#1 G.R. No.
76185 March 30, 1988
WARREN MANUFACTURING WORKERS UNION
(WMWU), petitioner,
vs.
THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS; PHILIPPINE
AGRICULTURAL, COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
WORKERS UNION (PACIWU); and SAMAHANG
MANGGAGAWA SA WARREN MANUFACTURING CORP.-
ALLIANCE OF NATIONALIST AND GENUINE LABOR
ORGANIZATIONS (SMWMC-ANGLO), respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for a
preliminary injunction and/or the issuance of a restraining order
seeking to set aside: (1) Order of the Med-Arbiter dated August
18,1986, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a certification
election is hereby ordered conducted to determine the
exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and
file employees of Warren Manufacturing Corporation,
within 20 days from receipt of this Order, with the
following choices:
1. Philippine Agricultural, Commercial and
Industry Workers Union
(PACIWU);
2. Warren Mfg. Workers Union;
3. Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Warren
Mfg. Corporation petition-
ANGLO; and
4. No Union.
The representation Officer is hereby directed to call
the parties to a pre- election conference to thresh out
the mechanics for the conduct of the actual election.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 15).
and (2) the Resolution dated October 7, 1986 of the Officer-in-
Charge of the Bureau of Labor dismissing the appeals of
Warren Manufacturing Corporation and herein petitioner
(Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 16-18).
This certification case had its inception in an intra-union rivalry
between the petitioner and the respondent Philippine
Agricultural, Commercial and Industrial Workers Union
(PACIWU for short) since 1985.
The undisputed facts of this case as found by the Med-Arbiter
of the Bureau of Labor Relations are as follows:
On June 13,1985, PACIWU filed a petition for
certification election, alleging compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements.
On July 7, 1985, respondent thru counsel filed a
motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that there
exist a C.BA between the respondent and the Warren
Mfg. Union which took effect upon its signing on July
16, 1985 and to expire on July 31, 1986.
While the petition was under hearing, PACIWU filed a
Notice of Strike and on conciliation meeting, a Return-
to-Work Agreement was signed on July 25,1985,
stipulating, among others, as follows:
To resolve the issue of union representation
at Warren Mfg- Corp. parties have agreed to
Page 1 of 26
the holding of a consent election among the
rank and file on August 25, 1985 at the
premises of the company to be supervised
by MOLE. ...
It is cleanly understood that the certified
union in the said projected election shall
respect and administer the existing CBA at
the company until its expiry date on July 31,
1986.
On 12 August 1985, an Order was issued by this
Office, directing that a consent election be held
among the rank and file workers of the company, with
the following contending unions:
1. Philippine Agricultural, Commercial and
Industrial Workers Union (PACIWU)
2. Warren Mfg. Workers Union;
3. No Union.
On August 25, 1985, said consent election was held,
and yielded the following results:
PACIWU----------------------------94
WMWU----------------------------193
Feeling aggrieved, however, PACIWU filed an
Election Protest.
In December, 1985 a Notice of Strike was again filed
by the union this time with the Valenzuela branch
office of this Ministry, and after conciliation, the parties
finally agreed, among others, to wit:
In consideration of this payment, ... individual
complaints and PACIWU hereby agree and
covenant that the following labor
complaints/disputes are considered amicably
settled and withdrawn/dismissed, to wit: ...
On the basis of a Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by the
parties, the Election Protest filed by the PACIWU was
ordered dismissed. (Rollo, pp. 12-13).
On June 5, 1986, the PACIWU filed a petition for certification
election followed by the filing of a petition for the same
purposes by the Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Warren
Manufacturing Corporation-Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine
Labor Organizations (Anglo for short) which petitions were both
opposed by Warren Manufacturing Corporation on the grounds
that neither petition has 30% support; that both are barred by
the one-year no certification election law and the existence of a
duly ratified CBA. The therein respondent, therefore, prayed
that the petitions for certification election be dismissed. (Rollo,
pp. 11-12).
As above stated, the Med-Arbiter of the National Capital
Region, Ministry of Labor and Employment, ordered on August
8, 't 986 the holding of a certification election within twenty 20)
days from receipt to determine the exclusive bargaining
representative of all the rank and file employees of the Warren
se Manufacturing Corporation, with the above-mentioned
choices.
Both Warren Manufacturing Corporation and petitioner herein
filed separate motions, treated as appeals by the Bureau of
Labor Relations, which dismissed the same for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
This petition was filed solely by the Warren Manufacturing
Workers Union, with the company itself opting not to appeal.
The Second Division of this Court in the resolution of
November 3, 1986 without giving due course to the petition,
required the respondents to comment and issued the
temporary, restraining order prayed for (Rollo, pp. 18-20).
The comment of the respondent PACIWU was filed on
November 27, 1986 (Ibid., pp. 29-32). The public respondent
through the Hon. Solicitor General filed its Comment to the
petition on December 10, 1986 (Ibid., pp. 34-43) and private
respondent ANGLO, filed its comment on December 16, 1986
(Ibid., pp. 45- 51). The petitioner with leave of court filed its
reply to comment entitled a rejoinder on January 6,1987 (Ibid.,
pp. 52-62).
In the resolution of January 26, 1987, the petition was given
due course and the parties were required to submit their
respective memoranda (Ibid., p. 76).
Memorandum for public respondent was filed on February
20,1987 (Ibid., p. 82-88). Respondent PACIWU's memorandum
was filed on March 18, 1987 (Ibid., pp. 95-99).
SMWMCANGLO'S Memorandum was filed on March 23,1987
(Ibid., pp. 100-1 09) and the petitioner's memorandum was
filed on March 31,1987 (Ibid., pp. 110-120).
In its memorandum, petitioner raised the following issues:
A. The holding of a certification election at the
bargaining unit is patently premature and
illegal.
B. The petition filed by private respondents do not
have the statutory 30% support requirement.
C. Petitioner was denied administrative due process
when excluded from med-arbitration
proceedings.
The petition is devoid of merit.
A.
Petitioner's contention is anchored on the following grounds:
Section 3, Rule V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of the Labor Code provides, among others:
... however no certification election may be held within
one (1) year from the date of the issuance of the
declaration of a final certification result.
and
Article 257, Title VII, Book V of the Labor Code provides:
No certification election issue shall be entertained by
the Bureau in any Collective Bargaining Agreement
existing between the employer and a legitimate labor
organization.
Otherwise stated, petitioner invoked the one-year no
certification election rule and the principle of the Contract Bar
Rule.
This contention is untenable.
The records show that petitioner admitted that what was held
on August 25,1985 at the Company's premises and which
became the root of this controversy, was a consent election
and not a certification election (Emphasis supplied). As
Page 2 of 26
correctly distinguished by private respondent, a consent
election is an agreed one, its purpose being merely to
determine the issue of majority representation of all the
workers in the appropriate collective bargaining unit while a
certification election is aimed at determining the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in an
appropriate bargaining unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining. From the very nature of consent election, it is a
separate and distinct process and has nothing to do with the
import and effect of a certification election. Neither does it
shorten the terms of an existing CBA nor entitle the participants
thereof to immediately renegotiate an existing CBA although it
does not preclude the workers from exercising their right to
choose their sole and exclusive bargaining representative after
the expiration of the sixty (60) day freedom period. In fact the
Med-Arbiter in the Return to Work Agreement signed by the
parties emphasized the following:
To resolve the issue of union representation at Warren
Mfg. Corp., parties have agreed to the holding of a
consent election among the rank and file on August
25,1985 at the premises of the company to be
supervised by the Ministry of Labor and
Employment .....
It is clearly understood that the certified union in the
said projected election shall respect and administer
the existing CBA at the company until its expiry date
on July 31, 1986. (Rollo, pp. 46, 48-49).
It is, therefore, unmistakable that the election thus held on
August 25, 1985 was not for the purpose of determining which
labor union should be the bargaining representative in the
negotiation for a collective contract, there being an existing
collective bargaining agreement yet to expire on July 31, 1986;
but only to determine which labor union shag administer the
said existing contract.
Accordingly, the following provisions of the New Labor Code
apply:
ART. 254. Duty to bargain collectively when there
exists a collective bargaining agreement.—When
there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to
bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party
shall terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty
(60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the
duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to
continue in full force and effect the terms and
conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-
day period and/or until a new agreement is reached
by the parties.
Corollary to the above, Article 257 of the New Labor
Code expressly states that No certification election
issue shall be entertained if a collective agreement
which has been submitted in accordance with Article
231 of this Code exists between the employer and a
legitimate labor organization except within sixty (60)
days prior to the expiration of the life of such certified
collective bargaining agreement." (Rollo, pp. 83-84)
Thus, as stated by this Court in General Textiles Allied Workers
Association v. the Director of the Bureau of labor Relations (84
SCRA 430 [19781) "there should be no obstacle to the right of
the employees to petition for a certification election at the
proper time. that is, within 60 days prior to the expiration of the
three year period ...
Finally, such premature agreement entered into by the
petitioner and the Company on June 2, 1986 does not
adversely affect the petition for certification election filed by
respondent PACIWU (Rollo, p. 85).
Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
the Labor Code clearly provides:
 Section 4. Effect of Early Agreement.—There
representation case shall not, however, be adversely
affected by a collective agreement submitted before
or during the last sixty days of a subsisting agreement
or during the pendency of the representation case.
Apart from the fact that the above Rule is clear and explicit,
leaving no room for construction or interpretation, it is an
elementary rule in administrative law that administrative
regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to
interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the
force of law and are entitled to great respect (Espanol v.
Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314 [1985)).
As aforestated, the existing collective bargaining agreement
was due to expire on July 31, 1 986. The Med-Arbiter found
that a sufficient number of employees signified their consent to
the filing of the petition and 107 employees authorized
intervenor to file a motion for intervention. Otherwise stated, he
found that the petition and intervention were supported by
more than 30% of the members of the bargaining unit. In the
light of these facts, Article 258 of the Labor Code makes it
mandatory for the Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct a
certification election (Samahang Manggagawa ng Pacific Mills,
Inc. v. Noriel, et al., 134 SCRA 152 [1985]). In the case of
Federation of Free Workers (Bisig ng Manggagawa sa UTEX v.
Noriel etc., et al., 86 SCRA 132 [1978]), this Court was even
more specific when it stated "No administrative agency can
ignore the imperative tone of the above article. The language
used is one of command. Once it has been verified that the
petition for certification election has the support of at least 30%
of the employees in the bargaining unit, it must be granted,
The specific word used can yield no other meaning. It becomes
under the circumstances, "mandatory"..."
The finality of the findings of fact of the Med-Arbiter that the
petition and intervention filed in the case at bar were supported
by 30% of the members of the workers is clear and definite.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED,
SO ORDERED.
Page 3 of 26
#2 [G.R. No. 107792. March 2, 1998] . SECOND DIVISION
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA PERMEX (SMP-PIILU-
TUCP), petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF
LABOR, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR,
PERMEX PRODUCER AND EXPORTER
CORPORATION, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision,
dated October 8, 1992 and order dated November 12, 1992, of
Undersecretary of Labor and Employment Bienvenido
Laguesma, ordering a certification election to be conducted
among the employees of respondent company.
The facts of the case are as follows. On January 15,
1991, a certification election was conducted among employees
of respondent Permex Producer and Exporter Corporation
(hereafter referred to as Permex Producer). The results of the
elections were as follows:
National Federation of Labor (NFL) - 235
No Union - 466
Spoiled Ballots - 18
Marked Ballots - 9
Challenged Ballots - 7
However, some employees of Permex Producer formed a
labor organization known as the Samahang Manggagawa sa
Permex (SMP) which they registered with the Department of
Labor and Employment on March 11, 1991. The union later
affiliated with the Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union
(PIILU).
On August 16, 1991, Samahang Manggagawa sa
Permex-Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union (SMP-
PIILU), wrote the respondent company requesting recognition
as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of
employees at the Permex Producer. On October 19, 1991
Permex Producer recognized SMP-PIILU and, on December 1,
entered into a collective bargaining agreement with it. The
CBA was ratified between December 9 and 10, 1991 by the
majority of the rank and file employees of Permex
Producer. On December 13, 1991, it was certified by the
DOLE.
On February 25, 1992, respondent NFL filed a petition for
certification election, but it was dismissed by Med-Arbiter
Edgar B. Gongalos in an order dated August 20, 1992.
Respondent NFL then appealed the order to the Secretary of
Labor and Employment. On October 8, 1992, the Secretary of
Labor, through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma, set
aside the order of the Med-Arbiter and ordered a certification
election to be conducted among the rank and file employees at
the Permex Producer, with the following choices:
1. National Federation of Labor
2. Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex
3. No union
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but its motion was
denied in an order dated November 12, 1992. Hence, this
petition.
Two arguments are put forth in support of the
petition. First, it is contended that petitioner has been
recognized by the majority of the employees at Permex
Producer as their sole collective bargaining agent. Petitioner
argues that when a group of employees constituting
themselves into an organization and claiming to represent a
majority of the work force requests the employer to bargain
collectively, the employer may do one of two things. First, if the
employer is satisfied with the employees claim the employer
may voluntarily recognize the union by merely bargaining
collectively with it. The formal written confirmation is ordinarily
stated in the collective bargaining agreement. Second, if on the
other hand, the employer refuses to recognize the union
voluntarily, it may petition the Bureau of Labor Relations to
conduct a certification election. If the employer does not submit
a petition for certification election, the union claiming to
represent the employees may submit the petition so that it may
be directly certified as the employees representative or a
certification election may be held.
The case of Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. Ferrer-
Calleja,[1] cited by the Solicitor General in his comment filed in
behalf of the NLRC, is particularly apropos. There, the union
also requested voluntary recognition by the company. Instead
of granting the request, the company petitioned for a
certification election. The union moved to dismiss on the
ground that it did not ask the company to bargain collectively
with it. As its motion was denied, the union brought the matter
to this Court. In sustaining the companys stand, this Court
ruled:
...Ordinarily, in an unorganized establishment like the
Calasiao Beer Region, it is the union that files a petition for a
certification election if there is no certified bargaining agent for
the workers in the establishment. If a union asks the employer
to voluntarily recognize it as the bargaining agent of the
employees, as the petitioner did, it in effect asks the employer
to certify it as the bargaining representative of the employees A
CERTIFICATION WHICH THE EMPLOYER HAS NO
AUTHORITY TO GIVE, for it is the employees prerogative (not
the employers) to determine whether they want a union to
represent them, and, if so, which one it should be. (emphasis
supplied)
In accordance with this ruling, Permex Producer should
not have given its voluntary recognition to SMP-PIILU-TUCP
when the latter asked for recognition as exclusive collective
bargaining agent of the employees of the company. The
company did not have the power to declare the union the
exclusive representative of the workers for the purpose of
collective bargaining.
Indeed, petitioners contention runs counter to the trend
towards the holding of certification election. By virtue of
Executive Order No. 111, which became effective on March 4,
1987, the direct certification previously allowed under the
Labor Code had been discontinued as a method of selecting
the exclusive bargaining agents of the workers.[2] Certification
election is the most effective and the most democratic way of
determining which labor organization can truly represent the
working force in the appropriate bargaining unit of a company.[3]
Petitioner argues that of the 763 qualified employees of
Permex Producer, 479 supported its application for registration
with the DOLE and that when petitioner signed the CBA with
the company, the CBA was ratified by 542
employees. Petitioner contends that such support by the
majority of the employees justifies its finding that the CBA
made by it is valid and binding.
But it is not enough that a union has the support of the
majority of the employees. It is equally important that everyone
in the bargaining unit be given the opportunity to express
himself.[4]
This is especially so because, in this case, the
recognition given to the union came barely ten (10) months
after the employees had voted no union in the certification
election conducted in the company. As pointed out by
respondent Secretary of Labor in his decision, there can be no
determination of a bargaining representative within a year of
the proclamation of the results of the certification election.
[5]
Here the results, which showed that 61% of the employees
voted for no union, were certified only on February 25, 1991
but on December 1, 1991 Permex Producer already
recognized the union and entered into a CBA with it.
Page 4 of 26
There is something dubious about the fact that just ten
(10) months after the employees had voted that they did not
want any union to represent them, they would be expressing
support for petitioner. The doubt is compounded by the fact
that in sworn affidavits some employees claimed that they had
either been coerced or misled into signing a document which
turned out to be in support of petitioner as its collective
bargaining agent. Although there were retractions, we agree
with the Solicitor General that retractions of statements by
employees adverse to a company (or its favored union) are
oftentimes tainted with coercion and intimidation. For how
could one explain the seeming flip-flopping of position taken by
the employees? The figures claimed by petitioner to have been
given to it in support cannot readily be accepted as true.
Second. Petitioner invokes the contract-bar rule. They
contend that under Arts. 253, 253-A and 256 of the Labor Code
and Book V, Rule 5, 3 of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, a petition for certification election or motion for
intervention may be entertained only within 60 days prior to the
date of expiration of an existing collective bargaining
agreement. The purpose of the rule is to ensure stability in the
relationships of the workers and the management by
preventing frequent modifications of any collective bargaining
agreement earlier entered into by them in good faith and for
the stipulated original period. Excepted from the contract-bar
rule are certain types of contracts which do not foster industrial
stability, such as contracts where the identity of the
representative is in doubt. Any stability derived from such
contracts must be subordinated to the employees freedom of
choice because it does not establish the kind of industrial
peace contemplated by the law.[6] Such situation obtains in this
case. The petitioner entered into a CBA with Permex Producer
when its status as exclusive bargaining agent of the employees
had not been established yet.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and order of the
respondent Secretary of Labor are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
#3 SECOND DIVISION . G.R. No. 97020. June 8, 1992.
CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE
UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR BIENVENIDO E.
LAGUESMA ABD FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS
(FFW), CALIFORNIA MFG. CORP. SUPERVISORS UNION
CHAPTER (CALMASUCO), Respondents.
