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** DRAFT **

From Reductive to Robust: Seeking the Core of Institutional Theory

ABSTRACT:

When discussing institutional theory, are we talking about the “same thing?” This paper

triangulates on an answer using a systems approach of content analysis and narrative

analysis. Two studies that use non-systemic approaches find more conflict than agreement

between views of the theory. A third study suggests that a path toward common ground

may be found in the idea of a quantifiably “robust” theory. A robust theory is one that is

quantifiably “more systemic” in nature and is expected to be more effective in application

and more reasonably falsifiable. The robustness of institutional theory is identified as 0.31

on a scale of zero to one (with zero being the lowest and least useful). Paths for advancing

the theory are suggested that use a systems approach to relate the usefulness of theory with

the quantifiable structure of theory.

KEYWORDS:

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Institutional theory, Theory of theory, Critical metatheory, Structure of theory, Robustness,

Epistemological validity, Evolution of theory, Systems view of theory

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WHAT IS THE CORE OF INSTITUTIONAL THEORY?

Institutional theory is a current issue (Palmer and Biggart, 2002) and, given the importance

of institutional and organizational change, is likely to remain an important issue for some

time. Given the depth and breadth of the current discussion, it seems reasonable to ask –

exactly what is this thing called institutional theory? The present paper explores the range

of the theory from multiple perspectives and suggests that an objective path toward

developing a common and useful definition might be found by applying a systems

approach to analyzing the structure of theory. The present paper extends the conversation

of Selznick (1996), who noted the conflict between older and newer forms of theory, and

Scott (1987), who suggested that there were “four faces” of institutional theory. Scott also

claimed that there were efforts at “consolidation.” The present article also answers the call

of Zucker & Darby (2005, p. 548) who state that institutional theory is rich in concepts and

has advanced so far as to, “warrant more formal models and codification.” Instead of

consolidation and codification, however, the present study finds expansion and conflict.

In the ongoing discussion around institutional theory, the general assumption seems to be

that authors are writing about the “same thing.” Such assumptions, when unexamined, may

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lead to false conclusions and conflicting views. In the present paper, I identify the range

and depth of that conflict, as well as the few areas of agreement. Further, through the use

of traditional and innovative methodologies, I investigate the structure of institutional

theory and suggest avenues for advancing the theory in a way that will support more

insightful empirical studies and more effective application in practice.

Although the present study will avoid a historical approach to the analysis of theory, it may

be useful to note the influence of such authors as DiMaggio, Meyer, Powell, Scott, and

Zucker. Generally, most authors studied in the present article cited these five authors. Some

authors studied in the present article (Reay et al., 2006, Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006,

DiMaggio and Powell, 2002) seem to have drawn on a broader sources of inspiration that

the others. Scott’s (1987) useful history notes some influential writers as Selznick, Berger

and Luckmann, Meyer and Rowan, and Hertzler. Their conceptual roots are traced to

Barnard, Hughes, and the sociology of knowledge.

Currently, institutional theory has expanded into management science (Palmer and Biggart,

2002), economics (Sobel, 1982), political science (Meyer, 2001), population ecology

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(Zucker, 1989), and beyond. The present study focuses on authors who may be more

familiar to the reader.

As institutional theory has expanded, each author has revised the theory for interpretation

and publication. In researching the literature for the present article, I found 14 different

descriptions of institutional theory. No two of these descriptions are identical, instead

containing substantive differences. A more comprehensive search would doubtless find

many more conflicts. Although according to their authors, these descriptions fit under the

general rubric of institutional theory, these differences may be seen as representing a

conflict in the common understanding of institutional theory, and so reflect differences in

the accepted understanding of institutions and organizations. While the academic process

thrives on the differences between points of view, the extent of those differences calls into

question whether scholars are, indeed, talking about the same thing. After all, if one author

states that institutional theory may be understood through concepts “a, b, and c” while

another author states that the relevant concepts are “c, e, and f,” there is some conceptual

overlap, but there are also inherent contradictions.

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The issue of rapid change within a body of theory has been of interest, and concern, for

decades. In one attempt to make sense of the issue, theories are described as having of a

“hard core” of unchanging assumptions, surrounded by a more changeable “protective

belt” (Lakatos, 1970). When a theory is challenged, a theorist may rise to defend it with a

new proposition that changes the belt, but presumably leaves the core intact. Among the 14

descriptions discussed here, there is no single concept that is held in common by all of the

authors. If there is no concept, or set of concepts, held in common, where then is the core

of institutional theory? Motivated by this lack of commonality, I seek in the present paper

seeks to identify the core of institutional theory. This effort will provide general and

specific support for the continued development of institutional theory.

A Chinese proverb states, “The beginning of wisdom is to call things by their right names.”

(Unknown, 2006, p. 1) The difficulty of engaging in a conversation with imprecise

definitions was famously illustrated when Plato called man a “featherless biped.” He was

forced to add, “with broad flat nails” in response to Diogenes, who arrived with a plucked

chicken, proclaiming “Here is Plato’s man.” (Bartlett, 1992, p. 77). It may be speculatively

asked if it was the atomistic nature of Plato’s definition that left it open to misinterpretation

and challenge. In short, we must wonder how we can know what we are talking about if a

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definition continually changes? In contrast to Plato’s rapidly evolving definition,

Newton’s laws (e.g. F=ma) have proved effective, and unchanged, for centuries. In the

present article, I will identify how an understanding of institutional theory might be shifted

from the transitory, pronouncements of Plato, toward enduring and useful laws of Newton.

When our theories attain this level of advancement, we may anticipate meaningful changes

in the way we study institutions.

