POINTERS IN LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION

Atty. Victoria V. Loanzon

with the assistance of Atty. Esteele Hiceta
And Atty. Mikael Tupaz

I. Fundamental Principles and Concepts

A. Legal basis
1. 1987 Constitution (State policies, Bill of Rights & Social Justice)
Labor Rights protected (and guaranteed):
o Under the 1987 Constitution: (Sec. 3, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution)
 Right to self-organization;
 Right to collective bargain;
 Right to collectively negotiate;
 Right to peaceful concerted activities;
 Right to strike in accordance with law;
 Right to participate in policy and decision-making processes;
 Right to security of tenure;
 Right to human condition of work;
 Right to a living wage;
 Right to a just share in the profits.
Under the Labor Code: (Art. 3, Labor Code)
 `Right to self-organize;
 Right to collectively bargain;
 Right to security of tenure; and
 Right to just and humane work condition.
State policies on:
Labor Code: (Art. 3, Labor Code): The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate
the relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers
to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane
conditions of work.

Employee’s Compensation (Art. 166, LC): The State shall promote and develop a tax-
exempt employees’ compensation program whereby employees and their dependents, in
the event of work-connected disability or death, may promptly secure adequate income
benefit and medical related benefits.

Labor Relations (Art. 211, LC): To promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective
bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as
modes of settling labor or industrial disputes;
To promote free trade unionism as an instrument for the enhancement of democracy and
the promotion of social justice and development;
To foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong and united labor movement;
To promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their rights and obligations as union
members and as employees;
To provide an adequate administrative machinery for the expeditious settlement of labor
or industrial disputes;
To ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace; and
To ensure the participation of workers in decision and policy-making processes affecting
their rights, duties and welfare.
To encourage a truly democratic method of regulating the relations between the employers
and employees by means of agreements freely entered into through collective bargaining,
no court or administrative agency or official shall have the power to set or fix wages, rates
of pay, hours of work or other terms and conditions of employment, except as otherwise
provided under this Code.
Worker’s representation and participation in policy and decision-making (Art. 255,
LC): The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an
appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the
employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. However, an individual
employee or group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to
their employer.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, workers shall have the right, subject
to such rules and regulations as the Secretary of Labor and Employment may promulgate,
to participate in policy and decision-making processes of the establishment where they are
employed insofar as said processes will directly affect their rights, benefits and welfare. For
this purpose, workers and employers may form labor-management councils: Provided, that
the representatives of the workers in such labor-management councils shall be elected by
at least the majority of all employees in said establishment. (As amended by Section 22,
Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
To encourage a truly democratic method of regulating the relations between the employers
and employees by means of agreements freely entered into through collective bargaining,
no court or administrative agency or official shall have the power to set or fix wages, rates
of pay, hours of work or other terms and conditions of employment, except as otherwise
provided under this Code.
Tripartism and tripartite conferences (Art. 275, LC): Tripartism in labor relations is
hereby declared a State policy. Towards this end, workers and employers shall, as far as
practicable, be represented in decision and policy-making bodies of the government.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives may, from
time to time, call a national, regional, or industrial tripartite conference of representatives
of government, workers and employers for the consideration and adoption of voluntary
codes of principles designed to promote industrial peace based on social justice or to align
labor movement relations with established priorities in economic and social development.
In calling such conference, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may consult with
accredited representatives of workers and employers. (As amended by Section 32, Republic
Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
Articles1700, Civil Code: Nature of relationship between employer and employee: It is not
merely contractual. Their relation is impressed with public interest that labor contracts
entered into between them must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are
subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts,
closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects. (Art. 1700,
Civil Code)
B. Construction in favor of labor: Labor contracts are construed as how the parties
intended it to be. But in case of doubt, it shall be construed in favor of the labor. (Art. 1702,
Civil Code)
The Labor Code shall be construed verba legis. But in case of doubt in its implementation
and interpretation, all doubts shall be construed in favor of labor. (Art. 4, Labor Code)

Question: Union filed a Notice of Strike (NOS) against Company on grounds of gross
violation of their collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Secretary of the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) certified the dispute to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration. Thereafter, Union filed a second NOS
allegedly over the same CBA violation. Company filed a Motion to Strike Out Notice of
Strike and to refer the dispute to voluntary arbitration, claiming that the Union failed to
exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the 2nd NOS. Union submitted its strike
vote. On the last day of the cooling-off and strike vote periods, the Union officers and
members reported for work but they were allegedly not allowed to enter the company
premises. In protest of what was considered a lock-out, the Union staged a strike on the
same day. Is the strike declared by the Union illegal?
Answer: NO, the declaration of the strike a day before the completion of the cooling-off and
strike vote periods was but a reaction to the company’s locking out the officers and
members of the Union. It is well to stress that under Art. 4 of the Labor Code, “all doubts in
the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.” In PeÑaflor v.
Outdoor Clothing Manufacturing Corporation, the Court reiterated that the principle laid
down in the law has been extended by jurisprudence to cover doubts in the evidence
presented by the employer and employee.

II. Recruitment and Placement

A. Illegal recruitment
Elements: Illegal recruitment is committed when two (2) elements concur: First, the
offender does not have the required license or authority to engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers. Second, the offender undertook (1) recruitment and placement
activity defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code or (2) any prohibited practice under
Art.34 of the same code. Illegal recruitment is qualified into large scale, when three or more
persons, individually or as group, are victimized. (People vs. Bartolome, G.R. No. 129486
July 4, 2008)
Prohibited activities
Article 34, Labor Code: It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of
authority:
1. To charge or accept, directly or indirectly, any amount greater than that specified in the
schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor, or to make a worker pay
any amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or advance
2. To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to
recruitment or employment;
3. To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any act of
misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a license or authority under this Code.
4. To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his employment in
order to offer him to another unless the transfer is designed to liberate the worker from
oppressive terms and conditions of employment;
5. To influence or to attempt to influence any person or entity not to employ any worker
who has not applied for employment through his agency;
6. To engage in the recruitment or placement of workers in jobs harmful to public health or
morality or to the dignity of the Republic of the Philippines;
7. To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor or by his duly
authorized representatives;
8. To fail to file reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies, remittance of
foreign exchange earnings, separation from jobs, departures and such other matters or
information as may be required by the Secretary of Labor.
9. To substitute or alter employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of
Labor from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the periods
of expiration of the same without the approval of the Secretary of Labor;
10. To become an officer or member of the Board of any corporation engaged in travel
agency or to be engaged directly or indirectly in the management of a travel agency; and
10. To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before departure for
monetary or financial considerations other than those authorized under this Code and its
implementing rules and regulations.
Types of illegal recruitment
- Simple Illegal Recruitment: The offender does not have the required
license or authority to engage in the recruitment and placement of workers;
and the offender undertook:
i. Recruitment and placement activity defined under Article 13(b) of
the Labor Code; or
ii. Any prohibited practice under Article 3 of the same Code.
- Illegal recruitment as economic sabotage can either be:
Large scale illegal recruitment if committed against three or more
persons individually or as a group (People v. Barolome, GR No. 129486,
July 4, 2008); or
Syndicated illegal recruitment if it is committed by three or more
persons in conspiracy.
Illegal recruitment and estafa, distinguished: A person may be charged and convicted
for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason for this is that illegal recruitment is a
malum prohibitum, whereas estafa is malum in se, meaning that the criminal intent of the
accused is not necessary for conviction in the former, but is required in the latter. (People v
Saulo, 344 SCRA 605)
Liability of Local Recruitment Agency and Foreign Employer
o Solidary liability: he liability of the principal/employer and the
recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims shall be joint and
several. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement
agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or
damages that may be awarded to the workers.
- If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate
officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be
 jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the
aforesaid claims and damages. (Sec. 10, RA 8042, as amended by RA 10022)
o Theory of imputed knowledge: The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes
the knowledge of the agent to the principal/employer, not the other way
around. The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer cannot, therefore,
be imputed to its agent. There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of
and consented to be bound under the 2-year employment contract extension,
it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and its “owner” cannot be
held solidarily liable for any of Divina’s claims arising from the 2-year
employment extension. (Sunace v NLRC, G.R. No. 161757, Jan. 25, 2006)
o Termination of contract of migrant worker without just or valid cause: In
case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized
cause as defined by law or contract, or any unauthorized deductions from the
migrant worker's salary, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement if
his placement fee and the deductions made with interest at twelve percent
(12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract. (Sec. 10, RA 8042, as amended; Serrano v Gallant Maritime Service,
Inc., GR 167614, March 24, 2009, which deleted the phrase ‘or for three
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.’ for being
unconstitutional)
o Direct hiring
- General Rule: Direct hiring is not allowed except through the Boards and
Entities authorized by the Secretary of Labor.
- Exception: When direct hiring is employed by the diplomatic corps;
international organizations; and such other employers as may be allowed by
the Secretary of Labor.

B. Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities.

Question: How can an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death be
compensable?
Answer: Entitlement of seamen on overseas work to disability benefits is a matter
governed, not only by medical findings, but by law and by contract. The material
statutory provisions are Articles 191 to 193 under Chapter VI (Disability Benefits) of the
Labor Code, in relation with Rule X of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Book IV of
the Labor Code. By contract, the POEA-SEC, as provided under Department Order No. 4,
series of 2000 of the Department of Labor and Employment, and the parties' CBA bind the
seaman and his employer to each other.
For disability to be compensable under Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, two
elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-
related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment
contract. In other words, to be entitled to compensation and benefits under this provision,
it is not sufficient to establish that the seafarer's illness or injury has rendered him
permanently or partially disabled; it must also be shown that there is a causal connection
between the seafarer's illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted.
The 2000 POEA-SEC defines "work-related injury" as "injury(ies) resulting in disability or
death arising out of and in the course of employment" and "work-related illness" as "any
sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under
Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied."
For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable,
all of the following conditions must be satisfied:
1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein; 

2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the
described risks; 

3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other
factors necessary to contract it; and
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer. (Austria v
Crystal Shipping, Inc., et. al., GR No. 206256, February 24, 2016)

Question: Godofredo was hired as a Messman on board M/T Umm Al Lulu by

petitioner C.F. Sharp, a local manning agency, on behalf of its principal, petitioner
ADNATCO, a marine transportation company based in the United Arab Emirates.
Godofredo and petitioner Austria, as representative of petitioners C.F. Sharp and
ADNATCO, signed a Contract of Employment, which was approved by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Prior to embarkation, Godofredo
underwent a pre-employment medical examination (PEME) and was declared
physically fit to work. Godofredo was repatriated in Manila. He went to a medical
clinic in Kawit, Cavite where he was examined by Doctor Cayetano G. Reyes, Jr. Dr.
Reyes diagnosed Godofredo with "Essential Hypertension" and advised Godofredo
to take the prescribed medication and rest for a week. At about 10:00 in the
morning on March 19, 2003, Godofredo was waiting for a ride when he suddenly
lost consciousness and fell to the ground. Good samaritans brought Godofredo to Del
Pilar Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Is Godofredo’s death
compensable?
Answer: YES. Whether or not Godofredo’s death is compensable depends on the
terms and conditions of his Contract of Employment. The employment of
seafarers, including claims for death benefits, is governed by the contracts they sign
at the time of their engagement. As long as the stipulations in said contracts are not
contrary to law, morals, public order, or public policy, they have the force of law
between the parties. Nonetheless, while the seafarer and his employer are governed
by their mutual agreement, the POEA Rules and Regulations require that the
POEA-SEC be integrated in every seafarer’s contract.
For a seafarer’s death to be compensable under the 1996 POEA-SEC, the Court
explicitly ruled in Inter-Orient Maritime, Inc. v. Candava that:
The prevailing rule under the 1996 POEA-SEC was that the illness leading to the
eventual death of seafarer need not be shown to be work-related in order to be
compensable, but must be proven to have been contracted during the term of the
contract. Neither is it required that there be proof that the working conditions
increased the risk of contracting the disease or illness. An injury or accident is said
to arise "in the course of employment" when it takes place within the period of
employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is
fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.
Applying the rule on liberal construction, the Court is thus brought to the
recognition that medical repatriation cases should be considered as an
exception to Section 20 of the 2000 POEA-SEC. Accordingly, the phrase "work-
related death of the seafarer, during the term of his employment contract" under
Part A (1) of the said provision should not be strictly and literally construed to
mean that the seafarer’s work-related death should have precisely occurred
during the term of his employment. Rather, it is enough that the seafarer’s
work-related injury or illness which eventually causes his death should have
occurred during the term of his employment. (C.F. Sharp Crew Management
Inc., et. al., vs. Legal Heirs of the Late Godofredo Repiso, GR No. 190534, February
10, 2016)

Question: The respondent Wilfredo Cabatay entered into a ten-month contract of

employment as able seaman with the petitioners for the vessel M/V BBC OHIO. The
contract was supplemented by a collective bargaining agreement or the Total Crew
Cost Fleet Agreement (TCC- FA) between the International Workers Federation (ITF)
and Marlow Navigation. While on duty, Cabatay fell from a height of four meters in
his work area; his side, shoulder, and head were most affected by his fall. He was
brought to a hospital in Huangpu, China, where he was diagnosed with "Left l-4
Verterbra Transverse Bone broken (accident)." He was declared unfit to work for 25
days. Thereafter, he was medically repatriated. Cabatay arrived in Manila on January
8, 2010, and was immediately referred to the company doctor, Dr. Dolores Tay for
examination and treatment. He underwent several tests, including a CT scan and a
repeat audiometry and MRI. On March 19, 2010, Cabatay complained of right
shoulder pain. On April 13, 2010, he underwent surgery on the rotator cuff on his
shoulder. After surgery, he missed several appointments with Dr. Tay and failed to
undergo his physiotherapy on time, starting it only on May 25, 2010. Earlier, or on
May 7, 2010, Dr. Tay gave Cabatay an interim disability assessment of Grade 10 for
his shoulder injury and Grade 3 for impaired hearing. She expected Cabatay's
hearing and shoulder problems to be resolved within three to six months, although
he was still under treatment as of June 3, 2010. Meantime, or on May 11, 2010,
Cabatay filed a complaint against the petitioners for, among others, permanent total
disability compensation. He did not dispute the company doctor's findings, he
argued that he was entitled to permanent total disability benefits since he had lost
his employment due to his injury which, he claimed, is compensated under the TCC-
FA. Is Cabatay entitled to permanent total disability compensation?

