XII.

QUO WARRANTO
1.
2.
G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149, August 23, 2011

RENALD F. VILANDO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

Facts:

In the May 14, 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
District of Negros Oriental. She won over the other contender, Olivia Paras. She was proclaimed as Representative by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers, and assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives.

Meanwhile, petitions involving either the disqualification or the proclamation of Limkaichong were filed before the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) which reached the Court.

The petitions, which questioned her citizenship, were filed against Limkaichong by her detractors: Louis Biraogo, Olivia Paras,
and Renald F. Vilando.

On April 1, 2009, the Court granted the aforesaid petition of Limkaichong, reversed the Joint Resolution of the Comelec,
dismissed the three (3) other petitions, and directed the petitioners to seek relief before the HRET by way of a petition for Quo
Warranto.

On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Renald F. Vilando (Vilando), as taxpayer; and Jacinto Paras, as registered voter
of the congressional district concerned, filed separate petitions for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before the HRET.
Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected and proclaimed. They
alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who acquired
the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter.

On March 24, 2010, the HRET dismissed both petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the House of
Representatives.

The petitioners sought reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, but it was denied by the HRET. 


Issue:

1. WON the HRET has jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto.
2. WON petitioner may question the citizenship of private respondent in an action for quo warranto.

Ruling:

Vilando's argument, that the quo warranto petition does not operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of Limkaichong's
father as the certificate of naturalization is null and void from the beginning, is devoid of merit.

In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. The proper
proceeding to assail the citizenship of Limkaichong's father should be in accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No.
473 (cancellation of the naturalization certificate).

Under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may question the illegally or
invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that
may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizen's descendant.
Vilando asserts that as an incident in determining the eligibility of Limkaichong, the HRET, having the plenary, absolute and
exclusive jurisdiction to determine her qualifications, can pass upon the efficacy of the certificate of naturalization.

True, the HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions, specifically over cases challenging ineligibility on the ground of lack
of citizenship. No less than the 1987 Constitution vests the HRET the authority to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of its Members. This constitutional power is likewise echoed in the 2004 Rules of the HRET.
Rule 14 thereof restates this duty, thus:

Rule 14. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives.

Time and again, this Court has acknowledged this sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET. The power granted to HRET by the
Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. Such power is
regarded as full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise
restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same.

Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of
the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral
attack on the citizenship of the father which, as already stated, is not permissible.

SHORT DIGEST

Facts:

L won in the election as a representative of the 1st District of Negros Oriental against O. She assumed office as Member of the a
House of Representatives. A petition for quo warranto was filed against L by V, O and R seeking for its disqualification. V, O and
R alleged that L is a Chinese Citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected and proclaimed.

Issue:

WON the HRET has jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto.

WON petitioner may question the citizenship of private respondent in an action for quo warranto.

Ruling:

1. The HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions, specifically over cases challenging ineligibility on the ground of lack of
citizenship. No less than the 1987 Constitution vests the HRET the authority to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of its Members. This constitutional power is likewise echoed in the 2004 Rules of the HRET.

2. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity.

Under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may question the illegally or
invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that
may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizen's descendant.

3.
4. Mendoza vs. Allas, G.R. No. 131977, Feb. 4, 1999
Facts:
Petitioner Pedro Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs in 1972. On March 1, 1988, he was appointed Customs Service Chief of
the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS). In 1989, the position of Customs Service Chief was reclassified by the
Civil Service as "Director III" in accordance with Republic Act No. 6758 and National Compensation Circular No. 50. Petitioner's
position was thus categorized as "Director III, CIIS" and he discharged the function and duties of said office.
On April 22, 1993, petitioner was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector, Collection District X, Cagayan de Oro City.
In his place, respondent Ray Allas was appointed as "Acting Director III" of the CIIS. Despite petitioner's new assignment as
Acting District Collector, however, he continued to receive the salary and benefits of the position of Director III.

In September 1994, petitioner received a letter from Deputy Customs Commissioner Cesar Z. Dario, informing him of his
termination from the Bureau of Customs, in view of respondent Allas' appointment as Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos.

Petitioner wrote the Customs Commissioner demanding his reinstatement with full back wages and without loss of seniority
rights. No reply was made.

On December 2, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto against respondent Allas before the Regional Trial Court. The
RTC rendered a decision granting the petition. The court found that petitioner was illegally terminated from office without due
process of law and in violation of his security of tenure, and that as he was deemed not to have vacated his office, the
appointment of respondent Allas to the same office was void ab initio. The court ordered the ouster of respondent Allas from
the position of Director III, and at the same time directed the reinstatement of petitioner to the same position with payment of
full back salaries and other benefits appurtenant thereto.

Respondent Allas appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 8, 1996, while the case was pending before said court,
respondent Allas was promoted by President Ramos to the position of Deputy Commissioner of Customs for Assessment and
Operations. As a consequence of this promotion, petitioner moved to dismiss respondent's appeal as having been rendered
moot and academic. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the case accordingly. The order of dismissal
became final and entry of judgment was made on March 19, 1996.

On May 9, 1996, petitioner filed with the court a quo a Motion for Execution of its decision. The court denied the motion on
the ground that the contested position vacated by respondent Allas was now being occupied by respondent Godofredo Olores
who was not a party to the quo warranto petition.

Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals questioning the order of the trial
court. On November 27, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Hence, this recourse.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the motion.

Ruling:
No.
Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise
respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office. If the court finds for the respondent, the judgment should
simply state that the respondent is entitled to the office. If, however, the court finds for the petitioner and declares the
respondent guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising the office, judgment may be rendered as
follows:

"Sec. 10. Judgment where usurpation found.-- When the defendant is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully
holding or exercising an office, position, right, privilege, or franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such defendant be ousted
and altogether excluded therefrom, and that the plaintiff or relator, as the case may be, recover his costs. Such further
judgment may be rendered determining the respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege, or franchise of all the
parties to the action as justice requires."

If it is found that the respondent or defendant is usurping or intruding into the office, or unlawfully holding the same, the court
may order:
(1) The ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office;

(2) The recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator;

(3) The determination of the respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege or franchise of all the parties to the
action as justice requires.
The character of the judgment to be rendered in quo warranto rests to some extent in the discretion of the court and on the
relief sought.
Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office. This rule, however, is not
applicable in quo warranto cases. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even though
such successor may trace his title to the same source. This follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never
directed to an officer as such, but always against the person-- to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally
authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim. In the case at bar, the petition for
quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas. What was threshed out before the trial court was the
qualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against respondent Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores.
The Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution of the trial court's decision.

Short Digest

Principle:
A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title
to the same source. This follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but
always against the person-- to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise
any function of the office to which he lays claim.

Facts:
M is holding a position of Director III in the Bureau of Customs. He was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector in
Cagayan de Oro. Consequently, A was appointed as Acting Director III. M received a letter informing him of his termination
from the BOC and appointing A as Director III. M then filed a petition for quo warranto against A. The trial court rendered in
favor of M and ordered the ouster of A and reinstatement of M. The judgment became final thus M filed for motion for
execution. But the same was denied since the position is now being occupied by O who was not a party to the quo warranto
petition.

Issue:
May the judgment in a quo warranto bind a person not a party to the petition?

Ruling:
Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office. This rule, however, is not
applicable in quo warranto cases. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even though
such successor may trace his title to the same source. This follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never
directed to an officer as such, but always against the person-- to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally
authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim. In the case at bar, the petition for
quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas. What was threshed out before the trial court was the
qualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against respondent Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores.
The Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution of the trial court's decision.

5.
6.
CALLEJA VS. PANDAY

Facts:

Respondents filed a petition with the RTC of San Jose, Camarines Sur for quo warranto with Damages and Prayer for
Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction, Damages and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order against herein
petitioners. Respondents alleged that from 1985 up to the filing of the petition with the trial court, they had been
members of the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, but sometime in May 2005,
petitioners, who are also among the incorporators and stockholders of said corporation, forcibly and with the aid of
armed men usurped the powers which supposedly belonged to respondents.

RTC-Br. 58 issued an Order transferring the case to the RTC in Naga City. According to RTC-Br. 58, since the verified
petition showed petitioners therein (herein respondents) to be residents of Naga City, then pursuant to Section 7,
Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the action for quo warranto should be brought in the RTC exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondents or any of the respondents resides. However, the
Executive Judge of RTC, Naga City refused to receive the case folder of the subject case for quo warranto, stating that
improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo warranto case to another administrative jurisdiction.

The RTC-Br. 58 then proceeded to issue and serve summons on herein petitioners (respondents below). Petitioner
Tabora filed his Answer, raising therein the affirmative defenses of (1) improper venue, (2) lack of jurisdiction, and (3)
wrong remedy of quo warranto. Thereafter, the other petitioners also filed their Answer, also raising the same
affirmative defenses. All the parties were then required to submit their respective memoranda.

RTC-Br. 58 issued the assailed Order: "xxx xxx Under Section 8, of the Interim Rules, [a] Motion to Dismiss is
among the prohibited pleadings. On the otherhand, the Supreme Court under Administrative Order 8-01 has directed
the transfer from the regular courts to the branches of the Regional Trial Courts specially designated to try and decide
intra-corporate dispute. xxx The Motion to Dismiss is DENIED pursuant to the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-
Corporate Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC) which mandates that motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading
(Section 8) and in consonance with Administrative Order 8-01 of the Supreme Court dated March 1, 2001, this case is
hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court Branch 23, Naga City which under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC has
been designated as special court to try and decide intra-corporate controversies under R.A. 8799. xxx The scheduled
hearing on the prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction set on July 18, 2005 is hereby
cancelled. Petitioners no longer moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Order and, instead, immediately elevated
the case to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Issue: Whether Quo Warranto is the proper remedy and is better left to the court of competent jurisdiction to rule
upon."

Held:

It should be noted that allegations in a complaint for quo warranto that certain persons usurped the offices, powers
and functions of duly elected members of the board, trustees and/or officers make out a case for an intra-corporate
controversy. Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, the Court, adopting Justice Jose Y. Feria’s view, declared in
Unilongov. Court of Appeals that Section 1, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is “limited to actions of quo
warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and
associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated,” while “[a]ctions of quo warranto against
corporations, or against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission and are governed by its rules. (P.D. No. 902-A as amended).”

However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed and Section 5.2 thereof provides as follows:

5.2. The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is
hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, That the
Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise
jurisdiction over these cases. xxx

Therefore, actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, which were formerly
cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have been transferred to the courts of
general jurisdiction. But, this does not change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not
apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an office in a private corporation. Presently, Section 1(a) of
Rule 66 reads thus:

Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. – An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or
franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;
x xxx

As explained in the Unilongocase, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer contains the phrase “or an
office in a corporation created by authority of law” which was found in the old Rules. Clearly, the present Rule 66
only applies to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public
officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated
despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is, therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate
Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 which applies to the petition for quo warranto filed by respondents before the
trial court since what is being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners to assume the office and act as the
board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated.

The next question then is, which branch of the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the present action for quo
warrato? Section 5 of the Interim Rules provides that the petition should be commenced and tried in the Regional
Trial Court that has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation. It is undisputed that the principal office of
the corporation is situated at Goa, CamarinesSur. Thus, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC,
it is the Regional Trial Court designated as Special Commercial Courtsin Camarines Sur which shall have jurisdiction
over the petition for quo warranto filed by herein respondents.

Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction over respondents’ petition for quo
warranto. Based on the allegations in the petition, the case was clearly one involving an intra-corporate dispute. The
trial court should have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the aforementioned administrative issuances of this
Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a Special Commercial Court; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction
over cases previously cognizable by the SEC.

The petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur
dated July 13, 2005 is SET ASIDE for being NULL and VOID. The petition for quo warranto in Civil Case No. T-1007
(now re-docketed as SEC Case No. RTC 2005-0001), entitled “Jose Pierre A. Panday, et al. v. Sps. Joaquin M. Calleja, Jr.,
et al.” is ordered DISMISSED.

Short digest:

Facts:

R filed a petition with the RTC of San Jose, Camarines Sur for quo warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory
and Prohibitory Injunction, Damages and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order against P.

R alleged that from 1985 up to the filing of the petition with the trial court, they had been members of the board of
directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, but sometime in May 2005, P, who are also among the
incorporators and stockholders of said corporation, forcibly and with the aid of armed men usurped the powers which
supposedly belonged to respondents.

RTC-Br. 58 issued an Order transferring the case to the RTC in Naga City. According to RTC-Br. 58, since the verified
petition showed petitioners therein (herein respondents) to be residents of Naga City, then pursuant to Section 7,
Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the action for quo warranto should be brought in the RTC exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondents or any of the respondents resides. However, the
Executive Judge of RTC, Naga City refused to receive the case folder of the subject case for quo warranto, stating that
improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo warranto case to another administrative jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether Quo Warranto is the proper remedy and is better left to the court of competent jurisdiction to rule
upon.

Held:

Section 1, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is “limited to actions of quo warranto against persons who
usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as
corporations without being legally incorporated,” while “[a]ctions of quo warranto against corporations, or against
persons who usurp an office in a corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission
and are governed by its rules. (P.D. No. 902-A as amended).”

However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed and Section 5.2 thereof provides as follows:
5.2. The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is
hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, That the
Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise
jurisdiction over these cases. xxx

Therefore, actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, which were formerly
cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have been transferred to the courts of
general jurisdiction. But, this does not change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not
apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an office in a private corporation.

7. Madrigal v. Lecaroz, G.R. No. L-46218, Oct. 23, 1990

LONG DIGEST:
Facts:
Joventino Madrigal's position as a permanent construction capataz in the office of the Provincial Engineer was
abolished. The abolition was allegedly due to the poor financial condition of the province and it appearing that his
position was not essential. The Civil Service Commission declared the removal of Madrigal from the service illegal.

