Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, 2015

Vol. 16, No. 1, 9–23, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14649373.2015.1003123

Revisiting Malaya: envisioning the nation, the history of ideas and

the idea of history

ABDUL RAHMAN Embong

ABSTRACT Political and historical thoughts pertaining to “modern Malaya” and Malaysia are
phenomena of the emerging modern era characterized by the stirrings and the rise of nationalism in
Southeast Asia since the early twentieth century. One of the most compelling ideas in envisioning
the nation and fighting for independence then was Melayu Raya, articulated by a group of visionary
leaders of socio-political movements who professed to fight for the creation of a political entity, a new
independent “nation.” Using the history of ideas approach, this article argues that nations are envi-
sioned, and that we need to contextualize the discussion within what has been termed as “Malay
world,” the old kingdoms in the region, and the subsequent struggles against colonial powers and
the “nationalist” projects for independence. To help understand this background, the article uses
the concept of “culture zone” as used by Fernand Braudel in his study of civilizations. This article
examines the debate on the “Malay world” and Melayu Raya, and also the post-Second World War
envisioning of the nation and the approaches taken by various groups to fight against British coloni-
alism and for independence. Despite almost six decades of independence, some of these ideas keep
returning, resonating with some aspects of the present in today’s Malaysia. In the course of this
article, a brief reference to the history of ideas and the idea of history is made.

K EYWORDS : Cultural zone, nation, history of ideas, Melayu Raya

Introduction new “nation”—which was to be free and

The foray into political and historical
thoughts of any nation or region—arguably
an important and productive intellectual
exercise—requires us to delve into the
history of ideas to make sense of what tran-
spired in the historical past and how they
impacted upon subsequent developments.
Political and historical thoughts pertaining
to “modern Malaya”1 are phenomena of the
emerging modern era, that is, the era charac-
terized by the stirrings and the rise of politics
as a discourse and practice in Malaya since
the late nineteenth and the beginning of the
twentieth century. These thoughts and
ideas were articulations by visionary
leaders and thinkers who nurtured the idea
of a bangsa (nation) as different from kerajaan
(ancient regime) (Milner 1982), an idea that
subsequently translated into the struggle
for the creation of a new political entity—a
independent from the yoke of colonialism
and foreign domination.
In the study of nations and nationalism,
there has been a debate on whether nations
are “imagined” or are “conceptualized.”
Basing himself mainly on Western experi-
ence on the rise of nations and nationalism,
Benedict Anderson in his celebrated classic,
Imagined Communities ([1983] 1991) argues
that a nation is a socially constructed com-
munity, imagined by the people who per-
ceive themselves as part of that group. An
“imagined community” is different from an
actual community because it is not (and, for
practical reasons, cannot be) based on every-
day face-to-face interaction between its
members. Anderson argues that “Even the
smallest nation will never know most of
their fellow-members, meet them, or even
hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives

© 2015 Taylor & Francis

10 Abdul Rahman Embong
the image of their communion” (Anderson
[1983] 1991, 7). A common language and dis-
course that had been made possible due to
the rise of print capitalism is important to
nurture such imagination. Nevertheless,
Anderson cautions that while “nation-ness
is the most universally legitimate value in
the political life of our time” (Anderson
[1983] 1991, 3), “Nation, nationality, national-
ism—all have proved notoriously difficult to
define, let alone analyse” (Anderson [1983]
1991, 7).
Referring specifically to Malayan history
and the rise of “bangsa” (nation) conscious-
ness, Anthony Milner in his work The Inven-
tion of Politics in Colonial Malaya (1995) takes a
different view. Arguing that bangsa is “con-
ceptualized” rather than “imagined,”
Milner (1995, 89) asserts that the term “con-
ceptualized” “conveys better the purpose
and energy with which the Malay writers
engaged in the construction of a new form
of community.” Milner further suggests
that “bangsa was certainly an intellectual
rather than a natural construction,” an argu-
ment in keeping with his proposition of it
being “conceptualized.” To him, the
concept of “imagination” “tends to disguise
the anxiety, the experimentation, the contest
and the sheer intellectual difficulty faced by
those who relinquished their loyalty to
older forms of community [meaning the ker-
ajaan] and constructed a new form” (Milner
1995, 89).
Whether nations are “imagined” or, on
the contrary, “conceptualized” are different
ways of studying the same phenomenon
of nation and nationalism. Whatever the
case may be, in this article, we use the
term “envisioning the nation”—a concept
which, in our view, contains both the
element of “imagination” as well as “con-
ceptualization.”2 Bearing this in mind, it is
argued here that studying Malay(sia)’s
history, especially of political and historical
thoughts related to her evolution into a
modern state/nation requires us to both
historicize and contextualize the discussion
within what has been termed as Alam
Melayu or the “Malay world,” the old king-
doms or kerajaan in the region, the rise of
bangsa consciousness, the subsequent
struggles against colonial powers and the
“nationalist” projects for independence. It
must be emphasized that official state
borders of the present states in Southeast
Asia were political rather than natural cul-
tural borders, and were a creation or a
product of the colonial era, a “contested
construction” in the eyes of these thinkers
and visionaries.
It is this argument that needs to be
underlined here as some of the key political
thoughts or ideas that emanated during the
era of struggle against colonialism trans-
cended such newly created political bound-
aries. To help understand this complex
background, we need to rely on a key
concept in social science, that is, the concept
of “cultural zone” as used by Fernand
Braudel in his study of civilizations, or its
earlier variant, the concept of “culture-area”
as used by anthropologist Clark Wissler
(1927), to refer to a geographical region that
has elements of a “common culture.”
Braudel (1993, 12) notes that: “A cultural
zone, as defined by anthropologists, is an
area within which one group of cultural
characteristics is dominant.” While some cul-
tural zones are small, others
cover much larger areas, united by
characteristics common to the group and
differentiating them from other large
communities. … Naturally enough, fol-
lowing the example of the anthropolo-
gists, geographers and historians have
taken to discussing cultural zones—this
time with reference to advanced and
complex civilizations. They identify
areas which in turn can be subdivided
into a series of districts. Such division …
applies essentially to large civilizations:
these regularly resolve themselves into
smaller units. (Braudel 1993, 12)
While the concept of “cultural zone” and
“culture-area” may appear homogenizing, it
does not imply there were only one culture
and one people in the region. Indeed, it
does recognize the diversity or the myriad
of constituent peoples, ethnicities and cul-
tures within it, but it emphasizes the shared

