IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS FOR DR. AURORA PARONG, et al vs MINISTER JUAN PONCE

ENRILE, et al

G.R. No. L-61388 July 19, 1985, EN BANC (Per Curiam)

DOCTRINE:

1. The function of the Presidential Commitment Order (PCO), issued on July 12, 1982,
pursuant to LOI No. 1211 dated March 9, 1982, in relation to Presidential Proclamation
No. 2045 dated January 17, 1981, is to validate, on constitutional ground, the detention of
a person for any of the offenses covered by Proclamation No. 2045 which continues in
force the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, if the arrest has been
made initially without any warrant. Its legal effect is to render the writ unavailing as a
means of judicially inquiring into the legality of the detention in view of the suspension of
the privilege of the writ. The grant of the power to suspend the said privilege provides the
basis for continuing with perfect legality the detention as long as the invasion or rebellion
has not been repelled or quelled and the need therefor in the interest of public safety
continues." Further: "The significance of the conferment of this power, constitutionally
upon the President as Commander-in-Chief, is that the exercise thereof is not subject to
judicial inquiry, with a view to determining its legality in the light of the bill of rights
guarantee to individual freedom.

2. Preventive Detention Action (PDA) replaced PCO pursuant to PD No. 1877 dated July 21,
1983. As provided for in the said decree, a PDA constitute an authority to arrest and
preventively detain persons committing the aforementioned crimes, for a period not
exceeding one (1) year, with the cause or causes of their arrest subjected to review by the
President or by the Review Committee created for that purpose.

FACTS:
 The petitioners, Garcia Padilla, et al, were detained by virtue of a Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) issued on July 12, 1982, pursuant to LOI No. 1211 dated March 9,
1982, in relation to Presidential Proclamation No. 2045 dated January 17, 1981. The said PCO was
issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos for violation of P.D. No. 885.

At the time of the arrest of the nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees herein on July 6,
1982, records reveal that they were then having conference in the dining room of Dr. Parong's
residence from 10:00 a.m. of that same day. Prior thereto, all the fourteen (14) detainees were
under surveillance as they were then Identified as members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) engaging in subversive activities and using the house of detainee Dr. Aurora
Parong in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, as their headquarters. Caught in flagrante delicto, the nine
(9) detainees mentioned scampered towards different directions leaving on top of their conference
table numerous subversive documents, periodicals, pamphlets, books, correspondence,
stationeries, and other papers, including a plan on how they would infiltrate the youth and student
sector (code-named YORK). Also found were one (1) .38 cal. revolver with eight (8) live bullets,
nineteen (19) rounds of ammunition for M16 armalite, eighteen thousand six hundred fifty pesos
P l8,650.00) cash believed to be CPP/NPA funds, assorted medicine packed and ready for
distribution, a sizeable quantity of printing paraphernalia, which were then seized.

An application for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of fourteen
detainees, nine of whom were arrested on July 6, 1982, another four on July 7, 1982, and the last
one on July 15, 1982. The writ was issued, respondents were required to make a return, and the
case heard on August 26, 1982.

ISSUES:

1. Can the right to bail be invoked during the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus?
2. Does the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus vest the President with
the power to issue warrants of arrest or presidential commitment orders?
3. Does the fact that the detainees were not caught in flagrante delicto make the arrest was
illegal?

RULING:
 1. No.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus raises a political, not a judicial,
question and that the right to bail cannot be invoked during such a period.

2. Yes.

It is to be pointed out that this argument was not raised in the petition. Nonetheless, suffice
it to point out that an arrest order by the President incident to the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is essentially preventive in nature. Besides, PD No. 1836 and LOI 1211 have
vested, assuming a law is necessary, in the President the power of preventive arrest incident to the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In addition, however, it should be noted
that the PCO has been replaced by Preventive Detention Action (PDA), pursuant to PD No. 1877
dated July 21, 1983. As provided for in the said decree, a PDA constitute an authority to arrest and
preventively detain persons committing the aforementioned crimes, for a period not exceeding one
(1) year, with the cause or causes of their arrest subjected to review by the President or by the
Review Committee created for that purpose." The last argument of petitioner, namely that the
detainees were not caught in flagrante delicto and therefore the arrest was illegal.

3. No.

The crimes of subversion and rebellion are continuing offenses. Besides this point involves
an issue of fact.

