Introduction to Blumenberg Robert Wallace New German Critique, No. 32. (Spring - Summer, 1984), pp. 93-108, Stable URL: http linksstor.orgsicisici=004-083X%28 198421582F22%20%3A32%3C93%3 AITBIIEDO.CORIBIT New German Criuque is currently published by New German Critique. Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of ISTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at flip: feworwjtor org/aboutterms.htmal. ISTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in par, that unless you fave obtained pcior permission, you may not dowaload an cnt isus of @ journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe ISTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial uss. Please contact the publisher cegarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at bhupsferwer,jstor.org/joumals/nge html Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transtnission. ISTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding ISTOR, please contact support @jstor.org- up:thrwwjstor.orgy Tue Sep 5 16:23:15 2006Introduction to Blumenberg* by Robert Wallace 1, Blumenberg’s Work on Myth Hans Blumenberg emerged as a philosopher of major stature wich the publication, in 1966, of his Die Legtimititder Newzeit — The Legitimacy ofthe Modern Age (my translation of which was published by MIT Pressin 1984), In German philosophically oriented scholarship, in the period since the 1960s, the series of major works that Blumenberg has pub- lished are comaparable, for both path-breaking originality and widely recognized importance, only to the works of Jiingen Habermas. Hav- ing 2 broader interest in the history of ideas chan Habermas has (a breadth that is evident, for example, in hiselaborate analysis ofthe his- torical nexus between medieval Christianity and modernity in The Legitimacy ofthe Modern Age}, and with a benc chat cends (outside philos- ‘ophy) more toward literature than toward social theory and polities {chough he also couches on these}, Blumenberg hasa great deal to offer to anyone who wants to undertand the relations becween thought and imagination that are manifested in modern licerature, as well as in modern philosophy. Especially important in this respect is his Aréeit am Mythos (1979) — Werk on Myth, of which the following piece, “To Bring Myth toan End,” isa chapter. (The complete translation will be published by MIT Press in 1985.) The book's title refers to the creative work chat has been expended on mythical stories and motifs by writers in the Western tradition ever since Homer, work that continues — with, ifanything, ‘even increased intensity — in the most recent couple of centuries of that tradition (centuries from which Blumenberg draws much of his illustrative macerial). The book's purpose is to determine what such work can mean in anage like che modern one, which ostensibly has dis- abused itselfof myth, along with fairy-cales, dogma, and“ prejudice” in ‘general, in order to turn its atcention strictly to “the facts” of human cit- cumstances and what one chooses to make of them. Acthe beginning of “To Bring Myth to an End” Blumenberg describes Fontenelte's sur- he preparation ofthis iranslarion wasmnade possible hy agcant irom theTranslation Program of the Nacional Endowment of dhe Husnanites. 9394 Introduction to Blumenterg prise, in the lace 17¢h century, ac the way the old stories continued co fascinate writers and their audiences (Racine was aleading instance of this, at the time] — despite the skepticism chat by then was generally accepted as the necessary first step in any search for the ruck aboucthe world. The same incongruity, and che same difficulty in interpreting it, are still with us today. Under the influence of Romanticism, eth= nography and psychoanalysis, we may by naw be somewhat less sur- prised than Fontenelle was at myth’s longevity in {at least) modern art and licerature. We understand chat myth has other functions besides that of explaining things, from which it has been displaced by science. But we are unclear about the status of those other functions, and how they relate to the explanatory ane. In Romanticism (Friedrich Schlegel, Novalis) they cend to swallow ic up: “True science” (ie., poetic, mythi- cal science} is expected to he symbolie, co orient us in the world, as, myth once did, and only incidentally to supply us with causal explana- tions of what is the case. Those af us who are noc willing to go that far, because it seems co imply abandoning rationality in favor of fantasy, have nevertheless been led to wonder why explanation is so sharply distinguished from symbolic orientation in our culture, when echnol- ogy has discovered so many cultures in which this is not the case. But even psychoanalysis, which, more than any other single influence, has made us aware of the persistence of non-rational symbolism and fan- ‘asy in ourtives, isfounded on theassumption thatthey cannot coexist indefinitely with science: “Where id was, there shall ego be,” thatis to say, rational comprehension of the mechanisms of symbolism and fancasy mustultimately bring their effectiveness to an end, finally com- pleting the Enlightenment task of dearing the way for science. Our pervasive assumption is that, like symbolism and fancasy, myth cannot ~ by irs nature — coexist with science, hecause the two are essentially sequential phenomena, one of which is destined so replace the arher. The only exception being cases of atavismn, of regression; which only underline the assumption of the normality of progress in the other direction. Blumenberg’s first major argument in Work on afyth is that this schema of necessary progress"*from