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THE RECIPROCITY OF JOURNALISM'S SOCIAL CONTRACT

Helle Sjøvaag

First published on: 05 November 2010

To cite this Article Sjøvaag, Helle(2010) 'THE RECIPROCITY OF JOURNALISM'S SOCIAL CONTRACT', Journalism
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 THE RECIPROCITY OF JOURNALISM’S
SOCIAL CONTRACT
The political-philosophical foundations of
journalistic ideology

Helle Sjøvaag
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This article traces the political-philosophical background of journalism’s social contract

metaphor. The social contract of the press finds its professional ideal in the intersection
between republican and liberal philosophies originating with the classical philosophies of
Rousseau, Locke and Hobbes. From these origins, the mechanism of contractual reciprocity is
appropriated to the relationship between journalism and its audiences to expose hidden
ideological traits within the profession. The concepts of rights and obligations found within a
contractarian perspective thus offer a new way of conceptualising the role of journalism in
democracy and the function of journalistic ideology. The press’ social contract ideology entails a
professional world-view that establishes journalism as a separate contractual partner with a
mission to sustain the democratic order as it is expressed in the original political-philosophical
social contract. This theoretical investigation of the ideological link between the two contractual
metaphors reveals how journalism functions according to the contractual reciprocity principle,
particularly with regard to its expectations of balanced rights and obligations within the
democratic order.

KEYWORDS journalism; professional ideology; reciprocity; social contract theory

Introduction
The journalistic social contract*the metaphor used to describe the democratic
‘‘mission’’ of the press*finds its legitimacy claim in the political-philosophical tradition in
which it originates. By tracing the social contract metaphor through its origins in the
political-philosophical traditions of liberalism and republicanism, the concept of rights and
obligations within a contractual relationship provides explanation and justification for the
role of the press1 in democracy. The social contract metaphor also explains the necessity of
journalistic ideology in maintaining the function of the press within this system. The
centrality of the social contract metaphor to the moral and legal standing of the press in
liberal democracies should entice us to investigate its ideological usefulness to journalism.
Within journalism’s contractarian world-view, journalism entails a contractual partner in its
own right, not just a communicator between the public and the state. This perspective
provides an entry point to theorise about the distribution of rights and responsibilities
within the journalistic social contract.

Journalism Studies, Vol. 11, No 6, 2010, 874888

ISSN 1461-670X print/1469-9699 online
– 2010 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/14616701003644044
 RECIPROCITY OF JOURNALISM’S SOCIAL CONTRACT 875

Social Contract Theory in Journalism Research

The social contract remains largely unexplored by media and communication
scholars. Journalism researchers sometimes mention it in conjunction with the democratic
‘‘mission’’ of the press (e.g. Entman, 2005, p. 62), while political communication and media
ethics refer either normatively or critically to the contract in reference to some notion of
journalistic responsibility (e.g. Kieran, 2000, p. 156; McQuail, 2003, p. 7). Overall, most
points of departures that address the social contract of the press concern journalism’s
democratic role in providing citizens with the information they need to make informed
decisions when electing governments and participating in the public debate between
elections (Schudson, 2008, p. 15; Siebert et al., 1956, pp. 25). The press is predominantly
seen here as serving the public by facilitating democratic debate and deliberation. For the
most part then, the concept frequently referred to in contractual terms revolves around
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journalistic responsibility to the public or the citizenry, by way of a loyalty to citizens that
entails an ‘‘implied covenant with the public’’ (Kovach and Rosenstiel, 2001, pp. 512).
Specific discussions of a journalistic social contract are scarce, but the relevant
researchers who address the concept directly include media ethicist Matthew Kieran,
Norwegian press historian Odd Raaum, Swedish media researcher Jesper Strömbäck, Denis
McQuail, Herbert Altschull and Deni Elliott. Kieran ties professional ethics and standards to
an ‘‘implicit contract’’*establishing contractual principles to be based on some
agreement between the citizenry and the journalistic institution of what constitutes
‘‘good journalism’’ (Kieran, 1997, pp. 269). Raaum references contractual aspects in
discussions of journalistic professionalism, public legitimacy and professional ideology
(1999, p. 9), observing that the contract entails a mission that, at the highest level of
abstraction, remains an oppositional force to the three formal branches of state power
(Raaum, 1999, p. 66). Strömbäck makes a specific reference to the social contract as
journalism’s obligation to provide ‘‘citizens with the information they need in order to be
free and self-governing, [and] the government with the information it needs in order to
make decisions in the common interest sensitive to public sentiments’’ (2005, p. 332),
predominantly through its watchdog function. In McQuail’s treatment of media account-
ability, a contractual relationship between the media and society is referred to as the self-
imposed and non-binding responsibilities on the part of the press*promises ‘‘found in
editorial mission statements or implicitly in the composition or content’’ of the media
(2003, p. 203). Deni Elliott describes media obligations to society as promises by way of
‘‘moral contracts’’ that ensures journalism provides ‘‘accurate material of interest and
importance’’ (1986, p. 39). Furthermore, Altschull’s account of the philosophical ideas
behind American journalism usefully addresses how liberal-democratic ideals have shaped
journalistic ideology, among them the Hobbesian social contract (1990, pp. 438).
However, although the social contract as metaphorical concept in journalism is implicit
in much journalism research, it has yet to be explored in theoretical detail in relation to its
political-philosophical origins.