Due to limitations of space, the studies in the present article are focused on the level of

“concept” and “theory” where concepts are presented as named by the authors and as

readers may generally understand them. A theory may be generally understood as a

collection of interrelated propositions – a concept that will be explored in depth below.

These studies will generally avoid the sub-concept level of interpretation. Due to the

difficulty of testing multiple models, these studies do not address what might be thought of

as a post-theory-development process of application and testing in a real world and/or

simulated environment.

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Drawing on Davidson and Layder, Romm (2001) suggests that researchers use

“triangulation” (where multiple research methods are used to reduce subjectivity in

research), I present three studies of institutional theory, all drawn from the same sources.

In the first study, I draw on techniques of content analysis to identify the range of concepts

found in the theory. Content analysis (e.g. Hjørland, 2002, Hood and Wilson, 2002)

essentially involves looking at the words used by the authors as reasonable representations

of the concepts that they convey. Grasping the range of concepts helps to identify the

similarities and differences between the various versions of theory. The first study

identifies a high level of disagreement between authors and provides examples of how

more definitions are generated. The addition of more examples may be seen as adding to

the conflict. Although there are clear benefits to this form of analysis, there are also

limitations.

In the second study, I use those same concepts coupled with innovative methods of

analysis to identify the high rate of change between versions of theory. The second study

objectively quantifies conflicts between versions of theory, even when the same authors

provide those versions. Next, a discussion on the theory of theory specifically focuses on

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the structure of theory as a means for understanding and advancing the efficacy of the

theory.

The third study is informed by narrative analysis (e.g. Pentland, 1999) to focus on the

propositions found in institutional theory. In this study, I use an innovative, though easily

replicable, method of analysis to identify the robustness of institutional theory as a whole.

This analysis is then used to suggest reconciliation between conflicting versions of the

theory. Importantly, an objective path for developing a more robust institutional theory is

suggested. A robust theory of institutions is expected to provide meaningful benefits to

academics and practitioners alike.

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STUDY #1 – CONCEPTS OF INSTITUTIONAL THEORY

This section identifies the range of concepts in institutional theory and analyzes that

collection of concepts from various perspectives. As developed by Wallis (2008), these

diverse views, in some sense, may be seen as reflecting the existing diversity in the field of

institutional theory. With each perspective, a different view of institutional theory is

provided. The new versions of institutional theory created here may be seen as schools of

thought or newly evolved versions of institutional theory. In addition to identifying the

range of concepts present in institutional theory, this study also claims that more

differences than similarities exist in the body of institutional theory. And, these differences

represent an inherent conflict.

A search of ProQuest™ database yielded 216 articles in academic journals where

institutional theory was discussed in the context of a human organization. In order to

obtain a more manageable set of data, I restricted my search to articles with the term

“institutional theory” in the citation. This assumes that such articles would include a

substantive discussion of institutional theory and so include concepts that may be

considered representative of the theory. Additionally, those articles and other sources

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suggested further scholarly publications. I reviewed promising books and found additional

descriptions. This search, although not exhaustive, found 14 descriptions of institutional

theory. It is also assumed that each description includes the most important aspects of each

author’s version of the theory. It is expected that a sample of this size will provide a

sufficient representation of the body of theory.

This study uses descriptions from Carroll, Goodstein, & Gyenes (1988), DiMaggio &

Powell (2002), Greenwood & Suddaby (2006), James & Wooten (2006), Lewin &

Volberda (2005), Mezias & Scarselletta (1994), Ocasio (1999), Reay et al. (2006), Scott

(1987), Scott (2005), Selznick (1996), Suddaby & Greenwood (2005), Zilber (2006), L.

Zucker & Darby (2005). Most of these descriptions were from the pages of Administrative

Science Quarterly (ASQ), and the Academy of Management Journal (AMJ).

From that collection of writings, I deconstructed each description into the authors’

component concepts. For example, Mezias & Scarselletta (1994, p. 658) suggest that

institutional theory be understood as one where:

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 Professions provide members with common culture/shared definitions of

problems/common repertoires.

 Strong professional norms in an organizational field will cause normative

isomorphism.

Based on that definition, the concepts relating to institutional theory would be: professions,

members, common culture/shared definitions, problems/common repertoires, professional

norms, organizational field, and normative isomorphism. While another reader might

develop a different list, it is expected that such lists would be substantively similar to the

one developed in this study.

It is generally accepted in academic writing that flowery speech is no substitute for clarity.

Therefore, working from the assumption that other writers seek clarity, I assume in these

studies that authors who use different words essentially mean to communicate different

ideas. In short, when analyzing the writings of others, I take them at their word and err on

the side of conservative interpretation although this may result in adding more concepts to

the list rather than fewer.

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From the above 14 sources, I found 188 concepts – from Administrative oversight, to Work

patterns. The complete “kaleidoscope of concepts” will not be listed, due to limitations of

space. This discovery lends teeth to the claim by (Zucker and Darby, 2005) that

institutional theory is “rich in concepts.”

That list of concepts might be seen as representing the whole of institutional theory from a

conceptual perspective. It should be noted that at this “survey” stage, no concept appears to

be more “important” than another, and no component seems to be closer to the core of

institutional theory than any other. The next task is to search for concepts held in common

by the authors. It may be assumed that greater commonality represents less conflict. The

following is a list of the concepts that seemed most popular among the 14 descriptions

having been noted by three or more authors:

Actions (including behavior and practice), Isomorphic change, Legitimacy of

authority, Myth (including rational myth and institutional myth), Organizational

field, Organizational interactions, Organizational structure (including template and

model), Organizations, Uncertainty/Ambiguity.

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These nine concepts stand in stark contrast to the 188 concepts that comprise the complete

list of concepts discussed as institutional theory. Also, it is worth noting that in the above

analysis a new version of institutional theory has been created with a new focus.

