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1. A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC. August 19, 2009.

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RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL AND FILING FEES
OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD FOUNDATION, INC.

Facts:

Roger, administrator of the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. requested by letter dated May 22, 2009
to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, that it be granted exemption from payment of docket fees
similar to that granted by OCA Circular No. 42.2005 and Rule 141 to “indigent” persons given the
privilege to free access to the courts which the Constitution guaranteed; it seeks to exempt itself from
the payment of filing fees, after the Court granted it a nominal filing fee of P5,000.00 and the balance
to be paid upon completion of the P10 Million collection action. As a foundation, Roger said, the Good
Shepherd Foundation helped and continues to help newly born and abandoned babies, old people
who cannot pay their common prescriptions, and broken families. Thus, it also seeks to be granted the
privilege granted to indigent litigants.

Issue:

Whether the special privilege (referring to the exemption from filing fees) granted under Rule141 and
OCA Circular is applicable to foundations/associations?

Held:

No. The Supreme Court answered “To answer the query of Mr. Prioreschi, the Courts cannot grant to
foundations like the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. the same exemption from payment of legal fees
granted to indigent litigants even if the foundations are working for indigent and underprivileged
people.

The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11,
Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, thus:

Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty.

The importance of the right to free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and to adequate legal
assistance cannot be denied. A move to remove the provision on free access from the Constitution on
the ground that it was already covered by the equal protection clause was defeated by the desire to
give constitutional stature to such specific protection of the poor.

In implementation of the right of free access under the Constitution, the Supreme Court promulgated
rules, specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court, and Sec. 19, Rule 141, Rules of Court.

The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent litigant
unless the court otherwise provides.

To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his
immediate family do not earn a gross income abovementioned, and they do not own any real
property with the fair value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person
attesting to the truth of the litigant’s affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached to
the litigant’s affidavit.

Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to dismiss the
complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal
liability may have been incurred.

The clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court indicate that
only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation,
Inc., being a corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from
that of its members, is a juridical person. Among others, it has the power to acquire and possess
property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with
the laws and regulations of their organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be accorded
the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants.

That the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for indigent and underprivileged people is of no
moment. Clearly, the Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause on a person’s poverty,
a condition that only a natural person can suffer.

There are other reasons that warrant the rejection of the request for exemption in favor of a juridical
person. For one, extending the exemption to a juridical person on the ground that it works for
indigent and underprivileged people may be prone to abuse (even with the imposition of rigid
documentation requirements), particularly by corporations and entities bent on circumventing the
rule on payment of the fees. Also, the scrutiny of compliance with the documentation requirements
may prove too time-consuming and wasteful for the courts.

In view of the foregoing, the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. cannot be extended the exemption from
legal and filing fees despite its working for indigent and underprivileged people.

Duco v. Comelec

Facts:

On October 29, 2007, simultaneous barangay and sangguniang kabataan (SK)


elections were held all over the country. In Barangay Ibabao, Loay, Bohol, the
petitioner was proclaimed as the elected Punong Barangay. His opponent,
respondent Narciso Avelino, initiated an election protest in the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC), seeking a recount of the ballots in four precincts upon his
allegation that the election results for the position of Punong Barangay were
spurious and fraudulent and did not reflect the true will of the electorate.
The MCTC ultimately ruled in favor of respondent Avelino. On April 30, 2008,
however, the COMELEC dismissed Ducos appeal,[7] holding:
Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
which mandates the payment of appeal fee in the amount of P/3,000.00
and Section 9 (a), Rule 22 of the same Rules which provides that failure
to pay the correct appeal fee is a ground for the dismissal of the appeal,
the Commission (First Division) RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to
DISMISS the instant case for Protestee-Appellants failure to perfect his
appeal within five (5) days from receipt of the assailed decision sought to
be appealed due to non-payment of the appeal fee as prescribed under the
Comelec Rules of Procedure.

Duco moved for reconsideration, but the COMELEC denied his motion
Issue:
whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in dismissing Ducos appeal and in denying his motion for
reconsideration.
Held:
Having determined that the petitioners appeal was properly dismissed, the
COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. In a special civil action for certiorari, the petitioner carries
the burden of proving not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of the public respondent
for his issuance of the impugned order.[26] Grave abuse of discretion is present
when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[27] In other
words, the tribunal or administrative body must have issued the assailed decision,
order or resolution in a capricious or despotic manner.[28] Alas, the petitioner did
not discharge his burden.
the Court has issued the following dictum for the guidance of the Bench and Bar:

In Aguilar, the Court recognized the Comelecs discretion to allow or


dismiss a perfected appeal that lacks payment of the Comelec-prescribed
appeal fee. The Court stated that it was more in keeping with fairness and
prudence to allow the appeal which was, similar to the present case,
perfected months before the issuance of Comelec Resolution No. 8486.

