REMEDIAL

LAW


POINTERS IN REMEDIAL LAW

1. How do you appeal a dismissal of a criminal case without violating the right of the
accused against double jeopardy?

When a criminal case based on demurrer to evidence is dismissed, the dismissal is
equivalent to an acquittal. As a rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant
amounts to an acquittal; any further prosecution of the accused would violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. Hence, the Republic may only assail an
acquittal through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court: Accordingly,
a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting an accused’s demurrer to
evidence may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, based on the
narrow ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(Republic vs. Gimenez, 778 SCRA 261, G.R. No. 174673 January 11, 2016)

2. What is the quantum of evidence required for forfeiture proceedings?

To stress, the quantum of evidence required for forfeiture proceedings under Republic
Act No. 1379 is the same with other civil cases — preponderance of evidence. (Republic
vs. Gimenez, 778 SCRA 261, G.R. No. 174673 January 11, 2016)

3. What law governs the procedure for forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth?

Actions for reconveyance, revision, accounting, restitution, and damages for ill-gotten
wealth are also called civil forfeiture proceedings. Republic Act No. 1379 provides for the
procedure by which forfeiture proceedings may be instituted against public officers or
employees who “[have] acquired during his [or her] incumbency an amount of property
whichis manifestly out of proportion to his [or her] salary as such public officer or
employee and to his [or her] other lawful income and the income from legitimately
acquired property, [which] property shall be presumed prima facie to have been
unlawfully acquired.” (Republic vs. Gimenez, 778 SCRA 261, G.R. No. 174673 January 11,
2016)

4. What is the nature of forfeiture proceedings?

In Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 603 SCRA 348 (2009), this court reaffirmed the doctrine
that forfeiture proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379 are civil in nature. Civil forfeiture
proceedings were also differentiated from plunder cases: . . . a forfeiture case under RA
1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different from a plunder case. . . . In a
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prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of the
criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. . . . On the other hand,
all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence, under RA 1379 is
the disproportion of respondent’s properties to his legitimate income, it being
unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties. As correctly formulated by the
Solicitor General, the forfeitable nature of the properties under the provisions of RA 1379
does not proceed from a determination of a specific overt act committed by the
respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal wealth. (Republic vs.
Gimenez, 778 SCRA 261, G.R. No. 174673 January 11, 2016)

5. How is offer of evidence made?

Our Rules of Court lays down the procedure for the formal offer of evidence. Testimonial
evidence is offered “at the time [a] witness is called to testify.” Documentary and object
evidence, on the other hand, are offered “after the presentation of a party’s testimonial
evidence.” Offer of documentary or object evidence is generally done orally unless
permission is given by the trial court for a written offer of evidence. More importantly,
the Rules specifically provides that evidence must be formally offered to be considered by
the court. Evidence not offered is excluded in the determination of the case. “Failure to
make a formal offer within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to
submit it.” (Republic vs. Gimenez, 778 SCRA 261, G.R. No. 174673 January 11, 2016)

6. Are the rules strictly applied in the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the late Ferdinand
Marcos and his family?

This court has long acknowledged the policy of the government to recover the assets and
properties illegally acquired or misappropriated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
his wife Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates,
dummies, agents or nominees. Hence, this court has adopted a liberal approach regarding
technical rules of procedure in cases involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth: In all the
alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside
technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution.
This Court prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But
substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms
or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two decades
have passed since the government initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten
wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there
is proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it
be brought out now. Let the ownership of these funds and other assets be finally
determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities and
annoying procedural sidetracks. (Republic vs. Gimenez, 778 SCRA 261, G.R. No. 174673
January 11, 2016)

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7. What are the guidelines in resolving demurrer to evidence?

This court has laid down the guidelines in resolving a demurrer to evidence: A demurrer
to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief. Where the plaintiff’s evidence together with such inferences and
conclusions as may reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against
the defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is
likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and
indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable therefrom, the
plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material elements of his case, or when
there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim. It should be sustained
where the plaintiff’s evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery. Furthermore, this
court already clarified what the trial court determines when acting on a motion to dismiss
based on demurrer to evidence: What should be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on
a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief based on the facts
and the law. The evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that which pertains to
the merits of the case, excluding technical aspects such as capacity to sue. (Republic vs.
Gimenez, 778 SCRA 261, G.R. No. 174673 January 11, 2016)

8. Are the documents collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigation considered
public documents for purposes of applying Rule 132 of the Rules of Court?

No. Indeed, in Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc, 665 SCRA 367 (2012), this court held that
mere collection of documents by the PCGG does not make such documents public
documents per se under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court: The fact that these documents
were collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigations does not make them per se
public records referred to in the quoted rule. Petitioner presented as witness its records
officer, Maria Lourdes Magno, who testified that these public and private documents had
been gathered by and taken into the custody of the PCGG in the course of the
Commission’s investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. However,
given the purposes for which these documents were submitted, Magno was not a
credible witness who could testify as to their contents. To reiterate, “[i]f the writings have
subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by those witnesses.” Witnesses can
testify only to those facts which are of their personal knowledge; that is, those derived
from their own perception. Thus, Magno could only testify as to how she obtained
custody of these documents, but not as to the contents of the documents themselves.
Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits or Memoranda
submitted to the court. Basic is the rule that, while affidavits may be considered as public
documents if they are acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still
classified as hearsay evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are not generally
prepared by the affiant, but by another one who uses his or her own language in writing

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the affiant’s statements, parts of which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by
the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to
cross-examine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being
hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.
(Republic vs. Gimenez, 778 SCRA 261, G.R. No. 174673 January 11, 2016)

9. What is the rule on issues raised for the first time during appeal?

This Court has already established that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not
raised in the proceedings below ought not to be considered by a reviewing court. Points
of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court are
barred by estoppel. The rule becomes crucial in this particular case. Here, DAR is the most
competent agency that can make a factual determination regarding the Notice of
Acquisition and its effect on the Conversion Order long issued by Secretary Garilao. As it
stands, none of the DAR Secretaries was ever given the opportunity to dwell on this issue.
On the contrary, Secretary Pagdanganan issued an Order on 13 August 2003 ruling that
Secretary Braganza’s Order affirming the conversion had become final. (Ayala Land, Inc.
vs. Castillo, 780 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 178110 January 12, 2016)