Moving from one form of popularity to another, of the 14 publications, two could clearly

be seen as the “most cited” according to Google Scholar™. The version of institutional

theory developed by DiMaggio & Powell (2002, original 1983) was cited by others over

5,000 times while Scott (1987) was cited more than 700 times suggesting a certain level of

authority in the field. The next lower cited article received about 200 citations. Focusing on

these two “most cited” versions of institutional theory, there are significant differences and

a few similarities. The DiMaggio & Powell version contains 22 concepts, while the Scott

version contains 57 concepts. The concepts held in common between these two are limited

to six:

Isomorphic change, Organizational goals, Organizational interaction,

Organizational structure, Organizations, and the Purposeful design of organizations

(including organizational modeling).

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This focus on what might be considered an “authoritative” version essentially creates a

new description of institutional theory built on the shared conceptual components of the

authors. In this comparison, the overlap of six concepts stands in stark contrast to the 67

concepts that the two do not share. From one perspective, those six concepts may be seen

as representing an “authoritative” version of institutional theory. From another point of

view, those 67 different concepts may be seen as representing a conflict between two

versions of institutional theory. Again, it should be noted that this new description has lost

some conceptual breadth when compared to the whole body of institutional theory.

Another dimension of comparison may be found between the sources of the articles used

for this study. Of the fourteen versions of institutional theory, six are from ASQ and four

are from the AMJ. The remaining four were found as chapters or articles in other academic

journals.

Within those articles drawn from ASQ, there are a total of 103 concepts, 15 of which are

found in two or more of the six articles. Those shared concepts are:

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Action/Behavior, Adaptation, Administrative component/oversight, Commitments,

Exogenous jolts, Institutional environment, Isomorphism, Legitimacy, Normative

commitments, Organizational structure, Organizations, Rewards, Technical

activities, Uncertainty/Ambiguity, Values.

In contrast, the four articles drawn from AMJ contained a total of 49 concepts, of which

nine are noted in two or more articles. They are:

Action/Behavior, Centrality/Eliteness, Compliance/Conformity, Exogenous jolts,

Institutional logic, Maturity of organizational field, Organizational field,

Organizational processes, Organizational structure.

Here it should be noted that the differences between the ASQ version and the AMJ version

of institutional theory far outweigh the few similarities. Indeed, between the two, there are

156 concepts that are different, while only the concepts of Action/Behavior and

Organizational structure are held in common. Perhaps most glaringly Isomorphism has

been lost as a shared concept, a situation to which some may take exception.

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There are obvious limitations to this study such as sample size and the amount of

interpretation applied to understand exactly what the authors meant to convey with each

specific word. However, a larger sample size might result in still more concepts resulting in

still more confusion and conflict.

It should also be noted that any discussion around some deeper level of understanding

must consist of still more concepts. Therefore, a deeper exploration might be expected to

produce much the same kinds of results as presented in the present study. Indeed, the

addition of more concepts will likely create new levels of conflict. You may also note that

this brief study began with 14 version of institutional theory and generated four more. In

some sense, this process may be considered representative of the process of academic

publications in general where investigation and analysis results in the generation of new

concepts and new theory. Yet this expansion does not seem to have increased the

understanding of institutional theory. In short, it may be concluded that institutional theory

is a highly contested field of study, a contest that has been largely hidden until now.

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This study is useful because it provides a comprehensive view of the concepts within the

body of theory. Additionally, each group of concepts might be viewed as a “school of

thought” for institutional theory within its specific venue.

A weakness of the preset study is that it may be considered static because it is used to

analyze a “snapshot” of theory as that theory may be represented within a particular span

of time. In the next section, I will look at how institutional theory has changed over time.

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STUDY #2 – DYNAMIC ROBUSTNESS

As developed by Wallis (2008), the concept of robustness has been used to describe the

stability of a network that is experiencing external perturbations. A system (e.g. human,

organizational, or conceptual) that is robust may be understood as one that will endure, or

has endured, for a longer time than one that is not robust. A system that is completely

unstable or chaotic would have a robustness of zero, while a perfectly stable system would

be understood as having a robustness of one. By measuring those perturbations we may

determine the “dynamic robustness” of a system of theory. We do this by identifying the

ratio of stable concepts to changing concepts.

In this process, one begins with two forms of a theory, then identifies the concepts

contained in each form of the theory and assigns a numerical value based on the number of

component concepts. Next, the ratio between the two (earlier and later) versions of the

theory is taken. If the two theories are identical, the dynamic robustness will be equal to

one. If the two theories have no concepts in common, they will have a dynamic robustness

of zero.

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For an abstract example, if theory “A1” has four distinct concepts (a, b, c, d) and

subsequently evolves, through a process of reinterpretation by the same or alternate author,

into theory “A2” with four concepts (c, d, e, f,), it may be seen that these two versions of

theory together as having a total of six concepts (a, b, c, d, e, f) with only two concepts

held in common (c, d). This relationship suggests that in the process of evolving from

theory A1 to theory A2, the theory exhibited a dynamic robustness of 0.33 (two divided by

six). Of course, such measures might only be considered valid when the concepts

themselves are unambiguous.

This technique may be used to quantify perturbations in theory with some level of

objectivity. Additionally, this method may be seen as responding to Hull’s (1988) deep

discussion on the evolution of theory – and providing a tool to aid in the mapping of that

evolution. The present study suggest that there are vast perturbations suggesting a

previously unexplored layer of conflict existing beneath the veneer of academic civility

and, as such, a rich opportunity for investigation.