underlying thread such as language, certain
ways of life and common historical experi-
ences that bind the various parts together.
This concept of a “cultural zone” and/or
“culture-area” is useful when discussing the
shared cultural expressions and historical
experiences of the area which constitutes
today’s Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the
Philippines. A look at the array of ideas ema-
nating in the history of this region draws our
attention to such notions as “Nusantara,”
“Alam Melayu” (Malay world), “Melayu
Raya” “Indonesia Raya,” Malphilindo,
“Melayu” (as a nationality), “Malaya” and
subsequently “Malaysia,” and ideologies
such as marhaenism and Islam (Islam is a reli-
gion, but it can also be studied from the per-
spective of ideology of struggle). Underlying
these ideas is the vision of a nation-of-intent
of their articulators, however elusive these
“envisionings of the nation” may be, as
they attempted to carve out peoples, bound-
aries, and territoriality.
Before proceeding further, a caveat is in
order. An objective discussion of such politi-
cal thoughts and historical ideas undertaken
in today’s Malaysia is fraught with difficul-
ties given the sharp political and ideological
divides and heated partisanships. Those
championing the “Malay supremacy”
agenda seek to stake the claim over Malay
identity and history of the region as an asser-
tion of “firstness,” to justify their exclusion-
ary political machinations, while some
others want to circumvent this idea of the
historical “Malay world,” arguing that
Malays too were “immigrants” of sorts
from other parts of the region to Malaysia.
Throughout this discussion, it will be
obvious that both positions are untenable
as they are not only ahistorical, but anti-
history. This article hopes to steer clear of
both positions, and seeks to delve into the
history of ideas to uncover certain key
concepts, ideas or paradigms as historical
facts, meaning that, they have existed sui
generis—independent of the individuals
who may have generated and espoused
them—and that these ideas have influenced
or shaped the country’s history in some
way or other.
Revisiting Malaya 11
“Malay world” and its contestations
History is replete with controversies and the
history of the region designated as “Malay
world” is no different. To begin with, was
there a “Malay world” or a “kerajaan
world”? Was the “Malay world” concept a
myth, a figment of the imagination of
fervent Malay nationalists such as Ibrahim
Yaacob, Mustapha Hussein, Ishak Hji
Muhamad, Burhanuddin Al-Helmy, and
Ahmad Boestamam from the Kesatuan
Melayu Muda (Union of Malay Youth) who
wanted to create an enlarged and unified
state encompassing Indonesia and Malaya?
Is their advocacy of the “Malay world” or
Melayu Raya and the agenda of making it a
“nation-of-intent” in the fight for Malaya’s
independence an example of “the indigen-
ization of colonial knowledge” as proposed
by some scholars, and that their advocacy
of this concept is “a strategy of survival in
order to hold a legitimate position in the
Malay community” as some of them were
“immigrants from various parts of the Archi-
pelago”? (Naoki 2008, 131–132)
Let us begin with the first controversy.
Scholars of history and culture seem to
differ on the historical origin of the Malays
and whether there was coherence/continuity
between the “Malayu” [sic] of old, and the
community of people called Melayu
(Malays) in the later period. This can be
seen in the works of two influential scholar-
historians which reflect their differing
views. Leonard Andaya from the University
of Hawaii, takes the position that the term
“Malayu” was already in existence for a
long time, and that it refers to a people
with a maritime civilisation, built around
what has been known as the “Sea of
Malayu” (mainly the Straits of Melaka and
the seas linking it with surrounding
regions/seas). Andaya (2008, 22) shows
that, “The first reference to a ‘Sea of
Malayu’ is from an Arabic document dated
c. 1000, which noted that travellers ‘reaching
the Sea of Malayu, were approaching the
area of China.’” He further argues that
“Although the Arabic document is not
specific, the general reference to a Sea of
12 Abdul Rahman Embong
Malayu approaching the area of China is an
accurate description of the extensive
network viewed as one sea stretching from
India to Vietnam” (Andaya 2008, 22). The
Sea of Malayu referred to here is the “voya-
ging corridor” from the Indian subcontinent,
the Southeast Asian isthmus and the north-
ern Malay Peninsula, and the shores of the
South China Sea. It goes through the Straits
of Melaka which for “more than two thou-
sand years … was the principal route
through Southeast Asia, and communities
located along its shores were the major bene-
ficiaries of the steady flow of commercial
traffic” (Andaya 2008, 50). Andaya con-
cludes that
For the Malayu, who were shaped by
their orientation to the sea and the river-
ine environment in which they lived,
stretches of land were viewed as barriers
that fortunately could be breached
through short land passages. … In this
maritime world, rivers and seas formed
unities, which land formed the link
between bodies of water. (Andaya
2008, 22)
Anthony Milner from the Australian
National University, however, takes a differ-
ent view. He acknowledges that these groups
of people “who were later to be identified as
‘Malay’ (and other Austronesian-speaking
peoples)” had existed from the early centu-
ries AD, and “had engaged in cultural as
well as … commercial and political relations
in numerous directions” (Milner 2011, 40).
However, he expresses caution regarding
the coherence of “Malay communities and
historical heritage,” arguing that “Despite
the impression communicated by much of
the work in ‘Malay studies,’ coherence is
not in fact the hallmark of the ‘Malay’ com-
munities and historical heritage … ”
(Milner 2011, 9), and that “The evidence of
earlier centuries, … does not allow us to
speak of ‘Malay’ with such confidence”
(Milner 2011, 22). Based on a careful study
of various sources, especially Malay manu-
scripts, Milner posits that the term
“Melayu” (Malays) is a civilizational
concept, rather than ethnic as argued by
Andaya. Milner also further argues that
“the expression ‘Malay world’ is misleading
to refer to this period, and it might be more
accurate to speak of a ‘kerajaan’ or ‘sultanate
world’” (Milner 2011, Chapter 4).
In our view, Milner is right that what
existed in the region were a number of
Malay kingdoms or sultanates headed by
their respective kings or raja, and that there
was no fixed territory or physical boundary
for each sultanate. The existence and con-
tinuation of the sultanates—big and small—
and the sustained asymmetrical relations
between the ruler (raja) and his subjects
(rakyat), justifies the term “the kerajaan” or
“the sultanate world” as he calls them.
None of these empires or kingdoms was suc-
cessful in unifying the region, under a centra-
lized rule—perhaps with the exception to
some extent of Sri Vijaya in Sumatra (AD
650–1377), Majapahit in Java (AD 1293–
1527), and Melaka (AD 1400–1511).3 But the
important point to note is each “kerajaan
world” existed and flourished within a
bigger world, a cultural zone (in the Braude-
lian sense) mentioned above, that sub-
sequent writers including nationalists of the
twentieth century referred to as the “Malay
world” or Alam Melayu. And that it is the
existence of these various kingdoms within
the cultural zone that had shaped the
history of the Malay world and has been
remembered as such.
Perhaps a short digression may be
necessary by drawing some parallels in
Chinese history. Before the rise of the Qin
dynasty (221–206 BC) and the Han dynasty
(202 BC– AD 220), the land and peoples
that were later called “China” and
“Chinese” consisted of various kingdoms or
empires, and various ethnic and tribal
groups. They lived in separate areas under
different kings and were often at war with
one another. It was Shi Huang-ti, the first
Qin emperor who succeeded in unifying
China through ruthless wars and suppres-
sion, a move that was followed by the Han
emperor, Liu Bang who overthrew the
Qins. It was these dynasties that laid the
foundation of a unified China and estab-
lished a centralized empire, on the basis of