10. What is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction?

The Court is not a trier of facts. It relies on the expertise of administrative agencies. In
Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 106 (1999), it declared the DAR to be in a
better position to resolve a petition for revocation. DAR is the primary agency that
possesses the necessary expertise on the matter: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction
does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. Respondent DAR is in a better position to resolve petitioner’s petition for
revocation, being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter.
The power to determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are
nonagricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage of the CARL lies with the DAR, not with
this court. (Ayala Land, Inc. vs. Castillo, 780 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 178110 January 12, 2016)

11. What is a petition for quo warranto?

A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use
or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim
is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Where the action
is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position;
otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office. In this case,
given the present factual milieu, i.e., (i) the final and executory resolutions of this Court in
G.R. No. 207264; (ii) the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-

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053 (DC) cancelling Reyes’s Certificate of Candidacy; and (iii) the final and executory
resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of
Reyes and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of
Representative for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque — it cannot be
claimed that the present petition is one for the determination of the right of Velasco to
the claimed office. To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of
clear legal duties and not to try disputed title. That the respondents make it appear so will
not convert this petition to one for quo warranto. (Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr., 780 SCRA 81,
G.R. No. 211140 January 12, 2016)

12. Distinguish “ministerial act” from “discretionary act”.

The difference between a ministerial and discretionary act has long been established. A
purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state
of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety
of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither
the exercise of official discretion or judgment. (Velasco vs. Belmonte, Jr., 780 SCRA 81,
G.R. No. 211140 January 12, 2016)

13. What is the Contra Proferentem rule?

The doctrine provides that in the interpretation of documents, ambiguities are to be
construed against the drafter. By its very nature, the precept assumes the existence of an
ambiguity in the contract, which is why contra proferentem is also called the ambiguity
doctrine. In this case, the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage clearly establishes that the
improvements found on the real properties listed therein are included as subject-matter
of the contract. It covers not only the real properties, but the buildings and improvements
thereon as well. (Cahayag vs. Commercial Credit Corporation, 780 SCRA 255, G.R. No.
168078, G.R. No. 168357 January 13, 2016)

14. What is the exception to the rule on extrajudicial foreclosures regarding the one (1)
year period to redeem the foreclosed property?

When it comes to extrajudicial foreclosures, the law grants mortgagors or their
successors-in-interest an opportunity to redeem the property within one year from the
date of the sale. The one-year period has been jurisprudentially held to be counted from
the registration of the foreclosure sale with the Register of Deeds. An exception to this
rule has been carved out by Congress for juridical mortgagors. Section 47 of the General

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Banking Law of 2000 shortens the redemption period to within three months after the
foreclosure sale or until the registration of the certificate of sale, whichever comes first.
The General Banking Law of 2000 came into law on 13 June 2000. If the redemption
period expires and the mortgagors or their successors-in-interest fail to redeem the
foreclosed property, the title thereto is consolidated in the purchaser. The consolidation
confirms the purchaser as the owner of the property; concurrently, the mortgagor — for
failure to exercise the right of redemption within the period — loses all interest in the
property. (Cahayag vs. Commercial Credit Corporation, 780 SCRA 255, G.R. No. 168078,
G.R. No. 168357 January 13, 2016)

15. What is the exception to the rule that evidence not offered will not be admitted?

Evidence not formally offered may be admitted and considered by the trial court so long
as the following requirements obtain: (1) the evidence is duly identified by testimony duly
recorded; and (2) the evidence is incorporated into the records of the case. The exception
does not apply to the case of Baldoza. While she duly identified the Contract to Sell during
her direct examination, which was duly recorded, Exhibit “L” was not incorporated into
the records. (Cahayag vs. Commercial Credit Corporation, 780 SCRA 255, G.R. No. 168078,
G.R. No. 168357 January 13, 2016)

16. How are issues raised in previous pleadings but not included in memorandum of appeal
treated?

Equally important is the fact that petitioners failed to include the issue over Exhibit “L” in
any of the Memoranda they filed with us. The omission is fatal. Issues raised in previous
pleadings but not included in the memorandum are deemed waived or abandoned (A.M.
No. 99-2-04-SC). As they are “a summation of the parties’ previous pleadings, the
memoranda alone may be considered by the Court in deciding or resolving the petition.”
Thus, even as the issue was raised in the Petition, the Court may not consider it in
resolving the case on the ground of failure of petitioners to include the issue in the
Memorandum. They have either waived or abandoned it. (Cahayag vs. Commercial Credit
Corporation, 780 SCRA 255, G.R. No. 168078, G.R. No. 168357 January 13, 2016)

17. How is a claim determined to be a compulsory counterclaim?

To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, we have devised the
following tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the
counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendants’ claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the
same evidence support or refute plaintiffs’ claim as well as the defendants’ counterclaim?
and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive

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answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory. (Alba, Jr.
vs. Malapajo, 780 SCRA 534, G.R. No. 198752 January 13, 2016)

18. Can errors in the decision rendered by a collegial body be imputed to a specific justice
or judge belonging to the collegial body?

