BENGSON III vs HRET
The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes
Facts:
Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in
San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The
fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5,
1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the United
States Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a
consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act
No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among
others, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of
a foreign country. Cruz was thereafter naturalized as a US citizen on June 5,
1990 in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps. On March 17,
1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998
elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner
Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection. Bengson then filed
a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that
respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under
Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. On March 2, 2000, the HRET
rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring
respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the 2nd District of
Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. Bengson’s MR was likewise denied.
Issue:
Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship.
Held:
Yes. There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by
naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two
kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A
person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural-born citizen thereof. As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born
citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."On the other
hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens
through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473,
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the
former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. To
be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a
Filipino citizen.
executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is
satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1)not left the
Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has
not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated
rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or
contrary to any Government announced policies. Filipino citizens who have
lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the
three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former
citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2)by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of
Congress. Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship,
naturalization is governed by Commonwealth
Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for
reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.
Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine
citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the
disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473. Repatriation, on the
other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the armed
forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of
the United States at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an
alien; and (5) political and economic necessity. As distinguished from the
lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said
oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned
resides or last resided. As a rule, repatriation results in the recovery of the
original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen.
On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost
his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-
born Filipino. The rule applies to Cruz’s case. Being a natural-born citizen,
Cruz reacquired this status upon his repatriation.
Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for
Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number
of votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending
petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he
was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a
US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate
for said elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the
disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to
have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and
registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on
August 31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in
the philippines.
RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d)
and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as
a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person
is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance
on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition.
Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby
terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view
of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that
he renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly
declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination
whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of
our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative
department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its
operation and application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent
sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate
of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and
that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as
the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines,
when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood,
received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in
past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking
made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for
declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained
the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after
taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken
against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
LIMKAICHONG vs COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 178831-32, July 30, 2009
Facts:
In its April 1, 2009 Decision in G.R. No. 179120, the Supreme Court reversed
the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division dated May 17, 2007
in SPA Nos. 07-247 and 07-248 disqualifying Limkaichong from running as a
congressional candidate in the First District of Negros Oriental due to lack of
citizenship requirement. Biraogo filed the instant motion for reconsideration
with prayer for oral argument.
The core issue in the consolidated petitions is the qualification of
Limkaichong to run for, be elected to, and assume and discharge, the
position of Representative for the First District of Negros Oriental. The
contention of the parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a
natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement in Section
6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the election that ensued, she was
voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest
votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner and has since
performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of
Representatives.
The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a
natural-born citizen because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of
her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the naturalization of
Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and
substantial defects.
Issues:
1. Whether the citizenship of Limkaichong's parents may be questioned in an
election case
2. Who has jurisdiction over the disqualification case
3. Whether the ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules apply
to disqualification based on citizenship
Held:
1. No. In assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should
be in accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 which
provides that:
Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued. - Upon motion
made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his
representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal, the competent judge
may cancel the naturalization certificate issued and its registration in
the Civil Register:
1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently
or illegally;
2. If the person naturalized shall, within five years next following the issuance
of said naturalization certificate, return to his native country or to some
foreign country and establish his permanent residence there: Provided, That
the fact of the person naturalized remaining more than one year in his native
country or the country of his former nationality, or two years in any other
foreign country, shall be considered as prima facie evidence of his intention
of taking up his permanent residence in the same:
3. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention;
4. If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to
graduate from a public or private high school recognized by the Office of
Private Education [now Bureau of Private Schools] of the Philippines, where
Philippine history, government or civics are taught as part of the school
curriculum, through the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support
them or by transferring them to another school or schools. A certified copy of
the decree canceling the naturalization certificate shall be forwarded by the
Clerk of Court of the Department of Interior [now Office of the President] and
the Bureau of Justice [now Office of the Solicitor General];
5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as
a dummy in violation of the constitutional or legal provisions requiring
Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise, use or enjoyment of a
right, franchise or privilege.
As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico, the Court held that:
x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the
proceedings for naturalization were tainted with certain infirmities, fatal or
otherwise, but that is beside the point in this case. The jurisdiction of the
court to inquire into and rule upon such infirmities must be properly invoked
in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. Such procedure is the
cancellation of the naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5), Commonwealth
Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473,
hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon motion made in the proper proceedings
by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper provincial
fiscal." In other words, the initiative must come from these officers,
presumably after previous investigation in each particular case.
Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its
representatives designated by statute, that may question the illegally or
invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate
denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by
private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizen’s
descendant.
Accordingly, it is not enough that one's qualification, or lack of it, to hold an
office requiring one to be a natural-born citizen, be attacked and questioned
before any tribunal or government institution. Proper proceedings must be
strictly followed by the proper officers under the law. Hence, in seeking
Limkaichong's disqualification on account of her citizenship, the rudiments of
fair play and due process must be observed, for in doing so, she is not only
deprived of the right to hold office as a Member of the House of
Representative but her constituents would also be deprived of a leader in
whom they have put their trust on through their votes. The obvious rationale
behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been
disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for
her bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the
honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom
they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government.
latter's election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word "sole" in
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 2509 of the OEC
underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over
election contests relating to its members.
The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was
alleged to have been tainted with irregularity does not divest the HRET of its
jurisdiction.
3. No. The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the manner of filing
either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against a Member of
the House of Representatives. In our Decision, we ruled that the ten-day
prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to
disqualification based on citizenship, because qualifications for public office
are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be
seasonably challenged. Accordingly, the 1987 Constitution requires that
Members of the House of Representatives must be natural-born citizens not
only at the time of their election but during their entire tenure. Being a
continuing requirement, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of it
may still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period
notwithstanding.

2. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she

had taken her oath of office, and she was allowed to officially assume the
office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET), and no longer the COMELEC, should now assume
jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.

x x x The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating
to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own
jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning
candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending
before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his
qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the
HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case
involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS KAMRAN F. KABARSI
FACTS:
On June 25, 2002, Kamran F. Kabarsi filed a petition for naturalization with
the RTC where he alleged the following:
1. His full name is Kamran F. Karbasi;
2. He is recognized as a Person of Concern by the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as shown in a
certification duly issued by the UNHCR;
3. He is presently residing with his family at 341 Burgos Street, Dipolog
City, since early part of June 2000 and more so has resided
continuously in the Philippines for not less than 11 years immediately
preceding the date of this petition; to wit, since 11 July 1990 and in
Dipolog City for more than one (1) year;
4. His last place of foreign residence was Pakistan and his other places
of residence, prior to his present residence, were as follows (i) Panay
Ave., Quezon City; (ii) Sta. Filomena, Dipolog City; (iii) Capitol Area,
Dumaguete City; (iv) Dohinob, Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte;
5. He was born on 4 September 1966 in Tehran, Iran, as shown in his
identity card which also serves as his birth certificate;
6. He is married and is the father of one (1) child;
7. His wife Cliji G. Lim Karbasi is a Filipino citizen, 22 years old and
born on 10 August 1979 in Cebu City, whom he married on 12
October 2000 in Dipolog City, as shown in their certificate of
marriage;
8. His child, Keenyji L. Karbasi, l-year old , was born on 9 June 2001 in
Dipolog City and presently residing with him and his wife at 341
Burgos Street, Dipolog City;
9. He arrived in Manila, Philippines, under an assumed name (Syed
Gul Agha) from Pakistan on 11 July 1990 specifically at the Manila
International Airport on board Philippine Airlines Flight No. 731, per
UNHCR certification containing reference to his Pakistani passport
issued under said assumed name;
10. Due to his marriage, he is entitled to the benefit of Section 3 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, which reduced to five years the ten
year requirement of continuous residence;
11. He speaks and writes English and Visayan;
12. His trade or occupation is as a repair technician in which he has
been engaged since 1998 and, as such, he derives an average
annual income of Php 80,000.00 more or less;
13. He has all the qualifications required under Section 2 and none of
the disqualifications under Section 4, of the Commonwealth Act No.