which Sun Yat-sen who led the Chinese
democratic revolution, established the
modern Republic of China in 1912, thus
putting an end to the 2000years of imperial
rule. We should note that neither during
the Qin nor the Han period was the name
“China” used to refer to the territory;
neither was the term “Chinese” used to
refer to her people at that time. The name
“China,” presumably based on the word
“Qin,” entered popular parlance after con-
tacts with the West; and the term “Han” is
the name of the largest of the 55 nationalities
that make up modern China today.
As shown above, imperial China was
not known by that name, rather by the
name of the respective dynasties. In the
same way, we can perhaps argue that
although the name “Melayu” (Malays) was
not yet used to refer to the region and the
people during the early empires such as Sri
Vijaya, the fact remains that these kingdoms
or empires were part of a world that later
came to be called the “Malay world” or
Alam Melayu, and the people “Malays.”
There have been many cases in history in
which facts and practices occurred prior to
the invention of terms or concepts to describe
or explain them. This is not peculiar to Malay
history or Southeast Asian history alone.
This phenomenon may be called “knowl-
edge lag” or “conceptual lag,” a cognitive
and intellectual dissonance between reality
and the idea to reflect it.
What matters for our purpose here is not
so much the different viewpoints when
drawing inferences from the facts of Malay
history by the scholars (e.g., “Malay world”
versus “sultanate world” debate), but more
importantly, the historical consciousness
emerging from that history. The modern
Malay historical consciousness as expressed
by the advocates of Melayu Raya takes the
history of the kingdoms of Srivijaya (AD
650–1377), Majapahit (AD 1293–1527), and
Melaka (AD 1400–1511) as its source of refer-
ence and inspiration (Ibrahim Yaakob 1957,
Burhanuddin Al-Helmy [1946] 2000). Admit-
tedly there are still many gaps in Malay/
Malaya’s historiography, including the ques-
tion of the connectivity between the Malays
Revisiting Malaya 13
of the Melaka era with the early Malayu
[sic] and the pre-Melaka kingdoms (Milner
2011). However, the fact remains that
modern Malay consciousness emerging in
the early twentieth century takes these as
given, arguing the existence of a “cultural
zone” of the Malay world and civilization
in Southeast Asia, and that Malay kingdoms
had been built within such a zone. During
different periods of the long history of these
kingdoms, there had been attempts by
some of the more visionary leaders, the
empire builders, who sought to unify parts
of the Malay world into one big empire, but
with limited success due to geography, and
more significantly the onslaught of Western
colonial wars and conquests (Abdul
Rahman 2006, 46–47). The Anglo-Dutch
Treaty of 1824, an agreement that carved
out spheres of influence between the then
two most powerful colonial powers, the
British and the Dutch, effectively sealed the
fate of the region from the potentials of
being unified. It was this agreement that
cemented what later became permanent pol-
itical borders between Indonesia and Malay-
sia—setting them on their separate trajectory
to become two different sovereign countries
after the Second World War.
Our proposition thus far can be summed
up as follows: the Malay world was a histori-
cal reality and Melayu Raya as an idea had
evolved as part of the Malay historical con-
sciousness, an idea that underpins the envi-
sioning of the Malay nation-of-intent
mainly to reconnect the two territories—
Malaya and Indonesia—that had been separ-
ated by the British and the Dutch through the
1824 Anglo-Dutch Treaty. Based on this his-
torical perspective, migratory moves within
the territories of the Malay world before the
drawing up of modern state boundaries
were normal or natural movements of
peoples within the same cultural zone, and
that the migrants were not perceived as
“foreigners.” It would, therefore, be ahistori-
cal if one were to argue—as some scholars do
—that the advocates of Melayu Raya
advanced this concept in order to give legiti-
macy to their “immigrant” status among
Peninsular Malays. Indeed, such a view of
14 Abdul Rahman Embong
the region’s history and its key actors is
rather parochial and short-termist, contrary
to the longue duree perspective required for
a comprehensive understanding of the
region’s historical evolution.
Post-Second World War and envisioning
the nation
It has been said that the two world wars that
erupted in the twentieth century have been
instrumental in ending an old era, and usher-
ing in a new one. In many ways, this is true.
The First World War (1914-1918)—whose
centenary was commemorated in 2014—
saw the collapse of the Ottoman empire,
the Habsburg empire, and tsarist Russia, as
well as the economic ruins of Europe on the
one hand, and the rise of the United States
to eventually become the most powerful
nation on earth, ushering in the American
century. It also saw the birth of the first
socialist republic, the Soviet Union, the
birth and/or expansion of communist
parties in some countries, the stirrings of
nationalism and the emergence of indepen-
dence struggles in the colonies, as well as
the emergence of several new nation states
such as modern Turkey.
For Southeast Asia, however, the pivotal
change was the Second World War or rather
the Pacific War (1941–1945). The British igno-
minious defeat in Malaya at the hands of the
Japanese fascists in February 1942, together
with the defeat of the Dutch in Indonesia
and the French in Indochina, shattered the
centuries-old myth of European invincibility
and “White Man’s superiority.” It also gave
the confidence that Asians could rise up
and take the destiny in their own hands. It
was this inspiration and strategic thinking
that led to nationalists in Indonesia such as
Soekarno and Hatta, and those in Malaya
such as Ibrahim Yaakob, Mustapha Hussein
and Burhanuddin Al-Helmy (who had
earlier set up the radical union Kesatuan
Melayu Muda in 1937) to seize the opportu-
nity in advancing the independence struggle
by tactically aligning themselves with Japan
to fight the Dutch and the British for national
independence.4 Their position was contrary
to the stand of the Allied Forces who
wanted various forces to rally behind a
Western-led anti-fascist international united
front. The collapse of the European colonial
powers in Southeast Asia at the beginning
of the Second World War and the opportu-
nity provided by an initially triumphant
Japan became the impetus for Ibrahim
Yaakob and his comrades to work towards
the establishment of an independent
Malaya together with Indonesia under the
Melayu Raya/Indonesia Raya framework.
The outcome, however, is already too well
known. The plan failed to materialize due
to the sudden fall of Japan because of the
US bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
leaving Indonesia to declare independence
on its own on August 17, 1945, and the
British re-occupying Malaya two weeks
later. Ibrahim Yaakob and some of his com-
rades escaped to Indonesia to continue the
struggle from there.
Nevertheless, the anti-colonial and
nationalist tide could not be reversed.
Malaya then was a country in motion and
on the cusp of change. The political land-
scape had been transformed tremendously
and the spirit of anti-colonialism and for
independence was thick in the air.
However, there were different articulations
and envisioning of the nation by different
segments and forces in society, and also by
the British colonial masters in Malaya and
in London.
Some of the urgent questions that had to
be resolved after the war in the struggle for
independence relate to the form of the new
state and citizenship. Would the state be a
Union or a Federation? A monarchy or a
republic? Would it be a democracy, and if
so, what type of democracy? What about
the question of citizenship of the emerging
independent state? On the Peninsula, with
the existence of nine Malay kingdoms with
their own rulers, and extant state parochial-
ism, the Malayan Union concept engineered
by the British immediately after the war
whereby the Malay states and the Straits
Settlements would become a union directly
under the British Crown in London would
be doomed to failure—as it did—due to