Madrigal filed a petition before the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Marinduque against public
respondents for mandamus and damages. The trial court issued an order dismissing the petition on the ground that
Madrigal's cause of action was barred by laches because herein petitioner was separated from the service on
November 25, 1971, and it was only on December 15, 1975, or FOUR (4) YEARS and TWENTY (20) DAYS after, that he
filed this case for "Mandamus and Damages" with the principal aim of causing his reinstatement to the public position
from where his service was terminated.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner’s cause of action is barred by laches.

Ruling:
That the instant case is one for MANDAMUS, and not QUO WARRANTO, is not of any significance, for the same
principle applies as held in these cases:

An action for reinstatement, by a public official, whether it be quo warranto or mandamus, should be filed in court
within one year from removal or separation, otherwise the action will be barred.

The unbending jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is to the effect that a petition for quo warranto and mandamus
affecting titles to public office must be filed within one (1) year from the date the petitioner is ousted from his
position. The reason behind this being there must be stability in the service so that public business may (sic) be
unduly retarded; delays in the statement of the right to positions in the service must be discouraged.

ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.

SHORT DIGEST
Facts:
The position of X as a permanent construction capataz in the office of the Provincial Engineer was abolished. The
abolition was allegedly due to the poor financial condition of the province and it appearing that his position was not
essential. The Civil Service Commission declared the removal of X from the service illegal. X filed a petition before the
Court of First Instance of Marinduque against Y for mandamus and damages. The trial court issued an order
dismissing the petition on the ground that X's cause of action was barred by laches because he was separated from
the service on November 25, 1971, and it was only on December 15, 1975, or FOUR (4) YEARS and TWENTY (20) DAYS
after, that he filed this case for "Mandamus and Damages" with the principal aim of causing his reinstatement to the
public position from where his service was terminated.

Issue:
Whether or not X’s cause of action is barred by laches.

Ruling:
YES. That the instant case is one for MANDAMUS, and not QUO WARRANTO, is not of any significance, for the same
principle applies as held in these cases: An action for reinstatement, by a public official, whether it be quo warranto
or mandamus, should be filed in court within one year from removal or separation, otherwise the action will be
barred.
The unbending jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is to the effect that a petition for quo warranto and mandamus
affecting titles to public office must be filed within one (1) year from the date the petitioner is ousted from his
position. The reason behind this being there must be stability in the service so that public business may (sic) be
unduly retarded; delays in the statement of the right to positions in the service must be discouraged.

8. De Tavera vs. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc.

Facts: Plaintiff--appellant Mita Pardo de Tavera filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal a complaint against the
Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the Society). In substance, the complaint alleged that
plaintiff is a doctor of Medicine by profession and a recognized specialist in the treatment of tuberculosis, having
been in the continuous practice of her profession since 1945; that she is a member of the Board of Directors of the
defendant Society, in representation of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office; that she was duly appointed on
April 27, 1973 as Executive Secretary of the Society; that on May 29, 1974, the past Board of Directors removed her
summarily from her position, the lawful cause of which she was not informed, through the simple expedient of
declaring her position vacant; that immediately thereafter, defendant Alberto Romulo was appointed to the position
by an affirmative vote of seven directors, with two abstentions and one objection; and that defendants Pardo, Nubla,
Garcia and Adil, not being members of defendant Society when they were elevated to the position of members of the
Board of Directors, are not qualified to be elected as such and hence, all their acts in said meeting of May 29, 1974
are null and void.

The defendants filed their answer on May 12, 1976, specifically denying that plaintiff was illegally removed from her
position as Executive Secretary and averring that under the Code of By-Laws of the Society, said position is held at the
pleasure of the Board of Directors and when the pleasure is exercised, it only means that the incumbent has to vacate
the same because her term has expired. Further, defendants disputed the timeliness of the filing of the action stating
that an action to question one’s ouster from a corporate office must be filed within one year from said ouster.

On the same date, defendant Adil filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of
action, or if it does, the same has prescribed. Inasmuch as plaintiff seeks reinstatement, he argued that the complaint
is an action for quo warranto and hence, the same should be commenced within one year from when the plaintiff was
ousted from her position.

Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Motion to Dismiss stating that the complaint is a suit for damages filed under the
authority of Section 6, Article II of the present Constitution in relation to Articles 12 and 32(6) of the New Civil Code,
and her constitutional right to equal protection of the law, as guaranteed by Section 1, Article IV of the present
Constitution.

Defendant Adil filed a Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss arguing that since there is an averment of
plaintiff’s right to office, and that defendant Romulo is unlawfully in possession thereof, then, it is indeed, a case for
quo warranto; and that assuming that it is merely a suit for damages, then, the same is premature, pursuant to
Section 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.

Facts (Short): Petitioner is a member of the Board of Directors and was duly appointed as Executive Secretary of the
defendant the Philippine Tuberculosis Society. Petitioner was summarily removed from her position by the Board of
Directors through the simple expedient way of declaring her position vacant on May 29, 1974. On March 23, 1976,
Petitioner filed a complaint against the Society alleging that the Society violated Petitioner’s rights under the Bylaws
of the Society, the Civil Code and the Constitution, which allegedly renders the individuals responsible therefore,
accountable for damages.

Issue: Whether or not the case is one for quo warranto and should thus be filed within a period of one year.

Held: No.

Action; Pleadings and Practice; Quo Warranto; Nature of action to be determined from complaint, not from the
answer.— The nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the
 cause of action, and not those averred as a defense in the defendant’s answer. The theory adopted by the plaintiff in
his complaint is one thing; that by the defendant in his answer another. The purpose of an action or suit and the law
to govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action,
made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.

Same; Same; Same; A suit questioning petitioner’s removal as corporate secretary not necessarily a quo warranto suit
where its purpose is to ask for damages on account of such removal.—While it is true that the complaint questions
petitioner’s removal from the position of Executive Secretary and seeks her reinstatement thereto, the nature of the
suit is not necessarily one of quo warranto. The nature of the instant suit is one involving a violation of the rights of
the plaintiff under the By-Laws of the Society, the Civil Code and the Constitution, which allegedly renders the
individuals responsible therefore, accountable for damages, as may be gleaned from the following allegations in the
complaint.

Same; Same; Same; Same.—Further, it must be noted that the action is not only against Alberto Romulo, the person
appointed in her stead, but also against the Society and the past and present members of the Board. In fact, Romulo
is sued as present occupant of the office and not to hold him accountable for damages because he did not participate
in the alleged illegal and unconstitutional removal of plaintiff--appellant. The action is primarily against the Society
and the past members of the Board who are responsible for her removal. The present Board of Directors has been
impleaded as party defendant for the purpose merely of enabling it to act, “to reinstate the plaintiff to her position as
Executive Secretary of the defendant Society” being one of the reliefs prayed for in the prayer of the complaint.

Same; Prescription; A suit for damages for alleged illegal ouster from position in a corporation prescribes in four (4)
years. —Corollarily, the one-year period fixed in Section 16, Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Court within which a
petition for quo warranto should be filed, counted from the date of ouster, does not apply to the case at bar. The
action must be brought within four (4) years, in accordance with Valencia vs. Cebu Portland Cement Co., et al.,
L-13715, December 23, 1959, 106 Phil. 732, a case involving a plaintiff separated from his employment for alleged
unjustifiable causes, where this Court held that the action is one for “injury to the rights of the plaintiff, and must be
brought within 4 years under Article 1146 of the New Civil Code.”

9.
LONG DIGEST

NO. 9
PPSTA v. Apostol, G.R. No. L-36966, Feb. 28, 1974

FACTS:
On July 20, 1972, private respondent Eufemia M. San Luis as a member of the Philippine Public School Teachers
Association (PPSTA for short), a fraternal non-stock association of public school teachers throughout the country, filed with
respondent court of first instance at Quezon City a complaint with preliminary injunction for the annulment of the 1972 annual
elections of the PPSTA board of directors held on June 26-28, 1972 at Teachers Camp in Baguio City for having been held
outside its principal office at Quezon City against herein petitioners as defendants.
Petitioners as defendants filed their answer in due course traversing the legal contentions of respondent (as hereinafter
discussed).
After the parties had in a series of pleadings filed voluminous documents dealing with the background and activities of the
PPSTA, particularly the questioned 1972 Annual Convention and elections held on June 26-28, 1972 in Baguio City, which
respondent court considered as stipulations of facts, respondent court rendered without further hearing and trial its decision of
April 26, 1973 holding that " (T)he meeting held in Baguio City being contrary to the by-laws of the corporation and the
Corporation Law, whatever acts therein made, including the elections of the Board of Directors, are null and void," and declared
as null and void all resolutions and corporate acts at the 29th (1972) annual PPSTA Representative Assembly, including the
elections of the 1972 PPSTA board of directors and the formation of the PPSTA commission on elections which supervised the
elections and proclaimed the winners.
Upon petitioners' motion for reconsideration complaining against its judgment "ordering the injunction permanent"
as without basis, since it had previously denied the preliminary injunction sought by respondent under its order dated July 28,
1972 where it "(found) that this is not a proper case for injunction — the acts to be enjoined having been consummated," 1 it
issued its order of May 21, 1973 denying reconsideration and amended the above-quoted portion on injunction of its judgment
so as to read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Granting final injunction perpetually restraining defendant PPSTA Commission on Elections from proclaiming the members
of the defendant 1972 PPSTA Board of Directors as duly elected; and in the event that they have been proclaimed as such,
restraining them from sitting as a board; and
xxx xxx xxx 2
Hence, the present petition by way of appeal by certiorari. The Court granted due course as well as issued a temporary
restraining order against enforcement of respondent court's decision and amendatory order which would have seated the 1972
PPSTA board of directors and would allowed the old 1971 board notwithstanding that its term has expired and that it was the
one that called for the 1972 annual convention and elections to be held in Baguio City to take back the management of the
PPSTA as holdover officers.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent has personality to bring the action of quo warranto.

RULING:
The Court finds it unnecessary to rule upon the parties' above conflicting contentions, since it finds to be decisive
petitioners' contention that respondent has no personality and standing as a single individual member out of thousands of
members of the PPSTA to bring the action below for annulment of the PPSTA 1972 annual convention and elections, as she was
not even a chapter delegate to the said convention and she was duly represented thereat in accordance with the PPSTA's by-
laws by her duly authorized chapter delegates who have raised no question as to the proceedings. 4 Article IX, section 5 of the
by-laws expressly provides that "only official delegates to the representative assembly are entitled to take part in the
discussions and to vote."

Court Section 6 thereof provides that in order that an individual may directly bring the action, he or she must claim to entitled
to the public office or position allegedly unlawfully held or usurped. 6 Otherwise, the action must be brought by the Solicitor
General or fiscal with leave of the court upon the complaint of the relator under section 4 of the Rule. 7

Chief Justice Moran thus explained the application of the two cited provisions:

The general rule is that actions for quo warranto should be brought by the Solicitor General or a fiscal in cases of usurpation of
an office established by law or by the Constitution under color of an executive appointment, or the abuse of a public franchise
under color of a legislative grant, for these are public wrongs and not private injuries. Since, under our system all power
emanates from the people, who constitute the sovereignty, the right to inquire into the authority by which a person assumes to
exercise the functions of a public office or franchise is regarded as inherent in the people on the right their sovereignty. Hence,
the action should be brought by the Solicitor General or the fiscal who represents the sovereign power.

However, in a case involving merely the administration corporate functions or duties which touch only private individual rights,
such as the election of officers, admission of a corporate officer, or member, and the like the action for quo warranto may be
brought with leave of court, by the Solicitor General or fiscal upon the relation of any person or persons having an interest
injuriously affected. Such action may be allowed in the discretion of the court, according to section 4 and the court, before
granting leave, may direct that, notice be given to the defendant so that he may be heard in opposition thereto, under section
5.

Respondent manifestly lays no claim herself to the office of PPSTA director nor has the present action been filed with leave of
court by the Solicitor General or fiscal upon her relation as a party having an interest injuriously affected, as required by the
cited Rule.

Her action must therefore fail on this score and the judgment erroneously rendered by respondent court shall be set aside.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment under review of respondent court is hereby set aside and the complaint ordered dismissed. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SHORT DIGEST

Facts:
On July 20, 1972, private respondent Eufemia M. San Luis as a member of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association
(PPSTA for short), a fraternal non-stock association of public school teachers throughout the country, filed with respondent
court of first instance at Quezon City a complaint with preliminary injunction for the annulment of the 1972 annual elections of
the PPSTA board of directors held on June 26-28, 1972 at Teachers Camp in Baguio City for having been held outside its
principal office at Quezon City against herein petitioners as defendants.

Respondent court rendered without further hearing and trial its decision of April 26, 1973 holding that " (T)he meeting held in
Baguio City being contrary to the by-laws of the corporation and the Corporation Law, whatever acts therein made, including
the elections of the Board of Directors, are null and void," and declared as null and void all resolutions and corporate acts at the
29th (1972) annual PPSTA Representative Assembly, including the elections of the 1972 PPSTA board of directors and the
formation of the PPSTA commission on elections which supervised the elections and proclaimed the winners.

Issue:

Whether or not the action has complied with the requirements of Rule 66 governing such special civil
actions of quo warranto.

Ruling:

NO. The Court sets aside the judgment of respondent court.

Respondent's action below was in essence one of quo warranto which is governed by Rule 66 of the Rules of Court Section 6
thereof provides that in order that an individual may directly bring the action, he or she must claim to entitled to the public
office or position allegedly unlawfully held or usurped. 6 Otherwise, the action must be brought by the Solicitor General or fiscal
with leave of the court upon the complaint of the relator under section 4 of the Rule. 7

Chief Justice Moran thus explained the application of the two cited provisions:

The general rule is that actions for quo warranto should be brought by the Solicitor General or a fiscal in cases of usurpation of
an office established by law or by the Constitution under color of an executive appointment, or the abuse of a public franchise
under color of a legislative grant, for these are public wrongs and not private injuries. Since, under our system all power
emanates from the people, who constitute the sovereignty, the right to inquire into the authority by which a person assumes to
exercise the functions of a public office or franchise is regarded as inherent in the people on the right their sovereignty. Hence,
the action should be brought by the Solicitor General or the fiscal who represents the sovereign power.