V.E. del Rosario & Associates for Petitioner.
Ferdinand E. Laguna for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR RELATIONS;
CERTIFICATION ELECTION; NOT APPLICABLE TO
ESTABLISHMENTS WHERE THERE EXISTS A CERTIFIED
BARGAINING AGENT. — The Court has already categorically
ruled that Article 257 of the Labor Code is applicable to
unorganized labor organizations and not to establishments
where there exists a certified bargaining agent which had
previously entered into a collective bargaining agreement with
the management (Associated Labor Unions [ALU] v. Calleja,
G.R. No. 85085, November 6, 1989, 179 SCRA 127).
Otherwise stated, the establishment concerned must have no
certified bargaining agent (Associated Labor Unions [ALU] v.
Calleja, G.R. No. 82260, July 19, 1989, 175 SCRA 490). In the
instant case, it is beyond cavil that the supervisors of CMC
which constitute a bargaining unit separate and distinct from
that of the rank-and-file, have no such agent, thus they
correctly filed a petition for certification election thru union
FFW-CALMASUCO, likewise indubitably a legitimate labor
organization.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; TWENTY-FIVE PERCENT (25%)
SUBSCRIPTION REQUIREMENT; IMMATERIAL THERETO;
REASONS THEREFOR. — CMC’s insistence on the 25%
subscription requirement, is clearly immaterial. The same has
been expressly deleted by Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6715
and is presently prescribed only in organized establishments,
that is, those with existing bargaining agents. Compliance with
the said requirement need not need even be established with
absolute certainty. The Court has consistently ruled that "even
conceding that the statutory requirement of 30% (now 25%) of
the labor force asking for a certification election had not been
strictly complied with, the Director (now the Med-Arbiter) is still
empowered to order that it be held precisely for the purpose of
ascertaining which of the contending labor organizations shall
be the exclusive collective bargaining agent (Atlas Free
Workers Union (AFWU-PSSLU Local v. Noriel, G.R. No. L-
51905, May 26, 1981, 104 SCRA 565). The requirement than
is relevant only when it becomes mandatory to conduct a
certification election. In all other instances, the discretion,
according to the rulings of this Tribunal, ought to be ordinarily
exercised in favor of a petition for certification (National Mines
and Allied Workers Union (NAMAWU-UIL) v. Luna, Et Al., G.R.
No. L-46722, June 15, 1978, 83 SCRA 607).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; AS A GENERAL RULE, AN EMPLOYER HAS
NO STANDING TO QUESTION THEREOF; EXCEPTION. —
CMC, as employer has no standing to question a certification
election (Asian Design and Manufacturing Corporation v.
Calleja, Et Al., G.R. No. 77415, June 29, 1989, 174 SCRA
477). Such is the sole concern of the worker has to file the
petition for certification election pursuant to Article 259 (now
258) of the Labor Code because it was requested to bargain
collectively. Thereafter, the role of the employer in the
certification process ceases. The employer becomes merely a
by-stander. Oft-quoted is the pronouncement of the Court on
management interference in certification elections, thus: "On
matters that should be the exclusive concern of labor, the
choice of a collective bargaining representative, the employer
is definitely an intruder. His participation, to say the least,
deserves no encouragement. This Court should be the last
agency to lend support to such an attempt at interference with
purely internal affair of labor." (Trade Unions of the Philippines
and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. Trajano, G.R. No. L-61153,,
January 17, 1983, 120 SCRA 64 citing Consolidated Farms,
Inc. v. Noriel, G.R. No. L-47752, July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 469,
473).
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
seeking to annul and set aside the (a) resolution * of the
Department of Labor and Employment dated October 16, 1990
in OS-A-10-283-90 (NCR-OD-M-90-05-095) entitled "In Re:
Petition for Certification Election Among the Supervisors of
California Manufacturing Corporation, Federation of Free
Workers (FFW) California Mfg. Corp. Supervisors Union
Chapter (CALMASUCO), petitioner-appellee, California
Manufacturing Corporation, employer-appellant" which denied
herein petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the order of Med-Arbiter
Arsenia Q. Ocampo dated August 22, 1990 directing the
conduct of a certification election among the supervisory
employees of California Manufacturing Corporation, and (b) the
Order ** of the same Department denying petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration.
As culled from the records, the following facts appear
undisputed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On May 24, 1990, a petition for certification election among the
supervisors of California Manufacturing Corporation (CMC for
brevity) was filed by the Federation of Free Workers (FFW) —
California Manufacturing Corporation Supervisors Union
Chapter (CALMASUCO), alleging inter alia, that it is a duly
registered federation with registry certificate no. 1952-TTT-IP,
while FFW-CALMASUCO Chapter is a duly registered chapter
Page 5 of 26
with registry certificate no. 1-AFBI-038 issued on May 21, 1990
(Annex "A", Rollo, p. 63); that the employer CMC employs one
hundred fifty (150) supervisors; that there is no recognized
supervisors union existing in the company; that the petition is
filed in accordance with Article 257 of the Labor Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 6715; and that the petition is
nevertheless supported by a substantial number of signatures
of the employees concerned (Annexes "E" and "F", Ibid., pp.
28-29).chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
In its answer, CMC, now petitioner herein, alleged among
others, that the petition for the holding of a certification election
should be denied as it is not supported by the required twenty-
five percent (25%) of all its supervisors and that a big number
of the supposed signatories to the petition are not actually
supervisors as they have no subordinates to supervise, nor do
they have the powers and functions which under the law would
classify them as supervisors (Annex "D", Ibid., p. 25).
On July 24, 1990, FFW-CALMASUCO filed its reply
maintaining that under the law, when there is no existing unit
yet in a particular bargaining unit at the time a petition for
certification election is filed, the 25% rule on the signatories
does not apply; that the "organized establishment"
contemplated by law does not refer to a "company" per se but
rather refers to a "bargaining unit" which may be of different
classifications in a single company; that CMC has at least two
(2) different bargaining units, namely, the supervisory
(unorganized) and the rank-and-file (organized); that the
signatories to the petition have been performing supervisory
functions; that since it is CMC which promoted them to the
positions of supervisors, it is already estopped from claiming
that they are not supervisors; that the said supervisors were
excluded from the coverage of the collective bargaining
agreement of its rank-and-file employees; and that the
contested signatories are indeed supervisors as shown in the
"CMC Master List of Employees" of January 2, 1990 and the
CMS Publication (Annex "G", Ibid., p. 30).
On August 22, 1990, the Med-Arbiter issued an order, the
decretal portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby ordered that
a certification election be conducted among the supervisory
employees of California Manufacturing Corporation within
twenty (20) days from receipt hereof with the usual pre-election
conference of the parties to thresh out the mechanics of the
election. The payroll of the company three (3) months prior to
the filing of the petition shall be used as the basis in
determining the list of eligible voters.
‘The choices are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘1. Federation of Free Workers (FFW) — California
Manufacturing Corporation Supervisors Union Chapter
(CALMASUCO); and
‘2. No union.’
"SO ORDERED." (Annex "H", Ibid., p. 33)
CMC thereafter appealed to the Department of Labor and
Employment which, however, affirmed the above order in its
assailed resolution dated October 16, 1990 (Annex "B", Ibid.,
p. 18). CMC’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was also
denied in its order dated November 17, 1990 (Annex "A", Ibid.,
p. 15), hence, his petition.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
The issues are presented by CMC in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"a) whether or not the term "unorganized establishment" in
Article 257 of the Labor Code refers to a bargaining unit or a
business establishment;
"b) whether or not non-supervisors can participate in a
supervisor’s certification election; and
"c) whether or not the two (2) different and separate plants of
herein petitioner in Parañaque and Las Piñas can be treated
as a single bargaining unit."cralaw virtua1aw library
The petition must be denied.
The Court has already categorically ruled that Article 257 of the
Labor Code is applicable to unorganized labor organizations
and not to establishments where there exists a certified
bargaining agent which had previously entered into a collective
bargaining agreement with the management (Associated Labor
Unions [ALU] v. Calleja, G.R. No. 85085, November 6, 1989,
179 SCRA 127) (Underscoring supplied). Otherwise stated, the
establishment concerned must have no certified bargaining
agent (Associated Labor Unions [ALU] v. Calleja, G.R. No.
82260, July 19, 1989, 175 SCRA 490). In the instant case, it is
beyond cavil that the supervisors of CMC which constitute a
bargaining unit separate and distinct from that of the rank-and-
file, have no such agent, thus they correctly filed a petition for
certification election thru union FFW-CALMASUCO, likewise
indubitably a legitimate labor organization. CMC’s insistence
on the 25% subscription requirement, is clearly immaterial. The
same has been expressly deleted by Section 24 of Republic
Act No. 6715 and is presently prescribed only in organized
establishments, that is, those with existing bargaining agents.
Compliance with the said requirement need not even be
established with absolute certainty. The Court has consistently
ruled that "even conceding that the statutory requirement of
30% (now 25%) of the labor force asking for a certification
election had not been strictly complied with, the Director (now
the Med-Arbiter) is still empowered to order that it be held
precisely for the purpose of ascertaining which of the
contending labor organizations shall be the exclusive collective
bargaining agent (Atlas Free Workers Union (AFWU)-PSSLU
Local v. Noriel, G.R. No. L-51905, May 26, 1981, 104 SCRA
565). The requirement then is relevant only when it becomes
mandatory to conduct a certification election. In all other
instances, the discretion, according to the rulings of this
Tribunal, ought to be ordinarily exercised in favor of a petition
for certification (National Mines and Allied Workers Union
(NAMAWU-UIF) v. Luna, Et Al., G.R. No. L-46722, June 15,
1978, 83 SCRA 607).
In any event, CMC as employer has no standing to question a
certification election (Asian Design and Manufacturing
Corporation v. Calleja, Et Al., G.R. No. 77415, June 29, 1989,
174 SCRA 477). Such is the sole concern of the workers. The
only exception is where the employer has to file the petition for
certification election pursuant to Article 259 (now 258) of the
Labor Code because it was requested to bargain collectively.
Thereafter, the role of the employer in the certification process
ceases. The employer becomes merely a by-stander. Oft-
quoted is the pronouncement of the Court on management
interference in certification elections,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On matters that should be the exclusive concern of labor, the
choice of a collective bargaining representative, the employer
is definitely an intruder. His participation, to say the least,
deserves no encouragement. This Court should be the last
agency to lend support to such an attempt at interference with
purely internal affair of labor." (Trade Unions of the Philippines
and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. Trajano, G.R. No. L-61153,
January 17, 1983, 120 SCRA 64 citing Consolidated Farms,
Inc. v. Noriel, G.R. No. L-47752. July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 469,
473).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for
utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Page 6 of 26
#4 FIRST DIVISION . G.R. No. 89609 January 27, 1992
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR
INDUSTRY OF THE PHILIPPINES (NACUSIP)-
TUCP, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, in her capacity as Director
of the Bureau of Labor Relations; and the NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS (NFSW)-FGT-
KMU, respondents.
Zoilo V. De la Cruz, Jr., Beethoven R. Buenaventura and
Pedro E. Jimenez for petitioner.
Manlapao, Drilon, Ymballa and Chavez for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of the
resolution issued by the respondent Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations Pura Ferrer-Calleja dated June 26, 1989
setting aside the order of the Med-Arbiter dated February 8,
1989 denying the motion to dismiss the petition and directing
the conduct of a certification election among the rank and file
employees or workers of the Dacongcogon Sugar and Rice
Milling Co. situated at Kabankalan, Negros Occidental.
The antecedent facts giving rise to the controversy at bar are
as follows:
Petitioner National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of
the Philippines (NACUSIP-TUCP) is a legitimate national labor
organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment. Respondent Honorable Pura Ferrer-Calleja is
impleaded in her official capacity as the Director of the Bureau
of Labor Relations of the Department of Labor and
Employment, while private respondent National Federation of
Sugar Workers (NFSW-FGT-KMU) is a labor organization duly
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment.
Dacongcogon Sugar and Rice Milling Co., Inc. (Dacongcogon)
based in Kabankalan, Negros Occidental employs about five
hundred (500) workers during milling season and about three
hundred (300) on off-milling season.
On November 14, 1984, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU
and employer Dacongcogon entered into a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) for a term of three (3) years,
which was to expire on November 14, 1987.
When the CBA expired, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU
and Dacongcogon negotiated for its renewal. The CBA was
extended for another three (3) years with reservation to
negotiate for its amendment, particularly on wage increases,
hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment.
However, a deadlock in negotiation ensued on the matter of
wage increases and optional retirement. In order to obviate
friction and tension, the parties agreed on a suspension to
provide a cooling-off period to give them time to evaluate and
further study their positions. Hence, a Labor Management
Council was set up and convened, with a representative of the
Department of Labor and Employment, acting as chairman, to
resolve the issues.
On December 5, 1988, petitioner NACUSIP-TUCP filed a
petition for direct certification or certification election among the
rank and file workers of Dacongcogon.
On January 27, 1989, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU
moved to dismiss the petition on the following grounds, to wit:
 The Petition was filed out of time;
II
There is a deadlocked (sic) of CBA negotiation
between forced intervenor and respondent-central.
(Rollo, p. 25)
On February 6, 1989, Dacongcogon filed an answer praying
that the petition be dismissed.
By an order dated February 8, 1989, the Med-Arbiter denied
the motion to dismiss filed by private respondent NFSW-FGT-
KMU and directed the conduct of certification election among
the rank and file workers of Dacongcogon, the dispositive
portion of which provides as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to
Dismiss the present petition is, as it is hereby
DENIED. Let therefore a certification election among
the rank and file employees/workers of the
Dacongcogon Sugar and Rice Milling Co., situated at
Kabankalan, Neg. Occ., be conducted with the
following choices:
(1) National Congress of Unions in the Sugar
Industry of the Philippines (NACUSIP-
TUCP);
(2) National Federation of Sugar Workers
(NFSW);
(3) No Union.
The designated Representation Officer is hereby
directed to call the parties for a pre-election
conference to thresh out the mechanics of the
election and to conduct and supervise the same
within twenty (20) days from receipt by the parties of
this Order. The latest payroll shall be used to
determine the list of qualified voters.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 34)
On February 9, 1989, private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration and/or appeal alleging that the Honorable
Med-Arbiter misapprehended the facts and the law applicable
amounting to gross incompetence. Hence, private respondent
prayed that the order of the Med-Arbiter be set aside and the
motion to dismiss be reconsidered.
On February 27, 1989, petitioner filed its opposition to the
motion for reconsideration praying that the motion for
reconsideration and/or appeal be denied for lack of merit.
On June 26, 1989, respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations rendered a resolution reversing the order of the Med-
Arbiter, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order of the
Med-Arbiter dated 8 February 1989 is hereby set
aside and vacated, and a new one issued dismissing
the above-entitled petition for being filed out of time.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 46)
Hence, this petition raising four (4) issues, to wit:
I. RESPONDENT HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA,
IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU
OF LABOR RELATIONS, COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RENDERING HER
RESOLUTION DATED 26 JUNE 1989 REVERSING
Page 7 of 26
THE ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 8, 1989 OF MED-
ARBITER FELIZARDO SERAPIO.
II. THAT THE AFORESAID RESOLUTION DATED 26
JUNE 1989 OF RESPONDENT PURA FERRER-
CALLEJA IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.
III. THAT THE AFORESAID RESOLUTION DATED 26
JUNE 1989 OF RESPONDENT DIRECTOR PURA
FERRER-CALLEJA DENIES THE RANK AND FILE
EMPLOYEES OF THE DACONGCOGON SUGAR &
RICE MILLING COMPANY, AND THE HEREIN
PETITIONER NACUSIP-TUCP, THEIR LEGAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
IV. THAT RESPONDENT DIRECTOR PURA
FERRER-CALLEJA, IN RENDERING HER SAID
RESOLUTION DATED 26 JUNE 1989 WAS BIASED
AGAINST PETITIONER NACUSIP-TUCP. (Rollo,
p. 2)
The controversy boils down to the sole issue of whether or not
a petition for certification election may be filed after the 60-day
freedom period.
Petitioner maintains that respondent Director Calleja
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction in rendering the resolution dated June 26, 1989
setting aside, vacating and reversing the order dated February
8, 1989 of Med-Arbiter Serapio, in the following manner:
1) by setting aside and vacating the aforesaid Order
dated February 8, 1989 of Med-Arbiter Felizardo
Serapio and in effect dismissing the Petition for Direct
or Certification Election of Petitioner NACUSIP-TUCP
(Annex "A" hereof) without strong valid, legal and
factual basis;
2) by giving a very strict and limited interpretation of
the provisions of Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor
Code, as amended, knowing, as she does, that the
Labor Code, being a social legislation, should be
liberally interpreted to afford the workers the
opportunity to exercise their legitimate legal and
constitutional rights to self-organization and to free
collective bargaining;
3) by issuing her questioned Resolution of June 26,
1989 knowing fully well that upon the effectivity of
Rep. Act No. 6715 on 21 March 1989 she had no
longer any appellate powers over decisions of Med-
Arbiters in cases of representation issues or
certification elections;
4) by ignoring intentionally the applicable ruling of the
Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Kapisanan
ng Mga Manggagawa sa La Suerte-FOITAF
vs. Noriel, L-45475, June 20, 1977;
5) by clearly failing to appreciate the significance (sic)
of the fact that for more than four (4) years there has
been no certification election involving the rank and
file workers of the Company; and,
6) by frustrating the legitimate desire and will of the
workers of the Company to determine their sole and
exclusive collective bargaining representative through
secret balloting. (Rollo, pp. 9-10)
However, the public respondent through the Solicitor General
stresses that the petition for certification election was filed out
of time. The records of the CBA at the Collective Agreements
Division (CAD) of the Bureau of Labor Relations show that the
CBA between Dacongcogon and private respondent NFSW-
FGT-KMU had expired on November 14, 1987, hence, the
petition for certification election was filed too late, that is, a
period of more than one (1) year after the CBA expired.
The public respondent maintains that Section 6 of the Rules
Implementing Executive Order No. 111 commands that the
petition for certification election must be filed within the last
sixty (60) days of the CBA and further reiterates and warns that
any petition filed outside the 60-day freedom period "shall be
dismissed outright." Moreover, Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the
Rules Implementing the Labor Code enjoins the filing of a
representation question, if before a petition for certification
election is filed, a bargaining deadlock to which the bargaining
agent is a party is submitted for conciliation or arbitration.
This rule simply provides that a petition for certification election
or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty
days prior to the expiry date of an existing collective bargaining
agreement. Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the filing of a
petition for certification election during the existence of a
collective bargaining agreement except within the freedom
period, as it is called, when the said agreement is about to
expire. The purpose, obviously, is to ensure stability in the
relationships of the workers and the management by
preventing frequent modifications of any collective bargaining
agreement earlier entered into by them in good faith and for
the stipulated original period. (Associated Labor Unions (ALU-
TUCP) v. Trajano, G.R. No. 77539, April 12, 1989, 172 SCRA
49, 57 citing Associated Trade Unions (ATU v. Trajano, G.R.
No. L-75321, 20 June 1988, 162 SCRA 318, 322-323)