massive Malay opposition. The concept was
too drastic as it would remove whatever
little power the sultans may still have. The
struggle against the “Malayan Union” gave
birth to the United Malays National Organis-
ation (UMNO) in May 1946, with the rallying
cry—not for “Merdeka”—but “Hidup Melayu”
(Long Live the Malays!) as the Malayan
Union was seen as a threat to the Malays.
At the same time, a “republic” as
initially envisaged by the Communist Party
of Malaya at its founding on April 30, 1930
was too alien and would be impossible. A
centralized federation of the Malay states
together with the Straits Settlements—Feder-
ated Malay States (FMS), Unfederated Malay
States (UFMS) and the Straits Settlements
(SS)—and the establishment of a consti-
tutional monarchy and parliamentary
democracy along the lines of the Westmin-
ster model would seem plausible. But what
kind of federation should it be to replace
the Malayan Union? There was intense
debate and mass participation on this
subject between the elite-driven UMNO
and the British on the one hand, versus the
mass-based coalition of Pusat Tenaga
Rakyat (Centre of People’s Forces) and the
All-Malaya Council of Joint Action
(PUTERA-AMCJA) on the other. The Federa-
tion of Malaya constitutional proposals that
became the basis for the Federation of
Malaya Agreement in 1948 and later 1957,
was formulated during the British–Malay
Conference of UMNO and representatives
of Malay rulers between June and December
1946. The Federation of Malaya Agreement
came into effect on February 1, 1948, estab-
lishing a Malayan Federation without
Singapore.
But there was another vision of the
nation and state, that is, the “People’s Consti-
tutional Proposals” formulated by PUTERA-
AMCJA in December 1946 and early 1947 as
an alternative to the British-UMNO consti-
tutional proposals. Although there were
some points of convergence between the
Federation of Malaya Proposals and the
People’s Constitutional Proposals namely
with regard to the position of the Malay
rulers, Malay language, religion and
Revisiting Malaya 15
customs, there were sharp fundamental
differences. While in the British-UMNO
initiated Federation of Malaya Proposals,
Singapore was left out of the Federation, in
the People’s Constitutional Proposals Singa-
pore was included as an integral and indivi-
sible part of the Federation of Malaya.5
Why did the British deliberately leave
Singapore out of the Federation in their pro-
posal? The oft-quoted reason was the
increase in Chinese demography that
would upset the Malays. While this was
true, there were other strategic consider-
ations on the part of the British with regard
to Singapore’s role in protecting their inter-
ests in the region. According to Wade
(2009, 10), as the British were planning to
withdraw from India and Burma, they were
not willing to give up their economic and
security interests in Southeast Asia. Their
strategic plan was to retain Singapore
directly under the British crown so it would
serve as “the main centre of British interests
and influence” in Southeast Asia. Thus,
here again, we see it was the strategic inter-
ests of the Western colonial powers that led
to the dismembering of the country that his-
torically used to be one, something that was
opposed by the PUTERA-AMCJA.
The question of citizenship too was not
only critical but complex. Besides the
history of the region as discussed above, we
have to take note of the kerajaan world in
which the rakyat (people) were subjects of
the Malay rulers.6 On the question of citizen-
ship, there was something novel in the
People’s Constitutional Proposals. In
Section 2, it states that “This citizenship
shall be a nationality, to be termed ‘Melayu,’
and shall carry with it the duty of allegiance
to the Federation of Malaya,” but it assures
that “the term ‘Melayu’ shall have no reli-
gious implications whatever.”7 Commenting
on this issue, Milner and Ting (2014, 34)
point put that “The term ‘Melayu’ had been
given a very broad definition—in fact, an
assurance was given that no religious or
assimilative implications would be attached
to the ‘Melayu’ nationality, except for the
effort to learn simple conversational
Malay.” To them, the term “Melayu” has
16 Abdul Rahman Embong
been “elastic, like how the Thais under
Phibun had been defined … The idea of a
‘Melayu’ incorporating Chinese was even
more ambitious—especially in light of the
Malay-Chinese contest in the Malayan
Union period, and not surprisingly aroused
strong opposition” (Milner and Ting 2014,
34).
The Federation of Malaya constitution
guarantees the rights and special position of
the Malays as well as rights, powers and
sovereignty of the Malay rulers in their
respective states. But how was “Melayu” or
Malays defined? It is here the fundamental
difference lies. The concept of “Melayu” in
the People’s Constitutional Proposals was
fundamentally different from the concept of
“Melayu” (Malay) as envisaged in the Fed-
eration of Malaya Agreement and eventually
in the Federation of Malaya Constitution. In
Article 160 of the Federation of Malaya Con-
stitution, “Malay” (Melayu) is defined as
someone who (1) professes to be a Muslim,
habitually speaks the Malay language and
adheres to Malay customs, and (2) (a) is dom-
iciled in the Federation or Singapore on
Merdeka Day, (b) born in the Federation or
Singapore before Merdeka Day, or (c) born
before Merdeka Day of parents one of
whom was born in the Federation or Singa-
pore, (collectively, the “Merdeka Day popu-
lation”) or is a descendent of a member of
the Merdeka Day population. While the
concept “Melayu” (Malays) in the Federation
of Malaya constitution emphasizes religion,
language and culture as markers of identity,
the People’s Constitutional Proposals were
more open and inclusive by defining
“Melayu” in terms of allegiance to and accep-
tance of the land, Malaya, which was their
object of loyalty. In short there would be
equal treatment to all citizens of Malaya
because the term “Melayu” was a political
concept, an open and inclusive one, and did
not carry any ethnic or religious connota-
tions. As some scholars put it, “the fact that
such an inclusive ‘Melayu’ proposal was
made at all is a reminder that the term
carries a history of openness, and one that
may just possibly be relevant again in
future societal planning in Malaysia”
(Milner and Ting 2014, 34). The emphasis
here is, of course, the question of openness
and inclusivity—i.e., a culture of pluralist
acceptance of the other.8
Competing models of consultation and
engagement: British-UMNO
Constitutional Working Committee
versus PUTERA-AMCJA united front
The different envisionings of the nation in the
post-Second World War period as explained
above were advanced via competing models
of consultations and engagement. One, the
British top-down approach began with the
Malayan Union Order in Council, April
1946, which was roundly opposed and
rejected. Following its rejection and withdra-
wal, the British announced the setting up of a
12-member Constitutional Working Com-
mittee composed of six representatives of
the Malayan Union Government, four repre-
sentatives of the Malay rulers, and two
UMNO representatives (Wade 2009, 9) to
draw up a new set of Constitutional Propo-
sals for Malaya to replace the Malayan
Union. The Constitutional Working Commit-
tee sat for several months from June 1946,
and published its constitutional proposals
on December 24 that year. As can be seen,
representatives from the Malay Nationalist
Party (MNP) (or Parti Kebangsaan Melayu
Malaya—PKMM in Malay) (see below),
which had pulled out of UMNO in June
1946, and other organizations were not
included in the Committee.
When the Working Committee’s propo-
sals were criticized as there were no public
inputs outside the 12-member Committee
and their deliberations were behind closed
doors, the British responded by setting up a
Consultative Committee headed by R.H.
Cheeseman, the Director of Education, to
collect views from “interested individuals,
communities and groups in Malaya on the
Constitutional Proposals.” This criterion
was criticized further by PUTERA-AMCJA
who argued that “Interested individuals,
communities and groups” was a different
principle compared with the more stringent
criterion advocated by PUTERA-AMCJA,