In this study, each author’s influence on institutional theory may be understood as a

perturbation. As such, useful examples may be found in the data used for the present

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article. In three publications (James and Wooten, 2006, Lewin and Volberda, 2005, Mezias

and Scarselletta, 1994), the authors suggest that their interpretation of institutional theory

has been drawn from a single source – the often-cited DiMaggio & Powell (2002, original

1983) whose article identified 22 concepts.

Despite citing DiMaggio & Powell as the sole source of their version of institutional

theory, Mezias & Scarselletta noted only four concepts in 1994. The present author

identified only two concepts as identical between those two versions of institutional theory.

This suggests a dynamic robustness of 0.08 – the result of two divided by 24. Similarly, in

2006 James & Wooten noted two concepts both of which appeared to have been drawn

directly from DiMaggio & Powell. This relationship indicates a dynamic robustness of

0.09 – the result of two divided by 22. More robustness is found with Lewin & Volberda

who, in 2005, described 12 concepts, five of which could be said to be in common with

their source: DiMaggio & Powell’s 22 concepts. This suggests a dynamic robustness of

0.17 – the result of five divided by 29.

This issue of low robustness and conflicting forms of theory is not limited to the evolution

of theory between authors. Among the 14 descriptions of institutional theory in the present

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study, some are by the same authors. Scott wrote on institutional theory in 1987 and again

in 2005. Suddaby & Greenwood wrote on institutional theory in 2005 and again in 2006 as

Greenwood & Suddaby. These examples offer the opportunity to investigate the dynamic

robustness of a theory as it evolves between authors.

In 1987, Scott noted 57 concepts. In 2005, he had reduced that number to 13, about ten of

which might be said to be held in common between the two versions. This suggests a

dynamic robustness of 0.17 – the result of ten divided by 60. While such a low level of

robustness might be attributed to the long span of time between the writings, other authors

have an even lower level of robustness despite fewer intervening years. Suddaby &

Greenwood note five concepts in 2005 and then 26 concepts in 2006 with only one concept

held in common. This suggests a dynamic robustness of 0.03 – the result of one divided by

30.

The low level of robustness between theories described by the same writers may be

explained by the idea that the articles were written for different publications. Suddaby &

Greenwood wrote in 2005 for Administrative Science Quarterly, while their 2006 paper

was written for Academy of Management Journal. It remains an open question as to what

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constitutes a legitimate representation of a theory if the theory undergoes such a dramatic

change at every turn. This is not to say that the authors have avoided academic justification

for their views. It must be assumed that they have met the prevailing standards for rigor.

One key idea here is that our academic standards are insufficient to support the

advancement of institutional theory because we have not been quantifying advancement in

any meaningful way.

In the preceding section, the results of study #1 suggest that it is difficult or impossible to

discern the core of institutional theory. In the present section, the low level of dynamic

robustness suggests one cause for our difficulty in defining the core of institutional theory.

The number of theories, and the concepts within those theories is growing rather rapidly. In

short, it may be suggested that institutional theory is experiencing more change than

stability and there appears to be a high level of conflict over what institutional theory “is.”

Recent insights into the development and structure of theory (e.g. Wallis, 2008, Van de

Ven, 2007) provide useful tools for the analysis of theory that are expected to help find

common ground in this conflict. In the next section, I present a discussion on the structure

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of theory. That discussion will support the third study in which I will identify the coherent

core of institutional theory.

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THE ROBUST STRUCTURE OF THEORY

In this section, I discuss the structure of theory and provide the conceptual support for the

third analysis of the present paper. As described by Wallis (2008), an important though

rarely explored question in academic research may be phrased as: “Is it possible to

ascertain the legitimacy of a theory through its structure?” Dubin (1978) suggests that there

are four levels of efficacy in theory; and, these levels seem to reflect the structure of the

theory: 1) Presence /Absence – what concepts are contained within a theory; 2)

Directionality – what are the causal concepts and what are the emergent concepts within

the theory; 3) Co-variation – how several concepts might impel change in one another; and

4) Rate of change – to what quantity does each of the elements within the theory effect one

another. Parson and Shills note four similar levels of systemization of theory moving

toward increasing “levels of systemization” (Friedman, 2003, p. 518).

Reflecting the validity of these assertions, Newton’s F=ma might be seen as residing at the

highest level because it is possible to identify quantitative changes in one aspect (e.g.

force) from changes in other aspects (e.g. mass & acceleration). Such a high level of

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understanding has been long sought in the social sciences. However, this long-forgotten

promise of the social sciences has remained elusive.

In another approach toward order, Weick (1989) draws on Southerland to describe theory

as, “an ordered set of assertions” (p. 517). This raises the question of just how well ordered

those assertions might be. By “ordered,” it might be implied that those assertions are to be

arranged alphabetically, by apparent importance, or any number of possible methods, as in

the above study #1. This “neatly or conveniently arranged” (1993, p. 1363) does not seem

to add much to the general understanding of theory, however. We gain no useful insight

into the validity of a theory if the assertions are in alphabetical order or the year each

concept was added to the literature.

By ordered, therefore, it may be that Weick was implying something more significant than

a list. A more useful, or at least an alternative, epistemological validity, therefore, might be

developed by looking at the assertions or propositions of a theory as being “interrelated,”

where the propositions might be seen as, “reciprocally or mutually related” (1993, p. 998).

With such a view, a body of theory might be seen as a kind of system and, “…any part of

the system can only be fully understood in terms of its relationships with the other parts of

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the whole system.” (Harder et al., 2004, p. 83, drawing on Freeman). It seems, therefore,

that every concept within a theory would best be understood through other concepts within

that body of theory. Significantly, this perspective seems to fit with Dubin’s (above)

assertion that theories of higher efficacy have explanations and concepts that are

understood as causing change in one another. In the present paper, I will refer to complex

propositions of this sort as “concatenated” in the sense expressed by Van de Ven (2007)

where two aspects of a theory are shown to influence the third aspect.