Finally, the public respondent emphasizes that respondent
Director has jurisdiction to entertain the motion for
reconsideration interposed by respondent union from the order
of the Med-Arbiter directing a certification election. Public
respondent contends that Section 25 of Republic Act No. 6715
is not applicable, "(f)irstly, there is as yet no rule or regulation
established by the Secretary for the conduct of elections
among the rank and file of employer Dacongcogon; (s)econdly,
even the mechanics of the election which had to be first laid
out, as directed in the Order dated February 8, 1989 of the
Med-Arbiter, was aborted by the appeal therefrom interposed
by respondent union; and (t)hirdly, petitioner is estopped to
question the jurisdiction of respondent Director after it filed its
opposition to respondent union's Motion for Reconsideration
(Annex
'F,' Petition) and without, as will be seen, in any way assailing
such jurisdiction. . . ." (Rollo, p.66)
We find the petition devoid of merit.
Anent the petitioner's contention that since the expiration of the
CBA in 1987 private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and
Dacongcogon had not concluded a new CBA, We need only to
stress what was held in the case of Lopez Sugar Corporation
v. Federation of Free Workers, Philippine Labor Union
Association (G.R. No. 75700-01, 30 August 1990, 189 SCRA
179, 191) quoting Article 253 of the Labor Code that "(i)t shall
be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to
continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the
existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new
agreement is reached by the parties." Despite the lapse of the
formal effectivity of the CBA the law still considers the same as
continuing in force and effect until a new CBA shall have been
validly executed. Hence, the contract bar rule still applies.
Besides, it should be emphasized that Dacongcogon, in its
answer stated that the CBA was extended for another three (3)
years and that the deadlock was submitted to the Labor
Management Council.