that is, “representatives of those and only
those, who regard Malaya as their real
home and as the object of their loyalty”
(PUTERA-AMCJA [1947] 2005, 8).
The PUTERA-AMCJA approach of con-
sultation and engagement was more bottom
up, which consisted of attempts at forging
unity of various ethnic and religious
groups, between gender, and very impor-
tantly between various classes namely pea-
sants and workers who constituted the
backbone of the pre-Merdeka Malayan
society. This was something unprecedented
in the country’s history. The coalition of
these anti-colonial forces was a clear
example of such broad-based cooperation
and unity. Prior to its formation, Parti
Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (PKMM [Malay
Nationalist Party]) was set up in October
1945, as a nationalist party which partially
inherited the mantle of the pre-war KMM,
to fight for Malaya’s independence, while
still upholding the idea of Melayu Raya. A
number of patriotic Malay organizations
representing the youth, women, peasants,
Muslim religious groups, and others also
came to be formed, and were subsequently
affiliated directly or indirectly with PKMM.
As part of the campaign to oppose the
British-initiated Constitutional Proposals
and to further struggle for independence,
Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (PUTERA [Centre for
People’s Forces]) was formed on February
22, 1947. PUTERA was chaired by Dr. Burha-
nuddin Al-Helmy and consisted of PKMM,
the youth movement Angkatan Pemuda
Insaf (API), peasant movement Barisan Tani
Malaya, women’s movement Angkatan
Wanita Sedar (AWAS), and 80 other
smaller organizations. Based on its own
reporting, it claimed a total membership of
about 150,000 (PUTERA-AMCJA [1947]
2005, 5).
PUTERA’s partner, the All-Malaya
Council of Joint Action (AMCJA) was inau-
gurated on December 22, 1946, two days
before the public announcement of the Con-
stitutional Proposals by the Working Com-
mittee. AMCJA was a federation of political
parties, trade unions, women’s associations
and youth organizations. The main
Revisiting Malaya 17
organizations in AMCJA were the Malayan
Democratic Union (which served as Sec-
retary to AMCJA), the Malayan Indian Con-
gress (MIC), the Malayan New Democratic
Youth League, the 12 Women’s Federations
in Malaya, the Malayan People’s Anti-Japa-
nese Ex-Service Comrades Association, and
the 300,000 strong Pan-Malayan Federation
of Trade Unions (PMFTU). The total
number of members of all organizations
under the umbrella of the AMCJA, according
to their own account, was about 400,000,
with Mr. Tan Cheng Lock as its chairman
(PUTERA-AMCJA [1947] 2005, 4–5).9
The PUTERA-AMCJA coalition, which
came into force in February 1947, had a
mass strength of about 600,000, a large
number in a small population of about 4.9
million then. Their alternative proposals to
the Working Committee’s constitutional pro-
posals were formulated based on broad-
based consultations. As history has shown,
PUTERA-AMCJA was able to mobilize
massive rallies throughout the length and
breadth of the country including in Singa-
pore against British colonialism and advan-
cing the independence struggle. It also
staged a successful nation-wide Hartal
(otherwise known as All Malaya Hartal) on
October 20, 1947 to coincide with the
opening of the British Parliament where the
Revised Constitutional Proposals were due
to be debated (PUTERA-AMCJA [1947]
2005; Khoong 2003).
Based on the short analysis above, we
can synthesize the historic significance of
the PUTERA-AMCJA coalition and model
of consultation thus:
(a) the inter-ethnic coalition was unprece-
dented in the country’s history,
showing the formula for future inter-
ethnic unity and cooperation;
(b) it was also an inclusive multi-stake
holder coalition with various social
forces included—workers, peasants,
women, youth, intellectuals, business-
men, etc. throughout the country;
(c) it was a coalition of organizations that
came together on the basis of shared
principles and democratic consultations,
18 Abdul Rahman Embong
guided by the spirit of mutual respect
and compromise, and acceptance was
the key to the success of negotiations
and cooperation; and
(d) it was a coalition with an imagined
nation which they also conceptualized
in some detail through the People’s
Constitutional Proposals—an envision-
ing of the nation “from below” that
had to compete with the top-down
envisioning that was proposed
through the British-initiated Consti-
tutional Working Committee
proposals.
Of course, with the benefit of hindsight,
there were important questions that could
be raised and important lessons that could
be derived from this historical experience.
For example: was the PUTERA-AMCJA
coalition deeply grounded? Was there an
element of triumphalism and over-esti-
mation on the part of the PUTERA-AMCJA
of its own strength and underestimation of
the British would-be response when these
two different models and proposals came to
a head on collision? What about the ideas
in the People’s Constitutional Proposals vis-
à-vis the Working Committee’s Proposals?
Did the PUTERA-AMCJA under-estimate
the divisive potency of the “ethnic para-
digm” and place too much hope and confi-
dence in the viability of the “class
paradigm”?10 These and other questions are
for further reflection and will not be dealt
with in this article. What we want to high-
light is the British response, which changed
the entire historical landscape of Malaya.
The British responded by using a compre-
hensive two-pronged strategy: first, it insti-
tuted the British-Malay Rulers-UMNO
envisioning of the new nation through their
constitutional proposals and the institution
of the Federation of Malaya Agreement on
February 1, 1948; second, they used force
by declaring the state of Emergency in June
that year accompanied by mass arrests and
the launch of a full-scale war against the
anti-colonial forces under the guise of the
“Emergency.” The PUTER-AMCJA united
front and the organizations in the coalition
were banned, thus putting an end to the
mass-based multi-stakeholder coalition, and
to some extent the ideas associated with it.
Many of its leaders and members were
arrested, but many also escaped to the
jungle to join the CPM-led guerrilla
struggle. Not a few national leaders, such
as Burhanuddin, and many local leaders
left for Singapore to continue the struggle
there.
However, some who were not arrested
such as Tan Cheng Lock, formed the
Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) in
1949 to mobilize local Chinese. In 1949, the
Communities Liaison Committee (CLC)
was formed at the initiative of Sir Malcolm
MacDonald, the British Commissioner
General for Southeast Asia, to find solutions
to existing racial problems. The committee,
comprising Dato’ Onn bin Jaafar (leader of
UMNO), Tan Cheng Lock, E.E.C Thuraising-
ham and 12 other members proposed that
non-Malays be involved in local politics
and more opportunities be given to the
Malays in the business and industrial
sectors. In addition, issues of citizenship
were discussed, namely citizenship based
on jus soli for non-Malays and special rights
for Malays. This was the post-Emergency
situation of inter-ethnic bargaining facili-
tated by the British. The rest is history.
By way of conclusion
This article is a modest attempt at re-examin-
ing some critical issues of Malayan history
that had shaped the basic character of the
nation, namely the political and historical
thoughts and the competing ideas in the
envisioning of the nation, their evolution as
well as their fate prior to Malaya’s indepen-
dence. The ideas that triumphed were those
that were supported and enforced by
power, while ideas that perished or sidelined
were those opposed and suppressed includ-
ing by force. However, some ideas do not
simply die, but rather recede or fade away.
Hence, despite almost six decades of inde-
pendence, some of these ideas from the
misty past keep coming back, resonating