A concatenated proposition might be understood as one that takes note of three or more

concepts. Further, such propositions also describe the relationships between those

concepts. For an abstract example, a concatenated proposition might state that changes in

concept A and concept B will cause changes in concept C. Alternatively, another

concatenated proposition might state that changes in concept D will cause changes in

concepts E and F. For a concrete example, Scott (1987) suggests that an Organizational

structure is formed by Time, Adaptation, and Historical dependency. Thus, the

interrelationship of three aspects results in a fourth aspect. It may be assumed that changes

in one of the causal aspects will result in changes in the resultant aspect.

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Propositions that contain multiple concepts but are not usefully interrelated are no

substitute for concatenated propositions. This idea relates to the need for parsimony in

theory (e.g. Van de Ven, 2007). For an abstract example, consider a set of propositions

claiming that changes in concept A cause changes in concept B, which then result in

changes to concept C. The idea of parsimony suggests that the propositions of that theory

be reduced to “Changes in A result in changes to C” because the concept of B does not add

much to the explanation (Stinchcombe, 1987, p. 132).

To briefly compare and contrast levels of interrelatedness, it may be said that the lowest

level of relationship may be found in some jumble of random concepts. A higher level of

interrelatedness might be seen in a book-length philosophical inquiry, where an author

describes concepts thus causing each to exist in closer relationship with others. Other

authors have used a wide variety of methods for increasing relatedness between concepts

such as placing them in a list as in the above Study #1, a flow-chart showing a cycle (e.g.

Nonaka, 2005, for social construction), a matrix (e.g. Pepper, 1961, for metaphors), or a

combination of lists and flows to create a meta-model (e.g. Slawski, 1990). With each

increasing level of relatedness, a reader might find new insights based on the relatedness

between concepts.

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Another way to look at interrelatedness might be seen in the concept of “reflexive.” Hall

(1999) suggests that some forms of inquiry represent a “third path” of inquiry that is

primarily neither objective, nor subjective; rather it is essentially reflexive, where meaning

is created in a socially constructed sense. In contrast to reflexive forms used in the sense of

the interaction between individuals, however, the second study of the present paper looks

at reflexive analysis in the sense that suggests a relationship within, or between, the

concepts of institutional theory.

Combining the idea of relatedness with the idea of theory having a tight core and a loose

belt, the concepts in the core might be seen as being more closely interrelated than the belt.

For example, the above reductive study of institutional theory was derived from, and also

produced, descriptions with low levels of interrelatedness, as might be found in the loosely

defined belt of a theory because the new theories are presented essentially as lists of

concepts.

In the following section, I present study #3. There, I will examine the authors’ conceptual

components that may be understood as being imbedded in the authors’ “propositions.” Van

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de Ven (2007, p. 117) states, “A proposition is a declarative sentence expressing a

relationship among some terms.” He goes on to describe four kinds of propositions, one of

which is: Conditional - if-then statements showing causal relationships. In that section, I

present a methodological tool to objectively quantify robustness and so obtain an objective

benchmark for the advancement of institutional theory.

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STUDY #3 – INVESTIGATING RELATIONAL PROPOSITIONS

Completing the third point of the triangulation, the study presented in this section will

reflect another perspective of institutional theory. Rather than then dynamic robustness

developed in study #2, this section will explore a static form of robustness. In the above

studies, the focus was on the discrete, atomistic concepts found within each authors’

description of institutional theory. In contrast, the following section presents another

analysis of institutional theory. This third study will focus on the concatenated propositions

from the authors’ descriptions of institutional theory.

As developed by Wallis (2008), static robustness is an objective representation of the

internal integrity of the structure of a body of theory. A measure of robustness may be

achieved by comparing the total number of aspects within the theory to the number of

aspects that are concatenated. On one end of that scale, a theory that simply lists its

component concepts, without identifying how the concepts are related to one another,

would have a robustness of zero.

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For example, in the above study #1, the four new versions of theory are all lists of concepts

and, as such, have static robustness of zero because no conceptual aspect is said to have

any effect on any other. On the other end of the scale, a fully robust theory (e.g. Newton’s

F=ma) has multiple dimensions each of which is concatenated from the other two.

Therefore, such a theory has a robustness of one - the result of three divided by three.

This study will draw on the descriptions of institutional theory as developed by the above

authors and, for reasons of space, will focus on those descriptions found in ASQ (Scott,

1987, Carroll et al., 1988, Selznick, 1996, Ocasio, 1999, Mezias and Scarselletta, 1994,

Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). For the present study, I have rewritten the propositions

for clarity. In this process, no alteration of the authors’ original meaning is intended. Rather

than interpret the intentions of the authors, the present analysis will err on the side of a

conservative view. Where the authors of these 14 versions of institutional theory use

different words, the present author will assume that they used those words specifically to

connote different meanings. Among these complex, concatenated propositions, there are

few areas of congruence, yet few areas of conflict. They are:

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1. Organizational interaction and adaptation arises in response to internal and external

environments. (Selznick, 1996, p. 271)

2. More structure from institutional myths – more elaborate displays of

confidence/satisfaction/good faith and less inspection and evaluation from external

sources. (Selznick, 1996, p. 273)

3. More structure from institutional myths – more elaborate displays of

confidence/satisfaction/good faith and less inspection and evaluation from internal

sources. (Selznick, 1996, p. 273)

4. Identities of decision makers and Matching Situations to Rules enables decision-

making. (Ocasio, 1999, p. 387)

5. More norms of appropriate beliefs and behavior cause members actions to become

routinized and to rely on rules of corporate governance. (Ocasio, 1999, p. 388)

