
reforested; substance in solid, gas, liquid, or any
4) Areas within forest concessions intermediate state excluding energy
which are timbered or have good materials such as coal, petroleum,
residual stocking to support an natural gas, radioactive materials, and
existing, or approved to be geothermal energy.
established, wood processing plant; (ab) "Mineral agreement" means a
5) Ridge tops and plateaus contract between the government and
regardless of size found within, or a contractor, involving mineral
surrounded wholly or partly by, forest production-sharing agreement, co-
lands where headwaters emanate; production agreement, or joint-
6) Appropriately located road- venture agreement.
rights-or-way; (ac) "Mineral land" means any
7) Twenty-meter strips of land area where mineral resources are
along the edge of the normal high found.
waterline of rivers and streams with (ad) "Mineral resource" means
channels of at least five (5) meters any concentration of minerals/rocks
wide; with potential economic value.
8) Strips of mangrove or (ae) "Mining area" means a portion
swamplands at least twenty (20) of the contract area identified by the
meters wide, along shorelines facing contractor for purposes of
oceans, lakes, and other bodies of development, mining, utilization, and
water, and strips of land at least its sites for support facilities or in the
twenty (20) meters wide facing lakes; immediate vicinity of the mining
9) Areas needed for other operations.
purposes, such as national parks, (af) "Mining operation" means
national historical sites, game refuges mining activities involving exploration,
and wildlife sanctuaries, forest station feasibility, development, utilization,
sites, and others of public interest; and processing.
and
10) Areas previously proclaimed by
the President as forest reserves, National Parks
national parks, game refuge, bird
sanctuaries, national shrines, national REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7586
historic sites: National Integrated Protected
Provided, That in case an area falling Areas System Act of 1992
under any of the foregoing categories
shall have been titled in favor of any Sec. 4. Definition of Terms. -
person, steps shall be taken, if public For purposes of this Act, the following
interest so requires, to have said title terms shall be defined as follows:
cancelled or amended, or the titled
area expropriated. (b) "Protected area" refers to
identified portions of land and water

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Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds 26

set aside by reason of their unique characterized by the harmonious

physical and biological significance, interaction of man and land while
managed to enhance biological providing opportunities for public
diversity and protected against enjoyment through recreation and
destructive human exploitation; tourism within the normal lifestyle and
economic activity of these areas;
(c) "Buffer zones" are identified
areas outside the boundaries of and (j) "Resources reserve" is an
immediately adjacent to designated extensive and relatively isolated and
protected areas pursuant to Section 8 uninhabited are normally with difficult
that need special development control access designated as such to protect
in order to avoid or minimize harm to natural resources of the area for
the protected area; future use and prevent or contain
development activities that could
(e) "National park" refers to a affect the resource pending the
forest reservation essentially of establishment of objectives which are
natural wilderness character which based upon appropriate knowledge
has been withdrawn from settlement, and planning;
occupancy or any form of exploitation
except in conformity with approved (k) "Strict nature reserve" is an
management plan and set aside as area possessing some outstanding
such exclusively to conserve the area ecosystem, features and/or species of
or preserve the scenery, the natural flora and fauna of national scientific
and historic objects, wild animals and importance maintained to protect
plants therein and to provide nature and maintain processes in an
enjoyment of these features in such undisturbed state in order to have
areas; ecologically representative examples
of the natural environment available
(f) "Natural monument" is a for scientific study, environmental
relatively small area focused on monitoring, education, and for the
protection of small features to protect maintenance of genetic resources in a
or preserve nationally significant dynamic and evolutionary state;
natural features on account of their
special interest or unique (l) "Tenured migrant
characteristics; communities" are communities within
protected areas which have actually
(g) "Natural biotic area" is an and continuously occupied such areas
area set aside to allow the way of life for five (5) years before the
of societies living in harmony with the designation of the same as protected
environment to adopt to modern areas in accordance with this Act and
technology at their pace; are solely dependent therein for
subsistence; and
(h) "Natural park" is a relatively
large area not materially altered by (m) "Wildlife sanctuary"
human activity where extractive comprises an area which assures the
resources uses are not allowed and natural conditions necessary to
maintained to protect outstanding protect nationally significant species,
natural and scenic areas of national or groups of species, biotic communities
international significance for or physical features of the
scientific, educational and environment where these may require
recreational use; specific human manipulation for their
perpetuation.
(i) "Protected
landscapes/seascapes" are areas of Sec. 5. Establishment and
national significance which are Extent of the System. - The

______________________________________________________________________________________
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
establishment and operationalization
of the System shall involve the
following:
(a) All areas or islands in the
Philippine proclaimed, designated or
set aside, pursuant to a law,
presidential decree, presidential
proclamation or executive order as
national park, game refuge, bird and
wildlife sanctuary, wilderness are,
strict nature reserve, watershed,
mangrove reserve, fish sanctuary,
natural and historical landmark,
protected and managed
landscape/seascapes as well as
identified virgin forests before the
effectivity of this Act are hereby
designated as initial components of
the System. The initial components of
the System shall be governed by
existing laws, rules and regulations,
not inconsistent with this Act;
(b) Within one (1) year from the
effectivity of this Act, the DENR shall
submit to the Senate and the House of
Representatives a map and legal
description or natural boundaries of
each protected area initially
comprising the System. Such maps
and legal descriptions shall, by virtue
of this Act, constitute the official
documentary representation of the
entire System, subject to such
changes as Congress deems
necessary;
(c) All DENR records pertaining to
said protected areas, including maps
and legal descriptions or natural
boundaries, copies of rules and
regulations governing them, copies of
public notices of, and reports
submitted to Congress regarding
pending additions, eliminations, or
modifications shall be made available
to the public. These legal documents
pertaining to protected areas shall
also be available to the public in the
respective DENR Regional Offices,
Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Offices (PENROs) and
Community Environment and Natural
______________________________________________________________________________________
27
Resources Offices (CENROs) where
NIPAS areas are located;
(d) Within three (3) years from the
effectivity of this Act, the DENR shall
study and review each area tentatively
composing the System as to its
suitability or nonsuitability for
preservation as protected area and
inclusion in the System according to
the categories established in Section 3
hereof and report its findings to the
President as soon as each study is
completed. The study must include in
each area:
(1) A forest occupants survey;
(2) An ethnographic study;
(3) A protected area resource
profile;
(4) Land use plans done in
coordination with the respective
Regional Development Councils; and
(5) Such other background studies
as will be sufficient bases for
selection.
The DENR shall:
(i) Notify the public of the
proposed action through publication
in a newspaper of general circulation,
and such other means as the System
deems necessary in the area or areas
in the vicinity of the affected land
thirty (30) days prior to the public
hearing.
(ii) Conduct public hearing at the
locations nearest to the area affected;
(iii) At the least thirty (30) days
prior to the date of hearing advise all
local government units (LGUs) in the
affected areas, national agencies
concerned, people's organizations and
nongovernment organizations and
invite such officials to submit their
views on the proposed action at the
hearing not later than thirty (30) days
following the date of the hearing; and
(iv) Give due consideration to the
recommendations at the public
hearing; and provide sufficient
explanation for his recommendations
contrary to the general sentiments
expressed in the public hearing;
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds 28

(e) Upon receipt of the turn, advice Congress.

recommendations of the DENR the Disestablishment of a protected area
President shall issue a presidential under the System or modification of
proclamation designating the its boundary shall take effect pursuant
recommended areas as protected to an act of Congress. Thereafter, said
areas and providing for measures for area shall revert to the category of
their protection until such time when public forest unless otherwise
Congress shall have enacted a law classified by Congress: Provided,
finally declaring such recommended however, That after disestablishment
areas as part of the integrated by Congress, the Secretary may
protected area system; and recommend the transfer of such
disestablished area to other
(f) Thereafter, the President shall government agencies to serve other
send to the Senate and the House of priority programs of national interest.
Representatives his recommendations
with respect to the designations as
protected areas or reclassification of B. The Power to Classify Lands
each area on which review has been
completed, together with maps and EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 292
legal description of boundaries. The Title XIV - ENVIRONMENT AND
President, in his recommendation, NATURAL RESOURCES
may propose the alteration of existing
boundaries of any or all proclaimed Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. -
protected areas, additional of any The Department shall:
contiguous area of public land of
predominant physical and biological (10) Promulgate rules and
value. Nothing contained herein shall regulations necessary to:
limit the President to propose. as part (a) Accelerate cadastral
of this recommendation to Congress, and emancipation
additional areas which have not been patent surveys, land use
designated, proclaimed or set aside by planning and public
law, presidential decree, proclamation land titling:
or executive order as protected area/s.
(13) Assume responsibility for the
Sec. 6. Additional Areas to be assessment, development, protection,
Integrated to the System. - licensing and regulation as provided
Notwithstanding the establishment of for by law, where applicable, of all
the initial component of the System, energy and natural resources; the
the Secretary shall propose the regulation and monitoring of service
inclusion in the System of additional contractors, licensees, lessees, and
areas with outstanding physical permit for the extraction, exploration,
features, anthropological significance development and use of natural
and biological diversity in accordance resources products; the
with the provisions of Section 5(d). implementation of programs and
measures with the end in view of
Sec. 7. Disestablishment as promoting close collaboration
Protected Area. - When in the opinion between the government and the
of the DENR a certain protected area private sector; the effective and
should be withdrawn or efficient classification and
disestablished, or its boundaries subclassification of lands of the public
modified as warranted by a study and domain; and the enforcement of
sanctioned by the majority of the natural resources and environmental
members of the respective boards for laws, rules and regulations;
the protected area as herein
established in Section 11, it shall, in

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Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds 29

(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction those which may hereafter be

on the management and disposition of provided by law.
all lands of the public domain and
serve as the sole agency responsible Sec. 29. Organizational
for classification, sub-classification, Structure. - The Authority shall be
surveying and titling of lands in headed by an Administrator who shall
consultation with appropriate be assisted by two (2) Deputy
agencies; Administrators, all of whom shall be
appointed by the President upon the
Chapter 4 - THE DEPARTMENT recommendation of the Secretary.
FIELD OFFICES
Sec. 22. Provincial and Sec. 30. Reorganization of
Community Offices. - The Natural Registry Offices in the National
resources provincial and community Capital Region. - The Registries of
offices shall each be headed by a Deeds in the National Capital Region
provincial natural resource officer and is hereby reorganized as follows:
community natural resource officer, (1) The Registries of Deeds in the
respectively. They shall take over the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay and
functions of the district offices of the Caloocan shall be maintained;
former Bureau of Forest Development, (2) There is hereby created
Bureau of Lands, and Bureau of Mines Registries of Deeds in the
and Geo-Sciences. Municipalities of Navotas, Malabon,
Valenzuela, Mandaluyong, San Juan,
Marikina, Las Pinas and Paranaque
with jurisdiction over their respective
Title III - JUSTICE municipalities;
Chapter I - GENERAL PROVISIONS (3) The Registry of Deeds of Pasig
Sec. 4. Organizational shall be maintained with jurisdiction
Structure. - The Department shall over the Municipalities of Pasig,
consist of the following constituent Taguig and Pateros; and
units: (4) The Registry of Deeds of
(1) Department proper; Makati shall have jurisdiction
(2) Office of the Government over the municipalities of
Corporate Counsel; Makati and Muntinlupa.
(3) National Bureau of
Investigation;
(4) Public Attorney's Office; C. The Power to Reclassify
(5) Board of Pardons and Parole;
(6) Parole and Probation Conversion: act or process of changing
Administration; the current use of a piece of agricultural
(7) Bureau of Corrections; land into some other use as approved by
(8) Land Registration Authority; the DAR
(9) Commission on the Settlement
of Land Problems. Reclassification: agricultural land is
“changed” into residential, commercial, or
Chapter 9 - LAND REGISTRATION industrial purposes by the LGU through a
AUTHORITY duly-enacted ordinance
Sec. 28. The Land Registration
Authority. - The Land Registration REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160
Authority, hereinafter referred to as Local Government Code
the Authority shall continue to
exercise its powers and functions Sec. 20. Reclassification of
under existing law on the Land Titles Lands. - (a) A city or municipality
and Deeds Registration Authority and may, through an ordinance passed by
the sanggunian after conducting

______________________________________________________________________________________
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
public hearings for the purpose,
authorize the reclassification of
agricultural lands and provide for the
manner of their utilization or
disposition in the following cases: (1)
when the land ceases to be
economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes as determined
by the Department of Agriculture or
(2) where the land shall have
substantially greater economic value
for residential, commercial, or
industrial purposes, as determined by
the sanggunian concerned: Provided,
That such reclassification shall be
limited to the following percentage of
the total agricultural land area at the
time of the passage of the ordinance:
(1) For highly urbanized and
independent component cities,
fifteen percent (15%);
(2) For component cities and first
to the third class municipalities, ten
percent (10%); and
(3) For fourth to sixth class
municipalities, five percent (5%):
Provided, further, That agricultural
lands distributed to agrarian reform
beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act
Numbered Sixty-six hundred fifty-
seven (R.A. No. 6657). otherwise
known as "The Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law", shall not be
affected by the said reclassification
and the conversion of such lands into
other purposes shall be governed by
Section 65 of said Act.
(b) The President may, when public
interest so requires and upon
recommendation of the National
Economic and Development Authority,
authorize a city or municipality to
reclassify lands in excess of the limits
set in the next preceding paragraph.
(c) The local government units
shall, in conformity with existing laws,
continue to prepare their respective
comprehensive land use plans enacted
through zoning ordinances which shall
be the primary and dominant bases for
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30
the future use of land resources:
Provided. That the requirements for
food production, human settlements,
and industrial expansion shall be
taken into consideration in the
preparation of such plans.
(d) Where approval by a national
agency is required for reclassification,
such approval shall not be
unreasonably withheld. Failure to act
on a proper and complete application
for reclassification within three (3)
months from receipt of the same shall
be deemed as approval thereof.
(e) Nothing in this Section shall be
construed as repealing, amending, or
modifying in any manner the
provisions of R.A. No. 6657.
III. THE TORRENS SYSTEM
A. General Themes
Modes of Acquiring Land Titles
(1) Public Grant
The conveyance of public land by the
government to a private individual. (i.e.
Spanish distribution of Public Lands by
issuance of royal grants and concessions)
No public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or
implied from government.
(2) Adverse Possession / Prescription
A possessor of land who may not be the
owner, after the lapse of a certain period
prescribed by law, may assert ownership
thereof as against anyone except the true
owner or one with a better title based on an
earlier possession which he had not
abandoned. Occupancy must be actual or
physical, adverse, open and notorious,
exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted,
coupled with the fact that it must be under
claim of ownership. It does not run against
private lands brought under the operation of
the Torrens system, nor against public lands
except where the law expressly so provides.
It is different from laches.
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
(3) Accretion
When soil and earth, weeds and other
deposits are washed away from other places
and gradually settle down and attach
themselves to one’s land that used to border
on a stream or local body of water, the
owner of the land becomes the owner of the
additional areas thus formed. (Art. 457 NCC)
It can not be invoked for areas fronting the
seashore as alluvial formations become part
of the public domain. Does not apply also to
lands adjoining a pond or lagoon with
respect to land left dry by the natural
decrease of water. If the accretion is formed
with the intervention of man, becomes part
of the public domain. Lands acquired by
accretion must still be registered to confirm
and protect the title of the owner. (also Art
461 NCC re: shifting course of riverbeds)
(4) Reclamation
Filling of submerged land by deliberate
act and reclaiming title thereto. In the
Philippines, it is only the government that
can assert title to reclaimed land.
(5) Private Grant or Voluntary Transfer
It is the usual means by which title to
land is transferred by the owner himself or
his duly authorized representative. Consent
of the grantor is an essential element. This
transfer is given effect by the voluntary
execution of a deed of conveyance in certain
prescribed form, completed by recording or
registration thereof in a public office. The
legal title to the land does not pass until the
conveyance shall have been registered or
made of public record.
(6) Involuntary Alienation
Transfers that do not require the
consent or cooperation of the owner of the
land. (i.e. expropriation, condemnation,
eminent domain, escheats, forfeiture,
foreclosure,…) Under this mode of acquiring
land, the purchasers are generally subject to
the rule of caveat emptor.
(7) Descent or Device
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31
May be acquired by virtue of hereditary
succession to the estate of a deceased
owner, or by devise if appropriate
dispositions were made in the testators will.
(8) Emancipation Patent or Grant
Land Reform:
- P.D. 27 / P.D. 266 – making tenant farmers
owners of the lands they till upon the
fulfillment of certain conditions.
- R.A. 6657 – The Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (Note, however, that
according to Prof. Gatmaytan, CARP falls
under the mode of involuntary alienation.)
Purpose
The purpose of the Torrens
system of land registration is to quiet title
to land: to put a stop forever to any
question of the legality of the title, except
as to claims which were noted at the time
of registration in the certificate or which
might arise subsequent thereto. (Umali v.
CA, Cruz v. CA)
The Torrens system facilitates
transactions involving real estate by giving
the public the right to rely upon the face of
a Torrens Certificate of Title, and to
dispense of the need of inquiring further,
except when the party concerned had
actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that should impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such
further inquiry. (Pino v. CA)
Every registered owner and
purchaser holds title to the property free
from all encumbrances not noted in the
deed.
In cases where the certificate of
title is in the name of the vendor when the
land is sold, in the absence of anything to
excite or arouse suspicion, the vendee
has the right to rely on what appears on
the certificate of title and is under no
obligation to look beyond the certificate
and investigate the title of the vendor
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
appearing on the face of the certificate.
(Pino v. CA)
It must be stressed that the
Torrens system does NOT create or vest
title, and has never been recognized as a
mode of acquiring ownership.
ALBA V. DE LA CRUZ
17 PHIL 49 (1910)
FACTS: Agricultural land in Bulacan was
registered in the names of the petitioners
Grey y Alba on Feb. 12 1908 by TC decree.
Their parents had obtained the land by
purchase in 1864 as evidenced by a public
document. On June 16, 1908 de la Cruz
asked for a revision of the case on the
grounds that he is the absolute owner of two
of the lands in question, alleging that the
degree of registration over those lands was
obtained maliciously and fraudulently. He
claimed that he had inherited the lands from
his father who had obtained them via state
grant in 1895 as inscribed in the old register
of property in Bulacan. TC reopened the
case, noting that the petitioners neglected to
mention de la Cruz’s occupancy of the land,
it modified its earlier decree by excluding the
two parcels of land.
ISSUE: WON the TC could reopen the case
after its decree of registration had already
been entered earlier.
RULING: No. By express provisions of law
all parties are deemed served notice by
publication “to all whom it may concern”.
The decree of registration must be held to
be conclusive against all persons whether
his name is mentioned in the application,
notice, or citation. Such decree could only
have been opened on the ground that it had
been obtained by fraud. Proof of
constructive fraud is not sufficient, there
must be actual or positive fraud to reopen a
case. This is not so in this situation, the
petitioners honestly believed that the
appellee was occupying the lands as their
tenant.
REPUBLIC V. UMALI
171 SCRA 647 (1989)
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32
FACTS: The original sale from the
government was tainted with fraud because
it was based on a forgery. However the
original OCT was canceled and valid a TCT
was issued. The properties were
subsequently transferred to purchasers in
good faith and for value.
ISSUE: WON the land could revert back to
the state.
RULING: No. A certificate of title
fraudulently secured is not null and void ab
initio, it was only voidable and the land
remained private as long as title thereto had
not been voided. There is no allegation in
the complaint filed by the petitioner that any
one of the defendants was privy to the fraud
or that they had acquired the subject land in
bad faith. Their status as innocent
transferees for value was never questioned
nor disproved. That status now accords to
them the protection of the torrens system
and renders the titles obtained by them
indefeasible and conclusive despite the flaw
in the TCT.
The real purpose of the Torrens
system of land registration is to quiet title to
land: to put a stop forever to any question of
the legality of the title except claims which
were noted at the time of registration in the
certificate or which may arise subsequent
thereto.
PINO V. CA
198 SCRA 434 (1991)
FACTS: Subject lot was originally owned by
spouses Juan and Rafaela. When Juan died
ownership was transferred to Rafaela and
her two sons: Raymundo and Cicero. The lot
was then sold to Rafaela who acquired title
thereto. She first sold a portion of the lot in
1967, then sold the other portion later.
Ownership was eventually sold to Pino who
registered the sale in 1970. In 1980 Cicero
died and his heirs instituted suit for nullity
and reconveyance against Pino.
ISSUE: WON Pino is an innocent purchaser
for value.
RULING: Yes. Where the certificate of title
is in the hands of the vendor when the land
is sold, the vendee for value has the right to
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
rely on what appears on the certificate of
title. In the absence of anything to excite or
arouse suspicion, the vendee is under no
obligation to look beyond the certificate and
investigate the title of the vendor.
The main purpose of the Torrens
system is to avoid possible conflicts of title
to real estate and to facilitate transactions
relative thereto by giving the public the right
to rely upon the face of the TCT and
dispense with the need for inquiring further
except when the party concerned has actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that
should impel a reasonably cautious man to
make such further inquiry.
The action had already prescribed
because it was filed 15 years after the sale
and issuance of TCT in 1967. The remedy
for the petitioner is to bring action for
damages against those who caused the
fraud.
CRUZ V. CA (NOV. 6, 1997)
When the sale was executed,
nothing was annotated in the certificate.
There can be no reconveyance because the
property had already been acquired by an
innocent purchaser for value. The real
purpose of the Torrens system of land
registration is to quiet title to land and to put
a stop forever to any question of the legality
of the title except claims which have been
recorded in the certificate of title. Every
registered owner and purchaser holds the
title to the property free from all
encumbrances not noted in the deed.
DELOS REYES V. CA
285 SCRA 81 (1998)
FACTS: In 1942 de los Reyes sold only
10,000 sqm to Penas who in 1943
registered all 13,405sqm. After 4
subsequent sales the land was eventually
acquired by Cainas. In 1978 the heirs of de
los Reyes filed action for reconveyance.
ISSUE: WON an action for reconveyance
filed after more than 30 years may prosper
against the holder for value.
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33
RULING: NO. When respondents Cainas
as fourth transferee in ownership dealt with
the land in question they were not required
to go beyond what appeared in the TCT in
the name of their transferor. They were
innocent purchasers for value having
acquired the property in due course and in
good faith under a clean title i.e. there were
no annotations of encumbrances or notices
of lis pendens at the back. They had no
reason to doubt the validity of the title to the
property. It would be the height of injustice if
a valid transaction transferring property to
them would be set aside just to
accommodate parties who heedlessly slept
on their rights for more then a third of a
century- having brought action to recover
the land only after 36 years from the accrual
of their cause of action.
HEIRS OF DELA CRUZ V. CA
FACTS: Petitioners were in actual, physical,
continuous and open possession of the land
since 1959, when their predecessor in
interest allegedly bought it from the Madrids.
Petitioners only had a photocopy of the deed
of sale. The Madrid brothers allegedly sold
the land to Marquez in 1976. The Madrids
and Marques obtained TCTs in 1986, the
petitioners then filed this action for
reconveyance and damages in the same
year.
RULING: The fact that the Madrids and
Marquez were able to secure their
respective TCTs did not operate to vest
upon them ownership of the property. The
Torrens system does not create or vest title.
It has never been recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership especially considering
the fact that both the Madrids and
Marquezes obtained their respective TCTs
only in 1986 27 long years after petitioners
first took possessions of the land. If the
Madrids and the Marquezes wished to
assert their ownership they should have filed
a judicial action for recovery of possession
and not merely to have the land registered
under their respective names. The Madrids
long inaction or passivity in asserting their
rights will preclude them from recovering the
same. Marquez is also not an innocent
purchaser for value as he must have been
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
fully aware of another person’s possession
of the lot he purchased. One who buys
without checking the vendor’s title takes all
the risks and losses consequent to such
failure.
Nature of proceedings
A land registration proceeding is in
rem, and therefore, the decree of
registration is binding upon and conclusive
against all persons, including the
Government and its branches. This is
irrespective of whether or not they were
personally notified of the filing of the
application for registration or have
appeared and filed an answer to said
application since all persons are
considered as notified by the publication
required by law. (Cacho v. CA) Note
however, that in instances where the
property sought to be registered is
occupied by persons other than the
registrant, mere notice by publication is
not sufficient: they must be given actual
and personal notice. Moreover, an
allegation of occupancy by such persons
must be stated in the petition for
registration. Failure to comply with these
requirements will render the issued decree
susceptible to a petition for reopening or
review of the decree of registration. See
subsequent discussion under Part IV. F.
(4).
A decree of registration acquires
finality and thereby becomes indefeasible
upon the lapse of one year from entry
thereof. Once such decree becomes final,
it is deemed conclusive not only on the
questions actually contested and
determined but also upon all matters that
might be litigated or decided in the land
registration proceedings. (Cacho v. CA)
SAJONAS V. CA
FACTS: Uychocde spouses sold the land to
spouses Sajonas in 1984 who had their
adverse claim duly registered. Upon full
payment, the sale was registered in Aug. 28,
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34
1985. However the land was also subject to
a notice of levy and execution in Feb 12,
1985 for debts owed by the Uychocde’s to
Pilares. The notice of levy and execution
was carried over to the new title. Sajonas
filed a complaint to have the notice removed
from the new title. Noting their earlier claim,
the TC agreed. Their decision was reversed
by the CA on the grounds that PD1529 limits
the validity of adverse claims to 30 days..
ISSUE: WON the earlier adverse claim was
invalid.
RULING: No. Sec. 70 of PD 1529 does not
the limit the effectivity of adverse claims to
30 days. To interpret the effectivity period as
absolutely limited to 30 days defeats the
purpose why the law provides for the
remedy of inscription of adverse claim.
Annotation is a measure designated to
protect the interest of a person over a piece
of real property where the registration of
such interest or right is not otherwise
provided for by Act 496, now PD 1529. It
serves as warning to third parties dealing
with the said property that someone is
claiming an interest on the same or a better
right then registered owner. Under the
Torrens System registration is the operative
act which gives validity to the transfer or
creates a lien upon the land. A person
dealing with registered land is not required
to go behind the register to determine the
condition of the property. He is only charged
with notice of the burdens on the property
which are noted on the face of the register
or certificate of title.
CACHO V. CA
In the case of Cacho v. US decided
in 1912, the court reserved making a final
decision on the registration of two parcels of
land bought by decedent Cacho.
Registration decrees were allegedly
subsequently issued in 1915. In 1978 heir
Cacho filed a petition for reconstitution of
title. After first going up to the SC,
reconstitution was granted by the TC over
RP and National Steel as well as the city of
Iligan opposition. CA reversed, requiring
petitioner to first fulfill the conditions set forth
in the Cacho v. US decision. .
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
A land registration proceeding is “in
rem” and therefore the decree of registration
is binding upon and conclusive against all
persons including the Government and its
branches irrespective whether or not they
were personally notified of the filing of the
application for registration or have appeared
and filed an answer to said application
because all persons are considered as
notified by publication required by law.
Further more, a decree of registration that
has become final shall be deemed
conclusive not only on the questions actually
contested and determined but also upon all
matters that might be litigated or decided in
the land registration proceedings with the
certification duly issued by the then Land
Registration Commission (now National
Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration) there is no doubt that
decrees of registration have in fact been
issued in the case at the bench. Also, such
decrees attained finality upon the lapse of
one year from entry thereof. To allow the
final decrees to once again be subject to the
conditions set forth in Cacho v. US would be
tantamount to setting aside the decrees
which cannot be reopened after the lapse of
one year from the entry thereof. Such action
would definitely run counter to the very
purpose of the Torrens System.
SPOUSES LEBURADA V. LRA
287 SCRA 333 (1998)
FACTS: TC ordered LRA to issue a degree
of registration in favor of the spouses
Leburada. LRA refused on the grounds that
its immediate issuance would result in the
duplication of titles over the same parcel of
land. LRA found that the title issued for the
lot could not be found because the TCT
covering them was incomplete/ unreadable.
It was waiting for better copies from the
Pasig register of deeds before proceeding
further.
ISSUE: WON LRA can be compelled by
mandamus to issue the decree.
RULING: NO. A judgment of registration
does not become executory until after the
expiration of one year after the entry of the
final decree of registration. True, land
registration is an in rem proceeding and is
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35
binding upon and conclusive against all
persons including the government, however
a court has no jurisdiction to order the
registration of a land already decreed in an
earlier land registration case. The LRA is
mandated to refer to the TC any doubt it
may have in regard to the preparation and
issuance of a decree of registration. As the
issuance of the decree is a judicial act and
not merely ministerial, it may not be
compelled through mandamus. Given the
above, that LRA hesitates to issue a decree
of registration is understandable. (But to
avoid multiplicity of suits, SC ordered LRA to
submit its report to the TC within 60 days)
B. The Land Registration
Administration
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1529
AMENDING AND CODIFYING THE
LAWS RELATIVE TO
REGISTRATION OF PROPERTY
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
SECTION 9. Qualifications of
Registers of Deeds and Deputy
Registers of Deeds. — No person
shall be appointed Register of Deeds
unless he has been admitted to the
practice of law in the Philippines and
shall have been actually engaged in
such practice for at least three years
or has been employed for a like period
in any branch of government the
functions of which include the
registration of property.
The Deputy Register of Deeds
shall be a member of the Philippine
Bar. Provided, however, that no
Register of Deeds or Deputy Register
of Deeds holding office as such upon
the passage of this Decree shall by
reason hereof, be removed from office
or be demoted to a lower category or
scale of salary except for cause and
upon compliance with due process as
provided for by law.
SECTION 10. General functions of
Registers of Deeds. — The office of
the Register of Deeds constitutes a
public repository of records of
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
instruments affecting registered or
unregistered lands and chattel
mortgages in the province or city
wherein such office is situated.
It shall be the duty of the
Register of Deeds to immediately
register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or
personal property which complies with
all the requisites for registration. He
shall see to it that said instrument
bears the proper documentary and
science stamps and that the same are
properly cancelled. If the instrument
is not registrable, he shall forthwith
deny registration thereof and inform
the presentor of such denial in
writing, stating the ground or reason
therefor, and advising him of his right
to appeal by consulta in accordance
with Section 117 of this Decree.
SECTION 11. Discharge of duties of
Register of Deeds in case of
vacancy, etc. —
(1) Until a regular Register of
Deeds shall have been appointed for a
province or city, or in case of vacancy
in the office, or upon the occasion of
the absence, illness, suspension, or
inability of the Register of Deeds to
discharge his duties, said duties shall
be performed by the following
officials, in the order in which they are
mentioned below, unless the Secretary
of Justice designates another official
to act temporarily in his place:
(a) For the province or city where
there is a Deputy Register of Deeds,
by said Deputy Register of Deeds, or
by the second Deputy Register of
Deeds, should there be one;
(b) For the province or city where
there is no Deputy or second Deputy
Register of Deeds, by the Provincial or
City Fiscal, or any Assistant Fiscal
designated by the Provincial or City
Fiscal;
(2) In case of absence, disability or
suspension of the Register of Deeds
______________________________________________________________________________________
36
without pay, or in case of vacancy in
the position, the Secretary of Justice
may, in his discretion, authorize the
payment of an additional
compensation to the official acting as
Register of Deeds, such additional
compensation together with his actual
salary not to exceed the salary
authorized for the position thus filled
by him.
(3) In case of a newly-created
province or city and pending
establishment of a Registry of Deeds
and the appointment of a regular
Register of Deeds for the new
province or city, the Register of Deeds
of the mother province or city shall be
the ex-officio Register of Deeds for
said new province or city.
SECTION 12. Owner's Index;
reports. — There shall be prepared in
every Registry an index system which
shall contain the names of all
registered owners alphabetically
arranged. For this purpose, an index
card which shall be prepared in the
name of each registered owner which
shall contain a list of all lands
registered in his name.
The Register of Deeds shall
submit to the Land Registration
Commission within ten days after the
month to which they pertain his
monthly reports on collections and
accomplishments. He shall also submit
to the Commission at the end of
December of each year, an annual
inventory of all titles and instruments
in his Registry.
SECTION 13. Chief Geodetic
Engineer. — There shall be a Chief
Geodetic Engineer in the Land
Registration Commission who shall be
the technical adviser of the
Commission on all matters involving
surveys and shall be responsible to
him for all plats, plans and works
requiring the services of a geodetic
engineer in said office. He shall
perform such other functions as may,
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
from time to time, be assigned to him
by the Commissioner.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 292
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987
BOOK IV, TITLE III
CHAPTER 9 — LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
SECTION 28. The Land Registration
Authority. — The Land Registration
Authority, hereinafter referred to as
the Authority shall continue to
exercise its powers and functions
under existing law on the Land Titles
and Deeds Registration Authority and
those which may hereafter be
provided by law.
SECTION 29. Organizational
Structure. — The Authority shall be
headed by an Administrator who shall
be assisted by two (2) Deputy
Administrators, all of whom shall be
appointed by the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary.
SECTION 30. Reorganization of
Registry Offices in the National
Capital Region. — The Registries of
Deeds in the National Capital Region
is hereby reorganized as follows:
(1) The Registries of Deeds in the
cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay and
Caloocan shall be maintained;
(2) There is hereby created
Registries of Deeds in the
Municipalities of Navotas, Malabon,
Valenzuela, Mandaluyong, San Juan,
Marikina, Las Piñas and Parañaque
with jurisdiction over their respective
municipalities;
(3) The Registry of Deeds of Pasig
shall be maintained with jurisdiction
over the Municipalities of Pasig,
Taguig and Pateros; and
(4) The Registry of Deeds of
Makati shall have jurisdiction over the
municipalities of Makati and
Muntinlupa.
______________________________________________________________________________________
37
C. JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129
AN ACT REORGANIZING THE
JUDICIARY, APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES (As Amended
by RA 7691)
SECTION 34. Delegated jurisdiction
in cadastral and land registration
cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned
by the Supreme Court to hear and
determine cadastral or land
registration cases covering lots where
there is no controversy or opposition,
or contested lots the value of which
does not exceed P100,000, such value
to be ascertained by the affidavit of
the claimant or by agreement of the
respective claimants if there are more
than one, or from the corresponding
tax declaration of the real property.
Their decisions in these cases shall be
appealable in the same manner as
decisions of the Regional Trial Courts.
CIRCULAR NO. 38-97
SUBJECT: Clarification of the
Extent of Delegated Jurisdiction
under Administrative Circular No.
6-93-A of METCs, MTCCs, MTCs
and MCTCs to Hear and Determine
Cadastral and Land Registration
Cases
The clear tenor and intention of
Administrative Circular No. 6-93-A is
that only original cadastral or land
registration cases are covered. The
jurisdiction of the First Level Courts,
being merely delegated, should be
limited to what is expressly mentioned
in the delegation.
1. There are limits to the
delegation, i.e., either the subject
matter is an uncontested lot or if
contested the value of the lot should
not exceed One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00) Pesos. There will be
difficulty in the determination of these
limits if and when the First Level
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
Courts are required to exercise
delegated jurisdiction over petitions
subsequent to original registration.
2. A First Level Court should not
be placed in a situation where, in
disposing of a matter subsequent to
registration, it will have to consult the
records of another Court which
granted the original registration.
3. To require First Level Courts to
handle petitions after original
registration would unduly increase
their dockets already loaded with
cases covered by RA 7691, the law on
their expanded jurisdiction.
Therefore, matters subsequent to the
original registration determined by
Second Level Courts, including
petitions for reconstitution of lost
titles, should not be unloaded to the
First Level Courts. The Second Level
Courts are hereby directed to take
cognizance of and exercise jurisdiction
over such matters.
Q: Which court has jurisdiction over
matters subsequent to the original
registration?
A: RTC
 Such cases are to be filed and entitled
in the original case in which the
decree of registration was entered.
(Sec. 108, PD 1529)
 These include the ff:
 Petition to compel surrender of
withheld owner’s duplicate
certificate of title
 Petition for amendment or
alteration of certificates
 Petition for issuance of a new
owner’s duplicate certificate in
case of loss or theft
 Petition for reconstitution of lost or
destroyed OCT
______________________________________________________________________________________
38
MOSCOSO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Petitioner applied for land
registration of a 1,147 square meters
residential lot, claiming that she inherited the
same from her father. The written opposition
however substantially allege that the
oppositors acquired ownership of the same
through a deed of donation.
The trial court rendered a decision
directing that the title over the land should
be registered in the name of the co-
ownership of: (1) Andrea M. Moscoso for
13/14 share; and (2) Maximina L. Moron for
1/14 share, subject to the reservation of a
road right-of-way in favor of the government
of the Philippines. Maximina’s share was
based on a power of attorney executed in
her favor which was treated as a recognition
of her status as a natural child.
ISSUE: WON the Court of First Instance,
acting as a land registration court, has
jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of
whether the oppositor is the acknowledged
natural child of Pascual Monge
HELD: untenable
RULING: Firstly, the otherwise rigid rule that
the jurisdiction of the Land Registration
Court, being special and limited in character
and proceedings thereon summary in
nature, does not extend to cases involving
issues properly litigable in other independent
suits or ordinary civil actions. Such is based
the following premises: (1) Mutual consent
of the parties or their acquiescence in
submitting the aforesaid issues for the
determination by the court in the registration
proceedings; (2) Full opportunity given to the
parties in the presentation of their respective
sides of the issues and of the evidence in
support thereto; (3) Consideration by the
court that the evidence already of record is
sufficient and adequate for rendering a
decision upon these issues.
In addition, considerations of
speedy justice and avoidance of multiplicity
of suits impel Us to hold and rule that under
the facts of the case at bar, the trial court,
acting as a land registration court, may
adjudicate the land sought to be registered
to either or both of the applicant and
oppositor, in whole or in part, based on
evidence submitted to the court showing
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
that the party has proper title for registration.
(Section 37, Act 496.)
In any event, as the Supreme Court
said in Nicanor T. Santos vs. Rosa Ganayo,
L-31854, Sept. 9, 1972, 116 SCRA 431,
"Whether a particular matter should be
resolved by the Court of First Instance in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its
limited jurisdiction as a special court
(Probate, Land Registration, etc.) is in
reality not a jurisdictional question. It is in
essence a procedural question involving a
mode of practice which may be waived."
OBITER: The proceedings for the
registration of title to land under the Torrens
system is an action in rem, not in personam,
hence, personal notice to all claimants of the
res is not necessary to give the court
jurisdiction to deal with and dispose of the
res, and neither may lack of such personal
notice vitiate or invalidate the decree or title
issued in a registration proceeding, for the
State, as sovereign over the land situated
within it, may provide for the adjudication of
title in a proceeding in rem or in the nature
of a proceeding in rem, which shall be
binding upon all persons, known or
unknown.
AVERIA JR. VS. CAGUIOA
146 SCRA 459 (1986)
FACTS: The petitioner-oppositor refused to
participate in the hearing of the registration
proceedings below, claiming the respondent
court, acting as a cadastral court, had no
competence to act upon the said case under
Section 112 of Act 496, because of the
absence of unanimity among the parties as
required under Section 112 of the Land
Registration Act. The respondent court then
held the hearing ex parte and later rendered
a decision ordering the registration prayed
for on the basis of the evidence presented
by the private respondent herein.
ISSUE: whether or not the court has
jurisdiction to order the registration of a deed
of sale which is opposed on the ground of
an antecedent contract to sell.
HELD: Yes. Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529 has
eliminated the distinction between the
general jurisdiction vested in the regional
______________________________________________________________________________________
39
trial court and the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon it by the former law when
acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at
avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has
simplified registration proceedings by
conferring upon the regional trial courts the
authority to act not only on applications for
"original registration" but also "over all
petitions filed after original registration of
title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such applications or
petitions."
Under the amended law, the court is
now authorized to hear and decide not only
such non-controversial cases but even the
contentious and substantial issues, such as
the question at bar, which were beyond its
competence before.
HEIRS OF GONZAGA vs. CA
FACTS: Eugenio, claiming title under (TCT)
No. 17519, sold two lots to Gonzaga.for
which TCT No. 81338 was issued on
November 29, 1960. In 1981, Gonzaga sold
the two lots to petitioner Mascariñas and
TCT No. 48078 was issued in the latter’s
favor.
However, another subsisting Torrens
title covers the same two lots, TCT No. C-
26086, in the name of private respondent
Sevilla issued on August 2, 1979 and is a
transfer from (OCT) No. 994 which was
registered on April 19, 1917. Both conflicting
TCTs were derived from one common OCT,
viz., OCT No. 994. However, while both the
court a quo and the respondent appellate
court found that OCT No. 994 was
registered on May 3, 1917, we find that on
the one hand, petitioners' titles indicate
original registration to have been made on
May 3, 1917, but on the other hand, private
respondents' title indicates original
registration to have been made on April 19,
1917.
The court a quo resolved the
conflicting claims in favor of private
respondents.
ISSUE: Between petitioners and private
respondents, who have the legal and valid
title to the two lots. (OVERLAPPING
TITLES)
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
HELD: Private respondents. Although
petitioner's title was issued in 1940, it will be
noted that petitioner's title over Lots 2693
and 2695 both with an area of 599 square
meters was based on the Cadastral Survey
of Kaloocan City, Cadastral Case No. 34,
while private respondents' title was derived
from OCT No. 994 issued on April 19, 1917.
In the case of Pamintuan vs. San Agustin,
this Court ruled that where two certificates
(of title) purport to include the same land,
the earlier in date prevails. . . . In successive
registrations, where more than one
certificate is issued in respect of a particular
estate or interest in land, the person
claiming under the prior certificate is entitled
to the estate or interest; and the person is
deemed to hold under the prior certificate
who is the holder of, or whose claim is
derived directly or indirectly from the person
who was the holder of the earliest certificate
issued in respect thereof. Hence, in point of
priority of issuance, private respondents' title
prevails over that of petitioner MWSS.
Lastly, a certificate is not conclusive
evidence of title if it is shown that the same
land had already been registered and an
earlier certificate for the same is in
existence. Since the land in question has
already been registered under OCT No. 994
dated April 19, 1917, the subsequent
registration of the same land on May 3, 1917
is null and void."
Though petitioner Mascariñas may
be a purchaser for value and in good faith,
but whose title, which is only a derivative of
the void OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917,
his title could not possibly be of force and
effect more than its parent title.
TAGAYTAY-TAAL TOURIST
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (273 SCRA 182;
1997)
FACTS: Petitioner was the registered owner
of four (4) parcels of land covered by TCT
Nos. T-9816, T-9817, T-9818 and T-9819.
The properties were mortgaged on June 7,
1976 to Filipinas Manufacturers Bank and
Trust Company by Benjamin Osias,
representing himself as President and
Chairman of the Board of petitioner.
Because of a dispute regarding the
true set of officers of the petitioner, the
______________________________________________________________________________________
40
parcels of land allegedly became delinquent
in the payment of real estate taxes resulting
in the sale of the said properties in a public
auction. Respondent City itself was the
successful bidder.
On July 14, 1989, respondent City
filed for the entry of new certificates of title
over the lots in its name. Said petition was
opposed by herein petitioner, alleging that
the tax delinquency sale was null and void
for lack of valid and proper notice to
petitioner.
On December 5, 1989, the trial court
dismissed on the ground of laches. CA
affirms.
On July 19, 1991, petitioner filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite,
sitting as a regular court, a petition assailing
the authority of respondent City to levy real
estate tax on the ground that said properties
are located in the Province of Batangas.
RTC rules in favor of petioner. No appeal
was filed.
ISSUES (a) whether or not the Regional
Trial Court of Cavite, sitting as a land
registration or cadastral court, had
jurisdiction to hear and decide respondent
City's petition for the cancellation of TCT No.
T-9816 and TCT No. T-9817 in the name of
petitioner and the issuance of new ones in
the name of respondent City despite serious
opposition by petitioner
HELD: negative.
RULING: Here, petitioner had the right to
avail of its legal and equitable remedies to
nullify the delinquency sale because, firstly,
there was lack of notice to it; secondly, the
properties in question became subject of
serious controversy before RTC -Cavite and
the SEC; and thirdly, respondent City had no
authority to impose realty tax on petitioner
as the properties are actually located in
Talisay, Batangas.
Given such facts, The issues raised
before the RTC sitting as a land registration
or cadastral court, without question,
involved substantial or controversial matters
and, consequently, beyond said court's
jurisdiction. The issues may be resolved
only by a court of general jurisdiction.
It is clear that petitions under
Section 75 and Section 108 of P.D. 1529
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
(formerly Sec. 78 and Sec. 112 of Act 496)
can be taken cognizance of by the RTC
sitting as a land registration or cadastral
court. Relief under said sections can only be
granted if there is unanimity among the
parties, or that there is no adverse claim or
serious objection on the part of any party in
interest; otherwise, the case becomes
controversial and should be threshed out in
an ordinary case or in the case where the
incident properly belongs.
Also, RTC-Cavite, sitting as a land
registration or cadastral court, could not
have ordered the issuance of new
certificates of title over the properties in the
name of respondent City if the delinquency
sale was invalid because said properties are
actually located in the municipality of Talisay,
Batangas, not in Tagaytay City.
ESTATE OF JACOB V. CA
(283 SCRA 474; 1998)
FACTS: Jacob left for the United States, but
before she did, she asked her son-in-law
Quinto Jr., to pay the real estate taxes on
her property. However, Luciano Jr. was not
allowed to pay by the City Treasurer's Office
as he had no written authorization from her.
In 1984 respondent City Treasurer of
Quezon City sent a notice to Mercedes
Jacob that her real estate taxes on the
property were delinquent and that the land
was already sold at public auction on 24
August 1983 to private respondent Virginia
Tugbang for P6,800.00. Jacob came to
know of the sale on 6 September 1983 when
she received from respondent City Treasurer
a Notice of Sale of Real Property addressed
to her husband. They tried to redeem the
property from Tugbang but she evaded them
until the Final Bill of Sale was issued. On 3
March 1989 TCT No. 81860 was issued in
the name of Tugbang.
On 17 May 1993 petitioners filed a
complaint for annulment or cancellation of
the auction sale, the final bill of sale, TCT
No. 81860, and for redemption of the
property plus damages. However, the trial
court dismissed the petition purportedly for
lack of jurisdiction as the petition was
deemed to be a petition to annul and set
aside the Decision canceling Jacob's TCT
No. 39178. The appellate court dismissed
the appeal.
______________________________________________________________________________________
41
ISSUE: the nature of the petitioners’ action
HELD: It is an action for reconveyance. The
complaint alleges that respondent Tugbang
procured a transfer certificate of title upon
her fraudulent representation in her petition
for cancellation of title. This way of acquiring
title creates what is called "constructive
trust" in favor of the defrauded party and
grants to the latter a right to the
reconveyance of the property.
As the petition makes out a case for
reconveyance and not a mere annulment of
an RTC judgment as viewed under par. (2),
Sec. 9, BP Blg. 129, jurisdiction over the
case is clearly vested in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City as provided in par. (2),
Sec. 19, BP Blg. 129.
Moreover, the Regional Trial Court
has jurisdiction over the petition as it may be
considered only as a continuation of the
original proceeding for cancellation of title
which in view of its non-litigious character is
summary in nature. Furthermore, under Sec.
2 of PD 1529, a Regional Trial Court, like the
RTC of Quezon City which issued a new title
to respondent Virginia Tugbang in lieu of the
old one, has the authority to act not only on
applications for original registration but also
over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising from such
applications or petitions.
As to whether such an action should
be granted requires further evidence culled
from a full-blown trial.
G.R. No. 120974 (substantially the same
facts)
Under Sec. 55 of the Land
Registration Act, as amended by Sec. 53 of
PD No. 1529, an original owner of
registered land may seek the annulment of
the transfer thereof on the ground of fraud
and the proper remedy is reconveyance.
However, such remedy is without prejudice
to the rights of an innocent purchaser for
value holding a certificate of title.
The other controversy lies in the
failure of petitioner City Treasurer to notify
effectively the delinquent taxpayer
(Valencia), under the wrong premise that the
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
property was still owned by the former
registered owner, Alberto Sta. Maria.
In ascertaining the identity of the
delinquent taxpayer, for purposes of
notifying him of his tax delinquency and the
prospect of a distraint and auction of his
delinquent property, petitioner City Treasurer
should not have simply relied on the tax
declaration.
IV. ORIGINAL REGISTRATION
PROCEEDINGS
Summary of Procedure:
1. Filing of application = 5 days
2. Court issues an order setting date and
hour of initial hearing not less than 45
days, but not more than 90 days from
date of order
3. Notice of initial hearing by publication,
mailing and posting.
 PUBLICATION
 O.G. and newspaper of
general circulation
 MAILING
 to persons named in the
application (within 7 days after
publication of notice in O.G.)
 to DPWH, Provincial Governor
and Mayor (if the applicant
requests to have the line of a
public highway or road
determined)
 to DAR, Sol. Gen., Director of
Lands, DPWH, Director of
Forest Development, Director
of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources
 if land borders a river,
navigable stream or shore,
or an arm of the sea where
a river or harbor line has
been established, or on a
lake
 if it otherwise appears
from the application or the
proceeding that a tenant-
______________________________________________________________________________________
42
farmer or the National
Gov’t. may have a claim
adverse to that of the
applicant
 POSTING
 in a conspicuous place on
each parcel of land included in
the application
 in a conspicuous place on the
bulletin board of the municipal
building of the municipality or
city
 at least 14 days before the
date of initial hearing
4. Sheriff and Commissioner of Land
Registration issue a certification to the
effect that the notice of initial hearing
has been complied with (before the
date of the initial hearing)
 This is conclusive proof of such
fact.
5. Opposition to application
 Can ask for relief from the court
 If none, order of default (this is
merely interlocutory)
6. Court issues its decision within 90
days from the date the case is
submitted for submission
 Judgment becomes final upon the
expiration of 30 days to be
counted from the date of receipt of
notice of the judgment
A. Who May Apply
PD 1529, Sec. 14. Who may
apply. - The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the provision
of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of
private lands or abandoned river beds by right of
accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of
land in any other manner provided for by law.
Where the land is owned in common: all the co-
owners shall file the application jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de
retro: the vendor a retro may file an application
for the original registration of the land, provided,
however, that should the period for redemption
expire during the pendency of the registration
proceedings and ownership to the property
consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall
be substituted for the applicant and may continue
the proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for
original registration of any land held in trust by
him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating
the trust.
Sec. 16. Non-resident
applicant. - If the applicant is not a
resident of the Philippines, he shall
file with his application an instrument
in due form appointing an agent or
representative residing in the
Philippines, giving his full name and
postal address, and shall therein agree
that the service of any legal process in
the proceedings under or growing out
of the application made upon his
agent or representative shall be of the
same legal effect as if made upon the
applicant within the Philippines. If the
agent or representative dies, or leaves
the Philippines, the applicant shall
forthwith make another appointment
for the substitute, and, if he fails to do
so the court may dismiss the
application.
CA 141, Sec. 48. The following-
described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or
______________________________________________________________________________________
43
an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the
land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act , to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of
sovereignty from Spain to the prior United States
have applied for the purchase, composition or
other form of grant of lands of the public domain
under the laws and royal decrees then in force
and have instituted and prosecuted the
proceedings in connection therewith, but have
with or without default upon their part, or for any
other cause, not received title therefor, if such
applicants or grantees and their heirs have
occupied and cultivated said lands continuously
since the filing of their applications.
(b) Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural
minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain
suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not,
under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least
30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in
sub-section (b) hereof.
DAIS V. CFI
51 PHIL. 396 (1928)
The rights to the succession of a
person are transmitted from the moment of
his death; in other words, the heirs
immediately succeed to the dominion,
ownership and possession of the property of
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds 44

