May - June 2018
TEN Fundamental
What’s inside?
Ten Fundamental Constitutional
Reforms:
a) Imperial Manila provisions
b) Exercise of Political Rights
c) Senate as a federal upper
chamber
d) Subnational government
framework
e) Defining the constituent units
f) Term limits and the Power of
Recall
g) Division of Competencies
h) Anti-Graft Mechanisms
i) National Languange
This Policy Brief is published bimonthly.
Editor: Benedicto R. Bacani Associate Editor: Ramie P. Toledo
ISSN 2243-8173-18-03
Constitutional Reforms
By Atty. Michael Henry Ll. Yusingco, LL.M
A ccording to the scholar, Raphael N. Montes: “Designing a federal
system is not a very easy task. Besides its basic principles, federalism is
very customizable. The peculiarities of a country would define the different
features of its own brand of federalism. It would be useful to seek out
relevant models but these models would only serve as guideposts since a
country’s federal system should reflect the unique conditions of its society.”1
With this caveat in mind, hereunder are 10 constitutional reforms that are
necessary to establish a viable federal system in the Philippines, to wit:
I. Imperial Manila provisions
II. Exercise of Political Rights
III. Senate as a federal upper chamber
IV. Subnational government framework
V. Defining the constituent units
VI. Term limits and the Power of Recall
VII. Division of Competencies
VIII. Anti-Graft Mechanism
IX. National Language
X. Transition Process
1
Raphael N. Montes, “Understanding Federalism”, Federalism and Multiculturalism, 2006, pp157-176 at http://localgov.up.edu.ph/
uploads/1/4/0/0/14001967/montes_understanding_federalism.pdf.
Lay-out Artist: Hazelyn A. Gaudiano
 Apolinario Mabini believed that federalism, “besides being the most perfect among the republican forms,
is best suited to the topography of our country”. Clearly, this is an endorsement of federalization that must
be highlighted.
But the ultimate caveat that must not be ignored comes from noted federalism expert and constitutional
scholar from the Melbourne Law School, Professor Cheryl Saunders. She warns that whatever the final
federal design is, there should be amongst the people both a shared understanding of what has been
created and a shared commitment to making the new system work.2 Otherwise, federalization may not
produce the outcomes many Filipinos are so excited about right now.
According to the dean of the Ateneo de Manila University’s School of Government, Dr. Ronald Mendoza:
“Why did Manila remain imperial? There are many factors, but one fundamental one is that the
Philippine Presidency remains a “winner-take-all” contest that hands over the country’s still
largely centralized public finances to Malacanañg’s occupant. Roughly 80% of tax revenues
are collected by central government agencies – and about the same share in terms of public
spending is allocated through central government budget processes.”4

The goal of this paper is to ensure Professor Saunders’ warning is heeded and to help make sure the As the revision process moves along, Filipinos must remember that the federalism initiative is a means
federal set-up is a palpable improvement from the current system. to improve the current political system. It is worth highlighting therefore that if the goal of constitutional
reform is to decentralize governance over the country, then the articulation of executive authority must
be changed.
I. Imperial Manila provisions
For instance, executive authority should be expressed as follows─“The executive power shall be vested
Sections 1, 16 and 17 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in the Executive Branch headed by the President of the Philippines.” Here the power is vested in the

I
refer to these sections in Article VII as Imperial Manila provisions because they comprise the constitutional
foundation of our highly centralized government structure. Section 1 on the Executive Department which
states that, “The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.” Note that executive
power is vested not in the office but in the person occupying the office.
institution not to the person.
Moreover, the appointing power of the president ought to be specifically limited to upper level officials
only. Doing this can potentially remove the politics in organization of the bureaucracy. And can thus give
meritocracy in the civil service, particularly at the Cabinet level, a chance to be firmly established.

Then read this provision in conjunction with this specific portion of Section 16, “He shall also appoint all With regards to the President’s control over the executive branch, it can be expressed this way─“The
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those President shall ensure that laws are faithfully executed by departments, bureaus, and offices in the
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.” executive branch.”

The power to appointment officials in the executive branch is obviously part and parcel of executive This articulation does not remove the control power of the Chief Executive over the bureaucracy, but it
power. But pursuant to this constitutional provision, the President of the Philippines has complete and puts the focus on the same being a responsibility of the holder rather than a supreme privilege attendant
almost limitless authority to appoint officials within the executive branch. to the office.