A careful perusal of Rule V, Section 6, Book V of the Rules All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the
Implementing the Labor Code, as amended by the rules respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations did not
implementing Executive Order No. 111 provides that: commit grave abuse of discretion in reversing the order of the
Med-Arbiter.
Sec. 6. Procedure — . . .
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED and the resolution of
the respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations is
In a petition involving an organized establishment or hereby AFFIRMED.
enterprise where the majority status of the incumbent
collective bargaining union is questioned by a
legitimate labor organization, the Med-Arbiter shall SO ORDERED.
immediately order the conduct of a certification
election if the petition is filed during the last sixty (60)
days of the collective bargaining agreement. Any
petition filed before or after the sixty-day freedom
period shall be dismissed outright.

The sixty-day freedom period based on the original

collective bargaining agreement shall not be affected
by any amendment, extension or renewal of the
collective bargaining agreement for purposes of
certification election.

xxx xxx xxx

The clear mandate of the aforequoted section is that the

petition for certification election filed by the petitioner
NACUSIP-TUCP should be dismissed outright, having been
filed outside the 60-day freedom period or a period of more
than one (1) year after the CBA expired.

It is a rule in this jurisdiction that only a certified collective

bargaining agreement — i.e., an agreement duly certified by
the BLR may serve as a bar to certification elections.
(Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v.
Estrella, G.R. No. 45323, February 20, 1989, 170 SCRA 378,
382) It is noteworthy that the Bureau of Labor Relations duly
certified the November 14, 1984 collective bargaining
agreement. Hence, the contract-bar rule as embodied in
Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the rules implementing the Labor
Code is applicable.

Page 8 of 26
#5 FIRST DIVISION . G.R. No. 101730 June 17, 1993
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA and PT & T
SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES UNION-
APSOTEU, respondents.
Leonard U. Sawal for private respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Can a petition for certification election filed by supervisory
employees of an unorganized establishment — one without a
certified bargaining agent — be dismissed on the ground that
these employees are actually performing managerial
functions?
This is the issue for reconsideration in this petition
for certiorari and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, of
the Resolution of 11 June 19911 of then Acting Secretary of
Labor and Employment Nieves D. Confesor dismissing the
appeal from the Order of 11 December 19902 of the Med-
Arbiter which granted the petition for certification election, and
of the Order of 15 August 19913 denying reconsideration.
On 22 October 1990, private respondent PT&T Supervisory
Employees Union-APSOTEU (UNION, for brevity) filed a
petition before the Industrial Relations Decision of the
Department of Labor and Employment praying for the holding
of a certification election among the supervisory employees of
petitioner Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation
(PT&T, for brevity). On 29 October 1990, UNION amended its
petition to include the allegation that PT&T was an
unorganized establishment employing roughly 100 supervisory
employees from whose ranks will constitute the bargaining unit
sought to be established.
On 22 November 1990, PT&T moved to dismiss the petition for
certification election on the ground that UNION members were
performing managerial functions and thus were not merely
supervisory employees. Moreover, PT&T alleged that a
certified bargaining unit already existed among its rank-and-file
employees which barred the filing of the petition.
On 27 November 1990, respondent UNION opposed the
motion to dismiss, contending that under the Labor Code
supervisory employees are not eligible to join the Labor
organization of the rank-and-file employees although they may
form their own.
On 4 December 1990, PT&T filed its reply to the opposition
and manifested that it is the function of an employee which is
determinative of whether said employee is a managerial or
supervisory employee.
On 11 December 1990, the Med-Arbiter granted the petition
and ordered that "a certification election . . . (be) conducted
among the supervisory personnel of the Philippine Telegraph &
Telephone Corporation (PT&T)."4Petitioner PT&T appealed to
the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
On 24 May 1991, PT&T filed its supplemental appeal and
attached copies of the job descriptions and employment
service records of these supervisory employees, including
samples of memoranda and notices they made which
purportedly illustrate their excercise of management
prerogatives. On 31 May 1991, petitioner submitted more job
descriptions to further bolster its contention.
On 11 June 1991, the Acting Secretary of Labor and
Employment Nieves R. Confesor denied petitioner's appeal for
lack of merit. However, she did not rule on the additional
Page 9 of 26
evidence presented by PT&T. Instead, she directed that the
evidence "should be scrutinized and . . . considered during the
exclusion-inclusion proceedings where the employees who
should be part of the bargaining unit . . . will be determined."5
On 15 August 1991, respondent Undersecretary of Labor and
Employment Bienvenido E. Laguesma denied reconsideration
of the resolution dismissing the appeal. Hence, the instant
petition anchored on the ground that public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to rule on the
additional evidence submitted by petitioner which would have
buttressed its contention that there were no supervisory
employees in its employ and which, as a consequence, would
have barred the holding of a certification election.
The petition is devoid of merit.
The applicable provision of law in the case at bar is Art. 257 of
the Labor Code. It reads —
Art. 257. Petitions in unorganized establishments. —
In any establishment where there is no certified
bargaining agent, a certification election
shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter
upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor
organization (emphasis supplied).
The supervisory employees of PT&T did not yet have a
certified bargaining agent to represent them at the time the
UNION, which is legitimate labor organization duly registered
with the Department of Labor and Employment,6 filed the
petition for certification election. Since no certified bargaining
agent represented the supervisory employees, PT&T may be
deemed an unorganized establishment within the purview of
Art. 257 of the Labor Code.
The fact that petitioner's rank-and-file employees were already
represented by a certified bargaining agent doe not make
PT&T an organized establishment vis-a-vis the supervisory
employees. After all, supervisory employees are "not . . .
eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-
file employees."7
Consequently, the Med-Arbiter, as sustained by public
respondent, committed no grave abuse of discretion in granting
the petition for certification election among the supervisory
employee of petitioner PT&T because Art. 257 of the Labor
Code provides that said election should
be automatically conducted upon filing of the petition. In fact,
Sec. 6 of Rule V, Book V, of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations makes it mandatory for the Med-Arbiter to order
the holding of a certification election. It reads —
Sec. 6. Procedure. — Upon receipt of a petition, the
Regional Director shall assign the case to a Med-
Arbiter for appropriate action. The Med-Arbiter, upon
receipt of the assigned petition, shall have twenty (20)
working days from submission of the case for
resolution within which to dismiss or grant the petition.
In a petition filed by a legitimate organization
involving an unorganized establishment, the Med-
Arbiter shall immediately order the conduct of a
certification election . . . (emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, PT&T did not possess the legal personality to file
a motion to dismiss the petition for certification election even if
based on the ground that its supervisory employees are in
reality managerial employees. It is well-settled that an
employer has no standing to question a certification
election8 since this is the sole concern of the workers.9 The
only exception to this rule is where the employer has to file the
petition for certification election itself pursuant to Art. 258 10 of
the Labor Code because it was requested to bargain
collectively. But, other that this instance, the choice of a
collective bargaining agent is purely the internal affair of
labor. 11

What PT&T should have done was to question the inclusion of

any disqualified employee in the certification election during
the exclusion-inclusion proceedings before the representation
officer. Indeed, this is precisely the purpose of the exclusion-
inclusion proceedings, i.e., to determine who among the
employees are entitled to vote and be part of the bargaining
unit sought to be certified.

Then Acting Secretary Nieves D. Confesor therefore did not

abuse her discretion when she opted not to act upon the
additional evidence by petitioner PT&T. For, the holding of a
certification election in an unorganized establishment is
mandatory and must immediately be ordered upon petition by
a legitimate labor organization, which is the case here.

At any rate, the additional evidence presented by petitioner

failed to sufficiently show that the supervisory employees who
sought to be included in the bargaining unit were in fact
performing managerial functions. On the contrary, while these
supervisory employees did excercise independent judgment
which is not routinary or clerical in nature, their authority was
merely recommendatory in character. In all instances, they
were still accountable for their actions to a superior officer, i.e.,
their respective superintendents. The Solicitor General
succinctly puts it thus —

A perusal of petitioner's annexes . . . would readily

show that the power of said supervisors in matters
relating to the excercise of prerogatives for or against
rank-and-file employees is not absolute but merely
recommendatory in character. Note that their reports
recommending or imposing disciplinary action against
rank-and-file employees always bore the concurrence
of one or two superiors . . . and the job descriptions . .
. clearly stated that these supervisors directly reported
to a superior and were accountable to the
latter 12 (emphasis supplied).

As the Med-Arbiter himself noted, "It is incredible that only

rank-and-file and managerial employees are the personnel of
respondent firm, considering the line of service it offers to the
public" 13 and the fact that it employed 2,500 employees, more
or less, all over the country.