Answer: NO. In Splash Philippines, Inc. v. Ruizo, the Court said that the 120-day
rule "cannot be used as a cure-all formula for all maritime compensation cases. Its
application must depend on the circumstances of the case, including especially
compliance with the parties' contractual duties and obligations as laid down in the
POEA-SEC and/or their CBA, if one exists." Needless to say, a seafarer cannot claim
full disability benefits on his mere say-so in complete disregard of the POEA-SEC and
the CBA, which are, to reiterate, the law between the parties and which they are
duty bound to observe. And so it must be in Cabatay's case, especially when he
refused the petitioners' offer that his medical condition be referred to a mutually
appointed doctor under Section 19.3 of the TCC-FA, to determine whether, despite
Dr. Tay's combined 36% disability assessment under Annex 3 of the agreement, he
is permanently unfit for further sea service. Absent such a determination
(certification) by a mutually appointed doctor, we hold that Dr. Tay's assessment
should stand. (Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc., et. al., vs. Cabatay, GR No. 212878,
February 01, 2016)

Question: When can the employer be held liable for the death of a seafarer, which
occurred after the termination of the employment contract?
Answer: Section 20(A) of the 1996 Revised POEA-SEC provides that in order to
avail of death benefits, the death of the seafarer must be work-related and should
occur during the effectivity of the employment contract. Under Section 32(A) of
the POEA-SEC, the claimant must still fulfill all the requisites for compensability, to
wit: 1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein; 2. The disease
was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks; 3. The
disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors
necessary to contract it; and 4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the
seafarer. (Balba vs. Tiwala Human Resources, Inc., and/or Togo Maritime Corp.,
GR No. 184933, April 13, 2016)

Question: Does the seafarer have the duty to prove that his work caused his illness
to be entitled to disability benefits?
Answer: YES. The Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of
Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels (POEA-SEC), particularly Section
20(B) thereof, provides that the employer is liable for disability benefits when the
seafarer suffers from a work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract.
To emphasize, to be compensable, the injury or illness 1) must be work- related and
2) must have arisen during the term of the employment contract. In Jebsen
Maritime, Inc. v. Ravena, the Court held that those diseases not listed as
occupational diseases may be compensated if it is shown that they have been
caused or aggravated by the seafarer’s working conditions. The Court stressed
that while the POEA-SEC provides for a disputable presumption of work-relatedness
as regards those not listed as occupational diseases, this presumption does not
necessarily result in an automatic grant of disability compensation. The claimant
still has the burden to present substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" that his work
conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the illness. (Doehle-
Philman Manning Agency, Inc., et. al., vs. Haro, GR No. 206522)

Question: Since 2002, respondent Conag had been deployed annually by petitioner
Scanmaras a bosun's mate aboard foreign vessels owned or operated by its
principal, Crown Ship Management, Inc./Louis Dreyfus Armateurs SAS (Crown
Ship). On March 27, 2009, he was again deployed as a bosun's mate aboard the
vessel MIT Ile de Brehdt. According to him, his job entailed lifting heavy loads and
occasionally, he would skid and fall while at work on deck. On June 19, 2009, as he
was going about his deck duties, he felt numbness in his hip and back. He was given
pain relievers but the relief was temporary. Two months later, the pain recurred
with more intensity, and he was brought to a hospital in Tunisia. On August 25,
2009, Conag was medically repatriated. Upon arrival in Manila on August 27, 2009,
he was referred to the company-designated physicians at the Metropolitan Medical
Center, Marine Medical Services, where he was examined and subjected to
laboratory examinations. The laboratory tests showed that Conag had "Mild Lumbar
Levoconvex Scoliosis and Spondylosis; Right SJ Nerve Root Compression," with an
incidental finding of "Gall Bladder Polyposis v. Cholesterolosis." For over a period of
95 days, he was treated by the company-designated physicians, Drs. Robert Lim and
Esther G. Go, and in their final medical report dated December 1, 2009, they
declared Conag fit to resume sea duties. Later that day, Conag signed a Certificate of
Fitness for Work, written in English and Filipino. Conag claimed that he was
required to sign the certificate as a condition sine qua non for the release of his
accumulated sick pay. Interestingly, however, on February 18, 2010, a mere nine
days after his letter, Conag filed his complaint with the LA for disability benefits,
presumably after he was told that he would not be rehired. Is Conag entitled to
disability benefits?
Answer: NO. It has been held in Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag,
and reiterated in Simbajon, that under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC, the duty to
secure the opinion of a third doctor belongs to the employee asking for
disability benefits. Not only did Conag fail to seasonably obtain an opinion from his
own doctor before filing his complaint, thereby permitting the petitioners no
opportunity to evaluate his doctor's assessment, but he also made it impossible for
the parties to jointly seek the opinion of a third doctor precisely because the
petitioners had not known about Dr. Jacinto's opinion in the first place. Indeed, three
months passed before Conag sought to dispute the company-designated physicians'
assessment, and during this interval other things could have happened to cause or
aggravate his injury. In particular, the Court notes that, after he collected his sick
wage, Conag spent two months in his home province and engaged in various
physical activities. In Coastal Safeway Marine Services, Inc. v. Esguerra, this Court
rejected the medical certifications upon which the claimant-seaman anchored his
claim for disability benefits, for being unsupported by diagnostic tests and
procedures which would have effectively disputed the results of the medical
examination in a foreign clinic to which he was referred by his employer. In
Dumadag, where the seafarer's doctor examined him only once, and relied on the
same medical history, diagnoses and analyses produced by the company-designated
specialists, it was held that there is no reason for the Court to simply say that the
seafarer's doctor's findings are more reliable than the conclusions of the company-
designated physicians. (Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., et. al., vs. Emilio Conag,
GR No. 212382, April 6, 2016)

Question: For the seafarer to validly claim disability benefits, is the three-day post-
employment medical examination mandatory?
Answer: YES. The law specifically declares that failure to comply with the
mandatory reporting requirement shall result in the seafarer's forfeiture of
his right to claim benefits thereunder. In Coastal Safeway Marine Services, Inc.
 v. Esguerra, this Court expounded on the mandatory reporting requirement
provided under the POEA-SEC and the consequence for failure of the seaman to
comply with the requirement, viz.:
The foregoing provision has been interpreted to mean that it is the company-
designated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman's
disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the
term of the hitter's employment. Conccdedly, this does not mean that the
assessment of said physician is final, binding or conclusive on the claimant, the labor
tribunal or the courts. Should he be so minded, the seafarer has the prerogative to
request a second opinion and to consult a physician of his choice regarding his
ailment or injury, in which case the medical report issued by the latter shall be
evaluated by the labor tribunal and the court, based on its inherent merit. For the
seaman's claim to prosper, however, it is mandatory that he should be
examined by a company-designated physician within three days from his
repatriation. Failure to comply with this mandatory reporting requirement
without justifiable cause shall result in forfeiture of the right to claim the
compensation and disability benefits provided under the POEA-SEC. (Dizon vs.
Naess Shipping Philippines, Inc. and DOLE UK, GR No. 201834, June 1, 2016)

C. Employment of Non-Resident Aliens

Non-resident alien must apply for a Special Work Permit with the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation.

D. Training and Employment of Special Workers

1. Apprentices and Learners
a. “Apprentice” – is a person undergoing training for an approved apprenticeable
occupation during an established period assured by an apprenticeship agreement. (RA
7796, Section 4)
Note: It is no longer the Secretary of Labor and Employment but the TESDA, who
approves apprenticiable occupations. (RA 7796, Section 4(m))
Qualifications:
At least 15 years of age, provided that if below 18 years, he shall not be eligible for
hazardous occupation.
Physically fit for the occupation in which he desires to be trained.
Possess vocational aptitude and capacity for the particular occupation as established
through appropriate tests; and
Possess the ability to comprehend and follow oral and written instructions.
Requisites for a Valid Apprenticeship:
Qualifications of apprentice are met;
Apprentice earns not less than 75% of the prescribed minimum salary;
Apprenticeship agreement duly executed and signed;
Apprenticeship program must be approved by TESDA; otherwise, the apprentice
shall be deemed a regular employee (Nitto Enterprises v NLRC, GR No. 114337,
September 29, 1995); and
Period of apprenticeship shall not exceed six (6) months.
Effect of Pre-termination: apprentice is not considered an employee.
 Question: If the company allowed individuals to work for at least three months and
then executed an Apprenticeship Agreement on the 4th month, is the agreement
valid?
Answer: NO. The fact that the workers were already rendering service to the
company when they were made to undergo apprenticeship renders the
apprenticeship agreements irrelevant as far as the employees are concerned,
especially since, prior to the apprenticeship, the employees performed tasks that
were usually necessary and desirable to the company’s usual business.
Even assuming there was a valid apprenticeship, the expiration of the first
agreement and the retention of the employees was a recognition by the employer of
their training and acquisition of a regular employee status. The second
apprenticeship agreement for a second skill which was not even mentioned in the
agreement is a violation of the Labor Code’s implementing rules. (Atlanta
Industries v Sabolino (2011))

b. “Learners” – are persons hired as trainees in semi-skilled and other industrial

occupations which are non-apprenticeable and which may be learned through practical
training on the job in a relatively short period of time which shall not exceed three (3)
months.
When learners may be hired:
No experienced workers are available;
The employment of learners being necessary to prevent curtailment of
employment opportunities; and
The employment will neither create unfair competition in terms of labor
costs not impair working standards.
Only inspection from TESDA is required.
Effect of Pre-termination: Learner is considered regular employee after two (2)
months of training and dismissal is without fault of the learner.
2. Disabled workers
a. Equal opportunity
b. No disabled person shall be denied access to opportunities for suitable
employment. Qualified disabled employees shall be subject to the same terms
and conditions of employment, and the same compensation, privileges,
benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able-bodied
person. (RA 7277, Section 5)
c. Discrimination on employment
d. No entity, whether public or private, shall discriminate against a qualified
disabled person by reason of disability in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, promotion, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms and conditions and privileges for
employment. (RA 7277, Section 32)
e. Handicapped Workers – are those earning capacity is impaired by age or
physical or mental deficiency or injury, disease or illness.
Note: There must be a link between the deficiency and the work which
entitles the employer to lessen the worker’s wage. If not, he should not be so
 considered as handicapped worker.
Incentives for Employment
Private entities that employ disabled persons who meet the required skills or
qualifications, either as regular employee, apprentice or learner, shall be
entitled to an additional deduction from their gross income equivalent to
25% of the total amount paid as salaries and wages to disabled persons;
provided, that the following are complied with:
Presentation of proof certified by DOLE that disabled persons are under their
employ; and
Disabled employee is accredited with DOLE and DOH as to his disability,
skills and qualifications.
Private entities that improve or modify their physical facilities to provide
reasonable accommodation for disabled persons shall also be entitled to an
additional deduction from their taxable income, equivalent to 50% of the
direct costs of the improvements or modifications.

III. Labor Standards

A. Conditions of employment
1. Scope
Employer – is any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries on
in the Philippines any trade, business industry, undertaking or activity of any kind
and uses the services of another person who is under his order as regards the
employment. (RA 8282, Section 8)
Employee – is any person who performs services for an employer in which either or
both mental and physical efforts are used and who receives compensation for such
services, where there is employer-employee relationship. (RA 8282, Section 8)
Four Fold Test:
Selection and Engagement of the employee;
Payment of Wages;
Power of Dismissal; and
Power of Control.
Two-tiered Approach:
The putative employer’s power to control employee with respect to the means and
methods by which the work is to be accomplished; and the underlying economic
realities of the activity or relationship.
Economic Dependence or Economic Reality Test – refers to whether the worker
is dependent on the alleged employer for his continued employment in that line of
business.
Control Test – refers to the employer’s power to control or right to control the
employee not only as to the result of the work to be done but also as to the means
and methods by which the same is to be accomplished.
2. Hours of work
a. Principles in determining hours worked
1. All hours are hours worked which the employee is required to give to his
employer, regardless of whether or not such hours are spent in productive labor
or involve physical or mental exertion.
 2. An employee need not leave the premises of the workplace in order that his rest
period shall be counted, it being enough that he stops working, may rest
completely and may leave his workplace, to go elsewhere whether within or
outside the premises of his workplace.
3. If the work performed was necessary, or it benefited the employer, or the
employee could not abandon his work at the end of his normal working hours
because he had no replacement, all time spent for such work shall be considered
as hours worked if the work is with the knowledge of his employer or immediate
supervisor.
4. The time during which an employee is inactive by reason of interruptions in his
work beyond his control shall be considered time worked either if the imminence
of the resumption of work requires the employee’s presence at the place of work
or if the interval is too brief to be utilized effectively and gainfully in the
employee’s own interest. (IRR Labor Code, Book II, Rule 1, Section 4)
Hours Worked include:
All time during which an employee is required to be on duty or to be at a prescribed
workplace;
All time during which an employee is suffered or permitted to work;
Rest periods of short duration during working hours which shall not be more than
twenty (20) minutes; and
Meal periods of less than twenty (20) minutes are only a rest period of short
duration and are thus considered as hours worked.
Normal hours of work
Compressed work week – is resorted to by the employer to prevent serious losses
due to causes beyond his control, such as when there is substantial slump in demand
or his goods or services or when there is lack of raw materials. To be an exception to
the “eight-hour a day” requirement, the workers must agree to the temporary
change of work schedule and they do not suffer any loss of overtime pay, fringe
benefits or their weekly or monthly take-home pay.
Conditions of a Valid CWW Scheme
1. It is expressly and voluntarily supported by the majority of the employees
affected.
2. If work is hazardous, a certification is needed form an accredited safety
organization or the firm’s safety committee that work beyond 8 hours is within the
limits or levels of exposure set by DOLE’s occupational safety and health standards.
3. The DOLE is duly notified. (DOLE Advisory No. 02, Series of 2004)
Power interruptions/brownout
First twenty (20) minutes is compensable.
Succeeding minutes not compensable.
If despite the lapse of the first 20 minutes, the employees are required to stay in
their workplaces, such time is compensable.
Brownout running for more than 20 minutes is not compensable if employee can
use the time effectively for their own interest.
Meal Break: Rules:
Should not be less than sixty (60) minutes. It is non-compensable except where
during the so-called meal period, the laborers are required to standby for
emergency work, or said meal hour is not one of complete rest, such period is
considered overtime.
May be less than sixty (60) minutes, but should not be less than twenty (20) minutes
and he shortened meal time must be with full pay, under the following instances:
Where the work is non-manual work in nature or does not involve strenuous
physical exertion;
Where the establishment regularly operates not less than sixteen (16) hours a day;
In cases of actual or impending emergencies or there is urgent work to be
performed on machineries, equipment or installations to avoid serious loss which
the employer would otherwise suffer;
Where the work is necessary to prevent serious loss of perishable goods.
If less than twenty (20) minutes, it becomes only a rest period and is thus
considered as work time.
Employees may request that their meal period be shortened so that they can leave
work earlier than the previously established schedule. Such shortened mealtime is
not compensable.
Waiting time
Considered as hours worked if waiting –
Is an integral part of his work;
The employee is required or engaged by the employer to wait; or
When employee is required to remain on call in the employer’s premises or so close
thereto that he cannot use the time effectively and gainfully for his own purpose.
Overtime
Overtime Pay – is an additional compensation for work performed beyond eight (8)
hours within the worker’s 24-hour workday regardless whether the work covers
two (2) calendar days.
Basis for Computation of Overtime Pay
Regular basic wage includes cash wage only, without any deduction on account of
facilities provided by the employer. (Labor Code, Article 90)
Rates: Overtime Work on –
Regular Work Day: the employee is paid for the overtime work on additional
compensation equivalent to his regular wage plus at least 25% thereof.
Holiday or Rest Day: overtime work performed on a special holiday or rest day not
falling on a regular holiday shall be paid an additional compensation equivalent to
the rate of the first eight (8) hours on that day plus at least 30% thereof.
Night shift differential
It is an additional compensation of not less than 10% of an employee’s regular wage
for every hour of work done between 10:00 PM and 6:00 AM, whether or not such
period is part of the worker’s regular shift.
General Rule: All employees are entitled to NSD.
Except:
Those provided in Article 82;
Employees of retail and service establishments regularly employing not more than
five (5) workers. (IRR Labor Code, Book III, Rule II, Section 1(b)
Rest periods
Duration: Not less than twenty-four (24) consecutive hours after every six (6)
 consecutive normal work days.
Holiday pay, 13th month pay
Holiday Pay is a day’s pay given by law to an employee even if he does not work on a
regular holiday. It is limited to the twelve (12) regular, also called legal, holidays
listed by law. The employee should not have been absent without pay on the
working day preceding the regular holiday.
List of Regular Holidays as amended by RA 9492, July 25, 2007
New Year’s Day – January 1
Maundy Thursday – movable date
Good Friday – movable date
Araw ng Kagitingan – Monday nearest to April 9
Labor Day – Monday nearest to May 1
Independence day – Monday nearest to June 12
National Heroes Day – Last Monday of August
Bonifacio Day – Monday nearest to November 30
Christmas Day – December 25
Rizal Day – Monday nearest to December 30
Eid’l Fitr – mvable date
Eid’l Adha – movable date
Service Charge
All service charges collected by hotels, restaurants and similar establishments shall
be distributed as follows:
85% for all covered employees to be equally distributed among them.
15% for disposition by management to answer for losses and breakages and
distribution to employees receiving more than P2,000 a month at the discretion of
the management in the latter case.
Coverage: All employees are covered regardless of their position, designation,
employment status, irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid except
managerial employees. (IRR Labor Code, Book III, Rule VI, Section 1 and 2)

B. Wages
1. Wage versus salary
o Wage – compensation for skilled or unskilled manual labor.
o Salary – paid to white collar workers and denote a higher grade of
employment.
o Wage or Salary includes:
 Commission;
 Facilities; and
 Commodities/Supplements.
2. Payment of wages
o Fair Day’s Wage for a Fair Day’s Labor – (“No Work, No Pay Principle”)
3. Facilities versus supplements
o Facilities – shall include all articles or services for the benefit of the employee
or his family but shall not include tools of the trade or articles or services
primarily for the benefit of the employer or necessary to the conduct of the
employer’s business.
 o Part of the wage; Deductible from the wage.
o Supplements – constitute extra remuneration or special privileges or benefits
given to or received by the laborers over and above their ordinary earnings
or wages.
o Independent of the wage; Not wage deductible.
4. Non-diminution of benefits
o When applicable: The rule is applicable if it is shown that:
o The grant of the benefit is founded on a policy or has ripened into a practice over
a long period.
o The practice is consistent and deliberate.
o The practice is not due to error in the construction or application of a doubtful or
difficult question of law.
o The diminution or discontinuance is done unilaterally by the employer.
General Rule: employees have a vested right over existing benefits voluntarily granted to
them by their employer. Thus, benefits being given to employees cannot be taken back or
reduced unilaterally by the employer because the benefit has become part of the
employment contract, written or unwritten.
Exceptions:
o Correction of error
o Negotiated benefits
o Wage order compliance
o Benefits on reimbursement basis
o Reclassification of position
o Contingent benefits of conditional bonus
o Productivity incentives
5. Wage order, Wage Distortion
o Wage Order – is an order issued by the Regional Board whenever the conditions
in the region so warrant after investigating and studying all pertinent facts and
based on the standards and criteria prescribed by the Labor Code. The Regional
Board proceeds to determine whether to issue the same or not. A wage order
establishes the minimum wage rates to be paid by employers in the region, which
shall in no case be lower than the applicable statutory minimum wage rates.
o Wage Distortion – is a situation where an increase in prescribed wage rates
results in the elimination of severe contraction of intentional quantitative
differences in wage or salary rates between and among employee groups in an
establishment as to effectively obliterate the distinctions embodied in such wage
structure based on skills, length of service or other logical bases of differentiation.
o Elements:
 An existing hierarchy of positions with corresponding salary rates;
 A significant change or increase in the salary rate of a lower pay class without
a corresponding increase in the salary rate of a higher one;
 The elimination of the distinction between the two groups or classes; and
 The distortion exists in the same region.