Journalism and Models of Democracy

The theoretical investigation undertaken in this article aims to do so on a highly
general level. The premise for this endeavour is that the discourse surrounding the
journalistic social contract is founded on social contract theory within political philosophy.
To express it somewhat crudely, as there is a direct semantic relationship here, there
 876 HELLE SJØVAAG

should also be a theoretical and ideological link between the political social contract and
the social contract of the press, seeing as journalism in fact surrounds itself with this type
of borrowed discourse. The question is why this is so, and what this entails for how we
conceptualise journalism. Most theories that address the role of journalism in democracy
understand the function of the press differently according to various models of
democracy. Systematisations of this kind are helpful but can vary to such a degree that
to attempt to appropriate journalistic social contract ideology into such classifications is
beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, a brief reference to how the media within
democratic systems have been classified provides insight into how the ideals embedded in
the liberal and republican traditions are understood within media studies.
Generally, media models are broadly divided into geographical regions or according
to systems of rule (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Siebert et al., 1956); designated to historical
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periods (Curran and Seaton, 1991; McQuail, 2003), or theoretically systemised according to
the role of the media in democratic processes (Ferree et al., 2002; Strömbäck, 2005). All
classifications divide either implicitly or explicitly between liberal and republican traditions.
C. Edwin Baker distinguishes between elitist theories, liberal pluralist theories and
republican theories of media and democracy. Liberalism sees democracy as the
aggregation of individual interest, while republicanism emphasises participation, collective
ideals and public goals (Baker, 2002, p. 126). Alternative ethical and normative conceptions
of media-democratic systems include deliberate democratic theory and communitarian-
ism. These theories are critical of the media’s function in democracy and suggest remedies
to improve democratic participation. Jürgen Habermas, for instance, criticises liberal media
systems and proposes that ‘‘the mass media ought to understand themselves as the
mandatory of an enlightened public whose willingness to learn and capacity for criticism
they at once presuppose, demand, and reinforce’’ (1996, p. 378). Habermas’ theory of
communicative action is republican-inspired, however not to the same extent as
communitarianism, which recommends an ethical media model for news reporting that
is ‘‘grounded in community, aiming for civic transformation, and operating by the principle
of mutuality’’ (Christians et al., 1993, p. 15). McQuail maintains that the social responsibility
theory that began with the Hutchins Commission (see below) retains a growing influence
in the development of media systems in most democracies in the world, at least in
Northern Europe (McQuail, 2003, pp. 545; Siebert et al., 1956, p. 5). Hallin and Mancini*
lately criticised for collapsing highly differentiated national systems into categories that
are too broad (e.g. Thorbjørnsrud, 2009)*propose on the other hand that Western media
systems are converging towards the liberal model, particularly in areas of political
parallelism and journalistic professionalism (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, pp. 294301).
Whatever strand of media-democratic framework dominates theoretical and practical
trends in modern democracies today, the evident entanglement of liberal and republican
philosophies into journalistic social contract principles provides an entry point to theorise
about the function of journalistic ideology.

Mixed Liberal-Republican Systems

The term ‘‘social contract’’ suggests a common agreement with far-reaching
jurisdiction. What lies in the metaphoric concept of contract is that two or more partners
have freely entered into an agreement that serves a common goal between them, where
that goal is attained by the fulfilment of duties that are ensured by the reciprocity of rights
 RECIPROCITY OF JOURNALISM’S SOCIAL CONTRACT 877

and obligations. In political-philosophical terms, the social contract is an agreement