with some aspects of the present envisioning
of Malaysia’s future. While we should
acknowledge that ideas are historically con-
tingent as cautioned by Skinner (1969),11 a
good grasp of the pre-independence debate,
contest of ideas and praxis, not only can
throw some light on contemporary develop-
ments, but also raise pertinent points for con-
sideration and reflection in today’s nation-
building and engagement with globalization
in the twenty-first century.
It is true that “history is very much a pol-
itical battleground” (Hong 1996, 51) as it is a
construction, written and institutionalised
especially by those with power or sanctioned
by power. The dominant history has been
written by the victors about their leaders,
ideas, actions and glories, while history of
the losers has either been maligned, dis-
torted, buried or forgotten. However, with
the rising awareness regarding the signifi-
cance of alternative histories including
people’s history, it is necessary to re-
examine or revisit certain historical periods
and questions that have been pivotal in
shaping the course of a people or nation.
In this article, we have adopted the
history of ideas approach by examining
some of the key ideas and practices that
had been advanced during various periods
under study. The history of ideas approach
requires what some scholars suggest a kind
of “hermeneutic retrieval” (Milner, Abdul
Rahman, and Tham et al. 2014, 14), especially
when examining those ideas that have been
maligned or suppressed, and have been rele-
gated as “irrelevant narratives” in conven-
tional history or political texts. This
methodology is useful to bring to the fore
or to re-surface those ideas that had been
debated in history, and to critically re-
examine them in a fresh light. While examin-
ing the history of ideas, it is also very crucial
to undertake an examination of the role of
agency especially on the part of the forces
fighting against colonialism and for indepen-
dence and those forces they were up against
during that period. This is in keeping with
what Collingwood suggests, that to know
history, we need to emphasize “the internals
of history”—the thoughts of the human
Revisiting Malaya 19
makers of history, by grasping and re-living
the thoughts of the makers of history (Col-
lingwood 1946, 305).
Notes
1. The question of political and historical thoughts
was the theme of the “Revisiting Malaya: Inter-
national Conference on Political and Historical
Thoughts” organized by the Inter-Asia School-
Modern Asian Thought Project (Singapore &
Malaysia Office), and co-organized by the
Center for Chinese Malaysian Studies and the
KL & Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall in Kuala
Lumpur, August 2–3, 2014.
2. The concept of ‘envisioning the nation’ was
earlier used by Cheah Boon Kheng (2007) in a
volume edited by Abdul Rahman Embong (2007).
3. History shows that Sri Vijaya which centred in
Palembang for a few centuries since the seventh
century had its rule extending beyond Sumatra
into the Malay Peninsula. The Melaka sultanate
in the fifteenth century also extended its rule
over a large part of the Malay Peninsula and
parts of Sumatra.
4. In India, the Indian National Army (INA) led by
Subhas Chandra Bose also took the same position.
The position against Western colonial powers
taken during the Second World War mentioned
above was not surprising as many in Indonesia
and Malaya supported the Ottoman Empire
against Britain and her allies in the First World
War.
5. For a brief comparison of the two proposals, see
Appendices 1, 2 and 3.
6. For a discussion of the transformation of the
concept of rakyat (people) from the old paradigm
of the kerajaan to that of modern citizens, please
see Abdul Rahman (2014) and Milner (1982) on
the kerajaan. Also see Ariffin (1993), which dis-
cusses the question of rakyat from another
perspective.
7. The PUTERA-AMCJA document explains that
the term “Melayu” was “unanimously accepted
… in preference of the term ‘Malay’ in view of
the fact that the historic name of the indigenous
people is ‘Melayu’ and not ‘Malay’ which is
merely the anglicized version of the term
‘Melayu’” (PUTERA-AMCJA [1947] 2005, 30–31).
8. I have argued elsewhere that this culture of public
acceptance of others by Malays was “ancient, pre-
dating colonialism” and that “many Southeast
Asian coastal and riverine societies (e.g. the
Melaka Sultanate of the fifteenth century) that
became plural in character during the colonial
period, or saw the degree of pluralism increase,
did so with little social trauma or opposition. …
20 Abdul Rahman Embong