However, in a case involving merely the administration corporate functions or duties which touch only private individual rights,
such as the election of officers, admission of a corporate officer, or member, and the like the action for quo warranto may be
brought with leave of court, by the Solicitor General or fiscal upon the relation of any person or persons having an interest
injuriously affected. Such action may be allowed in the discretion of the court, according to section 4 and the court, before
granting leave, may direct that, notice be given to the defendant so that he may be heard in opposition thereto, under section
5.

Respondent manifestly lays no claim herself to the office of PPSTA director nor has the present action been filed with leave of
court by the Solicitor General or fiscal upon her relation as a party having an interest injuriously affected, as required by the
cited Rule.

Her action must therefore fail on this score and the judgment erroneously rendered by respondent court shall be set aside.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment under review of respondent court is hereby set aside and the complaint ordered dismissed. No
pronouncement as to costs.

10.
Liban vs Gordon
(Long Digest)
Facts:
Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the QC Red Cross chapter. Respondent is the Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross Board of Governors. Petitioners argued that when the respondent accepts the
chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent ceased to be a member of the Senate- Sec. 13, Art. VI
1987 Constitution which provides that “No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may hold any other
office or employment in the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which
he was elected.” Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC which held that PNRC is a government-owned or controlled
corporation. Flores v. Drilon held that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment
to another government office.
Respondent argued that petitioners have no standing to file petition which appears to be an action for Quo Warranto
for they do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of the respondent. Section 11, Rule 66 of Civil Procedure “that
an action be commenced within 1 year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office
or position, arose.” Petitioners raise a constitutional question as taxpayers for illegal disbursement of funds
considering that respondent has been drawing salaries and other compensation as a Senator even if he is no longer
entitled to his office.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have standing.
Ruling:
No, petitioners have no standing.
The petition is an action for quo warranto. Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto proceeding is
generally defined as an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office or even a public franchise.
Petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of the respondent. Therefore, they do not have standing.
(Short Digest)
Facts:
XX are officers of the Board of Directors of the QC Red Cross Chapter. Y, while being a Senator, is the chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross. XX alleged that when Y accepted the chairmanship he ceased to be a member of the
Senate pursuant to Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution. XX filed this petition which appears to be an action for
quo warranto against Y for they do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of Y.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have standing?
Ruling:
No, petitioners have no standing.
The petition is an action for quo warranto. Under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto proceeding is
generally defined as an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office or even a public franchise.
Petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of the respondent. Therefore, they do not have standing.

11. SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD vs. SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and
SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998 Case Digest

LONG DIGEST

Facts:

On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular session of the 11th Congress. On the
agenda for the day was the election of officers. Senator Francisco S. Tatad and Senator Marcelo B. Fernan were
nominated for the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Senator Fernan was duly elected President of the
Senate.

Thereafter, Senator Tatad manifested, with the agreement of Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, he was assuming
the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority
while those who voted for him, belonged to the minority. During the discussion, Senator Juan M. Flavier also
manifested that the senators belonging to the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP -- numbering 7, and, thus, also a minority -- had
chosen Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader. No consensus was arrived at during the following days of
session.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader, informed the body that he received a letter from the 7 members of the LAKAS-
NUCD-UMDP, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as minority leader. The Senated President then
recognized Senator Guingona as minority leader of the Senate.

The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before the Supreme Court a petition for quo warranto alleging
that Senator Guingona has been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a
position that, according to them, rightfully belongs to Senator Tatad.

Issue: WON the quo warranto filed by petitioner against respondent will prosper?

Ruling:

The petition for quo warranto is not proper. Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and
exercise of power by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the
proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its
enjoyment. The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor or any person claiming to be
entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. The action shall be
brought against the person who allegedly usurped, intruded into or is unlawfully holding of exercising such office.

For a quo warranto prosper, the person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to
use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case,
petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
The specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has
not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has been vested.
Without any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona’s
assumption and exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of
discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

SHORT DIGEST

The Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular session of the 11th Congress. On the agenda for the day
was the election of officers. Senator F and Senator M were nominated for the position of Senate President. Senator F
was duly elected President of the Senate. Thereafter, Senator M manifested, with the agreement of Senator S, he was
assuming the position of minority leader. The members of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, stating that they had elected
Senator G as minority leader. The Senate President F then recognized Senator G as minority leader of the Senate. The
following day, Senators S and M filed before the Supreme Court a petition for quo warranto alleging that Senator G
has been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according
to them, rightfully belongs to Senator M. Is quo warranto the proper remedy?

NO, quo warranto is not the proper remedy. For a quo warranto prosper, the person suing must show that he or she
has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or
unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable
franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. The specific norms or standards that may be used in determining
who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the
Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Without any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that
illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent G’s assumption and exercise of the powers of the office of Senate
minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as
minority leader.

12.
13.
14. Camid vs. Office of the President

Very Long Digest

Facts:
President Macapagal issued several Executive Orders creating 33 municipalities in Mindanao. Among them was
Andong in Lanao del Sur which was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 7.

These executive orders were issued after legislative bills for the creation of municipalities involved in that case had
failed to pass Congress. President Macapagal justified the creation of these municipalities citing his powers under
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. Then Vice-President Pelaez filed a special civil action for a writ of
prohibition, alleging in main that the Executive Orders were null and void, Section 68 having been repealed by
Republic Act. No. 2370, and said orders constituting an undue delegation of legislative power.

After due deliberation, the Court unanimously held that the challenged Executive Orders were null and void. A
majority of five justices ruled that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code did not meet the well-settled
requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to the executive branch, while three justices opined that the
nullity of the issuances was the consequence of the enactment of the 1935 Constitution, which reduced the power of
the Chief Executive over local governments.

Among the Executive Orders annulled was Executive Order No. 107 which created the Municipality of Andong.
Nevertheless, the core issue presented in the present petition is the continued efficacy of the judicial annulment of
the Municipality of Andong.

Camid, who filed the petition for Certiorari in this case, represents himself as a current resident of Andong, suing as a
private citizen and taxpayer whose locus standi” is of public and paramount interest especially to the people of the
Municipality of Andong, Province of Lanao del Sur.” He alleges that Andong “has metamorphosed into a full-blown
municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential services for the municipality of its
constitutions,” even though he concdes that since 1968, no person has been appointed, elected or qualified to serve
any of the elective local government positions of Andong. Nevertheless, the municipality of Andong has its own high
school, Bureau of Posts, a Department of Education, Culture and Sports, office, and at least 17 “barangay units” with
their own respective chairmen. From 1964 until 1972, according to Camid, the public officials of Andong “have been
serving their constitutes through the minimal means and resources with least honorarium and recognition from the
Office of the then former President Diosdado Macapagal.” Since the time of Martial Law in 1972, Andong has
allegedly been getting by despite the absence of public funds, with the “Interim Officials” serving their constituents
"in their own little ways and means.”

The petition assails a Certification issued by the DILG. The Certification enumerates eighteen (18) municipalities
certified as "existing," per DILG records. Notably, these eighteen (18) municipalities are among the thirty-three (33),
along with Andong, whose creations were voided by this Court in Pelaez.

Camid imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DILG "in not classifying [Andong] as a regular existing
municipality and in not including said municipality in its records and of cial database as [an] existing regular
municipality.” He characterizes such non-classification as unequal treatment to the detriment of Andong, especially in
light of the current recognition given to the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly annulled by reason of Pelaez. As
appropriate relief, Camid prays that the Court annul the DILG Certification dated 21 November 2003; direct the DILG
to classify Andong as a "regular existing municipality;" all public respondents, to extend full recognition and support
to Andong; the Department of Finance and the Department of Budget and Management, to immediately release the
internal revenue allotments of Andong; and the public respondents, particularly the DILG, to recognize the "Interim
Local Officials" of Andong.

Moreover, Camid insists on the continuing validity of Executive Order No. 107. He argues that Pelaez has already been
modified by supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence.

Issue:

Whether or not the Petition for Certiorari should be granted

Ruling: No.

The case is not a fit subject for the special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus, as it pertains to the de novo
appreciation of factual questions. There is indeed no way to confirm several of Camid's astonishing factual allegations
pertaining to the purported continuing operation of Andong in the decades since it was annulled by this Court. No
trial court has had the opportunity to ascertain the validity of these factual claims, the appreciation of which is
beyond the function of this Court since it is not a trier of facts.

Peleaz was never reversed by this Court but rather it was expressly affirmed in the cases of, inter-alia, Municipality of
Malabang vs. Benito.

In the case of Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito, what was challenged is the validity of the constitution of the
Municipality of Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, also created by an executive order, and which, similar to Lawigan, was not
one of the municipalities annulled in Pelaez. This time, the officials of Balabagan invoked de facto status as a
municipal corporation in order to dissuade the Court from nullifying action. They alleged that its status as a de facto
corporation cannot be collaterally attached but should be inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at the
instance of the State, and not by a private individual as it was in that case. In response, the Court conceded that an
inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto, but only if
the municipal corporation is a de facto corporation.

Ultimately, the Court refused to acknowledge Balabagan as a de facto corporation, even though it had been organized
prior to the Court's decision in Pelaez. The Court declared void the executive order creating Balabagan and restrained
its municipal officials from performing their offcial duties and functions.

The Court did clarify in Malabang that the previous acts done by the municipality in the exercise of its corporate
powers were not necessarily a nullity. Camid devotes several pages of his petition in citing this point, yet the
relevance of the citation is unclear considering that Camid does not assert the validity of any corporate act of Andong
prior to its judicial dissolution. Notwithstanding, the Court in Malabang retained an emphatic attitude as to the
unconstitutionality of the power of the President to create municipal corporations by way of presidential
promulgations, as authorized under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code.

Is Andong similarly entitled to recognition as a de facto municipal corporation? It is not. There are eminent
differences between Andong and municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most prominent is the fact
that the executive order creating Andong was expressly annulled by order of this Court in 1965. If we were to affirm
Andong's de facto status by reason of its alleged continued existence despite its nullification, we would in effect be
condoning de ance of a valid order of this Court. Court decisions cannot obviously lose their efficacy due to the sheer
defiance by the parties aggrieved.

It bears noting that based on Camid's own admissions, Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by Section
442(d) of the Local Government Code. Section 442(d) requires that in order that the municipality created by executive
order may receive recognition, they must "have their respective set of elective municipal of cials holding office at the
time of the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code." Camid admits that Andong has never elected its municipal of
cers at all. This incapacity ties in with the fact that Andong was judicially annulled in 1965. Out of obeisance to our
ruling in Pelaez, the national government ceased to recognize the existence of Andong, depriving it of its share of the
public funds, and refusing to conduct municipal elections for the void municipality.

Short Digest:

The municipality of Andong was declared annulled by the Court in the Pelaez case. C, who is a resident of Andong,
asserts that Andong has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality. The petition for certiorari filed by C assails a
Certification issued by the DILG. The Certification enumerates 18 municipalities certified as “existing.” These 18
municipalities are among the municipalities which were voided by the Court in the Pelaez. C imputes grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the DILG in not classifying Andong as a regular existing municipality. Moreover, C argues that
Pelaez has already been modified by supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence. Is C’s
contention correct?

No. C’s contention is bereft of merit.

In the case of Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito, the status of corporation as a de facto corporation cannot be
collaterally attacked but should be inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State,
and not by a private individual as it was in that case. In response, the Court conceded that an inquiry into the legal
existence of a municipality is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto, but only if the municipal
corporation is a de facto corporation,

In the case at bar, the petitioner is an individual, and not a state. Furthermore, the Municipality of Andong failed to
meet the requisites set forth by Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code in order to be entitled to recognition as
a de facto municipal corporation.

15.
16. Divinigracia v Consolidated Broadcasting Facts:
Respondents Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) and Peoples Broadcasting Service, Inc. (PBS) are
two of the three networks that comprise the well-known Bombo Radyo Philippines. Both are involved in the
operation of radio broadcasting services in the Philippines, they being the grantees of legislative franchises
by virtue of two laws, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7477 and R.A. No. 7582. R.A. No. 7477. Section 9 of R.A. No.
7477 and Section 3 of R.A. No. 7582 contain a common provision predicated on the constitutional mandate
to democratize ownership of public utilities.
Following the enactment of these franchise laws, the NTC issued four (4) Provisional Authorities to PBS and
six (6) Provisional Authorities to CBS, allowing them to install, operate and maintain various AM and FM
broadcast stations in various locations throughout the nation.
Petitioner Santiago C. Divinagracia filed two complaints lodged against PBS and CBS, alleging that he was
the actual and beneficial owner of Twelve percent (12%) of the shares of stock of PBS and CBS separately,
and that despite the provisions in R.A. No. 7477 and R.A. No. 7582 mandating the public offering of at least
30% of the common stocks of PBS and CBS, both entities had failed to make such offering. Thus,
Divinagracia commonly argued in his complaints that the failure on the part of PBS and CBS to comply with
the mandate of their legislative franchise is a misuse of the franchise conferred upon it by law and it
continues to exercise its franchise in contravention of the law to the detriment of the general public and of
complainant who are unable to enjoy the benefits being offered by a publicly listed company. He thus
prayed for the cancellation of all the Provisional Authorities or CPCs of PBS and CBS on account of the
alleged violation of the conditions set therein, as well as in its legislative franchises.
The NTC issued a consolidated decision dismissing both complaints. While the NTC posited that it had full
jurisdiction to revoke or cancel a Provisional Authority or CPC for violations or infractions of the terms and
conditions embodied therein, it held that the complaints actually constituted collateral attacks on the
legislative franchises of PBS and CBS since the sole issue for determination was whether the franchisees had
violated the mandate to democratize ownership in their respective legislative franchises. The NTC ruled that
it was not competent to render a ruling on that issue, the same being more properly the subject of an action
for quo warranto to be commenced by the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines,
pursuant to Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:
Whether or not NTC has the power to cancel Provisional Authorities and CPCs of entities which Congress
has issued franchises to operate.

Ruling: NO.
There is in fact a more appropriate, more narrowly-tailored and least restrictive remedy that is afforded by
the law. Such remedy is that adverted to by the NTC and the Court of Appeals the resort to quo warranto
proceedings under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.