between the state and the citizenry. Rights and obligations in statepublic relations are
regulated through governmental systems such as parliamentarism, republicanism or
constitutional monarchy, through checks and balances established by the three branches
of government, and based on the sovereignty principle and the rule of law. The concept of
contractual rights and obligations was established by the sovereignty principle of the
philosophical tradition of republicanism, as well as freedom of speech and the right to
property principles coming from the political philosophy of liberalism. Republican
principles are largely positive rights*or rights to*such as right to representation, right
to due process, and right to state education. Liberal principles are largely negative rights*
or freedom from*such as freedom from regulation of markets, freedom from restrictions
on expression, and freedom from restrictions on religious belief. Rights and obligations
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regulate the contractual relationships through these negative and positive rights.
Questions regarding media regulation and normative journalistic standards within
liberal democracies can be rationalised as a negotiation between the negatively defined
liberal freedoms and the positively defined republican regulations (Hallin and Mancini,
2004, pp. 1011). Indeed it is this very tension between positive and negative liberties
which underlies much of the historical and normative research on the press, but whose
origin is seldom expressed as derived from the political-philosophy of social contractar-
ianism. The social contract metaphor reveals the press as an integral part of democratic
theory and launches a broader understanding of press ideology in which the development
of the Fourth Estate is bound to the frictions between liberal ideals and the morality of the
state (Siebert et al., 1956, pp. 5, 40, 51). Particularly within liberal media systems
exemplified by the United States, regulation challenges to the liberal paradigm are argued
with great care towards republican ideals, such as by the Hutchins Commission in their
1947 report on ‘‘A Free and Responsible Press’’. The Commission states that,
[T]he insistence of the citizen’s need has increased. He is dependent on the quality,
proportion, and extent of his news supply, not only for his personal access to the world
of event, thought, and feeling, but also for the materials of his duties as a citizen and
judge of public affairs. The soundness of his argument affects the working of the state
and even the peace of the world, involving the survival of the state as a free community.
Under these circumstances it becomes an imperative question whether the performance
of the press can any longer be left to the unregulated initiative of the few who manage it.
(Leigh, 1947, p. 17)

The Hutchins Commission expresses concern over the concentration of media

ownership in the United States immediately after the Second World War. It places the
greatest moral burden of upholding a vibrant press on journalism itself, but also holds the
citizenry responsible and accountable for the state of democracy. Media regulation here is
negatively defined, to the extent that government is only to regulate to curtail any
tendencies to monopoly and consequently the reduction of active voices in the public
sphere. The Commission argues defensively and conditionally in favour of government
regulation. Such a mixed liberal-republican argument is echoed in many liberal
democracies, but from the opposite vantage point. As such, the statemedia systems
within liberal-democratic countries are decidedly mixed liberal-republican systems (Hallin
and Mancini, 2004). We might credit this mix to the shared political-philosophical origins of
the state*i.e. the social contract so common to liberal democracies.
 878 HELLE SJØVAAG

The Origins of the Social Contract of the Press

The division of political-philosophical theory into liberal and republican traditions has
significance for the ideals on which the press rests. The two strands together make up the
press’ social contract ideal. Liberal principles, on which press freedom rests, simultaneously
provide the press with authority and justification for this legitimacy. The social contract of
the press, and journalism’s ‘‘mission’’ in democracy, derives its legitimation from republican
‘‘common good’’ principles, while this legitimacy in turn rests on the justifications of
liberalism*i.e. the tenets of the freedom of speech. Pressstate relations are predomi-
nantly administered by legal aspects that regulate the exchange of rights and obligations
between these two contractual partners. Regulations to ensure plurality and access are
positively defined and republican-inspired measures to improve democracy, while laws
enforced to ensure the freedom of expression and publication are negatively defined and
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liberal-inspired to uphold individual freedoms. Journalism’s relationship to the public is

legally regulated to the extent that access to the media is based on negative rights
principles. Primarily, however, the presspublic relationship is administered by moral
regulations that urge audiences to trust news institutions*such as ethical codes of
conduct and professional ideology.
If we look at the reciprocity of contractual obligations from the vantage point of
how the media came to occupy its ideological space within the democratic order, the
‘‘how’’ of this question finds its dominion in the intersection between liberal-democratic
theories and the moral or republican philosophies of citizenship. Republican and liberal-
democratic theories intersect in the social contract theories that developed during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The central texts within this development are
Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651); John Locke’s Letter on Toleration (1689); Jean-Jacques
Rousseau’s The Social Contact (1762); and John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty (1860). Social
contract theories originate in philosophical arguments about freedom, property, religion,
and law. These theories attempt to refute man’s loss of freedom in the transition from
state of nature to civil union; to defend systems of rule; to argue in favour of moral and
lawful behaviour; to defend civil obedience; to argue in favour of the democratic order;
and to defend property rights.2
The free press arguments that came out of the liberalism of John Milton and John
Stuart Mill were originally constructed in favour of religious freedom and the ultimate
obtainment of truth (Mill, 1991 [1860]; Milton, 1999 [1644]). Hereto the press is seen as
essential in its facility as medium for bringing all opinions to light for the benefit of
strengthening the truth, and for allowing no possibility of truth to remain hidden or
obscured by restriction. The early defenders of the freedom of speech helped form the
conceptual understanding of representative government and active citizenship*involving
the public, through the press, in the system of checks and balances of the modern political
constitution. According to John Keane then, ‘‘A free press was considered a critical
ingredient of politics, understood as a precarious balance between rulers and those who
are ruled’’ (Keane, 1991, pp. 267). As such, it was the democratic duty of the citizenry ‘‘to
exercise vigilance in keeping the rulers from abusing their powers’’ (Keane, 1991, p. 27).
In the defence of freedom of speech lies the liberal notion of negative freedom.
Herein we find the dual concepts ‘‘rights’’ and ‘‘obligations’’ that bind society’s members
to the social contract. Given the centrality of freedom of expression to the legitimacy of
both democracy and the press, the liberal view offers support for a theory of reciprocal
contractual obligations for the press and the citizenry. Hobbes establishes that the social
 RECIPROCITY OF JOURNALISM’S SOCIAL CONTRACT 879