On May 28, 1985, respondents filed the following Manifestation: "1. The persons listed
below who were detained by virtue of Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) issued on July 12,
1982, and in whose behalf the above-captioned cases was filed have been released detention by
the military authorities concerned on the dates appearing opposite their names, to wit: Names of
Detainees — Dates of Release: a. Dr. Aurora Parong-December 12, 1983: b. Norberto Portuguese-
January 31, 1985; c. Sabino Padilla — January 31, 1985; d. Francis Divinagracia — January 31,
1985; e. Imelda delos Santos — October 20, 1983; f. Benjamin Pineda — January 3l 1985; g.
Zenaida Mallari — January 31, 1985 h. Tito Tanguilig — October 21, 1983; i. Letty Ballogan —
March 4, 1983; j. Bienvenida Garcia — October 20, 1983; k Eufronio Ortiz, Jr. January 31, 1985;
1. Juanito Granada — October 20, 1983. 2. The foregoing information was received from the Off
ice of Civil Relations, Ministry of National Defense, through Major Felizardo O. Montero, JAGS-
GHO 3. As regards Tom Vasquez, who was included in the instant petition, he was released on
July 17, 1982, after his arrest on July 15, 1982, since he was not named in the PCO 4. Anent
Mariano Soriano, the undersigned have been informed by the Office of Civil Relations that the
subject escaped from detention two (2) years ago and as of date hereof is still at large."

There is no question, therefore, that the force and effectivity of a presidential commitment
order issued as far back as July 12, 1982 had ceased to have any force or effect.

Thus, the motion for reconsideration should have been granted, and the writ of habeas
corpus ordering the release of the detainees covered by such Section 8 issued, but in the light of
the foregoing manifestation as to all the petitioners, save for Dr. Parong, having been released, the
petition as to them has been declared moot and academic. As to Dr. Aurora Parong, since a warrant
of arrest against her was issued by the municipal court of Bayombong on August 4, 1982, for
illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions, the petition is likewise declared moot and
academic.

REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, et al vs HON. SALVADOR C.

MEDIALDEA, et al

G.R. No. 231658, 231771, 231774, July 4, 2017, EN BANC (Del Castillo, J.)

DOCTRINES:

The third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII was inserted by the framers of the 1987
Constitution to constitutionalize the pre-Marcos martial law ruling of this Court in In the Matter
of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang, to wit: that the factual basis of the declaration of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a political
question but precisely within the ambit of judicial review.

Scope of judicial review limited to "sufficiency of factual basis test"

The phrase "sufficiency of factual basis" in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
should be understood as the only test for judicial review of the President's power to declare martial
law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution. The Court does not need to satisfy itself that the President's decision is correct, rather
it only needs to determine whether the President's decision had sufficient factual bases, As
Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial law and/or to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the revocation of Congress and the review of
this Court.

FACTS:

On May 23, 2017, the notorious Marawi siege took place and RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE,
President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested by the Constitution
and by law, proclaimed as follows:

SECTION 1. There is hereby declared a state of martial law in the Mindanao group of
islands for a period not exceeding sixty days, effective as of the date hereof.

SECTION 2. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall likewise be suspended in the
aforesaid area for the duration of the state of martial law.

DONE in the Russian Federation, this 23rd day of May in the year of our Lord, Two
Thousand and Seventeen.

Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President
submitted to Congress a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.

Herein petitioners, therefore, all three petitions beseech the cognizance of this Court based
on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987 Constitution
which provides:

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon
within thirty days from its filing.

(A) G.R. No. 231658 (Lagman Petition) and (B) G.R. No. 231771 (Cullamat Petition) both raise
substantive issues on the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, while (C) G.R. No. 231774 (Mohamad
Petition) the Mohamad Petition raises a procedural one.

Mohamad Petition

"Petition for Review of the Sufficiency of [the] Factual Basis of [the] Declaration of
Martial Law and [the] Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus," labels itself as
"a special proceeding" or an "appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen" authorized under
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.The Mohamad Petition posits that martial law is a
measure of last resort and should be invoked by the President only after exhaustion of less severe
remedies. It contends that the extraordinary powers of the President should be dispensed
sequentially, i.e., first, the power to call out the armed forces; second, the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and finally, the power to declare martial law. It maintains
that the President has no discretion to choose which extraordinary power to use; moreover, his
choice must be dictated only by, and commensurate to, the exigencies of the situation.