The Sandiganbayan ruling was a collegial decision, with Justice Hernandez as the ponente,
and Associate Justices Quiroz and Cornejo as the concurring magistrates. It bears stressing
that in a collegial court, the members act on the basis of consensus or majority rule.
Umali cannot impute what he perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of law to one
specific Justice only. (Re: Verified Complaint dated July 13, 2015 of Alfonso V. Umali, Jr. vs.
Hernandez, 784 SCRA 483, I.P.I. No. 15-35-SB-J February 23, 2016)

19. Distinguish “appellate jurisdiction” from “equity jurisdiction”.

The appellate jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law. The appellate court acquires
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties when an appeal is perfected. On the other
hand, equity jurisdiction aims to provide complete justice in cases where a court of law is
unable to adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of a
resulting legal inflexibility when the law is applied to a given situation. The purpose of the
exercise of equity jurisdiction, among others, is to prevent unjust enrichment and to
ensure restitution. The RTC orders which allowed the withdrawal of the deposited funds
for the use and occupation of the subject units were issued pursuant to the RTC’s equity
jurisdiction, as the CA held in the petition docketed as C.A.--G.R. S.P. No. 81277. The RTC’s
equity jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its appellate jurisdiction on the ejectment
case. The RTC could not have issued its orders in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
since there was nothing more to execute on the dismissed ejectment case. As the RTC
orders explained, the dismissal of the ejectment case effectively and completely blotted
out and cancelled the complaint. Hence, the RTC orders were clearly issued in the
exercise of the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, not on the basis of its appellate jurisdiction.
(Regulus Development, Inc. vs. Dela Cruz, 781 SCRA 607, G.R. No. 198172 January 25,
2016)

20. Which court should issue a writ of execution?

Execution shall be applied for in the court of origin, in accordance with Section 1, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court. The court of origin with respect to the assailed RTC orders is the
court which issued these orders. The RTC is the court with jurisdiction to order the
execution of the issued RTC orders. Hence, the petitioner correctly moved for the
issuance of the writ of execution and levy of the respondent’s real property before the
RTC as the court of origin. (Regulus Development, Inc. vs. Dela Cruz, 781 SCRA 607, G.R.
No. 198172 January 25, 2016)

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21. Is the decision of a division of Court of Appeals binding on other Court of Appeals
division?

We note that the decision being relied on by petitioners was rendered merely by another
division of the Court of Appeals, and not this Court. We have previously settled that the
decision of a division of the Court of Appeals is not binding on a co-division. We held: In
the case at bar, this Court holds that there was no grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Special Sixth Division of the Court of
Appeals in not giving due deference to the decision of its co-division. As correctly pointed
out by the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, the decision of its co-division is
not binding on its other division. Further, it must be stressed that judicial decisions that
form part of our legal system are only the decisions of the Supreme Court. Moreover, at
the time petitioners made the aforesaid Manifestation, the Decision dated 14 December
2007 in C.A.--G.R. S.P. No. 96717 of the Special Tenth Division was still on appeal before
this Court. Therefore, the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted
for not giving due deference to the said Decision of its co-division, and its actuation
cannot be considered grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its
jurisdiction. (Agustin-Se vs. Office of the President, 783 SCRA 213, G.R. No. 207355
February 3, 2016)

22. When can a judge dismiss a case for lack of probable cause?

A judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause only in clear-cut cases when the
evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause — that is when the records
readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the
existence of the elements of the crime charged. Applying the standard set forth in De Los
Santos-Dio v. Court of Appeals, 699 SCRA 614 (2013), the evidence on record herein does
not reveal the unmistakable and clear-cut absence of probable cause against petitioners.
Instead, a punctilious examination thereof shows that the prosecution was able to
establish a prima facie case against petitioners for violation of Sections 4(a) and (e) in
relation to Sections 6(a) and (c) of RA 9208. As it appears from the records, petitioners
recruited and hired the AAA Group and, consequently, maintained them under their
employ in Jaguar for the purpose of engaging in prostitution. In view of this, probable
cause exists to issue warrants for their arrest. (Young vs. People, 783 SCRA 286, G.R. No.
213910 February 3, 2016)

23. What is the doctrine of immutability of judgment and what are the exceptions?

Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that
has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified
in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact

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and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of
the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down.
Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule as the Court
has the power and prerogative to relax the same in order to serve the demands of
substantial justice considering: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor, or property; (b) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause
not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of the rules; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; and (f) that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. (Bigler vs.
People, 785 SCRA 479, G.R. No. 210972 March 2, 2016)

24. Can the Supreme Court correct the penalties imposed in a criminal case despite the
finality of the judgment?

In a catena of similar cases where the accused failed to perfect their appeal on their
respective judgments of conviction, the Court corrected the penalties imposed,
notwithstanding the finality of the decisions because they were outside the range of
penalty prescribed by law. There is thus, no reason to deprive herein petitioner of the
relief afforded the accused in the aforesaid similar cases. Verily, a sentence which
imposes upon the defendant in a criminal prosecution a penalty in excess of the
maximum which the court is authorized by law to impose for the offense for which the
defendant was convicted, is void for want or excess of jurisdiction as to the excess. (Bigler
vs. People, 785 SCRA 479, G.R. No. 210972 March 2, 2016)

25. How should appeals in criminal cases treated by the appellate courts?

At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case
wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in
the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision based on grounds other
than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise
the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
penal law. (People vs. Comboy, 785 SCRA 512, G.R. No. 218399 March 2, 2016)

26. When can a case be considered a matter of transcendental importance?

While the Court held that legislators have the standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are
allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes
their prerogatives as legislators, there was no specific allegation of usurpation of

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legislative function in this case. Moreover, We do not view that the procedural rules on
standing should be waived on the ground that the issues raised in this petition are of
transcendental importance. To consider a matter as one of transcendental importance, all
of the following must concur: (1) the public character of the funds or other assets
involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in
the questions being raised. As will be shown in the discussion below, elements (2) and (3)
are obviously lacking in this case. (Rosales vs. Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), 788
SCRA 292, G.R. No. 201852 April 5, 2016)

27. What is the rule to follow in case of the concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari?

Since the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have original concurrent jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, the rule on hierarchy of courts determines the venue of
recourses to these courts. In original petitions for certiorari, this Court will not directly
entertain special civil action unless the redress desired cannot be obtained elsewhere
based on exceptional and compelling circumstances to justify immediate resort to this
Court, which We found none in the present case that likewise involves factual questions.
Time and again, it has been held that this Court is not a trier of fact. Glaringly, petitioners
did not comply with the rule that “there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.” Since petitioners assail the validity of the ERC
issuances and seeks to declare them as unconstitutional, a petition for declaratory relief
under Rule 63 of the Rules is the appropriate remedy. Under the Rules, any person whose
rights are affected by any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question
of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
(Rosales vs. Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), 788 SCRA 292, G.R. No. 201852 April 5,
2016)