contract entails ‘‘the mutual transferring of Right’’ (Hobbes, 1968 [1651], pp. 1923)*
which in turn entails duties. When rights and obligations within society are seen as
directed by morals, republican ideas of how to attain the kind of society we want add a
further dimension to the metaphor. Rousseau’s (1998 [1792]) notion of a social contract is
built on social responsibility and co-operation for the good of society, in essence asking
that we set aside individual interests for the benefit of the best outcome for all. As ‘‘best
outcome’’ refers to the quality of democracy and civil and individual life, both the liberal
and the republican tradition offer support for a consideration of rights and obligations in
the relationship between journalism and the citizenry. Liberalism argues the inherent
reciprocity of the contractual relationship from the vantage point of negative rights, while
republicanism argues the reciprocity inherent in rights and obligations from the vantage
point of positive rights.
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The press has a powerful position in a society founded on liberal-democratic ideals.

Here, the press has been designated, in social contract terms, as the Fourth Estate of
government. The political system that grew out of the political philosophy of Edmund
Burke and Baron de Montesquieu is one of checks and balances*in which the judicial, the
legislative, and the executive estates of constituted society oversee each other.
The legitimacy of this division of power rests with the sovereignty of the citizenry, which
in republican terms forms a ‘‘common will’’ based on the desire for a good and just
society; and*in liberal terms*attains truth through the open contest of opinions in the
free marketplace of ideas. As the press and democracy largely developed simultaneously,
the task of forming such a ‘‘truth’’ or ‘‘common will’’ was designated to communicators of
the written word, i.e. the press. Immanuel Kant offers such an argument. According to
him, the legitimacy of the ruler rests with the people, and the safeguard of the system
depends on the freedom of the pen. Kant writes that,

Thus the citizen must, with the approval of the ruler, be entitled to make public his
opinion on whatever of the ruler’s measures seem to him to constitute an injustice
against the commonwealth . . . Thus freedom of the pen is the only safeguard of the rights
of the people, although it must not transcend the bonds of respect and devotion
towards the existing constitution, which should itself create a liberal attitude of mind
among the subjects. To try to deny the citizen this freedom does not only mean, as
Hobbes maintains, that the subject can claim no rights against the supreme ruler. It also
means withholding from the ruler all knowledge of those matters which, if he knew
about them, he would himself rectify. (1990 [1793], p. 135, italics in the original)

Kant here expresses the ideal that freedom of the pen is essential for the maintenance
of civil society. The idea that publicity and public rationality would strengthen democracy
began with this notion of communication (e.g. Holmes, 1990, p. 29). Eighteenth-century
publicist activities likely involved novelists and publishers rather than what we today
conceive of as journalism. Nevertheless, Kant defends the publicist ideals behind
journalism as vital components in the fulfilment of the contract itself. The role of the
press is to expose those errors in legislation which infringe upon the citizen’s freedoms.
Within the social contract, the press is thus a safeguard*that which ensures that the
contract functions as it ideally should. A benevolent social contract functions only if the
contractual partners live up to their contractual obligations. For the institution of the press
this entails bringing to light for the executive estate the unintended consequences of
legislation. For the executive it means rectifying errors brought to light by the press.
 880 HELLE SJØVAAG

This constitutes the reciprocity of contractual relations between the citizenry and the state,
and*as the press functions as the communicator of the citizenry*contractual relations
between the press and the state.
Whereas Kant expresses the role of the press in the social contract, the exact
designation of the press to this role is established by Thomas Carlyle in his definition of the
press as the Fourth Estate of society. This link is significant because contractarian thinkers
often outline the social contract structure by referring to the three estates of government.
Carlyle’s addition of a Fourth Estate places the press firmly within the political structure*
as intermediary between citizen and state, and as watchdog of the fulfilments of
contractual obligations on the part of the three estates of government. Carlyle (1841) says
that,

Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters’ Gallery yonder,
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there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than they all . . . Printing, which comes
necessarily out of Writing, I say often, is equivalent to Democracy: invent Writing,
Democracy is inevitable . . . Whoever can speak, speaking now to the whole nation,
becomes a power, a branch of government, with inalienable weight in law-making, in all
acts of authority. It matters not what rank he has, what revenues or garnitures. The
requisite thing is, that he have a tongue which others will listen to; this and nothing more
is requisite. The nation is governed by all that has tongue in the nation: Democracy is
virtually there.