473;
14. He has complied with the requirements of the Naturalization Law
(Commonwealth Act No. 473) regarding the filing with the Office of
the Solicitor General of his bona fide intention to become a citizen of
the Philippines, as shown in his Declaration of Intention duly filed on
25 May 2001;
15. It is his intention in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines
and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to
any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to
Iran of which, at this time, he is a citizen or subject; that he will reside
continuously in the Philippines from the date of filing of this petition
up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship;
16. Dominador Natividad Tagulo, of legal age, Filipino, married and
residing at ABC Compound, Quezon Ave., Miputak, Dipolog City and
Alton C. Ratificar, of legal age, Filipino, married and residing at 047
Burgos Street, Dipolog City, who are Filipino citizens, whose
affidavits are attached to his petition, will appear and testify as
witnesses at the hearing thereof.
After finding that the petition is sufficient in form, the petitioner submitted his
witnesses, and thereafter, took the witness stand himself. He narrated that
he is an Iranian national. He and his brother left Iran in 1986 beacause of the
war between Iran and Iraq at that time. Their government confiscated their
passport so they travelled by camel to Pakistan where they stayed for 3
years, but was not granted a refugee status there. They decided to come to
the Philippines since one of his brothers was already studying in the country.
They procured Pakistani passports under assumed names.
Upon his arrival in the Philippines on July n, 1990, he submitted himself to
the United Nations in Manila. After several interviews, he was admitted as a
refugee and, later on, as a person of concern. As a refugee, he was granted
by the United Nations allowances, medical benefits and protection to some
extent.
On January 17, 2007, the RTC found Karbasi's evidence sufficient to support
his petition. Finding Karbasi as possessing all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen, the RTC rendered its
decision granting the petition for naturalization.
Not in conformity, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), interposed an appeal to the CA, based mainly on
the ground that the RTC erred in granting Karbasi's petition as he failed to
comply with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 473 (Naturalization
Law) on character, income and reciprocity. Specifically, the OSG pointed out
that Karbasi failed to establish that: 1] Iran grants reciprocal rights of
naturalization to Filipino citizens; 2] he has a lucrative income as required
under the law; and 3] he is of good moral character as shown by his
disregard of Philippine tax laws when he had underdeclared his income in his
income tax returns (ITRs) and overstated the same in his petition for
naturalization.
The CA ruled that the alleged under declaration in Karbasi's ITRs was
prepared in good faith because he was of the belief that he no longer needed
to include the income he received as payment of his services to Daewoo
Electronics Electronics Services, Inc. (Daewoo) and Kolins Philippines
International, Inc. (Kolins), because the same were already withheld at
source. The CA likewise affirmed the RTC finding that Karbasi, as a refugee,
need not prove reciprocity between Philippine and Iranian laws.
ISSUE:
WON reciprocity is necessary in the naturalization of refugees?
HELD: NO
Although it isTrue that the Naturalization Law disqualifies citizens or subjects
of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become
naturalized citizens or subjects. A perusal of Karbasi's petition, both with the
RTC and the CA, together with his supplemental pleadings filed with the
Court, however, reveals that he has successfully established his refugee
status upon arrival in the Philippines. In effect, the country's obligations
under its various international commitments come into operation. Articles 6
and 34 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, to which
the Philippines is a signatory, must be considered in this case, to wit:
Article 6 of the 1951 Convention:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "in the same circumstances"
implies that any requirements (including requirements as to length and
conditions of sojourn or residence) which the particular individual would have
to fulfill for the enjoyment of the right in question, if he were not a refugee,
must be fulfilled by him, with the exception of requirements which by their
nature a refugee is incapable of fulfilling.
Article 34 of the 1951 Convention:
The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation
and naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort
to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible
the charges and costs of such proceedings.
In the same vein, Article 729 of the said Convention expressly provides
exemptions from reciprocity, while Article 34 states the earnest obligation of
contracting parties to "as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and
naturalization of refugees." As applied to this case, Karbasi's status as a
refugee has to end with the attainment of Filipino citizenship, in consonance
with Philippine statutory requirements and international obligations. Indeed,
the Naturalization Law must be read in light of the developments in
international human rights law specifically the granting of nationality to
refugees and stateless persons.
Residence Qualification
GALLEGO vs. VERA
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming the
decision of the CFI of Leyte, which declared illegal the petitioner’s election to
the office of the municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in the election of Dec.
1940, on the ground that he did not meet the residence qualification.
Gallego is a native of Abuyog, Leyte. After his studies, he was employed as a
school teacher in Catarman, Samar, as well as in some municipalities in
Leyte. In 1937, he ran as municipal mayor in Abuyog, Leyte, but lost. In June
1938, he worked in Malaybalay Bukidnon in a plantation of the Bureau of
Forestry to make up for the financial drawback caused by his loss in the
previous election, and stayed there until he resigned in Sept. 1940.
Gallego registered himself as an elector in Bukidnon and voted there in the
election for assemblymen held in Dec. 1938, and in Jan. 1940, He obtained
and paid for his residence cert. from the municipal treasurer of Malaybalay, in
which certificate it was stated that he had resided in the said municipality for
1.5 yrs.
The CA declared that Gallego lost his domicile in Abuyog Leyte at the time
he was elected mayor there on the grounds that:
1. He registered as a voter in Malaybalay, Bukidnon
2. He voted in Malaybalay in the 1938 election for assemblymen
3. He obtained a residence cert from the municipality of Malaybalay
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte and
acquired a new domicile in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
HELD:
Yes. Gallego did not lose his domicile in Abuyog by working in Malaybalay as
an employee, registering as voter there and securing his residence certificate
there for 1940. The decision of the CA is reversed.
RATIO:
In the definition of “residence” in the election law under the 1935
Constitution, it states that in order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must
concur:
1. Residence or a bodily presence in the new locality
2. An intention to remain there
3. An intention to abandon the old domicile
The purpose to remain in the domicile should be for an INDEFINITE period of
time. The court believed that Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay
indefinitely because:
1. When he was employed as a teacher in Samar, he always returned
in Abuyog and even resigned when he ran for office in 1937
2. His departure was only for the purpose of making up for the financial
drawback caused by his loss in the election
3. He did not take his wife and children to Malaybalay with him
4. He bought a piece of land in Abuyog and did not avail of the land in
the plantation offered to him by the government
5. He visited his family no less than three times despite the great
distance between Abuyog, Leyte and Malaybalay Bukidnon
The court said that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence
qualification is to:
“exclude a stranger or a newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions
and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an
elective office to serve that community.”
And the petitioner was a native there, had run for the same office before, and
was now elected with a majority of 800 votes in a 3rd class municipality.
FAYPON VS QUIRINO (maiikli talaga yung digest sa net )
G.R. No. L-7068 December 22, 1954
FACTS:
Respondent was born in Caoayan, Ilocos Sur; came to Manila to pursue his
studies; went to United States for the same purpose; returned to the
Philippines; and engaged in the newspaper work in Manila, and Iloilo. When
he ran for the office of Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur, he was proclaimed
by the provincial board of canvassers as the governor. A petition for quo
warranto was filed by the petitioner on the ground of respondent's ineligibility
for the said office because of alleged lack of residence. The petitioner relies
on the fact that the respondent registered as voter in Pasay City in 1946 and
1947.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent's acts, activities, and utterances constitute
abandonment or loss of his residence of origin.