Aguilar has not, however, diluted the force of Comelec Resolution


No. 8486 on the matter of compliance with the Comelec-required appeal
fees. To reiterate, Resolution No. 8486 merely clarified the rules on
Comelec appeal fees which have been existing as early as 1993, the
amount of which was last fixed in 2002. The Comelec even went one step
backward and extended the period of payment to 15 days from the filing
of the notice of appeal.
Considering that a year has elapsed after the issuance on July 15,
2008 of Comelec Resolution No. 8486, and to further affirm the discretion
granted to the Comelec which it precisely articulated through the specific
guidelines contained in said Resolution, the Court NOW DECLARES,
for the guidance of the Bench and Bar, that for notices of appeal
filed after the promulgation of this decision, errors in the matter of
non-payment or incomplete payment of the two appeal fees in election
cases are no longer excusable.[34]

The foregoing dictum forecloses the petitioners plea for judicial understanding.

Tan v. Hernando
Facts:
In his letter-complaint against Jesus, Wilson Tan alleged that the latter was
guilty of dishonesty, moral turpitude and conduct unbecoming of a public
officer; Jesus borrowed P3,000.00 from the complainant and promised to pay it
with his half-month salary, evidenced by an acknowledgement receipt, but
failed to pay it, compelling him to file a criminal case for estafa against
Jesus. Due to the pendency of the criminal case, the administrative case was
held in abeyance. On May 8, 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator
received a certified copy of the decision in the criminal case, acquitting Jesus of
the charge but adjudging him civilly liable for P3,000.00. When referred to the
Executive Judge of Dumaguete RTC for investigation and report, the latter
recommended that he be held civilly liable; since Jesus retired from the service
on December 25, 2004, the judge recommended that he be allowed to retire. The
judge also noted that Jesus was a model employee who married late and have
young children, and resorted to borrowing to support his growing family. As
of the moment he could not pay his obligation as his salary was cut off upon
retirement.
The Office of the Court Administrator imposed the penalty of fine of P5,000.00
since he has already retired from the service.

Issue: whether Jesus Hernando be allowed to retire?

Held:
We adopt the recommendation of the Court Administrator because it was
supported by the evidence on record.

Having incurred just debts, Hernando had the moral and legal duty to pay
them when they became due. As a court employee, he must comply with his
valid contractual obligation, act fairly and adhere to high ethical standards to
preserve the Judiciary’s integrity and reputation. Unfortunately, he failed to
prove that he had adequately discharged his obligation. Hence, his actuations
warrant condign disciplinary action.

The law on disciplinary action for nonpayment of just debts is Section


46(b)(22), Chapter 7, Subtitle A (Civil Service Commission), Title I, Book V of
Executive Order (EO) No. 292 (The Revised Administrative Code of 1987), which
pertinently states:
Sec. 46. Discipline: General Provisions.– (a) No officer or employee in the Civil
Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law
and after due process.
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:

xxx

(22) Willful failure to pay just debts or willful failure to pay taxes due to the
government;

xxx

Under Section 22, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of EO No. 292, as
modified by Section 52(C)(10), Rule IV of Resolution No. 991936 of the Civil
Service Commission (Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service),
just debts include: 1) claims adjudicated by a court of law; or 2) claims the existence
and justness of which are admitted by the debtor. Hernando’s obligation falls under
both classifications.
Hernando cannot escape administrative responsibility. As we said in Orasa v. Seva:⁠1
The Court cannot overstress the need for circumspect and proper behavior on the part
of court employees. “While it may be just for an individual to incur indebtedness
unrestrained by the fact that he is a public officer or employee, caution should be
taken to prevent the occurrence of dubious circumstances that might inevitably impair
the image of the public office.” Employees of the court should always keep in mind
that the court is regarded by the public with respect. Consequently, the conduct of
each court personnel should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of (sic) onus and
must at all times be characterized by, among other things, uprightness, propriety and
decorum.
The Court Administrator recommends a fine of P5,000.00, in lieu of reprimand, the
penalty for the violation to be imposed on a first-time offender like Hernando. The
recommendation is premised on the fact that he had meanwhile retired from the
service, rendering reprimand an impractical and ineffectual penalty. Although we
agree that a fine is appropriate under the circumstances, we hold that the amount be
only P1,000.00 considering that Hernando had already been adjudged by the MTCC
in the criminal case to pay to the complainant the amount of P3,000.00.