In order to ensure that the democratic order is sustained, the social contract is
ultimately upheld by the citizen’s obligation to speak up against legislative errors, misuse
of power and social, moral and legal unfairness. Citizens need a medium in order that such
complaints and corrections be heard and amplified. Ultimately, societies become so
complex that citizens need journalists to fulfil this contractual obligation on their behalf.
The essence of these ideals promoted by Kant and Carlyle are of such universal nature that
they have become commonplace. Not only do these concepts enter democratic legislation
and legal frameworks through the efforts of the early rulers of the state, but the framework
of a social contact understanding of the place and function of journalism in democracy is
also embedded in the foundations of the modern press by well-read editors of early
metropolitan newspapers. And, as illustrated by the Hutchins Commission, Kant’s account
of the necessary balance of reciprocal rights and obligations within the social contract was
as amply reflected in 1947, as it is today.

Rights and Obligations Within the Social Contract

Embedded in the social contract notion of journalism and the press are also the
moral principles which warrant the legitimacy of the metaphor in the first place*those
which ensure the public that the press can be trusted with such a position of power and
responsibility. Thus, it also includes the ethical rules and responsibilities of the press
stipulated in the ethical guidelines of journalism and editors (e.g. McQuail, 2003, p. 298).
It further includes the professional practices and ideals with which the ethical standards
and the democratic and communicative goals are upheld, such as journalism’s
methodological ‘‘objectivity ideal’’. Together these ideals make up the metaphor of the
social contract of the press*a metaphor on which the press as institution and journalism
 RECIPROCITY OF JOURNALISM’S SOCIAL CONTRACT 881

as profession is greatly dependent, and from which they gain privilege, power, and
responsibility in democratic societies.
The idea that the news media, which according to the contract has obligations
towards the citizenry, should also have some measure of tacit rights with respect to its
audience is a largely overlooked aspect of journalism’s social contract. The question here is
not whether or not journalism in actual fact has rights of this kind that they can reasonably
claim. The point is rather to investigate theoretically whether the journalistic social
contract metaphor includes a reciprocal understanding of the contract that is hidden by
professional ideology. The political social contract embodies a balanced reciprocal
relationship between the state and citizenry. As the premise of this investigation is that
the journalistic social contract is directly founded on classic contractarian principles, we
should look for the presence of this reciprocal balance also within journalistic ideology.
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Carolyn Marvin and Philip Meyer emphasise the fact that journalism works in
conjunction with other institutions as well as with audiences in maintaining civic
responsibility. They claim that, ‘‘To expect journalists to assume the sole responsibility
for producing and managing the information environment is democratically unworkable’’
(Marvin and Meyer, 2005, p. 409). In effect, they say, this means citizens need to function as
quality control of the press’ work (Marvin and Meyer, 2005). Robert Picard shares this
approach as he claims audiences must consider their media use in light of the demands of
democratic participation (2005, p. 347). Kovach and Rosenstiel also address this issue of
audience responsibility, to the extent that audiences are responsible for judging
journalistic work ‘‘on the basis of whether it contributes to their ability to take an
informed part in shaping their society’’ (2001, p. 192). Likewise, Strömbäck maintains that
most media-democracy models ‘‘expect citizens to respect the democratic process and to
have some knowledge about society and politics’’ (2005, p. 339). McQuail argues similarly
when he notes that democratic political processes require ‘‘an informed electorate, a well-
formed and stable public opinion, and a readiness on the part of citizens to participate
actively’’ (2003, p. 6). Hence the government expects co-operation from media as well as
citizens. Hereunder, the function of the audience is to ‘‘exert pressure on larger issues’’ in
matters of public welfare (McQuail, 2003, p. 47).
The question of the distribution of rights and obligations relating to communication
within the social contract thus primarily focuses on the obligation of citizens as good and
critical media consumers. As shown above, Kant holds that the citizenry has an obligation
to uphold the social contract by raising its voice against injustice. The implied meaning
here is that citizens should react politically based on information provided by journalism
when this is democratically warranted. Kieran points out that the Lockean contractual
theory makes this argument in that ‘‘citizens must be made aware of the nature, workings
and characters of those in government so they are in a position to exercise their will as
citizens and judge those to whom power is entrusted on their behalf’’ (2000, p. 156).
Contractual philosophers thus place a democratic obligation on citizens to act on this
information that contemporary media theorists negate in their primary focus on critical
reception.
Looking at news media from a market perspective*as liberal philosophies tend to
do*this theoretical deficit is not surprising. If news is seen strictly as business, its
obligation is simply to give audiences more of what they want*which could
consequently mean giving them less of what they need. However, according to the social
contract ideal, the news media should itself be interested in maintaining a system in which
 882 HELLE SJØVAAG

