CMU vs. DARAB G.R. No.
R. No. 100091 mishandling the CMU funds and was separated from service by virtue of Executive Order No. 17, the
Facts:
Petitioner, the CMU, is an agricultural education institution owned and run by the state
located in the town of Musuan, Bukidnon province. It started as a farm school at Marilang,
Bukidnon, in early 1910, in response to the public demand for and agricultural school in Mindanao.
In 1960’s it was converted into a college with campus in Musuan, and became known as
the CMU. Primarily an agricultural university, the school was the answer to the need for training
people in order to develop the agricultural potential of the island of Mindanao.
On January 16, 1958 the late president Carlos P. Garcia, issued Proclamation No. 476,
withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, a site
which would be the future campus of what is now the CMU. A total land area comprising 3080
hectares was surveyed and registered and titled in the name of the petitioner.
In the early 1960’s student population of the school was less than 3000. By 1988, the
student population had expanded to some 13000 students. To cope with the increase in its
enrollment, it has expanded and improved its educational facilities partly from government
appropriation and partly by self-help measures.
In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160, a livelihood program called “Kilusang
Sariling Sikap Program” under which the land resources of the University were leased to its faculty
and employees. This arrangement was covered by a written contract. Under this program, the
faculty and staff combine themselves to groups of five members each, and the CMU provided
technical know-how, practical training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each group to cultivate
4-5 hectares of land for the lowland rice project. The contract prohibits participants and their hired
workers to establish houses or live in the project area and to use the cultivated land as a collateral
for any kind of loan. It was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed
between the CMU and the faculty and/or employees.
Among the participants in this program were Alvin Obrique, Felix Guinanao, Joven
Caballero, Nestor Pulao, Danilo Vasquez, Aronio Pelayo and other complainants. Obrique was a
Physics Instructor at the CMU while the others were employees in the lowland rice project. The
other complainants, who were not members of the faculty or non-academic staff of the CMU, were
hired workers or laborers of the participants in this program.
When petitioner Dr. Leonardo Chua became President of the CMU in July 1986, he
discontinued the agri-business project for the production of rice, corn and sugar cane known as Agri-
Business Management and Training Project, due to losses incurred while carrying on the said
project. Some CMU personnel, among whom were the complainants, were laid-off when this project
was discontinued. As Assistant Director of this agri-business project, Obrique was found guilty of
re-organization law of the CMU.
Sometime in 1986, under Dr. Chua as President, the CMU launched a self-help project
called CMU-Income Enhancement Program (CMU-IEP) to develop unutilized land resources, mobilize
and promote the spirit of self-reliance, provide socio-economic and technical training in actual field
project implementation and augment the income of the faculty and the staff.
Under the terms of a 3-party Memorandum of Agreement 2 among the CMU, the CMU-
Integrated Development Foundation (CMU-IDF) and groups of "seldas" of 5 CMU employees, the
CMU would provide the use of 4 to 5 hectares of land to a selda for one (1) calendar year.
The participants agreed not to allow their hired laborers or members of their family to
establish any house or live within the vicinity of the project area and not to use the allocated lot as
collateral for a loan. It was expressly provided that no tenant-landlord relationship would exist as a
result of the Agreement.
Initially, participation in the CMU-IEP was extended only to workers and staff members who were
still employed with the CMU and was not made available to former workers or employees. In the
middle of 1987, to cushion the impart of the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane project
on the lives of its former workers, the CMU allowed them to participate in the CMU-IEP as special
participants.
The one-year contracts expired on June 30, 1988. Some contracts were renewed. Those
whose contracts were not renewed were served with notices to vacate.
The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar can
project, the loss of jobs due to termination or separation from the service and the alleged
harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and precipitated the filing of, the complaint.
On the basis of the above facts, the DARAB found that the private respondents were not
tenants and cannot therefore be beneficiaries under the CARP. At the same time, the DARAB
ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous portions of the CMU
land and their inclusion in the CARP for distribution to qualified beneficiaries.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide Case No. 005 for
Declaration of Status of Tenants and coverage of land under CARP.
Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed serious errors and GADALEJ in
dismissing the Petition for Review on Certiorari and affirming the decision of DARAB
Held: Petition is meritorious. In support of this view, the Board held that the "respondent University failed to show that
it is using actually, really, truly and in fact, the questioned area to the exclusion of others, nor did it
Ratio: show that the same is directly used without any intervening agency or person", and "there is no
definite and concrete showing that the use of said lands are essentially indispensable for
We agree with the DARAB's finding that Obrique, et. al. are not tenants. Under the terms of the
educational purposes". The reliance by the respondents Board and Appellate Tribunal on the
written agreement signed by Obrique, et. al., pursuant to the livelihood program called "Kilusang
technical or literal definition from Moreno's Philippine Law Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary,
Sariling Sikap Program", it was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed
may give the ordinary reader a classroom meaning of the phrase "is actually directly and
between the CMU and the faculty and staff (participants in the project). The CMU did not receive
exclusively", but in so doing they missed the true meaning of Section 10, R.A. 6657, as to what lands
any share from the harvest/fruits of the land tilled by the participants. What the CMU collected was
are exempted or excluded from the coverage of the CARP. The construction given by the DARAB to
a nominal service fee and land use participant's fee in consideration of all the kinds of assistance
Section 10 restricts the land area of the CMU to its present needs or to a land area presently,
given to the participants by the CMU.
actively exploited and utilized by the university in carrying out its present educational program with
its present student population and academic facility overlooking the very significant factor of growth
In the same paragraph of their complaint, complainants claim that they are landless
of the university in the years to come. By the nature of the CMU, which is a school established to
peasants. This allegation requires proof and should not be accepted as factually true. Obrique is not
promote agriculture and industry, the need for a vast tract of agricultural land and for future
a landless peasant. The facts showed he was Physics Instructor at CMU holding a very responsible
programs of expansion is obvious. It was in this same spirit that President Garcia issued
position was separated from the service on account of certain irregularities he committed while
Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao
Assistant Director of the Agri-Business Project of cultivating lowland rice. Others may, at the
Agricultural College (forerunner of the CMU) a land reservation of 3,080 hectares as its future
moment, own no land in Bukidnon but they may not necessarily be so destitute in their places of
campus. It was set up in Bukidnon, in the hinterlands of Mindanao, in order that it can have enough
origin. No proof whatsoever appears in the record to show that they are landless peasants.
resources and wide-open spaces to grow as an agricultural educational institution, to develop and
The evidence on record establish without doubt that the complainants were originally train future farmers of Mindanao and help attract settlers to that part of the country.
authorized or given permission to occupy certain areas of the CMU property for a definite purpose
The first land use plan of the CARP was prepared in 1975 and since then it has undergone
to carry out certain university projects as part of the CMU's program of activities pursuant to its
several revisions in line with changing economic conditions, national economic policies and financial
avowed purpose of giving training and instruction in agricultural and other related technologies,
limitations and availability of resources. The CMU, through Resolution No. 160 S. 1984, pursuant to
using the land and other resources of the institution as a laboratory for these projects. Their entry
its development plan, adopted a multi-disciplinary applied research extension and productivity
into the land of the CMU was with the permission and written consent of the owner, the CMU, for a
program called the "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Project" (CMU-KSSP).
limited period and for a specific purpose. After the expiration of their privilege to occupy and
cultivate the land of the CMU, their continued stay was unauthorized and their settlement on the
The portion of the CMU land leased to the Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte
CMU's land was without legal authority. A person entering upon lands of another, not claiming in
Phils., Inc.) was leased long before the CARP was passed. The agreement with the Philippine Packing
good faith the right to do so by virtue of any title of his own, or by virtue of some agreement with
Corporation was not a lease but a Management and Development Agreement, a joint undertaking
the owner or with one whom he believes holds title to the land, is a squatter. Squatters cannot enter
where use by the Philippine Packing Corporation of the land was part of the CMU research program,
the land of another surreptitiously or by stealth, and under the umbrella of the CARP, claim rights to
with the direct participation of faculty and students. Said contracts with the Philippine Packing
said property as landless peasants. Under Section 73 of R.A. 6657, persons guilty of committing
Corporation and others of a similar nature were made prior to the enactment of R.A. 6657 and were
prohibited acts of forcible entry or illegal detainer do not qualify as beneficiaries and may not avail
directly connected to the purpose and objectives of the CMU as an educational institution. As soon
themselves of the rights and benefits of agrarian reform. Any such person who knowingly and
as the objectives of the agreement for the joint use of the CMU land were achieved as of June 1988,
willfully violates the above provision of the Act shall be punished with imprisonment or fine at the
the CMU adopted a blue print for the exclusive use and utilization of said areas to carry out its own
discretion of the Court. Therefore, private respondents, not being tenants nor proven to be landless
research and agricultural experiments.
peasants, cannot qualify as beneficiaries under the CARP.