6. Characteristics of participants and commitments of participants + influences of

environment and constraints of environment - shapes organizational structure. (Scott,

1987p. 494)

7. Conscious design & intervention affect institutionalization process. (Scott, 1987, p.

495)

33
8. Individuals take action, interpret action and share those interpretations with others –

causes social order. (Scott, 1987, p. 495)

9. Actions, repeated over time and assigned similar meanings is defined as

institutionalization. (Scott, 1987, p. 495)

10. Technological production, Bureaucracies, and pluralization of lifeworlds (e.g.

differentiation of public & private spheres), shape consciousness. (Scott, 1987, p. 496)

11. Belief systems and cognitive styles come from rational / purposeful organizations.

(Scott, 1987, p. 496)

12. Time, adaptation (mostly unplanned), and historical dependency results in

organizational structure. (Scott, 1987, p. 506)

Those propositions are represented in figure #1, where each arrow represents causal

direction, indicating where one aspect of institutional theory will have an effect on another.

As the concept of non-linear dynamics is an important aspect of institutional theory and

complexity theory (e.g. Dent and Holt, 2001, Lichtenstein, 2000), it may be worth noting

that the relationship between the causal aspects of this description of institutional theory

seems to support the idea of a non-linear or non-deterministic structure. This view is in

contrast to an atomistic list of conceptual components.

34
[…Insert figure #1 about here… ]

In the institutional theory model presented in figure 1, there are a total of 29 aspects.

However, of those only nine may be understood as emerging from the concatenated

relationship of other aspects: Cognitive styles / consciousness, Institutionalization, Social

order, Rational / purposeful organizations, Routinized, Organizational structure,

Adaptation, Organizational interaction, and Decision making. Therefore this form of the

theory has a static robustness of 0.31 – the result of nine divided by 29. In short, the causal

version may be seen as an improvement over the atomistic version and the present paper

serves as an example of advancing theory towards a robust form.

Rather than focusing on changes in interpretation among or between authors, as in the

second study, or the creation of schools of thought, as in the first study, this process

35
identifies the core of theory from the relationships between the concepts related in the

propositions.

The presented description surfaces challenging questions. First, there are a number of

aspects that are only causal, such as Belief systems, Time, and Historical dependency.

From the framework of understanding developed in the previous section, these aspects

represent “absolutes” – it is not clearly defined where they “originate.” To advance this

model towards robustness, it would be useful for each of the causal aspects to be defined

by two or more existing aspects in the model. For example, “Structure from institutional

myth” might be understood as resulting from “Actions repeated” and “Sharing

interpretations.” Alternatively, it might be suggested that the phrase “Sharing

interpretations” is essentially the same thing as institutional myth.

It should be noted here that the diagram, as presented, is a simplified representation. More

realistically, a robust theory should be viewed as a set of interrelated dimensions. For

example, Organizational structure should not be understood as something that does or does

not exist; rather, it should be understood as a dimensional product where more of each of

its six causal aspects will result in more Organizational structure.

36
Although by focusing on the concatenated propositions this model has left out many

component concepts of institutional theory, the closely related nature of the included

aspects suggest that it may be a good representative for the core of institutional theory.

37
DISCUSSION – COMPARISONS AND INSIGHTS

In this paper, I’ve presented three analyses each drawing on the same 14 versions of

institutional theory found in relevant academic publications. The first study focused on the

188 conceptual components found in those 14 versions. This study found more

disagreement than agreement between authors. Further, this study found that approaching

the whole body of institutional theory from various perspectives resulted in more versions

of the theory, but did not seem useful in identifying the core of institutional theory. In the

second study, I identified further conflict between versions of institutional theory even

when the same authors present those versions. Additionally, those variations are quantified

in terms of dynamic robustness between versions of the theory. In the third study, the focus

shifted to the relationship between concepts based on the idea that more complex

relationships suggest a higher level of structure – and therefore the opportunity for greater

efficacy in theory. The third study found that the static robustness of institutional theory is

0.31 on a scale of zero to one.

Limitations

38
While the present study suggests lines of investigation for advancing IT, there are also

important limitations. Most notably, the sample size of 14 versions of theory might not be

considered significant. The validity and usefulness of this line of research may be

improved by repeating the study with a larger sample.

Second, it is assumed by the present author that this method of analysis is repeatable – that

if performed by others, it would lead to substantially similar results. That assumption

should be tested.

Moving from reflections on the study to reflections on the results, it seems that viewing the

profusion of concepts found in institutional theory is more like looking through a

kaleidoscope than a coherent lens. From such a list, it is understandable how scholars

might be impelled to select a few concepts from the range of possibilities, rather than apply

them all. As noted above, that process also results in the generation of still more concepts.

Of course, the theory is still under development and the contribution of all authors, leading

to this broad collection of concepts, seems to be an essential step in the development of a

coherent, robust form of institutional theory. In short, metatheoretical analysis is not

possible without a foundation of multiple theoretical models.

39
It is an open question whether the generation of concepts must necessarily add to the outer

belt, or whether they might be promoted directly to the core.

Reductive or Robust

Comparing the flexibility of reductive and robust forms of theory and setting aside their

common requirement for scholarly justification, it seems that reductive forms enable the

easy addition or removal of concepts, essentially adding or removing them from the list. In

contrast, forms of theory that are robustly structured (e.g. Newton’s F=ma) are not so

easily altered. For example, referring to Figure #1, if the concept of “Structure from

institutional myth” were removed, the understanding of other concepts would be imperiled.

“Levels of inspection” and “Displays of confidence” would become disconnected from the

model. If a study does not include “Characteristics of participants,” the understanding of

“Organizational structure” would be imperiled.

In short, it seems that the reductive (and less integrated) forms of theory are more easily

changed and therefore may be seen as more easily manipulated or evolved by theorists.