their predecessor. The fact that the law private lands: lands of private
provides for the appointment of a legal ownership; include lands owned by private
administrator for the liquidation of the individuals and lands which are
deceased's property, and the partition patrimonial property of the State or of
among his heirs, does not deprive the heirs municipal corporations
of the right to intervene in the administration
of said property for the protection of their  Any sale or transfer in violation of the
interests. Heirs have the right to intervene in
prohibition is void.
a cadastral proceeding for the purpose of
objecting to the striking out of an answer
filed by the judicial administrator of the There are 3 remedies by which private
intestacy of the petitioners' predecessor in land may be recovered from disqualified
interest, claiming several parcels of land as aliens:
the property of said estate, even when the
aforementioned administrator consents to its (1) Escheat proceedings (see Rule
being stricken out 91 of the Rules of Court);

SANTIAGO V. CRUZ (2) Actions for reversion under the

19 PHIL. 145 (1911) Public Land Act; and

Because applicants own merely an
undivided share, less than fee simple, in the
land described in the application, the
application should be dismissed, without
prejudice to the right of the various owners
of the undivided interests in the land, jointly
to present a new application for registration.
Citizenship
As a general rule, only individuals,
corporations or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain
are qualified to be transferees of private
lands, i.e. Filipino citizens. (Sec. 12, Art.
XII, 1987 Const.) However, this is subject
to the ff. exceptions:
(1) Aliens can acquire private
lands, but only through hereditary
(not testamentary) succession
(Ramirez v. Vda. de Ramirez, 111
SCRA 704)
(2) Natural-born Filipino citizens
who lost their Phil. citizenship may
be transferees of private lands of up
to a maximum of 5,000 sq. m. of
urban land and 3 hectares of rural
land for residential, business or
other purposes. (BP 185, as
amended by RA 8179)
(3) Actions for recovery filed by the
former (Filipino) owner. Note
that the in pari delicto doctrine
was abandoned in the case of
Phil. Banking v. Lui She.
 However, there were
special factual
circumstances in this case
that warranted the non-
application of the in pari
delicto doctrine. Thus, the
case does not exclude the
possibility of barring
recovery by the Filipino
vendor where the buyer
has acquired Filipino
citizenship or where the
land has come to the hands
of a qualified transferee in
good faith.
Natural Persons
Const. Art. XII., Sec. 3. Lands of
the public domain are classified into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks. Agricultural
lands of the public domain may be
further classified by law according to
the uses which they may be devoted.
Alienable lands of the public domain
shall be limited to agricultural lands.
Private corporations or associations