RULING:
NO. The Court ruled out that mere absence from one's residence or origin -
domicile - to pursue studies, engage in business, or practice his avocation, is
not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures" to
improve his lot. When election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace
to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but
for professional or business reason, he may not be absent himself from the
place of his activities; so there he registers as voter. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence
of origin, he has not forsaken him. Thus, registration of a voter in another
place has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of
such residence.
ROMUALDEZ vs. RTC, Br. 7, TACLOBAN CITY (1993)
PHILIP ROMUALDEZ, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
7, TACLOBAN CITY, DONATO ADVINCULA, BOARD OF ELECTION
INSPECTORS, PRECINCT No. 9, MALBOG, TOLOSA, LEYTE, and the
MUNICIPAL REGISTRAR COMELEC, TOLOSA, LEYTE, respondents.
Ponente: VITUG, J.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari to set aside the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 7.
FACTS:
- Philip Romualdez is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Sometime in the early part of 1980, in consonance with his decision
to establish his legal residence at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
caused the construction of his residential house therein.
- Given the atmosphere brought about by the EDSA People Power
Revolution of 1986, Romualdez, together with his immediate family,
left the Philippines and sought "asylum" in the United States which
the United States government granted.
- In 1987, he attempted to come back to the Philippines to run for
Congress. However, his flight was aborted.
- It was the letter concerning his possible deportation which made him
come back to the Philippines, arriving here without any government
travel document.
- Upon arrival, he immediately went back to his residence in Malbog,
Tolosa, Leyte.
- During the registration of voters conducted by the COMELEC for the
11 May 1992 elections, petitioner registered himself anew as a voter
at Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. The chairman of the
Board of Election Inspectors allowed him to be registered.
- Donato Advincula filed a petition in the MTC, praying that
Romualdez’ name be excluded in the list of voters since he’s a
resident of Massachusetts, USA. (He did not fulfil the requirements
under Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Consti)
- As an answer, Romualdez contends that he has been a resident of
Tolosa, Leyte, since the early 1980's, and that he has not
abandoned his said residence by his physical absence therefrom
during the period from 1986 up to the third week of December 1991.
- MTC finds the respondent to be a resident of Brgy. Malbog, Tolosa,
Leyte and qualified to register as a voter thereat
- Advincula appealed.
- RTC finds respondent Philip Romualdez disqualified to register as a
voter for the 1992 elections and reversed the decision of the lower
court in toto.
- Hence, petitioner filed this present case.
- SC issued a TRO directing respondent RTC Judge Pedro Espino to
cease and desist from enforcing questioned decision.
ISSUES:
1. PROCEDURAL: Whether or not the MTC and RTC acquired
jurisdiction over the above cases, the petition having been filed by one who
did not allege to be himself a registered voter of the municipality concerned
2. SUBSTANTIAL: Whether or not the RTC erred in finding the
petitioner to have voluntarily left the country and abandoned his residence in
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte (Technically, the Court questions WON petitioner is
considered as a resident of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte)
RULING/RATIO:
1. The Court reiterates that "while lack of jurisdiction may be
assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the
proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will estop such
party from assailing such lack of jurisdiction." Undoubtedly, the
petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
respondent not only by his active participation in the proceedings
thereat but, more importantly, in having sought an affirmative
relief himself when the appeal was made to the latter court
whose jurisdiction he, in effect, invoked.
2. Petitioner Romualdez did not abandon his residence.
o In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as
synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in
the election law is synonymous with "domicile", which
imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention."
o "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which
when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons,
one intends to return.
o That residence, in the case of the petitioner, was established
during the early 1980's to be at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa,
Leyte.
o Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting
another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new
domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there,
and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
o Given his identity and the circumstances during the time,
petitioner’s sudden departure from the country cannot be
 described as "voluntary," or as "abandonment of residence"
at least in the context that these terms are used in applying
the concept of "domicile by choice.
o After examination of records, the Court finds not that much
to convince us that the petitioner had, in fact, abandoned his
residence in the Philippines and established his domicile
elsewhere.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, finding merit on the petition the same is hereby GRANTED
DUE COURSE; of the Decision of the respondent Regional Trial Court dated
03 April 1992 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of
the Municipal Trial Court dated 28 February 1992 is hereby REINSTATED
and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court in this case is
correspondingly made PERMANENT. No pronouncement as to costs.
NICOLAS-LEWIS v COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioners were successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship
under RA 9225, which accords to such applicants the right to suffrage,
among others. Long before the May 2004 national and local elections,
petitioners sought registration and certification as “overseas absentee voter”
only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a
COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23,
2003, they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of
the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The
same letter, however, urged the different Philippine posts abroad not to
discontinue their campaign for voter’s registration, as the residence
restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain individuals
who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections.
However, the COMELEC denied petition of the petitioners on the ground that
to exercise absentee voting; the one-year residency requirement should be
fulfilled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not dual citizens may exercise their right to suffrage as absentee
voters even short of 1-year residency requirement
HELD:
RA 9189 provides a list of those who cannot avail themselves of the
absentee voting mechanism. However, Section 5(d) of the enumeration
respecting Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another country
opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule. Section 5(d) of
R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident
who is “recognized as such in the host country” because immigration or
permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of one’s
residence in his country of origin.
However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad
to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that
he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional
intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that “all citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law” must be entitled to exercise the
right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee
voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is
required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate
Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.
After what appears to be a successful application for recognition of Philippine
citizenship under R.A. 9189, petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy
political rights, specifically the right of suffrage, pursuant to Section 5 thereof.
As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law – R.A. 9225
– requiring “duals” to actually establish residence and physically stay in the
Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary,
R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that “duals” are most likely non-
residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that
granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized
that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all
overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an
ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.
It is clear from these discussions of the Constitutional Commission that [it]
intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who
have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended
to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents
domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters
for the first time.
Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the
expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the
irresistible conclusion is that “duals” may now exercise the right of suffrage
thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. R.A.
9189 defines the terms adverted to in the following wise:
“Absentee Voting” refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the
Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote;
“Overseas Absentee Voter” refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is
qualified to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law,
who is abroad on the day of elections.
MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice
LAUREL, J.:
Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved
to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications that animal-
drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of
one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street
to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940
recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of th
e provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director
with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and r
egulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval
of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the
recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting
Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules
and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed
to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an
unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to
personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the
well-being and economic security of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and
avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the
public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the
desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety.
Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the
state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this
fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over
authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be
made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery.
The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of
all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema
lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health,
comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to
the greatest number.”
SIMON JR. vs COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Facts:
 A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one
of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon
City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the
City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being
the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association,
Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period
of 3 days within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA
to give way to the construction of the"People's Park".
 On 12 July 1990, private respondents, led by their President Roque
Fermo, filed a letter-complaint with the CHR against the petitioners,
asking for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr.
of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private
respondents'stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North
EDSA. CHR issued a preliminary order directing the petitioners to desist
from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending
resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission"
and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.
 Petitioners started the demolition despite CHR’s order to desist.
Respondents consequently asked that petitioner’s be cited in contempt.
 Meanwhile, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint filed by
respondents. They alleged that the Commission has no jurisdiction over
the complaint as it involved respondents’ privilege to engage in business,
not their civil and political rights.
