You are on page 1of 7

MATALIN COCONUT CO., INC. vs. THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF MALABANG, LANAO DEL SUR, AMIR M.

BALINDONG and HADJI PANGILAMUN MANALOCON, MUNICIPAL MAYOR and MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF
MALABANG, LANAO DEL SUR
G.R. No. L-28138. August 13, 1986

Doctrine: In Matalin Coconut v. Municipal Council of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, 143 SCRA 404, an ordinance
imposing P0.30 police inspection fee per sack of cassava flour produced and shipped out of the municipality
was held invalid. It is not a license fee but a tax, unjust and unreasonable, since the only service of the
municipality is for the policeman to verify from the drivers of trucks of petitioner the number of sacks actually
loaded.

Facts:
o Municipal Council of Malabang, Lanao del Surenacted Municipal Ordinance No. 45-46, entitled "AN
ORDINANCE IMPOSING A POLICE INSPECTION FEE OF P.30 PER SACK OF CASSAVA STARCH
PRODUCED AND SHIPPED OUT OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG AND IMPOSING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS THEREOF."
o The ordinance made it unlawful for any person, company or group of persons "to ship out of the
Municipality of Malabang, cassava starch or flour without paying to the Municipal Treasurer or his
authorized representatives the corresponding fee fixed by (the) ordinance."
o The validity of the ordinance was challenged by the Matalin Coconut, Inc. in a petition for
declaratory relief –– alleging among others that the ordinance is not only ultra vires, being violative
of RA No. 2264, but also unreasonable, oppressive and confiscatory, the petitioner prayed that the
ordinance be declared null and void ab initio, and that the respondent Municipal Treasurer be
ordered to refund the amounts paid by petitioner under the ordinance.
o Claiming that it was also adversely affected by the ordinance, Purakan Plantation Company was
granted leave to intervene in the action –– alleged that while its cassava flour factory was situated
in another municipality, it had to transport the cassava starch and flour it produced to the seashore
through the Municipality of Malabang for loading in coastwise vessels; that the effect of the
enactment of the ordinance is that intervenor had to refrain from transporting its products through
the Municipality of Malabang in order to ship them by sea to other places.
o Court a quo rendered a decision declaring the municipal ordinance in question null and void
o Respondents appealed to this Court but was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the ordinance enacted by respondent Municipal Council is valid

Held: NO.
Since the enactment of the Local Autonomy Act, a liberal rule has been followed by this Court in construing
municipal ordinances enacted pursuant to the taxing power granted under Section 2 of said law. This Court
has construed the grant of power to tax under the above-mentioned provision as sufficiently plenary to cover
"everything, excepting those which are mentioned" therein, subject only to the limitation that the tax so levied
is for public purposes, just and uniform.

We agree with the finding of the trial court that the amount collected under the ordinance in question
partakes of the nature of a tax, although denominated as "police inspection fee" since its undeniable purpose
is to raise revenue. However, we cannot agree with the trial court's finding that the tax imposed by the
ordinance is a percentage tax on sales which is beyond the scope of the municipality's authority to levy
under Section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act. Under the said provision, municipalities and municipal districts
are prohibited from imposing "any percentage tax on sales or other taxes in any form based thereon." The
tax imposed under the ordinance in question is not a percentage tax on sales or any other form of tax based
on sales. It is a fixed tax of P.30 per bag of cassava starch or flour "shipped out" of the municipality. It is not
based on sales.

However, the tax imposed under the ordinance can be stricken down on another ground. According to
Section 2 of the abovementioned Act, the tax levied must be "for public purposes, just and uniform" As
correctly held by the trial court, the so called "police inspection fee" levied by the ordinance is "unjust and
unreasonable."
IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF MUNICIPAL
ORDINANCE NO. 3659 OF THE CITY OF MANILA. PHYSICAL THERAPY ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
vs. THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY OF MANILA and ARSENIO H. LACSON, as Mayor of the City of Manila
G.R. No. L-10448. August 30, 1957

Doctrine: In Physical Therapy Organization of the Philippines v. Municipal Board of Manila, it was held that
where police power is used to discourage non-useful occupations or enterprises, an annual permit/license
fee of P100.00, although a bit exorbitant, is valid.