it continues to enjoy its rights as the Fourth Estate. In a reciprocal communication

situation, equal rights are ensured, says the philosopher Onora O’Neill, through an
obligation-based theory of good that focuses on the rationality of the individual to obtain
‘‘good results’’ (1990, pp. 1579). In the same manner as the above-quoted media
researchers, O’Neill emphasises obligations as fundamental to ensure the protection of the
rights of communicating parties. When the social contract of the press is researched within
this moral-philosophical framework, the term often used is simply ‘‘‘the press’ social
contract obligations’’ (e.g. O’Neill, 1990, p. 167). The focus is therefore on the obligations of
the press, and the rights of citizens.
However, in the perspective of the journalistic social contract, obligations cannot be
designated as more fundamental than rights. It is precisely because of the reciprocal
premise of the social contract that individuals accept their obligations in order to retain
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rights. As the original contractual motivation for renouncing the state of nature is right
from harm, the two must be seen as morally equal. In liberal democratic theory as well as
in journalistic ethical codes of conduct, the press is ascribed both rights and obligations
towards the public. Within the same framework, however, the public is ascribed only
rights. Citizens’ rights are the same as the basic press rights*right to information, right to
speak, and right to print. Liberal rights do not discriminate between communicators in the
public sphere, but treat both news media and audiences as communicating agents. In the
social contract division of political estates, however, the citizenry has a place of its own in
relation to the media and to the rulers. The citizenry is ‘‘the public’’, and the public sphere
is where communication takes place*a system in which the media and the citizenry both
participate to uphold and improve society. As citizens are as much part of this system as
journalism and politics, they too are formed by the rights and obligations of the political
fabric of society. Citizens have rights to information, but they also have obligations as to
how they react to this information. The system functions optimally only if all contractual
partners claim their rights as well as fulfil their obligations. Seen from a journalistic
contractual perspective then, citizens cannot remain the only category which retain rights
without also having obligations.

Professional Ideology and the Reciprocity of the Social Contract

Because the tenets of the social contract between news media and the citizenry
require journalists to report the contractual breaches made by the contractual partners,
the news media is full of reports of social and political neglect, criminal activity, the abuse
of power, and judicial oversight. The media do this through their gatekeeping and agenda-
setting functions. Moreover, the profession’s ethical guidelines and ideals*which
constitute the tenets by which social contract obligations are upheld*stipulate that
this obligation be carried out truthfully, uncorrupted and without subjective judgement.
Citizens are in turn obliged to react to this information by issuing sanctions that according
to the contract can be imposed on such contractual breaches. Should the media fail to
deliver on their obligation, journalists are in breach of the social contract. Following this
premise then, should citizens fail to react to reports in the press, the citizenry is itself
breaching its obligations within the contract.
Normally, the news media need only report breaches to the original social contract
‘‘objectively’’ and with a suitable amount of coverage before the case moves to the
general public sphere. Breaches in the contract between the citizenry and the state
 RECIPROCITY OF JOURNALISM’S SOCIAL CONTRACT 883