 In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners
in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of
P500.00 on each of them. On 1 March 1991, the CHR issued an Order,
denying petitioners' motion to dismiss. The CHR opined that "it was not
the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a
paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but
it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to
provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human
rights of all persons within the Philippines "
 Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petioners Simon
Jr. et al filed a petition for prohibition to enjoin the CHR from hearing
private respondents’ complaint.
Issue/s:
WON CHR has jurisdiction to hear the complaint and grant the relief prayed
for by respondents.
WON the CHR can investigate the subject matter of respondents’ complaint.
Held:
No. Under the constitution, the CHR has no power to adjudicate.
No. Complaint does not involve civil and political rights.
Rationale:
 Art XIII, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that the CHR has the
power to investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms
of human rights violations involving civil and political rights.
 In Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, the Court through Justice
Andres Narvasa observed that:
(T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence
and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication,
and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not
a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the
faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the
law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may
be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively,
subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by
law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have
CHR’s investigative power encompasses all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights.

 The term civil rights has been defined as referring to those rights that
belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its
inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or
administration of the government. They include the rights of property,
marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Political
rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate,
directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of
government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right
of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis
the management of government.
 Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it is readily
apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights
that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights
violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the
"(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners
and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of
disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes
committed against the religious."
 In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be
demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as
temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is
planned to be developed into a "People's Park." Looking at the standards
hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this
instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the
demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private
respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations
involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.
 ISIDRO CARIÑO vs. COMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
 court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take
G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991
FACTS:
Some 800 public school teachers undertook “mass concerted actions” to
protest the alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their
grievances. The “mass actions” consisted in staying away from their
classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable
assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order
to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the
return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High
School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90
days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An
investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges.
When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating
Committee, said teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to
boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed
dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of
Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with
RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers’ to
due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the
meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to
Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were
participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their
replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for
reasons completely unknown to them.
While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution
over the cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carino’s act of
issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing
its case and held that the “striking teachers” “were denied due process of
law;…they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to
the administrative charges;” there had been violation of their civil and
political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate.”
ISSUE:
* Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved
HELD:
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such
power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another
over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to
repeat, the Commission does not have.

Power to Investigate
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the
power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on
complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such
rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said
rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the
course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may
grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or
whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of
any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy
as may be required by its findings.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as
courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to
adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense,
these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
“Investigate” vs. “Adjudicate”
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire
or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of
"investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically.
"to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to
conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to
discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or
intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy
involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up
step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search
into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by
careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;"
"to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn
describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily
does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry,
judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning
a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge,
arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary
defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to
a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on:
settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule
upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or
grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of
judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its
strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide,
settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the
power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the
merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case
No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so
even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary
proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by
the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been
transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to
"resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass
concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are
prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of
carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the
teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite
the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute
infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative
disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by
them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual
teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said
acts or omissions.
Who has Power to Adjudicate?
These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education,
being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under
the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the
CSC.
Manner of Appeal
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by
the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are
adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the
proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the
respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education
 had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and
political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined
through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary
Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be
reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme
Court.
VINUYA VS ROMULO
FACTS:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the
DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit
organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of
providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the
Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive
Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing
a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the Philippines. But officials
of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the
position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation
had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty
between the Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against
humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the
respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of
reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and
other international tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals
relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951
and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women’s Fund and the Philippine
government signed a Memorandum of Understanding for medical and
welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five
years, these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
ISSUE:
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not
espousing petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of
reparations against Japan.
RULING:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive
Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse
petitioners’ claims against Japan.
Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”
One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations.
It is well-established that “the conduct of the foreign relations of our
government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative–
‘the political’–departments of the government, and the propriety of what may
be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry
or decision.” are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.
They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the
people whose welfare they advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and
courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and
executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine
government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is
demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the
political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already
decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its
nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The
wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the
conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in
time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents
in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause
would be inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt
our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in
this region. For the to overturn the Executive Department’s determination
would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate
political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been
constitutionally committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general
principle, where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the
treaty’s conclusion and our consideration – the Executive must be given
ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a
claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the
petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies
are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for
individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been
when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the
individual’s behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by
resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his
behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of
its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise
diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit,
for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal
person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not
adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can
do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering
their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the
province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not
alter this analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by
the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of
Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international
crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has
been used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the
community of states as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn
between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a
whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic
protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In
view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a
legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that
command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom.
Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are
mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general
international norms of equivalent authority.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo
Petitioner: Secretary of National Defense; Chief of staff, AFP
Respondent: Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo
G.R. No. 180906 / 7 October 2008
Ponente: CJ Puno
Facts:
CA Decision being appealed
1. The Manalo brothers filed, on 23 August 2007, a Petition for
Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
against petitioners and their officers from depriving them of their right
to liberty and other basic rights.
 The Writ of Amparo was approved on Aug 24, 2007 and
petitioners filed Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo
Petition.
2. The CA rendered a decision in favor of the Manalo brothers and
ordered the current petitioners to:
  To furnish the Manalos and CA of all official and unofficial
reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with
their case, except those already on file.
 To confirm in writing the present places of official
assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald
Caigas
 To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports,
records and charts, reports of any treatment given or
recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the
petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel
(military and civilian) who attended to them from February
14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days from notice of
this decision.
Ito na talaga
 Feb. 14, 2006 - Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, brothers
and herein respondents, were abducted by elements of the
military (AFP and Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit or
CAFGU) from their house in Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan.
o The abductors were looking for a certain “Bestre”. Manalo brothers
were suspected of being members of the NPA
o The white L300 van was driven by M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie
Castillo
o The brothers were repeatedly beaten and tortured and questioned
about their knowledge of the NPA.
 Sometime in the third week of detention, Raymond
attempted to escape. He discovered that they were in Fort
Magsaysay (Palayan, Nueva Ecija). He was however
recaptured and tortured. Detention in Fort Magsaysay lasted
for 3 and a half months.
 One day, Rizal Hilario took the Manalo brothers to Pinaud,
San Ildefonso, Bulacan and then beaten up. They remained
there for one or two weeks.
 Then brought to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan to meet Maj.
Gen. Jovito Palparan, Commanding General, 7th Infantry
Division.
o Gen. Palparan told the Manalo brother to tell their
parents to not go to rallies and hearings regarding
their disappearance. Instead, they should help in the
capture of “Bestre”.
o Respondents were then brought to their parents’
house to deliver Palparan’s message. Their parents
agreed out of fear.
 Manalo brothers were given medicine named “Alive”. Gen. Palparan
said that this would make them feel better, but the real effect was
drowsiness and a heavy feeling after waking up.
 After 3 months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson.
He was ordered to clean outside the barracks of the Army Rangers.
o Met Sherlyn Cadapan, a UP student who was also abducted,
tortured and raped by the military.
 Reynaldo was brought to Camp Tecson a week later. Other captives
(Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino) also arrived.
o All the captives were chained every night. They were told
that their families would be killed if they escaped.
o Cadapan, Empeño and Merino would later on be killed.
Merino would even be burned.
o November 22, 2006 – the captives were transferred to a
camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. They
were continually beaten and made to do chores.
o Here, respondents witnessed how soldiers killed an old man
suspected of harboring the NPA and also of an Aeta who
was subsequently burned.
 The captives were then brought to Zambales, in a safehouse near
the sea. They were brought back to Limay on June 2007 by Caigas,
the commander of the 24th Infantry Battalion.
 June 13, 2007 – Respondents were brought to Pangasinan to farm
the land of Caigas. Here, they started to save their earnings to aid in
their escape. When they saved 1000 pesos, they were able to
acquire a cellphone.