A word more. PT&T alleges that respondent UNION is affiliated

with the same national federation representing its rank-and-file
employees. Invoking Atlas Lithographic Services, Inc. v.
Laguesma, 14 PT&T seeks the disqualification of respondent
UNION. Respondent, however, denied it was affiliated with the
same national federation of the rank-and-file employees union,
the Associated Labor Union or ALU. It clarified that the PT&T
Supervisory Employees Union is affiliated with Associated
Professional, Supervisory Office, Technical Employees Union
or APSOTEU, which is a separate and distinct national
federation from ALU.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition

for Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order is DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

Page 10 of 26
#6 FIRST DIVISION . G.R. No. 96255. September 18,
1992.
HERCULES INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner, v. THE
SECRETARY OF LABOR, UNDERSECRETARY
BIENVENIDO E. LAQUESMA, MED-ARBITER
MELCHOR S. LIM AND THE NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF LABOR, Respondents.
Demosthenes S. Baban for Petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR
RELATIONS; CERTIFICATION ELECTION; AS A
GENERAL RULE, EMPLOYER IS NOT A PARTY THERETO;
EXCEPTION. — In a long line of decisions, this Court
has undeviatingly ruled that the employer is not a
party to a certification election which is the sole or
exclusive concern of the workers (Rizal Workers Union
v. Ferrer-Calleja, 186 SCRA 431). In the choice of their
collective bargaining representative, the employer is
definitely an intruder. His participation, to put it mildly,
deserves no encouragement (Consolidated Farms, Inc.
v. Noriel, 84 SCRA 469; Filipino Metals Corp. v. Ople,
107 SCRA 211). The only instance when the employer
may be involved in that process is when it is obliged to
file a petition for certification election on its workers’
request to bargain collectively pursuant to Article 258
of the Labor Code. After the order for a certification
election issues, the employer’s involvement ceases,
and it becomes a neutral bystander.
DECISION
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This petition for certiorari * seeks to set aside the
resolution ** dated September 17, 1990 of the
Undersecretary of Labor in the case entitled, "National
Federation of Labor v. Hercules Industries, Inc."
denying the herein petitioner’s appeal from respondent
Med-Arbiter’s Order dated May 25, 1990 declaring the
National Federation of Labor (NFL) as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file
workers/employees of Hercules Industries, Inc.
Hercules Industries, Inc., herein petitioner, is a
corporation duly registered under Philippine laws which
employs more or less one hundred eighty (180)
workers.
On July 30, 1987, private respondent National
Federation of Labor (NFL), a legitimate labor
federation, filed a petition for certification election
alleging that the existing collective bargaining
agreement would expire in August, 1987 and that it
enjoys the support of more than twenty per cent
(20%) of the rank and file employees in the bargaining
unit.
On August 21, 1987, by agreement of the parties, the
Med-Arbiter issued an order for the conduct of a
certification election with the following
choices:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) National Federation of Labor (NFL);
(2) Hercules Employees Labor Union (HELU); and
(3) No Union.
Page 11 of 26
On September 21, 1987, a pre-election conference was
conducted. The parties, however, could not agree on
the list of qualified voters who would participate in the
election. Specifically, Hercules Industries, Inc. charged
that the list included ninety eight (98) scabs; sixteen
(16) capatazes; eight (8) security guards; and nine (9)
managerial employees.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
On October 26, 1987, the Med-Arbiter issued an order,
the dispositive portion of which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, judgment
should be, as it is hereby promulgated, ordering the
immediate conduct of the Certification Election within
fifteen (15) days from date hereof, at the premises of
the Hercules Industries, Inc., Laih, Siay, Zamboanga
del Sur, with all the regular rank and file workers
appearing in the payroll of July, 1987, and the strikers,
who have not executed ‘Quitclaim’ and voluntarily
accepted separation pay, are eligible participants in the
Certification Election, except those that are
hereinbelow expressly and categorically excluded by
virtue of their being classified as managerial
employees, legally separated and barred under the
contemplation of law.
"A. MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES (Excluded).
"x x x
"B. SECURITY FORCE DEPARTMENT (Excluded).
"x x x
"C. STRIKES EMPLOYEES WHO HAVE EXECUTED DEED
OF QUITCLAIM AND VOLUNTARILY ACCEPTED
SEPARATION PAY
(Excluded)
"x x x
"The representation officer-designate is hereby ordered
to post immediately within five (5) days prior to the
date of election the notices of Certification Election
together with the master list of eligible voters in
conspicuous places at the premises of
the Respondent." (pp. 27-28, Rollo.)
On November 4, 1987, NFL appealed the order to the
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR Case No. A-1-10-88
LRD Case No. 014-87) on the following
grounds:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"1. The Med-Arbiter erred in unqualifiedly accepting all
the names appearing in the July 1987 payroll as
eligible voters and in allowing the 98 contract
replacement worker to vote; and
"2. The Med-Arbiter erred in disregarding the fact that
an earlier order for certification election had already
been handed down and that the workers were on
strike." (p. 29, Rollo.)
Pending the resolution of the NFL’s appeal, a
certification election was conducted on November 7,
1990.
On January 6, 1988, BLR Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja
of the DOLE rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
hereby granted and the certification election held on 7
November 1987 declared null and void.
"Let a new certification election among the rank and
file workers of Hercules Industries, Inc. be held. The
payroll of July 1987 excluding the [ninety eight] 98
scab replacement, shall be the basis of the voters’ list."
(p. 32, Rollo.)
On April 4, 1990, a pre-election conference attended
by the management of Hercules Industries, Inc. and
NFL’s representatives was held at the Department of
Labor and Employment Regional Office in Zamboanga
City. The NFL asked that a certification election be
immediately scheduled on May 4, 1990 at 9:00 a.m. to
be held in the Barangay Hall, Bato, Siay, Zamboanga
del Sur.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Accordingly, a certification election was held on May 4,
1990 with the following results:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR 89 Votes
"2. HERCULES LUMBER & EMPLOYEES
LABOR UNION 0 (Zero)
"3. MANAGEMENT (NO UNION) 0 (Zero)
"4. SPOILED/INVALID VOTES 2 (Votes)
TOTAL VOTES CAST: 91 Votes"
(p. 188, Rollo.)
On May 25, 1990, Med-Arbiter Melchor S. Lim issued a
resolution declaring and certifying the National
Federation of Labor as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the
petitioner.
On July 5, 1990, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration/appeal with the DOLE. It was denied
on September 17, 1990 by Undersecretary Bienvenido
E. Laquesma on the grounds that Sections 3 and 4,
Rule 6, Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor
Code on protests had not been followed; that the
records disclose that no protest was made before the
election, nor formalized within five (5) days after the
election, as provided for by the rules; and the DOLE
has not found any legal obstacle to the proclamation of
the NFL as the collective bargaining agent of
petitioner’s workers.
On September 29, 1990, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied on October
26, 1990 by Undersecretary Laquesma.
Hence, the present recourse.
On January 21, 1991, Zamboanga Rubber Workers
Union, a duly organized labor union affiliated with the
Philippine Integrated Industries Labor Union, filed a
motion for intervention in this Court alleging that it
had requested the petitioner in writing to recognize it
as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of its
workers. The motion was noted by this Court without
action.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the
petitioner, Hercules Industries, Inc., as employer, may
question the validity of the certification election among
its rank-and-file employees. The answer is
no.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Page 12 of 26
In a long line of decisions, this Court has undeviatingly
ruled that the employer is not a party to a certification
election which is the sole or exclusive concern of the
workers (Rizal Workers Union v. Ferrer-Calleja, 186
SCRA 431). In the choice of their collective bargaining
representative, the employer is definitely an intruder.
His participation, to put it mildly, deserves no
encouragement (Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Noriel, 84
SCRA 469; Filipino Metals Corp. v. Ople, 107 SCRA
211).
The only instance when the employer may be involved
in that process is when it is obliged to file a petition for
certification election on its workers’ request to bargain
collectively pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code.
After the order for a certification election issues, the
employer’s involvement ceases, and it becomes a
neutral bystander. (Rizal Workers’ Union v. Calleja,
supra.).
In this case, the Solicitor General correctly observed
that while the employees themselves never requested
the petitioner to bargain collectively, still, they did not
object to the results of the certification election.
Hence, petitioner’s appeal to the Bureau of Labor
Relations from the Med-Arbiter’s Order certifying the
NFL as the exclusive bargaining agent of its rank and
file employees, and its filing of this petition
for certiorari with us, must be rejected. The employer’s
intervention in the certification election of its workers
is frowned upon by law.
In any event, petitioner’s challenge against the validity
of the certification election of May 4, 1990 is devoid of
merit. Its allegations that no notice of the certification
election had been issued, hence, no copies of said
notice were given to it, nor posted in conspicuous
places within the company’s premises; that the payroll
of July 1987 was not used as the basis of the voters’
list; and that only fifteen (15) out of the ninety eight
(98) voters signed their names showing that they
actually voted, were belied by the minutes of the pre-
election conference (Annex "A" of Comment of private
respondent) which showed that petitioner was duly
notified of the conference and attended the same, and
that during said conference the Med-Arbiter set the
certification election on May 4, 1990.chanrobles.com :
virtual law library
The minutes of the certification election (Annex "C" of
private respondent’s Comment) also show that "the list
of the names of the voters were (sic) copied from the
payroll of 1987 per order of the Director, Bureau of
Labor Relations, Manila, . . ." (p. 188, Rollo).
Finally, the same minutes certified that: "The
certification election just concluded was conducted in
the most just, honest and freely (sic) manner without
untoward happening. Further, we certify that the result
above is true and correct" (p. 188, Rollo) thereby
refuting petitioner’s allegation that only fifteen (15)
out of ninety eight (98) workers signed the master list
to show that they actually voted again.
Besides, neither the records of the case nor the
minutes of the certification election show that
petitioner protested the conduct of the certification
election as provided in Section 3 of Rule VI
(ELECTIONS) of Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code which
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 3. Representation officer may rule on any
on-the-spot questions. — The Representation officer
may rule on any on-the-spot question arising from the
conduct of the election. The interested party may
however, file a protest with the representation officer
before the close of the proceedings.
"Protests not so raised are deemed waived. Such
protests shall be contained in the minutes of the
proceedings." (Emphasis ours.)chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
On the basis of the election minutes, which are the
only relevant and competent evidence on the conduct
of the election, the Med-Arbiter did not err in declaring
the NFL as the duly elected exclusive bargaining agent
of the petitioner’s rank and file workers. That finding
should be accorded not only respect but also finality by
this Court for it is supported by substantial evidence
(Chua v. NLRC, 182 SCRA 354).
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion in
the assailed decision of the NLRC, the petition
for certiorari is DISMISSED, with costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
#7 SECOND DIVISION . G.R. No. 104556. March 19, 1998
Page 13 of 26
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NFL), Petitioner, vs.
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HIJO
PLANTATION INC. (HPI), Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner NFL (National Federation of Labor) was chosen
the bargaining agent of rank-and-file employees of the Hijo
Plantation Inc. (HPI) in Mandaum, Tagum, Davao del Norte at
a certification election held on August 20, 1989. Protests filed
by the company and three other unions against the results of
the election were denied by the Department of Labor and
Employment in its resolution dated February 14, 1991 but, on
motion of the company (HPI), the DOLE reconsidered its
resolution and ordered another certification election to be
held. The DOLE subsequently denied petitioner NFLs motion
for reconsideration.
The present petition is for certiorari to set aside orders of
the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated August 29,
1991, December 26, 1991 and February 17, 1992, ordering the
holding of a new certification election to be conducted in place
of the one held on August 20, 1989 and, for this purpose,
reversing its earlier resolution dated February 14, 1991
dismissing the election protests of private respondent and the
unions.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On November 12, 1988, a certification election was
conducted among the rank-and-file employees of the Hijo
Plantation, Inc. resulting in the choice of no union. However, on
July 3, 1989, on allegations that the company intervened in the
election, the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations nullified
the results of the certification election and ordered a new one
to be held.
The new election was held on August 20, 1989 under the
supervision of the DOLE Regional Office in Davao City with the
following results:
Total Votes cast --------------------------- 1,012
Associated Trade Unions (ATU) ------- 39
TRUST KILUSAN ----------------------- 5
National Federation of Labor (NFL)---- 876
Southern Philippines Federation
of Labor ------------------------------------ 4
SANDIGAN ------------------------------- 6
UFW ---------------------------------------- 15
No Union ----------------------------------- 55
Invalid -------------------------------------- 13
The Trust Union Society and Trade Workers-KILUSAN
(TRUST-Kilusan), the United Lumber and General Workers of
the Philippines (ULGWP), the Hijo Labor Union and the Hijo
Plantation, Inc. sought the nullification of the results of the
certification election on the ground that it was conducted
despite the pendency of the appeals filed by Hijo Labor Union
and ULGWP from the order, dated August 17, 1989, of the
Med-Arbiter denying their motion for intervention. On the other
hand, HPI claimed that it was not informed or properly
represented at the pre-election conference. It alleged that, if it
was represented at all in the pre-election conference, its
representative acted beyond his authority and without its
knowledge. Private respondent also alleged that the
certification election was marred by massive fraud and
irregularities and that out of 1,692 eligible voters, 913,
representing 54% of the rank-and-file workers of private
respondent, were not able to vote, resulting in a failure of
election.
On January 10, 1990, Acting Labor Secretary Dionisio
dela Serna directed the Med-Arbiter, Phibun D. Pura, to
investigate the companys claim that 54% of the rank-and-file
workers were not able to vote in the certification election.
In his Report and Recommendation, dated February 9,
1990, Pura stated:
1. A majority of the rank-and-file workers had been
disfranchised in the election of August 20, 1989 because of
confusion caused by the announcement of the company that
the election had been postponed in view of the appeals of
ULGWP and Hijo Labor Union (HLU) from the order denying
their motions for intervention. In addition, the election was held
on a Sunday which was a non-working day in the company.
2. There were irregularities committed in the conduct of
the election. It was possible that some people could have
voted for those who did not show up. The election was
conducted in an open and hot area. The secrecy of the ballot
had been violated. Management representatives were not
around to identify the workers.
3. The total number of votes cast, as duly certified by the
representation officer, did not tally with the 41-page listings
submitted to the Med-Arbitration Unit. The list contained 1,008
names which were checked or encircled (indicating that they
had voted) and 784 which were not, (indicating that they did
not vote), or a total of 1,792, but according to the
representation officer the total votes cast in the election was
1,012.
Med-Arbiter Pura reported that he interviewed eleven
employees who claimed that they were not able to vote and
who were surprised to know that their names had been
checked to indicate that they had voted.
But NFL wrote a letter to Labor Secretary Ruben Torres
complaining that it had not been informed of the investigation
conducted by Med-Arbiter Pura and so was not heard on its
evidence. For this reason, the Med-Arbiter was directed by the
Labor Secretary to hear interested parties.
The Med-Arbiter therefore summoned the
unions. TRUST-Kilusan reiterated its petition for the annulment
of the results of the certification election. Hijo Labor Union
manifested that it was joining private respondent HPIs appeal,
adopting as its own the documentary evidence presented by
the company, showing fraud in the election of August 20,
1989. On the other hand, petitioner NFL reiterated its
contention that management had no legal personality to file an
appeal because it was not a party to the election but was only
a bystander which did not even extend assistance in the
election. Petitioner denied that private respondent HPI was not
represented in the pre-election conference, because the truth
was that a certain Bartolo was present on behalf of the
management and he in fact furnished the DOLE copies of the
list of employees, and posted in the company premises notices
of the certification election.
Petitioner NFL insisted that more than majority of the
workers voted in the election. It claimed that out of 1,692
qualified voters, 1,012 actually voted and only 680 failed to
cast their vote. It charged management with resorting to all
kinds of manipulation to frustrate the election and make the
Non Union win.
In a resolution dated February 14, 1991, the DOLE
upheld the August 20, 1989 certification election. With respect
to claim that election could not be held in view of the pendency
of the appeals of the ULGWP and Hijo Labor Union from the
order of the Med-Arbiter denying their motions for intervention,
the DOLE said:[1]
Page 14 of 26
. . . even before the conduct of the certification election on 12
November 1988 which was nullified, Hijo Labor Union filed a
motion for interventions. The same was however, denied for
being filed unseasonably, and as a result it was not included as
one of the choices in the said election. After it has been so
disqualified thru an order which has become final and
executory, ALU filed a second motion for intervention when a
second balloting was ordered conducted. Clearly, said second
motion is proforma and intended to delay the
proceedings. Being so, its appeal from the order of denial did
not stay the election and the Med-Arbiter was correct and did
not violate any rule when he proceeded with the election even
with the appeal. In fact, the Med-Arbiter need not rule on the
motion as it has already been disposed of with finality.
The same is true with the motion for intervention of ULGWP.
The latter withdrew as a party to the election on September
1988 and its motion to withdraw was granted by the Med-
Arbiter on October 27, 1988. After such withdrawal, it cannot
revive its lost personality as a party to the present case
through the mere expedience of a motion for intervention filed
before the conduct of a second balloting where the choices has
already been pre-determined.
Let it be stressed that ULGWP and HLU were disqualified to
participate in the election through valid orders that have
become final and executory even before the first certification
election was conducted. Consequently, they may not be
allowed to disrupt the proceeding through the filing of nuisance
motions. Much less are they possessed of the legal standing to
question the results of the second election considering that
they are not parties thereto.
The DOLE gave no weight to the report of the Med-
Arbiter that the certification election was marred by massive
fraud and irregularities. Although affidavits were submitted
showing that the election was held outside the company
premises and private vehicles were used as makeshift
precincts, the DOLE found that this was because respondent
company did not allow the use of its premises for the purpose
of holding the election, company guards were allegedly
instructed not to allow parties, voters and DOLE representation
officers to enter the company premises, and notice was posted
on the door of the company that the election had been
postponed.
Nor was weight given to the findings of the Med-Arbiter
that a majority of the rank-and-file workers had been
disfranchised in the August 20, 1989 election and that the
secrecy of the ballot had been violated, first, because the NFL
was not given notice of the investigation nor the chance to
present its evidence to dispute this finding and, second, the
Med Arbiters report was not supported by the minutes of the
proceedings nor by any record of the interviews of the 315
workers. Moreover, it was pointed out that the report did not
state the names of the persons investigated, the questions
asked and the answers given. The DOLE held that the report
was totally baseless.
The resolution of February 14, 1991 concluded with a
reiteration of the rule that the choice of the exclusive
bargaining representative is the sole concern of the workers. It
said: If indeed there were irregularities committed during the
election, the contending unions should have been the first to
complain considering that they are the ones which have
interest that should be protected.[2]
Accordingly, the Labor Secretary denied the petition to
annul the election filed by the ULGWP, TRUST-KILUSAN, HLU
and the HPI and instead certified petitioner NFL as the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file
employees of private respondent HPI.
However, on motion of HPI, the Secretary of Labor, on
August 29, 1991, reversed his resolution of February 14,
1991. Petitioner NFL filed a motion for reconsideration but its
motion was denied in an order, dated December 26,
1991. Petitioners second motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied in another order dated February 17,
1992. Hence, this petition.
 First. Petitioner contends that certification election is the
sole concern of the employees and the employer is a mere
bystander. The only instance wherein the employer may
actively participate is when it files a petition for certification
election under Art. 258 of the Labor Code because it is
requested to bargain collectively. Petitioner says that this is not
the case here and so the DOLE should not have given due
course to private respondents petition for annulment of the
results of the certification election.
In his resolution of August 29, 1991, the Secretary of
Labor said he was reversing his earlier resolution because
workers of Hijo Plantation, Inc. have deluged this Office with
their letter-appeal, either made singly or collectively expressing
their wish to have a new certification election conducted and
that as a result the firm position we held regarding the integrity
of the electoral exercise had been somewhat eroded by this
recent declaration of the workers, now speaking in their
sovereign capacity.
It is clear from this, that what the DOLE Secretary
considered in reversing its earlier rulings was not the petition of
the employer but the letter-appeals that the employees sent to
his office denouncing the irregularities committed during the
August 20, 1989 certification election. The petition of private
respondent was simply the occasion for the employees to
voice their protests against the election. Private respondent
HPI attached to its Supplemental Appeal filed on September 5,
1989 the affidavits and appeals of more or less 784 employees
who claimed that they had been disfranchised, as a result of
which they were not able to cast their votes at the August 20,
