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G.R. Nos.

136149-51 September 19, 2000

PEOPLE VS. LADJAALAM

Facts:

 Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil, also known as "Warpan was charged with the following:
1. Violation of Section 15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
2. Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act No.
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
3. Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as
amended by Republic Act. No. 8294
4. Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide

The trial court of Zamboanga convicted Ladjaalam on cases 1, 3 and 4.

 On September 24, 1997, certain police officers were about to serve a search warrant to the house of
Ladjaalam. The search warrant was issued for

1. Violation of Sec. 16, Article III of RA 6495, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972; and
2. Violation of PD 1866 penalizing illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.

 When the policemen were about 10 meters from the main gate of the house, they were met by a rapid burst
of gunfire coming from the second floor of the house. There was also gunfire at the back of the house. (case
no. 4)
The house of Ladjaalam has an extension house which allegedly a drug den (case no. 1)

 The police officers were able to elude the shots from the appellant’s group and were also able to
immobilize the group.

 During the search, items seized were methamphetamine hydrochloride or ‘shabu’ (case no. 2) and different
types of rifle (case no. 3)

 Apparently, the search warrant is void because it was issued for more than one specific offense. Section 3,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides that ‘A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense.

 The police officers presented Rino Bartolome Locson as a witness. Locson was an informer of the Anti-
Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga Police. On September 24, 1997, Locson was instructed by SPO2
Gaganting to go to appellant’s house to buy ‘shabu.’ Locson narrated to the court what happened during the
search and seizure operation in the appellant’s house; that on the said date, he bought and smoked shabu in
the extension house, together with 6 other people; that they were asked by the appellant to escape because
of the arrival of the police officers

 Ladjaalam posed a defense of frame-up and that the set of evidence against him were planted. He narrated
that:

 On Sept. 24, 1997, he was in his relative’s house, sleeping when he heard shot guns. He
woke up and went outside then the policemen arrested him; that the rifle allegedly used
on firing at the policemen were not his, as well as the shabu-that all the evidence were
planted, including the firearms.
 That the extension house, the alleged drug den are being rented by four persons; and that
he did not sell shabu to Locson on the day of raid.
 That he smoked cigarettes while inside the jail, hence, got a positive result in the paraffin
test.

 The Trial Court’s Ruling

o Appellant’s arrest as valid.

"Under the circumstances, the policemen ‘had authority to pursue and arrest Walpan
Ladjaalam and confiscate the firearm he used in shooting at the policemen and to enter
his house to effect said arrest and confiscation of the firearm.’ Under Rule 113, Section 5
(a), of the Rules of Court, ‘A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person xxx (w)hen in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.’ An offense is committed in
the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing
an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or
hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. At the
time the policemen entered the house of accused Walpan Ladjaalam after he had fired
shots at the policemen who intended to serve the Search Warrant to him, the accused was
engaged in the commission of a crime, and was pursued and arrested after he committed
the crime of shooting at the policemen who were about to serve the Search Warrant." 23

o As a consequence of the legal arrest, the seizure of firearms were also valid

o The trial court did not also take credence to the defense of the accused: “To its mind, it
was unbelievable that they would choose to plant evidence, when they were accompanied
by the barangay chairman and a radio reporter who might testify against them. It then
dismissed these allegations, saying that frame-up, like alibi, was an inherently weak
defense.”

o The testimony of Locson, clearly established that Ladjaalam operated and maintained a
drug den in his extension house where shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug, was sold, and where persons or customers bought and used shabu or
methamphetamine hydrochloride. The defense of the appellant that the house is being
rented is a weak defense. He was not able to substantiate his claim, with convincing
evidence e.g. contracts.

o The act of the accused in firing rifle to the policemen constitutes the crime of direct
assault with multiple attempted homicidenot multiple attempted murder with direct
assault considering that no policeman was hit and injured by the accused and no
circumstance was proved to qualify the attempted killing to attempted murder.

Issues: Whether or not the appellant’s use of unlicensed firearm be considered as an aggravating circumstance to the
crime of direct assault.

Whether or not the appellant should be convicted with a separate offense of illegal possession of firearms
(aside from the conviction of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide)

Held: No. Appellant’s use of unlicensed firearm CANNOT be considered as an aggravating circumstance to the
crime of direct assault. There should also no separate offense of illegal possession of firearms to be charged
to the appellant.
Appellant is found guilty only of two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the
use of a weapon; and (2) maintaining a drug den

“We find no justification for limiting the proviso in the second paragraph to murder and homicide. The law
is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that "no other
crime was committed by the person arrested." If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to
refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily,
where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.”