C. Leaves
1. Service Incentive Leave
 o SIL is a five-day (5) leave with pay for every employee who has rendered at
least one (1) year of service.
o One (1) year of service is a service within 12 months, whether continuous or
broken, reckoned from the date the employee started working including
authorized absences and paid regular holidays unless the number of working
days in the establishment, as a matter of practice or policy or as provided in
the employment contract is less than 12 months. (Integrated Contractor and
Plumbing Works, Inc. v. NLRC, GR 152427, August 9, 2005)
o SIL does NOT apply to the following:
o Employees of the Government;
o Managerial employees as defined in Book 3;
o Field personnel whose performance is unsupervised or those who are paid a
fixed amount for performing work irrespective of the time consumed in the
performance thereof;
o Those already enjoying Vacation Leave with pay for at least 5 days;
o Those already enjoying said benefits; and
o Those employed in establishments regularly employing less than 10
employees. (IRR Labor Code, Book III, Rule V, Sec.1)
2. Maternity Leave
o Qualifications for Entitlement of Maternity Benefit
o The female member should be employed at the time of delivery, miscarriage or
abortion.
o She must have been given the required notification to the SSS thru her
employer.
o Her employer must have paid at least three (3) months of maternity
contribution within the twelve (12) month period immediately before her
semester of contingency.
o Every pregnant woman in the private sector, whether married or unmarried, is
entitled to maternity leave benefits.
3. Paternity Leave
o Every married male employee in the private sector shall be entitled to
paternity leave benefits of seven (7) days with full pay for the first four
deliveries by his lawful spouse under such terms and conditions as provided
by law. (Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8187 for the
Private Sector, Sec. 2)
o Conditions for Entitlement:
o He is an employee at the time of the delivery of his child.
o He is cohabiting with his spouse at the time she gives birth or suffers a
miscarriage.
o He has applied for paternity leave with his employer.
o His wife has given birth or suffered a miscarriage.
o Covers only the first four deliveries or miscarriages.
4. Parental Leave for solo parents
o Solo Parent – any individual who falls under any of the following categories:
o A woman who gives birth as a result of rape and other crimes against
chastity even without a final conviction of the offender: Provided, that the
 mother keeps and raises the child;
o Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to
death of spouse;
o Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood while the
spouse is detained or is serving sentence for a criminal conviction for at
least one (1) year;
o Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to
physical and/or mental incapacity of spouse as certified by a public
medical practitioner;
o Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to legal
separation or de facto separation from spouse for at least one (1) year, as
long as he/she is entrusted with the custody of the children;
o Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage as declared by a court or
by a church as long as he/she is entrusted with the custody of the children;
o Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to
abandonment of spouse for at least one (1) year;
o Unmarried mother/father who has preferred to keep and rear her/his
child/children instead of having others care for them to give them up to a
welfare institution;
o Any other person who solely provides parental care and support to a
child/children;
o Any family member who assumes the responsibility of head of family as a
result of the death, abandonment, disappearance or prolonged absence of
the parents or solo parents. (RA 8972)
5. Special Leaves for women workers (Magna Carta for Women)

D. Special Groups of Employees

1. Women
a. Discrimination
b. Stipulation against marriage
c. Prohibited acts
d. Sexual Harassment
2. Minors
3. Kasambahay
4. Homeworkers
5. Night workers

IV. Post-Employment
A. Employer—employee relationship
1. Tests to determine employer-employee relationship
2. Kinds of employment

Question: For 15 years, LSGI contracted the services of medical professionals, specifically
pediatricians, dentists and a physician, to comprise its Health Service Team (HST). On that
last day school year 2003-2004, the LSGI Head Administrator informed the Medical Service
Team, including herein petitioners, that their contracts will no longer be renewed for the
following school year by reason of LSGI's decision to hire two (2) full-time doctors and
dentists. One of the physicians from the same Health Service Team was hired by LSGI as a
full-time doctor. When petitioners', along with their medical colleagues', requests for
payment of their separation pay were denied, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
with prayer for separation pay, damages and attorney's fees before the NLRC. The Labor
Arbiter dismissed petitioners' complaint and ruled that complainants, as propounded by
LSGI, were independent contractors under retainership contracts and never became
regular employees of LSGI. Is the LA correct?
Answer: NO. The NLRC correctly identified the existence of an employer-employee
relationship between petitioners and LSGI and not a bilateral independent contractor
relationship. On more than one occasion, the Court recognized certain workers to be
independent contractors: individuals with unique skills and talents that set them apart
from ordinary employees. They were independent contractors because of these unique
skills and talents and the lack of control over the means and methods in the performance of
their work. In some instances, doctors and other medical professional may fall into this
independent contractor category, legitimately providing medical professional services.
However, as has been declared by the-NLRC and the appellate court, petitioners herein
are not independent contractors, rather, they were fixed-term employees. A fixed-
term employment is allowable under the Labor Code only if the term was voluntarily
and knowingly entered into by the parties who must have dealt with each other on
equal terms not one exercising moral dominance over the other. While vague in its
sparseness, the Contract of Retainer very clearly spelled out that LSGI had the power of
control over petitioners. Time and again we have held that the power of control refers to
the existence of the power and not necessarily to the actual exercise thereof, nor is it
essential for the employer to actually supervise the performance of duties of the employee.
It is enough that the employer has the right to wield that power. (Samonte, et. al., vs. La
Salle Greenhills, Inc., Bro. Bernard S. Oca, GR No. 199683, February 10, 2016)

Question: Are bus drivers and/or conductors with definite routes considered as regular
employees?
Answer: YES. As a general rule, field personnel are those whose performance of their
job/service is not supervised by the employer or his representative, the workplace being
away from the principal office and whose hours and days of work cannot be determined
with reasonable certainty; hence, they are paid specific amount for rendering specific
service or performing specific work. If required to be at specific places at specific times,
employees including drivers cannot be said to be field personnel despite the fact that they are
performing work away from the principal office of the employee. In order to monitor their
drivers and/or conductors, as well as the passengers and the bus itself, the bus companies
put checkers, who are assigned at tactical places along the travel routes that are plied by
their buses. The drivers and/or conductors are required to be at the specific bus terminals
at a specified time. In addition, there are always dispatchers in each and every bus
terminal, who supervise and ensure prompt departure at specified times and arrival at the
estimated proper time. Obviously, these drivers and/or conductors cannot be considered
as field personnel because they are under the control and constant supervision of the bus
companies while in the performance of their work. Being engaged in the public utility
business, as bus drivers and/or conductors, they should be considered as regular
employees because they perform tasks which are directly and necessarily connected with
their employer’s business. (Dasco, et. al., vs. Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc., GR No.
211141, June 29, 2016)

3. Subcontracting versus Labor-Only Contracting

a. Elements
b. Trilateral relationship
c. Solidary liability

Question: DFI owns an 800-hectare banana plantation ("original plantation") in Alejal,

Carmen, Davao. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988 ("CARL"), commercial farms shall be subject to compulsory acquisition and
distribution, thus the original plantation was covered by the law. The Department of
Agrarian Reform ("DAR") granted DFI a deferment privilege to continue agricultural
operations until 1998. Due to adverse marketing problems and observance of the so-called
"lay-follow,” DFI closed some areas of operation in the original plantation and laid off its
employees. DAR recalled DFI’s deferment privilege resulting in the original plantation’s
automatic compulsory acquisition and distribution under the CARL. To minimize losses,
DFI offered to give up its rights and interest over the original plantation in favor of the
government by way of a Voluntary Offer to Sell. The DAR accepted DFI’s offer to sell the
original plantation. However, out of the total 800 hectares, the DAR only approved the
disposition of 689.88 hectares. Hence, the original plantation was split into two: 689.88
hectares were sold to the government ("awarded plantation") and the remaining 200
hectares, more or less, were retained by DFI ("managed area"). The managed area is
subject to the outcome of the appeal on the cancellation of the deferment privilege before
the DAR Secretary.

On January 1, 1996, the awarded plantation was turned over to qualified agrarian reform
beneficiaries ("ARBs") under the CARL. These ARBs are the same farmers who were
working in the original plantation. They subsequently organized themselves into a multi-
purpose cooperative named "DARBMUPCO." On March 27, 1996, DARBMUPCO entered into
a Banana Production and Purchase Agreement ("BPPA") with DFI. Under the BPPA,
DARBMUPCO and its members as owners of the awarded plantation, agreed to grow and
cultivate only high grade quality exportable bananas to be sold exclusively to DFI. The
BPPA is effective for 10 years. From the start, DARBMUPCO was hampered by lack of
manpower to undertake the agricultural operation under the BPPA because some of its
members were not willing to work. Hence, to assist DARBMUPCO in meeting its production
obligations under the BPPA, DFI engaged the services of the respondent-contractors, who
in turn recruited the respondent-workers. The engagement of the respondent-workers
started a series of labor disputes among DARBMUPCO, DFI and the respondent-contractors.
Who among DFI, DARBMUPCO and the respondent-contractors is the employer of the
respondent- workers?

Answer: Respondent-Contractors are labor-only contractors. There is no evidence showing

that respondent-contractors are independent contractors. The respondent-contractors,
DFI, and DARBMUPCO did not offer any proof that respondent-contractors were not
engaged in labor-only contracting. The word ‘independent contractor’ means 'one who
exercises independent employment and contracts to do a piece of work according to his
own methods and without being subject to control of his employer except as to result of the
work.' Furthermore, if the employer claims that the workmen is an independent contractor,
for whose acts he is not responsible, the burden is on him to show his independence. Also,
judicial admissions made by parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other
proceedings in the same case are conclusive and so does not require further evidence to
prove them. Here, the respondent- contractors voluntarily pleaded that they are labor-only
contractors; hence, these admissions bind them.

DFI is the principal. This Court has constantly adhered to the "four-fold test" to determine
whether there exists an employer-employee relationship between the parties.1âwphi1 The
four elements of an employment relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of the
employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the power to
control the employee’s conduct.

Of these four elements, it is the power to control which is the most crucial and most
determinative factor, so important, in fact, that, the other elements may even be
disregarded.

That DFI is the employer of the respondent-workers is bolstered by the CA’s finding that
DFI exercises control over the respondent-workers. DFI, through its manager and
supervisors provides for the work assignments and performance targets of the respondent-
workers. The managers and supervisors also have the power to directly hire and terminate
the respondent-workers. Evidently, DFI wields control over the respondent-workers.
(Diamond Farms, Inc., vs. Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL)-Workers
Solidarity of DARBMUPCO/DIAMOND-SPFL, et. Al., GR Nos. 173254-55 and 173263)

Question: On 23 February 2006, petitioner Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. (Manila
Memorial) entered into a Contract of Services with respondent Ward Trading and Services
(Ward Trading). The Contract of Services provided that Ward Trading, as an independent
contractor, will render interment and exhumation services and other related work to
Manila Memorial in order to supplement operations at Manila Memorial Park, Paranaque
City. The employees of Ward Trading worked six days a week for eight hours daily and
were paid P250 per day. Respondents alleged that they asked Manila Memorial to consider
them as regular workers within the appropriate bargaining unit established in the
collective bargaining agreement by Manila Memorial and its union, the Manila Memorial
Park Free Workers Union (MMP Union). Manila Memorial refused the request since
respondents were employed by Ward Trading, an independent labor contractor.
Thereafter, respondents joined the MMP Union. The MMP Union, on behalf of respondents,
sought their regularization which Manila Memorial again declined. Respondents then filed
the complaint. Does an employer-employee relationship exist between Manila Memorial
and respondents?

Answer: YES. A closer look at the Contract of Services reveals that Ward Trading does not
have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machinery, work
premises and other materials since it is Manila Memorial. Respondent Ward is still subject
to petitioner's control as it specifically provides that although Ward shall be in charge of
the supervision over individual respondents, the exercise of its supervisory function is
heavily dependent upon the needs of petitioner Memorial Park. The provisions of the
Service Contract leaves respondent Ward at the mercy of petitioner Memorial Park as the
contract states that the latter may take over if it finds any part of the services to be below
its expectations, including the manner of its performance. Thus, the presumption that Ward
Trading is a labor-only contractor stands. Consequently, Manila Memorial is deemed the
employer of respondents. (Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., vs. Luz, et. al., GR No.
208451, February 03, 2016)

Question: Complainants allege that they are former employees directly hired by
respondent Coca-Cola on different dates from 1984 up to 2000, assigned as regular Route
Helpers under the direct supervision of the Route Sales Supervisors. Their duties consist of
distributing bottled Coca-Cola products to the stores and customers in their assigned
areas/routes. After working for quite sometime as directly-hired employees of Coca-Cola,
complainants were allegedly transferred successively as agency workers to the following
manpower agencies, namely, Lipercon Services, Inc., People's Services, Inc., ROMAC, and
the latest being respondent Interserve Management and Manpower Resources, Inc.
Complainants allege that the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) conducted an
inspection of Coca-Cola to determine whether it is complying with the various mandated
labor standards, and relative thereto, they were declared to be regular employees of Coca-
Cola, which was held liable to pay complainants the underpayment of their 13th month
pay, emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA), and other claims. While admitting
employer-employee relationship with the complainants, nonetheless, respondent
Interserve avers that complainants are not its regular employees as they were allegedly
mere contractual workers whose employment depends on the service contracts with the
clients and the moment the latter sever said contracts, respondent has allegedly no choice
but to either deploy the complainants to other principals, and if the latter are unavailable,
respondent cannot allegedly be compelled to retain them. Who is the employer of the
complainants?
Answer: The contractor, not the employee, has the burden of proof that it has the
substantial capital, investment, and tool to engage in job contracting. Although not the
contractor itself (since Interserve no longer appealed the judgment against it by the Labor
Arbiter), said burden of proof herein falls upon petitioner who is invoking the supposed
status of Interserve as an independent job contractor. It is, thus, evident that Interserve
falls under the definition of a labor-only contractor, under Article 106 of the Labor Code; as
well as Section 5(1) of the Rules Implementing Articles 106-109 of the Labor Code, as
amended. As for the certification issued by the DOLE stating that Interserve was an
independent job contractor, the Court ruled: The certification issued by the DOLE stating
that Interserve is an independent job contractor does not sway this Court to take it at face
value, since the primary purpose stated in the Articles of Incorporation of Interserve is
misleading. According to its Articles of Incorporation, the principal business of Interserve is
to provide janitorial and allied services. The delivery and distribution of Coca-Cola
products, the work for which respondents were employed and assigned to petitioner, were
in no way allied to janitorial services. (Quintanar, et., al., vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers,
Philippines, GR No. 210565, June 28, 2016)