The Mohamad Petition posits that immediately after the declaration of martial law, and
without waiting for a congressional action, a suit may already be brought before the Court to assail
the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. In invoking this Court's power to
review the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the Mohamad Petition insists that the Court may "look
into the wisdom of the [President's] actions, [and] not just the presence of arbitrariness" Further it
asserts that since it is making a negative assertion, then the burden to prove the sufficiency of the
factual basis is shifted to and lies on the respondents. It thus asks the Court "to compel the
[r]espondents to divulge relevant information" In order for it to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis.

In closing, the Mohamad Petition prays for the Court to exercise its power to review,
"compel respondents to present proof on the factual basis [of] the declaration of martial law and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao and declare as
unconstitutional Proclamation No. 216 for lack of sufficient factual basis.

ISSUE:
 Are there sufficient factual bases for the President's issuance of Proclamation No. 216-
Declaration of Martial Law and Suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao region?

RULING:

In sum, the Court finds sufficient factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation No. 216
and declares it as Constitutional. Accordingly, the court dismissed the consolidated petitions. The
court arrived at the following conclusions:

Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority to the Court to determine
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or
by the law. Unless jurisdiction has been specifically conferred by the Constitution or by some
legislative act, no body or tribunal has the power to act or pass upon a matter brought before it for
resolution. It is likewise settled that in the absence of a clear legislative intent, jurisdiction cannot
be implied from the language of the Constitution or a statute.It must appear clearly from the law
or it will not be held to exist. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the proclamation or suspension. It must be emphasized that under Section 18, Article VII,
the Court is tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's exercise of
emergency powers. Put differently, if this Court applies the standard of review used in a petition
for certiorari, the same would emasculate its constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII. . In
other words, the framers of the Constitution added the safeguard under the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII on top of the expanded jurisdiction of this Court.

Purpose/significance of Section 18, Article VII is to constitutionalize the pre-Marcos martial

law ruling in In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Lansang.

The Court held in the 1951 case of Montenegro v. Castaneda that the authority to decide
whether there is a state of rebellion requiring the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is lodged with the President and his decision thereon is final and conclusive upon the courts.
This ruling was reversed in the 1971 case of Lansang where it was held that the factual basis of
the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
not a political question and is within the ambit of judicial review. However, in 1983, or after the
declaration of martial law by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the Court, in Garcia-Padilla
v. Enrile, abandoned the ruling in Lansang and reverted to Montenegro. According to the Supreme
Court, the constitutional power of the President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is not subject to judicial inquiry. Thus, by inserting Section 18 in Article VII which allows
judicial review of the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, the framers of the 1987 Constitution in effect constitutionalized and reverted to the
Lansang doctrine.

Purpose of Section 18, Article VII is to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse by
the President on the exercise of the extraordinary powers

Section 18, Article VII is meant to provide additional safeguard against possible abuse by
the President in the exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. Reeling from the aftermath of the Marcos martial law, the framers of the
Constitution deemed it wise to insert the now third paragraph of Section 18 of Article VII. To give
more teeth to this additional safeguard, the framers of the 1987 Constitution not only placed the
President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
within the ambit of judicial review, it also relaxed the rule on standing by allowing any citizen to
question before this Court the sufficiency of the factual basis of such proclamation or suspension.
Moreover, the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII veritably conferred upon any citizen a
demandable right to challenge the sufficiency of the factual basis of said proclamation or
suspension. It further designated this Court as the reviewing tribunal to examine, in an appropriate
proceeding, the sufficiency of the factual basis and to render its decision thereon within a limited
period of 30 days from date of filing. The Constitution has provided sufficient safeguards against
possible abuses of Commander-in- Chief's powers; further curtailment of Presidential powers
should not only be discouraged but also avoided.