“The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal possession of an M-14 rifle,
an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that for direct assault. While the penalty for the
first is prision mayor, for the second it is only prision correccional. Indeed, the accused may evade
conviction for illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing an even lighter offense
like alarm and scandal or slight physical injuries, both of which are punishable by arresto menor. This
consequence, however, necessarily arises from the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to
the Court’s review. Any perception that the result reached here appears unwise should be addressed to
Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest
intendment and language of the legislature. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law
and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case.”

“Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Congress of the Philippines for a possible review, at its sound
discretion, of RA 8294.”
Beshy, okay lang na wag isulat pero please read

Illegal Possession of Firearms

Aside from finding appellant guilty of, the trial court convicted him also of the separate offense of illegal possession
of firearms under PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, and sentenced him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8 years
of prision mayor.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees, on the ground that the trial court should not have applied the
new law. It contends that under the facts of the case, the applicable law should have been PD 1866, as worded prior
to its amendment by RA 8294.

The trial court’s ruling and the OSG’s submission exemplify the legal community’s difficulty in grappling with the
changes brought about by RA 8294. Hence, before us now are opposing views on how to interpret Section 1 of the
new law, which provides as follows:

"SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition


Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. -- The penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (₱15,000) shall be imposed
upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm,
such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed.

"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (₱30,000) shall be imposed
if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .30
caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful
such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 centerfire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and
by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.

"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall
be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

"If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or
insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d’etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of
rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d’etat.

"The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any
public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms
owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating
the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or
firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their employment.

"The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his
residence without legal authority therefor."

Citing People v. Jayson,59 the OSG argues that the foregoing provision does not cover the specific facts of this case.
Since another crime -- direct assault with multiple unlawful homicide -- was committed, appellant cannot be
convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms under the second paragraph of the aforecited provision.
Furthermore, since there was no killing in this case, illegal possession cannot be deemed as an aggravating
circumstance under the third paragraph of the provision. Based on these premises, the OSG concludes that the
applicable law is not RA 8294, but PD 1866 which, as worded prior the new law, penalizes simple illegal possession
of firearms even if another crime is committed at the same time. 60

Applying a different interpretation, the trial court posits that appellant should be convicted of illegal possession of
firearms, in addition to direct assault with multiple attempted homicide. It did not explain its ruling, however.
Considering that it could not have been ignorant of the proviso61 in the second paragraph, it seemed to have
construed "no other crime" as referring only to homicide and murder, in both of which illegal possession of firearms
is an aggravating circumstance. In other words, if a crime other than murder or homicide is committed, a person may
still be convicted of illegal possession of firearms. In this case, the other crime committed was direct assault with
multiple attempted homicide; hence, the trial court found appellant guilty of illegal possession of firearms.

We cannot accept either of these interpretations because they ignore the plain language of the statute. A simple
reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate
offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the "other crime" is murder or homicide, illegal
possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault
with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal
possession of firearms.

Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. 62 In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294’s
simple language is most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of
the new law demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused. 63 Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of
two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. Moreover, since
the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed
an aggravating circumstance.

We reject the OSG’s contention that PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294, should be applied in
this case.1âwphi1 When the crime was committed on September 24, 1997, the original language of PD 1866 had
already been expressly superseded by RA 8294 which took effect on July 6, 1997. 64 In other words, no longer in
existence was the earlier provision of PD 1866, which justified a conviction for illegal possession of firearms
separate from any other crime. It was replaced by RA 8294 which, among other amendments to PD 1866, contained
the specific proviso that "no other crime was committed."

Furthermore, the OSG’s reliance on People v. Jayson65 is misplaced. True, this Court sustained the conviction of
appellant for illegal possession of firearms, although he had also committed homicide. We explained, however, that
"the criminal case for homicide [was] not before us for consideration."
G.R. No. L-36941 June 29, 1984

PEOPLE vs. SAYLAN

FACTS: That the commission of the foregoing offense was attended by the aggravating circumstances of: abuse of
superior strength, nighttime, uninhabited place, ignominy and reiteracion

 RAFAEL SAYLAN was accused of the crime of rape by Eutropia Agno, a married woman and a
school teacher. He was sentenced with a death penalty by First Instance of Misamis Oriental

 On January 23, 1971, Eutropia went to the public market to buy foodstuffs for her family. On her
way home, she fetched her daughter in her mother’s house. They boarded a passenger jeepney.
The other passengers were Rudy Gonzales, a grade I pupil, Rafael Saylan, and a certain couple.
Since there was a barrio which was not passable, the passengers alighted and had to walk their
way to their own barrios. While walking, the appellant pulled out a dagger and then pointed it to
Eutropia. He told the children to stop and not to follow them. The appellant dragged Eutropia and
brought her towards a creek near a coconut and raped her five times. In one act, the appellant
forced Eutropia that they do the dog’s way of sexual intercourse.