40
That in turn suggests that as the field moves closer to a fully robust form of theory, it will

become more difficult to make further progress. The next few decades therefore may see

the evolution of competing very-nearly robust theories. Those theories may then be tested

in both real world and computer modeling venues. Then too, each version of theory may

find its own specific niche (e.g. one model may be applied to organizations, another to

individuals, and a third to schemas).

Additionally, the reductive study suggests a technique for identifying which concepts

within a general body of theory might be more closely connected with a given focus (e.g. a

version of institutional theory that is associated with a particular journal). A robust version,

in contrast, would be highly integrated so that the researcher is encouraged, and indeed

required to include all of the concepts for any given analysis. In the causal model depicted

in Figure #1, for example, a researcher focusing on Adaptation would be impelled to

describe how those interactions are modified by changes in the Internal environment and

the external environment. Additionally, the causal relationships imply that the researcher

describe how changes in the aspect of Adaptation altered the Organizational structure. In a

sense, this creates a road map that might be of benefit to researchers and students alike.

41
When a theory is not clear or consistent, it ceases to be a lens for viewing an organization

and becomes itself a representation of the author’s personal point of view. Further, this

view is typically tacit and so hidden from the reader unless explicated by such techniques

as are used in reflexive ethnography (e.g. Davies, 2001).

Core or Belt

An important aspect of Lakatos’ core/belt idea is that theorists may claim to have a core

while shifting the concepts in the belt to confound critics. This enables the theory to avoid

falsification in the Popperian sense; however, the theory that cannot be falsified cannot be

improved (Popper, 2002).

Studies #1 and #2 are relatively atomistic – focusing on component concepts. This

approach did not seem useful for discerning the core and belt of the theory. Rather than

identifying a single core, it might even be said that each perspective creates its own core.

That perspective-specific core might be considered as similar to a school of thought.

42
In contrast, study #3 suggests a core to the theory that is common to the entire body of

theory. That core is based on the idea that some concepts are more interconnected than

others. And, so, the changes in the theory and in the individual concepts must be more

effectively justified and so are less easily changed and more easily falsified.

In short, the core suggested in the present study may be thought of as defined by the

relationships between the concepts within the theory. That is to say from a point of view

that may be found from “within” the theory, rather than from any particular point of view

from “outside” the theory. The core suggested by study #3 is seen in Figure #2.

[… insert Figure #2 about here… ]

Future Studies

43
Looking to achieve a more optimal future of institutional theory, investigations should first

clarify the causal relationships suggested in the present paper. With a fully robust version

of institutional theory, the next step should be to test that model in the field and through

computer modeling to clarify or deny relationships suggested by the co-defined aspects.

Additionally, the “inter-testability” of the core aspects hints that such a model might be

falsifiable in the Popperian sense. For example, if the model pictured in Figure #1 were to

experience a change in Commitment of participants that did not result in a change in the

Organizational structure, the model would be falsified. This would, of course, open the

door to improving the model (Popper, 2002). Then too, if everything observable may be

explained in terms of the robust aspects, then each application in the field becomes a test of

the theory, and there is another opportunity to accelerate the evolution of institutional

theory through practice. Importantly, no study should be considered complete unless it

includes data representing all aspects of the theory.

Although compared with the longevity of Newton’s laws institutional theory might not

seem to be an “enduring” form of theory, it should be noted that the low level of robustness

found in this study suggests that theories with low robustness are more easily transferred

from author to author. Such a process may be linked to greater creativity as authors

44
generate new concepts and new versions of theory as the result of their research.

Metaphorically, this process might be related to an animal that undergoes mutation almost

with every step it takes. Such a high level of mutation may enable the creature to exist in a

wide variety of habitats; however, it should be asked, at what point do we begin calling

that creature by a different name? In contrast, let us consider an engineer who applies a

theory (e.g. Ohm’s law) from a textbook the design of a new piece of electronic equipment.

The result is usually a useful electronic device rather than a novel interpretation of the

theory. The benefits of the theory are spread to the society at large, rather than the name of

the theory spread across academic disciplines.

In creating this robust model, there is the opportunity to test institutional theory more

effectively. Any empirical study of institutional theory should be required to use a robust

model. Otherwise, the authors might be accused of bias in their choice of concepts from

the larger body of theory, and so have their useful work impugned. In such a robust study,

it would be necessary to identify empirical indicators from all of the robust dimensions of

the model.

45
Although this form of study would be necessarily more difficult, it is certainly within the

realm of expertise of most contributing scholars. Importantly, by the efforts of authors,

reviewers and editors, such an effort has the potential to rapidly accelerate the

advancement of theory for the benefit of scholars, practitioners, and society at large.

46
CONCLUSION – THE SURVIVAL OF INSTITUTIONAL THEORY

The present paper began with a search for an understanding of institutional theory. The

search identified many concepts however the studies presented here found more conflict

than commonality. Further study identified the static robustness of institutional theory and

paths for improving the robustness of the theory. A number of insights have emerged from

the present studies.

If institutional theory is applied to institutional theory, it may be seen that each published

article containing the words “institutional theory” acts as an institutional myth that

reinforces the idea of institutional theory, yet also serves to reduce the critical inspection

and evaluation from internal and external sources (Selznick, 1996, p. 273).

Those authors who are more central to the field of institutional theory may accept the

norms of that field as taken for granted (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006, p. 28).

Fortunately, institutional logics are never frozen (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006, p. 26).

As a newcomer to the field of institutional theory, I may be less “embedded” and therefore

possess more agency than others in the field (Reay et al., 2006, p. 977). In that case, the

47
present paper may serve as an exogenous jolt that disrupts the status quo causing

endogenous actors to be disembedded. They, having more agency as a result of the jolt,

may be impelled to take action.

