THE HEEL OF ACHILLES

Prelude to Japanese Occupation of the Philippines

The initial euphoria felt by Americans when Admiral Dewey defeated the Spanish
was soon tempered not only by the Insurrection but also by the reality of the changing
balance of power in the Pacific. By 1905 Japan, as a result of victories over China and
Russia, emerged as the dominant Asian power. Moreover, the potential Japanese
threat of hegemony increased as the fluid diplomatic configuration of the late 19 th
century European power froze in the years preceding World War I. England’s anxiety
about Europe led to an Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902. England’s recognition of
Japanese paramountcy and Europe’s increasing self-absorption caused their retreat
from the Asian scene. This turn in affairs, together with Japanese power and Chinese
weakness, combined to make American policy planners see Japan alone as the future
rival to the United States in Asia. In addition, America felt that Japan threatened the
stability of peace in Asia. In turn, to Japanese planners America became the only
power capable of and interests in checking Japanese imperialism.

Prior to 1941, however, the United States was not willing militarily to oppose
Japan’s drive for hegemony. The traditional isolation of America, its remoteness from
Asia, and its primary connections with Europe circumscribed American policy in the
Philippines and the Pacific. To avoid an eventual confrontation with Japan the United
States had to develop a policy of minimizing liabilities which might ensnare America.

The possession of the Philippines was one of the most inhibiting elements in the
American diplomatic posture in Asia. Strategically, the Philippines were a vulnerable
pawn which the Americans were compelled to defend. By 1907 President Roosevelt
saw that the Philippines aggravated flaws in American diplomacy in Asia. In a letter to
William Howard Taft, then Secretary of War, he noted that “the Philippine Islands form
our heel of Achilles. They are all that makes the present situation with Japan
dangerous.” Roosevelt argued for Philippine independence as a means of diminishing
America military risk, and this theme was repeated with increasing frequency as
Japanese imperialism became more blatant through the years.

The Japanese action in 1913 in Manchuria encouraged the American Congress to

establish a Philippine Commonwealth. Section Eleven of the Tydings-McDuffie Act of
1934, entitled “Neutralization of the Philippine Islands,” specifically instructed the
American President “to enter into negotiations with foreign powers…for the perpetual
neutralization of the Philippine Islands” in order to absolve the United States of any
postindependence obligations.

As Japanese imperialism became more menacing throughout the later 1930’s

Japan became increasingly the enemy, despite sympathetic interest at both ends of the
Philippine political and economic spectrum. Commitment to Philippine nationalism was
an overriding passion, and Japan appeared as a threat to the success of a
postindependence Republic of the Philippines.

The fall of France in the spring of 1940 was followed in September by a German-
Italian-Japanese axis alliance, which acknowledged “the leadership of Japan in
establishing a New Order in East Asia.”

On July 22, 1941, Japan moved into Indo-China. This calculated Japanese
decision was the step which President Roosevelt felt American could not let Japan take.
Four days later, Roosevelt froze all Japanese assets in the United States, impelling both
sides toward a confrontation. In early August, Japan finally decided firmly to avoid a
war with Russia in Manchuria and Siberia and to turn southward. The Japanese navy,
unhappy over its failure to obtain what it considered sufficient oil concessions during
the Kobayashi and Yoshizawa trade missions to the Dutch East Indies, argued that
Japan could not wait past early 1942 to decide on policy. It was assumed that military
balance of power would shift against Japan so decidedly that there would be little
chance for success. At the Imperial Conference of September 6, 1941, Admiral Nagano
Osami urged that Japan strike south to guarantee the vital oil flow for Japan. If not, he
warned, Japanese reserves would be used up, and Japan would become so dependent
on American oil as to inhibit Japanese maneuverability.