 Eutropia and appellant returned to the place where the children were left and then they all
proceeded to Malinao, their barrio. Eutropia confessed what happened to his husband and
submitted herself to medical examination.

 The accused did not deny having had sexual intercourse with Mrs. Agno but claimed that it was
with her consent; that the two of them has an affair.

 The complaint alleges the following aggravating circumstances: abuse of superior strength,
nocturnity, despoblado,ignominy, and reiteracion. The trial court convicted the accused of the
crime of rape with despoblado, ignominy, and reiteracion as aggravating circumstances.

Issue: Did the trial court err in finding that aggravating circumstances had accompanied the commission of the
offense?

Held: No. The judgment of the trial court is in accordance with the facts.

The trial court disregarded superiority because it "is inherent in the crime of rape or is absorbed in the
element of force." It also did not consider nocturnity "there being no evidence that the accused purposely
sought it to facilitate the commission of this rape."

Despoblado was present according to the trial court because: "The accused dragged the offended party, at
the point of a dagger, to the carabao trail, about 10 meters from the junction, but 40 to 50 meters below to
better attain his purpose without interference, and to better secure himself from detection and punishment
(U.S. vs. Vitug, 17 Phil. 1).

The trial court held that there was ignominy because the appellant used not only the missionary position,
i.e. male supenor female inferior, but also "The same position as dogs do" i.e., entry from behind. The
appellant claims there was no ignominy because "The studies of many experts in the matter have shown
that this 'position' is not novel and has repeatedly and often been resorted to by couples in the act of
copulation. (Brief, p. 24.) This may well be if the sexual act is performed by consenting partners but not
otherwise.

The trial court also held that "there is no reiteracion because one of the offenses, namely Robbery in Band,
for which the accused has been penal was committed after the commission of this rape case, and the penalty
imposed on the other offense of Frustrated Homicide, is lighter than the penalty for rape." (Id, P. 63.)

Although not alleged in the complaint, the trial court stated that the offense was aggravated by disregard of
rank because it was a fact known to the appellant that Mrs. Agno was a school teacher. The appellant
claims that this circumstance cannot be assigned to him because there was no deliberate intent to offend or
insult the rank of Mrs. Agno. The Solicitor General agrees with the appellant for the same reason.
G.R. No. L-28232 February 6, 1971

PEOPLE vs. JOSE

Facts:

 JAIME JOSE, BASILIO PINEDA, EDUARDO AQUINO, ROGELIO CAÑAL were convicted for the
crime of Forcible Abduction with rape to Magdalena "Maggie" de la Riva.

 On June 26, 1967, Miss De la Riva was driving her car with her maid. They were already in front of their
house in Quezon City when a Pontiac two-door convertible car with four men aboard intercepted them.
These men were Jose, Pineda, Aquino and Canal. Pineda alighted from the car, grabbed Maggie and
dragged her towards the Pontiac two-door convertible car. The maid was left behind. Maggie tried to resist
but to no avail. The car sped away in the direction of Broadway Street. Maggie pleaded for her release but
her pleas were futile. The car headed to Swanky Hotel in Pasay City. Pineda and the group blindfolded
Maggie and led her out of the car to one of the rooms on the second floor of the hotel. When they reached
the room, they removed the blindfolds of Maggie then commanded her to bare-naked. They threatened her
that they will pour acid on her face if she will not obey. Reluctantly, Maggie did as directed, but so slowly
did she proceed with the assigned task that the appellants got impatient. They started pushing Miss De la
Riva around, and undressed her. After 10 minutes, Pineda picked up Maggie’s clothes and left the room
with his other companions. The complainant tried to look for a blanket with which to cover herself, but she
could not find one. Jose then re-entered the room and raped Maggie. The other three took turns after Jose.
The four of them raped Maggie, one after the other.

