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Quantum Mechanics

Is it a whole or is there a hole


in it?

A have recently received a link to an interesting article authored by Adam Becker, entitled “The Puzzle
Of Quantum Reality”, arguing that, despite its wild success, QM still has a hole on it, like a kind of deep
explanation was still to be delivered by physicists.

It’s a century-old discussion: if Quantum Mechanics is complete or if there are some hidden variables
(the hole) that would make it less “weird” and eventually deterministic, local, classical-like, more
palatable to our macroscopic common sense.

Well, all the experiments designed to detect such hidden side have failed so far (attempts still going
on), and Bell’s inequality has never been verified by any of them.

IMO, this endless dilemma reduces, at the end of the day, to the much older Platonism x Positivism
debate. In the article, the author left (probably on purpose) his Platonist fingerprints scattered all
over the text. Let’s take, for example, the part “… The mathematics of the theory makes incredibly
accurate predictions about the outcomes of experiments and natural phenomena.”. shortly followed
by “…there's a great deal of disagreement over what the theory says about reality — or even whether
it says anything at all about it”. Well, if a theory accurately predicts the outcomes of experiments and
correctly explains all the physical quantities observed in natural phenomena, what else it must say
about reality? A Positivist (adept to physicalism or not) would promptly answer: Nothing at all!
However, for a Platonist, reality seems to always include some ethereal part that lies beyond the
mundane world of empirical results, something that must comply with his/her inner expectations or
desires.

Let’s jump to another piece of the article, where the author bravely states that “There's no compelling
logical or philosophical grounds for declaring unobservable things meaningless…. So, declaring
unobservable things meaningless is not only a silly position, it's a vague one”. I’m sorry for disagreeing
with Mr. Becker, but yes, there is plenty of compelling logical and philosophical ground for declaring
unobservable things meaningless. Moreover, it’s neither silly nor vague. It’s called Positivism. For the
sake of clarity, “unobservable” means something that not only hasn’t yet been observed using
currently available scientific instruments, but something that cannot be observed in principle,
regardless the detection technology available now or at any time in the future. Therefore,
unobservable phenomena or experiment outcomes don’t deliver any empirical evidence by principle.
For a Positivist that means the phenomena or experiment outcomes are not only meaningless. They
are non-existent, period. They’re not part of reality. Let’s get it real: by definition, observable things
are what “reality” is all about, regardless Platonists agree with it or not.

By the way, for a Positivist, there is no observable thing that cannot be measured. If it’s observable,
then it can be measured somehow. But what about intangible things like human feelings? Yes, they
are observable and can currently be measured, at least subjectively. We can easily say if Alice is
angrier or happier now than she was 30 minutes ago, or if she is more or less confident than Bob about
the “nature of reality” (whatever it means). And we are getting quite close to the day when we will
be able to objectively measure human feelings (assigning numbers, physical quantities, relating them
into equations). So, there should be no confusion between observable and measurable, nor fuzziness
in their definition, even for Platonists!

About the “measurement problem”, it has been solved by the quantum decoherence concept and,
together with the Consistent Histories view, it makes the Copenhagen interpretation as palatable as
any other, including the ones the author mentions (De Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave, Many
words/Multiverse, etc.). Sure, quantum decoherence explains how the probabilities derived from the
amplitude of the wave function collapse into the probability of 100% that comes when the
measurement/detection happens. Yes, as a Platonist would promptly remind me, it does not explain
the collapse of the wave function itself. But the wave function is exactly that: a function, a solution of
the Schrodinger equation, an unobservable (as a physical entity) mathematical abstraction. The
probabilities are the observable physical entities, so there is no hole to be filled here, from a Positivist’s
viewpoint. But for Platonists, the wave function is a real entity…

Still on the alternative interpretations of QM the author listed, they are just interpretations, and none
of them, when describing/predicting observable physical quantities, are better or worse than
Copenhagen interpretation (especially the updated version of it). Besides, none of them can deliver
full satisfaction to any Platonist, as any of them has their own weird “non-common-sense”
assumptions (infinitely numbered universes created every single moment, wave functions “attached”
to classical-like particles). For a Positivist, they are equally valid, reducible to a single one, the abstract
assumptions behind each of them being irrelevant, given that they do not influence experimental
outcomes.

Now take this one: “…In its stubborn silence on the nature of reality, it (Copenhagen interpretation)
offers no explanation of why quantum physics works at all…”. Well, is the author honestly saying the
theory that (according his own words, and regardless the subdued interpretation) underpins all the
modern technology, accurately predicts experimental results, correctly explains why the sun shines or
why his eyes can see “is silent on the nature of reality”? Maybe he could be more specific on what he
means by “nature of reality”, as it’s surely completely different from the “reality of nature” Positivists
are used to deal with. Besides, a good, robust scientific theory of nature doesn’t need to explain why
it works. It is expected to explain why nature works the way it does. It would be job of a metatheory,
belonging to the obscure, slippery kingdom of metaphysics, to explain why scientific theories work, all
of them, from Newtonian to Relativistic to Quantum Mechanics.

It’s a hallmark of Platonism this insatiable, religious-like need of assigning meaning to unobservable
things, of having theories about theories of nature, of believing that there is some crucial part of reality
that is living in an ethereal realm, inaccessible to experiments, reachable by abstraction only, divinely
protected from scientific scrutiny, prohibited to deliver any empirical evidence. But, despite this
serious lack of detectable symptoms, Platonists believe this non-materialized piece of truth is surely
there, its only purpose being to fulfill our psychological need for that immaculate, abstract perfection.
When the author criticizes Copenhagen interpretation for not pointing “to a feature of the world that
is like the mathematical structures at the heart of the theory” he betrays the full DNA of the Plato
belief that the world accessible to our mortal perception is an imperfect materialization of the five
perfect regular solids living in some magic, unreachable, pristine mathematical sphere. For any
Positivist, the equation that describes a physical law is just a creation of the human mind, invented to
conveniently relate two or more observable (objectively measurable) physical quantities, which are
the only real things in the scene. For a Platonist, the equation itself is part of reality, as well as the
theory where it is imbedded. It was not invented/created. Instead, it has always been “out there”,
until human mind “discovered” it. In their beliefs, the fact that the Schrödinger equation correctly
explains observable, measurable physical quantities of natural phenomena isn’t enough. They need a
theory that explains why the equation was lazily floating “out there”, since the beginning of time, until
Erwin Schrödinger “discovered” it in 1925.

In summary, if there is any hole at the QM foundation, is one that only Platonists bother with. For
Positivists, the only visible hole is that a quantum gravitation theory isn’t still fully up and running,
despite the promises and progress made by its two main candidates, string theory and LQG.
Therefore, QM isn’t (yet) a whole either. But switching to new or old alternative interpretations to
Copenhagen’s hasn’t helped a lot during the last 90 years. Maybe adding the new “Chaos &
Complexity Theory” usually heralded as the third and last revolution of 20th century Physics (although
it also involves/affects biology, sociology, politics…) is a better way to reach the “Theory of
Everything”.

References: https://www.npr.org/sections/13.7/2018/03/20/595286482/the-puzzle-of-quantum-
reality

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