______________________________________________________________________________________
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
may not hold such alienable lands of
the public domain except by lease, for
a period not exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and not to exceed
one thousand hectares in area.
Citizens of the Philippines may lease
not more than five hundred hectares,
or acquire not more than twelve
hectares thereof by purchase,
homestead, or grant..
Taking into account the requirements
of conservation, ecology, and
development, and subject to the
requirements of agrarian reform, the
Congress shall determine, by law, the
size of lands of the public domain
which may be acquired, developed,
held, or leased and the conditions
therefor.
Sec. 5. The State, subject to the
provisions of this Constitution and
national development policies and
programs, shall protect the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to
their ancestral lands to ensure their
economic, social, and cultural well-
being.
The Congress may provide for the
applicability of customary laws
governing property rights and
relations in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral
domain.
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions
of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines who has
lost its Philippine citizenship may be a
transferee of private lands, subject to
limitations provided by law.
CA 141
______________________________________________________________________________________
45
SEC. 12. Any citizen of the
Philippines over the age of eighteen
years, or the head of a family, who
does not own more than twenty-four
hectares of land in the Philippines or
has not had the benefit of any
gratuitous allotment of more than
twenty-four hectares of land since the
occupation of the Philippines by the
United States, may enter a homestead
of not exceeding twenty-four hectares
of agricultural land of the public
domain.
SEC. 22. Any citizen of lawful age
of the Philippines, and any such
citizen not of lawful age who is a head
of a family, and any corporation or
association of which at least sixty per
centum of the capital stock or of any
interest in said capital stock belongs
wholly to citizens of the Philippines,
and which is organized and
constituted under the laws of
Philippines, and corporate bodies
organized in the Philippines
authorized under their charters to do
so; may purchase any tract of public
agricultural land disposable under this
Act, not to exceed one hundred and
forty-four hectares in the case of an
individual and one thousand and
twenty-four hectares in that of a
corporation or association, by
proceeding as prescribed in this
chapter: Provided, That partnerships
shall be entitled to purchase not to
exceed one hundred and forty-four
hectares for each member thereof. but
the total area so purchased shall in no
case exceed the one thousand and
twenty-four hectares authorized in
this section for associations and
corporations.
 Sec. 22 has been amended by Art. XII,
Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution
SEC. 23. No person, corporation,
association, or partnership other than
those mentioned in the last preceding
section may acquire or own
agricultural public land or land of any
other denomination or classification,
which is at the time or was originally,
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
really or presumptively, of the public
domain, or any permanent
improvement thereon, or any real
right on such land and improvement:
Provided, however, That persons,
corporations, associations or
partnerships which, at the date upon
which the Philippine Constitution took
effect, held agricultural public lands
or land of any other denomination,
that belonged originally, really or
presumptively, to the public domain,
or permanent improvements on such
lands, or a real right upon such lands
and Constitution took improvements,
having acquired the same under the
laws and regulations in force at the
date of such acquisition, shall be
authorized to continue holding the
same
as if such persons, corporations,
associations, or partnerships were
qualified under the last preceding
section; but they shall not encumber,
convey, or alienate the same to
persons, corporations, associations, or
partnerships not included in section
twenty-two of this Act, except by
reason of hereditary succession, duly
legalized and acknowledged by
competent courts.
SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen
of the Philippines who is not the
owner of more than twenty-four
hectares and who since July fourth,
nineteen hundred and twenty-six or
prior thereto, has continuously
occupied and cultivated, either by
himself or through his predecessors-
in-interest, a tract or tracts of
agricultural public lands subject to
disposition, or who shall have paid the
real estate tax thereon while same has
not been occupied by any person shall
be entitled, under the provisions of
this chapter, to have a free patent
issued to him for such tract or tracts
of such land not to exceed twenty-four
hectares.
A member of the national cultural
minorities who has continuously
occupied and cultivated, either by
himself or through his predecessors-
______________________________________________________________________________________
46
in-interest, a tract or tracts of land,
whether disposable or not since July 4,
1955, shall be entitled to the right
granted in the preceding paragraph of
this section: Provided, That at the time
he files his free patent application he
is not the owner of any real property
secured or disposable under this
provision of the Public Land Law
Sec. 48, supra.
REPUBLIC v. CA
235 SCRA 567
A former Filipino citizen who, while
still a citizen, purchased a piece of land from
a vendor who has complied with the
requirements of registration under the Public
Land Act, may apply for registration of title
for that piece of land, in accordance with Art.
XII, Sec. 8 of the Constitution.
The time to determine whether the
person acquiring land is qualified, is the time
the right to own it is acquired and not the
time to register ownership.
KRIVENKO V. REGISTER OF DEEDS
79 PHIL 461 (1947)
There is absolutely no difference in
nature, character, value or importance to the
nation between a residential land of the
public domain and a residential land of
private ownership, and, therefore, both
should equally be considered as agricultural
lands to be protected as part of the national
patrimony. Specially is this so where the
prohibition as to the alienation of public
residential lots may become superfluous if
the same prohibition is not equally applied to
private residential lots. Indeed, the
prohibition as to private residential lands will
eventually become more important, for time
will come when, in view of the constant
disposition of public lands in favor private
individuals, almost all, if not all, the
residential lands of the public domain shall
have become private residential lands.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is
to be construed as not including residential
lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the
result would be that aliens may freely
acquire and possess not only residential lots
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
and houses for themselves but entire
subdivisions, and whole towns and cities,
and that they may validly buy and hold in
their names lands of any area for building
homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries,
hatcheries, schools, health and vacation
resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds,
airfields, and a host of other uses and
purposes that are not, in appellant's words,
strictly agricultural. That this is obnoxious to
the conservative spirit of the Constitution is
beyond question.
SAN JUAN V. INTESTATE ESTATE OF
SPOUSES SOCCHI, GR L-19467 (1966)
An alien who validly owns agricultural land in
the Philippines, which land is sold at public
auction for tax delinquency, may avail of the
right to repurchase the same within one year
pursuant to Section 38 of the Assessment
Law. Such right is but an incident of the right
of ownership and its exercise by the owner,
who happens to be an alien, does not fall
within the purview of the terms "shall be
transferred or assigned" used in Section 5,
Article XIII of the Constitution, or of the
terms "encumbered, alienated or
transferred" used in the implementing
provision of Section 122, Commonwealth
Act No. 141, otherwise known as Public
Land Act. Moreover, the sale at public
auction by reason of tax delinquency under
the Assessment Law does not immediately
divest the rights of the owner to the property
sold. Indeed it is provided in section 39 of
said law that after the sale and before
repurchase or before the expiration of the
term of one year fixed for such repurchase,
the real property shall remain in the
possession of the delinquent taxpayer who
shall have the right to the usufruct thereof. It
is only after failure to redeem within that
period and after the final bill of sale is issued
to the purchaser by the Provincial Treasurer
that the rights of the owner are definitely
divested.
PHIL. BANKING V. LUI SHE
21 SCRA 52 (1967)
If an alien is given not only a lease
of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land
by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot
______________________________________________________________________________________
47
sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this
to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear
that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of
ownership whereby the owner divests
himself in stages not only of the right to
enjoy the land (jus possidendi jus utendi,
just fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the
right to dispose of it (jus disponendi) —
rights the sum total of which make up
ownership. If this can be done, then the
Constitutional ban against alien landholding
in the Philippines, as announced in Krivenko
vs. Register of Deeds, is indeed in grave
peril. The contract giving the above rights to
the alien is therefore void.
RAMIREZ V. VDA. DE RAMIREZ
111 SCRA 704
The usufruct in favor of an alien is
upheld, because the same, albeit a real
right, does not vest title to land in the
usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to
land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by
the Constitution.
CHEESMAN V. IAC
193 SCRA 93
The fundamental law prohibits the
sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains
that, "Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private land shall be
transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain."
Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was charged
with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus,
assuming that it was his intention that the lot
in question be purchased by him and his
wife, he acquired no right whatever over the
property by virtue of that purchase; and in
attempting to acquire a right or interest in
land, vicariously and clandestinely, he
knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale
as to him was null and void. In any event, he
had and has no capacity or personality to
question the subsequent sale of the same
property by his wife on the theory that in so
doing he is merely exercising the
prerogative of a husband in respect of
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
conjugal property. To sustain such a theory
would permit indirect controversion of the
constitutional prohibition. If the property
were to be declared conjugal, this would
accord to the alien husband a not
insubstantial interest and right over land, as
he would then have a decisive vote as to its
transfer or disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have.
RELLOSA V. GAW CHEE HUN
93 PHIL. 827
Sale to alien by Filipino vendor
during Japanese occupation null and void,
for being contrary to the Constitution. But
vendor can no longer recover the land,
because of doctrine of pari delicto. (Note
however that the pari delicto doctrine was
subsequently abandoned in the case of Phil.
Banking v. Lui She, 21 SCRA 52.)
Corporations
REGISTER OF DEEDS V. UNG SUI SI
TEMPLE, 97 PHIL. 58 (1955)
A deed of donation of a parcel of
land executed by a Filipino citizen in favor of
a religious organization whose founder,
trustees and administrator are non-Filipinos,
can not be admitted for registration.
 Land tenure is not indispensable to
the free exercise of religious
profession and worship.
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF
DAVAO V. LRC, 102 PHIL. 596 (1957)
A corporation sole is a special form
of corporation usually associated with clergy,
designed to facilitate the exercise of the
functions of ownership of the church which
was regarded as the property owner. It
consists of one person only, and his
successors (who will always be one at a
time), in some particular, who are
incorporated by law in order to give them
some legal advantages particularly that of
perpetuity which in their natural persons
______________________________________________________________________________________
48
they could not have. Through this legal
fiction, church properties acquired by the
incumbent of a corporation sole pass, by
operation of law, upon his death not to his
personal heirs but to his successor in office.
A corporation sole, therefore, is created not
only to administer the temporalities of the
church or religious society where he
belongs, but also to hold and transmit the
same to his successor in said office.
Although a branch of the Universal Roman
Catholic Apostolic Church, every Roman
Catholic Church in different countries, if it
exercises its mission and is lawfully
incorporated in accordance with laws of the
country where it is located, is considered an
entity or person with all the rights and
privileges granted to such artificial being
under laws of that country, separate and
distinct from the personality of the Roman
Pontiff or the Holy See, without prejudice to
its religious relations with the latter which
are governed by the Common Law or their
rules and regulations.
Even before the establishment of
the Philippine Commonwealth and of the
Republic of the Philippines every corporation
sole then organized and registered had by
express provision of law (Corporation Law,
Public Act. 1459) the necessary power and
qualification to purchase in its name private
lands located in the territory in which it
exercised its functions or ministry and for
which it was created, independently of the
nationality of its incumbent unique and
single number and head, the bishop of the
diocese. The Roman Catholic Apostolic
Church in the Philippines has no nationality
and that the frames of the Constitution did
not have in mind the religious corporation
sole when they provided that 60 per centum
of the capital thereof be owned by Filipino
citizens. Thus, if this constitutional provision
were not intended for corporation sole, it is
obvious that this could not be regulated or
restricted by said provision.
A corporation sole or "ordinary" is
not the owner of the properties that he may
acquire but merely the administrator thereof
and holds the same in trust for the church to
which the corporation is an organized and
constituents part. Being mere administrator
of the temporalities or properties titled in his
name, the constitutional provision requiring
60 per centum Filipino ownership is not
applicable. The said constitutional provision
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
is limited by it terms to ownership alone and
does not extend to control unless the control
over the property affected has been devised
to circumvent the real purpose of the
constitution. In determining, therefore,
whether the constitutional provision requiring
60 per centum Filipino capital is applicable
to corporations sole, the nationality of the
constituents of the diocese, and not the
nationality of the actual incumbent of the
parish, must be taken into consideration. In
the present case, even if the question of
nationality be considered, the aforesaid
constitutional requirement is fully met and
satisfied, considering that the corporation
sole in question is composed of an
overwhelming majority of Filipinos.
REGISTER OF DEEDS V. CHINA
BANKING CORPORATION, 4 SCRA 1146
(1964)
The prohibition in the Constitution
against the acquisition of lands by aliens is
absolute in its terms. It cannot be limited to
the permanent acquisition of real estate by
aliens, whether natural or juridical persons.
A “deed of transfer” in favor of an alien bank,
even if it was subject to the obligation that
the bank dispose of the property within five
years from the date of acquisition, is
unregisterable.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. IAC AND ACME
146 SCRA 509 (1986)
Supra.
Even on the proposition that the
land remained technically "public" land,
despite immemorial possession of the Infiels
and their ancestors, until title in their favor
was actually confirmed in appropriate
proceedings under the Public Land Act,
there can be no serious question of Acme's
right to acquire the land at the time it did,
there also being nothing in the 1935
Constitution that might be construed to
prohibit corporations from purchasing or
acquiring interests in public land to which
the vendor had already acquired that type of
so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title.
The only limitation then extant was that
corporations could not acquire, hold or lease
______________________________________________________________________________________
49
public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024
hectares. The purely accidental
circumstance that confirmation proceedings
were brought under the aegis of the 1973
Constitution which forbids corporations from
owning lands of the public domain cannot
defeat a right already vested before that law
came into effect, or invalidate transactions
then perfectly valid and proper, This Court
has already held, in analogous
circumstances, that the Constitution cannot
impair vested rights.
B. Where to File
PD 1529
Sec. 2. Nature of registration
proceedings; jurisdiction of
courts. - Judicial proceedings for the
registration of lands throughout the
Philippines shall be in rem and shall
be based on the generally accepted
principles underlying the Torrens
system.
Courts of First Instance shall
have exclusive jurisdiction over all
applications for original registration of
title to lands, including improvements
and interests therein, and over all
petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to
hear and determine all questions
arising upon such applications or
petitions. The court through its clerk
of court shall furnish the Land
Registration Commission with two
certified copies of all pleadings,
exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or
issued in applications or petitions for
land registration, with the exception
of stenographic notes, within five days
from the filing or issuance thereof.
Sec. 17. What and where to
file. - The application for land
registration shall be filed with the
Court of First Instance of the province
or city where the land is situated. The
applicant shall file together with the
application all original muniments of
titles or copies thereof and a survey
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
plan of the land approved by the
Bureau of Lands.
The clerk of court shall not
accept any application unless it is
shown that the applicant has
furnished the Director of Lands with a
copy of the application and all
annexes.
Sec. 18. Application covering
two or more parcels. - An
application may include two or more
parcels of land belonging to the
applicant/s provided they are situated
within the same province or city. The
court may at any time order an
application to be amended by striking
out one or more of the parcels or by a
severance of the application.
Sec. 19. Amendments. - of registration be issued in the name
Amendments to the application
including joinder, substitution, or
discontinuance as to parties may be
allowed by the court at any stage of
the proceedings upon just and
reasonable terms.
Amendments which shall
consist in a substantial change in the
boundaries or an increase in area of
the land applied for or which involve
the inclusion of an additional land
shall be subject to the same
requirements of publication and notice
as in an original application.
Sec. 20. When land applied for
borders on road. - If the application
describes the land as bounded by a
public or private way or road, it shall
state whether or not the applicant
claims any and what portion of the
land within the limits of the way or
road, and whether the applicant
desires to have the line of the way or
road determined.
Sec. 21. Requirement of
additional facts and papers; ocular
inspection. - The court may require
facts to be stated in the application in
addition to those prescribed by this
Decree not inconsistent therewith and
may require the filing of any
______________________________________________________________________________________
50
additional paper. It may also conduct
an ocular inspection, if necessary.
Sec. 22. Dealings with land
pending original registration.
After the filing of the application and
before the issuance of the decree of
registration, the land therein
described may still be the subject of
dealings in whole or in part, in which
case the interested party shall present
to the court the pertinent instruments
together with a subdivision plan
approved by the Director of Lands in
case of transfer of portions thereof
and the court, after notice to the
parties, shall order such land
registered subject to the conveyance
or encumbrance created by said
instruments, or order that the decree
of the person to whom the property
has been conveyed by said
instruments.
AGUILAR V. CAOGDAN
105 PHIL. 661
The court that should take cognizance of a
registration case is that which has territorial
jurisdiction over the property.
The Pangasinan court of first
instance dismissed the registration case
when it found that the portions of the land
covered by it were actually situated within
the municipality of San Clement, province of
Tarlac, and the dismissal was without
prejudice. This dismissal has the effect or
relinquishing the jurisdiction originally
acquired by the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan and of transferring it to the court
of Tarlac was filed sometime before the
dismissal of the Pangasinan case can have
no legal adverse consequence. On the
contrary, it was a rectification of an error
committed as to venue for indeed the court
that should take cognizance of this
registration case is that which has territorial
jurisdiction over the property. This court is
the Court of First Instance of Tarlac.
MANILA V. LACK, 19 PHIL. 234
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
Before the creation of the Court of
Land Registration, jurisdiction to determine
the nature, quality, and extent of land titles,
the rival claims of parties contending
therefor, of their registration (in its former
sense), and the legality and effect thereof
was vested in the Courts of First Instance of
the Islands. They had complete and
exclusive jurisdiction thereover. By the
passage of Act No. 496 these courts were
deprived under certain conditions of the
power of determining some of these
questions and of adjudicating in relation to
certain aspects of others. By that Act, two
things occurred. First, a court of limited
jurisdiction, with special subject matter, and
with only one purpose, was created.
Second, by reason thereof courts,
theretofore of general, original, and
exclusive jurisdiction, were shorn of some of
their attributes and deprived of certain of
their power.
However, the purpose of the Court
of Land Registration is not to create or vest
title, but merely to confirm title already
created and vested. The Court of Land
Registration has no authority or jurisdiction
to adjudicate rights in lands not registered.
Therefore, a judgment of the Court of Land
Registration, after trial, declaring that a
parcel of land, excluded from the petition
and from registration, was owned by the
respondent and that such ownership was
the reason for the exclusion of said parcel
from registration, is not res adjudicata in an
action of ejectment in the Court of First
Instance, between the same parties, for the
recovery of said parcel. Such judgment has
no force or effect as evidence of title in such
action.
Form and Contents of Application
PD 1529, sec. 15. Form and contents. -
The application for land registration shall be in
writing, signed by the application or the person
duly authorized in his behalf, and sworn to
before any officer authorized to administer oaths
for the province or city where the application
was actually signed. If there is more than one
applicant, the application shall be signed and
sworn to by and in behalf of each. The
application shall contain a description of the land
and shall state the citizenship and civil status of
the applicant, whether single or married, and, if
______________________________________________________________________________________
51
married, the name of the wife or husband, and, if
the marriage has been legally dissolved, when
and how the marriage relation terminated. It shall
also state the full names and addresses of all
occupants of the land and those of the adjoining
owners, if known, and, if not known, it shall
state the extent of the search made to find them.
REPUBLIC V. ALON
199 SCRA 396
The following are the essential
requisites for original registration
proceedings in accordance with the Land
Registration Act:
1. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands
or a duly licensed private surveyor.
2. Filing of application for registration by
the applicant.
3. Setting of the date for the initial hearing
of the application by the Court.
4. Transmittal of the application and the
date of the initial hearing together with
all the documents or other evidences
attached thereto by the Clerk of Court to
the Land Registration Commission.
5. Publication of a notice of the filing of the
application and date and place of
hearing in the Official Gazette.
6. Service of notice upon contiguous
owners, occupants and those known to
have interests in the property by the
sheriff.
7. Filing of answer to the application by
any person whether named in the notice
or not.
8. Hearing of the case by the Court.
Amendments to Application
PD 1529, Sec. 19. Amendments. -
Amendments to the application
including joinder, substitution, or
discontinuance as to parties may be
allowed by the court at any stage of
the proceedings upon just and
reasonable terms.
Amendments which shall
consist in a substantial change in the
boundaries or an increase in area of
the land applied for or which involve
the inclusion of an additional land
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
shall be subject to the same
requirements of publication and notice
as in an original application.
Sec. 21. Requirement of
additional facts and papers; ocular
inspection. - The court may require
facts to be stated in the application in addition to
those prescribed by this Decree not inconsistent
therewith and may require the filing of any
additional paper. It may also conduct an ocular
inspection, if necessary.
ORTIZ V. ORTIZ
26 PHIL. 250
While an application for the
registration of various parcel real was
pending in the Court of Land Registration,
the petitioner sold the property under pacto
de retro to a corporation with juridical
personality, and owing to the lapse of
redemption period, ownership became
consolidated by operation of law and the
vendor lost all his rights in the properties.
Therefore the new and lawful owner in
entitled to be subrogate in place of the
petitioner, the previous owner, pending
registration, and he may continue the
proceedings in the case and finally obtain
title as owner. (Sec. 29, Act No. 496, and
arts. 1507 and 1508, Civil Code).
ESCUETA V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
16 PHIL. 482
It is not permissible to make amendments or
alterations in the description of the land after
its publication in the newspapers and after
the registration of the property has been
decreed, without the publication of new
notifications and advertisements making
known to everyone the said alterations and
amendments. Otherwise, the law would be
infringed with respect to the publicity which
characterizes the procedure, and third
parties who have not had an opportunity to
present their claims, might be seriously
affected in their rights, through failure of
opportune notice.
The agreement of the owners,
merely designated in an amendment of the
description of the land, is not sufficient,
because there may be other persons who
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52
might be injured by the alteration of the
description and of the plan of the land, and a
third party who did not appear at the trial, in
view of the previous publication of the
description of the property before its
alteration and amendment might afterwards
be damaged by the subsequent decree of
the court based on the altered or amended
description of which he was not opportunely
informed, or because he had no knowledge
of the amendment which was not published.
The real property to be inscribed in the
registry by virtue of the decree of the court
must be identical in its description with that
which was the subject of the application of
its owner and of the proceedings had in the
court.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. CA
276 SCRA 279 (1997)
Absent publication in a newspaper
of general circulation, the land registration
court cannot validly confirm and register title.
Note, though, that the court already acquires
jurisdiction upon mere publication in OG.
Due process, however, mandates
publication, mailing and posting. The in rem
nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued
against the whole world, and the objective of
dissemination of the notice in as wide a
manner as possible demand a mandatory
construction of the requirements for
publication, mailing and posting.
Dealings Pending Original Registration
See Sec. 22 of PD 1529.
C. Notice of Application,
Opposition and Default
See Sec. 23 of PD 1529
Application
OMANDAM V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
(1954)
Facts. Omandam applied for registration,
under the Land Registration Act, a parcel of
land subject to a mortgage in favor of PNB
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
for the sum of P600. On the date of hearing,
representatives of the Bureau of Lands,
PNB and other opponents appeared.
Representatives of Bureau of Lands and
PNB were given 15 days to file written
opposition to the application. Except as to
those who had made their appearance a
general default was entered. After hearing,
court decreed registration in favor of
Omandam.
Director of Lands filed an opposition
and ten days later, a motion for
reconsideration was filed by him predicated
upon newly discovered evidence and lack of
notice of the hearing. This was denied by
the Court. Director of Lands filed a motion
for relief from judgment on the ground of
excusable neglect. Also denied by the Court.
Held. Order appealed from is affirmed.
Ratio. Appellant points to the lack of
hearing on the petition for relief, as provided
for in sections 4 and 6, Rule 38. According
to the rule the Court is to require "those
against whom the petition is filed to answer
the same within fifteen days from the receipt
thereof" "if the petition is sufficient in form
and substance to justify such process."
Granting that the means of
communication between Occidental Misamis
and Manila was faulty as alleged by the
appellant, still there is no justification for the
delay in filing his opposition to the
application. The fact that he did not file his
opposition within the period granted or within
a reasonable time thereafter led the Court to
believe that he abandoned his opposition to
the application.
The motion for relief, apart from
failing to show excusable neglect, does not
have an affidavit of merits. Hence, being an
insufficient petition not only in form but also
in substance to justify the Court to require
those against whom it is filed to answer
within fifteen days from the receipt thereof,
as provided for in section 4, Rule 38, the
hearing provided for in section 6 of the rule
was not available to the party seeking the
relief.
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53
When a Subdivision Plan Duly-
Approved by the Director of Lands May
be Required to be Submitted:
1. when the opposition or adverse claim
covers only a portion of the lot and
said portion is not properly delimited
on the plan attached to the application
2. undivided co-ownership
3. conflicting claims of ownership or
possession
4. overlapping boundaries
NOTE: A subdivision plan showing the
contested and uncontested portions is a
pre-requisite to the decree of a partial
judgment (Sec. 28).
Opposition
See Sec. 25 of PD 1529.
NICOLAS VS. PRE, ET AL.
97 PHIL 766 (1955)
Facts. Nicolas filed for registration a vast
tract of land. Pre, et al., opposed the
application with respect to a portion of the
entire land claiming to be the owners
thereof. During the hearing, on which date
Nicolas was able to submit his evidence, the
parties agreed to come to an amicable
settlement. The court gave them 5 days.
Instead of submitting the proposed
settlement, Nicolas moved to dismiss the
registration proceeding, which was favorably
acted upon. Pre moved to reconsider the
order to give them an opportunity to present
their evidence. Pre’s motion was granted.
However, Nicolas failed to appear for the
reception of evidence. The court declared
Pre as owners of the portion of land claimed
by them as owners. No appeal was taken.
4 years later, Nicolas sought to
declare the order null and void for lack of
jurisdiction and for violation of Sec. 37 of Act
496. TC sustained motion to dismiss filed
by Pre. CA affirmed TC.
Held. CA decision affirmed. With the
enactment of Act No. 3621, the oppositor
may now not only allege in his answer his
objections to the application but also to ask
for any affirmative relief he may desire (e.g.,
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
ask for the land to be registered in his name
in the same proceeding). But the adverse
claimant to whom a portion of the land
applied for has been awarded has to pay to
the applicant such part of said expenses as
may be in proportion to the area awarded.
And inasmuch as the applicant (Nicolas) had
asked for the dismissal of his application,
the oppositors (Pre, et al.) ipso facto
acquired the role of applicants on the portion
they claim without any opposition
whatsoever.
ROXAS, ET AL., VS. CUEVAS, ET AL.
8 PHIL. 469 (1907)
Facts. An application for registration of
Hacienda Calauang in Laguna was filed.
The government and several residents in the
adjoining towns, cities and municipalities
opposed the application. Some oppositors
maintained that the land is the property of
the government and a portion thereof is
occupied by them.
The lands in question were originally
Crown lands conveyed to Salgado by a royal
grant. Upon his death, it was sold at auction
to Benito Machado as agent of Domingo
Roxas. The applicants herein acquired the
property by succession.
The lower court found that active
possession was exercised by Salgado and
his successors for a period of 130 years
while oppositors’ possession was precarious
and doubtful. Court of Land Registration
thus overruled the oppositions of private
respondents.
The Court adjudged the land to the
applicants except for a portion of the land
held to be public forest.
Held. Judgment of lower court affirmed. If
the land as claimed by the oppositors
belongs to the government, it follows that
the oppositors cannot have interest in the
land as they are not the government but
mere citizens. Since the land belongs to the
State, and since the lower court has not so
held it in its judgment, the aggrieved party
would be the State and not a mere citizen,
and it is the State that would have been
entitled to appeal from the judgment and not
any private individual. But the Insular
Government did not appeal.
______________________________________________________________________________________
54
In order that an application for
registration of the title of ownership in the
Court of Land Registration may be object to,
the opposition must be based on the right of
dominion or some other real right opposed
to the adjudication or recognition of the
ownership of the petitioner, whether it be
limited or absolute.
Order of Default
The court may, upon motion of the
applicant, order a default to be recorded if
no person appears and answers within the
time allowed, and there appears to be no
reason to the contrary. The court shall
then require the applicant to present
evidence.
Partial defaults are allowed in land
registration proceedings. (Sec. 26, PD
1529)
YABUT LEE VS. PUNZALAN
99 SCRA 567 (1980)
Facts. Spouses Yabut Lee filed an
application for registration 2 parcels of land.
No opposition having been interposed
despite due publication, TC issued an Order
of General Default. Due to the transfer of the
presiding judge, however, application was
not acted upon.
Subsequently, Punzalan filed a
petition for reopening and/or review. He
claimed that the applicants committed fraud
in not disclosing that he is the owner of a
house standing on the lots applied for and
that he has usufructuary rights over said
properties. TC denied reopening.
Held. Order of General Default set aside.
No judgment has yet been rendered by the
lower court, much less a decree of
registration issued. Petition for reopening is
thus premature. In the absence of any
decision and/or decree, there is nothing to
be reviewed or reopened. But in the interest
of substantial justice and the speedy
determination of the controversy, the TC
should have lifted the Order of General
Default to allow the Punzalan to file an
Opposition to the Application and present his
evidence.
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
An Order of General Default is
interlocutory in character and may be
modified or amended at any time prior to the
rendition of the final judgment.
MANDIAN VS. LEONG
103 PHIL 431 (1958)
Facts. Dionisio Leong was sued by
Mandian, widow and second wife Dionisio’s
late father, for usurpation. In answering the
complaint, Dionisio pleaded that he
possessed and administered the property as
part of the estate of his late father by
agreement with Mandian. Celestino, brother
of Dionisio, filed an answer in intervention
pleading that the lot was acquired during his
second marriage to Mandian but title was
placed in her name because the husband
was not a Filipino citizen. Celestino filed
cross-claim against Dionisio for his failure to
give his co-heirs any share in the estate’s
fruits.
No answer having been filed by
Dionisio notwithstanding the lapse of 26
days after he was served a copy of the
cross-claim, court declared him in default.
Dionisio sought reconsideration on the
ground that the period to answer must be
counted not from the time he was served a
copy but from the time the court admitted it.
Lower court denied reconsideration.
Held. Appeal dismissed and trial court
ordered to proceed with the hearing of the
case.
Ratio. The order declaring Dionisio in
default is interlocutory and preliminary to the
hearing of the case, and remains under the
control of the court, and may be modified or
rescinded by it on sufficient ground at any
time before final judgment. Thus, appeal is
premature and improper.
A prerequisite to defendant’s right to
appeal is that he file a motion under Rule 38
asking that the order of default entered
against him be set aside. Once such motion
is filed, the defendant, even if his motion is
denied, becomes entitled to all further
proceedings including final judgment and
may duly appeal therefrom.
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55
MALAGUM AND ORNOPIA VS. PABLO
46 PHIL 19 (1924)
Facts. Andrin and Anacleta Lopez were the
applicants for registration of a parcel of land
while Malagum and Ornopia appeared as
opponents (petitioners in this case). Lower
court granted opponents 24 hours to file
written opposition. Oppositors presented a
written opposition which was not verified
under oath. When the case was again called
for hearing, the opponents presented an
amended opposition in exactly the same
language as the previous opposition but
verified in the proper form. Applicants
opposed. Judge denied admission of said
amendment and declared opponents in
default. Motion for reconsideration was filed.
On the same date, court decreed the land in
favor of applicants.
Petitioners pray that a writ of
mandamus issue ordering the respondent
judge to reinstate the opposition.
Held. Demurrer sustained. Petition suffers
from defects not curable by amendment.
Ratio. Mandamus will not lie when there is
another plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
Petitioners should have taken an exception
to the order rejecting their amended
opposition or answer and after the denial of
their motion for reconsideration, could have
taken their appeal to the Supreme Court.
The order excluding their answer was not a
minor order within the meaning of Sec. 141
of the Civil Procedure to which no exception
could be taken. It was in effect a final
determination of their rights and may be
appealed as soon as the decision ordering
the issuance of the decree in favor of the
adverse party was rendered.
D. Hearing, Judgment and Decree of
Registration
Hearing
PD 1529
Sec. 27. Speedy hearing;
reference to a referee. - The trial
court shall see to it that all
registration-proceedings are disposed
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
or within ninety days from the date
the case is submitted for decision.
The Court, if it deems
necessary, may refer the case or any
part thereof to a referee who shall
hear the parties and their evidence,
and the referee shall submit his report
thereon to the Court within fifteen
days after the termination of such
hearing. Hearing before a referee may
be held at any convenient place within
the province or city as may be fixed by
him and after reasonable notice
thereof shall have been served the
parties concerned. The court may
render judgment in accordance with
the report as though the facts have
been found by the judge himself:
Provided, however, that the court may
in its discretion accept the report, or
set it aside in whole or in part, or
order the case to be recommitted for
further proceedings:
Sec. 28. Partial judgment. - In
a case where only a portion of the land
subject of registration is contested,
the court may render partial judgment
provided that a subdivision plan
showing the contested and
uncontested portions approved by the
Director of Lands is previously
submitted to said court.
Sec. 29. Judgment confirming
title. - All conflicting claims of
ownership and interest in the land
subject of the application shall be
determined by the court. If the court,
after considering the evidence and the
reports of the Commissioner of Land
Registration and the Director of
Lands, finds that the applicant or the
oppositor has sufficient title proper for
registration, judgment shall be
rendered confirming the title of the
applicant, or the oppositor, to the land
or portions thereof.
Sec. 30. When judgment
becomes final; duty to cause
issuance of decree. - The judgment
rendered in a land registration
proceedings becomes final upon the
expiration of thirty days to be counted
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56
from the data of receipt of notice of
the judgment. An appeal may be taken
from the judgment of the court as in
ordinary civil cases.
After judgment has become
final and executory, it shall devolve
upon the court to forthwith issue an
order in accordance with Section 39 of
this Decree to the Commissioner for
the issuance of the decree of
registration and the corresponding
certificate of title in favor of the
person adjudged entitled to
registration.
Sec. 31. Decree of
registration. - Every decree of
registration issued by the
Commissioner shall bear the date,
hour and minute of its entry, and shall
be signed by him. It shall state
whether the owner is married or
unmarried, and if married, the name
of the husband or wife: Provided,
however, that if the land adjudicated
by the court is conjugal property, the
decree shall be issued in the name of
both spouses. If the owner is under
disability, it shall state the nature of
disability, and if a minor, his age. It
shall contain a description of the land
as finally determined by the court, and
shall set forth the estate of the owner,
and also, in such manner as to show
their relative priorities, all particular
estates, mortgages, easements, liens,
attachments, and other
encumbrances, including rights of
tenant-farmers, if any, to which the
land or owner's estate is subject, as
well as any other matters properly to
be determined in pursuance of this
Decree.
The decree of registration shall
bind the land and quiet title thereto,
subject only to such exceptions or
liens as may be provided by law. It
shall be conclusive upon and against
all persons, including the National
Government and all branches thereof,
whether mentioned by name in the
application or notice, the same being
included in the general description "To
all whom it may concern".
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
 Exceptions provided by law (Sec. 44):
 Liens, claims or rights not required
by law to appear of record
 Unpaid real estate taxes of
preceding 2 years
 Public highways or private way
established/recognized by law; or
government irrigation canal or
lateral thereof
 Disposition pursuant to agrarian
reform
Sec. 32. Review of decree of
registration; Innocent purchaser
for value. - The decree of registration
shall not be reopened or revised by
reason of absence, minority, or other
disability of any person adversely
affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments, subject, however, to the
right of any person, including the
government and the branches thereof,
deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by such adjudication
or confirmation of title obtained by
actual fraud, to file in the proper
Court of First Instance a petition for
reopening and review of the decree of
registration not later than one year
from and after the date of the entry of
such decree of registration, but in no
case shall such petition be entertained
by the court where an innocent
purchaser for value has acquired the
land or an interest therein, whose
rights may be prejudiced. Whenever
the phrase "innocent purchaser for
value" or an equivalent phrase occurs
in this Decree, it shall be deemed to
include an innocent lessee,
mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for
value.
Upon the expiration of said
period of one year, the decree of
registration and the certificate of title
issued shall become incontrovertible.
Any person aggrieved by such decree
of registration in any case may pursue
his remedy by action for damages
against the applicant or any other
persons responsible for the fraud.
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57
Sec. 33. Appeal from
judgment, etc. - The judgment and
orders of the court hearing the land
registration case are appealable to the
Court of Appeals or to the Supreme
Court in the same manner as in
ordinary actions:
Sec. 34. Rules of procedure. -
The Rules of Court shall, insofar as
not inconsistent with the provision of
this Decree, be applicable to land
registration and cadastral cases by
analogy or in a suppletory character
and whenever practicable and
convenient.
BP 129
Sec. 34. Delegated jurisdiction
in cadastral and land registration
cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned
by the Supreme Court to hear and
determine cadastral or land
registration cases covering lots where
there is no controversy or opposition,
or contested lot the value of which
does not exceed twenty thousand
pesos, such value to be ascertained by
the affidavit of the claimant or by
agreement of the respective claimants
if there are more than one, or from the
corresponding tax declaration of the
real property. Their decisions in these
cases shall be appealable in the same
manner as decisions of the Regional
Trial Courts.
Rule 143, Rules of Court
These rules shall not apply to
land registration, cadastral and
election cases, naturalization and
insolvency proceedings, and other
cases not herein provided for, except
by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable
and convenient.
BALTAZAR VS. LIMPIN
49 PHIL. 39
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
Facts: M. Baltazar and J. Limpin filed an
application for registration. Opposition was
filed by B. Limpin and the Dir of Lands.
David was named as referee and he made a
report favorable to the applicants. No
exception was made to the referee’s report
so the judge handed down a decision in
which he concurred in part and dissented in
part with the referee’s report. Decision was
unfavorable to applicants. Applicants
appealed and filed a petition to order
stenographer to transcribe the notes of the
testimony of the referee. TC denied pet bec.
referee’s report has become unassailable.
Issue: WON petition to order stenographer
should be granted.
Held: Yes. GENERAL RULE: If a party fails
to make timely and specific exceptions to
the report of a referee and the report is
confirmed by the trial judge, he is bound by
the findings and cannot be heard to dispute
their truthfulness or escape the legal
consequences flowing therefrom. BUT by
virtue of sec 140 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and sec 36 of the Land
Registration Law, the trial judge retains a
discretion to accept the report of the referee
in part and set it aside in part or reverse it
entirely even where no exceptions to the
referee's report are taken (see sec 27 of PD
1529). When the trial judge accepts the
referee’s report in part, the general rule does
not apply such that the referee’s report does
not become unassailable. Petition granted.
DURAN V. OLIVA
113 PHIL 144
Facts: Duran and Vda. De Duran filed an
application for registration of land and Oliva
et al filed their opposition and MTD on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction because the
lands were already registered. TC granted
MTD. P claims there in no such thing as
MTDs in land registration cases.
Issue: WON MTDs are allowed in land
registration cases.
Held: Yes. By express provision of Rule 132
(now R143) of the Rules of Court, the rules
contained therein apply to land registration
and cadastral cases in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and
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58
convenient. The Land Registration Act does
not provide for a pleading similar or
corresponding to a motion to dismiss. As a
motion to dismiss is necessary for the
expeditious termination of land registration
cases, said motion contained in the Rules of
Court can be availed of by the parties.
Petition denied.
Evidence Necessary to Prove Title
RULE: No person is entitled to have land
registered under a cadastral or Torrens
system unless he is the owner in fee
simple of the same, even though there is
no opposition by 3rd persons against such
registration
 BURDEN is upon the APPLICANT
 A survey plan not duly approved by
the Director of Lands is of dubious
value and is not acceptable as
evidence
 If an applicant for registration relies on
a document evidencing his title thereto
he must prove:
1. the genuineness of the title
2. the identity of the land referred to
therein
RODRIGUEZ V. DIR OF LANDS
31 PHIL 272
Facts: Rodriguez filed an application for
registration of land and the Dir of Lands and
several homesteaders filed their opposition.
TC denied the application because the area
and boundaries of the land applied for is too
uncertain.
Issue: WON the P are entitled to a new trial.
Held: Yes. Only under exceptional
circumstances should an application for
registry in the Court of Land Registration be
dismissed. Applicants should be granted a
new trial, upon such terms as the court may
deem just and reasonable and to submit
additional evidence in support of his claim of
title, when there are strong or reasonable
grounds to believe that he is the owner of all
or of any part of the land described in his
application. This especially when the only
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
ground for the dismissal of the application,
as is in the CAB, is the lack of formal or
perhaps even substantial proof as to the
chain of title upon which applicant relies, or
as to the precise location of the land, which
there is reasonable ground to believe can be
supplied by the applicant upon his being
advised as to the nature of the defects or
omissions in the evidence offered by him,
such defects or omissions having been the
result of oversight or excusable error on his
part in submitting his evidence in support of
his claim of title to the land described in his
application.
REPUBLIC VS. LEE
Facts: Lee filed an application for
registration of land on the bare statement
that the land applied for has been in the
possession of her predecessor-in-interest for
more than 20 years. Director of Lands
opposed. TC granted the application.
Issue: WON Lee’s bare statement
constitutes the “well-nigh incontrovertible”
and “conclusive” evidence required in land
registration cases.
Held: No. The most basic rule in land
registration cases is that "no person is
entitled to have land registered under the
Cadastral or Torrens system unless he is the
owner in fee simple of the same, even
though there is no opposition presented
against such registration by third persons . .
In order that the petitioner for the registration
of his land shall be permitted to have the
same registered, and to have the benefit
resulting from the certificate of title, finally
issued, the burden is upon him to show that
he is the real and absolute owner, in fee
simple." Lee must prove the alleged 20 year
or more possession of his predecessors-in-
interest by means of factual support and
substantiation. Lee failed to discharge this
burden to the satisfaction of the Court. That
the representing fiscal did not cross-
examine her on this point does not help her
cause because the burden is upon her.
Petition granted.
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59
REPUBLIC CEMENT CORP. V. CA,
CORREA, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
BULACAN (198 SCRA 734)
Facts: Republic Cement Corp (RCC) filed
an application for registration of land. Rayo,
Mangahas and Legaspi opposed as to a
portion of the land applied for based on
ownership. Oppositors were later
substituted by the purchaser Correa. TC
denied application based on new SC ruling
that “a juridical person, is disqualified to
apply for its registration under Section 48 (b)
of she Public Land Law” and when its
predecessors-in-interest did not apply for
land registration, they did not have any
vested right or title which was transmissible
to the juridical person. Correa filed an
action for recovery. RCC filed a MTD on the
ground that the land registration case is on
appeal. TC granted MTD. The CA, as
regards the land registration case on appeal,
ruled that the SC ruling used by TC was
already overturned, such that juridical
persons like RCC can now apply for
registration. CA ordered registration in favor
of RCC but excluding certain portions in
favor of Correa. RCC appeals CA decision.
Issue: WON CA was correct in giving a
portion to Correa.
Held. Yes. Petitioner raises questions of fact
which are not within the province of the
present recourse. Settled is the rule that
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
final and binding upon the Supreme Court if
borne out by the evidence on record. A
review of the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals is not a function ordinarily
undertaken by the Supreme Court, the rule
admitting of only a few exceptions
recognized under decisional law, which
exceptions are not obtaining in the case at
bar.
After the death of RCC’s
predecessor-in-interest Felix Mangahas,
one-half (1/2) of said land was adjudicated
and partitioned among his five (5) daughters
in a deed of extrajudicial partition. Later,
RCC boought the land form the daughters.
Based on said transfers, petitioner is now
seeking the registration of the whole of Lot
No. 2880 in its name. This we cannot allow.
The deeds of sale relied upon by petitioner
do not constitute sufficient legal justification
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
for petitioner's claim over all of Lot No. 2880.
Petitioner's title over said lot, as the
successor in interest of said heirs, is limited
only to whatever rights the latter may have
had therein. It is elementary that a grantor
can convey no greater estate than what he
has or in which he has an alienable title or
interest.
Petitioner's claim over the excess
area is premised on the survey allegedly
made by surveyor Villaruz, but the resultant
areas depicted in said survey do not tally
with, but supposedly consist of expanded
areas very much larger than, those indicated
for the lots involved in their respective tax
declarations. These facts are expressly
stated by the foregoing parties in the deeds
of sale they executed in favor of petitioner
over the lots covered by the aforestated tax
declarations. We do not find satisfactory the
stilted explanation advanced to justify the
glaringly excessive disparity of areas
resulting after the supposed survey.
It does not appear from our scrutiny
of the records, despite petitioner's
representations in its written offer of
evidence filed in the court a quo, that the
purported survey plans of the lots involved
were actually submitted in evidence therein.
Neither was it alleged and proved that they
were approved by the Director of Lands. It
has long been held that unless a survey plan
is duly approved by the Director of Lands,
the same is of dubious value and is not
acceptable as evidence. Indubitably,
therefore, the reputed survey and its alleged
results are not entitled to credit and should
be rejected. An applicant for registration of
land, if he relies on a document evidencing
his title thereto, must prove not only the
genuineness of said title but also the identity
of the land therein referred to. If he only
claims a portion of what is included in his
title, he must clearly prove that the property
sought to be registered is included in that
title.
Spanish Titles
PD 1529, Sec. 3. Status of other
pre-existing land registration
system. - The system of registration
under the Spanish Mortgage Law is
hereby discontinued and all lands
recorded under said system which are
______________________________________________________________________________________
60
not yet covered by Torrens title shall
be considered as unregistered lands.
Hereafter, all instruments
affecting lands originally registered
under the Spanish Mortgage Law may
be recorded under Section 113 of this
Decree, until the land shall have been
brought under the operation of the
Torrens system.
The books of registration for
unregistered lands provided under
Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by
Act No. 3344, shall continue to remain
in force; provided, that all
instruments dealing with unregistered
lands shall henceforth be registered
under Section 113 of this Decree.
REPUBLIC V. FELICIANO
148 SCRA 424 (1987)
Facts: Feliciano filed a complaint with the
CFI of Camarines Sur against the Republic
of the Philippines for recovery of ownership
of a parcel of land. Feliciano alleges that he
bought the property from Victor Cardiola
who in turn acquired the property from a
Francisco Abrazado. Abrazado’s claim to
ownership is by virtue of an informacion
posesoria. Feliciano took actual possession
of the land and introduced improvements.
Government claimed ownership by virtue of
Proclamation 90 which reserved for
settlement purposes a tract of land which
includes Feliciano’s land. Feliciano filed an
action praying that he be declared rightful
and true owner by virtue of the informacion
posesoria of his predecessor-in-interests.
Issue: WON ownership is vested by virtue
of the informacion posesoria.
Held/ Ratio Decidendi : No. The inscription in
the property registry of an informacion posesoria
under the Spanish Mortgage law was a means
provided by the law then in force in the
Philippines prior to the transfer of sovereignty
from Spain to US, to record a claimant’s actual
possession of a piece of land, established through
an ex parte proceeding. Such inscription merely
furnishes, at best, prima facie evidence of the
fact that at the time the proceeding was held, the
claimant was in possession of the land under a
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
claim of right. The possessory information could
ripen into a record of ownership after the lapse
of 20 years upon the fulfillment of the requisites.
There is no showing in the case at bar that the
informacion posesoria held by the respondent
had been converted into a record of ownership.
Such possessory information, therefore,
remained at best mere prima facie evidence of
possession.
Tax Declarations
Tax declarations are not
conclusive proof of ownership in land
registration cases.
PALOMO V. CA
JANUARY 21, 1997
Facts: Gov General Forbes issued EO 40
w/c reserved for provincial park purposes an
area of land. Subsequently the CFI of Albay
ordered registratiion of 15 parcels of land
covered by EO40 in the name of Diego
Palomo. In 1954, President Magsaysay
issued Proc. 47 converting the area of EO40
into the “Tiwi Hot Spring National Park”.
The Palomos continued in adverse
possession, paying real estate taxes
thereon, and making improvements. In
1974, the Govt of the Phils. Filed a case for
annulment and cancellation of Certificates of
Title involving the 15 parcels. Jundgment
was rendered in favor of the Republic.
Issue: WON the certificate of titles to the
15 parcels are valid and binding.
Held/ Ratio Decidendi: NO. The tax
receipts which were presented in evidence
do not prove ownership of the parcels of
land inasmuch as the weight of authority is
that tax declarations are not conclusive
proof of ownership in land registration
cases.
Possession
SOUTH CITY HOMES V REPUBLIC
185 SCRA 693 (1990)
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61
Facts: Lot No. 5005 is a strip of land
between 2 lots owned by the petitioner.
Registration of the strip was issued in the
name of the petitioner, but the order was
reversed by special division of the
respondent court. Petitioner argues that the
reversal is erroneous.
The 2 adjacent lots are Lot 2381
and 2386. Both are now registered with the
petitioner. He submits 2 theories as to why
lot 5005 should also be registered in his
name. First, the strip of land formed part of
the 2 lots but was ommitted therefrom only
because of the inaccuracies of the old
system of cadastral surveys. Second, it had
acquired the property by prescription
through uninterrupted possession in the
concept of owner.
Issue: WON petitioner has acquired
ownership over lot 5005 through
prescription.
Ratio: NO. It is obvious that the technical
descriptions of the two lots do not include
the strip of land between them. Furthermore,
the testimony and the evidence presented
falls short of establishing the manner and
length of possession required by law to vest
prescriptive title in the petitioner to lot No.
5005. For one thing, as the SolGen points
out in his comment, the claim of adverse
ownership to the strip of land between their
respective lots was not exclusive but shared
by the predecessors-in-interest of the
petitioner. The petitioner merely occupied
the disputed strip believing it to be included
in the 2 lots. However, even if it can be
conceded that the previous owners of the
lots possessed the strip, the possession
cannot be tacked to the possession of the
petitioner. Possession cannot be
transferred.
Prescription
PARCOTILO V PARCOTILO
120 PHIL. 1231
Facts: The plaintiffs alleged that Pablo
owned two parcels of land during his lifetime
in Misamis Occidental. In 1918, Pablo and
his wife died of cholera, leaving no
ascendant or descendant. So it was
claimed by the plaintiffs herein that they are
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
co-owners of the land with the defendants
involved. On January 1956, plaintiffs filed a
complaint for partition, claiming that in 1936,
defendant Demetrio swore to an affidavit
that he was the only son and heir of Pablo
and in so doing, procured the transfer to his
name of the tax declarations of Pablo’s
lands. Demetrio then sold a portion of the
property to a third party, Crispin Prieto. The
defendants raised various defenses:
claiming that it was donated to them since
1917 and took possession thereof in 1918 in
the concept of an owner, introducing
improvements to it; the third party claims
innocent purchaser for value. The trial court
dismissed the complaint, upholding
defendant’s assertion that it was donated
mortis causa through a testament (without
requisite of law) exh 1 conveying it to
defendant. And it was also found that
defendant possessed the land without any
protesting his occupation thereof, and only
recently did plaintiffs raise this claim. The
TC ruled that exh 1 has no probative value
but it serves as a good ground to base
acquisitive prescription. Hence, this appeal.
Held/ Ratio Decidendi : The Supreme
Court affirmed the findings of the TC. Even
if exh 1 was not executed with all the
requisites of a valid will or of a valid donation
mortis causa, the said document supplied
the basis for the claim for the defendant.
This claim of ownership by Demetrio
coupled with his open, continuous and
adverse possession for a period of 38 years
had ripened into a title by prescription.
And where the lands involved are
unregistered and the rights thereto by
prescription accrued before the New Civil
Code went into effect, the law applicable is
Sec 41 of Act 190 of the Old Code of Civil
Procedure (10 year- period and concept of
actual, open, ... possession). Even the Art
1137 of the New Civil Code, nevertheless,
upholds the claim of defendant since he held
on the property through uninterrupted
adverse possession for more than 30 years.
SEMINARY OF SAN CARLOS VS THE
MUNICIPALITY OF CEBU (19 PHIL 32)
Facts: The Seminary of San Carlos asks for
the registration of two pieces of land located
in Cebu, alleging as its source of title a royal
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62
cession from the King of Spain. The City of
Cebu denies the title of the petitioner and
alleges in itself ownership of the land in
question, stating that its title is based upon
possession thereof required by law to effect
title by prescription.
The land in question as claimed by the
seminary, includes a portion of one of the
public squares of that city. So aside from
the question of ownership, the two related
matters resolved by the court involved the
quantity of the land and its precise location.
Held/ Ratio Decidendi: After looking at the
exhibits to ascertain the exact plan of the
land, the Court found that the land described
in petitioner’s exhibits far exceeds the land it
was allowed to claim. It was shown that
indeed, there appears to be a large
difference between the amount of land as
described in one of the petitioner’s exhibits
and that included in the plan. But still, there
are enough documents to show that it owns
part of the land. Under the evidence,
therefore, the Court concluded that a portion
of the land now occupied by the City of
Cebu as a public plaza is a land described in
the petitioner’s exhibits and so much said
land is contained in petitioner’s plan, and to
that land, no documentary record or title
appears except that of petitioner’s paper title
which the City fails to contradict. The City’s
contention is based solely on long years of
actual occupation (prescription). It then
signifies no source from which comes any
right or interest and asserts no ability to
disclose any. In fact, exh k was even
presented by petitioner to show that the
City’s occupation was permissive and not
adverse, was under license and not under
claim of right, and could not therefore be
made the basis of a prescriptive title. Any
express or implied acknowledgment which
the possessor makes with regard to the
dominant rights of the true owner interrupts
the possession held for prescriptive
purposes and defeats the operation of the
law granting such rights.
Also, the spanish grant (a written instrument
acknowledging the superior title of the
Seminary and limited the purpose of the
City’s possession of the land) given by the
governor-general then, recognizing the
Seminary’s right was binding upon the City
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
and conclusive as to the character thereof.
But the Seminary is likewise bound to honor
the purposes for which the City can occupy
the land (so long as the paseo exists).
RAMOS V CA
(FEB. 3, 1999)
Facts: supra
Held/ Ratio Decidendi: Under the law, an
action for reconveyance of real property
resulting from fraud prescribes in four years
from the discovery of fraud. Discovery of
the fraud must be deemed to have taken
place when Lucia Bautista was issued OCT
Nos. 17811 and 17812 because registration
of real property is considered constructive
notice to all persons and it shall be counted
from the time of such registering, filing, or
entering. An action based on implied or
constructive trust prescribes in 10 years.
This means that petitioners should have
enforced the trust within 10 years from the
time of its creation or upon the alleged
fraudulent registration of property. But as it
is, petitioners failed to avail of any of the
aforementioned remedies within the
prescribed periods. With NO remedy in view,
their claims should forever be foreclosed.
Likewise, the Court reiterated on the
protection afforded by the Torrens System
(once its title is registered, owner may rest
secure.. so no abandonment can work
against the private respondents.
E. Hearing, Judgment and Decree
Hearing and Notice
GOV’T OF THE PHIL, VASQUEZ,
GAYARES V ABURAL
(39 PHIL 996)
Facts: Cadastral proceedings were
commenced in Negros Occidental upon an
application of the Director of Lands in 1916.
Notices were issued. Vasquez and Gayares,
although residing in the same municipality
and participated in other cadastral cases,
did NOT enter any opposition. Hearing then
issued, and the lower court issued a final
decree ordering the Chief of the General
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63
Land Registration Office to issue the
decrees corresponding to the lots adjudged
in the decision. Eight months later, but
before the issuance by the Land
Registration Office of the so-called technical
decree, Vasquez and Gayares came into the
case for the first time, claiming complete
ignorance of the proceedings. The lower
court however, denied their motion for new
trial, saying that there was already a decree
rendered by the Court and there being no
allegation of fraud, the Court has no
jurisdiction to consider this case. Hence,
this appeal.
Held/ Ratio Decidendi: The main question
is: When does the registration of title, under
the Torrens System of Land Registration,
especially under the different Philippine
laws, establishing the Cadastral System,
become final, conclusive and indisputable?