 After the appellants raped Maggie, she was asked to put on her dress and pretend that nothing happened.
They left the hotel and dropped Maggie in front of Channel 5. The appellants called a taxicab for her ride
and warned again Miss De la Riva not to inform anyone of what had happened to her.

 The appellants had their own version of the story. Appellant Pineda entered a plea of guilty. His
expectation was his plea will be a mitigating circumstance, hence would free him from THE capital
punishment.

 The trial court ruled that offense has been attended by the following aggravating circumstances:

1. Use of a motor vehicle.


2. Night time sought purposely to facilitate the commission of the crime and to make its discovery difficult;
3. Abuse of superior strength;
4. That means were employed or circumstances brought about which added ignominy to the natural effects
of the act; and
5. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing other wrong
not necessary for the commission.

 The trial court imposed a capital penalty for the crime of abduction with rape

 Appellant Pineda claims that insofar as he is concerned there was a mistrial resulting in gross miscarriage
of justice. He contends that because the charge against him and his co-appellants is a capital offense and the
amended complaint cited aggravating circumstances, which, if proved, would raise the penalty to death, it
was the duty of the court to insist on his presence during all stages of the trial.

Issue: Was the contention of Pineda tenable? Was the aggravating circumstances properly considered?

Held: The contention is untenable. While a plea of guilty is mitigating, at the same time it constitutes an
admission of all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances, and
it matters not that the offense is capital, for the admission (plea of guilty) covers both the crime and its
attendant circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime. Because of the aforesaid legal effect of
Pineda's plea of guilty, it was not incumbent upon the trial court to receive his evidence, much less to
require his presence in court. It would be different had appellant Pineda requested the court to allow him to
prove mitigating circumstances, for then it would be the better part of discretion on the part of the trial
court to grant his request.

As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of the crimes committed,
the latter is definitely the more serious; hence, pursuant the provision of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum period. Consequently, the appellants should suffer
the extreme penalty of death. In this regard, there is hardly any necessity to consider the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, for the same would not alter the nature of the penalty to be imposed.

Nevertheless, to put matters in their proper perspective and for the purpose of determining the proper
penalty to be imposed in each of the other three crimes of simple rape, it behooves Us to make a definite
finding in this connection to the effect that the commission of said crimes was attended with the following
aggravating circumstances: (a) nighttime, appellants having purposely sought such circumstance to
facilitate the commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of superior strength, the crime having been committed
by the four appellants in conspiracy with one another (Cf. People vs. De Guzman, et al., 51 Phil., 105, 113);
(c) ignominy, since the appellants in ordering the complainant to exhibit to them her complete nakedness
for about ten minutes, before raping her, brought about a circumstance which tended to make the effects of
the crime more humiliating; and (d) use of a motor vehicle. With respect to appellants Jose, Aquino and
Cañal, none of these aggravating circumstances has been offset by any mitigating circumstance. Appellant
Pineda should, however, be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, a factor
which does not in the least affect the nature of the proper penalties to be imposed, for the reason that there
would still be three aggravating circumstances remaining. As a result, appellants should likewise be made
to suffer the extreme penalty of death in each of these three simple crimes of rape. (Art. 63, par. 2, Revised
Penal Code.)
Okay not to write but please READ

Judgment: WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: appellants
Jaime G. Jose, Basilio Pineda, Jr., and Edgardo P. Aquino are pronounced guilty of the complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape, and each and every one of them is likewise convicted of
three (3) other crimes of rape. As a consequence thereof, each of them is hereby sentenced to four
(4) death penalties;

Version of Defense Their story is that they and their co-accused Pineda had gone to the Ulog
Cocktail Lounge somewhere in Mabini street in Manila, and there killed time from 9:30 in the
evening of June 25 until closing time, which was about 3:30 in the early morning of the next day.
At the cocktail lounge they had listened to the music while enjoying some drinks. Between them
they had consumed a whole bottle of whisky, so much so that at least Aquino became drunk,
according to his own testimony. They had been joined at their table by a certain Frankie whom
they met only that night. Come time to go home, their new acquaintance asked to be dropped at
his home in Cubao. The five men piled into the red-bodied, black topped two-door convertible
Plymouth (Pontiac) car of Jaime Jose, and with Pineda at the wheel repaired to Cubao After
dislodging their new friend, Pineda steered the car to España Extension to bring Aquino to his
home in Mayon Street. But somewhere in España Extension before the Rotonda a small car
whizzed to them almost hitting them. They saw that the driver was a woman. Pineda gave chase
and coming abreast of the small car he shouted, "Putang ina mo, kamuntik na kaming mamatay."
The woman continued on her way. Now Pineda saying "let us teach her a lesson," sped after her
and when she swerved ostensibly to enter a gate, Pineda stopped his car behind being hurriedly got
down, striding to the small car, opened the door and started dragging the girl out. Both Jose and
Aquino confirm the presence of another woman inside the girl's car, who helped the girl struggle
to get free from Pineda's grip; and that the struggle lasted about ten minutes before Pineda finally
succeeded in pushing the girl into the red convertible. All the three accused insist they did nothing
to aid Pineda: but they also admit that they did nothing to stop him.