Such far-reaching command takes on a more autocratic tenor when read together with this part of Section
17, “The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.”
The control power of the President means he can overturn the decisions of any officer within the executive
branch. He can substitute his own view about any issue over that of his subordinate.
But while the particular reform suggested here is fundamental, more changes in the present political
system still need to be done to establish a genuine and meaningful decentralized governance framework
in the Philippines.

Under the national charter, the President himself is the sole wielder of executive power. He appoints for
PDP-Laban’s Constitution of the HOR sub-committee on constitutional
practically all positions in the central bureaucracy including the armed forces and the police. He has sole
control over the entire executive branch from department secretaries down to the rank-and-file.3
Federal Republic of the Philippines amendments report dated Jan. 16, 2018
[Salient features]
Correspondingly, the President has a direct hand in all matters of government. From public housing
to agriculture to solid waste management to foreign investment to tax collection to sports to water Executive power is shared by a strong As head of state, the President has oversight
management to foreign trade and affairs, and so forth. In all of these public functions, the President plays President and an equally influential Prime powers over all branches, heads foreign
a very prominent role. Ostensibly, control over the dispersal of public funds is also heavily concentrated Minister. See Sections 14, 15, 22 and 25 of relations. He will be the commander-in-chief
in his office. Article VII. of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and
will have appointing, pardoning, and residual
2
Cheryl Saunders, Melbourne Law School, “Options for Decentralizing Power: Federalism to Decentralization”, available at http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/files/
powers, among others.
federalism.pdf.
3
See Marcos vs. Manglapus [G.R. No. 88211 (October 27, 1989)]; Carpio vs. Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 96409, February 14, 1992]; and, Pimentel vs. Aquirre[G.R. No.
4
132988 (July 19, 2000)]. See https://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/158130-federalism-silver-bullet.

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 II. Exercise of Political Rights
F or a federal system to work, the citizens themselves must be deeply involved in the management of
the new political system. As former Senate President Nene Pimentel said, governance is not the business
of the governors alone but the governed as well.
To guarantee that Filipinos are able to actively participate in the civic sphere and exercise their political
rights, the new federal constitution must contain specific provisions regulating political parties and
dynasties.
For instance─
matter of who amongst the related candidates will be allowed to run for office shall be settled through
a drawing of lots among the concerned candidates if they fail to amicably settle the dispute.
No spouse or persons related within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to an incumbent
elective local official shall be allowed to run for any elective office within the same province, city, or
municipality in an election.
In all cases, no spouse or person related within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to
an incumbent elective official shall immediately succeed to the position of the latter, whether at the
local or national level.

ARTICLE ___ POLITICAL RIGHTS AND THE REGULATION OF POLITICAL

ORGANIZATIONS AND DYNASTIES PDP-Laban’s Constitution of the HOR sub-committee on constitutional
Federal Republic of the Philippines amendments report dated Jan. 16, 2018
Section 1. The State shall guarantee the free exercise of all political rights. [Salient features]
Section 2. Every Filipino shall have the right to participate in government either directly or through freely
chosen representatives. Has provisions regulating political parties No mention.
and dynasties. See Sections 11-15 of Article
Every Filipino shall have the right to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be IX (C).
by universal and equal suffrage.

Section 3. Filipinos shall have the right to form political parties, coalitions and other forms of organization
in a free and open party system. Political parties shall be democratic in their objectives, formation and
activities.
Political parties must facilitate the advancement of the people’s will. It shall be a pre-requisite for the
political party’s formation and continued existence to maintain a public policy agenda and program of
governance.
It shall also be mandatory for a political party, coalition or organization to maintain a website containing
their principles and platform and a principal office to conduct their advocacy.
Any member of the political party or coalition occupying public office or is running for public office who
shall act contrary to the avowed principles, policies and programs of the party shall be held to account as
provided by law.
III. Senate as a federal upper chamber
One solid truth about federalism is that it does not diminish the integrity of the nation-state. Indeed,
federation is not just about the devolution of political and fiscal powers to the sub-national level, but it
is also about institutionalizing coordinated efforts towards national development. Hence, for the federal
system to work properly, mechanisms must be established to foster cooperation and collaboration
among the regional governments in addressing national concerns.
The Senate as a federal upper chamber can be this institution. In this scenario, senators shall be elected
per region. The new charter can set a minimum number of senators to be elected in each region. But
there should be mechanism in place for the number to increase depending on the population growth
of a given region.