As a general rule, registration of title under
the cadastral system is final, conclusive and
indisputable after the passage of the 30 day
period allowed for an appeal from the date
of receipt by the party of a copy of the
judgment of the court adjudicating
ownership without any step having been
taken to perfect an appeal. The prevailing
party may then have execution of the
judgment as a matter of right and is entitled
to the certificate of title issued by the Chief
of the Land Registration Office. The
exception is the special provision providing
for fraud.
In this case, the Court explained
that there are 3 actions taken after trial in a
cadastral case. First, adjudicates ownership
in favor of claimants. Second, declaration by
the court that the decree is final and its order
for the issuance of the certificates of title by
the Chief of the Land Registration Office
(such order is made within 30 days from
date of receipt of a copy of the decision,
there being no appeal made). Third,
devolves upon the General Land
Registration Office to prepare the final
decrees in all adjudicated cases. Indeed,
the judgment in a cadastral survey, including
the rendition of the decree, is a judicial act.
As the law says, the judicial decree when
final is the basis of the certificate of title.
The issuance of a decree by the LRO is
ministerial act. The date on which the
defeated party receives a copy of the
decision, begins the running of the time for
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
the interposition of a motion for new trial or
appeal. Herein, the claim after 8 months will
not be allowed by the Court.
MAGBANUA, PINEDA V DIZON,
DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND FORESTRY
(73 PHIL. 622)
Facts: Petitioners applied in the CFI of Iloilo
for the registration of a parcel of land. This
was opposed by the DOL and DOF claiming
that the applicants have no sufficient title to
the land, and that a portion thereof formed
part of the provincial road. Hearing ensued,
and in there, an agreement was reached
wherein the applicants ceded to the
government the land claimed by it (excluding
it in their application). As such, the Court
rendered a decision bestowing parcels A
and C to applicants and ceding parcel B to
the government. The decision was silent
however to one parcel of land (parcel D). In
the decision, the applicants were ordered to
submit an amended plan duly approved by
the BOL corresponding to the technical
description as agreed upon.
The DOL however filed a motion for
reconsideration based on the Court’s failure
to include parcel D in its claim. Petitioners
opposed the MFR, saying that the judge no
longer has jurisdiction because the decision
had become final.
Held/ Ratio Decidendi: DOL can file MFR
because decision is NOT yet final. In view
of the necessity for the applicants to present
a new plan as a result of their agreement
whereby it was agreed that parcels B and D
were to be excluded in favor of the
government. The decision could not acquire
finality until the amended plan was
presented. Indeed, such decisions which
leave something yet to be done by the
parties and the court before it can be
enforced, has in various cases been
declared by the Court as interlocutory and
not appealable.
ALINSUNURIN V. DIR OF LANDS
(68 SCRA 177)
FACTS: On Feb. 24, 1964, Alipinoi
Alinsunurin filed an application for
registration under Act No. 496 of a vast tract
of land in nueva Ecija. The director of lands
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64
opposed the application, claiming that the
applicant was not in open, continuous
possession of the land for at least 30 years,
and that part of the land was a military
reservation, therefore inalienable land.
On Nov. 19, 1966, the lower court
rendered a decision in favor of the
applicants, ordering the registration of the
land in the names of: (Paranaque
Investment and Devt. Corp. (PIDC/
successor-in-interest of Alinsunurin); and (2)
Roman Tamayo as to 1/3 portion of the land.
The DOL filed a notice of appeal
with the SC. PIDC was furnished a copy of
the notice, but no copy was sent to Roman
Tamayo. Pending approval of the records of
appeal, PIDC and RT filed a motion for the
issuance of a decree of registration pending
appeal. The DOL opposed.
The lower court on March 11, 1967 ordered
the issuance of a decree of registration of
the entire land, 1/3 pro indiviso in favor of
RT, and 2/3 in favor of PIDC – the latter
subject to the final outcome of the appeal,
while the former absolute since RT was not
furnished a Notice of Appeal.
OCT No. 0-311 was isued by the
register of deeds on March 14, 1967. The
DOL filed a petition to nullify the LC’s order
dated march 11, 1967, the decree of reg
issued pursuant thereto, and the OCT No. 0-
311 issued by the ROD.
ISSUE: WON the OCT No. 0-3151 may be
nullified.
HELD: Yes. Under the circumstances of the
case, the failure of the appellants to serve a
copy of their Notice of Appeal to RT is not
fatal to the appeal because, admittedly, he
was served with a copy of the original, as
well as the Amended record on appeal in
both of which the Notice3 of Appeal is
embodied. Hence, such failure cannot
impair the right of appeal.
What is more, the appeal taken by
the gov't was from the entire decision, which
was not severable. Thus, the appeal affects
the whole decision.
In any event, We rule that execution
pending appeal is NOT applicable in land
registration proceedings. It is fraught with
dangerous consequences. Innocent
purchasers may be misled into purchasing
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
real properties upon reliance on a judgment
which may be reversed on appeal.
A Torrens title issued on the basis of
a judgment that is not final is a nullity, as it is
violative of the express provision of the LRA
w/c requires that a decree shall be issued
only after the decision adjudicating the title
becomes final and executory, and it is on the
basis of said decree that the ROD
concerned issues the corresponding
certificate of title.
Consequently, the LC acted w/o
jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in
ordering the issuances of a decree of reg.
Despite the appeal taken from the entire
decision a quo.
DE LOS REYES V. DE VILLA
(48 PHIL 227)
FACTS: Delos Reyes filed an application for
the registration of 2 parcels of land situated
in the municipality of Mariaya, Tayabas. The
CFI rendered a decision in favor of delos
Reyes, ordering the issuance of a decree of
registration and OCT as soon as the
decision becomes final. The court issued an
order directing the Land Reg Office to
prepare a final decree of registration. Such
was issued on Nov 22, 1923.
Braulio de Villa filed a petition for
review of the decree under Sec 38 of the
LRA, alleging that the registration of land
was obtained by fraud. The petition was
opposed by delos Reyes on the ground that
it had been presented after the expiration of
the time allowed under sec 38. DLR
maintains that the decree of March 31, 1923
was the reckoning point of the 1-year period
under Sec. 38, hence the petition was
presented out of time.
Appelant de Villa contends that the
1-yr period commenced on Nov. 22, 1923
when the final decree of registration was
issued by the GLRO; therefore, the petition
was presented well within the one year
period provided for in Sec. 38.
ISSUE: When does the one-year period for
the petition for review commence?
RATIO: Upon the issuance of the final
decree of registration, as described under
Section 40, by the chief of the general Land
Reg. Office. De Villa’s petition was timely
presented.
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65
The petition for review under Sec.
38 of the LRA must be presented within one
year after the entry of the decree of
registration described and defined in Sec. 40
of the same act.
The LRA expressly recognizes 2
classes of decrees in land registration
proceedings, namely, decrees of
confirmation and registration dealt with in
sections 30-41 of the Act, and the decrees
dismissing the application. It will be noted
that Sec. 38 speaks of the former class.
Sec. 40 defines and describes the
form and contents of such decrees. The
decision of the trial court in a land
registration case, ordering the issuance of a
decree of registration within the meaning of
Sec. 38 of the LRA.
In preparing and signing the final
decree of registration, the chief of the GLRO
acts in his capacity as Chief Clerk of the CFI
in land registration matters, and not as an
administrative one. It is the last word of the
court to the registration and is the basis for
the issuance of the certificate of title.
In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the date noted on the final decree
of registration, as the date of its issuance
and entry, must be regarded as the true date
of such entry, and the year within which a
petition for review must be presented begins
to run from that date.
YUSON V. DIAZ
(42 PHIL. 22)
Facts: Yuson purchased a parcel of land
from Lopez, to whom OCT no. 999 was
issued by the CFI (Lopez was the applicant
for registration). When Yuson took
possession of the land, they found the
respondents in possession of the part of the
land. The latter were asked to leave the
land, but they refused. The respondents
claim that they purchased the land in good
faith from one Graciano Garcia.
The Land Reg. Court issued a writ
of possession in favor of Lopez, by virtue of
which Lopez was placed in possession of
the land. In the case at bar, Yuson filed
petition/motion to issue a writ of possession
to compel the respondents to surrender the
land to Yuson.
The respondents maintain that, in
view of the right of possession which they
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
claim to have acquired over the parcel of
land, they cannot be dispossessed thereof
by means of a simple motion.
Yuson claims that it is entitled to a
writ of possession, relying on Sec. 39 of the
LRA. It is claimed that Sec. 39 guarantees
that the purchaser of registered land for
value shall hold the same free and clear
from any and all prior claims and
encumbrances, except those set forth in the
decree of registration and those expressly
mentioned in the Act as having been
reserved against it.
The CFI Judge refused to issue the
writ of possession. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON the successors-in-interest of
the applicants can acquire possession of
said parcel of land actually occupied by the
respondents by means of a petition asking
for a writ of possession?
Held: No. An independent action for
reconveyance or unlawful detainer is
necessary.
Under the facts stated in the
decision, it is improper to issue the
peremptory writ of mandamus against a
judge to compel him to issue a writ of
possession in favor of the owner of the
registered land occupied by a third person
who has not been defeated after trial.
Sec. 39 of the LRA w/c states that
an OCT issued by virtue of a decree of reg.
And every subsequent purchaser for value
receives a certificate and those mentioned in
Sec. 39. The meaning of the words “free
from all encumbrances” does not include
adverse possession of a third person who
subsequent to the decree entered and
occupied the said land.
By virtue of Sec. 17 of the LRA, the
Land Registration Court may, in cases falling
within its jurisdiction, enforce its orders,
judgments or decrees in the same manner
as the CFI, including a writ of possession.
But when OTHER persons have
subsequently entered the property, claiming
right of possession, the owner of the
registered property or his successors in
interest CANNOT dispossess such persons
by merely asking for a writ of possession.
He who believes himself entitled to
deprive another of the possession of real
property must come to the courts of justice,
instituting, as the case may be, and action
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66
for unlawful entry or detainer, or the
reinvindicatory action authorized under the
Civil Code.
When a Writ of Possession is Not
Proper:
1. when a 3rd person enters into and
occupies the land subsequent to the
decree of registration
 proper recourse would be an
action for illegal entry/unlawful
detainer or a reinvidicatory action
2. when a person seeks reconstitution of
a certificate of title over a piece of
property that he does not actually
possess
BLAS, SIMEON VS. DELA CRUZ
(37 PHIL. 1)
Facts: Dela Cruz filed an application for
registration of a parcel of land under the
Torrens system. Blas presented an
opposition, claiming that he was the owner
of a portion of land described in the petition.
Lower court ruled in favor of Blas, but the
SC ruled otherwise. The SC ordered that
the portion w/c was claimed by Blas be
registered in the name of V. dela Cruz.
Blas filed this present petition to
obtain an injunction against dela Cruz to
prevent him from destroying the buildings
and improvements over the subject land.
Blas claims that these byuildings fall under
“exceptional encumbrances” provided for
under Sec. 39 of Act 496. Therefore,
despite the absence of any notation in the
certificate of title as to these buildings, these
encumbrances must be recognized by dela
Cruz.
Issue: 1. Does the decree ordering the
registration of land under the Torrens system
include the buildings and improvements
thereon, when they have not been expressly
excluded in said decree? Ans: YES
2. May Blas claim said buildings as
his property and remove the same or
prevent the owner of the land under said
decree from removing or destroying the
same, even if he had not made any claim to
said improvements during the proceedings
for registration? Ans: No.
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
Held: The general purpose of the Torrens
System is to forever foreclose litigation
concerning the title to land. Every decree of
registration shall bind the land, and quiet title
thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated
by law. If the objector (Blas) may, during the
pendency of the case, remain silent as to
certain rights, interests or claims existing in
or upon the land, and then later, by a
separate action, have such interest litigated,
then the purpose of the Torrens System will
be defeated.
IN RE MANILA BUILDINGS AND LOANS
ASSOCIATION (13 PHIL 575)
Facts: MBLA leased a parcel of land owned
by Benito Legarda, and erected a building of
strong materials thereon. On Jan. 14, 1908,
MBLA applied to the Court of Land Reg. for
the registration of a building of strong
materials erected on ground belonging to
another. The application was denied by the
CLR.
MBLA filed an amended application
alleging that the land was registered in the
name of Legarda; and that the lease
contract between MBLA and Legarda was
registered/indorsed on the title deed of the
latter.
On April 14, 1908, the CLR ruled
that an annotation that the building thereon
belongs to the lessee (MBLA) is sufficient
registration. MBLA appealed to the SC,
claiming that Sec. 2 of the LRA allows the
registration of “title to land or buildings or
interest therein…”
Held: The use of the phrase “land or
buildings or an interest therein,” instead of
the single word “land”, is no reason for
construing the law as authorizing the
registration of buildings erected on land
belonging to another separately and
independently from the registration of the
land. The natural and logical interpretation
of such language of the LRA being natural
and logical interpretation of such language
of the LRA being that it authorizes the owner
of the land to register together with the land
all the improvements. But under NO
circumstances can registration be applied
for separately and independently by the
owner of the land and by the owner of the
buildings; that is to say that the land of one
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67
person and the building of another erected
thereon can have no separate legal
existence in the registry as property
independent in themselves.
At the expiration of the lease, the
owner of the land has the right, not merely a
contingent one but a definite right under the
law, to cause the building erected on his
estate to be taken down without incurring
any obligation whatsoever, enforcing against
the lessee the obligation imposed by article
1561 (Civil Code), to return the estate in the
same condition in w/c he received it.
vi.
Remedies
An aggrieved party may take any of
the following remedies to challenge the
judgment in a land registration case or
the validity of title issued pursuant
thereto:
(1) Motion for New Trial
(2) Petition for Relief from Judgment
(3) Appeal
(4) Petition for Review of Decree of
Registration
(5) Action for Reconveyance
(6) Action for Damages
(7) Action for Compensation from
the Assurance Fund
(8) Cancellation Suit
(9) Quieting of Title
(1) New Trial
Within the 15-day reglementary
period for perfecting an appeal, the
aggrieved party may file a motion for new
trial under Rule 37 of the Rules of Court
for one or more of the following causes:
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence which
ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against and by reason of
which such aggrieved party has
probably been impaired in his
rights; or
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
(b) Newly-discovered evidence
which he could not, with
reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the
trial, and which if presented would
probably alter the result.
(2) Relief from Judgment
A petition for relief from judgment
under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court can
be resorted to in instances where the
judgment was entered through fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence (FAME for short).
This petition must be verified and
filed within 60 days after the petitioner
learns of the judgment to be set aside,
but not more than 6 months after such
judgment was entered. It must be
accompanied by affidavits showing the
FAME relied upon, and the facts
constituting the petitioner's good and
substantial cause of action or defense.
This remedy can be availed of only
when the judgment has become final and
the remedies of new trial or appeal are no
longer available.
(3) Appeal
The judgment and orders of the court
hearing the land registration case are
appealable to the Court of Appeals in the
same manner as in ordinary actions.
(4) Petition for Review of
Decree of Registration
A petition for reopening and review of
decree of registration under Sec. 32 of PD
1529 may be resorted to provided that the
ff. requisites are present:
(1) the petitioner has a real and
dominical right;
(2) that he has been deprived
thereof;
______________________________________________________________________________________
68
(3) through fraud (actual or
extrinsic);
(4) that the petition is filed within one
year from the issuance of the
decree (Yabut Lee v. Punzalan);
and
(5) the property has not as yet been
transferred to an innocent
purchaser for value
Once the 1-year period lapses, the
decree of registration and the certificate of
title issued become incontrovertible, and
the person aggrieved loses his recourse to
this remedy.
However, even if a petition is filed
within 1 year from the entry of the decree,
the courts cannot entertain such petition if
the rights of an innocent purchaser for
value may be prejudiced.
 This 1-year period commences upon
the issuance of the final decree of
registration by the LRA (De los Reyes
v. De Villa, supra)
MERCEDES ANICETA GARCIA, ET AL
VS. DOMINADOR G. MENDOZA
14 SCRA 691 (1965)
FACTS: Petitioner Mercedes A. Garcia
claims that she and her husband, Cirilo
Mendoza, had purchased Lot No. 32080
located in San Carlos City, Pangasinan on
April 24, 1938. They subsequently sold it
under a Pacto de Retro sale to co-
petitioners Sps. Dulcesimo Rosario and
Violeta Reyes and Erlinda O. Rosario
(Petitioners), who then took possession of
said lot.
On February 23, 1988, the cadastral
court issued a decision adjudicating Lot No.
32080 in favor of Dominador G. Mendoza
(hereafter, Mendoza), their son.
Petitioner Garcia claims that there
was actual fraud because Mendoza falsely
claimed that his father, Cirilo Mendoza,
inherited the property from Hermenegildo
Mendoza (Cirilo's alleged father); that
Mendoza made it appear that Lot 32080 was
an exclusive property of Cirilo Mendoza,
who had been in possession of the lot since
October 15, 1987, and subsequently,
donated the same to his son, Mendoza.
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
On September 2, 1988, the
petitioners filed with the court a petition for
review of judgment. This was denied in an
Order dated December 6, 1988. Mendoza
countered that a petition for relief from
judgment under Sec. 38, Act No. 496, does
not apply to a cadastral proceeding.
Moreover, Mendoza alleged that he had filed
his claim over Lot No. 32080
ISSUE: WON the remedy of petition for
review of judgment exists or is warranted by
Act No. 2259 (Cadastral Act):
HELD: Sec. 11, Act 2259 clearly states that
except as otherwise provided by the
Cadastral Act, all the provisions of the Land
Registration Act are applicable to cadastral
proceedings as well as to the decree and
certificates of title granted and issued under
the Cadastral Act.
SOLEDAD DE G. CRISOLO, IN HER
BEHALF AND AS GUARDIAN OF NOEL
CRISOLO VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
68 SCRA 435 (1975)
FACTS: Within a year from the issuance of a
decree of registration in a land registration
case, respondent-ward, represented by his
guardian, filed a petition for review of the
decree under Section 38 of Act 496 on the
ground of fraud which allegedly consisted in
petitioner's taking advantage of the insanity
of respondent-ward to secure the execution
of a deed of exchange of properties by and
between the petitioner and said respondent-
ward, and in petitioner's instituting the land
registration proceedings while said ward
was confined at the National Psychopathic
Hospital. The trial court dismissed the
petition and held that Section 38 of Act 496
was not applicable because respondent had
opportunity to oppose the registration
proceedings but abandoned his opposition.
Private respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals and when petitioner moved to have
the appeal certified to the Supreme Court
because it involved purely questions of law,
the Court of Appeals denied the motion and
instead sustained the allegation of fraud. It
rendered a decision reversing that of the trial
court and remanding the case to the trial
court for further proceedings. Hence, this
petition for certiorari on the grounds that the
______________________________________________________________________________________
69
Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction since
only questions of law are involved and
private respondent is not entitled to the re-
opening of the land registration proceedings
because he was not denied fraudulently of
his day in court but merely abandoned his
opposition thereto despite the opportunity
given to him to oppose the registration.
ISSUE: whether or not an oppositor, after
abandoning his opposition in a land
registration case and after a decision had
been rendered and a decree of registration
issued thereunder, is entitled to a reopening
of the proceedings by means of a petition for
review based on fraud under Section 38 of
Act 496
HELD: The record shows that private
respondent had been duly afforded the
opportunity to object to, the registration and
substantiate the same. The person(s)
contemplated under Section 38 of Act 496,
to be entitled to a review of a decree of
registration, are those who were fraudulently
deprived of their opportunity to be heard in
the original registration case. Such is not the
situation of the private respondents here.
They were not denied their day in court by
fraud, which the law provides as the sole
ground for reopening of the decree of
registration. In fact they opposed the
registration but failed to substantiate their
opposition.
Mere allegation of fraud is not
enough. Specific, intentional acts to deceive
and deprive another of his right, or in some
manner injure him, must be alleged and
proved. There must be actual or positive
fraud as distinguished from constructive
fraud to entitle one to the reopening of a
decree of registration. And it must be
extrinsic and not intrinsic fraud. (Grey Alba
vs. De la Cruz, supra, 17 Phil. 49, 57).
SPOUSES RODOLFO YABUT LEE AND
LYDIA LISCANO, VS. FLORENCIO P.
PUNZALAN, 99 SCRA 567 (1980)
FACTS: On May 14, 1968, applicants-
appellees had filed before the CFI an
application for the registration of two parcels
of land (Land Reg. Case No. N-345, LRC
Record No. 34956). No opposition having
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
been interposed despite due publication, the
trial Court issued an Order of General
Default. In due time, the applicants
presented their evidence before the Clerk of
Court who was duly commissioned to
receive the same. The latter submitted his
Report to the Court for proper action but due
to the transfer of then Presiding Judge
Julian E. Lustre to another district, the
Application was unacted upon.
On November 26, 1968, appellant
Florencio Punzalan filed a "Petition for
Reopening and/or Review" on the claim that
applicants had committed fraud in not
disclosing in their Application that he is the
owner of a house standing on the lots
applied for, that he has usufructuary rights
over said properties, and prayed that the
Petition be admitted, the case reopened and
a new trial ordered so that he could have his
day in Court.
The trial Court, presided by Judge
Jose C. de Guzman, rendered an Order
denying reopening and/or review "for not
having been well taken and for lack of merit
since "there is nothing to reopen and/or
review at the moment."
ISSUE: WON the CFI was correct in denying
reopening/review of the case
HELD: The petition for review contemplated
in the law clearly envisages the issuance of
a decree of registration. It presupposes the
rendition of a Court's decision. In fact, it has
even been held that a petition for review
under the law "may be filed at any time after
the rendition of the Court's Decision and
before the expiration of one year from the
entry of the final decree of registration". In
the case at bar, no judgment has as yet
been rendered by the lower Court, and
much less has any decree of registration
been issued. The filing of a Petition for
Reopening and/or Review by appellant,
therefore, is decidedly premature. Indeed, in
the absence of any decision and/or decree,
there is nothing to be reviewed or reopened.
Innocent Purchaser for Value
One is considered an "innocent
purchaser for value" only if, relying on the
certificate of title, he bought the property
______________________________________________________________________________________
70
from the registered owner, "without notice
that some other person has a right to, or
interest in, such property and pays a full
and fair price for the same, at the time of
such purchase, or before he has notice of
the claim or interest of some other
persons in the property." (Realty Sales
Enterprise, Inc. v. IAC, 154 SCRA 328)
He is not required to explore farther than
what the Torrens title indicates upon its
face. (Fule v. De Legare, 117 Phil 367)
The phrase "innocent purchaser
for value" is deemed to include an
innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other
encumbrancer for value. (Sec. 32, PD
1529)
REALTY SALES ENTERPRISE, INC. AND
MACONDRAY FARMS, INC. VS. IAC,
154 SCRA 328 (1987)
FACTS: Morris Carpo filed a complaint with
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XXIII, presided over by Judge Rizalina
Bonifacio Vera thereafter referred to as Vera
Court, for declaration of nullity of Decree No.
N-63394 and TCT No. 20408 issued in the
name of Realty Sale. It was alleged that the
court (Reyes court) that adjudicated title in
favor of Realty had no jurisdiction as a land
registration court. It was further alleged that
the original records of LRC Case No. 657,
GLRO Record No. 29882 which was the
basis for the issuance of said order of May
21, 1958, were lost and/or destroyed during
World War II and were still pending
reconstitution; hence, the Reyes Court had
no authority to order the issuance of a
certificate of title. The court of first instance
decided in favor of Carpo. Realty appealed.
CA affirmed CFI. The Court of Appeals
further held that Morris G. Carpo is a
purchaser in good faith and for value.
ISSUE: 1. WON the court that adjudicated
title in favor of Realty had jurisdiction
2. WON Carpo is an innocent
purchaser for value was never raised as an
issue in the trial court.
HELD: 1. The parties thereto did not have to
commence a new action but only had to go
back to the preceding stage where records
are available. The land registration case
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
itself remained pending and the Court of
First Instance of Rizal continued to have
jurisdiction over it.
The records were destroyed at that
stage of the case when all that remained to
be done was the ministerial duty of the Land
Registration Office to issue a decree of
registration (which would be the basis for the
issuance of an Original Certificate of Title) to
implement a judgment which had become
final There are however authentic copies of
the decisions of the CFI and the Court of
Appeals adjudicating Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan
Psu-47035 to Estanislao Mayuga. Moreover,
there is an official report of the decision of
this Court affirming both the CFI and the CA
decisions. A final order of adjudication forms
the basis for the issuance of a decree of
registration.
Considering that the Reyes court
was actually in the exercise of its jurisdiction
as a land registration court when it issued
the order directing the issuance of a decree
of registration, "substituting therein as
registered owner Dominador Mayuga, in lieu
of the original adjudicates, Estanislao
Mayuga, based on the affidavit of self-
adjudication, subject to the provisions of
Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court," which
order is in consonance with the ruling of this
Court in the Guico decision, and the
decisions of the CFI-Rizal and the CA dated
August 19, 1935 and November 17, 1939,
respectively, We uphold the validity of said
order and rule that Judge Vera was without
jurisdiction to set it aside.
2. A perusal of the records of the case
reveals that no factual basis exists to
support such a conclusion. Even Carpo
himself cites no factual proof of his being an
innocent purchaser for value. He merely
relies on the presumption of good faith
under Article 527 of the Civil Code.
It is settled that one is considered
an innocent purchaser for value only if,
relying on the certificate of title, he bought
the property from the registered owner,
"without notice that some other person has a
right to, or interest in, such property and
pays a full and fair price for the same, at the
time of such purchase, or before he has
notice of the claim or interest of some other
persons in the property." (Cui v. Henson, 51
Phil. 606 [1928], Fule v. De Legare, 117 Phil.
367 [1963], 7 SCRA 351.) He is not required
______________________________________________________________________________________
71
to explore farther than what the Torrens title
upon its face indicates. (Fule v. De Legare,
supra.) At the time of sale there was as yet
no Torrens title which Carpo could have
relied upon so that he may qualify as an
innocent purchaser for value. Not being a
purchaser for value and in good faith, he is
in no better position than his predecessors-
in-interest.
WALSTROM VS. MAPA
181 SCRA 431 (1990)
FACTS: Petitioner alleges that her
predecessor in interest (Dianson) filed a free
patent application. On April 10, 1933 free
patent was issued in Dianson’s name. On
the other hand, Mapa, predecessor in
interest of private respondents filed
Miscellaneous Sales Application. On May
12, 1934, the Director of Lands awarded
Josefa Abaya Mapa a tract of land. Dianson
filed a protest against the construction made
by Mapa on the said land. The Director of
the Director of Lands awarded Josefa Abaya
Mapa a tract of land. The Director of Lands
decided in favor of Mapa. Nearly two years
later, on July 8, 1966, Gabriela Walstrom
filed a motion for reconsideration with the
Director of Lands of the decision dated
August 12, 1964 of the regional land officer,
claiming that she had acquired the rights
and interests of Cacao Dianson to the
subject parcel of land by virtue of a transfer
of said rights and interests by Dianson to
one Agripino Farol who, in turn, transferred
the same rights and interests to Gabriela
Walstrom. The Director set aside the
previous order, Mapa appealed to DANR
Secretary. DANR restated the decision of
the reigonal land officer in favor of Mapa.
Petitioner Hilda Walstrom filed a civil
complaint against the respondents praying
for the nullification of the Mapas' sales
patent and certificates of title issued by the
register of deeds of Benguet Province 11
under Section 38 of Act 496 or the Land
Registration Act. Court dismissed petition for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
ISSUE: WON the court was correct in
dismissing Walstrom’s petition
HELD: It is the teaching of the foregoing
provisions that a decree of registration may
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
be reopened or renewed by the proper
Regional Trial Court upon the concurrence
of five essential requisites, to wit: (a) that the
petitioner has a real and a dominical right;
(b) that he has been deprived thereof; (c)
through fraud; (d) that the petition is filed
within one year from the issuance of the
decree; and (e) that the property has not as
yet been transferred to an innocent
purchaser for value.
An examination of the records of the
case shows non-concurrence of the
essential elements enumerated above.
The first element is patently not
present because the petitioner can not
allege that she has already a real and
dominical right to the piece of property in
controversy. The latest order of the DANR
Secretary, dated June 13, 1968, was to give
full force and effect to the regional land
officer's decision, dated August 12, 1964.
13 The regional land officer held that the
petitioner's Free Patent Application No. 3-74
shall exclude the disputed portion "A" of Lot
No. 1, which, instead, shall be included in
the Mapas' Miscellaneous Sales Application.
The second element is also absent
since corollary to the aforecited ruling of the
DANR Secretary, the petitioner can not aver
that she was deprived of property because
she did not have a real right over portion
"A".
Apropos the third element, the
records are bereft of any indication that
there was fraud in the issuance of the
certificates of title. As matters stand, the
prerequisites have not been complied with.
The petitioner's recourse to Section 38
would not have prospered; accordingly, the
respondent court's dismissal of petitioner's
complaint was proper.
Instead of invoking Section 38, the
petitioner should have pressed for the
speedy resolution of her petition with the
DANR. The petitioner avers that since the
one-year prescriptive period for seeking
judicial relief provided for in Sec. 38 of the
Land Registration Act was about to lapse,
she was compelled to file the action to nullify
said patent. The petitioner's submission is
not correct. Her fear of the futility, or even
only inefficacy, of exhausting the
administrative remedies granted her by law
is clearly unfounded.
______________________________________________________________________________________
72
Actual or extrinsic fraud
For fraud to be ground for nullity of
a judgment, it must be extrinsic to the
litigation. Extrinsic fraud (also known as
collateral fraud) refers to any fraudulent
act of the successful party in a litigation
which is committed outside the trial of a
case against the defeated party, or his
agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby
said defeated party is prevented from
presenting fully and fairly his side of the
case. Or more simply, a deprivation of a
party of his day in court. Examples of
extrinsic fraud include the following:
 failure and intentional omission on
the part of respondents to disclose
the fact of actual physical
possession of the premises by
petitioner (Nicolas v. Director of
Lands, 9 SCRA 934)
 deliberate failure to notify a party
entitled to notice (Stilianopulos v.
City of Legaspi, 316 SCRA 523)
Intrinsic Fraud
On the other hand, intrinsic fraud
refers to acts of a party in a litigation
during the trial which did not affect the
presentation of the case, but did prevent a
fair and just determination of the case.
Examples of such acts are the use of
forged instruments or perjured testimony.
It has also been said that if the fraud
alleged in the petition is involved in the
same proceedings in which the party
seeking relief had ample opportunity to
assert his right, to attack the document
presented by the applicant for registration,
and to cross-examine the witnesses who
testified thereto, then the fraud relied upon
is intrinsic. (Frias v. Esquivel, 5 SCRA
770)
STERLING INVESTMENT CORPORATION,
ET AL VS. HONORABLE V. M. RUIZ
30 SCRA 318 (1969)
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
FACTS: Alejandro Cabasbas filed a
complaint to recover land registered in his
name. A compromise agreement was
entered into by the parties. A decision was
rendered based thereon. Later on Cabasbas
filed an amended complaint asking for the
annulment of the compromise based on
fraud. He alleged that it was obtained
through fraud as it was made to appear
before the court of first instance that the
conveyance of title was made on February,
1946 when in fact it took place on
September 14, 1944, in violation of the
Homestead Law. The RTC dismissed the
complaint.
HELD: Fraud relied upon is intrinsic. It
suffices to refer to the leading case of De
Almeda v. Cruz, a 1949 decision. As Justice
Tuason speaking for the Court made clear:
"Fraud to be ground for nullity of a judgment
must be extrinsic to the litigation. Were not
this the rule there would be no end to
litigations, perjury being of such common
occurrence in trials. In fact, under the
opposite rule, the losing party could attack
the judgment at any time by attributing
imaginary falsehood to his adversary's
proofs. But the settled law is that judicial
determination however erroneous of matters
brought within the court's jurisdiction cannot
be invalidated in another proceeding. It is
the business of a party to meet and repel his
opponent's perjured evidence."
The latest case in point, decided in
1968, this time in an opinion penned by
Justice Zaldivar, reiterates the above
doctrine. Thus: "Not every kind of fraud,
however, is sufficient ground to set aside a
judgment. This Court has held that only
extrinsic or collateral, as distinguished from
intrinsic, fraud is a ground for annulling a
judgment. Extrinsic fraud refers to any
fraudulent act of the successful party in a
litigation which is committed outside the trial
of a case against the defeated party, or his
agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby
said defeated party is prevented from
presenting fully and fairly his side of the
case. On the other hand, intrinsic fraud
refers to acts of a party in a litigation during
the trial, such as the use of forged
instruments on perjured testimony, which did
not affect the presentation of the case, but
did prevent a fair and just determination of
the case."
______________________________________________________________________________________
73
ALFREDO FRIAS, ET AL., VS. SANTIAGO
ESQUIVEL, ET AL.
FACTS: Appellee spouses Alfredo N. Frias
and Belen Lustre filed in the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija an application to
register a residential lot. Respondents
Esquivels opposed the application claiming
ownership of a portion of 1,357 square
meters of the land sought to be registered,
having inherited the same from their
parents, Victoriano Esquivel and Catalina
Villamanca. They also sought the
postponement of the proceedings pending
final determination of Civil Case No. 998 of
the same court between themselves as
plaintiffs and the applicants as defendants,
involving the ownership and possession of
the land subject of their opposition.
In the civil case mentioned above,
the plaintiffs alleged that they, together with
their youngest sister, Anastacia Esquivel de
Yambao (who refused to be joined as a
party in the action), inherited pro-indiviso
from their parents, Victoriano Esquivel and
Catalina Villamanca, a parcel of land with
improvements thereon situated at Jaen,
Nueva Ecija, containing an area of about
1,357 square meters; that while said
property was still owned in common, on or
about July 16, 1951, without their knowledge
and consent, Anastacia Esquivel de Yambao
sold the whole of it to the defendants, the
Frias spouses, who knew, at the time of the
sale, that their vendor owned only a part
thereof; that the defendants had taken
possession of the land and had refused to
reconvey it to them despite repeated
demands therefor.
The Court issued an order
postponing the hearing on the application
until after final adjudication of Civil Case No.
998, but on March 24, 1953 issued an order
of general default except as against the
oppositors and the Director of Lands. On
April 20, 1956 we rendered judgment in Civil
Case No. 998 (G.R. No. 8825) declaring the
deed of sale executed by Anastacia Esquivel
valid insofar as Santiago, Felisa, Ceferina
and Anastacia, all surnamed Esquivel, were
concerned, but invalid with respect to the
minor heirs of the late Alvaro Esquivel.
It appears that, subsequent to our
decision, that is, on February 15, 1957, the
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
children of the deceased Alvaro Esquivel —
who had attained the age of majority, with
the exception of Alvaro and Reynaldo — and
their mother, Perpetua Pada de Zaragosa
(remarried to Eduardo Zaragosa), as natural
guardian of the two minors, executed a deed
of sale conveying their one-seventh
participation in the land to the Frias
spouses. (Exhibit I)
On October 2, 1957, in the aforesaid
registration proceedings, after due notice
and hearing, the Court rendered judgment
adjudicating the land described in the plan
Exhibit A in favor of the applicants and
ordering its registration in their name. After
the same had become final and executory,
the Court ordered the issuance of the
Decree of Registration, and on December
11, 1957 the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office issued Decree of
Registration No. 60798 in favor of the Frias
spouses.
On December 8, 1958, Rosario
Esquivel-Gonzales, as the duly appointed
guardian of the minors Reynaldo and
Ricardo Esquivel, filed a verified petition to
reopen the decree of registration on the
ground of fraud because it appears that,
subsequent to our decision, that is, on
February 15, 1957, the children of the
deceased Alvaro Esquivel — who had
attained the age of majority, with the
exception of Alvaro and Reynaldo — and
their mother, Perpetua Pada de Zaragosa
(remarried to Eduardo Zaragosa), as natural
guardian of the two minors, executed a deed
of sale conveying their one-seventh
participation in the land to the Frias
spouses. (Exhibit I)
On October 2, 1957, in the aforesaid
registration proceedings, after due notice
and hearing, the Court rendered judgment
adjudicating the land described in the plan
Exhibit A in favor of the applicants and
ordering its registration in their name. After
the same had become final and executory,
the Court ordered the issuance of the
Decree of Registration, and on December
11, 1957 the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office issued Decree of
Registration No. 60798 in favor of the Frias
spouses.
On December 8, 1958, Rosario
Esquivel-Gonzales, as the duly appointed
guardian of the minors Reynaldo and
Ricardo Esquivel, filed a verified petition to
______________________________________________________________________________________
74
reopen the decree of registration on the
ground of fraud that applicants committed
fraud in obtaining said decree of registration,
and such fraud consists of the following: the
herein applicants had falsely represented to
this Honorable Court during the hearing of
their application that they were the owners
of the entire residential lot included in their
plan marked as Exhibit "A" and now covered
by the decree of registration, when at that
time they knew fully well they were not the
owners thereof in its entirety; that they were
aware of such fraudulent representation
when they made it because they were
parties in Civil Case No. 998 of this Court
involving precisely the validity of their title to
the aforementioned lot; they also knew that
on appeal the case became G.R. No. L-
8825 of the Supreme Court which, in a
decision promulgated on April 20, 1956, held
that the title (a deed of sale) to that
residential lot claimed by the herein
applicants is invalid with regard to the minor
heirs of the late Alvaro Esquivel', one of
them being Reynaldo Esquivel, your
petitioner's ward, in whose behalf this
petition is being presented.
ISSUE: WON there was actual fraud
HELD: To justify the setting aside or review
of a decree of registration under Section 38
of Act No. 496, the party seeking relief must
allege and prove, inter alia, that the
registration was procured through fraud —
actual and extrinsic. It has been held in this
connection that if the fraud alleged in the
petition to set aside the decree is involved in
the same proceedings in which the party
seeking relief had ample opportunity to
assert his right, to attack the document
presented by the applicant for registration,
and to cross- examine the witnesses who
testified relative thereto, then the fraud relied
upon is intrinsic. The fraud is extrinsic if it
was employed to deprive a party of his day
in court, thus preventing him from asserting
his right to the property registered in the
name of the applicant (Bagoyboy vs.
Director of Lands, 37 Off. Gaz., 1956)
Upon consideration of the facts
relied upon by appellants to justify a review
of the decree in question, we find that the
same do not constitute the extrinsic fraud
required as justification for the granting of
the relief sought by them.
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
ALBINO NICOLAS, ET AL. VS. THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
9 SCRA 934 (1963)
FACTS: Albino Nicolas, filed an application
to register under the Torrens System two
parcels of land. On December 19, 1951,
Eusebio Coloma, also applied for
registration in favor, under the system, the
ssame parcels. Before the initial hearings of
the two applications, Guillermo Camungao
(petitioner herein), presented with the
Registration Court, a written appearance,
opposing the registration of Lots 2, of both
PSUS, alleging that said lots belonged to
him, having been awarded to him in Sales
Application No. 2091 (E-3989). The
Provincial Fiscal, representing the Director
of Lands, filed an opposition to the
applications for registration, alleging that the
lots, are public lands and covered by Sales
Application No. 2091 (E-3989) of Guillermo
Camungao. On August 22, 1952, the lower
court issued an Order of General Default in
both cases, except as to the Director of
Lands. A hearing was subsequently held,
with notice thereof, sent only to the
Provincial Fiscal, as representative of the
Director of Lands. No notice to Guillermo
Camungao, was given, in spite of his written
appearance and opposition to the
registration. Judgment was rendered on
September 20, 1955, adjudicating the lands
applied for, in favor of the applicants. The
judgment having become final and
executory the court a quo issued an order
for the issuance of a decree of registration.
On January 21, 1956, an Order of eviction
was directed against appellant, and it was
the first time he came to know that a
decision and decree had been rendered and
issued in the registration cases. Camungao
filed a petition to set aside the decision. The
court dismissed the petition for review.
ISSUE: WON there was actual fraud
HELD: It is contended that, in cases of the
nature of the one at bar, the only basis for
the re-opening of the case, is actual fraud.
There was allegation of actual fraud in the
petition, such as the failure and intentional
omission on the part of the respondents to
disclose the fact of actual physical
______________________________________________________________________________________
75
possession of the premises by petitioner
herein. It is fraud to knowingly omit or
conceal a fact, upon which benefit is
obtained to the prejudice of a third person
(Estiva vs. Alvero, 37 Phil. 498). In short, the
series of allegations contained in the
petition, portions of which are quoted
heretofore, describe fraudulent acts, actual
and otherwise. Perhaps, the trial judge had
reasons to doubt the veracity of the
supposed fraudulent acts, attributed to
respondents. This doubt, however, should
not have been made the basis of dismissal,
because if a court doubts the veracity of the
allegations in the petition, the best thing it
could do, would have been to deny the
motion to dismiss and proceed with the
hearing on the merits, of the petition (De
Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al., 50 O.G.,
p. 3064). This is specially true in the instant
case, where the ground for the motion to
dismiss the petition for review, is lack of
cause of action, which is not indubitable.
The written appearance with
opposition presented by petitioner herein, on
November 7, 1951 (R.A.) was a valid one,
and sufficient to give him a legal standing in
court and would entitle him to notice, as a
matter of right. The lower court erred in
having chosen to ignore the written
appearance with opposition, which was a
substantial compliance with the law, that
requires a formal answer.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS.
TEODOCIA LOZADA,
90 SCRA 503 (1979)
FACTS: In her application for the registration
of the lots in question, applicant did not
disclose the vital facts that her husband's
previous application for a revocable permit
and to purchase the lands in question from
the Bureau of Lands had been rejected,
because the lands were already reserved
as a site for school purposes. She
concealed the fact that the lands were part
of the public domain and stated the
deliberate falsehood that the lands were
allegedly inherited by her from her parents,
which allegation misled the Bureau of Lands
into not filing an opposition to her application
and thus effectively deprived the Republic of
its day in court. Applicant succeeded on ex
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
parte evidence in securing registration of the
property.
Within one year from entry of
decree, the Solicitor General filed a petition
for review of the decision and decree of
registration on the ground of actual fraud.
The Court of First Instance gave due course
to the petition and after hearing ordered the
cancellation of the certificate of title in favor
of applicant-appellant. Applicant-appellant
appealed to the Court of Appeals which
certified the appeal to the Supreme Court as
involving only questions of law.
ISSUE: WON there was actual fraud
HELD: The fraud, as distinguished from
intrinsic fraud which connotes any fraudulent
scheme executed by a prevailing litigant
outside of the trial of a case against the
defeated party, of his agents, attorneys or
witnesses, whereby said defeated party is
prevented from presenting fully and fairly his
side of the case.
But even assuming that such fraud
could be technically considered as "intrinsic
fraud [which] takes the form of 'acts of a
party in a litigation during the trial, such as
the use of forged instruments or perjured
testimony, which did not affect the
presentation of the case, but did prevent a
fair and just determination of the case,'" it
would not alter the result, because the
mistake and error into which the officials of
the Bureau of Lands were misled by such a
deliberately false application, suppressing
the facts known to the applicant that the
lands sought to be registered were lands of
the public domain (and not private property)
and having been reserved for a school site
were not susceptible of private registration
(as in fact her husband's application to
purchase the same had been rejected)
cannot operate to bar the Republic's timely
petition to review and set aside the decree,
since the State cannot be estopped by the
mistake or error of its officials and agents.
Besides, the registration decree was
properly voided by the lower court since it
had no jurisdiction over the lands of the
public domain subject matter of the
proceedings which were portions of the bed
or foreshore of the Las Piñas river and were
not open to registration proceedings.
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76
Other Grounds
Other grounds for a petition for
review or reopening of a decree of
registration include want of due process
as a result of machinations of the clerk of
court (Tiongco v. de la Merced, 58 SCRA
89) and the fact that the land sought to be
registered is part of the public domain
and incapable of registration, as when it
is part of a military reservation (Republic
v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648).
(5) Action for
Reconveyance
Notwithstanding the irrevocability of
the Torrens title already issued in the
name of another person, he can still be
compelled under the law to reconvey the
subject property to the rightful owner. In
an action for reconveyance, the decree of
registration is respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought instead is
the transfer of the property, which has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered
in another person's name, to its rightful
and legal owner, or to one with a better
right. (Walstrom v. Mapa, Jr., 181 SCRA
431) The property registered is deemed
to held in trust for the real owner by the
person in whose name it is registered.
In filing an action for reconveyance, it
is not necessary that the 1-year period
lapse first. Such an action can be filed
anytime after the entry of decree of
registration provided that is within the
prescriptive period.
An action for reconveyance based on
an implied or constructive trust
prescribes in 10 years.
However, an action for reconveyance
based on an implied trust for co-heirs is
imprescriptible.
An action for reconveyance on the
ground of fraud must be filed within 4
years from discovery of the fraud. Such
discovery is deemed to have taken place
from the issuance of an original certificate
of title.
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
An action for reconveyance which in
effect seeks to quiet title to property in
one's possession is imprescriptible.
(Almarza v. Arguelles, 156 SCRA 718)
NOTE: Reconveyance cannot be made
without a survey defining with precision
the metes and bounds of the area to be
reconveyed.
MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS V. COURT
OF APPEALS (MARCH 31, 1987)
Facts: Respondent Norma Leuenberger
inherited Lot No. 140 (27.246 has.) from her
grandmother Simeona Vda. De Ditching. In
1952, she donated a portion (3 has.) of the
property to the Municipality of Victorias for
the ground of a high school. The 4 hectares
of the land was converted into a subdivision.
Later, she discovered that part of the
remaning portion was being used by the
Municipality as a cemetery from 1934. She
wrote the Mayor demanding payment of
rentals and delivery of the area. The Mayor,
however, showed her documents showing
that the Municipality purchased the land.
Respondents then filed a complaint for
recovery of possession. Municipality’s
defense is that of ownership claiming that
the land was purchased by it from Simeona
Vda. De Ditching. TC decided in favor of
Municipality. CA reversed.
HELD: It is undisputed that petitioner had
been in open, public, adverse and
continuous possession of the land for more
than 30 years. Evidence established without
debate that the property was originally
registered in 1916. When Gonzalo Ditching
died, Simeona became the administratrix of
the property and it was while she was
serving as such that she executed the
document of sale in favor of the municipality.
Unfortunately, the Municipality failed to
register the Deed of Sale. Thus, respondent
was able to register the property under the
Torrens System. However, since she
inherited the same from her grandmother
only after the latter had already sold the
portion to the petitioner, she had no legal
right which may serve as basis for her to
register the land.
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77
While an inherently defective Torrens title
may not ordinarily be cancelled even after
proof of its defect, the law nevertheless
safeguards the rightful party’s interest in the
titled land from fraud and improper use of
technicalities by allowing such party to
judicially seek reconveyance to him of
whatever he has been deprived of as long
as the land has not been transferred to a
purchaser in good faith. (Pascua v.
Capuyoc). As the land in dispute is held in
trust by private respondent in favor of the
Municipality, the latter cannot be deprived of
its possession nor can it be made to pay
past rentals. Private respondent is in equity
bound to reconvey the property to the cestui
que trust, the Municipality.
ESCONDE V. BARLONGAY,
152 SCRA 603 (1987)
Facts: Private respondent Delfin applied for
registration of title of the land subject of the
present petition. His application was
granted in 1969 and an OCT was issued in
his favor in 1971 by the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan. In Feb of 1978, he filed a petition
for the issuance of a writ of possession
against the spouses Esconde. The spouses
opposition to the motion was denied.
Subsequently in Oct 1978, petitioner,
Basilisa Esconde filed an action for
reconveyance against Delfin. Judge Sammy
Barlongay dismissed the action for
reconveyance on the grounds of res
judicata. Hence, this petition.
HELD: Petition is devoid of merit. Petitioner
and her husband’s failure to appear before
the land registration proceedings despite
notice of the scheduled survey of the land
and notice of the publication and posting by
the sheriff of the notice of hearing to oppose
the defendant’s application, bars the
petitioner from filing this action. Section 38
of Act 496 provides that a decree of
registration once issued, binds the land and
quiets title thereto. It is conclusive against
all persons one year from the date of entry.
However, it is a settled doctrine that when a
decree of registration was obtained by fraud,
the party defrauded has only one year from
date of entry to file a petition for review
thereof.
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
An action for reconveyance, on the
other hand, is a legal and equitable remedy
granted to the rightful owner of land w/c has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
the name of another for the purpose of
compelling the latter to transfer of reconvey
the land to him. This action may be filed
even after one year from the issuance of the
decree. Its aim is not to re-open the
registration proceedings but to show that the
person who secured the registration of the
questioned property is not its real owner. In
the case at bar, reconveyance is not the
proper remedy as there was no proof of
irregularity in the issuance of the title nor in
the proceedings incident thereto. It was also
not established that fraud had intervened in
the issuance of the title and the period of
one year within w/c intrinsic fraud could be
claimed had long expired. Furthermore, the
petitioner’s action had also prescribed as an
action for reconveyance must be filed within
four (4) years from the discovery of the
fraud.
ALZONA V. CAPUNITAN,
4 SCRA 450 (1962)
Facts: Plaintiffs instituted an action for the
recovery of two registered parcels of land
and for the cancellation of the corresponding
certificates of title in the names of the
defendants and the issuance of the proper
certificates in their names. The TC
dismissed the complaint on the grounds of
estoppel and prescription of action. On
appeal, the CA found that the subject land
was the conjugal property of Arcadio Alomia
and Ildefonsa Almeda. Said land was
bought by Arcadio from the Friar Lands
Administration and a Patent Title was issued
in his favor. However before completing
payment of the installments, Arcadiio died.
Upon Arcadio’s death, Ildefonsa executed
an affidavit that she was the sole heir of
Arcadio. She was made the assignee
thereof and after completion of the
installment payments, a Certificate of Title
was issued in her favor. Defendant
Capunitan was a niece of Ildefonsa who
bought the property from the latter. The CA
also found that plaintiffs, nieces and
nephews of Arcadio, are entitled to the other
half of the disputed property and that
Ildefonsa exercised a legal fraud when she
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78
executed said affidavit. She, therefore, held
in trust the other half of the property in favor
of the plaintiffs. The case, however, was
remanded to the TC. TC later held that
although the plaintiffs have the right to ask
for reconveyance, their cause of action has
already prescribed.
HELD: The case involves an implied or
constructive trust upon the defendants-
appellees. The CA declared that Ildefonsa
held in trust the ½ of the property legally
belonging to the plaintiffs, of which the
defendants had full knowledge. The sale in
favor of defendants, however, is not void or
inexistent, action on which is
imprescripltible. It is voidable, at most, and
as such valid until revoked within the time
prescribed by law for its revocation.. An
action for reconveyance based on an
implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years.
The plaintiffs cause of action accrued in
1928 when the defendants bought the land
and took possession thereof from Ildefonsa.
However, plaintiffs-appellants only filed the
present action for reconveyance on
November of 1949 or 13 years after the
COA accrued. Thus, the action had long
prescribed.
VDA DE JACINTO V VDA DE JACINTO,
5 SCRA 371 (1962)
Facts: The land in question originally
belonged to the now deceased spouses
Jacinto, both of whom died intestate
survived by their children named Melchor
and Pedro. Melchor also died intestate
before the estate of their parents could be
partitioned. After the partition, Pedro,
besides receiving his share, continued
administering the properties which
corresponded to the heirs of his deceased
brother. Pedro applied for the registration
and succeeded in having the properties
registered in his name
When the widow of his deceased
brother decided to sell the parcel of land,
she realized for the first time, that the parcel
delivered to her by Pedro had a smaller area
than that which rightfully belonged to her
and her son.
HELD: In view of these facts, it would be
against reason and good conscience not to
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
hold that Pedro committed a breach of trust
which entitled him to secure registration of
the land in question to the prejudice of his
coheirs. In an action like the present, he
may be ordered to make reconveyance of
the property to the person rightfully entitled
to it. In fact, it has been held that even in
the absence of fraud in obtaining
registration, or even after the lapse of one
year after the issuance of a decree of
registration, a co-owner of land who applied
for and secured its adjudication and
registration in his name knowing that it had
not been allotted to him in the partition, may
be compelled to convey the same to
whoever received it in the apportionment, so
long as no innocent third party had acquired
rights therein, in the meantime, for a
valuable consideration.
An action to enforce a trust is
imprescriptible. Consequently, a coheir
who, through fraud, succeeds in obtaining a
certificate of title in his name to the prejudice
of his coheirs, is deemed to hold the land in
trust for the latter, and the action by them to
recover the property does not prescribe.
ALMARZA V ARGUELLES,
156 SCRA 718 (1987)
Facts: Lot No. 5815 originally belonged to
private respondents’ predecessor-in-interest,
Grana. The latter sold a portion thereof to
petitioner. Said portion was physically
segregated from the whole lot and was
taken possession of by petitioner.
In a cadastral case, the court
declared private respondents owner of ½
undivided share of Lot No. 5815 and a
certain Pancrudo (deceased) as owner of
the other ½. OCT was issued in the name
of said adjudicatees.
Private respondents instituted a
complaint for recovery against the petitioner.
The latter interposed a counterclaim for
reconveyance of the disputed portion of Lot
No. 5815.
The LC ordered petitioner to vacate
and dismissed the counterclaim of the
petitioner fo the reason that although a
constructive or implied trust was constituted
in favor of petitioner when the disputed
portion was included in the OCT issued to
private respondents, petitioner’s action for
reconveyance had prescribed, more than
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79
ten years having elapsed from the issuance
of said certificate of title.
HELD: SC reverses. The remedy of a
landowner whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in the
name of another is, after one year from the
date of the decree, not to set aside the
decree, but respecting the decree as
incontrovertible and no longer open to
review, to bring an ordinary action in the
ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or
if the property has passed into the hands of
an innocent purchaser for value, for
damages. Petitioner availed herself of this
remedy seasonably.
Prescription cannot be invoked in an
action for reconveyance which is in effect an
action to quiet title, against the plaintiff
therein who is in possession of the land in
question. The reason is that as lawful
possessor and owner of the disputed
portion, her cause of action for
reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to
quiet title to property in one’s possession, is
imprescriptible. The petitioner’s undisturbed
possession over a period of 48 years gave
her a continuing right to seek the aid of a
Court of equity to determine the nature of
the adverse claim of a third party and the
effect on her title.
If ever prescription may be invoked,
it may be said to have commenced to run
only from the time the possessor was made
aware of a claim adverse to his own. In the
case at bar, petitioner was made aware of
such adverse claim only upon service on her
of the summons in the civil case. As her
action for reconveyance, or to quiet title was
contained in her counterclaim, the same
cannot be said to have already prescribed.
TAMAYO V CALLEJO,
46 SCRA 27 (1972)
Facts: A parcel of land was previously
owned by spouses Vicente Tamayo and
Cirila Tamayo. They sold the northern
portion of said land to Fernendo Domantay,
who took possession thereof. Vicente died
and Cirila waived her rights to the remaining
portion of their original property to their
children, Marcos and Mariano. These
brothers were declared the sole heirs of the
deceased. The brothers applied in a
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
cadastral proceeding for the registration of
the land. The application was granted and
OCT was issued in favor of the brothers.
Domantay sold his property in favor
of Callejo who took possession thereof.
Marcos sold his undivided share to Mariano.
Callejo filed a complaint for reconveyance
and damages against Mariano. CFI
dismissed the complaint on the ground that
the land purchased by Domantay from the
parents of Mariano is not included in said
titles of Mariano. The CA reversed and
overruled the plea of prescription set up by
Mariano upon the theory that the title to said
portion of land now claimed by Callejo is
held in trust by the Tamayos and that the
action to enforce said trust does not
prescribe.
HELD: CA affirmed with modification. CA
did not err in overruling the plea of
prescription. Prescription of action for
reconveyance is reckoned from the date of
creation of the express trust. Although the
trust created by the application for
registration filed by Mariano and Marcos in
1913, and the inclusion in the OCT issued in
their names of the tract of land previously
sold to Domantay and later conveyed to
Callejo may have had a constructive or
implied nature, its status was substantially
affected in 1918 by the following facts,
namely: On the date last mentioned,
Domantay and Mariano – the latter acting on
his own behalf and on that of his brother
Marcos – executed a public instrument
whereby Mariano EXPLICITLY
acknowledged that his deceased parents
had sold to Domantay the parcel of land
then held by the latter, and stipulating that
Domantay is the absolute owner of said
land, free from any lien or encumbrance
thereon.
This express recognition by Mariano
– on his behalf and that of his brother
Marcos – of the previous sale made by their
parents to Domantay, had the effect of
imparting to the aforementioned trust the
nature of an express trust – it having been
created by the will of the parties, “no
particular words” being “required for the
creation of an express trust, it being
sufficient that a trust is clearly intended”.
This express trust is a “continuing and
subsisting” trust, not subject to the statute of
limitations, at least, until repudiated, in which
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80
event the period of prescription begins to run
only from the time of the repudiation. The
latter did not take place in the case at bar,
until early in June, 1952, when Mariano
rejected Callejo’s demand that the now
disputed portion be excluded from the TCT
in the former’s name. But then, the case at
bar was filed weeks later when the period of
prescription had barely begun to run.
The CA declared that the land in
question is “declared reconveyed” to Callejo.
Such reconveyance cannot, however, be
deemed made without a survey defining with
precision the metes and bounds of the area
to be segregated for Callejo. Accordingly,
the case was remanded to the court of origin
for the preparation of the subdivision plan of
the portion to be segregated and the judicial
approval of said plan, and only after such
approval has become final and executory
may the reconveyance be either made or
deemed effected.
JOAQUIN V COJUANGCO,
20 SCRA 769 (1967)
Facts: The OCT of the first parcel of land
involved in this case was issued as early as
1921. Said parcel was transferred in favor of
the defendants who obtained a TCT in their
own names in 1928. With respect to the
second parcel, OCT was acquired in 1925
and the land was subsequently transferred
to defendants also in 1925. TCT was issued
to the transferees in 1936.
HELD: The action in this case is one for
reconveyance, on the theory that the original
registered owners were the administrators of
those lands, and hence held them in a
fiduciary capacity. Even assuming that this
was true, the disabilities imposed by such
relationship did not extend to the transferees
of said administrators, who acquired the
land for value and claimed adverse title in
themselves. The action for reconveyance
on the theory of trust might prosper, if at all,
as against the trustees and provided they
still hold the properties, but not as against
third persons who do not occupy the same
fiduciary position.
(6) Action for Damages
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds 81