 August 13, 2007 – Reynaldo and Raymond Manalo were able to
escape and board a bus bound for Manila.
 The respondents were able to corroborate each other’s affidavits.
 Dr. Benito Molino also corroborated the accounts of the Manalo
brothers. He specializes in forensic medicine. He conducted a
medical exam on the respondents
 After their escape. The scars and wounds of respondents were
consistent with their account of physical injuries inflicted on them. He
followed the Istanbul Protocol in the medical exam.
 Petitioners also submitted affidavits
 Gen. Palparan and M/Sgt. Hilario filed their affidavits late.
  Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall and witness for the
petitioner, conducted an investigation on May 29, 2006, from 8am to
10pm.
 All 6 persons (CAFGU members) implicated in the abduction denied
the allegation. They had alibis (some were building a chapel, some
were just at home)
 Discovered that “Ka Bestre” is actually Rolando Manalo, elder
brother of the respondents.
 Recommendation was for the dismissal of the case.
Issue:
WON the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly given
Dispositive: Petition dismissed. CA decision reaffirmed.
Held:
History of the Amparo Rule
 The adoption of the Amparo Rule is a result of the two-day National
Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced
Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-17, 2007.
o It was an exercise for the first time of the Court’s expanded
power to promulgate rules to protect our people’s
constitutional rights
 “Amparo” literally means “protection” in Spanish
o Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial review
derived from the U.S. with the limitations on judicial power
characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in
Mexico.
o It enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting
individual rights in particular cases, but prevents them from
using this power to make law for the entire nation
 This concept evolved into the (1) amparo libertad for the protection of
personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) amparo
contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes;
(3) amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and
legality of a judicial decision; (4) amparo administrativo for the
judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) amparo agrario for
the protection of peasants’ rights derived from the agrarian reform
process
 In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of amparo has
been constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights abuses
especially committed in countries under military juntas.
 In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly
provide for the writ of amparo, several of the above amparo
protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of
Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse
Clause, provides for the judicial power “to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.” The Clause accords a similar general protection
to human rights extended by the amparo contra leyes, amparo
casacion, and amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is
comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several
provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
Was the grant proper? YES
 Promulgated in October 24, 2007. First time that the Supreme Court
exercised its expanded power in the 1987 Constitution to promulgate
rules to protect the people’s constitutional rights (life, liberty,
property)
 Coverage of which is confined to:
o Extralegal killings – killings committed without due process
of the law
o Enforced disappearances – an arrest, detention or abduction
by the government; refusal of the State to disclose the fate
or whereabouts places him outside the protection of the law
 “Amparo” literally means protection in Spanish. Writ of Amparo
originated in Mexico (Yucatan State). Eventually incorporated into
the Mexican Constitution in 1847. Spread across the Western
hemisphere and eventually to the Philippines.
 Provides for swift relief because of the summary nature of its
proceedings. Only substantial evidence is required.
 There is still a threat to the life, liberty, and a violation of their right to
security of the Manalo brothers because their captors, whom they
escaped from, still remain at large.
o Right to security is in Art. III, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
o It is the right to enjoyment of life.
 Three ways of exercising right to security:
o Freedom from fear.
 Enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) Article 3
  Everyone has the right to life, liberty and
security of person.
 It is the “right to security of person” as the
word “security” itself means “freedom from
fear.
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), Art. 9 (1)
 Everyone has the right to liberty and
security of person.
 “Freedom from fear” is the right and any threat
to the rights to life, liberty or security is the
actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a
reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of
action. (PH is a signatory to both conventions)
o Guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security.
 Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees against search without warrant
 ELKs and EDs involve Physical torture, force, and
violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity.
 It constitutes an invasion of both bodily and
psychological integrity as the dignity of the human
person includes the exercise of free will
 Note: The consti also guarantees against torture
o Guarantee of protection of one’s right by the Government
 The writ of amparo, this right is built into the
guarantees of the right to life and liberty under
Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the
right to security of person under Article III, Section
2.
 Protection includes conducting effective
investigations, organization of the government
apparatus to extend protection to victims of ELKs
and EDs as well as their families
 Right to security of persons can exist independently
of the right to liberty. (the court cited several cases
here, Delgado Paez v. Colombia; Bwaya v. Zambia;
Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea)
 They have a positive duty to protect right to liberty
and not just a prohibition for arbitrary deprivation of
such rights. (ECHR in Kurt v. Turkey)
 The continuing threat on the life of the Manalo brothers is apparent.
This threat vitiates their free will because they are forced to limit their
movements and activities. Threats to liberty, security, and life are
actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo.
 The military failed to provide protection for the respondents. They
were even the ones who actually tortured them. The one-day
investigation conducted by Jimenez was limited, superficial and one-
sided.
 “In sum, we conclude that respondents’ right to security as “freedom
from threat” is violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and
security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection
by the government is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation
and protection on the part of the military.”
RAZON VS TAGITIS
FACTS:
The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and
the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB)
Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin
Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the
early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They
immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to
buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga.
When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. The
receptionist related that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in the
afternoon and even left his room key with the desk. Kunnong looked for
Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latter’s Manila-based secretary
who did not know of Tagitis’ whereabouts and activities either; she advised
Kunnong to simply wait.
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP
professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB,
reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. On November 7,
2007, Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of the
circumstances surrounding Tagitis’ disappearance.
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), Mary Jean Tagitis filed a
Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-
Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla.The petition was directed against Lt. Gen.
Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I.
Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal,
Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt.
Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response;
Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael,
Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet.
Mary Jean said in her statement that she approached some of her co-
employees with the Land Bank in Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur
who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military who could
help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband. All of her efforts did
not produce any positive results except the information from persons in the
military who do not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of
the uniformed men. According to reliable information she received, subject
Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically
with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an
earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the
different terrorist groups particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah or JI.
She then filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in
Cotobato and in Jolo, seeking their help to find her husband, but was told of
an intriguing tale by the police that her husband was not missing but was with
another woman having good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of
the refusal of the PNP to help and provide police assistance in locating her
missing husband.
Heeding an advise of one police officer, she went to the different police
headquarters namely Police Headquarters in Cotabato City, Davao City,
Zamboanga City and eventually in the National Headquarters in Camp
Crame in Quezon City but her efforts produced no positive results. These
trips exhausted all of her resources which pressed her to ask for financial
help from friends and relatives.
She has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail,
and under the circumstances, she has no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy to protect and get the release of her husband, Engr. Morced Tagitis,
from the illegal clutches of his captors, their intelligence operatives and the
like which are in total violation of the subject’s human and constitutional
rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of
Amparo, set the case for hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the
petitioners to file their verified return within seventy-two (72) hours from
service of the writ.
In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the
petitioners denied any involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis’ alleged
abduction. They argued that the allegations of the petition were incomplete
and did not constitute a cause of action against them; were baseless, or at
best speculative; and were merely based on hearsay evidence. In addition,
they all claimed that they exhausted all means, particularly taking pro-active
measures to investigate, search and locate Tagitis and to apprehend the
persons responsible for his disappearance.
THE CA RULING
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the
disappearance of Tagitis was an "enforced disappearance" under the United
Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearances. The CA held that "raw reports" from an "asset" carried
"great weight" in the intelligence world. It also labeled as "suspect" Col.
Kasim’s subsequent and belated retraction of his statement that the military,
the police, or the CIDG was involved in the abduction of Tagitis.