The present paper may be thought of as a vocabulary that exposes contradictions in the

body of institutional theory, through the critical analysis of the conflicting versions of

theory. Similarly, it is a form of rhetoric that promotes an alternative vision of the structure

of the field (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005, p. 35) in the sense that seeking a robust

structure to institutional theory is a more important goal than seeking innumerable insights.

The question becomes: Is the field of institutional theory, as a loosely coupled

organization, ready to give up some of its existing practices in the face of the new

circumstances (Selznick, 1996, p. 271) suggested by the search for robust theory?

In the present paper, I have answered the call of Zucker, and Darby (2005, p. 548) to find

some sort of order. Along the way, however, I found myself moving beyond the call to

finding relationships between the concepts and to identify useful directions for effective

development of the theory. My focus has not been on the imposition of order. Rather I am

focused on discovering what sense of order already exists amongst the thicket of theory.

48
The world of institutional theory is an organization, albeit a loosely connected one. And, as

such, the adaptation of that organization is shaped by the outside world (Selznick, 1996, p.

171). However, that world has challenged the validity of academic efforts in real-world

application such as the “mixed reviews” from the application of open systems theory

(McElyea, 2003) to the more general failure of organizational theory (Burrell, 1997). It

may be useful to ask if institutional theory will survive. Or will it join the 90% of social

theory that rises rapidly only to disappear just as quickly (Oberschall, 2000)?

The present paper provides a valuable contribution by identifying how academic efforts,

using the tool of robust theory, may lead to successful adaptation and the renewed

relevance of academia. In short, with robust theories of institutions, there exists the

opportunity to make academia much more relevant to the world of practice. Though stated

briefly, the implications here are quite profound.

In addition to this renewed promise of the social sciences, there are some additional

insights that have emerged from this process.

49
First, I have explicated and quantified the conflict inherent in the normal scientific

approach to institutional theory in terms of dynamic robustness. Understanding this

conflict implies the opportunity to advance the field more purposefully. Where previously a

reader might have believed that authors presenting on the topic of institutional theory are

describing the same thing, the present paper has shown that is not the case. The present

study highlights the opportunity for the integration of concepts and a path for

reconciliation. Importantly, a robust theory might be seen as possessing epistemological

justification, not from external testing, but internally through rigorous and repeatable

methods.

Second, moving toward a robust theory has, historically, provided astonishing results. In

Wallis (2010) shows how early theories of electricity had low levels of robustness and

were not useful in practical application. As the scientific revolution advanced the theories

became more robust and progressively more useful. Today, we have cell phones,

computers, and such because of the usefulness of those quantifiably robust theories. That

same kind of advance in effectiveness has long eluded the social sciences because we have

had no way to evaluate or integrate our theories with any sort of rigor. The methodology

50
presented in the present paper suggests that a path of advancement may now be within

reach.

Third, well-structured theories appear to be more falsifiable in the Popperian sense.

Therefore, it becomes possible to visualize a path for improving those theories and so

fulfill the promise of the social sciences. For those who can see the path, the process of

academic interaction may soon appear as more of a footrace to achieve measurably robust

and effective theories, rather than an American football game where yardage is traded back

and forth until the spectators are bored and go home to choose a different sport.

Fourth, based on Dubin’s (1978) list where increasing relatedness suggests higher efficacy

of theory, and Weick’s (1989) inference that propositions should be effectively ordered, or

interrelated, it may be suggested that increasing robustness suggests a higher level of

epistemological validity of a theory. In general, however, it is important that the causal

core may be seen as being derived from a different epistemological validity than the

loosely related list of concepts that comprises the belt. Where the belt may find validation

from any one of a wide range of research methodologies and points of view, as those

methods are the source of the concepts that inhabit the belt, the core finds validation only

51
in the relationship between its own concepts. This is a significant epistemological shift that

suggests a rich opportunity for additional study.

Finally, where it previously has been generally understood that social theory is advancing

due to some natural evolution of ideas emerging from the back-and-forth between scholars,

the present set of studies suggests that there may be no advancement. The methods

suggested in the present article open the door for more purposeful and more rapid

evolution of institutional theory towards greater usefulness.

52
REFERENCES

53
Actions Actions
repeated assigned similar
Belief systems meanings

Sharing
interpretations
Time

Interpretation of
Rational / action
Institutionalization
Purposeful
Pluralization of organizations
lifeworlds Social Order Individual
actions

More norms of
Routinized (rely appropriate
Technological Cognitive styles Organizational on rules) beliefs
production / Consciousness structure

Concepts closer to Belt: More elaborate


displays of
Structure from
BureaucraciesBelief systems institutional
confidence

More elaborate displays of myth Less in section


confidence Adaptation and evaluation
Decision-
Internal environmentOrganizational Intermediate Concepts: making
interaction
Internal More norms of appropriate beliefs Routinized (rely on
environment rules) Characteristics Matching rules
Interpretation of action of participants to situations
Individual actions
External
Sharing interpretations Historical Concepts closer to Core:
environment
(influences and dependency Characteristics of
Actions assigned similar Commitment of
participants Organizational structure
constraints) participants
meanings
Decision-making Social Order
Actions repeated
Structure from Cognitive styles /
Technological production institutional myth Consciousness

Figure
Bureaucracies Time concepts of institutional
#1 – Relationships between concatenated theory
Institutionalization

Pluralization Rational /
of lifeworlds Purposeful
organizations
External environment (influences
and constraints) Adaptation

Organizational
Less in section and evaluation
interaction
Historical dependency

Matching rules to situations

Commitment of participants 54
Figure #2 – Concepts, and their relationship with the core of institutional theory

55

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