The state may provide subsidies for political organizations and other regulatory measures as provided
by law.
PDP-Laban’s Constitution of the HOR sub-committee on constitutional
Section 4. No person shall be allowed to join a political party, coalition or organization within one year Federal Republic of the Philippines amendments report dated Jan. 16, 2018
from the termination, either by voluntary removal or by expulsion, of membership in another political party, [Salient features]
coalition or organization.
The Senate is the federal upper chamber. The Senate is the federal upper chamber.
Section 5. Political authority must never be concentrated, consolidated, or perpetuated by persons related See Sections 1 and 5 of Article VI.
to one another.

No spouse or persons related within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity shall be allowed
to run for any elective office within the same province, city, or municipality in the same election. The

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 IV. Subnational government framework The regional government shall exercise the

A key feature of a federal system is the presence of different levels of government, usually a central/
power of supervision over local governments.
See Section 37.
national level and regional/subnational level with each responsible for their mandated duties and
functions.

For the federal system to work in the Philippines the regional government structure itself must be
configured to facilitate a community-oriented governance mindset. Pertinently, a regional government
framework meeting this requirement is found in the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law.
Accordingly, the regional governance structure in the new federal constitution can be parliamentary with
members elected through single-member legislative districts and though political party representation.
The chief executive of the regional government shall then be elected by the regional parliament from
its ranks.
Members of the regional executive cabinet shall also be members of the regional parliament. However,
non-members may be designated to a cabinet post subject to confirmation by the regional parliament.
One necessary change that must be made here is to remove the supervisory power of the president
over the regional executive and over local government units. This institutional link undermines the
autonomy of the subnational level of government. Indeed, it is a peculiar facet of a presidential-unitary
structure and has no place in a federal system.
Note however that the regional parliament shall function as the check and balance mechanism to the
regional executive. Moreover, it shall have oversight functions over local government units within the
region.
V. Defining the constituent units
T he shift to a federal system will be a huge challenge for all Filipinos. It stands to reason therefore
that the drawing of territorial boundaries must not result to drastic and immediate disruptions to the
public. The people’s deep familiarity to the current geographical organization of the Philippines must
be seriously considered in naming the constituent units of the federal state.
Ostensibly, the regional administrative infrastructure currently existing could be the basis for defining
the territorial boundaries of the constituent states of the new federal republic. This would also mean
there are already working institutional offices ready to carry out any new mandates. Doing this will be
relatively easier and perfunctory because these regional administrative bodies already enjoy familiarity
amongst communities within their respective territorial jurisdictions.
But the federal charter must also have clear mechanisms for these sub-national units to re-organize
themselves if they see fit. In other words, let the regions themselves decide, when the conditions are
suitable, to amalgamate or to separate as well as initiate the process to do so. The power over this
course of action must not be vested on the central government (i.e. federal legislature) alone like in
the 1987 Constitution concerning the Cordilleras and the Bangsamoro. This power must be vested in
the regional parliaments concerned subject to concurrence of the federal parliament.

The most important feature of this reform is that the autonomy of the regional government must be PDP-Laban’s Constitution of the HOR sub-committee on constitutional
self-evident in the new charter and self-executory. Meaning, there should be no need for an enabling Federal Republic of the Philippines amendments report dated Jan. 16, 2018
law to operationalize the autonomy of the regional level government. The new constitutional itself is [Salient features]
the source of its autonomy.
As per Sections 6 (2) and 9 of Article X: “THE Federal republic shall be composed of
TERRITORIES AND BOUNDARIES OF constituent units, namely the States of:
PDP-Laban’s Constitution of the HOR sub-committee on constitutional THE REGIONS SHALL BE AS LISTED AND Luzon, Visayas, Mindanao, the Bangsamoro
Federal Republic of the Philippines amendments report dated Jan. 16, 2018 DESCRIBED IN AN ORDINANCE WHICH and Metro Manila.
[Salient features] SHALL BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE
CONSTITUTION.”
It describes a parliamentary regional It describes a parliamentary regional
governance framework to be established governance framework to be established by Section 9. THE REGIONS AND REGIONAL
by a regional and local government code. a State and Local government code. AUTONOMY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS
The federal assembly tasked to enact ARTICLE SHALL BE DEEMED CREATED
this enabling law when they deem fit. See The Prime Minister exercises the power of AND EFFECTIVE WHEN APPROVED BY
Sections 6 (3) and 13 of Article X. supervision over the state governments. MAJORITY OF THE VOTES CAST BY
REGISTERED VOTERS IN A REGION IN A
The Federal government, through the PLEBISCITE CALLED FOR THE PURPOSE:
Prime Minister, shall exercise the power of
supervision over regional governments. See
Section 21.