As to the determination of when and what lands are found to be necessary for use by the
The questioned decision of the Adjudication Board, affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
CMU, the school is in the best position to resolve and answer the question and pass upon the
segregating 400 hectares from the CMU land is primarily based on the alleged fact that the land
problem of its needs in relation to its avowed objectives for which the land was given to it by the
subject is "not directly, actually and exclusively used for school sites, because the same was leased
State. Neither the DARAB nor the Court of Appeals has the right to substitute its judgment or
to Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Philippines)".
discretion on this matter, unless the evidentiary facts are so manifest as to show that the CMU has
no real for the land.
It is our opinion that the 400 hectares ordered segregated by the DARAB and affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated August 20, 1990, is not covered by the CARP becauase (1)
It is not alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (2) The CMU land reservation is not in
excess of specific limits as determined by Congress; (3) It is private land registered and titled in the
name of its lawful owner, the CMU; (4) It is exempt from coverage under Section 10 of R.A. 6657
because the lands are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for school
site and campus, including experimental farm stations for educational purposes, and for establishing
seed and seedling research and pilot production centers.
Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the
DARAB is limited only to matters involving the implementation of the CARP. It is restricted to
agrarian cases and controversies involving lands falling within the coverage of the aforementioned
program. It does not include those, which are actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for, among such purposes, school sites and campuses for setting up experimental farm
stations, research and pilot production centers.
Going beyond what was asked by the complainants who were not entitled to the relief prayed the
complainants who were not entitled to the relief prayed for, constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion because it implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction.
The education of the youth and agrarian reform are admittedly among the highest
priorities in the government socio-economic programs. In this case, neither need give way to the
other. Certainly, there must still be vast tracts of agricultural land in Mindanao outside the CMU land
reservation which can be made available to landless peasants, assuming the claimants here, or some
of them, can qualify as CARP beneficiaries. To our mind, the taking of the CMU land which had been
segregated for educational purposes for distribution to yet uncertain beneficiaries is a gross
misinterpretation of the authority and jurisdiction granted by law to the DARAB.
It is the opinion of the Court that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of grave
abuse of discretion by respondents Court of Appeals and DAR Adjudication Board. Declaring the
decision of the DARAB dated September 4, 1989 and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
August 20, 1990, affirming the decision of the quasi-judicial body, as null and void and ordered to be
set aside.

Consequently, the DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case pending
before it involving a portion of the CMU's titled school site, as the portion of the CMU land
reservation ordered segregated is actually, directly and exclusively used and found by the school to
be necessary for its purposes. The CMU has constantly raised the issue of the DARAB's lack of
jurisdiction and has questioned the respondent's authority to hear, try and adjudicate the case at
bar. Despite the law and the evidence on record tending to establish that the fact that the DARAB
had no jurisdiction, it made the adjudication now subject of review.

In this case, DARAB found that the complainants are not share tenants or lease holders of
the CMU, yet it ordered the "segregation of a suitable compact and contiguous area of Four
Hundred hectares, more or less", from the CMU land reservation, and directed the DAR Regional
Director to implement its order of segregation. Having found that the complainants in this agrarian
DAR v. DECS
dispute for Declaration of Tenancy Status are not entitled to claim as beneficiaries of the CARP
because they are not share tenants or leaseholders, its order for the segregation of 400 hectares of
the CMU land was without legal authority. Petition for review on certiorari to set aside decision of CA which denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration
We do not believe that the quasi-judicial function of the DARAB carries with it greater
authority than ordinary courts to make an award beyond what was demanded by the -Lot No.2509 and Lot No. 817-D consists of an aggregate area of 189.2462 hectares located at
complainants/petitioners, even in an agrarian dispute. Where the quasi-judicial body finds that the Hacienda Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental and Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay, Negros Occidental,
complainants/petitioners are not entitled to the rights they are demanding, it is an erroneous respectively. On October 21, 1921, these lands were donated by Esteban Jalandoni to respondent
DECS. Titles were transferred in the name of respondent DECS.
interpretation of authority for that quasi-judicial body to order private property to be awarded to
future beneficiaries. The order segregation 400 hectares of the CMU land was issued on a finding -DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10 agricultural crop years, commencing
that the complainants are not entitled as beneficiaries, and on an erroneous assumption that the from crop year 1984-1985 to crop year 1993-1994. The contract of lease was subsequently renewed
CMU land which is excluded or exempted under the law is subject to the coverage of the CARP.
for another 10 agricultural crop years, commencing from crop year 1995-1996 to crop year 2004-
2005.
-June 10, 1993: Eugenio Alpar et.al, claim to be permanent and regular farm workers of the subject
lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage with the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Escalante.
-After investigation, MARO Jacinto R. Piñosa, sent a “Notice of Coverage” to respondent DECS,
stating that the lands are covered by CARP and inviting its representatives for a conference with the
farmer beneficiaries. Then, MARO Piñosa submitted his report to OIC-PARO Stephen M. Leonidas,
who recommended to the DAR Regional Director the approval of the coverage of the landholdings.