Facts:
o The petitioner-appellant, an association of registered massagists and licensed operators of massage
clinics filed an action for declaratory judgment and petition for injunction regarding the validity of
Municipal Ordinance No. 3659
o Trial court dismissed the petition and later dissolved the writ of injunction previously issued.
o Appellants’ main contention: that Manila City is without authority to regulate the operation of
massagists and the operation of massage clinics within its jurisdiction –– that such power has been
withdrawn or omitted and that now the Director of Health, pursuant to authority conferred by Section
938 of the Revised Administrative Code and Executive Order No. 317, series of 1941, as amended by
Executive Order No. 392, series, 1951, is the one who exercises supervision over the practice of
massage and over massage clinics in the Philippines. Plus, contends that license fee of P100.00 for
operator in Section 2 of the Ordinance is unreasonable, may, unconscionable.

Issue: Whether or not City of Manila is without authority to regulate the operation of massagists and the
operation of massage clinics within its jurisdiction

Held: NO.
As to the authority of the City Board to enact the Ordinance in question, the City Fiscal, in representation of
the appellees, calls our attention to Section 18 of the New Charter of the City of Manila, Republic Act No.
409, which gives legislative powers to the Municipal Board to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary
and proper for the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general
welfare of the City and its inhabitants. This is generally referred to as the General Welfare Clause, a delegation
in statutory form of the police power, under which municipal corporations are authorized to enact ordinances
to provide for the health and safety, and promote the morality, peace and general welfare of its inhabitants.

It would appear to us that the purpose of the Ordinance is not to regulate the practice of massage, much
less to restrict the practice of licensed and qualified massagists of therapeutic massage in the Philippines.
The end sought to be attained in the Ordinance is to prevent the commission of immorality and the practice
of prostitution in an establishment masquerading as a massage clinic where the operators thereof offer to
massage or manipulate superficial parts of the bodies of customers for hygienic and aesthetic purposes. This
intention can readily be understood by the building requirements in Section 3 of the Ordinance, requiring
that there be separate rooms for male and female customers; that instead of said rooms being separated
by permanent partitions and swinging doors, there should only be sliding curtains between them; that there
should be "no private rooms or separated compartments, except those assigned for toilet, lavatories, dressing
room, office or kitchen"; that every massage clinic should be provided with only one entrance and shall have
no direct or indirect communication whatsoever with any dwelling place, house or building; and that no
operator, massagist, attendant or helper will be allowed "to use or allow the use of a massage clinic as a
place of assignation or permit the commission therein of any immoral or indecent act", and in fixing the
operating hours of such clinic between 8:00 a.m. and 11:00 p.m. This intention of the Ordinance was correctly
ascertained by Judge Hermogenes Concepcion, presiding in the trial court, in his order of dismissal where he
said: "What the Ordinance tries to avoid is that the massage clinic run by an operator who may not be a
masseur or massagists may be used as cover for the running or maintaining a house of prostitution."

We do not believe that the Municipal Board of the City of Manila and the Mayor wanted or intended to
regulate the practice of massage in general or restrict the same to hygienic and aesthetic only.

Evidently, the Manila Municipal Board considered the practice of hygienic and aesthetic massage not as a
useful and beneficial occupation which will promote and is conducive to public morals, and consequently,
imposed the said permit fee for its regulation.
PHILIPPINE GAMEFOWL COMMISSION AND HEE ACUSAR vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MAYOR
CELESTINO E. MARTINEZ, JR., THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF BOGO (CEBU), and SANTIAGO SEVILLA
G.R. Nos. 72969-70. December 17, 1986

Doctrine: Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 146 SCRA 294, reiterated in
Deang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, is authority for the rule that the power to issue permits to operate
cockpits is vested in the Mayor, in line with the policy of local autonomy.

Facts:
o Hee Acusar, who was operating the lone cockpit in Bogo, was ordered to relocate the same
pursuant to P.D. No. 449, the Cockfighting Law of 1974, on the ground that it was situated in a tertiary
commercial zone, a prohibited area.
o Although the period of grace for such relocation was extended to June 11, 1980 by P.D. 1535, Acusar
failed to comply with the requirement, as a result of which the Philippine Constabulary considered
the cockpit phased out.
o CFI declared that he had waived his right to a renewal of license because of his failure to relocate.
o Santiago Sevilla, private respondent herein, was granted a license to operate a cockpit by Mayor
Celestino E. Martinez by authority of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bogo and with subsequent approval
of the PC Regional Command 7 as required by law.
o As only one cockpit is allowed by law in cities or municipalities with a population of not more than
100k. Acusar sued to revoke this license but was dismissed by the court.
o Acusar went to the Philippine Gamefowl Commission seeking a renewal of his cockpit license and
the cancellation of Sevilla's where he succeeded initially with the issuance by the PGC, allowing him
to temporarily operate his cockpit.
o This was challenged in two separate actions filed by Sevilla and the municipal government of Bogo
o PGC then issued its resolution on the merits of Acusar's petition and ordered Mayor Martinez and the
Sangguniang Bayan "to issue the necessary mayor's permit in favor of Hee Acusar" and "to cancel
and/or revoke the mayor's permit in favor of Engr. Santiago A. Sevilla." The Commission also
"RESOLVED to issue the Registration Certificate of Hee Acusar for the current year 1984 and revoke
the Registration Certificate of Engr. Santiago A. Sevilla."
o The above-stated resolution was on appeal and declared null and void by the Intermediate Court
of Appeals, and its decision is now before us in a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not CA’s descision in revoking Acusar’s license shall be upheld