B. Termination of Employment
1. Termination by Employee
a. Resignation versus Constructive dismissal
Question: La Suerte is a recruitment agency duly authorized by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) to deploy workers for overseas employment. On
March 20, 2009, La Suerte hired Iladan to work as a domestic helper in Hongkong for a
period of two years with a monthly salary of HK$3,580.00. On July 20, 2009, Iladan was
deployed to her principal employer in Hongkong, Domestic Services International
(Domestic Services), to work as domestic helper for Ms. Muk Sun Fan. On July 28, 2009 or
barely eight days into her job, Iladan executed a handwritten resignation letter. On August
6, 2009, in consideration of P35,000.00 financial assistance given by Domestic Services,
Iladan signed an Affidavit of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim duly subscribed before Labor
Attache Leonida V. Romulo (Labor Attache Romulo) of the Philippine Consulate General in
Hongkong. On the same date, an Agreement, was signed by Iladan, Conciliator-Mediator
Maria Larisa Q. Diaz (Conciliator-Mediator Diaz) and a representative of Domestic Services,
whereby Iladan acknowledged that her acceptance of the financial assistance would
constitute as final settlement of her contractual claims and waiver of any cause of action
against respondents and Domestic Services. The Agreement was also subscribed before
Labor Attache Romulo. On August 10, 2009, Iladan returned to the Philippines. Thereafter,
or on November 23, 2009, Iladan filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, refund of placement
fee, payment of salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contract, as well as
moral and exemplary damages, against respondents. Was Illadan illegally dismissed?
Answer: NO. In illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of proving that the
employee's dismissal was legal. However, to discharge this burden, the employee must first
prove, by substantial evidence, that he had been dismissed from employment. It is a settled
jurisprudence that it is incumbent upon an employee to prove that his resignation is not
voluntary. However, Iladan did not adduce any competent evidence to prove that
respondents used force and threat. For intimidation to vitiate consent, the following
requisites must be present; (1) that the intimidation paused the consent to be given; (2)
that the threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real or serious, there
being evident disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men can offer,
leading to the choice of doing the act which is forced on the person to do as the lesser evil;
and (4) that it produces a well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from whom it
comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury to his person or
property. In the instant case, not one of these essential elements was amply proven by
[Iladan]. Proof of an irregularity in execution of the Quitclaim is absolutely essential. The
Agreement likewise bears the signature of Conciliator-Mediator Diaz. Thus, the signatures
of these officials sufficiently prove that Iladan was duly assisted when she signed the
waiver and settlement. Concededly, the presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. In this case, no
such evidence was presented. (Iladan vs. La Suerte International Manpower Agency,
Inc., and Lao, GR No. 203882, January 11, 2016)
Question: The case stems from a complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary claims filed
by Teodora F. Campo (respondent) against the petitioners, wherein she claimed that she
worked for STWC as a weaving machine operator beginning June 11, 1999, until she was
unlawfully dismissed from employment on November 21, 2010. Prior to her dismissal, she
was suspended for one week beginning November 14, 2010 after a stitching machine that
she was operating overheated and emitted smoke on November 13, 2010. When the
respondent tried to report back to work on November 21, 2010, she was denied entry by
the STWC's security guard, reportedly upon the instructions of Arcenal. For their defense,
the petitioners argued that the respondent, who was hired only in June 2009, voluntarily
resigned from STWC after she was reprimanded for poor job performance. They submitted
a handwritten resignation letter allegedly executed by the respondent on November 13,
2010, together with the Waiver, Release and Quitclaims Statement that she supposedly
signed following her receipt of P30,000.00 from STWC. The respondent, however, denied
having executed the resignation letter, the quitclaim, and the supposed receipt of the
P30,000.00. Was respondent illegally dismissed?

Answer: YES. Anent the foregoing circumstances, it is well-settled by jurisprudence that in

labor cases, "the employer has the burden of proving that the employee was not dismissed,
or, if dismissed, that the dismissal was not illegal." In illegal dismissal cases,
fundamental is the rule that when an employer interposes the defense of
resignation, on him necessarily rests the burden to prove that the employee indeed
voluntarily resigned. The authenticity and due execution of the undated Waiver,
Release and Quitclaims Statement purportedly signed by the respondent was also
not sufficiently established. The QDR was not conclusive on the issue of its genuineness.
Even granting that such document was actually executed by the respondent, its execution
was not fatal to the respondent's case for illegal dismissal. The finding of illegal dismissal
could still stand, as jurisprudence provides that "[a]n employee's execution of a final
settlement and receipt of amounts agreed upon do not foreclose his right to pursue a claim
for illegal dismissal." (Silvertex Weaving Corporation/Arcenal/Ong vs. Campo, GR No.
211411, March 16, 2016)

Question: Respondent Elizabeth Villa brought against the petitioner her complaint for
illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, nonpayment of overtime pay, and nonpayment of
service incentive leave pay. The petitioner averred that after the administrative hearing she
was found to have violated the company rule on the timely issuance of the invoices that had
resulted in delay in the payment of buyers considering that the payment had depended
upon the receipt of the invoices; that she had been suspended from her employment as a
consequence; that after serving the suspension, she had returned to work and had followed
up her application for retirement with Lucina de Guzman, who had then informed her that
the management did not approve the benefits equivalent to 86% of her salary rate applied
for, but only 1/2 month for every year of service; and that disappointed with the outcome,
she had then brought her complaint against the petitioners. Was Villa illegally dismissed?
Answer: Villa's application for early retirement did not manifest her intention to sever the
employer- employee relationship. Although she applied for early retirement, she did so
upon the belief that she would receive a higher benefit based on the petitioner's offer. As
such, her consent to be retired could not be fairly deemed to have been knowingly and
freely given.
Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of both the employer and the employee based on
their voluntary agreement that upon reaching a certain age, the employee agrees to sever
his employment. The employee's intent is decisive. In determining such intent, the relevant
parameters to consider are the fairness of the process governing the retirement decision,
the payment of stipulated benefits, and the absence of badges of intimidation or coercion.
In case of early retirement programs, the offer of benefits must be certain while the
acceptance to be retired should be absolute. The acceptance by the employees
contemplated herein must be explicit, voluntary, free and uncompelled.
In Jaculbe v. Silliman University, we elucidated that: [A]n employer is free to impose a
retirement age less than 65 for as long as it has the employees' consent. Stated conversely,
employees are free to accept the employer's offer to lower the retirement age if they
feel they can get a better deal with the retirement plan presented by the employer.
Thus, having terminated petitioner solely on the basis of a provision of a retirement
plan which was not freely assented to by her, respondent was guilty of illegal
dismissal.
Under the circumstances, the CA did not err in declaring the petitioner guilty of illegal
dismissal for violating Article 282 of the Labor Code and the twin notice rule.

Question: Under what circumstances may an employee be entitled to overtime pay?

Answer: Entitlement to overtime pay must first be established by proof that the overtime
work was actually performed before the employee may properly claim the benefit. The
burden of proving entitlement to overtime pay rests on the employee because the benefit is
not incurred in the normal course of business. Failure to prove such actual performance
transgresses the principles of fair play and equity.
Section 4(c), Rule I, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code relevantly
states as follows:
Section 4. Principles in determining hours worked. – The following general principles
shall govern in determining whether the time spent by an employee is considered
hours worked for purposes of this Rule:
(a) x x x.
 (b) x x x.
 (c) If the work performed was necessary, or it benefited the
employer, or the employee could not abandon his work at the end of his normal
working hours because he had no replacement, all time spent for such work shall
be considered as hours worked, if the work was with the knowledge of his
employer or immediate supervisor. (bold emphasis supplied)
 (d) x x x. (Robina
Farms Cebu/Universal Robina Corporation vs. Villa, GR No. 175869, April 18,
2016)

Question: For almost 22 years, Mina was a high school teacher enjoying a
permanent status in DWCL’s high school department. In 2002, he was appointed as
an associate professor at the college department but shortly thereafter, or on June 1,
2003, he was appointed as a college laboratory custodian. He was also divested of
his teaching load. His appointment even became contractual in nature and was
subject to automatic termination after one year "without any further notification."
Aside from this, Mina was the only one among the high school teachers transferred
to the college department who was divested of teaching load. Does this tantamount
to constructive dismissal?
Answer: YES. Constructive dismissal is a dismissal in disguise. There is cessation of
work in constructive dismissal because ‘"continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a
diminution in pay’ and other benefits." To be considered as such, an act must be a
display of utter discrimination or insensibility on the part of the employer so intense
that it becomes unbearable for the employee to continue with his employment. The
law recognizes and resolves this situation in favor of employees in order to protect
their rights and interests from the coercive acts of the employer. Clearly, Mina’s new
duties as laboratory custodian were merely perfunctory and a far cry from his
previous teaching job, which involved the use of his mental faculties. And while
there was no proof adduced showing that his salaries and benefits were diminished,
there was clearly a demotion in rank. (Divine Word College of Laoag vs. Mina, GR
No. 195155, April 13 2016)

Question: Respondent Jerwin Casiño (Casiño) was hired by petitioner in 2009 as

Stock Custodian and Cook in the latter's Kubong Sawali Restaurant. Upon discovery
of theft involving company property where respondent was allegedly a conspirator,
a criminal complaint for qualified theft against him and his co-employees was filed
on November 26, 2012 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City.
Additionally, he and his co-employees were preventively suspended indefinitely
pending investigation. He was informed of the suspension through a Memorandum
Order dated November 27, 2012, effective November 28, 2012, by the restaurant's
Human Resource Manager, Henry Revilla. Meanwhile, the criminal complaint for
qualified theft was later dismissed for lack of basis. On May 17, 2013, respondent
filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, and non-
payment of monetary benefits. For his part, petitioner denies having dismissed
respondent, arguing that they were prevented from completing the investigation
because respondent stopped reporting for work after Reynante Camba, his co-
employee, was arrested. This, according to petitioner, prevented him from
complying with the twin-notice rule. Was respondent constructively dismissed?
Answer: YES. An employee is considered to be constructively dismissed from
service if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer has
become so unbearable to the employee as to leave him or her with no option but to
forego with his or her continued employment. From said definition, it can be
gathered that various situations, whereby the employee is intentionally placed by
the employer in a situation which will result in the former's being coerced into
severing his ties with the latter, can result in constructive dismissal. One such
situation is where an employee is preventively suspended pending investigation for
an indefinite period of time. To be valid, however, not only must the preventive
suspension be imposed pursuant to Section 8, it must also follow the 30-day limit
exacted under the succeeding Section 9 of the Rule. Thus: Section 9. Period of
suspension. No preventive suspension shall last longer than thirty (30) days. The
employer shall thereafter reinstate the worker in his former or in a substantially
 equivalent position or the employer may extend the period of suspension provided
that during the period of extension, he pays the wages and other benefits due to the
worker. In such case, the worker shall not be bound to reimburse the amount paid to
him during the extension if the employer decides, alter completion of the healing, to
dismiss the worker. Here, there is no inquiry on the propriety of petitioner's resort
to the imposition of a preventive suspension. What is now in question is the fact that
respondent was preventively suspended by petitioner for an indefinite period of
time and whether the imposition of indefinite preventive suspension is tantamount
to constructive dismissal. (Agcolicol, Jr., vs. Casino, GR No. 217732, June 15, 2016)

3. Termination by Employer
a. Just Causes
Jonas Michael R. Garza v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., et al. G.R. No. 180972. January
20, 2014: The burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for valid cause.
Unsubstantiated accusations or baseless conclusions of the employer are insufficient legal
justifications to dismiss an employee. “The unflinching rule in illegal dismissal cases is that
the employer bears the burden of proof.” Embezzlement and failure to remit collections can
only be sustained if the employee actually collected the amounts due to the company.

Question: Can an employee’s previous infractions be considered in terminating his

employment?
Answer: NO. - In the case of Filipio v. The Honorable Minister Blas F. Ople, the Court,
quoting then Labor Minister Ople, ruled that past infractions for which the employee has
suffered the corresponding penalty for each violation cannot be used as a justification for
the employees dismissal for that would penalize him twice for the same offense. At most, it
was explained, these collective infractions could be used as supporting justification to a
subsequent similar offense. In contrast, the petitioners in the case at bar did not impose
any punishment for the numerous absences and tardiness of respondent. Thus, said
infractions can be used collectively by petitioners as a ground for dismissal. (Michael Press
vs. Galit 545 SCRA 23, G. R. No. 153510 February 13, 2008)

b. Serious Misconduct
i. Requisites:
1. The misconduct must be serious;
2. It must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties; and
3. It must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the
employer.

Question: On November 14, 2005, CPMPC hired Carbonilla, Jr. as a Credit and Collection
Manager. Sometime in 2007, CPMPC underwent a reorganization whereby Carbonilla, Jr.
was also assigned to perform the duties of Human Resources Department (HRD) Manager.
In 2008, he was appointed as Legal Officer and subsequently, held the position of Legal and
Collection Manager. However, beginning February 2008, CPMPC, through its HRD Manager,
Ma. Theresa R. Marquez (HRD Manager Marquez), sent various memoranda to Carbonilla,
Jr. seeking explanation on the various infractions he allegedly committed. Unconvinced by
Carbonilla, Jr.'s explanations, CPMPC scheduled several clarificatory hearings, but the
former failed to attend despite due notice. Later, CPMPC conducted a formal investigation
where it ultimately found Carbonilla, Jr. to have committed acts prejudicial to CPMPC's
interests. As such, CPMPC, CEO Quevedo, sent Carbonilla, Jr. a Notice of Dismissal dated
August 5, 2008 informing the latter of his termination on the grounds of: (a) loss of trust
and confidence; (b) gross disrespect; (c) serious misconduct; (d) gross negligence; (e)
commission of a crime of falsification/inducing Aguipo to violate the law or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code; and (e) committing acts highly prejudicial to the interest
of the cooperative. Consequently, Carbonilla, Jr. filed the instant case for illegal dismissal,
non-payment of salaries, 13th month pay, as well as damages and backawages, against
CPMPC.In defense, CPMPC maintained that the totality of Carbonilla, Jr.'s infractions was
sufficient to warrant his dismissal, and that it had complied with the procedural due
process in terminating him. Did Carbonilla’s acts constitute serious misconduct and loss of
trust and confidence?
Answer: Misconduct as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character and implies wrongful intent and not
mere error in judgment. For misconduct to be considered as a just cause for termination,
the following requisites must concur: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate
to the performance of the employee's duties showing that the employee has become unfit
to continue working for the employer; and (c) it must have been performed with wrongful
intent. All of the foregoing requisites have been duly established in this case.
Records reveal that Carbonilla, Jr. s serious misconduct consisted of him frequently
exhibiting disrespectful and belligerent behavior, not only to his colleagues, but also to his
superiors. He even used his stature as a law graduate to insist that he is "above" them, often
using misguided legalese to weasel his way out of the charges against him, as well as to
strong-arm his colleagues and superiors into succumbing to his arrogance
For another, Carbonilla, Jr.'s dismissal was also justified on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence. According to jurisprudence, loss of trust and confidence will validate an
employee's dismissal when it is shown that: (a) the employee concerned holds a position of
trust and confidence; and ( b) he performs an act that would justify such loss of trust and
confidence. There are two (2) classes of positions of trust: first, managerial employees
whose primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which they are
employed or of a department or a subdivision thereof, and to other officers or members of
the managerial staff; and second, fiduciary rank-and-file employees, such as cashiers,
auditors, property custodians, or those who, in the normal exercise of their functions,
regularly handle significant amounts of money or property. These employees, though rank-
and-file, are routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer's money or
property, and are thus classified as occupying positions of trust and confidence.
The totality and gravity of Carbonilla, Jr. 's infractions throughout the course of his
employment completely justified CPMPC's decision to finally terminate his employment.
The Court's pronouncement in Realda v. New Age Graphics, Inc. is instructive on this matter,
to wit: The totality of infractions or the number of violations committed during the
period of employment shall be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed
upon an erring employee. The offenses committed by petitioner should not be taken
singly and separately. Fitness for continued employment cannot be
compartmentalized into tight little cubicles of aspects of character, conduct and
ability separate and independent of each other. Indeed, the employer cannot be
compelled to retain a misbehaving employee, or one who is guilty of acts inimical to
its interests. (Cebu People’s Multi-purpose Cooperative and Quevedo vs. Carbonilla, Jr.,
GR No. 212070, January 27, 2016)