Now the defense contends that Pineda cruised around and around the area just to scare the girl
who was in truth so scared that she begged them to let her be and return her to her home. She
turned to Jose in appeal, but this one told her he could net do anything as the "boss" was Pineda.
Aquino heard her plead with Jose "do you not have a sister yourself?" but did not bear the other
plea 'do you not have a mother?' Then Pineda stopped at the corner of the street where he had
forcibly snatched the girl presumably to return her, but then suddenly changing his mind he said,
'why don't you do a strip tease for us. I'll pay you P1,000.00 and the girl taunted, 'are you
kidding?': that after a little while she consented to do the performance as long as it would not last
too long and provided the spectators were limited to the four of them.

Pineda sped the car until they got to Swanky Hotel where he and Maggie alighted first, but not
before Maggie had borrowed a handkerchief from one of them to cover her face as she went up the
Hotel. The three followed, and when they saw the pair enter a room, they quickly caught up. All
the three accused testify that as soon as they got into the room, Maggie de la Riva asked the boys
to close the windows before she. undressed in front of them. They themselves also removed their
clothing. Two of them removed their pants retaining their briefs, while Boy Pineda and Cañal
stripped to the skin "because it was hot." The three accused declared that they saw Boy Pineda
hand P100.00 to Maggie and they heard him promise her that he would pay the balance of P900.00
later. Whereupon, the show which lasted about 10 minutes began with the naked girl walking back
and forth the room about 4 to 5 times. This accomplished, all of them dressed up once more and
the three accused (Jaime Jose, Eduardo Aquino and Rogelio Cañal) left the room to wait in the car
for Boy Pineda and Maggie de la Riva who were apparently still discussing the mode of payment
of the balance. Three minutes later Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda joined them. Now, the
question of how and where to drop Maggie came up and it is testified to by the accused that it was
Maggie's idea that they should drop her near the ABS Studio so that it would appear as if she had
just come from her work.
G.R. No. 169246 January 26, 2007

PEOPLE vs. NICOLAS GUZMAN y BOCBOSILA.

Facts:

 On Nov. 25, 1999, appellant and two other persons are having a drinking spree in front of a grocery store at
Barangay Commonwealth, Quezon City. Michael, the victim, passed by in front of the said grocery store.
Suddenly, appellant and his two companions approached and surrounded Michael. They repeatedly stabbed
Michael with a knife which causes the death of Michael. True names and identities of the two other persons
remained unknown.

 In building its case, the prosecution relied on the testimonies of its witnesses, namely:
o Ronald Santiago- witness- jeepney driver and resident of Brgy. Commonwealth, Quezon City.
o Edgardo Bauto – witness;-a tricycle driver and resident of Brgy. Commonwealth, Quezon City.
o Danilo Balber (Danilo)- Michael’s father;
o Police Inspector Alberto Malaza - a member of the police force assigned at Police Community
Precinct No. 1, Batasan Hills
o SPO3 Samuel Quinto (SPO3 Quinto)- police investigator at the Batasan Hills Police Station 6. He
was the one who investigated the incident.
o Dr. Francisco Supe, Jr. –medico legal who examined the body of Michael

 Appellant testified that on the day of incident, he was inside his store when he heard shouts outside. He saw
that Jesus was having fights with Danilo and Ronald. Michael arrived at the scene. Lemuel then came to
rescue Jesus but Michael blocked his way- the two wrestled. Moments later, he saw Lemuel holding a knife
and his hands were bloodied. Michael, on the other hand, was lying on the ground. Lemuel and Jesus, were
appellant’s bus conductor and driver, respectively. Appellant narrated that he went outside to observe the
situation. When the policemen couldn’t find Jesus and Lemuel, he was invited to the police station. From
then on, the policemen held him in custody.