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 perceptible impact and most likely simply as a knee-jerk response to the clamor of the day from their
PROVIDED, THAT ONLY REGIONS VOTING constituents.
FAVORABLY IN SUCH PLEBISCITE SHALL
BE GRANTED REGIONAL AUTOMONY IN This type of development perspective is by itself not a sign of bad governance because it can also
ACCORDANCE WITH THIS ARTICLE AND address the needs of the community. It becomes rather objectionable when it motivates local officials
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHALL to just abandon looking at the broader view of socio-economic progress for their constituencies. When
CONTINUE TO EXERCISE ITS POWERS this happens, the electoral system in place has in effect severely constrained responsible development
AND FUNCTIONS OVER REGIONS THAT planning. And consequently, has also stunted the socio-economic growth of the regions.
DID NOT VOTE FAVORABLY IN SUCH
The new charter can instead impose a longer term of office for regional elected officials with the
PLEBISCITE. IN CASE THE VOTERS OF possibility for one re-election. A period of 5 or 6 years per term would be reasonable. The same could
A PROPOSED REGION DID NOT VOTE be afforded to local government officials as well.
FAVORABLY TO THE CREATION OF A
REGION, UPON THE PETITION OF FIVE But an important corollary to this change is making the power to recall elected officials more easily
PERCENT (5%) OF THE REGISTERED accessible for the people. The process of recalling elected officials must no longer be as rigid and
VOTERS IN A REGION, ANOTHER difficult as the current regime. More importantly, the power of recall must be explicitly expressed as a
PLEBISCITE SHALL BE CALLED AND constitutional right of the people.
CONDUCTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF
THIS SECTION.
PDP-Laban’s Constitution of the HOR sub-committee on constitutional
Federal Republic of the Philippines amendments report dated Jan. 16, 2018
VI. Term limits and the Power of Recall [Salient features]

The rationale for the imposition of a specific time frame for elected office was best expressed by one The terms of office of elective regional and No mention about term limits of subnational
of the members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Mr. Edmundo G. Garcia made the following local officials, except barangay officials, elected officials and the power of recall.
argument during the debates on this very particular issue: which shall be provided by law, shall be five
(5) years and no such official shall serve for
“I know that some of us here have been in politics for a long time and I do not wish to offend them.
more than two (2) consecutive terms. See
But I simply think that there should be no special caste of professional politicians. It should not be
a life-time profession or a career, but rather an opportunity for public service to be broadened to as Section 14 of Article X.
great number of people and there should be no effort to accumulate power. Accumulation of power, at
one time, really brings about the desire to accumulate more, and rather than providing a structure or No mention about the power of recall.
a setup which strengthens this trend, the alternative must be to provide structural safeguards for this
kind of practice. Therefore, I would not subscribe to more than one reelection for Senators and more
than two reelections for Representatives or local officials.”

Unfortunately, Mr. Garcia did not foresee that the imposition of term limits would actually push
politicians to use members of their family to circumvent this rule.
Indeed, by employing this revolving door scheme amongst family members, politicians have not only
found a way to beat the three-term limit but have also expanded the reach of their political power
within government. By some ironic twist of fate, they have also arrived at a legal and democratic way
to firmly entrenched their families in local politics.
The three-term limitation in the 1987 charter also means we have triennial local elections. Again, the
original intent for this system of local elections is to allow voters to remove and replace leaders who
have failed their expectations at the earliest chance possible. But this has never been the case.
The triennial local elections system has in fact bred local officials who only have a short-sighted
development outlook and therefore can only be bothered by projects that have an immediate and
VII. Division of Competencies
A s mentioned earlier, one key feature of a federal set-up is the presence of two tiers of government
with each solely responsible for its assigned duties and functions. There are two vital requirements in
allocating competencies to the different levels of government.
First, the assignment of responsibilities between the central and regional governments must be clear
and coherent. The distribution scheme must be formulated in such a way that the designation of
accountability is unequivocal. We do not want the political culture of blame-shifting and credit-grabbing
to persist in the new federal regime.
Second, this division of duties and functions amongst the different tiers of government is very critical
because the correct allocation of tax powers and other revenue-raising measures depends on it.