Question: In February 2000, respondent Pacific Concord Container Lines (Pacific

Concord), a domestic corporation engaged in cargo forwarding, hired the petitioner as an
Account Executive/Marketing Assistant. In January 2002, Pacific Concord promoted her as
a sales manager with the monthly salary rate of P25,000.00, and provided her with a brand
new Toyota Altis plus gasoline allowance. On November 8, 2002, she reported for work at
9:00 a.m. and left the company premises at around 10:30 a.m. to make client calls. At 1:14
p.m. of that day, she received the following text message from respondent Monette Cuenca
advising her that she was no longer connected with Pacific Concord. The petitioner
immediately tried to contact Cuenca, but the latter refused to take her calls. On the same
day, the petitioner learned from clients and friends that the respondents had disseminated
notices, flyers and memos informing all clients of Pacific Concord that she was no longer
connected with the company as of November 8, 2002. Pacific Concord also caused the
publication of the notice to the public in the Sunstar Daily issue of December 15, 2002. Does
Pacific Concord have sufficient grounds to terminate petitioner for breach of trust and
confidence?
Answer: NO. Article 282(c) of the Labor Code authorizes an employer to dismiss an
employee for committing fraud, or for willful breach of the trust reposed by the employer.
However, loss of confidence is never intended to provide the employer with a blank check
for terminating its employee. For this to be a valid ground for the termination of the
employee, the employer must establish that: (1) the employee must be holding a position of
trust and confidence; and (2) the act complained against would justify the loss of trust and
confidence. There are two classes of employees vested with trust and confidence. To the
first class belong the managerial employees or those vested with the powers or
prerogatives to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial
actions. Considering that the petitioner’s duties related to the sales of forwarding
services offered by Pacific Concord, her calling other forwarding companies to
inquire for vacant positions did not breach the trust reposed in her as sales manager.
Such act, being at worst a simple act of indiscretion, did not constitute the betrayal of
trust that merited the extreme penalty of dismissal from employment. (Lagahit vs.
Pacific Concord Container/Monette Cuenca (Branch Manager), GR No. 177680, January
13, 2016)

Question: Cadiz was the Human Resource Officer of respondent Brent Hospital and
Colleges, Inc. (Brent) at the time of her indefinite suspension from employment in 2006.
The cause of suspension was Cadiz's Unprofessionalism and Unethical Behavior Resulting
to Unwed Pregnancy. It appears that Cadiz became pregnant out of wedlock, and Brent
imposed the suspension until such time that she marries her boyfriend in accordance with
law. Cadiz then filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice,
Constructive Dismissal, Non-Payment of Wages and Damages with prayer for
Reinstatement. Was Cadiz illegally dismissed?
Answer: YES. The foregoing circumstances, however, do not readily equate to disgraceful
and immoral conduct. Brent's Policy Manual and Employee's Manual of Policies do not
define what constitutes immorality; it simply stated immorality as a ground for disciplinary
action. Instead, Brent erroneously relied on the standard dictionary definition of
fornication as a form of illicit relation and proceeded to conclude that Cadiz's acts fell
under such classification, thus constituting immorality. Jurisprudence has already set the
standard of morality with which an act should be gauged - it is public and secular, not
religious. Whether a conduct is considered disgraceful or immoral should be made in
accordance with the prevailing norms of conduct, which, as stated in Leus, refer to those
conducts which are proscribed because they are detrimental to conditions upon which
depend the existence and progress of human society. The fact that a particular act does
not conform to the traditional moral views of a certain sectarian institution is not sufficient
reason to qualify such act as immoral unless it, likewise, does not conform to public and
secular standards. More importantly, there must be substantial evidence to establish that
premarital sexual relations and pregnancy out of wedlock is considered disgraceful or
immoral. (Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, GR No. 187417, February 24,
2016)
Question: On November 25, 1985, respondent was initially employed by petitioner
Premiere Development Bank (now Security Bank Savings Corporation [SBSC]) as
messenger until his promotion as loans processor at its Sangandaan Branch.
Thereafter, he was appointed as Acting Branch Accountant and, in June 2007, as
Acting Branch Manager. On March 26, 2008, he was assigned to its Quezon Avenue
Branch under the supervision of Branch Manager Corazon Pinero (Pinero) and held
the position of Customer Service Operations Head (CSOH) tasked with the
safekeeping of its checkbooks and other bank forms. On July 22, 2008, respondent
received a show-cause memorandum from Ms. Ruby O. Go, head of West Regional
Operations, charging him of violating the bank's Code of Conduct when he
mishandled various checkbooks under his custody. The matter was referred to
SBSC's Investigation Committee which discovered, among others, that as of July 11,
2008, forty-one (41) pre-encoded checkbooks of the Quezon Avenue Branch were
missing. Can separation pay be given despite the validity of the employee’s
dismissal?
Answer: The grant of separation pay to a dismissed employee is primarily
determined by the cause of the dismissal. In the case at bar, respondent's
established act of repeatedly allowing Branch Manager Pinero to bring the
checkbooks and bank forms outside of the bank's premises in violation of the
company's rules and regulations had already been declared by the LA to be gross
and habitual neglect of duty under Article 282 of the Labor Code. The infractions,
while not clearly indicative of any wrongful intent, is, nonetheless, serious in nature
when one considers the employee's functions, rendering it inequitable to award
separation pay based on social justice. It bears stressing that the banking industry is
imbued with public interest. All throughout, there is no showing that he questioned
the acts of Branch Manager Pinero; neither did he take it upon himself to report said
irregularities to a higher authority. Hence, under these circumstances, the award of
separation pay based on social justice would be improper. (Security Bank Savings
Corporation vs. Singson, GR No.214230, February 10, 2016)
c. Willful Disobedience or Insubordination
ii. Requisites:
1. The employee’s assailed conduct has been willful or intentional, the willfulness
being characterized by a “wrongful and perverse attitude”; and
2. In connection to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.

Question: Puncia alleged that since 2004, he worked as a messenger/collector for

Toyota and was later on appointed on March 2, 2011 as a Marketing Professional
tasked to sell seven (7) vehicles as monthly quota. However, Puncia failed to comply
and sold only one (1) vehicle for the month of July and none for August, prompting
Toyota to send him a Notice to Explain. Thereafter, a hearing was conducted but
Puncia failed to appear despite notice. On October 18, 2011, Toyota sent Puncia a
Notice of Termination, dismissing him on the ground of insubordination for his
failure to attend the scheduled hearing and justify his absence. This prompted
Puncia to file a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and
payment of backwages, unfair labor practice, damages, and attorney's fees against
Toyota and its officers. Is failure to meet monthly sales quota tantamount to gross
insubordination?
Answer: YES. n this regard, case law instructs that "gross inefficiency" is analogous
to "gross neglect of duty," a just cause of dismissal under Article 297 of the Labor
Code, for both involve specific acts of omission on the part of the employee resulting
in damage to the employer or to his business. In Aliling v. Feliciano, the Court held
that an employer is entitled to impose productivity standards for its employees, and
the latter's non-compliance therewith can lead to his termination from work. [T]he
practice of a company in laying off workers because they failed to make the work
quota has been recognized in this jurisdiction, x x x. In the case at bar, the
petitioners' failure to meet the sales quota assigned to each of them constitute
a just cause of their dismissal, regardless of the permanent or probationary status
of their employment. Failure to observe prescribed standards of work, or to
fulfill reasonable work assignments due to inefficiency may constitute just
cause for dismissal. Such inefficiency is understood to mean failure to attain
work goals or work quotas, either by failing to complete the same within the
allotted reasonable period, or by producing unsatisfactory results.
Indisputably, Toyota complied with the substantive due process requirement as
there was indeed just cause for Puncia's termination. While Toyota afforded
Puncia the opportunity to refute the charge of gross inefficiency against him,
the latter was completely deprived of the same when he was dismissed for
gross insubordination - a completely different ground from what was stated in
the Notice to Explain. As such, Puncia's right to procedural due process was
violated. Hence, considering that Toyota had dismissed Puncia for a just cause,
albeit failed to comply with the proper procedural requirements. (Puncia vs. Toyota
Shaw/Pasig, Inc., GR No. 214399, June 28, 2016)

d. Gross and Habitual Neglect of Duties

i. In order to constitute a just cause for the employee’s dismissal, the neglect of
duties must not only be gross but also habitual.
 ii. Gross Neglect – means an absence of that diligence that an ordinarily prudent
man would use in his own affairs.
iii. Habitual Neglect – implies repeated failure to perform one’s duties over a
period of time, depending upon the circumstances.
iv. Forms of Neglect of Duty
1. Habitual Tardiness and absenteeism;
2. Abandonment of work
a. Requisites:
i. Failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and
ii. Clear intention to sever ER-EE relationship being manifested by some overt
acts.
b. Due Process in Abandonment
1. First Notice directing the employee to explain why he should not be declared as
having abandoned his job;
2. Second Notice to inform him of the employer’s decision to dismiss him on the
ground of abandonment.
e. Fraud or Willful Breach of Trust
i. Requisites for Fraud:
1. Fraud must be committed against the employer or his representative; and
2. In connection with the employee’s work.
ii. Requisites for the Doctrine of Loss of Confidence to Apply
1. Loss of Confidence should not be simulated;
2. Not used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified;
3. Not arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary;
4. Must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad
faith; and
5. The employee involved holds a position of trust and confidence.
f. Commission of a Crime or Offense
Refers to an offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative and thus,
the conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is not analogous thereto as the
element of relation to his work or to his employer is lacking.
Note: the conviction of the employee in a criminal case is not necessary to warrant
his dismissal by the employer.
g. Analogous Cases
Must be due to the voluntary and/or willful act or omission of the employee.
Examples:
1. Violation of company rules and regulations
2. Drunkenness
3. Gross inefficiency analogous to gross neglect of duty

Question: Is the employee’s failure to meet a company imposed quota equivalent to gross
inefficiency?
Answer: - In fine, an employee’s failure to meet sales or work quotas falls under the
concept of gross inefficiency, which in turn is analogous to gross neglect of duty that is a
just cause for dismissal under Article 282 of the Code. However, in order for the quota
imposed to be considered a valid productivity standard and thereby validate a dismissal,
managements prerogative of fixing the quota must be exercised in good faith for the
advancement of its interest. The duty to prove good faith, however, rests with WWWEC as
part of its burden to show that the dismissal was for a just cause. WWWEC must show that
such quota was imposed in good faith. (Aliling vs. Feliciano 671 SCRA 186, G.R. No.
185819, April 25, 2012)

h. Authorized Causes
a. Automation / Robotics – installation of labor-saving devices.
b. Redundancy – exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is
reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise.
i. Requisites of a Valid Redundancy Program:
1. Good faith of the employer in abolishing the redundant positions; and
2. Fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared
redundant such as but not limited to:
a. Preferred status;
b. Efficiency; and
c. Seniority
c. Retrenchment (Downsizing)
i. Reduction of personnel usually due to poor financial returns so as to cut down
on costs of operations in terms of salaries and wages to prevent bankruptcy of
the company.
ii. Linked with losses; it is a cost-cutting measure made immediately necessary by
business reduction or reverses.
1. Requirements for Valid Retrenchment
a. Retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business
losses, which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but
substantial, serious, actual and real, or if only expected, are reasonably
imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer;
b. The employer served written notice both to the employees and to the
DOLE at least one (1) month prior to the intended date of retrenchment;
c. The employer pays the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to
one month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service;
d. The employer exercises it prerogative to retrench employees in good faith
for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the
employees’ right to security of tenure; and
e. The employer used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would
be dismissed and who would be retained among the employees, such as
status, efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age and financial hardship for
certain workers.
Question: Arriola, a licensed general surgeon, was offered by SNC-Lavalin, through
its letter, dated May 1, 2008, the position of Safety Officer in its Ambatovy Project
site in Madagascar. After three months, Arriola received a notice of pre-termination
of employment, dated September 9, 2009, from SNC-Lavalin. It stated that his
employment would be pre-terminated effective September 11, 2009 due to
diminishing workload in the area of his expertise and the unavailability of
alternative assignments. Consequently, on September 15, 2009, Arriola was
repatriated.Aggrieved, Arriola filed a complaint against the petitioners, among
others,for illegal dismissal. The petitioners denied the charge of illegal dismissal
against them. They claimed that SNC-Lavalin was greatly affected by the global
financial crises during the latter part of 2008. The economy of Madagascar, where
SNC-Lavalin had business sites, also slowed down. Was the authorized cause for
dismissal proven?
Answer: NO. The Court finds that Arriola was not validly dismissed. The petitioners
simply argued that they were suffering from financial losses and Arriola had to be
dismissed. It was not even clear what specific authorized cause, whether
retrenchment or redundancy, was used to justify Arriola's dismissal. Worse, the
petitioners did not even present a single credible evidence to support their claim of
financial loss. (Industrial Personnel & Management Services, Inc., et. al., vs. De
Vera and Arriola, GR No. 205703, March 07, 2016)

Question: PAL and Synergy Services Corporation (Synergy) entered into a station
services agreement and a janitorial services agreement whereby Synergy provided
janitors and station attendants to PAL at Mactan airport. Respondents were among
the personnel of Synergy posted at PAL to carry out the contracted tasks. Claiming
to be performing duties directly desirable and necessary to the business of PAL, the
respondents, along with 12 other co-employees, filed complaints for regularization
of their status as employees of PAL, underpayment of salaries and non-payment of
premium pay for holidays, premium pay for rest days, service incentive leave pay,
13th month pay and allowances. Meanwhile, while the above regularization cases
were pending in the CA, PAL terminated its service agreements with Synergy
effective June 30, 1998, alleging serious business losses. Consequently, Synergy also
terminated its employment contracts with the respondents, who forthwith filed
individual complaints for illegal dismissal against PAL. PAL in turn filed a third-
party complaint against Synergy. Was there valid retrenchment?
Answer: NO. The Court held that PAL failed to establish such economic losses which
rendered impossible its compliance with the order to accept the respondent as
regular employees. While retrenchment is a valid exercise of management
prerogative, it is well settled that economic losses as a ground for dismissing an
employee is factual in nature, and in order for a retrenchment scheme to be valid, all
of the following elements under Article 283 of the Labor Code must concur or be
present, to wit:
. (1) That retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent
business losses which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but
substantial, serious, actual and real, or if only expected, are reasonably
imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer; 

. (2) That the employer served written notice both to the employees and to
the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the
intended date of retrenchment; 

(3) That the employer pays the retrenched employees separation pay
 equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half QA) month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher
(4) That the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in
good faith for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent
the employees' right to security of tenure; and,
(5) That the employer uses fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who
would be dismissed and who would be retained among the employees, such
as status, efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial hardship for
certain workers.
The absence of one element renders the retrenchment scheme an irregular exercise
of management prerogative. The employer's obligation to exhaust all other means to
avoid further losses without retrenching its employees is a component of the first
element enumerated above. To impart operational meaning to the constitutional
policy of providing full protection to labor, the employer's prerogative to bring
down labor costs by retrenching must be exercised essentially as a measure of last
resort, after less drastic means have been tried and found wanting. (PAL, Inc. vs.
Ligan, et. al., GR No. 203932, June 08, 2016)

d. Closure or Cessation of Operation of the Establishment or Undertaking

i. Requisites:
1. The decision to close or cease operations should be made in good faith.
2. The purpose should not be to circumvent the provision of Title I, Book Six of
the Labor Code.
3. There is no other option available to the employer except to close or cease
operations.
4. The notice requirement under Art. 289 should be complied with.
5. Separation pay under the law (when not due to serious business losses) or
company policy or CBA or similar contract, when appropriate must be paid to
the affected employees.
ii. Rules:
1. Where closure is due to serious business losses, no separation pay is
required.
2. Where closure is due to an act of the government, the workers are not
entitled to separation pay.
3. Where closure is not due to serious business losses, workers are entitled to
separation pay.
e. Disease
i. Requisites:
1. The employee is suffering from a disease;
2. His continued employment is either prohibited by law, prejudicial to his
health or prejudicial to the health of his co-employees;
3. There is a certification by a competent public health authority that the
disease is of such nature or at such stage that it cannot be cured within a
period of six months even with proper medical treatment.
4. Notice of termination based on this ground should be served to the employee
concerned and the Department of Labor and Employment at least thirty (30)
 days prior to the effectivity of the termination; and
5. Separation pay should be paid to him in the amount equivalent to at least one
month salary or to one-half month salary for every year of service, whichever
is greater, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one (1)
whole year.
f. Other Authorized Causes
i. Total and permanent disability of employee
ii. Valid application of union security clause

Question: Is the Termination of Employment pursuant to a Union Security Clause a

valid cause for dismissal?
Answer: YES. - Another cause for termination is dismissal from employment due to
the enforcement of the union security clause in the CBA. Here, Art. II of the CBA on
Union security contains the provisions on the Union shop and maintenance of
membership shop. There is union shop when all new regular employees are
required to join the union within a certain period as a condition for their continued
employment. There is maintenance of membership shop when employees who are
union members as of the effective date of the agreement, or who thereafter become
members, must maintain union membership as a condition for continued
employment until they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit or the
agreement is terminated. Termination of employment by virtue of a union security
clause embodied in a CBA is recognized and accepted in our jurisdiction. This
practice strengthens the union and prevents disunity in the bargaining unit within
the duration of the CBA. By preventing member disaffiliation with the threat of
expulsion from the union and the consequent termination of employment, the
authorized bargaining representative gains more numbers and strengthens its
position as against other unions which may want to claim majority representation.
(Alabang Country Club, Inc vs. NLRC, 545 SCRA 351 G.R. No 170287 February 14,
2008)

Question: What are its requisites?