1989 election. It was the protests of employees which moved
the DOLE to reconsider its previous resolution of February 14,
1991, upholding the election.
Nor is it improper for private respondent to show interest
in the conduct of the election. Private respondent is the
employer. The manner in which the election was held could
make the difference between industrial strife and industrial
harmony in the company. What an employer is prohibited from
doing is to interfere with the conduct of the certification election
for the purpose of influencing its outcome. But certainly an
employer has an abiding interest in seeing to it that the election
is clean, peaceful, orderly and credible.
Second. The petitioner argues that any protest
concerning the election should be registered and entered into
the minutes of the election proceedings before it can be
considered. In addition, the protest should be formalized by
filing it within five (5) days. Petitioner avers that these
requirements are condition precedents in the filing of an
appeal. Without these requisites the appeal cannot prosper. It
cites the following provisions of Book V, Rule VI of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code:
SECTION 3. Representation officer may rule on any on-the-
spot questions. - The Representation officer may rule on any
on-the-spot question arising from the conduct of the
election. The interested party may however, file a protest with
the representation officer before the close of the proceedings.
Protests not so raised are deemed waived. Such protests shall
be contained in the minutes of the proceedings.
SEC. 4. Protest to be decided in twenty (20) working days. -
Where the protest is formalized before the med-arbiter within
five (5) days after the close of the election proceedings, the
med-arbiter shall decide the same within twenty (20) working
days from the date of its formalization. If not formalized within
the prescribed period, the protest shall be deemed
dropped. The decision may be appealed to the Bureau in the
same manner and on the same grounds as provided under
Rule V.
In this case, petitioner maintains that private respondent
did not make any protest regarding the alleged irregularities
(e.g., massive disfranchisement of employees) during the
election. Hence, the appeal and motions for reconsideration of
Page 15 of 26
private respondent HPI should have been dismissed
summarily.
The complaint in this case was that a number of
employees were not able to cast their votes because they were
not properly notified of the date. They could not therefore have
filed their protests within five (5) days. At all events, the
Solicitor General states, that the protests were not filed within
five (5) days, is a mere technicality which should not be
allowed to prevail over the workers welfare. [3] As this Court
stressed in LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Phil. Musicians Guild,[4] it is
essential that the employees must be accorded an opportunity
to freely and intelligently determine which labor organization
shall act in their behalf. The workers in this case were denied
this opportunity. Not only were a substantial number of them
disfranchised, there were, in addition, allegations of fraud and
other irregularities which put in question the integrity of the
election. Workers wrote letters and made complaints protesting
the conduct of the election. The Report of Med-Arbiter Pura
who investigated these allegations found the allegations of
fraud and irregularities to be true.
In one case this Court invalidated a certification election
upon a showing of disfranchisement, lack of secrecy in the
voting and bribery.[5] We hold the same in this case. The
workers right to self-organization as enshrined in both the
Constitution and Labor Code would be rendered nugatory if
their right to choose their collective bargaining representative
were denied. Indeed, the policy of the Labor Code favors the
holding of a certification election as the most conclusive way of
choosing the labor organization to represent workers in a
collective bargaining unit.[6] In case of doubt, the doubt should
be resolved in favor of the holding of a certification election.
Third. Petitioner claims that the contending unions,
namely, the Association of Trade Union (ATU), the Union of
Filipino Workers (UFW), as well as the representation officers
of the DOLE affirmed the regularity of the conduct of the
election and they are now estopped from questioning the
election.
In its comment, ATU-TUCP states,
. . . The representative of the Association of Trade Unions
really attest to the fact that we cannot really identify all the
voters who voted on that election except some workers who
were our supporters in the absence of Hijo Plantation
representatives. We also attest that the polling precinct were
not conducive to secrecy of the voters since it was conducted
outside of the Company premises. The precincts were (sic) the
election was held were located in a passenger waiting shed
infront of the canteen across the road; on the yellow pick-up; at
the back of a car; a waiting shed near the Guard House and a
waiting shed infront of the Guard House across the
road.Herein private respondents also observed during the
election that there were voters who dictated some voters the
phrase number 3 to those who were casting their votes and
those who were about to vote. Number 3 refers to the National
Federation of Labor in the official ballot.
ATU-TUCP explains that it did not file any protest because it
expected workers who had been aggrieved by the conduct of
the election would file their protest since it was in their interests
that they do so.
Fourth. Petitioner points out that the letter-appeals were
written almost two years after the election and they bear the
same dates (May 7 and June 14, 1991); they are not verified;
they do not contain details or evidence of intelligent acts; and
they do not explain why the writers failed to vote. Petitioner
contends that the letter-appeals were obtained through duress
by the company.
We find the allegations to be without merit. The record
shows that as early as August 22 and 30, 1989, employees
already wrote letters/affidavits/manifestoes alleging
irregularities in the elections and disfranchisement of workers.
[7]
As the Solicitor General says in his Comment, [8] these
affidavits and manifestoes, which were attached as Annexes A
to CC and Annexes DD to DD-33 to private respondents
Supplemental Petition of September 5, 1989 just 16 days after
the August 20, 1989 election. It is not true therefore that the
employees slept on their rights.
As to the claim that letters dated May 7, 1991 and June
14, 1991 bear these same dates because they were prepared
by private respondent HPI and employees were merely asked
to sign them, suffice it to say that this is plain speculation which
petitioner has not proven by competent evidence.
As to the letters not being verified, suffice it to say that
technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases.
The allegation that the letters did not contain evidence of
intelligent acts does not have merit. The earlier letters[9] of the
workers already gave details of what they had witnessed
during the election, namely the open balloting (with no
secrecy), and the use of NFL vehicles for polling
precincts. These letters sufficiently give an idea of the
irregularities of the certification election. Similarly, the letters
containing the signatures of those who were not able to vote
are sufficient. They indicate that the writers were not able to
vote because they thought the election had been postponed,
especially given the fact that the two unions had pending
appeals at the time from orders denying them the right to
intervene in the election.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED
and the questioned orders of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 16 of 26
#8 THIRD DIVISION . G.R. No. 91915. September 11,
1992.
DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY OF
TACLOBAN, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT and DIVINE WORD
UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES UNION-
ALU, Respondents.
Generosa R. Jacinto for Petitioner.
Joji L. Barrios for Private Respondent.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari for being violative
of the "constitutional right of employees to self-
organization which includes the right to form, join or
assist labor organizations of their own choosing for
purposes of collective bargaining," 1 are the Orders of
May 23, 1989 and January 17, 1990 issued by then
Secretary of Labor and Employment Franklin H. Drilon
and Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment
Dionisio D. de la Serna, respectively.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
Culled from the records are the following facts which
led to the filing of the instant petition:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
On September 6, 1984, Med-Arbiter Bienvenido C.
Elorcha certified the Divine Word University Employees
Union (DWUEU) as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the Divine Word University (University for
brevity). On March 7, 1985, DWUEU submitted its
collective bargaining proposals. On March 26, 1985,
the University replied and requested a preliminary
conference to be held on May 28, 1985. However, two
days before the scheduled conference or on May 26,
1985, DWUEU’s resigned vice-president Mr. Brigido
Urminita (or Urmeneta) wrote a letter addressed to the
University unilaterally withdrawing the CBA proposals.
Consequently, the preliminary conference was
cancelled. 2
After almost three years, or on March 11, 1988,
DWUEU, which had by then affiliated with the
Associated Labor Union, 3 requested a conference with
the University for the purpose of continuing the
collective bargaining negotiations. 4 Not having heard
from the University, DWUEU-ALU sent a follow-up
letter on March 23, 1988 reiterating its request for a
conference and warning the University against
committing acts of interference through its various
meetings with both the academic and non-academic
employees regarding their union affiliation and
activities. Despite the letter, the University persisted in
maintaining silence.
On April 25, 1988, DWUEU-ALU filed with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board of the Department of
Labor and Employment a notice of strike on the
grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor
practice acts, specifically, refusal to bargain,
discrimination and coercion on (sic) employees. 5 The
conferences which were held after the filing of the
notice of strike led to the conclusion of an agreement
between the University and DWUEU-ALU on May 10,
1888 with the following terms:chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
"1. Union will submit their (sic) CBA proposals on
Friday, May 13, 1988 for whatever action management
will take.
2. Union and management agrees (sic) to sit down and
determine (sic) the number of employees that will
represent their bargaining unit.
3. Conciliation proceedings is (sic) temporarily
suspended until the parties inform this office of further
development.
4. The issues of discrimination: re Ms. Colinayo and
Ms. Cinco Flores is settled.
5. Issue (sic) on coercion and refusal to bargain shall
be subject of continuing dialogue.
6. Atty. Jacinto shall be given 10 days notice in the
next conciliation meeting." 6
However, it turned out that an hour before the May 10,
1988 agreement was concluded, the University had
filed a petition for certification election with the Region
VIII office of the Department of Labor and
Employment. 7
On the other hand, on May 19, 1988, DWUEU-ALU,
consonant with the agreement, submitted its collective
bargaining proposals. These were ignored by the
University. Thereafter, through the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of Region
VIII, marathon conciliation conferences were
conducted but to no avail. Hence, on August 25, 1988,
then Secretary of Labor Franklin M. Drilon, exercising
his powers under Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code, issued
an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute
and directing all striking workers to report back to
work within twenty-four (24) hours and the
management to accept them back under the same
terms and conditions prevailing prior to the work
stoppage. The Secretary also designated the NCMB to
hear the case and to submit its report thereon. 8
On the same day, Med-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado,
acting on the University’s petition for certification
election, issued an Order directing the conduct of a
certification election to be participated in by DWUEU-
ALU and "no union," after he found the petition to be
"well-supported in fact and in law." 9
Said Order prompted the DWUEU-ALU to file with the
Secretary of Labor an urgent motion seeking to enjoin
Milado from further acting on the matter of the
certification election. On September 20, 1988, the
Labor Secretary granted said motion and directed
Milado to hold in abeyance any and all certification
election proceedings at the University pending the
resolution of the labor dispute. 10 The Labor
Secretary’s Order, predicated on his extraordinary
powers under Art. 263 (g) of the Labor Code,
conformed with this Court s Resolution of October 29,
1987 in the Bulletin Today cases (G.R. Nos. 79276 and
79883) where the issue of strong disagreement among
the parties on the question of representation was
deemed subsumed in the labor dispute certified for
compulsory arbitration. The Secretary
added:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Underscoring the necessity to conform with this
settled doctrine is the fact that the dispute over which
this Office assumed jurisdiction arose from the alleged
continued refusal by the University to negotiate a CBA
with the Union despite the latter’s certification as
exclusive bargaining agent in 1984. Necessarily related
Page 17 of 26
thereto is the representativity issue raised by the
University in its certification election petition. The
resolution of these issues in one proceeding is, in the
words of the Supreme Court, ‘meet and proper in view
of the very special circumstances obtaining in this
case, and will prevent split jurisdiction and that
multiplicity of proceedings which the law abhors’ (24
December 1987 [should be December 17, 1987]
resolution of the Supreme Court in the Bulletin Today
cases, supra).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Moreover, to allow a certification election to proceed at
this point in time might further rupture the already
strained labor-management relations pervading at the
University. The assumption order issued by this Office
merely served as a temporary bond to hold together
such a fragile relationship. More importantly, the
projected election hastily decreed would preempt the
proper resolution of the issues raised and pursued so
zealously by the employees that prompted them to
stage their strike." 11
The NCMB of Region VIII conducted hearings on the
case from October 17-18, 1988. On October 26, 1988,
the Divine Word University Independent Faculty and
Employees Union (DWUIFEU), which was registered
earlier that day, filed a motion for intervention alleging
that it had "at least 20% of the rank and file
employees" of the University. 12
Exercising once again his extraordinary powers under
Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code, the Secretary
consolidated "the entire labor dispute including all
incidents arising therefrom, or necessarily related
thereto" in his Order of May 23, 1989 13 and the
following cases were "subsumed or consolidated to the
labor dispute" : the petition for certification election
docketed as MED-ARB-Case No. 5-04-88, the DWUEU’s
complaint docketed as NLRC Case No. 8-0321-88, and
the University’s complaint docketed as NLRC Case No.
8-0323-88. Thus, in said Order of May 23, 1989, the
Secretary of Labor resolved these issues:" (1) whether
there was refusal to bargain and an impasse in
bargaining; (2) whether the complaints for unfair labor
practices against each other filed by both parties,
including the legality of the strike with the NLRC, which
later on was subsumed by the assumption Order, are
with merits; and, (3) whether or not the certification
election can be passed upon by this Office."cralaw
virtua1aw library
On the first issue, the Secretary of Labor
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is a matter of record that when the Union filed its
Notice of Strike (Exh. A) two of the issues it raised
were bargaining deadlock and refusal to bargain. It is
also worth mentioning that the CBA proposals by the
Union were submitted on March 7, 1985 (Exh. 9) after
Med-Arbiter Bienvenido Elorcha issued a certification
election Order dated September 6, 1984 (Exh. 4). An
examination of the CBA proposals submitted by the
Union of the University showed there was (sic) some
negotiations that has (sic) taken place as indicated on
the handwritten notations made in the CBA proposal
(Exh. F). The said proposals include among others,
union scope, union recognition, union security, union
rights, job security, practices and privileges, terms and
conditions of work, leave of absence, hours of work,
compensation salary and wages, workers’ rights and
safety, workers’ education, retirement longevity pay,
strike and lockouts and grievance machinery.
The said CBA proposals were indorsed by DWU
President to Atty. Generosa R. Jacinto, Divine Word
University legal counsel together with a copy of the
Union CBA proposals. The submission of the CBA
proposals and the reply letter of the DWU counsel,
dated March 26, 1985 to the Union indicated that the
CBA negotiations process was set into motion. DWU’s
counsel even suggested that the preliminary
conference between the union and the university be
scheduled on 28 May 1985 at 2:30 P.M. which
unfortunately did not take place due to the alleged
withdrawal of the CBA proposals.
Undeniably, the Union and the DWU have not been
able to conclude a CBA since its certification on 6
September 1984 by then Med-Arbiter Bienvenido
Elorcha. But the non-conclusion of a CBA within one
year, as in this case, does not automatically authorize
the holding of a certification election when it appears
that a bargaining deadlock issue has been submitted to
conciliation by the certified bargaining agent. The
records show that the Notice of Strike was filed by the
Union on 25 April 1988, citing bargaining deadlock as
one of the grounds (Annex ‘1’), while the Petition for
Certification Election was filed by the DWU on 10 May
1988. The filing of the notice of strike was precipitated
by the University’s act of not replying to the Union’s
letters of March 11 and March 23, 1988.
This being the case, Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the
Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies and we
quote:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
‘Sec. 3. When to file. In the absence of a collective
bargaining agreement submitted in accordance with
Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification
election may be filed at any time. However, no
certification election may be held within one year from
the date of issuance of declaration of a final
certification election result. Neither may a
representation question be entertained it (sic) before
the filing of a petition for certification election, a
bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent or certified
bargaining agent is a party has been submitted to
conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of
a valid notice of strike or lockout.’
Clearly, a bargaining deadlock exists and as a matter
of fact this is being conciliated by the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board at the time the
University filed its Petition for Certification Election on
10 May 1988. In fact the deadlock remained
unresolved and was in fact mutually agreed upon to be
conciliated further by the NCMB as per items 1 and 5
of the ‘Agreement’ (Exhibit ‘L’).
The aforequoted rule clearly barred the Med-Arbiter
from further entertaining the petition for certification
election. Furthermore, the various communications
sent to the University by the Union prior to the filing of
the notice of strike was enough opportunity for the
former to raise the issue of representation if it really
casts doubt to the majority status of the Union. More
importantly, if DWU indeed doubted the status of the
union, how come it entered into an agreement with the
latter on May 10, 1988. Apparently, the move to file
the petition on the same day was an afterthought on
the part of the University which this Office considers as
fatal." 14
The same Order dismissed not only the case filed by
DWUEU-ALU for unfair labor practice on the ground of
the union’s failure to prove the commission of the
unfair labor practice acts specifically complained of
(NLRC Case No. 8-0321-88) but also the complaint
filed by the University for unfair labor practices and
illegal strike for "obvious lack of merit brought about
Page 18 of 26
by its utter failure to submit evidence" (NLRC Case No.
8-0323-88).
Citing the Bulletin Today cases, the said Order
pronounced as untenable the University s claim that
the assumption Order earlier issued by the Office of
the Secretary of Labor merely held in abeyance the
holding of a certification election and that the
representation issue was not deemed consolidated by
virtue of the said assumption Order. Accordingly, the
Order has this dispositive
portion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES
CONSIDERED, the Divine Word University of Tacloban
and the Divine Word University Employees Union are
hereby directed to enter into a collective bargaining
agreement by adopting the Union’s CBA proposals sent
to the DWU President on 19 May 1988 (Exhibit ‘6’).
DWU is hereby warned that any unwarranted delay in
the execution of the collective bargaining agreement
will be construed as an unfair labor practice act.
Moreover, the petition for certification election filed by
the University is hereby dismissed for lack of merit and
the Order of Med-Arbiter Rodolfo Milado set aside.
Likewise, NLRC CASES Nos. 8-0321-88 and 8-0323
filed by the Union and the DWU, respectively, are
hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED." 15
The University filed a motion for the reconsideration of
said Order. It was opposed by the DWUEU-ALU.
However, since on May 5, 1989 the DWUEU-ALU had
filed a second notice of strike charging the University
with violation of the return-to-work order of the
Secretary of Labor and unfair labor practices such as
dismissal of union officers, coercion of employees and
illegal suspension, 16 the Office of the Secretary called
for a series of conciliation and mediation conferences
between the parties. At the July 5, 1989 conference,
the University agreed to submit its proposals on how to
settle amicably the labor dispute on or before July 17,
1989.
On said date, however, the University failed to appear.
Instead, its representative phoned in a request for the
resetting of the conference purportedly because its
Board of Directors had failed to muster a quorum.
Hence, after so informing ALU’s Eastern Visayas Vice-
President, the conference was rescheduled for July 19,
1989. The University once again failed to
appear.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
In view of the University’s intransigence, the DWUEU-
ALU pursued its second notice of strike on November
24, 1989. Four days later, the University filed with the
Office of the Secretary of Labor a motion praying that
said Office assume jurisdiction over the dispute or
certify the same to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration on the ground that the strike affected not
only the University but also its other academic and
non-academic employees, the students and their
parents. On December 4, 1989, the Office of the
Secretary of Labor received a Resolution passed by the
students of the University urging said Office’s
assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute and
the earliest resolution of the case.
Consequently, on December 29, 1989, Secretary Drilon
issued an Order reiterating the August 28, 1988 Order
which assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. He
ordered all striking workers to return to work within 24
hours and the University to accept them back under
the same terms and conditions of employment;
deemed the issues raised in the May 5, 1989 notice of
strike as "subsumed in this case" ; ordered the
Director of Regional Office No. VIII to hear the issues
raised in said notice of strike and to submit his findings
and recommendations within ten days from submission
of the case by the parties, and enjoined the parties to
cease and desist from any act that may "aggravate the
employer-employee relationship."cralaw virtua1aw
library
On January 17, 1990, Acting Secretary of Labor
Dionisio L. de la Serna, "dismissed" for lack of merit
the University’s motion for reconsideration and
affirmed the Order of May 23, 1989. He noted the fact
that the March 7, 1985 collective bargaining proposals
of the DWUEU had not been validly withdrawn as the
union’s Vice-President had resigned and the withdrawal
was signed only by three of the eight members of the
Executive Board of said union. Granting that the
withdrawal was valid, the Acting Secretary believed
that it did not "exculpate the University from the duty
to bargain with the Union" because the collective
bargaining processes had been "set in motion from the
time the CBA proposals was (sic) received by the
University until the impasse took place on account of
its failure to reply to the Union’s letters pursuing its