typically involve crimes punishable under the law and moral and ethical misconduct*
issues sometimes exposed by investigative journalism. The public then forms a public
opinion*often through the media*as to the suitable punishment for the contractual
breach in question. Investigative journalism, say James Ettema and Theodore Glasser*the
flagship of the journalistic endeavour*functions in such a way. ‘‘[J]ournalists report
empirically verifiable violations of established standards while the public evaluates and
perhaps responds to those violations’’ (Ettema and Glasser, 1998, p. 8). Social morality,
they maintain, forms the basis for journalism and is established by the citizenry and the
press in conjunction (Ettema and Glasser, 1998, p. 82). Journalism participates in the
establishment and maintenance of this moral order by exposing transgressions. However,
should the news media’s opinion of the severity of the transgression differ from that of
public opinion, journalists can usually conceal such judgement by continuing to report
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according to the professional journalistic rules that constitute the terms of the contract,
simply by increasing the amount of coverage devoted to such breaches. When reporting
reaches critical mass, the news media can induce sanctions though amassing a seemingly
strong public opinion. This is often the case when chairmen or ministers have to resign
their posts, or people or agencies must issue public apologies for wrongful or immoral
behaviour. The mechanism described here*sometimes referred to as the watchdog
function of the press*constitutes the potential power of journalism and the news media
within the larger media logic.
Seen from a contractual perspective, should the news media fail to live up to their
contractual obligations, the state and public can issue sanctions. The state can revoke
licences and public funding, or introduce new legislation, and citizens can render a news
provider illegitimate or invalid as agenda setter*effectively through getting their news
elsewhere. Should the public fail to live up to its obligations, journalism can in turn
sanction its audience*something that, granted, does not happen very often. Instances of
such attempted sanctions, however, reveal a paradox in the journalistic ideology that
exposes the frailty of the profession and the subsequent importance of the social contract
metaphor in concealing and suppressing this weakness. When journalists attempt to
sanction the public, they can do so by vacating the premises on which their contractual
obligations are upheld. One way to do this is to increase coverage, as argued above.
Another way is for journalism to vacate its responsibilities. Thus, journalism may depart
from the ‘‘ideal of objectivity’’, and actively tell the public how to react to the contractual
breaches reported in the press.
One example of such a situation was the emergence of a subjective journalistic
method called ‘‘the journalism of attachment’’, during the reporting of the Bosnian War
(19921995). Some journalists here reacted to what they perceived as the unwillingness of
the international community to become involved in the Bosnian war, primarily by
embracing a subjective style of reporting (Bell, 1996, pp. 28, 135). In an attempt to procure
the public’s attention, it has been argued that the Sarajevo correspondents who embraced
this subjectivity cast all the blame for the war on the Bosnian Serbs and called for
intervention from the UN and NATO3 (Hume, 2000, p. 76). This could be explained from a
contractual perspective as an attempt at sanctioning contractual breaches by audiences as
they failed to amass the necessary political pressure to induce governments to intervene in
the war on behalf of what the reporters saw as the unjust suffering of the Bosnian civilian
population (Sjøvaag, 2005).
 884 HELLE SJØVAAG

Within the boundaries of the social contract of the press lies the assumption that
journalists and the citizenry communicate on the same basic moral terms. This is
necessarily so because journalists need such a socially common moral framework in order
to shed light on the ills of society and thus fulfil its contractual obligations (Ettema and
Glasser, 1998, pp. 701). Because this is a discourse that is based on rights and obligations
within the social contract, journalists expect*in return for their contractual
professionalism*that their work engender public response. In the contractarian
reciprocity of rights and obligations between journalists and the public, journalism
exchanges a ritualistic ‘‘objectivity’’ for influence (e.g. Belsey, 1998, p. 10). It would seem
that in return for the obligation of professionalism, journalism demands the rights to
audience response, i.e. that the public reacts politically to reports in the press. The
subjectivity of ‘‘the journalism of attachment’’ emerged only when the ‘‘objective method’’
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failed to produce the results it normally would have been able to provoke in accordance
with the tenets of the contract. However, this professional heresy remains concealed when
the contract between journalism and civil society works optimally and the objective
method is able to incur social reaction.
Although the journalistic ‘‘objectivity ideal’’ states that journalists merely report
without having an interest in the effects of their work, the reciprocity of rights and
obligations sustaining the social contract suggests that this image of journalism is
disingenuous. The contractual agreement entails that journalism should affect political
action in the citizenry when action is called for. However, the professional ideal ensures
that their social engagement remains masked as ‘‘objectivity’’. This is possible because
professional ideology is able to successfully maintain the social contract, which in turn
sustains the Fourth Estate as a possible catalyst for social change. Therefore, journalists
expect the public to trust their role as watchdog. When this does not happen*when the
public disregards its reporters*the rules of the social contract of the press no longer
function according to the principles of reciprocity. Here, journalists find themselves in a
situation where audiences no longer fulfil their contractual obligations, thus creating a
situation in which sanctions to contractual breaches are warranted. As Ettema and Glasser
observe, investigative journalism encourages the community to affirm transgressions
through reaction, or to affirm that it is not through indifference. Stories met with
indifference may disappear from the news agenda, however, they note, ‘‘That such stories
sometimes are told again is evidence of a moral persistence, even moral courage, in
journalism that should command public respect’’ (Ettema and Glasser, 1998, p. 82). This
description of a ‘‘moral persistence’’ supports the existence of the reciprocity principle in
journalism ideology. The reason why this expectation of rights in relation to audiences
usually remains hidden is the paradox that ensues from such exposure: by encouraging
audiences to fulfil their contractual obligations, journalists are in breach of their own.
Journalists in a liberal democratic system lack the social authority awarded to the
classic professions. Because journalism lacks the monopoly on expertise that other
professions have, journalists compensate for this lack of professional exclusivity through
its professional ideology (Raaum, 1999, p. 9). The paradox inherent in this situation is one
which serves to exacerbate the importance of journalistic ideology. The simultaneous
strength and weakness of the journalistic profession is precisely its lack of classical
professional status. Because of the liberal foundation on which rests the freedom of the
press, journalism is based on the universal appropriation of negative rights*essentially
rights from restrictions on its professional activities. This principle maintains the freedom of
 RECIPROCITY OF JOURNALISM’S SOCIAL CONTRACT 885