The acceptance of the Other, who came as traders,
travellers, religious preachers, and so on, from
Arabia, Indian, China, and other parts of the
Malay archipelago … became something rather
natural, as part and parcel of the public culture
of the indigenous people, reflecting the fact that
the Malay society then was … relatively open
and accommodative, not exclusivist” (Abdul
Rahman 2002, 40), and that this culture prevailed
in the PUTERA-AMCJA negotiations and
cooperation.
9. The Communist Party of Malaya, while support-
ing the principles of PUTERA-AMCJA, was not
part of the coalition.
10. On this issue, see Milner, Abdul Rahman, and
Tham (2014).
11. Skinner (1969) cautions about supposedly “time-
less questions” as there is the element of contin-
gency in ideas. “A knowledge of the history of
such ideas can then serve to show the extent to
which those features of our own arrangements
which we may be disposed to accept as traditional
or even ‘timeless’ truths may in fact be the merest
contingencies of our peculiar history and social
structure. To discover from the history of
thought that there is in fact no such timeless con-
cepts, but only the various different concepts that
have gone with various different societies, is to
discover a general truth not merely about the
past but about ourselves as well. Furthermore, it
is a commonplace—we are all Marxists to this
extent—that our own society places unrecognized
constraints upon our imaginations” (Skinner
1969, 53). “To demand from the history of
thought a solution to our immediate problems is
thus to commit not merely a methodological
fallacy, but something like a moral error. But to
learn from the past—and we cannot
otherwise learn it at all—the distinction between
what is necessary and what is the product
merely of our own contingent arrangements, is
to learn the key to self-awareness itself”
(Skinner 1969, 53).
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Author’s biography
Abdul Rahman Embong, PhD, a development sociol-
ogist, is emeritus professor and principal research
fellow at the Institute of Malaysian and International
Studies (IKMAS), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.
His research focus is on development, middle class,
nation-state and globalization. He has written many
books, including State-led Modernization and the New
Middle Class in Malaysia (2002); The Nation-state:
Processes and Debates (in Malay) (2006); Globalisation,
Culture and Inequalities: In Honour of the Late
Ishak Shari (ed. 2004), and Transforming Malaysia:
Dominant and Competing Paradigms (ed. with
Anthony Milner and Tham Siew Yean, 2014). He
was President of the Malaysian Social Science Associ-
ation (2000–2010), and is currently the Association’s
Advisor.
Contact address: Institute of Malaysian and Inter-
national Studies (IKMAS), Universiti Kebangsaan
Revisiting Malaya 21
Malaysia, 43600 UKM Bangi, Selangor, Malaysia.
Email: rahmanhe@ukm.edu.my
Appendix 1: Recommendations by the
Constitutional Working Committee
(Announced on December 24, 1946).
1. A Federation of Malaya to replace the
Malayan Union. To comprise nine Penin-
sular Malay states together with Penang
and Malacca.
2. A central government comprising a High
Commissioner, a Federal Executive
Council and a Federal Legislative
Council.
3. In each Malay state the Government shall
comprise the ruler assisted by a State
Executive Council and a Council of State
with legislative powers. In each of the
Straits Settlements, there will be a Settle-
ment Council with legislative powers.
4. There will be a Conference of Rulers to
consult with each other and with the
High Commissioner on state and
federal issues.
5. Defence and external matters will be
under British control.
6. Rulers would undertake to accept the
advice of the High Commissioner in all
matters relating to government, but
would exclude matters relating to Islam
and Malay customs.
7. Proposed that the Legislative Council
comprise the High Commissioner, three
ex-officio members, 11 official members,
34 unofficial members including heads
of government in the nine states and
two settlements and 23 seats for repre-
sentatives of industries, etc.
8. UMNO and Sultans would agree to this
only following the scrapping of the Mac-
Michael treaties.
A key element of the proposals was
that relating to citizenship. A new
Malayan citizenship—which was not to
be a nationality—was proposed in the
Federation plan. This was an addition
to nationality and the committee
explained it as a possible qualification
for electoral rights, membership of
Council, or other privileges and
22 Abdul Rahman Embong