Purpose of Section 18, Article VII is to curtail the extent of the powers of the President

This is the primary reason why the provision was not placed in Article VIII or the Judicial
Department but remained under Article VII or the Executive Department.
During the closing session of the Constitutional Commission's deliberations, President Cecilia
Muñoz Palma expressed her sentiments on the 1987 Constitution. She said:

The flagrant abuse of that power of the Commander-in-Chief by Mr. Marcos caused the
imposition of martial law for more than eight years and the suspension of the privilege of
the writ even after the lifting of martial law in 1981. The new Constitution now provides
that those powers can be exercised only in two cases, invasion or rebellion when public
safety demands it, only for a period not exceeding 60 days, and reserving to Congress the
power to revoke such suspension or proclamation of martial law which congressional
action may not be revoked by the President. More importantly, the action of the President
is made subject to judicial review, thereby again discarding jurisprudence which render[s]
the executive action a political question and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts to
adjudicate.

Unique features of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII make it sui generis

A proceeding "[i]n its general acceptation, [is] the form in which actions are to be brought
and defended, the manner of intervening in suits, of conducting them, the mode of deciding them,
of opposing judgments, and of executing." In fine, the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding"
appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen
for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief
Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a
petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.

Other conclusions arrived at by the Court

The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is independent of the actions taken by Congress.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the
Court considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of
the declaration; it is not allowed td "undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.
On the other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but
likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court I which does not look into the
absolute correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed below, Congress could probe deeper
and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.

The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the judicial power to review to be exercised
independently from the congressional power to revoke.

The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration
of the President's decision of which among his graduated powers he will avail of in a given
situation. The Court must similarly and necessarily refrain from calibrating the President's
decision of which among his extraordinary powers to avail given a certain situation or condition.

"Graduation" of powers refers to hierarchy based on scope and effect; it does not refer to
a sequence, order, or arrangement by which the Commander-in-Chief must adhere to.

The 1987 Constitution gives the "President, as Commander-in- Chief, a 'sequence' of

'graduated power[s]'. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law." It
must be stressed, however, that the graduation refers only to hierarchy based on scope and effect.
It does not in any manner refer to a sequence, arrangement, or order which the Commander-in-
Chief must follow. This so-called "graduation of powers" does not dictate or restrict the manner
by which the President decides which power to choose. These extraordinary powers are conferred
by the Constitution with the President as Commander-in-Chief; it therefore necessarily follows
that the power and prerogative to determine whether the situation warrants a mere exercise of the
calling out power; or whether the situation demands suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus; or whether it calls for the declaration of martial law, also lies, at least initially,
with the President. The power to choose, initially, which among these extraordinary powers to
wield in a given set of conditions is a judgment call on the part of the President. The Court, as
Congress does, must thus accord the President the same leeway by not wading into the realm that
is reserved exclusively by the Constitution to the Executive Department.

The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the Congress not to interfere a priori in the
decision-making process of the President. The recommendation of the Defense Secretary is not a
condition for the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that the President's power to declare
martial law is not subject to any condition except for the requirements of actual invasion or
rebellion and that public safety requires it.

The scope of the power of review under the 1987 Constitution refers only to the
determination of the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus.

The parameters for determining the sufficiency of the/actual basis/or the declaration of
martial law and/or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are as follows: l)
actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it - the first two requirements must concur;
and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.

LEE YICK HON vs THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS

G.R. No. L-16779, March 30, 1921, EN BANC (Street, J.)

FACTS:

A petition for the writ of habeas corpus was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila
by one Lee Yick Hon, alleging he had lately arrived from China at the port of Manila with a view
to entering the Philippine Islands, but was presented from so doing by the Insular Collector of
Customs, who was detaining him for deportation. Upon the presiding in Sala IV of said court,
cited the collector to appear and show cause in writing why the writ of habeas corpus should not
be issued as prayed. This citation was served at about 11 a.m., at which house arrangement had
already been perfected for the deportation of Lee Yick Hon on a boat scheduled to leave Manila
for Hongkong at noon on the same day; and either by oversight or design the Insular Collector
failed to contermand the order for his embarcation on that boat. The result was that Lee Yick
Hon was deported within two or three hours after the Insular Collector had been served with the
citation to show cause in the habeas corpus proceeding. Thereupon contempt proceedings were
instituted against the Insular Collector, with the result already stated.

ISSUE:
 Is the petitioner guilty of contempt by allowing Lee Yick Hon to be deported under the
conditions stated, thus frustrating the possible issuance of the writ of habeas corpus?

