James and I affirm the resolution.

We observe that because the resolution asks if deployment of any anti missile system in South
Korea is in their best interest, the resolution is a question of whether all missile systems have
been good for South Korea, including existing systems such as AEGIS and PATRIOT.

Contention One is Defense Wins Championships

Even before the first North Korean nuclear weapon was developed in 2006, South Korea sat
comfortably behind the AEGIS and PATRIOT missile defense systems.

Having a missile defense network is crucial for South Korean interests. Leaving the Republic
open to imminent attack has two harms.

First, destroying deterrence

David Blair of the Telegraph writes that currently, “North Korea is outclassed in almost every
field of conventional warfare by South Korea.”

However, the removal of all missile defense systems heavily disadvantages the South to the
North.

Vu of the National Review finds that a withdrawal would prompt North Korea to take on more
provocative actions like testing missiles and nukes and attacking at the DMZ..

Empirically, the day after the deployment of THAAD was halted, North Korea proceed with
another missile defense in a show of strength.

Second, shooting first

Bruce Klinger of the Heritage Foundation writes that if missile defense is not deployed, South
Korea will be entirely reliant on escalatory methods, specifically preemptive strikes.

This program, called Kill Chain, gives South Korean military officials only three minutes to
decide whether a nuclear threat is credible, and immediately strike all warhead sites with
missiles in response.

Unfortunately, Crisis Group finds South Korea has massive intelligence vulnerabilities
characterized by many scandals, yet President Moon still confirmed he would be interested in
using a peremptory strike system in the event of a possible nuclear attack.

Thus, Mark Gollom of CBC News concludes that miscalculation is the most probable scenario
for war on the Korean Peninsula.

Contention Two is Taking Back the Reins

Right now, the United States has operational control of the South Korean military.

The New York Times explains that transfers of operational control back to South Korea have
been delayed due to security concerns.

The Korea Times explains the impetus for transfer back to the South Koreans as they state
“missile defense is likely to be a prerequisite for Korea to take over OPCON”.

Missile defense reassures the South Korean military of their ability to stand independently.

The Washington Post explains that in 2017 Moon has supported the return of opcon to South
Korea, but without the support of the military, which is contingent on missile defense, the return
is impossible.

The return of OPCON yields 2 impacts.

First is a return to sovereignty. The CRS explains that the transfer of OPCON is seen as
important as South Korea’s sovereignty. It is always in South Korea’s best interest to have
sovereign control of their own military, rather than relying on president Trump. Having control of
your own interests is a prerequisite to taking actions in your best interest. OPCON allows for a
reframing of the alliance to transform South Korea from an effective proxy state to become the
U.S.’ equitable partner. As O’Malley of Dongseo University in 2015 writes, No longer will
South Korea be a Yankee colony and puppet of the imperialists. Rather, the South
Korean government would be the only legitimate sovereign power protecting the political
aspirations of the Korean people on South Korean territory.

Second is improving regional relations. Jin of American University in 2016 explains that
continual postponement of the transfer of opcon serves as a message to China that the United
States is still in control in South Korea. O’Malley of Dongseo University explains that restoration
of operational control would decrease the perception of South Korea being a United States
proxy state. This precludes all attempts to stymie North Korean aggression. Zhao of Cornell
University argues that China will never embrace a reunified Korean peninsula as long as
the issue of American military presence in the post-unification scenario can be
addressed[.]

Thus, we affirm.