RULE 21: SUBPOENA

LOZADA vs MACAPAGAL –ARROYO

GR. No. 184379-80
April 24,2012

Doctrine: for a subpoena to issue, it must first appear that the person or documents sought
to be presented are prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy, to wit:
A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at
the hearing or trial of an action or at any investigation conducted under the laws of the
Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition.
There are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad testificandum and
subpoena duces tecum. The first is used to compel a person to testify, while the second is
used to compel the production of books, records, things or documents therein specified.

FACTS: The instant Petition stems from the alleged corruption scandal precipitated by a
transaction between the Philippine government, represented by the National Broadband
Network (NBN), and ZTE Corporation, a Chinese manufacturer of telecommunications
equipment. Former NEDA Secretary Neri sought the services of Lozada as an unofficial
consultant in the ZTE-NBN deal. The latter avers that during the course of his engagement,
he discovered several anomalies in the said transaction involving certain public officials.
These events impelled the Senate of the Philippines Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct an
investigation thereon, for which it issued a subpoena directing Lozada to appear and testify
on 30 January 2008.
Lozada was issued a subpoena by Senate with regards to the NBN-ZTE scandal. He
did not appear during the hearing and instead flew to London on ‘official business’. Upon his
return, he was escorted by several men and was told by Sec. Atienza that Atienza was talking
to Executive Secretary (ES) and Ma’am (the president), whom Lozada assumed to be ES
Recto and the President. Lozada was brought to La Salle Green Hills (LSGH) where he was
purportedly harassed and threatened by the police. His brother filed for a writ of amparo. The
court held that the Writ of Amparo was properly denied by the CA because the petitioners
failed to meet the threshold of substantial evidence and that they failed to prove the existence
of a continuing threat.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Denial of the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum proper?

RULING: In the present case, the CA correctly denied petitioners’ Motion for the Issuance of
Subpoena Ad Testificandum on the ground that the testimonies of the witnesses sought to be
presented during trial were prima facie irrelevant to the issues of the case. The court a
quo aptly ruled in this manner:
The alleged acts and statements attributed by the petitioner to Neri and Abalos are not
relevant to the instant Amparo All the references of petitioners to either Sec. Neri or Abalos
were solely with respect to the ZTE-NBN deal, and not to the events that transpired on 5-6
February 2008, or to the ensuing threats that petitioners purportedly received. Although the
present action is rooted from the involvement of Lozada in the said government transaction,
the testimonies of Sec. Neri or Abalos are nevertheless not prima facie relevant to the main
issue of whether there was an unlawful act or omission on the part of respondents that
violated the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada. Thus, the CA did not commit any
reversible error in denying the Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum.

RULE 22: COMPUTATION OF TIME

MONTAJES vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR. No. 183449
March 12,2012

Doctrine: – In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order
of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the
designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance
included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day
FACTS: Alfredo (Montajes) was charged and convicted for Direct Assault against Barangay
Captain Jose (Rellon) when he allegedly tried to hit the latter with a bolo when he stopped a
benefit dance which already exceeded the time allowed for it. The Municipal Trial Court of
Buenavista Agusan del Norte convicted him, and his appeal to the Regional Trial Court was
also denied, hence, Jose filed a petition (motion) for extension of time to file a Petition for
Review with the Court of Appeals for 15 days, counted from May 21, 2007 or until June 5,
2007. It appears that he received the copy of the RTC’s order denying his motion for
reconsideration on May 4, 2007. He then filed his Petition for Review on June 5, 2007.
On September 21, 2007, the CA dismissed his petition for review outrightly for being filed out
of time. The CA noted that Jose received the copy of the RTC order denying his motion for
reconsideration on May 4, 2007, hence he had 15 days within which to file the petition for
review. Considering that May 19, 2007 fell on a Saturday, it was error for Jose to compute his
extension of time on the first working day after the deadline (Saturday, May 19), or on May 21,
2007 since when a party is granted an extension of time, the 15-day reckoning period should
start from the last day which is Saturday, Sunday or holiday, according to the CA. His motion
for reconsideration denied, Jose filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme
Court, arguing that his petition was not filed out of time since he filed it pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 22 of the Rules of Court; based on such provision, if the last day to file a petition falls on
a Saturday, the time shall not run until the next working day. Here, the last day of the
reglementary period within which to file the said petition for review with the CA fell on a
Saturday, thus, the last day to file the petition was moved to the next working day which was
May 21, 2007, Monday. Hence, he was not wrong in asking the CA to give him 15 days from
May 21, 2007 to file the petition and not from May 19, 2007, Saturday. He asks that his
petition be resolved on the merits rather than on technicalities since he filed his petition for
review long before the CA dismissed the case.
ISSUE: Whether the Petition for Review was filed on time?
RULING: The Petition Granted, the provision [Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court]
applies in the matter of filing of pleadings in courts when the due date falls on a Saturday,
Sunday or legal holiday, in which case, the filing of the said pleading on the next working day
is deemed on time;
Whereas, the question has been raised if the period is extended ipso jure to the next working
day immediately following where the last day of the period is a Saturday, Sunday or a legal
holiday, so that when a motion for extension of time is filed, the period of extension is to be
reckoned from the next working day and not from the original expiration of the period.
THEREFORE, the Court Resolves, for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, to declare that
Section 1, Rule 22 speaks only of “the last day of the period” so that when a party seeks an
extension and the same is granted, the due date ceases to be the last day and hence, the
provision no longer applies. Any extension of time to file the required pleading should
therefore be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date
is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.