mythos to logos” isnot the only or the best way to understand the relation berween myth and rationality; nar doesabandoning it entail ceasing to distinguish logos from myth, as tends to occur in Romantic theories. What he proposes is that instead ofunderstanding myth in terms of what it “comes from” and servesas a “preliminary” substitute for (namely, logos, science), we should understand it primarily it relation ta what it comes afier and serves to cuercome. This point of departure is samething that he entitles the “ab- solutism of realty,” a situation in which “man comes close w not hav-Robert Wallace 95 ing control of the conditions of his existence and, what is more im- porcant, believes that he simply lacks control of chem.” Blumenberg, calls chis a “limic concept,” which white ic may never have been fully presencin reality isa necessary extrapolation, a ‘timiting case,” which makes sense of what we do observe in myth and in che rest of human, hiscory. [cis consistent, he says, with currenc theories of che origin of human beings — of what happened when our ancestors adopred an up- righ, bipedal posture; were displaced from che sheltering forest into the open savannah; and found chat their instinc:s did not cell chem how co cope with ehis new situation. Blumenberg argues thatthe dramatically enlarged horizon of what chey could perceive (and within which they could be perceived) woutd be, for chem, a situation of great ambiguity, one in which some of cheit central instincts — such as fleeing from immediate danger, an instinct that had served to clarify many situ- ations for them in the forest — would be of lizle help. Our ancestors “came close to not having control of the condicions of their existence” because they had become, as we remain, a species without a clearly defined biological niche. If this situation were not dealt with in some radically new way, it would produce the mental state chat Blumenberg calls “Angst,” which is normally cranslaced as “anxiety” but would be bewer rendered by the psychiasrist's paraphrase, “intense fear or dread lacking an unambiguous cause or a specific threat.” The resulting behavior would be panic, paralysis, or both. Thus the “absolutism of realicy” isa fundamental threat, implicitin our biological nature and its relation co our natural environment, 19 our capacity for survival. Our response to this challenge has been to develop. in place of the adaptive instincts that we lack, culture, inal ies forms. Among those forms, chacof myth hasacrucial role to play. That roleis to overcome or forestall the Angst that the “absolutism of reality” would otherwise praduce, by “rationalizing” icinto plainfear of specif- ic, named agencies, more or less personalized powers, wham we can address and (co that extent) deal with. Icalso helps that these powers, which are often (in che early stages) cheriornarphic, are plural, and each, has a limited domain — there is a “separation of powers” becwcen them, which limits what each of them, individually, can do to us. And what is more, the stories say, they were more horrible, and less predict- able, "inthe beginning.” Monsters like Medusa(who is likean emblem ‘of Angst itself| and dhe various Giants, and che heroes like Perseus and Heracles who overcome them, illustrate che latter aspect. Sado the his- tories of the Olympian gods themselves — “the old storm-god Zeus hecomes the world-orderer,” as Blumenberg mentions below. Thus the temporal axis is indeed crucial toan adequate understand- ing of myth {as Blumenberg argues below against Lévi-Strauss's an-96. Introduction to Blumenberg thropological Eleaticism), But this axis is not chat of myth’s “replace- ment” by logos (a version of history to which Lévi-Strauss might cor rectly object) but chac of myth’s overcoming of che initial absolutism of reality ‘The resulcof this “overcoming” can be described essentially as“*dis- tance” — putting the chreac of an overwhelming, alien reality “atarm’s length,” emotionally, so thac one can have time (“breathing space”) in which to develop means to deal with it. Thus myth and rationality are inseparable from each other, functionally, from the beginning: the one making room for the other to do its thing. The fact chat rationality did nov get organized as “method” or “science” until (by various rec~ konings) $50 or 2400 years ago does not, of course, mean that it was absent from human functioning before that threshold, was crossed, any more than it is absent from “primitive” cultures today. But our preoccupation with the great new "beginning from scratch” — from the sole certainty of the eagta, as in Descartes — thatwe supposedly car- ried ou 350 years or so ago has made us receptive to schemas that pre- sent the emergence of reason (and the supercession of all that went before ir} as occurring within history. Contrary to the fundamental madern rule of excluding teleological hypotheses, we Have regarded the supposed passage“from mythos to logos’ as, ineffect, the working ‘of destiny. Blumenberg, in good scientific syle, wants 1o remove this, final, most stzbbornillusion from our view of ourselvesand our world. Theresult, interestingly, when reason is removed fram this pedestal, is thac other human accomplishments, such as myth, regain some of their proper dignity. ‘The book contains other theoretical innovations that I can only mention here.' Ic contains a very novel hypothetical account of the gcnesis of mychical concencs chrough a sort of “natural selection” over millenia of story-telling; an account chat supplements that of raych’s overall function chat I have just sketched. This “Darwinism