FACTS: De los Reyes sold to Pena

 Substitute for action for reconveyance property which had an area of 10,000
if an innocent purchaser for value square meters. However, Pena’s title did
intervenes not cover only the 10,000 square meters but
 if based on constructive trust: 10 also an additional 3,405 which De los Reyes
did not sell. The property passed to five
years
owners successively in a span of more than
 if based on fraud: 4 years twenty years. De los Reyes filed an action
for reconveyance of the 3,405 square meter
PINO V. COURT OF APPEALS, property.
198 SCRA 434 (1991)
HELD The Supreme Court said that the
FACTS: Rafaela Donato, Raymund complaint for reconveyance must fail. The
Gaffud and Cicero Gaffud were co-owners of property passed to four owners
a lot. The title of the lot was only in the successively in a span of more than twenty
name of Rafaela Donato. Donato sold to years before it reached the current owners.
Pino the lot. A TCT was issued in the name Surely, the rights of innocent purchasers of
of Pino. The Gaffuds filed a complaint for real property must be protected. In Avecilla
nullity of sale and reconveyance against v. Yatco, the Supreme Court ruled that the
Pino. only remedy of an owner who was
fraudulently deprived of his land, which was
HELD: The Supreme Court said that the subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser
complaint for nullity of sale and for value, is to file an action for damages
reconveyance must fail. Pino is a purchaser against the person who perpetrated the
in good faith. Where the certificate of title is fraud within 4 years after the discovery of
in the name of the vendor when the land is the deception.
sold, the vendee for value has the right to
rely on what appears on the certificate of
title. In the absence of anything to excite or (7) Assurance Fund
arouse suspicion, said vendee is under no
obligation to look beyond the certificate and Sec. 93. Contribution to the
investigate the title of the vendor appearing Assurance Fund
on the face of said certificate.
If an action for reconveyance based  Imposed upon the entry of a
on constructive trust cannot reach an certificate of title in the name
innocent purchaser for value, the remedy of of the registered owner (also
the defrauded party is to bring an action for applies to registration of
damages against those who caused the building and other
fraud or were instrumental in depriving him improvements on the land
of the property. And it is now well-settled covered by the certificate)
that such action prescribes in 10 years from
 Amount imposed is .25% of the
the issuance of the Torrens Title over the
assessed value of the real
property.
estate. The assessed value
shall be based on the last
assessment for tax purposes. If
DE LOS REYES V. COURT OF APPEALS,
there has be no previous
285 SCRA 81 (1998)
assessment, then the
assessment shall be
determined by the sworn
declaration of 2 disinterested
persons. However, in any
event, if the value of the
property is too small, then the
court can always increase the
valuation of the property.

______________________________________________________________________________________
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds 82

a) that there was no

Sec. 94. Custody and Investment of negligence on his
the Fund part;
 All contributions to the b) that he was deprived
assurance fund which are as a consequence of
received by the Register of the bringing of his
Deeds shall be turned over to land or interest
the National Treasurer. The therein under the
National Treasurer can invest provisions of the
the money as may be provided Property
for by law. Registration Decree;
or by the
Sec. 95. Action for Compensation registration by any
from Fund other person as
owner of such land,
 Only the following persons can or by mistake,
recover from the assurance fund: omission or
1. Any person who sustains misdescription in
loss or damage under the any certificate of
following conditions: owner’s duplicate, or
a) that there was no in any entry or
negligence on his memorandum in the
part; and register or other
b) that the loss or official book or by
damage sustained any cancellation;
was through any and
omission, mistake or c) that he is barred or
malfeasance of the in any way
court personnel, or precluded from
the Register of bringing an action
Deeds, his deputy, or for the recovery of
other employees of such land or interest
the Registry in the or claim upon the
performance of their same.
respective duties
under the provisions Sec. 96. Against whom Action
of the Property Filed.
Registration Decree;  Against the Register of
or Deeds of the province or city
where the land is situated
2. Any person who has and the National Treasurer
been deprived of any if it is brought to recover for
land or interest therein loss or damage or for
under the following deprivation of land or any
conditions: estate or interest therein
arising wholly through fraud,
negligence, omission, mistake
or misfeasance of the court
personnel, Register of Deeds,
his deputy or other employees
of the Registry in the
performance of their respective
duties
 Against the Register of
Deeds of the province or city

______________________________________________________________________________________
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
where the land is situated
and the National Treasurer,
and other person or persons
as co-defendants if it is
brought to recover for loss or
damage or for deprivation of
land or of any interest therein
arising through fraud,
negligence, omission, mistake
or misfeasance of a person
OTHER THAN court personnel,
the Registry of Deeds, his
deputy or other employees of
the Registry
 The Solicitor General must
defend all such suits.
 Nothing in this law shall be
construed to deprive the
plaintiff of any right of action
which he may have against any
person for such loss, or
damage or deprivation without
joining the National Treasurer
as party defendant.
 All actions against the
Assurance Fund must be
reported to the Commissioner
of Land Registration.
Sec. 97. Judgment, how satisfied.
 If there are other defendants
besides, the National
Treasurer and Register of
Deeds, execution shall first
issue on the other defendants.
If the judgment cannot be
satisfied by the other
defendants in whole or in
part, then the assurance fund
will answer for that part
unsatisfied.
 The plaintiff cannot recover
more than the fair market
value of the land at the time
he suffered the loss, damage
or deprivation.
Sec. 98. General Fund when liable.
 The General Fund is liable if
there are not enough funds to
satisfy the judgment from the
Assurance Fund. Take note
however that those funds from
the general fund must not have
______________________________________________________________________________________
83
been otherwise appropriated
for other purposes.
Sec. 99. Subrogation of government to
plaintiff’s rights
 The government shall be
subrogated to the rights of the
plaintiff against other persons
if payment has been made by
the National Treasurer. The
amount recovered shall be paid
to the Assurance Fund.
Sec. 100. Register of Deeds as party
in interest.
 If it appears that the Assurance
Fund is liable due to the
unlawful or erroneous issuance
of a title, the Register of Deeds
shall be deemed a party in
interest, who shall upon the
authority of the Commissioner
of Land Registration, file the
necessary action in court to
annul or amend the title. The
court may order the Register of
Deeds to amend or cancel a
title or to do any other acts
which are just and equitable.
Sec. 101. Losses not recoverable.
 The Assurance Fund is not
liable for any loss, damage or
deprivation caused or
occasioned by
1. breach of trust (express,
implied or constructive) or
2. by any mistake in the
resurvey of registered land
resulting in the expansion
of area in the title.
Sec. 102. Limitation of Action.
 Action against the Assurance
Fund must be instituted within
6 years from the time the right
to bring such action first
occurred.
 The right to bring action shall
be transmitted to the legal
representatives of the person
sustaining loss or damage
unless the same is barred in his
lifetime.
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
 Notwithstanding the expiration
of the 6 year period, if at the
time the right of action first
accrued the person entitled to
bring such action was
incapacitated to do so, such
person or any person claiming
from, by or under him may
bring the proper action at any
time within 2 years after the
incapacity has been removed.
TORRES V. COURT OF APPEALS,
186 SCRA 672 (1990)
FACTS: Mariano Torres was the owner of a
lot and building. Fernandez, Torres’s
brother-in-law, filed a petition with the CFI of
Manila where he misrepresented to be
Torres’ attorney-in-fact. He alleged that the
owner’s duplicate copy of the title to the lot
and building was lost. Fernandez
succeeded in obtaining a court order for the
issuance of another copy of the certificate.
Fernandez forged a simulated deed of sale
in his favor. Thus, the TCT in the name of
Torres was cancelled in favor of Fernandez.
Fernandez mortgaged the property to Mota.
Torres found out about Fernandez’s
TCT. Torres brought an action to annul
Fernandez’s TCT. Fernandez was unable to
pay his loan obligations. Mota was the
highest bidder in the public auction of the
property mortgaged.
______________________________________________________________________________________
84
ISSUE: Who has a better right to the
property – Torres or Mota
HELD: Torres has a better right over the
property. As between two persons both of
whom are in good faith and both innocent of
negligence, the law must protect and prefer
the lawful holder of registered property over
the transfer of a vendor bereft of any
transmissible rights. In view of the
foregoing, to hold, for the purpose of
enforcing the mortgage, that Mota was an
innocent mortgagee would be futile because
as above shown, no certificate of title
covering the subject realties in derogation of
Torres’ certificate of title may validly be
issued.
The only possible remedies of Mota
would be to go against Fernandez or the
Assurance Fund. However, Mota cannot go
after the Assurance Fund since Mota was
negligent in protecting her interest. Mota as
a creditor and mortgagee should have
inquired as to all the related facts and
circumstances regarding the rentals and
tenants. Mota should have looked at the
payment of taxes on the property. It was not
enough that Mota should have merely relied
on the title. Thus, Mota’s only remedy is to
go after Fernandez.
FRANCISCO V. NATIONAL TREASURER,
(AUGUST 3, 2000)
FACTS: The spouses Milambiling were the
owners of a parcel of lane. It appears that a
couple impersonated themselves as the
spouses Milambiling. The imposters were
able to somehow acquire a duplicate TCT
over the land. The imposters sold the land
to De Guzman. Milambiling filed an action
against De Guzman for declaration of nullity
of sale. Milambiling won the suit. De
Guzman thus filed an action for damages
against the Assurance Fund.
HELD: De Guzman cannot recover from the
Assurance Fund. Only the following
persons can recover from the Assurance
Fund:
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds 85

(3) Any person who sustains loss or

damage under the following conditions:
d) that there was no
negligence on his part; and
e) that the loss or damage
sustained was through any
omission, mistake or
malfeasance of the court
personnel, or the Register of
Deeds, his deputy, or other
employees of the Registry in the
performance of their respective
duties under the provisions of
the Property Registration
Decree; or
The Assurance Fund is intended to
relieve innocent persons from the harshness
of the doctrine that a certificate is conclusive
evidence of an indefeasible title to land. De
Guzman did not suffer any injury because of
the operation of this doctrine. De Guzman
sought to avail of the benefits of the Torrens
System by registering the property in his
name. That De Guzman eventually lost the
property to Milambiling does not entitle him
to compensation under the Assurance Fund.
De Guzman’s recourse is against the
persons who duped him.

Any person who has been deprived (8) Others

of any land or interest therein under
the following conditions: Cancellation suit involving double title
a) that there was no negligence on
his part; PAJOMAYO V. MANIPON,
b) that he was deprived as a 39 SCRA 676 (1971)
consequence of the bringing of
his land or interest therein under
FACTS: Both parties claims that they are the
the provisions of the Property
exclusive owners of the land in dispute.
Registration Decree; or by the
Pajomayos had with them OCT No. 1089
registration by any other person
issued by the register of deeds on
as owner of such land, or by
November 27, 1931 in virtue of the
mistake, omission or
homestead patent. The Manipons on the
misdescription in any certificate
other hand had OCT No. 14043 issued on
of owner’s duplicate, or in any
April 1, 1957, in connection with the
entry or memorandum in the
cadastral proceedings.
register or other official book or
by any cancellation; and
ISSUE: Which of the two OCTs should
c) that he is barred or in any way
prevail?
precluded from bringing an
action for the recovery of such
HELD: OCT No. 1089 should prevail. The
land or interest or claim upon
decree of registration issued in the cadastral
the same.
proceedings does not have the effect of
annulling the title that had previously been
De Guzman does not fall under any
issued in accordance with the provisions of
of these two cases. The loss or damage
the Land Registration Law (Act 496).
was not due to the omission, mistake or
The law requires that the
malfeasance of the court personnel or
homestead patent must be registered in the
Register of Deeds, his deputy or other
Office of the Register of Deeds of the
employees. Furthermore, they were not
province where the land covered by the
deprived of their land “as a consequence of
patent lies (sec. 122 of Act 496 – Land
bringing of the land or interest therein under
Registration Law).
the provisions of the Property Registration
Thus once a homestead patent
Decree. Neither was there deprivation due
granted in accordance with the Public Land
to the registration by any other person as
Act is registered pursuant to sec. 122 of Act
owner of such land or by mistake, omission
496, the certificate of title issued in virtue of
or misdescription in any certificate or
said patent has the force and effect of a
owner’s duplicate or in any entry or
Torrens under the Land Registration Act.
memorandum in the register or other official
book or by any cancellation.