The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a bedlam of
speculation" police theories painting the disappearance as "intentional" on
the part of Tagitis. He had no previous brushes with the law or any record of
overstepping the bounds of any trust regarding money entrusted to him; no
student of the IDB scholarship program ever came forward to complain that
he or she did not get his or her stipend. The CA also found no basis for the
police theory that Tagitis was "trying to escape from the clutches of his
second wife," on the basis of the respondent’s testimony that Tagitis was a
Muslim who could have many wives under the Muslim faith, and that there
was "no issue" at all when the latter divorced his first wife in order to marry
the second. Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom by the Abu
Sayyaf or by the ARMM paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis’ disappearance,
since the respondent, the police and the military noted that there was no
acknowledgement of Tagitis’ abduction or demand for payment of ransom –
the usual modus operandi of these terrorist groups.
Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ
to Tagitis and his family, and directed the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane
Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task Force Tagitis heads Gen. Joel
Goltiao and Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A.
Espina to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty
and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their
actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against
the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen.
Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military,
that was involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but
the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of April 9, 2008.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be extended to
Engr. Morced Tagitis.
RULING:
The disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis is classified as an enforced
disappearance, thus the privilege of the Writ of Amparo applies.
Under the UN Declaration enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or
by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the
disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the
law." Under this definition, the elements that constitute enforced
disappearance are essentially fourfold:
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of
the fate of the disappeared person;
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law.
There was no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared.
The direct evidence at hand only shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY
Pension House after depositing his room key with the hotel desk and was
never seen nor heard of again. The undisputed conclusion, however, from all
concerned – the petitioner, Tagitis’ colleagues and even the police authorities
– is that Tagistis disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was
never seen again.
A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege,
among others (in terms of the portions the petitioners cite):
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated
or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the
respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the
attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or
individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation,
together with any report;(e) The actions and recourses taken by the
petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and
the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission.
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete
in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights.
As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the
ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary
details.76 In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in
light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a
situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with
certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap,
abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these
information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the
disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity,
detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the
Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for
violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the
unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be to
determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the
circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the
victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action.
The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its
isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements – namely, of
the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened
violations of the rights to life, liberty or security – are present.
The properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleader’s knowledge about
Tagitis’ disappearance, the participation by agents of the State in this
disappearance, the failure of the State to release Tagitis or to provide
sufficient information about his whereabouts, as well as the actual violation of
his right to liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any failure in its
statement of a cause of action.
If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of
supporting affidavit, as required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing
to the summary nature of the proceedings for the writ and to facilitate the
resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the requirement for
supporting affidavits, with the annotation that these can be used as the
affiant’s direct testimony. This requirement, however, should not be read as
an absolute one that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not
strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially
complied with the requirement by submitting a verified petition sufficiently
detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement that an
affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to attach
the required affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her witness
(Mrs. Talbin) personally testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and
17 and February 18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the
petition. Thus, even on this point, the petition cannot be faulted.
The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action first
attracted notice in Adolf Hitler’s Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog
Decree of December 7, 1941. The Third Reich’s Night and Fog Program, a
State policy, was directed at persons in occupied territories "endangering
German security"; they were transported secretly to Germany where they
disappeared without a trace. In order to maximize the desired intimidating
effect, the policy prohibited government officials from providing information
about the fate of these targeted persons.
In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first two
categories, and 855 cases were recorded during the period of martial law
from 1972 until 1986. Of this number, 595 remained missing, 132 surfaced
alive and 127 were found dead. During former President Corazon C.
Aquino’s term, 820 people were reported to have disappeared and of these,
612 cases were documented. Of this number, 407 remain missing, 108
surfaced alive and 97 were found dead. The number of enforced
disappearances dropped during former President Fidel V. Ramos’ term when
only 87 cases were reported, while the three-year term of former President
Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58 reported cases. KARAPATAN, a local non-
governmental organization, reports that as of March 31, 2008, the records
show that there were a total of 193 victims of enforced disappearance under
incumbent President Gloria M. Arroyo’s administration. The Commission on
Human Rights’ records show a total of 636 verified cases of enforced
disappearances from 1985 to 1993. Of this number, 406 remained missing,
92 surfaced alive, 62 were found dead, and 76 still have undetermined
status.Currently, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearance reports 619 outstanding cases of enforced or
involuntary disappearances covering the period December 1, 2007 to
November 30, 2008.
Under Philippine Law
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof."We note that
although the writ specifically covers "enforced disappearances," this concept
is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the
Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that
the drafters of the Amparo Rule initially considered providing an elemental
definition of the concept of enforced disappearance:
Justice Puno stated that, “as the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized
separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these
killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the
Revised Penal Code and special laws.”
Although the Court’s power is strictly procedural and as such does not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the
Court can provide can be very meaningful through the procedures it sets in
addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Court,
through its procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby
directly compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations
of constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a
difference – even if only procedurally – in a situation when the very same
investigating public authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or
actual violations of constitutional rights.
The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations, under
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure that all
efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect
contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the
individual situations require. The second is to address the disappearance, so
that the life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security
restored. In these senses, our orders and directives relative to the writ are
continuing efforts that are not truly terminated until the extrajudicial killing or
enforced disappearance is fully addressed by the complete determination of
the fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by the production of the
disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty and security, and,
in the proper case, by the commencement of criminal action against the
guilty parties.
During the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance (in Paris, France on February 6, 2007, "enforced
disappearance" is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any
other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or
groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of
the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or
by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which
place such a person outside the protection of the law.
In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the
Philippines v. Duque III, we held that:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere
of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into
a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere
constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force
of domestic law.
The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy
that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II,
Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor
of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty
and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not
afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of
the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their
families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The duty to
investigate must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere
formality preordained to be ineffective.
Evidentiary Difficulties Posed by the Unique Nature of an Enforced
Disappearance
The unique evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced disappearance
cases; these difficulties form part of the setting that the implementation of the
Amparo Rule shall encounter. These difficulties largely arise because the
State itself – the party whose involvement is alleged – investigates enforced
disappearances. Past experiences in other jurisdictions show that the
evidentiary difficulties are generally threefold.
First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct
perpetrators. In addition, there are usually no witnesses to the crime; if there
are, these witnesses are usually afraid to speak out publicly or to testify on
the disappearance out of fear for their own lives.
Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance
is a distinct possibility; the central piece of evidence in an enforced
disappearance
Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities
deliberately deny that the enforced disappearance ever occurred.
"Deniability" is central to the policy of enforced disappearances, as the
absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to escape the
application of legal standards ensuring the victim’s human rights.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
The remedy of the writ of amparo provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes
of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the
appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine
criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for
damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings.
We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of
evidence is not at all novel in the Philippine legal system. In child abuse
cases, Section 28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness is
expressly recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule
allows the admission of the hearsay testimony of a child describing any
act or attempted act of sexual abuse in any criminal or non-criminal
proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the right of cross-
examination by the adverse party.
CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY
Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasim’s disclosure,
made in an unguarded moment, unequivocally point to some government
complicity in the disappearance. The consistent but unfounded denials and
the haphazard investigations cannot but point to this conclusion. For why
would the government and its officials engage in their chorus of concealment
if the intent had not been to deny what they already knew of the
disappearance? Would not an in-depth and thorough investigation that at
least credibly determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the government’s
cap under the circumstances of the disappearance? From this perspective,
the evidence and developments, particularly the Kasim evidence, already
establish a concrete case of enforced disappearance that the Amparo Rule
covers. From the prism of the UN Declaration, heretofore cited and quoted,
evidence at hand and the developments in this case confirm the fact of the
enforced disappearance and government complicity, under a background of
consistent and unfounded government denials and haphazard handling. The
disappearance as well effectively placed Tagitis outside the protection of the
law – a situation that will subsist unless this Court acts.