CBA Proposals dated March 11 and 23, 1988."cralaw
virtua1aw library
On the University’s assertion that no negotiations took
place insofar as the March 7, 1985 collective
bargaining proposals are concerned, the Acting
Secretary found that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The records indicate otherwise Conciliation
meetings were conducted precisely to discuss the CBA
proposals the Union submitted to the University on
March 7, 1985. As a matter of fact, the University
admitted the existence of the deadlock when a
provision was incorporated in the agreement it signed
on May 10, 1988 with the Union which
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘a. That on the matter of Bargaining Deadlock —
1. Union will submit their (renewed) CBA proposals on
Friday May 13, 1988 for whatever action management
will take.
2. Union and Management agree to sit down and
determine the number of employees that will represent
(constitute) their bargaining unit;
x x x’
On account of the deadlock regarding the March 7,
1985 CBA proposals, it was agreed that the Union
submit a renewed CBA proposal which it did on May
19, 1988. The records indicate that no response was
made by the University. The uncooperative posture of
the University to respond and continue with the
negotiations could very well be explained when one (1)
hour prior to the start of the conciliation on May 10,
1988, the University filed a Petition for Certification
with (sic) Regional Office. The surreptitious filing of the
petition and at the same time cunningly entering into
an agreement which required the Union to submit a
renewed CBA proposal, is patently negotiating in bad
faith. The University should have candidly and timely
raised the issue of representation, if it believed that
such issue was valid, not by entering into an
agreement. The May 10, 1988 Agreement only served
to falsely heighten the expectations of the Union and
this Office that a mutually acceptable settlement of the
Page 19 of 26
dispute was in the offing. This Office cannot tolerate
such actuations by the University." 17
The Acting Secretary then concluded that for reneging
on the agreement of May 10, 1988 and for its
"reluctance and subscription to legal delay," the
University should be "declared in default." He also
maintained that since under the circumstances the
University cannot claim deprivation of due process, the
Office of the Secretary of Labor may rightfully impose
the Union’s May 19, 1988 collective bargaining
agreement proposals motu proprio. On the University’s
contention that the motion for intervention of the
DWU-IFEU was not resolved, the Acting Secretary
ruled that said motion was in effect denied when the
petition for certification election filed by the University
was dismissed in the Order of May 23,
1989.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Hence, the University had recourse to instant petition.
In its petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction filed on February 9, 1990, the
University raises as grounds therefor the
following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A. Respondent Secretary committed grave and patent
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
issuing his order dated 17 January 1990 finally denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the face of
the order dated 29 December 1989 and subsequent
acts of DOLE official subsuming the second notice of
strike with the first notice of strike.
B. In the absence of a certified CBA and there having
been no certification election held in petitioner unit for
more than five (5) years, a certification election is
mandatory.
C. Respondent Secretary committed grave and patent
abuse of discretion in issuing his orders dated 23 May
1989 and 17 January 1990 disregarding evidence on
record, provisions of law and established
jurisprudence.
D. Petitioner was denied due process." 18
Citing the dispositive portion of the December 29,
1989 Order of the Secretary of Labor which states that
the issues raised in the May 5, 1989 notice of strike
"are ordered subsumed in this case" and elaborating
on the meaning of the word "subsume," i.e., "to
include within a larger class, group, order, etc.," 19
the petitioner University argues that the Secretary of
Labor "cannot resolve petitioner’s and (intervenor)
DWU-IFEU’s motions for reconsideration (in the NS. 1)
of the Order dated 23 May 1989 until the proceedings
in the subsumed NS. 2 are terminated." It opines that
since the Regional Director is an extension of the
Secretary of Labor, the latter should have waited for
the recommendation of the former on the issues in
notices of strike nos. 1 and 2 before the he issued the
Order of January 17, 1990.
We agree with the Acting Secretary of Labor’s
observation that the action for intervention had in
effect been denied by the dismissal of the petition for
certification election in the May 23, 1989 Order. The
sub silencio treatment of the motion for intervention in
said Order does not mean that the motion was
overlooked. It only means, as shown by the findings of
facts in the same Order, that there was no necessity
for the holding of a certification election wherein the
DWU-IFEU could participate. In this regard, petitioner’s
undue interest in the resolution of the DWU-IFEU’s
motion for intervention becomes significant since a
certification election is the sole concern of employees
except where the employer itself has to file a petition
for certification election. But once an employer has
filed said petition, as the petitioner did in this case, its
active role ceases and it becomes a mere bystander.
Any uncalled-for concern on the part of the employer
may give rise to the suspicion that it is batting for a
company union. 20
Petitioner’s contention that the Acting Secretary of
Labor should have deferred the issuance of the Order
of January 17, 1990 until after his receipt of the
Regional Director’s recommendation on the notices of
strike is, under the circumstances, untenable. Ideally,
a single decision or order should settle all
controversies resulting from a labor dispute. This is in
consonance with the principle of avoiding multiplicity of
suits. However, the exigencies of a case may also
demand that some matters be threshed out and
resolved ahead of the others. Any contrary
interpretation of the Secretary of Labor’s powers under
Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code on this matter would
only result in confusion and delay in the resolution of
the manageable aspects of the labor
dispute.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
In this case, resolution of the motion for
reconsideration at the earliest possible time was
urgently needed to set at rest the issues regarding the
first notice of strike, the certification election and the
unfair labor practice cases filed by the University and
the DWUEU-ALU. The nature of the business of the
University demanded immediate and effective action
on the part of the respondent public officials.
Otherwise, not only the contending parties in the
dispute would be adversely affected but more
importantly, the studentry and their parents. It should
be emphasized that on January 17, 1990, the second
notice of strike could not have been resolved as yet
considering that at that time, Regional Director Teddy
S. Cabeltes was still conducting the conference
between the parties in pursuance of the directive in the
Order of December 19, 1989. The Secretary, or for
that matter, the Acting Secretary, could not have
intended the efforts of the Regional Director to be
inutile or fruitless. Thus, when he set aside the issues
raised in the second notice of strike, the Acting
Secretary was acting in accordance with the exigencies
of the circumstances of the case. Hardly can it be said
to be an abuse of his discretion.
On the issue of whether or not a certification election
should have been ordered by the Secretary of Labor,
pertinent are the following respective provisions of the
Labor Code and Rule V, Book V of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the same
Code:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 258. When an employer may file petition. —
When requested to bargain collectively, an employer
may petition the Bureau for an election. If there is no
existing certified collective bargaining agreement in the
unit, the Bureau shall, after hearing, order a
certification election.
All certification cases shall be decided within twenty
(20) working days.
The Bureau shall conduct a certification election within
twenty (20) days in accordance with the rules and
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Labor.
Sec. 3. When to file. — In the absence of a collective
bargaining agreement duly registered in accordance
Page 20 of 26
with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification
election may be filed at any time. However, no
certification election may be held within one year from
the date of issuance of a final certification election
result. Neither may a representation question be
entertained if, before the filing of a petition for
certification election, a bargaining deadlock to which
an incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party
had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had
become the subject of valid notice of strike or lockout.
(Emphasis supplied)
If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly
registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code,
a petition for certification election or a motion for
intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60)
days prior to the expiry date of such
agreement."cralaw virtua1aw library
These provisions make it plain that in the absence of a
collective bargaining agreement, an employer who is
requested to bargain collectively may file a petition for
certification election any time except upon a clear
showing that one of these two instances exists: (a) the
petition is filed within one year from the date of
issuance of a final certification election result or (b)
when a bargaining deadlock had been submitted to
conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of
a valid notice of strike or lockout.
While there is no question that the petition for
certification election was filed by the herein petitioner
after almost four years from the time of the
certification election and, therefore, there is no
question as to the timeliness of the petition, the
problem appears to lie in the fact that the Secretary of
Labor had found that a bargaining deadlock
exists.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
A "deadlock" is defined as the "counteraction of things
producing entire stoppage: a state of inaction or of
neutralization caused by the opposition of persons or
of factions (as in government or a voting body):
standstill." 21 There is a deadlock when there is a
"complete blocking or stoppage resulting from the
action of equal and opposed forces; as, the deadlock of
a jury or legislature." 22 The word is synonymous with
the word impasse 23 which, within the meaning of the
American federal labor laws, "presupposes reasonable
effort at good faith bargaining which, despite noble
intentions, does not conclude in agreement between
the parties." 24
A thorough study of the records reveals that there was
no "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining"
specially on the part of the University. Its indifferent
attitude towards collective bargaining inevitably
resulted in the failure of the parties to arrive at an
agreement. As it was evident that unilateral moves
were being undertaken only by the DWUEU-ALU, there
was no "counteraction" of forces or an impasse to
speak of. While collective bargaining should be
initiated by the union, there is a corresponding
responsibility on the part of the employer to respond in
some manner to such acts. This is clear from the
provisions of the Labor Code Art. 250(a) of which
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. — The
following procedures shall be observed in collective
bargaining:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it
shall serve a written notice upon the other party with a
statement of its proposals. The other party shall make
a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days
from receipt of such notice.
(b) Should differences arise on the basis of such notice
and reply, either party may request for a conference
which shall begin not later than ten (10) calendar days
from the date of request.
(c) If the dispute is not settled, the Board shall
intervene upon request of either or both parties or at
its own initiative and immediately call the parties to
conciliation meetings. The Board shall have the power
to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of the
parties to such meetings. It shall be the duty of the
parties to participate fully and promptly in the
conciliation meetings the Board may call;
(d) During the conciliation proceedings in the Board,
the parties are prohibited from doing any act which
may disrupt or impede the early settlement of the
disputes; andchanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
(e) The Board shall exert all efforts to settle disputes
amicably and encourage the parties to submit their
case to a voluntary arbitrator."cralaw virtua1aw library
Considering the procedure outlined above, the Court
cannot help but notice that the DWUEU was not
entirely blameless in the matter of the delay in the
bargaining process. While it is true that as early as
March 7, 1985, said union had submitted its collective
bargaining proposals and that, its subsequent
withdrawal by the DWUEU Vice-President being
unauthorized and therefore ineffective, the same
proposals could be considered as subsisting, the fact
remains that said union remained passive for three
years. The records do not show that during this three-
year period, it exerted any effort to pursue collective
bargaining as a means of attaining better terms of
employment.
It was only after its affiliation with the ALU that the
same union, through the ALU Director for Operations,
requested an "initial conference" for the purpose of
collective bargaining. 25 That the DWUEU abandoned
its collective bargaining proposals prior to its affiliation
with ALU is further confirmed by the fact that in the
aforequoted May 10, 1988 agreement with the
University, said Union bound itself to submit a new set
of proposals on May 13, 1988. Under the
circumstances, the agreement of May 10, 1988 may as
well be considered the written notice to bargain
referred to in the aforequoted Art. 250(a) of the Labor
Code, which thereby set into motion the machinery for
collective bargaining, as in fact, on May 19, 1988,
DWUEU-ALU submitted its collective bargaining
proposals.
Be that as it may, the Court is not inclined to rule that
there has been a deadlock or an impasse in the
collective bargaining process. As the Court earlier
observed, there has not been a "reasonable effort at
good faith bargaining" on the part of the University.
While DWUEU-ALU was opening all possible avenues
for the conclusion of an agreement, the record is
replete with evidence on the University’s reluctance
and thinly disguised refusal to bargain with the duly
certified bargaining agent, such that the inescapable
conclusion is that the University evidently had no
intention of bargaining with it. Thus, while the Court
recognizes that technically, the University has the right
to file the petition for certification election as there was
no bargaining deadlock to speak of, to grant its prayer
that the herein assailed Orders be annulled would put
an unjustified premium on bad faith bargaining.
Page 21 of 26
Bad faith on the part of the University is further
exemplified by the fact that an hour before the start of
the May 10, 1988 conference, it surreptitiously filed
the petition for certification election. And yet during
said conference, it committed itself to "sit down" with
the Union. Obviously, the University tried to preempt
the conference which would have legally foreclosed its
right to file the petition for certification election. In so
doing, the University failed to act in accordance with
Art. 252 of the Labor Code which defines the meaning
of the duty to bargain collectively as "the performance
of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly
and expeditiously in good faith." Moreover, by filing
the petition for certification election while agreeing to
confer with the DWUEU-ALU, the University violated
the mandate of Art. 19 of the Civil Code that" (e)very
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith."cralaw virtua1aw library
Moreover, the University’s unscrupulous attitude
towards the DWUEU-ALU is also betrayed by its
belated questioning of the status of the said union. The
communications between them afforded the University
ample opportunity to raise the issue of representation
if indeed it was doubtful of the DWUEU-ALU’s status as
a majority union, but it failed to do so. On the other
hand, in the agreement of May 10, 1988, the
University even agreed "to sit down and determine the
number of employees that will represent their
bargaining unit." This clearly indicates that the
University recognized the DWUEU-ALU as the
bargaining representative of the employees and is,
therefore, estopped from questioning the majority
status of the said union.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual
law library
Hence, petitioner’s contention that the DWUEU-ALU’s
proposals may not be unilaterally imposed on it on the ground
that a collective bargaining agreement is a contract wherein
the consent of both parties is indispensable is devoid of merit.
A similar argument had already been disregarded in the case
of Kiok Loy v. NLRC, 26 where we upheld the order of the
NLRC declaring the union’s draft CBA proposal as the
collective agreement which should govern the relationship
between the parties. Kiok Loy v. NLRC is applicable in the
instant case considering that the facts therein have also been
indubitably established in this case. These factors are: (a) the
union is the duly certified bargaining agent; (b) it made a
definite request to bargain and submitted its collective
bargaining proposals, and (c) the University made no counter
proposal whatsoever. As we said in Kiok Loy," [a] company’s
refusal to make counter proposal if considered in relation to
the entire bargaining process, may indicate bad faith and this
is especially true where the Union’s request for a counter
proposal is left unanswered." 27 Moreover, the Court added in
the same case that "it is not obligatory upon either side of a
labor controversy to precipitately accept or agree to the
proposals of the other. But an erring party should not be
tolerated and allowed with impunity to resort to schemes
feigning negotiations by going through empty gestures." 28
That being the case, the petitioner may not validly assert that
its consent should be a primordial consideration in the
bargaining process. By its acts, no less than its inaction which
bespeak its insincerity, it has forfeited whatever rights it
could have asserted as an employer. We, therefore, find it
superfluous to discuss the two other contentions in its
petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. This decision is immediately executory. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
#9 FIRST DIVISION . G.R. Nos. 94929-30 March 18, 1992
PORT WORKERS UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES
(PWUP), petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, ATTY.
ANASTACIO L. BACTIN, MED-ARBITER NCR-DOLE, Public
Respondents; INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL
SERVICES, INC., (ICTSI) and ASSOCIATED PORT
CHECKERS AND WORKERS UNION (APCWU), Private
Respondents; SANDIGAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA
DAUNGAN (SAMADA) and PORT EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION AND LABOR UNION (PEALU), Nominal
Private Respondents, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
There was muffled excitement among the workers of the
International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI)
because its collective bargaining agreement with private
respondents Associate Port Checkers and Workers Union
(APCWU), the incumbent union, was due to expire on April 14,
1990. Other unions were seeking to represent the laborers in
the negotiation of the next CBA and were already plotting their
moves.
The first challenge to APCWU was hurled on March 14, 1990,
when the Sandigan ng Manggagawa sa Daungan (SAMADA)
filed a petition for certification election. The consent signatures
of at least 25% of the employees in the bargaining unit were
submitted on March 26, 1990, or eleven days after the petition.
On April 2, 1990, herein petitioner Port Workers Union of the
Philippines (PWUP) filed a petition for intervention.
Still another petition for certification election was filed by the
Port Employees Association and Labor Union (PEALU), on
April 6, 1990. The consent signatures were submitted on May
11, 1990, or thirty-five days after the filing of the petition.
The petitions of SAMADA and PEALU were consolidated for
joint decision. On April 26, 1990, APCWU filed a motion to
dismiss them on the ground that they did not comply with the
requirement set forth in Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the
Implementing Rules, quoted in part as follows:
In a petition involving an organized establishment or
enterprise where the majority status of the incumbent
collective bargaining union is questioned through a
verified petition by a legitimate labor organization, the
Med-Arbiter shall immediately order the certification
election by secret ballot if the petition is filed during
the last sixty (60) days of the collective bargaining
agreement and supported by the written consent of at
least twenty-five percent (25%) of all the employees in
the bargaining unit. Any petition filed before or after
the sixty-day freedom period shall be dismissed
outright. The twenty-five percent (25%) requirement
shall be satisfied upon the filing of the petition,
otherwise the petition shall be dismissed. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Specifically, APCWU faulted both petitions for non-compliance
with the requirement for the 25% consent signatures at the
time of filing. This contention was upheld by the Med-Arbiter in
an order dated June 5, 1990, dismissing the consolidated
petitions. 1
PWUP appealed to the Secretary of Labor on June 28, 1990,
arguing that Article 256 of the Labor Code did not require the
written consent to be submitted simultaneously with the petition
for certification election. The principal petitioners did not
appeal. On August 21, 1990, DOLE Undersecretary
Bienvenido Laguesma affirmed the order of the Med-Arbiter
and dismissed PWUP's appeal. 2
Page 22 of 26
Thereafter, ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for a new
collective bargaining agreement, which was concluded on
September 28, 1990. This was ratified on October 7, 1990, by
a majority of the workers in the bargaining unit, i.e., 910 out of
the 1,223 members, and subsequently registered with the
DOLE.
PWUP is now before us, claiming grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the public respondent in the application of Article
256 of the Labor Code. The article provides in part as follows:
Art. 256. Representation issue in organized
establishments. — In organized establishments, when
a verified petition questioning the majority status of
the incumbent bargaining agent is filed before the
Department of Labor and Employment within the
sixty-day period before the expiration of the collective
bargaining agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall
automatically order an election by secret ballot when
the verified petition is supported by the written
consent of at least twenty-five (25%) percent of all the
employees in the bargaining unit to ascertain the will
of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. . .
.
The petitioner argues that under this article, the Med-Arbiter
should automatically order election by secret ballot when the
petition is supported by at least 25% of all employees in the
bargaining unit. SAMADA and PEALU substantially complied
with the law when they submitted the required consent
signatures several days after filing the petition. The petitioner
complains that the dismissal of the petitions for certification
election, including its own petition for intervention, had the
effect of indirectly certifying APCWU as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of the ICTSI employees.
Private respondent ICTSI maintains that the dismissal was
based on Article 256 of the Labor Code as implemented by
Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, quoted
above. Moreover, under Section 10, Rule V, Book V of the
Implementing Rules, decisions of the Secretary in certification
election cases shall be final and unappealable.
ICTSI also cites the following ruling of this Court in Tupas v.
Inciong: 3
We find no merit in the petition. As observed by the
Solicitor General, while the petition of TUPAS for a
certification election may have the written support of
30 per cent of all the workers of the bargaining unit, it
is also an undisputed fact that UMI (the rival union of
TUPAS) has a clear majority of the said workers, as
shown by the fact that 499 workers out of the total
working force of 641 have not only ratified the
collective bargaining agreement concluded between
UMI and LUSTEVECO, but also affirmed their
membership in UMI so that there is no more need for
holding a certification election. (Emphasis supplied.)
For its part, APCWU questions PWUP's personality in these