______________________________________________________________________________________
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
Where two certificates of title are
issued to different persons covering the
same land in whole or in part, the earlier in
date must prevail as between the original
parties, and in case of successive
registration where more than one certificate
is issued over the land the person holding
under the prior certificate is entitled to the
land as against the person who relies on the
second certificate.
Cancellation suit involving non-
registrable property (reversion suit)
REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS,
99 SCRA 743 (1980)
FACTS : A motion to reopen
cadastral case was filed by Alpuerto. After
trial the court rendered its decision
adjudicating to him the subject lot and
ordered the issuance of a decree of
registration over the said lot. Hence, Land
Registration Commission issued a decree.
This was the basis of the issuance of the
OCT. Portions of the lot were subsequently
transferred to various persons.
Later the provincial fiscal of Quezon
filed a MFR on the ground that the said
decision was obtained through fraud,
misrepresentation and deceit. The Director
of Land joined the fiscal, on the ground that
the same was issued on the wrong premise,
i.e. that the decision of the court had already
become final and executory when in fact it
had not.
Later the SolGen filed for the
government a complaint for annulment,
cancellation of titles and for reversion on the
ground that the decision of the lower court
adjudicating the lot to Alpuerto, its order for
the issuance of the decree of registration as
well as the OCT and all the TCTs derived
therefrom are all null and void and w/o legal
effect because the court had no jurisdiction
to allocate the subject land, which is
inalienable.
RATIO :CA 141 explicitly states that timber
and mineral lands shall be governed by
special laws. And the Forestry Law now
vests in the Director of Forestry the
jurisdiction and authority over forest or
timberland.
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86
In one case the SC held that if the
land covered by the homestead application
of petitioner was still within the forest zone
or under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Forestry, the Director of Lands has no
jurisdiction to dispose of said land under the
provisions of the Public Land Law and the
applicant acquired no right to the land.
Also, if a person obtains a title under
the Public Land Act w/c includes, by
oversight, lands w/c cannot be registered
under the Torrens System, or when the
Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction
over the same because it is a public forest,
the grantee does not, by virtue of the said
certificate of title alone, become the owner
of the land illegally included.
The patent of title thus issued is void
at law, since the officer who issued it had no
authority to do so.
Under these circumstances, the
certificate of title may be ordered cancelled
and the cancellation may be pursued
through an ordinary action therefor.
The doctrine of estoppel cannot
operate against the State. “It is a well-settled
rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic or its
government is usually not estopped by
mistake or error on the part of its officials or
agents.
The state may still seek the
cancellation of the title issued to Alpuerto
pursuant to Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act.
Such title has not become indefeasible, for
prescription cannot be invoked against the
State.
 Sec. 101: All actions for reversion to
the Gov’t. of lands of the public
domain shall be instituted in the
proper courts in the name of the
Republic.
(9) Quieting of Title
Art. 476, Civil Code. Whenever
there is a cloud on title to real
property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which is apparently valid or effective
but is in truth and in fact invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
to said title, an action may be brought
to remove such cloud or to quiet the
title.
An action may also be brought
to prevent a cloud from being cast
upon title to real property or any
interest therein.
Art. 477, Civil Code. Plaintiff must
have legal or equitable title to the
land; but not necessarily possession.
Sec. 1, Rule 63, Rules of Court. An
action for the reformation of an
instrument, to quiet title to real
property or remove clouds therefrom,
or to consolidate ownership under Art.
1607 of the Civil Code, may be
brought under this Rule.
REALTY SALES ENTERPRISES V. IAC,
154 SCRA 328 (1987)
Suits to quiet title are not technically
suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking,
in personam, but being against the person in
respect of the res, these proceedings are
characterized as quasi in rem. The judgment
in such proceedings is conclusive only
between the parties.
MAMADSUL V. MOSON,
190 SCRA 82 (1990)
An action to quiet title is
imprescriptible if the plaintiffs are in
possession of the property. The right of a
plaintiff to have his title to land quieted, as
against one who is asserting some adverse
claim or lien thereon, is not barred while the
plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual
possession of the land, claiming to be
owners thereof, the reason for this rule
being that while the owner in fee continues
liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon
the adverse claim, he has a continuing right
to the aid of a court of equity in his favor to
ascertain and determine the nature of such
claim and its effect on his title, or to assert
any superior equity in his favor. He may wait
until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his
right. But the role that the statute of
limitations is not available as a defense to
______________________________________________________________________________________
87
an action to remove a cloud from title can
only be invoked by a complainant when he
is in possession. One who claims property
which is in the possession of another must,
it seems, invoke his remedy within the
statutory period.
Petitioners may wait until their
possession is disturbed or their title is
attacked before they may take steps to
vindicate their right. The statute of limitation
is not available as a defense to an action to
remove a cloud from title over property in
possession of the petitioners.
It is not necessary that the person
seeking to quiet his title is the registered
owner of the property in question. "Title" to
property does not necessarily mean the
original transfer certificate of title. It can
connote acquisitive prescription by
possession in the concept of an owner
thereof. One who has an equitable right or
interest in the property may also file an
action to quiet title under the law.
TAN V. VALDEHUEZA,
66 SCRA 61 (1975)
Relying on Section 3 of Rule 17 of
the Rules of Court which pertinently
provides that a dismissal for failure to
prosecute "shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits," the
Valdehuezas submit that the dismissal of
civil case 2002 operated, upon the principle
of res judicata, as a bar to the first cause of
action in civil case 2574. This contention is
untenable as the causes of action in the two
cases are not identical. Case 2002 was for
injunction against the entry into and the
gathering of nuts from the land, while case
2574 seeks to "remove any doubt or cloud
of the plaintiff's ownership . . ." with a prayer
for declaration of ownership and recovery of
possession.
Applying the test of absence of
inconsistency between prior and subsequent
judgments the failure of Tan, in case 2002,
to secure an injunction against the
Valdehuezas to prevent them from entering
the land and gathering nuts is not
inconsistent with her being adjudged, in
Case 2574, as owner of the land with right to
recover possession thereof. Case 2002
involved only the possession of the land and
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
the fruits thereof, while case 2574 involves
ownership of the land, with possession as a
mere attribute of ownership. The judgment
in the first case could not and did not
encompass the judgment in the second,
although the second judgment would
encompass the first. Moreover, the new Civil
Code provides that suitors in actions to quiet
title "need not be in possession of said
property."
FAJA V. COURT OF APPEALS,
75 SCRA 441 (1977)
An action to quiet title to property in the
possession of plaintiff is imprescriptible. One
who is in actual possession of a piece of land
claiming to be owner thereof may wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked
before taking steps to vindicate his right, the
reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed
possession gives him a continuing right to seek
aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a
third party and its effect on his own title, which
right can be claimed only by one who is in
possession. The right to quiet title to the
property, to seek its reconveyance and annul any
certificate of title covering it, accrues only from
the time the one in possession was made aware
of a claim adverse to his own, and it is only then
that the statutory period of prescription
commences to run against such possessor.
Decree of Registration
 issued pursuant to a final and
executory judgment
 basis for the original and duplicate
certificates of title
 OCT takes effect upon the date of
entry in the record book of the
Register of Deeds (Sec. 40)
 binds the land and quiets title thereto,
subject only to such exceptions or
liens as may be provided by law (See
Sec. 44 of PD 1529)
 conclusive upon and against all
persons, including the National Gov’t.
and all branches thereof
 becomes incontrovertible within 1 year
from issuance
See Sec. 31, 32, 39 of PD 1529.
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88
GOMEZ V. CA
168 SCRA 503 (1988)
FACTS: Petitioners applied for the
registration of their land. After notice and
publication, there being no opposition to the
application, the trial court issued an order of
general default. Later the court issued an
order stating that the decision had become
final and directed the Land Registration
Office to issue the corresponding decrees of
registration over the lots adjudicated in the
decision.
Later it was reported to the court a quo that
some of the lots subject of the registration
were already covered by homestead
patents, issued in 1928 & ’29 and registered
under the Land Registration Act. Hence the
decision was recommended to be set aside.
Lower court set aside the decision.
ISSUE : WON respondent Judge
had jurisdiction to issue the decision setting
aside its earlier decision
HELD : YES. It is not disputed that
the first decision had become final and
executory. However unlike ordinary civil
actions the adjudication of land in a
cadastral or land registration proceeding
does not become final, in the sense of
incontrovertibility until after the expiration of
one (1) year after the entry of the final
decree of registration.
As long as the final decree has not
been entered by the Land Registration
Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period
of one (1) year has not elapsed from the
date of entry of such decree, the title is not
finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be
under the control and sound discretion of the
court rendering it.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the
respondent land registratoin officials to issue
the decree is purely ministerial. It is
ministerial in the sense that they act under
the orders of the court and the decree must
be in conformity with the decision of the
court and with the data found in the record,
and they have no discretion in the matter.
However, if they are in doubt upon any point
in relation to the preparation and issuance of
the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
to the court. They are in this respect as
officials of the court and not as
administrative officials, and their act is the
act of the court. They are in specifically
called upon to “extend assistance to courts
in ordinary and cadastral land registration
proceedings”.
RAMOS V. RODRIGUEZ,
244 SCRA 418 (1995)
Ramos applied for the registration of
a parcel of land. After issuing an order of
general default the judge rendered decision
adjudicating said lot to the petitioners;
ordered issuance of decree and directed
NLTDRA to prepare the decree and
certificate of registration.
NLTDRA however recommended
that the order be set aside because the said
subject lot is already covered by a TCT. The
court opined that it cannot set aside its
decision on the basis of the report after the
finality of its decision. It added that the
proper remedy of the government was an
action for annulment of judgment. Later
however the court set aside its order and
denied petitioner’s application for
registration. The court noted that the subject
lot is already covered by an existing TCT
and that no final decree has yet been issued
by the LRA.
Petitioner assailed this decision on
the principle of finality of judgments.
RATIO: This issue has already been
settled in a similar case where the court
declared that: “However unlike ordinary civil
actions the adjudication of land in a
cadastral or land registration proceeding
does not become final, in the sense of
incontrovertibility until after the expiration of
one (1) year after the entry of the final
decree of registration.
As long as the final decree has not
been entered by the Land Registration
Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period
of one (1) year has not elapsed from the
date of entry of such decree, the title is not
finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be
under the control and sound discretion of the
court rendering it.”
They also raised the issue of the
function of LRA as only ministerial. In
Gomez the SC squarely met this issue:
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89
“Petitioners insist that the duty of the
respondent land registratoin officials to
issue the decree is purely ministerial. It
is ministerial in the sense that they act
under the orders of the court and the
decree must be in conformity with the
decision of the court and with the data
found in the record, and they have no
discretion in the matter. However, if they
are in doubt upon any point in relation to
the preparation and issuance of the
decree, it is their duty to refer the matter
to the court. They are in this respect as
officials of the court and not as
administrative officials, and their act is
the act of the court. They are in
specifically called upon to “extend
assistance to courts in ordinary and
cadastral land registration proceedings”.
In the case at bar, the LRA is not
legally obligated to follow the court’s order
because the subject land sought to be
registered was found to be already decreed
and titled under the Payatas Estate.
The one-year period stated in Sec.
32 of PD 1529 within which a petition to
reopen and review the decree of registration
is described in Sec. 31 of the said PD which
decree is prepared and issued by the
Commissioner of Land Registration.
G. Certificate of Title
 Not subject to collateral attack; Cannot
be altered, modified or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law
Original Certificate of Title
 True copy of the decree of registration
 Signed by the Commissioner and
sent, together with the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title, to the
Register of Deeds of the city or
province where the property is
situated for entry in his registration
 Takes effect upon the date of entry
thereof
 Original copy is filed in the Registry of
Deeds
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
 Merely confirms a pre-existing title
(Ponce de Leon v. RFC); does not
establish time of acquisition of the
property
Transfer Certificate of Title
 Subsequent certificate of title that may
be issued by the Register of Deeds
pursuant to any voluntary or
involuntary instrument relating to the
same land
See Secs. 39 – 50, PD 1529
PONCE DE LEON VS. REHABILITATION
FINANCE CORP.,
36 SCRA 289 (1976)
Facts: Ponce procured an industrial loan
from RFC in 1951. As security, Ponce
mortgaged a parcel of land in Paranaque
which was registered in the name of
Francisco Soriano (FS) – OCT No. 8094 –
married to Tomas Rodriguez. At the time of
signing of the mortgage deed, Tomasa was
already dead leaving her heirs, her children.
None of Tomasa’s children signed the
mortgage deed.
Ponce failed to pay the
amortizations due. RFC took steps to extra-
judicially foreclose the mortgaged
properties. Upon foreclosure, RFC
purchased the Paranaque lot.
Prior to the expiration of the one-
year period redemption period, FS offered to
repurchase the PQUE lot for P14,000, but
the bank (RFC) rejected the offer. RFC
scheduled the public sale of the lot.
In 1956, Ponce filed the present
action questioning the validity of the sheriff’s
foreclosure sale, and requesting a writ of P.I.
to restrain RFC from carrying out its
scheduled sale.
The Sorianos filed a 3rd party
complaint contending that the mortgage was
void insofar as FS is concerned for lack of
consideration; and that the PQUE lot
belonged to the conjugal property, and that
Tomasa was already dead at the time… and
the heirs who have inherited it have not
signed the mortgage contract.
The TC dismissed Ponce’s
complaint, and declared the mortgage of 1/2
of the PQUE lot of void because it belongs
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90
to the heirs of Tomasa. All the three parties
appealed.
Issues: WON the TC erred in voiding the
sale to the RFC of the PQUE lot, upon the
ground that the same formed part of the
conjugal partnership of the Soriano spouses.
Held/ Ratio Decidendi : The TC erred in
applying the said presumption. The sale to
RFC is valid.
It appears that the property was
registered in the name of “Francisco Soriano
married to Tomasa Rodriguez,” and that
based on this fact alone, the TC presumed
that it belongs to the conjugal partnership.
The TC erred in applying the said
presumption.
We should not overlook the fact that
the title to said property was not a transfer
certificate of title, but an original one, issued
in accordance with a decree which, pursuant
to law, merely confirms a pre-existing title.
Said OCT does not establish, therefore, the
time of acquisition of the PQUE property by
the registered owner thereof.
REYES VS. REYES,
17 SCRA 1099 (1966)
Facts: Mateo, Juan and Francisco Reyes
are the registered owners of several parcels
of land covered by OCT Nos. 22161 and
8066. In 1962, Mateo and Juan filed a
motion for the issuance of writs of
possession over all the lots against Raval.
Raval admitted that he was in possession of
22161 but not of 8066, although he is
entitled to the possession of both, having
acquired by way of absolute sale from
Francisco the latter’s undivided 1/3 interest
to these discputed lots.
The CFI issued the writes of
possession. Raval did not appeal.
Subsequently, petitioners filed an action to
recover the products of the disputed land
against Raval. Raval filed a counter-claim
for partition of the said lots, alleging that he
is the co-owner of the properties.
Issues: Who between the petitioners or
respondent has a better right to the
possession or custody of the disputed
owners’ duplicate of certificates of title?
Held/ Ratio Decidendi : Petitioners are
entitled to the possession.
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
While we agree that the disputed
lots are subjects of litigation, we see no valid
reason to justify, on this ground, the
withholding from the registered owners,
such as the petitioners herein, the custody
and possession of the owners’ duplicates of
certificates of title.
In a decided case, this court has
already held that the owner of the land in
whose favor and in whose name said land is
registered and inscribed in the certificate of
title has more preferential right to the
possession of the owners’ duplicate than
one whose name does not appear in the
certificate and has yet to establish his right
to the possession thereto.
It being undisputed that respondent
had already availed of an independent civil
action to recover his alleged co-owner’s
share in the disputed lots by filing a
counterclaim for partition, his rights appear
to be amply protected; and considering that
he may also avail of the provision on notice
of lis pendens for the purpose of recording
the fact that the lots covered by titles in
question are litigated in the said Civil case,
we again see no justifiable reason for
reason for respondent to retain the custody
of the owner’s duplicates of certificates of
title.
NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY VS. IAC,
157 SCRA 380 (1991)
Facts: In 1971, spouses Vivas executed a
deed of sale with a right of repurchase in
favor of spouses Magcamit, with a condition
that the balance of P40,000 was to be paid
the moment the certificate of title is issued
and delivered to the vendees. The
Magcamits have remained in peaceful
possession of the property since then.
In 1975, the OCT covering the
subject property was issued in the names of
spouses Vivas w/o the knowledge of the
Magcamits. Vivas mortgaged the property
to the petitioner.
NGA foreclosed the property, and
was able to purchase the same during the
auction. TCT No. T-75171 was issued in the
name of NGA. Upon learning this, Spouses
Magcamit offered to pay P40,000 to Vivas
but the latter refused. NGA claims it is now
the owner of the property in question. NGA
filed an ejectment suit against Magcamit.
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91
Issues: WON violation of the terms of
agreement between the Vivas and the
Mgcamits to deliver the certificate of title to
the vendees upon its issuance, constitutes a
breach of trust sufficient to defeat the title
and right acquired by NGA, an innocent
purchaser for value.
Held/ Ratio Decidendi : No. NGA won. It
is axiomatic that while the registration of the
conditional sale with right of repurchase may
be binding on third persons, it is by provision
of law “understood to be without prejudice to
a 3rd party who has a better right”. In this
case, it will be noted that the 3rd party NGA
is a registered owner under the Torrens
System and has obviously a better right than
private respondents, and that the deed of
sale with the suspensive condition is not
registered and is necessarily binding only on
the spouses Vivas and Magcamits.
Registration of title to land under the
Torrens System is an action in rem, not in
personam. Hence personal notice to all is
not necessary..
Where there is nothing on the
certificate of title to indicate any cloud or
vice in the ownership of the property, or any
encumbrance thereon, the purchaser need
not explore further than what the torrens title
upon its face indicates in quest for any
hidden defect or inchoate right.
Indefeasibility
HEIRS OF VENCILAO VS. CA,
(APRIL 1, 1998)
Facts: In 1990, Vencilao filed an action for
quieting of title against the spouses
Gepalago. Complaint was amended to
include an action for reconveyance and
cancellation of title.
LV claims to have purchased the
land from PNB; and that they are the
registered owners of the land.
The TC appointed a commissioner
to survey the property. The commissioner
reported that out of the 22,400 sq. m.
property claimed by the Vencilaos,
Gepalagos were the registered owners. TC
ruled in favor of the Vencilaos, since they
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
have been in possession for more than 30
years. CA reversed.
Issues: Who is entitled to the land?
Held/ Ratio Decidendi : Gepalagos are
entitled to the land. As a general rule, where
the certificate of title is in the name of the
vendor when the land is sold, the vendee for
value has the right to rely on what appears
on the face of the title. He is under no
obligation to look beyond the certificate of
title. Exception is when there is anything in
the certificate w/c indicates any cloud or vice
in the ownership of the property.
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING
COMPANY V DUMYUNG, ROD OF
BAGUIO & CFI OF BAGUIO,
89 SCRA 532
Facts: Republic of the Phil. filed a case for
annulment of 3 free patents on the ground of
misrepresentation and false dates and
information furnished by defendants, Manuel
Dumyung, Fortunato Dumyung and
Dumyung Bonayan. The Register of Deeds
was made a formal party defendant.
Lepanto filed motions for intervention,
alleging that a portion of the titled lands in
question is within the intervenor’s ordinary
timber license, and the other portion being
embraced in its mineral claims.
Before the hearing on the 3 civil
claims, Republic filed 3 criminal cases for
falsification of public documents, for
allegedly making untrue statements in their
applications for free patents. The civil cases
were then suspended.
The trial court then dismissed the
criminal case for insufficiency of evidence.
As a result, the defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the 3 civil cases saying that: (1) the
dismissal of the criminal cases also resulted
in the dismissal of these civil cases; (2) the
court has no jurisdiction over the case
because the certificates of title can no longer
be assailed; (3) Lepanto has no legal
interest in the matter.
The CFI then DISMISSED the civil
cases ruling that the free patents duly
registered were indefeasible, as in the
Torrens system. Hence, this petition.
Issues: WON the original certificates of title
held by respondents were indefeasible
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92
WON the respondents are entitled
to the benefits of RA 3872
WON the acquittal of the
respondents in the criminal cases also
meant extinction of civil cases
Held/ Ratio Decidendi : Case REMANDED
to TC for reception of evidence.
(1) and (2) No. Under CA 141. timber and
mineral lands are NOT alienable or
disposable. The principal factual issue
raised by the Republic and the intervenor is
that the lands covered by the patents and
certificates of title are timber and mineral
lands and, therefore, inalienable. Without
receiving evidence, the TC dismissed the 3
civil cases on the ground that the free
patents were duly registered in the ROD and
as such, enjoy the same privileges and
safeguards as the torrens title. And even in
its dismissal of the Motion for
Reconsideration, it used RA 3872,
liberalizing the free patent provisions of the
Public Land Act in favor of the national
cultural minorities. The SC emphasized that
the trial court’s assumption that the
respondents are protected by RA 3872 is
WITHOUT any factual basis. There is no
evidence that respondents are members of
the national cultural minorities, that they
have continuously and cultivated the lands
and that they are not the owner of any land
secured or disposable under the Public Land
Act. These QUALIFICATIONS must first be
established. Thus, it was premature for the
trial court to render that decision. It is well-
settled that a certificate of title is void when it
covers property of public domain classified
as forest or timber and mineral lands. Any
title issued on non-disposable lots even in
the hands of innocent purchaser for value,
shall be cancelled.
(3) No. The acquittal of the respondents in
the criminal cases for falsification is NOT a
bar to the civil cases. The criminal cases
dealt with falsification using evidence to
prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt.
Herein, the factual issues are WON lands in
question are timber or mineral lands and
WON respondents are entitled to the
benefits of RA 3872.
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
FLORENTINO REYES, ET AL V COURT
OF APPEALS, JACINTA, PAULA, PETRA
REYES, 258 SCRA 651 (1996)
Facts: On July 29, 1970, a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement was
allegedly entered into between petitioner
Florentino and his sisters (Jacinta, Paula
and Petra). The subject of the alleged
partition was a parcel of land located in
Makati, originally registered in the name of
their father, Bernardino Reyes. The Deed
stipulated that the sisters waived their rights,
interests and participation in favor of
Florentino. In the deed, a share of 50 m 2
was given to Paula. Petitioner then
regisitered the deed and obtained a TCT in
his name, leaving the 50 m2 in the name of
Paula.
May 1985, respondents discovered
the registration of said deed and denied
having any knowledge of its execution and
disclaimed having signed the deed and
having waived their rights. Paula likewise
denied any participation and reiterated that it
was fraudulently prepared by petitioner and
that their signatures were forged. It was
also asserted that the Notary Public who
signed was not listed as accredited Notary
Public.
Petitioner, however, even executed
a Deed of Absolute Sale and sold some
portion to his children. Later on, there was
allegedly another Deed of Partition dividing
the property (participated by Florentino, his
children and Paula).
As a result, private respondents filed
a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and
Damages with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction/ Restraining Order. The Lower
Court enjoined the ROD from issuing and
delivering the TCTs and subsequently ruled
that Florentino forged and simulated the
controversial documents, thereafter ordering
that the documents involved are null and
void. CA affirmed this decision. Hence, this
petition.
Issues: WON the lower court erred in ruling
that the deed was forged
WON the petitioner acquired the
land by prescription, despite the forgery
Held/ Ratio Decidendi: PETITION
DISMISSED.
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93
(1) No. Petitioners failed to convincingly
overturn the factual findings of the lower
court -- (a) the signatures were done by one
person; (b) the acknowledgment was signed
by a notary public who was never
commissioned as such and no record of the
deed was ever done; (c) the word Pasay,
Rizal was superimposed on the word
Makati; (d) the residence certificates were
obtained in Pasay City instead of Makati; (e)
the group picture shown could have been
taken on another occasion and not
necessarily before signing the deed.
Clearly, the question to be resolved here is a
question of fact beyond the SC’s power to
decide. (Question of Law: when doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is
pertaining to the case vs Question of Facts:
when the doubt arises as to the truth or
falsity of alleged facts) As cited in Chua
Tiong Tay, the SC can only review factual
findings on 10 occasions. Thus, this being a
purely question of fact and not covered in
the exceptions, the SC cannot take
cognizance of this case. What further
strengthens the case of forgery is the fact
that CA affirmed the findings. As to the
claim that there was no allegation of
deception, the SC held that forgery and
simulation was precisely arrant deception.
And as regards the allegation that a
document duly notarized cannot be
impugned, the SC deemed it baseless,
saying that there was a finding of fact that it
was notarized by an unaccredited Notary
Public and was not recorded accordingly.
(2) No. The provisions on acquisitive
prescription (Arts 1117 and 1134) will not
apply in this case. Petitioners cannot justify
their ownership and possession of the land
since they did not meet an essential
requisite, cited in Art 526 -- that of GOOD
FAITH. The forgery and simulation cannot
be the basis for issuing a just title. Likewise,
there can be no acquisitive prescription
considering that the parcel of land in dispute
is titled property -- in the name of their father
Bernardino, which Florentino does not deny.
As such, their title cannot defeat the real
rights of the respondents through their
father. In fact, there was not even any
adverse possession since respondents
continued to reside in the property.
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
Prescription
Art. 47 of PD 1529 explicitly provides
that title to registered land cannot be
acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. This is to be contrasted from
unregistered lands and/or public
agricultural lands which can be acquired
through adverse, notorious continuous
possession under a claim of ownership for
the period fixed by the Public Land Act
(CA 141).
SULPICIA JIMENEZ AND TORIBIO
MATIAS V VICENTE FERNANDEZ AND
TEDORA GRADO,
184 SCRA 190 (1990)
Facts : The land in question is the eastern
portion of a 436 m2 residential land located
in Pangasinan, covered by a TCT under the
name of Suplicia Jimenez. The entire land
was originally owned by Fermin Jimenez
who had two sons (Fortunato and Carlos).
Fortunato predeceased his father and had
only one child (Sulpicia). After Fermin’s
death, the entire land was registered in the
name of Carlos and Sulpicia in equal shares
pro-indiviso. Later on, Carlos died and
passed possession of the eastern part to his
illegitimate daughter (Melecia) who later sold
it to Cagampan then to Grado. Sulpicia, on
the other hand, executed an affidavit
adjudicating unto herself the other half of the
property appertaining to Carlos upon
manifestation that she is the only legal heir
of Carlos. Consequently, TCT was issued in
Sulpicia’s name alone. Sulpicia then filed a
case to recover possession of said land from
Melecia. The lower court dimissed
Sulpicia’s claim, which the Court of Appeals
affirmed. Hence, this petition.
Issues: WON Melecia Jimenez has a right
over the parcel of land
WON the lower court erred in
declaring Grado as the absolute owner citing
Arcuico case (prescription) and laches
Held: Petition GRANTED.
(1) Melecia has no right. Melecia is an
illegitimate daughter of Carlos and could not
have validly acquired the land nor legally
effect any transfer of it. Only a legitimate,
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94
legitimated, adopted or acknowledged
natural child has successional rights. This
was embodied in the law then in force (1889
Civil Code).
(2) The court erred in relying on the Arcuino
case, concluding that respondents acquired
the property under litigation by prescription.
This cannot be applied in this case because
herein, Suplicia was a title holder since 1933
while in the Arcuino case plaintiffs were not
registered owners. As such, Sulpicia’s title
over the property remained good and
continued to be good when she segregated
into a new title. Sulpicia’s title being
covered by the Torrens System could never
be defeated by Melecia’s possession no
matter how long. The right of Sulpicia,
therefore, is imprescriptible and not barred
under the doctrine of laches. Laches is an
equity case, whose application depends on
a case-to-case basis and depends on the
court’s discretion. In the case at bar, the
doctrine is NOT applicable. After all, the
professed objective of Act 496 (LRA, Torrens
System) is to establish the stability of the
landholding system in the Philippines
(maintaining the confidence of the people in
their titles). And to this end, the Court ruled
that the right of the appellee to file an action
to recover possession based on its Torrens
title is imprescriptible and not barred under
the doctrine of laches.
URBANO JAVIER, LEONILA ALBIELA V
HON. CONCEPCION, HON. A REYES,
HON. L REYES, LIM CHUA, TAN TIAN
ON,TAN SIOK TAN, 94 SCRA 212 (1979)
Facts: On October 17, 1959, respondents
as plaintiffs (Chua, Tan Tian On, Tan Siok
Tan) filed against herein petitioners with the
CFI of Quezon, for reconveyance of a parcel
of land with improvements thereon known as
Lot 12 and an accounting and recovery of
the produce of the land possessed by herein
petitioners since 1945. Lot 12 is allegedly
part of Lot 6 covered by TCT 16817. In
Expediente Nos. 1509 and 1679, said Lot 12
was ordered excluded for the reason that
respondents then were deemed owners of
said land.
Defendants then, now petitioners,
denied the material averments of the
complaint and pointed out that Lot 12 could
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
never be a part of Lot 6 because between
the two lots there exists a big river. It was
also alleged that Lot 6 was situated within
the jurisdiction of Dolores, Quezon while Lot
12 was situated within the jurisdiction of
Candelaria, Quezon. As special defenses,
defendants-petitioners alleged that they
acquired Lot 12 partly by purchase and
partly by inheritance; that they have title
granted by the Spanish government; that the
lot was adjudicated to them by CFI of
Tayabas; that they have declared the land
for tax purposes; that they have cleared,
cultivated and planted on these lands; that
plaintiffs were never the owners of this land,
and even if a portion thereof was included in
their title, it was done thru fraud and deceit
by making it appear in the application and in
the notices that said Lot 6 belonged to them
and is within the jurisdiction of Dolores,
Quezon.
The Lower Court found that Lot 12
is part of Lot 6 and was accordingly
adjudicated to plaintiffs. This is confirmed
by the Commissioner’s Report as
manifested by the Chief Surveyor. Also, it
was pointed out that defendant knew that
the land is within Lot 6 and covered by a title
in favor of plaintiffs since 1924 -- so, when
he filed his opposition, he did not act in good
faith and did not occupy the land for 30
years (so no prescription). Indeed, no title to
registered land may be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. The CA
affirmed this finding. Hence, this petition.
Issues: WON there was fraud or
misrepresentation in the procurement of the
TCT
WON the case is barred by statute
of limitations or by laches
Held/ Ratio Decidendi: Decision affirmed,
with modification
(1) No. The existence of actual or positive
fraud is a question of fact, and respondent
court having ruled out the same, the SC has
no basis to sustain the defendants-
petitioners’ contention. Lot 12 was clearly
found to be part and parcel of Lot 6, for
which TCT was issued to plaintiffs-
respondents and registered in 1941.
Likewise, the decree of registration has long
become final, absent a showing that the
same was questioned within one year after
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95
thereof was made. Under Sec 38, a person
allegedly defrauded has a year to file a
case. Thus, even assuming arguendo that
there was actual or positive fraud in securing
the title, the defendants-petitioners are now
barred from questioning the same.
(2) No. As the land in registration was
covered by the Torrens System and duly
registered, the decree of registration can no
longer be impugned on the ground of fraud,
error or lack of notice, AFTER the lapse of
one year.
Indeed, it is an established rule that
one cannot acquire title to a registered land
by prescription or adverse title when
covered by a Torrens tile. Adverse,
notorious, continuous possession under
claim of ownership for the period fixed by
the law is ineffective against a Torrens title
and it is likewise settled that the right to
secure possession under a decree of
registration does not prescribe (Tuason
Case)
As regards equitable doctrine of
laches, it will NOT apply as against the
registered owners. The reliance on Mejia de
Lucas Case was misplaced because the
circumstance attendant in that case was not
present in this case. The 37-year
possession in the case cited and intervening
rights of third persons who may be
prejudiced due to series of transfers effected
allows the application of laches. But this
was not the case herein.
 Petitioners, however did not act in bad
faith in occupying the land in question
(finding of fact), and possession in bad
faith only started in 1959 when judicial
summons were served. As such, in the
interest of justice, petitioners are entitled
to accounting and reimbursement of
necessary and useful expenses during
its occupation of the land in good faith.
Collateral Attack
A certificate of title cannot be
subject to a collateral attack. It cannot be
altered, modified or canceled except in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law.
(Sec. 48, PD 1529)
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
HALILI VS. CIR,
257 SCRA 174
FACTS: The original controversy arose
when the Halili Bus Drivers and Conductors
Union (PTGWO) filed claims for unpaid
overtime pay for 897 Union members
against Fortunato Halili. The latter died,
thus the claims were made against his
estate. The Union and the administratrix of
the estate reached an amicable agreement
whereby the Administratrix would transfer to
the employees title to a tract of land covered
by TCT36389 in Caloocan + additional
amount of P25,000. The administratrix
executed a Deed of Conveyance of Real
Property, transferring it to the Union. The
Union requested from the Minister of Labor
the authority to sell and dispose of the
property. Granted. Atty. Pineda,
representing the Union, filed a motion with
MOLE praying for authority to sell the land to
Manila Memorial Park Cemetery (MMPCI).
Granted by labor arbiter Valenzuela. Title
was transferred in the name of MMPCI. In a
resolution, the SC set aside the orders of
labor arbiter Valenzuela saying it was issued
w/o due process of law. Union filed a
complaint with NLRC to compel MMPCI to
reconvey the property. NLRC refused to
take cognizance of the case (outside of
jurisdiction). Petitioners thus filed the
instant petition seeking reconveyance.
ISSUE: 1. WON there was jurisdiction ---
no, there was none.
2. WON validity of MMPCI’s title
can be attacked. – no!
RATIO: The petition should definitely be
dismissed because the property was
registered under the Torrens System of
registration in the name of MMPCI. The
best proof of ownership is the Certificate of
Title.
Sec 48 of PD 1529 (Prop Reg
Decree) provides that “a certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified or canceled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law.”
The Certificate of title, in the
absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and
shows the real interest of its owner. The
petition of the Union seeks for
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96
reconveyance, thus in effect seeking the
nullification of MMPCI’s title… aba di pwede
yan! This is a collateral attack w/c is not
permitted under the principle of
indefeasibility of a Torrens Title.
* additional: 1. The portions of the land have
already been sold out to individual lot buyers
(innocent purchasers for value).
H. Cadastral Proceedings
A cadastral proceeding, as
distinguished from a land registration
proceeding, is one where the petition for
registration is filed by the government and
not by the persons claiming ownership of
the lands subject thereof.
However, as in land registration
proceedings, the objective in cadastral
proceedings is the adjudication of title to
lands involved in said proceeding.
Cadastral proceedings are in rem, and
judgments therein are binding on the
whole world.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS BENITEZ, 16
SCRA 557 (1960)
FACTS: In cadastral proceedings by the
Director of Lands before the CFI, Spouses
Benitez and Brillo were declared owners of a
parcel of land in tacloban. Decision was
rendered on Dec 29, 1932. 26 years after,
they filed a petition before the same
cadastral court for reopening of the
proceedings. They claim that through
inadvertence, they failed to include a portion
(1,805sq m) thus it should be adjudicated to
them pursuant to RA 931. Court admitted
the petition and set the petition for hearing. It
ordered copies of the petition be furnished to
the Solgen, provincial fiscal of Leyte and
Tacloban.
Cadastral Court granted the petition. It
declared the couple as owners of the
additional portion. Spouses moved for writ
of execution. Occupants of the additional
portion opposed, disputing the validity of the
decision. They were 62 occupants by virtue
of permits granted by the Dir. of Lands.
Solgen also opposed citing lack of
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
jurisdiction for the reopening of the
proceedings because there was no requisite
publication. Both were denied. MFR.
Denied. Present petition.
ISSUE: was there Jurisdiction?
RATIO: The petition to reopen cadastral
proceedings is a matter of right granted by
RA 931 as long as it is filed within due time.
In RA 931, parties are given a period of 10
years to file a petition for reopening the
proceedings in case there was failure to file
a claim in the first proceedings. However,
the petition must be filed in the same
cadastral proceedings, with the same
procedures. Thus, it is necessary that
notice be given to those persons who claim
an adverse interest in the land sought to be
registered, as well as to the general public,
by publishing such notice in 2 successive
issues of the OG, and posting it in a
conspicuous place in the land to be
surveyed, as well as in the municipal
building.
Publication is one of the essential bases of
the court’s jurisdiction.
VALISNO VS PLAN
FACTS: In 1964, petitioner-spouses
Flordeliza and Valisno purchased 2 parcels
of land from the legal heirs of Agapito
Blanco. They declared the two parcels in
their name for taxation purposes and
exercised exclusive possession thereof in
the concept of owners by installing a
caretaker (Fermin Lozano). In 1968, private
respondent Cayaba ousted Lozano from the
land. He claims ownership by virtue of a
deed of sale in his favor. He then erected a
6-door apartment on the land. Petitioner
filed complaint for recovery of possession.
Resolved in favor of petitioners. CA
reversed the decision and dismissed
complaint, ruling that the land occupied by
Cayaba has not been successfully identified
with the land described in the complaint. CA
also ruled that being the actual possessor of
the property, Cayaba possesses it with a just
title. CA gives more weight to Cayaba’s
evidence.
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97
In 1979. Cayaba applied for registration in
his name. Petitioners filed opposition. MTD
(ground: prior judgment). Granted.
Opposition was dismissed. Instant petition.
ISSUE: WON dismissal was proper. – YES.
RATIO: It must be noted that the opposition
partakes of the nature of an answer with a
counterclaim. In ordinary civil cases, the
counterclaim would be considered a
complaint, this time with the original
defendant becoming the plaintiff. The
original plaintiff, who becomes defendant in
the counterclaim may either then answer the
counterclaim or be declared in default, or
may file a motion to dismiss the same. The
latter choice was what respondent Cayaba
opted for. Although such situation rarely, if
ever, happens in land registration cases, the
irregularity that petitioners complain of
stems basically from the infrequent use of a
motion to dismiss in land registration cases,
and not from it being unauthorized.
There was, in fact, res judicata. With respect
to the subject matter, there can be no
question that the land sought to be
recovered by petitioners are the very same
parcels of land being sought to be registered
in Cayaba's and Noriega's names. While the
complaint in the first action is captioned for
recovery of possession, the allegations and
the prayer for relief therein raise the issue of
ownership, In effect, it is in the nature of an
action reinvidicatoria. The second case is for
registration of title. Consequently, between
the two cases there is identity of causes of
action because in action reinvidicatoria,
possession is sought on the basis of
ownership and the same is true in
registration cases. Registration of title in
one's name is based on ownership. In both
cases, the plaintiff and the applicant seek to
exclude other persons from ownership of the
land in question. The only difference is that
in the former case, the exclusion is directed
against particular persons, while in the latter
proceedings, the exclusion is directed
against the whole world. Nonetheless, the
cause of action remains the same.
 Abellera vs. Farol ruled that "while in a
cadastral case, res judicata is available
to a claimant in order to defeat the
alleged rights of another claimant,
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
nevertheless, prior judgment can not be
set up in a motion to dismiss." This
ruling is now abandoned; reversed by
this case.
DURAN VS. OLIVA,
3 SCRA 154 (1961)
Facts: (SUPRA)
Held: By express provision of Rule 132 of
the ROC, the rules contained therein apply
to land registration and cadastral cases in
suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient. The LRA does
not provide for a pleading similar or
corresponding to a motion to dismiss. As a
motion to dismiss is necessary for the
expeditious termination of land registration
cases, said motion can be availed of by the
parties.
The primary and fundamental
purpose of the Torrens System of
registration is to finally settle the titles to
land and put to stop any question of legality
of title thereto. Pursuant to this purpose, a
homestead patent once registered under the
LRA cannot be the subject matter of a
cadastral proceeding, and any title issued
thereon is null and void.
Hearing, judgment and Decree (Sec.
38)
WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION
INC., (WIDORA) VS. CA, ORTIGAS & CO.,
201 SCRA 165 (1991)
Facts: Widora filed an application for
registration of a land they acquired from the
heirs of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
Molina and Ortigas & Co. separately
opposed claiming ownership. Ortigas filed a
motion to dismiss alleging that the court had
no jurisdiction, the land being applied for
having been already registered under the
Torrens System (TS). MTD denied and the
case was set for hearing. TC believes
Ortigas’ TCTs were derived form OCT 337,
19, 336, 334 (as it appears on its face)
pursuant to Decree 1425, NOT OCT 351 as
claimed by Ortigas. If it were really derived
from OCT 351 then why didn’t Ortigas have
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98
the same corrected? And besides, Decree
1425 covers land which is 4 kms. away from
the land being applied for. So if there was no
valid decree of registration, Ortigas’ TCTs
cannot be valid.
Ortigas brought the case to the CA
on certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and
the CA reversed the TC decision and
dismissed the case. The CA believed
Ortigas’ TCTs are actually derived from OCT
351, the latter being issued pursuant to
Decree 1425 and that since OCT 351 is a
copy of Decree 1425, even though a copy of
Decree 1425 cannot be presented in court
does not mean Decree 1425 was not issued
and OCT 351 would suffice to show that a
decree of registration was made. So
according to the CA, as far as Lots 7 and 8
are concerned Ortigas’ TCTs refer to OCT
351 and the CA ordered that the mistake in
the TCTs be corrected.
Issue: WON Ortigas’ TCTs are valid despite
the absence of a supporting decree of
registration.
Held: No. CA judgment set aside.
Ratio: The evidence presented by Ortigas
to prove the existence of a decree of
registration is merely secondary (i.e. the
plan, testimony of surveyor and OCT 351).
Ortigas must satisfy requisites to justify
admission of secondary evidence (1.
Execution 2. Lost or destroyed or
possession of adverse party). Ortigas’
evidence should not have been admitted in
the first place.
A ground for dismissal based on
disputed facts (WON the TCT’s of Ortigas
was supported by a decree of registration
specifically by Decree 1425) is not a ground
for dismissal. The resolution of this
controversy calls for a full-blown trial to
afford the parties a day in court.
An order denying a motion to
dismiss is merely interlocutory thus not
proper for the extraordinary writ of
prohibition. Interlocutory orders cannot be
reviewed by the CA until the LC shall have
decided the merit of the case.
The mistakes that appear in Ortigas’
TCTs cannot be corrected except by order of
the court in a petition filed for the purpose
and entitled in the original case in which the
decree of registration was entered. The
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
court is not authorized to alter or correct a
certificate of title if it would mean the
reopening of the decree of registration
beyond the period allowed by law.
Respondent court committed a procedural
lapse.
The rule that a land registration
court has no jurisdiction over parcels of land
already covered by certificate of Title applies
only where there exists no serious
controversy as to the certificate’s
authenticity vis-a-vis the land covered
therein.
GABRIEL VS. CA, PETRITA PASCUAL,
RUDYARDO SANTIAGO,
159 SCRA 461 (1988)
Facts: A survey was made for Santiago
Quimson. Land was registered under his
name and an OCT was issued by the
Registry of Deeds. Subsequently a
cadastral survey (Orani survey) was
conducted which resulted in an increase in
the land. The Cadastral court confirmed
Quimson’s title. The lot was subdivided and
subsequently acquired by Eligio Naval.
Potenciano Gabriel had a parcel of land
surveyed (2,792,712 sq m designated as
Psu 9742) and later it was amended to
exclude portions of land owned by Quimson.
OCT 1264 with a reduced area (2,436,280
sq m) was issued to Gabriel. Another
cadastral survey was conducted (Hermosa
survey) and Gabriel’s lot covered by Psu-
9742 became Lot No. 557 with a further
reduced area (2,096,433 sq m) but no new
certificate of title was issued such that the
OCT 1264 continued to subsist with an area
of 2,436,280 sq m. Gabriel passed away
and his heirs (petitioners) divided the land
according to Psu 9742 under OCT 1264
(includes land owned by Naval). Petitioners
filed a complaint against Pascual and
Santiago (administrators of Naval estate)
claiming that respondents usurped the land
and that the land was merely loaned to the
respondents for dike and water control
purposes of the latter’s fishpond. The TC
dismissed the complaint on the ground that
the land was in the possession of Naval in
the concept of an owner and the petitioner’s
claim that the land was loaned to Naval was
not supported by sufficient evidence.
Further the TC found that the right of
______________________________________________________________________________________
99
petitioners was lost by prescription and that
they were guilty of laches. TC ORDERED
THE NECESSARY CORRECTION OF THE
TECHINICAL DESCRIPTION TO MAKE IT
CONFORM TO THE CORRECT AREA. CA
affirmed.
Issue: WON the courts have the authority
to order the necessary corrections of an
erroneous technical description and make it
conform to the correct area.
Held: Yes. Petition dismissed. Decision
affirmed.
Ratio: In cadastral cases, jurisdiction of the
court over lands already registered is limited
to the necessary correction of technical
errors in the description of lands, provided
such corrections do not impair the
substantial rights of the registered owner,
and that such jurisdiction cannot operate to
deprive a registered owner of his title. The
court also has the power to determine the
priority of overlapping or over-laying
registered title. This power is necessary for
a complete settlement of the title to the land,
which is the express purpose of cadastral
proceedings. Furthermore, in the case at
bar, it was not as if the court reopened or set
aside a final decree. Therefore the action of
the lower court in correcting the error in the
technical description appearing in Psu 9742
is well within its jurisdiction.
The fact that Gabriel did not own the
land is shown by the Hermose and Orani
Cadastre, and by the behavior of Gabriel
himself (even after discovering occupation
he allowed Naval to use and occupy the
land). The claim that the land was loaned
was supported by mere oral evidence which
the SC believes to be insufficient to defeat
title and possession of registered owners.
For failure to prosecute their claims
for 20 years, petitioners have lost by laches
their right to recover their property.
REPUBLIC AND DIR. OF LANDS VS.
JUDGE ESTENZO
158 SCRA 282 (1988)
Facts: Oct. 31, 1940 Cadastral Court
declared Lot No. 8423 of the Ormoc
Cadastral as public land. 32 years later (Jan
12, 1972) spouses Adolfo filed a petition to
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
re-open the Oct. 31, 1940 decision. Spouses
claimed ownership by virtue of having
purchased it and as evidenced by a deed of
quitclaim and confirmation dated August 28,
1969, likewise alleging that due to accident,
mistake, and excusable neglect of the
previous claimant, the land was declared
public. Director of Lands appeared as
oppositor. Judge adjudicated Lot No. 8423
in favor of spouses. Rep. and Dir. Appeals
by certiorari. Petitioner claims spouses’
petition is barred by the expiration of the
period for reopening of cadastral
proceedings under RA 931 (Dec. 31, 1968).
Issue: WON spouses are barred.
Held: Yes. Decision set aside.
Ratio: Spouses filed their petition more
than 3 years after the lapse of the
reglementary period required by the law.
The period having expired, respondent
judge was without jurisdiction when he
entertained spouses’ petition to re-open the
decision of the cadastral court.
Spouses claim that assuming the
LC has no jurisdiction to re-open the
cadastral proceedings their petition may be
taken as one for confirmation of imperfect
title considering the allegation contained in
the complaint. But looking into their petition,
the spouses’ cause of action is premised on
RA 931 because it conforms with the
conditions to be met before one can avail of
the provisions of RA 931 therefore the
petition filed by the spouses cannot be one
for confirmation of imperfect title. If it were a
confirmation of imperfect title, spouses can
take advantage of the extension of period
granted by RA 6236 (Dec. 31, 1976) but that
law does not apply to re-opening of
cadastral cases.
Requirements of the rules relative to
perfection of appeal in an ordinary case
apply in the same manner to appeals from a
decision of a court of first instance in
registration and cadastral proceedings.
Hence, from Aug. 28, 1972 when the
assailed decision was received by herein
petitioners until Sept. 15, 1972 when the
petition was filed, the 30 period had not yet
elapsed.
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100
I. Lost or Destroyed Certificates
(Sec.109, PD 1529)
 In case of loss or theft of an owner’s
duplicate certificate of title
 Due notice under oath is required to
be sent to Reg. of Deeds where land
is situated as soon as loss or theft is
discovered
 Petition to be filed by registered owner
or other person in interest
 Notice and hearing required
OCAMPO V. GARCIA,
105 PHIL. 533
FACTS: Appellees ask for the
issuance of another duplicate certificate TCT
which was lost in the liberation of Manila.
They ask as well that the two encumbrances
(re appointment of special administrator and
sum due to a judgment creditor) thereon
because such encumbrances no longer exist
or have been satisfied.
HELD: There is no question that under the
foregoing quoted provisions of Act No. 496,
the court of first instance, acting as land
registration court, may, upon petition of the
registered owner or other person in interest,
after notice and hearing, and upon
satisfactory proof, direct the issuance of a
new duplicate certificate of title in lieu of a
lost or destroyed one, and the cancellation
of encumbrances on a certificate of title
which have terminated or ceased. Having
shown to the satisfaction of the Court that
the owner's duplicate of transfer certificate
of title No. 28709 had been lost or destroyed
during the battle for liberation of Manila, the
appellees are entitled to the issuance of
another owner's duplicate TCT. Having also
shown to the Court's satisfaction that
Mariano Ocampo y Zamora, who had been
appointed by the probate court to administer
the estate of the late Manuel Rivera y
Angeles, died in 1938, and the record of that
fact on the back of the certificate of title
would serve no useful purpose, the
appellees may ask for the cancellation
thereof and the Court commits no error in
directing the cancellation of the annotation
on the certificate of title of the
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
administrator's appointment by the probate
court.
SERRA V. CA,
195 SCRA 482
RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE; PURPOSE.
— The purpose of the reconstitution of any
document, book or record is to have the
same reproduced, after observing the
procedure prescribed by law in the same
form they were when the loss or destruction
occurred. The reconstitution of certificates of
title should be made, as just stated, in the
same form and exactly as they were at the
time they were lost or destroyed. A person
who seeks a reconstitution of a certificate of
title over a property he does not actually
possess cannot, by a mere motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession, which is
summary in nature, deprive the actual
occupants of possession thereof.
Possession and/or ownership of the property
should be threshed out in a separate
proceeding
RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE; ACTUAL
AND PERSONAL NOTICE TO ACTUAL
POSSESSORS, INDISPENSABLE. — duplicate certificate of title. Indeed, the only
Private respondents argue that the herein
petitioners are bound by the order granting
reconstitution because the reconstitution
proceedings was heard after notices were
sent to alleged boundary owners and the
petition was published in the Official
Gazette. However, the petitioner who were
in actual possession of the properties were
not notified. Notice by publication is not
sufficient as regards actual possessors of
the property. In the case of Alabang
Development v. Valenzuela, No. 54094,
August 30, 1982, 116 SCRA 277, We held
that in petitions for reconstitution of titles,
actual owners and possessors of the lands
involved must be duly served with actual
and personal notice of the petition.
RECONSTITUTED TITLE A NULLITY
WHERE NO ORIGINAL TITLE EXISTS. — If
no such original title in fact exists, the
reconstituted title is a nullity and the order
for its reconstitution does not become final
because the court rendering the order has
not acquired jurisdiction. It may be attacked
at any time. The same rule applies if in fact
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101
there is an earlier valid certificate of title in
the name and in the possession of another
person/s.
REPUBLIC V CA AND YUPANGCO,
OCTOBER 26, 1999
Issue: The question for decision in this
case is whether in a proceeding for the
issuance of an owner’s duplicate certificate
of title, the Solicitor General is required to be
notified, such that failure to give such notice
would render the proceedings void.
Held: Nothing in the law requires that the
Office of the Solicitor General be notified
and heard in proceeding for the issuance of
an owner’s duplicate certificate of title. In
contrast, §23 of the same law(PD 1529),
involving original registration proceedings,
specifically mentions the Solicitor General
as among those who must be notified of the
petition. Similarly, §36 provides that the
petition for registration in cadastral
proceedings must be filed by the Solicitor
General, in behalf of the Director of Lands.
It is only now that the Solicitor
General is claiming the right to be notified of
proceedings for the issuance of the owner’s
basis for such claim is that the Office of the
Solicitor General represents the government
in land registration and related proceedings.
Even so, however, the request for
representation should have come from the
Registrar of Deeds of Makati who was the
proper party to the case.
Considering that the law does not
impose such notice requirement in
proceedings for the issuance of a new
owner’s duplicate certificate of title, the lack
of notice to the Solicitor General, as counsel
for the Registrar of Deeds, was at most only
a formal and not a jurisdictional defect. M
J. Reconstitution of Lost or Destroyed
Certificates
(Sec. 110, PD 1529)
 Denotes restoration of the instrument
which is supposed to have been lost
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds 102