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 Particularly, how the revenue-raising powers of the region are defined in the federal constitution itself.
The general rule of course is “the funds follow the functions”. Meaning, the assignment of funds must
be accompanied by the appropriate revenue raising power.
Hence, if the regional level of government is given more autonomy, which means more duties and
responsibilities, then it only follows that it must be given more power to raise revenues.
The first one is entitled Corruption in Asia: Pervasiveness and Arbitrariness. One of the insights in this
article is maintaining ONLY one independent anti-corruption agency has proven to be very effective in
curbing corruption in the public sector.
The second article is Combating Corruption in the Asia-Pacific Countries: What Do We Know and What
Needs to be Done?. One conclusion here worth highlighting is that “POLITICAL WILL” is the most
important prerequisite for an anti-corruption mechanism to be successful.

But should the regions still have a share in the national taxes or should they simply get block grants? Following the Singapore standard therefore, the most viable and sound approach to fight corruption in
Should regional governments be vested a high degree of taxing powers and at the same time be given a federal system is to explicitly express in the federal constitution that it is the Office of the Ombudsman
a huge share in the national revenue collection? which has the sole authority and responsibility to prosecute graft and corruption.

Whatever the fiscal arrangement may be, it must be self-evident in the new charter and self-executory Additionally, the new charter must also provide the proper resources to this office to ensure its
as well. The details be maybe left to the appropriate lawmaking body but the fundamental operating independence and insulate it from any political intervention. Indeed, to enable its officials to exercise
principles must be clear in the new federal constitution. “POLITICAL WILL” in fighting graft and corruption under a federal system.

PDP-Laban’s Constitution of the
Federal Republic of the Philippines
HOR sub-committee on constitutional
amendments report dated Jan. 16, 2018
[Salient features]
Instituting a coherent and robust anti-corruption mechanism in the new federal constitution is integral
to the success of the federal system itself. Indeed, if the current way of fighting graft and corruption is
carried over to the federal set-up, then the socio-political ills we all want to eliminate can even multiply
significantly.

Has an explicit allocation. See 20 of Allocation is closely similar to the PDP-Laban

Article X for the list of federal government
competencies and Section 26 for the list
of regional government competencies.
Section 27 covers concurrent or shared
competencies.
Fiscal scheme is described in Sections 12
and15 for the regional government and
Section 38 for the local government.
draft charter. But it also provided a list for PDP-Laban’s Constitution of the HOR sub-committee on constitutional
concurrent assignments. Federal Republic of the Philippines amendments report dated Jan. 16, 2018
[Salient features]
Fiscal scheme is also similar, at least in
principle, to the PDP-Laban draft charter.
The same mechanism established in the No mention.
1987 Constitution
IX. National Language

A federal system is often described as a system of government designed to institutionalize the idea of
unity in diversity. Naturally, one matter that needs to be addressed in the constitutional reform process
VIII. Anti-Graft and Corruption Mechanism is our national language. Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution lays out an interesting arrangement on

A multi-layer government structure will require a more sophisticated and streamlined anti-corruption
this subject that needs to be reconsidered in the drafting process.

institution. Note that every president elected since 1992 have each created their own anti-corruption We have one national language, which is Filipino (See Section 6). But we also have two official
office. So instead of just having one agency to tackle this problem, we have multiple agencies. And languages, which are Filipino and English (See Section 7). And no law has ever been passed to
many anti-corruption experts believe this is precisely the reason why the Philippines has failed in the remove the status of the latter as such. In fact, until now the language of government, of legislation,
battle against this heinous problem. and of the courts in the Philippines continues to be English.

For many years now Singapore has consistently been perceived as the least corrupt country in
Southeast Asia. Thus, making its anti-corruption framework the most logical benchmark for the
Philippines to follow. I am citing two articles here to highlight vital lessons from Singapore’s experience
in defeating corruption which the Philippines can adopt without any difficulty at all.
Then, we also have auxiliary languages or regional dialects such as Cebuano, Hiligaynon, Ilocano,
Waray, Tausug, so forth, which are all contemplated to function as a third level means of communication
within the regions where they are spoken.
But realities on the ground dispute this neat grouping of Philippine languages. Most Filipinos commonly