Under Section 1 of Rule 66, an action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be
brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises public office, position or franchise. Even while the action is maintained in the
name of the Republic, the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor is obliged to commence such action upon
complaint, and upon good reason to believe that any case specified under Section 1 of Rule 66 can be
established by proof.
The special civil action of quo warranto is a prerogative writ by which the Government can call upon any
person to show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise. It is settled that
[t]he determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such privilege
has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto, the
right to assert which, as a rule, belongs to the State upon complaint or otherwise, the reason being that the
abuse of a franchise is a public wrong and not a private injury. A forfeiture of a franchise will have to be
declared in a direct proceeding for the purpose brought by the State because a franchise is granted by law
and its unlawful exercise is primarily a concern of Government. Quo warranto is specifically available as a
remedy if it is thought that a government corporation has offended against its corporate charter or misused
its franchise.
The Court of Appeals correctly noted that in PLDT v. NTC, the Court had cited quo warranto as the
appropriate recourse with respect to an allegation by petitioner therein that a rival telecommunications
competitor had failed to construct its radio system within the ten (10) years from approval of its franchise,
as mandated by its legislative franchise. It is beyond dispute that quo warranto exists as an available and
appropriate remedy against the wrong imputed on private respondents.
Petitioners argue that since their prayer involves the cancellation of the provisional authority and CPCs, and
not the legislative franchise, then quo warranto fails as a remedy. The argument is artificial. The authority of
the franchisee to engage in broadcast operations is derived in the legislative mandate. To cancel the
provisional authority or the CPC is, in effect, to cancel the franchise or otherwise prevent its exercise. By
law, the NTC is incapacitated to frustrate such mandate by unduly withholding or canceling the provisional
authority or the CPC for reasons other than the orderly administration of the frequencies in the radio
spectrum.
What should occur instead is the converse. If the courts conclude that private respondents have violated
the terms of their franchise and thus issue the writs of quo warranto against them, then the NTC is obliged
to cancel any existing licenses and CPCs since these permits draw strength from the possession of a valid
franchise. If the point has not already been made clear, then licenses issued by the NTC such as CPCs and
provisional authorities are junior to the legislative franchise enacted by Congress. The licensing authority of
the NTC is not on equal footing with the franchising authority of the State through Congress. The issuance
of licenses by the NTC implements the legislative franchises established by Congress, in the same manner
that the executive branch implements the laws of Congress rather than creates its own laws. And similar to
the inability of the executive branch to prevent the implementation of laws by Congress, the NTC cannot,
without clear and proper delegation by Congress, prevent the exercise of a legislative franchise by
withholding or canceling the licenses of the franchisee.

And the role of the courts, through quo warranto proceedings, neatly complements the traditional
separation of powers that come to bear in our analysis. The courts are entrusted with the adjudication of
the legal status of persons, the final arbiter of their rights and obligations under law. The question of
whether a franchisee is in breach of the franchise specially enacted for it by Congress is one inherently
suited to a court of law, and not for an administrative agency, much less one to which no such function has
been delegated by Congress. In the same way that availability of judicial review over laws does not preclude
Congress from undertaking its own remedial measures by appropriately amending laws, the viability of quo
warranto in the instant cases does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative by abrogating
the legislative franchises of respondents should it be distressed enough by the franchisees violation of the
franchises extended to them.

QUICK DIGEST:

FACTS:
X filed two complaints against the grantees of legislative franchise, PBS and CBS, praying for the cancellation
of all the Provisional Authorities or CPCs of PBS and CBS on account of alleged violation of the conditions set
therein as well as in its legislative franchise. The NTC dismissed both complaints, positing that although it
had jurisdiction to revoke or cancel, it held that the complaints actually constituted collateral attacks on the
legislative franchises of PBS and CBS since the sole issue for determination was whether the franchisees had
violated the mandate to democratize ownership in their respective legislative franchises. The NTC ruled that
it was not competent to render a ruling on that issue, the same being more properly the subject of an action
for quo warranto to be commenced by the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines,
pursuant to Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:
Whether or not NTC has the power to cancel Provisional Authorities and CPCs of entities which Congress
has issued franchises to operate.

RULING:
 No.

Under Section 1 of Rule 66, an action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be
brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises public office, position or franchise. Even while the action is maintained in the
name of the Republic, the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor is obliged to commence such action upon
complaint, and upon good reason to believe that any case specified under Section 1 of Rule 66 can be
established by proof.

Petitioners argue that since their prayer involves the cancellation of the provisional authority and CPCs, and
not the legislative franchise, then quo warranto fails as a remedy. The argument is artificial. The authority of
the franchisee to engage in broadcast operations is derived in the legislative mandate. To cancel the
provisional authority or the CPC is, in effect, to cancel the franchise or otherwise prevent its exercise. By
law, the NTC is incapacitated to frustrate such mandate by unduly withholding or canceling the provisional
authority or the CPC for reasons other than the orderly administration of the frequencies in the radio
spectrum.

17.

XIII. EXPROPRIATION
1.
G.R. No. 166973, February 10, 2009

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. BENJAMIN ONG CO, RESPONDENT.

Facts:

Petitioner was established by R.A. No. 6395 to undertake the development of hydroelectric generation of power and the
production of electricity from nuclear, geothermal and other sources, as well as the transmission of electric power on a
nationwide basis. Its charter grants to petitioner, among others, the power to exercise the right to eminent domain.

On 27 June 2001, petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, for the acquisition of an easement of
right-of-way over three (3) lots at Barangay Cabalantian, Bacolor, Pampanga with a total area of 575 square meters belonging
to respondent, in connection with the construction of its transmission lines for its Lahar Affected Transmission Line Project
(Lahar Project).

At the pre-trial conference, respondent conceded the necessity of expropriation. Thus, the sole issue for litigation revolved
around the determination of just compensation.

The RTC appointed three (3) commissioners to determine the fair market value of the property as of 15 April 2002.
Commissioners Dayrit and Garcia submitted their joint report wherein they appraised the value of the property at P1,900.00
per square meter or a total of P1,179,000.00, while Commissioner Abcejo submitted his Commissioner's Report pegging the
value of the property at P875.00 per square meter.

The RTC rendered its Partial Decision, wherein it declared the validity of the expropriation and ordered petitioner to pay the
sum of P1,179,000.00, with interest at 6% per annum beginning 15 April 2002, the date of actual taking, until full payment.

Issue:

1. Whether what should be paid is the full fair market value of the property or a mere easement fee

2. When is reckoning date for the determination of just compensation.

Ruling:

1. Petitioner expropriated respondent's property for its Lahar Project, a project for public use. In Republic v. Gingoyon
(Gingoyon), we observed that R.A. No. 8974 covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure
projects. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 8974 explicitly include power generation, transmission and
distribution projects among the national government projects covered by the law. There is no doubt that the installation of
transmission lines is important to the continued growth of the country. Electricity moves our economy, it is a national concern.
R.A. No. 8974 should govern the expropriation of respondent's property since the Lahar Project is a national government
project.

Significantly, Gingoyon is explicit authority that R.A. No. 8974 applies with respect to substantive matters covered by it to the
exclusion of Rule 67 in cases when expropriation is availed of for a national government project. We noted in Gingoyon:

It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of "immediate
payment" in cases involving national government infrastructure projects.

It likewise bears noting that the appropriate standard of just compensation is a substantive matter. It is well within the province
of the legislature to fix the standard, which it did through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 8974. Specifically, this prescribes the
new standards in determining the amount of just compensation in expropriation cases relating to national government
infrastructure projects, as well as the manner of payment thereof. At the same time, Section 14 of the Implementing Rules
recognizes the continued applicability of Rule 67 on procedural aspects when it provides "all matters regarding defenses and
objections to the complaint, issues on uncertain ownership and conflicting claims, effects of appeal on the rights of the parties,
and such other incidents affecting the complaint shall be resolved under the provisions on expropriation of Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court.

As earlier mentioned, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, substantially provides that properties which will be traversed
by transmission lines will only be considered as easements and just compensation for such right of way easement shall not
exceed 10 percent of the market value. However, this Court has repeatedly ruled that when petitioner takes private property to
construct transmission lines, it is liable to pay the full market value upon proper determination by the courts.

The presence of transmission lines undoubtedly restricts respondent's use of his property. Petitioner is thus liable to pay
respondent the full market value of the property.

2. Rule 67 clearly provides that the value of just compensation shall "be determined as of the date of the taking of the property
or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first."

Typically, the time of taking is contemporaneous with the time the petition is filed. The general rule is what is provided for by
Rule 67. There are exceptions--grave injustice to the property owner, the taking did not have color of legal authority, the taking
of the property was not initially for expropriation and the owner will be given undue increment advantages because of the
expropriation. However, none of these exceptions are present in the instant case.

Based on the foregoing, the reckoning date for the determination of the amount of just compensation is 27 June 2001, the date
when petitioner filed its expropriation complaint.

As a final note, the function for determining just compensation remains judicial in character. In Export Processing Zone
Authority v. Dulay, and National Power Corporation v. Purefoods, we ruled:

The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or
legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that
private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can
mandate its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into
the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
SHORT DIGEST

Facts:

NPC was to undertake the development of hydroelectric generation of power and the production of electricity from nuclear,
geothermal and other sources, as well as the transmission of electric power on a nationwide basis. On Jne 27, 2001, NPC filed a
complaint for the acquisition f an easement of right-of-way over three (3) lots belonging to C in connection with the
construction of its transmission lines for its Lahat Project.

The RTC appointed three commissioners to determine the fiar market value as of April 15, 2002 (I think this is when NPC took
possession of the subject lots).

Issue:

When is reckoning date for the determination of just compensation.

Ruling:

Rule 67 clearly provides that the value of just compensation shall "be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or
the filing of the complaint, whichever came first."

Based on the foregoing, the reckoning date for the determination of the amount of just compensation is 27 June 2001, the date
when petitioner filed its expropriation complaint.

2.
3. Republic vs. Gingoyon (2005)

FACTS
The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation of the Court’s decision in Agan v. PIATCO, promulgated in 2003
(2003 Decision). This decision nullified the “Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III” entered into between the Philippine Government (Government) and
the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as well as the amendments and supplements thereto.

The agreement had authorized PIATCO to build a new international airport terminal (NAIA 3), as well as a franchise to operate
and maintain the said terminal during the concession period of 25 years. The contracts were nullified and that the agreement
was contrary to public policy. At the time of the promulgation of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities had already been built
by PIATCO and were nearing completion. However, the ponencia was silent as to the legal status of the NAIA 3 facilities
following the nullification of the contracts, as well as whatever rights of PIATCO for reimbursement for its expenses in the
construction of the facilities.

After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of PIATCO, despite the
avowed intent of the Government to put the airport terminal into immediate operation. The Government and PIATCO
conducted several rounds of negotiation regarding the NAIA 3 facilities.

In 2004, the Government filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay RTC. The Government sought upon the filing of the
complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities.
The Government also declared that it had deposited the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 (3 Billion) in Cash with the Land Bank of
the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3 terminal’s assessed value for taxation purposes. The Government insists that Rule 67
of the Rules of Court governs the expropriation proceedings in this case to the exclusion of all other laws. On the other hand,
PIATCO claims that it is Rep. Act No. 8974 which does apply.

ISSUE
Whether or not Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the expropriation proceedings in this case?
RULING:
Application of Rule 67 Violates
the 2004 Agan Resolution

Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government. Yet by no means does it
serve at present as the solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate private property. For example, Section 19 of
the Local Government Code governs as to the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain through an
enabling ordinance. And then there is Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings intended for national
government infrastructure projects.

Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably
applies in instances when the national government expropriates property "for national government infrastructure projects." [28]
Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national government for purposes other than national infrastructure projects, the
assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply.

Under both Rule 67 and Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government commences expropriation proceedings through the filing of a
complaint. Unlike in the case of local governments which necessitate an authorizing ordinance before expropriation may be
accomplished, there is no need under Rule 67 or Rep. Act No. 8974 for legislative authorization before the Government may
proceed with a particular exercise of eminent domain. The most crucial difference between Rule 67 and Rep. Act No. 8974
concerns the particular essential step the Government has to undertake to be entitled to a writ of possession.

Rule 67 merely requires the Government to deposit with an authorized government depositary the assessed value of the
property for expropriation for it to be entitled to a writ of possession. On the other hand, Rep. Act No. 8974 requires that the
Government make a direct payment to the property owner before the writ may issue. Moreover, such payment is based on the
zonal valuation of the BIR in the case of land, the value of the improvements or structures under the replacement cost
method,[29] or if no such valuation is available and in cases of utmost urgency, the proffered value of the property to be seized.

It is quite apparent why the Government would prefer to apply Rule 67 in lieu of Rep. Act No. 8974. Under Rule 67, it would not
be obliged to immediately pay any amount to PIATCO before it can obtain the writ of possession since all it need do is deposit
the amount equivalent to the assessed value with an authorized government depositary. Hence, it devotes considerable effort
to point out that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not apply in this case, notwithstanding the undeniable reality that NAIA 3 is a national
government project. Yet, these efforts fail, especially considering the controlling effect of the 2004 Resolution in Agan on the
adjudication of this case.

It is the finding of this Court that the staging of expropriation proceedings in this case with the exclusive use of Rule 67 would
allow for the Government to take over the NAIA 3 facilities in a fashion that directly rebukes our 2004 Resolution in Agan. This
Court cannot sanction deviation from its own final and executory orders.

Would the deposit under Section 2 of Rule 67 satisfy the requirement laid down in the 2004 Resolution that "[f]or the
government to take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures"? Evidently
not.

If Section 2 of Rule 67 were to apply, PIATCO would be enjoined from receiving a single centavo as just compensation before
the Government takes over the NAIA 3 facility by virtue of a writ of possession. Such an injunction squarely contradicts the
letter and intent of the 2004 Resolution. Hence, the position of the Government sanctions its own disregard or violation the
prescription laid down by this Court that there must first be just compensation paid to PIATCO before the Government may
take over the NAIA 3 facilities.

Thus, at the very least, Rule 67 cannot apply in this case without violating the 2004 Resolution. Even assuming that Rep. Act No.
8974 does not govern in this case, it does not necessarily follow that Rule 67 should then apply. After all, adherence to the
letter of Section 2, Rule 67 would in turn violate the Court's requirement in the 2004 Resolution that there must first be
payment of just compensation to PIATCO before the Government may take over the property.