obligations. Federal citizenship would be constitutional rulers, accepting the

acquired by: (1) any subject of the ruler of
any state. This included all Malays and
excluded all non-Malays; (2) British sub-
jects born locally; (3) children of fathers
who were federal citizens. (Source:
Wade 2009, 9)
Appendix 2: Summary of PUTERA-
AMCJA Constitutional Proposals
Presented as an alternative to the proposals
by the Constitutional Working Committee
(source: PUTERA-AMCJA [1947] 2005, 4-5).
1. A United Malaya, inclusive of
Singapore.
2. A fully-elected central legislature for
the whole of Malaya.
3. Equal political rights for all who regard
Malaya as their real home and the
object of their loyalty.
4. The Malay Sultans to assume the pos-
ition of fully sovereign and
advice, not of British “adviser’ but of
the people through democratic
institutions.
5. Matters of the Muslim religion and
Malay customs to be under the sole
control of the Malays.
6. Special attention to be paid to the
advancement of the Malays.
7. Malay should be the official language of
the country.
8. Foreign Affairs and Defence of the
country should be the joint responsibil-
ity of the government of Malaya and
His Majesty’s Government.
9. The term “Melayu” should be the title
of any citizenship or national status in
Malaya.
10. The national flag of the country should
incorporate the Malay national colours.
Appendix 3: Summary of People’s
Constitutional Proposals and Revised
Constitutional Proposals

People’s Constitutional Proposals Revised Constitutional Proposals

A united Malaya including Singapore
A popularly elected Central Government and An appointed Executive Council headed by a
popularly elected State councils
A citizenship granting equal rights to all who Birth qualifications, language test, and long
made Malaya their permanent home and
the object of their undivided loyalty
Malay Rulers to have real sovereign power
responsible to the people through
popularly elected Councils
Malay customs and religion to be fully
controlled by the Malay people through
special councils
A federation of the Malay states and the
former Straits Settlements excluding
Singapore
British High Commissioner in Malaya and
an appointed Federal Legislative Council
of 50 unofficial members, 14 official
members and 11 free members (the
Menteri Besar of the nine Malay states and
one representative each from Penang and
Malacca).
residential terms imposed, effectively
restricting the access to citizenship of
domiciled non-Malays
Malay Rulers recognized as sovereign
monarchs with inherent prerogatives,
powers and privileges
Malay customs and religion placed within
the sole jurisdiction of the Malay Rulers

(Continued)

Appendix 3. Continued
Special provisions for the advancement of the Special provisions for the advancement of the
Malays politically, economically and
educationally
Malay to be the official language
A national flag and anthem
Melayu to be the title of any proposed
citizenship and nationality in Malaya
Foreign affairs and defence to be the joint
responsibility of the government of Malaya
and the government of Great Britain
A Council of Races to be set up to block any No such provisions were provided for
discriminatory legislation that is based on
ethnicity or religion
Anglo-Malay sovereignty entrenched with
the provision of a Conference of Rulers
consisting of the Malay rulers presided
over by the British High Commissioner,
and a 55% reservation of Malay
representation in the Federal legislature for
the first 3 terms
(Source: Wikipedia contributors 2014.)
Revisiting Malaya 23
Malays politically, economically and
educationally
Malay recognized as an official language
together with English
A national flag was adopted with no
provisions for a national anthem
No provisions for a Malayan nationality was
adopted
All portfolios remained within the
prerogative of the British High
Commissioner and the government of
Great Britain
A Conference of Rulers was formalized.
Ethnic representation in the Federal
Legislative Council was set with no
provisions for an elected legislature
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