-August 7, 1998: DAR Regional Director Andres approved the recommendation and directed
Provincial Agrarian Reform Office to facilitate acquisition and distribution of landholdings to
qualified beneficiaries.
-DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which affirmed the Order of the
Regional Director.
-Aggrieved DECS filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which set aside the decision
of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Hence, the instant petition for review.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject properties are exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657/
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998 (CARL)—NO
2. Whether or not the farmers are qualified beneficiaries of CARP--YES
The general policy under CARL is to cover as much lands suitable for agriculture as
possible. Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 sets out the coverage of CARP. The program shall: “… cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural
lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the
public domain suitable for agriculture.”
Following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable
for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands
shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account,
ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law,
the specific limits of the public domain;
(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as determined by
Congress in the preceding paragraph;
(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for
agriculture; and
(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the
agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon.
Section 3(c): “agricultural land- “land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and
not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.”
“agriculture” or “agricultural activity”- means the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing
of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and
other farm activities, and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming
operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.
The records of the case show that the subject properties were formerly private agricultural
lands owned by the late Esteban Jalandoni, and were donated to respondent DECS. From that time
until they were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, the lands continued to be agricultural
primarily planted to sugarcane, albeit part of the public domain being owned by an agency of the
government. There is no legislative or presidential act, before and after the enactment of R.A. No.
6657, classifying the said lands as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial
land. Indubitably, the subject lands fall under the classification of lands of the public domain
devoted to or suitable for agriculture.
-DECS: sought exemption from CARP coverage on the ground that all the income derived from its
contract of lease with Anglo Agricultural Corporation were actually, directly and exclusively used for
educational purposes.
-DAR: the lands subject are not exempt from the CARP coverage because the same are not actually,
directly and exclusively used as school sites or campuses, as they are in fact leased to Anglo
Agricultural Corporation. Further, to be exempt from the coverage, it is the land per se, not the
income derived that must be actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.
HELD: I. We agree with the petitioner DAR that they are not exempted.
Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are exempted from the
coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption:
c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national
defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or
private schools for educational purposes, … , shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.
xxx xxx xxx
In order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the land must be “actually, directly, and exclusively used
and found to be necessary;” and 2) the purpose is “for school sites and campuses, including
experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes.”
The importance of the phrase “actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be
necessary” cannot be understated. The words of the law are clear and unambiguous. The “plain
meaning rule” or verba legis is applicable. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
We are not unaware of our ruling in the case of Central Mindanao University v. Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, wherein we declared the land subject exempt from CARP
coverage. However, DECS’ reliance is misplaced because the factual circumstances are different in
the case at bar.

PROV. OF CAMARINES SUR vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993
FACTS:
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed
Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate
property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and
non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government employees.
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province, through its Governor, Hon. Luis R. Villafuerte, filed two
separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered
for their property.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the
amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may
suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of
possession in an order dated January18, 1990.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated that
under Section 9 of the Local Government Code, there was no need for the approval by the Office of
the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain.
However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first
secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of
petitioners for use as a housing project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to
take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the
amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings
until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private
respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.
ISSUE 1: WON, the expropriation was for a public purpose.
YES. Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of "public purpose"
or "public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept was that
the condemned property must actually be used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public
plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use".
Under the new concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends
to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community , like a resort
complex for tourists or housing project (Heirs of Juancho Ardano v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983];
Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SC.RA 461 [1987]).
The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a public purpose .
The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of
the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to
the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage
industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The
housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution. As held in
Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a
matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the
environment and in sum the general welfare."
ISSUE 2: WON a local government unit needs the approval of the DAR to reclassify land before it
can expropriate it.
The power of expropriation is superior to the power to distribute lands under the land reform
program. (Juancho Ardana v Reyes).
It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it
only when expressly authorized by the legislature. It is also true that in delegating the power to
expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on
the exercise thereof by the local governments. While such delegated power may be a limited
authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated
power must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other legislations.
Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local
Government Code, which provides:
A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its
sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public
use or purpose.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government units must first secure
the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-
agricultural use before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is
no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation
of agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform.
Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or
constricted by implication.
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer
expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc,
without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian
Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it
would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a
public purpose or public use.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the
use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of
legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only when a
particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use. While this case is pending RA 7881 was approved by Congress amending RA 6657.

There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how broad their terms are, do not
Issue: Whether or not RA 6657 is unconstitutional.
embrace the sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as subject thereto.