It likewise bears noting that the appropriate standard of just compensation is a substantive matter. It is well within the province
of the legislature to fix the standard, which it did through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 8974. Specifically, this prescribes the
new standards in determining the amount of just compensation in expropriation cases relating to national government
infrastructure projects, as well as the manner of payment thereof. At the same time, Section 14 of the Implementing Rules
recognizes the continued applicability of Rule 67 on procedural aspects when it provides "all matters regarding defenses and
objections to the complaint, issues on uncertain ownership and conflicting claims, effects of appeal on the rights of the parties,
and such other incidents affecting the complaint shall be resolved under the provisions on expropriation of Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court."

4. Republic vs. Gingoyon (2006)

Facts:

This case pertains to the Resolution of the motions for partial reconsideration filed by the Government, Asahikosan, and
Takenaka.

Particularly brought to fore are the claims relating to two entities, Takenaka Corporation (Takenaka) and Asahikosan
(Asahikosan) Corporation, who allegedly claim "significant liens" on the terminal, arising from their alleged unpaid bills by virtue
of an Engineering, Procurement and Construction Contract they had with PIATCO. On account of these adverse claims, the
Government now claims as controvertible the question of who is the builder of the NAIA 3.

The Government likewise claims as "indispensable" the need of Takenaka and Asahikosan to provide the necessary technical
services and supplies so that all the various systems and equipment will be ready and operational in a manner that allows the
Government to possess a fully-capable international airport terminal.

The Government's concerns that impelled the filing of its Motion for Reconsideration are summed up in the following passage
therein: "The situation the Republic now faces is that if any part of its Php3,002,125,000 deposit is released directly to PIATCO,
and PIATCO, as in the past, does not wish to settle its obligations directly to Takenaka, Asahikosan and Fraport, the Republic
may end up having expropriated a terminal with liens and claims far in excess of its actual value, the liens remain
unextinguished, and PIATCO on the other hand, ends up with the Php3,0002,125,000 in its pockets gratuitously."

Issue:
Is the claim of the Government valid?

Ruling:
The Court is not wont to reverse its previous rulings based on factual premises that are not yet conclusive or judicially
established. Certainly, whatever claims or purported liens Takenaka and Asahikosan against PIATCO or over the NAIA 3 have
not been judicially established. Neither Takenaka nor Asahikosan are parties to the present action, and thus have not presented
any claim which could be acted upon by this Court. The earlier adjudications in Agan v. PIATCO made no mention of either
Takenaka or Asahikosan, and certainly made no declaration as to their rights to any form of compensation. If there is indeed
any right to remuneration due to these two entities arising from NAIA 3, they have not yet been established by the courts of the
land.

It must be emphasized that the conclusive ruling in the Resolution dated 21 January 2004 in Agan v. PIATCO (Agan 2004) is that
PIATCO, as builder of the facilities, must first be justly compensated in accordance with law and equity for the Government to
take over the facilities. It is on that premise that the Court adjudicated this case in its 19 December 2005 Decision.

While the Government refers to a judgment rendered by a London court in favor of Takenaka and Asahikosan against PIATCO in
the amount of US$82 Million, it should be noted that this foreign judgment is not yet binding on Philippine courts. It is
entrenched in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure that a foreign judgment on the mere strength of its
promulgation is not yet conclusive, as it can be annulled on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.[1] It is likewise recognized in Philippine jurisprudence and international law that
a foreign judgment may be barred from recognition if it runs counter to public policy.[2]

Assuming that PIATCO indeed has corresponding obligations to other parties relating to NAIA 3, the Court does not see how
such obligations, yet unproven, could serve to overturn the Decision mandating that the Government first pay PIATCO the
amount of 3.02 Million Pesos before it may acquire physical possession over the facilities. This directive enjoining payment is in
accordance with Republic Act No. 8974, and under the mechanism established by the law the amount to be initially paid is that
which is provisionally determined as just compensation. The provisional character of this payment means that it is not yet final,
yet sufficient under the law to entitle the Government to the writ of possession over the expropriated property.
 5.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELICIANO F. WYCOCO

FACTS:

This case is a consolidated petition of one seeking review of the decision of CA modifying the decision of RTC acting as
a Special Agrarian Court, and another for mandamus to compel the RTC to issue a writ of execution and to direct
Judge Caspillo to inhibit.

Feliciano F. Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690 hectare land. Wycoco voluntarily offered to sell the land to
the Department of Agrarian Reform for P14.9 million. DAR offered P2,280,159.82. The area which the DAR offered to
acquire excluded idle lands, river and road located therein. Wycoco rejected the offer, prompting the DAR to indorse
the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the purpose of fixing the just
compensation in a summary administrative proceeding. Thereafter, the DARAB requested LBP to open a trust account
in the name of Wycoco and deposited the compensation offered by DAR. In the meantime, the property was
distributed to farmer-beneficiaries.

On April 13, 1993, Wycoco filed the instant case for determination of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court
of Cabanatuan City against DAR and LBP.

On March 9, 1994, the DARAB dismissed the case on its hand to give way to the determination of just compensation
by the RTC.

Meanwhile, DAR and LBP filed their respective answered that the valuation of Wycoco’s property was in accordance
with law and that the latter failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not participating in the summary
administrative proceedings before the DARAB which has primary jurisdiction over determination of land valuation.

On November 14, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Wycoco. It ruled that there is no need to
present evidence in support of the land valuation in as much as it is of public knowledge that the prevailing market
value of agricultural lands sold in Licab, Nueva Ecija is from P135,000.00 to 150,000.00 per hectare. The court thus
took judicial notice thereof and fixed the compensation for the entire 94.1690 hectare land at P142,500.00 per
hectare or a total of P13,428,082.00. It also awarded Wycoco actual damages for unrealized profits plus legal
interest.

The DAR and the LBP filed separate petitions before the Court of Appeals. The petition brought by DAR on
jurisdictional and procedural issues was dismissed. This prompted Wycoco to file a petition for mandamus before this
Court praying that the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City be executed, and that Judge Caspillo be
compelled to inhibit himself from hearing the case.

The petition brought by LBP on both substantive and procedural grounds was likewise dismissed by the Court of
Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals modified its decision by deducting from the compensation due to Wycoco
the amount corresponding to the 3.3672 hectare portion of the 94.1690 hectare land which was found to have been
previously sold by Wycoco to the Republic.

LBP contended that the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case acting as Special Agrarian Court.

2. Whether or not Wycoco can compel DAR to purchase the entire land.

3. Whether or not the awards of interest and damages for unrealized profits is valid.

HELD:

1. Yes, the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court, acquired jurisdiction of the case. Sections 50 and 57 of Republic Act
No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) provides:
Section 50.Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)….

Section 57.Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses
under this Act.

2. No, the DAR cannot be compelled to purchase the entire property voluntarily offered by Wycoco. The power to
determine whether a parcel of land may come within the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is
essentially lodged with the DAR. That Wycoco will suffer damages by the DAR’s non-acquisition of the approximately
10 hectare portion of the entire land which was found to be not suitable for agriculture is no justification to compel
DAR to acquire the whole area.

3. Yes, Wycoco’s claim for payment of interest is partly meritorious. The trust account opened as the mode of
payment of just compensation should be converted to a deposit account. The conversion should be retroactive in
application in order to rectify the error committed by the DAR in opening a trust account and to grant the landowners
the benefits concomitant to payment in cash or LBP bonds. Otherwise, petitioner’s right to payment of just and valid
compensation for the expropriation of his property would be violated. The interest earnings accruing on the deposit
account of landowners would suffice to compensate them pending payment of just compensation.

Short Digest:

Facts: X is the registered owner of a 94.1690 hectare land and voluntarily offered to sell the land to the Department
of Agrarian Reform for P14.9 million. DAR offered P2,280,159.82. X rejected the offer, prompting the DAR to indorse
the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the purpose of fixing the just
compensation in a summary administrative proceeding.

Thereafter, the DARAB requested LBP to open a trust account in the name of X and deposited the compensation
offered by DAR. In the meantime, the property was distributed to farmer-beneficiaries.

X filed the instant case for determination of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City
against DAR and LBP. The DARAB dismissed the case on its hand to give way to the determination of just
compensation by the RTC.

Meanwhile, DAR and LBP filed their respective answered that the valuation of X’s property was in accordance with
law and that the latter failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not participating in the summary administrative
proceedings before the DARAB which has primary jurisdiction over determination of land valuation.

Trial court rendered a decision in favor of X. It ruled that there is no need to present evidence in support of the land
valuation inasmuch as it is of public knowledge that the prevailing market value of agricultural lands sold in Licab,
Nueva Ecija is from P135,000.00 to 150,000.00 per hectare. The court thus took judicial notice thereof and fixed the
compensation for the entire 94.1690 hectare land at P142,500.00 per hectare or a total of P13,428,082.00

Issue:

1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case acting as Special Agrarian Court.

2. Whether or not Wycoco can compel DAR to purchase the entire land.

Held:
 1. Yes, the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court, acquired jurisdiction of the case. Sections 50 and 57 of Republic Act
No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) provides:

Section 50.Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)….

Section 57.Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses
under this Act.

2. No, the DAR cannot be compelled to purchase the entire property voluntarily offered by Wycoco. The power to
determine whether a parcel of land may come within the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is
essentially lodged with the DAR. That Wycoco will suffer damages by the DAR’s non-acquisition of the approximately
10 hectare portion of the entire land which was found to be not suitable for agriculture is no justification to compel
DAR to acquire the whole area.

6.
7. NPC v. Angas, G.R. Nos. 60225-26, 8 May 1992, 208 SCRA 542.

LONG DIGEST
Facts:
On April 13, 1974 and December 3, 1974, petitioner National Power Corporation, a government-owned and controlled
corporation and the agency through which the government undertakes the on-going infrastructure and development projects
throughout the country, filed two complaints for eminent domain against private respondents with the Court of First Instance.
Both cases were jointly tried upon agreement of the parties. On June 15, 1979, a consolidated decision in Civil Cases Nos. 2248
and 2277 was rendered by the lower court, declaring and confirming that the lots mentioned and described in the complaints
have entirely been lawfully condemned and expropriated by the petitioner, and ordering the latter to pay the private
respondents certain sums of money as just compensation for their lands expropriated "with legal interest thereon until fully
paid."

Two consecutive motions for reconsideration of the said consolidated decision were filed by the petitioner. The same were
denied by the respondent court. Petitioner did not appeal the aforesaid consolidated decision, which became final and
executory.Thus, on May 16, 1980, one of the private respondents [Sittie Sohra Batara] filed an ex-parte motion for the
execution of the June 15, 1979 decision, praying that petitioner be directed to pay her the unpaid balance of P14,300.00 for the
lands expropriated from her, including legal interest which she computed at 6% per annum. The said motion was granted by the
lower court. Thereafter, the lower court directed the petitioner to deposit with its Clerk of Court the sums of money as
adjudged in the joint decision dated June 15, 1979.

Petitioner complied with said order and deposited the sums of money with interest computed at 6% per annum. On February
10, 1981, one of the private respondents [Pangonatan Cosna Tagol], through counsel, filed with the trial court anex-parte
motion in Civil Case No. 2248 praying, for the first time, that the legal interest on the just compensation awarded to her by the
court be computed at 12% per annum as allegedly "authorized under and by virtue of Circular No. 416 of the Central Bank
issued pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 116 and in a decision of the Supreme Court that legal interest allowed in the
judgment of the courts, in the absence of express contract, shall be computed at 12% per annum."

On February 11, 1981, the lower court granted the said motion allowing 12% interest per annum. [Annex L, Petition].
Subsequently, the other private respondents filed motions also praying that the legal interest on the just compensation
awarded to them be computed at 12% per annum, on the basis of which the lower court issued on March 10, 1981 and August
28, 1981 orders bearing similar import. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the lower court's last order dated August 28,
1981, alleging that the main decision had already become final and executory with its compliance of depositing the sums of
money as just compensation for the lands condemned, with legal interest at 6% per annum; that the said main decision can no
longer be modified or changed by the lower court; and that Presidential Decree No. 116 is not applicable to this case because it
is Art. 2209 of the Civil Code which applies.
 On January 25, 1982, the lower court denied petitioner's, motion for reconsideration, stating that the rate of interest at the
time of the promulgation of the June 15, 1981 decision is that prescribed by Central Bank Circular No. 416 issued pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 116, which is 12% per annum, and that it did not modify or change but merely amplified its order of
August 28, 1981 in the determination of the legal interest.

Issue:
WON in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just compensation for expropriated lands, the law applicable is Article
2209 of the Civil Code which prescribes a 6% legal interest rate or Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed the legal interest
rate at 12% per annum.

Ruling:
Art. 2209 of the Civil Code, and not Central Bank Circular No. 416, is the law applicable to the case at bar. Said law reads: Art.
2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs a delay, the indemnity for damages,
there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation,
the legal interest, which is six percent per annum.

The Central Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits and to judgments involving such loan
or forbearance of money, goods or credits. This is evident not only from said circular but also from Presidential Decree No. 116,
which amended Act No. 2655, otherwise known as the Usury Law. On the other hand, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies to
transactions requiring the payment of indemnities as damages, in connection with any delay in the performance of the
obligation arising therefrom other than those covering loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits.

In the case at bar, the transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits but expropriation of
certain parcels of land for a public purpose, the payment of which is without stipulation regarding interest, and the interest
adjudged by the trial court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The legal interest required to be paid on the amount of
just compensation for the properties expropriated is manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the delay in the
payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in the joint judgment of the lower court sought to be enforced
in this case is interest by way of damages, and not by way of earnings from loans, etc. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code shall apply.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Orders promulgated on February 11, 1981, March 10, 1981, August 28, 1981 and
January 25, 1982 [as to the recomputation of interest at 12% per annum] are annulled and set aside. It is hereby declared that
the computation of legal interest at 6% per annum is the correct and valid legal interest allowed in payments of just
compensation for lands expropriated for public use to herein private respondents by the Government through the National
Power Corporation. The injunction heretofore granted is hereby made permanent. No costs.