Facts:

G.R. NO. 180048 JUNE 19, 2009DE GUZMAN VS COMELEC

This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining orderassails the June 15, 2007 Resolution of the First Division of
COMELEC, disqualifying ROSELLER DE GUZMAN fromrunning as vice-mayor in
the May 14, 2007 elections.Petitioner was a naturalized American. However, on
January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship under RA9225. Upon approval of his
application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
onSeptember 6, 2006. Having reacquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to
exercise full civil and political rights.As such, qualified to run as vice-mayor of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of


Guimba, Nueva Ecija inthe May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce
his American Citizenship in accordance withRA 9225.
HELD:

We find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his
failure to renounce hisAmerican citizenship. RA 9225 was enacted to allow
reacquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for:1. Natural born citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization ascitizens of a
foreign country;2. Natural born citizens of the Philippines who after the effectivity of
the law, becomes citizens of aforeign country.The law provides that they are not
deemed to have reacquired or retained their Philippinecitizenship upon taking the oath
of allegiance.Petitioner’s oath of allegiance and certificate of candidacy did not
comply with section(5)2 of RA 9225 which furtherrequires those seeking elective
public office in the Philippines to make a personal and sworn renunciation of
foreigncitizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such, he
is disqualified from running for vicemayor.

GOLANGCO VS FUNG
504 SCRA 321, G.R. No. 147640 October 12, 2006
JOWETT K. GOLANGCO,petitioner vs. ATTY. JONE B. FUNG, respondent.
FACTS: Respondent is an employee of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and
was, at that time, assigned as Officer-In-Charge of the Operations and Surveillance Division, Anti-Illegal
Recruitment Branch, Licensing and Regulation Office, under the auspices of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE). Some inspectors of the POEA Licensing and Regulation Office went to the office of
G&M (Phil.) Inc. and inquired from petitioner Golangco, the President of G&M (Phil.) Inc., about the
allegation that the agency collected excessive fees from its applicants. Petitioner Golangco denied such
allegation. the operatives recommended that an entrapment operation be conducted on the employees of
the agency. A joint POEA-CIS team headed by respondent with eight others as members, including SPO4
Bonita and SPO2 Zacarias, proceeded to the premises of G&M (Phil.) Inc. to conduct the said operation.
During the arrest of Encenada, petitioner Golangco was not around. When he arrived, he, too, was arrested
by the POEA-CIS team and was brought to the POEA Headquarters for investigation. Aggrieved by his
arrest, petitioner Golangco filed a criminal complaint against respondent before the Office of the
Ombudsman for arbitrary detention and violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act No.
3019. The case was docketed as OMB-0-93-0407. An administrative complaint for oppression, abuse of
authority, gross inefficiency, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct arising from the same incident
was likewise filed against respondent which was docketed as OMB-ADM-0-93-0149.
The administrative complaint against respondent, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-93-0149, proceeded
independently of the criminal complaint. In a Resolution dated 13 March 1995, GIO II Celso R. Dao found
respondent guilty of the administrative charges against him and recommended his dismissal from the
service for cause with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of his leave credits and retirement benefits and
disqualification from further re-employment in the government. This Resolution was disapproved by
Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. who recommended the reassignment of the case to
another graft investigating officer so that the administrative aspect of the case can "be reconciled with the
facts found in the criminal aspect of the case." The recommendation of Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L.
Aportadera, Jr. was later approved by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa and the case was
reassigned to GIO Onos.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE COURT A QUO HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE
FINDINGS OF PROBABLE CAUSE BY THE OMBUDSMAN IN THE CRIMINAL CASE OMB-0-93-0407,
MUCH LESS DIRECT THE LATTER TO WITHDRAW SAID CASE ALREADY FILED WITH REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT ITS APPELLATE JURISDICTION PERTAINS ONLY TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY CASE OMB-ADM-0-93-0149 WHICH IS DISTINCT AND
INDEPENDENT OF SAID CRIMINAL CASE.

HELD:The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives, and decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only—it cannot review the orders, directives, or
decisions of the O f f i c e o f t h e O m b u d s m a n i n c r i m i n a l o r n o n - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c a s e s .
the Court of Appeals did not err when it held that respondent is not liable for the administrative charge
hurled against him. Likewise, petitioners Golangco and the Office of the Ombudsman assail the actuation
of the Court of Appeals in taking cognizance of the criminal case against respondent and directing the
Office of the Ombudsman to withdraw Criminal Case No. 96-149144. This, according to petitioners, is in
violation of established jurisprudence stating that the Court of Appeals has no authority to review the
finding of probable cause by the Office of the Ombudsman

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