of words” serves o further distinguish Blumenberg's view of myth from thecom- mon Romantic one, prominenily exemplified in this centuryin Jung's ‘writings, according io which mythical contents express archetypes that are, as it were, “given” from eternity — outside history. There are extended discussions of Freud’sand Ernst Cassirer'sanalyses of myth, complementing the discussion of Lévi-Strauss in the chapter we are printing here, There is a very careful analysis of the relations and dif- ferences between myth and monotheistic religion, and myth and ‘A more comprehensive, though brief, summary is cancained in my article, “A Reconciliation of Myth and Ravionality,” in umonrr, vol. 5, 0, 1 (Feb, 1984), 68,Robert Wallace 92 dogma, including the important intermediate case of Gnosticism (which also played an imporcant rolein The Legitimacy ofthe Modern Age). Besides these “analytical” contributions, there are numerous discussions of particular literary works, comparable to the discussion of Valéry’s Mon Faust in this chapter. And, finally, the later half of the book is an analytical survey, in the light of this new methodology, ofthe history of the Prometheus myth, from its frst appearance in Hesiod and Aeschylus to the twentieth century treatments oft by Gide and Kafka. A separate, central portion of this story isan especially intensive study of the role of the Prometheus motif in Goethe's life and works, from his youchful “Prometheus” ode to Pandora and Dicktung und Wakrheit. This study brings together in a very striking way many of che most potent and. problematic elements in Goethe's thought and creativity, such as his combination of Spinozistic pantheism and aesthetic “polytheism,” his concept of the “demonic,” his relation to Napoleon, and the peculiar dictum, “Nemo contra deum nisi deus ipse.” It illustrates very con- cretely, almostin the manner of psychohistory” (from which itdiffers mainly in that Blumenberg's grasp of the trans-personal, non- “psychological” dymanics of the history in which Goethe is embedded is so strong}, how dealings with myth and with “the facts” as conceived in our “post-mythical” age can interact. 2. “To Bring Myth to an End” ‘The chapter of Work on Myth that we are printing here is chapter 4 of part Two of the book — the last chapter of the “analytical” portion, Prior co the account of the history of the Prometheus myth. The tide, “To Bring Myth coan End,” imrnediately makesone wonder — what can this mean, in a book that appears to be opposed to the Enlightenmentidea thacwe must make an end of myth — thatis, clear itoucof the way— along wih all our other inherited mental detritus, in order to make room for science? We soon find, however, that for Blumenberg “bringing myth to an end” has nothing whatever to do -with “clearing it out of the way.” Rather, it refers to a situation chat would be the ideal limiting case of the literary “work on myth” that is the subject of the book as a whole. Just as the “limit-concept of the work of myth” is, Blumenberg says, tie “absolutism of reality,” so“the limic-concept of work ar myth would be to bring myth to an end, to venoure the most extreme deformation, which only just allows or almost no longer allows the original figure to be recognized. For tht. theory of reception this would be the fiction of afinal myth, thac is, of myth that fully exploits, and exhausts, che form.” 80 “to bring myth to an end’ isthe ideal limiting case that is syramet- rically opposite, in the direction of the future, co the absolutism of99 Introduction to Blumenterg reality, in the direction of the past. From the way he uses the rerms, here and elsewhere, it is evident chat the expression, “the work of myth,” refers to the hypothetical essential accomplishment of myth in creating the “breathing space” that | described: whereas “work on myth” is something that is only possible after that. “One mustalready have the work of myth behind one in order to be able to apply oneself toworkon myth ,..," Blumenberg writes in the passage from which [ have been quoting. The orientation of the first type of “work” is back- ward in time, toward a hypothetical terror that has to be overcome; whereas the orientation of the second is forward, toward a hypothetical end of myth, “the fiction of a final myth that fully exploits, and ex- hausts, the form.” What this means we learn from the examples to which the remainder of the chapter is devored, 3, The “Final Myth” Underlying German Idealism Blumenberg moves directly from this schematic outline to some ching chat he inecoduces as merely an illustrative instance, but which curs out (0 be one of the most novel and illuminating theses of the whole book, in relation to the history of philosophy. This is the sugges- on that “stich a final myth could have been the fundamental myth of German Idealism” — the Idealism that Schiller inreverently surnmed upasasserting thac “the world is only a ball chatthe ego has thrown and thar it catches again in ‘reflection’! Or that Schopenhauer sum- marized more solemnly (not long afier he had himself made fun of ic, as Blumenberg shows us), when he decided that “the worlds are my representation, chatis, that I, the eternal subject, am the bearer of this universe, whose whole being is nothing but a relationship to me." Now German Idealism — the philosophy of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, which this famous or infamous “fundamental myth” underlies — isof course the watershed phenomenon that claimnsca emerge from a critique of Kant, and against which Feuerbach, Marx, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche all react, 