28. Are extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings adversarial?

No. Mortgagee institutions are reminded that extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings are
not adversarial suits filed before a court. It is not commenced by filing a complaint but an
ex parte application for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage before the executive judge,
pursuant to Act No. 3135, as amended, and special administrative orders issued by this
Court, particularly Administrative Matter No. 99-10-05-0 (Re: Procedure in Extra-Judicial
Foreclosure of Mortgage). The executive judge receives the application neither in a
judicial capacity nor on behalf of the court; the conduct of extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings is not governed by the rules on ordinary or special civil actions. The executive
judge performs therein an administrative function to ensure that all requirements for the

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extrajudicial foreclosure of a mortgage are satisfied before the clerk of court, as the ex
officio sheriff, goes ahead with the public auction of the mortgaged property. Necessarily,
the orders of the executive judge in such proceedings, whether they be to allow or
disallow the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage, are not issued in the exercise of a
judicial function but in the exercise of his administrative function to supervise the
ministerial duty of the Clerk of Court as Ex Officio Sheriff in the conduct of an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale. (Jonsay vs. Solidbank Corporation [now Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company], 788 SCRA 552, G.R. No. 206459 April 6, 2016)

29. What is the nature of the action to quiet title?

The action filed by Spouses Tappa was one for quieting of title and recovery of
possession. In Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 137 (2000), an action for
quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity, to wit: x x x
Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure “. . . an adjudication that a
claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so
that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from
any danger of hostile claim.” In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is
tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, “. . .
not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said
immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he
who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he
could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and
even to abuse the property as he deems best. x x x.” (Emphasis in the original) In our
jurisdiction, the remedy is governed by Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, which state:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently
valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable,
and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to
quiet the title. An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon
title to real property or any interest therein. Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or
equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action.
He need not be in possession of said property. (Heirs of Delfin and Maria Tappa vs. Heirs
of Jose Bacud, 788 SCRA 13, G.R. No. 187633 April 4, 2016)

30. What are the requirements for an action to quiet title to prosper?

The action filed by Spouses Tappa was one for quieting of title and recovery of
possession. In Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 137 (2000), an action for
quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity, to wit: x x x
Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure “. . . an adjudication that a

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claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so
that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from
any danger of hostile claim.” In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is
tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, “. . .
not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said
immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he
who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he
could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and
even to abuse the property as he deems best. x x x.” (Emphasis in the original) In our
jurisdiction, the remedy is governed by Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, which state:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently
valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable,
and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to
quiet the title. An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon
title to real property or any interest therein. Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or
equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action.
He need not be in possession of said property. (Heirs of Delfin and Maria Tappa vs. Heirs
of Jose Bacud, 788 SCRA 13, G.R. No. 187633 April 4, 2016)

31. Define “probable cause”.

To begin with, a finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that
more likely than not a crime has been committed and that there is enough reason to
believe that it was committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, or on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. The
case of Vergara v. The Hon. Ombudsman, 580 SCRA 693 (2009), is instructive on this
score: Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of
the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,
or on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt, but it certainly demands more than bare suspicion
and can never be left to presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic. (Joson vs.
Office of the Ombudsman, 788 SCRA 647, G.R. Nos. 210220-21 April 6, 2016)

32. How are errors committed by investigating prosecutors be corrected?

It falls upon the petitioner to discharge the burden of proving there was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, in accordance with the definition and
standards set by law and jurisprudence. “Not every error in the proceedings, or every
erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. While the

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prosecutor, or in this case, the investigating officers of the Officenof the Ombudsman,
may err or even abuse the discretion lodged in them by law, such error or abuse alone
does not render their act amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari.” The requirement for judicial intrusion is still for the petitioner to
show clearly that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Joson, in this case, failed to do so. On the contrary, the
record reveals that the Ombudsman carefully perused and studied the documents and
meticulously weighed the evidence submitted by the parties before issuing the assailed
joint resolution and joint order which strongly negated any averment that they were
issued capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily, or in a despotic manner. (Joson vs. Office of
the Ombudsman, 788 SCRA 647, G.R. Nos. 210220-21 April 6, 2016)

33. Policy of noninterference, defined.

A finding of probable cause, or lack of it, is a finding of fact which is generally not
reviewable by this Court. Only when there is a clear case of grave abuse of discretion will
this Court interfere with the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman. As a general rule,
the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s determination of the existence or
absence of probable cause. As the Court is not a trier of facts, it reposes immense respect
to the factual determination and appreciation made by the Ombudsman. The rationale
behind this rule is explained in Republic v. Desierto, 512 SCRA 57 (2007), in this wise: The
rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted
by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.
Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable
petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of
the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the
courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of
discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file
an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant (Joson vs. Office
of the Ombudsman, 788 SCRA 647, G.R. Nos. 210220-21 April 6, 2016)

34. What is the scope of the party-intervenor’s right to appeal the decisions of the court
which rejected its motion for intervention?