The orders of the CA nullifying the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of private respondents' property and requiring the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain Decision: Petition dismissed. R.A. No. 7881 approved by Congress on 20 February 1995 expressly
the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents' state that fishponds and prawn farms are excluded from the coverage of CARL. In view of the
property from agricultural to non-agricultural use are set aside.
foregoing, the question concerning the constitutionality of the assailed provisions has become moot
and academic with the passage of R.A. No. 7881.
● Although local governments do not have inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it
only when expressly authorized by legislature, and the latter may retain certain control or impose
certain restraints on the exercise thereof, such delegated power although limited it is complete
within its limits. Nothing in the LGC limits this power by requiring the approval of DAR. Likewise,
there is nothing in CAR law which expressly subjects such expropriations under the control of DAR.
SANCHEZ V MARIN
(Doctrine of Adherence of Jurisdiction)

FACTS:
Atlas Fertilizer Corp vs DAR
GR No 97855 June 19, 1997
David Felix owned a fishpond. Jaime Sanchez was instituted as a tenant on the said fishpond, with a
50/50 sharing agreement. After a few years, Felix sold and transferred ownership of the subject
Facts:
fishpond to the Marins.
This is a consolidated case questioning the constitutionality Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32
of RA 6657. That the said provision extends agrarian reform to aquaculture lands even as Sec. 4 of
As new owners of the fishpond, they entered into a civil law agreement with their mother, Zemaida,
Art. XIII of the Constitution limits agrarian reform only to agricultural lands.
which was renewable yearly. Zenaida then made an arrangement with Sanchez wherein Sanchez
would receive a regular salary and a 20%share in the net profit of the fishpond.
The said provisions being violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution by similarly
treating of aquaculture and agriculture lands when they are differently situated.
When her lease agreement with her children expired, Zenaida ordered Sanchez to vacate the
premises. Sanchez refused, asserting that he was a tenant of the fishpond and not a mere
That the said provisions distort employment benefits and burdens in favor of aquaculture
contractual worker; hence, he had the right to its peaceful possession and security of tenure. On 21
employees and against other industrial workers even as Section 1 and 3 of Art. XIII of the
July 1986, the petitioner filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, in
Constitution mandates the State to promote equality in economic and employment opportunities
which he asked the court to declare him as a tenant of the subject fishpond. On 20 July 1987, the
and that the questioned provisions deprived petitioner of its government-induced investments in
RTC of Lucena City rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioner,
aquaculture even as Sec. 2 and 3 of Art. XIII of the Constitution mandate the State to respect the
freedom of enterprise and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns of investments and to
As Sanchez was already declared as an agricultural tenant of the fishpond, he filed a petition to the
expansion and growth.
ProvincialAgrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) for the fixing of leasehold rentals for his use of the
fishpond.
In the petitioner's argument they contended that in the case of Luz Farms, Inc v. Secretary of
Agrarian and Reform, the Court has already ruled impliedly that lands devoted to fishing are not
However, Zenaida countered this application by filing a case with the PARAD to eject Sanchez for
agricultural lands.
failure to pay the rent and for failure to render an accounting. The PARAD consolidated the 2 cases
and ruled in favor of Sanchez.
That in aquaculture, fishponds and prawn farms, the use of land is only incidental to and not the
principal factor in productivity and hence, as held in the above-mentioned case, they too should be
Zenaida appealed to the DARAB, which affirmed the PARAD decision. The CA reversed the ruling,
excluded from RA 6657 just as land devoted to livestock, swine, and poultry have been excluded for
stating that the DARAB lacked jurisdiction over the case. It stated that Sec. 2 of RA 7881, which
the same reason.
amended Sec. 10 of RA 6657, excluded private lands actually, directly, and exclusively used for prawn
farms and fishponds from the coverage of the CARL, so that the operation of a fishpond is no longer
considered an agricultural activity. Since the cases are not agrarian disputes, then the DARAB could
not have validly acquired jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE:
W/N the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:
YES. The present case was instituted as early as 1991 when the law applicable was still RA 6657, and
fishponds and prawn farms were not yet exempted/excluded from the CARL coverage. At that time,
there was an agrarian dispute between the parties.

Prior to the enactment of RA 7881 in 1995, the case was already pending appeal before the DARAB.
And being in the nature of a substantive law, the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7881
to Republic Act No.6657 in the year 1995 cannot be given a retroactive application as to deprive the
petitioner of his rights under the previous agrarian legislation.

Hence, the aforesaid amendments cannot be made to apply to divest the DARAB of its jurisdiction of
the case. Once jurisdiction is acquired by the court, it remains with it until the full termination of the
case.