56 chat anyone who takes German philosophy at all seriously (even if only in the work of, say, either Kant or Marx) must somehow come to cerms with it. Even from the distance of the 20th century, chis has not proved to be easy. Asa careful study of Marx ‘or Kant or any other thoughitful treatment of the issues that are in- volved soon makes clear, it is not enough to respond to Idealism merely by “turning iton its head,” substituting object for subject — so that Schopenhauer's formula, for example, becomes: “the subject, whose whole beings nothing bura relationship tothe universe.” Even ifwe were satisfied with that asa statement, we would still need 10 know what it is about this “subject” — i¢., about ourselves — that has at times made us so eager co give it(i.e., (0 give ourselves) an ontologicalRobert Wallace 99 Briorty over the “external world.” Is this merely asyndrome of back- sliding into“ pre-Copernican” anthropocentrism? Ifso, why was there in fact no comparably “anthropocentric” ontology in the (Ckrono- Ligically pre-Copetnican) philosophy of the Greeks? Is Christianicy, perhaps, to blame for its appearancein modern times, by virtue of hav- ig introduced radically anthropocencric attitudes and doctrines into our tradition? The relation between Christianity and madern philosophy isacom- plex question, which Blumenberg explored in depth in The Lettimac of the Modern Age. Briefly, he argued there that there is no continuity of substance between medieval/Christian concepts and attitudes and modern secular ones — so that a secular, modern anthtopocentrism would not simply be a continuation, “in another guise,” of Christian anthropacentrism.? Butthis does not prevent Christianiey from having played an indispensable role in che genesis of modernity, in that Chris- Gan concepts — in particular, the concept of an omnipotent Gad — led, as their implications were worked out in such doctrines as lare medieval Nominalism (partof the syndrome that Blumenberg enticles “theological absolutism’), to the crisis of the human relation to the world to which modern (implicitly secular) “human self-assertion” is, the response. The fact that such “self-assertion" — the determination to make what we can of our lives in this world, in view of the absence of any relligible divine “order” that we can decide to adhere to or ta strive toward ~ is noc iselfinherently anthropacentric has been sufficiently demonsirated by the role, precisely, of the Copernican revolution in modem man’s self-assessment, where Copernicus’ accomplishment has hecome a paradigm of the process of overcoming limited, self- centered perspectives, a process that we have to press forward ifwe are tooriencour action to” thingsas they ceallyare” — which we mustdo if our “self-assertion” is to succeed.* Teis that success, rather than any special oncological dignity, that is che essential modern objective Buc although it is not itself necessarily anthropocenttic, madern 2. Ofcourse one could pointco the fact that Fichte, Schelling and Hegel wereallar least aominally Lutherans, and suggest chat their thinking is notin fact "modern," in the sense of being secular. Hut the relation of self ca God in «heir thoughe is 39 thoroughly unorthodox, when compared ro Augustine, Aquinas, Luther orany other paradigmatic Christian thinker, that it seems desirable to atleast est the possi of Interpreting chem as genuinely modern thinkers, before warning chem aver 1a a cor- tinuous Chestian “wadiion” 4. Blumenberg's second major boak, Di Genesis dor hiperidondschen Wel (Frankfurt ‘am Main: Suhrkamp, 1978), examines the consequences of Copernicanism, both 25, cormalagy and as metaphor, for modem thought100 Intreduction to Blumenberg human self-assertion did create che historical context in which the characteristic anthropocentrism of modern philosophy became pos- sible. This syndromeis epitomized in Descartes famous schemaof the self res cogitans} versus the world (ves extensa), which, by articulating as, an ontology the relationship — man versus theworld —thacis implicit in sclfassertion, set up the cerms of most of moder philosophy. Simuttancously with Descartes’ dualism, modem materialism, begin ning with Hobbes, said in effect that knowledge is about the world (res extenca}, s0 the subjece that experiences or that possesses knowledge canbe ignored. For those who sill wanted to thinkin terms ofa ‘on she world, of a point of departure (in the spirit of “self-assertion”), the difficulties of connecting two separate realms, either ontologically thow doabodyanda mind form one individual?) orepistemologically (how can a mind know something that is coually different from it in kind?), made ic tempting to reduce bodies 10 mental contents, as Berkcley did; which was idealism (also known, later, as phenomena~ lism) All of these theories continue 1o have their advocates, evo cen turies later. Materialism has the advantage that it appears not to be anthropocentric, as it docs not need to draw a line berween chose things that have minds (dualism) or have ideas (idealism) and those thacdo not. But none of them tries to understand how the debate arose, and why itdid so only in the modern age. So The Legitimacy ofthe Modem Age, by explaining the genesis of the Cartesian syndrome, already went a long way toward explaining Ger- man as well as other idealisms. But, as Blumenberg makes clear here, German Idealism — the idealism that was formed in the aftermath of Kant’s proof of the impossibility of any proof of the existence of a God who could ensure our knowledge of the world (as Descartes and Berkeley in different ways, made him