With the consequent denial of its intervention and dismissal of its complaint-in-
intervention in Civil Case No. 666-I, petitioner should have appealed such denial. “[A]n
order denying a motion for intervention is appealable. Where the lower court’s denial of
a motion for intervention amounts to a final order, an appeal is the proper remedy x x x.”
Having failed to take and prosecute such appeal, petitioner acquired no right to
participate in the proceedings in Civil Case No. 666-I, even question the judgment of the
RTC consequently rendered in said case. “A prospective intervenor’s right to appeal
applies only to the denial of his intervention. Not being a party to the case, a person

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whose intervention the court denied has no standing to question the decision of the
court[, but] only the trial court’s orders denying his intervention x x x, not the decision
itself.” (Republic vs. Heirs of Diego Lim, 788 SCRA 61, G.R. No. 195611 April 4, 2016)

35. What is the rule regarding the parties who refused to appeal a decision?

With respect to the Lim and Josefat heirs, they are precluded from seeking a reversal of
the herein assailed judgment. As mere respondents in the present Petition, this Court
cannot grant the affirmative relief theyseek as they did not themselves file a petition
questioning the appellate court’s decision. “It is a fundamental principle that a party who
does not appeal, or file a petition for certiorari, is not entitled to any affirmative relief. An
appellee who is not an appellant may assign errors in his brief where his purpose is to
maintain the judgment, but he cannot seek modification or reversal of the judgment or
claim affirmative relief unless he has also appealed.” “As a general rule, a party who has
not appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than the
ones granted in the appealed decision. The reason for this rule is that since parties did not
appeal from the decision or resolution, they are presumed to be satisfied with the
adjudication.” These pronouncements are especially significant considering that the CA
ruled that the Lim and Josefat heirs have no legal standing to maintain and prosecute Civil
Case No. 666-I; indeed, their Comment should have been stricken off the record as a
necessary consequence of the appellate court’s pronouncement, which they failed to
question and is now binding as to them. (Republic vs. Heirs of Diego Lim, 788 SCRA 61,
G.R. No. 195611 April 4, 2016)

36. What is the nature of a corporate rehabilitation case?

A corporate rehabilitation case is a special proceeding in rem wherein the petitioner
seeks to establish the status of a party or a particular fact, i.e., the inability of the
corporate debtor to pay its debts when they fall due. It is summary and non-adversarial in
nature. Its end goal is to secure the approval of a rehabilitation plan to facilitate the
successful recovery of the corporate debtor. It does not seek relief from an injury caused
by another party. Jurisdiction over corporate rehabilitation cases originally fell within the
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which had absolute
jurisdiction, control, and supervision over all Philippine corporations. With the enactment
of the Securities Regulation Code in 2000, this jurisdiction was transferred to the Regional
Trial Courts. Consequently, this Court enacted A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC or the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (Interim Rules) which took effect on December 15,
2000. Under the Interim Rules, a motion for reconsideration was a prohibited pleading.
Orders issued by the rehabilitation court were also immediately executory unless

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restrained by the appellate court. (Golden Cane Furniture Manufacturing Corporation vs.
Steelpro Philippines, Inc., 788 SCRA 82, G.R. No. 198222 April 4, 2016)

37. How is the denial of the petition for rehabilitation appealed?

The dismissal of the petition for rehabilitation, even if due to technical grounds or due to
its insufficiency, amounts to a failure of rehabilitation. It is a final order because it finally
disposes of the case, leaving nothing else to be done. Pursuant to A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC,
the correct remedy against all decisions and final orders of the rehabilitation courts in
proceedings governed by the Interim Rules is a petition for review to the CA under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
evidently the wrong mode of appeal. Even if Golden Cane’s petition were under the
regime of the 2008 Rules, the correct remedy would still have been a petition for review
to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. The outright dismissal of the petition can be seen
as equivalent to the disapproval of the rehabilitation plan. Ultimately, the result is the
failure of rehabilitation. (Golden Cane Furniture Manufacturing Corporation vs. Steelpro
Philippines, Inc., 788 SCRA 82, G.R. No. 198222 April 4, 2016)

38. What is the rule in determining the sufficiency of a motion to postpone pretrial?

Pretrial answers the call for the speedy disposition of cases. Under Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court, the counsels and the parties are mandated to appear at pretrial. Their
nonappearance may be excused only if there is a valid cause or if a representative
appears on their behalf. If the defendant fails to appear, the RTC may allow the plaintiff to
present evidence ex parte and may render judgment based on it. This Court has ruled that
a motion for postponement is a privilege and not a right. The movant should not assume
that his motion would be granted. In deciding whether to grant or deny a motion to
postpone the pretrial, the court must take into account two factors: (a) the reason given,
and (b) the merits of the movant’s case. (Vergara vs. Otadoy, Jr., 788 SCRA 35, G.R. No.
192320 April 4, 2016)

39. Is it the ministerial duty of the court to issue writ of possession to the buyer in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale?

Possession being an essential right of the owner with which he is able to exercise the
other attendant rights of ownership, after consolidation of title the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale may demand possession as a matter of right. This is why Section 7 of Act
No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, imposes upon the RTC a ministerial duty to issue
a writ of possession to the new owner upon a mere ex parte motion. Section 7 reads: Sec.
7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court
of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is
situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in
an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to

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indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the
mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be
made under oath and filed in form of an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral
proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property
registered under the Mortgage Law or under Section 194 of the Administrative Code, or
of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of
any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of
court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph 11 of
Section 114 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 2866, and the court shall, upon
approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the
province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.
(Gallent, Sr. vs. Velasquez, 788 SCRA 518, G.R. No. 203949, G.R. No. 205071 April 6, 2016)

40. Which has greater probative value? The affidavit or the testimony of a witness in
court?

Generally, whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a
witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits
taken ex parte are inferior to testimony in court, the former being almost invariably
incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions and
sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness
may be unable to recall the connected circumstances necessary for his accurate
recollection of the subject. (People vs. Vargas, 788 SCRA 617, G.R. No. 208446 April 6,
2016)

41. How will a slight doubt as to the identity of the accused affect a criminal case?

The deficiency in the proof submitted by the prosecution cannot be ignored. A slight
doubt created in the identity of the perpetrators of the crime should be resolved in favor
of the accused. As succinctly put by the Court in People v. Fernandez, 385 SCRA 224
(2002): It is better to liberate a guilty man than to unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt
has not been proved by the required quantum of evidence. Hence, despite the Court’s
support of ardent crusaders waging all-out war against felons on the loose, when the
People’s evidence fails to prove indubitably the accused’s authorship of the crime of
which they stand accused, it is the Court’s duty — and the accused’s right — to proclaim
their innocence. Acquittal, therefore, is in order. (People vs. Vargas, 788 SCRA 617, G.R.
No. 208446 April 6, 2016)