Answer: In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union
security clause, the employer needs only to determine and prove that:
(1) the union security clause is applicable;
(2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the
CBA; and
(3) there is sufficient evidence to support the unions decision to expel the employee
from the union. These requisites constitute just cause for terminating an employee
based on the CBAs union security provision.

iii. Expiration of period in term of employment

iv. Completion of project in project employment
v. Failure in probation
vi. Relocation of business to a distant place
vii. Defiance of return-to-work order
viii. Commission of illegal acts in a strike
 ix. Violation of contractual commitment
x. Retirement
1. Due Process
i. Twin-notice requirement
o The employer is required to furnish an employee who is to be dismissed
with two (2) written notices before such termination:
o Pre-Notice – a written notice served on the employee specifying the
material dates and acts committed by him which may constitute as ground
for termination.
o Post-Notice – a written notice of termination served on the employee
indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds
have been established to justify his termination.

Question: When will the two-notice rule not apply?

Answer: Caong v. Regualos, January 26, 2011: The employer’s policy of suspending
drivers who fail to remit the full amount of the boundary was fair and reasonable under the
circumstances. An employer has free rein and enjoys a wide latitude of discretion to
regulate all aspects of employment, including the prerogative to instill discipline on the
employees. Since the case involved a suspension, not a termination, the strict application of
the twin-notice rule is not warranted.

j. Hearing; Ample Opportunity to be heard

o Should be held during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of
counsel, if the employee so desires, is given the opportunity to respond to the
charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him.
o Guiding principles in connection with the hearing requirement in
dismissal cases:
o “Ample opportunity to be heard” means any meaningful opportunity
(verbal or written) given to the employee to answer the charges against
him and submit evidence in support of his defense, whether in a hearing,
conference, or some other fair, just and reasonable way;
o A formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when requested
by the employee in writing or substantial evidentiary dispute exist or a
company rule or practice requires it, or when similar circumstances justify
it; and
o The “ample opportunity to be heard” standard in the Labor Code prevails
over the “hearing or conference” requirement in the implementing rules
and regulations.

Question: Respondent was a full-time nursing instructor at the College of Nursing of

the NDC Tagum Foundation before she was appointed as its dean in 1996. Beginning
1999, she also operated a nursing review and caregiver training center while
simultaneously working at the NDC Tagum Foundation. While respondent was still
under contract with the NDC Tagum Foundation, the University of Mindanao (UM)
engaged her services as consultant for the establishment of the UM's Nursing
Department. In February 2003, she was interviewed for deanship at the UM; and
 within that month, her appointment as full-time program head was approved by the
president of the university. She was also listed as faculty member in the permit
application it submitted to the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). In a letter
dated 11 February 2003, Natavio advised respondent that her engagement with the
UM was in conflict with the interests of the NDC Tagum Foundation, and that it was
an act of disloyalty. Moreover, even her work attendance was already affected. She
was then requested to formally declare her plan to leave the NDC Tagum
Foundation, so it could appoint a new dean. Respondent did not respond to the
letter. On April 2003, she declined the appointment at the UM, as she had decided to
stay with the NDC Tagum Foundation. On 4 September 2003, respondent received
another letter from Natavio requiring the former to explain why she should not be
dismissed on the ground of neglect of duty because of her moonlighting activities.
The letter also stated that respondent not only had poor work attendance, but also
neglected to update the school curriculum. On the following day, respondent
submitted a written explanation denying the charges of neglect. She contended that
she had not received any compensation from the UM; therefore, her work there
could not be considered as moonlighting. She also questioned the timing of the
management's objection to her review and training center, considering that it had
been operational since 1999. On 15 September 2003, petitioners placed respondent
on preventive suspension for five days pending the outcome of the management's
investigation of her supposed moonlighting activities and her reported attempts to
pirate some of the school's instructors for transfer to the UM. In a letter of even date,
Somoso notified respondent of the latter's preventive suspension and directed her
to explain why she should not be dismissed based on the reports. The next day,
respondent submitted a letter denying the latest allegation and seeking a
clarification of her employment status. In addition, she prayed that the
management's decision be made only after a proper investigation. In a letter dated
17 September 2003, petitioners notified her of her dismissal from employment
effective 18 September 2003. Was respondent given the opportunity to be heard?
Answer: NO. In this case, it is not disputed that respondent was terminated from
employment for just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code. The only question to
be determined is whether the procedural due process requirements for a valid
dismissal were complied with. It is settled that a full adversarial hearing or
conference is not required. All that is required is a fair and reasonable opportunity
for the employee to explain the controversy at hand. Clearly, the alleged
opportunities given for her to explain her side, through the letters dated 4 and 15
September 2003, fell short of the minimum standard of what constitutes an
opportunity to be heard in administrative proceedings, i.e., a fair and reasonable
chance to defend oneself against the bases cited for one's dismissal. (NDC Tagum
Foundation, Inc., et. al., vs. Sumakote, GR No. 190644, June 13, 2016)

ii. Reliefs for Illegal Dismissal

Question: The instant case stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal, payment
of backwages and other benefits, and regularization of employment filed by Allan
Lapastora (Lapastora) and Irene Ubalubao (Ubalubao) against Olympic Housing, Inc.
(OHI). Lapastora and Ubalubao alleged that they worked as room attendants of OHI
from March 1995 and June 1997, respectively, until they were placed on floating
status on February 24, 2000, through a memorandum sent by Fast Manpower. To
establish employer-employee relationship with OHI, Lapastora and Ubalubao
alleged that they were directly hired by the company and received salaries directly
from its operations clerk, Myrna Jaylo (Jaylo).

Prior to their dismissal, they were subjected to investigations for their alleged
involvement in the theft of personal items and cash belonging to hotel guests and
were summarily dismissed by OHI despite lack of evidence. For their part, OHI and
Limcaoco alleged that Lapastora and Ubalubao were not employees of the company
but of Fast Manpower, with which it had a contract of services, particularly, for the
provision of room attendants. They claimed that Fast Manpower is an independent
contractor as it (1) renders janitorial services to various establishments in Metro
Manila, with 500 janitors under its employ; (2) maintains an office where janitors
assemble before they are dispatched to their assignments; (3) exercises the right to
select, refuse or change personnel assigned to OHI; and (4) supervises and pays the
wages of its employees. Was Lapastora illegally dismissed?
Answer: YES. Indisputably, Lapastora was a regular employee of OHI. As found by
the LA, he has been under the continuous employ of OHI since March 3, 1995 until
he was placed on floating status in February 2000. His uninterrupted employment
by OHI, lasting for more than a year, manifests the continuing need and desirability
of his services, which characterize regular employment. Article 280 of the Labor
Code provides as follows:
Art. 280. Regular and casual employment. The provisions of written agreement
to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties,
an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been
engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for
a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or
services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the
duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding

paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of
service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular
employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment
shall continue while such activity exists.

Based on records, OHI is engaged in the business of managing residential and

commercial condominium units at the OER. By the nature of its business, it is
imperative that it maintains a pool of housekeeping staff to ensure that the premises
remain an uncluttered place of comfort for the occupants. It is no wonder why
Lapastora, among several others, was continuously employed by OHI precisely
because of the indispensability of their services to its business. The fact alone that
Lapastora was allowed to work for an unbroken period of almost five years is all the
same a reason to consider him a regular employee. On the substantive aspect, it
appears that OHI failed to prove that Lapastora’s dismissal was grounded on a just
or authorized cause.

On the procedural aspect, OHI admittedly failed to observe the twin notice rule in
termination cases. As a rule, the employer is required to furnish the concerned
employee two written notices: (1) a written notice served on the employee
specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said employee
reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side; and (2) a written notice of
termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all
the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination. In the
present case, Lapastora was not informed of the charges against him and was denied
the opportunity to disprove the same. He was summarily terminated from
employment. (Olympia Housing, Inc. vs. Lapastora and Ubalubao, GR No. 187691,
January 13, 2016)

Question: Can an officer of a corporation may be included as judgment obligor in a

labor case for the first time only after the decision of the Labor Arbiter had become
final and executory, and whether the twin doctrines of "piercing the veil of
corporate fiction" and personal liability of company officers in labor cases apply?
Answer: There is no hard and fast rule on when corporate fiction may be
disregarded; instead, each case must be evaluated according to its peculiar
circumstances. For the case at bar, applying the above criteria, a finding of personal
and solidary liability against a corporate officer like Guillermo must be rooted on a
satisfactory showing of fraud, bad faith or malice, or the presence of any of the
justifications for disregarding the corporate fiction. As stated in McLeod, bad faith is
a question of fact and is evidentiary, so that the records must first bear evidence of
malice before a finding of such may be made. It is our finding that such evidence
exists in the record. Like the A. C. Ransom, and Naguiat cases, the case at bar
involves an apparent family corporation. The evidence presented in this case
indicate a pattern or scheme to avoid the obligations to Uson and frustrate the
execution of the judgment award, which this Court, in the interest of justice, will not
countenance. In the case at bar, Uson's allegation was that he was maliciously and
illegally dismissed as an Accounting Supervisor by Guillermo, the Company
President and General Manager, an allegation that was not even disputed by the
latter nor by Royal Class Venture. It raised no intra-corporate relationship issues
between him and the corporation or Guillermo; neither did it raise any issue
regarding the regulation of the corporation. As correctly found by the appellate
court, Uson's complaint and redress sought were centered alone on his dismissal as
an employee, and not upon any other relationship he had with the company or with
Guillermo. Thus, the matter is clearly a labor dispute cognizable by the labor
tribunals. (Guillermo vs. Uson, GR No. 198967, March 07, 2016)

ii. Preventive Suspension

o An employee may be placed under preventive suspension, if:
 o The evidence of guilt is strong and the employer or head of
establishment is convinced that the continued stay of the employee
during the period of investigation constitutes a distraction to the
normal operations of the company; and
o His continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to
life or property of the employer or his co-workers.
o It shall be for a maximum period of thirty (30) days, during which period
the employee placed under preventive suspension is not entitled to any
wages.

b. Retirement

i. Management Prerogative

a. Discipline

b. Transfer of employees
Question: Echo is a provider of warehousing management and delivery services. King 8
Commercial Corporation (King 8), Echo's predecessor, initially employed Cortes and
Somido. Echo thereafter absorbed the respondents as employees. In 2008, Somido was
made a Warehouse Checker, while Cortes, a Forklift Operator. In January of 2009, the
respondents and their co-workers formed Obrero Pilipino-Echo 2000 Commercial
Chapter (Union). Cortes was elected as Vice-President while Somido became an active
member. The respondents claimed that the Union's President, Secretary and one of the
board members were subsequently harassed, discriminated and eventually terminated
from employment by Echo. In May of 2009, Echo received information about shortages
in peso value arising from the movement of products to and from its warehouse. After
an immediate audit, Echo suspected that there was a conspiracy among the employees
in the warehouse. Since an uninterrupted investigation was necessary, Echo, in the
exercise of its management prerogative, decided to re- assign the staff. The respondents
were among those affected. On July 7, 2009, Enriquez issued a memorandum informing
the respondents of their transfer to the Delivery Section, which was within the premises
of Echo's warehouse. The transfer would entail no change in ranks, status and salaries.
On July 14, 2009, Somido wrote Echo a letter indicating his refusal to be promoted as a
"Delivery Supervisor." He explained that he was already happy as a Warehouse Checker.
Further, he was not ready to be a Delivery Supervisor since the position was sensitive
and required more expertise and training, which he did not have. Cortes similarly
declined Echo's offer of promotion claiming that he was contented in his post then as a
Forklift Operator. He also alleged that he would be more productive as an employee if
he remained in his post. He also lacked prior supervisory experience. On July 16, 2009,
Enriquez, sans consent of the respondents, informed the latter of their
assignments/designations, effective July 17, 2009, as Delivery Supervisors. Echo alleged
that the respondents did not perform the new duties assigned to them. Thereafter,
successive memoranda were issued by Echo to the respondents, who refused to
acknowledge receipt and comply with the directives therein. The Memoranda dated July
20, 2009 suspended them without pay for five days for their alleged insubordination.
 The Memoranda dated August 8, 2009 informed them of their termination from
employment, effective August 15, 2009, by reason of their repeated refusal to
acknowledge receipt of Echo's memoranda and flagrant defiance to assume the duties of
Delivery Coordinators. Can the respondents refuse the transfer?

Answer: YES. The offer of transfer is, in legal contemplation, a promotion, which
the respondents validly refused. Such refusal cannot be the basis for the
respondents' dismissal from service. The finding of unfair labor practice and the
award of moral and exemplary damages do not however follow solely by reason
of the dismissal.
Article 212(13) of the Labor Code distinguishes from each other as follows the
concepts of managerial, supervisory and rank-and-file employees:
"Managerial employee" is one who is vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay
down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off,
recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those
who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions
if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but
requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not falling within any of
the above definitions are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of this
Book. (Italics ours)
For promotion to occur, there must be an advancement from one position to another
or an upward vertical movement of the employee's rank or position. Any increase in
salary should only be considered incidental but never determinative of whether or
not a promotion is bestowed upon an employee. An employee is not bound to accept
a promotion, which is in the nature of a gift or reward. Refusal to be promoted is a
valid exercise of a right. Such exercise cannot be considered in law as
insubordination, or willful disobedience of a lawful order of the employer, hence, it
cannot be the basis of an employee's dismissal from service. In the case at bench, a
Warehouse Checker and a Forklift Operator are rank-and-file employees. On the
other hand, the job of a Delivery Supervisor/Coordinator requires the exercise of
discretion and judgment from time to time. Despite the fact that no salary increases
were effected, the assumption of the post of a Delivery Supervisor/Coordinator
should be considered a promotion. The respondents' refusal to accept the same was
therefore valid. (Echo 2000 Commercial Corporation, et. al., vs. Obrero Filipino-
Echo 2000 Chapter-CLO, et. al., GR No. 214092, January 11, 2016)
c. Productivity standard

d. Bonus

e. Change of working hours

f. Marriage between employees of competitor-employers

g. Post-Employment ban

j. Social Welfare Legislation

 a. SSS Law
i. Coverage and Exclusions
ii. Dependents, beneficiaries
iii. Benefits

b. GSIS Law
i. Coverage and Exclusions
ii. Dependents, beneficiaries
iii. Benefits

c. Portability Law

d. Employee’s coverage and when compensable

k. Labor Relations

a. Right to self-organization
i. Who may/may exercise the right
1. Doctrine of necessary implication
ii. Commingling/Mixture of membership

Question: Can both the supervisory and rank-and-file employees be affiliated with
the same labor organization?
Answer: Yes. Samahang Manggagawa Sa Charter Chemical (SMCC-SUPER) v.
Charter Chemical and Coating Corp., March 16, 2011. The mixture of rank-and-file
and supervisory employees in a union does not nullify its legal personality as a
legitimate labor organization.

Question: Can both the supervisory union and the rank-and-file employees’ union
be affiliated with the same labor federation?
Answer: Yes. Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation v. Hon. Secretary of Labor,
August 14, 2011)
As amended by R.A. 9481, the Labor Code now allows a rank and file union and a
supervisory union of the same company to be part of the same federation for the
following reasons:
An employer cannot ignore the existence of a legitimate labor organization at the
time of its voluntary recognition of another union. The employer and the voluntarily
recognized union cannot, by themselves, decide whether the other union
represented an appropriate bargaining unit.
The employer may voluntarily recognize the representation status of a union in
unorganized establishments

San Miguel Foods v. San Miguel Corp. Supervisors and Exempt Union, August 1,
2011: The test of grouping is community or mutuality of interest.There should be
only one bargaining unit for employees involved in “dressed chicken” processing
 and workers engaged in “live chicken” operations.Although they seem separate and
distinct from each other, the tasks of each division are actually interrelated and
there exists mutuality of interests which warrants the formation of a single
bargaining unit.

iii. Rights and Conditions of membership

1. Nature of relationship
i. Member-Labor union
ii. Labor union—Federation
a) Disaffiliation
b) Substitutionary doctrine

iii. Bargaining unit

iv. Bargaining Representative

v. Determination of representation status

b. Rights of labor organization

1. Check Off, Assessment, Agency fees

2. Collective bargaining
1. Duty to bargain collectively
2. Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
Mandatory provisions of CBA

c. Unfair Labor Practice

o Nature, aspects

Question: Who has jurisdiction over an unfair labor practice complaint?