RULING:

No. The order to show cause, a copy of which was served on the Insular Collector of
Customs on July 23, 1920, is not the peremptory writ of habeas corpus, unconditionally
commanding the respondent to have the body of the detained person before the court at a time
and place therein specified. The requisites of the peremptory writ of habeas corpus are stated in
section 533 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and appropriate forms are supplied in section 534 of
said Code and in section 82 of General Orders, No. 58. The order served in the case before us
was merely a preliminary citation requiring the respondent to appear and show cause why the
peremptory writ should not be granted. The practice of issuing a preliminary citation of this
character, upon applications for the writ of habeas corpus, has, as all legal practitioners are
aware, become common in our courts; and upon considerations of practical convenience, the
usage has must be commend it, in cases where the necessity for the immediate issuance of the
peremptory writ is not manifest. Nevertheless, in a case like that now before us, it is necessary to
take account of the difference between the preliminary citation and the real writ of habeas
corpus; and when advertence is had to this point, and the actual terms of the citation are
considered, it is at one obvious that the appellant did not put himself in contempt by allowing
Lee Yick Hon to be deported.

In proceeding against a person alleged to be guilty of contempt of court, it is not to be

forgotten that such proceedings are commonly treated as criminal in their nature even when the
acts complained of are incidents of civil actions. For this reason, the mode of procedure and rules
of evidence in contempt proceedings are assimilated as far as practicable to those adapted to
criminal prosecutions. Moreover, it is well settled that a person cannot be held liable for
contempt in the violation of an injunction or in fact of any judicial order unless the act which is
forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so as to leave no reasonable
doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required. A party cannot be
punished for contempt in failing to do something not specified in the order.

In the case before us, the deportation of the petitioner was not forbidden by any order of
the court, and hence that act cannot be considered as disobedience to the court.
 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENJAMIN
VERGARA, et al vs. HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR.

G.R. No. 154037. April 30, 2003, SECOND DIVISION (Austria-Martinez, J.)

DOCTRINE:

The order directing the payment of rentals falls within the purview of Section 9. Until and
unless all the means provided for under Section 9, Rule 39 have been resorted to and failed,
imprisonment for contempt as a means of coercion for civil purposes cannot be resorted to by the
courts.

FACTS:

Petitioners are the tenants of Berlito P. Taripe on a property located in Dr. A. Santos Ave.,
Paraaque City.They were arrested by Ormoc City policemen by authority of a Warrant of Arrest
issued by Judge Fortunito L. Madrona for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Distribution and
Partition pending before the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City.

The warrant of arrest stemmed from a motion filed by respondent Eleuteria P. Bolao, as
Special Administratrix of the estate of the late Anselma P. Allers, praying that petitioners be held
guilty of indirect contempt for not complying with the probate courts order dated October 9, 1999
directing them to pay their monthly rentals to respondent Bolao.It appears that pending the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Allers, respondent Bolao included the property leased by
Taripe to petitioners in the inventory of the estate. The lessees' reason why they are freezing the
monthly rentals is that they are uncertain as to whom to remit it.

The lessees were arrested. Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The appellate court ordered the temporary release of
petitioners. However, after due proceedings, the appellate court rendered its decision remanding
the lesees to the custody of the Jail Warden of Ormoc City until they have complied with the orders
of the probate court.
ISSUE:

Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the order of the trial court finding petitioners
guilty of indirect contempt of court and directing their imprisonment for their contumacious
refusal to pay the rentals to the administratrix?

RULING:

Yes. The writ of execution issued by the trial court in this case commanded its sheriff to
collect from petitioners the rentals due from the property, and should they fail to pay, from
petitioners personal/real properties sufficient to cover the amounts sought to be collected. It was
not addressed to petitioners. It pertained to the sheriff to whom the law entrusts the execution of
judgments, and it was due to the latter's failure that the writ was not duly enforced. (Section 9 of
Rule 39)

In Philippine jurisdiction, Section 20, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution expressly
provides that no person shall be imprisoned for debt. Debt, as used in the Constitution, refers to
civil debt or one not arising from a criminal offense. It means any liability to pay arising out of a
contract, express or implied. In the present case, petitioners, as recognized lessees of the estate of
the deceased, were ordered by the probate court to pay the rentals to the administratrix. Petitioners
did not comply with the order for the principal reason that they were not certain as to the rightful
person to whom to pay the rentals because it was a certain Berlito P. Taripe who had originally
leased the subject property to them.Clearly, the payment of rentals is covered by the constitutional
guarantee against imprisonment.