42. Can there be a finding of probable cause based on opinion and belief?

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In assessing if the Ombudsman had committed grave abuse of discretion, attention must
be drawn to the context of its ruling — that, is: preliminary investigation is merely an
inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that
a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for
it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, “a finding of probable cause does not
require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.” In
Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr., 677 SCRA 113 (2012), “[p]robable cause, for the purpose of filing
a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty
thereof. The term does not mean ‘actual or positive cause’ nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not
require an inquiry x x x whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.
(Reyes vs. Ombudsman, 787 SCRA 354, G.R. Nos. 212593-94., G.R. Nos. 213163-78, G.R.
Nos. 213540-41, G.R. Nos. 213542-43, G.R. Nos. 215880-94, G.R. Nos. 213475-76 March
15, 2016)

43. Can there be a finding of probable cause based on hearsay?

Owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the “technical rules of
evidence should not be applied” in the course of its proceedings, keeping in mind that
“the determination of probable cause does not depend on the validity or merits of a
party’s accusation or defense or on the admissibilitv or veracity of testimonies
presented.” Thus, in Estrada v. Ombudsman, 748 SCRA 1 (2015), the Court declared that
since a preliminary investigation does not finally adjudicate the rights and obligations of
parties, “probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.” (Reyes vs. Ombudsman, 787 SCRA 354, G.R.
Nos. 212593-94., G.R. Nos. 213163-78, G.R. Nos. 213540-41, G.R. Nos. 213542-43, G.R.
Nos. 215880-94, G.R. Nos. 213475-76 March 15, 2016)

44. Is it the court’s discretion to grant immunity to state witness?

The Court rejects Reyes’s theory that the whistleblowers and Tuason are the “most guilty”
in the perpetuation of the PDAF scam and, thus, rebuffs her claim that the Ombudsman
violated Section 17, Rule 119 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure by granting
immunity to them. To begin with, “[t]he authority to grant immunity is not an inherent
judicial function. Indeed, Congress has vested such power in the Ombudsman[,] as well as
in the Secretary of Justice. Besides, the decision to employ an accused as a state witness
must necessarily originate from the public prosecutors whose mission is to obtain a
successful prosecution of the several accused before the courts. The latter do not, as a
rule[,] have a vision of the true strength of the prosecution’s evidence until after the trial
is over. Consequently, courts should generally defer to the judgment of the prosecution
and deny a motion to discharge an accused so he can be used as a witness only in clear
cases of failure to meet the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 [of the 2000 Rules of

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Criminal Procedure].” (Reyes vs. Ombudsman, 787 SCRA 354, G.R. Nos. 212593-94., G.R.
Nos. 213163-78, G.R. Nos. 213540-41, G.R. Nos. 213542-43, G.R. Nos. 215880-94, G.R.
Nos. 213475-76 March 15, 2016)

45. Is the res inter alios acta rule strictly applied in preliminary investigation?

Neither can the Napoles siblings discount the testimonies of the whistleblowers based on
their invocation of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence, which states that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another, unless the admission is by a conspirator under the
parameters of Section 30 of the same Rule. To be sure, the foregoing rule constitutes a
technical rule on evidence which should not be rigidly applied in the course of preliminary
investigation proceedings. In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the Ombudsman’s
appreciation of hearsay evidence, which would otherwise be inadmissible under technical
rules on evidence, during the preliminary investigation “as long as there is substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay.” This is because “such investigation is merely preliminary,
and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.” Applying the same logic,
and with the similar observation that there lies substantial basis for crediting the
testimonies of the whistleblowers herein, the objection interposed by the Napoles
siblings under the evidentiary res inter alios acta rule should falter. Ultimately, as case
law edifies, “[t]he technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has
jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation,” as in this case.
(Reyes vs. Ombudsman, 787 SCRA 354, G.R. Nos. 212593-94., G.R. Nos. 213163-78, G.R.
Nos. 213540-41, G.R. Nos. 213542-43, G.R. Nos. 215880-94, G.R. Nos. 213475-76 March
15, 2016)

46. What is the difference between the prosecutor’s determination of probable

cause and that of the judge’s determination of probable cause?

Once the public prosecutor (or the Ombudsman) determines probable cause and thus,
elevates the case to the trial court (or the Sandiganbayan), a judicial determination of
probable cause is made in order to determine if a warrant of arrest should be issued
ordering the detention of the accused. The Court, in People v. Castillo, 590 SCRA 95
(2009), delineated the functions and purposes of a determination of probable cause made
by the public prosecutor, on the one hand, and the trial court, on the other: There are
two kinds of determination of probable. The executive determination of probable cause is
one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the
public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause
exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by
law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial
authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or

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not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or
not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a
matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. The
judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge
must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing
the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds
no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant. (Reyes vs.
Ombudsman, 787 SCRA 354, G.R. Nos. 212593-94., G.R. Nos. 213163-78, G.R. Nos.
213540-41, G.R. Nos. 213542-43, G.R. Nos. 215880-94, G.R. Nos. 213475-76 March 15,
2016)

47. If the court orders the prosecutor to present additional evidence, is this order
mandatory?

The Court in Mendoza v. People, 722 SCRA 647 (2014), clarified that the trial court (or the
Sandiganbayan) is given three (3) distinct options upon the filing of a criminal information
before it, namely to: (a) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to
establish probable cause; (b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (c)
order the prosecutor to present additional evidence in case of doubt as to the existence
of probable cause. The Court went on to elaborate that “the option to order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory” and reiterated that “the
court’s first option x x x is for it to ‘immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause.’” Verily, when a criminal Information is filed
before the trial court, the judge, motu proprio or upon motion of the accused, is entitled
to make his own assessment of the evidence on record to determine whether there is
probable cause to order the arrest of the accused and proceed with the trial; or in the
absence thereof, to order the immediate dismissal of the criminal case. This is in line with
the fundamental doctrine that “once a complaint or information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the
accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court.” Nevertheless, the Court, in Mendoza
cautions the trial courts in proceeding with dismissals of this nature: Although
jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge must always proceed with caution in
dismissing cases due to lack of probable cause, considering the preliminary nature of the
evidence before it. It is only when he or she finds that the evidence on hand absolutely
fails to support a finding of probable cause that he or she can dismiss the case. On the
other hand, if a judge finds probable cause, he or she must not hesitate to proceed with
arraignment and trial in order that justice may be served. (Reyes vs. Ombudsman, 787
SCRA 354, G.R. Nos. 212593-94., G.R. Nos. 213163-78, G.R. Nos. 213540-41, G.R. Nos.
213542-43, G.R. Nos. 215880-94, G.R. Nos. 213475-76 March 15, 2016)

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48. Can a court which has no jurisdiction over the principal case acquire jurisdiction
over the complaint-in-intervention?