do} -- requires addltionct ‘explanation. The fascinating thing about this idealism, in contrast to Berkeley's for example, has always been is dynamic quality: In every ‘case it describes a process of movement, of activity, of emergence, whether this is called “positing,” “reflection,” “negation” or “subla- tion [Auftchung)" — and, abstract though they sound, these are always described as quasi-temporal processes: in the manner, in fact, of astory, ‘Acthe same tme, the relation between these stories and the concrete history chat we are all involved in has always been obscure. So when Blumenberg says they are all forms of a myth — “the fundamental myth of German Idealism” — we receive, I think, a significant itlu- mination. Science, in the sense of a body of theory that is rclated, however indirectly, co evidence, and capable of being replaced by new theories that do the same job better — this they do not seem to be. Metaphysics, in the sense of Placo, Aristotle, or Leibniz, they also doRobert Wallace 101 notseem tobe. Norhistory,in the usual sense. Butstories they definitely are, and furthermore they are stories that those who tell chem will cer- tainly notacknowledge having merely “made up." Thus “myth” seems to be the most appropriate category to put them in. Itneed not be — and for Blumenberg it certainly is not — aderoga- tory categorization (like “fairy-tale” in Schopenhauer’s initial reaction t Eichte which Blumeaberg quote cit part of a seious effort to understand what is going on here.' If what is going on is not history, science, metaphysics, or “just a made-up story,” maybe itis mych, To ‘be more specific, maybe “such a final myth could have been the fun- damental myth of German Idealism.” To appreciate this explanation, we need to understand the terms “final” and “fundamental,” as well as “myth.” To take the easier one first: Blumenberg borrows the idea of a‘“fun- damental myth” (Grundmythos) from Hans Jonas, who used itin analyz- ing Gnosticism in his Grasis und spatantiker Geist (1934-54), It signifies a mythical schema that underlies a variety of apparently heterogeneous stories, such as those that proliferated among the Gnostic sects. It seems as though such a schemais more likely to be demonstrable ina casewhere there isalso a**docirinal” side io the storiesin question, that is, where they respond in part to the pressure of a literate and phil- osophically (or theologically) “sophisticated” audience that wants “truths” co compare to those it is already familiar with. This is certainly the case wich the Idealist myth, and in any case, some idea of an underlying schema is clearly necessary ia order to define what itis that the diverse accounts offered by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel have in common. Now: Why a “final” fundamental myth? The concept of a “final myth” was what Blumenberg introduced Idealism, here, to illustrate: so his discussion elucidates both subjects simultancously. “The uhi- mate for final: letzter] myth was a consequence of the ukimate doubt,” he tells us: of the doube chat Descartes introduced with his hypathesis of the malicious spirir (an extreme version, Blumenberg suggested in The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, of the Nominalists’ God) who might pos- sibly deceive us completely about the external world. The insidious 4. Habermastakesan even more sympathticinteestin che dels, epeclyin cule and onan iets Bonar. beacon, 1971) He Hn in che an iporcae eranof haoght (cep 88} harcootins,indiferent and never adequately Caried forms, in teal and in Mars. Bus he does foc tele what to make ofthe syxemaie intention of Fidic's Dace of trowel, which purports to transpose ts reader, through a single ar, nc ihe dened sefeiwuisod of an abuse ego hat produces bod iselPand the ward p. 2103.102 Introduction to Blumenberg uncertainty created by this hypothesis was given its full force, as men- tioned, by Kant’s proof of the impossibility of a proof of the existence ofa (perfectly good} God — the latter having been Descartes’ means of overcoming this uncertainty. “There was only one way,” Blumenberg, writes, “to Femove this last monster from the world, namely, for the cognitive subject to make itself into the authority [Fnstanz] that is re- sponsible for the object that it knows.” As I described above, modern. philosophy is still very preoccupied with the problems posed by Descar- tes" analysis of mind and body, which he himself (confident in his ability to solve them with the aid of his proof of God as the ens perfec tissimu) pushed co the extreme with his hypothesis of the malicious deceiving spirit. As Leibniz foresaw, it has not been possible to refute that hypothesis, however much it may be discredited in regard 10 its possible prachicakrelevance. In general, the theoreticat problem of the relation of the self co the world is as unsolved as ever, and for pure theory (though obviously not for the pradice of science, which goes merrily along with no episternology whatever) this isa threat co its very existence. The one definitive way, as Blumenberg points out, to put this ultimate theoretical doubcto rest would be to make the subject the origin and ultimate reference point of the world, which would then “come into the horizon of {the subject's] experience as something it has made” and which it therefore cannot be fundamentally deceived about But in excluding this theoretical doubr, the Ideatist fundamental myth would also radically exclude the absolutism of reality itself. One cannot be ertified by, any more chan one can be deceived about, a reality that one has created. Thus the Idealise myth