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were
the ones who were remiss in their duties when the government completely
failed to exercise the extral.'
To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, we refer this case back to the CA for
appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP and the PNP-
CIDG investigations and actions, and the validation of their results through
hearings the CA may deem appropriate to conduct.
118 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT AUTHOR:
OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL NOTES: (if
RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner, applicable)
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S.
IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN
BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT.
AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS,
COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an officer named MATUTINA,
LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the
name "HARRY," ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN "BONG"
PASICOLAN and VINCENT CALLAGAN,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 193160
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF
AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL
RODRIGUEZ, POLICE DIR. GEN. JESUS A. VERSOZA,
P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, BGEN. REMEGIO M. DE
VERA, 1ST LT. RYAN S. MATUTINA, LT. COL. LAURENCE
E. MINA, ANTONIO C. CRUZ, ALDWIN C. PASICOLAN and
VICENTE A. CALLAGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.
[G.R. No. 191805; April 16, 2013]
TOPIC:
PONENTE: SERENO, CJ.
FACTS: (chronological order)
1. Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti
Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military tagged KMP
as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its
members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
2. Noriel was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when
he refused to confess to his membership in the NPA.
3. After his released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition
for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders,
Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal
Properties. The petition was filed against former Pres. Arroyo, et al.
4. The CA granted the writs but dropped Pres. Arroyo as party-
respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of
office or actual incumbency.
5. After a careful examination of the records, the SC was convinced that
the Court of Appeals correctly found sufficient evidence proving
that the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division
of the military abducted petitioner Rodriguez, and detained and
tortured him. Hence, the SC affirmed with modification the CA’s
decision. The case was dismissed with respect to respondents former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, and
P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz,
Aldwin Pasicolan and Vincent Callagan for lack of merit.
6. The SC directed the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to take the appropriate action with respect
to any possible liability or liabilities, within their respective legal
competence, that may have been incurred by respondents Gen. Victor
lbrado, PDG. Jesus Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor
Ochoa, Brig. Gen. Remegio De Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan Matutina, and Lt. Col.
Laurence Mina. The Ombudsman and the DOJ were ordered to submit
to the Court the results of their action within a period of six months from
receipt of this Decision.
7. Pursuant to the Decision ordering the Office of the Ombudsman to take
further action, Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales sent this Court a
letter requesting an additional two-month period within which to submit
a report. The Ombudsman stated that Noriel Rodriguez and his
family refused to cooperate with the investigation for security
reasons.
8. Respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that
the soldiers belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry
Division of the military cannot be held accountable for authoring
the abduction and torture of petitioner. Their arguments revolve
solely on the claim that respondents were never specifically
mentioned by name as having performed, permitted, condoned,
authorized, or allowed the commission of any act or incurrence
omission which would violate or threaten with violation the rights
to life, liberty, and security of petitioner-respondent and his family.
9. The Ombudsman submitted the Investigation Report, which detailed the
steps taken by the Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the
Ombudsman, concluding that no criminal, civil, or administrative
liabilities may be imputed to the respondents. It was reflected therein
that the lawyers for the Rodriguezes had manifested to the FIO that the
latter are hesitant to appear before them for security reasons.
10. Karapatan (a non-governmental organization that provides legal
assistance to victims of human rights violations and their families) could
not locate Noriel and Rodel. As of this writing, the Rodriguezes refused
to participate in the present fact-finding investigation ‘for security
reasons.’ Recent information revealed that Noriel and his family are no
longer interested in participating in the present case.
11. Instead of appearing before the FIO for a conference under oath, SPO1
Robert B. Molina submitted an Affidavit stating that Wilma H. Rodriguez
appeared before the Gonzaga Police Station and requested to enter
into the blotter that her son, Noriel, was allegedly missing in Sitio
Comunal, Gonzaga, Cagayan. Thereupon, he gathered information
relative to Wilma’s report "but the community residence failed to reveal
anything".
12. The other accounts – specifically that of respondent Antonino C. Cruz,
Special Investigator II of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), as
well as the claims of respondents Mina and De Vera that they had
disclosed to the CHR that Noriel had become an agent ("asset") of the
17th Infantry Battalion – have been thoroughly evaluated and ruled
upon in our Decision. The OMB further laments, "If only he (Noriel)
could be asked to verify the circumstances under which he executed
these subsequent affidavits, his inconsistent claims will finally be
 settled," and that "(I)f there is one person who can attest on whether
detention and torture were indeed committed by any of the Subjects
herein, it is Noriel Rodriguez himself, the supposed victim."
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the CA erred when it granted the writ of amparo
in favor of petitioner Noriel.
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
SC denied the respondents’ motion for reconsideration.
The purported unwillingness of the petitioner to appear or participate at this
stage of the proceedings due to security reasons does not affect the
rationale of the writ granted by the CA, as affirmed by this Court. In any
case, the issue of the existence of criminal, civil, or administrative
liability which may be imputed to the respondents is not the province
of amparo proceedings -- rather, the writ serves both preventive and
curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the
expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is
curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of
perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and
action. In this case then, the thrust of ensuring that investigations are
conducted and the rights to life, liberty, and security of the petitioner,
remains.
The writ of amparo partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only
substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs
available to the petitioner. It is not an action to determine criminal guilt
requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or even administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence. The totality of evidence as a standard for the grant of
the writ was correctly applied by the Court.
No reversible error may be attributed to the grant of the privilege of the writ
by the CA, and the present motion for reconsideration raises no new issues
that would convince us otherwise.
Respondents’ claim that they were not competently identified as the soldiers
who abducted and detained the petitioner, or that there was no mention of
their names in the documentary evidence, is baseless. The CA rightly
considered Rodriguez’s Sinumpaang Salaysay as a meticulous and
straightforward account of his horrific ordeal with the military, detailing the
manner in which he was captured and maltreated on account of his
suspected membership in the NPA.
Petitioner narrated that at dawn on 9 September 2009, he noticed a soldier
with the name tag "Matutina," who appeared to be an official because the
other soldiers addressed him as "sir." He saw Matutina again at 11:00 p.m.
on 15 September 2009, when his abductors took him to a military operation
in the mountains. His narration of his suffering included an exhaustive
description of his physical surroundings, personal circumstances, and
perceived observations. He likewise positively identified respondents 1st Lt.
Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina to be present during his abduction, detention and
torture. These facts were further corroborated by Hermie Antonio Carlos in
his Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he recounted in detail the circumstances
surrounding the victim’s capture.
Respondents’ main contention in their Return of the Writ was correctly
deemed illogical and contradictory by the CA. They claim that Rodriguez
had complained of physical ailments due to activities in the CPP-NPA yet
nevertheless signified his desire to become a double-agent for the military.
If petitioner was tired of life in the wilderness and desired to become an
ordinary citizen again, it defies logic that he would agree to become an
undercover agent and work alongside soldiers in the mountains – or the
wilderness he dreads – to locate the hideout of his alleged NPA comrades.
Respondents conveniently neglect to address the findings of both the CA
and this Court that aside from the abduction of Rodriguez, respondents,
specifically 1st Lt. Matutina, had violated and threatened the former’s right
to security when they made a visual recording of his house, as well as the
photos of his relatives. The CA found that the soldiers even went as far as
taking videos of the photos of petitioner’s relatives hung on the wall of the
house, and the innermost portions of the house. There is no reasonable
justification for this violation of the right to privacy and security of petitioner’s
abode, which strikes at the very heart and rationale of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo. More importantly, respondents also neglect to address our ruling
that the failure to conduct a fair and effective investigation similarly
amounted to a violation of, or threat to Rodriguez’s rights to life, liberty, and
security.