Held: YES.
According to the Local Government Code, the municipal mayor has the power to "grant licenses and permits
in accordance with existing laws and municipal ordinances and revoke them for violation of the conditions
upon which they have been granted," and the Sangguniang Bayan is authorized to 'regulate cockpits,
cockfighting and the keeping or training of gamecocks, subject to existing guidelines promulgated by the
Philippine Gamefowl Commission."

A study of the abovecited powers shows that it is the municipal mayor with the authorization of the
Sangguniang Bayan that has the primary power to issue licenses for the operation of ordinary cockpits. Even
the regulation of cockpits is vested in the municipal officials, subject only to the guidelines laid down by the
PGC. Its power to license is limited only to international derbies and does not extend to ordinary cockpits.
Over the latter kind of cockpits, it has the power not of control but only of review and supervision.

We have consistently held that supervision means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that their subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may
take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties." Supervision is a lesser
power than control, which connotes "the power of the officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that
of the latter." Review, on the other hand, is a reconsideration or reexamination for purposes of correction. As
thus defined, the power of supervision does not allow the supervisor to annul the acts of the subordinate, for
that comes under the power of control. What it can do only is to see to it that the subordinate performs his
duties in accordance with law. The power of review is exercised to determine whether it is necessary to
correct the acts of the subordinate. If such correction is necessary, it must be done by the authority exercising
control over the subordinate or through the instrumentality of the courts of justice, unless the subordinate
motu propio corrects himself after his error is called to his attention by the official exercising the power of
supervision and review over him.

The power of review vested in the PGC by P.D. 1802-A have been modified by the local Government Code,
which became effective on February 14, 1983. Under the Code, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is supposed
to examine the ordinance, resolutions and executive orders issued by the municipal government and to
annul the same, but only on one ground, to wit, that it is beyond the powers of the municipality or ultra vires.
Significantly, no similar authority is conferred in such categorical terms on the Philippine Gamefowl
Commission regarding the licensing and regulation of cockpits by the municipal government.

We accept the factual findings of the respondent court that Acusar's cockpits was within the prohibited area
and was therefore correctly considered phased out when its operator failed to relocate it as required by law.
According to the Court of Appeals, "it is not controverted that Acusar's cockpit is near a Roman Catholic
church, near the Cebu Roosevelt Memorial College, near residential dwelling and near a public market."
These circumstances should be more than enough to disqualify Acusar even under the prior-operator rule he
invokes, assuming that rule was applicable.

VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, RENATO ALIPIO, JOSE TORRES III, LEONCIO CORPUZ, TERESITA CALOT, ROSALIA
FERNANDEZ, ELIZABETH VELASCO, NANETTE VILLANUEVA, HONORATO BUENAVENTURA, RUBEN DE CASTRO,
VICENTE ROXAS, RICARDO DAMIAN, DOMDINO ROMDINA, ANGELINA OBLIGACION, CONRADO GREGORIO,
TEODORO REYES, LYDIA ATRACTIVO, NAPOLEON MENDOZA, PERFECTO GUMATAY, ANDRES SABANGAN,
ROSITA DURAN, SOCORRO BERNARDEZ, and PEDRO GABRIEL vs. THE HONORABLE EDGARDO L. PARAS, MATIAS
RAMIREZ as the Municipal Mayor, MARIO MENDOZA as the Municipal Vice-Mayor, and THE MUNICIPAL
COUNCIL OF BOCAUE, BULACAN
G.R. Nos. L-42571-72. July 25, 1983

Doctrine: In De la Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569, the Bocaue, Bulacan ordinance prohibiting the operation of
night-clubs, was declared invalid, because of its prohibitory, not merely regulatory, character .