RULE 23: DEPOSITIONS PENDING ACTION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs SANDIGANBAYAN
GR. No. 152375
December 16, 2011

Doctrine: A plain reading of (Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on “Deposition Pending Action”
(deposition de bene esse) provides for the circumstances when depositions may be used in the trial,
or at the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding) readily rejects the petitioner’s position
that the deposition can be admitted into evidence without observing the requirements of Section 47
(The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in
evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.), Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.

FACTS: A case was filed against the respondents for before the Sandiganbayan (SB) for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages in relation to the allegation
that respondents illegally manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and
Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI). This case docketed
as Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases, among them, Civil Case No.
0130, a petition instituted by Victor Africa (Son of the late Jose Africa) which sought to nullify
the orders of the PCGG directing him to account for the alleged sequestered shares in ETPI
and to cease and desist from exercising voting rights. The present respondents were not
made parties either in Civil Case No. 0130. In the former case, Victor Africa (Africa) was not
impleaded in and so is plainly not a party thereto.
In the proceedings for Civil Case No. 0130, testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director
and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane
deposition) before Consul General Ernesto Castro of the Philippine Embassy in London,
England. The purpose was for Bane to identify and testify on the facts set forth in his affidavit
so as to prove the ownership issue in favor of the petitioner and/or establish the prima facie
factual foundation for sequestration of ETPI’s Class A stock.
As to Civil Case No. 009, the petitioner filed a motion (1st Motion) to adopt the testimonies of
the witnesses in Civil Case No. 0130, including the deposition of Mr. Maurice Bane which was
denied by SB in its April 1998 Resolution because he was not available for cross-examination.
The petitioners did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead made its Formal
Offer of Evidence on December 14, 1999. Significantly, the Bane deposition was not included
as part of its offered exhibits. In rectifying this, they filed a second motion with prayer for re-
opening of the case for the purpose of introducing additional evidence and requested the
court to take judicial notice of the facts established by the Bane deposition. This was however
denied by the SB in its November 6, 2000 resolution (2000 resolution). A third motion was
filed by the petitioners on November 16, 2001 seeking once more to admit the Bane
deposition which the SB denied for the reason that the 1998 resolution has become final in
view of the petitioner’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal within the 15-day
reglementary period.
ISSUE: Whether the Bane deposition is admissible under the rules of court and under the
principle of judicial notice.
RULING: No. Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at the trial of a pending
action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court does not only require due observance of its
sub-paragraphs (a) to (d); it also requires, as a condition for admissibility, compliance with
“the rules on evidence.” Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court makes an
implied reference to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court before the deposition may be
used in evidence.
Admissibility of the Bane deposition still needs to comply with the rules of court on the
admissibility of testimonies or deposition taken in a different proceeding. Depositions are not
meant as substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. Generally, the
deponent must be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing
otherwise, the adverse party may oppose it as mere hearsay. Cross-examination will test the
truthfulness of the statements of the witness; it is an essential safeguard of the accuracy and
completeness of a testimony. Depositions from the former trial may be introduced as evidence
provided that the parties to the first proceeding must be the same as the parties to the later
proceeding.
Further, the rule of judicial notice is not applicable in this case as it would create confusion
between the two cases. It is the duty of the petitioner, as a party-litigant, to properly lay
before the court the evidence it relies upon in support of the relief it seeks, instead of
imposing that same duty on the court.

RULE 24: DEPOSITIONS BEFORE ACTION OR PENDING APPEAL

People vs Webb
GR No 132577
August 17,1999

Doctrine: The deposition is conducted under oath outside of the court room, usually in one of
the lawyer’s offices. A transcript - word for word account - is made of the deposition.
Testimony of a witness, taken in writing, under oath or affirmation, before some judicial officer
in answer to questions or interrogatories and the purposes of taking depositions are to: 1.]
Give greater assistance to the parties in ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing
perjury; 2.] Provide an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent claims and
defenses; 3.] Make available in a simple, convenient and inexpensive way, facts which
otherwise could not be proved except with great difficulty; 4.] Educate the parties in advance
of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses thereby encouraging settlements; 5.]
Expedite litigation; 6.] Safeguard against surprise; 7.] Prevent delay; 8.] Simplify and narrow
the issues; and 9.] Expedite and facilitate both preparation and trial. As can be gleaned from
the foregoing, a deposition, in keeping with its nature as a mode of discovery, should be
taken before and not during trial.

FACTS: Respondent Webb was accused in the crime of Rape with Homicide .

During the course of the proceedings in the trial court, respondent filed a Motion To Take
Testimony By Oral Deposition praying that he be allowed to take the testimonies of some of
the vital witnesses residing in the US before the general consul, consul, vice-consul or
consular agent of the Philippines in lieu of presenting them as witnesses in court alleging that
the said persons are all residents of the United States and may not therefore be compelled by
subpoena to testify since the court had no jurisdiction over them.

The prosecution thereafter filed an opposition. The trial court denied the motion of
respondent. Respondent elevated his cause to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for
certiorari. Respondent Webb argued that: 1.] The taking of depositions pending action is
applicable to criminal proceedings; 2.] Depositions by oral testimony in a foreign country can
be taken before a consular officer of the Philippine Embassy in the United States; and, 3.] He
has the right to completely and fully present evidence to support his defense and the denial of
such right will violate his constitutional right to due process.

Court of Appeals rendered judgment in favor of Webb.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA committed reversible error in reversing the trial court’s ruling.

RULING: Yes. The use of discovery procedures is directed to the sound discretion of the trial
judge. The deposition taking cannot be based nor can it be denied on flimsy reasons.
Discretion has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of
the law. There is no indication in this case that in denying the motion of respondent-accused,
the trial judge acted in a biased, arbitrary, capricious or oppressive manner. Grave abuse of
discretion implies such capricious, and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act all in contemplation of law.”

End…
Suaverdez, Ronald Laurence B.