Moreover, petitioners cannot be validly punished for contempt under Section 8, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court to wit:

SEC. 8. Imprisonment until order obeyed. When the contempt consists in the refusal or
omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the respondent to perform, he may be
imprisoned by order of the court concerned until he performs it. (7a)

because herein subject order is not a special judgment enforceable, under Section 11, Rule 39,
which provides:
 SEC. 11. Execution of special judgment. When a judgment requires the performance of any
act other than those mention in the two preceding sections, a certified copy of judgment
shall be attached to the writ of execution and shall be served by the officer upon the party
against whom the same is rendered, or upon any other person required thereby, or by law
to obey the same, and such party or person may be punished for contempt if he disobeys
such judgment.

The order directing the payment of rentals falls within the purview of Section 9.Until and
unless all the means provided for under Section 9, Rule 39 have been resorted to and failed,
imprisonment for contempt as a means of coercion for civil purposes cannot be resorted to by the
courts. In Sura vs. Martin, Sr., it was held that:

Where an order for the arrest and imprisonment of defendant for contempt of court (for
failure to satisfy a judgment for support on ground of insolvency) would, in effect, violate
the Constitution.

Thus, petitioners could not be held guilty of contempt of court for their continued refusal to
comply with the probate courts order to pay rentals to the administratrix nor could they be held
guilty of contempt for disobeying the writ of execution issued by the probate court, which directs
therein the Sheriff, thus: Should lessees fail to pay the aforementioned amounts on rentals, then of
the goods and chattels of said lessees you may cause to be made the sum sufficient to cover the
aforestated amounts, but if no sufficient personal properties are found thereof to satisfy this
execution, then of the real properties you make the sums of money in the manner required by law
and make return of your proceeding under this writ within the reglementary period.

It was the sheriffs duty to enforce the writ.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN

MALANG SALIBO, et al vs WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX, et al
G.R. No. 197597, April 08, 2015, SECOND DIVISION (LEONEN, J.)

DOCTRINE:
 Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken
identity. In such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and is continuously being
illegally detained.

FACTS:

Butukan S. Malang, one of the accused in the Maguindanao massacre, had a pending
warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in. When Datukan Malang Salibo learned that the
police officers of suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang, he presented himself to clear his
name. He presented portions of his passport, boarding passes and other documents tending to
prove that he was in Saudi Arabia when the massacre happened. However, he was apprehended
and detained by the authorities to whom he presented himself.

He now questions the legality of his detention via Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus,
maintaining that he is not the accused Batukan S. Malang.

ISSUE:

Is a Petition for Habeas Corpus the proper remedy of petitioner Salibo? Should it be
granted?

RULING:

1. Yes. Called the "great writ of liberty" the writ of habeas corpus "was devised and exists
as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the
best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom." The remedy of habeas corpus is
extraordinary and summary in nature, consistent with the law's "zealous regard for
personal liberty."

Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus "shall extend
to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or
by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The
primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished
from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal." "Any restraint
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient." The nature of the restraint of liberty need
not be related to any offense so as to entitle a person to the efficient remedy of habeas corpus. It
may be availed of as a post-conviction remedyor when there is an alleged violation of the liberty
of abode. In other words, habeas corpus effectively substantiates the implied autonomy of
citizens constitutionally protected in the right to liberty in Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution. Habeas corpus being a remedy for a constitutional right, courts must apply a
conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the substantive right to liberty will not be
further curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes.

It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police
Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When
petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was
neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal
knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an
escapee prisoner. The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo
without a warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of law, for
which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued.

2. Yes.

In ordering petitioner Salibo's release, we are prejudging neither his guilt nor his
innocence. However, between a citizen who has shown that he was illegally deprived of his
liberty without due process of law and the government that has all the "manpower and the
resources at [its] command" to properly indict a citizen but failed to do so, we will rule in favor
of the citizen.

Should the government choose to prosecute petitioner Salibo, it must pursue the proper
remedies against him as provided in our Rules. Until then, we rule that petitioner Salibo is
illegally deprived of his liberty. His Petition for Habeas Corpus must be granted.