Answer: Silva v. National Labor Relations Commission: The correlations of Article
248 (1) and Article 261 of the Labor Code stress that for a ULP case to be cognizable
by the Labor Arbiter, and for the NLRC to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereon, the
allegations in the complaint must show prima facie the concurrence of two things,
namely: (1) gross violation of the CBA; and (2) the violation pertains to the
economic provisions of the CBA.
However, when an employer proceeds to negotiate with a splinter union despite the
existence of its valid CBA with the duly certified and exclusive bargaining agent, the
former indubitably abandons its recognition of the latter and terminates the entire
CBA.

Question: How will the Labor Arbiter rule if malice was not alleged in a complaint
for unfair labor practice?
Answer: Dismiss the case. Manila Mining Corporation Employees Association v.
Manila Mining Corp., September 29, 2010: For a charge of unfair labor practice to
prosper, it must be shown that the employer was motivated by ill-will, bad faith or
fraud, or was oppressive to labor. The employer must have acted in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy causing social humiliation,
wounded feelings or grave anxiety. While the law makes it an obligation for the
employer and the employees to bargain collectively with each other, such
compulsion does not include the commitment to precipitately accept or agree to the
proposals of the other. All it contemplates is that both parties should approach the
negotiation with an open mind and make reasonable effort to reach a common
ground of agreement.

Question: Is it possible for a labor union to commit an unfair labor practice?

Answer: Yes. Goya v. Goya Employees Union, January 21, 2013: A CBA which
prescribes three categories of employees (probationary, regular, casual) and
provides for the definition, functions and duties of each, serves as a limitation on
management’s prerogative of outsourcing parts of its operations, particularly if it
involves functions or duties specified under the CBA.

Question: With the adoption of cost cutting measures, Eduardo was part of
manufacturing that was retrenched by the company. Can Eduardo ask for
reinstatement?
Answer: No. Pepsi Cola Products v. Molon et al., February 18, 2013: Retrenchment
in good faith is not an unfair labor practice. The fact that the retrenchment program
was implemented on a company-wide basis shows that the scheme was not
calculated to stymie union activities.

Question: Jerusalem Corp. (“JC”) has been providing new chairs to its sewing crew
for the past five years. On the sixth year, JC stopped providing new chairs. Can the
company be charged with unfair labor practice for withdrawal of this regular
provision?
Answer: No. Royal Plant Workers Union v. Coca Cola Bottlers, April 15, 2013:
Removal of chairs, which had been provided for more than three decades, was not
ULP. The rights of the Union under any labor law were not violated.
Since the CBA stated that any benefit not expressly provided for in the CBA shall be
deemed as purely voluntary acts, and shall not be construed as obligation of the
company, its subsequent removal was valid. The long practice did not convert it into
an obligation or a vested right in favor of the union. Chairs are not considered
“benefits” and are not therefore covered by the prohibition against diminution.

Question: Who has the burden of proof in an unfair labor practice case?
Answer: The party who instituted the case has the burden of proof. Central
Azucarera de Bais Employees Union v. Central Azucarera de Bais, November 17,
2010: Basic is the principle that good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith
has the duty to prove the same. By imputing bad faith to the actuations of CAB,
CABEU-NFL has the burden of proof to present substantial evidence to support the
allegation of unfair labor practice. Apparently, CABEU-NFL refers only to the
circumstances mentioned in the letter-response, namely, the execution of the
supposed CBA between CAB and CABELA and the request to suspend the
negotiations, to conclude that bad faith attended CAB’s actions. The Court is of the
view that CABEU-NFL, in simply relying on the said letter-response, failed to
substantiate its claim of unfair labor practice to rebut the presumption of good
faith.

Question: Who has the burden of proof in a case when there is allegation that the
registration of the labor union was attended with fraud?
Answer: The party who instituted the action has the burden of proof. Yokohama
Tire Phils. v. Yokohama Employees Union, March 10, 2010; Heritage Hotel
Manila v. PIGLAS-Heritage, October 30, 2009: The charge that a labor organization
committed fraud and misrepresentation in securing its registration is a serious
charge that should be clearly established by evidence and the surrounding
circumstances.
The petitioner (the party that filed the Petition for Cancellation) has the burden of
proof.

Question: Is the employer a party to the petition for certification election?

Answer: No. Republic of the Philippines, represented by DOLE, v. Kawashima
Textile, July 23, 2008: Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an
employer is a mere bystander to any petition for certification election; such
proceeding is non-adversarial and merely investigative, for the purpose thereof is to
determine which organization will represent the employees in their collective
bargaining with the employer. The choice of their representative is the exclusive
concern of the employees; the employer cannot have any partisan interest therein; it
cannot interfere with, much less oppose, the process by filing a motion to dismiss or
an appeal from it; not even a mere allegation that some employees participating in a
petition for certification election are actually managerial employees will lend an
employer legal personality to block the certification election. The employer's only
right in the proceeding is to be notified or informed thereof.
As amended by R.A. 9481, the Labor Code now provides that, in certification election
cases, the employer shall not be considered a party with a concomitant right to
oppose a petition for certification election.

Question: Can employer terminate the employment of union members during the
Freedom Period?
Answer: No. PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Tañeca, August 9, 2010: The mere signing of
the authorization in support of a Petition for Certification Election before the
“freedom period,” is not sufficient ground to terminate the employment of union
members under the Union Security Clause respondents inasmuch as the petition
itself was actually filed during the freedom period.

Question: What is the effect if the employer and the company extends its 5-year
CBA?
Answer: FVC Labor Union-Philippine Transport and General Workers
Organization (FVCLU-PTGWO) v. Sama-Samang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa Sa
FVC-Solidarity of Independent and General Labor Organizations (SANAMA-FVC-
SIGLO), November 27, 2009: While the parties may agree to extend the CBA’s
 original five-year term together with all other CBA provisions, any such amendment
or term in excess of five years will not carry with it a change in the union’s exclusive
collective bargaining status. By express provision of the above-quoted Article 253-
A, the exclusive bargaining status cannot go beyond five years and the
representation status is a legal matter not for the workplace parties to agree upon.
In other words, despite an agreement for a CBA with a life of more than five years,
either as an original provision or by amendment, the bargaining union’s exclusive
bargaining status is effective only for five years and can be challenged within sixty
(60) days prior to the expiration of the CBA’s first five years.

Question: Can the personality of the petitioner labor be collaterally attacked in the
same certification election proceeding?
Answer: No. Samahang Manggagawa Sa Charter Chemical (SMCC-SUPER) v.
Charter Chemical and Coating Corp., March 16, 2011: The legal personality of
petitioner union cannot be collaterally attacked in the certification election
proceedings. The remedy is to file a separate action for cancellation of the union’s
registration/legal personality.

Question: Can bonuses be demandable?

Answer: Yes. Eastern Telecoms v. Eastern Telecoms Employees Union, February
8, 2012;
The general rule is a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation. For a
bonus to be enforceable, it must have been promised by the employer and expressly
agreed upon by the parties. Given that the bonus in this case is integrated in the
CBA, the same partakes the nature of a demandable obligation. Verily, by virtue of
its incorporation in the CBA, the Christmas bonus due to respondent Association has
become more than just an act of generosity on the part of the petitioner but a
contractual obligation it has undertaken.

Question: Are dismissed employees entitled to backwages?

Answer: If termination was not without just cause, they are entitled to back wages.
Visayas Community Medical Center (VCMC) formerly known as Metro Cebu
Community Hospital (MCCH) v. Erma Yballe, et al., G.R. No. 196156, January 15,
2014: As a general rule, backwages are granted to indemnify a dismissed employee
for his loss of earnings during the whole period that he is out of his job. Considering
that an illegally dismissed employee is not deemed to have left his employment, he
is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue to him from the employment.
The grant of backwages to him is in furtherance and effectuation of the public
objectives of the Labor Code, and is in the nature of a command to the employer to
make public reparation for dismissing the employee in violation of the Labor Code.
The Court held that the respondents are not entitled to the payment of backwages.
The Court, citing G&S Transport Corporation v. Infante (G. R. No. 160303,
September 13, 2007) stated that the principle of a “fair day’s wage for a fair day’s
labor” remains as the basic factor in determining the award thereof. An exception to
the rule would be if the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally
locked out, suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally prevented from working.
 It is, however, required, for this exception to apply, that the strike be legal, a
situation which does not obtain in the case at bar.
The Supreme Court stressed that the law makes a distinction between union
members and union officers. A union member who merely participates in an illegal
strike may not be terminated from employment. It is only when he commits illegal
acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost employment status. In
contrast, a union officer may be terminated from employment for knowingly
participating in an illegal strike or participates in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike. The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer
who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. It possesses the
right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from service.

o By employers

3. By labor organizations
Question: What is the concept of Unfair Labor Practice?
Answer: The primary concept of unfair labor practices is stated in Article 247 of
the Labor Code, which states:
Article 247. Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for prosecution thereof. ––
Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional right of workers and employees to
self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and
management, including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with
each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial
peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations.
"In essence, [unfair labor practice] relates to the commission of acts that transgress
the workers’ right to organize." "[A]ll the prohibited acts constituting unfair labor
practice in essence relate to the workers’ right to self-organization." "[T]he term
unfair labor practice refers to that gamut of offenses defined in the Labor Code
which, at their core, violates the constitutional right of workers and employees to
self-organization." Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the ‘right to self-
organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing
for purposes of collective bargaining.’ This is made plain by no less than three
provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines. Article 243 of the Code provides as
follows:

ART. 243. Coverage and employees’ right to self-organization. — All persons

employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious,
charitable, medical, or educational institutions whether operating for profit or not,
shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing for purposes or collective bargaining. Ambulant,
intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those
without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid
and protection.

Article 248 (a) declares it to be an unfair labor practice for an employer, among
others, to ‘interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right
 to self-organization.’ Similarly, Article 249 (a) makes it an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization to ‘restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to
self-organization . . .’

xxxx

The right of self-organization includes the right to organize or affiliate with a labor
union or determine which of two or more unions in an establishment to join, and to
engage in concerted activities with co-workers for purposes of collective bargaining
through representatives of their own choosing, or for their mutual aid and
protection, i.e., the protection, promotion, or enhancement of their rights and
interests. (Mendoza vs. Officers of Manila Water Employees Union, GR No.
201595, January 255, 2016)

d. Peaceful concerted activities

o By labor organization
1. Strike
i. Valid versus Illegal strikes

Question: Are the employees who participated in an illegal strike entitled to

backwages?
Answer: NO. -we held in one case that union members who participated in an illegal
strike but were not identified to have committed illegal acts are entitled to be
reinstated to their former positions but without backwages.

We then held in G & S Transport Corporation v. Infante: With respect to

backwages, the principle of a fair days wage for a fair days labor remains as the
basic factor in determining the award thereof. If there is no work performed by the
employee there can be no wage or pay unless, of course, the laborer was able,
willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed or
otherwise illegally prevented from working. While it was found that respondents
expressed their intention to report back to work, the latter exception cannot apply
in this case. In Philippine Marine Officers Guild v. Compaia Maritima, as affirmed
in Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort v. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees
Union, the Court stressed that for this exception to apply, it is required that the
strike be legal, a situation that does not obtain in the case at bar. (Supra)

Question: What are the responsibilities of a union official and a union member in an
Illegal Strike?
Answer: It is clear that the responsibility of union officials is greater than that of
the members. They are tasked with the duty to lead and guide the membership in
decision making on union activities in accordance with the law, government rules
and regulations, and established labor practices. The leaders are expected to
recommend actions that are arrived at with circumspection and contemplation, and
always keep paramount the best interests of the members and union within the
bounds of law. If the implementation of an illegal strike is recommended, then they
would mislead and deceive the membership and the supreme penalty of dismissal is
appropriate. On the other hand, if the strike is legal at the beginning and the officials
commit illegal acts during the duration of the strike, then they cannot evade
personal and individual liability for said acts. (Toyota Motors Phils. Corp. Workers
Association vs. NLRC, G.R. Nos 158786 & 158789, G.R. Nos. 158798-99 October
19, 2007)

Question: An ordinary employee who participated in an illegal strike cannot be

terminated from employment but may be terminated upon proof that he committed
illegal acts. Who has the burden of proof?
Answer: Our ruling in Association of Independent Unions in the Philippines v.
NLRC lays down the rule on the liability of the union members: Decisive on the
matter is the pertinent provisions of Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code that: [x x x]
any worker [x x x] who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. [x x x] It can be
gleaned unerringly from the aforecited provision of law in point, however, that an
ordinary striking employee cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal
strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike and the
striker who participated in the commission of illegal act[s] must be identified. But
proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. Substantial evidence available under
the circumstances, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may
suffice.
In the landmark case of Ang Tibay vs. CIR, the court ruled Not only must there be
some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a
conclusion
Thus, it is necessary for the company to adduce proof on the participation of the
striking employee in the commission of illegal acts during the strikes. (supra)

Question: What are acts are considered illegal acts during a strike?
Answer: No precise meaning was given to the phrase illegal acts. It may encompass
a number of acts that violate existing labor or criminal laws, such as the following:

(1) Violation of Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides that [n]o person
engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or
obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employers premises for lawful
purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares;
(2) Commission of crimes and other unlawful acts in carrying out the strike; and
(3) Violation of any order, prohibition, or injunction issued by the DOLE Secretary or
NLRC in connection with the assumption of jurisdiction/certification Order under
Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code.

As earlier explained, this enumeration is not exclusive and it may cover other
breaches of existing laws. (supra)
 Question: What are the six categories of Illegal Strikes?
Answer: Noted authority on labor law, Ludwig Teller, lists six (6) categories of an
illegal strike, viz:
(1) [when it] is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees
performing governmental functions; or
(2) [when it] violates a specific requirement of law[, such as Article 263 of the Labor
Code on the requisites of a valid strike]; or
(3) [when it] is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to
commit an unfair labor practice against non-union employees; or
(4) [when it] employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a
widespread terrorism of non-strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art.
264(e) of the Labor Code]; or
(5) [when it] is declared in violation of an existing injunction[, such as injunction,
prohibition, or order issued by the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of
the Labor Code]; or
(6) [when it] is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or
conclusive arbitration clause. (supra)

Question: Can a “mass leave” be considered a strike?

Answer: NO. -The term “Mass Leave” has been left undefined by the Labor Code.
Plainly, the legislature intended that the term’s ordinary sense be used.“Mass” is
defined as “participated in, attended by, or affecting a large number of individuals;
having a large-scale character.” While the term “Leave” is defined as “an authorized
absence or vacation from duty or employment usually with pay.”
Thus, the phrase “mass leave” may refer to a simultaneous availment of authorized
leave benefits by a large number of employees in a company. It is undeniable that
going on leave or absenting one’s self from work for personal reasons when they
have leave benefits available is an employee’s right. (Naranjo vs Biomedica Health
Care Inc, 681 SCRA 438, G.R. No. 193789 September 19, 2012)

2. Picket
o By employer
1. lockout
o Assumption of jurisdiction
1. Nature
2. Effects of assumption ofjurisdiction

E. Jurisdiction and Remedies

a. Labor Arbiter
o Jurisdiction

Question: What is the nature of the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter?
Answer: The foregoing provisos manifestly show the non-litigious and the summary
nature of the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, who is given full discretion
 whether to conduct a hearing or not and to decide the case before him through
position papers. (Oriental Shipmanagement Co., Inc. vs. Bastol, G.R. No. 186289
June 29, 2010)

Question: What is the rationale behind the summary nature of proceedings before
Labor Arbiter?
Answer: In Iriga Telephone Co, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 286
SCRA 600 (1998), the Court discussed the reason why it is discretionary on the part
of the Labor Arbiter, who, motu propio, determines whether to hold a hearing or
not. Consequently, a hearing cannot be demanded by either party as a matter of
right. The parties are required to file their corresponding position papers and all the
documentary evidence and affidavits to prove their cause of action and defenses.
The rationale behind this is to avoid delay and curtail the pernicious practice of
withholding of evidence. (Oriental Ship management Co., Inc. vs. Bastol, supra)

Question: Are quasi-judicial labor tribunals bound by strict rules of procedure?