or destroyed in its original form and

condition Judicial reconstitution partakes of a
 Purpose is to have the same land registration proceeding and is
reproduced, after proper proceedings, perforce a proceeding in rem.
in the same form they were when the The procedure for judicial
loss or destruction occurred. reconstitution is laid down in Sec. 12
(contents of the petition) and 13
(publication, posting, and sending by mail
What is the purpose of reconstitution? of the petition) of RA 26. These
requirements are mandatory and
The purpose of the reconstitution of jurisdictional, and non-compliance
any document, book or record is to have therewith voids the reconstitution
the same reproduced, after observing the proceedings.
procedure prescribed by law in the same
form they were when the loss or
destruction occurred. The reconstitution What are the sources for judicial
of certificates of title should be made in reconstitution of title?
the same form and exactly as they were at
the time they were lost or destroyed. I) For Original Certificate of Title
(Serra Serra v. CA, 195 SCRA 482) (C.T)
In the following order:
How is reconstitution done?
a) Owner’s duplicate of the CT
Reconstitution may be done either b) Co-owner’s mortgagee’s or lessee’s
judicially or administratively / duplicate of said C.T.
extrajudicially, depending on the source (Note that reconstitution based on
document which is the basis for the
(a) and (b) can be done
reconstitution. (See Sec. 5 of RA 26, as
administratively. However, Sec. 10
amended by RA 6732, as well as Sec. 10-
12 of RA 26.) of RA 26 allows a petitioner to file
directly with the RTC. Moreover,
What is the force and effect of a such certificates of title
reconstituted title? reconstituted under Sec. 10 are not
subject to the encumbrance
A reconstituted certificate of title has provided under Sec. 7 of RA 26.)
the same validity and legal effect as the
original thereof. (Sec. 6, RA 26) This is c) Certified copy of such certificate,
without prejudice to any party whose right previously issued by the Reg. Of
or interest in the property was duly noted deeds or by legal custodian thereof
in the original at the time it was lost or
destroyed, but entry or notation of which d) Authenticated copy of the decree of
was not made on an extrajudicially registration or patent, which was the
reconstituted certificate of title. basis of the certificate of title

e) Deed of mortgage, lease or

Judicial Reconstitution encumbrance containing description
of prop covered by the CT and on
file with Reg. of Deeds, or an
authenticated copy thereof
indicating that its original had been
registered

f) Any other document (similar to the

documents previously enumerated)

______________________________________________________________________________________
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
which, in the judgment of the court,
is a sufficient and proper basis for
reconstitution.
II) For Transfer Certificate of Title
In the following order:
a) The same as sources a, b and c for
reconstitution of original CT
b) Deed of transfer or other document
covered by TCT and on file with the
Reg. of Deeds, or an authenticated
copy thereof indicating that its
original had been registered and
pursuant to which the lost or
destroyed CT was issued
c) The same as sources (e) and (f) for
reconstitution of original CT
Can liens and encumbrances be
reconstituted?
YES. The sources for such
reconstitution are provided under Sec. 4 of
RA 26. Also see Sec. 8-9 of the same
law.
Who may file a petition for
reconstitution?
A petition for reconstitution may be filed
with the RTC by:
(1) the registered owner;
(2) his assigns; or
(3) any other person having an
interest in the property (Sec. 12,
RA 26)
Can the Register of Deeds reconstitute
a certificate of title motu proprio?
NO. Sec. 6 of RA 26, which gave the
Register of Deeds such power, has been
expressly repealed by RA 6732.
When does the order of reconstitution
become final?
Upon 15 days from receipt by the
Register of Deeds and by the
Administrator of the Land Registration
______________________________________________________________________________________
103
Authority of a notice of such order or
judgment without any appeal having been
filed by any of such officials. (Sec. 110,
PD 1529, as amended by RA 6732)
What is the force and effect of a
fraudulently reconstituted title?
It is void ab initio as against the party
obtaining the same and all persons having
knowledge thereof. (Sec. 11, RA 6732)
What is the remedy of an aggrieved
party to a fraudulently reconstituted
title?
Sec. 10 of RA 6732 provides that any
interested party who by fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence (FAME;
note, these are the same grounds for a
motion for new trial as well as a petition
for relief from judgment) has been
unjustly deprived or prevented from taking
part in the proceedings may file a petition
in the proper court to set aside the
decision and to reopen the proceedings.
The petition must be verified and
filed within 60 days after the petitioner
learns of the decision but not more than 6
months from the promulgation thereof.
(This is the same as a petition for relief
from judgment.)
Can a writ of possession issue in
reconstitution cases?
NO. Reconstitution does not confirm
or adjudicate ownership over the property
covered by the reconstituted title, unlike in
original land registration proceedings.
Thus, a person who seeks a reconstitution
of a CT over a property he does not
actually possess cannot, by a mere
motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession (which, it must be noted, is
summary in nature) deprive the actual
occupants of possession thereof. (Serra
Serra v. CA, 195 SCRA 482)
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ISABEL
LASTIMADO, 94 SCRA 865
FACTS:
1. September 11, 1967 - Lastimado filed in
the CFI a Petition for the reopening of
cadastral proceedings over a portion of Lot
No. 626 of the Mariveles Cadastre.
2. In the absence of any opposition,
whether from the Government or from
private individuals, Lastimado was allowed
to present her evidence ex-parte.
3. October 14, 1967- the trial Court granted
the Petition and adjudicated the land in favor
of Lastimado.
4. The trial Court issued an order for the
issuance of a decree of registration on
November 20, 1967, and on November 21,
1967, the Land Registration Commission
issued Decree No. N-117573 in favor of
private respondent. Eventually, OCT No. N-
144 was also issued in her favor.
5. Lastimado thereafter subdivided the land
into ten lots, and the corresponding titles,
TCT Nos. 18905 to 18914 inclusive, were
issued by the Register of Deeds.
6. June 3, 1968 - or within one year from
the entry of the decree of registration, RP
filed a Petition for Review pursuant to Sec.
38, Act No. 496, on the ground of fraud
alleging that during the period of alleged
adverse possession by private respondent,
said parcel of land was part of the U.S.
Military Reservation in Bataan, which was
formally turned over to the Republic of the
Philippines only on December 22, 1965, and
that the same is inside the public forest of
Mariveles, Bataan and, therefore, not
subject to disposition or acquisition under
the Public Land Law.
7. The trial court dismissed the petition on
the ground that the Solicitor General had
failed to file opposition to the original petition
for reopening the cadastral proceedings,
and was therefore estopped from
questioning the decree of registration. The
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's
dismissal.
______________________________________________________________________________________
104
8. The Supreme Court set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals as well as
the order of the trial court, and held that the
trial court should have afforded petitioner an
opportunity to present evidence in support of
the facts alleged to constitute actual and
extrinsic fraud committed by private
respondent. Moreover, the inaction of the
Solicitor General cannot operate to bar the
action of the State as it cannot be estopped
by the mistake or error of its official or
agents.
Case remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings.
HELD: The essential elements for the
allowance of the reopening or review of a
decree are: (1) that the petitioner has a real
and dominical right; (2) that he has been
deprived thereof; (c) through fraud; (d) that
the petition is filed within one year from the
issuance of the decree; and (e) that the
property has not as yet been transferred to
an innocent purchaser.
For fraud to justify the review of a degree, it
must be extrinsic or collateral and the facts
upon which it is based have not been
controverted or resolved in the case where
the judgment sought to be annulled was
rendered. The fraud is one that affects and
goes into the jurisdiction of the Court.
It is error for the lower court to deny
the petition for review of a decree of
registration filed within one year from the
entry of the decree, without hearing the
evidence in support of the allegation and
claim that actual and extrinsic fraud has
been committed by the applicants. The
lower court should afford the petitioner an
opportunity to prove it.
If the allegation of the government
that the land in question was inside the
military reservation at the time it was
claimed is true, then, it cannot be the object
of any cadastral proceeding nor can it be the
object of reopening under Republic Act No.
931. Similarly, if the land in question, indeed,
forms part of the public forest, then,
possession thereof, however long, cannot
convert it into private property as it is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Forestry and beyond the power and
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
jurisdiction of the cadastral Court to register
under the Torrens System.
The inaction or neglect of
government agencies cannot operate to bar
the action by the State as it cannot be
estopped by the mistake or error of its
officials or agents. The State as a persona in
law is the juridical entity, which is the source
of any asserted right to ownership in land
under basic Constitutional precepts, and is
charged with the conversion of such
patrimony.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
MALABON VS. THE HONORABLE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MALABON,
181 SCRA 788
1. March 17, 1988 - a Deed of Absolute
Sale of a property covered by TCT No. R-
3899 in the name of Salome Castillo in favor
of Jose M. Castillo, was presented to the
Register of Deeds in Caloocan City for
registration. It could not be given due course
because the original of said TCT in the
Registry of Deeds was missing.
2. As the missing title covered a parcel of
land in Malabon, Atty. Gaudencio Cena, the
Register of Deeds for Malabon, filed on April
12, 1988 in the Regional Trial Court of
Malabon, a verified petition for reconstitution
of the original of TCT No. R-3899 under
Rep. Act No. 26, which was given due
course on April 22, 1988. The court’s order
setting it for hearing on August 17, 1988 was
ordered to be published in two (2)
consecutive issues of the Official Gazette as
provided in Section 9 of Republic Act No. 26.
3. At the hearing for the purpose of
establishing the jurisdictional requirement of
publication of the notice of the hearing of the
petition, the petitioner submitted the
following exhibits:
a) a certification dated August 10,
1988, of the Director of the National Printing
Office certifying that the order dated April 22,
1988 was included in Volume 84, Nos. 21
and 22, May 23 and May 30, 1988 issues of
the Official Gazette;
b) the sheriffs certificate of posting;
and
c) the registry return receipts for the
copies of the notices which were sent to the
______________________________________________________________________________________
105
Director of Lands, the Office of the Solicitor
General, the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration (NLTDRA),
Salome Castillo, and Jose Castillo.
4. November 3, 1988 - the petitioner caused
to be marked as Exhibit G the certificate of
publication issued by the Director of the
National Printing Office stating that the order
of the court dated April 22, 1988 was
published in Volume 84, Nos. 21 and 22,
May 23 and May 30, 1988 issues of the
Official Gazette and that the May 30, 1988
issue was released for circulation on
October 3, 1988. The May 23 and May 30
issues of the Official Gazette were also
marked as Exhibits B-1 and B-2,
respectively.
5. The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City
testified that the original TCT No. R-3899
had been missing from the files of his office
since 1981; that the Deed of Sale of the
property of Salome Castillo in favor of Jose
Castillo was presented for registration but it
could not be registered because the original
of TCT No. R-3899 could not be found; and
that he was authorized by the administrator
of the NLTDRA to file a petition for
reconstitution of the lost original copy of TCT
No. R-3899.
6. The Regional Trial Court in Malabon
dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction
because the notice of the petition was not
published in the Official Gazette "at least
thirty (30) days prior to the date of hearing"
(Sec. 9, R.A. No. 26) which had been set on
August 17, 1988. The May 23 and May 30
issues of the Official Gazette were actually
released for circulation on October 3, 1988,
or forty-seven (47) days after the scheduled
hearing of the petition.
7. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 26
provides:
"Sec. 9. A registered owner desiring to
have his reconstituted certificate of title
freed from the encumbrance mentioned
in section seven of this Act, may file a
petition to that end with the proper
Court of First Instance, giving his
reason or reasons therefor. A similar
petition may, likewise, be filed by a
mortgagee, lessee or other lien holder
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
whose interest is annotated in the
reconstituted certificate of title.
Thereupon, the court shall cause a
notice of the petition to be published, at
the expense of the petitioner, twice in
successive issues of the Official
Gazette, and to be posted on the main
entrance of the provincial building and
of the municipal building of the
municipality or city in which the land
lies, at least thirty days prior to the date
of hearing, and after hearing, shall
determine the petition and render such
judgment as justice and equity may
require. The notice shall specify,
among other things, the number of the
certificate of title, the name of the
registered owner, the names of the
interested parties appearing in the
reconstituted certificate of title, the
location of the property, and the date
on which all persons having an interest
in the property must appear and file
such claim as they may have. The
petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit
proof of the publication and posting of
the notice."
ISSUE: Whether the actual publication of
the notice of the petition in the Official
Gazette forty-seven (47) days after the
hearing, instead of "at least thirty (30) days
prior to the date of hearing" was sufficient to
vest jurisdiction in the court to hear and
determine the petition.
HELD: Evidently, it did not. The purpose of
the publication of the notice of the petition
for reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to
apprise the whole world that such a petition
has been filed and that whoever is minded
to oppose it for good cause may do so within
thirty (30) days before the date set by the
court for hearing the petition. It is the
publication of such notice that brings in the
whole world as a party in the case and vests
the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide
it.
In Director of Lands vs. The Court
of Appeals and Demetria Sta. Maria de
Bernal, Greenfield Development
Corporation, Alabang Development
Corporation and Ramon Bagatsing (102
SCRA 370), this Court ruled that "in all
cases where the authority of the courts to
proceed is conferred by a statute and when
______________________________________________________________________________________
106
the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is
mandatory, it must be strictly complied with,
or the proceedings will be utterly void."
Where there is a defect in the publication of
the petition, such defect deprives the court
of jurisdiction (Po vs. Republic, 40 SCRA
37). And when the court a quo lacks
jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, it
lacks authority over the whole case and all
its aspects (Pinza vs. Aldovino, 25 SCRA
220, 224).
Apart from the defective publication of the
petition, another reason for its dismissal is
that the Register of Deeds for Malabon is
not the proper party to file the petition for
reconstitution. Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 26, which allowed the Register of Deeds
to motu proprio reconstitute a lost or
destroyed certificate of title from its
corresponding owner's duplicate certificate,
was expressly repealed or declared to be
"inoperative" by Section 6 of Republic Act
6732, approved on July 17, 1989. A petition
for reconstitution may now be filed only by
"the registered owner, his assigns, or any
person who has an interest in the property"
(Section 12, Republic Act No. 26). In other
respects, the special procedure provided in
Republic Act No. 26 remains unchanged and
therefore still applies (Zuñiga vs. Vicencio,
153 SCRA 720).
JOSE MANUEL STILIANOPULOS VS. THE
CITY OF LEGASPI
[G.R. NO. 133913. OCTOBER 12, 1999.]
FACTS:
1. September 26, 1962 - Legaspi City filed a
petition for the judicial reconstitution of its
titles to twenty parcels of land, including Lot
1, the certificates of which had allegedly
been lost or destroyed during World War II.
2. September 16, 1964 -, the trial court
ordered the Register of Deeds to
reconstitute the OCTs over these lots
including OCT No. 665 in favor of the City.
3. August 4, 1970 - the City filed a
Complaint for quieting of title over Lot 1
against Carlos V. Stilianopulos alias Chas V.
Stilianopulos, Ana Estela Stilianopulos, and
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
the American Oxygen and Acetylene
Company. While this case was pending,
Carlos V. Stilianopulos died. As a
consequence, TCT No. T-1427 which was
registered under his name was cancelled,
and TCT No. 13448 was issued in the name
of his son, petitioner herein, on July 12,
1974.
4. February 29, 1984 - the trial court
rendered its Decision, which upheld the
validity of TCT No. 13448 and its superiority
to OCT No. 665. Thus, Stilianopulos was
declared the lawful owner of the disputed
property, Lot 1, Psd-3261.
5. The CA reversed the trial court and ruled
in favor of the City. Stilianopulos’ recourse to
this Court was dismissed in a Minute
Resolution promulgated on August 17, 1988,
12 on the ground that the issue raised was
factual in nature.
6. Stilianopulos filed an action for the
cancellation of OCT No. 665, which the trial
court subsequently dismissed on August 15,
1989 on the ground of res judicata. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court,
reasoning that petitioner’s action was "an
action for annulment of the order" of the
reconstitution of OCT No. 665 and was
therefore not cognizable by the trial court.
7. June 13, 1994 - Stilianopulos again filed
before the CA a new action for annulment of
the September 16, 1964 Order based on
three grounds: "(1) that the Respondent City
of Legaspi procured OCT No. 665
fraudulently; (2) that the original certificate
of title which was judicially reconstituted was
non-existent: and (3) that the court which
ordered the reconstitution lacked
jurisdiction."
8. The Court of Appeals ruled that "the
prescriptive period for extrinsic fraud has
lapsed [and] the petitioner is likewise guilty
of laches in the filing of this case for
annulment."
Res judicata had also set in against
petitioner, as there was an identity of parties
and causes of action — ownership and
possession of the lot covered by OCT No.
665 — between the earlier case for quieting
of title and his Petition for Annulment.
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107
Further, petitioner did not raise the issue of
lack of jurisdiction in the earlier case; thus,
he was guilty of laches.
ISSUES: (1) WON the prescriptive period
for extrinsic fraud has [not] lapsed" and
(2) WON the reconstitution court
had no jurisdiction and "petitioner is [not]
guilty of laches." In addition, the Court will
pass upon the CA holding that this case is
also barred by res judicata.
HELD: The Petition has no merit.
For fraud to become a basis for
annulment of judgment, it has to be
extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the
fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved
in the original action or where the acts
constituting the fraud were or could have
been litigated. It is extrinsic or collateral
when a litigant commits acts outside of the
trial which prevents a party from having a
real contest, or from presenting all of his
case such that there is no fair submission of
the controversy. Our examination of the
facts shows that, indeed, respondent failed
(1) to state in its Petition for Reconstitution
that Lot 1 was occupied and possessed by
petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest and (2)
to give him notice of such proceedings.
Deliberately failing to notify a party entitled
to notice constitutes extrinsic fraud.
Although the CA and the respondent
impliedly admitted the presence of extrinsic
fraud, both contend, however, that the
prescriptive period for filing an action based
thereon had already run out on the
petitioner. The appellate court said: "If the
ground for the annulment is extrinsic fraud,
the action has to be filed within four (4)
years from the time the fraud is discovered
pursuant to the provisions of Article 1891 of
the Civil Code. . .”
Petitioner’s arguments are
untenable. He could and should have raised
the issue of extrinsic fraud in the action for
quieting of title. It was then that he became
aware of the reconstituted title in the name
of respondent. A simple check on the
records of the reconstitution proceedings
would have revealed that it was conducted
without notice to the petitioner’s father.
Thus, we find no sufficient
explanation why March 24, 1988 should be
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
reckoned as the date when the prescriptive
period should begin. Simply unacceptable is
the contention that petitioner’s counsel
discovered the extrinsic fraud "shortly after
March 24, 1988" only. Granting arguendo
that the prescriptive period should begin
when petitioner’s counsel read the Land
Registration Commission Report, the
"discovery" should have been made earlier,
because the Report had been made
available to the said counsel when it was
attached to the respondent’s Appeal Brief on
April 5, 1986, or at the latest, when the CA
Decision was promulgated on October 16,
1987. There was absolutely no excuse why
petitioner had to wait until the finality of the
Decision in the case for quieting of title,
before raising the issue of extrinsic fraud in
order to annul the Decision in the
reconstitution proceedings. Clearly, the facts
constituting the fraud should have been
known to petitioner’s predecessor-in-
interest, when the Petition to quiet the title
was filed in 1970.
It appears that the trial court had no
jurisdiction. First, under Section 13 of RA 26,
the sending of notice to the occupant of the
land covered by the title sought to be
reconstituted is mandatory and jurisdictional.
If no notice of the date of hearing of a
reconstitution case is served on the
possessor or anyone else having interest in
the property involved, the order of
reconstitution is null and void. Second,
reconstitution of title is simply the reissuance
of a new duplicate certificate of title allegedly
lost or destroyed in its original form and
condition. Thus, it arises from the loss or
destruction of the owner’s copy of the
certificate. In the case at bar, the title to Lot
1 was not lost or destroyed. It remained in
the possession of the petitioner’s father and
was eventually passed on to him. If a
certificate of title has not been lost but is in
fact in the possession of another person,
then the reconstituted title is void and the
court that rendered the Decision had no
jurisdiction.
However, the CA ruled that the
delay of more than twenty years since
petitioner learned of the reconstituted title
was unreasonable, giving rise to the
presumption that he had abandoned the
idea of seeking annulment of the
proceedings on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, and that he had opted to take
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108
other actions instead. Laches is the failure
or neglect, for an unreasonable or
unexplained length of time, to do that which
by exercising due diligence could or should
have been done earlier, warranting the
presumption that the right holder has
abandoned that right or declined to assert it.
This inaction or neglect to assert a right
converts a valid claim into a stale demand.
Laches prevents a litigant from raising the
issue of lack of jurisdiction. True, petitioner
filed the annulment Complaint right after the
dismissal of the cancellation-of-title case,
but it is equally true that it was filed only
after the quieting-of-title case had been
decided in favor of the respondent. By
participating in the quieting-of-title case and
arguing therein his defenses against the
legality of the title of the respondent in order
to establish his rights over the disputed
property, petitioner is deemed to have
chosen this action over the annulment of the
reconstitution proceedings. Annulment of
the reconstitution proceedings was belatedly
resorted to only after the CA had reversed
the trial court and upheld the reconstituted
title of respondent. Laches bars a party from
invoking lack of jurisdiction for the first time
on appeal for the purpose of annulling
everything done, with his active
participation, in the case below. It cannot be
said either that the application of laches
would work an injustice against petitioner,
because he was given a fair chance in the
quieting-of-title case to prove his ownership
of the disputed lot.
Furthermore, by seeking the
reexamination of the ownership of the
disputed lot, petitioner accepted the
jurisdiction of the court which heard the
action for quieting of title. A litigant cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief and, after failing to obtain
such relief, to repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction. Clearly, laches has
attached and barred the petitioner’s right to
file an action for annulment.
We are convinced that indeed res
judicata has already set in. This conclusion
is the most persuasive argument raised by
the appellate court. The principle applies
when the following elements are present (1)
a judgment has became final; (2) such
judgment was rendered on the merits; (3)
the court that rendered it had jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; and
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds 109

(4) there was identity of parties, subject of Deeds, but in no case shall the number
matter and causes of action between the of the lost or damaged titles be less than
previous and the subsequent action. There 500 as determined by the Administrator of
is identity of cause of action between a case the Land Registration Authority. (Sec. 110,
for annulment of title and one for annulment PD 1529, as amended by RA 6732)
of judgment. Causes of action are identical
when there is an identity in the facts What are the source documents on
essential to the maintenance of the two which administrative reconstitution
actions, or where the same evidence will
may be based?
sustain both actions. If the same facts or
evidence can sustain either, the two actions
are considered the same so that the (1) The owner's duplicate of the
judgment in one is a bar to the other. The certificate of title; (Sec. 2a, RA
underlying objectives or reliefs sought in 26)
both the quieting-of-title and the annulment-
of-title cases are essentially the same — (2) The co-owner's mortgagee's, or
adjudication of the ownership of the disputed lessee's duplicate of the
lot and nullification of one of the two certificate of title; (Sec. 2b, RA
certificates of title. Thus, it becomes readily 26)
apparent that the same evidence or set of
facts as those considered in the quieting-of- (3) For liens and other
title case would also be used in this Petition. encumbrances affecting the
The difference in form and nature of the two destroyed or lost CT, the
actions is immaterial and is not a reason to annotations or memoranda
exempt petitioner from the effects of res appearing on the owner's co-
judicata. The philosophy behind this rule owner's mortgagee's or lessee's
prohibits the parties from litigating the same duplicate. (Sec. 4a, RA 26)
issue more than once. When a right or fact
has been judicially tried and determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction or an
What are the requirements for
opportunity for such trial has been given, the
judgment of the court, as long as it remains
administrative reconstitution?
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them. Verily, 1. Owner’s duplicate copy of the
there should be an end to litigation by the OCT or TCT and 3 clear xerox
same parties and their privies over a copies. If the owner’s duplicate is
subject, once it is fully and fairly adjudicated. lost or unavailable, then the co-
owner’s duplicate of title and 3
clear/legible xerox copies may be
Administrative Reconstitution submitted;

Administrative reconstitution is 2. Real estate tax receipt

the putting together again/ restoration of representing full payment for the
the original copies of Original and Transfer last 2 years prior to the
Certificates of Title that were lost or application/petition;
destroyed due to fire, flood or other
natural calamities without necessity of 3. Tax declaration or real property;
court proceeding. and

It may be availed of only in case of 4. Others (e.g. power of attorney).

substantial loss or destruction of land titles
due to fire, flood or other force majeure What is the procedure for
where the number of certificates of titles administrative reconstitution?
lost or damaged, is at least 10% of the
total number in the custody of the Register