No. We shall discuss the principal issue of whether the intervention is proper in this case.
A Complaint-in-Intervention is merely an incident of the main action. In the case of Asian
Terminals, Inc. v. Bautista-Ricafort, 505 SCRA 748 (2006), we expounded that
“intervention is merely ancillary and supplemental to the existing litigation and never an
independent action, the dismissal of the principal action necessarily results in the
dismissal of the complaint-in-intervention. Likewise, a court which has no jurisdiction over
the principal action has no jurisdiction over a complaint-in-intervention. Intervention
presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of
intervention is governed by jurisdiction of the main action.” In this case, the RTC had
already acquired jurisdiction upon filing of the complaint. The re-raffling of the case is
more administrative than it is judicial. By directing the re-raffling of the case to all the
RTCs, the Complaint-in-Intervention should be refiled in the court where the principal
action is assigned. (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas vs. Campa, Jr., 787 SCRA 476, G.R. No.
185979 March 16, 2016)

49. Can a party assail a judicially approved agreement if it was based on erroneous
understanding of the law?

The RTC, after finding the August 19, 2003 compromise agreement to be in order and not
contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy, issued the October 20, 2003
order approving the compromise agreement. With this stamp of judicial approval, the
compromise agreement became more than a mere contract of the parties. The judicially
approved agreement was thereby turned into a final judgment, immutable and
unalterable, regardless of whether or not it rested on erroneous conclusions of fact and
law, and regardless of whether the change would be by the court that rendered it or the
highest court of the land. This doctrine of immutability is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice, for, at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments of the courts must become final at some definite date set by law. The doctrine
exists for the reason that every litigation must come to an end at some time, for it is
necessary for the proper enforcement of the rule of law and the administration of justice
that once a judgment attains finality, the winning party should not be denied the
favorable result. Clearly, the element of public policy and public interest has diluted the
purely private interest of the parties before the compromise agreement was approved by
the trial court. (Tung Hui Chung vs. Shih Chiu Huang, 787 SCRA 55, G.R. No. 170679 March
9, 2016)

50. Can an accused be convicted based on circumstantial evidence?

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Certainly, it is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted, but for
circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction, following are the guidelines: (1) there is
more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is as such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Decided cases expound that the circumstantial
evidence presented and proved must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as
the guilty person. All the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rationale except that of guilt. (People
vs. Urzais, 789 SCRA 386, G.R. No. 207662 April 13, 2016)

51. What is “equipoise rule”?

The equipoise rule states that where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable
of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfil the test
of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The equipoise rule
provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional
presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused. The basis of the
acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply means that the evidence of the prosecution
was not sufficient to sustain the guilt of accused-appellant beyond the point of moral
certainty. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, however, is a burden particular to the
prosecution and does not apply to exculpatory facts as may be raised by the defense; the
accused is not required to establish matters in mitigation or defense beyond a reasonable
doubt, nor is he required to establish the truth of such matters by a preponderance of the
evidence, or even to a reasonable probability. (People vs. Urzais, 789 SCRA 386, G.R. No.
207662 April 13, 2016)

52. Doctrine of immutability of judgment, defined.

Well-settled is the rule that a judgment that has acquired finality “becomes immutable
and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the
court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land.” The rationale of this doctrine
is to avoid delay in the administration of justice and in order to put an end to judicial
controversies. In the case of Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corp., 476
SCRA 305 (2005), the Court explained the principle of immutability of judgment in this
wise: The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of
public policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments
or orders of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law; otherwise, there
would be no end to litigations, thus setting to naught the main role of courts of justice

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which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and
order by settling justiciable controversies with finality. Nonetheless, this doctrine may be
relaxed in order to serve substantial justice in case compelling circumstances that clearly
warrant the exercise of the Court’s equity jurisdiction are extant. Thus, like any other rule,
it has exceptions, such as: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro
tunc entries which cause, no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust
and inequitable. After all, the rules of procedure intend to promote the ends of justice,
thus, their strict and rigid application must always be eschewed when it would subvert its
primary objective. (Navarra vs. Liongson, 790 SCRA 155, G.R. No. 217930 April 18, 2016)

53. What should the court do if there are two conflicting judgments in one case?

Where a certain case comprises two or more conflicting judgments which are final and
executory, the Court, in the case of Collantes v. Court of Appeals, 517 SCRA 561 (2007),
offered three (3) options in resolving the same. First, the court may opt to require the
parties to assert their claims anew; second, to determine which judgment came first; and
third, to determine which of the judgments had been rendered by a court of last resort.
(Navarra vs. Liongson, 790 SCRA 155, G.R. No. 217930 April 18, 2016)

54. Doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, defined.

Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, facts and issues actually and directly
resolved in a former suit can never again be raised in any future case between the same
parties even involving a different cause of action. The CA decision in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
104667 concerning the validity of plaintiff’s substitution became conclusive on the
parties. Thus, petitioners cannot again seek refuge by filing their second petition (C.A.-
G.R. S.P. No. 105568) in the guise of questioning the order of execution but actually
invoking the alleged nullity of the substitution of plaintiff. Petitioners cannot evade or
avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a
different method of presenting their case. (Navarra vs. Liongson, 790 SCRA 155, G.R. No.
217930 April 18, 2016)