The writ’s curative role is an acknowledgment that the violation of the
right to life, liberty, and security may be caused not only by a public
official’s act, but also by his omission. Accountability may attach to
respondents who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who
carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. The duty
to investigate must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a
mere formality preordained to be ineffective.

The CA found that respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG Verzosa, LT. Gen.
Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Col. De Vera, and Lt. Col. Mina conducted a
perfunctory investigation which relied solely on the accounts of the
military. Thus, the CA correctly held that the investigation was
superficial, one-sided, and depended entirely on the report prepared
by 1st Lt. Johnny Calub. No efforts were undertaken to solicit
petitioner’s version of the incident, and no witnesses were questioned
regarding it. The CA also took into account the palpable lack of effort
from respondent Versoza, as the chief of the Philippine National
Police.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
De Lima v. Gatdula
691 SCRA 226
Short Version:
The judge in this case required an Answer (instead of a Return) from De
Lima et al and did not follow the correct procedure in issuing the writ and
privilege of Writ of Amparo.
Facts:
 On February 27, 2012, respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the RTC of Manila (In
the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Amparo of Atty.
Magtanggol B. Gatdula, SP No. 12-127405) The case was raffled to
Judge Pampilo, Jr. on the same day
 The Amparo was directed against petitioners De Lima et al. Gatdula
wanted De Lima, et al “to cease and desist from framing him up for
the fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of Frusrated
Murder against Gatdula in relation to the alleged ambush incident”
 Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge
issued summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer.
He also set the case for hearing on 1 March 2012. The hearing was
held allegedly for determining whether a temporary protection order
may be issued. During that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al.
manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo
cases
 In an Order dated 2 March 2012,6 Judge Pampilo insisted that
“[s]ince no writ has been issued, return is not the required
pleading but answer.” The judge noted that the Rules of Court
apply suppletorily in Amparo cases. He opined that
 Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case on
7 March 2012.10 Even without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered
the parties to file their respective memoranda within five (5) working
days after that hearing. Since the period to file an Answer had not
yet lapsed by then, the judge also decided that the memorandum of
De Lima, et al. would be filed in lieu of their Answer
 On 20 March 2012, the RTC rendered a “Decision” granting the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The RTC also granted the interim
reliefs prayed for, namely: temporary protection, production and
inspection orders. The production and inspection orders were in
relation to the evidence and reports involving an on-going
investigation of the attempted assassination of Deputy Director
Esmeralda. It is not clear from the records how these pieces of
evidence may be related to the alleged threat to the life, liberty or
security of the respondent Gatdula.
 RTC denied MR filed by De Lima, et al
 De Lima, et al thus came to the SC assailing the March 20 RTC
Decision via Rule 45.
ISSUE:
 Whether the Writ of Amparo can be executed and reviewed – No.
RTC committed several procedural errors on issuing the privilege of
the Writ of Amparo.
RATIO:
 Writ of Amparo (See Notes)
 The Decision dated 20 March could not be the judgment ro ginal
order that is appealable under Sec. 19 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amapro. This Decision pertained to the issuance of the writ, not the
judgment.
 Irregularities in the RTC procedues:
1. The insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is
the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for
petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo.
 The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the
intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy to
those whose right to life, liberty and security are violated
or are threatened to be violated.
  A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or
particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action,
hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure is seriously misplaced.
2. The holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the
issuance of the writ and the filing of a Return. Without a
Return, the issues could not have been properly joined.
3. The court required a memorandum in lieu of a responsive
pleading (Answer) of De Lima, et al
 The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to
frame the issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it should
be done prior to the hearing, not after.
 A memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of the
claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading usually
required before the case is submitted for decision.
 One cannot substitute for the other since these
submissions have different functions in facilitating the
suit.
 A memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo
 The privilege of the Writ of Amparo is different from the actual
order called the Writ of Amparo
 The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure
outline in the Rule on the Writ of Mparo
 After examining the petition and its attached affidavits,
the Return and the evidence presented in the summary
hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts
from the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally
eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner’s
life, liberty or security.
 A judgment which simply grants the “privilege of the writ”
cannot be executed.
 Petition for Review – not the proper remedy. Petition for Certitorari is
prohibited. However, simply dismissing the present petition will
cause grave injustice to the parties involved.
 The rules can be suspended on the following grounds:
(1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (2) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances, (3) the
merits of the case, (4) a cause not entirely attributable to
the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules, (5) a lack of any showing that
the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and
(6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, as a prophylactic to the irregularities
committed by the trial court judge, and by virtue of its powers under Article
VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution, the Court RESOLVES to:
(1) NULLIFY all orders that are subject of this Resolution issued by Judge
Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. after respondent Gatdula filed the Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Amparo;
(2) DIRECT Judge Pampilo to determine within forty- eight (48) hours from
his receipt of this Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is
proper on the basis of the petition and its attached affidavits.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the personal service of this
Resolution on Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. of Branch 26 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila for his proper guidance together with a WARNING that
further deviation or improvisation from the procedure set in A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC shall be meted with severe consequences.
SO ORDERED.
NOTES:
NATURE OF THE REMEDY OF AMPARO
 The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and
extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of the people to life,
liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution
 It was issued as an exercise of the Supreme Court’s power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights
 Aims to address concerns such as, among others, extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances
PROCESS:
 Initiated through a petition to be filed in RTC, Sandiganbayan, CA,
or the SC
o The judge or justice then makes an “immediate evaluation”
of the facts as alleged in the petition and affidavits submitted
“with the attendant circumstances detailed.”
 After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the Writ of  After measures have served their purpose, the judgment will be
Amparo or immediately dismiss the case. satisfied.
o Dismissal if the petition and the supporting affidavits do not o In Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the petitioner’s
show that the petitioner’s right to life, liberty or security is life, liberty and security cease to exist as evaluated by the
under threat or the acts complained of are not unlawful court that renders the judgment
o The issuance of the writ itself sets in motion presumptive o The case may also be terminated through consolidation
judicial protection for the petitioner. The court compels the should a subsequent case be filed – either criminal or civil.
respondents to appear before a court of law to show whether
the grounds for more permanent protection and interim
reliefs are necessary.
 The respondents are required to file a Return after the issuance of
the writ through the clerk of court.
o The Return serves as the responsive pleading to the petition.
o Unlike an Answer, the Return has other purposes aside from
identifying the issues in the case. Respondents are also
required to detail the actions they had taken to determine the
fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party
o If the respondents are public officials or employees, they are
also required to state the actions they had taken to: (i) verify
the identity of the aggrieved party; (ii) recover and preserve
evidence related to the death or disappearance of the
person identified in the petition; (iii) identify witnesses and
obtain statements concerning the death or disappearance;
(iv) determine the cause, manner, location, and time of death
or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may
have brought about the death or disappearance; and (v)
bring the suspected offenders before a competent court .
These information are important, so that the judge can
calibrate the means and methods that will be required to
further the protections, if any, that will be due to the
petitioner.
 There will be a summary hearing only after the Return is filed to
determine the merits of the petition and whether interim reliefs are
warranted. If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be done ex parte
 After the hearing, the court will render the judgment within ten (10)
days from the time the petition is submitted for decision.
o If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the
court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as
may be proper and appropriate.
o The judgment should contain measures which the judge
views as essential for the continued protection of the
petitioner in the Amparo case. These measures must be
detailed enough so that the judge may be able to verify and
monitor the actions taken by the respondents.
o It is this judgment that could be subject to appeal to the SC
via Rule 45.