______________________________________________________________________________________
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
(1) The registered owner, his assigns, or
other persons having an interest in
the property files a petition with the
Register of Deeds, complying with the
requirements imposed by Sec. 5 of
RA 26.
(2) If the Register of Deeds has no valid
reason to deny the petition, he/she
shall reconstitute the certificate of title
accordingly.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND
ANTONINA GUIDO, 204 SCRA 160
FACTS:
1. August 22, 1979 – The RP, represented
by the SolGen, filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of Decreto No. 6146,
the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 2337
and all titles derived from said decree; and
the declaration of the parcel of land covered
by the decree as belonging to the state,
except so much thereof as had been validly
disposed of to third persons. The complaint
alleged inter alia, that:
"15. The alleged Decree
No. 6146 issued on
September 10, 1911 and the
alleged owner's copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 23377 issued on May
12, 1933, both in the name
of Francisco and
Hermogenes Guido, and
which supposed owner's
duplicate was made the
basis of the administrative
reconstitution of TCT No.
(23377) RT-M-0002 on
March 29, 1976, or about 43
years later, are false,
spurious and fabricated and
were never issued by virtue
of judicial proceedings for
registration of land, either
under Act No. 496, as
amended, otherwise known
as the Land Registration
Act, or any other law, . . ."
______________________________________________________________________________________
110
2. The defendants denied that Decreto No.
6145 and TCT No. 23377 were false and
spurious. They consistently claimed (from
the trial court up to this Court) that the parcel
of land covered by the questioned document
is a portion of the vast Hacienda de Angono
owned by their predecessor-in-interest, Don
Buenaventura Guido y Sta. Ana; that Don
Buenaventura Guido left a portion of the
hacienda (porcion del plano 11-627) to his
heirs, Francisco and Hermogenes Guido;
that the subject matter of the petition is only
a portion of plano 11-827, and covered by
Decreto No. 6145, issued on September 1,
1911 in the name of the heirs of
Buenaventura Guido y Sta. Ana (Francisco
and Hermogenes Guido); that on June 12,
1912, OCT No. 633 was issued on the basis
of Decreto No. 6145; that the original title
was subsequently cancelled and in lieu
thereof, TCT No. 23377 was issued on May
12, 1933; that the heirs of Francisco and
Hermogenes Guido adjudicated among
themselves the estate left by their
predecessors and transferred one-half
portion thereof to Jose Rojas sometime in
1942, as contained in an Extra-judicial
Settlement of Estate with Quitclaim dated
December 17, 1973.
3. The parties, however, admit that on
August 20, 1974, the heirs of Buenaventura
Guido, requested the then Land Registration
Commission (now Land Registration
Authority) to issue the corresponding original
certificate of title based on Decreto 6145,
which was denied on January 8, 1976.
4. March 29, 1976 - Alfredo Guido,
representing the other heirs, filed a petition
for reconstitution of TCT No. 23377 with the
Registry of Deeds of Morong. The petition
alleged that the original could not be located
in the files of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
after he and his co-heirs sought the
registration of their Extra-judicial Settlement
with Quitclaim dated December 17, 1973.
The petition was supported by the
owner's duplicate copy of the title.
5. The petition for administrative
reconstitution of TCT No. 23377 was
granted and a reconstituted certificate of title
[TCT (23377) RT-M-0002] was issued dated
March 29, 1976.
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
6. After the reconstitution, the heirs
presented before the Registry of Deeds of
Morong the Extra-judicial Settlement of
Estate with Quitclaim which they executed
on December 17, 1973 in favor of Jose
Rojas and which they had earlier presented
for registration.
7. Subsequently, the entire parcel of land
covered by the decree was subdivided into
twenty-one (21) lots and twenty-one (21)
different certificates of titles were issued in
lieu of the reconstituted TCT No. 23377. On
August 25, 1978, fourteen (14) of these
twenty-one (21) lots were exchanged with
shares of stocks of Interport Resources
Corporation. On April 21, 1980, all the
named heirs renounced their rights over the
property in favor of their co-heir Alfredo
Guido, Sr. in exchange for monetary
considerations.
8. The court a quo rendered judgment
dismissing the complaint and declaring
Decree No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377,
genuine and authentic.
9. The decision of the trial court was
appealed by the Solicitor General to the
Court of Appeals which affirmed said
decision on July 12, 1988.
ISSUES: It is the contention of petitioner
that respondent Court of Appeals committed
serious errors in the assessment of the
evidence on record and acted with grave
abuse of discretion in concluding that the
Republic failed to satisfy the requirements of
preponderant proof in support of its theory.
HELD:
1. In civil cases, the party having the burden
of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. The general
rule in civil cases is that a party having the
burden of proof of an essential fact must
produce a preponderance of evidence
thereon. By preponderance of evidence is
meant simply evidence which is of greater
weight, or more convincing than that which
is offered in opposition to it. The term
'preponderance of evidence' means the
weight, credit and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the terms
______________________________________________________________________________________
111
'greater weight of evidence' or 'greater
weight of the credible evidence.'
2. The matter of determining which party
had the preponderant evidence is within the
province of the trial court before whom the
evidence of both parties are presented. The
decision of who to believe and who not to
believe goes to the credibility of a witness
which, likewise, is within the province of the
trial court.
3. We have carefully gone through the
records of this case and there is no reason
for this Court to reverse the decisions of
both the court a quo and the appellate court.
Both courts were one in concluding that the
preponderance of evidence is in favor of the
theory presented by the private
respondents, i.e., the authenticity of the
questioned documents.
4. The fact alone that the petition for
reconstitution was approved on the same
day that it was filed did not render the
approval suspect. In administrative
reconstitution of a certificate of title
supported by the owner's duplicate copy of
the title, no other requisite was required
under Section 6 of Republic Act 26 unlike
in judicial reconstitution under Section 12 of
the same law. The Register of Deeds
correctly granted the reconstitution on the
basis of private respondents owners'
duplicate copy of TCT No. 23377.
5. We find no legal basis for the declaration
of the questioned documents as valid only
with respect to such portions of the property
not possessed and owned by bonafide
occupants with indefeasible registered titles
of ownership or with lengths of possession
which had ripened to ownership. Having
been found valid and genuine, Decreto No.
6145 therefore, possessed all the attributes
of a decree of registration. Section 31 of the
Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529),
second paragraph provides:.
“The decree of registration
shall bind the land and quiet
title thereto, subject only to
such exceptions or liens as
may be provided by law. It
shall be conclusive upon
and against all persons,
including the National
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
Government and all
branches thereof, whether
mentioned by name in the
application or notice, the
same being included in the
general description "To all
whom it may concern."
6. Likewise, TCT No. 23377, having been
found true and authentic also possessed all
the attributes of a torrens certificate of title.
By express provision of Section 47 of P.D.
1529, no title to registered land in derogation
to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. To declare that the decree and
its derivative titles is valid but only with
respect to the extent of the area described in
the decree not possessed by occupants with
indefeasible registered titles or to
possessors with such lengths of possession
which had ripened to ownership is to
undermine the people's faith in the torrens
title being conclusive as to all matters
contained therein. The certificate serves as
evidence of an indefeasible title to the
property in favor of the person whose names
appear therein. After the expiration of the
one year period from the issuance of the
decree of registration upon which it is based,
it becomes incontrovertible, unless
subsequent to the issuance of the decree a
third party may be able to show that he
acquired title thereto by any of the means
recognized by law.
V. SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION
The act of registration is the
operative act to convey or affect the land
insofar as third persons are concerned.
Thus, the mere execution of deeds of
sale, mortgages, leases or other voluntary
documents serves only as (1) a contract
between the parties, and (2) as evidence
of authority to the Register of Deeds to
register such documents. They do NOT,
in themselves, effect a conveyance or
encumbrance on the land. The exception
to this rule is if the instrument is a will.
The act of registration creates a
constructive notice to the whole world of
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112
such voluntary or involuntary instrument or
court writ or process.
CAMPILLO VS CA
129 SCRA 513 (1984)
The De Vera spouses sold 2 parcels of land
to Santos. Sale was not registered. About a
year later, Campillo obtained a judgment for
a sum of money against De Vera. The
parcels, still in the De Veras’ name, were
levied upon on execution and Campillo was
able to purchase them at a public auction.
TCT was issued to Campillo. Santos sought
to annul sale at public auction, claiming to
be the owner.
HELD: Registration of the sale shall be the
operative act to convey or affect the land
insofar as third persons are concerned. The
properties were still in the name of the De
Veras. Campillo was not required to look
behind the register to determine the
condition of the property. He is only charged
with notice of the burdens on the property
which are noted on the face of the register
or the certificate of title. To require him to do
more is to defeat one of the primary objects
of the Torrens system.
RATIO: A bona fide purchaser for value of
such property at an auction sale acquires
good title as against a prior transferee of
same property if such prior transfer was
unrecorded at the time of the auction sale.
HEIRS OF MARASIGAN VS IAC
152 SCRA 253 (1987)
Who has a better right to the property in
question, the party (Marasigan) who bought
it with a notice of lis pendens annotated at
the back of her title or the party (Marron) in
whose favor the notice of lis pendens was
made? The appellate court answered this
question in favor of the party who had the
notice annotated and who won the litigation
over the property.
Marron’s cause of action had not prescribed.
While Marasigan acquired the property in
1974, it was only in 1977 that the sale was
registered. It is the act of registration which
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
creates constructive notice to the whole
world. (Sec 52, PD 1529)
Also when Marasigan was issued her TCT
the notice of lis pendens in her
predecessors’ title was carried over to her
title. In case of subsequent sales or
transfers, the Registrar of Deeds is duty
bound to carry over the notice of lis pendens
on all titles to be issued. Otherwise, if he
cancels any notice of lis pendens in violation
of his duty, he may be held civilly and even
criminally liable for any prejudice caused to
innocent third persons.
A notice of lis pendens means that a certain
property is involved in a litigation and serves
as notice to the whole world that one who
buys the same does it at his own risk. It was
also a clear notice to Marasigan that there
was a court case affecting her rights to the
property she had purchased. Consequently,
Marasigan was bound by the outcome of the
litigation against her vendors or transferors.
GARCIA VS CA
95 SCRA 380 (1980)
In this case two sets of certificates of title
were issued to different people for the same
lots. The 1st set was issued sometime in
1920 to Lapus who had bought the parcels
in 1918. However, despite this registered
sale, the OCT was not cancelled and the
sale to Lapus was not annotated thereon.
The 2nd set of titles was issued in 1963 when
heirs of the original owner, relying on the
clean OCT, were able to succeed in having
TCTs issued to them. Eventually, both sets
of “owners” entered into transactions with
other people who in turn secured TCTs in
their favor. Whose successors in interest
would have a better right?
HELD: Where two certificates (of title)
purport to include the same land, the earlier
in date prevails. And the rule that in case of
double registration the owner of the earlier
certificate is the owner of the land applies to
the successive vendees of the owners of
such certificates. The vendee of the earlier
certificate would be the owner as against the
vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
______________________________________________________________________________________
113
There can be no doubt that Lapus was an
innocent purchaser for value. He validly
transmitted to his successors-in-interest his
indefeasible title or ownership over the
disputed lots or parcels of land. That title
could not be nullified or defeated by the
issuance forty-three years later to other
persons of another title over the same lots
due to the failure of the register of deeds to
cancel the title preceding the title issued to
Lapus. This must be so considering that
Lapus and his successors-in-interest
remained in possession of the disputed lots
and the rival claimants never possessed the
same.
MINGOA VS LAND REG COM
200 SCRA 782 (1991)
A deed of donation of several parcels of land
was executed by petitioner in favor of his
children on July 15, 1987. The deed was
forwarded to the Register of Deeds for
registration by registered mail on September
9, 1988. It was entered in the primary entry
book of the Register of Deeds on September
20, 1988 under Entry No. 181. Said Register
of Deeds suspended registration of the
donation until the petitioner has secured the
proper clearances from the Department of
Agrarian Reform on the ground that under
Section 6 of Republic Act 6657 any
disposition of private agricultural lands made
prior to June 15, 1988, when the Act took
effect, must be registered within three (3)
months from said date or on before
September 13, 1988 to be valid.
HELD: Sec. 56 of PD 1529 requires the
Register of Deeds, upon payment of the
entry fees, to enter in the primary book of
entry, in the order of reception, all
instruments including copies of writs and
processes filed with him relative to
registered land the date, hour and minute
shall be noted in said book which shall be
regarded as the date of registration of the
instrument and the memorandum of each
instrument on the certificate title shall bear
the same date. Sec. 34 of PD1529 makes
the Rules of Court suppletorily applicable to
land registration and cadastral cases.
Pursuant to Sec 1, Rule 13 of the ROC, in
case of filing by registered mail, it is the post
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
office stamp on the envelope or the registry
receipt w/c shall be considered as the date
of their filing, payment, or deposit in court.
In the present case, September 9 should be
considered the date of filing and thus the
deed of donation was filed within the three-
month statutory period.
A. Voluntary Registration
Conveyances and other Dealings by
Registered Owner
Voluntary dealings with land refer to
deeds, instruments or documents which
are the results of the free and voluntary
acts of the parties thereto. These include:
 Sales, conveyances or transfers of
ownership over the titled property;
 Mortgages and leases;
 Powers of attorney;
 Trusts
In voluntary registration, when does an
innocent purchaser for value become
the holder of a certificate of title?
He becomes the holder of a CT at the
moment he presents and files a duly
notarized and valid deed of sale, and the
same is entered in the day book (primary
entry book) AND at the same time he
surrenders or presents the owner's
duplicate certificate of title covering the
land sold, and pays the registration fees.
(Garcia v. CA, 95 SCRA 380. Contrast
this from involuntary registration, which
will be discussed in the following section.)
It must be noted that an executed
document or transfer of registered land
placed by the registered owner thereof in
the hands of another operates as a
representation to a third party that the
holder of the document of transfer is
authorized to deal with the land.
PD 1529, Sec. 51. Conveyances and other
dealings by registered owner- An owner of
registered land may convey, mortgage, transfer,
______________________________________________________________________________________
114
lease, charge, or otherwise deal with the same in
accordance with existing laws. He may use such
forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other
voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law.
But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary
instrument, except a will purporting to convey or
affect registered land; shall take effect as
conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate
only as a contract between the parties and as
evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to
make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative
act to convey or affect the land insofar as third
persons are concerned, and in all cases under
this Decree, the registration shall be made in the
Office of the Register of Deeds for the province
or city where the land lies.
Sec. 52. Constructive notice upon registration-
every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien
attachment, order, judgement, instrument or
entry affecting registered land shall, if registered,
filed or entered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds for the province or city where the land to
which it relates lies be constructive notice to all
persons from the time of such registering, filing,
or entering.
VILLALUZ V. NEME
7 SCRA 27 (1963)
Facts: Maria Rocabo died intestate, leaving
three daughters( Maria, Patricia, and
Sinforosa)and grandchildren (from her other
children who predeceased her), the plaintiffs
in this case. She left a parcel of land
granted her under homestead patent and
with original certificate of title. After approval
of her application but before the granting of
patent, Maria donated the southern portion
of the land to her daughter, also named
Maria, and donated the northern part to
Patricia in two notarial deeds of donation
giving them the right to present the deeds of
donation to the Bureau of Lands. The
daughters forgot to present the deeds of
donation and patent was granted in the
name of their mother, Maria Rocabo. After
their mother’s death, the daughters,
Sinforosa included, executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition among themselves to
the exclusion of plaintiffs. They later
declared the land for tax purposes and sold
it to Pajarillo, who thereafter sold it to Neme.
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
Plaintiffs came to know that the
lands were in the possession of Neme.
They filed a complaint for partition of land
and recovery of their share. It also
appeared that the deeds of sale of the land
were not registered in favor of defendant
Neme and not recorded in compliance with
the Public Land Act and the Land
Registration Law; the vendees even failed to
have their deed of sale annotated on the
said TCT or have the title transferred in their
names.
HELD: A deed of extra-judicial partition
executed without including some of the
heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent
to the same is fraudulent and vicious, and
sale of the land subject of the partition did
not prejudice and affect the interest and
participation of the heirs excluded.
Moreover, the acquisition of the land
in question is governed by the Public Land
Act and the Land Registration Law.
Considering that the deed of sale had not
been registered in accordance with the
same laws, the same did not constitute a
conveyance which would bind or affect the
land because the registration of a voluntary
sale of land is the operative act that
transmits or transfers title (Tuason vs.
Raymundo, 28 Phil 635).
ALARCON V. BIDIN
120 SCRA 390 (1983)
FACTS: Roberto Alarcon leased
Sargas a parcel of land he co-owned with a
certain Trinidad. In 1926, Alarcon sold a
portion of his undivided share to Sergas.
The date of the instrument of sale was
entered on the title as January 5, 1926 and
the date of inscription as May 3, 1963, with
the name of the vendor in the text of the
“Escritura de Venta” as Roberto Alarcon
while the typewritten name at its bottom
read Alberto Alarcon with a thumbmark
above it. Alarcon sold another portion of his
share to Alvarez in 1928. Alvarez sold it to
Francisco, one of the private respondents.
The heirs of Alarcon filed a suit for
recovery and questioned the genuineness if
the “Escrituras de Venta”, that the
thumbmark is not Roberto’s, nor is he
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Alberto Alarcon,and that the documents in
favor if Alvarez was not signed by Roberto.
The lower court dismissed on the ground of
laches.
HELD: Decision sustained. The
heirs’ allegation that their father never sold
the disputed land is belied by the Escrituras
de Venta he executed, one in favor of
Sergas, another in favor of Alvarez.
Furthermore, Sergas and Alvarez had taken
adverse possession of the property under
the claim of ownership from the time the
property was sold to them. More than 50
years had elapsed since the execution of the
deed of sale in 1926 and 1928 when the
heirs instituted their cause of action in 1978.
Land registered under the Torrens
system may not be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession. The presumption
given by law is in favor of registered
owners. Although title to property is still in
the name of Roberto Alarcon, it has been
subjected to registration in 1963 if the sale
made by him to Sergas. Technically, Sergas
became the owner in 1963 of the portion
sold to him.
PNB V. CA
98 SCRA 207 (1980)
FACTS: Spouses Inigo Bitanga and Rosa
Ver owned a parcel of land. The husband
died before the issuance of the Original
Certificate of Title. He was survived by his
wife and children. The wife mortgaged the
entire property to PNB. The mortgage
document was registered in the day book of
the Register of Deeds if Ilocos Norte but was
not annotated in the Register of Deeds
when the OCT was issued.
The wife defaulted on her
obligations to Manila Trading Company. The
company levied upon the property and was
able to buy the same in a public auction. It
thereafter sold its rights over the property to
Sambrano who secured annotation of the
said sale.
She also failed to settle her
obligation to PNB, who sold the land at
public auction with the PNB as the highest
bidder. The period for redemption expired
and PNB consolidated title over it, but the
document of consolidation was not
annotated in the owner’s duplicate certificate
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
of title since the wife failed to surrender the
same. Upon PNB’s petition, a owner’s
duplicate certificate was issued in its favor.
It later sold the land to Reyes.
The heirs of Bitanga filed a
complaint against PNB for reconveyance of
real property and damages and sought to
enjoin PNB and Reyes from consummating
the sale of the property in question and
prohibiting the Register of Deeds from
registering the sale.
HELD: The land was conjugal property,
hence, only ½ belongs to the wife and it was
only this half which was acquired by PNB.
The conjugal character of the land
was not changed even if the tax declaration
on the lot was in the name of the wife only.
Declaration of ownership for purpose of
taxation is not sufficient evidence of title.
The lien by reason or on account
of the mortgage executed by Rosa Ver
over the entire parcel of land which was
not annotated on the original certificate of
title could not have attached to the land.
Otherwise stated, the failure of the
interested party to appear during the
registration proceedings and to claim such
interest in the land barred him from having
such interest on the certificate of title.
Double Sale
In cases of double sale, the property
belongs to the purchaser who first
registers the transaction in his name in the
registry of property.
Forged Documents
Although forged documents are
generally null and void, they can legally be
the root of a valid title when an innocent
purchaser for value intervenes. However,
this does not apply where the owner still
holds a valid and existing CT covering the
same property.
Mortgages and Leases
Sec. 60, PD 1529 requires deeds of
mortgage or lease and all instruments
which assign, extend, discharge or
otherwise deal with the mortgage or lease
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116
to be registered, and such deeds shall
take effect upon the title only upon
registration. Unless recorded, such deeds
are not binding on third persons even
though they are binding between the
parties.
Powers of Attorneys; Trusts
Sec. 64, PD 1529 provides that any
person may convey or otherwise deal with
registered land through a power of
attorney. The instrument granting or
revoking the power of attorney must be
registered with the Register of Deeds of
the province or city where the land lies.
Note the special provisions in the Civil
Code dealing with the requirements for
powers of attorney in transactions
involving land, particularly Art. 1874, Art.
1879, and Art. 1878.
B. Involuntary Dealings
Involuntary dealings refer to writs,
orders or processes issued by a court of
record affecting registered land which by
law should be registered to be effective.
They likewise refer to instruments which
are not the wilful acts of the registered
owner and which may have been
executed even without his knowledge or
against his consent. These dealings
include:
 Writs of attachment, injunction or
mandamus;
 Sales on Execution of judgment;
 Sales for taxes;
 Adverse claims;
 Notices of lis pendens
In contrast to voluntary registration, a
mere entry in the day book (primary entry
book) of the Registry of Deeds in cases of
involuntary registration is a sufficient
notice to all persons even if the owner's
duplicate CT is not presented to the
Register of Deeds. (Because the
proceedings were involuntary, the owner's
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
CT may not be available because the
owner did not freely enter into the
transaction involved.)
Adverse Claims
 Period of effectivity: 30 days from the
date of registration
 lapse of the 30-day period does
not result in the automatic
cancellation of the adverse claim
(a petition for cancellation must
first be filed)
 How cancelled:
 Before lapse of 30 days
 by party in interest: by filing a
petition in the proper RTC for
cancellation
 by claimant: by filing a sworn
petition withdrawing his
adverse claim
 After lapse of 30 days
 by party in interest: by filing a
verified petition for
cancellation
 No 2nd adverse claim based on the
same ground may thereafter be
registered by the same claimant.
What is annotation? What is the
purpose of annotating adverse claims?
Annotation is a measure designed to
protect the interest of a person over a
piece of real property where the
registration of such interest or right is not
otherwise provided for by Act 496, now PD
1529. It serves as a warning to third
parties dealing with the said property that
someone is claiming an interest on the
same or a better right than the registered
owner, and that any transaction regarding
the disputed land is subject to the
outcome of the dispute.
Requisites for Valid Adverse Claim
(1) The claimant's right or interest in
registered land must be adverse to
the registered owner;
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117
(2) Such right or interest must have
arisen subsequent to the date of
original registration; and
(3) No other provision is made in the
Decree for the registration of such
right or claim. (Sec. 70, PD 1529;
Arrazola v. Bernas, 86 SCRA 279)
Note that a mere money claim CANNOT
be registered as an adverse claim.
 Formal requisites must be complied
with. Failure to do so renders such
adverse claim non-registrable and
ineffective.
When is notice of lis pendens proper?
A notice of lis pendens is proper in
actions:
(1) to recover possession of real
estate;
(2) to quiet title thereto;
(3) to remove clouds upon the
title thereof;
(4) for partition; and
(5) any other proceeding of any
kind in court directly affecting
the title to the land or the use
or occupation thereof or the
building thereon. (Sec. 76,
PD 1529, Sec. 14, Rule 13,
Rules of Court)
What is the nature and purpose of a
notice of lis pendens?
The notice of lis pendens, i.e. that real
property is involved in an action, is
intended to constructively advise or warn
all people who deal with the property that
they so deal with it at their own risk, and
whatever rights they may acquire in the
property in any voluntary transaction are
subject to the results of the action, and
may well be inferior and subordinate to
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
those which may be finally determined
and laid down therein.
Such notice is ordinarily recorded
without the intervention of the court where
the action is pending, as it is but an
extrajudicial incident of the pending action
which does not affect the merits thereof.
It must be noted that a notice of lis
pendens can subsist concurrently with an
adverse claim.
Cancellation of Lis Pendens
a. before final judgment
 may be done upon proper showing
that the notice is for the purpose of
molesting the adverse party, or
that it is not necessary to protect
the rights of the party who caused
it to be recorded
 a mere incident to a court action,
and may therefore be ordered by
the court having jurisdiction of it at
any given time (certificate of
finality issued by the court will not
suffice; should be done with
judicial authority)
 not contingent on the existence of
a final judgment in the action, and
ordinarily has no effect on the
merits thereof
b. after final judgment
 deemed cancelled upon the
registration of a certificate of the
Clerk of Court in which the action
or proceeding was pending stating
the manner of disposal thereof
MAGDALENA HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION VS CA,
184 SCRA 3 (1990)
Facts: A part of Lot 15 of Magdalena Rolling
Hills Subdivision, had initially been set aside
as the subdivision's "open space," i.e.,
reserved for use as a park, playground or
recreational zone.However, an amendment
of the plan of the subdivision substituting the
area earlier designated as open space, was
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118
approved by the City Council of Quezon
City. The Council also authorized the
subdivision for disposition to the public of
the former open space. Subsequently, the
CFI of Quezon City also approved the same
amended subdivision plan.
The entire Lot 15, including that part
thereof originally designated as open space
was subsequently conveyed to the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
by way of dacion en pago and to third
parties who thereafter constructed houses
thereon.
The purchasers of the other
subdivision lots, who had organized
themselves into a non-stock corporation
known as the Magdalena Homeowners
Association, Inc., believed that the act of the
Quezon City Government of authorizing the
release of said Lot 15 as open space, after it
had been so declared and earlier dedicated
as such — and its substitution by another
portion of the subdivision — was beyond the
City Government's authority. They therefore
brought suit against the Magdalena Estate,
Inc. (MEI) in the court of First Instance at
Quezon city for the recovery of said Lot 15
as "open space" for public use of the
residents of the subdivision.
While the case was pending, notices
of lis pendens were, at the plaintiffs'
instance, inscribed by the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City on the Torrens titles of all the
lots. The Trial Court then dismissed the
case. The petitioners went up to the Court of
Appeals. While the case was pending
adjudgment, the subdivision owner and DBP
filed separate motions with the Court of
Appeals praying for cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens. These motions were
granted by resolution. Reconsideration was
sought and denied by the trial court. Hence,
the petition at bar.
Issue: WON the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of and grant
the motion to cancel notice of lis pendens
although no such motion had ever been filed
in the lower court.
Held: YES. The notice of lis pendens —
i.e., that real property is involved in an action
— is ordinarily recorded without the
intervention of the court where the action is
pending. The notice is but an incident in an
action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
does not affect the merits thereof. It is
intended merely to constructively advise, or
warn, all people who deal with the property
that they so deal with it at their own risk, and
whatever rights they may acquire in the
property in any voluntary transaction are
subject to the results of the action, and may
well be inferior and subordinate to those
which may be finally determined and laid
down therein. The cancellation of such a
precautionary notice is therefore also a mere
incident in the action, and may be ordered
by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any
given time. And its continuance or removal
— like the continuance or removal of a
preliminary attachment or injunction — is not
contingent on the existence of a final
judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no
effect on the merits thereof.
In the CAB, the case had properly
come within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals in virtue of the perfection of
the plaintiffs' appeal. It therefore had power
to deal with and resolve any incident in
connection with the action subject of the
appeal, even before final judgment. The rule
that no questions may be raised for the first
time on appeal have reference only to those
affecting the merits of the action, and not to
mere incidents thereof, e.g., cancellation of
notices of lis pendens, or, to repeat, the
grant or dissolution of provisional remedies.
Now, a notice of lis pendens may be
cancelled upon order of the court, "after
proper showing that the notice is for the
purpose of molesting the adverse party, or
that it is not necessary to protect the rights
of the party who caused it to be recorded."
The Court of Appeals found as a
fact that the case had dragged on and had
been unnecessarily prolonged by repeated
amendments of the complaints by the
plaintiffs, and that the circumstances on
record justified the conclusion that the
annotation of the notice of lis pendens was
intended to molest and harass the
defendants.
SEVESES VS CA,
OCTOBER 13, 1999
Facts: Rexcon Philippines, through its
president, Reynaldo Reyes entered into a
contract of sale on installments of a parcel of
land, with private respondent Carreon. He
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119
then learned that 3 days later, a mortgage in
favor of Makati Leasing and Finance
Corporation was annotated on the title. This
was later cancelled. But a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of Reyes and another
mortgage in favor of Ayala Investment and
Dev't Corp. were subsequently annotated.
Carreon then demanded that title to the land
be restored in the name of Rexcon.
Due to Carreon's failure to pay the
other installments, Reyes considered the
sale rescinded and instituted an action for
rescission before the RTC. Meanwhile,
Carreon caused a notice of lis pendens to
be annotated on Reyes' title. The RTC
affirmed Reyes' extra-judicial foreclosure.
Seveses then acquired the land
from Reyes. Although the notice of lis
pendens was carried over to Seveses' title,
Reyes informed him that the pending case
had been terminated inasmuch as no appeal
was filed by Carreon. He then obtained a
Certificate of Finality from the court. Thus
the notice of lis pendens was cancelled.
However, because he was served a
notice of eviction, Seveses learned that
Carreon indeed appealed the decision of the
RTC to the CA, wherein he obtained a
favorable judgment. This CA decision
became final.
Issue: WON a Certification of Finality will
suffice to have a notice of lis pendens
cancelled (and save the day for Seveses).
Held: NO. The rules dictate that
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens
should be done with judicial authority. Thus,
by virtue of the notice of lis pendens,
Seveses is bound by the outcome of the
litigation subject of the lis pendens. As a
transferee pendente lite, he stands exactly
in the shoes of the transferor and must
respect any judgment or decree which may
be rendered for or against the transferor. His
interest is subject to the incidents or results
of the pending suit, and his Certificate of
Title will, in that respect, afford him no
special protection.
YARED VS TONGCO,
AUGUST 1, 2000
Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint alleging
that private respondent succeeded in having
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
the subject properties registered in his
name, to the prejudice of the other surviving
heirs of the previous owners, petitioner
among them. Petitioner caused the
annotation of notices of lis pendens on the
titles of respondent. The trial court
dismissed the case on the ground of
prescription. Petitioner filed a notice of
appeal while Tongco then sought to cancel
the notices of lis pendens which was denied.
After 3 Motions for Recon, Tongco
succeeded. When petitioner then sought to
reconsider the cancellation, the judge
reversed himself. But when Tonco filed
another MR, he was sustained (Leche! Make
up your mind, judge!). Hence, this certiorari to
the SC.
Held: Eto raw ang importante sa case nito as
per Dan Gat: All petitioner has to do is to
assert a claim of possession or title over the
subject property to put it under the coverage
of the rule on lis pendens. It is not necessary
for her to prove ownership or interest over
the property sought to be affected by lis
pendens. (But the petition was dismissed by
the SC for violating the doctrine of judicial
heirarchy.)
VI. REGISTRATION OF PATENTS
Issuance and Registration of Patents
Once a patent is registered and
the corresponding certificate of title is
issued, the land covered by them ceases
to be part of the public domain and
becomes private property, and the Torrens
title issued pursuant to the patent
becomes indefeasible upon the expiration
of 1 year from the date of issuance of
such patent.
However, even after the lapse of 1
year, the State may still bring an action
under Sec. 101 of CA 141 for the
reversion to the public domain of land
which has been fraudulently granted to
private individuals. Such is not barred by
prescription. The indefeasibility cannot be
invoked by one who procured the title by
means of fraud. (Baguio v. Republic, Jan.
21, 1999)
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120
Sec. 103. Certificates of title
pursuant to patents. - Whenever
public land is by the Government
alienated, granted or conveyed to any
person, the same shall be brought
forthwith under the operation of this
Decree.
It shall be the duty of the official
issuing the instrument of alienation,
grant, patent or conveyance in behalf
of the Government to cause such
instrument to be filed with the
Register of Deeds of the province or
city where the land lies, and to be
there registered like other deeds and
conveyance, whereupon a certificate
of title shall be entered as in other
cases of registered land, and an
owner's duplicate issued to the
grantee.
The deed, grant, patent or instrument
of conveyance from the Government to
the grantee shall not take effect as a
conveyance or bind the land but shall
operate only as a contract between
the Government and the grantee and
as evidence of authority to the
Register of Deeds to make
registration.
It is the act of registration that shall
be the operative act to affect and
convey the land, and in all cases under
this Decree, registration shall be made
in the office of the Register of Deeds
of the province or city where the land
lies.
The fees for registration shall be paid
by the grantee. After due registration
and issuance of the certificate of title,
such land shall be deemed to be
registered land to all intents and
purposes under this Decree.
Prohibitions (Secs. 118 – 123, CA 141)
a. Encumbrance or alienation of such
lands acquired under free patent or
homestead within 5 years from date of
issuance of patent;
 exceptions: in favor of –
 government
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
 banks
b. Using such lands to satisfy a debt
contracted prior to the expiration of the
5-year period
 exceptions: in favor of –
 government
 banks
c. Alienation, transfer or conveyance of
any homestead after 5 years and
before 25 years after issuance of the
title without approval of the DENR
d. Transfer to persons or entities not
qualified to acquire lands of the public
domain
e. Transfer or lease to an individual
where the result would be holdings in
excess of the maximum limit allowed
by law (12 hectares)
 exception: in cases of hereditary
succession
 Effects of violation:
1) annulment/cancellation of the
grant
2) reversion of the property to the
State
Right of Repurchase (Sec. 119, CA 141)
Every conveyance of land
acquired under the free patent or
homestead provisions, when proper, shall
be subject to repurchase by the applicant,
his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of
5 years from the date of the conveyance.
ORTIGAS V. HIDALGO,
198 SCRA 635 (1991)
FACTS: Estate of Villa claims ownership of
subject land. It appears that a certain
Teresio Villa applied for the land. However,
land was not registered nor decreed to
anybody. No attempt was made to have
judicial or administrative confirmation of title
over the land.
Estate of Villa filed criminal charges
against settlers in the land, petitioners
herein. Petitioners were convicted of
squatting. Order of demolition was issued.
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121
Petitioners, meanwhile asked OP to
give the land to them. OP ordered Director
of Lands to look into the issue. Director of
Lands dismissed claim of Estate of Villa and
gave due course to application of
petitioners.
Petitioners went to SC on certiorari
with prayer for TRO.
HELD: It is clear, therefore, that private
respondent (estate of Villa) is not the
registered owner of the disputed parcel of
land. Assuming arguendo that respondent
had been granted a patent to the land in
question, the same has never been
registered with the Registry of Deeds of the
province where the property is located.
Indeed, respondent could offer no proof to
show that the same was registered. All
patents that may be granted must be
registered since the conveyance of the land
covered thereby is effective only upon such
registration which shall be the operative act
to convey and affect the land (CA 141, Sec.
107). Registration is mandatory under the
law to affect third parties.
Absent the fact of registration of a
patent, title to the land covered thereby,
whether it be by sales or homestead, may
not be said to have been perfected and,
therefore, not indefeasible. A patent
becomes indefeasible as a Torrens Title only
when said patent is registered with the
Register of Deeds pursuant to the provisions
of the Land Registration Act.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. CA,
17 SCRA 71
Sales application was filed. The land
was advertised to highest bidder and was
awarded to applicant (1928). Having
complied with the requirements, Director of
Lands signed sales patent in favor of
applicant Tolentino (1950). Later, Tolentino
learned that portion of land awarded to him
was covered by homestead application of
Braulio Cosme and that homestead patent
and OCT was issued to him (1949).
Director of Lands verified that
homestead patent embraced land covered
by sales patent to Tolentino. Director filed
action for cancellation of homestead patent
and OCT. An intervenor came out and asked
that he be declared a buyer in good faith
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds
and be recognized owner of the property.
RTC cancelled homestead patent and OCT
and ordered reversion of land.
CA upheld RTC but upon MR reconsidered
its decision and reversed RTC.
HELD: The present action is for the
cancellation of the patent and certificate of
title of the defendant on the ground that they
are an absolute nullity, because the Bureau
of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue them at
all.
The Government is the proper party to bring
an action to cancel a patent and a certificate
of title issued in accordance therewith.
A certificate of title issued pursuant to a
homestead patent partakes of the nature of
a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding
as long as the land of the domain (Lucas vs.
Durian, supra).
A certificate of title issued pursuant to a
decree of registration and a certificate of title
issued in conformity therewith are on a
higher level than a certificate of title based
upon a patent issued by the Director of
Lands.
Prior to the issuance of a patent and its
registration, the Government retains the title
to the land. The award thereof, however,
confers on the awardee the right to take
possession of the land so that he can
comply with the requirements prescribed by
the law before said patent can be issued in
his favor. Being protected by law, under
which it cannot be taken away without due
process said right has the effect of
withdrawing the land of the public domain
that is "disposable" by the Director of Lands
under the provisions of the Public Land Act.
DAVID V. MALAY,
NOVEMBER 19, 1999
FACTS: Andres Adona applied for
homestead patent over parcel of land.
Application was perfected before he died.
However, OCT was issued in the name of
his mistress after his death. His children by
his mistress partitioned the land among
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122
themselves. One of them bought the
interests of the others.
Andres Adona’s children, private
respondents herein, by his legal wife sought
to annul this sale. The action was treated as
action for reconveyance. RTC dismissed
case on the ground of lack of cause of
action and prescription. CA reversed RTC.
CA said property belongs to estate of Andres
Adona, whose incontestable right is derived
from perfected homestead application
before his death.
HELD: Estate of Andres Adona is entitled to
the property. OCT in the name of the
mistress to be cancelled, property to be
reconveyed to the private respondents.
Section 32 of PD 1529 is also
applicable to patents. The date of issuance
of the patent corresponds to the issuance of
decree in regular cases.
OCT would have become
indefeasible a year after it was issued had
not its issuance been attended by fraud.
Fraud created implied trust. Fraud gave
private respondents right of action.
Prescription of this right of action reckoned
from the time right is disturbed.
FONTANILLA V. CA,
NOVEMBER 29, 1999
FACTS: Crisanto and Felician Duanan are
homestead grantees. Their son Luis Duanan
inherited 4 has of the land. Luis Duanan
gave two of his children 2 has of his
inheritance. Luis’ children mortgaged the
land. Later, Luis’ children sold the land to
Eduardo Fontanilla and Ellen Fontanilla.
Luis wanted to repurchase the land
from the Fontanillas. The latter refused on
the ground that Luis, not being the vendor,
cannot exercise the right of redemption.
Also, the right to redeem has prescribed
since over 5 years has lapsed from the time
Luis conveyed the property to his two
children.
HELD: Section 119 of the PD 1529 does not
say that the applicant/legal heir must be the
vendor before he can exercise the right of
redemption. It only says that the
applicant/legal heir may repurchase the
land.
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds 123

The prescriptive period is reckoned

from the time the homestead was conveyed
to someone outside the family of the
grantee. Thus, the reckoning period is from
the time land was sold to the Fontanillas.
The conveyance to Luis’ son is not the
conveyance contemplated in Section 119 of
the Public Land Act. Luis’ conveyance to his
son did not violate the policy that the
homestead be kept within the family.

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