Answer: The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in
cases involving monetary awards from the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. Article 223
of the Labor Code provides: xxx Time and again, however, this Court, considering
the substantial merits of the case, has relaxed this rule on, and excused the late
posting of, the appeal bond when there are strong and compelling reasons for the
liberality, such as the prevention of miscarriage of justice extant in the case or the
special circumstances in the case combined with its legal merits or the amount and
the issue involved. After all, technical rules cannot prevent courts from exercising
their duties to determine and settle, equitably and completely, the rights and
obligations of the parties. This is one case where the exception to the general rule
lies. (Semblante vs. CA, 19th Division, G.R. No. 196426, August 15, 2011)

Price v. Innodata (2008): “Where contract of employment, being a contract of

adhesion, is ambiguous, any ambiguity therein should be construed strictly against
the party who prepared it.”
Sofio v. Valenzuela (2012): When the labor arbiter’s decision has become final,
party who prevailed already attained a vested right to said judgment. They had to
rely on the immutability of judgment.
INC Shipmanagement, Inc. Captain Sigfredo E. Monterroyo and/or Interorient
Navigation Limited v. Alexander L. Moradas, G.R. No., January 15, 2014: Having
established through substantial evidence that respondent’s injury was self-inflicted
and, hence, not compensable pursuant to Section 20 (D) of the 1996 POEA-SEC, no
grave abuse of discretion can be imputed against the NLRC in upholding LA’s
decision to dismiss respondent’s complaint for disability benefits. It is well-settled
that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered to be tainted with grave
abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction

1. versus Regional Director

o Requirements to perfect appeal to NLRC
Question: In Iillegal dismissal cases, is the Labor Arbiter bound by the ruling of the
Med-Arbiter regarding the existence or non-existence of employer-employee
relationship between the parties in the certification election case?
Answer: NO. The purpose of a petition for certification election is to determine which
organization will represent the employees in their collective bargaining with the
employer. The respondent union, without its member- employees, was thus
stripped of its personality to challenge the Med-Arbiter’s decision in the
certification election case. Thus, the members of the respondent union were left
with no option but to pursue their illegal dismissal case filed before the Labor
Arbiter. To dismiss the illegal dismissal case filed before the Labor Arbiter on the
basis of the pronouncement of the Med- Arbiter in the certification election case that
there was no employer-employee relationship between the parties, which the
respondent union could not even appeal to the DOLE Secretary because of the
dismissal of its members, would be tantamount to denying due process to the
complainants in the illegal dismissal case. INC Shipmanagement, Inc. Captain
Sigfredo E. Monterroyo and/or Interorient Navigation Limited v. Alexander L.
Moradas, G.R. No., January 15, 2014

o Reinstatement pending appeal

b. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

o Jurisdiction
Question: What is the degree of evidence required in labor cases?
Answer: In labor cases, as in other administrative proceedings, only substantial
evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient
to support a conclusion is required. To note, considering that substantial evidence is
an evidentiary threshold, the Court, on exceptional cases, may assess the factual
determinations made by the NLRC in a particular case.
The Court ruled that NLRC had cogent legal bases to conclude that petitioners have
successfully discharged the burden of proving by substantial evidence that
respondent’s injury was directly attributable to him. Records bear out
circumstances which all lead to the reasonable conclusion that respondent was
responsible for the flooding and burning incidents. While respondent contended
that the affidavits and statements of the vessel’s officers and his fellow crew
members should not be given probative value as they were biased, self-serving,
and mere hearsay, he nonetheless failed to present any evidence to substantiate his
own theory. Besides, as correctly pointed out by the NLRC, the corroborating
affidavits and statements of the vessel’s officers and crew members must be
taken as a whole and cannot just be perfunctorily dismissed as self-serving absent
any showing that they were lying when they made the statements therein.
INC Shipmanagement, Inc. Captain Sigfredo E. Monterroyo and/or Interorient
Navigation Limited v. Alexander L. Moradas, G.R. No., January 15, 2014
United Placement v. NLRC (1993): Review powers of NLRC are limited only on issues
raised on appeal. Hence, it is grave abuse of discretion for the NLRC to resolve issues
not raised on appeal.
 c. Court of Appeals
o Appeal via Rule 65, Rules of Court

Question: When is the reckoning point for the filing a petition for certiorari in
assailing an assailed resolution of the NLRC?
Answer: In practice, service means the delivery or communication of a pleading,
notice or some other paper in a case, to the opposite party so as to charge him with
receipt of it and subject him to its legal effect. The purpose of the rules on service is
to make sure that the party being served with the pleading, order or judgment is
duly informed of the same so that he can take steps to protect his interests; i.e.,
enable a party to file an appeal or apply for other appropriate reliefs before the
decision becomes final.

The rule is – where a party appears by attorney in an action or proceeding in a

court of record, all notices required to be given therein must be given to the attorney
of record; and service of the court's order upon any person other than the counsel of
record is not legally effective and binding upon the party, nor may it start the
corresponding reglementary period for the subsequent procedural steps that may
be taken by the attorney. Notice should be made upon the counsel of record at his
exact given address, to which notice of all kinds emanating from the court should be
sent in the absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of
address.

When a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must
be made upon said attorney; and notice to the client and to any other lawyer, not the
counsel of record, is not notice in law.

The NLRC Rules governing the issuance and service of notices and resolutions is,
likewise, no different:

SECTION 4. SERVICE OF NOTICES, RESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND DECISIONS. - a)

Notices and copies of resolutions or orders, shall be served personally upon the
parties by the bailiff or duly authorized public officer within three (3) days from
his/her receipt thereof or by registered mail or by private courier;

b) In case of decisions and final awards, copies thereof shall be served on both
parties and their counsel or representative by registered mail or by private
courier; Provided that, in cases where a party to a case or his/her counsel on record
personally seeks service of the decision upon inquiry thereon, service to said party
shall be deemed effected as herein provided. Where parties are numerous, service
shall be made on counsel and upon such number of complainants, as may be
practicable and shall be considered substantial compliance with Article 224 (a) of
the Labor Code, as amended. For purposes of appeal, the period shall be counted
from receipt of such decisions, resolutions, or orders by the counsel or
representative of record.
c) The bailiff or officer serving the notice, order, or resolution shall submit his/her
return within two (2) days from date of service thereof, stating legibly in his/her
return his/her name, the names of the persons served and the date of receipt, which
return shall be immediately attached and shall form part of the records of the case.
In case of service by registered mail or by private courier, the name of the addressee
and the date of receipt of the notice, order or resolution shall be written in the
return card or in the proof of service issued by the private courier. If no service was
effected, the reason thereof shall be so stated.

Also, in Ginete v. Sunrise Manning Agency, et al., the Court held that "the period
for filing a petition for certiorari should be reckoned from the time the counsel of
record received a copy of the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration."
The Court further clarified that the period or manner of "appeal" from the NLRC to
the Court of Appeals is governed by Rule 65, pursuant to the ruling of the Court in
the case of St. Martin Funeral

Homes v. NLRC in light of Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended, which states that the
"petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, or
resolution sought to be assailed."

The Court further expounded therein, to wit:

Corollarily, Section 4, Rule III of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC expressly
mandates that "(F)or the purpose(s) of computing the period of appeal, the same
shall be counted from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders by the counsel of
record. "Although this rule explicitly contemplates an appeal before tile Labor Arbiter
and tile NLRC, we do not see any cogent reason why tile same rule should not apply to
petitions for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals from decisions of the NLRC. This
procedure is in line with the established rule that notice to counsel is notice to party
and when a party is represented by counsel, notices should be made upon the counsel
of record at his given address to which notices of all kinds emanating from the court
should be sent. It is to be noted also that Section 7 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure
provides that "(A)ttorneys and other representatives of parties shall have authority
to bind their clients in all matters of procedure"' a provision which is similar to
Section 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. More importantly, Section 2, Rule 13 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure analogously provides that if any party has
appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel.

In Bello v. NLRC, citing anew Ginete v. Sunrise Manning Agency, et al., the Court
held that "the period for filing a petition for certiorari should be reckoned from the
time the counsel of record received a copy of the Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration."

Thus, based on the foregoing, while in cases of decisions and final awards, copies
thereof shall be served on both parties and their counsel/representative by
registered mail, for purposes of appeal, however, the period shall be counted from
receipt of such decisions, resolutions, or orders by the counsel or representative of
record.

In the instant case, it is not disputed that during the NLRC proceedings, petitioner
was represented by counsel, Atty. Romeo S. Occena, as in fact the NLRC albeit
belated, furnished a copy of its July 29, 2009 Resolution to Atty. Occena on
November 19, 2009. Petitioner's several motions during the proceedings before the
NLRC were likewise all signed by Atty. Occena as counsel. Consequently, following
the policy that the period to appeal shall be counted from receipt of resolution by
the counsel of record, considering that petitioner is represented by a counsel, the
latter is considered to have received notice of the NLRC Resolution dated July 22,
2009 on November 19, 2009, the date when his representative and counsel, Atty.
Occena was served notice thereof and not on July 30, 2009, or the date when
petitioner's mother received the same decision.

Accordingly, the 60-day period for filing the petition for certiorari with the CA
should be counted from the receipt by the petitioner's counsel of a copy of the NLRC
Decision dated July 22, 2009 on November 19, 2009. It should be stressed that the
NLRC sent the notice of Resolution to petitioner's counsel only on November 19,
2009. While there was a notice of Resolution dated July 22, 2009, said notice was
not served upon petitioner's counsel. Thus, strictly speaking, the running of the 60-
day period to appeal should be counted from November 19, 2009 when the notice of
Resolution dated July 22, 2009 was served on petitioner's counsel. Considering that
petitioner filed his petition for certiorari on October 7, 2009, the same was well
within the prescribed period to appeal. The petition for certiorari was filed on time.

However, the foregoing discussion notwithstanding, we have reviewed the records

of the case at bar and find no reversible error committed by the NLRC concerning
the merits of the present petition. While the petition for certiorari was timely filed
with the CA, the instant petition would still suffer the same verdict of dismissal in
view of the identical findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. The findings of fact
made by Labor Arbiters and affirmed by the NLRC are not only entitled to great
respect, but even finality, and are considered binding if the same are supported by
substantial evidence.

We find that the NLRC correctly upheld petitioner's dismissal to be valid. Records
show that petitioner was relieved from his post in UST due to his poor work
performance and attitude. However, while petitioner was removed from UST,
private respondent immediately reassigned him to Mercury Drug Fairview which he
refused to accept. Despite notices requiring him to report back to work, petitioner
refused to heed. Considering that it was petitioner who went on absence without
official leave (AWOL), the same negates the allegation of illegal dismissal.
(Cervantes vs. City Service Corporation and Prieto, Jr., GR No. 191616, April 18,
2016)

Question: What is the extent of the authority of the Court of Appeals (CA) to review
in a special civil action for certiorari the findings of fact contained in the rulings of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)?
Answer: Article 223 of the Labor Code pertinently states:
Art. 223. Appeal - Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be
entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor
Arbiter;
(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including
graft and corruption;
(c) If made purely on questions of law; and
 (d) If serious errors in the findings of
facts are raised which would cause grave or
irreparable damage or injury to the appellant. x x x x.

In our view, the CA acted judiciously in undoing the too literal interpretation of
Article 223 of the Labor Code by the NLRC. The enumeration in the provision of the
grounds for an appeal actually encompassed the ground relied upon by the
respondents in their appeal. Their phrasing of the ground, albeit not hewing closely
(or literally) to that of Article 223, related to the first and the last grounds under the
provision. In dismissing the appeal on that basis, the NLRC seemed to prefer form
and technicality to substance and justice. Thereby, the NLRC acted arbitrarily, for its
dismissal of the appeal became entirely inconsistent with the constitutional
mandate for the protection to labor.

Secondly, the CA's overturning of the NLRC's ruling was based on its finding that the
petitioners did not sufficiently establish the just and valid cause to dismiss the
respondents from their employment. As the assailed judgment indicates, the CA's
review was thorough and its ruling judicious. The CA thereby enforced against the
petitioners the respected proposition that it was the employer who bore the burden
to show that the dismissal was for just and valid cause. The failure of the petitioners
to discharge their burden of proof as the employers necessarily meant that the
dismissal was illegal. The outcome could not be any other way.

In order to warrant the dismissal of the employee for just cause, Article 282 (b) of
the Labor Code requires the negligence to be gross and habitual. Gross negligence is
the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is
duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious
indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. Habitual
neglect connotes repeated failure to perform one's duties for a period of time,
depending upon the circumstances. Obviously, a single or isolated act of negligence
does not constitute a just cause for the dismissal of the employee.

The ground for dismissal, according to the LA, was gross negligence. Considering,
however, that the petitioners did not refute the respondents' claim that the incident
was their first offense, and that the petitioners did not present any evidence to
 establish the supposed habitual neglect on the part of the respondents, like
employment or other records indicative of the service and personnel histories of the
respondents during the period of their employment, the CA reasonably found and
concluded that the just cause to dismiss them was not established by substantial
evidence. (Sugarsteel Industrial, Inc., and Yapjoco vs. Albina, Uy and Velasquez,
GR No. 168749, June 06, 2016)

d. Supreme Court
o Rule 45, Rules of Court

e. Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR)

o Jurisdiction

Question: Is the issuance of a certificate of registration a ministerial function of the

BLR?
Answer: NO. It cannot be over-emphasized that the registration or the recognition
of a labor union after it has submitted the corresponding papers is not ministerial on
the part of the BLR. After a labor organization has filed the necessary registration
documents, it becomes mandatory for the BLR to check if the requirements under
Art. 234 of the Labor Code have been sedulously complied with. If the union’s
application is infected by falsification and like serious irregularities, especially those
appearing on the face of the application and its attachments, a union should be
denied recognition as a legitimate labor organization. Prescinding from these
considerations, the issuance to the Union of Certificate of Registration necessarily
implies that its application for registration and the supporting documents thereof
are prima facie free from any vitiating irregularities. (S.S. Ventures International,
Inc. vs. SS Venture Labor Union, G.R. No. 161690 July 23, 2008)

f. National Conciliation and Mediation Board

Insular Hotel Employees Union- NFL v. Waterfront Insular Hotel (2010):

Procedurally, the first step to submit a case for mediation is to file a notice of
preventive mediation with the NCMB.

o Conciliation vs. Mediation

o Preventive mediation

g. DOLE Regional Directors

o Recovery/Adjudicatory power

Insular Hotel Employees Union v. Waterfront Insular Hotel, September 22, 2010:
The general rule is individual employees cannot raise a grievance. Only disputes
involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or
voluntary arbitrators. A labor federation cannot raise a grievance on behalf of
members of its local/chapter.
BPI v. BPI Employees Union (2012): In ruling in favor of the union in a voluntary
arbitration, the Court held that the CBA is the contract between the parties. All
provisions and conditions for availment of benefits should be made clear. Any
ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the employees.
Santuyo v. Remerco Garments, March 22, 2010: Article 217(c) of the Labor Code
requires labor arbiters to refer cases involving the implementation of CBAs to the
grievance machinery provided therein and to voluntary arbitration.
Moreover, Article 260 of the Labor Code clarifies that such disputes must be referred
first to the grievance machinery and, if unresolved within seven days, they shall
automatically be referred to voluntary arbitration.
Continental Steel v. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Montano: Being for the benefit
of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits
should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof.

h. DOLE secretary
o Visitorial and enforcement powers
o Under Art. 129 of the Labor Code, the power of the DOLE and its duly
authorized hearing officers to hear and decide any matter involving the
recovery of wages and other monetary claims and benefits was qualified by the
proviso that the complaint not include a claim for reinstatement, or that the
aggregate money claims not exceed Php5, 000. RA 7730, or an Act Further
Strengthening the Visitorial and Enforcement Powers of the Secretary of Labor,
did away with the Php5,000 limitation, allowing the DOLE Secretary to exercise
its visitorial and enforcement power for claims beyond Php5,000. The only
qualification to this expanded power of the DOLE was only that there still be an
existing employer-employee relationship. (Bombo Radyo Phils. Inc. vs.
Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 179652,
March 6, 2012)
o Power to suspend effects of termination
o Remedies
i. Voluntary arbitrator
o Jurisdiction
o Remedies
j. Prescription of actions
o Money claims (without any legal bar) – 3 years
o Illegal dismissal (without any legal bar) – 4 years
o Unfair labor practice
o Offenses under the Labor Code
o Illegal recruitment