SHORT DIGEST
Facts:
X, filed two complaints for eminent domain against Y. A consolidated decision was rendered by the lower court, declaring and
confirming that the lots mentioned and described in the complaints have entirely been lawfully condemned and expropriated
by X, and ordering the latter to pay Y certain sums of money as just compensation for their lands expropriated "with legal
interest thereon until fully paid."

One of the private respondents filed an ex-parte motion for the execution of the June 15, 1979 decision, praying that petitioner
be directed to pay her the unpaid balance of P14,300.00 for the lands expropriated from her, including legal interest which she
computed at 6% per annum. The said motion was granted by the lower court. Thereafter, the lower court directed X to deposit
with its Clerk of Court the sums of money. X complied with said order and deposited the sums of money with interest
computed at 6% per annum. One of the private respondents, filed with the trial court an ex-parte motion praying, that the legal
interest on the just compensation awarded to her by the court be computed at 12% per annum as allegedly "authorized under
and by virtue of Circular No. 416 of the Central Bank issued pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 116 and in a decision of the
Supreme Court that legal interest allowed in the judgment of the courts, in the absence of express contract, shall be computed
at 12% per annum."

The lower court granted the said motion allowing 12% interest per annum. X moved for a reconsideration of the lower court's
last order, alleging that the main decision had already become final and executory with its compliance of depositing the sums of
money as just compensation for the lands condemned, with legal interest at 6% per annum; that the said main decision can no
longer be modified or changed by the lower court; and that Presidential Decree No. 116 is not applicable to this case because it
is Art. 2209 of the Civil Code which applies.
Issue:
WON in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just compensation for expropriated lands, the law applicable is Article
2209 of the Civil Code which prescribes a 6% legal interest rate or Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed the legal interest
rate at 12% per annum.

Ruling:
Art. 2209 of the Civil Code, and not Central Bank Circular No. 416, is the law applicable to the case at bar. Said law reads: Art.
2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs a delay, the indemnity for damages,
there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation,
the legal interest, which is six percent per annum.

The Central Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits and to judgments involving such loan
or forbearance of money, goods or credits. On the other hand, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies to transactions requiring the
payment of indemnities as damages, in connection with any delay in the performance of the obligation arising therefrom other
than those covering loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits.

In the case at bar, the transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits but expropriation of
certain parcels of land for a public purpose, the payment of which is without stipulation regarding interest, and the interest
adjudged by the trial court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The legal interest required to be paid on the amount of
just compensation for the properties expropriated is manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the delay in the
payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in the joint judgment of the lower court sought to be enforced
in this case is interest by way of damages, and not by way of earnings from loans, etc. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code shall apply.

7. City of Manila, vs. Serrano [GR 142304, 20 June 2001]

Facts (Long): On 21 December 1993, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance 7833, authorizing the
expropriation of certain properties in Manila's First District in Tondo, covered by TCTs 70869, 105201, 105202, and
138273 of the Register of Deeds of Manila, which are to be sold and distributed to qualified occupants pursuant to
the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila. One of the properties sought to be expropriated,
denominated as Lot 1-C, consists of 343.10 square meters, and was in the name of Feliza de Guia. Lot 1-C was
assigned to Edgardo De Guia, one of the heirs of Alberto De Guia, in turn one of the heirs of Feliza de Guia. On 29 July
1994, the said property was transferred to Lee Kuan Hui, in whose name TCT 217018 was issued. The property was
subsequently sold on 24 January 1996 to Demetria De Guia to whom TCT 226048 was issued. On 26 September 1997,
the City of Manila filed an amended complaint for expropriation (Civil Case 94-72282) with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 16, Manila, against the supposed owners of the lots covered by TCTs 70869 (including Lot 1-C), 105201,
105202, and 138273, which included herein respondents Oscar, Felicitas, Jose, Benjamin, Estelita, Leonora, Adelaida,
all surnamed Serrano.

On 12 November 1997, the Serranos filed a consolidated answer, praying the exemption of Lot 1-C from
expropriation. Upon motion by the City, the trial court issued an order, dated 9 October 1998, directing the City to
deposit the amount of P1,825,241.00 equivalent to the assessed value of the properties. After the City had made the
deposit, the trial court issued another order, dated 15 December 1998, directing the issuance of a writ of possession
in favor of the City. The Serranos filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

On 16 November 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision holding that although Lot 1-C is not exempt from
expropriation because it undeniably exceeds 300 square meters which is no longer considered a small property within
the framework of RA 7279, the other modes of acquisition of lands enumerated in §§59-10 of the law must first be
tried by the city government before it can resort to expropriation, and thus enjoined the City from expropriating Lot
1-C. In its resolution, dated 23 February 2000, the Court of Appeals likewise denied two motions for reconsideration
filed by the City. The City filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Facts (Short):

Issue: Whether it was premature to determine whether the requirements of RA 7279, §§9-10 have been complied
with.
Ruling: Rule 67, §2 provides that “upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to
the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if
he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property
for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money,
unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic
of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government depositary. If personal property is involved, its
value shall be provisionally ascertained and the amount to be deposited shall be fixed by the court. After such deposit
is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the
property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the parties.”

Thus, a writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government of a complaint for expropriation
sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed
value of the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with these requirements, the issuance of the writ of
possession becomes ministerial. Herein, these requirements were satisfied and, therefore, it became the ministerial
duty of the trial court to issue the writ of possession. The distinction between the Filstream and the present case is
that in the former, the judgment in that case had already become final while herein, the trial court has not gone
beyond the issuance of a writ of possession. Hearing is still to be held to determine whether or not petitioner indeed
complied with the requirements provided in RA 7279. Whether the City has complied with these provisions requires
the presentation of evidence, although in its amended complaint petitioner did allege that it had complied with the
requirements. The determination of this question must await the hearing on the complaint for expropriation,
particularly the hearing for the condemnation of the properties sought to be expropriated. Expropriation proceedings
consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a
public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private
property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners.

8. Long digest
• MCWD V. J. KING AND SONS, G.R. NO. 175983, APRIL 16, 2009 MATA
Principle:

In expropriation proceeding, there are two stages, first, is the determination of the validity of the expropriation, and
second is the determination of just compensation.
The general rule is that upon filing of the expropriation complaint, the plaintiff has the right to take or enter into
possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation. An exception to this procedure is provided
by R.A. No. 8974. It requires the payment of one hundred percent (100%) of the zonal value of the property to be
expropriated to entitle the plaintiff to a writ of possession.

Facts:
Petitioner Metropolitan Cebu Water District is a government-owned and controlled corporation created pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended. Among its purposes are to acquire, install, improve, maintain and operate
water supply and distribution systems within the boundaries of the District.
Petitioner, wanted to acquire a five (5)-square meter lot occupied by its production well. The lot is part of
respondent’s property covered by TCT No. 168605 and located in Banilad, Cebu City. Petitioner initiated negotiations
with respondent for the voluntary sale of the latter’s property. Respondent did not acquiesce to petitioner’s proposal.
After the negotiations had failed, petitioner pursuant to its charter initiatedexpropriation proceedings through Board
Resolution No. 015-2004 which was duly approved by the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). On 10
November 2004, petitioner filed a complaint to expropriate the five (5)-square meter portion of respondent’s
property.
On 7 February 2005, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. Petitioner wanted to tender the
amount to respondent during a rescheduled hearing which petitioner’s counsel had failed to attend. Petitioner then
deposited with the Clerk of Court the amount of P17,500.00 equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the current
zonal value of the property which the Bureau of Internal Revenue had pegged at P3,500.00 per square meter.
Subsequently, the trial court granted the motion and issued the writ of possession. Respondent moved for
reconsideration but the motion was denied.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals. It sought the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) which the Court of Appeals granted. Thus, petitioner was not able to gain entry to
the lot.
On 26 July 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting respondent’s petition. It ruled that the
board resolution which authorized the filing of the expropriation complaint lacked exactitude and particularity which
made it invalid; that there was no genuine necessity for the expropriation of the five (5)-square meter lot and; that
the reliance on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8974 in fixing the value of the property contravenes the judicial determination
of just compensation. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was rejected
Hence, this petition.

Issues:
1. Whether there was sufficient authority from the petitioner’s board of directors to institute the expropriation
complaint; and
2. Whether the procedure in obtaining a writ of possession was properly observed.

Ruling:
Yes, the petitioner’s board of directors has sufficient authority to institute the expropriation complaint. Moreover, the
procedure in obtaining a writ of possession was properly observed.
Eminent domain is the right of the state to acquire private property for public use upon payment of just
compensation. The power of eminent domain is inseparable in sovereignty being essential to the existence of the
State and inherent in government. Its exercise is proscribed by only two Constitutional requirements: first, that there
must be just compensation, and second, that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.In an expropriation proceeding there are two stages, first, is the determination of the validity of the
expropriation, and second is the determination of just compensation.
As an inherent sovereign prerogative, the power to expropriate pertains to the legislature. However, Congress may,
as in fact it often does, delegate the exercise of the power to government agencies, public officials and quasi-public
entities. Petitioner is empowered under its charter, to explicitly exercise the power of eminent domain.
R.A. No. 8974, otherwise known as "An Act To Facilitate The Acquisition Of Right-Of-Way, Site Or Location For
National Government Infrastructure Projects And For Other Purposes" , includes projects undertaken by government
owned and controlled corporations. Moreover, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 8974 explicitly
includes water supply, sewerage, and waste management facilities among the national government projects covered
by the law.
A corporation does not have powers beyond those expressly conferred upon it by its enabling law. All the powers,
privileges, and duties of the district shall be exercised and performed by and through the board and that any
executive, administrative or ministerial power may be delegated and re-delegated by the board to any of its officers
or agents for such purpose.
In this case, petitioner being a corporation it can exercise its powers only through its board of directors. For petitioner
to exercise its power of eminent domain, two requirements should be met, namely: first, its board of directors passed
a resolution authorizing the expropriation, and; second, the exercise of the power of eminent domain was subjected
to review by the LWUA. These requirements were properly observed by the petitioner. Therefore, there was
sufficient authority from the petitioner’s board of directors to institute the expropriation complaint.
As to the propriety of the issuance of a writ of possession, a discussion on the various stages in an expropriation
proceeding is necessary.
The general rule is that upon filing of the expropriation complaint, the plaintiff has the right to take or enter into
possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation. An exception to this procedure is provided
by R.A. No. 8974. It requires the payment of one hundred percent (100%) of the zonal value of the property to be
expropriated to entitle the plaintiff to a writ of possession, as discussed inTan v. Republic G.R. No. 170740, 25 May
2007,523 SCRA 203. R.A. No. 8974 also provides a different scheme for the obtention of a writ of possession. The law
does not require a deposit with a government bank; instead it requires the government to immediately pay the
property owner.Under this statutory provision, when the government, its agencies or government-owned and
controlled corporations, make the required provisional payment, the trial court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ
of possession.
In this case, petitioner was supposed to tender the provisional payment directly to respondent during a hearing which
it had failed to attend. Petitioner, then, deposited the provisional payment with the court. The trial court did not
commit an error in accepting the deposit and in issuing the writ of possession. The deposit of the provisional amount
with the court is equivalent to payment. Upon compliance with the requirements, a petitioner in an expropriation
case is entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right and it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to
forthwith issue the writ of possession. Therefore, the proper procedure was observed in this case.

Short digest:
NDXE, a GOCC, with authority to expropriate private property under its charter, sought to expropriate portion of K.
Queen and Daughters Company’s property, for its deep well project. The Board of Directors of NDXE authorized its
expropriation and was reviewed by Local Water Utilities Administration. NXDE then deposited with the Clerk of Court
the amount of P17,500.00 equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the current zonal value of the property which
the Bureau of Internal Revenue had pegged at P3,500.00 per square meter.The trial court issued writ of possession to
NXDE over the property. However, the Court of Appeals(CA) issued a TRO because there was no sufficient authority to
expropriate said property. Is the CA correct?

No.In an expropriation proceeding there are two stages, first, is the determination of the validity of the expropriation,
and second is the determination of just compensation.
A corporation does not have powers beyond those expressly conferred upon it by its enabling law. All the powers,
privileges, and duties of the district shall be exercised and performed by and through the board and that any
executive, administrative or ministerial power may be delegated and re-delegated by the board to any of its officers
or agents for such purpose.
The general rule is that upon filing of the expropriation complaint, the plaintiff has the right to take or enter into
possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation. An exception to this procedure is provided
by R.A. No. 8974. It requires the payment of one hundred percent (100%) of the zonal value of the property to be
expropriated to entitle the plaintiff to a writ of possession
In this case, petitioner being a corporation it can exercise its powers only through its board of directors. NXDE was
authorized by its Board, and was reviewed by Local Water Utilities Administration. Further, NXDE then
properlydeposited with the Clerk of Court the amount of P17,500.00 equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the
current zonal value of the property which the Bureau of Internal Revenue had pegged at P3,500.00 per square meter.
Therefore, NXDE has sufficient authority to expropriate the property of K. Queen and Daughters Company. The CA’s
order was incorrect.

Side Notes: Full discussion of the stages of expropriation proceeding.

(1) Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its
exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, with
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned for the
public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon payment of just compensation. An order of expropriation is
final. An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, as it finally disposes of the action and leaves
nothing more to be done by the courts on the merits. The order of expropriation would also be a final one for after its
issuance, no objection to the right of condemnation shall be heard. The order of expropriation may be appealed by
any party aggrieved thereby by filing a record on appeal.
(2) Determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken with the assistance of
not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before
the court and findings of the commissioners would likewise be a final one, as it would leave nothing more to be done
by the court regarding the issue. A second and separate appeal may be taken from this order fixing the just
compensation.