 On 12 November 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting appellant of murder and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death . CA ruled that the correct penalty is reclusion perpetua.

Issue: Whether or Not the lower court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of Treachery

Held: The ruling of the RTC in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of Treachery is correct. The correct
penalty is reclusion perpetua.

In the instant case, treachery was alleged in the Information against appellant.37 Moreover, all the essential
elements/conditions of treachery were established and proven during the trial. The suddenness and
unexpectedness of the attack of appellant and his two companions rendered Michael defenseless,
vulnerable and without means of escape. It appears that Michael was unarmed and alone at the time of the
attack. Further, he was merely seventeen years of age then. 38 In such a helpless situation, it was absolutely
impossible for Michael to escape or to defend himself against the assault of appellant and his two
companions. Being young and weak, Michael is certainly no match against adult persons like appellant and
his two companions. Michael was also outnumbered since he had three assailants, and, was unarmed when
he was stabbed to death. Appellant and his two companions took advantage of their size, number, and
weapon in killing Michael. They also deliberately adopted means and methods in exacting the cruel death
of Michael by first surrounding him, then grabbing his shoulders and overpowering him. Afterwards, each
of them repeatedly stabbed Michael with a knife at the stomach until the latter fell lifeless to the ground.
The stab wounds sustained by Michael proved to be fatal as they severely damaged the latter’s large
intestine.

The fact that the place where the incident occurred was lighted and many people were walking then in
different directions does not negate treachery. It should be made clear that the essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his part. This
is even more true if the assailant is an adult and the victim is a minor. Minor children, who by reason of
their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. Thus, when an adult person illegally attacks a
minor, treachery exists. As we earlier found, Michael was peacefully walking and not provoking anyone to
a fight when he was stabbed to death by appellant and his two companions. Further, Michael was a minor at
the time of his death while appellant and his two companions were adult persons.
OKAY NOT TO WRITE BUT PLEASE READ

RTC ruling-

 . It sustained the "clear, direct and positive" testimony of the prosecution witnesses who . It found no ill-
motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses in testifying against appellant. It also ruled that there was
treachery in the killing of Michael since the latter was unarmed, unsuspecting and very young at the time of
the attack. In ending, the RTC held:

SC ruling

On another point, we agree with the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals. Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code states that murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 of the same Code provides that if the
penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, as in the instant case, and there are no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Since there is no mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the
present case, and, treachery cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance as it was already taken as a
qualifying circumstance, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed

As to the fourth issue, appellant contends that even if he were held liable for the death of Michael, there was no
treachery which will qualify the killing as murder. According to him, there is no evidence to show that appellant and
his two companions had deliberately and consciously adopted their mode of attack to ensure its execution without
risk to themselves. The stabbing incident occurred in a place that was properly lighted. There were many people in
the area then walking in different directions. He claims that if he and his two companions wanted to ensure that no
risk would come to them, then they could have chosen another time and place to attack Michael.

Treachery is a sudden and unexpected attack under the circumstances that renders the victim unable and unprepared
to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack.35 It is an aggravating circumstance that
qualifies the killing of a person to murder. Article 14, paragraph (16) of the Revised Penal Code states the concept
and essential elements of treachery as an aggravating circumstance, thus:

ART. 14. The following are aggravating circumstances:

xxxx

16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

As can be gleaned from the foregoing, two essential elements/conditions are required in order that treachery may be
appreciated: (1) The employment of means, methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offender’s safety
from any retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, who has, thus no opportunity for self-defense or
retaliation; (2) deliberate or conscious choice of means, methods or manner of execution. Further, it must always be
alleged in the information and proved in trial in order that it may be validly considered.36
With regard to the allegation in the Information that the killing of Michael was attended by an aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation, the RTC and the Court of Appeals were correct in disregarding the same
against appellant. The essence of evident premeditation as an aggravating circumstance is that the execution of the
criminal act was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a
space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. It implies a deliberate planning of the crime before executing
it. It must also be shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out.
Further, there must be proof that the accused meditated and reflected on his intention between the time when the
crime was conceived by him and the time it was actually perpetrated. 44 In the case at bar, there is no evidence to
show that appellant and his two companions had previously planned and reflected in killing Michael. When
appellant and his two companions saw Michael on that fateful night, they immediately pounced on him. The thought
of killing Michael came into the minds of appellant and his two companions only when they saw Michael walking
on the road. Indeed, the killing of Michael was sudden and unplanned.

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