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 relate with English as the official language of the state because it is widely used by government. Moreover,
the usage of Filipino as the language of the nation is suspect because it is basically a Tagalog clone. And
X. Transition Process
hence it is very rarely spoken by nationals outside the Tagalog region.
The transition to a federal-set need not happen as soon as the federal charter is ratified by the people
In the context of religious worship for example, there are no Filipino masses in Pampanga but only
in the plebiscite. We have to take into account the reality that there will be a huge adjustment to be
English and Kapangpangan. In Visayan speaking areas such as Cebu and Zambaonga, masses are
made in terms of bureaucratic organization and civil service capacity-building. Filipinos themselves
celebrated in English and Bisaya. Indeed, in malls outside of Metro Manila, Filipino is only spoken by
must be re-oriented having been used to an over-centralized governance structure for so long.
vacationers and by the “natives” to them as merely a matter of courtesy. In their day-to-day lives, locals
always communicate with one another through their dialect.
The important reminder here is that the federal constitution itself can provide for a transitory process.
But the new charter should not follow the same tenor of Article XVIII Transitory Provisions of the
A provision that is inconsistent with the actual conditions and sentiments of the people has no place in
1987 Constitution. The sections here are all couched in broad and general terms. Consequently,
the state charter. Correspondingly, our experience of languages spoken in the country necessitates a
they had very little instructional value towards the country’s shift from dictatorship to democracy.
rethinking of the constitutional designation of Filipino as the sole national language.
For example, as per Section 22 – “At the earliest possible time, the Government shall expropriate
Is it still necessary to have just one artificially created national language given the richness of our linguistic
idle or abandoned agricultural lands as may be defined by law, for distribution to the beneficiaries of
heritage? Or is it now more appropriate for our language diversity to be officially acknowledged because
the agrarian reform program.” Given the ambiguity of the directives set here, this mandate has not
it reflects the narrative that is real to all Filipinos? A constitution could recognize more than one national
been complied with satisfactorily.
language after all.
Another example, as per Section 24 – “Private armies and other armed groups not recognized by
In fact, the Constitution of South Africa for instance recognizes 11 official languages and enjoins the state
duly constituted authority shall be dismantled.” 31 years on, the social ill which this directive was
to take practical and positive measures to elevate the status and advance the use of their indigenous
meant to cure continues to plague many communities in the country largely due to the vagueness of
languages. (See Chapter 1, Section 6 (1) and (2))
the term “duly constituted authority”.
Additionally, should English now be unequivocally accepted as the lone official language of the Philippines
To remedy this inadequacy, the new federal charter can specifically prescribe for the step by step
because doing so more accurately reflects the reality experienced by many in the polity? English is
re-organization towards the federal set-up. Keeping in mind the viability of the federal system in the
obviously a colonial language. But considering that American colonization is a fact of life that is universally
long term.
shared in the Philippines, the designation of English as such would certainly be more unbiased for all
Filipinos than Filipino.
Furthermore, a fiscal equalization mechanism is absolutely necessary to help currently
underperforming regions in the transition to a federal system. But where will the money to support this
Hence, the new charter can prescribe several national languages to reflect the linguistic and cultural
initiative come from? How will it be sustained? And more importantly, which government institution
diversity of the country. Furthermore, with Filipinos now being genuine citizens of the world, the new
should be responsible in managing this program?
charter claiming the lingua franca of the day as our one and only official language makes practical sense.
Insisting on keeping both English and Filipino as the official languages of the state on the grounds of
The transition process from unitary to federal should actually be undertaken gradually and as
nationalism seems anachronistic. Our nationhood now ought to be founded on deeper grounds than just
deliberately as we possibly can. Hence instead of expecting a Big Bang sort of transformation for
having a common native tongue.
our political system, we should focus on laying down the correct building blocks this time around. We
are essentially re-building the nation after all.

PDP-Laban’s Constitution of the HOR sub-committee on constitutional PDP-Laban’s Constitution of the HOR sub-committee on constitutional
Federal Republic of the Philippines amendments report dated Jan. 16, 2018 Federal Republic of the Philippines amendments report dated Jan. 16, 2018
[Salient features] [Salient features]

The same arrangement established in the No mention. The same arrangement established in the No mention.
1987 Constitution. 1987 Constitution.

Michael Henry Ll. Yusingco, a practicing lawyer, is the author of the book “Rethinking the Bangsamoro
Perspective.” He conducts research on current issues in state-building, decentralization and constitutionalism.

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 Shaping Public Policy
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