would be a “final” myth nor only because it would setcle the ultimate doubt, but because it would remove the need for any other myth. It would complete the task thac was begun by the primeval “work of myth,” in away that those who performed that original work could not even have dreamed of: by establishing man, who once thought he was at the mercy of reality, as its sovereign master, instead. Buc of course such a projec is charoughly paradoxical No more than we critical moderns could ultimately accept a myth, once we recognized it as such, as a solution (o a theoretical problem (we are much more likely to depreciate theory as such, “pragmatically,” than to knowingly combine it wich myth) — no more could we, as “workers ‘on myth, accept one actual myth as truly “final” and insurpassable. ‘As Blumenberg says in the last sentence of Work on Myth, after discus- sing Kafka’s amazing one-page “eschatological” version of the Prometheus story, “What if chere were stitl something to say, afterall?" Here he explains’ “For one myth to be distinguished as an ultimateRobert Wallace 103 and insurpassable pure representation of its ‘form’ is the highest stimulus to dealings with the mythical, but it is nota status that can be shown to be final. Beginning and end are symmetrical also in that they scape tangibility. Myth has always alrcady passed over into the proce ss of reception, and it remains in that process no matter what vio~ lence is applied in order to break its bonds and co establish its final form.” Idealisro’s fundamental myth seems to be “an ultimate and insur- passable pure representation of myth’s form’ in that, while containing none of myth’s traditional contents, it aims to deal, definitively, with the problem that traditional myth existed in order to deal with: the absolutism of reality. Rather than dismissing myth, in the usual man- her of modern philosophy, it implicitly, recognizes the need for i (which, indeed, was suggested by the frustration of philosophy's at- tempts to deal with its own problems), and secks to meet that need by means of a single all-encompassing “final” myth, But, Blumenberg points out, the success of such an attempt cannot be demonstrable. The series of competing “final myths” that German philosophy has produced since the Idealists — a series that includes Schopenhauer’s myth of the transmigration of souls, Nierzsche's “eternal recurrence,” Scheler’s “werdender Gou,” and Heidegger's “story of Being” — makes this impossibilicy sufficiently evident The reason for it, Blumenberg says, is that “Beginning and end” — the absolucism of reality and the bringing of myth to an end — “are sym- ‘metrical also in that they escape tangibility.” Both are limit-concepts, ideal end-states that we seek (respectively) to escape and to attain, but which we cannot knowlingly experience. “Myth has always already passed over inco the process of reception..." -— thacis, we can never experience the initial “work of myth,” which we imagine as having achieved the inital distance from the absolutism of reality; and conse gqenuly the myths by which chat distance was achieved always “come lown” co us as something that we have nat ourselves creared, but can only receive and “work on.” Idealism is not willing to accept this fun- damencal receptivity: Itclaims an identity with the creative subject chat produces all human culture (indeed, all reality), Ie wants co “break myth’s bonds {to reception] and establish its final form.” But che plausibility of the “final myth” by which icsecks co do this — the myth of a subject that is the source of all reality — self depends on the traditional form (if not the traditional contents} of mythical speech. Without that mythical “mode,” which they did notcreare, and which it would make no sense for their “subject” (which, according to the story, has no prior absolute realicy co deal with) co create, the Idealists (arid. the other philosophical myth-makers who cameaafier them} could not4104 Introduction to Blumenberg even have gorten started. To thacextentatleast, then, myth “remainsin the process of reception” despite all their effarts co break out of that process and bring it co an end. 4, Bringing Faust to an End Idealism’s attempt at bringing myth to an end is supremely ambi- sous, 18 scope, buts correspondingly vulnerable, since that scope reflects its pretensions as philosophy, and chus invites criticism of its mythical content. The apparentscope, and the vulaerabilicy, oflicerary attempts at bringing particular traditional myths “to an end’ like Kafka’s “Prometheus,” which I mentioned )are much more lirsited, since they do not pretend to be anything ocher than story-telling, or to presenta brand new, and ukimate, story. But that does noc prevent them from being very potent. In fact, Blumenberg says, “In every claim to bringa mych to an end the more far-reaching, ifonly implied claim is exposed that one brings myrh to an end when one displays one final myth.” Pre- sumably this isso because by demonstrating the terminabilicy ofsome- ching that had seemed uncreatable and interminable, one would pro- portionately diminish the problem thac things of chat sort had served to ‘overcome {or — which amounts to the same thing — one would pro- portionately enhance the status of the subject that had had the problem) In any case, the transformation that Valéry carries out in his Mon Faustis, to say the least, striking. The key changes are, first, a reversal of the roles of Faustand Mephistopheles, making the former, now, tempt the latter; and second, a redefinition of the “supreme moment” that ‘was the subject of Faust's wager with