55. Can a judicial admission be contested?

It is without doubt that Bodoy is guilty of dishonesty. He made a categorical admission
that he withdrew the amount of Php60,000.00 from the trial court’s bank account
because he was hard pressed for money. His admission was confirmed by COC Gubatanga
that there was an unauthorized withdrawal from the trial court’s funds, as well as, by the
documents from the bank proving that such withdrawal was indeed effected. It is
hornbook doctrine that a judicial admission binds the person who makes the same, and

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absent any showing that this was made thru palpable mistake, no amount of
rationalization can offset it. Bodoy’s act of surreptitiously withdrawing Php60,000.00 from
the trial court’s bank account without any stamp of authority constitutes dishonesty,
which is defined as follows: [T]he disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack
of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
(Gubatanga vs. Bodoy, 790 SCRA 205, A.M. No. P-16-3447 April 19, 2016)

56. What is the difference between the declaration of default for failure to file
responsive pleading within the reglementary period and failure to appear during
pretrial?

Counsel apparently confuses a declaration of default under Section 3 of Rule 9 with the
effect of failure to appear under Section 5 of Rule 18. Failure to file a responsive pleading
within the reglementary period is the sole ground for an order of default under Rule 9. On
the other hand, under Rule 18, failure of the defendant to appear at the pretrial
conference results in the plaintiff being allowed to present evidence ex parte. The
difference is that a declaration of default under Rule 9 allows the Court to proceed to
render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant; while the
effect of default under Rule 18 allows the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte and for
the Court to render judgment on the basis thereof. The lower court may have declared
defendants therein as in default; however, it did not issue an order of default, rather, it
ordered the plaintiff to present evidence ex parte in accordance with the Rules. In any
case, the Castros could have availed themselves of appropriate legal remedies when the
CA failed to resolve the issue, but they did not. They cannot now resurrect the issue
through a Comment before this Court. (Paramount Life & General Insurance Corporation
vs. Castro, 790 SCRA 363, G.R. No. 195728, G.R. No. 211329 April 19, 2016)

57. What are the three requirements to perfect an appeal?

It has been repeatedly underscored in a long line of jurisprudence that the right to appeal
is a mere statutory privilege and must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of the law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must
strictly comply with the requirements of the rules, and failure to do so leads to the loss of
the right to appeal. Basically, there are three requirements in order to perfect an appeal:
(1) the filing of a notice of appeal; (2) the payment of docket and other legal fees; and (3)
in some cases, the filing of a record on appeal, all of which must be done within the
period allowed for filing an appeal. Failure to observe any of these requirements is fatal
to one’s appeal. (National Transmission Corporation vs. Heirs of Teodulo Ebesa, 785 SCRA
1, G.R. No. 186102 February 24, 2016)

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58. Does partial payment of the appeal fee toll the running of the prescriptive
period?

Verily, the payment of appeal docket fees is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It is
mandatory as it is required in all appealed cases, otherwise, the Court does not acquire
the authority to hear and decide the appeal. The failure to pay or even the partial
payment of the appeal fees does not toll the running of the prescriptive period, hence,
will not prevent the judgment from becoming final and executory. (National Transmission
Corporation vs. Heirs of Teodulo Ebesa, 785 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 186102 February 24, 2016)

59. Cause of action, defined.

Cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another. In pursuing that cause, a plaintiff must first plead in the complaint a “concise
statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the cause of action.” In particular,
the plaintiff must show on the face of the complaint that there exists a legal right on his
or her part, a correlative obligation of the defendant to respect such right, and an act or
omission of such defendant in violation of the plaintiff’s rights. (Magellan Aerospace
Corporation vs. Philippine Air Force, 785 SCRA 221, G.R. No. 216566 February 24, 2016)

60. Is the three-day notice rule under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 mandatory?

Proceeding now to whether PAF violated the three-day notice rule relative to its motion
to dismiss filed before the RTC, it has been repeatedly held that the three (3)-day notice
requirement in motions under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court as
mandatory for being an integral component of procedural due process. Just like any other
rule, however, this Court has permitted its relaxation subject, of course, to certain
conditions. Jurisprudence provides that for liberality to be applied, it must be assured that
the adverse party has been afforded the opportunity to be heard through pleadings filed
in opposition to the motion. In such a way, the purpose behind the three-day notice rule
is deemed realized. (Magellan Aerospace Corporation vs. Philippine Air Force, 785 SCRA
221, G.R. No. 216566 February 24, 2016)

61. Is the non-inclusion of the amount of the property fatal in determining the
jurisdiction of the court?

The noninclusion on the face of the complaint of the amount of the property, however, is
not fatal because attached in the complaint is a tax declaration (Annex “N” in the
complaint) of the property in question showing that it has an assessed value of
P215,320.00. It must be emphasized that annexes to a complaint are deemed part of, and
should be considered together with the complaint. In Fluor Daniel, Inc.-Philippines v. E.B.
Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd., 528 SCRA 321 (2007), this Court ruled that in determining

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the sufficiency of a cause of action, the courts should also consider the attachments to
the complaint, thus: We have ruled that a complaint should not be dismissed for
insufficiency of cause of action if it appears clearly from the complaint and its
attachments that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. The converse is also true. The complaint
may be dismissed for lack of cause of action if it is obvious from the complaint and its
annexes that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. Hence, being an annex to BSP’s
complaint, the tax declaration showing the assessed value of the property is deemed a
part of the complaint and should be considered together with it in determining that the
RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction. (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas vs. Legaspi, 785 SCRA
466, G.R. No. 205966 March 2, 2016)

62. Can a court take judicial notice of its acts in the previous case?

A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts
established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records of
another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the same court,
and of public records on file in the same court. Since a copy of the tax declaration, which
is a public record, was attached to the complaint, the same document is already
considered as on file with the court, thus, the court can now take judicial notice of such.
(Bankgo Sentral ng Pilipinas vs. Legaspi, 785 SCRA 466, G.R. No. 205966 March 2, 2016)

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