Facts:
o 2 cases for prohibition with preliminary injunction were filed alleging that:
a) Ordinance No. 84 is null and void as a municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful
business, occupation or calling.
b) Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the petitioners' right to due process and the equal protection
of the law, as the license previously given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn without
judicial hearing.
c) That under PD No. 189, as amended, by PD No. 259, the power to license and regulate
tourist-oriented businesses including night clubs, has been transferred to the DOT.
o Respondent Judge issued a restraining order and answers were thereafter filed.
o Petitioners Vicente de la Cruz, et al. had been previously issued licenses by the Municipal Mayor of
Bocaue since 1958; petitioner Vicente de la Cruz, since 1960; petitioner Renato Alipio, since 1961
and petitioner Leoncio Corpuz, since 1972;
o Petitioners had invested large sums of money in their businesses –– said that the night clubs are well-
lighted and have no partitions, the tables being near each other; and that the petitioners
owners/operators of these clubs do not allow the hospitality girls therein to engage in immoral acts
and to go out with customers; plus these hospitality girls are made to go through periodic medical
check-ups and not one of them is suffering from any venereal disease and that those who fail to
submit to a medical checkup or those who are found to be infected with venereal disease are not
allowed to work.
o Then came the decision upholding the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and
dismissing the cases. Restraining orders are lifted.
o Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.
Issue: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade,
the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses.

Held: NO.
The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may
be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such
as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve
the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof,
and for the protection of property therein." It is practically a reproduction of the former Section 39 of
Municipal Code.

"The general welfare clause has two branches:


a. One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority and relates to such ordinances
and regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred upon the municipal council by law. With this class we are not here directly concerned.
b. The second branch of the clause is much more independent of the specific functions of the council
which are enumerated by law. It authorizes such ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to
provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order,
comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection
of property therein.'
It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause
must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not
inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State."

If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass
the test of validity. In the two leading cases above set forth, this Court had stressed reasonableness,
consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the
laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue
could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable
end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly, the ordinance on
its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by
reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The admonition in Salaveria should be heeded:
"The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or
property rights under the guise of police regulation." It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there
was in this instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals
desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the investments made and salaries to be
earned by those therein employed.

The conclusion reached by this Court is not to be interpreted as a retreat from its resolute stand sustaining
police power legislation to promote public morals. The commitment to such an ideal forbids such a
backward step. Legislation of that character is deserving of the fullest sympathy from the judiciary.
Accordingly, the judiciary has not been hesitant to lend the weight of its support to measures that can be
characterized as falling within that aspect of the police power. Reference is made by respondents to Ermita-
Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. 28 There is a misapprehension
as to what was decided by this Court. That was a regulatory measure. Necessarily, there was no valid
objection on due process or equal protection grounds. It did not prohibit motels. It merely regulated the
mode in which it may conduct business in order precisely to put an end to practices which could encourage
vice and immorality, this is an entirely different case. What was involved is a measure not embraced within
the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. Moreover, while it was pointed out in
the aforesaid Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. decision that there must be a
factual foundation of invalidity, it was likewise made clear that there is no need to satisfy such a requirement
if a statute were void on its face. That it certainly is if the power to enact such ordinance is at the most dubious
and under the present Local Government Code non-existent.

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY vs. HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA
as Judge of the CFI of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC.
G.R. No. L-34915. June 24, 1983
Doctrine: In Quezon City v. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759, the ordinance requiring owners of commercial cemeteries
to reserve 6% of their burial lots for burial grounds of paupers was held invalid; it was not an exercise of the
police power, but of eminent domain.

Facts:
o Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN
THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF"
provides:
"Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set
aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of
Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City
Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open
for operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application."
o For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but
seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the following
resolution: "RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby request the
City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in
Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for
paupers burial."
o Respondent Himlayang Pilipino filed a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question –– alleging that the
same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the
Revised Administrative Code.
o The respondent court, rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance null and void.
o MR denied, the City Government and City Council filed the instant petition –– arguing that the taking
of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is
taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the
Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, "to make
such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Act."
o While, Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious
because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot
be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.
o The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is NOT available as a source of power
for the taking of the property in this case because it refers to "the power of promoting the public
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property."

Issue: Whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power

Held: NO.
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least 6% of the total area of all private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order,
safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a
certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation.
Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private
cemeteries.

The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of
Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial
of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject
to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government
Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang Panlungsod may "provide
for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply
authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct
public cemeteries. This has been the law and practice in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation,
however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and
regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and
other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety,
health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the
development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the
regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to
homeowners.

As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the
municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The
clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation, but we CANNOT STRETCH it to cover this
particular taking. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had
incorporated, received necessary licenses and permits, and commenced operating. The sequestration of
6% of the cemetery cannot even be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the private
respondent when it accepted the permits to commence operations.

You might also like