Mephistopheles, in Goethe's Past, snd which now becomes 2 mysuclscnsual selRoblivion that contrary to the fundamental premise of that wager, cannot, in princi- ple, “tarry.” Consequently, Faust no longer “strives,” whether for knowledge or for anything else. Instead, he is resigned. Likewise his Gretchen, here called “Lust,” “does not entangle hima and does not redeem him,” butis merely “a tactile element in the impressionism of the garden scene.” Butthesedeformationsare not arbitrary: The rever- sal of the terpration relationship reflects the sheer power that knowl- edge, as science, has brought with i¢ since Goethe’s time, and which dwarfs Mephistopheles's old wares; and the redefinition of the su- preme moment reflects the impersonality that science has also brought with it, which has made the old “Faustian” craving for knowl- edge as personal experience and personal power obsolete.’ Likewise, 5. The face that science does not replace myth does nat prevent the swo fram inceeactingin important ways, partcularivin the easeafa mythafche personal retarionRobert Wallace 105 Gretchen/Lust’s changed role reflects the simultaneous deterioration of our consciousness of sin and redemption as real possibilities. The identity of this Faust with the one we kriew fram Goethe is reduced to thatof the old triad of himself, Mephistopheles, and Gretchen/Lust, in ‘which the two dyadic relations in which Faust participates are still dis- nguished, at least on the surface, by involving, respectively, knowl- edge and sensuality {although part of Valéry's point may be that, a8, experience, these coincide}. “Thus Valéry comes very close to, as Blumenberg says, “venturing the mostextreme deformation, which only juscallows or almostno longer allows the original figure to be recognized.” What more undisclosed potential could the old story still contain? We can't know, of course, untessand until ivis disclosed, which is why the proviso always applies, thatsuccessin bringing amyth oan end isnotdemonstrable.(“Whatif there were still something to say, after all?) But we can certainly see how such an approach 16 the ideal of the “final myth” involves ‘a cotality, a perfection, whose fateful effectiveness consists... ir its making it possible for the first time to experience the fascination that does not allow one to rest unt one has imitated the model, equalled the standard that it sets, or even surpassed it.” Which is why the attempted “inal myths” of modern philosophy and literature have not been followed by the condition, purified ofall myth, that would accord with the original expectations of modern thought, but have instead formed an unceasing series of attempts to equal of surpass previous “final myths.” 5. The Myth of Reincarnations as Setting the Standard for “Final Myths? The last section of “To Bring Myth to an End"examines “final myths” proposed by Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, and Hans Jonas, in order to focus on “the standard chat a ‘final myth’ has co satisfy.” This, standard, Blumnenberg says, “was, if I see it correctly, firstlaid down by Schopenhauer,” in some unpublished notes on the transmigration of souls, which is for Schopenhauer (in Blumenberg’s words} “the epit- ‘ome of a story that comes as close to philosophical truch as any story that could be devised,” andis to be considered as the “Non plus ultra” of myth, “its richest and most important instance.” Blumenberg points out chat it differs from Nietzsche's “eternal recurrence of the same” by focussing on the subject's eventual liberation from reality, ‘o knowledge. An extended discussion ofthat elation ard the transformations i¢has Lundergone in the course of Western. history, can be fourd in part Three of The Legienacy ofthe Modsra Age:**The Trial of Theoretical Curiosity”108 Introduction to Rlumenberg rather chan on the eternal repetition of the reality chat he creates, as the argument for his responsibility. Feuerbach, preferring a less calculac- ing God than the one he sees implied in che idea of the transmnigration of souls, and Jonas, who imagines a Gad who has put the entire fate of his universe, for good or ill, in human hands, both resemble Nietzsche {rather thaa Schopenhauer) inthis respect, thactheir myths emphasize esponsibility for the universe, rather than responsibilicy for oneself. Blumenberg recently published a short essay on a sentence that appears among Nietzsche's notes from the period when Zarathustra ‘was corning into being, but which suggests a different approach from the one that Nietzsche actually pursued in thac work.® The sentence reads: “That we could bear being immorcal — that would be the highese ching." Blumenberg interprets this as referring not to the quasi-“immortality” constituted by “eternal recurrence,” but to che possibility of remembering one’s actions and following their conse- quences in the world after one’s deach. To willingly continue eternally as the same person whom one would then remember fully, without benefit of forgedfulness and repression, and whose full consequences ‘one would perceive — to continue thus rather than to “dissolve in shame" —wauld indeed testify to the quality of one's life. Blumenberg, does not explicitly call his conception a “final myth," bur it appears to possess precisely what he describes, in the present piece, as the most importanc characteristic of such a myth (which Schopenhauer's myth of reincarnation itlustraces here}: that ic presents “the subject's respon- sibiligy to hirnself and for himsel£” Blumenberg praises Schopenhaucr for “trying to preserve, if notto intensify [in his myth of reincarnation), Kant's