proceedings in view of the lack of consent signatures in its
petition, and argues as well that the petitioner has no authority
to represent SAMADA or PEALU, which had not appealed. The
private respondent also invokes Tupas and maintains that the
ratification of the new CBA by the majority of the workers was
an affirmation of their membership in the union that negotiated
that agreement.
In his own Comment, the Solicitor General agrees with the
petitioner that there has been substantial compliance with the
requirements of the law. He submits that Article 256 should be
liberally interpreted pursuant to Article 4 of the Labor Code,
stating as follows:
Art. 4. Construction in favor of labor. — All doubts in
the implementation and interpretation of the
 provisions of this Code including its implementing
rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of
labor.
The Court has deliberated on the arguments of the parties in
their respective pleadings and finds for the petitioner.
We have held that pursuant to the constitutional provision
guaranteeing workers the right to self-organization and
collective bargaining, "the constant and unwavering policy of
this Court" has been "to require a certification election as the
best means of ascertaining which labor organization should be
the collective bargaining representative." 4
The certification election is the most democratic and
expeditious method by which the laborers can freely determine
the union that shall act as their representative in their dealings
with the establishment where they are working. 5 As we
stressed in Belyca Corporation vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 6 the holding
of a certification election is a statutory policy that should not be
circumvented.
This Court also held in Western Agusan Workers Union-Local
101 of the United Lumber and General Workers of the
Philippines vs. Trajano: 7
. . . it has long been settled that the policy of the
Labor Code is indisputably partial to the holding of a
certification election so as to arrive in a manner
definitive and certain concerning the choice of the
labor organization to represent the workers in a
collective bargaining unit. Conformably to said basic
concept, this Court recognized that the Bureau of
Labor Relations in the exercise of sound discretion,
may order a certification election notwithstanding the
failure to meet the 30% requirement. (Scout Ramon V.
Albano Memorial College v. Noriel, 85 SCRA 494
[1978]; Vicmico Industrial Wokers Asso. v. Noriel, 131
SCRA 569 [1984])
In line with the policy, we feel that the administrative rule
requiring the simultaneous submission of the 25% consent
signatures upon the filing of petition for certification election
should not be strictly applied to frustrate the determination of
the legitimate representative of the workers. Significantly, the
requirement in the rule is not found in Article 256, the law it
seeks to implement. This is all the more reason why the
regulation should at best be given only a directory effect.
Accordingly, we hold that the mere filing of a petition for
certification election within the freedom period is sufficient
basis for the issuance of an order for the holding of a
certification election, 8 subject to the submission of the consent
signatures within a reasonable period from such filing.
This interpretation is consonant with Philippine Association of
Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations,9where we
declared:
. . . even conceding that the statutory requirement of
30% of the labor force asking for a certification
election had not been strictly complied with,
respondent Director is still empowered to order that it
be held precisely for the purpose of ascertaining
which (of the contending labor organizations) shall be
the exclusive collective bargaining representative.
(National Mines and Allied Workers Union v. Luna, et
al., 83 SCRA 607)
It is not denied that the petition to intervene filed by PWUP did
not carry the 25% consent signatures, but that the requirement
is in fact not applicable to a petition in intervention. We so held
in PAFLU v. Ferrer-Calleja thus: 10
It is crystal clear from the said provisions that the
requisite written consent of at least 20% of the
workers in the bargaining unit applies to petitioners for
Page 23 of 26
certification election only and not to motions for
intervention. . . . As long as the motion for intervention
has been properly and timely filed and the
intervention would not cause any injustice to anyone,
it should not be denied and this is so even if the
eventual purpose of the Motion for Intervention is to
participate in the Certification Election. After all, the
original applicant had already met the 20%
requirement.
The contention that the petitioners had no right to represent the
principal petitioners which had not appealed the dismissal
order is also not acceptable. We repeat that the certification
election is not litigation but a mere investigation of a non-
adversary character where the rules of procedure are not
strictly applied. 11 Technical rules and objections should not
hamper the correct ascertainment of the labor union that has
the support of confidence of the majority of the workers and is
thus entitled to represent them in their dealings with
management.
The above-quoted decision affirms the right of PWUP to call for
the holding of the election although it was initially only an
intervenor. That recognition should not be defeated by the
circumstance that the other petitioning unions have not seen fit
to appeal the dismissal of their petitions even if such dismissal
was questionable and is in fact being reversed here. The
petition for intervention was viable at the time it was filed
because the principal petitions had complied with the
requirement for the consent signatures as specified by Article
256. Hence, its intervention should not be disallowed simply
because of the withdrawal or failure to appeal of SAMADA and
PEALU.
It is correct to say that as a matter of strict procedure, a petition
for intervention should be deemed automatically dismissed
where the principal petition itself fails. However, that technical
rule should be allowed to prevent a correct determination of the
real representative of the workers in line with their
constitutional rights to self-organization and collective
bargaining.
Regarding the invocation of Inciong by the private
respondents, the Court has modified that decision
in Associated Labor Unions vs. Calleja, 12 where we held:
Finally, the petitioner assails the decision of the
respondent Director on the ground that "the
ratification of the collective bargaining agreement
renders the certification election moot and academic."
This contention finds no basis in law.
The petitioner was obviously referring to the contract-
bar rule where the law prohibits the holding of
certification elections during the lifetime of the
collective bargaining agreement. Said agreement was
hastily and prematurely entered into apparently in an
attempt to avoid the holding of a certification election.
Deviation from the contract-bar rule is justified only where the
need for industrial stability is clearly shown to be
imperative. 13 Subject to this singular exception, contracts
where the identity of the authorized representative of the
workers is in doubt must be rejected in favor of a more certain
indication of the will of the workers. As we stated in Philippine
Association of Free Labor Union vs. Estrella, 14 any stability
that does not establish the type of industrial peace
contemplated by the law must be subordinated to the
employees' freedom to choose their real representative.
The private respondents contend that the overwhelming
ratification of the CBA is an affirmation of their membership in
the bargaining agent, rendering the representation issue moot
and academic and conclusively barring the holding of a
certification election thereon. That conclusion does not follow.
Even Tupas did not say that the mere ratification of the CBA by
the majority of the workers signified their affirmation of
membership in the negotiating union. That case required, first,
ratification of the CBA, the second, affirmation of membership
in the negotiating union. The second requirement has not been
established in the case at bar as the record does not show that
the majority of the workers, besides ratifying the new CBA,
have also formally affiliated with APCWU.
Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing
the Labor Code provides that the representation case shall not
be adversely affected by a collective agreement submitted
before or during the last 60 days of a subsisting agreement
or during the pendency of the representation case. As the new
CBA was entered into at the time when the representation case
was still pending, it follows that it cannot be recognized as the
final agreement between the ICTSI and its workers.
On the allegation that the decision of the Secretary of Labor on
certification election is final and inappealable, this Court held
in San Miguel Corp. v. Secretary of Labor 15 that:
It is generally understood that as to administrative
agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power
there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize
the acts of such agencies on questions of law and
jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by
statute. (73, C.J.S. 506, note 56). . . . judicial review is
proper in case of lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of
discretion. error of law, fraud or collusion (Timbancaya
v. Vicente, 82 O.G. 9424; Macatangay v. Secretary of
Public Works and Communication, 63 O.G. 11236;
Ortua v. Singson Encarnacion, 59 Phil. 440).
There was indeed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondents when
they dismissed the petitions for certification election because
the consent signatures had not been submitted simultaneously
with the petition. The issue of majority representation thus
remains open and awaits settlement. Following the rulings
above-quoted, we hereby declare that the newly-concluded
CBA cannot constitute a bar to the holding of a certification
election.
It is possible that the APCWU will prevail in the certification
election, in which event the new CBA it concluded with ICTSI
will be upheld and recognized. It is also possible that another
union will be chosen, in which event it will have to enter into its
own negotiations with ICTSI that may result in the adoption of
a new CBA. In the meantime, however, the old CBA having
expired, it is necessary to lay down the rules regulating the
relations of the workers with the management. For this reason,
the Court hereby orders that the new CBA concluded by ICTSI
and APCWU shall remain effective between the parties,
subject to the result and effects of the certification election to
be called.
The certification election is the best method of determining the
will of the workers on the crucial question of who shall
represent them in their negotiations with the management for a
collective bargaining agreement that will best protect and
promote their interests. It is essential that there be no collusion
against this objective between an unscrupulous management
and a union covertly supporting it while professing its loyalty to
labor, or at least that the hopes of labor be not frustrated
because of its representation by a union that does not enjoy its
approval and support. It is therefore sound policy that any
doubt regarding the real representation of the workers be
resolved in favor of the holding of the certification election. This
is preferable to the suppression of the voice of the workers
through the prissy observance of technical rules that will exalt
procedure over substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged
order dated August 21, 1990, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the public respondent is DIRECTED to schedule and hold
certification election among the workers of the International
Page 24 of 26
Container Terminal Services, Inc., this to be done with all
possible dispatch. No costs.
#10 FIRST DIVISION . G.R. No. 51337. March 22,
1984.
UNITED CMC TEXTILE WORKERS
UNION, Petitioner, v. BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS, HON. CARMELO NORIEL,
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR
UNIONS, (JULY CONVENTION), Respondents.
Jose L. Simon for Petitioner.
Wilfredo Y. Guevarra and Edward P. David
for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR LAWS;
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS; PENDENCY OF UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICE CASE, A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION TO
CERTIFICATION ELECTION; CASE AT BAR. — Under
settled jurisprudence, the pendency of a formal charge
of company domination is a prejudicial question that,
until decided, bars proceedings for a certification
election, the reason being that the votes of the
members of the dominated union would not be free.
The ULP Case herein was filed on August 31, 1978, or
anterior to the Certification Case, which was presented
on September 5, 1978. The pendency of the charge
was known to respondent public official by virtue of the
Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner as intervenor in
the Certification Case. No allegation has been made
that said ULP Case was instituted in bad faith to
forestall the Certification Case.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The question to resolve is whether or not public
respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the Order of the Med-Arbiter calling for a
certification election despite: (a) the pendency of an
unfair labor practice case filed by petitioner charging
respondent PAFLU as being company-dominated; (b)
the existence of a deadlock in negotiations for renewal
of the collective bargaining agreement between
petitioner and the Central Textile Mills, Inc. (CENTEX,
for short); and (c) a reasonable doubt as to whether
the 30% requirement for holding a certification
election has been met.
Petitioner is a legitimate labor organization, the
incumbent collective bargaining representative of all
rank and file workers of CENTEX since 1956.
Respondent PAFLU is also a legitimate labor
organization seeking representation as the bargaining
agent of the rank and file workers of
CENTEX.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
On August 31, 1978, petitioner filed a complaint for
Unfair Labor Practice (R4-LRD-C-8-1493-78) (the ULP
Case, for brevity) against CENTEX and PAFLU alleging
that CENTEX had "helped and cooperated in the
organization of the Central Textile Mills, Inc. Local
PAFLU by allowing the organizing members of the
PAFLU to solicit signatures of employees of the
company who are members of the complainant union
to disaffiliate from complainant union and join the
respondent PAFLU, during company time and inside
the company premises on August 21, 1978 and the
following days thereafter." 1
While the ULP Case was pending, PAFLU, on
September 5, 1978, filed a Petition for Certification
Election (R4-LRD-M-9432-78) (the Certification Case,
for short) among the rank and file workers of CENTEX,
alleging that: 1) there has been no certification
election during the 12 months period prior to the filing
of the petition; 2) the petition is supported by
signatures of 603 workers, or more than 30% of the
rank and file workers of CENTEX; 3) the collective
bargaining agreement between CENTEX and petitioner
will expire on October 31, 1978; 4) the petition is filed
within the 60-day-freedom-period immediately
preceding the expiration of the CBA, and 6) there is no
legal impediment to the filing of the petition. 2
Petitioner intervened in the Certification Case and filed
a Motion to Dismiss on September 27, 1978 on the
grounds that: 1) the ULP Case charging that PAFLU is a
company-dominated union is a prejudicial question and
bars the holding of the certification election; and 2)
PAFLU failed to comply with the 30% requirement for
mandatory certification election since only 440 of the
603 are valid signatures and that 719 signatories are
required as constitutive of 30% of the rank and file
workers totalling 2,397 and not 1,900 as alleged by
PAFLU. 3
On October 16, 1978, petitioner filed a Notice of Strike
with the Bureau of Labor Relations for deadlock in the
CBA negotiations with CENTEX. The parties having
failed to effect a conciliation, the Labor Minister
assumed jurisdiction on November 9, 1978 in Case No.
AJML-033-78 4 (referred to hereafter as the Deadlock
Case)cralawnad
A Supplemental Motion to Dismiss in the Certification
Case was filed by petitioner on December 7, 1978
alleging that the Labor Minister had already taken
cognizance of the deadlock in the CBA negotiations and
constituted an impediment to the holding of a
certification election. 5
On December 18, 1978, in the Deadlock Case, the
Deputy Minister of Labor released a Decision directing
petitioner and CENTEX to execute and sign a CBA to
take effect on November 1, 1978 up to October 30,
1981 based on the guidelines enumerated therein, and
to furnish the Office of the Minister of Labor with a
signed copy of the renewed agreement not later than
January 31, 1979. 6
On January 23, 1979, in the Certification Case, the
Med-Arbiter issued an Order for the holding of a
certification election among CENTEX rank and file
workers, whereby qualified voters could choose either
PAFLU or petitioner as the collective bargaining
representative or No Union at all. 7 This was affirmed
by respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations on appeal, in the challenged Resolution,
dated May 25, 1979, stating that: 1) the Bureau has
discretion to order certification election where several
unions are contending for representation and when
there is doubt as to whether the 30% requirement has
been met; and 2) to preclude the filing of a petition for
certification election the notice of strike for deadlock in
CBA negotiations must occur prior to the petition. 8
A Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was
denied for lack of merit in the Resolution of August 20,
Page 25 of 26
1979 9 , also assailed herein.
Hence, this petition, on the general proposition that
public respondent has committed serious error of law
and acted with grave abuse of discretion, and that
petitioner has no plain and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
We issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining
the conduct of the certification election, and eventually
gave the Petition due course.
The issues raised are: (1) is the pendency of the ULP
Case charging a participating union in the certification
election proceedings as company-dominated a
prejudicial question to the conduct of the election? (2)
Does the decision in the Deadlock Case directing the
parties to execute a CBA have the effect of barring the
certification election? (3) Does respondent Director
have the discretion to call for a certification election
even if the 30% consent requirement is lacking?
The case can be resolved on the basis of the first issue
alone, which must be answered in the affirmative.
Under settled jurisprudence, the pendency of a formal
charge of company domination is a prejudicial question
that, until decided, bars proceedings for a certification
election 10 , the reason being that the votes of the
members of the dominated union would not be free. 11
The ULP Case herein was filed on August 31, 1978, or
anterior to the Certification Case, which was presented
on September 5, 1978. The pendency of the charge
was known to respondent public official by virtue of the
Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner as intervenor in
the Certification Case. No allegation has been made
that said ULP Case was instituted in bad faith to
forestall the Certification Case. The following ruling is
thus squarely in point:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"There is no assertion that such complaint was flimsy,
or made in bad faith or filed purposely to forestall the
certification election. So, no reason existed for the
Industrial Court to depart from its established practice
of suspending the election proceeding. And this seems
to be accepted rule in the law of labor relations, the
reason being, in the words of Mr. Justice Montemayor,
`if there is a union dominated by the company, to
which some of the workers belong, an election among
workers and employees of the company would not
reflect the true sentiment and wishes of the said
workers and employees because the votes of the
members of the dominated union would not be free.’
(Manila Paper Mills Employees v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 104 Phil. 10)
"And we have held, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
that such charge of company domination is a
prejudicial question that until decided, shall suspend or
bar proceedings for certification election. (Standard
Cigarette Workers’ Union v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 101 Phil. 126)
"Indeed, if as a result of the Pelta’s complaint in Case
No. 255-ULP, the Workers Union should be ordered
dissolved as a company dominated union, any election
held in the meantime would be a waste of energy and
money to all parties concerned." 12
The rationale for the suspension of the election
proceedings has been further amplified as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"What is settled law, dating from the case of Standard
Cigarette Workers’ Union v. Court of Industrial
Relations (101 Phil. 126), decided in 1957, is that if it
were a labor organization objecting to the participation Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (July
in a certification election of a company-dominated Convention) in Case No. R4-LRD-M-9-432-78 entitled
union, as a result of which a complaint for an unfair "In the Matter of Certification Election Among Rank
labor practice case against the employer was filed, the and File Workers of Central Textile Mills, Inc.,
status of the latter union must be first cleared in such Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions, Petitioner,
a proceeding before such voting could take place. In United CMC Textile Workers Union, Intervenor."cralaw
the language of Justice J.B.L. Reyes as ponente: `As virtua1aw library
correctly pointed out by Judge Lanting in his dissenting
opinion on the denial of petitioner’s motion for No costs.
reconsideration, a complaint for unfair labor practice
may be considered a prejudicial question in a SO ORDERED.
proceeding for certification election when it is charged
therein that one or more labor unions participating in
the election are being aided, or are controlled, by the
company or employer. The reason is that the
certification election may lead to the selection of an
employer-dominated or company union as the
employees’ bargaining representative, and when the
court finds that said union is employer-dominated in
the unfair labor practice case, the union selected would
be decertified and the whole election proceedings
would be rendered useless and nugatory.’ (Ibid., 128).
The next year, the same jurist had occasion to
reiterate such doctrine in Manila Paper Mills Employees
and Workers Association v. Court of Industrial
Relations (104 Phil. 10 [1958]), thus: `We agree with
the CIR on the reasons given in its order that only a
formal charge of company domination may serve as a
bar to and stop a certification election, the reason
being that if there is a union dominated by the
Company, to which some of the workers belong, an
election among the workers and employees of the
company would not reflect the true sentiment and
wishes of the said workers and employees from the
standpoint of their welfare and interest, because as to
the members of the company dominated union, the
vote of the said members in the election would not be
free. It is equally true, however, that the opposition to
the holding of a certification election due to a charge of
company domination can only be filed and maintained
by the labor organization which made the charge of
company domination, because it is the entity that
stands to lose and suffer prejudice by the certification
election, the reason being that its members might be
overwhelmed in the voting by the other members
controlled and dominated by the Company,’ (Ibid.,
15). It is easily understandable why it should be thus.
There would be an impairment of the integrity of the
collective bargaining process if a company-dominated
union were allowed to participate in a certification
election. The timid, the timorous, and the faint-hearted
in the ranks of labor could easily be tempted to cast
their votes in favor of the choice of management.
Should it emerge victorious, and it becomes the
exclusive representative of labor at the conference
table, there is a frustration of the statutory scheme. It
takes two to bargain. There would be instead a
unilateral imposition by the employer. There is need
therefore to inquire as to whether a labor organization
that aspires to be the exclusive bargaining
representative is company-dominated before the
certification election." 13

With the suspension of the certification proceedings

clearly called for by reason of a prejudicial question,
the necessity of passing upon the remaining issues is
obviated.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of August 20, 1979 issued

by public respondent affirming the Order of the Med-
Arbiter, dated January 23, 1979, calling for a
certification election is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order heretofore
issued by this Court shall continue to be in force and
effect until the status is cleared of respondent

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