9. Republic vs. Tagle

(Long Digest)
Facts:
Helena Z. Benitez is the registered owner of two parcels of land located in Barangay Salawag, Dasmarias, Cavite. The
Philippine Government, through the Philippine Human Resources Development Center, an agency under the then
Ministry of Human Settlements, negotiated with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency Survey Team on the
technicalities of the establishment of the ASEAN Human Resources Development Project in the Philippines. Among
the five main programs of the proposed project was Program III which involved the establishment of a Construction
Manpower Development Center, an agency now under the Department of Trade and Industry.
PHRDC and private respondent Helena Z. Benitez signed a Memorandum of Agreement which provides, among
others, that BENITEZ undertakes to lease within the period of twenty years and/or sell a portion of that property in
favor of PHRDC which likewise agrees to lease within a period of twenty years and/or buy said property site.
The Philippine Womens University and BENITEZ granted a permit to PHRDC to occupy and use the land in question
and to undertake land development, electrical and road network installations and other related works necessary to
attain its objectives. CMDF took possession of the property and erected buildings and other related facilities
necessary for its operations.
PWU entered into the aforesaid lease contract. After the expiration of the lease contract negotiations began on the
purchase of the property in question on a plain offer of BENITEZ to sell the same. However, for reasons known only to
her, BENITEZ did not sign the Deed of Absolute Sale thus reneging on her commitment to sell the lot in question.
BENITEZ and PWU demanded from PHRDC the payment of rentals and to vacate the premises It later filed an unlawful
detainer suit against petitioner.
Failing to acquire the property involved through negotiated sale, petitioner, through the Department of Trade and
Industry, to which CMDF is attached, instituted a complaint for Eminent Domain, pursuant to the provisions of
Executive Order No. 1035. In compliance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 42, petitioner deposited with the Philippine National Bank in favor of defendant an amount equivalent to
the provisional value of the land.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Possession. Respondent Judge issued an Order granting petitioners
Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Possession but subsequently quashed.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Tagle may quash a writ of possession on the ground that the expropriating government agency
is already occupying the property sought to be expropriated.
Ruling:
No. Judge Tagle is required to issue a writ of possession in favor DTI pursuant to Sec. 7 of EO 1035:

“SEC 7. Expropriation. If the parties fail to agree in negotiation of the sale of the land as provided in the preceding
section, the government implementing agency/instrumentality concerned shall have authority to immediately
institute expropriation proceedings through the Office of the Solicitor General, as the case may be. The just
compensation to be paid for the property acquired through expropriation shall be in accordance with the provisions
of P.D. No. 1533. Courts shall give priority to the adjudication of cases on expropriation and shall immediately issue
the necessary writ of possession upon deposit by the government implementing agency/instrumentality concerned of
an amount equivalent to ten per cent (10%) of the amount of just compensation provided under P.D. No. 1533;
Provided, That the period within which said writ of possession shall be issued shall in no case extend beyond five (5)
days from the date such deposit was made.”

Under this statutory provision, when the government or its authorized agent makes the required deposit, the trial
court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession.

The expropriation of real property does not include mere physical entry or occupation of land. Although eminent
domain usually involves a taking of title, there may also be compensable taking of only some, not all, of the property
interests in the bundle of rights that constitute ownership. The writ of possession is both necessary and practical,
because mere physical possession that is gained by entering the property is not equivalent to expropriating it with the
aim of acquiring ownership over, or even the right to possess, the expropriated property.

Clearly, an ejectment suit ordinarily should not prevail over the State’s power of eminent domain. DTI has deposited
not just the 10 percent required under EO 1035, but the whole amount of the just compensation that private
respondent is entitled to. Thus, there is no any legal impediment for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of
DTI. Precisely, the purpose of instituting expropriation proceedings is to prevent petitioner from being ejected from
the subject property; otherwise, the above-mentioned absurd and circuitous rulings would arise.

(Short Digest)
Facts:
PHRDC and H entered into a memorandum agreement that H undertakes to lease a portion of her property for 20
years and/or sell a portion of the property in favour of PHRDC. PWU and H granted a permit to PHRDC to occupy and
use to undertake land development, electrical and road network installations and other related works necessary to
attain its objectives. After the expiration of the lease contract, negotiations began for the sale of the property but H
did not sign the Deed of Sale. PWU and H demanded the payment of rentals and to vacate the premises. It filed an
unlawful detainer suit against the Republic.
Failing to acquire the property involved through negotiated sale, DTI to which CMDF is attached instituted a
complaint for Eminent Domain pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. 1035. In compliance with Section 2,
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 42, Republic deposited with the PNB in favor of
H an amount equivalent to the provisional value of the land. R, filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Possession. It
was granted but was subsequently quashed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Judge may quash a writ of possession on the ground that the expropriating government agency is
already occupying the property sought to be expropriated.
Ruling:
No. Judge is required to issue a writ of possession in favor DTI pursuant to Sec. 7 of EO 1035:
“SEC 7. Expropriation. If the parties fail to agree in negotiation of the sale of the land as provided in the preceding
section, the government implementing agency/instrumentality concerned shall have authority to immediately
institute expropriation proceedings through the Office of the Solicitor General, as the case may be. The just
compensation to be paid for the property acquired through expropriation shall be in accordance with the provisions
of P.D. No. 1533. Courts shall give priority to the adjudication of cases on expropriation and shall immediately issue
the necessary writ of possession upon deposit by the government implementing agency/instrumentality concerned of
an amount equivalent to ten per cent (10%) of the amount of just compensation provided under P.D. No. 1533;
Provided, That the period within which said writ of possession shall be issued shall in no case extend beyond five (5)
days from the date such deposit was made.”
Clearly, an ejectment suit ordinarily should not prevail over the State’s power of eminent domain. DTI has deposited
not just the 10 percent required under EO 1035, but the whole amount of the just compensation that private
respondent is entitled to. Thus, there is no any legal impediment for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of
DTI. Precisely, the purpose of instituting expropriation proceedings is to prevent petitioner from being ejected from
the subject property; otherwise, the above-mentioned absurd and circuitous rulings would arise.

8.
9.
G.R. No. 142971 May 7, 2002
THE CITY OF CEBU, petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES APOLONIO and BLASA DEDAMO, respondents.

LONG DIGEST

Facts:

The City of Cebu expropriated the parcel of land owned by the Sps. Dedamo. The parties executed and submitted to
the trial court an Agreement wherein they declared that they have partially settled the case. Pursuant to the
Agreement, the trial court appointed 3 Commissioners to determine the just compensation of the lots sought to be
expropriated. The 3 Commissioners rendered an assessment for the lot in dispute and fixed it at P 12, 824.10 per sq.
m. The assessment was approved as just compensation thereof by the trial court. As a result, the City of Cebu
elevated the case to the SC and raised the issue that just compensation should be based on the prevailing market
price of the property at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings and not at the time the property was
actually taken.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in deciding the case on the basis of the agreement of the parties that just
compensation shall be fixed by the commissioners appointed the court

Ruling:

The trial court did not err in its decision. Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from
sovereignty. It is the Government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private
property for public use or purpose. However, the Government must pay the owner thereof just compensation as
consideration therefor. In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for the determination of just
compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides that just compensation shall be determined as
of the time of actual taking.

The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs. Court of Appeals. We did not categorically rule in
that case that just compensation should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. We explicitly stated therein
that although the general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of
 the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the
property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings."
Also, the trial court followed the then governing procedural law on the matter, which was Section 5 of Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court.

More than anything else, the parties, by a solemn document freely and voluntarily agreed upon by them, agreed to be
bound by the report of the commission and approved by the trial court. The agreement is a contract between the
parties. It has the force of law between them and should be complied with in good faith.

SHORT DIGEST

The City of Cebu City expropriated the land of Sps. X and Y. Pending expropriation case in the RTC, the City of Cebu
City and Sps. X and Y entered into an agreement, whereby the trial court appointed 3 commissioners to determine
the just compensation. Sps. X and Y opposed the valuation submitted by the commissioners for the just compensation
should be based on the prevailing market price of the property at the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings and not the date of the taking. Is the contention of Sps. X and Y meritorious?

NO, the contention of X and Y is unmeritorious. The general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain
is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception: where this
Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings." But in this case, the parties entered into an agreement. By a solemn document freely and
voluntarily agreed upon by the petitioner and the respondents, agreed to be bound by the report of the commission
and approved by the trial court. The AGREEMENT is a contract between the parties. It has the force of law between
them and should be complied with (Art. 1159,CC). Furthermore, Art. 1315 of the same Code provides that contracts
are perfected by mere consent.

10. Spouses Ortega vs. City of Cebu

Long Digest

Facts:

Spouses Ortega are the registered owners of a parcel of land, one-half of which is occupied by squatters. Spouses Ortega filed
an ejectment case against the squatters before the MTCC of Cebu City, which rendered decision in favor of the spouses Ortega.
The case eventually reached the Supreme Court, which affirmed the decision of the MTCC. The decision of the MTCC became
final and executory, and a writ of execution was issued.

On May 23, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of [Cebu City] enacted City Ordinance No. 1519, giving authority to the City
Mayor to expropriate one-half (1/2) portion (2,856 square meters) of [the spouses Ortega's] land (which is occupied by the
squatters), and appropriating for that purpose the amount of P3,284,400.00 or at the price of ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY PESOS (P1,150.00) per square meter. The amount will be charged against Account No. 8- 93-310, Continuing
Appropriation, Account No. 101-8918-334, repurchase of lots for various projects. The value of the land was determined by the
Cebu City Appraisal Committee in Resolution No. 19, series of 1994, dated April 15, 1994. aESTAI
Pursuant to said ordinance, [Cebu City] led a Complaint for Eminent Domain [before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23,
Cebu City] against [the spouses Ortega], docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-16577.

On March 13, 1998, the [RTC] issued an order declaring that [Cebu City] "has the lawful right to take the property subject of the
instant case, for public use or purpose described in the complaint upon payment of just compensation”.

Based on the recommendation of the appointed Commissioners (one of whom was the City Assessor of [Cebu City], the [RTC]
issued another Order dated May 21, 1999, fixing the value of the land subject to expropriation at ELEVEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P11,000.00) per square meter and ordering [Cebu City] to pay [Spouses Ortega] the sum of THIRTY ONE MILLION AND FOUR
HUNDRED SIXTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P31,416,000.00) as just compensation for the expropriated portion of Lot No. 310-B.

The Decision of the [RTC] became final and executory because of [Cebu City's] failure to perfect an appeal on time, and a Writ
of Execution was issued on September 17, 1999 to enforce the court's judgment. Upon motion of [the Spouses Ortega], the
[RTC] issued an Order dated March 11, 2002.
[Cebu City] filed an Omnibus Motion to Stay Execution, Modification of Judgment and Withdrawal of the Case, contending that
the price set by the [RTC] as just compensation to be paid to [the Spouses Ortega] is way beyond the reach of its intended
beneficiaries for its socialized housing program. The motion was denied by the [RTC]. [Cebu City's] Motion for Reconsideration
was likewise denied.

The CA affirmed the RTC’s denial of Cebu City’s Omnibus Motion to Modify Judgment and to be Allowed to Withfraw from the
Expropriation Proceedings.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s denial of Cebu City’s Omnibus Motion to Modify Judgment and to be
Allowed to Withdraw from the Expropriation Proceedings

Ruling: No. the CA did not err in affirming the RTC's Order that the expropriation case had long been final and executory.
Consequently, both the Order of expropriation and the Order fixing just compensation by the RTC can no longer be modified. In
short, Cebu City cannot withdraw from the expropriation proceedings.

SEC. 4. Order of expropriation. — If the objections to and the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the
property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of
expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or
purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of
the property or the ling of the complaint, whichever came first.

A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal,
however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such
terms as the court deems just and equitable.

Plainly, from the aforequoted provision, expropriation proceedings speak of two (2) stages, i.e.,:
1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its
exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. This ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of
condemnation [or order of expropriation] declaring that the plaintiff has the lawful right to take the property sought
to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation
to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint; and
2. Determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.

We held in the recent case of Republic v. Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation5 that:
[A]n order of expropriation denotes the end of the first stage of expropriation. Its end then paves the way for the second stage
— the determination of just compensation, and, ultimately, payment. An order of expropriation puts an end to any ambiguity
regarding the right of the petitioner to condemn the respondents' properties. Because an order of expropriation merely
determines the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of such exercise, its issuance does not
hinge on the payment of just compensation.After all, there would be no point in determining just compensation if, in the first
place, the plaintiff's right to expropriate the property was not first clearly established.

Conversely, as is evident from the foregoing, an order by the trial court fixing just compensation does not affect a prior order of
expropriation. As applied to the case at bar, Cebu City can no longer ask for modi cation of the judgment, much less, withdraw
its complaint, after it failed to appeal even the first stage of the expropriation proceedings.

Cebu City is adamant, however, that it should be allowed to withdraw its complaint as the just compensation fixed by the RTC is
too high, and the intended expropriation of the Spouses Ortegas' property is dependent on whether Cebu City would have
sufficient funds to pay for the same.

We cannot subscribe to Cebu City's ridiculous contention.

It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the determination of just compensation is a

judicial prerogative

Short Case Digest:

Spouses O are registered owners of a parcel of land. The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cebu City enacted a City Ordinance giving
authority to the City Mayor to expropriate one-half of the said land, and appropriating for the purpose the amount of
P3,284,400.00 or P1,150.00 per square meter. Pursuant to said ordinance, Cebu City filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain
before the RTC against Spouses O. The RTC issued an order declaring that Cebu City has the lawful right to take the property
subject of the instant case, for public use or purpose described in the complaint upon payment of just compensation. The RTC
issued another order fixing the value of the subject land at P11,000.00 per square meter and ordering Cebu City to pay Spouses
O the sum of P31,416.000.00 as just compensation for the expropriation portion of the subject land. The Decision of the RTC
became final and executory because of Cebu City’s failure to perfect an appeal on time, and a Writ of Execution was issued to
enforce the court’s judgment. Cebu City filed an Omnibus Motion to Stay Execution, Modification of Judgment and Withdrawal
of the Case, contending that the price set by the [RTC] as just compensation to be paid to [the Spouses Ortega] is way beyond
the reach of its intended beneficiaries for its socialized housing program. The motion was denied by the [RTC]. [Cebu City's]
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied. Can the Cebu City withdraw from the expropriation proceedings?

-No. both the Order of expropriation and the Order fixing just compensation by the RTC can no longer be modified.

Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on Expropriation, expropriation proceedings speak of two stages, i.e.:
1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its
exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. This ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of
condemnation [or order of expropriation] declaring that the plaintiff has the lawful right to take the property sought
to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation
to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint; and
2. Determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.

Conversely, as is evident from the foregoing, an order by the trial court fixing just compensation does not affect a prior order of
expropriation. As applied to the case at bar, Cebu City can no longer ask for modi cation of the judgment, much less, withdraw
its complaint, after it failed to appeal even the first stage of the expropriation proceedings.

It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the determination of just compensation is a judicial prerogative.

11.
12.
13. BARDILLON v BRGY. MASILI
FACTS:
At the root of this present Petition is the controversy surrounding the two (2) Complaints for eminent
domain which were filed by herein Respondent for the purpose of expropriating a ONE HUNDRED FORTY
FOUR (144) square meter-parcel of land, otherwise known as Lot 4381-D situated in Barangay Masili,
Calamba, Laguna and owned by herein petitioner. Petitioner acquired from Makiling Consolidated Credit
Corporation the said lot pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale which was executed by and between the
former and the latter on October 7, 1996.
The first [C]omplaint for eminent domain was filed before the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna
(MTC), following the failure of Barangay Masili to reach an agreement with herein petitioner on the
purchase offer of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00). The MTC issued an order dismissing
Civil Case No. 3648 for lack of interest for failure of the [respondent] and its counsel to appear at the pre-
trial.
The second [C]omplaint for eminent domain was filed before Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of
Calamba, Laguna (RTC). This [C]omplaint also sought the expropriation of the said Lot 4381-D for the
erection of a multi-purpose hall of Barangay Masili, but petitioner, by way of a Motion to Dismiss, opposed
this [C]omplaint by alleging in the main that it violated Section 19(f) of Rule 16 in that [respondents] cause
of action is barred by prior judgment, pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata.
The Judge issued an order denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss, holding that the MTC which ordered the
dismissal of the case has no jurisdiction over the said expropriation proceeding.
With the subsequent approval of Municipal Ordinance No. 2000-261 on July 10, 2000, and the submission
thereof in compliance with [the] Judges Order dated June 9, 2000 requiring herein respondent to produce
the authority for the expropriation through the Municipal Council of Calamba, Laguna, the assailed Order
dated August 4, 2000 was issued in favor of Barangay Masili x x x and, on August 16, 2000, the
corresponding order for the issuance of the [W]rit of [P]ossession over Lot 4381-D.
ISSUES:
(1) whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the expropriation case;
(3) whether the CA erred when it ignored the issue of entry upon the premises; and

RULING:

Jurisdiction Over Expropriation

An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by
the government of its authority and right to take property for public use. As such, it is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and should be filed with the regional trial courts.

This was explained by the Court in Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Francisco Pastor:

It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or
any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the
courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the
observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the governments exercise of
eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-
bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation
suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the
expropriation.

Verily, the Court held in Republic of the Philippines v. Zurbano that condemnation proceedings are within
the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance, the forerunners of the regional trial courts. The said case was
decided during the effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which, like BP 129 in respect to RTCs, provided
that courts of first instance had original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation
is not capable of pecuniary estimation. The 1997 amendments to the Rules of Court were not intended to
change these jurisprudential precedents.

To reiterate, an expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the value of the land,
because the subject of the action is the governments exercise of eminent domain -- a matter that is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Legality of Entry Into Premises

The requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation case are expressly and
specifically governed by Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On the part of local
government units, expropriation is also governed by Section 19 of the Local Government Code. Accordingly,
in expropriation proceedings, the requisites for authorizing immediate entry are as follows: (1) the filing of a
complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent
to 15 percent of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax
declaration.
In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of respondent after it had filed the
Complaint for expropriation and deposited the amount required was proper, because it had complied with
the foregoing requisites.
The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter properly addressed to the RTC in the course of
the expropriation proceedings. If petitioner objects to the necessity of the takeover of her property, she
should say so in her Answer to the Complaint. The RTC has the power to inquire into the legality of the
exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity for it.

Quick Digest
FACTS:
Respondent filed two Complaints for eminent domain, for the purpose of expropriating a parcel of land
situated in Brgy. Masili and owned by Petitioner. The first [C]omplaint for eminent domain was filed before
the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna (MTC), the second was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Calamba, Laguna (RTC). Both complaints sought the expropriation of the lot for the erection of a multi-
purpose hall of Barangay Masili, but petitioner, by way of a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to the doctrine of
res judicata.
 The Judge issued an order denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss, requiring herein respondent to produce
the authority for the expropriation and, issued the corresponding order for the issuance of the [W]rit of
[P]ossession over the said lot.
ISSUES:
Whether the CA erred when it ignored the issue of entry upon the premises.

RULING:
No.
The requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation case are expressly and
specifically governed by Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, in
expropriation proceedings, the requisites for authorizing immediate entry are as follows: (1) the filing of a
complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent
to 15 percent of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax
declaration.
In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of respondent after it had filed the
Complaint for expropriation and deposited the amount required was proper, because it had complied with
the foregoing requisites.
The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter properly addressed to the RTC in the course of
the expropriation proceedings. If petitioner objects to the necessity of the takeover of her property, she
should say so in her Answer to the Complaint. The RTC has the power to inquire into the legality of the
exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity for it.

14.
15.

G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009

HON. VICENTE P. EUSEBIO VS. JOVITO M. LUIS

Facts:

Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land. Said parcel of land was taken by the City of Pasig sometime in 1980
and used as a municipal road now known as A. Sandoval Avenue, Barangay Palatiw, Pasig City. On February 1, 1993, the
Sanggunian of Pasig City passed Resolution No. 15 authorizing payments to respondents for said parcel of land. However, the
Appraisal Committee of the City of Pasig, in Resolution No. 93-13 dated October 19, 1993, assessed the value of the land only at
P150.00 per square meter. In a letter dated June 26, 1995, respondents requested the Appraisal Committee to consider
P2,000.00 per square meter as the value of their land.

One of the respondents also wrote a letter dated November 25, 1994 to Mayor Vicente P. Eusebio calling the latter's attention
to the fact that a property in the same area, as the land subject of this case, had been paid for by petitioners at the price of
P2,000.00 per square meter when said property was expropriated in the year 1994 also for conversion into a public road.
Subsequently, respondents' counsel sent a demand letter dated August 26, 1996 to Mayor Eusebio, demanding the amount of
P5,000.00 per square meter, or a total of P7,930,000.00, as just compensation for respondents' property. In response, Mayor
Eusebio wrote a letter dated September 9, 1996 informing respondents that the City of Pasig cannot pay them more than the
amount set by the Appraisal Committee.

Thus, on October 8, 1996, respondents filed a Complaint for Reconveyance and/or Damages (Civil Case No. 65937) against
herein petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 155. Respondents prayed that the property be
returned to them with payment of reasonable rental for sixteen years of use at P500.00 per square meter, or P793,000.00, with
legal interest of 12% per annum from date of filing of the complaint until full payment, or in the event that said property can no
longer be returned, that petitioners be ordered to pay just compensation in the amount of P7,930,000.00 and rental for sixteen
years of use at P500.00 per square meter, or P793,000.00, both with legal interest of 12% per annum from the date of filing of
the complaint until full payment. In addition, respondents prayed for payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's
fees and costs.

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the plaintiffs (LUIS) and against the defendants (EUSEBIO)

Issue:
1. Whether respondents are entitled to regain possession of their property taken by the city government in the 1980's and,

2. In the event that said property can no longer be returned, how should just compensation to respondents be determined.

Ruling:

1. These issues had been squarely addressed in Forfom Development Corporation v. Philippine National Railways, which is
closely analogous to the present case.

In said case, the Court held that because the landowner did not act to question the lack of expropriation proceedings for a very
long period of time and even negotiated with the PNR as to how much it should be paid as just compensation, said landowner is
deemed to have waived its right and is estopped from questioning the power of the PNR to expropriate or the public use for
which the power was exercised. It was further declared therein that:

The non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the property to the landowner. What is
left to the landowner is the right of compensation.

x x x It is settled that non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of their
expropriated lot.

Just like in the Forfom case, herein respondents also failed to question the taking of their property for a long period of time
(from 1980 until the early 1990's) and, when asked during trial what action they took after their property was taken, witness
Jovito Luis, one of the respondents, testified that "when we have an occasion to talk to Mayor Caruncho we always asked for
compensation." It is likewise undisputed that what was constructed by the city government on respondents' property was a
road for public use, namely, A. Sandoval Avenue in Pasig City. Clearly, as in Forfom, herein respondents are also estopped from
recovering possession of their land, but are entitled to just compensation.

2. The prevailing doctrine on judicial determination of just compensation is that set forth in Forfom. Therein, the Court ruled
that even if there are no expropriation proceedings instituted to determine just compensation, the trial court is still mandated
to act in accordance with the procedure provided for in Section 5, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring the
appointment of not more than three competent and disinterested commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the subject property.

It was also emphasized therein that although ascertainment of just compensation is a judicial prerogative, the commissioners'
findings may only be disregarded or substituted with the trial court's own estimation of the property's value only if the
commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them, where they have disregarded a clear
preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive.

Verily, the determination of just compensation for property taken for public use must be done not only for the protection of
the landowners' interest but also for the good of the public. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained as follows:

The concept of just compensation, however, does not imply fairness to the property owner alone. Compensation must be just
not only to the property owner, but also to the public which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation.

It is quite clear that the Court, in formulating and promulgating the procedure provided for in Sections 5 and 6, Rule 67, found
this to be the fairest way of arriving at the just compensation to be paid for private property taken for public use.

With regard to the time as to when just compensation should be fixed, it is settled jurisprudence that where property was
taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings, and its owner files an action for recovery of possession thereof before
the commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling.

Short Digest
Facts:

L is an owner of a parcel of land. The said parcel of land was taken by the City of Pasig to be used as a municipal road. L
demanded the payment of just compensation in the amount of 5, 000 per sq.m. However, E did not assented to the demand of
L, and only asserted that they can only pay L in accordance with the assessment made by appraisal committee. L then filed a
case for reconveyance and damages.

Issue:

1. Whether respondents are entitled to regain possession of their property taken by the city government in the 1980's and,

2. In the event that said property can no longer be returned, how should just compensation to respondents be determined.

Ruling:

1. No. It is settled that non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of
their expropriated lot.

Herein respondents also failed to question the taking of their property for a long period of time (from 1980 until the early
1990's) and, when asked during trial what action they took after their property was taken, witness Jovito Luis, one of the
respondents, testified that "when we have an occasion to talk to Mayor Caruncho we always asked for compensation." It is
likewise undisputed that what was constructed by the city government on respondents' property was a road for public use,
namely, A. Sandoval Avenue in Pasig City.

2. Therein, the Court ruled that even if there are no expropriation proceedings instituted to determine just compensation, the
trial court is still mandated to act in accordance with the procedure provided for in Section 5, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, requiring the appointment of not more than three competent and disinterested commissioners to ascertain and
report to the court the just compensation for the subject property.

It was also emphasized therein that although ascertainment of just compensation is a judicial prerogative, the commissioners'
findings may only be disregarded or substituted with the trial court's own estimation of the property's value only if the
commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them, where they have disregarded a clear
preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive.

16.
17.
18. Landbank vs. Araneta
Facts:
At the heart of the controversy is a large tract of land with an area of 1,645 hectares, more or less, which was originally
registered in the name of Alfonso Doronilla (Doronilla) under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 7924 of the Rizal Registry.
On June 21, 1974, then President Marcos issued Proclamation 1283, carving out a wide expanse from the Watershed
Reservation in Antipolo, Rizal and reserving the segregated area for town site purposes, "subject to private rights, if any there
be.
In 1978, the OSG filed with the then CFI of Rizal an expropriation complaint against the Doronilla property. Meanwhile, on
1979, Doronilla issued a Certification, copy furnished the Agrarian Reform Office, among other agencies, listing seventy-nine
(79) "bona fide planters" he allegedly permitted to occupy a portion of his land. On 1987 or nine (9) years after it commenced
expropriation proceedings, the OSG moved for and secured the dismissal of the expropriation case.
Earlier, or on March 15, 1983, J. Amado Araneta, now deceased, acquired ownership of the subject Doronilla property by virtue
of court litigation. A little over a week later, he had OCT No.7924 canceled and secured the issuance of Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. N-70860 in his name.

Issue:
Whether or not the land is subject to expropriation.

Ruling:

We reiterate the ensuing pronouncement in Natalia Realty, Inc., as cited by the CA, that agricultural lands reclassified as a
residential land are outside the ambit of compulsory acquisition under RA 6657 ought to be brought to bear against the 912
farmer-beneficiaries adverted to:

The issue of whether such lands of the Lungsod Silangan Townsite are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988, the Supreme Court categorically declared, viz:

We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that CARL shall `cover,
regardless of tenurial agreement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands.' As to what constitutes
`agricultural land,' it is referred to as `land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.' The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation.
`Agricultural lands' are only those lands which are `arable and suitable agricultural lands' and do not include commercial,
industrial and residential lands.'

Summarizing, the farmer-beneficiaries who were given the 75 CLTs prior to the issuance of Proclamation 1283, as amended by
Proclamation 1637, are deemed full owners of the lots covered by 75 CLTs vis-à-vis the real registered owner. The farmer-
beneficiaries have private rights over said lots as they were deemed owners prior to the establishment of the LS Townsite
reservation or at least are subrogated to the rights of the registered lot owner. Those farmer-beneficiaries who were issued
CLTs or EPs after June 21, 1974 when Proclamation 1283, as amended, became effective do not acquire rights over the lots they
were claiming under PD 27 or RA 6657, because the lots have already been reclassified as residential and are beyond the
compulsory coverage for agrarian reform under RA 6657. Perforce, the said CLTs or EPs issued after June 21, 1974 have to be
annulled and invalidated for want of legal basis, since the lots in question are no longer subject to agrarian reform due to the
reclassification of the erstwhile Doronilla estate to non-agricultural purposes.