concept of the postur late.” After proving, in the Critigue of Pure Reason, that the reality of God, of freedom and af immoreality could never be demonstrated, Kant ‘went on to assert, in the Critique of Practical Reason, that all of these were nevertheless presupposed, as“ postulates," in moral action. [fimmor- tality were demonstrable, it would interfere with moral action, which Kant’s view must proceed from reverence for duty (as formulated in the Categorical Imperative), and cannot involve calculations of prob- able reward or punishment after death. However, while one has no knowledge of God or of immortality, oneis permitted co hope, indeed cone mus! bape that a God and an immortal soul exist so that good- ness may be justly rewarded in the hereafter. Also, pure duty is such a 6 “Nachdenken her einen Saez von Nieresche,” the second of three “Kurzessays” entitled, collectively, “Uber éen Rand dee Wirklichkeit binaus, Akzenie(Morich}, Feb 1985, 16-27Robert Wallace 107 rigorous requirement that Kant eventually recognized that actual hurnan behavior will never do more than strive coward it. This gap be- cween duty and human reality {benween the will and the action) gave the “postulate” of immortality an additional function in Kane's think- ing: Itmade room foran individual soul co pursue the infinite progress in moral goodness thar alone could bring its actions into full com- plianice with the Categorical Imperative. But this would only be pos- sible if the soul had an endless series of lives. Hence Kans final interest in the idea of reincarnation (an interest that he shared with Lessing, as well as Schopenhauer) This may all seer, as Blumenberg says, like a lot of “obsolete rub- bish.” However, ashe goes on to pointout, “the oppressivenessofcon- tingeney, which lies behind the myth (of immoraaliy, does notcease.” This oppressiveness is also the ultimate explanation of {dealisen's myth of the subjectas origin. As Blumenberg wrote earlier in the chap- ter, “The deepest conflict thar the subject that reflects on its absolute root can have with itself is the confirmation of its contingency in the world, of its lack of necessity... [thatis, the] conflict that consists in or arises from the fact thata subject isa result ofa physical process and for that very reason does not experience its self-constitution, but rather, from its possession of the sole absolute certainty of the cagito sum, gains access to this consticution as something heterogeneous to it.” In addi- tion to this kind of contingency — to the priority of mater over subjec- vig we may be ea ally oppressed by the priosiy of sia: by (as Blumenberg calls ica litde further on) “the overwhelming presump- tion that one is produced by alien, social agencies,” which existen- alism desperately resists with ics doctrine thac existence is prior to essence. Both kinds of contingency, icseems clear, will if anything) be increased by the progress of science, which white itcreates new means forus to usc in controlling acontinuously increasing tange of reality, at the same time continually strengthens the presumption that the most fundamental layer of our personhood is exogenously determined. This ultimate “contingency” seems to be, in fact, the irreducible, per- manent form of the absolutism of reality, and «hus constitutes the per- manent issue with which “final myths” will have to try to deal. When Blumenberg says thata final myth must satisfy the standard of present- ing “the subject's responsibility to himself and for himself,” he is say- ing, [ chink, that it is no good to try to deal with the issue of our contingency by claiming responsibility for the world as awhole, as the Idealists and Nictzsche (the Nietzsche of the “will to power” and “cter- nal recurrence") and Jonas reall inclined to do, but the crucial thingis to recognize and accept our responsibility co and for ourselves, as individuals, That we have such a responsibility, in spite of the con-108 Introduction to Blumenborg tingency thac prevents us from knowing that we are ““in command” in thisarea, is what Kant’s ethics,’ his doctrine of the “postulates,” and all of our “final myths" aim to tell us. Like the myth of reincarnations, they “reconcile individuation and dependence on the world,” and thus — ironically — undermine the depreciation of individuation that Schopenhauer himself preached. One might say, then, thac they de- fend the possibilicy of modern “individualism” (as implied by modern “self-assertion}. But icis clear chat some “final myttis” — those that suggest our responsibility toand for ourselves — do so moreeeffectively than those that make us responsible for the world as a whole. 2, Two important early documents of Blumenlberg’s long involvement with Kant are"Isteine philosophische Fthik gegenwirtig méglich?” in tudinm Canerale,6(1958), 174184, and “Kant und die Fage nach dem ‘goidigen Gort Sudan Gena, (1984), 554-576, “« eee Con " PRAXIS INTERNATIONAL Editors: Ferenc Fehér and Mihailo Markovi vvoure 40.2 oe 1954 Anticles [age abonnas, Queso’ and Counerguestions alton aoe), the Seualancl umaniy ara Biel Palen bhediew Arto end eas Coney. Soca Hvement Coul oc ard ihe Plow of Sores ENS dental te klancan Meio Clue: Normative Prsugpost ons fnew hse Conran to So Sexnce and ar. (pach alsa ante cecal, rivet Review pie Sulont, iby “Dieter Over Needs iso Secale Aled quater: Ai, hl, Octet and anny Soeenpion to uokome 415845) Inga £1195 UK) £175 (verses: 83) 90 Sk $40.80 (Canad Irae: £2860 {UR £4 20 (nr $0800 $104 50 canads eae sa arts uth payment, Yo: ye Dormer Desarne. Best Dcwel 16a cower toad Oxia OX ela Basil Blackwell « Oxford - England