the pen as a vital component of the social contract upon which democracy rests.
The negative rights which uphold the interests of the press as institution, nevertheless do
little to strengthen the legitimacy of a profession which generally enjoys little public
regard. Thus, in journalism’s struggle to attain independence and credibility in an
environment fraught with competition, the continued maintenance of the professional
ideal is essential (Raaum, 1999, pp. 347). Based on this premise, the journalistic sanction
towards an audience not fulfilling its contractual obligations is a highly contradictory and
paradoxical move. Such a strategy could, on the one hand, be seen by the press itself as
necessary to entice the public to fulfil its social contract obligations, but should, on the
other hand, be avoided in order to maintain journalistic legitimacy.
If we look at the social contract as an agreement between three parties*the state,
the people and the press*we uncover the common justification for awarding the press
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obligations without rights in its relationship with the citizenry. Within this exchange, the
legitimacy of the journalistic profession ultimately rests on its fulfilment of its social
contract obligations towards the citizenry more so than on its obligations to the state.
Conversely, the legitimacy of the people rests more on its fulfilment of its social contract
obligations to the state than to the press. In the obligations of the people towards
upholding the social contract, the press is seen merely as an intermediary between the
citizenry and the state (Curran, 2005, p. 121). Should we, however, consider contractual
tenets as rights and obligations towards the democratic order in its own right, this
imbalance in the power relations between the three parties is dissolved. This explains why
journalistic sanctions against the audience are scarce or invisible, without negating the
existence of this reciprocity within the ideological field. Citizens have obligations towards
the press insofar as the press embodies an essential democratic conduit. Whereas
journalism sociology and democratic theory see the media as an intermediary between
the two primary contractual partners, i.e. the state and the public, this analysis suggests
that the press ideologically conceives of itself as a separate partner within the social
contract. This world-view explains why the social contract metaphor is so pervasive within
journalistic ideology. Without the implicit reciprocity of the social contract of the press,
journalism would not have the moral encouragement to tacitly expect that audiences
respond politically to news content. And without the underlying presence of this
expectation*which classic contractarian theory grants the press*neither the journalistic
nor the political social contract would function according to the contractual agreements.

The Usefulness of the Social Contract Metaphor

In contractarian terms, the duty of the journalist is to abide by the rules of
professionalism and the obligations of the social contract. But the fulfilment of this duty is
in turn dependent on the other contractual partners, i.e. the public and the state, also
meeting their obligations under the same contract. The problem of duty appears when
reciprocity fails. This is not equal to saying that readers get the newspapers they deserve.
Social contract theory does more than explain the mechanisms behind good or bad
journalism. The rights and obligations perspective offers a vantage point from which the
exchange of obligations*or duties*for rights adds valuable insight to considerations of
how journalism ideology is maintained within the profession.
The weakness of the journalistic profession provides only one argument for the
continued relevance of the social contract as metaphor for journalism’s legitimacy as
 886 HELLE SJØVAAG

the Fourth Estate of democracy. Designating journalism’s role in society as a social

contract also provides a substantial justification for the power of the press, in
theoretical as well as moral and practical terms. A political-philosophical consideration
of the social contract of the press can, in addition to more practical and institutional
frameworks of understanding, also serve as a productive vantage point for researching
the dynamics of media markets, changes in media landscapes, and competition
between media outlets. As such, we should consider that ideology*as here
described*is more than a journalistic mythos. Rather, it is a vital and natural part of
the democratic fabric which helps sustain not only the press and the journalistic
profession but in turn also the citizenry and the state. For it is through this mythology
that journalism can fulfil its obligations. The final suggestion is thus that this
understanding of the social contract of the press*and its philosophical, political and
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ideological components*should contribute our understanding of the role of journalism

within liberal democracies.

NOTES
1. The press*here defined as the journalistic enterprise in broad terms, and to the news
business regardless of publication platform.
2. See Boucher and Kelly (1994, pp. 310), Keane (1991, pp. 1117), Lessnoff (1990, pp. 213)
and Street (2001, p. 254).
3. Reporters who called for outside help include The Guardian’s Maggie O’Kane and Ed
Vulliamy; Newsday’s Roy Gutman; Martin Bell and Allan Little of the BBC; and CNN’s
Christiane Amanpour (Carruthers, 2000, pp. 2402; Hammond, 2002, pp. 12).

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Helle Sjøvaag, Department of Information Science and Media Studies, The University of
Bergen, PO Box 7802, 5020 Bergen, Norway. E-mail: helle.sjovaag@infomedia.uib.no